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GAO_GAO-15-636T	{ "title": [ "Background", "Our Preliminary Observations Indicate That EPA’s Procedures for Processing Congressional Requests to the SAB Do Not Ensure Compliance with ERDDAA", "CASAC Has Provided Certain Types of Advice Related to Air Quality Standards", "GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The SAB provides a mechanism for EPA to receive peer review and other advice in the use of science at EPA. The SAB is authorized to, among other things, review the adequacy of the scientific and technical basis of EPA’s proposed regulations. The SAB and its subcommittees or panels focus on a formal set of charge questions on environmental science received from the agency. Depending on the nature of the agency’s request, the entire advisory process from the initial discussion on charge questions with EPA offices and regions to the delivery of the final SAB report generally takes from 4 to 12 months.\nUnder the Clean Air Act, air quality criteria must accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare, which may be expected from the presence of certain air pollutants in the ambient air. economic, or energy effects that may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS. CASAC’s advisory process is similar to the SAB’s process, including the option of establishing subcommittees and panels that send their reports and recommendations to CASAC.\nAs federal advisory committees, the SAB and CASAC are subject to FACA, which broadly requires balance, independence, and transparency. FACA was enacted, in part, out of concern that certain special interests had too much influence over federal agency decision makers. The head of each agency that uses federal advisory committees is responsible for exercising certain controls over those advisory committees. For example, the agency head is responsible for establishing administrative guidelines and management controls that apply to all of the agency’s advisory committees, and for appointing a Designated Federal Officer (DFO) for each advisory committee. Advisory committee meetings may not occur in the absence of the DFO, who is also responsible for calling meetings, approving meeting agendas, and adjourning meetings. As required by FACA, the SAB and CASAC operate under charters that include information on their objectives, scope of activities, and the officials to whom they report. Federal advisory committee charters must be renewed every 2 years, but they can be revised before they are due for renewal in consultation with the General Services Administration (GSA).\nUnlike CASAC, which was established by amendments to the Clean Air Act, the SAB was established under ERDDAA, and since 1980, has been required to provide scientific advice to designated congressional committees when requested. According to SAB staff office officials, until recently, the SAB has responded to general congressional questions and concerns. However, in 2013, representatives of a congressional committee formally requested advice from the SAB regarding two reviews the SAB was conducting. According to EPA officials, this was the first time representatives of a congressional committee formally requested advice from the SAB. Both requests were addressed and submitted directly to the SAB Chair and the Chair of the relevant SAB panel and sent concurrently to the SAB staff office and EPA Administrator. While ERDDAA does not specify a role for EPA in mediating responses from the SAB to the designated congressional committees, EPA identifies such a role for itself under FACA. Specifically, EPA points to the DFO’s responsibility to manage the agenda of an advisory committee. Also, under FACA, EPA is responsible for issuing and implementing controls applicable to its advisory committees. Responses to the committee’s requests for scientific advice were handled by the SAB staff office and EPA’s OCIR. The SAB staff office and, later, OCIR responded to the committee’s first request for advice, and OCIR responded to the committee’s second request for advice. See table 1 for more information on these requests.", "Our preliminary observations indicate that EPA’s procedures for processing congressional requests for scientific advice from the SAB do not ensure compliance with ERDDAA because the procedures are incomplete and do not fully account for the statutory access designated congressional committees have to the SAB. Specifically, EPA policy documents do not clearly outline how the EPA Administrator, the SAB staff office, and members of the SAB panel are to handle a congressional committee’s request for advice from the SAB. In addition, EPA policy documents do not acknowledge that the SAB must provide scientific advice when requested by select congressional committees.\nEPA’s written procedures for processing congressional committee requests to the SAB are found in the SAB charter and in the following two documents that establish general policies for how EPA’s federal advisory committees are to interact with outside parties:\nEPA Policy Regarding Communication Between Members of Federal Advisory Committee Act Committees and Parties Outside of the EPA (the April 2014 policy), and\nClarifying EPA Policy Regarding Communications Between Members of Scientific and Technical Federal Advisory Committees and Outside Parties (the November 2014 policy clarification).\nCollectively, the SAB’s charter, EPA’s April 2014 policy, and EPA’s November 2014 policy clarification provide direction for how EPA and the SAB are to process requests from congressional committees. However, these documents do not clearly outline procedures for the EPA Administrator, the SAB staff office, and members of the SAB panel to use in processing such requests.\nAt the time of the House committee’s two requests to the SAB in 2013, the SAB charter was the only EPA document that contained written policy relating to congressional committee requests under ERDDAA. The SAB charter briefly noted how congressional committees could access SAB advice, stating; “While the SAB reports to the EPA Administrator, congressional committees specified in ERDDAA may ask the EPA Administrator to have SAB provide advice on a particular issue.” (GAO italics) Beyond what the charter states, however, no EPA policy specified a process the Administrator should use to have the SAB review a congressional request and provide advice.\nIn response to a request from the SAB staff office that EPA clarify the procedures for handling congressional committee requests, EPA, through an April 4, 2014, memorandum informed the SAB that committee members themselves and the federal advisory committees as a whole should refrain from directly responding to these external requests. Attached to the memorandum was the April 2014 policy that stated: “if a FACA committee member receives a request relating to the committee’s work from members of Congress or their staff, or congressional committees, the member should notify the DFO, who will refer the request to the EPA OCIR. OCIR will determine the agency’s response to the inquiry, after consulting with the relevant program office and the DFO.” This policy, however, did not provide more specific details on processing requests from congressional committees under ERDDAA.\nIn November 2014, EPA issued a clarification to the April 2014 policy, specifying that SAB members who receive congressional requests pursuant to ERDDAA should acknowledge receipt of the request and indicate that EPA will provide a response. The November 2014 policy clarification does not identify the SAB as having to provide the response. The November 2014 policy clarification also stated that the request should be forwarded to the appropriate DFO and that decisions on who and how best to respond to the requests would be made by EPA on a case-by-case basis. While the November 2014 policy clarification provides greater specificity about processing requests, it is not consistent with the SAB charter because the policy indicates that congressional committee requests should be handled through the DFO, whereas the charter indicates that they should be handled through the EPA Administrator and provides no further information. A senior EPA official stated that the agency considered that the charter and the November 2014 policy clarification differed in the level of detail, but not in the broad principle that the agency is the point of contact for congressional requests to the SAB (and SAB responses to those requests). However, under the agencies are to clearly document federal standards of internal control,internal controls and the documentation is to appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. While EPA has documented its policies, they are not clear because the charter and the November 2014 policy clarification are not consistent about which office should process congressional requests. Agency officials said that the SAB charter is up for renewal in 2015. By modifying the charter when it is renewed to reflect the language in the November 2014 policy clarification—that congressional requests should be forwarded to the appropriate DFO—EPA can better ensure that its staff process congressional committee requests consistently when the agency receives such a request.\nMoreover, neither the April 2014 policy nor the November 2014 policy clarification clearly documents EPA’s procedures for reviewing congressional committee requests to determine which questions would be taken up by the SAB, consistent with the federal standards of internal control. Because EPA’s procedures for reviewing congressional committee requests are not documented, it will be difficult for EPA to provide reasonable assurance that its staff is appropriately applying criteria when determining which questions the SAB will address. EPA officials told us that internal deliberations in response to a congressional request follow those that the agency would apply to internal requests for charges to the SAB. Specifically, officials told us that EPA considers whether the questions are science or policy driven, whether they are important to science and the agency, and whether the SAB has already undertaken a similar review. However, these criteria are not documented. In addition, under ERDDAA, the SAB is required to provide requested scientific advice to select committees, regardless of EPA’s judgment. As EPA has not fully responded to the committee’s two 2013 requests to the SAB, by clearly documenting its procedures for reviewing congressional requests to determine which questions should be taken up by the SAB and criteria for evaluating requests, the agency can provide reasonable assurance that its staff process these and other congressional committee requests consistently and in accordance with both FACA and ERDDAA.\nFurthermore, the charter states that, when scientific advice is requested by one of the committees specified in ERDDAA, the Administrator will, when appropriate, forward the SAB’s advice to the requesting congressional committee. Neither the charter nor the April 2014 policy and November 2014 policy clarification specify when it would be “appropriate” for the EPA Administrator to forward the SAB’s advice to the requesting committee. Such specificity would be consistent with federal standards of internal control that call for clearly documenting internal controls. Without such specification, the perception could be created that EPA is withholding information from Congress that the SAB is required to provide under ERDDAA. EPA officials stated that the EPA Administrator does not attempt to determine whether advice of the SAB contained in written reports should be forwarded to the requesting committee and that all written reports are publically available on the SAB website at the same time the report is sent to the EPA Administrator. By modifying the charter or other policy documents to reflect when it is and when it is not appropriate for the EPA Administrator to forward the advice to the requesting committee, EPA can better ensure transparency in its process.\nIn general, under FACA, as a federal advisory committee, the SAB’s agenda is controlled by its host agency, EPA. As such, the SAB generally responds only to charge questions put to it by EPA although, under ERDDAA, the SAB is specifically charged with providing advice to its host agency as well as to designated congressional committees. In addition, it is EPA’s responsibility under GSA regulations for implementing FACA to ensure that advisory committee members and staff understand agency-specific statutes and regulations that may affect them, but nothing in the SAB charter, the April 2014 policy, or the November 2014 policy clarification communicates that, ultimately, SAB must provide scientific advice when requested by congressional committees. For example, we found no mechanism in EPA policy for the SAB to respond on its own initiative to a congressional committee request for scientific advice unrelated to an existing EPA charge question. A written policy for how the SAB should respond to a congressional committee request that does not overlap with charge questions from EPA would be consistent with federal internal control standards. Moreover, such a policy would better position the SAB to provide the advice it is obligated to provide under ERDDAA and for EPA to provide direction consistent with GSA regulations for implementing FACA. We will continue to monitor these issues and, as we finalize our work in this area, we will consider making recommendations, as appropriate. We plan to issue our final results in June 2015.", "CASAC has provided certain types of advice related to the review of NAAQS. The Clean Air Act requires CASAC to review air quality criteria and existing NAAQS every 5 years and advise EPA of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects that may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance of NAAQS. According to a senior EPA official, CASAC has carried out its role in reviewing the air quality criteria and the NAAQS but has never provided advice on adverse social, economic, or energy effects of strategies to implement the NAAQS because EPA has never asked it to. This is in part because NAAQS are to be based on public health and welfare criteria, so information on the social, economic, or energy effects of NAAQS are not specifically relevant to setting NAAQS.\nIn a June 2014 letter to the EPA Administrator, CASAC indicated that, at the agency’s request, it would review the impacts (e.g., the economic or energy impacts) of strategies for attaining or maintaining the NAAQS but stressed that such a review would be separate from reviews of the scientific bases of NAAQS. In response to such a request, the letter stated that an ad hoc CASAC panel would be formed to obtain the full expertise necessary to conduct such a review. According to a senior EPA official, the agency has no plans to ask CASAC to provide advice on adverse effects.\nChairman Rounds, Ranking Member Markey, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.\nInformation from EPA-requested reviews could be useful for the states, which implement the strategies necessary to achieve the NAAQS. EPA is required to provide states, after consultation with appropriate advisory committees, with information on air pollution control techniques, including the cost to implement such techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(b)(1) (2015). According to a senior-level EPA official, EPA collects this information from other federal advisory committees, the National Academy of Sciences, and state air agencies, among others, and EPA fulfills this obligation by issuing Control Techniques Guidelines and other implementation guidance.", "If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Janet Frisch (Assistant Director), Antoinette Capaccio, and Greg Carroll.\nThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h1_full", "h0_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why don't the EPA's procedures for processing congressional requests for advice from the SAB ensure compliance with ERDDAA?", "What do the procedures fail to account for?", "How does the EPA respond to congressional requests?", "Why is this lack of documentation an issue?", "How might such documentation be beneficial?", "According to EPA's charter, what occurs when scientific advice is requested by one of the committees specified in ERDDAA?", "How does this guidance lack specificity?", "What will GAO continue to do?", "What does EPA formulate rules for?", "How does EPA enhance the quality and credibility of such rules?", "What does ERDDAA require from SAB?", "What do amendments to the Clean Air Act require from CASAC?" ], "summary": [ "The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) procedures for processing congressional requests for scientific advice from the Science Advisory Board (SAB) do not ensure compliance with the Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978 (ERDDAA) because these procedures are incomplete. For example, they do not clearly outline how the EPA Administrator, the SAB staff office, and others are to handle a congressional committee's request.", "While the procedures reflect EPA's responsibility to exercise general management controls over the SAB and all its federal advisory committees under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), including keeping such committees free from outside influence, they do not fully account for the specific access that designated congressional committees have to the SAB under ERDDAA. For example, EPA's policy documents do not establish how EPA will determine which questions would be taken up by the SAB.", "EPA officials told GAO that, in responding to congressional requests, EPA follows the same process that it would apply to internal requests for questions to the SAB, including considering whether the questions are science or policy driven or are important to science and the agency. However, EPA has not documented these criteria.", "Under the federal standards of internal control, agencies are to clearly document internal controls. Moreover, under ERDDAA, the SAB is required to provide requested scientific advice to select committees.", "By clearly documenting how to process congressional requests received under ERDDAA, including which criteria to use, EPA can provide reasonable assurance that its staff process responses consistently and in accordance with law.", "Furthermore, EPA's charter states that, when scientific advice is requested by one of the committees specified in ERDDAA, the Administrator will, when appropriate forward the SAB's advice to the requesting congressional committee.", "EPA policy does not specify when it would be “appropriate” for the EPA Administrator to take this action. Such specificity would be consistent with clearly documenting internal controls.", "GAO will continue to monitor these issues and plans to issue a report with its final results in June 2015.", "EPA formulates rules to protect the environment and public health.", "To enhance the quality and credibility of such rules, EPA obtains advice and recommendations from the SAB and CASAC—two federal advisory committees that review the scientific and technical basis for EPA decision making.", "ERDDAA requires the SAB to provide both the EPA Administrator and designated congressional committees with scientific advice as requested.", "Amendments to the Clean Air Act established CASAC to, among other things, provide advice to the Administrator on NAAQS." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 2, 3, -1, 5, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-19-110	{ "title": [ "Background", "Reclamation and the Title XVI Program", "Water Reuse", "Grants Management", "Reclamation Awarded About $715 Million for Title XVI Projects and Studies, and Some Construction Projects Remain Eligible for Title XVI Grants", "Most of the $715 Million Reclamation Awarded Was for Title XVI Construction Projects", "Some Construction Projects Remain Eligible for Title XVI Grants", "Title XVI Projects and Studies Vary in Their Uses of Reused Water and Include Urban and Rural Areas", "Title XVI Projects Are Generally Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects that Produce Nonpotable and Potable Reused Water for a Variety of Purposes", "Title XVI Projects and Studies Include Western Urban and Rural Areas", "Reclamation’s Project Selection Process Is Consistent with Relevant Federal Grant Regulations, and Its Evaluation Criteria Have Changed in Recent Years", "Reclamation Publicly Announces Funding Opportunities and Has a Merit Review Process for Applications, which Is Consistent with Relevant Federal Grant Regulations", "Criteria Used to Evaluate Projects Have Changed in Recent Years", "Reclamation’s Process for Monitoring Title XVI Grants Is Consistent with Relevant Federal Grant Regulations", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Information on Construction Projects Eligible under the Title XVI Water Reclamation and Reuse Program", "Appendix II: Information on the Evaluation Criteria Used to Select Projects to Award Grants under the Title XVI Program", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "As Interior’s primary water management agency, Reclamation’s mission has been to manage, develop, and protect water and water-related resources in 17 western states since 1902. Reclamation has led or provided assistance in the construction of most of the large dams and water diversion structures in the West for the purpose of developing water supplies for irrigation, municipal water use, flood control, and habitat enhancement, among others. Reclamation is organized into five regions—Great Plains, Lower Colorado, Mid-Pacific, Pacific Northwest, and Upper Colorado—and the agency’s central office in Denver provides technical and policy support. Each regional office oversees the water projects, including Title XVI projects and studies, located within its regional boundaries. The types of projects eligible under the Title XVI program include, among others, construction of water treatment facilities, pipelines to distribute reused water, and tanks and reservoirs to store reused water.\nThe Title XVI program is one of several programs under Interior’s WaterSMART (Sustain and Manage America’s Resources for Tomorrow) Program. The WaterSMART program is implemented by Reclamation and the U.S. Geological Survey within Interior. According to an Interior document, the WaterSMART program focuses on identifying strategies to help ensure sufficient supplies of clean water for drinking, economic activities, recreation, and ecosystem health. Reclamation carries out its portion of the WaterSMART program by administering grants, including Title XVI grants for water reuse, conducting research, and providing technical assistance and scientific expertise. Reclamation offers three types of grants to project sponsors under the Title XVI program: construction projects, which are projects to plan, design, or construct infrastructure for the treatment and distribution of reused water; feasibility studies, which are documents that generally identify specific water reuse opportunities, describe alternatives, and incorporate other considerations, such as the financial capability of the project sponsor; and research studies, which are studies to help states, tribes, and local communities establish or expand water reuse markets, improve existing water reuse facilities, or streamline the implementation of new water reuse facilities.\nKey Terms Related to Water Reuse\nAcre-foot of water: about 326,000 gallons generally identify specific water reuse opportunities; describe alternatives; and incorporate other considerations, such as the financial capability of the project sponsor.\nFederal awards for construction projects under the Title XVI program are generally limited to 25 percent of total project costs—up to $20 million in federal funding—and require a 75 percent nonfederal cost share from the project sponsor. Federal funding for feasibility studies under the Title XVI program is generally limited to 50 percent of the total study costs, up to $450,000, and federal funding for research studies is generally limited to 25 percent of the total study costs, up to $300,000. Reclamation generally awards Title XVI grants for construction projects to project sponsors in installments over multiple years before the federal funding maximum for each project is reached, whereas it generally awards the full amount for feasibility and research study grants in a single year.\nPotable: water that is suitable for drinking.\nProject sponsors: water districts, wastewater or sanitation districts, municipalities, tribes, and other entities that develop projects or studies eligible for Title XVI grants. tribes, and local communities establish or expand water reuse markets, improve existing water reuse facilities, or streamline the implementation of new water reuse facilities.\nFrom fiscal year 1992, when the Title XVI program was established, through fiscal year 2009, Congress authorized 53 Title XVI projects. Each of these projects was subject to a cap on the federal cost share. In fiscal years 1992 through 2010, Congress generally directed funding for these specific authorized projects each year. Starting in fiscal year 2011, Congress began appropriating funding for the Title XVI program without directing specific funding to individual projects. As a result, Reclamation started using a competitive process to award Title XVI grants to projects and studies, through which project sponsors with authorized projects applied for Title XVI grants. Only the 53 projects that were already authorized by Congress were eligible to apply for grants for construction projects. Section 4009(c) of the WIIN Act, enacted in December 2016, authorized an additional $50 million to be appropriated for water reuse projects. To be eligible to receive Title XVI grants under the WIIN Act, projects must submit a completed feasibility study to Reclamation, and Reclamation must review the study to determine whether, among other things, the project is technically and financially feasible and provides a federal benefit in accordance with the reclamation laws. Reclamation is then to submit a report with the results of its review to Congress, and projects determined to be feasible are then eligible to apply for grants under the competitive grant program established by the WIIN Act. Each feasibility study identifies an estimated project cost. Like most projects individually authorized prior to the WIIN Act, the federal share of this cost is generally capped at 25 percent, up to $20 million. In addition to construction projects, Reclamation began awarding Title XVI grants to project sponsors for feasibility studies in fiscal year 2011 and for research studies in fiscal year 2016. Figure 1 shows a timeline of the Title XVI program.", "With water reuse, water that is typically unusable, such as municipal or industrial wastewater, undergoes additional treatment to make it suitable for certain purposes. For example, municipal wastewater typically undergoes primary and secondary treatment before it can be discharged into a river, stream, or other body of water. With water reuse, wastewater generally undergoes further (tertiary) treatment to remove additional nutrients and suspended solids and to disinfect the water. The treated water can then be reused for nonpotable uses, such as landscape or agricultural irrigation or industrial uses. In some cases, wastewater undergoes additional, advanced treatment—such as microfiltration and reverse osmosis—and may then be suitable for potable uses, such as injection into a groundwater basin or reservoir where it may later be extracted for drinking water. Figure 2 shows some of the typical treatment processes that may be applied to reused water, and figure 3 shows some of the typical uses of reused water.\nSeveral reports have shown that water reuse could offer significant untapped water supplies, particularly in coastal areas facing water shortages. For example, in a 2012 report on municipal wastewater reuse, the National Research Council of the National Academies estimated that U.S. municipalities discharged about 12 billion gallons of treated municipal wastewater each day into coastal waters. They estimated that reuse of these coastal discharges could directly augment available water sources by providing the equivalent of 27 percent of the municipal supply. Municipalities discharge another 20 billion gallons each day to inland locations. While reuse of inland discharges has the potential to affect the water supply of downstream users by decreasing the amount of water available to them, we previously found that at least some of this volume could also be beneficial. Even with such potential uses, the Environmental Protection Agency reported in 2012 that only 7 to 8 percent of municipal wastewater was being intentionally reused in the United States.", "In our past work, we have highlighted the importance of awarding competitive grants in a fair and transparent way and monitoring grants. In recent years, OMB has taken actions to help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of grantmaking across the federal government. In particular, in December 2014, OMB’s Uniform Guidance became effective for new grant awards after adoption by federal grantmaking agencies, including Interior. The Uniform Guidance requires, among other things, that federal agencies provide public notices of funding opportunities, and these notices are to contain information, such as key dates and the merit and other criteria that the agency will use to evaluate applications. The Uniform Guidance also requires certain monitoring activities for federal grants, such as generally requiring grant recipients to submit financial reports.", "From fiscal years 1992 through 2017, Reclamation awarded about $715 million for 46 construction projects and 71 studies under the Title XVI program, based on our review of agency documents. Most of this funding—about $703 million—went toward construction projects, while the remaining awards were for feasibility and research studies. Some construction projects remain eligible for Title XVI grants. Specifically, about $464 million in grant funding not yet awarded up to the federal ceiling remains for individually congressionally authorized Title XVI construction projects, and about $513 million remains in total estimated projects eligible for Title XVI grants under the WIIN Act, as of August 2018.", "Across the three different types of grants offered under the Title XVI program—construction projects, feasibility studies, and research studies—Reclamation awarded about $715 million from fiscal years 1992 through 2017, according to agency documents. This $715 million awarded under Title XVI leveraged more than $2.8 billion in nonfederal cost share. Reclamation awarded most of this Title XVI funding for construction projects, as shown in table 1.\nOverall, Reclamation awarded about $703 million under Title XVI to 46 construction projects from fiscal years 1992 through 2017. Of these 46 construction projects that received awards, 43 were individually congressionally authorized construction projects and 3 were construction projects that were eligible for Title XVI grants under the WIIN Act, according to agency documents we reviewed. Additionally, Reclamation made awards for 71 studies—58 feasibility study grants since fiscal year 2011 and 13 research study grants since fiscal year 2016.", "Based on our review of Reclamation financial data, some construction projects remain eligible for Title XVI grants. Eligible project costs fell into two categories: (1) grant funding not yet awarded up to the federal ceiling for individually congressionally authorized Title XVI construction projects, and (2) the federal share of estimated costs identified in feasibility studies for projects eligible for Title XVI grants under the WIIN Act. About $464 million in not-yet-awarded funding remained for 28 individually congressionally authorized Title XVI construction projects as of August 2018. Also, about $513 million remained in estimated project costs for the 40 construction projects that were eligible under the WIIN Act, as of August 2018, as shown in table 2 below.\nAs of August 2018, of the 53 individually congressionally authorized construction projects, more than half—28 projects—had remaining project costs eligible for Title XVI grants.\nThe 13 ongoing congressionally authorized projects had about $233 million in project costs that had not yet been awarded. Some project sponsors told us that they were in the process of designing or constructing projects. Others told us that while they were not currently designing or constructing projects, they had plans to pursue additional Title XVI grant awards in the future. More than one-third of the $233 million in remaining eligible project costs was for two projects— located in San Diego and San Jose, California—that were two of the projects authorized when the Title XVI program was created in 1992.\nThe 15 congressionally authorized projects with no planned construction had remaining project costs of about $231 million eligible for Title XVI grants. Project sponsors identified several reasons why they were not planning to apply for further grant awards. Specifically, several project sponsors said they had faced challenges in applying for further grants because language in the statutes authorizing the projects limited the scope of their projects. For example, one project sponsor told us that it was interested in expanding its water reuse demonstration facility but that it was not eligible to apply for additional Title XVI grants because the statute that authorized the project specifically authorized a demonstration facility. In addition, one project sponsor stated that its project authorization had already reached its sunset date, which means the project can no longer apply for Title XVI grants. Some of the project sponsors with no construction planned said that they may consider applying for additional Title XVI grants under their existing authorizations in the future, should they decide to move forward with construction. However, others said that they had decided not to move forward with authorized projects and had no plans to apply for Title XVI grants in the future. For example, one project sponsor said that it had determined that its project was no longer financially feasible.\nIn addition, as of August 2018, 40 projects had Reclamation-approved feasibility studies that had been transmitted to Congress, based on our review of agency documents, and were therefore eligible to apply for Title XVI construction grants under the WIIN Act. A total of about $513 million in project costs across these 40 projects remained eligible for Title XVI grants. Of the 40 projects, 20 applied for Title XVI grants in fiscal year 2017, and Reclamation selected 3 for awards. These 20 projects had about $269 million in project costs that remained eligible for Title XVI grants. Twenty projects did not apply for Title XVI grants in fiscal year 2017 and had about $244 million in project costs that remained eligible for these grants, as of August 2018.", "Title XVI projects and studies for fiscal years 1992 through 2017 cover various uses for reused water and include both urban and rural areas throughout the West, based on our review of agency data as well as documents from and interviews with project sponsors. For example, Title XVI construction projects produce both nonpotable and potable reused water for a variety of purposes, such as landscape and agricultural irrigation, habitat restoration, and extraction as drinking water. The projects and studies funded by the Title XVI program include both urban and rural areas throughout the West, with California accounting for 36 construction projects and about 90 percent of total Title XVI funding.", "Title XVI construction projects are generally large-scale infrastructure projects, such as water reuse treatment plants and pipelines, that produce, store, and distribute reused water for a variety of purposes, both nonpotable and potable. Since the inception of the Title XVI program, Reclamation has awarded Title XVI grants to construction projects that cumulatively provided nearly 390,000 acre-feet of reused water in 2017. According to Reclamation data, the projects funded by Title XVI individually delivered between 38 acre-feet of reused water and more than 100,000 acre-feet of water in fiscal year 2017. Most of these construction projects provided reused water for nonpotable uses across four main categories: (1) landscape irrigation, (2) agricultural irrigation, (3) commercial and industrial use, and (4) habitat restoration.\nLandscape irrigation. Landscape irrigation—including irrigation of golf courses, road medians, school grounds, parks, sport fields, and other green spaces—is the most common use of reused water produced by Title XVI projects, with 29 Title XVI projects producing reused water for this purpose, based on our analysis of documents from Reclamation and project sponsors. The reused, nonpotable water produced by such projects is generally distributed through purple-colored pipes, to denote that the water is not for drinking purposes. For example, the Title XVI program provided grants to Eastern Municipal Water District—a water district located in Southern California—to help build water reuse infrastructure, including pipelines, pumping stations, and storage tanks. With this added storage capacity, the district has the ability to store more than 2 billion gallons of reused water, which is used to irrigate sports fields, golf courses, parks, school grounds, and medians, according to the project sponsor. By maximizing use of its reused water, the project sponsor noted that the district is reducing its dependence on water piped in from other parts of the state or region. Similarly, the Title XVI program provided grants to help build pipelines and reservoirs to distribute and store reused water for landscape irrigation and other purposes in other parts of California (see fig. 4).\nAgricultural irrigation. Reused water produced by Title XVI projects is also used to irrigate a variety of agricultural products, including fruits and vegetables, flowers, and vineyards. For example, the North Valley Regional Recycled Water Program is helping to provide a reliable water source for the Del Puerto Water District, which provides water to approximately 45,000 acres of farmland in California’s San Joaquin Valley, according to the project sponsor. The Del Puerto Water District has encountered water shortages in recent years, which have created economic hardships on growers in the area, according to the project sponsor. Title XVI grants provided under WIIN Act authority helped the district expand its reused water supply and distribution infrastructure and ensure a reliable, drought-resistant water supply, according to the project sponsor. In addition, reused water produced by the Watsonville Area Water Recycling Project near Watsonville, California, is used to irrigate strawberries and other fruits and vegetables as well as flowers. The groundwater basin that serves the coastal region where Watsonville is located has been overdrafted for a long time, causing groundwater elevations to drop below sea level and leading to seawater intrusion that makes the groundwater unusable in certain areas, according to the project sponsor. This sponsor noted that Watsonville’s Title XVI project helps reduce demand on the overdrafted groundwater basin, which in turn helps to protect against further seawater intrusion and also provides a reliable, drought-tolerant water supply to help protect the region’s agricultural economy. Figure 5 shows flowers in a greenhouse that are irrigated with reused water from Watsonville’s Title XVI project.\nCommercial and industrial use. Reused water produced by Title XVI projects is used for cooling towers at power plants and data centers, oil production, toilet flushing in university and commercial buildings, and for other commercial and industrial purposes, according to project sponsors. For example, some of the reused water produced by the Southern Nevada Title XVI project is used for power plant cooling, and reused water from San Jose’s Title XVI project is used for cooling at data centers in California’s Silicon Valley. In addition, reused water from the Long Beach Area Reclamation Project is injected into the ground after oil is extracted, which helps prevent the ground from sinking, according to the project sponsor. Having access to a secure source of reused water can attract data centers and other businesses that require large amounts of water to areas that can guarantee access to reused water, according to a project sponsor and representatives from a nongovernmental water reuse organization we interviewed.\nHabitat restoration. Some Title XVI projects use reused water to restore wetlands or supply water to recreational lakes. For example, in California’s Napa Valley, reused water from the North Bay Title XVI project is being used to restore the Napa Sonoma Salt Marsh. Some threatened and endangered species, such as the Chinook Salmon, have started returning to the area since the restoration began, according to the project sponsor. Reused water from this Title XVI project also provides other habitat benefits. For example, wineries in the area that irrigate with reused water do not need to divert as much water from streams, which leaves more water for fish, according to the project sponsor. In addition, the North Valley Regional Recycled Water Program in California’s San Joaquin Valley supplies reused water to wildlife refuges and wetlands, in addition to agricultural lands. This area has the largest remaining freshwater marsh in the western United States, which provides critical habitat for migratory birds as well as other species, according to the project sponsor (see fig. 6).\nThere are also several potable projects that have been funded by Title XVI. These projects generally fall into two categories: (1) indirect-potable reuse and (2) desalination.\nIndirect-potable reuse. Title XVI has provided grants for indirect-potable projects, in which wastewater undergoes advanced treatment to obtain potable-quality water. The water is then injected into an environmental buffer, such as a groundwater aquifer, where it is left for a certain amount of time before it is extracted. The water is treated again before it is distributed as drinking water. One use for highly-treated reused water is for seawater barriers, where water is injected into the ground to prevent the intrusion of high-salinity water into groundwater aquifers. Indirect- potable reuse has been gaining prominence, according to some project sponsors and representatives from nongovernmental water reuse organizations, with Title XVI grants going to several project sponsors for both the construction of facilities as well as research into optimal treatment methods. For example, the Groundwater Replenishment System in Orange County, California, which was partially funded by Title XVI, takes highly-treated wastewater that would have previously been discharged into the Pacific Ocean and purifies it using an advanced treatment process. The water is then injected into a groundwater aquifer and is later extracted as drinking water that serves more than 800,000 people, according to the project sponsor. Figure 7 shows reused water at several different points in the treatment process and reverse osmosis treatment equipment at Orange County’s Groundwater Replenishment System.\nDesalination. Title XVI has provided grants for projects that treat brackish groundwater—water that has a salinity above freshwater but below seawater—and then feed it directly into potable water distribution systems or into a groundwater aquifer or surface water reservoir. For example, the Mission Basin Groundwater Purification Facility in Oceanside, California, desalinates brackish groundwater using reverse osmosis and other treatment methods. The reused water supplies about 15 percent of the city’s water needs, according to the project sponsor.\nIn addition to Title XVI construction projects, Reclamation’s feasibility and research studies also vary in their planned uses of reused water. For example, one feasibility study project sponsor we interviewed was awarded a Title XVI grant to investigate the feasibility and potential impacts of reusing produced water from oil and gas operations in Oklahoma. The study plans to investigate possible dual benefits of reusing produced water, including (1) providing a new source of water for irrigation and other purposes and (2) reducing the disposal of produced water as a possible means for addressing increased seismic activity associated with oil and gas operations, according to the project sponsor. Another feasibility study project sponsor we interviewed from a rural, landlocked community in Washington State is investigating the feasibility of creating a virtual zero discharge system that would eliminate all wastewater disposal by reusing the wastewater. Similar to feasibility studies, Title XVI research studies address different topics. For example, one project sponsor we interviewed was researching how to optimize filtration of reused water using membrane filtration, which is a critical treatment process to reduce contaminants in water. Another project sponsor was researching impediments and incentives to using reused water for agricultural irrigation.", "Based on our review of agency documents, project sponsors in 12 of the 18 states eligible to participate in the Title XVI program were awarded at least one type of funding under Title XVI since the inception of the program in 1992, as shown in table 3.\nFrom fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2017, Reclamation awarded about $640 million—or about 90 percent of total awarded Title XVI funding—to projects in California, the majority of which was for construction projects. The concentration of projects in California reflects the early emphasis of the Title XVI program on Southern California and reducing its reliance on water provided by the Colorado River, as well as the high level of interest in the program in the state, according to a 2010 Congressional Research Service report. Overall, project sponsors in 9 states were awarded feasibility study grants, sponsors in 4 states were awarded research study grants, and sponsors in 8 states were awarded construction grants (see fig. 8).\nTitle XVI projects and studies include western urban and rural areas. In particular, many Title XVI projects are sponsored by entities in urban areas that serve a large population base. For example, the main part of the Los Angeles Area Water Supply Title XVI project is sponsored by the West Basin Municipal Water District, which has a service area of nearly 1 million people in 17 cities and unincorporated areas in Los Angeles County. This Title XVI project produces five different types of reused water to meet the unique needs of West Basin’s municipal, commercial, and industrial reuse customers, according to the project sponsor. Similarly, the City of San Diego, which has a population of about 1.4 million, was awarded Title XVI grants for a number of projects, including an indirect-potable reuse project anticipated to provide one-third of San Diego’s water supply by 2035, according to the project sponsor. Other Title XVI projects are sponsored by entities in rural areas and small cities. For example, the Hi-Desert Water District project serves a rural and economically disadvantaged community in the town of Yucca Valley, California, that has a population of about 20,000. This Title XVI project will fund facilities to collect, treat, and reuse treated wastewater, thereby eliminating degradation of the local groundwater supply and helping ensure a safer, reliable water supply for this community, according to the project sponsor. Similarly, the city of Round Rock, Texas, which has a population of about 120,000, sponsored the Williamson County Title XVI project. This project produces reused water for landscape irrigation, most of which is used to irrigate a 650-acre park, according to the project sponsor.\nSome Title XVI projects are sponsored by regional partnerships composed of different local entities. For example, in the late 1990s, 4 entities in Northern San Diego County—Carlsbad Municipal Water District, Leucadia Wastewater District, Olivenhain Municipal Water District, and San Elijo Joint Powers Authority—formed a coalition to leverage their water reuse programs; the coalition has since grown to 10 entities. This coalition sponsored an individually congressionally authorized Title XVI project, the North San Diego County project, and applied for a Title XVI grant for a new project eligible under the WIIN Act in fiscal year 2017. Similarly, in the northern part of the San Francisco Bay Area, 10 local agencies formed a regional partnership covering 315 square miles across Sonoma, Marin, and Napa Counties to sponsor the North Bay Water Reuse Program. According to the project sponsors involved in this regional partnership, using a regional partnership approach to water reuse projects provides an economy of scale; maximizes the ability to obtain local, state, and federal funding for the projects; and allows smaller, local entities to access funding and expertise for projects that would be out of reach without regional collaboration. See appendix I for more detailed information on specific Title XVI construction projects.", "Reclamation’s process for selecting projects and studies to award grants under the Title XVI program involves announcing the funding opportunity, establishing criteria to evaluate potential projects, and reviewing applications to make award decisions. We found that this process is consistent with relevant federal grant regulations outlined in OMB’s Uniform Guidance, based on our review of agency documents and federal grant regulations. The criteria Reclamation uses to evaluate Title XVI projects have changed in recent years, with the elimination or addition of some criteria and changes in the weighting of others.", "To start its selection process, Reclamation announces funding opportunities by developing annual funding opportunity announcements (FOA), which are publicly available on its website and on www.grants.gov. These FOAs contain information for applicants to consider prior to applying, including the types of eligible projects and studies, estimated funding available, information on the application review process, the application due date, and the criteria that Reclamation will use to score applications.\nProject sponsors submit applications for Title XVI grants to Reclamation in response to the FOAs, according to Reclamation officials. Reclamation officials then review the applications to ensure the projects are eligible and that applications are complete, according to agency officials we interviewed and documents we reviewed related to the selection process. Next, an application review committee scores eligible applications. The application review committee is composed of Reclamation staff representing the five regions and other staff with technical expertise. Committee members individually review and score each Title XVI application based on the evaluation criteria in the FOA. After the individual scoring, the application review committee meets collectively to discuss the scores; this meeting is generally facilitated by Title XVI program staff from Reclamation’s central office in Denver. If there are any outliers in the scores—e.g., if a committee member scores an application significantly higher or lower than the other members—then they are to discuss and may adjust the score to help ensure fairness and consistency in how the applications are scored relative to the evaluation criteria, according to agency officials. Following this discussion, Reclamation averages the members’ scores for each application and then ranks the applications based on the average scores. Reclamation creates a list of recommended projects and funding amounts for these projects, based on the rankings and congressional direction on the amount of funding for the Title XVI program in any given year.\nReclamation’s process for selecting projects and studies to fund under the Title XVI program is consistent with relevant federal grant regulations outlined in the Uniform Guidance. Based on our review of Title XVI FOAs from fiscal years 2011 through 2018, all FOAs met the requirements prescribed by the Uniform Guidance. Specifically, the Uniform Guidance requires that grant funding opportunities be publicly announced and contain certain information, such as the evaluation criteria, key dates, and the process used to evaluate applications. Based on our review of FOAs, Reclamation’s FOAs were publicly announced and contained this information.\nMany project sponsors we interviewed said that Reclamation’s Title XVI application selection process is generally clear and well-managed and that Reclamation officials, at both the regional level and central office in Denver, were responsive and transparent throughout the selection process. Several project sponsors noted that Reclamation offered to debrief with Title XVI applicants after it made its grant selections; further, Reclamation officials provided constructive feedback to applicants to improve their applications in future years.\nSome project sponsors raised concerns about how long it takes WIIN Act- eligible Title XVI projects to be awarded grants. In particular, the WIIN Act provides that WIIN Act-eligible projects can only receive funding if an enacted appropriations act designates funding by project name, after Reclamation has recommended specific projects for funding and transmitted its recommendations to Congress. Given the timing of Reclamation’s FOA process, WIIN Act-eligible projects selected in a given fiscal year generally need to be included in the subsequent fiscal year’s appropriations act. For example, congressional direction in May 2017 provided that $10 million of the total Title XVI funding was to go to Title XVI WIIN Act-eligible projects, and Reclamation sent Congress its fiscal year 2017 selections for WIIN Act-eligible projects to fund in November 2017. However, according to Reclamation officials, Reclamation could not begin awarding fiscal year 2017 funding to selected projects until March 2018, after enactment of the fiscal year 2018 appropriations act, which listed the selected projects by name. One project sponsor noted that this two-part process created challenges related to the project timeline and budget. Reclamation officials said that project sponsors have also expressed concerns to Reclamation about how any resulting delays may affect the ability of projects to move forward. Reclamation officials noted that this is a statutory requirement and that they had discussed this process with project sponsors to make them aware of the timing for the grants.", "Reclamation has changed the evaluation criteria it uses to select projects to fund under the Title XVI program since it began using a competitive process in fiscal year 2011. Reclamation first developed criteria for the annual Title XVI project selection process in 2010, which it applied starting in fiscal year 2011. Prior to that, Congress generally provided project-specific funding direction for individually authorized Title XVI projects. According to agency officials, Reclamation developed the initial evaluation criteria for the annual Title XVI selection process based on (1) the language in the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Studies and Facilities Act, as amended; (2) Reclamation goals and priorities for the program; and (3) the criteria Reclamation used to select projects to fund under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Reclamation sought and incorporated public comments on the criteria in 2010. After that, Reclamation’s evaluation criteria for Title XVI construction projects generally remained unchanged from fiscal years 2011 through 2016.\nIn fiscal years 2017 and 2018, Reclamation eliminated some criteria in the Title XVI FOAs for construction projects, added some new criteria, and changed the weighting of some criteria, based on our review of FOAs for those years. For example, in 2017, Reclamation more than doubled the weight of the economic criterion for the fiscal year 2017 FOA for WIIN Act-eligible projects, making it worth 35 percent of the points as compared to the previous 13 percent. Reclamation officials told us that these changes were made in response to the language of the WIIN Act— which listed a number of criteria for projects, including projects that provide multiple benefits—and comments they received from OMB during the review process for the revised criteria. In March 2018, Reclamation proposed further revisions to the evaluation criteria for the fiscal year 2018 Title XVI program and held a public comment period to solicit input on the proposed changes. The proposed FOA contained one set of criteria applicable to both types of eligible Title XVI construction projects—individually congressionally authorized and WIIN Act-eligible projects. Reclamation received 21 comment letters on the criteria and, after analyzing the comments, officials said that they made additional changes to some of the criteria before issuing the final fiscal year 2018 FOA on May 30, 2018. For example, Reclamation added clarification to the economic criteria. See appendix II for a more detailed description of the final fiscal year 2018 Title XVI criteria, as well as changes to the criteria in fiscal years 2017 and 2018.\nSeveral project sponsors noted that changes to the evaluation criteria may affect which projects are more competitive in Reclamation’s application scoring and project selection process. In particular, several project sponsors and representatives from nongovernmental organizations we interviewed told us they believed that recent changes— particularly the increased weight on economic criteria, including cost effectiveness—may disadvantage small projects. Others said increasing the weight on cost effectiveness may disadvantage new projects that are just beginning construction of costly new treatment facilities versus projects that are expanding existing facilities. Reclamation officials we interviewed stated that the economic criteria take into account the extent to which projects would provide multiple benefits—not just cost effectiveness. They also pointed out that they clarified in the fiscal year 2018 FOA that there are a number of ways to provide information on project benefits in Title XVI applications, including by describing benefits in a qualitative manner. They added that feedback from project sponsors had been positive on the additional changes Reclamation made in response to earlier stakeholder comments on the economic criteria for the final fiscal year 2018 FOA. Furthermore, Reclamation’s increased emphasis on economic criteria is consistent with federal principles on federal spending for water infrastructure projects, which states that federal infrastructure investments are to be based on systematic analysis of expected benefits and costs.", "To monitor Title XVI grants, Reclamation reviews financial and performance reports submitted by project sponsors, regularly communicates and visits with project sponsors to obtain information on the status of the projects, and collects information on the amount of water Title XVI projects deliver each year, which is included in Interior’s annual performance report.\nFinancial and Performance Reports. In its financial assistance agreements for Title XVI grants, Reclamation generally requires project sponsors to submit financial and performance reports. Specifically, Reclamation generally requires that project sponsors submit financial and performance reports at least once per year and sometimes more frequently, as determined by the risk that each project poses, according to agency officials. Based on our review of reports, the financial reports list transactions related to Title XVI grants, such as expenditures, and the performance reports provide updates on the status of the Title XVI projects. Reclamation delineates its monitoring requirements, which generally include requirements for financial and performance reports, in the financial assistance agreements for Title XVI grants that each project sponsor agrees to prior to receiving funding. In our review of documents related to Reclamation’s monitoring process for Title XVI construction grants active in fiscal year 2017, we found that project sponsors submitted all but one financial and performance reports that Reclamation had required, and submitted all but two by their due date or within 2 weeks of this date. We found that Reclamation’s requirements are consistent with relevant federal grant regulations in OMB’s Uniform Guidance, which provide that federal awarding agencies, including Reclamation, generally are to collect financial reports from project sponsors at least annually.\nOngoing Communication and Site Visits. To further monitor the performance of Title XVI grants, Reclamation officials communicate regularly with project sponsors via telephone and email and conduct site visits to obtain information on the status of the projects, according to Reclamation officials and project sponsors. Based on our review of agency guidance, Reclamation generally is to conduct at least one site visit per year for projects with significant on-the-ground activities, such as construction projects. During the visits, agency officials generally are to receive updates on progress made on the project and determine if it is on schedule and meets the scope of work identified in the financial assistance agreement. Reclamation generally requires officials to document these visits and other monitoring activities in project files, according to agency documents. Through the site visits and other communication with project sponsors, agency officials may also provide information on program requirements and respond to project sponsors’ questions about the Title XVI program. For example, during site visits, Reclamation officials have responded to project sponsors’ questions about the status of payments and allowable project costs and clarified requirements for financial and performance reports, according to our review of agency documents and interviews with project sponsors. In our review of Reclamation’s Title XVI construction grants active in fiscal year 2017, we found that Reclamation generally conducted annual site visits for Title XVI construction projects that year. We found that this is consistent with federal grant regulations in OMB’s Uniform Guidance, which state that federal awarding agencies may make site visits as warranted by program needs.\nData Collection. Reclamation also annually collects data on the amount of water delivered from each Title XVI construction project, as well as projected water deliveries for the coming year. Reclamation analyzes the water delivery data, compares projected data to actual deliveries, and follows up with project sponsors to understand any discrepancies, according to agency officials. For example, actual water deliveries could be lower than projected deliveries if communities implement water conservation measures that result in projects having less wastewater to treat and deliver for reuse. According to Reclamation officials, information on the amount of reused water delivered from Title XVI projects helps them to monitor progress on Title XVI projects and helps demonstrate the benefits and accomplishments of the Title XVI program. These data are consolidated and included in Interior’s annual performance report to demonstrate how the agency is meeting Interior’s objective of achieving a more sustainable and secure water supply. Collecting data on Title XVI water deliveries is consistent with the Title XVI program’s purpose of supporting water supply sustainability by providing financial and technical assistance to local water agencies for the planning, design, and construction of water reuse projects.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Interior for review and comment. The Department of the Interior provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Interior, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "This appendix provides information on construction projects that are individually congressionally authorized under the Bureau of Reclamation’s Title XVI Water Reclamation and Reuse Program (Title XVI), as well as projects to which Reclamation awarded grants under the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act) funding opportunity in fiscal year 2017. Figure 9 below provides information on the 53 construction projects that have been individually authorized by Congress under the Title XVI program. The projects are ordered by the total amount of Title XVI funding each was awarded from fiscal years 1992 through 2017, from highest to lowest.\nFigure 10 below provides information on the three construction projects to which Reclamation awarded grants under the Title XVI WIIN Act funding opportunity in fiscal year 2017. The projects are ordered by the total Title XVI funding each was awarded in fiscal year 2017—the first year that grants were awarded under the WIIN Act—from highest to lowest.", "This appendix provides detailed information on the evaluation criteria the Bureau of Reclamation used to select projects to award grants under the Title XVI Water Reclamation and Reuse Program (Title XVI). The six evaluation criteria Reclamation used to select construction projects to fund in fiscal year 2018 are as follows (points are out of a total of 110 points). 1. Water Supply (35 points) a. Stretching Water Supplies (18 points): Points will be awarded based on the extent to which the project is expected to secure and stretch reliable water supplies. Consideration will be given to the amount of water expected to be made available by the project and the extent to which the project will reduce demands on existing facilities and otherwise reduce water diversions. b. Contributions to Water Supply Reliability (17 points): Points will be awarded for projects that contribute to a more reliable water supply. 2. Environment and Water Quality (12 points): Points will be awarded based on the extent to which the project will improve surface, groundwater, or effluent discharge quality; will restore or enhance habitat for nonlisted species; will address problems caused by invasive species; or will provide water or habitat for federally listed threatened or endangered species. Indirect benefits of the project will also be considered under this criterion. 3. Economic Benefits (35 points) a. Cost Effectiveness (10 points): Points will be awarded based on the cost per acre-foot of water expected to be delivered upon completion of the project and how the cost of the project compares to a nonreclaimed water alternative. b. Economic Analysis and Project Benefits (25 points): Points will be awarded based on the analysis of the project’s benefits relative to the project’s costs. 4. Department of Interior Priorities (10 Points): Points will be awarded based on the extent that the proposal demonstrates that the project supports the Department of the Interior priorities, such as utilizing natural resources and modernizing infrastructure. 5. Reclamation’s Obligations and Benefits to Rural or Economically Disadvantaged Communities (8 points) a. Legal and Contractual Water Supply Obligations (4 Points): Points will be awarded for projects that help to meet Reclamation’s legal and contractual obligations. b. Benefits to Rural or Economically Disadvantaged Communities (4 Points): Points will be awarded based on the extent to which the project serves rural communities or economically disadvantaged communities in rural or urban areas. 6. Watershed Perspective (10 Points): Points will be awarded based on the extent to which the project promotes or applies a watershed perspective by implementing an integrated resources management approach, implementing a regional planning effort, forming collaborative partnerships with other entities, or conducting public outreach.\nReclamation changed some of its evaluation criteria in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The fiscal year 2017 changes were made in response to requirements in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act)—which listed several criteria for projects, including projects that provide multiple benefits—and comments from the Office of Management and Budget, according to Reclamation officials. The fiscal year 2018 changes were generally made in response to comments Reclamation received during the formal comment period it held in March and April 2018 to solicit input on the criteria, according to Reclamation officials. The changes to the criteria are shown in table 4.", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Elizabeth Erdmann (Assistant Director), Lesley Rinner (Analyst-in-Charge), Margaret Childs, and Sierra Hicks made key contributions to this report. Ellen Fried, Timothy Guinane, Thomas M. James, John Mingus, Patricia Moye, Anne Rhodes-Kline, Sheryl Stein, and Sara Sullivan made additional contributions." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_title", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "h3_title h1_full", "", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What did the Bureau of Reclamation do under the Title XVI program?", "What was most of this funding awarded for?", "What projects remain eligible for funding?", "How much funding is still available to eligible projects?", "What does Reclamation's process to select Tile XVI projects involve?", "What did GAO find regarding this process?", "What has Reclamation changed in recent years?", "Why were these changes made?", "What factors have placed increasing demands on the U.S. water supply?", "How can water management challenges be addressed?", "How did Reclamation's Title XVI project support such efforts?", "How has Congress supported such efforts?", "What was GAO asked to review?", "What does this report describe?", "How did GAO collect data for this report?" ], "summary": [ "The Bureau of Reclamation, within the Department of the Interior, awarded about $715 million in water reuse grants for 46 construction projects and 71 studies under the Title XVI Water Reclamation and Reuse Program (Title XVI) from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2017, according to agency documents.", "Most of the Title XVI funding—about $703 million—has been awarded for construction projects.", "Some construction projects remain eligible for Title XVI grant funding.", "About $464 million in eligible Title XVI grant funding not yet awarded remains for projects that Congress individually authorized; for projects eligible under the 2016 amendments to the Title XVI program, about $513 million remains.", "Reclamation's process to select Title XVI projects and studies to receive grants involves announcing the funding opportunity, establishing criteria to evaluate potential projects, and reviewing applications to make award decisions, according to agency documents GAO reviewed.", "GAO found that Reclamation's grant award process is consistent with relevant federal regulations for awarding grants. For example, the Title XVI funding opportunity announcements GAO reviewed contained information required by the regulations, such as the criteria used to evaluate applications.", "In recent years, Reclamation has changed the criteria it uses to evaluate projects, eliminating or adding some criteria and changing the weighting of others.", "Reclamation officials said that these changes were made in part in response to statutory changes.", "Population growth and drought are among the factors that have placed increasing demands on the U.S. water supply, particularly in the arid West.", "The reuse of wastewater can help address water management challenges by treating water that is typically unusable and then reusing it for beneficial purposes, such as irrigation, according to the Environmental Protection Agency.", "Reclamation's Title XVI program awards grants for the study and construction of water reuse projects in 17 western states and Hawaii.", "From fiscal years 1992 through 2009, Congress individually authorized some Title XVI projects. In 2016, Congress amended the Title XVI program to allow grants to be awarded to additional water reuse projects.", "GAO was asked to review the Title XVI program.", "This report describes, among other things, for the Title XVI program (1) grants Reclamation has awarded for projects and studies and remaining projects that are eligible for grants, (2) the types and locations of projects and studies that have received grants, and (3) Reclamation's process for selecting projects and studies and its consistency with federal grant regulations as well as how the program's evaluation criteria have changed since 2011.", "GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency guidance; analyzed financial data for fiscal years 1992 through 2017; compared documents related to the project selection process against federal grant regulations; and interviewed agency officials and nonfederal project sponsors with different types of projects." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-12-711	{ "title": [ "Background", "The Cost Implications of Evolving Plans for Overseas Presence Are Uncertain", "Decision to Forward Station Ships in Europe Could Allow the Navy to Provide Missile Defense with Fewer Ships, but the Long-Term Costs Are Not Well Defined", "DOD Will Likely Save Money by Reducing Army Forces and Headquarters in Europe, but Amount of Savings Depends on Future Decisions", "DOD Has Taken Steps to Align Posture Initiatives with Strategy and Cost but Continues to Lack Comprehensive and Consistent Cost Estimates of Initiatives", "DOD’s Process to Prioritize Posture Initiatives Is Improving", "Combatant Commands Reported Some Cost Data in Their 2011 Theater Posture Plans, but Gaps Remain", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "DOD operates six geographic combatant commands, each with an assigned area of responsibility (see fig. 1). Each geographic combatant command carries out a variety of missions and activities, including humanitarian assistance and combat operations, and assigns functions to subordinate commanders. Each command is supported by a service component command from each of the services and by a theater special operations command. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have key roles in making decisions on where to locate their forces when they are not otherwise employed or deployed by order of the Secretary of Defense or assigned to a combatant command. In addition, the military departments allocate budgetary resources to construct, maintain, and repair buildings, structures, and utilities and to acquire the real property or interests in real property necessary to carry out their responsibilities. Together, the combatant commands and service component commands develop theater posture plans that seek to prioritize force structure changes and posture initiatives that will best meet national security and strategic priorities for a given area of responsibility.\nThe process for assessing global posture initiatives is managed under the framework of the Global Posture Executive Council, which consists of representatives from the military services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and OSD. The purpose of the Global Posture Executive Council includes facilitating senior leader posture decision making and overseeing the assessment and implementation of posture plans. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director, Joint Staff, serve as co-chairmen of the council, and its membership includes senior representatives from both offices, as well as representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Joint Staff; the combatant commands; the services; and others as needed. Subordinate to the Global Posture Executive Council is the Global Posture Integration Team, which consists of representatives from each military department who review posture initiatives from all combatant commands’ theater posture plans included in the annual global posture prioritization process. The prioritization process itself takes place in a 3-day seminar held in or around November of each year during which 22 representatives from organizations that comprise the Global Posture Executive Council come together to review the posture initiatives proposed in each combatant command’s theater posture plan and prioritize these initiatives based primarily on how they align with strategic defense guidance. The prioritized initiatives are then provided to the services to inform the development of their budgets.\nA hierarchy of national and defense guidance informs the development of DOD’s global posture. The National Security Strategy, to be issued by the President at the beginning of each new administration, and annually thereafter, describes and discusses topics including worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to its national security. The Secretary of Defense then provides corresponding strategic direction through the National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance to the military through the National Military Strategy. On specific matters, such as global defense posture, DOD has also developed new guidance in numerous documents, principally the 2010 Guidance for the Employment of the Force—which consolidates and integrates planning guidance related to operations and other military activities—and the 2010 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—which implements the strategic policy direction provided in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan also tasks combatant commanders to develop theater campaign, contingency, and posture plans that are consistent with the Guidance for the Employment of the Force.facilitate the development of operational and contingency plans, while the theater posture plan provides an overview of posture requirements to support those plans and identifies major ongoing and new posture initiatives to address capability gaps, including current and planned military construction requirements. Figure 2 illustrates the relationships among these national and DOD strategic guidance documents.", "Although DOD has conducted some analysis to support recent global defense posture decisions, the cost implications of these decisions are unknown. In its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, DOD asserted that cost savings associated with permanently stationing forces in the United States rather than overseas are offset by other factors, such as increased costs to periodically rotate forces back to overseas locations. To support this assertion, OSD identified two posture initiatives: (1) the forward deployment and permanent stationing of U.S. Navy ships in Rota, Spain, in support of ballistic missile defense and (2) the reduction of U.S. Army force structure in Europe. Based on our review of the analysis behind these two posture initiatives, we found that the analysis supporting the first was incomplete and that any analysis of the second cannot be completed until several basic decisions are made and assumptions defined.", "The Secretary of the Navy recently announced the permanent stationing of four Aegis-equipped ships in Rota, Spain—two ships in fiscal year 2014 and the other two ships in fiscal year 2015—in order to more efficiently address the operational requirements associated with the President’s Phased Adaptive Approach for European ballistic missile defense.\nThe Navy considered and compared three options in order to determine the most appropriate way to address the operational requirements for ballistic missile defense in Europe: (1) deploying ships to the region from U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, and (3) deploying ships to the region and rotating crews from U.S. bases. The Navy concluded that forward stationing ships represented the most efficient and strategically beneficial of the three options. We reviewed the Navy’s documentation associated with the decision and found two key issues. First, the Navy did not fully consider the rotational crewing option. Second, the Navy used different operational assumptions for the remaining two options and did not control for those differences prior to comparing the analytical results.\nLimited analysis of the rotational crewing option. The Navy provided little documentation for its analysis of the option to forward station ships and rotate crews from U.S. bases—also known as rotational crewing. This option avoids permanently relocating ship crews and their families. Navy officials stated that rotational crewing was undesirable because of its deleterious effect on crew efficiency and morale. Our previous reports found that the Navy had not developed comprehensive guidance for implementing rotational crewing initiatives or a systemic approach for analyzing rotational crewing alternatives and lessons learned. Moreover, as we reported in 2008, initial Navy rotational crewing efforts had provided greater forward presence for Navy ships by eliminating ship transits and maintaining more on-station time in distant operating areas. Therefore, a rotational crewing approach for this posture decision could potentially provide a strategically effective and cost-effective option. However, the Navy provided less analysis of this option than the other two options, which may have prevented the Navy from determining the potential operational value of this approach.\nDifferent operational assumptions not controlled for in analysis of alternatives. The Navy provided more documentation and analysis for its comparison of the forward stationing option to the current approach of U.S.-based deployments to the region. As a result of its analysis, the Navy concluded that the forward stationing option requires significantly fewer ships to meet European ballistic missile defense mission requirements and therefore represents the more efficient and cost-effective option. However, we found that the Navy applied different assumptions to the two options and did not demonstrate that it had controlled for those differences, both of which could affect the outcome of the analysis. Further, Navy officials did not demonstrate that they had considered the long-term life cycle effect and associated costs for each forward deployed ship. Such factors may represent significant costs, without which DOD may lack the comprehensive analysis needed to determine the most efficient approach for meeting ballistic missile defense mission requirements.\nGAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business case analysis or a cost-benefit analysis seeks to find the best value solution by linking each alternative to how it satisfies a strategic objective. This linkage is achieved by developing business cases that present facts and supporting details among competing alternatives, including the life cycle costs and quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits. Specifically, each alternative should identify (1) relative life cycle costs and benefits; (2) methods and rationale for quantifying the life cycle costs and benefits; (3) effect and value of cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs; (4) sensitivity to changes in assumptions; and (5) risk factors. Finally, the analysis should be unbiased, consider all possible alternatives, and be rigorous enough that independent auditors can review it and clearly understand why a particular alternative was chosen. DOD guidance regarding economic analysis similarly encourages the use of sensitivity analysis, a tool that can be used to determine the extent to which costs and benefits change or are sensitive to changes in key factors; this analysis can produce a range of costs and benefits that may provide a better guide or indicator than a single estimate.\nIn contrast, the Navy’s choice to forward station ships in Europe was informed by cost and strategic factors. The Navy considered a number of basing options in or near the Mediterranean and developed a decision matrix that included both strategic and cost factors, such as the proximity of each site to the planned deployment regions and the amount of military construction that would be required at each site to support the ships and their crews. Based on these factors, Navy officials determined that Naval Station Rota provided the best option. From a strategic and operational perspective, Naval Station Rota provides the U.S. Navy with a large maritime port and an associated airfield close to current and potential future operating areas. Additionally, since it is a home port for the Spanish Navy and currently houses Spanish military ships of similar size, there is no need to expand the port pier space to accommodate the incoming ships. Figure 3 shows the current port pier space.\nWhile Naval Station Rota can accommodate the expanded mission, some costs will be incurred. The infrastructure at Rota was initially designed to accommodate a much larger contingent of military personnel and family members than it does currently. Its capacity, according to Navy officials, is sufficient to accommodate the personnel numbers expected once the ships, their crews, and the crews’ families are stationed there. As such, although some military construction will be required, less would be required at Rota than at any of the other sites in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility that were considered. Specifically, the Navy estimated it would cost approximately $33 million for construction of new facilities and upgrades to existing infrastructure. Further, Naval Station Rota officials explained, and we observed, that the base currently has sufficient galley, medical, and housing facilities and that there are no plans to expand the physical footprint of on-base support infrastructure. The Navy also considered estimated up-front and recurring increases in operational and personnel expenses, including those for additional support personnel and increased utilities costs. In total, the Navy estimated that it would incur approximately $166 million in up-front military construction, personnel, and maintenance costs; an annual increase in operations and maintenance; and personnel costs of approximately $179 million.", "The 10-year time period identified in the analysis is fiscal years 2012 through 2021.\nAlthough this decision pertains to a combatant command, funding for the installation containing the command’s headquarters is included in the Army’s budget. entire brigades was likely and that they were currently examining options, including rotating smaller formations, such as companies or battalion-sized elements. The potential rotations will likely have implications on the final basing plan in Europe as well, as the Army would likely want to maintain facilities in Europe for rotating forces.\nUntil the decisions outlined above are made—especially regarding the plans to rotate forces back to Europe—the full extent of the savings that will be realized in light of the Secretary of Defense’s January 2012 decision to reduce the size of permanently stationed U.S. Army forces in Europe will remain uncertain. Based on previous GAO and Army analysis, there is the potential for DOD to save considerably more than the $2 billion originally estimated in light of DOD’s decision to remove the brigades from the force structure. Looking forward, the decisions about the size and frequency of Army rotations will be a key cost driver. Costs will be incurred not only to pay for the rotations, but assumptions about these rotations will also be used to decide which Army installations in Europe to retain.", "", "In part to respond to previous GAO recommendations, DOD recognized the need to prioritize initiatives to reflect strategic goals, has taken steps to align posture initiatives with defense strategy, and has begun to gather cost information. DOD’s evolving global defense posture process links posture initiatives with defense goals and prioritizes those initiatives based on strategic and implementation criteria. Strategic criteria are defined by four focus areas: enabling crisis response, ensuring access for global posture enablers, shaping and improving security cooperation, and supporting contingencies and ongoing operations. Implementation criteria include such factors as operational flexibility, operational management and institutional provisions of the force, ease of implementation, and international relations. Based on our observation of the process, all posture initiatives submitted by combatant commands in their theater posture plans are discussed and voted on within the framework of the strategic and implementation criteria by 22 stakeholders from the Global Posture Executive Council using electronic voting software displayed on a projection screen. The result is a list of posture initiatives ranked in order of strategic priority. During the process, the stakeholders also discuss the approximate costs associated with each initiative, but cost is not considered a key factor and is not voted on. According to DOD officials, this is because costs are considered both before and after the prioritization process (before by the combatant command and after by the services in their budget processes) and because the costs associated with an initiative are always discussed before voting takes place.", "Although the geographic combatant commands are responsible for reporting cost data on existing global posture, we found that the combatant commands did not completely and consistently report cost data in their 2011 theater posture plans. Our prior work has demonstrated, however, that comprehensive cost information is a key component in enabling decision makers to set funding priorities, develop annual budget requests, and evaluate resource requirements at key decision points. Specifically, GAO previously recommended that DOD should compile and report comprehensive cost data in the combatant commands’ theater posture plans.to this recommendation, DOD revised an enclosure in the 2010 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to direct the combatant commands to include the following cost data on current posture in their theater posture plans: DOD officials told us that in response ongoing, current year, and 5-year planned posture initiatives listed by host nation participation (when appropriate). title and cost; full project costs, that is, construction costs plus furniture, fixtures, equipment, and any operation and maintenance costs; implementation progress (when appropriate); and Despite this guidance, our review of the 2011 theater posture plans submitted by the five geographic combatant commands found that though all of them partially complied with the revised guidance, none met all the requirements. For example, some theater posture plans included current year cost data but no cost data for the out years. Additionally, some theater posture plans did not report key cost data, such as military construction costs or operation and maintenance costs. Three of the five posture plans did not include implementation progress for each initiative and did not indicate why this information was not included.\nAdditionally, DOD published supplemental guidance in early 2011 that directs the combatant commands to provide initiative summary sheets for each new posture initiative in their 2011 theater posture plans. These summary sheets are used to inform the prioritization process and include several elements, such as approximate costs broken out by fiscal year and host nation funding (if known), for each posture initiative. However, we found that cost data were not consistently reported in the initiative summary sheets for new posture initiatives as accurately as possible. Therefore, cost data for new posture initiatives may not be able to be accurately compared during the prioritization process. DOD officials told us that in the months between issuance of the theater posture plans and the prioritization process, combatant commands have the opportunity to provide updated cost information for new initiatives.\nBased on our analysis as well as remarks from DOD officials involved in the process, there are two reasons that combatant commands have not been able to accurately and consistently report cost information for their posture initiatives. The first is the lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities. Joint doctrine discussing the components of a joint force notes the responsibility of service component commanders to develop program and budget requests that comply with combatant commander guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities. In addition, the doctrine states that component commanders will provide a copy of the program submission to the combatant commander prior to forwarding it to the service headquarters, and will keep the combatant commander informed of the status of combatant command requirements while service programs are under development. However, according to OSD officials, the combatant commands did not have access to comprehensive cost data that they were required to compile and report because some of the data are compiled by service component commands and the military departments. Officials we interviewed from three combatant commands echoed this sentiment, explaining that while the combatant command is responsible for developing mission requirements for its respective region, it is the military departments that are responsible for developing the budgets that fund initiatives meant to address mission requirements. OSD officials told us that in order to address this lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities, OSD has drafted a DOD instruction outlining the U.S. global defense posture process, which includes specific guidance to the combatant commands and military departments on providing cost data associated with new posture initiatives. Additionally, OSD officials told us that they are in the process of promulgating a data call to issue to the military departments and combatant commands to facilitate determination of the cost of current overseas posture. Key OSD organizations involved in these efforts include OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. We were unable to evaluate the instruction, however, because it was under continuous revision and had not been finalized during the time of our review.\nThe second reason that combatant commands have not been able to accurately and consistently report cost information for their posture initiatives is the lack of a standardized format with which to report the information. Current DOD guidance does not provide a standardized format for the combatant commands to use when requesting information from service component commands, in order to consistently report the required cost data for each posture initiative. Accordingly, officials from U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Air Force Europe stated, for example, that requests for cost data are either too broad or too vague and that fulfilling these data requests is labor intensive. Without a standardized format for reporting cost information associated with each global posture initiative, decision makers on the Global Posture Executive Council cannot accurately consider and compare costs associated with different initiatives.", "By asserting that cost savings associated with decreasing overseas presence are often offset through costs incurred and operational impacts elsewhere, DOD has tempered expectations for savings associated with such reductions. However, in an increasingly constrained budget era, DOD and congressional decision makers need precise estimates so that they can more readily balance resources against strategic requirements. To this end, estimates associated with global posture decisions should be backed by rigorous analysis based on information that is as complete and comprehensive as possible. The potential costs or cost savings that may arise from recent posture decisions in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility will remain uncertain without additional analysis. Specifically, the decision to forward station Aegis-equipped ships at Naval Station Rota may allow the Navy to meet the ballistic mission with fewer ships overall but could cost DOD approximately $1 billion over a 5-year period. And, until a more rigorous analysis of the decision is conducted, the costs of the other options considered will remain unknown. Further, costs and cost savings associated with the decision to reduce Army forces in Europe and adjust the Army’s basing footprint in the region will remain unknown until options related to rotational forces and their associated costs are identified and assessed.\nAt a department wide level, DOD has taken positive steps to develop a process for prioritizing posture initiatives. Currently, the process considers, but is not driven by, cost. However, it remains essential that comprehensive cost information for each initiative be compiled and reported so that once initiatives are proposed, they can be adequately prioritized, resourced, and approved. The current process is hampered by the inconsistency with which cost data are reported; the lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of key OSD organizations, military departments, combatant commands, and service component commands in helping to develop these cost estimates; and the lack of any standardized template with which to report them. Lacking this information, department and congressional decision makers will be unable to adequately assess the true cost of global posture initiatives in the future.", "To identify future funding requirements and improve the posture planning process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:\nDirect the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive analysis for each course of action the Navy has considered to address mission requirements for ballistic missile defense in the Mediterranean that compares all options the Navy considered and either applies consistent operational assumptions or controls for different operational assumptions and includes the long-term life cycle costs and annual operating costs associated with forward stationing.\nDirect the Secretary of the Army to identify and assess options to rotate forces in Europe and their associated costs, including the impacts on future basing in Europe.\nClarify the roles and responsibilities of key OSD organizations, the military departments, and the service component commands, and establish a standardized reporting format to include in applicable guidance for key DOD organizations to use to ensure that cost information is consistently summarized and reported to inform the posture planning process.", "In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and has already initiated certain actions to address them. DOD’s response acknowledged that conducting analysis prior to making posture decisions is important, and that the actions it has taken or plans to take should provide a greater understanding of the global defense posture process and its consideration of costs. However, we believe some additional steps are warranted in order to fully address our recommendations.\nIn response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive analysis for each course of action the Navy has considered to address mission requirements for ballistic missile defense in the Mediterranean, that compares all options the Navy considered and either applies consistent operational assumptions or controls for different operational assumptions and includes the long-term life cycle costs and annual operating costs associated with forward stationing, DOD partially concurred, but did not identify additional actions to address the recommendation. Specifically, DOD agreed that analysis should be conducted prior to making posture decisions, but does not agree that additional analysis is needed to support the decision to forward station four ships in Rota, Spain. As discussed in this report, we acknowledge that the Navy conducted some analysis to support this decision, including the development and consideration of some estimated costs, but we found the analysis inconsistent and incomplete. For example, while the Navy initially stated that it considered rotational crewing as an option, we found its analysis was limited when compared to the other options. In its written comments, DOD identified concerns with this approach, including increased stress on the crews; however, the analysis supporting the decision did not include a discussion of these issues. Additionally, we found that the Navy did not control for the different assumptions used to develop the ship number requirements associated with the forward stationing and U.S.-based deployment approaches, which could have altered the results of the analysis and could represent significant long-term costs. If the Navy maintains that forward stationing is the most effective and efficient means to meet the ballistic missile defense requirement in Europe, DOD would still benefit from determining the life cycle costs associated with the decision in order to determine its true long-term costs, which could be significant. While DOD provided onetime capital costs and average yearly operations and maintenance costs for this option, it remains unclear whether these are long-term life cycle cost estimates. Based on our findings and our cost estimating guide that states that a credible business case analysis should include life cycle costs as well as quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits, we maintain that the Navy, DOD, and Congress would benefit from additional analysis in order to develop a more comprehensive cost estimate associated with the decision to forward station ships in Rota.\nDOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to identify and assess options to rotate forces in Europe and their associated costs, including the impacts on future basing in Europe, and stated that certain actions are ongoing. Specifically, the Army is currently working with U.S. European Command and various Army components to identify and assess options for rotating personnel and equipment through Europe for training and exercises with allies and partners. If fully implemented, we believe DOD’s actions should meet the intent of our recommendation.\nDOD also agreed with our recommendation to clarify the roles and responsibilities of key OSD organizations, the military departments, and the service component commands, and establish a standardized reporting format that will be included in applicable guidance for key DOD organizations to use to ensure that cost information is consistently summarized and reported to inform the posture planning process, and stated that certain actions are under way to address these matters. For example, DOD stated that the department is in the final stages of approving an instruction on the U.S. Global Defense Posture Process that will document roles, responsibilities, and requirements for global posture planning for key OSD organizations, the Joint Staff, the military departments, and the combatant commands. The instruction will institutionalize the Global Posture Integration Team and Global Posture Executive Council to provide formal oversight of global posture management. Additionally, DOD is in the process of issuing a data call to the military departments and combatant commands to help determine the existing infrastructure costs at enduring overseas installations. Lastly, DOD stated that the Joint Staff issued supplemental Theater Posture Plan guidance to the combatant commands in February 2012, including standardized reporting criteria (e.g., estimated costs) for future posture initiatives. If they are fully implemented, we believe DOD’s actions should meet the intent of our recommendation.\nThe department also provided a number of general and technical comments that we considered and incorporated, as appropriate. A complete copy of DODs written comments is reprinted in appendix II.\nWe are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; and the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted analysis of costs and savings associated with recent overseas posture decisions, we reviewed DOD documented cost data and collected additional information by interviewing officials associated with two major global force posture initiatives: the stationing of four Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, to provide ballistic missile defense for the region and the reduction of permanently stationed Army forces in Europe. To determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis to support the decision to station four Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, we analyzed key documents and briefings provided by the U.S. Navy, U.S. European Command, and Naval Station Rota in order to assess assumptions, courses of action considered, and cost estimates. We conducted a site visit to Naval Station Rota to observe existing capabilities and needs for military construction projects identified by the Navy. We also collected information by interviewing officials from the U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; U.S. European Command; U.S. Navy Europe; and Naval Station Rota. To determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis to support force structure reduction of Army brigade combat teams in Europe, we reviewed key documents from U.S European Command and U.S. Army Europe describing the status of planned force structure changes in Europe, including the 2010 and 2011 theater posture plans for U.S. European Command’s area of responsibility. We also collected information by interviewing officials from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Department of the Army, Program Assessment and Evaluation Division; U.S. European Command; and U.S. Army Europe. We analyzed and assessed cost estimates for multiple courses of action associated with the number of brigade combat teams in Europe developed by the U.S. Army, Program Assessment and Evaluation Division, against GAO’s cost estimating criteria to determine the extent to which Army analysts employed best practices when developing the estimates.\nTo determine the extent to which DOD developed a process for making decisions about global posture initiatives that aligns with strategy and considers costs, as well as efforts made by combatant commands to compile and report comprehensive cost data on existing global posture and new posture initiatives in their theater posture plans, we evaluated core global posture strategy documents; current and draft DOD guidance; and other documentation we collected through interviewing with officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command and its three service component commands, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, the four military service headquarters, OSD, OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. To determine the extent to which DOD’s global posture process includes a consideration of cost, we observed the Joint Staff’s November 2011 Posture Review Seminar at which officials employed the Global Posture Initiative and Project Prioritization Process to rank posture initiatives identified in the combatant commands’ respective theater posture plans. We also analyzed and evaluated theater posture plans from 2010 and 2011 for each combatant command to determine the extent to which the plans included comprehensive cost data for each posture initiative. To identify potential challenges associated with the combatant commands’ directive to compile and report comprehensive cost data, we collected information through interviews with officials from U.S. European Command and its service component commands, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Africa Command.\nWe conducted this performance audit between June 2011 and May 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Guy LoFaro, Assistant Director; Robert L. Repasky, Assistant Director; Jennifer Echard; Joanne Landesman; Stephanie Moriarty; Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; Courtney Reid, Analyst in Charge; Michael Shaughnessy; and Grant Sutton made key contributions to this report.", "Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe. GAO-11-131. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2011.\nDefense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits of Basing Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe. GAO-10-745R. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2010.\nDefense Infrastructure: Guam Needs Timely Information from DOD to Meet Challenges in Planning and Financing Off-Base Projects and Programs to Support a Larger Military Presence. GAO-10-90R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.\nBallistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.\nForce Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Ability to Manage, Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives. GAO-09-706R. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2009.\nDefense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to Ensure That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near Guam when Needed. GAO-08-427. Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2008.\nDefense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.\nDefense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.\nDefense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.\nOpportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. GAO-05-680R. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h2_title h3_title", "h3_full h2_full", "h2_full", "h0_full h2_full h1_full", "", "", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What options did the Navy consider for deployment of U.S. Navy ships?", "What issues did GAO find with the Navy's decisionmaking process?", "What effects could such assumptions have?", "What does GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide state?", "What issues might an incomplete analysis raise?", "What are the planned reductions of U.S. Army forces in Europe likely to do?", "What could eliminate the need for new construction?", "What did DOD announce regarding rotating forces?", "How is this lack of definition an issue?", "What does DOD lack despite taking steps to align posture initiatives with strategy and cost?", "What does DOD's posture process link initiatives with?", "How do stakeholders prioritize initiatives?", "What issues did combatant commands have with cost reporting?", "What reasons did GAO find for this?", "Why is this lack of data an issue?", "What guidance did DOD issue in January 2012?", "How was this demonstrated by its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report?", "What did GAO evaluate regarding the DOD?", "How did GAO evaluate this?" ], "summary": [ "The Navy considered three options: (1) deploying ships to the region from U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews overseas, and (3) deploying ships to the region and rotating crews from U.S. bases.", "The Navy concluded that forward stationing ships was the most efficient option, but GAO found that it did not fully consider the option to rotate crews from U.S. bases and, in a classified analysis, it used different assumptions for forward stationing versus deploying from the United States.", "These assumptions could affect the results of the analysis and have long-term cost implications.", "GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business case or cost-benefit analysis finds the best value solution by presenting facts and supporting details among competing alternatives, including the life cycle costs and benefits, and sensitivity to changes in assumptions.", "Without an analysis that controls for differing assumptions or considers factors such as complete life cycle costs, the long-term costs associated with its decision to forward station ships will remain unknown.", "The planned reductions of U.S. Army forces in Europe will likely save money; however, decisions that could affect the extent of the savings are pending. For example, a 2010 Army analysis found $2 billion in savings over 10 years by returning forces from Germany, but assumed that new facilities estimated at $800 million would need to be built in the United States to house them.", "However, present planned reductions in overall Army end strength could eliminate the need for new construction.", "Further, DOD announced that it will rotate forces from the United States to Europe, but the nature of the rotations—which could include significant costs depending on their size and frequency—has not yet been defined.", "According to DOD officials, until such determinations are made, the savings to DOD will remain uncertain.", "DOD has taken steps to align posture initiatives with strategy and cost, but continues to lack comprehensive and consistent cost estimates of initiatives.", "DOD’s evolving posture process links initiatives with defense goals.", "Stakeholders from key DOD entities prioritize the initiatives in a voting process based on strategic criteria; cost is discussed, but not voted on.", "Furthermore, combatant commands did not completely and consistently report cost data in their theater posture plans because of the lack of readily available cost information.", "GAO found two primary reasons for this: unclear roles and responsibilities of key DOD organizations that have access to the cost data needed to compile and report comprehensive cost estimates and lack of a standardized format to compile and report cost data from component commands.", "Until these cost data are comprehensively compiled and reported, DOD and congressional decision makers will be unable to assess the true cost of posture initiatives.", "In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance on defense budget priorities, indicating that it must rebalance its overseas force posture—including the forward stationing of Navy ships in Spain for ballistic missile defense and the reduction of U.S. Army forces in Europe—in the face of deficit reduction.", "Similarly, DOD reported in its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress that savings associated with permanently stationing forces in the United States rather than overseas are often offset by such factors as increased rotational costs.", "Based on direction from the Senate Armed Services Committee, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has (1) conducted analysis to support recent overseas posture decisions and (2) developed a process for making posture decisions that align with strategy and consider costs.", "GAO assessed two recent posture initiatives, DOD plans and guidance related to posture, and theater posture plans from each combatant command." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 3, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, 0, -1, 3, 3, -1, 0, -1, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
CRS_R42434	{ "title": [ "", "Does the United States Need to Import Foreign Lower-Skilled Workers?", "Current Guest Worker Visas", "Overview of H-2A and H-2B Visas", "Temporary Labor Certification", "H-2A Program", "H-2A Visa Issuances", "Regulatory Changes", "DHS H-2A Regulations", "DOL H-2A Regulations", "H-2B Program", "H-2B Visa Issuances and the Statutory Cap", "Recent Regulatory Changes", "DHS Regulations", "DOL Regulations on H-2B Employment", "DOL Regulations on H-2B Wages", "Other Guest Worker-Related Visas", "J-1 Summer Work Travel Program", "Administrative Changes", "Participation in the SWT Program", "Unauthorized Employment", "Employment Eligibility Verification", "Legislative Reform Efforts", "Temporary Agricultural Workers", "Temporary Nonagricultural Workers", "Policy Considerations", "Program Administration", "Labor Market Test", "Wages", "Seasonal or Temporary Nature of Work", "Numerical Limits", "Treatment of Family Members", "Adjustment of Status of Guest Workers", "Enforcement", "Conclusion" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "U.S. employers in various industries argue that they need to hire foreign workers to perform low-skilled jobs. A threshold question about importing temporary lower-skilled workers, sometimes referred to as guest workers, is whether U.S. employers need foreign workers for lower-skilled positions, or whether there is a sufficient number of available U.S. workers who could fill these jobs. This question gains salience in times of high U.S. unemployment. The issue of whether U.S. employers need foreign workers is often stated in terms of whether there are domestic labor shortages in particular industries and occupations. Questions about the existence of labor shortages are difficult to answer definitively because of various factors.\nThe issue of labor shortages in seasonal agriculture, in particular, has been a longstanding concern and is receiving renewed attention. The farm labor shortage issue, however, is surrounded by many unanswered questions, including the following: Would more U.S. workers be willing to become farm workers if wages were raised and the terms of work were changed? If so, would such wage and other changes make the U.S. agricultural industry uncompetitive in the world marketplace? Alternatively, would there be an adequate supply of authorized U.S. farm workers if new technologies were developed and implemented?\nIn the past, guest workers have been imported to address U.S. worker shortages during times of war. During World War I, for example, tens of thousands of Mexican workers performed mainly agricultural labor as part of a temporary worker program. The controversial Bracero program, which began during World War II and lasted until 1964, brought several million Mexican agricultural workers into the United States. At its peak in the late 1950s, the Bracero program employed more than 400,000 Mexican workers annually. Today, the United States imports guest workers in much smaller numbers to perform temporary agricultural and nonagricultural labor. In current guest worker programs, issues of need for foreign workers are addressed on an individual basis through a process of labor certification.\nGuest worker programs remain controversial. Some view them as a necessary source of legal workers and call for their reform and expansion. Others view them, in their current form, as \"inherently abusive\" and argue that if they are to be allowed to continue operating, they must be thoroughly overhauled.\nThis report discusses existing visa programs for temporary lower-skilled workers, including regulatory changes since 2008. It covers legislative efforts to reform current programs and to create new guest worker visas. It further identifies and explores key policy considerations to help inform congressional action on guest worker programs.", "The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, enumerates categories of aliens, known as nonimmigrants, who are admitted to the United States for a temporary period of time and a specific purpose. Nonimmigrant visa categories are identified by letters and numbers, based on the sections of the INA that established them. Among the major nonimmigrant visa categories is the \"H\" category for temporary workers. The H category includes H-2A and H-2B visas for guest workers, as well as visas for higher-skilled temporary workers. Foreign nationals can also perform lower-skilled temporary work on certain other nonimmigrant visas.", "The INA, as originally enacted, authorized an H-2 nonimmigrant visa category for foreign agricultural and nonagricultural workers who were coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services (other than services of an exceptional nature requiring distinguished merit and ability) or labor. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) amended the INA to subdivide the H-2 program into the current H-2A agricultural worker program and H-2B nonagricultural worker program and to detail the admissions process for H-2A workers. The H-2A and H-2B programs are administered by the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor (DOL) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\nWhile there are many differences between the H-2A agricultural worker program and the H-2B nonagricultural worker program, the process of importing workers under either program entails the same steps. Employers who want to hire workers through either program must first apply to DOL for labor certification, as discussed in the next section. After receiving labor certification, a prospective H-2A or H-2B employer can submit an application, known as a petition, to DHS to bring in foreign workers. If the application is approved, foreign workers who are abroad can then go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa from the Department of State (DOS). If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry.\nIn both the H-2A and H-2B programs, there is a tension between providing protections to U.S. and foreign workers on the one hand and making the programs responsive to legitimate employer needs on the other. While these competing interests are longstanding, the current environment—with relatively high levels of U.S. unemployment; discussions about expanding the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system (as discussed below); and concerns about shortages of legal workers, especially in agriculture—has heightened the tensions.", "DOL's ETA is responsible for administering the labor certification process under the H-2A and H-2B programs. Under both programs, employers submit applications in which they request the certification of a particular number of positions.\nINA provisions on the admission of H-2A workers state that an H-2A petition cannot be approved unless the petitioner has applied to DOL for certification that\n(1) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified … and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and\n(2) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.\nThere is no equivalent statutory labor certification requirement for the H-2B program. The INA, however, does contain some related language. For example, it defines an H-2B alien, in relevant part, as an alien \"who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary service or labor if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country.\" The H-2B labor certification requirement instead appears in DHS regulations. These regulations state:\nThe petitioner may not file an H-2B petition unless the United States petitioner has applied for a labor certification with the Secretary of Labor ... and has obtained a favorable labor certification determination ...\nThe H-2A and H-2B labor certification requirements are intended to provide job, wage, and working conditions protections to U.S. workers. They are implemented in both programs through a multifaceted labor certification process that requires prospective H-2A and H-2B employers to conduct recruitment for U.S. workers and offer a minimum level of wages and benefits that varies by program.\nTable 1 provides summary information on H-2A and H-2B labor certification applications. The position certified number represents the number of positions for which employers can apply to DHS to fill with foreign workers. Typically, however, employers petition for a smaller number of workers.", "The H-2A program allows for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services of a seasonal or temporary nature, provided that U.S. workers are not available. In general, for purposes of the H-2A program, work is of a temporary nature where the employer's need for the worker will last no longer than one year. Thus, an approved H-2A visa petition is generally valid for an initial period of up to one year. An employer can apply to extend an H-2A worker's stay in increments of up to one year, but an alien's total period of stay as an H-2A worker may not exceed three consecutive years. An alien who has spent three years in the United States in H-2A status may not seek an extension of stay or be readmitted to the United States as an H-2A worker until he or she has been outside the country for three months.\nAs discussed above, an employer who wants to import H-2A workers must first apply to DOL for a certification that (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work; and (2) the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed. Prospective H-2A employers must attempt to recruit U.S. workers and must cooperate with DOL-funded state employment service agencies (also known as state workforce agencies) in local, intrastate, and interstate recruitment efforts. Under the H-2A program's fifty percent rule , employers are required to hire any qualified U.S. worker who applies for a position during the first half of the work contract under which the H-2A workers who are in the job are employed.\nAmong the other H-2A labor certification requirements, employers must provide a \"three-fourths guarantee\"; that is, they must guarantee to offer workers employment for at least three-fourths of the contract period. As discussed below, H-2A employers must pay their H-2A workers and similarly employed U.S. workers the highest of several wage rates and must also provide workers with housing, transportation, and other benefits, including workers' compensation insurance. No health insurance coverage is required.\nAs indicated in Table 1 above, 86,014 H-2A positions were certified for FY2009 and 79,011 were certified for FY2010. Employers in North Carolina received more H-2A certifications than employers in any other state in both years. Other top states, in terms of number of H-2A positions certified, were Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, and Louisiana.", "The H-2A program is not subject to a statutory numerical limit and has grown significantly over the last 20 years. One way to measure the H-2A program's growth is to consider changes in the number of H-2A visas issued annually by DOS. As explained above, the visa application and issuance process occurs after DOL has granted labor certification and DHS has approved the visa petition. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the number of H-2A visas issued increased more than fourfold between FY1992 and FY2000, when about 30,000 visas were issued. H-2A visa issuances remained at about 30,000 annually until FY2005 and then started to increase, peaking at more than 64,000 FY2008. The number of H-2A visas issued subsequently declined, totaling some 55,000 in FY2011, according to preliminary DOS data.\nDespite its growth since the early 1990s, the H-2A program remains quite small relative to total hired farm employment. This relatively small size has become an issue in the debate about the program. Critics of the H-2A program cite the low levels of participation as evidence of the program's inadequacy to meet the needs of U.S. agricultural employers. Others, however, attribute the program's low utilization to the availability of unauthorized workers, who are willing to work for lower wages than legal workers.", "In August 2007, in the aftermath of unsuccessful congressional efforts to enact comprehensive immigration legislation with guest worker provisions, the George W. Bush Administration announced that it would streamline existing guest worker programs within current law. In December 2008, DHS and DOL published final rules to significantly amend their respective H-2A regulations, which went into effect on January 17, 2009. The Obama Administration retained the 2008 DHS rule on the H-2A visa. It sought to review the 2008 DOL rule, and unsuccessfully attempted to suspend it in 2009. DOL subsequently issued a new final H-2A rule, which became effective on March 15, 2010, to replace the 2008 final rule.", "The 2008 DHS final rule on the H-2A visa described its purpose as being \"to provide agricultural employers with an orderly and timely flow of legal workers, thereby decreasing their reliance on unauthorized workers, while protecting the rights of laborers.\" The rule made various changes to prior regulations to facilitate continued H-2A employment. Among these changes, it modified previous limitations on an H-2A worker's period of stay in the United States. It also extended the period of time that an H-2A worker could remain in the United States after the H-2A petition expired in order to prepare to depart or to seek an extension of stay. In addition, the DHS rule limited participation in the H-2A program to designated countries.", "The 2010 DOL final rule on H-A employment issued under the Obama Administration included as its centerpiece, regulations by the Employment and Training Administration concerning H-2A labor certification. It also included regulations by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) concerning enforcement of contractual obligations under the H-2A program.\nThe 2010 rule reversed changes made by the 2008 DOL rule to the H-2A labor certification process. Prior to the 2008 rule, the labor certification process was a fully supervised certification-based process, in which federal or state officials reviewed an employer's actual efforts or documentation to ensure compliance with program requirements. The 2008 rule replaced this supervised process with an attestation-based process, in which prospective H-2A employers had to attest in their applications, under threat of penalties, that they complied with H-2A program requirements.\nIn the supplementary information accompanying the proposed rule to replace the 2008 rule, DOL explained the need for new rulemaking, in part, as follows:\nThe Department, upon due consideration, believes that the policy underpinnings of the 2008 Final Rule, e.g. streamlining the H–2A regulatory process to defer many determinations of program compliance until after an Application has been fully adjudicated, do not provide an adequate level of protection for either U.S. or foreign workers.\nThe ETA regulations in the 2010 DOL final rule reestablished the type of H-2A labor certification process that had been in effect prior to the 2008 rule. At the same time, these regulations retained some of the changes to the labor certification process included in the 2008 rule. For example, the 2010 regulations retained the earlier rule's expansion of the definition of agricultural labor or services for the H-2A program to include logging employment.\nUnder the 2010 DOL H-2A rule, prospective H-2A employers are required to submit a job order to the state workforce agency (SWA) serving the area of intended employment before filing a labor certification application. Once reviewed and cleared by the SWA, the job order becomes the basis for recruiting U.S. workers to fill the employer's job openings. The employer can then file the labor certification application with DOL.\nAs part of the labor certification process, H-2A employers have to offer and pay wages that meet specified requirements. The 2010 DOL rule amended existing regulations to require H-2A employers to pay their workers the highest of four wage rates: the federal or applicable state minimum wage, the prevailing wage rate, the adverse effect wage rate (AEWR), or the agreed-upon collective bargaining wage. In addition, the ETA regulations in the 2010 DOL rule included a system of post-certification audits of H-2A employer applications, which were a revised version of the system in the 2008 rule, and expanded DOL's authority to bar employers from participating in the program (known as debarment authority).\nWage and Hour Division regulations in the 2010 DOL H-2A final rule addressed enforcement of contractual obligations under the H-2A program. These regulations revised provisions in the 2008 final rule. Among the changes, the 2010 rule provided WHD with independent authority to debar employers for \"substantial violations\" and increased the civil money penalties for specified violations.", "The H-2B program provides for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform temporary nonagricultural service or labor, if unemployed U.S. workers cannot be found. Foreign medical graduates coming to perform medical services are explicitly excluded from the program. In order for work to qualify as temporary under the H-2B visa, the employer's need for the duties to be performed by the worker must be a one-time occurrence, a seasonal need, a peak load need, or an intermittent need. The employer's need for workers under the H-2B program must generally be for a period of one year or less, but, as explained in the discussion of recent regulatory changes below, it could be longer in the case of a one-time occurrence. An alien's total period of stay as an H-2B worker may not exceed three consecutive years. An H-2B alien who has spent three years in the United States may not seek an extension of stay or be readmitted to the United States as an H-2B worker until he or she has been outside the country for three months.\nLike prospective H-2A employers, prospective H-2B employers must first apply to DOL for certification that U.S. workers capable of performing the work are not available and that the employment of alien workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. H-2B employers must pay their workers the highest of the prevailing wage rate or the federal, state, or local minimum wage. Unlike H-2A employers, they are not subject to the AEWR. Traditionally, H-2B employers have been subject to many fewer worker benefit requirements than H-2A employers, but DOL regulations published in February 2012 added new requirements to the H-2B labor certification process. (As explained in the Recent Regulatory Changes section, however, these 2012 regulations are not in effect as of this writing.)\nH-2B workers are largely low skilled, but the H-2B program is not limited to workers of a particular skill level and over the years the H-2B visa has been used to import a variety of workers. According to DOL labor certification data, the top H-2B occupation in recent years, in terms of the number of workers certified, has been landscape laborer. Other top occupations include forest worker, housekeeping cleaner, and amusement park worker.\nAs shown in Table 1 above, 154,489 H-2B positions were certified for FY2009. Employers in Texas received more than 21,000 of these certifications. Other top states in FY2009, in terms of number of H-2B positions certified, were Florida, Colorado, and Virginia.", "Unlike the H-2A visa, the H-2B visa is subject to a statutory numerical limit. Under the INA, the total number of aliens who may be issued H-2B visas or otherwise provided H-2B status during a fiscal year may not exceed 66,000. This cap does not apply to petitions for current H-2B workers to extend their stay, change their terms of employment, or change or add employers.\nAs shown in Figure 2 , the number of H-2B visas issued by DOS dipped between FY1992 and FY1993 and then began to increase fairly steadily until FY2007. As discussed below, a temporary provision exempted certain H-2B workers from the statutory 66,000 cap for three years beginning in FY2005. In both FY2003 and FY2004, however, H-2B visa issuances exceeded the cap.", "Mirroring regulatory actions taken on the H-2A program, DHS and DOL under the George W. Bush Administration published final rules to significantly amend their respective H-2B regulations in December 2008. The final rules went into effect on January 18, 2009. The Obama Administration initially retained both the 2008 DHS and DOL final rules on the H-2B visa. In March 2011, however, DOL proposed new regulations to replace the DOL 2008 H-2B rule. A new final rule was published in February 2012, with an effective date in April 2012. The rule did not become operative in April 2012, however. A federal district court in Florida issued a preliminary injunction against the rule, which is being challenged on the grounds that DOL lacks authority over H-2B labor certification rules. The H-2B program is currently operating under the 2008 DOL rule.\nIn January 2011, DOL published a separate final rule to revise the methodology for calculating prevailing wage rates under the H-2B program, with an effective date of January 1, 2012. Due to court challenges and congressional action, the effective date of the wage rule has been changed several times. The effective date is currently set at March 27, 2013, in response to language enacted as part of the FY2013 Continuing Appropriations Resolution.", "DHS's 2008 rule on the H-2B visa made various changes to prior regulations. Among these changes, it redefined \"temporary employment\" for H-2B purposes to require the prospective H-2B employer to establish that his or her need for the worker would end in the \"near, definable future.\" In the case of a one-time occurrence (one type of allowable need under the H-2B program, as discussed above), the employer's need could last up to three years. Other changes to DHS's H-2B regulations mirrored changes to its H-2A regulations. These included modification of previous limitations on an H-2B worker's period of stay in the United States and limitation of participation in the H-2B program to nationals of designated countries.", "The 2012 DOL final H-2B rule, which, as noted above, is not currently operative, includes regulations by DOL's ETA concerning H-2B labor certification—the main focus of discussion here —and regulations by DOL's WHD concerning H-2B program enforcement.\nUnder DOL's 2008 rule, the H-2B labor certification process became an attestation-based process, in which employers had to attest in their applications, under threat of penalties, that they had complied with program requirements. The 2012 rule reinstated a certification-based model, in which employers had to show compliance with recruitment and other requirements in advance of a determination on the labor certification application.\nAs in its explanation of the need for new H-2A rulemaking, DOL stated in the supplementary information accompanying its proposed rule (the precursor to the 2012 final rule) that the existing system of making determinations about program compliance after an application had been adjudicated did not provide sufficient protections for U.S. or foreign workers. It further described problems of noncompliance:\n[I]n the first year of the operation of the attestation-based system our experience indicates that employers are attesting to compliance with program obligations with which they have not complied, and that employers do not appear to be recruiting, hiring and paying U.S. workers, and in some cases the H-2B workers themselves, in accordance with established program requirements.\nIn addition to returning to a certification-based model, the 2012 rule bifurcated the labor certification application process into distinct registration and application phases and revised application timetables.\nThe 2012 final rule made a variety of other changes to the H-2B labor certification process. In an expansion of current employer obligations, the final rule required employers to provide workers engaged in corresponding employment with at least the same protections, wages, and benefits as those provided to H-2B workers. The final rule also placed new benefit requirements on employers, such as requiring them to pay or reimburse workers for transportation and visa costs.\nAdditionally, the 2012 DOL rule revised ETA regulations on audits and debarment, mechanisms intended to ensure employer compliance with labor certification requirements. It also added provisions to allow ETA to revoke an H-2B labor certification after it has been approved in specified circumstances.\nWhile the ETA regulations discussed above comprise the main body of the 2012 DOL final H-2B rule, the rule also included regulations by WHD to carry out certain H-2B-related enforcement functions. These functions were delegated by DHS, effective January 18, 2009, to the Secretary of Labor, who, in turn, delegated them to WHD. The final 2012 WHD regulations described the agency's enforcement responsibilities as follows:\nIn general, matters concerning the rights of H–2B workers and workers in corresponding employment under this part and the employer's obligations are enforced by the WHD.... The WHD has the responsibility to carry out investigations, inspections, and law enforcement functions and in appropriate instances to impose penalties, to debar from future certifications, to recommend revocation of existing certifications, and to seek remedies for violations\nUnder the final rule, WHD, like ETA, has independent authority to debar employers for violations.", "As mentioned above, H-2B employers are required to pay workers the highest of the prevailing wage rate or the federal, state, or local minimum wage. In January 2011, DOL issued a final rule to change the methodology for determining prevailing wage rates for the H-2B program. Under the rule, the prevailing wage rate is the highest of four rates: (1) the wage rate that applies to the job under a collective bargaining agreement, (2) the wage rate that applies to the job under the Davis-Bacon Act, (3) the wage rate that applies to the job under the Service Contract Act, or (4) the average wage paid to workers employed in similar jobs in the area of intended employment, as determined by DOL's Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Survey. Many interested parties believe that this rule change would generally increase hourly wages for H-2B workers. As noted above, this rule is not currently in effect.", "Beyond the \"H\" nonimmigrant category, there are other nonimmigrant visas that cover temporary lower-skilled work. Notable among them is the J-1 visa under the \"J\" nonimmigrant category for exchange visitors. The J-1 visa is for individuals participating in work- and study-based exchange visitor programs and encompasses a variety of work-related programs. Among them are programs for au pairs, camp counselors, and, as discussed below, students engaged in summer work and travel. The J-1 visa is not numerically limited by law. DOS oversees the various J-1 programs and designates sponsor organizations to conduct program activities.\nAlthough many J-1 programs include work, they are not categorized as temporary work programs under the INA and are not subject to standard temporary work program requirements or standard nonimmigrant visa petitioning procedures. For example, the application process for the J-1 programs is different than for the H-2A, H-2B, and other temporary worker programs. Among the differences, the J-1 programs do not require the submission of either a labor certification application to DOL or a nonimmigrant visa petition to DHS. Instead, program administration is handled by the designated sponsors, who are responsible for screening and selecting prospective J-1 participants. An individual who is selected for participation in a J-1 program is issued a form by a sponsor that he or she then uses to apply for a visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate.", "The largest J-1 program and the one most relevant to a discussion of guest workers is the Summer Work Travel (SWT) program. DOS describes the SWT program as follows:\nThe Summer Work Travel program provides foreign students with an opportunity to live and work in the United States during their summer vacation from college or university to experience and to be exposed to the people and way of life in the United States.\nSWT participants perform a variety of jobs, but, according to DOS, \"work in largely unskilled positions.\" Among the positions they hold are H-2B-like seasonal jobs at resorts and amusement parks. By regulation, as discussed below, SWT participants are excluded from performing certain types of work, including domestic help in private homes.", "In April 2011, DOS issued an interim final rule to amend its regulations on the SWT program. The rule became effective in July 2011. In the supplementary information accompanying the rule, DOS explained the need for modifications as follows:\nThe Department has examined the potential risks and harms related to the Summer Work Travel program and believe[s] that the current regulations do not sufficiently protect national security interests; the Department's reputation; and the health, safety, and welfare of Summer Work Travel program participants.\nDOS cited an increase in the number of complaints about the SWT program during the summer of 2010 involving \"fraudulent job offers, inappropriate jobs, job cancellations on arrival, insufficient number of work hours, and housing and transportation problems,\" as well as more general concerns about the increased incidence of criminal activity, such as money laundering and identity theft, in some unspecified nonimmigrant visa categories.\nThe 2011 rule added new requirements under the SWT program and increased the responsibility of designated sponsors to perform oversight. The program-wide rule built on a pilot program implemented in 2011 that placed additional requirements on SWT participants from six countries due to concerns about criminal activity. The rule established separate sets of job placement procedures for participants from Visa Waiver countries and non-Visa Waiver countries based on the idea that the former faced less risk of harm related to SWT program participation. A main difference was that sponsors had to ensure that participants from non-Visa Waiver countries had job placements when they entered the United States.\nUnder the 2011 rule, sponsors had to vet prospective U.S. host employers and job offers, and they had to ensure that the employers fulfilled their obligations under the SWT program. These obligations included paying participants at least the prevailing wage rate and providing them with the number of weekly hours listed on the job offer. Sponsors also had to screen and vet foreign entities that assist them in conducting core functions of the program, such as participant screening and selection. In addition, the rule expanded the monitoring responsibilities of sponsors, requiring them to contact program participants on a monthly basis.\nThe 2011 DOS rule expanded provisions in prior regulations regarding prohibited work activities under the SWT program. Under the prior regulations, participants could not hold positions as domestic employees in U.S. households or positions that required them to invest money in inventory for door-to-door sales. The 2011 rule clarified the domestic help restriction by providing examples of the types of positions that SWT participants cannot hold: they cannot provide child care or elder care and cannot work as gardeners or chauffeurs. The rule retained the restriction on sales positions that require the purchase of inventory and enumerated other types of prohibited work, such as positions in the adult entertainment industry and positions in clinical care that entail patient contact.\nIn November 2011, in the face of continuing complaints about the SWT program, DOS announced additional limitations on the program in a public notice. It announced that it was restricting the program to the number of participants in 2011 (approximately 103,000) and that it would not designate any new SWT sponsor organizations. The notice indicated that these restrictions would remain in effect until DOS completed an ongoing review of the SWT program and its regulations and \"implements the next steps.\"\nIn May 2012, DOS published a second interim final rule on the SWT program, most of which became effective that month. This rule made changes to the 2011 interim rule and also implemented new regulations intended to enable the U.S. government \"to better regulate sponsors in order to protect participants, the program itself, and U.S. communities that support Summer Work Travel participants.\"\nAs characterized in the supplementary information accompanying the 2012 interim rule, the new regulations \"expand sponsors' obligations with respect to the cultural component mandated by the Act [Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961], clarify characteristics of jobs that are consistent with the purpose of the Act, [and] identify jobs that are inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.\" Among the new requirements under the 2012 rule, SWT participants must be placed in jobs that are seasonal or temporary, and there must be opportunities for participants to interact with U.S. citizens and experience American culture during the work component of the program. The new rule also placed new responsibilities on sponsors that were intended to protect U.S. workers. For example, under the new regulations, sponsors must confirm each season that prospective host employers will not displace U.S. workers at worksites where SWT participants will be placed.\nIn the supplementary information accompanying the 2012 interim rule, DOS also addressed the issue of a numerical cap. It stated that the SWT program would \"proceed for the near future at a level not to exceed 109,000 participants annually.\"", "According to USCIS's Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which maintains information about nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors in the United States, more than 100,000 foreign nationals have participated in the J-1 SWT program each year since 2005 (see Figure 3 ). It is not known, however, precisely how many of these participants held H-2B-like jobs.", "Policy discussions about guest worker programs necessarily involve consideration of unauthorized workers, who have traditionally performed lower-skilled work in a variety of industries. It is widely believed that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to work. The Pew Hispanic Center (Center), which regularly analyzes data and issues reports on the unauthorized alien population in the United States, has estimated that there were 8.0 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian labor force in March 2010. These unauthorized workers accounted for 5.2% of the civilian labor force.", "To prevent unauthorized immigrants from obtaining employment, policymakers have established systems for verifying the employment eligibility of workers. Currently, all employers must examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work authorization and must complete and retain employment eligibility verification (I-9) forms. This document review process has been largely undermined by the ready availability of fraudulent documents.\nEmployers may also participate in the E-Verify electronic verification system administered by USCIS. E-Verify is primarily a voluntary program, although there are some mandatory participants. There are ongoing legislative efforts to make E-Verify or a similar system mandatory for all employers. Some are concerned that such a mandatory electronic employment eligibility verification system would result in labor shortages in industries with large numbers of unauthorized workers, such as agriculture.", "Since the 1990s, a variety of legislative proposals have been put forth concerning guest workers. Some proposals would reform existing programs, while others would establish new guest worker programs for agricultural and nonagricultural workers. Over the years, some proposals have been introduced in Congress as stand-alone bills, while others have been part of larger comprehensive immigration reform measures.\nRecently, congressional interest in the area of guest worker programs has been focused mainly on temporary agricultural workers. This focus stems, in part, from concerns of Members of Congress that legislative efforts to make E-Verify or another electronic employment eligibility verification system mandatory, as discussed above, would lead to agricultural worker shortages.", "Over the years, both growers and labor advocates have criticized the H-2A program. Growers complain that the program is administratively cumbersome, expensive, and ineffective in meeting their labor needs. Labor advocates argue that the program provides too few protections for workers.\nIn the late 1990s, representatives of growers and workers reached agreement on legislation to address the foreign agricultural worker issue. The legislation became known as the Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits, and Security Act, or AgJOBS. It combined provisions to reform the H-2A program with a program to legalize the status of farm workers though a two-stage process. During the 106 th Congress, AgJOBs legislation became the basis of a bipartisan compromise on foreign agricultural workers, but that compromise fell apart at the end of the 2000s. More recently, AgJOBS titles were included in comprehensive immigration reform bills considered in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses. None of these bills were enacted.\nForeign agricultural workers have been a recent focus of attention in Congress, with the immigration subcommittees of both the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees holding related hearings in 2011 and 2012. A number of legislative proposals on agricultural guest workers have likewise been put forward in the 112 th Congress. Some bills would amend INA provisions on the H-2A visa, while others would establish new temporary agricultural worker programs as alternatives to the H-2A program. Still other proposals would couple a legalization program for agricultural workers either with H-2A reform, as in the traditional AgJOBS formulation, or with other changes to current law on agricultural labor.", "Historically, the H-2B program has not been subject to the same level of employer criticism about administrative burden and expense as the H-2A program. Instead, in years of high demand for H-2B workers, employer criticism and related reform efforts have centered on the statutory annual numerical cap of 66,000. In past Congresses, as discussed above, legislation was enacted to establish a temporary exemption from the cap for certain returning H-2B workers. Following the expiration of that temporary provision in 2007, there were unsuccessful legislative efforts to reinstate some type of returning worker exemption.\nIn addition to these legislative efforts targeted at the H-2B cap, comprehensive immigration reform bills introduced in past Congresses have included provisions related to the H-2B visa and temporary nonagricultural workers generally. Various bills over the years have proposed to make changes to the H-2B visa and to establish new guest worker programs for temporary nonagricultural workers. One feature common to many of the latter proposals for new programs is that they would have enabled employers to hire workers to meet ongoing labor needs on a temporary basis. They would not have been subject to the limitation under the H-2B program that the employer demonstrate a seasonal or temporary need (see discussion of H-2B temporary need requirements, above, and discussion of seasonal or temporary need issues, below).\nOther H-2B bills in recent Congresses have proposed to reform the H-2B visa by increasing labor protections under the program. These proposals have sought to strengthen protections in various areas, including federal labor law enforcement, recruitment of U.S. workers, and wages. They have likewise included provisions on labor recruiter accountability.", "Generally speaking, as discussed above, guest worker programs try to achieve two goals simultaneously: to be responsive to legitimate employer needs for labor and to provide adequate protections for U.S. and foreign temporary workers. DOL explicitly addressed the idea of balancing the needs of employers and workers in its 2011 proposed rule on the H-2B visa (the precursor to the 2012 final rule). Supplementary information accompanying the 2011 proposal stated:\nAlthough the Department still seeks to maintain an efficient system, it has in this new rule struck a balance between reducing processing times and protecting U.S. worker access to these job opportunities.\nThe balancing of broad guest worker program goals is reflected, in practice, in the particular provisions that proposals include on a range of component policy considerations, such as program administration, the labor market test, and wages, among others.\nThe following discussion focuses on the H-2A and H-2B programs and related legislative proposals. It also references the J-1 SWT program, which provides participating employers with seasonal labor but, as noted above, is not characterized as a temporary worker program under immigration law.", "As previously mentioned, the H-2A and H-2B programs are administered by DOL and DHS, with DOL making a determination on the labor certification application and DHS adjudicating the nonimmigrant visa petition. Under the INA, as explained above, prospective H-2A employers must apply to DOL for labor certification. In the case of the H-2B visa, the INA does not require DOL labor certification. Rather, it makes general reference to \"consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government\" as part of the process of adjudicating petitions for \"H\" and other specified nonimmigrants. The requirement for H-2B labor certification is established by regulation. Under the J-1SWT program, as set forth in DOS regulations, designated sponsors are responsible for program administration.\nRegulatory and legislative proposals have sought to establish new agency roles in administering guest worker programs. For example, H-2B rules proposed in 2005 by DHS and DOL would have eliminated DOL's labor certification role. Under this proposal, which was ultimately withdrawn in the face of opposition, employers would have applied directly to DHS for H-2B workers and would have included certain labor attestations with their application. In the supplementary information accompanying its 2005 proposal, DHS explained the rationale for the change, as follows:\nDHS has determined that the H-2B process should be modified to reduce unnecessary burdens that hinder petitioning employers' ability to effectively use this visa category…. The delays in processing applications for labor certification combined with the relatively short period of time for which the worker will be available under current rules have discouraged use of the program. This rule will remove existing regulatory barriers and thus likely lead to more efficiency in the H-2B program.\nOther proposals would assign administrative responsibility elsewhere. For example, a comprehensive immigration bill introduced in 2005 would have given the Secretary of State primary administrative responsibility for a new nonagricultural guest worker program. A more recent legislative proposal, discussed in the next section, would establish a new temporary agricultural worker visa administered by the Department of Agriculture, in consultation with DHS.", "A key question about any guest worker program is if, and how, it tests the labor market to determine whether U.S. workers are available for the job opportunities in question. Under both the H-2A and H-2B programs, employers interested in hiring foreign workers must first go through the process of labor certification. Intended to protect job opportunities for U.S. workers, labor certification entails a determination by DOL of whether qualified U.S. workers are available to perform the needed work and whether the hiring of foreign workers will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Recruitment is the primary method used to determine U.S. worker availability. While there is widespread agreement on the goals of labor certification, the process itself has been criticized for being cumbersome, slow, and ineffective in protecting U.S. workers.\nA main difference between the DOL H-2A and H-2B rules issued by the George W. Bush Administration in 2008 and the rules issued by the Obama Administration in 2010 and 2012 concerns implementation of the labor market test. As discussed above, the 2008 DOL rules for both programs changed the traditionally supervised labor certification process into an attestation-based certification process. In the supplementary information accompanying its 2008 proposed H-2A rule, DOL cited criticism of the labor certification process as \"complicated, time-consuming, and requiring the considerable expenditure of resources by employers.\" It further stated that its proposals \"to re-engineer the H–2A program processing\" will \"simplify the process by which employers obtain a labor certification while maintaining, and even enhancing, the Department's substantial role in ensuring that U.S. workers have access to agricultural job opportunities.\" Legislative guest worker proposals in recent Congresses have also incorporated various forms of labor attestation.\nThe 2010 DOL final H-2A rule and the 2012 DOL final H-2B rule return to a supervised, certification-based model of labor certification. In the supplementary information accompanying the 2010 final H-2A rule, DOL identified its \"primary concern with respect to its statutory mandate\" as \"restoring necessary protections to U.S. and foreign workers while maintaining a fair and reliable process for addressing legitimate employer needs.\" The 2011 DOL proposed H-2B rule echoed these concerns about worker protections:\n[T]here are insufficient worker protections in the current attestation-based model in which employers merely assert, and do not demonstrate, that they have performed an adequate test of the U.S. labor market and one which is in accordance with the regulations.\nAs detailed above, the 2012 final H-2B rule included other changes to the labor certification process, including an extension of the U.S. worker recruitment period .\nDespite the differences between the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations' DOL rules, the underlying requirements for employers to recruit U.S. workers are similar. Under both sets of rules, employers are required to cooperate with, and accept referrals of workers from, state workforce agencies and to engage in independent recruitment efforts, such as placing print job advertisements.\nWhile U.S. worker recruitment is a standard feature of guest worker programs, such a requirement can take different forms and does not necessarily have to be contained within a larger DOL labor certification process. For example, one 2011 legislative proposal to establish a new temporary agricultural worker visa would require employers to recruit U.S. workers by posting the job opportunity on a DOL electronic job registry; the posting would include the work period, wages, and other terms of employment. DOL would not perform any type of labor certification function. The job posting would be a prerequisite for applying for enrollment in the new program, which would be administered by the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in consultation with DHS. Under the proposal, agricultural employers would submit information that USDA would use to determine the number of agricultural workers required.", "To prevent adverse effects on similarly employed U.S. workers, the H-2A and H-2B programs require employers to offer wages at or above a specified level. As described above, under the H-2A program, employers must pay their workers the highest of the federal or applicable state minimum wage, the prevailing wage rate, the adverse effect wage rate (AEWR), or the agreed-upon collective bargaining wage. Under the H-2B program, employers must pay their workers the highest of the prevailing wage rate or the federal, state, or local minimum wage. Under the J-1 SWT program, SWT participants must be paid the highest of the prevailing local wage or the federal or state minimum wage.\nWage requirements have been a key area of controversy about the H-2A program, which is the only nonimmigrant program subject to the AEWR. Farm labor advocates argue that the AEWR is necessary to protect U.S. agricultural workers from a possible depression of wages resulting from the hiring of foreign workers. Employers have long maintained that the AEWR as traditionally calculated using USDA's Farm Labor Survey data results in inflated wage rates. Legislative proposals to reform the H-2A program or establish new agricultural guest worker programs have typically included provisions to eliminate the use of the AEWR, or, more recently, to redefine the AEWR.\nThe 2011 DOL rule on H-2B wage rates has been highly controversial, with some critics arguing that the new wage requirements will make the H-2B program prohibitively expensive. As mentioned, in response to legislation enacted by the 112 th Congress to prohibit use of funds to implement the new wage methodology for the first six months of FY2013, DOL has postponed the effective date of the rule until March 27, 2013.", "The H-2A and H-2B programs are, by definition, limited to seasonal or temporary work. They are intended to meet employers' temporary—and not permanent—needs for labor when U.S. workers cannot be found.\nThis \"seasonal or temporary\" requirement places restrictions on both programs. With respect to the H-2A program, it means that the program cannot be used for year-round agricultural activities absent a statutory provision. There are special provisions that apply to certain year-round activities. For example, the INA definition of the H-2A nonimmigrant visa explicitly permits the use of the H-2A program for the \"pressing of apples for cider on a farm.\" Special procedures also are in place for sheepherders and goatherders to work through the H-2A program. Legislation in recent Congresses has sought to include dairy industry activities—most of which are excluded from the H-2A program as being year-round—in the H-2A program by amending current law.\nUnder the H-2B program, as described above, the employer's need for the duties to be performed by the worker must be a one-time occurrence, seasonal need, peak load need, or intermittent need. Some proposals in past Congresses would have broadened the H-2B visa from a category restricted to temporary need to one covering \"short-term\" labor. This change, which was not enacted, would have permitted H-2B workers to fill a wider range of job openings. Some past comprehensive immigration reform proposals also would have established new nonagricultural guest worker programs that would not have required a showing of temporary need and, in some cases, would have allowed for the initial admission of workers for two years or more.", "A numerical cap provides a means, separate from program requirements, of limiting the number of foreign workers who can be admitted annually in a visa category. Currently, the H-2A visa and the J-1 visa are not numerically limited by law. As explained, however, DOS has announced that it is restricting the J-1 SWT program to 109,000 annually. The H-2B program, by contrast, is statutorily capped at 66,000 annually. Like the H-2B program, other capped temporary worker programs in current law have fixed statutory numerical limits.\nMore flexible numerical caps, however, have been incorporated into guest worker proposals in both past Congresses and in the current Congress. For example, a guest worker program that was outlined by former Senator Phil Gramm during the 107 th Congress, but never introduced as legislation, included a numerical cap—one that would have varied annually based on regional unemployment rates. According to the program prospectus released by Senator Gramm:\nExcept for seasonal work, the number of guest workers permitted to enroll would be adjusted annually in response to changes in U.S. economic conditions, specifically unemployment rates, on a region-by-region basis.\nA comprehensive immigration bill proposed in the 110 th Congress would have established a new nonimmigrant visa with a numerical cap that would have varied based on demand for the visa. A bill introduced in 2011 would establish a new agricultural worker visa with monthly and annual numerical limitations. These caps would be based on data and information provided by agricultural employers and would \"tak(e) into consideration the historical employment needs of agricultural employers and the reports of United States workers applying for agricultural employment.\"", "Currently, the INA allows for the admission of the spouses and minor children of alien workers on H-2A, H-2B, and other \"H\" visas who are accompanying or following to join the worker in the United States. While making provision for the admission of guest workers' spouses and minor children enables families to stay together, this practice has been faulted for decreasing incentives for guest workers to return home after their authorized period of stay. Some legislative proposals to establish new guest worker programs would explicitly prohibit family members from accompanying or following to join principal aliens.", "The issue of adjustment of status, or the change of immigration status to legal permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States, arises in connection with guest worker programs. Legal lower-skilled guest workers have very limited opportunities under current law to obtain legal permanent residence. For those who enter legally but remain beyond their authorized period of stay and lapse into illegal status, the opportunities are even more limited.\nVarious proposals have been put forth in recent years to enable guest workers to adjust status. AgJOBS legislation, as discussed above, combines reform of the H-2A guest worker program with a separate program to legalize the status of agricultural workers. Under AgJOBS, farm workers who satisfy a set of requirements would first apply for a legal temporary resident status and then, after meeting additional work and other requirements, could apply to adjust to LPR status. Some comprehensive immigration reform bills in past Congresses have similarly proposed to change the status of eligible unauthorized workers to a new nonimmigrant worker status, and then, subject to additional requirements, to adjust the status of these nonimmigrants to LPR status.\nSome immigration proposals would establish special mechanisms for guest workers who enter the United States legally to adjust to LPR status. Proposals that would enable guest workers to seek LPR status take different forms. For example, some past comprehensive immigration reform bills would have established new guest worker visas, together with special mechanisms for participants to adjust status.\nA policy proposal to replace existing nonimmigrant visas for nonagricultural, nonseasonal work (including some H-2B work) with provisional visas offers another model for facilitating adjustment of status. As described in a 2009 Migration Policy Institute report, provisional visas would provide for the transition from temporary to permanent status for interested and eligible workers. According to the report, the adoption of provisional visas would be most effective as part of a larger reform of temporary worker categories but such a system could also be \"overlaid on existing visa categories\" with visa holders receiving \"the new 'terms and conditions' of visa portability and a predictable path to earning permanent residence.\" The Obama Administration's 2011 blueprint for immigration reform proposed the creation of a new temporary worker program for lower-skilled workers that seemed to embody these principles. The program would be limited to nonagricultural, nonseasonal workers, who would be given \"important labor protections, portability, and the ability to seek permanent residence.\"", "Another set of considerations relates to enforcement of the terms of a guest worker program. With respect to the H-2A program, the INA broadly authorizes the Secretary of Labor to\ntake such actions, including imposing appropriate penalties and seeking appropriate injunctive relief and specific performance of contractual obligations, as may be necessary to assure employer compliance with terms and conditions of employment.\nWith respect to the H-2B program, more limited language added to the INA in 2005 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to impose administrative remedies and to deny certain petitions filed by an employer if the Secretary finds \"a substantial failure to meet any of the conditions of the [H-2B] petition\" or \"a willful misrepresentation of a material fact in such petition.\" The Secretary of Homeland Security is further authorized to delegate any of this enforcement authority to the Secretary of Labor in accordance with an agreement between the two agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security subsequently made this delegation of authority and now DOL's Wage and Hour Division is responsible for the enforcement of the terms and conditions of H–2B labor certifications.\nThe 2008 DOL final rules on H-2A employment and H-2B employment put in place a compliance model that combined a streamlined labor certification process with post-certification enforcement mechanisms, including audits, civil money penalties, and debarment. In proposing to rewrite these rules and reinstate a model in which employers demonstrate compliance prior to certification, the Obama Administration cited concerns about employer noncompliance with program requirements under the 2008 rules.\nThe 2010 DOL final H-2A rule and the 2012 DOL final H-2B rule incorporate a compliance-demonstration system. In supplementary information accompanying the 2011 proposed H-2B rule (precursor to the 2012 final rule), DOL questioned the appropriateness of a post-certification enforcement system for a temporary worker program, in which \"non-compliance would likely be identified through enforcement efforts well after the impacted H-2B workers have returned to their home country or the U.S. workers were already denied employment.\"\nAnother enforcement-related question is what type of mechanism, if any, ensures that guest workers do not remain in the United States beyond their authorized period of stay. Historically, the removal of aliens who have overstayed their visas and thereby lapsed into unauthorized status, but have not committed crimes, has not been an immigration enforcement priority.\nAmong the related regulatory provisions are provisions establishing notification requirements for H-2A and H-2B employers. DHS regulations on the H-2A visa and the H-2B visa, as modified by the 2008 final rules, require petitioners to notify DHS within two work days when an H-2A or H-2B worker fails to report at the start of the employment period, absconds from the worksite, or is terminated prior to completion of the work, or when the work for which H-2A or H-2B workers were hired is completed early. In supplementary information accompanying the H-2B final rule, DHS explained the purpose of these notification requirements as being\nto enable DHS to keep track of H–2B workers while they are in the United States and take appropriate enforcement action where DHS determines that the H–2B workers have violated the terms and conditions of their nonimmigrant stay.\nTo help ensure that H-2A and H-2B workers departed the United States at the end of their authorized period of stay, the 2008 DHS final rules on the H-2A visa and the H-2B visa also established a pilot program, known as the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Program Pilot. Under the pilot program, which began in December 2009, H-2A and H-2B aliens who were admitted to the United States at certain designated ports of entry were required to depart the country from one of these designated ports and provide certain biographic and biometric information. According to DHS, the program was \"designed to positively record the departure [of workers] by utilizing the biographic and biometric information submitted at the time of entry and departure.\"\nThe pilot program was discontinued effective September 29, 2011. In the notice announcing the discontinuation of the program, DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) indicated that during the pilot period, \"DHS gathered enough data to assess the pilot's technology, design and implementation and to identify lessons learned that can be applied to programs that may have similar requirements.\"\nOther ideas have been proposed to help ensure the departure of temporary workers at the end of their authorized period of stay. One suggestion is to involve the workers' home countries in guest worker programs. Another option is to create an incentive for foreign workers to leave the United States by, for example, withholding from earnings or otherwise setting aside a sum of money for each worker that would become available only once the worker returned home.", "For many years, there has been broad dissatisfaction with existing guest worker programs and periodic activity to enact reform. The last time Congress considered significant reform to lower-skilled temporary worker programs, it did so in the context of comprehensive immigration reform legislation, in which guest worker programs were an ancillary focus. Today's discussions about possible guest worker reform are focused more squarely on the programs themselves and on the needs of employers and workers. The tension between these often competing needs lies at the core of the debate about how to proceed with reform. The H-2A and H-2B regulations issued by the George W. Bush Administration and the Obama Administration reflect very different views about how to balance employer and worker needs, as do recent legislative proposals. It would seem, however, that in the current environment some type of compromise on employer and worker needs—in the policy areas highlighted here and/or in other areas—may be essential to achieving significant guest worker reform legislatively.\nAppendix A. DOL H-2A and H-2B Labor Certifications by State\nAppendix B. DOL H-2B Labor Certifications by Occupation\nIn FY2010, DOL approved 3,726 H-2B labor certification applications. For these applications, DOL approved requests for a total of 86,596 H-2B positions.\nA majority of H-2B requests certified by DOL are for workers in a few occupations. Table B -1 shows that in FY2010, 64.0% of certified requests were for 10 occupations. One occupation, landscape laborer, accounted for 26.8% of the total number of workers certified.\nAppendix C. H-2A and H-2B Visa Issuances\nAppendix D. DHS and DOL Regulations on H-2A and H-2B Nonimmigrants and their Employment in the United States\nH-2A Regulations: DHS\nThe 2008 DHS final rule on the H-2A visa made various changes to prior regulations. It modified previous limitations on an H-2A worker's period of stay in the United States. Under prior regulations, an H-2A worker who had spent three years in the United States had to remain outside the country for six months before he or she could again be granted H-2A status. The DHS rule reduced this waiting period to three months.\nThe DHS H-2A rule extended the period of time from 10 days to 30 days that an H-2A worker could remain in the United States after the H-2A petition expired in order to prepare to depart or to seek an extension of stay based on a subsequent job offer. In another change, the DHS rule allowed an H-2A worker who was awaiting an extension of stay based on a petition filed by a new employer (and accompanied by an approved labor certification) to begin the new job before the extension of stay was granted, provided that the new employer was a registered user in good standing of E-Verify, the electronic employment verification system administered by USCIS.\nThe DHS rule also established new requirements under the H-2A program. It instituted a prohibition on payments by prospective H-2A workers to employers, recruiters, or other employment service providers where the payments are a condition of obtaining H-2A employment. In addition, the DHS rule limited participation in the H-2A program to nationals of countries designated annually by DHS, with the concurrence of DOS.\nH-2A Regulations: DOL\nThe 2010 DOL rule on the H-2A visa reversed key changes to the H-2A labor certification process made by the 2008 rule, while retaining other changes made by that earlier rule. The 2010 rule reinstated the type of supervised labor certification process that had been in place prior to the 2008 rule's establishment of an attestation-based certification process.\nUnder the 2010 rule, a prospective H-2A employer must submit a job order to the state workforce agency (SWA) serving the area of intended employment before filing a labor certification application. The job order has to be submitted between 60 and 75 days before the employer's date of need for workers, and it has to include the job qualifications and requirements as well as the required minimum benefit and wage provisions. Either the SWA or DOL can require the employer to submit documentation in support of any job qualification specified in the job offer. Once reviewed and cleared by the SWA, the job order becomes the basis for recruiting U.S. workers to fill the employer's job openings. The employer then must file a labor certification application with DOL at least 45 days before the date of need. The 2010 rule further required DOL to establish an electronic registry of H-2A jobs and to post the job order on the registry once the labor certification application was accepted.\nAs part of the labor certification process, H-2A employers have to offer and provide required wages and benefits to H-2A workers and workers in corresponding employment . The 2010 rule redefined corresponding employment for H-2A purposes as the employment of non-H-2A workers by an employer who has an approved H-2A labor certification in any work included in the job order or in any agricultural work performed by the H-2A workers.\nWith respect to wages, the 2010 DOL rule amended existing regulations to require H-2A employers to pay their workers the highest of four wage rates: the federal or applicable state minimum wage, the prevailing wage rate, the adverse effect wage rate (AEWR), or the agreed-upon collective bargaining wage. The 2010 rule reversed changes made by the 2008 rule to the methodology for calculating the AEWR. It reinstated the wage requirements in effect prior to the 2008 rule, with the addition of the collective bargaining wage. Explaining the addition of the collective bargaining wage, the 2010 rule stated:\nThis amendment requires employers to use a collective bargaining wage if it is the highest wage, thus avoiding the potential payment of a collective bargaining wage that is less than the other wages. At the same time, it acknowledges the role of the collectively bargained wage as a potential legitimate wage.\nThe 2010 rule also reinstated the fifty-percent rule in its pre-2008 rule form. The fifty-percent rule requires an H-2A employer to hire any qualified U.S. worker who applies for a position until 50% of the period of the work contract under which the H-2A workers are employed has elapsed. The 2008 rule took initial steps to phase out this requirement.\nH-2B Regulations: DHS\nDHS's 2008 rule on the H-2B visa revised prior regulations in various ways. It changed the definition of temporary employment for H-2B purposes to require the prospective H-2B employer to establish that his or her need for the worker would end in the \"near, definable future.\" While the 2008 rule stated, as did the prior regulation, that the employer's need will generally be for a period of one year or less, it also provided that in the case of a one-time occurrence, the employer's need could last up to three years. The DOL final rule discussed above further clarified that except in the case of a one-time occurrence, an H-2B labor certification application based on an employer's need lasting more than 10 months would be denied, absent unusual circumstances.\nDHS's 2008 H-2B rule further amended prior regulations to require that an employer have an approved labor certification before the employer could submit a petition for H-2B workers. Previously, an employer whose H-2B labor certification application was denied by DOL could submit an H-2B petition to DHS containing countervailing evidence. In response to this new requirement for an approved certification, DOL established an appeals process in cases of H-2B labor certification denials.\nOther changes to DHS's H-2B regulations mirrored changes to its H-2A regulations. The H-2B rule, like the H-2A rule, reduced from six months to three months the amount of time that a worker who had spent three years in the United States had to remain outside the country before he or she could again be granted H-2B status. The DHS H-2B rule instituted a prohibition on payments by prospective H-2B workers to employers, recruiters, or other employment service providers where the payments are a condition of obtaining H-2B employment. DHS's H-2B rule also limited participation in the H-2B program to nationals of countries to be designated annually by DHS, with the concurrence of DOS.\nH-2B Regulations: DOL\nThe 2012 rule discussed here is not in effect, as described above. The H-2B program is currently operating under the 2008 DOL final rule issued by the Bush Administration.\nThe 2012 DOL rule reversed changes made to the H-2B labor certification process under the 2008 rule and reinstituted a certification-based model. It also bifurcated the labor certification application process into distinct registration and application phases and revised application timetables.\nUnder the 2012 final rule, DOL must assess an employer's temporary need for H-2B workers in the registration phase. A prospective H-2B employer is required to submit an H-2B registration 120 days to 150 days before the initial date of need for workers and must receive registration approval before filing a labor certification application. A registration approval could be valid for up to three years.\nThe labor market test is administered by DOL in the subsequent application phase to determine whether U.S. workers are available to fill the job opportunities. Under the 2008 rule, DOL made simultaneous determinations on temporary need and the labor market test. Under the 2012 rule, the employer must file the labor certification application and the job order 75 to 90 days before the date of need. The SWA is required to keep the job order open and continue referring U.S. workers for the job opportunity until 21 days before the date of the employer's need. Under the 2008 rule, the SWA had to keep the job order open for at least 10 days.\nUnder the 2012 DOL H-2B rule, the electronic job registry that was created for posting H-2A job orders was expanded to include H-2B job orders. Under the rule, once DOL accepts the labor certification application, the job order is posted on the online registry.\nThe 2012 final rule made a variety of other changes to the H-2B labor certification process. The 2008 regulations provided that, except in cases of a one-time occurrence, labor certification applications with a period of employer need of more than 10 months would generally be denied. In the 2012 final rule, DOL shortened this maximum period to nine months, maintaining that this new maximum \"definitively establishes the temporariness of the position, as there is an entire season in which there is simply no need for the worker(s).\" Along similar lines, the 2012 rule limited the participation of job contractors in the H-2B program to cases in which they can demonstrate their own temporary need for workers, not that of their employer-clients.\nIn addition, the 2012 rule required employers to provide workers engaged in corresponding employment with at least the same protections, wages, and benefits as those provided to H-2B workers. Corresponding employment, as defined under the rule, included, with some exceptions, employment of non-H-2B workers performing substantially the same work included in the job order or substantially the same work performed by H-2B workers. Under the 2008 regulations, this \"equal treatment\" requirement was limited to workers hired in connection with an H-2B labor certification application during the prescribed recruitment period. Furthermore, the 2012 final rule required employers to pay or reimburse workers for transportation and visa costs, and to offer a three-fourths guarantee similar to that under the H-2A program, in which H-2B employers must guarantee payment of wages for at least three-fourths of the contract period.\nAppendix E. H-2B Wage Requirements\nDOL H-2B Wage Rule Chronology\nOn October 5, 2010, DOL issued proposed regulations to change the methodology for determining the prevailing wage for H-2B workers. DOL issued a final rule on January 19, 2011. The effective date of the final rule was January 1, 2012.\nA court ruling invalidated the January 1, 2012, effective date. Therefore, on June 28, 2011, DOL issued a proposed rule to change the effective date of the new wage methodology. On August 1, 2011, DOL issued a final rule setting September 30, 2011, as the effective date for the new wage methodology.\nIn response to two lawsuits that sought to prevent the implementation of the new wage methodology, DOL announced on September 28, 2011, that it was postponing the effective date of the new wage rule for 60 days, until November 30, 2011.\nOn November 18, 2011, the President signed H.R. 2112 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-55 ). The bill stated that DOL could not use funds appropriated by the act to \"implement, administer, or enforce\" the new wage methodology before January 1, 2012. The bill did not prevent the new wage methodology from going into effect as planned on November 30. DOL determined, however, that if the new wage methodology went into effect, it would not be able to issue wage determinations. Accordingly, the department delayed the effective date of the new methodology until January 1, 2012.\nOn December 23, 2011, the President signed H.R. 2055 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ). The act prevented DOL from using funds provided by the act \"to implement\" the new wage methodology for the remainder of FY2012. In response, DOL announced that it was postponing the effective date of the new wage methodology until October 1, 2012.\nOn September 28, 2012, the President signed H.J.Res. 117 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 ( P.L. 112-175 ). The act prohibits DOL from using funds to implement the new wage methodology until March 27, 2013. In response, DOL announced that it was postponing the effective date of the new wage methodology until March 27, 2013.\nComparison of Wage Methodology Under Current and New DOL Regulations\nTable E -1 compares the wage methodology under the current and new regulations for determining the prevailing wage for H-2B workers. The last column of the table identifies some of the changes that may affect the wages of H-2B workers.\nWage Rates Under Current Methodology\nUnder current regulations, DOL uses data from its Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey to provide four wage rates based on the level of education, experience, and supervision that the employer requires for the job. These four skill levels are labeled Level I, II, III, and IV. The Level I and IV wage levels (hourly and annual) are estimated by DOL's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) directly from OES wage data. The Level I wage is the average wage for the bottom third of the earnings distribution. The Level IV wage is the average of the top two-thirds of the earnings distribution. The Level II and Level III wages are calculated from the Level I and IV wages.\nTo illustrate the four wage levels, assume that the Level I and Level IV hourly wages estimated from OES wage data are $10.00 and $22.00, respectively. The difference between the Level IV and Level I wage is $12.00. Dividing this difference by three and adding the result to the Level I wage yields a Level II wage of $14.00 (i.e., $12.00 ÷ 3 = $4.00. $10.00 + $4.00 = $14.00). Subtracting the result from the Level IV wage yields a Level III wage of $18.00 (i.e., $22.00 - $4.00 = $18.00)." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 2, 3, 4, 4, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h2_full", "", "h2_full h1_title", "", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h0_full h1_title", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title h3_title", "h3_full h2_full", "", "h4_full h3_title h1_full", "", "h4_full", "h3_full", "", "", "", "h4_full", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What do U.S. employers argue regarding foreign workers?", "How does current law address this?", "How are these programs administered?", "What do the H-2A and H-2B programs strive to do?", "What concerns have been raised regarding these goals?", "How did the Bush Administration treat these programs?", "How did the Obama Administration modify these programs?", "What is the process for bringing workers into the United States?", "What is the first step in this process?", "How has the labor certification process been criticized?", "What has been a focus of congressional attention in recent Congresses?", "What proposals have been introduced to amend this program?", "What alternate proposals have been introduced?", "What other employment legislature has been of congressional interest recently?", "What might guest worker proposals contain?", "What key policy considerations are included in such proposals?", "What issues regarding LPR status might also arise?" ], "summary": [ "U.S. employers in various industries argue that they need to hire foreign workers to perform lower-skilled jobs, while others maintain that many of these positions could be filled by U.S. workers.", "Under current law, certain lower-skilled foreign workers, sometimes referred to as guest workers, may be admitted to the United States to perform temporary service or labor under two temporary worker visas: the H-2A visa for agricultural workers and the H-2B visa for nonagricultural workers.", "Both programs are administered by the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) and the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration (DOL/ETA).", "The H-2A and H-2B programs—and guest worker programs broadly—strive both to be responsive to legitimate employer needs for labor and to provide adequate protections for U.S. and foreign temporary workers.", "There is much debate, however, about how to strike the appropriate balance between these twin goals.", "Under the George W. Bush Administration, both DHS and DOL issued regulations to streamline the H-2A and H-2B programs.", "The Obama Administration retained the DHS rules, but rewrote the DOL rules. Arguing that the latter provided inadequate protections for workers, it issued a new DOL final rule on H-2A employment, which became effective in March 2010. The Obama Administration also issued a new DOL final rule on H-2B employment in 2012 and a DOL final rule on H-2B wage rates in 2011, but neither of these rules is currently in effect.", "Bringing workers into the United States under either the H-2A program or H-2B program is a multi-agency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State.", "As an initial step in the process, employers must apply for DOL labor certification to ensure that U.S. workers are not available for the jobs in question and that the hiring of foreign workers will not adversely affect U.S. workers.", "The labor certification process has long been criticized as ineffective, with employers complaining that it is burdensome and unresponsive to their labor needs and labor advocates arguing that it provides too few protections for workers.", "The H-2A program and foreign agricultural workers in general have been a focus of congressional attention in recent Congresses.", "Proposals have been introduced as recently as in the 112th Congress that would have amended current law on the H-2A visa, while others would have established new temporary agricultural worker programs as alternatives to the H-2A program.", "Still other proposals would have coupled a legalization program for agricultural workers with either H-2A or other agricultural labor-related reform.", "DOL's recent rules on H-2B employment and wages also have been subjects of congressional interest.", "Guest worker proposals may contain provisions on a range of component policy issues.", "Key policy considerations include the labor market test to determine whether U.S. workers are available for the positions, wages, and enforcement.", "The issue of adjustment of status, which means the change to legal permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States, may also arise in connection with guest worker programs." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-16-570	{ "title": [ "Background", "CBP Contract Supplier Bidding and Award Process", "Phase-In of the CBP", "Number of Contract Suppliers and Product Categories in Round 2", "National Mail-Order Program Contract Suppliers and Covered Items", "Sources for CBP-Related Beneficiary Assistance", "CMS’s CBP-related Monitoring Activities", "Number of Beneficiaries Receiving CBP- covered Items Generally Decreased after Implementation of Round 2 and the National Mail-Order Program", "Number of Beneficiaries Receiving CBP-Covered Items Generally Decreased after Implementation of Round 2, with Larger Decreases Than Those for Items and Areas Not in CBP", "Number of Beneficiaries Receiving National Mail- Order Program Items Generally Decreased after Implementation, Though Utilization Increased for Some Items Acquired through Retail Outlets", "CMS Reports That Available Evidence Indicates No Widespread Effects of Round 2 and the National Mail-Order Program on Beneficiary Access", "CMS’s Health Status Monitoring Indicates the CBP Has Not Affected Health Measures", "Number of Round 2 and National Mail-Order Program Inquiries and Complaints to 1-800- MEDICARE Generally Decreased throughout the First 2 Years", "CMS Investigates CBP Complaints Using Secret Shopping Calls, and Terminates Contracts of Suppliers That Remain Noncompliant after Targeted Education", "CMS’s Post- Implementation Beneficiary Satisfaction Survey Results Remained Positive", "Some Stakeholders Reported Specific Beneficiary Access Concerns", "Most Competitions Had Several Active Contract Suppliers, Although Some Competitions Had a Single Active Supplier or a Single Supplier with a Large Market Share", "Most Round 2 and National Mail-Order Program Competitions Had Several Active Contract Suppliers in 2014, but Others Had Just One or a Few Active Suppliers", "Some Competitions Had a Single Supplier with a Large Market Share", "Eleven Percent of Suppliers Were Inactive in All Competitions in their Contracts, and Others Were Inactive in at Least One Competition or Barely Active", "CMS Monitors CBP Competitions, Including Making Secret Shopping Calls to Inactive Suppliers", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: The 100 Competitive Bidding Areas Included in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ Competitive Bidding Program Round 2", "Appendix II: Description of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ Phase-In of the Competitive Bidding Program", "CBP Rounds in the Original Competitive Bidding Areas", "CBP Rounds Included in the Expanded Competitive Bidding Areas", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "CMS and Palmetto GBA administer and implement the CBP and its bidding phases. In each CBP bidding phase, suppliers that want to participate in the CBP may submit a bid in one or more product categories in one or more designated competitive bidding areas. To be offered a CBP contract, suppliers must be qualified, meaning they have met general Medicare enrollment and quality standards as well as CBP’s financial and applicable licensing standards; be eligible to bill Medicare for DME items; have a DME surety bond; and be accredited and licensed.\nAfter CMS and Palmetto GBA review qualified suppliers’ bids, the bids are ordered by lowest to highest price, and CMS then makes offers to all those needed to meet or exceed CMS’s estimated beneficiary demand who submitted the lowest prices. If a bidding supplier accepts an offer to furnish a specific product category in a specific competitive bidding area, it must agree to furnish all of the items included in the product category to all eligible Medicare beneficiaries residing in the competitive bidding area at the applicable single payment amounts. Because the single payment amount is the median of the winning bid price offers for each DME item in a product category for each competitive bidding area, the payment can be less or more than a particular winning supplier’s actual bid for an item. Furthermore, because each competitive bidding area and product category combination is a separate competition, the same DME item may have a different single payment amount in each area. For example, the round 2 single payment amounts for a new foam rubber mattress ranged between $111.38 in the Palm Bay and Deltona, Florida, competitive bidding areas to $178.62 in the Honolulu, Hawaii, competitive bidding area. Contracts are generally awarded for 3 years and can include one or many competitions. While generally only contract suppliers that accepted a contract for a given product category and competitive bidding area are eligible to furnish those items, there are circumstances in which suppliers not awarded a CBP contract—referred to as non-contract suppliers—may be grandfathered to continue to furnish some CBP-covered items to certain beneficiaries for a limited time. In addition, physicians, treating practitioners, and hospitals can furnish walkers, folding manual wheelchairs, or external infusion pumps to their own patients as part of their professional services or during hospital admission or discharge without a CBP contract.\nWhen offering contracts, CMS takes steps that it believes will ensure beneficiary access and choice. For example, CMS’s goal is to award at least five contracts for each product category and competitive bidding area competition. To help meet this goal, CMS caps the estimated projected capacity of any single supplier at 20 percent of the total projected beneficiary demand for each product category, in each competitive bidding area, regardless of the capacity estimated by the supplier in its bid submission. CMS also tries to ensure that small suppliers are awarded CBP contracts by setting a target that 30 percent of the qualified suppliers awarded a contract in each product category and competitive bidding area competition are small.", "CMS is required by the MMA to conduct a new CBP phase at least once every 3 years, and begins the bid submission and award process for the new contracts before the current contracts expire. Beginning with the first round of CBP in 2008, CMS and Palmetto GBA have continued to phase- in CBP through additional rounds and programs. (See fig. 1 for a timeline summarizing the phase-in of the CBP and app. II for additional information about the CBP phases.)", "As of October 2015, there were 822 round 2 contract suppliers—520 of which were small suppliers—to furnish DME items and services in eight product categories and 100 competitive bidding areas. (See table 1 for a list of round 2 product categories and app. I for a list of the 100 competitive bidding areas.) Contracts were effective beginning July 1, 2013, and expired June 30, 2016.", "There were 19 national mail-order contract suppliers as of October 2015—6 of which were small suppliers—to furnish the eight mail-order diabetes testing supply HCPCS codes included in the national mail-order program. Contracts were effective beginning July 1, 2013, and expired June 30, 2016. The program operates in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, and includes the same eight mail-order diabetes testing supply HCPCS codes as the round 1 rebid. For this round and future national mail-order program rounds, a supplier’s diabetes testing supply bid must demonstrate that the supplier’s bid would cover at least 50 percent, by sales volume, of all types of diabetes test strips on the market. Medicare payments for items included in the national mail-order program are the same regardless of whether they are furnished via mail order or by retail, though out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries may be higher when they receive these supplies through retail outlets.", "Medicare beneficiaries residing in competitive bidding areas have several sources available to help them locate contract suppliers and receive assistance for CBP-related issues, questions, or complaints.\nMedicare Supplier Directory. To locate a CBP contract supplier, beneficiaries can use the CMS online supplier directory tool on CMS’s Medicare website. The Medicare Supplier Directory contains the names of the contract suppliers in each competitive bidding area as well as the product categories for which they furnish CBP-covered items. Contract suppliers are responsible for submitting information to CMS each quarter regarding the specific brands of items they plan to furnish in the upcoming quarter, and CMS uses this information to update the supplier directory tool.\n1-800-MEDICARE inquiries. CMS directs beneficiaries to call its 1- 800-MEDICARE beneficiary help line for assistance with CBP-related questions. Customer service representatives are trained to assist CBP beneficiaries and use several scripts to respond to questions and assist beneficiaries in locating contract suppliers. If a beneficiary’s inquiry cannot be addressed by the customer service representatives, the inquiry is forwarded to an advanced-level customer service representative, who researches and responds to the beneficiary’s inquiry.\nPalmetto GBA and CMS regional offices. Palmetto GBA provides CBP-related information and updates through its website and works with CMS regional office staff to monitor CBP activities and provide educational outreach.\nCompetitive Acquisition Ombudsman. The Competitive Acquisition Ombudsman was created to respond to CBP-related complaints and inquiries made by suppliers and individuals, and works with CMS officials and contractors and Palmetto GBA to resolve them.", "CMS has implemented several activities to monitor whether beneficiary access or satisfaction have been affected by the implementation of CBP and to ensure that contract suppliers are meeting their contract obligations.\nInquiries and complaints to 1-800-MEDICARE. CMS tracks all CBP-related inquiries to 1-800-MEDICARE. All calls are first classified as inquiries, and CMS defines as a CBP complaint only those inquiries that cannot be resolved by any 1-800-MEDICARE customer service representative and are elevated to another entity, such as Palmetto GBA, CMS’s regional offices, or the Competitive Acquisition Ombudsman for resolution.\nSecret shopping calls. According to CMS officials, CMS utilizes shopping calls, in which Palmetto GBA representatives pose as referral agents or family members acting on behalf of beneficiaries and call contract suppliers to request items, such as specific diabetes testing supplies, to determine whether the suppliers offer the supplies covered under their contracts. Some calls are conducted on a random basis and are intended to reach contract suppliers from across all product categories and competitive bidding areas, while others are directed at particular suppliers. According to CMS officials, the agency uses both random and targeted calls to monitor contract suppliers that have not billed for items included in their contracts over a period of time. In addition, CMS officials said that a third type of secret shopping call, focused calls, is used to investigate specific complaints and verify contract supplier compliance with contract requirements after any necessary education to the supplier(s) is provided. According to CMS, if contract suppliers remain noncompliant following education, the agency will start the contract termination process.\nBeneficiary satisfaction surveys. CMS conducted both pre- and post-round 2 and national mail-order program surveys to measure beneficiary satisfaction with CBP. The round 2 pre-implementation survey was conducted January 3 through March 18, 2013, and the post-implementation survey was conducted from March 5 through April 10, 2014. The national mail-order program pre-implementation survey was conducted April 10 through April 24, 2013, and the post- implementation survey was conducted April 17 through April 27, 2014.\nHealth Status Monitoring Tool. CMS analyzes Medicare claims data to monitor health measures, including encounters with the health care system (such as hospitalizations, emergency room visits, and physician visits) and one outcome (death) for beneficiaries in both CBP-covered areas and non-CBP areas for both round 2 and the national mail-order program. CMS posts quarterly reports on its website to show historical and regional trends in health measures for specific groups of beneficiaries.", "The number of beneficiaries receiving DME items covered under CBP round 2 generally decreased after the implementation of round 2, and these utilization decreases generally were larger than the decreases for items or areas that were not included in CBP. The number of beneficiaries receiving diabetes testing supplies covered under the national mail-order program also generally decreased after the implementation of the program, although there was an increase in the utilization of some items through retail outlets.", "The number of beneficiaries receiving at least one DME item included in CBP round 2 decreased after the implementation of round 2, and these decreases were larger than those for items or areas that were not included in CBP. That is, the decrease was largest among items and areas for which CMS established competitively set rates beginning in July 2013. Specifically, the percentage decrease in the number of beneficiaries receiving at least one round 2 DME item between 2012 and 2014 was 17 percent. In contrast, the decreases in utilization were 6 to 7 percent for the same items in non-CBP areas and for non-CBP items. (See fig. 2.)\nNumerous factors could have contributed to the decrease in the number of beneficiaries receiving DME, and the decreases do not necessarily indicate that beneficiaries did not receive needed DME. Some stakeholders have expressed concern that lower payment rates and a smaller number of suppliers may have caused some beneficiaries to not receive needed DME. However, CMS stated that CBP has helped limit fraud and abuse and may have curbed unnecessary utilization of some CBP-covered items in competitive bidding areas. Additionally, in recent years CMS began implementing several broader antifraud efforts that were not limited to CBP-covered items or areas, such as taking additional steps to identify aberrant or suspicious billing patterns among all Medicare FFS claims before making payments, and implementing new safeguards to better screen existing and new Medicare suppliers.\nLooking at each of the eight product categories individually, the number of beneficiaries receiving covered items generally decreased after implementation of round 2, and these decreases were generally larger than those for the same items in non-CBP areas. Specifically, utilization of seven of the eight round 2 product categories decreased between 2012 and 2014, with decreases that were larger than in non-CBP areas for six of these seven categories. While there was substantial variation in the magnitude of the decrease in beneficiaries receiving these items, the percentage decreases in the number of beneficiaries receiving items and in the number of items received were generally similar, indicating that the average number of items beneficiaries received was relatively constant. Continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) was the only product category for which the number of beneficiaries receiving items increased between 2012 and 2014, as well as the category with the largest difference between the percentage change in beneficiaries and in items. (See fig. 3.)\nSimilarly, almost all round 2 areas experienced a decrease in the number of beneficiaries receiving CBP round 2 items after the implementation of round 2, though the magnitude of the decrease varied. Specifically, 95 of the 100 round 2 areas experienced a decrease between 2012 and 2014 in the number of beneficiaries receiving CBP round 2 items, ranging from 2 to 42 percent. Of the 15 areas with the largest percentage decreases in the number of beneficiaries receiving these items, 12 were in California and Texas. Nine of these 12 areas also had the largest relative decreases in the number of beneficiaries receiving round 2 items compared with the number receiving non-CBP-covered DME items. CMS officials told us that the relatively large decreases in California and Texas attributed to the implementation of CBP round 2 were likely because these states historically had high rates of potential fraud and abuse. (See fig. 4.)", "The total number of beneficiaries receiving at least one diabetes testing supply item covered under the national mail-order program decreased after implementation of the program, although there was an increase in the number of beneficiaries receiving some of these items through retail outlets. Specifically, there was an overall 12 percent decrease between 2012 and 2014 in the number of beneficiaries receiving at least one diabetes testing supply item through any acquisition method. However, during the same time period there was a 39 percent decrease in the number of beneficiaries receiving these items through mail order and a 13 percent increase in the number of beneficiaries receiving these items through retail outlets such as stores or pharmacies. The net result was a switch from a majority of beneficiaries (57 percent) receiving these supplies through mail order in 2012 to a majority receiving supplies through retail in 2014 (63 percent). (See fig. 5.) These utilization results were driven by changes in the two most commonly received items covered under the national mail-order program: diabetes test strips and lancets. For the other six covered diabetes testing supplies, the number of beneficiaries receiving these items through retail outlets decreased.\nAlthough CMS officials said that they could not speculate about reasons for this switch, a diabetes advocacy group we interviewed speculated that beneficiaries may have decided to switch to retail because they had difficulty finding contract suppliers that would provide the specific brand of test strips they requested. The use of retail outlets could result in higher out-of-pocket payments for beneficiaries because unlike mail-order contract suppliers, retail outlets are not required to accept assignment for diabetes testing supplies covered under the national mail-order program.", "Based on its monitoring of health measures, CMS reported that the implementation of the CBP has not resulted in widespread beneficiary access issues. The number of round 2 and national mail-order program inquiries and complaints to 1-800-MEDICARE generally decreased throughout the first 2 years of the programs’ implementation. CMS told us that it investigates complaints using secret shopping calls and that its post-implementation beneficiary satisfaction surveys remained positive. Nevertheless, several stakeholder groups we interviewed reported specific concerns such as delays in delivery of CBP-covered DME items and beneficiaries having difficulty locating a contract supplier.", "CMS reported that its health status monitoring tool showed similar trends in health measures in both CBP and non-CBP areas, both before and after the implementation of round 2. CMS has reported no changes in health measures attributable to the implementation of any CBP round since the agency began monitoring measures in 2011, which CMS officials told us is an indication that the CBP has not caused widespread problems with beneficiary access. Officials told us that CMS investigated aberrant trends in health measures identified by the monitoring tool and concluded that all such trends were the result of issues unrelated to CBP. For example, CMS officials told us that they investigated an increased mortality rate in one competitive bidding area and concluded it was due to an influenza outbreak. Similarly, they found that other issues resulted from changes in DME policy not specific to CBP, such as new requirements regarding prior authorization for wheelchairs.\nCMS’s health status monitoring tool uses Medicare claims data to track seven health measures—deaths, hospitalizations, emergency room visits, physician visits, admissions to skilled nursing facilities, average number of days spent hospitalized in a month, and average number of days in a skilled nursing facility in a month. CMS monitors these health measures for three groups of Medicare FFS beneficiaries residing in both CBP and non-CBP areas: (1) all beneficiaries enrolled in FFS, (2) beneficiaries likely to use one of the competitively bid products on the basis of related health conditions, and (3) beneficiaries for whom Medicare has paid a claim for one of the competitively bid products. CMS’s tool considers historical and regional trends in health status to monitor health measures in all CBP and non-CBP areas. CMS publishes aggregated results for four U.S. geographic regions quarterly on its website. CMS uses the tool to review Medicare claims data on a bi-weekly basis. According to a monitoring tool user guide that CMS provided us, the tool uses a statistical scoring algorithm to identify potential changes in health measures in every competition. The goal of the scoring algorithm is to identify persistent aberrant trends in health measures in individual competitive bidding area and product category competitions that are not mirrored in other regions. These aberrant trends can then be investigated further, through steps such as beneficiary and supplier outreach and contract compliance reviews.\nBased on our analysis, CMS’s methodologies and scoring algorithm used to evaluate health measure trends among CBP areas appear to be sound. However, we did not examine individual investigations that CMS conducted to assess aberrant changes in trends in particular competitive bidding areas and product categories and whether these trends could be attributed to CBP.", "The number of inquiries and complaints to 1-800-MEDICARE regarding CBP round 2 or the national mail-order program represented less than 1 percent of all calls to 1-800-MEDICARE, and inquiries and complaints generally decreased throughout the programs’ first 2 years of implementation. During the first quarter of implementation (July 1, 2013, to September 30, 2013), 1-800-MEDICARE received almost 100,000 inquiries—including almost 300 complaints—related to CBP round 2 or the national mail-order program. However, the number of inquiries and complaints dropped sharply during the second quarter of implementation, and then generally continued to decrease slowly or remained relatively consistent over subsequent quarters. (See fig. 6.)\nAfter implementation of the CBP, CMS began to track CBP-related inquiries to 1-800-MEDICARE and to classify them as either general CBP inquiries, such as requests for general information, or assistance determining whether a beneficiary resided in a competitive bidding area and whether the inquiries were about a specific product category. The highest number of general CBP inquiries occurred in the first quarter after implementation—61,457—which decreased to 8,741 by the last quarter of the 2-year period. The number of category-specific inquiries for each product category generally decreased from the first quarter to the last quarter. The mail-order diabetes testing supplies product category had the highest number of specific inquiries during the first quarter—15,953— which fell to 1,610 inquiries in the last quarter. The standard wheelchairs product category had the next-highest number of inquiries during the first quarter—6,438—which fell to 2,967 inquiries in the last quarter.\nThe total number of complaints was small compared to the total number of inquiries. However, the number of complaints may not fully capture the number of people who expressed problems or dissatisfaction with the CBP program, because CMS defines a complaint as an inquiry to 1-800- MEDICARE that needs to be referred to an outside entity for resolution, such as Palmetto GBA. The 1,156 complaints recorded in the first 2 years occurred across multiple round 2 product categories, rather than being concentrated in a few specific categories. The complaints varied, but included complaints that contract suppliers refused to serve beneficiaries residing in their competitive bidding areas or had provided poor customer service, that beneficiaries had experienced delays in receiving DME or had received the wrong DME, and that beneficiaries had difficulty obtaining specific brands and models of DME items that had been prescribed by their physicians. For example, Palmetto GBA received several complaints indicating that contract suppliers refused to provide the U-Step walker, a specific brand of walker, furnished under a specific HCPCS code. According to CMS, U-Step walkers are infrequently prescribed, and Palmetto GBA worked with beneficiaries on a case-by- case basis to obtain them from contract suppliers. CMS told us that in every instance in which Palmetto GBA intervened, Palmetto GBA was able to locate a contract supplier to provide the item for each beneficiary with a prescription for the U-Step walker.", "CMS officials told us that the agency monitors contract suppliers to ensure that they are complying with the terms of their contracts, such as servicing all beneficiaries that reside in their competitive bidding areas and furnishing the same items to Medicare beneficiaries that they make available to other customers. Officials told us that when CMS receives complaints regarding contract suppliers’ noncompliance with contract terms, CMS may contact the supplier and/or beneficiary to obtain information necessary for investigation and may also work with other CMS contractors or deploy secret shopper calls, if deemed appropriate to do so. CMS told us that the reason for the secret shopping call helps the agency determine the strategy chosen—that is, whether it is appropriate to conduct the secret shopping calls with one or multiple supplier locations, or with multiple contract suppliers for particular competitive bidding areas or product category competitions. According to CMS, Palmetto GBA may conduct dozens or hundreds of focused secret shopping calls to investigate a single complaint to thoroughly investigate an allegation or verify contract supplier compliance. CMS told us that during secret shopping calls, Palmetto GBA representatives may pose as referral agents on behalf of beneficiaries and request items, such as specific diabetes testing supplies from contract suppliers, to determine whether the suppliers offer the supplies they claim to furnish. According to CMS, if those calls find that the contract supplier refused to provide DME items according to the terms of its CBP contract, Palmetto GBA describes the results of the call to the supplier’s representative and sends an educational letter reiterating contract obligations. Officials said that for a contract supplier who remains noncompliant, CMS sends a letter terminating the supplier’s CBP contract, and suppliers can submit a corrective action plan, accept the termination, or request a hearing.\nAccording to CMS, between July 2013 and June 2015, Palmetto GBA made a total of 3,953 focused secret shopping calls related to round 2 complaints and a total of 254 focused secret shopping calls related to the national mail-order program. CMS officials told us that as a result of those secret shopping calls, the agency issued 43 termination notices to contract suppliers during this time frame. Of those, 37 contract suppliers came into compliance and 6 suppliers’ contracts were terminated.", "CMS reported that its pre- and post-CBP implementation beneficiary satisfaction surveys found that the majority of respondents rated their experiences positively in both time periods. For both the pre- and post- implementation surveys, CMS obtained telephone responses from a random sample of approximately 400 beneficiaries in each of the 100 competitive bidding areas who received at least one CBP-covered DME item. The surveys asked beneficiaries to record their satisfaction ratings on a five-point scale for six questions: the beneficiary’s initial interaction with DME suppliers, the training received regarding the DME item, the delivery of the DME item, the quality of the item provided by the supplier, the customer service provided by the supplier, and the supplier’s overall complaint handling. In both the pre- and post-implementation surveys, a majority of the beneficiaries who responded to each of the six questions rated their experiences as either “good” or “very good,” although there were slightly fewer positive responses in the post-implementation survey. The percentage of positive responses after implementation decreased for each question, ranging between 85 and 92 percent for pre- implementation questions, and between 84 and 89 percent for the same questions post-implementation. (See fig. 7.)\nCMS also conducted pre- and post-implementation surveys for the national mail-order program using the same methodology. Those surveys also found that post-implementation satisfaction levels remained high. CMS obtained responses from a random sample of 2,086 beneficiaries for the 2013 pre-implementation survey and 2,000 for the 2014 post- implementation survey. For each of the six questions in both surveys, results indicated that between 82 and 92 percent of beneficiaries surveyed rated their experiences as either “good” or “very good,” although the exact percentage decreased slightly for some questions and increased slightly for others. (See fig. 8.)\nAs we reported previously, CMS’s survey design has some limitations. For example, the survey design did not capture responses from beneficiaries who may have needed, but did not obtain, DME during the period. That is, if a beneficiary did not receive a DME item, the beneficiary’s response regarding his or her potential access issue to the DME item would not be included in the survey. Additionally, the distribution of beneficiaries who received items across the different product categories could have changed between the pre- and post- implementation surveys, and the results were not analyzed separately by product category.", "The stakeholders we interviewed reported varied experiences with CBP and the national mail-order program. Some stakeholders reported that they had no beneficiary access issues following the implementation of round 2 and the national mail-order program and others reported numerous beneficiary access concerns. In general, stakeholders from one of the five beneficiary advocacy groups and one of four state hospital associations (California, Florida, Illinois, and New York) reported no or very few specific concerns with CBP beneficiary access. However, stakeholders from four beneficiary advocacy groups reported that their members experienced several access issues with the implementation of CBP round 2 and the national mail-order program. These issues included delays in delivery of CBP-covered DME items, such as walkers, and trouble locating contract suppliers to provide specific DME items, such as liquid oxygen and specific brands of diabetes testing strips, or to repair wheelchairs. In addition, discharge planners and other stakeholders from three state hospital associations reported that beneficiaries also experienced delays in delivery of CBP-covered items, such as walkers and wheelchairs, and had difficulty locating contract suppliers to provide oxygen or service DME items when the beneficiaries were visiting in a competitive bidding area but resided elsewhere.\nDischarge planners and referral agents from the Florida and California hospital associations told us that the delays in delivery of needed DME resulted in an increase in the length of hospital stays for some beneficiaries. For example, individuals we spoke with from the Florida Hospital Association told us that prior to CBP, DME suppliers typically delivered DME within 24 hours of the request, 7 days a week. However, since CBP round 2 was implemented, contract suppliers in Florida’s competitive bidding areas no longer delivered on weekends and also delivered only during certain hours Monday through Friday. The planners and agents from the Florida Hospital Association told us that delays in delivery can extend the length of beneficiaries’ hospital stays when the DME is necessary prior to discharge, such as DME for orthopedic-related injuries. In some cases, they told us that the hospital loans or provides certain DME, such as walkers, in order to discharge beneficiaries on time.\nAs previously described, CMS’s health status monitoring tool did not indicate changes in the average length of hospital stays resulting from the implementation of CBP. We conducted a limited analysis to compare the length of hospital stays in 2012 (pre-CBP) and 2014 (post-CBP) for beneficiaries who had a hip or knee replacement, both nationally and in California and Florida. We found that the average length of stay was slightly lower in 2014 than in 2012, both for the two selected states and nationally. This was true for both beneficiaries who received DME within a day of discharge and those who did not, within as well as outside competitive bidding areas. (See fig. 9.) This limited analysis did not indicate an increase in the average length of stay among beneficiaries as a result of the implementation of CBP, although we did not expand our analysis to determine if results were consistent across other reasons for hospitalization.", "Most round 2 and national mail-order program competitions had at least five active contract suppliers in 2014, but other competitions had just one or a few active suppliers. In addition, some competitions had a single contract supplier that accounted for the majority of the market share. Eleven percent of contract suppliers were inactive during 2014 in all the competitions in which they were awarded and accepted a contract, and about half of contract suppliers were inactive in at least one of the competitions in their contract. CMS told us that it monitors the contract supplier market and has its contractor conduct secret shopping calls of inactive suppliers on a quarterly basis to confirm that the suppliers are not in breach of their contracts.", "A large majority of the possible 801 individual competitions in which a contract supplier could be awarded a contract had at least five contract suppliers that were active in 2014, which we defined as having furnished at least one covered item during 2014 in at least one of the competitive bidding areas and product category competitions in which they were awarded and accepted a contract. We found that 84 percent of the competitions had at least five active contract suppliers; however, 11 percent of competitions had three or fewer active suppliers and 1 percent had just one active supplier. (See table 2.) During the bid evaluation and contract award processes, CMS tries to ensure beneficiary access and choice by awarding contracts to at least five contract suppliers in each competition. To ensure that there is sufficient capacity to satisfy beneficiary demand, CMS considers a competition with only one qualified supplier to be nonviable. According to CMS officials, once contracts are awarded, contract suppliers are required to furnish items and services upon request, but are not otherwise required to furnish a certain amount of DME items as part of their contract obligations.\nThe number of active contract suppliers across the 800 round 2 competitions varied substantially by product category. The round 2 product category with the largest number of active contract suppliers was oxygen, in which 352 suppliers accounted for over $362 million in charges during 2014. Furthermore, the majority (86) of the 100 competitions for the oxygen product category had at least 11 active suppliers. In contrast, the product category with the fewest active contract suppliers was negative pressure wound therapy (NPWT), with 60 suppliers that accounted for over $48 million in charges. Over half (69) of the 100 competitions for NPWT had 4 or fewer active contract suppliers and 4 had a single active supplier. For the national mail-order program, all 19 contract suppliers were active in 2014.", "While multiple suppliers had substantial shares of the market for most competitions, in some competitions a single supplier had a majority. In 72 percent of the 801 competitions, no contract supplier had more than half of the market. However, in 14 percent (113) of the competitions, a single contract supplier had at least three quarters of the market, and in 6 percent (48) of the competitions, one contract supplier had 90 percent or more of the market. (See table 3.)\nMarket concentration varied substantially by product category. The round 2 product category with the least market concentration was wheelchairs, for which the top contract supplier had less than 25 percent of the market in 43 of the 100 total competitions. One reason for this was the relatively high market share of non-contract suppliers, as physicians and hospitals are allowed to provide folding manual wheelchairs to their patients directly in certain circumstances. In addition, other suppliers chose to be grandfathered and continued furnishing capped rental wheelchairs to beneficiaries who were their customers when CBP round 2 began. For example, we found that non-contract suppliers had at least 25 percent of the market share in 56 of the 100 total wheelchair competitions. In contrast, the product category with the largest market concentration was NPWT, for which the top contract supplier had at least 90 percent of the market in 47 of the 100 competitions. NPWT was also the only round 2 product category for which non-contract suppliers accounted for less than 10 percent of market share in all 100 competitions.\nIn addition, some contract suppliers had a substantial proportion of the total round 2 and national mail-order program market—which was over $1 billion in 2014—as well as even higher market share for individual product categories. For example, the contract supplier with the highest market share based on charges for CBP-covered items, Lincare, had $157 million in charges, or 13 percent of the round 2 and mail-order program market in 2014. It also had 25 percent of the oxygen market and the highest market share in three other product categories (CPAP, hospital beds, and walkers). Arriva, the contract supplier with the second highest overall market share, had $85 million in charges, or 7 percent of total 2014 charges. However, these charges were for mail-order diabetes testing supplies only; Arriva had 50 percent of the $170 million national mail-order program market. Apria, the contract supplier with the third highest overall market share, had $68 million in charges, or 6 percent of the total market, and accounted for over 10 percent of the CPAP and oxygen markets. KCI, with the fourth highest market share, was only active in the NPWT category, and had $42 million in charges during 2014, which accounted for 86 percent of the NPWT market.", "Eleven percent of contract suppliers (94 of 834) were inactive during 2014 in all of the competitions in their contract—that is, they did not furnish any CBP-covered items during 2014 in any of the competitive bidding areas and product categories in which they were awarded and accepted a contract. The completely inactive suppliers varied in their categories, areas, and duration of participation in CBP. The 94 completely inactive suppliers’ contracts included over half of all competitions (446 of 801), and spanned all 8 round 2 product categories and 99 of the 100 round 2 areas. In addition, about half of the 94 completely inactive contract suppliers stopped participating in CBP prior to the end of 2014—19 were terminated by CMS and 23 closed or otherwise voluntarily withdrew from the CBP. However, the majority of completely inactive contract suppliers had higher composite bids than other contract suppliers. Specifically, 82 of the 94 completely inactive contract suppliers’ bids (estimates of the price at which they could profitably provide those items) were above the median bid of all suppliers in the same competition, on average, and for 56 of the contract suppliers this difference was more than 10 percent. In addition, 61 of the 94 completely inactive contract suppliers were designated as small bidders by CMS, and 59 had only one or two competitions in their contract.\nIn 2014, an additional 39 percent of contract suppliers (324 suppliers) were inactive in at least one of the competitions in their contract, and 3 percent (28) had less than $1,000 in total Medicare charges for CBP- covered items. These partially inactive suppliers included contract suppliers that were very active in other markets. For example, Lincare, the supplier with the largest overall market share, was inactive in 144 of the 689 competitions in its contract. Similar to the completely inactive suppliers, the 28 barely active contract suppliers’ contracts spanned all eight round 2 product categories and 96 of the 100 round 2 areas, and 24 of the 28 barely active contract suppliers bid above the median bid, on average.", "To help ensure beneficiary access and choice, CMS officials said that CMS monitors all competitions, but applies greater focus to those where there is just one or a few active contract suppliers and assesses whether there is a need for CMS to award subsequent contract offers to existing contract suppliers. CMS officials told us that the agency does not believe that having competitions with just one or a few active contract suppliers has decreased beneficiary access and choice because its routine monitoring of beneficiary access has not identified access issues. CMS also told us that the agency monitors suppliers that are inactive by having Palmetto GBA conduct secret shopping calls quarterly. According to CMS, most of the secret shopping calls to contract suppliers that were inactive resulted in finding that the suppliers were not in breach of contract, and in some instances, they reported that they had not received requests from beneficiaries or referral agents for CBP-covered items.\nHowever, CMS reported that Palmetto GBA found that eight inactive contract suppliers were in breach of their contracts because they were not providing items that had been requested. Of those, three contract suppliers were brought into compliance and the other five contract suppliers’ contracts were terminated. In addition, CMS officials told us that the agency also works with the Competitive Acquisition Ombudsman and uses local competitive bidding liaisons to provide an on-the-ground physical presence and investigate and address any potential issues.", "We provided a draft of this product to HHS for comment. HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and appropriate congressional committees. The report will also be available at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "Appendix I: The 100 Competitive Bidding Areas Included in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ Competitive Bidding Program Round 2 by specific ZIP codes related to a metropolitan statistical area, and they may be the same size as, larger than, or smaller than the related metropolitan statistical area, depending on a variety of considerations. The competitive bidding area is the area wherein only contract suppliers may furnish competitively bid items to beneficiaries unless an exception is permitted by law. Metropolitan statistical areas with populations over 8 million may be subdivided into multiple competitive bidding areas. Most round 2 metropolitan statistical areas have only one competitive bidding area. However, the three largest metropolitan statistical areas (Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York) are subdivided into multiple competitive bidding areas, so there are a total of 100 competitive bidding areas.", "Since the durable medical equipment (DME) competitive bidding program (CBP) was implemented in 2008, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has phased in several additional CBP rounds and programs.", "Round 1. CMS awarded contracts to 329 contract suppliers—208 of which were designated by CMS as small suppliers—to furnish DME items and services in 10 product categories in 10 competitive bidding areas. According to CMS, the round 1 competitive bidding areas were selected, in part, because they may have had prior instances of unnecessary DME utilization. Contracts were intended to be effective for a 3-year period, July 1, 2008, through June 30, 2011; however, round 1 was stopped on July 15, 2008, through the enactment of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA). Among other provisions, MIPPA terminated the contracts already awarded by CMS to suppliers in round 1 and required CMS to repeat the competition for round 1—referred to as the CBP round 1 rebid.\nRound 1 rebid. CMS awarded contracts to 356 contract suppliers—219 of which were small suppliers—to furnish DME items and services in nine product categories in nine competitive bidding areas. Contracts were effective January 1, 2011, and expired after 3 years on December 31, 2013, except for the contracts for the mail-order diabetes testing supplies product category, which expired on December 31, 2012.\nRound 1 recompete. CMS awarded contracts to 282 contract suppliers— 163 of which were small suppliers—to furnish DME items and services in six product categories and nine competitive bidding areas. The recompete contracts were effective January 1, 2014, and expire December 31, 2016.\nRound 1 2017. Round 1 2017 will include seven product categories, with the same items as were bid in the round 1 recompete except for the external infusion pumps and supplies product category, which is not included in round 1 2017. Round 1 2017 will be implemented in the same 9 competitive bidding areas as the round 1 rebid and round 1 recompete, but because competitive bidding areas that included more than one state have been redefined so that there are no longer any multistate areas, the total number of competitive bidding areas is 13. These contracts become effective January 1, 2017, and expire December 31, 2018.", "Round 2 and national mail-order program. CMS awarded contracts to 822 contract suppliers—520 of which were small suppliers—to furnish DME items and services in eight product categories and 100 competitive bidding areas. CMS also awarded 19 contracts—6 of which were to small suppliers—to furnish mail-order diabetes testing supplies included in the national mail-order program. The round 2 and national mail-order program contracts were effective July 1, 2013, and expired June 30, 2016.\nRound 2 recompete and national mail-order program recompete. According to CMS officials, the agency awarded contracts to 586 contract suppliers—334 of which were small suppliers—to furnish DME items for seven product categories with most of the same items bid in other rounds, although CMS grouped certain items into different product categories. Round 2 recompete will be implemented in the same 100 competitive bidding areas as round 2, but because competitive bidding areas that included more than one state have been redefined so that there are no longer any multistate areas, the total number of competitive bidding areas is 117. CMS officials told us that the agency also awarded contracts to 9 contract suppliers—2 of which were small suppliers—to furnish the same diabetes testing supplies in the same areas that were included in the first national mail-order program. The round 2 recompete and national mail- order program recompete contracts were effective July 1, 2016, and expire December 31, 2018.", "", "Kathleen M. King, (202) 512-7114 or [email protected].", "In addition to the contact named above, Martin T. Gahart, Assistant Director; Michelle Paluga, Analyst-in-Charge; Todd Anderson; Alison Binkowski; Elizabeth T. Morrison; and Emily Wilson made key contributions to this report.", "Medicare: Bidding Results from CMS’s Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program. GAO-15-63. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2014.\nMedicare: Second Year Update for CMS’s Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program Round 1 Rebid. GAO-14-156. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2014.\nMedicare: Review of the First Year of CMS’s Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program’s Round 1 Rebid. GAO-12-693. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012.\nMedicare: The First Year of the Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program Round 1 Rebid. GAO-12-733T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012.\nMedicare: Issues for Manufacturer-level Competitive Bidding for Durable Medical Equipment. GAO-11-337R. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2011.\nMedicare: CMS Has Addressed Some Implementation Problems from Round 1 of the Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program for the Round 1 Rebid. GAO-10-1057T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010.\nMedicare: CMS Working to Address Problems from Round 1 of the Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program. GAO-10-27. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2009.\nMedicare: Covert Testing Exposes Weaknesses in the Durable Medical Equipment Supplier Screening Process. GAO-08-955. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2008.\nMedicare: Competitive Bidding for Medical Equipment and Supplies Could Reduce Program Payments, but Adequate Oversight Is Critical. GAO-08-767T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008.\nMedicare: Improvements Needed to Address Improper Payments for Medical Equipment and Supplies. GAO-07-59. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007.\nMedicare Payment: CMS Methodology Adequate to Estimate National Error Rate. GAO-06-300. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2006.\nMedicare Durable Medical Equipment: Class III Devices Do Not Warrant a Distinct Annual Payment Update. GAO-06-62. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2006.\nMedicare: More Effective Screening and Stronger Enrollment Standards Needed for Medical Equipment Suppliers. GAO-05-656. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2005.\nMedicare: CMS’s Program Safeguards Did Not Deter Growth in Spending for Power Wheelchairs. GAO-05-43. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2004.\nMedicare: Past Experience Can Guide Future Competitive Bidding for Medical Equipment and Supplies. GAO-04-765. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2004." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h4_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h4_full", "h0_full h5_title", "h0_full h5_full", "h0_full", "h4_full h1_full h5_title h2_title h3_full", "h5_full h1_full", "h3_full h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "", "h5_full h1_full", "h2_title h4_title", "h2_full", "h4_full h2_full", "h2_full", "", "", "", "h3_full h2_title", "", "h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What happened when two CBP phases were implemented?", "What did the CBP specify?", "What has CBP helped do?", "How did the number of beneficiaries receiving items change from before 2012 to after 2014?", "What has CMS reported about round 2 and national mail-order program?", "What did CMS officials tell GAO?", "How did the number of CBP inquiries and complaints change during the first two years of implementation?", "What did beneficiary advocacy groups and state hospital associations report?", "What did round 2 and the national mail-order program include?", "What contract suppliers did these competitions have?", "What characterized these suppliers?", "What did CMS tell GAO?", "What did the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 require?", "How beneficial were the first 2 years of round 2 and the national mail-order program?", "How has GAO been involved with CBP?", "What was GAO asked to do?", "What did GAO examine in its report?", "What does the GAO report describe?", "How did GAO examine the effect of CBP on utilization?", "How did GAO examine the effect of CBP on beneficiary access?", "How did GAO describe supplier markets?" ], "summary": [ "The number of beneficiaries receiving durable medical equipment (DME) items covered under the competitive bidding program (CBP) generally decreased after implementation of two CBP phases that began July 1, 2013—round 2 and the national mail-order program for diabetes testing supplies.", "Under the CBP, (administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)), only competitively selected contract suppliers can furnish certain DME items at competitively determined prices to beneficiaries in designated competitive bidding areas.", "CMS officials stated that CBP has helped limit fraud and abuse and may have curbed unnecessary utilization of some CBP-covered items in competitive bidding areas.", "From the year before (2012) to the year after (2014) implementation, the number of beneficiaries receiving covered items in round 2 areas decreased 17 percent, compared with a 6 percent decrease for beneficiaries in non-CBP areas. The number of beneficiaries that received diabetes testing supplies through the national mail-order program also decreased 39 percent between 2012 and 2014, with a corresponding 13 percent increase in the number of beneficiaries receiving these items through retail outlets.", "CMS reports that available evidence from the agency's monitoring efforts indicates that the implementation of round 2 and the national mail-order program have had no widespread effects on beneficiary access. In particular, CMS has reported that its health status monitoring tool has not detected any changes in health measures attributable to the CBP, and the results of its 2014 post-CBP beneficiary satisfaction surveys remained positive.", "CMS officials told GAO that CMS took measures to ensure that contract suppliers met their contract obligations, such as investigating complaints using secret shopping calls, and terminating contracts of suppliers that remained noncompliant after receiving targeted education.", "In addition, the number of CBP inquiries and complaints generally decreased throughout the first 2 years of round 2 and the national mail-order program.", "However, some beneficiary advocacy groups and state hospital associations reported specific access issues, such as difficulty locating contract suppliers that will furnish certain items and delays in delivery of DME items.", "Round 2 and the national mail-order program included 801 separate competitive bidding area and product category competitions.", "Most of these competitions had at least five active contract suppliers in 2014. However, 11 percent of the competitions had three or fewer active contract suppliers and 1 percent had just one active contract supplier.", "In addition, while multiple suppliers had substantial shares of the market for most competitions, in some competitions a single supplier had a majority. For example, in 6 percent of the competitions, one contract supplier had at least 90 percent of the market. Conversely, 11 percent of contract suppliers did not furnish any CBP-covered items for any competitions in their contract.", "CMS officials told GAO that CMS monitors these suppliers to help ensure that they are meeting their contractual obligations, such as being willing to service all beneficiaries in their areas and to furnish the same items to Medicare beneficiaries that they make available to other customers.", "To achieve Medicare savings for DME, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 required that CMS implement the CBP for certain DME, such as wheelchairs and oxygen, in phases, or rounds. Round 1 started in 2008, and round 2 and the national mail-order program started in 2013.", "CMS estimated that the first 2 years of round 2 and the national mail-order program saved Medicare approximately $3.6 billion.", "GAO has reported on several prior CBP rounds.", "GAO was asked to continue to review the implementation of the CBP.", "In this report, GAO examines the extent to which round 2 and the national mail-order program have affected (1) utilization of CBP-covered DME items, and (2) beneficiaries' access to DME items.", "This report also (3) describes the number and market shares of the round 2 and mail-order program suppliers.", "To examine the effect of CBP on utilization, GAO used Medicare DME claims data from 2012 and 2014—the year before and the year after implementation of round 2—to compare the number of beneficiaries who received CBP-covered DME items.", "To examine the effect of CBP on beneficiary access, GAO reviewed information about CMS's efforts to monitor the effects of the CBP, and interviewed selected Medicare beneficiary organizations and state hospital associations.", "To describe the supplier markets, GAO analyzed 2014 Medicare claims data, the latest year with complete available data when GAO began this engagement." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 0, 1, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R45737	{ "title": [ "", "Prison Populations and Postsecondary Education", "Background on Pell Grants for Incarcerated Individuals", "Current Pell Grant Eligibility", "Second Chance Pell Experiment", "Select Issues and Discussion", "Increased Pell Grant Program Costs", "Eligibility Factors", "Pell Grant Eligibility for Prisoners Who Might Not Be Released", "Pell Grant Eligibility of Individuals Who Lack Selective Service Registration", "Pell Grant Eligibility of Individuals Who Have Not Completed Secondary School", "Additional Research on the Effects of Postsecondary Education in Correctional Institutions", "Obstacles to Providing Access to Postsecondary Education in a Correctional Environment", "Unaccommodating Correctional Environments", "Complicated Systems of Responsibility for Correctional Education", "Inadequate Education Program Design", "Increasing Opportunities for Post-Release Employment" ], "paragraphs": [ "I n 1994, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-322 ). The act, among other things, made federal and state prisoners ineligible to receive Pell Grants. The Pell Grant program is the single largest source of federal grant aid supporting postsecondary education students. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was passed during a period when federal and state policymakers were adopting increasingly punitive measures―such as establishing new crimes, increasing penalties for certain offenses, requiring convicted offenders to serve a greater proportion of their sentences before being eligible for release, and making convicted offenders ineligible for certain government assistance programs―as a means to combat violent crime. However, concerns about the financial and social costs of an increasing prison population and what prisons are doing to rehabilitate prisoners and prevent recidivism have led some policymakers to consider whether some of the \"tough on crime\" policies of the 1980s and 1990s need to be changed.\nPolicymakers have started to reconsider whether prisoners should be prohibited from utilizing Pell Grants to participate in postsecondary education programs while they are incarcerated. Legislation was introduced in the 115 th and 116 th Congresses that would have allowed incarcerated individuals to receive Pell Grants. As Senator Lamar Alexander noted \"most prisoners, sooner or later, are released from prison, and no one is helped when they do not have the skills to find a job. Making Pell grants available to them in the right circumstances is a good idea.\" In addition, both the Obama Administration and Trump Administration recommended expanding Pell Grants or other targeted federal financial aid to prisoners who are eligible for release after serving a period of incarceration.\nHowever, reestablishing prisoners' eligibility for Pell Grants is not without controversy. Legislation was introduced in the 115 th Congress that would have ended the Second Chance Pell Experiment, a program begun under the Obama Administration that evaluates the effects of granting prisoners access to Pell Grants. Opposition to allowing prisoners to receive Pell Grants stems from the belief that taxpayer money should not be used to finance the education of prisoners, especially if it might compromise assistance to non-prisoners. Of note, under current Pell Grant program rules, expanding Pell Grant eligibility to prisoners would not affect the eligibility of non-prisoners or award levels of non-prisoners.\nThis report provides a discussion of issues policymakers might consider if Congress takes up legislation to allow individuals incarcerated in federal and state facilities to receive Pell Grants. Before discussing these issues, the report offers a brief examination of relevant data on the prison population and the educational participation and attainment of incarcerated adults. This is followed by an overview of the history of the prohibition on allowing incarcerated individuals to receive Pell Grants, and a brief discussion of who is eligible for Pell Grants.", "This section provides information on the number of prisoners in the United States from 1980 to 2018 and an overview of the latest recidivism data from the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). It also describes the educational attainment of prisoners, and their participation in and completion of educational programs offered to them.\nThe recent debate over prisoners' eligibility for Pell Grants is driven, in part, by concerns that the prohibition on prisoners receiving Pell Grants is hampering access to postsecondary education that could aid prisoners' rehabilitation, assist their efforts to find employment after being released, and help them become productive and law-abiding members of their communities. These concerns are combined with an acknowledgment that \"tough on crime\" policies contributed to a prison population that grew throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and the early 2000s and, because most offenders sentenced to prison will eventually be released, more people returning to their communities after serving a period of incarceration. The growth in the prison population combined with the Pell Grant ban means that an increasing number of prisoners are unable to participate in postsecondary education and large numbers of ex-prisoners are potentially returning to their communities without having enhanced skills or education while in prison that could aid them in becoming law-abiding citizens.\nThe prison population in the United States increased steadily from 1980 to 2009 before decreasing somewhat from 2010 to 2018 (the most recent year for which prison population data are available). There were approximately 1,471,000 prisoners under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional authorities in 2018, compared to 330,000 prisoners in 1980. Increased prison populations are a function of increases in prison admissions, among other things, but growth in the prison population absent large increases in the percentage of convicted offenders who were sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole means that there has also been an increase in the number of people released from prison annually. Approximately 626,000 prisoners were released by state and federal correctional authorities in 2016, up from approximately 158,000 prisoners released in 1980.\nA recent study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) found that 44% of prisoners released from custody in 2005 were rearrested in the first year after their release and 83% of released prisoners had been rearrested after nine years. A review of research on corrections-based educational programming suggests that prisoners who participate in postsecondary education while incarcerated recidivate at lower rates than prisoners who do not participate. However, methodological limitations in many of the studies mean that alternative explanations for the results―for example, that prisoners who took postsecondary coursework had a greater desire to reform themselves―cannot be excluded.\nEmployment and educational attainment have also been linked. Data from the Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) indicate that the employment rate of adults ages 25-64 increases as their level of educational attainment increases. Sixty percent of adults without a high school diploma were in the labor force in 2017 compared to 87% of adults with at least a bachelor's degree. ACS data further indicate that incarcerated individuals have lower levels of educational attainment than the general population. Figure 1 shows that approximately one-third (31%) of incarcerated adults (age 25 or older) have less than a high school diploma, while 12% of non-incarcerated adults have not completed high school.\nWhile incarcerated individuals have relatively low levels of educational attainment, data suggests that a large percentage of prisoners are not advancing their education while they are incarcerated. Based on a survey of 1,546 inmates in state, federal, and private prisons, the Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reported that more than half (58%) did not further their education during their current period of incarceration. The NCES study did not ask prisoners whether the cost of postsecondary education prevented them from participating, but the Institute for Higher Education Policy notes that self-financing can be a barrier for prisoners who want to participate in postsecondary education while they are incarcerated.", "Prior to 1992, all incarcerated individuals were eligible to receive aid under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329, as amended), including Pell Grants and loans. Pell Grants are need-based aid that is intended to be the foundation for all federal need-based student aid awarded to undergraduates. A 1982 report by the General Accounting Office (now known as the Government Accountability Office; GAO) estimated that approximately 11,000 federal and state prisoners received Pell Grants in academic year (AY) 1979-1980. ED's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) estimated that about 25,000 prisoners each year received Pell Grants during the period from 1988 to 1992. The 1982 GAO report noted that some states and schools also provided considerable financial assistance to prisoners.\nThe 1980s and 1990s were marked by several policy initiatives at the state and federal level to augment penalties for convicted offenders. In addition, Congress was concerned about schools established solely to take advantage of the HEA Title IV funds provided to incarcerated students, and the possibility of high student loan default rates among individuals formerly or currently incarcerated. Some financial aid administrators questioned whether Pell Grants were the most appropriate source of rehabilitative aid for incarcerated students. The Higher Education Amendments of 1992 ( P.L. 102-325 ) limited the eligibility of incarcerated students to HEA Title IV aid in several ways:\nIndividuals who were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole and those who were sentenced to death were prohibited from receiving a Pell Grant. Pell Grant aid provided to incarcerated students in each fiscal year had to supplement and not supplant the level of postsecondary education assistance provided by the state to incarcerated individuals in FY1988. No incarcerated student was eligible to receive a loan (this remains current law). The cost of attendance for incarcerated students was limited to tuition and fees, and required books and supplies (this remains current law). An institution of higher education (IHE) became ineligible to participate in the HEA Title IV programs if more than 25% of its enrolled students were incarcerated (this remains current law).\nGAO published a report in 1994 in response to remaining congressional concerns regarding the use of Pell Grants by incarcerated individuals. The report provided data on the number of inmates receiving Pell Grants, described the effect of allowing incarcerated individuals to receive Pell Grants on grants for other needy students, and reviewed the research at that time on the effect of correctional education on recidivism rates. Using ED data for AY1993-1994, GAO reported that approximately 23,000 Pell Grant recipients were incarcerated (less than 1% of all recipients), and the average amount of the Pell Grant was the same regardless of whether individuals were incarcerated or not. Of Pell Grant recipients who were incarcerated, 39% were enrolled in public two-year IHEs, 35% were enrolled in private nonprofit four-year IHEs, and 12% were enrolled in public four-year IHEs. The remaining 14% of incarcerated students were enrolled in public, private nonprofit, or private for-profit programs that granted certificates (10%) or private nonprofit or private for-profit two-year IHEs (4%). GAO indicated that because the Pell Grant program operates as an entitlement for students, the number and amount of Pell Grants for incarcerated individuals had no effect on Pell Grant availability for individuals who were not incarcerated. Finally, GAO concluded that the studies on incarcerated students' participation in educational programming and recidivism \"have resulted in conflicting findings\" because isolating the effect of correctional education on recidivism was not possible in existing studies for two primary reasons: many interrelated factors affecting recidivism are difficult to define and measure, and an experimental design that randomly assigns prisoners to treatment and control groups would be necessary to eliminate the effect of motivated prisoners self-selecting into correctional education programs.\nThe culmination of the \"tough on crime\" approach in setting federal policy was the enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA, P.L. 103-322 ). The act, among other things, authorized grants to assist states that enacted \"truth in sentencing\" laws with building new prisons, expanded the number of offenses for which the federal death penalty applies, and established a series of new federal crimes. With respect to the HEA, the VCCLEA eliminated the supplement not supplant provision relating to Pell Grant funds made available to incarcerated individuals and the prohibition on Pell Grant receipt by individuals sentenced to life in prison or the death penalty. The VCCLEA also established the current prohibition against any individuals incarcerated in federal and state penal institutions receiving Pell Grants.\nAs a likely consequence of the newly enacted prohibition on prisoners receiving Pell Grants, combined with previously enacted prohibitions on the receipt of HEA Title IV student loans, the availability of postsecondary education programs to state prisoners and their enrollment in such programs declined. After prisoners were prohibited from receiving Pell Grants, approximately half of the postsecondary correctional education programs closed and those that remained were reduced in size. In addition, from 1991 to 2004 the percentage of state prison inmates enrolling in college courses declined from 14% to 7%.\nIn 2008, Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed into law the Higher Education Opportunity Act ( P.L. 110-315 ), which prohibited those individuals who upon completion of a period of incarceration for a forcible or nonforcible sexual offense were subject to an involuntary civil commitment from receiving Pell Grants. This prohibition was partially in response to the fact that 54 individuals who were civilly committed sex offenders in Florida had received Pell Grants in 2004.", "Under Department of Education (ED) regulations for HEA Title IV, an incarcerated student is defined as any \"student who is serving a criminal sentence in a federal, state, or local penitentiary, prison, jail, reformatory, work farm, or other similar correctional institution.\" The definition does not include an individual who is confined in a correctional facility prior to the imposition of any criminal sentence or juvenile disposition, such as an individual confined in a local jail while awaiting trial. Similarly, it does not include students confined or housed in less restrictive settings such as halfway houses or home detention, or who are serving their sentences only on weekends.\nTo be eligible for a Pell Grant, a student must meet requirements established by Title IV of the HEA. Some requirements apply to all of the HEA Title IV student aid programs, and some are specific to the Pell Grant program. Among the requirements generally applicable to the HEA Title IV student aid programs for AY2018-2019 are the following:\nStudents must have a high school diploma or a general educational development (GED) certificate; must have completed an eligible homeschool program; or must have shown an \"ability to benefit\" from postsecondary education and either be enrolled in an eligible career pathway program or have been initially enrolled in an eligible postsecondary program prior to July 1, 2012. Males who are subject to registration with the Selective Service System (SSS) must be registered with the Selective Service. Students must not be in default on any HEA Title IV student loan.\nSpecific eligibility requirements for the Pell Grant program that may be germane to criminal justice involved individuals include, but are not limited to, the following:\nStudents must not be incarcerated in a federal or state penal institution. Students must not be subject to an involuntary civil commitment following incarceration for a sexual offense (as determined under the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program).\nTherefore, students serving a sentence in a federal or state penal institution, operated by a federal or state government or a contractor, are ineligible for Pell Grants. Other alleged and convicted offenders, however, may be eligible for a Pell Grant. Those incarcerated in a juvenile justice facility or a local or county jail may be eligible. Individuals in a halfway house or home detention, serving a jail sentence only on weekends, or confined prior to the imposition of any criminal sentence or juvenile disposition are eligible for Pell Grants.\nThe other HEA Title IV student aid programs also have eligibility rules for incarcerated students (see regulatory definition above). No incarcerated individual is eligible for any of the loan programs. Incarcerated students are eligible for the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program and the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program. Despite statutory eligibility, it is unlikely that incarcerated individuals would receive FSEOG or FWS aid because such funds are limited, the aid is subject to additional eligibility requirements established by each IHE, and offering FWS jobs in a correctional setting would be difficult.", "In 2015, ED initiated the Second Chance Pell Experiment to determine if access to Pell Grants would increase the enrollment of incarcerated individuals in high-quality postsecondary education programs. The initiative was part of the \"Obama Administration's commitment to create a fairer, more effective criminal justice system, reduce recidivism, and combat the impact of mass incarceration on communities.\" HEA Section 487A authorizes the Secretary of Education to waive certain HEA Title IV statutory or regulatory requirements, except for requirements related to award rules, at a limited number of IHEs in order to provide recommendations for proposed regulations and initiatives. The Secretary used this waiver authority to implement the Second Chance Pell Grant Experiment. In promoting the experiment, ED highlighted research finding that making postsecondary education and training opportunities available to incarcerated individuals increases educational attainment, reduces recidivism, and improves post-release employment opportunities and earnings.\nUnder the Second Chance Pell Experiment, participating IHEs, in partnership with federal and/or state prisons, award Pell Grants to individuals who are otherwise Pell-eligible except that they are incarcerated in a federal or state prison. Priority is given to students who are likely to be released from prison within five years. Incarcerated students must enroll in educational programs that lead to high-demand occupations from which such individuals are not legally barred. Education programs may not be offered through correspondence, but may be offered online. In addition, students must be able to complete such programs either while incarcerated or after being released. Participating IHEs must offer academic and career guidance, as well as transition services. Finally, the Pell Grant aid offered under the experiment must supplement and not supplant such postsecondary education assistance provided by the IHE, the prison, or another source.\nThere are 65 IHEs participating in the experiment, enrolling approximately 8,500 inmates in the first year, 11,000 in the second year, and 10,000 in the third year of the experiment. More than one-half of the participating IHEs are public two-year colleges. Approximately two-thirds of participating IHEs already provided postsecondary correctional education prior to joining the experiment. Some IHEs experienced start-up difficulties related to accreditation approvals, the availability of adequate facilities and space, recruiting eligible prisoners, and enrolling a sufficient number of prisoners to make the program financially viable. Of the programs originally planned, approximately 35% were designed to award a postsecondary certificate, 47% were designed to award an associate's degree, and 18% were designed to award a bachelor's degree.\nED generally issues reports of experiments that analyze and summarize IHE-reported outcomes and \"address how the experiment: reduced administrative burden; avoided creating additional costs to taxpayers; and improved aid delivery services or otherwise benefited students.\" The reports are intended to inform federal legislative decisionmaking. In February 2019, ED announced that the experiment would be extended an additional year but did not provide an estimate of the release of any data or an evaluation of the program.\nIn April 2019, GAO reported on the status of the Second Chance Pell Experiment (hereafter referred to as the 2019 GAO report ). According to the report, in AY2017-2018, 59 schools disbursed $22.3 million in Pell Grants to over 6,000 prisoners under the experiment. Schools reported various challenges implementing the experiment including, but not limited to, prisoners not being registered for Selective Service, prisoners being in default on a HEA Title IV student loan, and prisoners and school staff having difficulty proving prisoner income and financial need.", "Many prisoners are interested in participating in postsecondary education, but one of the most significant barriers to prisoners taking college-level classes is their lack of resources. Providing access to Pell Grants could help reduce this barrier. However, there are several issues policymakers might consider before expanding access to Pell Grants, including overall program costs, whether the federal government should support more research on the effects of postsecondary education in correctional institutions, obstacles to providing access to postsecondary education in a correctional environment, and barriers returning prisoners might face when trying to find post-release employment related to their education.", "Expanding Pell Grant eligibility to some or all federal and state prisoners will increase Pell Grant program costs. The Pell Grant program is funded by a mix of annual discretionary appropriations and permanent mandatory appropriations. Expanding eligibility would increase both discretionary and mandatory costs.\nThe Pell Grant program is often referred to as a quasi-entitlement because, since AY1990-1991, eligible students receive the Pell Grant award level calculated for them without regard to available appropriations. Expanding eligibility without instituting other provisions would not reduce awards for any otherwise eligible individuals and would only expand the pool of eligible individuals.\nThe increase in program costs that would result from making federal and state prisoners eligible for Pell Grants who are currently ineligible would be limited by several provisions under current law:\nStudents must have a high school diploma (or equivalent) or be enrolled in an eligible career pathway program that leads to high school completion and postsecondary credential attainment. As discussed above, 31% of incarcerated individuals do not have a high school diploma (or equivalent) and thus would only be eligible for a Pell Grant if enrolled in an eligible career pathway program. Students must not have already completed the curriculum requirements of a bachelor's or higher degree. As discussed above, 3% of incarcerated individuals have a bachelor's or higher degree. The Pell Grant award for incarcerated students may not exceed the cost of tuition and fees and, if required, books and supplies. The average AY2017-2018 Pell Grant was $4,032 for all undergraduates and $3,541 for students participating in the Second Chance Pell Experiment.", "The following sections describe subgroups of individuals that may require additional consideration when extending Pell Grant eligibility.", "If policymakers choose to reinstate prisoners' eligibility for Pell Grants, part of the justification for doing so is that taking college coursework might help prisoners obtain post-release employment and reduce their risk of recidivism. However, this reasoning raises a question about whether prisoners who might never be released should be eligible to receive Pell Grants. The current Second Chance Pell Experiment excludes individuals who are unlikely to be released and gives priority to students who are expected to be released within five years. Prisoners who might never be released include those who have been sentenced to periods of incarceration that would realistically exceed their natural life spans and those convicted of sex offenses who could be civilly committed to a secure psychiatric facility after serving their sentences because they are at high risk of committing a violent sex offense.\nA study conducted by the Sentencing Project found that in 2016, a total of 161,957 state and federal prisoners were serving life sentences. This includes 108,667 prisoners sentenced to life with the possibility of parole (LWP) and 53,290 prisoners sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). Prisoners serving life sentences accounted for one out of every nine prisoners in 2016. The Sentencing Project also found that another 44,311 prisoners were serving virtual life sentences, which were defined as sentences where a prisoner would have to serve at least 50 years of incarceration before being eligible for release. Virtual lifers , while still technically eligible for release (i.e., they were not sentenced to LWOP), are prisoners whose sentences are so long they will most likely spend the rest of their lives in prison. Of note, the Sentencing Project's definition of virtual lifers does not include older prisoners who are sentenced to incarceration and might serve less than 50 years, but because of their advanced age are likely to die in prison. The number of prisoners serving life and virtual life sentences accounted for 14% of all inmates in 2016.\nThe Sentencing Project's research found that a handful of states accounted for the majority of prisoners with LWP, LWOP, and virtual life sentences. Four states (California, Georgia, New York, and Texas) accounted for 55% of all prisoners serving LWP. Four states (California, Florida, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania) and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) accounted for 53% of all prisoners serving LWOP. Five states (Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Texas) accounted for 55% of prisoners with virtual life sentences.\nThe Sentencing Project also found that from 2003 to 2016 there was a 27% increase in the number of prisoners serving any type of life sentence, though the number of prisoners sentenced to LWOP increased by 59% while the number of prisoners sentenced to LWP increased by 18%.\nWhen debating about possibly expanding eligibility for Pell Grants, policymakers might also consider whether civilly committed sex offenders, who might never be released, should be allowed to participate in the program. Laws regarding the civil commitment of sex offenders (also known as sexually violent predator or sexually dangerous persons statutes) allow for the involuntary civil commitment of certain sex offenders at the conclusion of their prison sentences. As of 2015, 20 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government had laws that allowed for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators and sexually dangerous persons. Individuals who are civilly committed are held until courts deem that they no longer meet the criteria for civil commitment. These individuals are held in secure treatment facilities. In general, for someone to be civilly committed the individual must have committed a qualifying sex offense, have a qualifying mental condition (e.g., a personality disorder or a paraphilia ), and be identified as high risk to commit another sexual offense as a result of the disorder.\nThe Prison Policy Initiative reported that 5,430 offenders were civilly committed in 2016 in 15 states. Unlike most prison sentences, there is no set period of time for when someone who is civilly committed will be released. For example, Minnesota has yet to release any civilly committed sex offenders committed to its custody since the mid-1980s, and 40 individuals have died in custody.", "Congress may consider whether to amend the HEA Title IV and Pell Grant eligibility requirement for Selective Service registration because it is an obstacle for some men who have been involved in the criminal justice system. Most men aged 18–25 are required to register with the SSS. Men who are required to register and do not do so are ineligible for Pell Grants, unless they did not knowingly and willfully fail to register. Men ages 18-25 who are incarcerated are not required to register with the Selective Service while they are in prison. Some research shows that men who have been involved in the criminal justice system are at a higher risk for failing to register due to misunderstandings and misinformation.\nUnder current regulations, a man who did not register may still achieve eligibility through one of several processes. If he was not required to register, he can provide evidence of his exception. If he is age 25 or younger, he can register. If he was unable to register for reasons beyond his control, he can provide evidence of the circumstances that prevented him from registering. If he has already served on active duty in the Armed Forces, he can provide evidence of such. If he did not knowingly and willfully fail to register, he may submit to his school an advisory opinion from the SSS that does not dispute his claim that he did not knowingly and willfully fail to register, and the school must not have evidence to the contrary. For incarcerated or previously incarcerated men 26 and older who failed to register, proving Pell Grant eligibility may be cumbersome. Some IHEs in the Second Chance Pell Experiment have advocated waiving the Selective Service registration requirement for incarcerated individuals in order to increase enrollments. The waiver could potentially reduce or eliminate the burden of proving eligibility or establishing eligibility for men 26 and older who were incarcerated at any time during the ages of 18 to 25.", "If postsecondary education completion by prisoners is a policy objective, the large proportion of prisoners who have not completed a secondary school education may also need to be addressed. As shown previously in Figure 1 , approximately one-third of incarcerated individuals have not completed high school. There are two primary federal approaches for educating adults who have not completed secondary school: supporting elementary and secondary education and supporting postsecondary career pathways.\nMany correctional systems spend a significant proportion of available funding on providing Adult Basic Education (ABE) and GED preparation courses. Even in cases where prisoners have a high school diploma or GED, they might still need remedial education in order to complete and pass college-level courses. Congress might consider whether there is a need for additional funding or a restructuring of programs to support ABE and GED preparation courses in prisons, or to diagnose learning disabilities in prisoners. There are several federal programs that provide some support that can be used for the secondary education of prisoners:\nThe Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA; P.L. 113-128 ), which provides grants to states for basic education for out-of-school adults, specifies that each state must subgrant funds to support educational activities for individuals in correctional institutions and for other institutionalized individuals. AEFLA provides formula grants to states that award competitive grants and contracts to local providers. States may award up to 20% of the funds made available to local providers for programs for corrections education and the education of other institutionalized individuals. The Strengthening Career and Technical Education for the 21 st Century Act ( P.L. 115-224 ) supports the development of career and technical education (CTE) programs that impart technical or occupational skills at the secondary and postsecondary levels. The majority of funding is awarded as formula grants to states, which are authorized to spend up to 2% of their allocation to serve individuals in state institutions, such as state correctional institutions, juvenile justice facilities, and educational institutions that serve individuals with disabilities. The Second Chance Act of 2007, as amended ( P.L. 110-199 ), authorized a series of competitive grants to support offender reentry programs operated by state, local, and tribal governments and nonprofit organizations. These programs include the Adult and Juvenile State and Local Offender Demonstration Program, which may support adult education and training, among several allowable uses. Another of these programs is the Grant Program to Evaluate and Improve Educational Methods at Prisons, Jails, and Juvenile Facilities, which authorizes grants to evaluate and improve academic and vocational education in prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities.\nUnder current provisions in the HEA, schools may establish career pathway programs for students who are not high school graduates but can demonstrate an ability to benefit from postsecondary education. Students enrolled in career pathway programs may be eligible for Pell Grants and other HEA Title IV aid. A career pathway program combines occupational skills training, counseling, workforce preparation, high school completion, postsecondary education, and postsecondary credential attainment. The ability to benefit may be demonstrated by the student passing an examination approved by ED to be eligible for federal student aid, or by successfully completing six credit hours or 225 clock hours of college work applicable to a certificate or degree offered by a postsecondary institution. Ability to benefit tests must be proctored by a certified test administrator and given at an assessment center facility. Administering ability to benefit tests to incarcerated individuals might be challenging. If incarcerated individuals do not take the ability to benefit test, they would have to successfully complete six credit hours or 225 clock hours of college work to become eligible for HEA Title IV aid. Should Congress want to take additional steps to promote postsecondary educational pursuits of incarcerated individuals, it might consider encouraging the development of career pathway programs in correctional environments such that prisoners who have not completed high school may pursue postsecondary education with the aid of a Pell Grant.", "As outlined above, there is a lack of regular, comprehensive data on postsecondary education in correctional facilities. The evaluation literature on the effect of postsecondary education on recidivism would benefit from more routinely collected and complete data on postsecondary education that allows for methodologically rigorous studies. This suggests that there might be a role for the federal government to play in collecting and reporting data on postsecondary education in correctional institutions and supporting more rigorous evaluations of postsecondary education for prisoners.\nBJS collects data on the prison population through its annual National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) program and its Survey of Prison Inmates (SPI). The First Step Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-391 ) requires BJS to collect data through the NPS on the number of federal prisoners who have a high school diploma or GED prior to entering prison, the number who obtain a GED while incarcerated, and the number of BOP facilities with remote learning capabilities. The SPI collects data related to prisoner participation in education and job training, but the data are collected sporadically. The most recent iteration was conducted in 2016. Prior to that, BJS conducted the SPI in 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1997, and 2004, when it was known as the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities. Neither the NPS or the SPI collects data on the types of degrees prisoners seek, how many receive a postsecondary certificate or degree, how much time they spend taking courses, how instruction is provided (e.g., onsite, through correspondence courses, online), or how postsecondary education programs are funded. Nonetheless, BJS has decades of experience collecting data on prison inmates from state correctional agencies and BOP. Congress could consider expanding BJS's mandate under 34 U.S.C. Section 10132 to require the collection and reporting of more detailed data on postsecondary education in correctional facilities. However, states participate in the NPS program voluntarily, so if data collection efforts become too burdensome there is the possibility that some state correctional systems will decline to participate. As a way of promoting state participation in data collection efforts, policymakers might also consider whether to make participation a condition of receiving grant funds under a program such as the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program.\nOne limitation of both of the NPS program and the SPI is that they only collect data on prisoners while they are incarcerated. Variables that are necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of postsecondary correctional education programs―such as rearrest, reconviction, and reincarceration; post-release educational attainment; post-release employment, and the nature of post-release employment; to just name a few―can only be collected after prisoners have been released, and sometimes several years after they have been released. Even though there are existing data sources that could be used to measure recidivism (e.g., criminal history records data maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or in state criminal history repositories), a new federally sponsored longitudinal data collection effort to track whether prisoners attain education credentials post-release or find employment post-release would enable additional research on the relationship between education and post-incarceration success. In addition, policymakers might consider whether to authorize the FBI to share criminal history records with non-governmental research organizations for the purpose of promoting and conducting recidivism research.\nCongress might also consider other ways to promote research on prisoners' postsecondary education and its impact on recidivism and employment. The literature on postsecondary correctional education lacks studies that utilized randomized controlled trials, which are regarded as the gold standard of social science research. While randomized controlled trials could help draw more definitive conclusions about whether participation in postsecondary education reduces recidivism, it might also undermine the aims of the proposed policy change. A randomized controlled trial would require prisoners to be randomly assigned to a treatment group (postsecondary education programming) or a control group (no postsecondary education programming). This means that some prisoners who might have otherwise enrolled in postsecondary education programming would not be allowed to access it while incarcerated. Although, there are ethical considerations when conducting randomized controlled trials on prisoners and they are afforded additional protections as subjects of behavioral science research studies. Congress could also promote more rigorous evaluations of postsecondary correctional education by providing funding to the National Institute of Justice―the research, development, and evaluation agency of the Department of Justice―that is specifically dedicated for this purpose.\nIt has been argued that evaluations of correctional education programs and other prison-based programming should focus on outcomes other than just recidivism and employment. Cessation of criminal activity is considered an important marker of rehabilitation. However, the emphasis on evaluating how correctional education programs affect recidivism means that little is known about the process whereby education programs help shape how released prisoners re-integrate into their communities. As noted previously, correctional education is believed to help prisoners improve their cognitive skills and abilities, which, in turn, enables them to continue their education and/or training upon release and secure gainful employment. While there is value in improving the quality of evaluations that assess the effect of correctional education on recidivism and employment, there might be value as well in better understanding how the availability of, and participation in, correctional education programs affect changes in motivation, literacy gains, development of concrete skills, disciplinary actions, postsecondary credits earned, and completion of educational programs.\nPolicymakers might also consider whether the federal government should support research into ways to improve the delivery of postsecondary correctional education programs. There is a dearth of methodologically rigorous research on the best way to deliver postsecondary education in prison. For example, prior research seldom accounted for differences in the initial educational level of prisoners. Additionally, there is little research on the effectiveness of different modalities of providing postsecondary education (e.g., in-person instruction, correspondence courses, online learning) or whether the amount of time spent engaging in postsecondary education (i.e., the dosage ) has an effect on recidivism.", "The following sections describe considerations unique to providing and delivering postsecondary education in a correctional environment.", "Even if Congress were to provide access to Pell Grants for certain prisoners, factors related to the correctional environment might limit the ability of prisoners to participate in postsecondary education programs. Three recurring resource challenges identified by ED and GAO are space, access to educational equipment or supplies, and trained staff. In 2016, 14 states and BOP held more inmates than their maximum capacity. Correctional systems and institutions that are over capacity might not be able to provide sufficient classroom space to meet an increase in demand for postsecondary instruction. Prisons in rural areas might also have problems finding instructors who are nearby or are willing to commute to the prison in order to teach college courses. Additionally, even trained educators will require training on effective teaching strategies for correctional students and techniques and procedures for working in restrictive prison environments.\nIt is not unusual for prisoners to be moved from one prison facility to another within the same state or within the federal prison system. Common reasons for the transfer of federal prisoners include security reclassification, medical treatment, and program participation. A prisoner who is transferred from one facility to another would be unable to complete a college course he or she is currently enrolled in if it is an in-person-only class not offered at the facility to which the prisoner is transferred. Programs that are accessible, integrated, and transferrable in every prison in a state or across the federal prison system may reduce the need for transferred prisoners to restart their postsecondary education in a new facility. The Institute for Higher Education Policy (IHEP) argued that many of the resource problems that limit access to postsecondary education could be addressed by providing more access to online courses. However, many correctional agencies limit the ability of prisoners to access the internet. Congress might consider whether there are steps that could be taken to promote online postsecondary courses for prisoners. For example, Congress could support a program to develop and test security protocols for prisoner internet access that allows them access to specific, but not all, web content.", "There are a variety of arrangements through which educational programming is provided to prisoners. In some states, correctional education is the responsibility of the correctional agency; in other states, a separate entity is responsible for providing it, either through a correctional school district or through the state's education department. Having separate agencies responsible for confining prisoners and providing prisoner education can add additional layers of bureaucracy and the agencies' missions might, at times, conflict. Beyond this, in many states the warden of each correctional institution is the one who makes the decision about whether postsecondary education courses will be offered at the prison. Also, the warden can cancel postsecondary courses if he or she objects to them.\nA 2019 GAO report described the importance of schools coordinating with prison staff and state corrections agencies. This suggests that for an effective expansion of educational activities to occur, there might be a need for states and BOP to have a uniform or coordinated curriculum across all correctional facilities in their respective systems. Policymakers might consider whether there is a need to promote more consistent policies in how states provide correctional education. For example, Congress could place conditions on federal funds to require state correctional departments to determine what type of postsecondary education courses will be available at each facility.", "The educational programs accessed by prisoners may not be designed to increase their academic and post-release success given the unique attributes of the prison population. ED provides a research-based guide for developing education programs to help incarcerated adults transition successfully to their communities. For example, incarcerated individuals may benefit from supportive services. Support services may include assistance selecting academic programs, tutoring, assistance with study skills, assistance with financial literacy, academic and employment counseling, or other academic supports to help them succeed in individual courses and their program of study. For example, some individuals may require advice and assistance in choosing courses, educational programs, and careers that will transfer more easily to practical employment in their post-release communities of choice. Practical employment options for former prisoners are those that provide earnings that permit self-sufficiency, are open to individuals with a criminal record, and are available despite any possible residential or transportation constraints.\nSome individuals may want to complete their program of study post-release. An incarcerated student who begins a postsecondary degree program through a postsecondary correctional education program may not be able to complete such degree before release and would benefit from the postsecondary correctional education program credits being fully transferrable or articulated to an educational program available to noninstitutionalized students. Strategic partnerships that ensure institutional courses are fully transferrable and articulated to multiple academic programs may increase the program completion rate.", "In addition to issues related to providing greater access to postsecondary education in prisons, policymakers might also consider issues related to prisoners being able to utilize the education and skills they learned during their coursework to secure post-release employment.\nVocational certificates are a form of postsecondary credential that is popular with prisoners. One study found that approximately one in three prisoners (29%) would like to enroll in courses where they could obtain certificates from colleges or trade schools, which is greater than the proportion of prisoners who reported that they would like to enroll in courses that offer an associate's degree (18%), bachelor's degree (14%), master's degree (5%), professional degree (1%), or doctorate degree (2%). However, it is important that the vocational training inmates receive while incarcerated is aligned with employment opportunities that are available in the local job markets to which inmates will return. As IHEP notes, \"learning vocational skills that are quickly made obsolete by technological advances or that are irrelevant to local employment opportunities is a waste of money by funders and effort by students.\" Policymakers might consider whether there should there be mandated coordination between correctional agencies, state departments of labor, and business organizations to ensure that inmates are using Pell Grants to participate in postsecondary education programs that provide the skills needed to secure meaningful employment when they are released.\nA criminal history can be a barrier to securing employment in a variety of fields, either because formerly incarcerated individuals are prohibited from working in the field due to a provision in law or regulation, or because employers are wary of hiring someone with a criminal history. One estimate suggested that in 2010, 12% of noninstitutionalized men had a felony conviction, and in 2014, 34% of unemployed working-age men had a criminal record. Increasing access to Pell Grants might be for naught if prisoners cannot get hired because of their criminal histories. Policymakers might consider whether there is a need to undertake efforts to reduce the collateral consequences of a criminal history on post-release employment. For example, Congress could consider expanding the Department of Labor's Federal Bonding Program for employers that hire recently released prisoners." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What was passed and signed in 1994?", "Why did policymakers reconsider this signed and passed law?", "What is the purpose of Pell Grants?", "What eligibility restraint is there for the Pell Grant?", "What was the purpose of the Second Chance Pell Experiment?", "What did the Second Chance Pell Experiment consist of?", "What is the timeline of the experiment?" ], "summary": [ "In 1994, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322), which, among other things, made prisoners ineligible for Pell Grants.", "However, concerns about the financial and social costs of the growing prison population combined with concerns about the recidivism rate of released prisoners have led some policymakers to reconsider whether prisoners should be allowed to use Pell Grants to help cover the cost of postsecondary coursework.", "Pell Grants are intended to assist in making the benefits of postsecondary education available to eligible students who demonstrate financial need.", "Under Department of Education (ED) regulations, any student who is \"serving a criminal sentence in a federal or state penitentiary, prison, jail, reformatory, work farm, or other similar correctional institution\" is not eligible to receive a Pell Grant.", "However, in 2015 ED used its authority under the Higher Education Act (HEA) to create the Second Chance Pell Experiment to determine if access to Pell Grants would increase the enrollment of incarcerated individuals in high-quality postsecondary correctional education programs.", "Under the experiment, participating institutions of higher education, in partnership with federal and/or state correctional institutions, award Pell Grants to students who are otherwise Pell-eligible except for being incarcerated in a federal or state institution.", "The experiment is expected to conclude in 2020." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_R44395	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Legislative Context", "The Constitutional and Nuclear Options", "Precedents and Senate Rules", "The Senate's Rulemaking Authority", "Attempts to Amend the Standing Rules of the Senate on Opening Day: 1953, 1957, and 1959", "83rd Congress (1953)", "85th Congress (1957)39", "86th Congress (1959)", "Cloture Reform Attempts: 1961 To 1975", "87th Congress (1961)", "Overview", "Calling Up the Anderson/Morton and Humphrey/Kuchel Resolutions", "What Constitutes \"Opening Day\"?", "Continuing Body", "Procedural Strategy", "Ending Debate", "88th Congress (1963)", "Political Context", "An \"Opening Day\" Accord", "Calling Up Anderson's Resolution (S. Res. 9)", "The Continuing Body Debate", "The Presiding Officer", "Ending Debate", "A New Procedural Tactic", "89th Congress (1965)", "Political Context", "Calling Up the Reform Resolutions", "Preserving \"Opening Day\"", "Ending Debate", "90th Congress (1967)", "Political Context", "Calling Up S. Res. 6", "The Vice President and the Compound Motion", "Ending Debate", "Continuity Doctrine", "91st Congress (1969)", "Political Context", "Calling Up the Reform Resolution (S. Res. 11)", "Continuing Body Doctrine", "Senate Rules in Force", "The Role of the Vice President", "Ending Debate", "92nd Congress (1971)", "Political Context", "Calling Up S. Res. 9", "Vice President's Role", "Continuing Body Doctrine", "Ending Debate", "93rd Congress (1973)", "94th Congress (1975)", "Political Context", "Calling Up S. Res. 4", "The Vice President's Role", "February 20", "February 24", "February 26", "February 28", "March 3", "March 5", "March 6", "March 7: The Finale", "Changing Senate Rules: Several Considerations", "The Presiding Officer", "The Majority Leader", "A Determined Majority", "Procedural Strategy", "\"Opening Day\"", "Continuing Body Doctrine", "The Scope of Changes to the Senate Rulebook", "Afterword", "The 1977 Post-Cloture Filibuster", "1979 Revision", "1986 Revision", "A January 2013 Development", "Historic Change in November 2013: Filibusters Curbed on Most Presidential Nominees327", "The 114th Congress (2015-2016)", "Concluding Observations" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "At the beginning of the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses—in 2011, 2013, and 2015 respectively—a number of reform-minded Senators unsuccessfully urged the Senate to adopt its rules on opening day by majority vote (as the House does on its first day) without having to overcome a supermajority hurdle required under existing procedures. For example, on January 6, 2015, a reform-minded Senator stated, \"It has been the tradition at the beginning of many Congresses that a majority of the Senate has asserted its right to adopt or amend the rules. Just as Senators of both parties have done in the past, we do not acquiesce to any provision of Senate rules—adopted by a previous Congress—that would deny the majority that right.\" The Senator's comments highlight a two-fold conundrum that suffuses this report: (1) a majority of the Senate can amend the chamber's rules; (2) however, before that may occur, reform advocates might be required under existing Senate rules—which carry over from one Congress to the next (part of the \"continuing body\" thesis)—to first muster a supermajority to bring interminable debate to a close on proposals to amend Senate rules. Only then would Senators have the opportunity to vote directly on proposals to alter the chamber's rules. Contemporary attempts to change Senate rules mirror similar opening day efforts that became biennial rituals nearly every new Congress from 1953 to 1975—the principal focus of this report. A major impetus for the repeated attempts at filibuster reform during this period was the frustration of liberal Senators in winning enactment of civil rights legislation. Prolonged debate and other procedural tactics by southern and other Members often blocked passage of those measures.\nThe revival of the idea that the Senate has the constitutional right on the opening day of a new Congress to change its procedures by majority vote regardless of entrenched rules or traditions merits detailed analysis. Why? Because this topic addresses perhaps the most distinctive procedural characteristic of the Senate: the filibuster (extended debate). An examination of the 1953 to 1975 initiatives to change Senate rules on the first day of a new Congress—unhindered by supermajority voting requirements carried over from the previous Congress—might provide useful context and analysis for today's advocates and opponents of this approach. Then and now, the procedural/political struggles associated with this idea focus less on rewriting many Senate rules and more on making it somewhat easier to constrain obstructive filibusters. Worth brief mention is that \"filibustering,\" in its broadest sense, refers to more than prolonged debate. It encompasses a range of acts to delay and frustrate the Senate, such as objecting to a unanimous consent request to end quorum calls, raising numerous points of order, or forcing repetitive roll call votes.\nEven so, the right of every Senator to engage in extended debate is probably the chamber's most famous feature. It is so well-known that Hollywood even made a classic movie in 1939 ( Mr. Smith Goes t o Washington ) that highlighted the filibuster's educative and political value. A solo, around-the-clock filibuster was launched by fictitious Senator Jefferson Smith (played by actor James Stewart). Senator Smith/Stewart collapsed from exhaustion at the movie's end, but his filibuster mobilized public opinion and Member sentiment against a tawdry land deal. In short, the Senator's talkathon exposed wrongdoing, aroused public support, and, importantly, persuaded his colleagues of the rightness of his views.\nSenators value extended debate for many other reasons, such as preventing bills they disagree with from becoming law, dramatizing issues for the public, protecting minority rights against majority steamrolling, ensuring thorough analysis of legislation, and checking overzealous Presidents. On the other hand, opponents contend that prolonged debate—its actual or threatened use—thwarts majority rule, promotes gridlock, delays or kills legislation, exacts unwarranted concessions on measures or matters backed by Senate majorities, and, at times, blocks consideration of proposals that enjoy majority support in the country.\nIn the view of Senator Robert C. Byrd, D-WV, one of the most knowledgeable parliamentary experts in Senate history: \"The liberties of a free people will always be safe where a forum exists in which open and unlimited debate is allowed.\" He added: \"The good outweighs the bad, and not all filibusters have been bad, even though they may have been exasperating, contentious, and perceived as iniquitous.\" Senator Byrd's views underscore that extended debate is the core procedural feature that distinguishes the Senate from the House of Representatives, where almost every second of debate time is limited by some rule, precedent, or practice.\nCritics, by contrast, emphasize that filibusters contravene a fundamental principle of democratic governance: majority rule. In Federalist No. 2 2 , Alexander Hamilton wrote: \"To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.\" Or as Thomas Jefferson said in the parliamentary manual he prepared for the Senate when he served as President of the Senate (1797-1801): \"The voice of the majority decides. For the lex majoris partis [law of the greatest part, or majority rule] is the law of all councils, elections, &c. where not otherwise expressly provided.\" In addition, the Framers did expressly provide in the Constitution a limited number of instances where supermajorities are required, such as a two-thirds vote of each chamber to override a presidential veto or two-thirds of the Senators voting to win the Senate's consent to a treaty.\nNothing in either the Constitution or Senate rules defines a filibuster, let alone what constitutes an appropriate length of time for debating a measure or matter. From the First Congress, Senators recognized that debates for dilatory purposes would occasionally be used, but \"they were not used frequently enough to give the Senate any trace of the notoriety which the filibuster later attached to the Upper Chamber.\" During much of the 19 th century, unrestricted debate aroused rather little senatorial concern, in large measure because the Senate's smaller size and workload (compared to today) made lengthy debates easier to accommodate. Once the motion for the previous question disappeared from the Senate's Standing Rules in 1806, it was not until 1917 that the Senate adopted a rule (Rule XXII) to allow a supermajority to bring debate to close. Over time, however, lengthy debate, and its threat, evolved to become a potent obstructive practice for delaying or preventing chamber consideration of measures or matters.\nThere is significant frustration in the present-day Senate with extended debate because it is difficult to end talkathons. A key reason for the difficulty is that on most measures and matters, a vote of three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn (60 if all 100 seats are filled) is required to invoke cloture under Rule XXII, which imposes limits on overall consideration. Little surprise that in a sharply divided and polarized Senate, the number 41 is stronger than 59. An even higher threshold (two-thirds of those voting, a quorum being present) is required to end debate on measures to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate.\nThe supermajority vote required to invoke cloture on both substantive issues and amendments to Senate rules is among the major factors that explain why in recent years various Senators have urged procedural revisions. Among current proposals are changes to limit opportunities for prolonged debate on certain motions, to reduce the length of time required to end debate under Rule XXII, to lower the 60-vote threshold to invoke cloture, or to require Senators to remain in the chamber and engage in a so-called \"talking filibuster\"—as portrayed in the aforementioned Mr. Smith Goes t o Washington— rather than use other methods (repeated quorum calls, for example) to stall Senate action.\nWith heightened interest in revising Senate procedures that permit lengthy debate, this report has several purposes. First, it provides a general overview of the Senate's contemporary legislative context that has triggered renewed interest in amending the Standing Rules of the Senate at the beginning of—even during—a new Congress. Second, the report focuses mainly on issues associated with what some call the \"constitutional option,\" as distinguished from the \"nuclear option.\" Proponents of the constitutional option cite Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution—\"Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings\"—as granting them the authority to amend the rules of the Senate on opening day by majority vote and without filibusters. Senate rules require a supermajority vote to end debate on proposals to amend chamber procedures. The nuclear option refers to the creation by majority vote of new precedents to curb filibusters of specific measures or matters.\nThird, the report reviews three Congresses (1953, 1957, and 1959) where various Senators professed that a complete rewrite of Senate rules was in order at the start of a new Congress. Fourth, an analysis of the 1961 through 1975 cloture revision proposals is presented. These initiatives focused principally on amending Rule XXII rather than adopting a new Senate rulebook. As with the reform attempts of the 1950s, this analysis summarizes several of the key parliamentary and political considerations or challenges likely to confront contemporary advocates who would like to change Senate rules at the opening of a new Congress. Fifth, the report examines several issues that emerged during these past attempts to change Senate rules that might affect contemporary efforts to revise Senate rules. The report concludes with an afterword that highlights significant cloture developments post-1975, especially the November 21, 2013, precedent that established majority cloture on most presidential nominations (see the discussion in Part VI).", "The legislative work of the contemporary Senate is regularly influenced by at least two key procedural and political factors. First, the Senate remains at its core a \"minority rule\" institution. The chamber's rules, precedents, and practices accord extraordinary procedural prerogatives to every Senator. No other democratic legislative assembly worldwide, so far as is known, grants its Members such wide-ranging freedom as are accorded to U.S. Senators to debate and to offer amendments, including amendments unrelated to the pending question. Restrictions can be imposed on each of these freedoms, but both are mostly available to all Senators to employ as they personally determine. One consequence is that any Senator is well-positioned to stall or frustrate chamber action on measures or matters, sometimes temporarily, sometimes permanently. Procedural actions by Senators who oppose a measure are particularly potent when time is at a premium near the close of a session. As a frustrated Senate majority leader lamented: \"Only in the United States Senate and only in the last few days of a session can 85 Senators vote one way: Yes, for this bill; 12 Senators vote another way: No against the bill—and the no's prevail.\"\nSecond, the Senate is currently highly polarized. Collaboration and compromise across the party divide can be much harder to attain than in the post-Depression and World War II eras. Many factors account for this development. For example, Members of the two Senate parties hold sharply divergent views on many of the major issues of the day (the proper role of government, for example). Another factor that inhibits biparty cooperation is intense electoral competitiveness of the two parties as each struggle to win governing power. Bipartisan coalitions, as a result, are very difficult to forge on consequential measures and matters. Recent Senates also have witnessed minority party Senators, whether Democratic or Republican, using an array of parliamentary tools to make governance by the majority party extraordinarily difficult. In response, Senate majority party leaders have employed parliamentary countermoves to try to advance their policy and political priorities.\nAggressive use of chamber rules and practices—such as routine threats to filibuster legislation or nominations—has triggered calls for procedural reform. The filibuster is perhaps the prime target for change because its goal is often to delay or prevent votes on measures or matters that might otherwise pass the Senate with majority support. As former Senate Republican Whip Thomas Kuchel of California explained: \"What is a filibuster? My definition would be that it is irrelevant speechmaking in the Senate, designed solely and simply to consume time, and thus to prevent a vote from being taken on pending legislation.\" Of course, extended debate serves a variety of purposes, as previously noted, such as to inform and enlighten colleagues and the attentive citizenry; inflame public opinion; focus attention on emerging issues; foster reasoned deliberation on legislation; influence lawmakers' votes; or highlight the strengths and weaknesses of legislative proposals and presidential nominations. A filibuster marathon by one or more Senators is not easy to stop, however.\nThe Senate has only one formal rule (Rule XXII) to terminate prolonged debate on measures or matters. It is a time-consuming, multi-step procedure that impacts at least three session days. This salient fact compounds the difficulty of managing a deadline-driven and workload-packed institution; further, as noted earlier, Rule XXII requires a three-fifths vote of the Senators duly chosen and sworn to bring debate to a close. Even then, Rule XXII commonly allows for up to 30 more hours of post-cloture consideration on most matters before a vote could occur on the clotured measure or matter. The procedural reality is that the mere threat of extended debate—perhaps foreshadowed by objections to unanimous consent requests—is often enough to block action on measures or matters, not because proponents lack majority support but because the 60-vote threshold is beyond reach barring, perhaps, various concessions to opposition lawmakers. Even if a party has 60 or more Members, chamber leaders may not want to consume valuable time to go through the cloture process, thus empowering smaller minorities.\nSignificantly, Rule XXII stipulates that a two-thirds vote of Senators present and voting (interpreted to mean two-thirds of the Senators voting, a quorum being present) is required to invoke cloture on proposals to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate. The proposals themselves only need the support of a majority—even a simple majority, 26 of 51—of Senators to pass the Senate. The conundrum for reform-minded Senators: if they mobilize at least a majority of Members who favor altering Rule XXII, they cannot accomplish their objective under the terms of the rule they want to change. In short, the reformers face a \"Catch-22\" parliamentary dilemma. As Senator Jacob Javits, R-NY, pointedly noted: \"True, the Senate by a majority [even a simple majority] at any time can work its will on any piece of legislation, including a change in the rules, but the question is: What does it take to get to the point where the majority can manifest its will?\" In the case of rules changes, the answer is that it could first require the support of a two-thirds supermajority of Members voting to bring to an end, as Rule XXII states, a filibuster against \"a measure or motion to amend Senate rules.\" Only then could a Senate majority vote on the revision itself.", "The \"constitutional\" and \"nuclear\" terms are often used interchangeably because at their heart each seeks to change Senate Rule XXII (or any Senate rule) by majority vote, circumventing the two-thirds cloture requirement to bring debate to an end on proposals to alter Senate rules. The term \"nuclear\" can apply to both options in this specific sense: the success of either the constitutional or nuclear option might trigger a parliamentary meltdown, an explosion of dilatory and obstructive tactics by Senators who vehemently oppose limitations on their ability to filibuster measures or matters. Both options might also use novel procedures to achieve their objectives. For ease of comparison, this report considers the two options separately, which emulates a study by two acknowledged Senate procedural experts.\nThe \"constitutional\" option refers to efforts at the start of a new Congress to amend Senate rules by majority vote, without regard to Rule XXII's two-thirds requirement for ending debate. Proponents of this approach cite the constitutional provision that \"Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings.\" Opponents exclaim that \"the Constitution says nothing of the sort. It merely says ... that both Houses can make their own rules.\" Opponents also emphasize that the Senate has rules that require a supermajority vote to end debate on proposals to amend chamber procedures.\nThe nuclear option refers to the creation of new precedents that prevent filibusters of specific measures or matters. As Senate precedents state: \"Any ruling by the Chair in response to a point of order made by a Senator is subject to an appeal. [If there is an appeal, a majority vote of the Senate upholds the decision of the Chair.] If no appeal is taken, the ruling of the Chair stands as the judgment of the Senate and becomes a precedent for the guidance of the Senate in the future.\" In the view of two Senate procedural experts, the nuclear option is \"essentially a variant of the 'constitutional option.' The difference is that this parliamentary maneuver would be applied [during] a congressional session\" rather than at the beginning of a new Congress.\nSenators often turn to one or the other option in their attempt to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate by majority vote, bypassing the supermajority impediment. The use of either option to try to amend a major rule of the Senate is almost certain to rile many Members as being outside the conventional legislative process: proposals to amend Senate rules are typically referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration for study and review. Attempts to amend Rule XXII can arouse considerable notice by the media, outside groups, and the attentive public.\nTo summarize: the nuclear option involves the creation of new debate-ending precedents using proceedings that may require actions in contravention of existing precedents or rules. Precedents are the common law of the Senate and govern scores of chamber proceedings. As freshman Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona noted in his maiden speech, the Senate is \"an institution bound by tradition and precedent.\" Former Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, a four-term veteran of the Senate, underscored Senator Flake's observation. \"To the extent that there are precedents,\" he said, \"they're extraordinarily important. In the parliamentary process, precedent is what controls.\" Precedents do not change the formal text of Senate rules, but they do affect their interpretation and application in Senate proceedings.\nThe other route to amending the Standing Rules of the Senate by majority vote emphasizes the Senate's constitutional rulemaking authority under Article I, Section 5. This approach has often occurred biennially at the beginning of a new Congress. It is the principal focus of this report. Remember that a Senate majority can amend the Standing Rules at any time. At issue is Rule XXII's two-thirds vote requirement to invoke cloture before the Senate might adopt by majority vote a pending amendment to its Standing Rules. A further review of the two reform options—creating precedents or amending Senate rules—merits additional discussion because each option can provoke contentious floor struggles.", "A feature of precedential change is that the text of a formal rule remains unchanged, such as Rule XXII, but the new precedent effectively alters all or part of its application and interpretation in chamber proceedings. A good on-point illustration of how a precedent could change Rule XXII was considered in May 2005. Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-TN, was frustrated by Democratic filibusters against judicial nominees of President George W. Bush. The majority leader realized that in a polarized Senate with 55 GOP Senators and partisan tensions high, he was unlikely to attract the 60 votes required to invoke cloture to end extended debate on a nomination. However, he believed he could win majority approval of these nominees by employing the nuclear option, establishing by majority vote a Senate precedent that would end the ability of a minority party to filibuster these nominees and permit a Senate majority to overcome these filibusters. One version of the parliamentary strategy he devised to create this precedent outlines a sequence of actions like the following:\nBring a controversial judicial nominee to the floor, which Democrats would filibuster. After a failed cloture vote to end debate on confirming the nominee, Senator Frist would raise a point of order that further debate was dilatory and that a majority vote was sufficient to invoke cloture on the nominee. The ruling by the presiding officer, perhaps the President of the Senate, Vice President Dick Cheney, would sustain the point of order. This ruling might not comport with established precedents and be contrary to the advice of the Senate parliamentarian. As one news account stated, Cheney \"almost certainly will oversee [as the presiding officer] any deployment of the so-called 'nuclear option' on judges.\" If the Chair's ruling at this point went unchallenged, it would set a new Senate precedent. However, the strong likelihood was that the minority leader would appeal the decision of the Chair on the grounds that it contravenes existing rules governing Senate procedure. The majority leader would then make a non-debatable motion to table (kill) the appeal. A Senate majority would agree to the tabling motion, which would have two immediate consequences: (1) affirming the Chair's ruling, thus ending further extended debate on the pending judicial nomination, and (2) establishing a new precedent—as defined by the point of order—that allows Senators to end judicial filibusters by majority vote.\nMajority Leader Frist never had the chance to execute his planned procedural maneuver. He was blocked by a bipartisan accord reached by an ad hoc Senate group, the so-called \"Gang of 14,\" seven Democrats and seven Republicans. This bipartisan group had been meeting quietly for weeks, trying to devise a compromise to break the political stalemate on judicial nominations and avert use of the nuclear option. They were successful. For example, in their Memorandum of Understanding, the seven Republicans promised not to support \"any recommendation to or interpretation of the Rules of the Senate that would force a vote on a judicial nomination by means other than unanimous consent or Rule XXII.\" In return, the seven Democrats promised not to filibuster certain pending judicial appointments, and agreed that judicial nominees \"should only be filibustered under extraordinary circumstances, and each signatory must use his or her own discretion and judgment in determining whether such circumstances exist.\" Thus, a high-stakes parliamentary showdown over ending filibusters on judicial nominations by majority vote was averted. Nevertheless, the basic concept of this form of action generally provided the structure for the successful use of a \"nuclear option\" eight years later by Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-NV (see Part VI).\nFour strategic considerations are important to note about Senator Frist's unrealized plan. First, it is especially useful for advocates of procedural change to have the support of the majority leader, because he sets the schedule of floor proceedings, enjoys priority of recognition from the Chair, and engages in the vote-gathering process. Second, it is essential to have a supporter presiding, so that he/she will follow an agreed-upon procedural script—including the issuance of rulings contrary to precedent—that bolsters the objectives of the reformers. Third, the majority leader should expect an appeal of the Chair's ruling, either by the minority leader or his designee. Fourth, once the appeal is made, the majority leader would immediately offer a non-debatable motion to table (kill) the appeal, which would be agreed to by majority vote. Thus, the new precedent would end filibusters on judicial nominees.\nImportant to emphasize in the Frist example is the favorable ruling of the Chair. Without it, the majority leader cannot secure the desired precedent by moving to table the appeal. If the presiding officer rejects the majority leader's point of order, an appeal of that ruling would place the majority leader in an untenable parliamentary situation for two reasons. First, appeals normally are subject to unlimited debate that may require a supermajority vote to limit, outcomes diametrically opposed to the preferences of the majority leader. Second, a motion to table the appeal, if one should be made, is not an effective option for the majority leader because it upholds the Chair's ruling. Failure to table means the appeal remains open to extended debate.", "Champions of filibuster reform contend that the Senate may, like the House, adopt its rules by majority vote when a new Congress convenes. Among the inter-connected principles asserted by reform-minded Senators are as follows: (1) A Senate majority has the constitutional right at the start of a new Congress to create or amend procedural rules, unhindered by Senate rules inherited from earlier Congresses. (2) All Senate rules continue from one Congress to the next except those viewed as being unconstitutional. The cloture rule, therefore, is unconstitutional to the extent that it inhibits the Senate from exercising its constitutional power to amend its rules. (3) Even if Senate rules continue from one Congress to the next, this continuity cannot extend to rules viewed as being unconstitutional. As asserted in 1969 by Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the start of a new Congress is a special constitutional time that permits the Senate to change its procedures by majority vote unencumbered by chamber rules adopted by a previous Congress.\nExperience over the past two decades makes it perfectly clear that there is no escape hatch once the Senate binds itself to rule XXII at the beginning of a new Congress. After rule XXII is acquiesced in by a new Congress, it becomes self-perpetuating until the next Congress is elected, since it has proven impossible to obtain the required two-thirds vote to close debate on any proposal to change the rule. This means that modification of [Rule XXII] will either be won at the opening of a new Congress, when the majority can make the decisions, or it will not be won at all.\nMany lawmakers, then and now, challenge Senator Church's view as being contrary to Senate rules, traditions, and the long-standing \"continuing body\" doctrine. Senator Church argues that the Senate that convenes after an election is a new Senate; others emphasize that it is a continuing body, which has been the unbroken tradition since the Second Congress.\nThe basic idea of the continuing body is that from its beginning in 1789, the Senate always has a quorum (a majority under the Constitution) of Senators to conduct official business. Proponents of this doctrine state that because only one-third of the Senate's membership stands for election every two years, the Founding Fathers enabled the other two-thirds of the chamber's membership to operate as a functioning continuing body. Moreover, long-standing practices bolster the credibility of the doctrine, such as Senate officers have no set term of office and serve until their successors are named; standing committees and their membership, as well as standing orders, simple Senate resolutions and concurrent resolutions (such as budget resolutions), and unanimous consent agreements continue from one Congress to the next until they are changed; treaties submitted to the Senate and articles of impeachment from the House of Representatives remain before the Senate from one Congress to the next; and \"the uniform practice from the time of the organization of the Second Senate until the present time has been to treat the rules of the Senate as continuing.\" Further, a 1959 amendment to Senate Rule V states explicitly that the chamber's rules continue from one Congress to the next \"unless they are changed as provided in these rules,\" which include the supermajority cloture requirements of Rule XXII. Rule V was adopted as part of a package amending Rule XXII. It was not voted on separately.\nSenate history also reveals that there is not universal adherence to the continuing body thesis. In 1959, prior to the aforementioned Rule V addition to the Standing Rules of the Senate, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota referred to \"the misguided theory that the rules of the Senate are continuing.\" He contended that the theory was of \"doubtful validity.\" His point was two-fold: first, simply because two-thirds of the Senate's Members carry over from one Congress to the next does not mean that the Senate cannot change its rules by majority vote; and, second, because the Senate's rules carry over does not imply that a new Senate necessarily favors the old rules.\nIn short, a fundamental question is this: Do the rules of the Senate automatically carry over from Congress to Congress and govern proposals to change Senate rules at the start of a new Congress? Senate Rule V—chamber rules carry over unless changed according to the procedures outlined therein—answers the question affirmatively. Senate reformers assert that the Constitution (Article I, Section 5) takes precedence over Senate Rule V. As Democratic Senator Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania said:\nThe fact is that the Senate is a continuing body for some purposes but not for others. The question is accordingly entirely irrelevant to the issue of the constitutional right of each newly elected Senate to change its rules at the beginning of each session, as authorized by the Constitution. For that purpose the Constitution overrides any fine spun theory about a continuing body.\nThree times in the 1950s—1953 (the 83 rd Congress), 1957 (the 85 th Congress), and 1959 (the 86 th Congress)—Senate reformers stated the case for the Senate's right to adopt its Standing Rules at the start of a new Congress without facing a possible supermajority hurdle. If successful, their goal also would do away with the continuing body doctrine. The historical record suggests that the principal focus of the 1950s reformers was to amend Rule XXII rather than to readopt the Senate's Standing Rules every two years. Yet they had to argue for revising chamber rules because of two 1949 changes to Rule XXII that made any effort to amend only that rule highly problematic, if not impossible. This reality heavily conditioned the 1950s efforts.\nFirst, the number required to invoke cloture was changed in 1949 from the original 1917 cloture rule—two-thirds of those voting—to two-thirds of the Senators duly chosen and sworn. Saddled with mobilizing a higher threshold of support for invoking cloture, the 1950s reformers knew the odds of that happening were quite slim. Second, and more significant, the 1949 change to Rule XXII disallowed cloture on motions to proceed to the consideration of proposals to alter Senate rules. This feature of Rule XXII remained in place until it was changed in 1959.\nIn short, the reformers had no real or effective way to stop filibusters on Senate rule changes. As a result, reformers—led by Senator Clinton Anderson, D-NM—believed that the only way they could alter Rule XXII by majority vote without provoking a filibuster was to invoke the constitutional option: assert their right to adopt new Senate rules by majority vote, rejecting any supermajority requirement to achieve that goal. (They did not consider the nuclear option.) Until new rules were adopted, the presumption of the reformers was that the Senate would follow general parliamentary procedures that would permit a majority to cut off extended debate, such as the previous question motion. Their plan, if agreed to, would shatter the continuity doctrine. (In later years, reformers emphasized that their primary focus was to revise Rule XXII rather than all Senate rules).", "It is useful to note that several parliamentary topics discussed herein vary in their salience in the debates of different years. Even so, they are subjects that have been raised repeatedly over the decades during debates on revising Senate rules. The topics include such matters as the role of the majority leader and the Vice President as presiding officer; the continuing body doctrine; interim procedural rules pending adoption of new Senate rules (or amendments thereto); the \"opening day\" concept; parliamentary strategies; and ending debate. To be sure, many of these general issues also orient much of the cloture reform discussion in subsequent decades.", "On January 6, 1953, Senator Clinton Anderson, D-NM, moved \"that the Senate take up for immediate consideration the adoption of rules for the Senate of the Eighty-third Congress.\" As he stated, \"I am contending that we are operating without rules at the present time.\" Senator Anderson's view was that the Senate's rules had expired, which would mean that new ones could be adopted by majority vote of the membership without the requirement for a supermajority cloture vote to end debate on their proposal. A reform advocate, Democratic Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, contended that, in the absence of Senate rules, \"general parliamentary law governed in the Senate\" until a majority adopted new Senate rules. Anderson's fundamental goal was to retain the Senate's previous rules with one exception: amend Rule XXII to reduce the number required to invoke cloture.\nMajority Leader Robert Taft, R-OH, noted that he could deal with Senator Anderson's motion in several ways: by extended debate, by a non-debatable motion to table (or kill) the motion, or by raising a point of order. He then said that, after sufficient debate on Anderson's motion, he would either move to table or make a point of order that the motion contravened the continuing rules of the Senate. Senator Taft noted that no \"Senate has undertaken at the beginning of a Congress to adopt its rules. It has been assumed that the Senate is a continuing body and that it has continuing rules.\" He added: \"It is now said that the Senate must now operate under Robert's Rules of Order, or some other rules of parliamentary law. But surely there must be rules of some kind. It seems obvious to me that those should be the [existing] rules of the Senate.\" Senator Taft was suggesting that Senate rules have been continuously in effect since the First Congress, with later amendments, without any explicit requirement that they must be readopted at the start of every new Congress. Since the Senate already had rules, there was no need to proceed to adopt biennially a set of new rules.\nOpponents of the continuing body thesis recognized its \"Catch-22\" feature: how can the Senate amend Rule XXII when the practical effect of that rule is to prevent its amendment? To overcome this obstacle, supporters of majority cloture (or some other change in the number needed to invoke that procedure) contended that every new Senate can amend its rules by majority vote under the Constitution. The continuing body argument, reformers said, is simply not relevant, because any new Senate on opening day can adopt its own rules. As Senator Humphrey put it: \"I think the question before the Senate is whether we have the right to adopt rules, be they good, bad, or indifferent. Do we, as Members of this body, lose our right to have anything to say about its rules, by reason of the fact that we are elected to a Senate which adopted rules years and years ago?\" Moreover, Members who voted for those rules probably no longer serve in the institution? Acquiescence in repeatedly accepting the rules of previous Senates did not mean, according to Senator Humphrey, that \"the Senate has … renounced its constitutional right to make its own rules. It cannot, in fact, renounce this constitutional power.\"\nMajority Leader Taft, who doubtless knew he had the votes to table Anderson's motion, responded to these issues in various ways. For one, he stated that the continuing body theory is supported by tradition and precedent and enhances the Senate's \"prestige and power. I believe that it adds to the influence we have with the people in performing the duties which we have to perform.\" For another, it is a \"radical step\" to declare \"that the Senate is not a continuing body, that we have no rules, and that at the first of every session we are to debate all the practices and rules of the Senate.\" Third, Senator Taft noted that, if reformers can mobilize the votes and with favorable rulings from the presiding officer, \"it is always possible for the Senate to protect itself against a filibuster.\" He added: \"I submit that the rules of the Senate permit a change by a majority vote at any time the Senate wishes to make a change.\" Majority Leader Taft also made clear that he would not prejudice the right of Senator Anderson to offer his rules-revamping resolution. In the end, after three days of debate (January 3, 6, and 7), the Senate voted by a wide margin (70 to 21) to table Senator Anderson's motion. That decision meant that existing Senate rules continued to govern chamber proceedings.", "On January 3, Senator Anderson made the same motion that he proposed four years earlier. Citing Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution, Senator Anderson said: \"I now move that this body take up for immediate consideration the adoption of rules for the Senate of the 85 th Congress.\" Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, D-TX, exercising his leadership prerogative of first recognition by the Chair, planned to offer a motion to table Anderson's proposal. However, after some discussion with Anderson and his supporters, Johnson proposed a unanimous consent agreement that provided six hours of debate, equally divided, with a vote on the tabling motion to occur the next day at 6 p.m. There was no objection to the accord. During discussion of the unanimous consent agreement, Senator Wayne Morse, D-OR, suggested that the Senate ought to face the issue head-on of whether a new Senate can adopt new rules. He suggested that the Senate follow these parliamentary steps:\nFirst entertain a motion [that Senator Anderson] proposes to make to the effect that the Senate proceed to adopt Senate rules binding upon the 85 th Congress. Second, the Senate and the Presiding Officer should then consider a point of order raised by some Senator asking for a determination as to whether or not the motion calling for the adoption of new rules is in fact in order. Third, the Senate should then consider an appeal from the decision of the Chair on the point of order.\nSenator Johnson disagreed with Morse's recommendation. He pointed out that a vote on the motion to table was used in 1953 and, furthermore, \"when any Senator votes on the motion to lay on the table, he really is voting on the question of whether new rules for the Senate should be adopted at the beginning of the 85 th Congress.\"\nThe next day the Senate voted 55 to 38 for Senator Johnson's tabling motion. Nonetheless, reform advocates won a favorable and detailed advisory opinion from the President of the Senate, Vice President Richard Nixon, concerning the Senate's constitutional right by majority vote to change its rules at the beginning of a new Congress. Nixon's advisory opinion addressed how to reconcile two constitutional mandates: (1) the constitutional provision that only one-third of the Senate is up for election every two years, implying that the Framers intended the Senate to be a continuing body \"for at least some purposes;\" and (2) the constitutional provision providing that \"each House may determine the rules of its Proceedings.\" Responding to a parliamentary inquiry from Senator Humphrey, Vice President Nixon said in part:\nAny provision of Senate rules adopted in a previous Congress which has the expressed or practical effect of denying the majority of the Senate in a new Congress the right to adopt the rules under which it desires to proceed is, in the opinion of the Chair, unconstitutional.\nThe Chair emphasizes that this is only his own opinion, because under Senate precedents, a question of constitutionality can only be decided by the Senate itself, and not by the Chair.\n[U]ntil the Senate at the initiation of a new Congress expresses its will otherwise, the rules in effect in the previous Congress in the opinion of the Chair remain in effect, with the exception that the Senate should not be bound by any provision in those previous rules which denies the membership of the Senate the power to exercise its constitutional right to make its own rules.\nNixon also stated that if Johnson's tabling motion prevailed (as it did), he would view that as the Senate's approval of the previous rules of the chamber; if the motion to table failed, that would mean that \"the Senate can proceed with the adoption of rules under whatever procedures the majority of the Senate approves.\" Senator Richard Russell, D-GA, the leader of the southern lawmakers and Senator Johnson's mentor and patron, made it known informally that, if Anderson's motion prevailed, he would offer changes to every Senate rule and filibuster every proposed alteration, forcing an endless number of separate cloture votes. Although Anderson's motion was rejected on a procedural vote, reformers garnered a favorable advisory opinion from the Vice President that bolstered their commitment to changing Senate rules by majority vote.", "The legislative context for the constitutional option seemed especially favorable in the 86 th Congress. One reason was the large Democratic election victory in 1958. The Senate's lineup went from 49 Democrats to 47 Republicans in the previous Congress to 64 Democrats to 34 Republicans in the 86 th Congress. Of 15 Democratic freshmen Senators, at least half were sympathetic to rules changes. Moreover, with Vice President Nixon presiding over the Senate, it was expected that he would offer advisory opinions favorable to Senator Anderson and his supporters. Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, who opposed the constitutional option, recognized the favorable climate for change and proposed a bipartisan filibuster rules change that the Senate in the end adopted unchanged: the first major change of filibuster rules in a decade.\nOn January 7, the opening day of the 86 th Congress, Senator Johnson, using the priority of recognition accorded majority leaders by Senate precedents, asked unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of his reform resolution (S. Res. 5), co-sponsored by nearly every top Democratic and Republican leader. S. Res. 5 proposed to change the number required to invoke cloture on measures and matters from two-thirds of the entire membership to two-thirds of those present and voting. That standard would also apply to motions to proceed to rules changes. In addition, S. Res. 5 would also add a new clause to Senate Rule V (then Rule XXXII) stating that the rules of the Senate continue from one Congress to the next unless changed as provided in the rules. The new clause, according to two legal scholars, was \"a concession to Senator Russell\" of Georgia and the other southern Senators. Importantly, Senator Johnson's action preempted Senator Anderson's motion to have the Senate take up for immediate consideration \"the adoption of rules for the 86 th Congress,\" as he had done in 1953 and 1957. Senator Johnson's objective was to have his reform initiative and not Anderson's considered first by the Senate.\nDuring his opening remarks on S. Res. 5, Senator Johnson referred to the Senate's one-day rule, \"which entitles the Senate to a day's notice in writing of motions to amend or modify a rule and that any Senator may insist upon compliance with the rule.\" If a Member objected to his request for the immediate consideration of S. Res. 5, Senator Johnson said he would comply with the one-day written notice requirement and then call up S. Res. 5 the next session day (January 8). Subsequent to Johnson's asking unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of S. Res. 5, Senator Jacob Javits, who supported Anderson, asked Presiding Officer Nixon: \"Under what rule will the resolution submitted by the Senator from Texas be considered?\" The Chair replied: under the rules of the Senate \"which have been adopted previously by the Senate,\" but not any Senate rule that restricts the constitutional right of a majority of Senators \"to cut off debate in order to exercise the right of changing or determining the rules.\" The Vice President elaborated:\nIf, for example, during the course of debate on the motion of the Senator from Texas, which deals with changing the rules, a Senator believes that action should be taken and debate closed, such Senator at that time could, in the opinion of the Chair, raise the constitutional question by moving to cut off debate. The Chair would indicate his opinion that such a motion was in order but would submit the question to the Senate for its decision.\nAfter further discussion, Senators Javits and Clifford Case, R-NJ, objected to Johnson's request to call up S. Res. 5. Two things quickly happened back-to-back. First, Senator Johnson sent to the desk his written notice to amend certain Senate rules. Second, Senator Anderson \"moved that the Senate proceed to adopt its rules.\" (Senator Anderson's motion had the bipartisan support of thirty-two other Senators). However, Senator Johnson insisted that he had not yielded the floor and, therefore, Senator Anderson could not offer his motion. The outcome: Senator Johnson adjourned the Senate but not before he declared that \"I do not want my motion [S. Res. 5] supplanted by any other motion.\" Significantly, the adjournment prevented Senator Anderson from giving written notice of his intent to propose revisions to Senate rules.\nThe next day, January 8, there was considerable discussion about the procedural state of play in the chamber. Three events are worth noting. First, after the Vice President presented S. Res. 5 to the Senate, Majority Leader Johnson stated, \"I will be glad to ask unanimous consent that it be in order to consider [Senator Anderson's] motion today.\" The Senate agreed to Johnson's consent request, and Anderson—citing Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution—moved to adopt new rules for the 86 th Congress. Johnson then propounded a unanimous consent request, which was agreed to, that Anderson's motion be considered as a substitute for S. Res. 5. Johnson made it clear that he would consult at some point during the day with Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, R-IL, before offering a motion to table Anderson's proposal. Making Senator Anderson's motion immediately in order was certainly a strong indication that Johnson had the votes to defeat his colleague's proposal and to win adoption of S. Res. 5.\nSecond, because the Senate was now in the second calendar day of the new Congress, Senator Javits asked the Vice President whether \"the Anderson motion and the Johnson of Texas motion are both within the confines of motions made at the beginning of a new Congress.\" The Vice President replied: \"The Senator from New York is correct.\" The Vice President emphasized again the distinction between the procedural position of the Senate at the beginning of a new Congress and during a Congress. At the start of a new Congress, a majority has the constitutional authority to amend its rules; during a Congress, once the initial decision is made about chamber rules, the Senate commits to them whether by acquiescence or formal action. Senator Javits tried unsuccessfully to strike the continuity of rules provision from S. Res. 5.\nThird, Vice President Nixon's judgment that the Senate would follow the old rules except for Rule XXII, which he viewed as unconstitutional, led to considerable discussion of what rules the Senate was observing pending adoption of new ones. Senator Mike Monroney, D-OK, spoke at length about the perils of \"throwing out the rule book,\" saying \"there are no rules which would apply. The Anderson proposal would take us into a blind area.\" It would open a \"Pandora's box\" of parliamentary misery. He went on to state: \"We are asked, by the Anderson motion, to throw overboard the precedents which have been carefully developed since 1790, and to say that on the opening day of a Congress we shall rewrite the entire book of rules and make them subject to adoption. Thus any group of Senators having a strong majority behind them could write rules which could gag the minority.\" Senator Monroney urged his colleagues \"not to vote to throw away the entire rule book and open the way for a bargain day for crackpots [who would tear up the rule book] in some future Senate.\"\nRemarks by South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond supported the sentiments of Senator Monroney. The South Carolinian asked which form of \"general parliamentary law\" would serve as temporary rules until the Senate agreed to adopt permanent rules? He listed nine parliamentary manuals ( Robert's Rules of Order , for example) as possibilities. \"The Senate could easily spend several months debating and deciding on temporary rules,\" exclaimed Thurmond. \"After that would come the more difficult and more time consuming task of debating and agreeing on each of the permanent rules.\"\nSensitive to the issues raised by Senators Monroney and Thurmond, Senator Anderson modified his original motion (the adoption of new rules for the Senate), specifying that all Senate rules would remain in effect except Rule XXII. In short, what was not subject to amendment was accepted by the Senate. Other reform-minded Senators largely dismissed the concerns of Senators Monroney and Thurmond. \"Over in the other body of Congress,\" stated Senator Javits, \"this whole job [of amending and adopting the rule book] was done in 3 minutes. The House does it every 2 years.... They have made it work for decades.\" Senator Humphrey added that reasonable Senators \"know that most of the rules would be reenacted time after time, as is the case in the House of Representatives.\" Senator Paul Douglas said he was astounded that several of his colleagues believed that the Senate could not adopt new rules very quickly at the start of a new Congress, as occurs in the House. \"I do not claim we are superior to the House,\" he said. \"But I do say we are at least as sensible as the House and as coordinated as the House, and that if the House can adopt new rules at every [new Congress], the Senate can also do it.\"\nWhen debate ended, Majority Leader Johnson moved \"to lay on the table the modified amendment of the Senator from New Mexico, in the nature of a substitute for Senate Resolution 5.\" Johnson's tabling motion carried by a vote of 60 to 36. Subsequently, on January 12, the Senate adopted S. Res. 5, as introduced, by a 72 to 22 vote. To reiterate: S. Res. 5 made two changes to Rule XXII and one to Senate Rule V: (1) two-thirds of the Senators present and voting could invoke cloture (previously, cloture required a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership); (2) cloture could be applied to motions to proceed to consider a change in Senate rules; heretofore, this was not a feature of Rule XXII; and (3) a provision was added to Rule V affirming that Senate rules continue from one Congress to the next, \"unless they are changed as provided in these rules.\"\nThe 1950s debate on \"opening day\" rules changes featured issues that were also prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. The reformers of 1953, 1957, and 1959 encountered little difficulty in having the Senate debate their proposals to change Senate rules. However, bringing the reformer's ideas to an affirmative vote proved to be a procedural and political road too far. This reality also underscores the difficulty of amending Senate rules on opening day by majority vote. On the other hand, history also indicates that, given the right set of political circumstances—determination, patience, adroit leadership, favorable rulings from the Chair, and a committed majority willing to shatter customary ways of proceeding—the unlikely or seemingly unattainable can become a real possibility.", "During the 1960s and 1970s, the reformers' strategic purpose shifted from the broad goal of rewriting the Senate's rulebook to a specific focus on amending Rule XXII. All their attempts at revision failed during this era except for the 1975 change. The political context for these initiatives, especially during the 1960s, was shaped to a large extent by the civil rights struggle of African Americans. Later, with enactment of civil rights legislation, many Senators who previously opposed attempts to curb extended debate began to vote for cloture; they realized that prolonged debate could be employed to achieve their policy/political objectives.\nNoteworthy is that the filibuster itself was undergoing change. In the decade from 1961 through 1971, there were more cloture votes (40) than in the period from 1917—the year the cloture rule was adopted—through 1971. Double and even triple digit cloture votes became the norm in subsequent Congresses. Significantly, for the first time ever, cloture was invoked to end a southern-led filibuster against the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gradually, the public's strong association of filibusters with southern Senators against civil rights bills waned as filibusters became a procedural tool for Senators of all ideological stripes. In 1970, for example, liberal Democratic Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin and his supporters talked to death a bill to fund development of a supersonic transport plane.\nAlong with the usual arguments against changing Rule XXII (protection of minority rights and small state interests, for example), there were others that emerged during this era. For example, heightened concern among many Members with the growth of executive power, particularly in the defense and foreign policy arenas, bolstered support for extended debate as a means to challenge presidential initiatives and protect congressional power. The willingness of Members to filibuster also increased during this period for other reasons, such as the decline of informal folkways (for example, newcomers should be seen and not heard) and the election of assertive Senators who were not averse to using chamber rules to achieve their personal, policy, and political goals. Thus, efforts continued during the 1961-1975 period (and beyond, of course) to revise the Senate's cloture procedure. For each year discussed—1961, 1963, 1965, and so on—this section will highlight the political context and the major parliamentary/procedural issues that influenced the eventual outcome.", "", "The issue of civil rights was not much in evidence during the 1961 effort to revamp Rule XXII. However, everyone was mindful that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 required enormous effort on the part of proponents to overcome the dilatory tactics of the opposition. For example, the Senate debate began February 15, 1960, and ended April 8 with around-the-clock sessions from February 29 through March 8. Both the Democratic and Republican presidential platforms of 1960 endorsed filibuster reform. The Democratic platform urged \"that action be taken at the beginning of the 87 th Congress to improve congressional procedures so that majority rule prevails and decisions can be made after reasonable debate without being blocked by a minority in either house.\" The GOP platform supported \"efforts to change present rule XXII of the Senate.\"\nA bipartisan group of Senators sought to amend Rule XXII rather than try to rewrite de novo the rules of the 87 th Senate. Concern about opening \"Pandora's box\"—lengthy argumentation over every conceivable rules change—led the reformers to opt for a narrower reform approach. There were two major proposals to change the cloture rule. Senator Anderson and his GOP sponsor, Thruston Morton of Kentucky, wanted to permit cloture by three-fifths of those present and voting. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana backed this idea. Senator Hubert Humphrey and Republican Whip Thomas Kuchel of California recommended that after 15 calendar days (exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays) of debate, the presiding officer would submit to the Senate the question of whether the prolonged discussion should be brought to a close. The vote on this question would be decided by a majority of the Senators chosen and sworn.\nWith the November 1960 election of John F. Kennedy as President, there were many Senate Democrats who were not keen on starting the 87 th Congress with a party-splitting debate over revising the cloture rule. A fractured Senate Democratic Party could jeopardize the new President's \"New Frontier\" program. Contrarily, reform-minded lawmakers argued the importance of revising Senate rules at the start of the new Congress to protect JFK's program from obstructionism. However, after five days of debate, the majority leader offered a motion to refer the proposed cloture proposals (and other Senate reform resolutions) to the Committee on Rules and Administration, which Mansfield chaired. Upset with Mansfield's motion, many reformers voted against the January 11 referral motion, which prevailed by a 50 to 46 vote. This vote damaged reformers' prospect for change. Why? Outgoing Vice President Nixon was still presiding but only until the President Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon Johnson took office on January 20. The reformers knew that Johnson, unlike Nixon, was not sympathetic to their cause. Senator Mansfield did promise, however, that he would bring the Anderson three-fifths cloture reform proposal (S. Res. 4) to the floor in September. The majority leader delivered on his promise.\nStill, there were complaints from various reformers that it was not a propitious time so late in the session to bring a controversial rules change to the floor when Members were anxious to depart the capital. Moreover, the Senate would operate under the existing features of Rule XXII requiring a two-thirds vote of the Members voting, a quorum being present, to end prolonged debate. On Saturday, September 16, the majority leader moved to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 4. Immediately, Senator Mansfield and Republican Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois submitted a cloture motion signed by 21 Senators to bring debate on the motion to proceed to the resolution to a close. On Tuesday, September 19, the Senate failed to invoke cloture (37 yeas to 43 nays). The Senate then voted (47 to 35), on a request by the majority leader, to table his motion to consider S. Res. 4. The tabling motion ended the effort to amend Rule XXII.", "The bipartisan Senate leadership supported the goal of the four reformers to bring their resolutions before the Senate. On opening day (January 3), soon after the traditional proceedings (swearing in of newly elected Senators, adopting resolutions notifying the President and the House that the Senate is ready to proceed to business, and so on), Senator Anderson stated that \"in accordance with article I, section 5, of the Constitution, which declares that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, on behalf of myself and the [GOP] Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Morton], I send to the desk a resolution [S. Res. 4] and ask that it be read.\" After the resolution was read, Senator Anderson quickly asked unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of S. Res. 4, reducing cloture from two-thirds to three-fifths of those voting, a quorum being present. Senator Russell of Georgia objected. Citing Senate Rule V requiring one day's notice in writing of proposals to amend Senate rules, Senator Anderson submitted his \"Notice of Motion to Amend Rule XXII.\" The same procedure occurred with the Humphrey/Kuchel recommendation (S. Res. 5), providing for majority cloture after 15 session days of debate. Senator Russell also objected to S. Res. 5's immediate consideration. Senator Russell emphasized \"that there is no question that it would be necessary for the Senate to adjourn to ever get the Anderson motion before the Senate, because the rule requires [a layover of] 1 legislative day.\" The Vice President added: \"The [Anderson] resolution [S. Res. 4] will lie over [upon objection], under the rule.\"\nTo comply with Senate Rule V, Majority Leader Mansfield adjourned the chamber so that the reform resolutions would be placed on the section of the Senate's Calendar of Business entitled \"Resolutions and Motions Over, Under the Rule.\" The presiding officer lays them before the Senate on the next legislative day during the so-called morning hour, the first two hours of a session day following an adjournment of the Senate. Under Senate Rule VII, the resolutions are laid before the Senate only after all other routine morning business, such as the introduction of bills and resolutions, had been conducted. Morning business, in brief, is a component of the morning hour. If consideration of S. Res. 4 was not concluded within the two-hour period, it would be returned to the General Orders calendar unless the Senate agreed to a unanimous consent request to continue debate or a Member offered a debatable motion to proceed to consider S. Res. 4.\nWith the adjournment of the Senate on January 3, S. Res. 4 met the one-day advance notice requirements of Senate Rule V, having lain over one legislative day between the time of its introduction and its presentment to the Senate the next legislative day (January 4). As Vice President Nixon, who was presiding, stated on January 4: \"The Chair lays [Senate Resolution 4] before the Senate, which will be read for the information of the Senate.\" Subsequently, Senators discussed a variety of issues until Vice President Nixon declared: \"The hour of 2 o'clock has arrived and [the morning hour] is concluded; and the resolution [S. Res. 4] goes to the calendar, under the rule.\" (The Senate convened at noon on January 4).\nSenator Javits then asked the Chair whether the Senate was proceeding under the Constitution. Specifically he asked whether consideration of new chamber rules by majority vote was in order notwithstanding inherited procedures \"that inhibit that process?\" Senator Javits further inquired: \"Is it not then proper that the 2 o'clock rule [the two-hour morning period] shall not apply in this instance to this situation?\" The Vice President replied: \"Under the usual rule and the precedents of the Senate, a resolution of this type is, at the conclusion of the morning hour, placed upon the calendar, subject to being called up at a later time. However, it would be proper to request unanimous consent to proceed without regard to that rule.\" Senator Humphrey offered a motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 4.\nDebate continued that day on filibuster reform, along with discussion of other matters. When the day's debate was largely concluded, Majority Leader Mansfield stated that there would be the usual morning hour on January 5. He asked and eventually received unanimous consent that \"morning hour\" would occur on January 5 despite the fact that he recessed rather than adjourned the Senate. Senator Javits wanted to know if \"such an arrangement\" would \"effect any change in the pending business, which is the motion to take up these resolutions?\" Senator Mansfield explained that an adjournment would return the reform resolutions to the legislative calendar. \"But by taking a recess,\" he said, \"they will remain, in their present form, in order in the morning hour.\" Vice President Nixon responded: \"That is correct.\"", "\"Opening day\" is a flexible and imprecise term. Consider these three points. First, it is the calendar day on which the new Congress officially convenes following a biennial election. Second, opening day in the view of various reform advocates is a timely and favorable period under the Constitution for amending Senate rules by majority vote. Third, the Senate can remain in the same legislative—or opening—day for many calendar days if the majority leader successfully moves after each daily session to recess rather than moving to adjourn the Senate. In short, opening day could extend over many days, weeks, months, or the entire two-year life of a Congress.\nUnderstandably, reform Senator Kuchel posed this question to Vice President Nixon: \"Would the Vice President rule that if we go over to a new legislative day, we will still have 'the opening of a new Congress' before us, so that we can apply our rights under the Constitution?\" Nixon responded as follows: \"It is the opinion of the Chair that so long as no substantive business is undertaken by the Senate the opening of a new Congress still is in effect, so that the Senate would be able to adopt its rules under the majority procedure which the Chair has described.\" Nixon also made clear that it would take unanimous consent to preserve this situation if other business intervened. For example, Majority Leader Mansfield proposed to call up a privileged resolution (H. Con. Res. 1) creating a joint committee to make the necessary arrangements for the inauguration of the President-elect and Vice President-elect. Asked by Senate reformers if such an action would change the procedural situation, Vice President Nixon said:\n[I]t would change the situation in regard to the rules of the Senate, unless there is a unanimous consent agreement entered into that it shall not do so. The present occupant of the Chair must in frankness inform the Senate that for the first time in his 6 years of service he is making a ruling from the Chair which is not entirely in accord with the advice of the Parliamentarian, who is inclined to believe that because this resolution is in the nature of a privileged resolution … it might not have that effect. However, the occupant of the Chair does not dare to make that ruling. The ruling of the occupant of the Chair, unless it is overruled by the Senate, is that, in the absence of an agreement, this would change the situation.\nThe outcome: the majority leader withdrew the resolution. Clearly, the Vice President's ruling was important to the reformers. They did not want the intervention of \"business\" to mean that they had inadvertently acquiesced in all the Senate's rules from the previous Congress. If that occurred, reform Senators would be bound by Rule XXII's supermajority requirement to end debate on proposals to amend new Senate rules by majority vote. Thus, various lawmakers periodically asked the presiding officer whether certain actions of the Senate would constitute substantive business. To reemphasize: the reformers did not want opponents to claim that their failure to raise any objections to chamber proceedings meant that they had consented to having the rules of the 86 th Senate automatically carry over to the 87 th Senate. (In recent years, it has become common for the Senate to operate on the opening day of a new Congress pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement obtained in the previous Congress.)", "Senator Richard Russell put this direct question to Vice President Nixon: \"Does the Chair hold that the provision [stating that Senate rules continue from one Congress to the next] is unconstitutional?\" Nixon said: \"The Chair does.\" However, the Vice President went on to explain at some length his view of whether the Senate is a continuing body. He said:\nThe Chair in his [1957] advisory opinion did hold that the Senate was a continuing body and that the rules of the Senate did continue except for any rule adopted by the Senate which, in the opinion of the Chair, would inhibit the constitutional right of a majority of the Members of the Senate to change its rules or adopt new rules at the beginning of a new session of the Senate. This was the basis of the Chair's advisory opinion. The Chair's opinion was not that it was not a continuing body and that it began with no rules at all at the beginning of a new Congress. It is the opinion of the Chair, that, at the beginning of each new session of Congress, the Senate does operate under and begins its business with the rules adopted in previous sessions of the Senate; but the Chair holds that any provisions of the rules previously adopted which would restrict what the Chair considers to be the constitutional right of the majority of the Members of the Senate to change Senate rules, or to adopt new rules, would not be applicable.\nSenator Russell observed that it was \"most unusual\" for the \"Vice President, representing the Executive, to select one rule of the Senate and hold it unconstitutional and to hold the other rules constitutional.\"\nA question by Senator Humphrey prompted a brief discussion of the previous question motion (a non-debatable way to end debate, commonly used in the House). Humphrey asked the Vice President how might debate be ended on a reform resolution, \"by a motion to table or the previous question?\" Nixon responded: \"That would be the Chair's opinion.\" To make sure he heard the Vice President correctly, Senator Russell asked if the \"previous question could be applied on something brought up\" under Senate rules? And Nixon said: \"That would be the Chair's ruling, because, in the Chair's opinion, the right of a majority of the Members of the Senate to adopt its rules at the beginning of a session would include the right to bring the matter to a vote by moving the previous question.\" Perhaps taken aback by the Chair's position, Senator Russell asked if the \"previous question ruling [would] be under Roberts Rules of Order ?\" The Chair replied that Roberts Rules \"would be applicable to the extent they might apply, but also having in mind the previous procedures of the Senate.\" Senator Russell then informed the Chair that Roberts Rules of Order \"provide for a two-thirds vote in moving the previous question.\"\nThe Vice President made it clear, however, that he would couple Roberts Rules of Order with Jefferson's Manua l, which contains a section (XXXIV) on the previous question motion along with a footnote that emphasizes that its use in modern times is to end debate. According to the Vice President, a majority of Senators would have the right at the start of a new Congress to end debate and \"bring the matter [rule changes] to a vote by moving the previous question.\"\nThroughout the several days of debate, proponents and opponents shared divergent opinions on the continuing body doctrine. Both sides also acknowledged that the Senate has both continuous and discontinuous features. For example, Senator Russell quoted part of the first paragraph of Senate Rule XXV (naming the standing committees and identifying their jurisdiction), which states that the panels \"shall continue and have the power to act until their successors are appointed.\" A reform advocate, Senator Joseph Clark, cited the exact same rule only highlighting different language therein: \"The following standing committees shall be appointed at the commencement of each Congress.\"\nSuch disagreements between and among Senators reflected a change in the reformers' strategy. In the 1950s, reformers wanted to amend Rule XXII to reduce the potency of the filibuster by the procedural artifice of adopting a new Senate rulebook every two years. In 1961 (and thereafter), right from the outset, it was clear that the reformers' principal goal was limited to adoption of a new filibuster rule by majority vote at the start of a new Congress. To make their case, the reformers relied on the rulemaking authority granted the Senate by the Constitution; the advisory opinions of Vice President Nixon in 1957 and 1959; and the existing rules of the Senate, except those that, in their judgment, foiled the majority's will. On the latter point, the Vice President's position that all Senate rules applied except those that the Chair believed were unconstitutional did not, as noted earlier, sit well with Senator Russell. He exclaimed:\nIn my judgment, either all of the rules go over or none of the rules go over. Either, under the exercise of the rule-making power as provided in the Constitution, the Senate makes its rules and, as a continuing body, the rules apply until changed in the manner described therein, or else in the beginning of each Congress the Senate should adopt all new rules, as is done in the House of Representatives.\nIn response, Senator Clark noted that, if the Vice President was unable to explain adequately his rationale to Senator Russell, \"I suppose this is one of those little things we had better agree to disagree on.\"", "During these proceedings, reform Senator Douglas outlined a procedural pathway to change Senate rules at the opening of a new Congress. Worth underscoring is a key assumption of the reformers: they believed they had the votes—at least a majority or close to it—and the support of the Chair, Vice President Nixon, to accomplish their objective. They also believed, correctly, that the new majority leader, Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, would not act to frustrate the reformers' opening day parliamentary intentions. Their procedural plan included several of the following key features:\nAt the beginning of a new Congress, a Member of the reform group would seek recognition from the Chair. Upon receiving recognition, he would say: \"Mr. President, on behalf of the following Senators and myself, and in accordance with Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution and the advisory rulings of the Chair at the opening of the 85 th and 86 th Congresses, I send to the desk a resolution and I ask that the Clerk read it.\" After the Clerk read the resolution changing Rule XXII, the Senator would ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration. If there was no objection, the resolution would be on the floor for debate. Most likely, there would be an objection. Senate rules require one legislative day's notice in writing to amend or modify a Senate rule. The Senator who offered the motion would then address the Chair and send to the desk a motion in writing to amend a Senate rule and ask that the written notice be read. [Recall that the reformers' prime focus was on Rule XXII; they saw no contradiction in observing other Senate rules. They cited the earlier Nixon advisory opinions that all Senate rules carried over, except those that have the practical effect of denying a majority its constitutional right to determine its rules.] Presumably, the Senate would adjourn, rather than recess, so the reformer's resolutions would comply with the one legislative day notice rule. [The Senate majority leader, as noted previously, determines whether the Senate recesses or adjourns at the end of a day.] Reform Senators would need to object to any attempt to transact substantive business or, alternatively, seek unanimous consent to provide that any such business would not affect the status of \"opening day\" proceedings. The purpose would be to ensure that the reformers do not waive any rights to amend Senate rules on opening day by majority vote. \"Opening day\" could extend for an indefinite period until it was terminated by a Senate adjournment. Opponents could (a) defeat the motion to call up the resolution; (b) move to refer the resolution to the Committee on Rules and Administration; (c) table the reformers' resolution, reaffirming the continuity of Senate rules; or (d) raise a constitutional (or other) point of order against the resolution. The constitutional challenge would likely come if a filibuster is launched against either the motion to call up the resolution or on the resolution itself. After a reasonable period of debate, a reform Senator would move to cut off debate, perhaps even by moving the previous question. A constitutional point of order against such a motion would likely be made by a Member of the opposition. Under well-established precedents, the Chair would submit such a point of order to the Senate.\nIt is at this stage where things would become problematic for the reformers because they confront again the aforementioned \"Catch 22\" situation. Unless they had 67 votes, the reformers would be unable to invoke cloture to bring an end to prolonged discussion on the debatable constitutional point of order. Long-standing Senate precedents obligate the Chair to submit constitutional points of order to the Senate for its consideration. To be sure, the reformers would expect the Chair to make favorable rulings—even if Senate precedents were broken—that facilitated their goal of changing Rule XXII (or any other Senate rule for that matter) by majority vote. Fundamentally, this meant a favorable ruling that supported the implementation of what has come to be called the constitutional option.\nFor example, if the Chair ruled on his own authority in favor of the constitutional option—specifically, that debate would end by majority vote on a motion to proceed to the reform resolution, ignoring long-standing precedents that constitutional points of order are to be submitted to and decided by the Senate—an appeal of that controversial decision would surely be made by an opponent of change. The appeal is debatable, which would require cloture to end, but the Chair might immediately recognize a reformer (perhaps the majority leader) to table the appeal. If the tabling motion was successful, the Senate would have established a precedent that arguably would terminate filibusters by majority vote on rule changes proposed at the start of a new Congress. Accordingly, Senate reformers could close extended debate by majority vote on both the motion to call up their reform resolution and on the resolution itself.\nThis parliamentary scenario highlights why favorable rulings from the Chair are among the key elements that sometimes could advantage the \"opening day\" objectives of Senate reformers. By contrast, if the Chair submitted the debatable constitutional point of order to the Senate—as precedents and practices dictate—it would be unlikely that the reformers could muster the 67 votes required to invoke cloture to end the filibuster.", "On September 15, 27 Democratic Senators and 10 GOP Senators each issued nearly identical press releases. Each release lamented the timing of bringing S. Res. 4 to the floor when \"adjournment fever\" was high with Senators anxious to return home or to fulfill other commitments. Majority Leader Mansfield responded by saying that the \"leadership is not permitted the luxury of considering rule XXII in a vacuum.\" Several measures required consideration, Mansfield said, before the scheduled end of the first session (September 27). Besides the issue of timing, Senate reformers were unhappy because an unsupportive Vice President Lyndon Johnson was presiding—so favorable rulings from the Chair aiding the reformers could not be expected—and the lapse of the pretense of \"opening day\" meant, as Senator Javits pointed out, that \"a proposed change in rule XXII can be closed only by the votes of two-thirds of the Members present and voting.\"\nOn Saturday, September 16, Majority Leader Mansfield moved that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 4 (providing for cloture by three-fifths of those voting, a quorum being present), which the Committee on Rules and Administration reported without recommendation. (Recall that the Senate on January 10 had referred the resolution to that panel.) Senator Mansfield explained to Senators why S. Res. 4 was not favorably reported. He said:\nIn my opinion, Senate Resolution 4 could not have been reported favorably by the Rules Committee because the votes simply were not there for a favorable report. The Rules Committee, despite what I think was the inherent opposition of many of its members, nevertheless, in the interest of helping the leadership to keep its word, subordinated personal feelings on this most important matter and allowed the resolution to be reported without recommendation.\nWith the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4 made, Senator Mansfield and Minority Leader Dirksen filed cloture to end debate on the measure. Senator Mansfield also received assurances from the Chair that, given the pendency of the cloture motion, \"the Senate cannot consider any other motion or measure except conference reports and other privileged matters, unless unanimous consent is obtained.\" On September 19, the Senate voted (37 yeas, 43 nays) not to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed. Mansfield then moved immediately to table the motion to consider S. Res. 4, which the Senate agreed to by a 47 to 35 vote. Senator Mansfield's successful tabling motion ended filibuster reform in the 87 th Congress.", "", "The constitutional option once more came into play at the start of the 88 th Congress. A bipartisan group of change-oriented lawmakers tried again unsuccessfully to amend Rule XXII to permit three-fifths of the Senators voting, a quorum being present, to invoke cloture. Senator Anderson was the prime sponsor of this resolution (S. Res. 9), with Senators Humphrey and Kuchel planning to propose a majority cloture resolution (S. Res. 10) as a complete substitute for S. Res. 9. Southern Senators, along with their allies in the chamber, conducted a 24-day filibuster that blocked the liberals' hope for change. Part of the reformers' strategy was to try to persuade Vice President Johnson to rule that, under the Constitution, dilatory debate on the proposed rules change could be cut off by majority vote.\nSpecifically, the reformist Senators devised an optimistic strategy to change Rule XXII. Among its basic features were the following:\nDuring the expected filibuster against revising Rule XXII, Senator Anderson would move to end further debate on the pending motion by majority vote. The Vice President would rule that the motion was in order because, under the Constitution, debate on a proposed rules change at the start of a new Congress could be terminated by majority vote. No doubt a Senator, perhaps from the South, would appeal the ruling of the Vice President. A reform Senator would then offer a nondebatable motion to table the appeal, which would be agreed to by majority vote. This vote would uphold the Chair's ruling and create a new Senate precedent that would allow a majority at the beginning of a new Congress to cut off debate on both the motion to proceed to a rules change and on the rules revision itself. With the precedent in place, a Senate majority would vote to end debate on the pending motion to proceed and then on the rules change. Further filibuster attempts by opponents of reforming Rule XXII could be ended under the new majority vote precedent.\nTo focus the Senate's attention on the rules debate and induce the membership to reach a decision on the matter, Majority Leader Mansfield served notice \"that vacancies on the Democratic policy and steering committee will not be filled, nor assignments to the standing committees made, until we have resolved the rules controversies. Further, I shall object to any committee meeting during sessions of the Senate, because it seems to be quite unfair to transact business, whether legislative or executive, in committees to which no new Member has been assigned.\"\nLater in the debate, and to force a conclusion, Senator Mansfield informed lawmakers that the Senate would meet six days a week; daily sessions, if necessary, would be lengthened; live quorums would be called; and \"Members should be prepared to cancel out-of-town engagements, in order that we may quickly secure these quorums.\" Once more, the key question was whether, at the start of a new Congress, Senate rules—with their supermajority requirement for cloture—automatically carried over from the previous Congress and governed consideration of proposals to change Senate rules.", "When the 88 th Congress convened on January 9, Majority Leader Mansfield, in cooperation with Minority Leader Dirksen, informed the Senate that \"the rights of every Member of this body with respect to the question of [cloture reform] which will be pending before the Senate next week will be fully protected. [W]e have consulted the Parliamentarian and have been assured that that is the case.\" Senators Anderson and Humphrey also announced on that day that they would submit to the Senate on January 14 a notice in writing of their intent to amend Rule XXII, and that they would introduce their respective reform resolutions.\n\"Opening day\" was kept alive from a parliamentary perspective through the majority leader's prerogative of deciding whether to recess or adjourn at the end of a Senate session. On January 9, the Senate recessed, as it did on Thursday (January 10). When it reconvened on the calendar day of January 14 (Monday)—the legislative day of January 9—Senators Anderson and Humphrey introduced their respective reform resolutions and provided written notice of their intent to amend Senate Rule XXII. Upon objection to the immediate consideration of the resolutions, the Chair directed that resolutions lie over one legislative day as required by chamber rules. The Senate adjourned on January 14, which ensured the resolutions' compliance with the layover requirement.\nBeginning the next calendar day, the Senate recessed continuously—thus remaining in the legislative day of January 15—until it adversely disposed of the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 9 several weeks later (on February 7). By recessing, the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9 automatically remained the pending business of the Senate until disposed of or until the Senate displaced it with other business. As the Chair said in response to a parliamentary inquiry: \"If the Senate adjourns tonight (January 15) without having taken any action on the motion [to proceed], the motion will die. It will have to be taken up anew [although] the motion [to proceed] can be renewed.\"", "On January 15, the Chair presented S. Res. 9 to the Senate during the morning hour. Senator Russell then asked three questions (parliamentary inquiries) of Vice President Johnson to clarify the procedural situation. The three questions were (1) \"As I understand [chamber rules], this matter [S. Res. 9] is laid down automatically as business coming over from yesterday?\" (2) S. Res. 9 \"is now before the Senate and is a debatable issue? and (3) \"If the resolution is debated until 2 o'clock [the Senate convened at noon], it then will be the duty of the Chair to send the resolution to the calendar?\" Each question received an affirmative response from the Vice President. Subsequently, Senator Willis Robertson of Virginia, a lead opponent of filibuster reform, yielded time to Senator Humphrey, so he could offer without debate a complete substitute amendment to S. Res. 9, which was the text of Humphrey's S. Res. 10 (majority cloture). Senator Robertson yielded time to Senator Humphrey with the understanding that he would not lose his right to the floor.\nWith the expiration of the morning hour, Senator Anderson's resolution was placed on the Calendar of General Orders. He was prepared at some point to offer a motion to proceed to its consideration. However, Senator Robertson held the floor and discussed at some length the demerits of filibuster reform. Regularly, he deferred to his leader, Senator Russell of Georgia, before he would yield to a colleague for a question or agree to a unanimous consent request propounded by a reform Senator. For example, Senator Anderson interjected during Robertson's lengthy discourse, \"I wish to move the adoption of [my] resolution.\" Senator Robertson responded that he was serving on a team led by Senator Russell. \"He is my general; and, therefore, I now yield to him.\" In a display of collegiality, Senator Russell requested that his southern colleague, without losing his right to the floor, yield to Senator Anderson so he could offer his motion. Senator Anderson then stated: \"I now move that the Senate consider my resolution.\" In response, the Chair stated: \"The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from New Mexico that the Senate proceed to the consideration of his resolution.\" That motion remained pending for the next several weeks of debate on filibuster reform until it was tabled.\nWorth underscoring is the role of Majority Leader Mansfield in filibuster reform. Senator Mansfield supported cloture reform, and provided the Anderson-led lawmakers with ample time to make their case for reform, ensured parliamentary fairness to both sides, and made the issue of extended debate the top priority of the Senate for a number of weeks. In brief, Senator Mansfield made sure that the Senate's focus was nearly always on changes to Senate rules, even to the extent of preventing chamber consideration of legislative and executive business. To be sure, a majority leader who opposes filibuster reform can erect parliamentary roadblocks—refusing to schedule reform resolutions or moving to table them after minimal debate, for example—that make revisions to the cloture rule difficult or impossible to accomplish.", "Senate debate was replete with references to the continuing body doctrine. Senator Robertson, for example, went on at length to explain that the Senate has always been a continuing body. He cited the Constitution, Senate rules, history, the intent of the Framers, the Federalist Papers, the statements of eminent former Senators, Supreme Court decisions, and much more. The Senate that organized in 1789, concluded Senator Robertson, \"has never died.\" In the view of Senator Russell, the entire procedure of the reformers was \"predicated on the theory that the Senate is not a continuing body and has no rules to continue.\" He went on to say:\nThere is no question that the Senate is a continuing body. All of us know that one-third of the Members of the Senate are elected every 2 years, and two-thirds of the Members carry over. That is what makes the Senate a continuing body, and until a few years ago no one had the temerity to claim that the Senate is not a continuing body.\nSenator Anderson argued that the continuing body thesis had no bearing on the right of the Senate to amend its rules. \"The pending question,\" he said, \"is not in any way predicated on the theory that the Senate is a continuing body. The pending question is on agreeing to my motion to have the Senate consider Senate Resolution 9.\" GOP Senator Javits endorsed Anderson's judgment: \"So whether one holds to the view that the Senate is a continuing body or does not hold to that view, that question is not involved in the question of whether we have a right to change the rules\" at the start of a Congress by majority vote. Added Senator Humphrey:\nThe Anderson constitutional motion has nothing to do with whether or not the Senate is a continuing body. The Senate has both continuous and discontinuous aspects. The arguments for the carryover of rules comes down to this: since two-thirds of the Senators carry over, the Senate is a continuous body; because the Senate is a continuous body, the rules carry over. Striking the words 'continuous body' from this equation, the argument reads: since two-thirds of the Senators carry over, the rules carry over. But this is a patent non sequitur. It assumes that the carryover of two-thirds of the Senate always carries over a majority in favor of the rules.\nSenator Humphrey also identified a number of discontinuous features of the Senate, such as that all bills die at the end of a Congress and that the Senate selects its own officers every new Senate even if there is a continuing majority. \"If the Senate is a continuing body, why did we have to reelect our beloved friend Carl Hayden\" as President pro tempore?\nClearly, there was a wide gap between the Russell and Anderson supporters on the continuity of Senate rules. Senator Russell pointedly noted that the reformers stressed that they support all the Senate's rules, except Rule XXII. Moreover, said Russell, the reformers plan to close debate on S. Res. 9 \"in some fashion unknown to the Senate ... That is a most extraordinary situation.\" Replying to Senator Russell, Senator Anderson explained that the reformers \"are willing to abide by all the rules of the Senate which we believe to be constitutional; but we do not wish to abide by rules which are not constitutional.\" So, said Senator Russell, you are the judge of which Senate rules are constitutional? \"No,\" stated Senator Anderson, but \"I reserve the right to vote on the question of constitutionality\" when that question is submitted to the Senate.", "Recall that the reformers hoped that Vice President Johnson would support the constitutional option when, as planned, Senator Anderson would move to close debate by a simple majority on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9. It was not to be, however. On January 28, debate on the role of the presiding officer was joined in a significant way. On that date, Senator Anderson, employing the constitutional option, said: \"I move under the Constitution that without further debate the Chair submit the pending question [the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9] to the Senate for a vote.\" The phrasing of the motion was of strategic importance to the reformers. They knew that Johnson would submit the constitutional question to the Senate, as he had stated earlier, but they wanted the Vice President to submit the question for a vote with no debate. That was not to be, however.\nOnce Anderson's motion was read by the legislative clerk, Johnson emphasized that the \"Presiding Officer does not have the authority to rule on a constitutional point of order … because the Vice President cannot make a decision for 100 Senators, unless he has previously been granted the authority to make that decision.\" The Vice President submitted the following question to the Senate:\nDoes a majority of the Senate have the right under the Constitution to terminate debate at the beginning of a session and proceed to an immediate vote on a rule change notwithstanding the provisions of the existing Senate rules?\nJohnson also informed the lawmakers that the \"Senate is now operating under the rules as shown in the Senate Manual,\" a view generally endorsed by Senator Anderson but with some exceptions. What no Senator should ignore, said Senator Anderson, \"is that the first order of business after the proper organization of the Senate was a motion to amend the Senate rules,\" particularly Rule XXII. \"Is not that the situation this year? In this Congress? At this time? At this hour?\"\nDuring the debate, reform Senator Kenneth Keating, R-NY, posed a number of questions to the Chair. One question, restated in several different forms, was particularly telling. \"If during the debate on the [Anderson] motion it were to appear to the Chair that dilatory tactics are being employed to prevent the Senate reaching a decision,\" inquired Keating, \"would the Chair have the power to rescind the submission and render a ruling on the motion [subject to an appeal of the Chair's decision]?\" Vice President Johnson then asked Senator Keating what Senate rule or constitutional provision gives such authority to the Chair? In response, Keating stated that he had no quarrel with the Chair submitting the motion to the Senate. He simply wanted to learn \"whether there is any way to bring the motion to a vote?\" The Vice President noted: \"Since 1803 every Presiding Officer of the Senate has held that constitutional questions must be submitted to the Senate.\" He further asked Senator Keating if he knew of any Senate rule granting presiding officers the authority to rule on constitutional questions? Majority Leader Mansfield interjected that, if the Chair responded in the affirmative to Keating's parliamentary inquiries, \"it would in effect mean that the Vice President, who is a member of the executive branch, could at his discretion become dictator of the Senate.\"\nSenator Keating continued to press the point. He rephrased his question and asked if the Presiding Officer \"knows of any way whereby debate on this subject can be terminated so long as there are any Senators who wish to speak on the subject?\" Johnson identified four ways: \"first, it could be terminated by majority vote; second, it could be terminated by a motion to table; third, it could be terminated by an agreement among Senators; fourth, it could be determined in accordance with the cloture rule, Rule XXII.\" Senator Keating then inquired how a majority could cut off debate, and Johnson responded: that is a matter the \"100 Senators have within their control, and which is not within the control of the Chair.\"\nSenator Keating then wanted to know if either the Constitution or Senate rules grant the Chair \"inherent power\" to curb dilatory tactics. Johnson responded in the negative. Senator Russell of Georgia, however, was far more direct than Johnson in rejecting Keating's inherent power suggestion. \"I have never heard of a procedure so violative of every facet of democracy, of free institutions, of our free government,\" he said, \"as to imply that the Vice President of the United States has the right … to tell Senators to 'Sit down; we are going to vote now. I am tired of hearing all this debate. Clerk, call the roll. Senators, you will now vote.'\"\nSenator Humphrey joined the debate. He contended that the whole argument was about \"whether a majority has the right to change the rules without being stymied by a cloture rule which permits a minority to block a change in the rules.\" It is most unusual, exclaimed Senator Humphrey, that \"we find ourselves in a situation in which we can debate a motion to end debate and can kill a motion to end debate with debate.\" Is there not, Humphrey asked, some point where dilatory actions become unconstitutional \"by reason of the debate, which has no further meaning in logic or reasons, is it not then the unquestioned right of the members of the Senate—either through the method suggested by Jefferson of moving the previous question or by calling again on the Vice President to invoke the constitutional right of a majority to change the Senate rules—to bring the matter to an end?\" Senator Humphrey underscored that there was ample precedent for the Chair to make a unilateral ruling. \"On the basis of Jefferson's Manual , a sound and solemn case can be made for insisting that the Vice President hand down a ruling.\" According to Jefferson,\nThe Senate have accordingly formed some rules for its own government; but those going only to a few cases, they have referred to the decisions of their President, without debate and without appeal, all questions of order arising either under their own rules, or, where they have provided none.\nSenator Keating added: \"There is danger in giving a Presiding Officer too much power—but there is danger, too, in his having too little power. The Presiding Officer cannot be a passive observer of tactics which make a mockery of debate.\" He argued that the presiding officer must have implied authority under the Constitution \"to bring a constitutional question to a vote in the Senate.\" Moreover, as suggested by various reformers, the Chair's authority to end debate and bring a matter to a vote would apply only at the start of a new Congress and only on matters involving Senate rule changes.\nOther Senators participated in the debate on the Vice President's responsibility as presiding officer. Senator Javits argued that the \"Chair does not by law have to submit a constitutional question to the Senate. Although the precedents may say so, we have shattered many precedents.\" GOP Senator Case of New Jersey urged the Vice President to \"help the Senate come to a conclusion which will permit a majority of Senators to exercise their constitutional function.\" The Vice President remained firm in his view that he would not \"exercise authority he does not believe he has merely because other men are unwilling to exercise the authority they do have.\" Majority Leader Mansfield emphasized that \"what is the Senate's business the Senate will attend to and attend to alone.\"", "Ending debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9 proved to be a lengthy process. Day after day Senators voiced their strong support or opposition to the constitutional option. As the prolonged debate continued, a number of Senators urged its end so the Senate could consider other business. A close friend of the majority leader, GOP Senator George Aiken of Vermont, expressed a view shared by a number of Members. \"I consider the business and the defense of the country and our relationships with other countries of vastly more importance [than filibuster reform]. As far as I am concerned, I am ready to table the original motions and all motions pertaining to it and proceed with the essential business of the Senate.\" In response to this sentiment, and concern about the public's negative view of the proceedings, the chamber's two party leaders (Mansfield and Dirksen) propounded on January 30 the following unanimous consent agreement (UCA):\nOrdered , That on Thursday, January 31, 1963, at the conclusion of routine morning business, the Senate resume consideration of the following question submitted on the 28 th instant by the Vice President to the Senate for its decision, namely, \"Does a majority of the Senate have the right under the Constitution to terminate debate at the beginning of a session and proceed to an immediate vote on a rule change notwithstanding the provisions of the existing Senate rules?\"\nAnd that after debate of 3 hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by Mr. Russell and Mr. Humphrey, the Senate proceed to vote on the issue of tabling the said question. Furthermore, that there be a live quorum before the debate limitation starts and after it ends.\nImmediately, proponents and opponents of cloture reform sought to determine the consequences and implications of the UCA if it was adopted or rejected. The Vice President noted that if the UCA was adopted, the Senate would be agreeing to a specific time to vote on a motion to table the question specified in the consent agreement. During the discussion, Senator Javits asked the Chair, if the question was tabled, \"then it will no longer be before the Senate, and there will no longer be debate on that question?\" The Vice President responded: \"The Chair has twice ruled or twice stated ... that the Senate would revert to the original question, which is the motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 9.\" On the other hand, remarked Senator Javits, if the tabling motion is not rejected, \"debate would continue ... upon the constitutional question framed by the Chair and put to the Senate. Is that correct?\" Johnson's response: \"That would be the question. Senators might discuss many topics, but that would be the question.\" In the end, no Senator objected to the leadership-crafted UCA.\nThe next day, January 31, the crucial vote occurred on the Vice President's question contained in the UCA. After three hours of debate, the determination of a quorum, and a request for the yeas and nays, the Senate voted 53 to 42 to table the question submitted by the Vice President. The Vice President then stated: \"The question now recurs on the motion submitted on January 15 by the Senator from New Mexico that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 9 to amend the cloture rule of the Senate.\"\nDebate on filibuster reform continued into early February. Senator Mansfield expressed doubt about the Senate ever reaching a direct vote on S. Res. 9. If the Senate did adopt the motion to proceed, there were simply too many dilatory motions that opponents could use to prevent a vote on S. Res. 9 itself, such as motions to refer with diverse instructions, to postpone to various days, or to amend S. Res. 9, not to mention raising numerous points of order, calling for live quorums, and proposing motions to adjourn.\nTo expedite action and to further test the sentiment of Senators, Majority Leader Mansfield announced on February 5 that he would offer a motion the next day to table the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9. (Senator Mansfield also announced that he would vote against his own motion to table the pending question). The majority leader anticipated the failure of his tabling motion because many opponents of filibuster reform, such as Senator Russell, stated before the vote that they would oppose Mansfield's motion because it would cut off debate. Accordingly, Senator Mansfield also introduced a cloture motion on February 5 to end debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9. He outlined his rationale for cloture: \"If the motion for cloture does not receive approximately 60 votes in its favor—that the first cloture motion will mark the end of this debate, so far as I am concerned; and I will then make a motion to adjourn.\" If the cloture vote is \"fairly close—say 60 or more—it will be my intention to offer a second motion on cloture\" to end debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9.\nOn February 6, as Senator Mansfield expected, his tabling motion failed by a vote of 5 yeas and 92 nays. The next day, the vote on cloture occurred to close debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9. Before the vote, Senator Mansfield reiterated that \"if the vote in favor of cloture is less than 60, I shall immediately, upon the conclusion of the vote, move that the Senate adjourn until Monday.\" The vote for cloture was 54 ayes and 42 nays. After the Chair announced the defeat of the cloture motion, Senator Mansfield immediately moved that the Senate adjourn; he asked for the yeas and nays on that question. The Senate voted 64 to 33 for adjournment, ending filibuster reform for the 88 th Congress. (Motions to proceed to a matter, such as S. Res. 9, die with an adjournment of the Senate.)", "During debate on February 5, two reform Senators spoke about a matter that is relevant for the contemporary Senate. They wondered if a new Senate precedent was being established: filibustering the motion to proceed. Senator Humphrey declared that it is \"most unusual for any Senator to object to a motion to consider in this body.\" Normal procedure, he said, is to adopt the motion to proceed and then debate the substance of the measure. As he stated: \"To take up a motion or a bill in a parliament or the Congress is as normal as the Fourth of July, and to deny people the opportunity even to take up a bill for debate and consideration is unusual, abnormal, and the burden of proof rests upon those who take that position.\" Senator Anderson elaborated on Humphrey's observations. In 1953, 1957, and 1959, said Anderson, Members who opposed the reformers did not prevent a debate on the substance of their proposals. \"Now we have established a precedent in this Congress whereby every time the majority leader moves to proceed to the consideration of a measure, an attempt will be to engage in a 2- to 3-week filibuster. This procedure will come back to plague the Senate.\"", "", "A bipartisan group of reform-minded Senators, as in previous Congresses, proposed to change Rule XXII by employing the constitutional option. They were unsuccessful. After only three session days of intermittent consideration, the two main reform resolutions were referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration by unanimous consent. The panel reported the resolutions adversely, ending the effort to revise Rule XXII.\nTwo factors largely changed the reform dynamic. First, the Senate demonstrated in 1964 that it could mobilize the two-thirds vote (71 to 29) required to invoke cloture on the landmark Civil Rights Act of that year. It was the first time that cloture was invoked on a civil rights measure. Senate reformers recognized that they could muster cloture on civil rights legislation—an issue that energized their earlier attempts at filibuster reform. As a result, the intensity for revising Rule XXII was not as strong as in other years. Second, Lyndon Johnson was now President, and Senators wanted to focus on considering the \"Great Society\" program of the new administration. Lawmakers did not want to delay action on the President's agenda—such as passage of Medicare, the Voting Rights Act, or the Elementary and Secondary Education Act—with a lengthy and divisive filibuster reform fight.", "On opening day, January 4, Senator Anderson provided notice to all Senators that he would soon submit a resolution to amend Rule XXII. Immediately, Senator Javits wanted assurances from Anderson that \"no business will intervene, before the proposed action is taken [introduction of Anderson's resolution], that will prejudice the legal basis for which we have always contended for this move.\" Senator Anderson replied that he had discussed the question with the majority leader, the minority leader, and Senator Russell, and all agreed that any subsequent action on Senate business would not prejudice the reformers' aims. As Senator Russell, the anti-reform leader, stated: \"I know that the [Anderson resolution] will be submitted. I do not propose to quibble over the time of its submission. The question will be settled on the floor of the Senate at the appropriate time.\"\nTwo days later, Senator Anderson introduced his resolution (S. Res. 6) providing for cloture by three-fifths of the Senators voting, a quorum being present, and asked for its immediate consideration. When GOP leader Dirksen objected, the presiding officer (the President pro tempore) stated that S. Res. 6 would go over, under the rule. Senator Anderson immediately sent to the desk his written notice of his motion to amend Rule XXII. Senator Douglas of Illinois also introduced during the morning hour S. Res. 8 providing for majority cloture. When Senator Douglas asked for the immediate consideration of his resolution, there was an objection. He then submitted, as required under chamber rules, a notice of his intent to amend Senate rules.\nOn January 7, as one of the first orders of business, Majority Leader Mansfield clarified the intent of a consent agreement entered into the previous day. He stated that the introduction and referral of measures and the transaction of routine business during the morning hour would not prejudice \"the rights of any Senator as regards the parliamentary situation affecting any proposed amendment to Senate rules.\" Later in the morning hour, the President pro tempore stated that S. Res. 6 automatically \"comes over from the previous day.\" Immediately, Senator Dirksen moved that S. Res. 6 be referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration. Senator Douglas asked Senator Dirksen, before he began to speak, if he could offer his proposal. Senator Dirksen refused on the ground that he wanted to focus exclusively on S. Res. 6. A period of debate then ensued between opponents and proponents of filibuster reform. When Senator Anderson was recognized to speak on the subject, he offered an amendment to Dirksen's motion to commit:\nThat the resolution be referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, which shall make its report on said resolution and any other proposed amendments of rule XXII of the Senate on January 25, 1965, and all rights in existence at the opening of the Congress shall be deemed preserved.\nConsiderable debate followed as to the intent of Anderson's motion. Senator Russell raised two points of order against it. First, he argued that instructions to committees \"cannot apply to anything except a measure before the Senate.\" Anderson's motion \"aims to instruct the committee with respect to resolutions that have not yet been offered,\" which is contrary to Senate rules and precedents. Second, Senator Russell contended that language in Anderson's motion—\"all rights in existence at the opening of the Congress shall be preserved\"—is not in order because it is instructing the Senate itself. Senator Russell wanted to know, he said, how the Chair construes the clause—\"with respect to preserving constitutional rights.\"\nPresident pro tempore Carl Hayden of Arizona ruled the instruction to the committee in order but not the instruction to the Senate itself. Specifically, Hayden said, \"The first part of the resolution were instructions to the committee [and in order] and the last part is instructions to the Senators and not in order.\" He then said: \"The hour of 2 o'clock having expired, and the morning hour having expired, the resolution under consideration now goes to the calendar under the uniform rules of the Senate.\" Senator Mansfield then asked if a motion to call up S. Res. 6 from the calendar was in order. The Chair responded that the majority leader was correct. Without delay, Senator Anderson said: \"Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 6.\" Republican leader Dirksen noted that the motion to proceed is debatable.\nAfter the Senate proceeded to a matter unrelated to filibuster reform, several Senators engaged in a discussion of the Chair's earlier ruling. For example, Senator Douglas explained that he and other Senators could not hear the President pro tempore's ruling because he spoke in an inaudible voice. If he had heard the decision, said Senator Douglas, he would have appealed the ruling because it implied the end of \"opening day.\" Because \"this matter is getting a little out of hand,\" the majority leader recessed the Senate until the next day (January 8).", "Controversy surrounding the Chair's inaudible ruling continued on January 8. That ruling upheld a point of order that ostensibly undermined the idea that the reformers' \"opening day\" rights are preserved during subsequent session days even if other business intervenes. Senator Russell pointed out that various lawmakers and floor staff heard the decision, no reform Senator appealed the ruling of the Chair, and, therefore, \"there is no question in my mind that the ruling is binding.\" Senator Douglas called the ruling unfair and said that reform proponents would have appealed the ruling if they had heard it. He added:\nIf the Senate appoints committees during this time [referring to Anderson's reporting deadline of January 25 for Rules and Administration], it can be maintained with a great deal of strength that we have adopted the previous rules in toto , including Rule XXII and that therefore a motion to change Rule XXII is not in order.\nSenator Douglas then asked the Chair: if the Senate is organized would the advocates of reform be viewed as tacitly accepting all of the Senate's rules, including Rule XXII? The Chair responded: \"The parliamentarian advises me that the Senator will not lose any of his constitutional rights, and furthermore if amendments must be made to rules, they can be made at any time.\" Senator Douglas advised his reform colleagues not to view as binding the Chair's ruling with respect to their opening day constitutional rights. Senator Russell argued to the contrary. He declaimed that \"there is no doubt that the ruling of the Chair is the ruling of the Senate as of this hour.\"\nIn the end, the outcome of the discussion was murky, but it appeared that the Chair's inaudible (to some Senators and parliamentary staff) ruling was not overturned. In the judgment of Senator Javits, \"we are discussing a matter of great importance in terms of whether Senators hear the ruling or not, so that they can appeal. But I see no permanent jeopardy or loss of rights which has been done so far.\" The Senate recessed, ending that session day.", "On January 11, the Senate resumed consideration of Senator Anderson's pending motion to call up S. Res. 6. Majority Leader Mansfield received unanimous consent to refer the Anderson and Douglas (S. Res. 8) resolutions to the Committee on Rules and Administration with instructions \"to make its report on said resolutions to the Senate on March 9, 1965.\" Senator Anderson asked if the majority leader's request \"would protect all existing rights?\" Senator Mansfield responded: \"Yes, of course.\" Asked later what accounted for senatorial agreement to Mansfield's unanimous consent request, Senator Anderson said, \"We just got reasonable, all of us.\" The committee issued a negative report on the two resolutions; the Senate did not resume consideration of either resolution in the 89 th Congress.", "", "A bipartisan group of liberal and moderate Senators, led by George McGovern, D-SD, and Thruston Morton, R-KY, proposed to amend Rule XXII by permitting cloture by three-fifths—rather than two-thirds—of those voting, a quorum being present. The reformers were optimistic that conditions were favorable for change because Vice President Hubert Humphrey would be presiding—recall that as a Senator he was a strong advocate of filibuster reform—and these Members believed a majority of their colleagues were sympathetic to their cause. Their effort was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, what made this attempt noteworthy is that a parliamentary procedure was devised—a \"compound motion\"—that might permit Rule XXII to be amended by majority vote at the beginning of a Congress.\nThe reformers met soon after the November 1966 elections to plan their strategy. Similarly, Senator Russell, the opposition leader, convened meetings with his group. When the new Senate opened on January 10, Majority Leader Mansfield stated that he would follow established practice: \"no bills or resolutions will be introduced and no routine business will be transacted prior to the President's delivery tonight\" of the State of the Union message. Two reform Senators then sought and received assurances from the majority leader and Vice President Humphrey that the rights of every Senator with respect to amending Rule XXII would be protected.\nOnce more, reformers wanted to establish the principle that each new Congress could adopt its own rules by majority vote, unfettered by entrenched rules of previous Congresses. As a result, reform Senators regularly sought assurances that revisions of Senate rules by majority vote at the start of a new Congress would not be nullified by the transaction or intervention of legislative business. Otherwise, such a development might give rise to points of order that the \"opening day\" window had closed and reformers had tacitly accepted chamber rules, including Rule XXII, inherited from previous Congresses. The reformers also wanted to terminate filibusters on rule changes without using Rule XXII and its supermajority requirements. Their well-settled approach: emphasize that Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution takes precedence over Rule XXII and allows a majority both to end prolonged debate and to revise Senate rules. Senator Russell, the leader of the opposition, viewed the matter differently: \"I do not understand what rights could be prejudiced\" since the Senate can adopt or amend rules at any time by majority vote.", "On January 11, Senator McGovern, citing the Constitution (Article I, Section 5) and the advisory opinions of Vice President Richard Nixon, introduced S. Res. 6 to change the cloture requirement from two-thirds of those present and voting to three-fifths of those present and voting. Senator McGovern then asked unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the resolution. As expected, there was an objection. Vice President Humphrey then called the Senate's attention to the following Senate rule: \"All resolutions shall lie over one [legislative] day for consideration, unless by unanimous consent the Senate shall direct otherwise.\" At once, Senator McGovern announced that \"without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the majority of the Senate of the 90 th Congress to accept, reject, or modify any [Senate] rule, I hereby give notice in writing that I shall hereafter move to amend Rule XXII of the standing rules.\" GOP Senator Kuchel then followed the same procedure as McGovern when he introduced S. Res. 7, which proposed that an absolute majority (51) of the Senate could invoke cloture. Subsequently, there was some debate on both resolutions involving the majority leader, the minority leader, and other Senators. Vice President Humphrey noted that under chamber rules, the Senate would have to adjourn, not recess, if S. Res. 6 was to come before the Senate on a new legislative day. Senator Mansfield adjourned the Senate by unanimous consent.\nOn January 12, the Senate convened at noon. Majority Leader Mansfield received unanimous consent that, following a period of morning business, S. Res. 6 would be called up, and, if not disposed of by 2 p.m., would be returned to the Calendar of General Orders. During the morning business period (recall that routine business is conducted at the start of the morning hour), an amendment was filed to S. Res. 6 and another to S. Res. 7, but neither amendment was ever acted upon. When morning business ended, the Chair stated: \"Pursuant to a previous unanimous-consent agreement, the Chair lays before the Senate, Senate Resolution 6 which will be stated by title.\" Senator Russell then asked for a live quorum call. After a quorum was established, the Vice President stated: \"The question is on agreeing to the resolution.\" Senator Russell was immediately recognized, and he went on at considerable length discussing the deficiencies of S. Res. 6 and highlighting the uniqueness of the Senate as a deliberative body. When Senator Russell ended his discourse, Senator McGovern said: \"Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 6.\" Senator McGovern then spoke at some length on the need for cloture reform.\nSeveral days later, on January 18, Senator McGovern stated that, after consultation with the majority leader, he determined that it was time to end debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 6. Accordingly, Senator McGovern asked unanimous consent that further debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 6 would end within two hours, the time to be divided between the majority leader and Senator McGovern. He further stated that \"if we cannot achieve that purpose, I would then seek to obtain the same objective through a motion.\" Senator Dirksen objected. Senator McGovern then offered a compound motion containing two discrete directives that aroused considerable debate.", "Unable on January 18 to achieve unanimous consent to end debate on his motion to proceed, Senator McGovern remarked that he would propose a compound motion that would implement the constitutional option long sought by the reformers. He further emphasized that the procedure \"would not be a precedent for any action during the term of the Senate.\" His compound motion, which sparked a procedural battle, was as follows:\nMr. President, under article I, section 5, of the Constitution, which provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, and each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, I move that debate upon the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 6 be brought to a close in the following manner:\nThe Chair shall immediately put the motion to the Senate for a yea-and-nay vote and, upon adoption thereof by a majority of those present and voting, with a quorum present, there shall be two hours of debate upon the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 6 divided equally between proponents and opponents thereof and immediately thereafter the Chair shall put to the Senate, without further debate, the question on adoption of the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 6.\nSenator Russell quickly said the motion was subject to a division. Vice President Humphrey agreed and stated that the division would occur \"at the time of the vote upon the motion.\" He also added that \"a point of order can be raised against the entire motion at any time.\" Minority Leader Dirksen acted on the Vice President's suggestion. He raised a point of order that the entire motion was out of order. Furthermore, he stated that McGovern's motion did not present a constitutional question but was simply a dressed-up previous question motion. \"So, no constitutional question being involved, [the motion] flies in the face of the present rules of the Senate and of all other parliamentary procedure, and is, in my judgment, clearly subject to a point of order.\"\nThe Vice President then explained his view of the issues raised by the McGovern motion, which provoked prolonged procedural wrangling between opponents and proponents of change. Vice President Humphrey stated that the point of order raised constitutional questions and, following long-standing Senate precedents, he submitted the matter to the Senate for its consideration. \"Shall the point of order made by the Senator from Illinois be sustained? That question is debatable.\"\nMajority Leader Mansfield and other lawmakers then posed a series of parliamentary questions to the Vice President, which made plain the reformers' procedural strategy for ending prolonged debate on McGovern's motion. The salient points are as follows:\nIf Dirksen's point of order was tabled by a simple majority, that would establish the \"propriety\" of McGovern's motion. The pending business then would be the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 6. If a tabling motion failed to receive majority support, the point of order remained the pending business and was debatable. If the Senate tabled the point of order, thus validating McGovern's motion, there would be two hours of debate and then, without further debate or intervening motions, points of order, or appeals, the Chair would order the clerk to call the roll on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 6. Vice President Humphrey repeated several times that, if the motion to table was agreed to, then he and the Senate were bound by the instructions in McGovern's motion to have the Senate vote (after two hours of debate) on the motion to proceed. At least four procedural votes seemed possible, all to be decided by majority vote of the Senate: (1) on the motion to table the point of order; (2) on the first part of McGovern's basic motion—implementing Senator Russell's earlier request for a division of the resolution; (3) on the proviso in McGovern's motion to allow two hours of debate; and (4) on the motion to take up S. Res. 6.\nTo be sure, Senator McGovern's motion was controversial. Opponents castigated the motion as cloture by a simple majority; destructive of the Senate as an institution and a continuing body; not in conformity with Senate rules and unworthy of the Senate; a \"bizarre\" procedure; and a parliamentary scheme that violates Senators' procedural rights. Proponents rejected those arguments. They contended that the Senate would determine what it wanted to do in this situation. No procedural rights would be denied Senators, they argued, because \"motions in order of preference provided in [Senate] rules\" could be made during the two hours of debate as well as when the resolution was taken up. As reform Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey stated: \"All this talk of bad precedent or destruction of the Senate is all poppycock. The only precedent established here will be a precedent for the constitutional right of the Senate at the beginning of each session to change its rules or to adopt the old ones, if it so desires.\"\nIn the view of Senator Javits, Members who worried that future Vice Presidents or Senate majorities might become tyrants and violate the Constitution failed to recognize that such behavior could occur at any time. Presiding officers could refuse to recognize Senators when four or five are standing seeking to address the Chair. A presiding officer could say: \"Nobody else wishes to debate this question, read the resolution, and let's vote.\" If a presiding officer acted in such an arbitrary and autocratic manner, the result would be a \"revolution\" in the Senate against that behavior. \"You can conjure up all the terrible images you like as to what any precedent will do.\" McGovern's motion, Senator Javits declaimed, was based upon the Constitution for a given time period and for a narrow purpose.", "On January 18, Senator McGovern's motion to table the Dirksen point of order was rejected by a vote of 37 yeas and 61 nays. The Vice President stated: \"The point of order is still the pending business; the motion to table was not successful.\" He then put this question to the Senate: \"Is the point of order of the Senator from Illinois to be sustained?\" The Senate voted to sustain the point of order by a 59 to 37 vote. Majority Leader Mansfield stated his intent to adjourn the Senate, which would return S. Res. 6 to the calendar. However, Mansfield stated that he would renew the motion to proceed to S. Res. 6 on January 19, and that he, Senator Dirksen, Senator McGovern, and other lawmakers would file cloture on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 6. On January 19, a bipartisan group of 31 Senators, including the party leaders on both sides of the aisle, submitted a cloture motion to close debate on the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 6.\nOn January 24, there was some debate preceding the motion to invoke cloture. Senator Mansfield emphasized that the question soon to be voted on was neither about S. Res. 6 nor changing Rule XXII; it was about whether the Senate would ever permit a vote on the substantive issue. \"The Senate has never been willing to face up to its merits,\" he said. \"I believe we have an obligation and a responsibility to do so now.\" Senator Dirksen asserted that there was no public outcry to change the two-thirds rule required to invoke cloture. \"We hear it from the groups who want it made much easier to ram through the Senate panaceas and laws, bills and resolutions, which are usually self-serving rather serving the public interest.\"\nIn the end, 53 Senators voted to invoke cloture with 46 opposed. As the Vice President declared: \"two-thirds of the Senators present and voting not having voted in the affirmative, the motion [to end debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 6] is rejected.\" Senator Mansfield stated that he had been prepared, had the vote been reasonably close, to submit a second cloture motion. But I think it would be a sham, a fake, and a phony thing to do in view of the vote just taken.\" (It is noteworthy that a majority (53)—but not a two-thirds supermajority—voted to end debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 6.) Subsequently, Senator Mansfield adjourned the Senate but not before stating that an adjournment would return S. Res. 6 to the Calendar of General Orders. His action ended further consideration of the reform resolutions.", "During the Senate's debate on S. Res. 6, Senator McGovern refuted the idea that the Senate is a continuing body, arguing that the \"dead hand of the past cannot control the 100 Senators who today comprise the Senate of the United States.\" He contended that only in the limited sense that two-thirds of the Senate carry over from Congress to Congress can the Senate be considered a continuing body. Arguments are made, he said, that since two-thirds of the Senate carry over, the rules carry over. \"But this a patent non sequitur,\" declared the Senator.\nIt assumes that the carryover of two-thirds of the Senate always carries over a majority in favor of the rules. The infusion of one-third newly elected Senators—both by their numbers, by their convictions, and by their powers of persuasion—may very well change the majority view of the rules, and it is this majority that is determinative under our constitutional democracy, not who carries over into the new Congress. That the new one-third may change the majority on any matter is well illustrated by the shifting of the Senate from party to party over the years.\nSenator McGovern then raised the idea that a national calamity could one day affect Senate operations. He said that situations could develop where the Senate would not be a continuing body. \"If a catastrophe wiped out a large number of Senators at any given time, this might not be true. Then, of course, we would be faced with a situation where the membership was not carried over.\"\nFlorida Democrat Spessard Holland opposed S. Res. 6, and challenged the views of Senator McGovern. The resolution, said Senator Holland, would destroy Rule XXII and, more importantly, its adoption would strike down \"the stability of the Senate itself by [offering] each recurring Senate ... an open invitation to rewrite the rules so as to substitute its own views at that time or the views of a simple majority of the Senate at that time.\" Senator Strom Thurmond, R-SC, pointed out that if the Founding Fathers did not want the continuity of the body, they \"would not have provided the necessary quorum to do business at all times, and the Senate would not have been a continuing body.\" And Senator Sam Ervin, D-NC, offered this criticism of the proposed filibuster reforms. The reformers argue, said Senator Ervin, that the Senate could change its rules by majority vote \"at the beginning of each session, but not later in the session. It is an obvious absurdity that the Constitution of the United States changes its meaning from the first part of a session to other stages of a session. The constitutional truth is that the Senate is empowered to make the rules of its own proceedings, and this provision of the Constitution applies at the beginning of a session and during every day of the session.\"", "", "Once more the Senate confronted the fundamental issue: can the Senate, at the beginning of a new Congress, rewrite its rules without being bound by those very same rules, specifically the supermajority requirement embedded in Rule XXII? Senators Frank Church, D-ID, and James Pearson, R-KS, proposed to change the number of Senators required to invoke cloture under Rule XXII from two-thirds of those present and voting to three-fifths of those present and voting. Senator Philip Hart, D-MI, and other reform-minded Members, beginning in Fall 1968, began to assess whether there was significant support for modifying Rule XXII. They found support for the three-fifths change but not for majority cloture. As a result, Senators Hart and Javits announced that they would not introduce their majority cloture proposal. Their goal was to consolidate \"strength in the Senate behind the so-called 60 percent amendment.\" A more fundamental objective of theirs was to win acceptance of the principle that the Senate is \"empowered at the beginning of each Congress to change its own rules without being subject to those very rules.\" Senatorial opposition to this principle remained high.\nSenator Church noted that Senator Anderson was not leading the fight for the three-fifths change, as he had done for years, because heavy Senate responsibilities prevented him from being the \"general\" of the reform effort. Importantly, Hubert Humphrey was still Vice President until Republican Spiro Agnew assumed the role of President of the Senate. (Agnew's first day in the Chair would be January 21.) Humphrey's role as presiding officer was especially significant because he laid out a controversial procedural strategy for achieving the reformers' objectives.", "The 91 st Congress opened on January 3, and Majority Leader Mansfield announced that established practice would be observed: no bills and resolutions would be introduced, or other business transacted, until after the President's State of the Union address. Six days later, Senator Church introduced S. Res. 11. He said:\nMr. President, article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States declares that \"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings.\"\nPursuant to this, and to advisory opinions of both Vice President Nixon and Vice President Humphrey that rules which restrict the power of a majority of the Senate of a new Congress to change its rules are not binding on the Senate at the opening of a new Congress, I submit on behalf of myself, the distinguished senior Senator from Kansas (Mr. Pearson), and 35 other Senators, a resolution to amend rule XXII, and ask that it be read.\nFollowing the reading of the resolution, the usual procedural events occurred. Senator Church asked unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 11. The chief floor opponent of the resolution, Senator Holland of Florida, objected, and the Chair, citing Rule XIV, said \"the resolution will lie over 1 day.\" Senator Church then sent to the desk his notice of a motion to amend certain Senate rules, which was ordered to be printed in the Congressional Record. This sequence of events largely concluded that day's floor discussion of S. Res. 11. Reform Senator Javits did ask the Chair whether Senator Church's notice to amend left unaffected the constitutional rights of all Senators. President pro tempore Richard Russell, who was presiding, rejected the suggestion that opening day conferred special rights.\nThe Chair has noted from year to year that the Senator from New York and others have undertaken very zealously to protect some imaginary right while proceeding under the rules on all other procedures. The Chair is of the opinion that that is wholly unnecessary to protect any constitutional right any Senator has or the Senate as a parliamentary organization has. Any constitutional right can be asserted at any time.\nAt the end of proceedings on January 9, Senator Mansfield adjourned the Senate so that S. Res. 11 would meet the aforementioned one-day layover requirement. Subsequently, Senator Mansfield recessed the Senate through January 28. During consideration of S. Res. 11, Senators generally accepted the view that \"opening day\" could extend for several weeks. On January 10, at the end of the morning hour, Senator Hart moved \"that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 11.\"", "Senator Church took the initial lead in explaining and defending S. Res. 11. He noted that amending Rule XXII to reduce to three-fifths from two-thirds of those present and voting was a modest change. It was not a \"gag rule.\" Rule XXII as written, he said, placed too much power in a minority of Senators. He underscored the necessity of affirming that a majority of the 100 Senators has a constitutional right to adopt whatever cloture rule they think best without hindrance from previously adopted Senate rules.\nAs for the continuing body doctrine, it applied only in the limited sense that two-thirds of the Members carry over from Congress to Congress. In the larger sense, said Senator Church, the Senate is not a continuing body citing, for example, that bills and resolutions must be reintroduced afresh at the start of a new Congress. Senator Church exclaimed that \"whether we choose to call the Senate a continuing body or not, the fact that two-thirds of the Senators normally carry over does not support the proposition that rules adopted by an earlier Congress can prevent the Senate of a new Congress from altering those rules in such manner as the majority may determine at the opening of that Congress.\"\nSenator Holland then offered his critique of S. Res. 11. He stated that its adoption would constitute a precedent whereby a \"mere majority of the Senate, no matter how transient, at the beginning of any Congress\" could change any Senate rule. Senator Church agreed and emphasized that such a precedent would be fully in accord with the Constitution. Senator Holland replied that it would be a \"real disaster\" to grant such \"sweeping power\" to a mere majority. He further noted that such a precedent would damage the prestige of the Senate, weaken the Senate's ability to ensure \"stability\" in our governmental system, and would be contrary to the traditions and intentions of the Founding Fathers. S. Res. 11, he said, should reach the floor in the regular way, which includes consideration by the Committee on Rules and Administration. The Founding Fathers, he contended, regarded the \"Senate as a continuing body, and a body which, because of that continuation and because of the peculiar structure under which it was set up, would give stability to the Government, which otherwise might be without such stability.\"", "There was considerable controversy over the issue of acquiescence to Senate rules versus non-acquiescence during the opening day period. Senator Javits took the lead in explaining the position of the reformers. Two points are noteworthy. First, Javits re-emphasized a view that reformers articulated for years. The Senate has the constitutional authority to change any rule by majority vote at the start of a new Congress. Senate rules that thwart this possibility are contrary to the Constitution, and Members are not bound by them, he argued. Stated differently, if reformers must attract a two-thirds supermajority vote to curb a filibuster before the Senate can consider amendments to change the rules, \"then the Constitution has been as effectively amended as if it had been contained in the original document, or three-quarters of the States or two-thirds of both Houses of Congress had agreed.\"\nSecond, reformers accepted by acquiescence, said Senator Javits, all Senate rules except those that vitiate \"the constitutional authority of a majority of the Senate to act. [W]hat does vitiate the authority of a majority of the Senate to act is the inability of a majority to close off debate.\" Thus, reformers \"are not bound by any rule which would vitiate our right to endeavor to change the rule we challenge. That is why we have accepted the concept that, by acquiescence, rules can be made applicable without vitiating our ability to change the rule which we seek to change with the authority of the majority of the Senate.\" Senator Javits continued: \"We say that by acquiescence everything is applicable except what prevents us from exercising what we consider to be authority given by the Constitution to bring about amendment to the rules.\"\nSenator Holland did not agree with the views of Senator Javits. He found it unusual that the reform Senators accepted all the Senate's rules and were willing to proceed under them, but they were unwilling to follow the Senate rule that stipulates that all the chamber's rules carry over from Congress to Congress. The two Senators' disagreement was set in bold relief when the Senate discussed several critical decisions of Vice President Humphrey.", "During debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res.11, Senator Javits stressed that the Senate has never been able on opening day to get a direct vote on the question of amending Senate rules by vote of the majority. He recommended a way, however. \"I think we might as well face it very honestly and straightforwardly …, I think it depends on the Presiding Officer…. As the saying goes, he has to bite the bullet. There is no other way.... [H]e can rule on whether the Senate, at the beginning of a Congress, can amend its rules. He has that power if he will use it.\" Vice President Humphrey was prepared to do just that.\nThe triggering event was a cloture motion filed on January 14 by Senator Church and 19 other colleagues. Cloture was filed to bring debate to a close on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 11. In offering the cloture motion, Idaho Senator Church stated that \"we continue to proceed under the constitutional rights and privileges to change the rules of the Senate agreed to at the opening of the session.\" He then asked the Vice President the crucial question: \"If a majority of the Senators present and voting, but less than two-thirds, vote in favor of this motion for cloture, will the motion have been agreed to?\" The Vice President said:\nIf a majority—this is the view of the Chair—but less than two-thirds of those present and voting, vote in favor of this cloture motion, the question whether the motion has been agreed to is a constitutional question. The constitutional question is the validity of the rule XXII requirement for an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the Senate before a majority of the Senate may exercise its right to consider a proposed change in the rules. If the Chair were to announce that the motion for cloture had not been agreed to because the affirmative vote had fallen short of the two-thirds required, the Chair would not only be violating one established principle by deciding the constitutional question himself, he would be violating the other established principle by inhibiting, if not effectively preventing, the Senate from exercising its right to decide the constitutional question. The Chair does not intend to violate both of these principles.\nIn response to the parliamentary inquiry of the Senator from Idaho, therefore, the Chair informs the Senate that in order to give substance to the right of the Senate to determine or change its rules and to determine whether the two-thirds requirement of rule XXII is an unconstitutional inhibition on that right at the opening of a new Congress, if a majority of the Senators present and voting but fewer than two-thirds, vote in favor of the pending motion for cloture, the Chair will announce that a majority having agreed to limit debate on Senate Resolution 11, to amend rule XXII at the opening of a new Congress, debate will proceed under the cloture provisions of that rule.\nThe Chair notes that its decision that debate will proceed under the cloture provisions of rule XXII is subject to an appeal if it is taken before any other business intervenes. The Chair would place the appeal before the Senate for an immediate vote since rule XXII provides that appeals from the decision of the Chair, under cloture procedure, shall be decided without debate.\nAfter the Vice President stated his parliamentary course of action, he was bombarded with questions from various Senators who strongly opposed his plan. Senator Holland declared that the Vice President's proposed ruling would completely rewrite Rule XXII. \"I know of no precedent whatsoever, and I cannot conceive of any precedent,\" declared Senator Holland, \"whereby a ruling should be made that a proceeding can be undertaken under an existing rule, and follow it meticulously in every respect except one, and that is that after the vote is taken the Presiding Officer shall decide that the rule does not apply, and hold that the objectives of the rule to close debate may be attained by a lesser and smaller vote than that announced by the rule.\" Other Senators expressed dismay with the Chair's ruling. The selected views of two Senators make the point.\nSenator Herman Talmadge, D-GA . \"Do I understand the ruling of the Chair to be that the Senate is a continuing body?\" The Vice President : \"The Chair has not ruled on it, but it is the view of the Chair that the Senate is a continuing body, and he does not feel it is relevant to the issue….The question is not whether the Senate is a continuing body. The question is posed by the Senator from Idaho, and it has nothing to do with a continuing body.\"\nSenator Talmadge . \"Under what authority does the Vice President propose to gag Senators if [Rule XXII] does not give him that authority?\" The Vice President : \"[I] would place the question before this body so that the body itself may decide whether or not that provision of rule XXII is or is not constitutional.\"\nSenator Talmadge . The Vice President has said \"that rule XXII is unconstitutional and yet he purports to use that same rule to gag Senators from 50 States sent to represent them.\" The Vice President : \"[T]he Chair has not said rule XXII is unconstitutional….The Chair merely said that the question posed by the Senator from Idaho in his motion is one that challenges the constitutionality of section 2 of rule XXII….It has been understood [by numerous Congresses] that Senators could test the rules and portions thereof as to constitutionality.\"\nSenator Talmadge . \"If rule XXII is unconstitutional, we have no cloture rule whatever. Not only a majority could not gag the Senate, but 99 Senators could not gag the Senate, if any Senator wanted to speak, if rule XXII is unconstitutional.\" The Vice President : \"The Chair would only respond that cloture proceedings are not the subject being contested.\"\nSenator Sam Ervin, D-NC . The Senate's rules can be changed at any time by a majority. \"The power of the Senate is exactly the same every day it is in session, whether at the beginning of a session, in the middle of a session, or at the last part of a session, is it not, under the Constitution?\" The Vice President : \"As it stands now, the Senate has the right, by majority vote, to change its rules. However, the Chair must observe that the Senate also has a rule that says, under rule XXII, it will take a two-thirds vote to limit debate.\"\nSenator Ervin . \"How can Congress establish rules under the Chair's ruling that will prevent a majority from doing what it wants at any time?\" The Vice President : \"By the Senate itself making its own decisions. The Senate is the judge of its own rules.\"\nSenator Ervin . \"Does not the ruling of the Chair hold it to be unconstitutional for the Senate to establish any rule requiring more than a bare majority to silence all Senators?\" The Vice President : \"[W]hen the Senate finally decides on its rules, it can decide any kind of rules it wants, by majority vote. If done under section 2 of rule XXII, they can have it, but at the beginning of a new Congress ..., it has been the long-standing precedent of this body that none of the rights of any Senator are to be denied or prejudiced in any way.\"\nOther Senators, all from the South, joined in the critique of the Vice President's planned ruling. As Senator Russell of Georgia exclaimed: \"What we are asked to do here now on the dictum of the Presiding Officer is to disregard our rules and give him power over the Senate by a ruling from the Chair to impose gag rule of the worse sort—by a bare majority.\" Senators Javits, Pearson, and Hart supported Vice President Humphrey, who noted that he would be leaving the Senate soon, and wanted the Senate to decide this constitutional question. \"It appears to the Chair we can decide it, and will decide the most fundamental issue … in the only way it can be decided, by majority vote. All constitutional issues are decided by majority vote.\"", "On January 16, all Senators realized that an historic vote was imminent. Senators Holland, Russell, and Dirksen discussed why the intended ruling of the Vice President was wrong. Senators Javits and Jennings Randolph, D-WV, offered their support for the expected ruling. When the cloture motion was presented to the Senate, the Vice President said: \"The question before the Senate is, Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?\" The vote was 51 yeas and 47 nays. As the Vice President stated:\nUnder the provisions of article I, section 5, of the Constitution and those provisions of rule XXII and other rules not in conflict with this constitutional provision, the Chair announces that 51 Senators having voted yea and 47 Senators having voted nay, cloture has been invoked on the motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 11, and debate will proceed under the limitation provisions of rule XXII.\nThe Vice President's decision amounted to majority cloture on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 11. Senator Holland immediately appealed the ruling, noting that the \"Chair was without the authority to declare cloture upon a vote of less than two-thirds of the Senate.\" The appeal, said the Vice President, is not debatable under Rule XXII. He then stated: \"The question is, Is the decision of the Chair to stand as the judgment of the Senate?\" Clearly, this was another key vote because majority cloture on the motion to proceed would not be invoked if the Vice President's decision was overturned. The Senate chose not to uphold the Chair's ruling by a vote of 45 yeas to 53 nays. \"The decision of the Chair not having been sustained,\" said the Vice President, \"the Senate will continue the debate on the motion to take up.\"\nWhat contributed to the sudden reversal? Six Senators (two Democrats and four Republicans) switched their positions on the two votes: they first backed the Vice President's majority cloture decision and then voted against it on appeal. Uncertainty surrounds these vote changes, but two reasons seem plausible. First, Majority Leader Mansfield \"had made it known earlier that although he favored cloture on the rules debate, he would not support the Vice President's ruling.\" His view of the matter could have influenced one or more of the six to switch their votes. Second, Minority Leader Dirksen, in the lead-up to the first vote, reminded party colleagues that Republicans \"are still a minority\" in the Senate and will need extended debate both to stop or modify legislation and to support the new occupant of the White House, Republican Richard Nixon. \"I do not propose to liquidate the freedom of this body,\" he said. Moreover, according to one account, the position of the six switchers \"was that they approved the effort to bring the question of unlimited debate to a vote but did not agree that the Senate filibuster rule itself could be changed by a simple majority, as Mr. Humphrey had ruled.\"\nImportant to note is that Vice President Humphrey created what might seemingly be an efficacious way for reformers to employ the constitutional option at the beginning of a Congress. Under the short-lived \"Humphrey precedent,\" the Chair could rule that if a majority voted to invoke cloture to terminate extended debate on a motion to proceed to a resolution amending Rule XXII, then further debate would occur under the provisions of Rule XXII. This outcome would mean that an appeal of the Chair's ruling on constitutional grounds—the presiding officer is obliged to submit such appeals to the Senate for resolution and they are typically subject to extended debate—would be nondebatable because the cloture motion itself is nondebatable. A successful vote on a motion to table the appeal would likely occur immediately, creating a precedent that would grant the Senate the constitutional right to change its rules by majority vote at the start of a new Congress.\nThe demise of S. Res. 11 did not come immediately, however. Senator Church filed a cloture motion on January 24. Its purpose was to end debate on the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 6. Senator Church acknowledged that it would take two-thirds of the Senators present and voting to end debate. He said: \"[T]he constitutional question was posed to the Senate itself a few days ago, as to whether or not, in the judgment of the Senate, a majority is sufficient, at the commencement of a Congress, to limit debate. The Senate has voted it was not, and I think, for purposes of the 91 st Congress, that question has been settled.\" In short, the rules of the previous Congress were fully in force in the 91 st Congress. On January 28, the Senate vote on the motion—\"Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the pending motion shall be brought to a close?\"—was 50 yeas and 42 nays, short of the two-thirds required to invoke cloture.", "", "Senators Church and Pearson again took the lead in introducing a resolution (S. Res. 9) to reduce the number required to invoke cloture under Rule XXII from two-thirds to three-fifths of those present and voting. Fifty-one Senators, from both parties, sponsored the resolution. The reformers' fundamental argument was that a majority at the beginning of a new Congress has the constitutional right to change Senate rules. Reformers were also committed, said Senator Javits, \"to the constitutional principle that the legislative arm should have the right, after full and fair debate, to vote.\"\nReformers were fairly optimistic that this time they would be successful in amending Rule XXII. In Senator Church's view, \"opposition to the existing Senate cloture rule\" has increased, and \"there is reason to believe that the movement within the Senate to modify rule XXII has gained additional strength.\" Majority Leader Mansfield, who continued to support cloture reform, said that some opponents of cloture reform showed signs of softening given the logjam that occurred in the closing days of the 91 st Congress, which ended just two days before the start of the 92 nd Congress.\nAlthough the movement to modify Rule XXII did gain strength, it was not enough to end debate on S. Res. 9. Over a six-week period (January 26 to March 9), there were four unsuccessful attempts to invoke cloture. Each attracted majority support—February 18, (48 to 37); February 23, (50 to 36); March 2, (48 to 36); and March 9, (55 to 39)—but not the required two-thirds of those present and voting. Tellingly, the opposition to reform was led by two formidable parliamentary experts: Senators James Allen, D-AL, and Sam Ervin. (Senator Allen was reputed to be the equal of Senator Byrd in his mastery of Senate rules and precedents.) Senator Russell, long the anti-filibuster reform leader, died on January 21, 1971.\nIn general, opponents of reform made several familiar points—extended debate protects the minority against an arrogant majority, it ensures that the view and voice of the small states will be heeded, and unlimited debate is what makes the Senate a great deliberative body. The anti-reformers added new arguments to their repertoire. For example, the filibuster, they said, was essential to challenge the growing power of the executive branch, particularly in the defense and foreign policy arenas. (Remember this was the time of the Vietnam War.) Further, the opposition pointed out that liberal Senators also employed the filibuster, finding it a useful procedural tool to block unwanted legislation advanced by conservative Members and the Republican White House.", "On the opening day of the 92 nd Congress (January 21, 1971), Majority Leader Mansfield received unanimous consent that debate on amending Senate rules would be postponed until a later date, \"and that this deferral shall not be prejudicial to the rights or positions of any opponent or proponent of any rules change.\" Four days later Senator Church introduced S. Res. 9 and asked that the resolution \"go over under the rule,\" referring to Rule XIV. As Senator Church stated: \"I ask unanimous consent that [the written notice to amend Senate rules] be read, and go over under the rule, as required by rule XIV, so that it may be taken up tomorrow, on the next legislative day, for consideration and debate.\" There was no objection to the unanimous consent request. Senator Church then asked the President pro tempore: \"As matters now stand, will the resolution that I have just introduced to amend rule XXII be the pending business before the Senate tomorrow when the legislative business is laid before the Senate?\" The Chair replied: \"It will be laid down after the routine morning business before the end of the morning hour, and subject to debate until the end of the morning hour, when it will go to the calendar.\"\nThe next day, January 26, Vice President Agnew presented to the Senate S. Res. 9, \"which comes over 'under the rule' from the previous day.\" Senator Allen asked the Vice President whether at the conclusion of the morning hour, S. Res. 9 would be returned to the calendar. \"The Senator is correct,\" stated the Chair. The Vice President then said: \"The question is on adoption of the resolution.\" Various Senators began to debate the proposed modification of Rule XXII. With the expiration of the morning hour, the Chair stated, \"the resolution goes to the calendar.\" Reform Senator Pearson immediately said: \"I now move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 9,\" and this motion became the Senate's pending business. Because Senator Pearson chose not to speak on the resolution, Senator Allen quickly moved \"that the pending motion be postponed to the next legislative day\" (which occurred on February 11). As he stated: \"The effect of [my] motion is to postpone until the next legislative day the consideration of the motion\" offered by Senator Pearson. Senator Allen then discussed at length the pitfalls of S. Res. 9 and the history of proposed cloture reforms until the Senate recessed. Over the next several weeks, Senator Allen was joined by other Senators in criticizing S. Res. 9 and championing the benefits of extended debate.\nThree things about this overall debate are worth noting. First, unlike previous efforts, rarely did reformers inquire of party leaders or the Chair whether the conduct of Senate \"business\" would constitute their acquiescence to the rules of the previous Congress. As a result, the Senate did transact legislative and executive business. As Senator Allen explained:\nMr. President, I want to say that this is the most benign and the most benevolent filibuster that I have seen, if it could even rise to the status of a filibuster. It is an extended discussion, but Senators have had no difficulty whatever in getting consideration of any other matter they want to bring up. At any time anyone has wanted to speak, introduce a bill, bring up confirmations, he has been allowed to do so.... No one objects to anyone else speaking.\nIn fact, Senator Allen often asked and received unanimous consent that the resumption of his remarks on filibuster reform not be considered a second speech. (Rule XIX states that \"no Senator shall speak more than twice upon any one question in debate on the same legislative day without leave of the Senate.\")\nSecond, two parliamentary experts who both opposed major filibuster reform, especially majority cloture—Senator Allen and Senator Byrd—were on opposite sides on matters of procedure. Senator Allen's aim was to protect his procedural prerogatives so he could defeat S. Res. 9; Senator Byrd's goal was to ensure that the Democratic leadership, and not the Senator from Alabama, maintained control of the floor. An example of their competitive procedural relationship was this series of back-and-forth exchanges regarding the implications of recessing or adjourning the Senate. The exchanges began when Senator Byrd requested unanimous consent that when the Senate completed its business \"on Monday next, it stand in recess until ... Tuesday next.\" Senator Allen, reserving his right to object, asked:\nSenator Allen . I should like to inquire of the distinguished Senator whether, by moving to recess rather than to adjourn until next Monday, he does not rule out the possibility of a morning hour or a period for the transaction of morning business or for special allocations of time except by unanimous consent.\nSenator Byrd . The answer is yes, but I will be very glad to ask unanimous consent that there be such a period for the transaction of routine morning business.\nSenator Allen . By adding the routine morning business, does not the Senator in effect make of the recess an adjournment?\nSenator Byrd . He does, in effect, only with regard to routine morning business; but he does not change the morning hour, which is the first 2 hours following an adjournment. It is just by the sufferance of the Senate that [I] would arrange for a period for the transaction of routine morning business following a recess.\nSenator Allen . The point the junior Senator from Alabama is making is that as long as we recess each day rather than adjourn, each Senator is limited to two speeches, and the recess session when it convenes would be part of the same legislative day. Therefore, if a Senator should make two speeches [upon any one question] in 2 calendar days but the same legislative day, he would not be allowed to make still another speech until there is an adjournment.\nSenator Byrd . The distinguished Senator is correct in that regard. However, the able Senator, I am sure, with his usual great resourcefulness, would have no difficulty in finding a way to make a third speech if he so desired. [In fact, Senator Allen had no difficulty in making numerous speeches on the same question. For example, he would propose a new question—a motion to postpone consideration of S. Res. 9—and talk at great length about the demerits of filibuster reform.]\n[C]hanging the program from that of a recess to that of an adjournment to that of a recess also prevents the death of the motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 9, and eliminates the morning hour which is marked by the close of the first 2 hours following an adjournment.\nSenator Allen . I offer no objection.\nSenator Allen also inquired of the Chair whether at the conclusion of the morning hour at 2 p.m., the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9 would die and the resolution would be returned to the Calendar of General Orders. The Chair responded that the motion to proceed would not die at the end of the morning hour \"because there is no unfinished business. The motion [to proceed], therefore, would continue to be debatable.\" (When Senate resolutions are considered during the morning hour but action is not concluded on those matters, they are typically returned to the Calendar of General Orders to be potentially called up again by a debatable motion.)\nA third noteworthy feature of the debate was how infrequently the anti-filibuster Senators participated in the deliberations on S. Res. 9. For example, on February 26, Senator Church offered for the third time a cloture motion to end debate on the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 9. (Recall that S. Res. 9 was taken up on January 26.) Immediately, Senator Ervin asked the Chair if the cloture motion was in order. Senator Ervin explained:\n[C]loture refers to bringing debate to a close. I have been here in rather constant attendance on the sessions of the Senate. In the English language, the word 'debate' signifies a discussion or series of discussions in which adverse views are expressed in respect to a subject. In my opinion, there is no debate to be brought to a close. The proponents of the resolution to change the rules of the Senate have been conspicuous by their absence and by their silence, and I respectfully submit that the rules of the Senate cannot be construed to be applicable to the end of debate upon a proposition when the debate has never begun.\nThe Chair responded that Senator Ervin had not raised an appropriate parliamentary inquiry.\nSenator Church, one of the two lead co-sponsors of S. Res. 9, acknowledged Senator Ervin's observation. \"[T]here is justice in [the Senator's] observation that most of the time has been taken by the opponents, which has placed a burden on them.\" During subsequent session days, as a review of the Congressional Record reveals, Senate proponents of filibuster reform did come to the floor to advocate for adoption of S. Res. 9.\nVarious reasons might account for why the filibuster reformers did not engage their opponents during much of the time that S. Res. 9 was pending on the floor. One is that the reformers knew the arguments of the opposition so well, having heard them over the years, that they saw little value in contesting their opponents' unyielding positions with their own views. (Of course, opponents of the proposed change also knew well the arguments and views of the reformers.) Another reason for the minimal debate is that since the Senate had little business on its legislative calendar during the period when S. Res. 9 was on the floor (January 26 through March 9), the reformers opted to be busy in other areas. And with 51 co-sponsors of S. Res. 9, including Majority Leader Mansfield, reformers might have decided that private discussions with Vice President Agnew and on-the-fence Senators were better ways to enhance their chances of success.", "When debate commenced on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 9, Senator Allen asked the Vice President whether he planned to issue any advisory opinions as to actions he might take during the Rule XXII debate. In a setback for reformers, the Vice President said that he had \"no intention of issuing advisory opinions on hypothetical cases…. [S]uch opinions could serve no useful purpose other than to give a particular conclusion of the Chair.\" He added that questions involving constitutional issues or the continuity of the Senate would be submitted to the chamber's membership for decision. Senator Javits wrote to Agnew urging him to follow the so-called Humphrey precedent of 1969: declare that cloture has been invoked by majority vote with any appeal of that ruling to be decided without debate. Javits stated that such an action by the Vice President \"is not a precedent, because it is entirely susceptible to change with a newly constituted Senate.\" Vice President Agnew did not accept the Javits suggestion.", "As in previous attempts to amend Rule XXII at the start of a new Congress, a key question was whether the Senate is a continuing body with continuing rules. If the Senate is a continuing body, reform advocates would need to muster the two-thirds vote required to invoke cloture under Rule XXII and thus bring an end to a talkathon. If the Senate is not a continuing body, then two things might occur: first, a majority vote could end a filibuster on a proposal to amend Rule XXII and, second, the reform proposal itself could then be adopted by majority vote.\nSenator Allen challenged the reformers' view that the Senate is not a continuing body. \"They offer an amendment to rule XXII,\" he said, \"thereby adopting and accepting, as in full force and effect, every rule of the U.S. Senate, including rule XXII.\" If there is no rule XXII, then what is there to amend? By implicitly accepting the continuity of Senate rules, it stands to reason that the only way to end debate is by rule XXII, which requires a two-thirds vote.\nWithout rule XXII, there is no right to cut off debate. So [the reformers] have to accept rule XXII in order to have any vehicle by which to cut off debate. So they are seeking to amend that rule, a rule which they say does not exist, because they are making new rules for the Senate.\nMoreover, Senator Allen emphasized that the Senate was in full compliance with Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution. The Senate, he said, has rules and they state that they \"carry forward from Congress to Congress unless amended as provided by the rules.\"\nSenator Allen did suggest that if the Senate was not a continuing body, then it would be reasonable to conclude that, at the beginning of a Congress, the chamber could establish anew its procedural rules (\"For the ___Congress, the following shall be the rules.\"). Calling that approach \"ludicrous,\" Senator Allen contended that it would be \"hard to conceive of any circumstance more disruptive of the continuity of the legislative process than any such power in a simple majority of the Members of the Senate.\"\nProponents of revising Rule XXII, disagreed with the view that the Senate was a continuing body and bound by procedural rules inherited from previous Senates. That view, they said, meant that only those Senators who served in the First Congress enjoyed the constitutional right to adopt Senate rules by majority vote. \"The illogic behind the proposition that two-thirds of the Senate constitutes grounds for making it a continuing body even though the new one-third can radically alter its philosophy, partisan composition, and committee hierarchies has never ceased to amaze me,\" declared Senator Pearson. Reform Senator Hart of Michigan said, \"I have never understood this notion that those dead and gone can, nonetheless, inhibit those of us here in establishing the rules of the Senate when we start this Congress.\" In response, Senator William Fulbright, D-AK, noted: \"We do not inhibit you. All you need is two-thirds.\"", "Prior to the fourth and final cloture vote to end debate on the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 9, Senator Javits repeated that the only way to bypass what he viewed as the extra-constitutional filibuster process is for the Vice President to rule that debate had gone on long enough. He should declare, said Javits, \"that as we are operating under the Constitution that ends the matter,\" and the Senate should proceed to a vote on the reform resolution without further debate, points of order, or appeals. When President pro tempore Allen Ellender of Louisiana announced on March 9 that the cloture vote had failed (55 to 39), Senator Javits immediately appealed the decision of the Chair. The majority leader withheld offering a motion to table to permit Senator Javits to make a brief statement. Javits contended that Rule XXII makes it \"impossible for less than two-thirds to end debate.\"\nTherefore, I believe, in this unique situation, the Chair should have ruled that a majority of the Senate having voted to close debate, and debate having continued for what everyone agrees has been an adequate period of time so that the Chair would not have to hear any more debate, debate should have been declared closed, and the rest of rule XXII applied. That would mean appeals as well as points of order would not be subject to debate, but would be decided without debate.\nThe majority leader took the floor after Senator Javits and urged his colleagues to reject the appeal. If it were upheld, he said, \"it would only be a matter of time before a majority would be able to cut off debate on any issue. That is the real issue at this time. The heart of this institution is as stake.\" Mansfield moved to table the appeal, which was agreed to by a 55 to 37 vote. This decision ended the reform effort.", "Reform Senators chose not to try to amend Senate Rule XXII at the start of this Congress. Part of the explanation might involve the change of heart of several prominent reform advocates. In what Majority Whip Alan Cranston, D-CA, said was a \"Senate seminar\" on Rule XXII, several reform lawmakers stated that they had gained a greater appreciation of unlimited debate. \"I shall vote to keep rule XXII unchanged if the question comes up again when the new Congress convenes in January 1973,\" remarked Senator Cranston. Senator Church, who served in 1969 and 1971 as the majority floor manager of those reform efforts, explained that experience \"states a strong case for the retention of rule XXII in its present form.\" Church's statement underscored that liberal Senators were now employing extended debate on unwanted measures or matters.", "", "Many Senators remained dismayed at the difficulty of invoking Rule XXII under the two-thirds present and voting standard. Moreover, the 1970s witnessed wider use of the filibuster by Senators of varying ideological perspectives. With the enactment into law of major civil rights legislation during the 1960s, the filibuster no longer was tainted as a procedural weapon to preserve racial inequality. Many non-southern Senators came to appreciate that they could use the filibuster, or its threat, to achieve their legislative objectives. The result: \"the filibuster came into such regular use that senators sponsoring any bill of substance found that they had to muster enough votes to invoke cloture to halt the almost automatic filibuster.\" Even Senators who had unswervingly supported the filibuster, often as a matter of principle, became more flexible in their view of cloture and voted for it.\nWhere party leaders filed cloture motions only six times during 1969-1970, that number surged to thirty-one by the 1973-1974 period. These procedural developments, combined with the perception among anti-filibuster Senators that cloture was too difficult to invoke, set the stage for another round of reform at the start of the 94 th Congress. In addition, in the wake of Watergate and the resignation of President Nixon, the 1974 mid-term elections \"saw a huge Democratic majority swept into the Senate. Working closely with Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, the reformers forced the threshold for cloture down to three-fifths\" of the membership duly chosen and sworn (60 of 100).\nTwo Senators—Democrat Walter Mondale of Minnesota and GOP Senator James Pearson—took the lead in urging a revision of the cloture rule. Along with 43 other Senators of both parties, the two lawmakers introduced S. Res. 4, which proposed to reduce the number required to invoke cloture from two-thirds to three-fifths of the Senators present and voting. Lowering the number to invoke cloture promoted at least two overlapping reformist goals: (1) discouraging Senators from launching filibusters because cloture would be easier to invoke, and (2) encouraging party and committee leaders to schedule legislation for floor consideration that previously might never have been subject to chamber action because of insufficient votes to end talkathons.\nThe debate on S. Res. 4 consumed seven weeks (January 14 to March 7) and was perhaps more contentious than any previous effort to amend Rule XXII. Once more, filibuster reformers pursued the constitutional option. They wanted to establish the principle that a majority of the Senate, at the beginning of a new Congress, could modify Senate rules by majority vote without being subject to Rule XXII and its supermajority requirement for invoking cloture. The reformers won the day in some respects but not until the \"mortal combat,\" as one Senator called it, ended with adoption of a compromise proposal sponsored by the joint party leadership.\nProcedural hardball was the order of the day as the two acknowledged masters of Senate rules and precedents faced off against each other once again: Senator Allen for the opponents of filibuster reform and Majority Whip Byrd for the proponents. Initially, Senators Mondale and Pearson functioned as the floor managers, but they were supplanted for a time when Senator Byrd became the de facto floor leader for S. Res. 4, fending off an array of parliamentary maneuvers and dilatory actions initiated by Senator Allen and his allies. It is evident from the Congressional Recor d that Senator Allen dominated floor proceedings with Majority Whip Byrd working to overcome Allen's dilatory tactics.\nSignificantly, Senators Mondale and Pearson had the support of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, who played a pivotal and controversial role in advancing the reformers' objectives through his rulings. His decisions, especially the furor aroused by Rockefeller's recognition practices, triggered such vehement criticism that it created a hostile mood in the chamber. That reality contributed to Senate approval of the joint leadership's compromise of three-fifths of all Senators, duly chosen and sworn (or 60 if there are no vacancies), as sufficient to end prolonged debate. (The two-thirds requirement for cloture on a measure or motion to amend Senate rules remained in effect.)", "On January 14, the opening day of the 94 th Congress, Senator Mondale submitted S. Res. 4 on his behalf and 44 other bipartisan co-sponsors. Mondale also sent to the desk, as required by Senate rules, a notice in writing of his intent to amend Rule XXII. Furthermore, as had become customary in these proceedings, Senator Mondale declared that by operating under Senate Rules, \"the supporters of this resolution do not acquiesce to the applicability of certain of those rules to the effort to amend rule XXII; nor do they waive any rights which they may obtain under the Constitution…, uninhibited by rules in effect during the previous Congresses.\" Majority Leader Mansfield endorsed Mondale's statement. He received unanimous consent that, \"notwithstanding any delay in the consideration of this resolution, all proceedings, rights and privileges concerning the effort to change rule XXII … be reserved, so that proponents of such a change not be prejudiced in any way in the actual commencement of the consideration of this resolution.\" Mansfield's goal was to assure the reformers that their \"opening day\" status would be preserved even though an adjournment would end the first day. The Senate adjourned on January 14 so S. Res. 4 would comply with chamber rules, thus enabling the measure to be considered on the next legislative day. On January 16, Majority Whip Byrd received unanimous consent for the Senate to proceed the next day to the consideration of S. Res. 4 at the conclusion of morning business.\nOn January 17, under the aforementioned unanimous consent agreement, the Chair presented S. Res. 4 to the Senate. \"Debate on this resolution,\" he said, \"may continue until the close of business today or the hour of 6 p.m., whichever is earlier.\" When debate concluded on S. Res. 4, the resolution was placed on the Calendar of General Orders where it could be called up by a motion to proceed rather than, as Senator Byrd stated, \"come down automatically under the rule [Rule XIV] and would remain before the Senate until the morning hour had expired.\"\nSenator Pearson led off the debate on January 17. He contended that changing cloture from two-thirds of those present and voting to three-fifths of those present and voting would strike a better balance between the right to debate and the right to decide. He cited Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's, R-MA, well-known observation, \"To vote without debating is perilous, but to debate and never vote is imbecile.\"\nOther Senators joined the debate. Senator Mondale pointed out that repeated use of the filibuster by a small group of Senators had blocked important social, economic, and government reform legislation favored by a large majority of Senators. He also posed the critical question facing the Senate and Vice President Rockefeller: \"May a majority of the Members of the Senate of the 94 th Congress change the rules of the Senate, uninhibited by the past rules of the Senate?\" Mondale also addressed the \"continuing body\" thesis. He argued that the continuing body debate is not determinative of the constitutional question. The Framers spelled out exactly on what matters a two-thirds vote was to be required, such as overriding a presidential veto. That they did not do so in dealing with the rules of the Senate or House clearly meant \"that a majority should be able to do so.\" Moreover, Senator Mondale noted that the Constitution is replete with protective provisions for the minority, such as our tripartite system of government with its checks and balances; the Bill of Rights; the Civil War Amendments; the judicial branch with its power of judicial review; and the Senate itself with two Members from each state regardless of population. Senator Charles Mathias, R-MD, underscored that fundamental to any parliamentary institution is \"a time for debate and a time for decision.\" He emphasized that the current two-thirds standard for invoking cloture was \"so high that debate lingers on even after all that needs to be said has been said, and resaid.\"\nSenator Allen then took the floor and challenged the views of the reformers. For example, he refuted the idea that \"a different [parliamentary] situation exists every 2 years, at 2-year intervals, in the continuing Senate.\" If the Senate is not a continuing body, then it would need to adopt a full set of rules at the beginning of a new Congress. The Senate, he observed, has never followed the procedure of the House in adopting rules at the start of a Congress. Furthermore, said Senator Allen, his reading of the Constitution is that it is the same at the start of a session and during the remainder of the session. In that case, \"when in the world does the beginning of a session end?\"\nProposals to amend Senate rules, he argued, are subject to the provisions of the existing rules. He contended that the Mondale-Pearson approach was a backdoor or \"basement\" approach to change. Senator Allen also found it ironic that the reformers would introduce a resolution to revamp Rule XXII yet plan to \"follow it up with a cloture motion.\" The reformers take one part of Rule XXII that they like and discard the part they dislike. The reformers are saying, he said:\nLet us use rule XXII to cut off debate; let us follow that procedure. Let us put in a resolution, follow it up with a cloture motion. Let us use rule XXII to that extent. But, oh, no, let us not use that pernicious two-thirds in there. Let us come forward with something new. Let us reject that, but let us accept this part of it.\nSenator Allen also rejected the advisory opinions of Vice President Nixon and the 1969 ruling of Vice President Humphrey. Humphrey's ruling that cloture could be invoked by majority vote \"was a precedent for about 15 minutes\" before it was overturned on appeal. Reform Senators, exclaimed Allen, are trying to impose a \"gag rule\" on the Senate.\nOn January 21, at the conclusion of the morning hour, Senator Mondale offered a motion \"that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Order No. 1, Senate Resolution 4, amending Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate with respect to the limitation of debate.\" After the Vice President directed the clerk to report the resolution to the Senate, the Chair said: \"The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Minnesota.\" Senator Mondale's motion, as expected, was not agreed to as Senator Allen began a lengthy discussion of the merits of Rule XXII. When the Senate adjourned, Mondale's motion to consider fell to be renewed at another time. Recall that under Senate precedents an unacted-upon motion to proceed dies with an adjournment of the Senate. In the days ahead, little floor action occurred on filibuster reform until February 20.", "When debate began January 17 on S. Res. 4, reform Senator Javits emphasized the key role of the Vice President in issuing favorable rulings. The reformers wanted helpful rulings from the Chair, specifically that the Senate could amend its rules by majority vote and not be bound by the supermajority requirements of Rule XXII. Senator Javits asked rhetorically: If the Chair made those rulings, would a Senate majority vote to sustain the Chair's decisions and not \"shrink\" from supporting the presiding officer—whose pronouncements would certainly be appealed—as Senate majorities have done in the past? Vice President Rockefeller, according to one account, \"surprised everyone, including President Ford, with a series of rulings\" that favored the Mondale-Pearson initiative. His decisions and the actions of various Senators ultimately shaped the eventual outcome. Key proceedings occurred on February 20, February 24, February 26, February 28, March 3, March 5, March 6, and March 7.", "The previous day, February 19, Senator Byrd received unanimous consent that a reform proponent was to be recognized the next day to call up S. Res. 4. Accordingly, Senator Pearson offered a motion similar to the one supported by the reformers in 1969: a compound, or multi-part, motion. It stated:\nI move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar item No. 1, Senate Resolution 4, amending rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate with respect to limitation of debate; and that under article I, section 5, of the U.S. Constitution, I move that debate upon the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 4 be brought to a close by the Chair immediately putting this motion to end debate to the Senate for a yea-and-nay vote; and, upon the adoption thereof by a majority of those Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, the Chair shall immediately thereafter put to the Senate, without further debate, the question on the adoption of the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 4.\nTo summarize: Senator Pearson's compound motion would establish a unique cloture procedure to bring S. Res. 4 to the floor. Three parts formed the essence of the compound motion: (1) the Senate would consider a motion to proceed to S. Res. 4; (2) the Chair would immediately end debate on the motion to proceed and submit to the Senate the question of ending debate on the motion to proceed by majority vote; and (3) upon approval of that question, the Senate would, without further debate, vote immediately on adoption of the pending motion to proceed to S. Res. 4.\nSenator Pearson stressed that his compound motion, if adopted, would not apply to subsequent attempts to invoke cloture by majority vote. He implied that his motion, if approved, would only be in order at the start of a Congress when the Constitution authorizes the Senate to create its rules by majority vote. As Senator Mondale put it, under the Constitution, \"at the beginning of a Congress, and on questions affecting the rules alone, the majority has the right to determine its own rules.\" As for the 1959 rules change (mandating the continuity of Senate rules), Senator Mondale called it \"bootstrap language. It cannot bind future Senates; the Constitution prohibits it.\"\nMajority Leader Mansfield was recognized. He declared that the Pearson motion seeks \"to destroy—let me repeat, is to destroy—the very uniqueness of this body; to relegate it to the status of any other legislative body, and to diminish the Senate as an institution of this Government.\" To invoke cloture by a simple majority vote, as contemplated by the Pearson motion, \"would alter the concept of the Senate so drastically that I cannot under any circumstances find any justification for it.\" The majority leader stated that he would make a point of order that Pearson's motion is out of order, but would withhold to allow further Senate debate on the matter.\nLater in that day's debate, the majority leader received unanimous consent to permit the Vice President to make a statement relative to the Mansfield point of order. Vice President Rockefeller noted that he had reviewed the past history of the issue and would be guided by those precedents. The gist of his statement, periodically repeated to the Senate in the days ahead, was that if a motion to table the Mansfield point of order prevailed, the Vice President would interpret that senatorial decision as approval of the compound motion. The Vice President also observed that the procedure by which the rules may be amended is a constitutional question, and all Presidents of the Senate save one (Vice President Humphrey) had submitted the question to the Senate for debate and determination. Accordingly, the Vice President declaimed: \"the Chair submits to the Senate the question: Is the point of order made by the Senator from Montana well taken? The question is debatable.\"\nSenator Javits was recognized and explained his view of the parliamentary matter. Senator Javits's basic point was that the Constitution \"stands on the [Senate] landscape bigger, more solidly than any declaration of any kind, whether contained in the rules or whether contained in our fears or our prejudices.\" The reform effort, he argued, \"has been constantly frustrated by importing into the argument fears and concerns that a majority could do this, do that, or do the other…. But [majority rule] is the essence of Government and the essence of this Constitution, and the fact that our people have confidence in the way in which the form has been declared.\" Senator Edward Kennedy, D-MA, added, \"There has been a great deal of discussion about the rights of the minority, and very little about the rights of the majority.\"\nSenator Javits also addressed a series of parliamentary questions to the Chair designed to elicit from the Vice President how he might rule on several critical issues. The Vice President's responses aroused considerable controversy. Javits asked, if Mansfield's point of order was tabled, \"would it be a decision by the Senate to affirm the propriety of the motion to end debate which has been offered by Senator Pearson?\" Vice President Rockefeller answered, \"Yes.\" He elaborated:\nThe point of order raised by the Senator from Montana challenges the propriety of the motion offered by the Senator from Kansas. [I]f the point of order raised by the Senator from Montana is tabled, the Chair would be compelled to interpret that action as an expression by the Senate of its judgment that the motion offered by the Senator from Kansas to end debate is a proper motion. Therefore, since the motion offered by the Senator from Kansas to end debate provides that it shall be immediately put to the Senate for a yea-and-nay vote the Chair would be compelled to abide by such requirement, the Senate having determined the requirement to be a valid one.\nIn response to questions from other Members, the Vice President reiterated that tabling the Mansfield point of order meant that the Pearson motion to proceed would be before the Senate for an immediate vote by a majority without any additional debate.\nSenators Allen, Byrd, and Thurmond, among others, challenged the views of the Chair. Senator Allen, for example, declared, \"A mere motion could not say that it is not going to be debatable. The motion to table is not decisive of another, it is an entirely different point.\" Senator Thurmond acknowledged that a majority can change Senate rules. \"But it is not clear that one Senator can make a motion and embody in that motion provisions that cut off debate.\" He added that Senate rules \"mean nothing if a Senator can send up a motion that, in itself cuts off debate, and that is what is being done here.\" Senator Byrd went on at some length to contest the probable ruling of the Chair and to urge Senators to sustain the majority leader's point of order. Among Senator Byrd's observations are the following:\n\"This motion is self-executing, and the Chair is interpreting the motion of the Senator from Kansas to mean that if this point of order … is tabled the motion to shut off debate is self-executing, and the motion, which would, in any other instance, be debatable once the point of order is laid to rest, is, indeed, not debatable by virtue of the Senate in tabling the point of order in this instance. I must say that I have to disagree.\" \"We are today operating by the rules of the Senate, which rules and precedents provide that a motion before the Senate, against which a point of order has been made and tabled, remains before the Senate and is debatable. I cannot for the life of me understand how, in this instance, the motion, if the point of order is tabled, will not still be before the Senate and will not be debatable. I cannot understand that. I cannot understand how the Chair can logically state that the Senate, by this motion, and by virtue of its tabling a point of order, which is a separate matter, ipso facto shuts off debate on the motion of the Senator to close debate by a majority vote.\" \"[I]t is not a rule of the Senate that a motion to close debate must be immediately put to a vote, without debate. Beyond that, which is even more dangerous, it is not the rule of the Senate that 1 Senator can dictate his own terms by which the Senate will close debate and if he got 51 Members to back him up, immediately gags the other 49.\"\nTo be sure, Senators Mondale and Pearson disagreed with the \"frightening\" procedural picture painted by their opponents. Senator Pearson acknowledged that his motion incorporated a provision to end debate, but that was by design. Its purpose, he said, was to raise the constitutional right of the Senate to amend its rules by majority vote at the start of a new Congress. Our opponents \"talk about disregarding rules; I submit that we could very well disregard provisions of the Constitution.\" The Pearson motion was \"borne within the Constitution\" and would be decided by majority vote. Senator Mondale emphasized that there was no precedent being established \"that would give a Presiding Officer the authority to rule except where article I, section 5, is involved…. Beyond that, on other issues, the general rules of the Senate prevail.\"\nSoon thereafter, Senator Mondale said: \"Mr. President, I move to lay on the table the point of order raised by the distinguished Senator from Montana, and I ask for the yeas and nays.\" The Senate agreed to the tabling motion by a 51 to 42 vote, thus rejecting Mansfield's point of order and upholding Pearson's compound motion. The effect of the vote was seemingly to establish, at least temporarily, an authoritative Senate precedent that at the start of a Congress a majority could terminate debate on a rules change without being bound by Rule XXII's supermajority requirement. Senate reformers appeared to have won the day, but they were foiled by the parliamentary shrewdness of Senator Allen.\nImmediately after the vote, Senator Allen was recognized by Vice President Rockefeller. He asked for a division of Senator Pearson's motion, noting that the first part of the motion simply asked that the Senate proceed to consider S. Res. 4. Since that part made no reference to a constitutional question, said Senator Allen, it was therefore debatable. The Vice President agreed that the motion is both divisible and debatable. Following the decision of the Chair, Senator Allen informed his colleagues:\n[T]he Senator from Alabama would suggest that all Members who would not like to hear a further discourse on this subject may retire to their office. The Senator from Illinois can go to Mandalay, where, I believe, the plane is waiting for him. The Senator from Oklahoma can go to Vietnam, because the Senator from Alabama will be discussing this motion, since the Chair, in its wisdom, has ruled that the first section of this motion is debatable.\nSenator Allen held the floor that day until the Senate adjourned. The Senate's adjournment killed the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4, and returned the resolution to its place on the Calendar of General Orders. Senate GOP Whip Robert Griffin, MI, observed that proponents \"had the opportunity ... to challenge the motion to adjourn, and could have insisted instead upon a recess in order to keep their motion before the Senate.\" However, Senate reformers, surprised by the sudden turn of events, needed to regroup and plan their next procedural move.\nDespite having been thwarted by Senator Allen's procedural maneuver, reformers did win two meaningful goals. First, the successful 51 to 42 tabling of Mansfield's point of order arguably represented Senate acceptance of the theory that a simple majority rather than two-thirds could cut off a filibuster against a rules change at the start of a new Congress. It bears repeating that the procedural reality is that a majority of the Senate can change its rules on the first day or the last day of a session. What troubles reform advocates is that it can require a supermajority to get to a vote on an amendment to the Standing Rules of the Senate. Hence, the reformers' advocacy of the constitutional option.\nSecond, Vice President Rockefeller's ruling bolstered the legitimacy of the constitutional option, long advocated by anti-filibuster Senators. According to one account, the new precedent was \"the first time the Senate and its presiding officer ever simultaneously accepted\" the constitutional option.\nWhat happened over the next few days was a concerted effort by opponents of S. Res. 4 to reverse the Senate's decision to table Majority Leader Mansfield's point of order. Senator Allen dominated debate and castigated the reformers' effort to change Rule XXII. Although he permitted interruptions in his discourse, he ensured that he would regain the floor and that his subsequent speeches would not count under the Senate's \"two-speech rule.\"", "The procedural battle resumed with particular intensity on this day. Almost as soon as it began, Senator Allen sent a four-part motion to the desk and asked for its division. The first part was a motion to proceed to S. Res. 4. The second part declared an end to the \"beginning\" of the 94 th Congress, which meant, as Senator Allen made clear, that debate \"may continue until brought to an end as provided by the provisions of Senate Rule XXII.\" The third part directed the Vice President to submit any question of order to the Senate for decision. And the fourth part stated \"that the question submitted be the direct question and not on a motion to table.\" With Senator Allen's request that his motion be divided, the first part (the motion to proceed) was pending before the Senate.\nBefore Senator Allen had a chance to speak on his motion, Senator Mondale was recognized by the Chair. Citing the Constitution, he offered a compound motion designed to trump Senator Allen's.\nUnder article I, section 5, of the U.S. Constitution, I move that debate upon the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 4 be brought to a close by the Chair by immediately putting this motion to end debate, without debate and with no intervening motions and without amendments to the Senate for an immediate vote; and upon adoption thereof, by a majority of those Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, the Chair shall immediately thereafter put to the Senate, under article I, section 5, of the U.S. Constitution, without further debate and without intervening motions and without amendments, the question on the adoption of the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 4 for an immediate vote.\nIn a replay of February 20, Majority Leader Mansfield immediately raised a point of order against Mondale's compound motion stating that it was out of order. (Recall that the thrust of Mondale's motion was to supplant completely Senator Allen's motion, part 1 of which was pending before the Senate.) Senator Mondale moved to table the Mansfield point of order. Senator Allen then entered the fray. My point of order, said Senator Allen, is \"that the whole resolution is out of order, which would supplant the point of order as to the motion to lay on the table.\" The Chair ruled that Allen's point of order was not in order. Senator Mondale then said, \"Regular order, Mr. President,\" which was the motion to table Mansfield's point of order. Senator Allen suggested the absence of a quorum, which was \"live.\" Once a quorum was established, an array of procedural actions came fast and furious—for example, points of order, appeals, motions to table, votes to reconsider chamber actions, requests for the yeas and nays—as each side sought to parry the objectives of the other.\nAs the parliamentary maneuvers continued, the majority leader became frustrated with the proceedings. He inquired of the Vice President: \"[I]s there a rule covering dilatory tactics in the Senate?\" The Chair responded: \"Only after cloture has been invoked.\" So a Senator, asked Mansfield, can keep suggesting the absence of a quorum or making a motion to recess to a certain time or adjourn ad infinitum? Correct, said the Vice President, so long as business has intervened between quorum calls, such as votes on motions to recess. \"[W]hat is the value of a tabling motion which forecloses debate if it allows the continuation of tactics of a dilatory nature,\" said Mansfield. The Chair replied: \"The proper motions can be entertained, not debated, if there has been intervening business.\"\nSenator Allen even forced a vote to table part 1 of his own compound motion (to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 4), which the Senate rejected by a vote of 38 yeas to 49 nays. After further delaying tactics, the Vice President submitted the critical question to the Senate: the motion to table the majority leader's point of order that Senator Mondale's motion, whose terms invoked the Constitution, was not in order. For the second time, the Senate upheld the legitimacy of the compound motion—to close debate immediately on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4 and, thereafter, the Senate would vote immediately on the pending motion to proceed. The vote on the tabling motion was 48 to 40. Unsurprisingly, after voting on the prevailing side as Senate Rule XIII requires, Senator Allen became eligible to offer a motion to reconsider; he moved to reconsider that vote. By the same 48 yeas to 40 nays, Allen's reconsideration motion was tabled.\nFollowing the tabling of Mansfield's point of order, Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia made a negative comment about the Vice President's role as presiding officer, which reflected the view of Senators who opposed amending Rule XXII. Senator Harry Byrd stated: \"I want to protest the rapidity with which the Chair is putting these questions and refusing to recognize some of us who have been seeking recognition.\" (Two days later, this issue prompted angry Senate debate.) Several times, for example, Senator Allen had sought recognition but did not receive it from the Vice President. The Senate recessed on February 24 and continued to do so until March 3. This meant that both the Allen and Mondale motions to proceed to S. Res. 4 remained the Senate's pending business. As Senate precedents state: \"A motion to proceed to the consideration of a matter, if unacted upon, dies with an adjournment of the Senate.\"\nThe next day (February 25) there were various motions to postpone—for a day, week, or month—to table, and other dilatory tactics on Mondale's motion to end debate on Senator Allen's motion to proceed to S. Res. 4. Most of the day's debate was dominated by opponents of S. Res. 4, led by Senator Allen. As reform Senator Mathias pointed out, \"it is worthy of note at this time that on no less than 27 occasions the Senate has been effectively prevented from voting on the Mondale motion through the use of quorum calls, and similar parliamentary practices.\"\nControl of the floor seesawed between proponents and opponents of filibuster reform. When motions were made or votes were taken, Vice President Rockefeller had some leeway in recognizing the first Senator whom he believed was seeking the floor. As a journalistic account noted, each time the Vice President \"put the question to the Senate whether debate shall be cut off right away, Senator Allen and his allies move in with privileged motions, such as motions to recess or postpone action, or with quorum calls. Mondale and his allies then jump in with successful votes to table these intervening motions. But Senator Allen and his allies immediately rise and offer new delaying tactics.\"", "This was a fateful day for the Senate and the Vice President. Not only were many Senators frustrated by the parliamentary maneuvers, but certain actions of the Vice President dramatically altered the mood of the Senate. Many lawmakers, anxious to move on to other business, supported private negotiations among proponents and opponents that could lead to a compromise acceptable to both sides. Senator Russell Long, D-LA, for example, suggested that the threshold to invoke cloture be reduced to three-fifths of those chosen and sworn (60 of 100) rather than the current two-thirds of those present and voting. The triggering event that produced this outcome concerned the Vice President's authority and duty under Senate rules and precedents to \"recognize the Senator who shall first address him.\" In the judgment of many Senators, this did not occur.\nWhen the Senate resumed consideration of the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4, the pending question was a motion by Senator Allen to postpone consideration of the Mondale resolution for a month. GOP Senator Charles Mathias, MD, after noting the numerous dilatory actions of the opponents of S. Res. 4, moved to table Senator Allen's motion to delay consideration of S. Res. 4 by one month. Senator Mathias' tabling motion was successful: 57 yeas to 34 nays. Majority Leader Mansfield, who wanted to expedite Senate action, quickly renewed a motion he had made previously, albeit unsuccessfully. He said: \"I make the point of order that the pending [compound] motion by the Senator from Minnesota is out of order, insofar as it precludes debate, intervening motions, and amendments.\" The Vice President responded: \"This being a constitutional question the Chair will submit to the Senate for debate and determination the question: 'Is the point of order raised by the Senator from Montana well taken?'\" What happened next is what aroused the anger of many Senators.\nAs soon as the Vice President submitted the constitutional question to the Senate, Senator Allen and reform Senator Edmund Brooke, R-MA, both sought recognition from the Chair. No doubt by prearrangement, Vice President Rockefeller recognized Senator Brooke, who moved to table Mansfield's point of order. Without delay, Senator Allen tried to get recognized by the Chair. Three times in rapid succession, he said, \"Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.\" Each time the Vice President chose to ignore Senator Allen's request. Instead, the Vice President directed the Clerk to call the roll. The Senate agreed to table Mansfield's point of order by a vote of 46 to 43, the third time that a Senate majority implicitly upheld the principles embedded in the constitutional option. As soon as the vote was announced, Vice President Rockefeller stated:\nThe Senate having voted to table the point of order questioning the propriety of the motion of the Senator from Minnesota, insofar as it precludes debate, intervening motions, and amendments, thereby affirming the propriety of the motion in this regard, the motion is now to be put to the Senate for an immediate vote. The question now is on the motion of the Senator from Minnesota [to end debate and vote on the Allen motion to proceed to S. Res. 4].\nAn angry Democratic Senator Long was recognized to comment on \"what the Chair did a few minutes ago.\" Senator Long castigated the Vice President for not recognizing Senator Allen, who was \"standing on his feet making a parliamentary inquiry, and he made it three times before the first name was called and answered on that roll.\" He continued: \"The Presiding Officer presides over the Senate…. [H]e does not own this body. I have never in my life seen it happen in the Senate that a man can be standing trying to seek recognition, for whatever purpose, and the Chair can just go right on ahead and say, 'The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll,' call the roll—tell the clerk, 'Call the roll'.\" Senate reformers, declared Long, were wasting their time trying to change the cloture rule. \"[Y]ou have one-man cloture right now.\" Senator Long ended his strong criticism of the Vice President's action by noting that a bipartisan group of lawmakers was working behind-the-scenes to fashion a compromise on amending Rule XXII.\nFor the remainder of the day, various Senators took the floor to rebuke the Vice President. There were also Members who defended the Chair and supported his actions. The Vice President apologized to Senator Allen for any unintended discourtesy, but observed that he applied \"the parliamentary procedures to the best of my ability.\" He also stated that \"Senate rules don't require the presiding officer to recognize a senator for the purpose of making a parliamentary inquiry—it's discretionary.\" Senator Long rejected that contention. He cited a Senate precedent that every Senator \"has a right to recognition [for any purpose whatsoever] before the Senate acts on an issue.\" Majority Whip Byrd added, \"[W]hile the Chair was under no obligation to respond to the parliamentary inquiry, I think the Chair is always under an obligation to recognize a Senator who is seeking recognition.\"\nAt day's end, Majority Leader Mansfield recessed the Senate and encouraged Senator Long to work with party and reform leaders to replace the current version of Rule XXII (two-thirds of those present and voting) with a \"constitutional\" three-fifths of 100 Senators. (Recall that the Mondale/Pearson plan recommended cloture by three-fifths of those present and voting.)", "Majority Whip Byrd, on behalf of himself; the majority leader; the minority leader, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania; and the minority whip, Robert Griffin, introduced a resolution (S. Res. 93) that was the product of the private negotiations. (Senator Byrd also filed at the desk a complete substitute amendment embodying the text of S. Res. 93, which he intended to offer to S. Res. 4.) The compromise that emerged from these negotiations consisted of three intertwined elements: (1) three-fifths of the Senate present and sworn (60 of 100) would be required to invoke cloture; (2) a two-thirds vote of those present and voting would continue as the requirement to invoke cloture on a proposed rules change; and (3) the Senate would reverse the three precedents established earlier that a majority could change Senate rules at the beginning of a Congress. Byrd submitted the required notice of his intent to amend Senate rules. He also asked unanimous consent for the resolution's immediate consideration. Senator Allen objected, and S. Res. 93 went over under the rule. Senator Byrd then explained the impetus for S. Res. 93:\nI personally think that we have arrived at the point where the Senate is looking bad, and we are in a parliamentary morass. I realize there is a determined effort on the part of some Senators to change the rules so as to provide for the invoking of cloture by less than two-thirds of those present and voting. It seems to me that the resolution which has now been introduced, and which would provide for invoking cloture by a constitutional three-fifths on all matters other than a change in the rules, is the proper way to proceed.\nSenator Griffin concurred with Byrd's statement, but emphasized the importance of reversing the February 26 vote (51 yeas to 42 nays) tabling Senator Mansfield's point of order directed at Mondale's compound motion. Senator Roman Hruska, R-NE, entered a motion to reconsider the February 26 vote to table Mansfield's point of order against the compound motion. The majority leader received consent that the reconsideration vote would occur on Monday (March 3) at a propitious time, which turned out to be 4 p.m. Senator Mondale announced that he would vote against the motion to reconsider, but if the motion was agreed to, he would support S. Res. 93, \"which I think is substantially sound.\" Senator Allen remained adamant in his opposition to any change to Rule XXII, and declared his intent to try to defeat the joint leadership compromise.", "At 4 p.m., the Senate held important votes back-to-back. As the presiding officer stated: \"The hour of 4 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will now proceed to vote on the motion by the Senator from Nebraska to reconsider the vote by which the Senate tabled the Mansfield point of order against part 1of the Mondale motion to close debate on the Allen motion to proceed to Senate Resolution 4.\" First, by a vote of 53 yeas to 38 nays, the Senate agreed to reconsider the [February 26] vote by which the Senate laid on the table the Mansfield point of order. Next, with Mansfield's point of order the pending question, the Senate reversed its earlier action and rejected the motion to table Mansfield's point of order by a vote of 40 yeas to 51 nays. Significantly, the Senate did not then vote to sustain Mansfield's point of order, which became a source of debate and controversy during the next two days. Nonetheless, the two successful reversal votes seemed to signal that Senators amenable to reform were inching closer to adoption of the filibuster compromise: cloture by a three-fifths vote of the Senators duly chosen and sworn (60 of 100).\nSenator Byrd filed a cloture motion to end debate on Senator Allen's pending motion to proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 4. The Senate then adjourned for five minutes by a 44 to 15 vote insisted upon by Senator Allen. As Senator Byrd said, it was \"the desire of the leadership of the Senate to have the resolution [S. Res. 93] ... come over under the rule. Only an adjournment would initiate that procedure.\"\nWith the start of a new legislative day (March 4) following the previous day's adjournment, a two-hour period (called the \"morning hour\") occurred at the session's start for the conduct of typically routine business (reference of measures to committees, for instance). Senator Allen and his allies wanted to run out the clock on the two-hour period to prevent the presiding officer from automatically laying the joint leadership reform resolution (S. Res. 93) before the Senate. They succeeded through a variety of dilatory actions. For instance, Senator Allen proposed an amendment to the Senate's Journal (the official record of Senate actions) to include the Lord's Prayer. The Senate tabled Allen's prayer amendment. Using a different dilatory tactic than usual, a number of pro-filibuster Senators would ask, after a roll call vote, \"Mr. President, how is the Senator from North Carolina [Jesse Helms] recorded, please?\"\nDuring the March 4 debate, Senator Allen raised a compelling issue that the Senate formally addressed the next day. The issue was compelling because various Senators had indicated that they would vote for the joint leadership compromise only if previous precedents (February 20, 24, and 26) were reversed. Senator Allen contended that when Senator Byrd adjourned the Senate for five minutes, his action killed the opportunity to reverse the precedent established on February 26 when the Senate tabled the Mansfield point of order against the Mondale-Pearson constitutional option approach to changing the Standing Rules of the Senate.", "The Senate continued with debate on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4. Senator Allen reminded his colleagues that the Senate voted on March 3 to accomplish two things: (1) it reconsidered the successful February 26 vote (46 to 43) by which the Senate tabled the Mansfield point of order against the pending Mondale motion on grounds that \"it precludes debate, intervening motions, and amendments;\" (2) upon reconsideration, the Senate then rejected the tabling of Mansfield's point of order (40 yeas to 51 nays). However, Senator Allen pointed out that the Senate did not take the crucial next step: a vote to sustain, or uphold, the Mansfield point of order against the Mondale compound motion. Allen contended that precedents upholding the reformers' objectives were still viable because they had not been reversed.\nSenator Allen argued that when Senator Byrd on March 3 filed cloture on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4 and then adjourned the Senate for five minutes, that action removed the point of order from the floor and prevented the Senate from acting to sustain Mansfield's point of order. As a result, the Mansfield point of order was dead and no longer before the Senate. As Senators Allen and Jesse Helms, R-NC, wrote in their one-sentence \"Dear Colleague\" letter to all the Members: \"Please note from the speech below [by Senator Allen] that the precedent as to majority vote cut-off of debate has not been reversed, and that the last [February 26] Mansfield point of order was never acted on and died with the adjournment of the Senate on Monday, March 3, 1975.\"\nSenator Allen's contention was important because various Senators had committed to vote for the joint leadership compromise only if the earlier precedents legitimizing the Mondale-Pearson initiatives were reversed. The February 26 precedent was not reversed, exclaimed Allen, and, therefore, [supporters of the leadership compromise] \"are under no obligation to go along with the compromise.\" Senator Byrd argued that when Mansfield's point of order was untabled, \"the Senate reversed its previous vote to table the Mansfield point of order.\" He also observed that \"various interpretations can be placed on what happened, depending upon one's personal point of view, and the cause that one seeks to further.\" Moreover, even though the adjournment killed the point of order, the anticipated adoption of cloture on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4 would, as Rule XXII states, make the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4 the \"unfinished business to the exclusion of all other business until disposed of.\" Minority Whip Robert Griffin of Michigan viewed Senator Allen's observations as \"a highly technical kind of argument. In terms of substance and intent, the Senate has done what is necessary to reverse—very emphatically and dramatically—the action taken earlier.\"\nNonetheless, several Senators recommended that the Senate vote to sustain Mansfield's point of order. For example, Senator Carl Curtis, R-NE, received unanimous consent that prior to the pending cloture vote to close debate on the motion to consider S. Res. 4, the Senate would vote to sustain Mansfield's point of order, which it did by a 53 to 43 vote. Senator Byrd also received unanimous consent that this vote be recorded in the permanent Congressional Record of March 3 so that the March 5 vote \"will appear as part of the entire March 3 proceeding.\" Worth mention is that Senator Byrd, in his multi-volume history of the Senate, cited a report of the Committee on Rules and Administration that the March 5 action \"erased the precedent of majority cloture established two weeks before, and reaffirmed the 'continuous nature of the Senate rules'.\" The March 5 vote did not address the precedents of February 20 and February 24—which ostensibly upheld the right of a majority of Senators to adopt new rules at the beginning of a Congress. On the other hand, the Senate's March 5 vote sustaining the February 26 point of order was the last and, therefore, the controlling precedent.\nAfter the vote to sustain Mansfield's point of order, the Senate invoked cloture (73 to 21) on the motion to proceed to S. Res. 4. Senator Allen was recognized and, under post-cloture procedures, had one hour to discuss issues involving S. Res. 4. Other Senators (Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Republican Jesse Helms of North Carolina) joined Allen in criticizing the entire filibuster reform effort. When Senator Allen yielded back his remaining time and no other Member sought recognition, the Chair put the question on the motion to take up S. Res. 4. The motion was agreed to by a 69 to 26 vote. Senator Byrd then submitted S. Res. 93 as a complete substitute for S. Res. 4. He received unanimous consent that the complete substitute amendment (the text of S. Res. 93) be agreed to and considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment. Senator Byrd then submitted a cloture motion to end debate on S. Res. 4, as amended.", "Senator Byrd filed another cloture motion to end prolonged debate on S. Res. 4, as amended. Senator Allen asked Byrd if there is \"any feeling that the [first] cloture motion will not carry.\" Senator Byrd responded: \"Just a bit of insurance, I always like to have another cloture motion in my pocket. As a matter of fact, I have two or three more lying around my desk.\" The Senate considered a number of other amendments and motions before it adjourned.", "An hour after the Senate convened on this day, Vice President Rockefeller put this question to the membership: \"Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on Senate Resolution 4, as amended, amending rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate with respect to the limitation of debate, shall be brought to a close.\" The Senate voted (73 to 21) for cloture on S. Res. 4, as amended. Majority Leader Mansfield then took the floor and expressed his dismay at the parliamentary turmoil that had enveloped the floor during the past weeks. \"Here we have a group of grown men, mature men, our constituents think, and we have been acting like schoolchildren…. We cannot allow a minority, a small group of Members, to grab the Senate by the throat and hold it there. It is about time … that we recognize our responsibilities and live up to them, regardless of our particular feelings.\" Senator Mansfield's plea fell on deaf ears.\nSenator John Stennis, D-MS, refuted Mansfield's view of things. \"I do not make any apologies, not any, to anyone, under my circumstances,\" he said, \"for doing what I can to keep the Senate a distinctive body.\" Senator Allen endorsed Stennis's views. Allen and his allies then spent the remainder of the post-cloture period—hour after hour—employing numerous parliamentary maneuvers to stymie expeditious action on S. Res. 4, as amended. For example, Senator Byrd asked unanimous consent that any roll call votes \"throughout the remainder of today and this evening and tonight and tomorrow, if necessary, be limited to 10 minutes rather than 15 minutes.\" Senator Allen objected. Senator Byrd pointed out that during the post-cloture period, dilatory amendments and motions are not in order, \"and appeals are not debatable. But delaying tactics are still possible.\" Senator Allen excelled at offering what many viewed as dilatory amendments, points of order, motions, appeals, and quorum calls.\nDespite the plethora of procedural moves and countermoves, both sides knew that the Mondale-Pearson forces had the votes to adopt S. Res. 4, as amended. As GOP Senator James McClure of Idaho, an opponent of S. Res. 4, remarked, \"I have been involved in the legislative process long enough to count votes.\" After 50 days of debate, it was evident to many lawmakers that it was time to stop the parliamentary wrangling and proceed to a final vote on S. Res. 4, as amended. With the end in sight, various lawmakers offered their personal assessment of what had taken place in the Senate. A sampling of the comments of Senator Allen and Senator Mondale underscores the wide gulf between the two sides. In the view of Senator Allen:\nIf the idea is prevalent that Members of the Senate will lie down, roll over and play dead to this type of action—unauthorized and not countenanced by the rules—then you can certainly look for that effort to be made.\nWe have heard a great deal about a compromise in the Senate. The Senator did not participate in any conferences looking to a compromise, because you cannot compromise on principle…. This so-called compromise carried with [it] the idea [that] the precedent set by the Vice President, that you could have majority cloture at the beginning of a Congress with respect to amendment of the rules. The agreement was—as was echoed throughout the Chamber and throughout the cloakrooms—that future rules changes would be governed by the rules; and they cynically put in there that two-thirds would still be the requirement for cutting off debate on a rules change, knowing full well that they would go the majority vote route by just putting in a debate-chokeoff motion, getting a point of order made to it, tabling it, and then you would have a nondebatable, nonamendable, and nonreferrable measure before the Senate.\nThis is not going to be the proudest day for the gag-rule Senators, starting off as they did operating outside the rules, knowing full well that they were getting the cooperation of the Vice President, cutting off debate in advance, having the Vice President activate a motion that had not even been passed by the Senate. Then that led to the plan to run it the cloture route, inasmuch as the original effort acquired such a terrible smell that they had to turn the management of the bill over to the leadership to handle from there on out.\nSenator Mondale's perspective on the proceedings was quite different from Senator Allen's. Mondale stressed the significance of reforming Rule XXII because it \"will make the Senate more efficient, more democratic, and more effectual.\" He added:\nLet no one misunderstand. For the first time in American history, the President of the Senate of the 94 th Congress and the membership of the Senate of the 94 th Congress have both clearly, unequivocally, and unmistakenly accepted and upheld the proposition that the U.S. Senate may, at the beginning of a new Congress, establish its rules by majority vote, uninhibited by rules adopted by previous Congresses.\nSenator Mondale also highlighted the three times (February 20, February 24, and February 26) that a Senate majority tabled points of order against the Mondale-Pearson approach (the compound motion) to revise Rule XXII. These actions, said Mondale, underlined the constitutional right of a majority to modify Senate rules at the start of a new Congress. As for the votes on March 3 (reconsidering and untabling) and March 5 (sustaining Mansfield's point of order), \"I caution against giving those actions much significance. Those actions cannot erase the two other affirmative votes on tabling,\" he contended. \"Those actions cannot waive, alter, or undercut the constitutional right which the majority of the Members of the Senate possess.\" It must be remembered, Mondale stated, that the legislative context surrounding the March 3 and March 5 votes involved private negotiations among Senators Long, Mansfield, Byrd, and others. Their efforts produced a supermajority consensus in support of a joint leadership compromise. Many reform Senators, remarked Mondale, \"acted in the interest of compromise and consensus. No [reform] Senator, to my knowledge, abandoned any right.\"\nSeveral reform Senators acknowledged and endorsed the views of Senator Mondale. A good example was Senator Dick Clark, Democrat of Iowa. \"I reluctantly agreed to the joint leadership's request for a compromise,\" he said. \"It was not necessary to compromise. The crucial votes to end debate had been won, and it was possible to move ahead to pass Senate Resolution 4 as originally introduced. But the leadership felt that an explosive situation existed in the Senate, so the proponents of a change in rule XXII have cooperated in their efforts to resolve this dispute.\" After Senators had their say, S. Res. 4, as amended, was agreed to by a 56 to 27 vote.", "It appears evident from this discussion that it is usually difficult—barring consensus among Senators as in the 1959 and 1975 cases—to amend Senate rules, especially amendments that affect the chamber's deliberative character. When attempts are made to amend Rule XXII, two fundamental values are in conflict: the right to debate versus the right to decide. The two can be reframed as minority protection versus majority rule. To be sure, it can be quite difficult to reach an appropriate balance between these values when the Senate has before it controversial and contentious issues. How long and thorough debate must be is not always clear, partly because today's complex, interconnected, and many-sided issues typically require extensive debate and discussion.\nNoteworthy is that even the threat of extended debate—which today might be viewed as a \"silent\" filibuster—can stall action on various issues. Given a crowded Senate agenda, it may not be practical for majority party leaders to call up measures and spend considerable time (a scarce and precious resource) to try to end an expected talkathon. It is also not easy to determine the goals or motives of a Senator who engages in unending debate: Is it to thwart senatorial action on \"bad\" ideas or is it to highlight an urgent national issue? Over time Senators can fathom when the purposes of prolonged debate are to educate and inform rather than to block and frustrate legislative issues. As Senator Robert Byrd once said: \"I will be able to perceive [a filibuster], because I know one when I see it.\"\n\"Opening day\" initiatives to amend Senate rules commonly expose sharp divisions between and among Senators. On one side are Members who claim that the Senate, at the commencement of a new Congress, has the right under its constitutional rulemaking authority to amend Senate rules by majority vote, uninhibited by any inherited supermajoritarian rules from previous Congresses. Many of the \"majoritarian\" Senators do not want to eliminate filibusters but to impose constraints on unlimited debate, such as imposing debate limits on the motion to proceed to legislation. On the other side are Members who contend that initiatives to amend Senate rules at the beginning of a Congress must follow the Senate's existing rules because the Senate is a continuing body. \"Minoritarian\" Senators emphasize the virtues of extended debate, such as protecting minority views, encouraging bipartisanship and comity, and allowing even one Senator to challenge the agenda of the White House.\nIf an attempt is made at the start of the 115 th Congress (2017-2018) to amend Senate rules by majority vote, what key concerns might Senators on either side of the issue bear in mind? This summary examination of earlier attempts to alter Rule XXII suggests that at least four elements could influence the fate of the constitutional option. They are: the sympathetic support of the presiding officer; the assistance of the majority leader; the mobilization of a determined and united majority; and skillful use of procedural moves and countermoves. Needless to say, Senate champions of change are essential, as are elections that produce an influx of lawmakers supportive of procedural reform.", "The historical record indicates that rulings from the Chair can either help or hinder the objectives of Senate reformers. In 1957, 1959, and 1961, Vice President Richard Nixon propounded several advisory opinions that bolstered the cause of the reformers. Nixon said, for example, that \"any provision of Senate rules adopted in a previous Congress which has the expressed or practical effect of denying the majority of the Senate in a new Congress the right to adopt the rules under which it desires to proceed is, in the opinion of the Chair, unconstitutional.\" Although Nixon's opinions did not have precedential value, they certainly provided encouragement to and inspired confidence among the reform Senators in what they realized would be an uphill parliamentary struggle.\nIn 1963, by contrast, Senator Anderson wanted Vice President Lyndon Johnson to submit the cloture reform motion, based on Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution, to the Senate for a vote, but not for debate. That was not to be. Johnson submitted the following question to the Senate: \"Does a majority of the Senate have the right under the Constitution to terminate debate at the beginning of a session and proceed to an immediate vote on a rule change notwithstanding the provisions of existing Senate rules?\" Johnson's decision assisted the anti-reformers in defeating the Anderson forces. (Constitutional questions, since 1804, are submitted to the Senate for resolution. They are debatable and not decided by presiding officers, unless a presiding officer opts to break this long-standing precedent.)\nVice Presidents Humphrey and Rockefeller, on the other hand, made official rulings that promoted the preferences of the reformers. Take the 1969 case involving Vice President Humphrey, a strong reform supporter. Strategic pre-planning between the Vice President and the reformers created the parliamentary conditions for changing Rule XXII. Briefly, their opening day strategy included the following features:\nReformers introduced a resolution to reduce the number of Senators required to invoke cloture. A reformer offered a motion to proceed to the resolution. Opponents launched a talkathon against the motion to proceed to the proposed change. Reformers filed cloture on the motion to proceed to the reform resolution. In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Vice President stated that if a majority, but less than the required two-thirds specified in Rule XXII, voted in favor of cloture, that would constitute invoking cloture on the reform resolution. Furthermore, once cloture was invoked under these circumstances, the debate-limiting prohibitions of Rule XXII would govern floor proceedings. An opponent appealed the ruling of the Vice President on the ground that cloture under Rule XXII requires two-thirds of the Senators present and voting to invoke, not a majority. Once majority cloture was invoked, an appeal would not be debatable under Rule XXII. If the Senate voted down the appeal and sustained the Chair's ruling, this decision would establish a new and binding precedent permitting a majority to amend Senate rules at the opening of a new Congress.\nVice President Humphrey's majority cloture \"precedent,\" however, lasted about 15 minutes before it was overturned on appeal by the Senate. In fact, parliamentarians might contend that the Humphrey precedent was never a precedent because his ruling was rejected on appeal to the Senate.\nImportant to reemphasize is that the Senate, at any time during the two-year life of a Congress, could circumvent the supermajority requirements of Rule XXII and create a new precedent for majority cloture. As then Majority Whip Byrd stated during consideration of the 1975 reform proposal:\nAs I have said more than once, at any time a majority of Senators in this body are determined to invoke cloture, if they have the support of the leadership—certainly, if they have the support of the joint leadership—and if they have a friendly presiding officer in the Chair, they can do it. Using the example I cited yesterday in debate, going back to 1969, when a Presiding Officer ruled that at the beginning of a new Congress, a majority of Senators, voting to invoke cloture, could invoke cloture. I wish to say again that in such a situation in the future, if 51 Senators were to vote to uphold the ruling of the Chair, we would have majority cloture.\nOn that occasion in 1969, fortunately, the Presiding Officer did not apply that provision of rule XXII that says that appeals are not debatable once cloture is invoked. But another Presiding Officer, at another time, in taking the view that a majority can invoke cloture, might invoke the rule, might invoke the rule in its entirety and not allow an appeal to be debatable, in which case an appeal could be made by any Senator against the ruling of the Chair, a motion to table could immediately be made, and 51 Senators could reject the appeal and thus sustain the ruling of the Chair, and we would have majority cloture, which would be a much easier method than the way in which the distinguished Senator from Minnesota and other Senators went about approaching this matter at the beginning of this session.\nNote that unlike the requirement of a \"friendly presiding officer\" referenced by Senator Byrd in the above quotation, on November 21, 2013, the presiding officer ruled according to precedent. He did not uphold Majority Leader Reid's point of order. (The 2013 case is discussed below.)", "The majority leader is in charge of scheduling the business of the Senate. As a result, his support of (or opposition to) the reformers' objectives could be determinative of the final outcome. The majority leaders discussed in this report—from Taft to Mansfield—were largely helpful in ensuring that reformers had adequate time to make their case for altering Rule XXII. Remember that Majority Leader Taft in 1953 set aside a limited but reasonable period of time for the consideration of Senator Anderson's proposal to revamp all the Senate's rules by majority vote at the start of a new Congress. Alternatively, Taft might have quickly made a motion to table Anderson's resolution with little or no debate\nMajority Leader Mansfield, who supported certain changes to Rule XXII, provided ample time to debate those proposals. Although Senator Mansfield favored amendments to Rule XXII, he opposed strongly any hint of majority cloture. He also protected the reformers from unknowingly acquiescing to Senate rules from the previous Congress. Regularly, he ensured that \"opening day\" extended over several days and weeks. Mansfield also adjourned at times, rather than recessed the Senate, to expedite action on reform resolutions required to lay over a legislative day before being eligible for floor consideration.\nMajority Leader Lyndon Johnson was not especially sympathetic to changing Rule XXII, either as a Senator or Vice President. However, he did broker in 1959 two major changes to Rule XXII. First, cloture could now be invoked by two-thirds of those voting, a quorum being present, rather than two-thirds of the entire membership. Second, the new two-thirds requirement also would apply to proposals to change Rule XXII. In addition, a continuity of rules provision was added to Rule V: \"The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.\" Senator Johnson persuaded traditional opponents of filibuster reform—southern Democrats and conservative Republicans—that unless they supported these changes, proponents might rewrite Rule XXII in a manner inimical to their political and policy interests, such as allowing majority cloture on civil rights measures.", "Another factor that influences the fate of filibuster reform proposals is the mobilization of a cohesive and determined majority willing to battle for their procedural aims. As Senator Byrd noted, given friendly rulings from the Chair and the support of the party leaders, a majority of Senators can achieve their goal of amending Senate rules on opening day (or at any time) if they are and remain united. Unity is vital because it is the means to achieve the desired end: amending Senate rules on opening day by majority vote.\nOpponents of major changes to Senate Rule XXII seem certain to engage in an array of dilatory practices to block the reformers' plans. They would also appeal unfavorable rulings of the Chair. Rulings of the Chair favorable to reform Senators would be affirmed by tabling (killing) appeals by opponents of change. Recall that when a majority of reform Senators did prevail, it was only to see their ephemeral victory reversed either immediately or after a few days. Today's opponents and proponents of amending Rule XXII seem likely to enlist the support of outside groups, think tanks, and other allies to achieve their broad goals: either advancing or blocking filibuster reforms.", "Every major legislative battle, including Senate rules changes, requires a procedural and strategic plan. Among various considerations that could affect strategy and options are the following: In brief, what procedural scenarios might best advance the reformers' goals? Among various considerations that could affect strategy and parliamentary options are the following: A procedural plan might be vetted with the Vice President, the Senate parliamentarian, party leaders, Senate allies, and other relevant actors. As for the Vice President, what is his view of the reformer's objectives? Would he preside on opening day during the reform debate or would he depart soon after he performs various administrative or ceremonial duties, such as administering the oath to newly elected Senators? Does the Vice President share the partisan affiliation of the majority party? If the Vice President is absent, what is the view of the President pro tempore on this entire matter? Reform advocates would surely prepare in advance their procedural moves and countermoves. Importantly, how many Senators are expected to support the reform initiative and will they actively participate on the floor to explain and advocate for the proposed reform(s)?\nThere are many procedural options with none guaranteed to produce the outcome contemplated by advocates of change. A successful result, however, would establish an authoritative precedent that would govern in analogous floor situations.\nThe Anderson Approach. Introduce a resolution that asserts that Senate rules have lapsed and new ones are to be adopted by majority vote at the start of every new Congress. This approach has not been successful to date. Prospects for favorable action in the future remain uncertain. Still, this method might focus lawmaker and public attention on whether it is important to update the Senate's rulebook every two years with an eye toward strengthening the institution's governing capacity. Embedded in this concept is adjusting rules to strengthen the Senate's ability to process the public's business in a reasonably deliberative and effective manner. If successful, the Anderson plan could gradually move the Senate toward majority rule, the fundamental decision-making principle of most parliamentary bodies. However, given the unique and long-standing traditions of the Senate, it seems likely that, under the Anderson proposal, provision would need to be made for ample and lengthy debate on measures and matters before the right to vote took priority over the right to discuss. Needless to say, opponents of the Anderson approach would contend that it would change fundamentally the character, purpose, and uniqueness of the Senate. The McGovern Approach. In 1967, citing the Constitution, Senator McGovern introduced his reform resolution, which was filibustered. Later, he offered a compound motion (again citing the Constitution) to close debate after two hours (equally divided between proponents and opponents), after which the Chair would place before the Senate, with no further debate, the vote on the motion to proceed to his reform resolution. A point of order was raised against McGovern's compound motion. The Senator moved to table the point of order, but the Senate voted to reject McGovern's tabling motion and to sustain the point of order. The Church-Pearson Approach I. In 1969, Senators Church and Pearson introduced a reform resolution, which was subject to lengthy debate. A cloture motion was offered, and the Vice President stated that if a cloture motion attracted majority, but not two-thirds, support, he would accept the legitimacy of majority cloture and any appeals would be decided without debate. There was an appeal of the Chair's ruling, which the Chair declared to be nondebatable, based on his contention that cloture had been invoked. The Senate voted to reject the Vice President's ruling. The Church-Pearson Approach II. In 1971, after the fourth failed cloture vote on the Church-Pearson motion to proceed to the filibuster reform resolution, Senator Javits appealed the Chair's ruling that cloture had failed because it did not attract sufficient votes (though it had attained a majority of 55). His appeal was tabled. Senator Javits also argued that the Chair should have simply declared that debate had gone on long enough and put the question on the procedural motion or on the reform resolution itself without further debate or intervening motions. A majority vote would decide the outcome. The Chair did not act on that \"nuclear\" suggestion, which would have contravened long-standing Senate precedents. The Mondale-Pearson Approach III. In 1975, Senator Pearson offered a compound motion that would (1) end debate on the motion to proceed, and (2) permit a vote, without further debate, on the motion to proceed. A point of order was raised against this procedure. The Vice President said that, if the point of order was tabled, that would establish the propriety of the motion. The point of order was tabled—a victory for reformers—but the motion was divided and became ensnared in parliamentary maneuvers. Senator Mondale then offered another compound motion designed to force majority action on the motion to proceed to the reform resolution. Points of order were raised against Mondale's motion, but they were tabled, a victory for reformers. However, as personal and procedural tensions escalated in the chamber, the Senate reversed course and, upon reconsideration, sustained a point of order against the compound motion used by the reformers to accomplish their goals. In the end, the Senate adopted changes to Rule XXII acceptable to most Members, including the reform advocates.\nThere are other matters, to be sure, that were raised during past reform endeavors, but none were determinative of the outcome. Among several secondary issues are the topics discussed below, though what appear secondary to some might be primary for others.", "There is no consensus on how long \"opening day\" reform proceedings may go on. Days, weeks, and several months have not been uncommon. (By recessing rather than adjourning, the majority leader can keep the Senate in the same \"legislative day\" for many weeks.) Opponents of reform often made critical comments about the length of opening day, and reminded the anti-filibuster Senators that Senate rules could be changed at any time during a legislative session. From the reformers' perspective, \"opening day\" was viewed as their best opportunity to avoid the supermajority hurdles of Rule XXII. They cited the Constitution and House practice to support their position. Regularly, change-oriented Members commonly sought assurances from the Chair that the conduct of other Senate business would not constitute their acquiescence to Senate rules from the previous Congress.\nSenator Byrd suggested that the nuclear option—establishing new precedents that circumvent the two-thirds vote required to invoke cloture on proposed rule changes—would be an easier way to change Senate rules by majority vote. That option could be used by a determined majority at the beginning, during, or end of a legislative session. Whether reformers employ the constitutional or nuclear option to try to amend Senate rules, perhaps their most critical challenge concerns mustering the votes to achieve their goals.", "This topic suffused every attempt at Senate rules reform at the beginning of a Congress. From a review of the debate, it appears that the each side had reasonable positions. The Senate is a continuous body in some respects—two-thirds of the Members carry over, more than the majority quorum under the Constitution required to conduct official business; impeachments carry over from one Congress to the next; treaties remain before the Senate from one Congress to the next; simple and concurrent resolutions bind the Senate from one Congress to the next; and Senate committees remain constituted from the previous Congress minus Members who were not reelected. The Senate is also a discontinuous institution in other respects (for example, all measures die at the end of a Congress). However, Senate Rule V, not to mention the long-standing tradition since the Second Congress, stipulates that the chamber's rules continue from Congress to Congress unless changed according to those rules.", "The 1950s reformers initially sought to rewrite Senate rules anew at the start of every new Congress. This idea, which emulates House practice, remains an option for the Senate. The Senate might adopt a resolution terminating all extant Senate rules. Another resolution that contains the new Senate rules might then be introduced for debate, amendment, and, finally, an up-or-down vote. In the main, this approach has generated insufficient support among the membership. Instead, Rule XXII (cloture) remains the principal focus of the reformers.\nSenator Anderson recognized that revisions to the Senate rulebook at the start of every new Congress might arouse extensive debate about which of the numerous parliamentary manuals would govern the Senate pending adoption of a new rulebook. Supporters of change contended that the Senate would observe existing Senate rules with revisions targeted at provisions that inhibit majority rule. Other reformers pointed out that the House has no difficulty in adopting new rules at the start of every new Congress, following so-called \"general parliamentary law,\" and that the Senate is surely as competent as the other chamber. (General parliamentary law refers to \"that body of precedent which traditionally serves as guidance for proceedings pending the adoption of formal rules.\") Needless to say, the Senate could undertake to revise its rulebook by following the conventional legislative process: committee review of reform proposals by the Rules and Administration Committee (hearings, markups, and the report stage), followed by floor consideration under a debate and amendment process, perhaps regulated by a unanimous consent agreement.", "The Senate's cloture rule (Rule XXII) was revised a number of times between 1917, when it was first adopted, and 1975. In 1917, Rule XXII required two-thirds of those present and voting to invoke cloture. Subsequently, there were these formal changes to Rule XXII during the 1949 to 1975 period; thereafter, from 1977 to 2013, other important changes occurred.\n1949: (a) To invoke cloture, two-thirds of the entire membership, and (b) cloture could not be applied to motions to proceed to consider proposals to change Senate rules (though it could, for the first time, be applied to other motions to proceed). 1959: (a) To invoke cloture, two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, and (b) cloture could be applied to motions to proceed to a change in Senate rules. 1975: (a) To invoke cloture, three-fifths of all Senators duly chosen and sworn: 60 of 100, except a two-thirds vote of Senators present and voting is still required to close debate for measures or motions to amend Senate rules.\nThe parliamentary ingenuity of Senator Allen in 1975 and Democratic Senators James Abourezk, SD, and Howard Metzenbaum, OH, in 1977 during the post-cloture period set the stage for two follow-on amendments to Rule XXII: one in 1979 and the other in 1986. Both rule changes limited the time for post-cloture consideration. Why? Because Senator Allen created and Senators Abourezk and Metzenbaum further developed a procedural innovation, dubbed a \"post-cloture filibuster,\" that exploited loopholes in Rule XXII to prevent or delay final action on clotured legislation.\nFor example, under the provisions of Rule XXII, once cloture is invoked, each Senator is limited to one hour of post-cloture debate. However, the time for reading amendments, appeals, roll call votes, quorum calls, and so on did not count against the one hour. These dilatory tactics could consume many days before they might conclude. Their effect was to end the tradition that, once cloture was invoked on a measure, opponents would bow to the will of the Senate and allow a final vote on the legislation without further procedural maneuvers.\nOnce new dilatory tactics emerge on the legislative scene, Senators are likely to use these devices for their own purposes. Such was the case in 1977 when Democratic Senators Abourezk and Metzenbaum waged a nearly unbreakable post-cloture filibuster against an energy bill supported by President Jimmy Carter and backed by a substantial bipartisan majority of the Senate. The dilatory tactics of the two Senators provoked the 1979 and 1986 revisions to Rule XXII. (Worth mention is that Senator Allen and his allies engaged in a post-cloture filibuster in 1976 on an antitrust enforcement measure. Majority Leader Mansfield exclaimed that the post-cloture filibuster against the antitrust bill was an \"attempt to murder\" Rule XXII.)", "In 1977, two Democratic Senators—the aforementioned Abourezk and Metzenbaum—launched a post-cloture filibuster against a controversial natural gas deregulation bill. Their post-cloture tactic stymied Senate action for 13 days on President Carter's national energy plan. Here are several examples of how the two Senators employed the post-cloture filibuster:\nPrior to the vote on cloture, as Rule XXII requires, the two Senators pre-filed over 500 amendments that they were ready to call up once cloture was invoked, as the two Senators fully expected. With so many amendments filed and eligible for consideration, the two Senators had plenty of \"ammunition\" with which to delay Senate proceedings. Senators Abourezk and Metzenbaum called up numerous amendments and objected to unanimous consent requests to suspend the required reading. In one case, the reading clerk took 55 minutes to read an amendment. Occasionally, the Senators would demand two roll-call votes on a single amendment, one on the proposal itself and another on the motion to reconsider. In such instances, the two Senators voted with the majority to reject the amendments so they would be eligible to offer motions to reconsider. The two Senators demanded roll-call votes on each amendment, a process requiring at least 15 minutes.\nThese relatively simple procedural steps enabled the two Senators for 13 days to tie the Senate in knots. None of the time consumed for their procedural motions, as noted earlier, counted against each Senator's one hour for debate once cloture was invoked. Senatorial frustration was growing as the post-cloture filibuster rolled on.\nIn the end, Senator Robert Byrd, who at the beginning of 1977 became majority leader, came up with an effective counter-strategy. The aim was to rule out of order as dilatory the bulk of the Abourezk-Metzenbaum amendments that had been filed. Senator Byrd enlisted the cooperation of Vice President Walter Mondale, the President of the Senate, to accomplish his aims. On October 3, 1977, Vice President Mondale recognized Majority Leader Byrd, who made a point of order \"that when the Senate is operating under cloture, the Chair is required to rule out of order all amendments which are dilatory or which on their face are out of order.\" Under precedents at the time, the Chair had to wait until a Senator raised a point of order against each amendment before ruling whether it was dilatory.\nMondale sustained Byrd's point of order. The Vice President ruled that the majority leader's point of order \"goes to the meaning of rule XXII which provides that once cloture is invoked, no dilatory motion or dilatory amendment or amendment not germane shall be in order. The purpose of the rule is to require action by the Senate on a pending measure following cloture within a period of reasonable dispatch.... The Chair will take the initiative to rule out of order dilatory amendments which, under cloture, are not in order and which on their face are out of order.\" Senator Abourezk appealed the decision, but lost on a 79 to 14 vote. The stage then was set for the pre-arranged plan. Reading from a typed script given him by Senator Byrd, the Vice President recognized only the majority leader (by precedent the majority leader receives priority of recognition), who called up over 30 Metzenbaum amendments in rapid succession. (Any Senator can call up any filed amendment, even if it is not his or her own.) Each of Metzenbaum's amendments was quickly ruled out of order by the Vice President, who ignored the Senators who wanted to appeal the Chair's rulings, a customary right of Senators. Although bedlam broke out on the floor, Senators Abourezk and Metzenbaum soon thereafter ended their post-cloture filibuster. With this experience fresh in their minds, Senators were ready to revise Rule XXII, which occurred in the next Congress.", "On February 22, 1979, the Senate amended Rule XXII to restrict opportunities for further post-cloture filibusters. Most significantly, Rule XXII now provided that once cloture was invoked, a 100-hour cap would be imposed on all post-cloture consideration, including time spent reading and voting on amendments, quorum calls, and other procedural motions. This 100-hour cap was the fundamental achievement of the 1979 amendment to Rule XXII. Other post-cloture revisions provided that no Senator may call up more than two amendments until every other Senator has had the opportunity to call up two amendments. Further, the reading of any amendment was also dispensed with after cloture was invoked, provided that the amendment was available in printed form at the desk of each Senator for not less than 24 hours.\nThese changes occurred in the context of Majority Leader Byrd's deep and successful commitment to ending the post-cloture filibuster. First, Senator Byrd emphasized that the post-cloture filibuster had created \"ill feelings and deep divisions in the Senate. It is fractious; it fragments the Senate, it fragments the party on either side of the aisle, and it makes the Senate a spectacle. It is not in the national interest.\" He further underscored that the Senate was \"becoming more and more the victim of this ingenious procedure that allows, first a filibuster threat; second, the filibuster on the motion to proceed; third, the filibuster on the matter itself; and fourth and finally, the [most] cataclysmic and divisive filibuster of all, the postcloture filibuster.\" The Senate, exclaimed Senator Byrd, no longer had an effective Rule XXII. He set about to revise Senate procedures on the opening day of the 96 th Congress (1979-1980).\nOn January 15, Senator Byrd introduced a resolution, S. Res. 9, that proposed general reforms (e.g., the installation of an electronic voting system in the chamber), as well as others focused on post-cloture procedures. However, many Republican Senators believed that the changes proposed by Senator Byrd would reduce the role of the minority in the legislative process. To promote bipartisan collaboration and compromise, the two party leaders (Byrd and GOP leader Howard Baker of Tennessee) created an ad hoc committee to develop a mutually acceptable way to consider Byrd's reform proposals. The key recommendation that emerged from the discussions was for the Senate to consider separately the post-cloture reforms embedded in S. Res. 9. On February 7, Senator Byrd submitted a resolution (S. Res. 61) that dealt only with post-cloture procedures.\nNoteworthy is that on January 15, Majority Leader Byrd had made clear to his Senate colleagues that it was imperative for the Senate to deal with the postcloture filibuster because it thwarts \"the will not only of a majority but of a three-fifths majority of the Senate, which, having voted for cloture signifies its will that the debate shall come to a close and that the pending matter shall be acted upon one way or the other.\" If a unanimous consent agreement to address changes to the post-cloture filibuster was unattainable, Senator Byrd said that he would employ the constitutional option—\"in essence upholding the power and right of a majority of the Senate to change the rules of the Senate at the beginning of a new Congress.\" Moreover, he dismissed the view that the Senate's rules continue from one Congress to the next unless they are changed in accordance with those rules. \"That [Senate] rule was written in 1959 by the 86 th Congress. The 96 th Congress is not bound by the dead hand of the 86 th Congress.\" He went on to state:\nThe Senate of the 86 th Congress could not pretend to believe that all succeeding Senates would be bound by the rules that it had written. It would be just as reasonable to say that one Congress can pass a law providing that all future laws have to be passed by a two-thirds vote. Any Member of this body knows that the next Congress would not heed that law and would proceed to change it and would vote repeal by a majority vote.\nI am not going to argue the case any further today, except to say that it is my belief—which has been supported by rulings of Vice Presidents of both parties and by votes of the Senate—in essence upholding the power and right of a majority of the Senate to change the rules of the Senate at the beginning of a new Congress.\nI have not always taken that position, but I take it today in the light of recent bitter experience. The experience of the last few years has made me come to a conclusion contrary to the one I reached years ago.\nBy continually recessing the Senate until it adjourned on the calendar day of February 22, Senator Byrd kept the chamber in the same \"opening\" legislative day of January 15. (See footnote 52 for a discussion of \"legislative\" and \"calendar\" days in the Senate.)\nOn February 7, Majority Leader Byrd successfully propounded a unanimous consent agreement consisting of three parts: (1) the Senate would immediately proceed to consider a separate resolution (S. Res. 61) dealing only with that part of S. Res. 9 that addressed post-cloture procedure; (2) only germane amendments to post-cloture provisions would be in order; and (3) if the post-cloture provisions were not disposed of by 6 p.m. on February 22, the Senate would automatically proceed to consider the remaining general provisions of S. Res. 9, as a new resolution. Several Senators asked Senator Byrd to clarify a few matters. For example, Senator Jesse Helms asked \"if the majority leader does intend to adjourn [the Senate] after resolution has been reached on this matter, whether it be February 22 or earlier, is that correct?\" Senator Byrd responded yes if \"the [post-cloture] resolution has been agreed to.\" In short, the Senate's agreement to S. Res. 61 would conclude \"opening day\" and \"avoid a confrontation on the issue of whether Byrd could cut off a filibuster against rules changes by majority vote at the beginning of a Congress.\" On February 22, the Senate adopted S. Res. 61, as amended, by a 78 to 16 vote, after which the Senate briefly adjourned (ending the \"first day\" of the 96 th Congress).", "Seven years later, when the Senate considered and agreed on February 27, 1986, to a proposal (S. Res. 28) to televise Senate floor sessions gavel-to-gavel, it also agreed to a provision in that resolution to further limit post-cloture consideration. S. Res. 28 amended Rule XXII to reduce the time for post-cloture consideration from 100 hours to 30 hours. This reduction meant that Senators during the post-cloture period could potentially still be recognized for one hour, but the 30 hours would be available on a first-come, first-served basis. This alteration, along with other post-cloture rules and precedents—such as dispensing with the reading of amendments and enabling the Chair to rule dilatory amendments and motions out of order—reduced the delaying potential of post-cloture filibusters. \"The threat of a [post-cloture] filibuster loses some of its sting if only [30] postcloture hours are allowed,\" noted a Senator.\nMinority Leader Byrd and Majority Leader Robert Dole, R-KS, were the lead sponsors of S. Res. 28. Both were also advocates of rules changes that might encourage public understanding of the Senate through more efficient management of the chamber's business. For example, Senator Byrd wanted to limit debate on motions to take up legislation to two hours. Negotiations between the opponents and proponents of televising Senate sessions went on for days because \"some senators were for television but against rules changes; others wanted rules changes but not television; and still others insisted that the two be linked.\"\nA concern of many opponents of television in the Senate was that it would eventually lead to constraints on the right of Members to engage in prolonged debate. Democratic Senator Long of Louisiana \"believed the public would not like what it saw—that is 'free' or unlimited debate—and would demand more expeditious floor action.\" Former Senator and GOP leader Howard Baker of Tennessee viewed the matter differently. Televising floor proceedings, he contended, would enhance the Senate's role as \"a great public forum.\" In the end, the Senate, by a 67 to 21 vote, agreed to televise its floor proceedings gavel-to-gavel over C-SPAN (the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network) and, in the only change to Rule XXII, to cap post-cloture consideration to 30 hours. It is useful to know that S. Res. 28 did not technically authorize gavel-to-gavel television coverage of the Senate \"over C-SPAN.\" As with the House, the resolution authorized \"a Senate owned, operated and controlled\" television system, with the idea that broadcasts would be made available to the public through normal broadcast channels (networks, stations, etc.).\nIt is worth noting that S. Res. 28 also provided for a non-debatable motion to approve the Senate Journal . The Journal is a constitutional requirement, and constitutes the official record of Senate actions, such as votes cast. In the past, one filibustering tactic was to force a reading of the Journal of the previous legislative day. Because a legislative day in the Senate could extend over several days or weeks, the reading could take hours.", "On January 24, 2013, the Senate made several changes to its cloture procedures. Two were permanent amendments to the Standing Rules of the Senate and two were temporary standing orders that expired with the end of the 113 th Congress. A standing order has the same binding procedural status as a Senate rule, but cloture on a measure proposing a standing order can be invoked by three-fifths of Senators, duly chosen and sworn (60 votes if there are no vacancies in the Senate) because a standing order does not amend the Standing Rules of the Senate. To invoke cloture on measures to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate requires a vote of two-thirds of the Senators voting, a quorum being present, or as many as 67 votes if all 100 Senators vote on the measure.\nAs for the permanent changes, one added a new paragraph 3 to Rule XXII; it authorized a bipartisan cloture motion to proceed to a measure or matter (to date, not yet used). That bipartisan motion, however, requires the signature of the two party leaders as well as seven Senators not affiliated with the majority party and seven additional Senators not affiliated with the minority party. Normally under paragraph 2 of Rule XXII, a cloture motion must be signed by at least 16 Senators—in practice, often all from the majority party—and presented in open session and read by the clerk. Then, two session days later—a cloture motion filed Monday, for example, is acted on Wednesday—the presiding officer will, after ascertainment of a quorum (typically waived by unanimous consent), put this question to the Senate: \"Is it the sense of the Senate that debate shall be brought to a close?\" A vote is held immediately. Under the new permanent change contained in paragraph 3, if there is a bipartisan cloture motion on a motion to proceed, the vote on cloture will occur the session day after a cloture motion is presented—thus eliminating a day's wait—and if cloture is invoked, the vote will occur on the motion to proceed without further debate (eliminating the 30 hours of post-cloture consideration).\nThe other permanent change collapsed the three actions required to take a House message to conference into a single debatable motion. The single motion, which would typically be propounded by the majority leader, goes something like this: \"I move to insist upon the Senate amendment, agree to the request by the House for a conference, and authorize the Presiding Officer to appoint conferees.\" Previously, if a Senator objected to any of the three actions required to convene a conference—in this example: insist , request , and authorize —a filibuster could occur on each part, which effectively inhibited the use of conference committees to resolve bicameral differences on legislation. Today, the consolidated or compound motion for the Senate to authorize a conference is still subject to a filibuster. However, \"if cloture is filed on the motion to authorize a conference, the motion will thereafter be subject to only two hours of debate, equally divided between the majority and minority leaders, or their designees.\" If 60 Senators vote to invoke cloture, then without further debate a simple majority could approve taking a measure to conference.\nAs for the two temporary standing orders, one minimized the threat of a filibuster on the motion to proceed by limiting debate to four hours, equally divided, if two amendment opportunities were provided to each party. Minority party Senators often lamented that the majority leader too often prevented them from offering amendments by a procedural tactic called \"filling the amendment tree,\" restricting Senators' ability to offer amendments. Under the temporary change, the majority and minority parties were allowed at least two amendment opportunities, which was never used. The second temporary change limited post-cloture debate on certain nominations, for example, to two hours on federal district judges and eight hours on lower executive branch appointments.\nIn addition, the two party leaders—Senators Reid and McConnell—agreed that each would insist that Senators who object to unanimous consent requests must come to the floor and engage in debate; that the presiding officer could put the question (a vote) under certain circumstances if no Senator was seeking recognition to debate; and that the conventional legislative procedures (committee review, for example) would be followed during the 113 th Congress for any further procedural changes. These agreements proved difficult to implement.", "On November 21, 2013, Majority Leader Reid—asserting that the Senate's constitutional advice and consent responsibility had become \"deny and obstruct\"—employed a nuclear option to allow a majority of the Senate to end debate on presidential nominees, except those for the Supreme Court. (Filibusters on legislative matters remain intact.) Recall that in 2005 Republican Majority Leader Bill Frist planned to execute the nuclear option to end Democratic filibusters against President Bush's judicial nominees. The \"Gang of 14,\" composed of lawmakers with long service in the Senate, prevented implementation of Frist's objective. They did not want a precedent set that future majorities could use at any time to change Senate rules.\nBy contrast, as a sign of generational change—as well as heightened polarization in the Senate and in each party's electoral base—many newer Democratic Senators wanted to reform the filibuster procedure. Nearly half of Senate Democrats at that time had begun their service only since 2008. They had never experienced minority status, and urged Senator Reid to employ the nuclear option. In the view of political scientist Ross Baker of Rutgers University, \"I don't think you'll ever see a much clearer example of a generation gap on the wisdom of changing the filibuster rules.\" Another prominent congressional scholar wrote that use of the nuclear option on November 21, 2013, was \"among the three or four most important events in the procedural history of the Senate. Ignoring the plain text of [Rule XXII], a majority of senators changed the effective rule by merely declaring it to be something else.\"\nSupport for using the nuclear option had been building for months, if not years, among some Senate Democrats. The issue that served as the catalyst for the November action was Senate refusal to confirm within a few weeks' time three judicial nominees to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Each nominee failed to win the 60 affirmative votes to end prolonged debate.\nThe 11-member D.C. Circuit Court, which had three vacancies, is viewed as one of the most important in the nation. It considers issues involving such matters as the legitimacy of federal regulations and legislative-executive clashes over constitutional prerogatives, such as the recess appointment authority of the President versus the Senate's advice and consent responsibility.\nThe majority consensus among Senators was that the three nominees were qualified to serve on the appellate court. Filibustering opponents argued, however, that the D.C. Circuit Court was underworked; thus, there was no need for more judges. They also noted that, when Democrats were in the minority during the George W. Bush presidency, they also argued that the circuit court's workload did not justify adding more judges. Opponents suggested, too, that it was unnecessary to upset the ideological balance on the D.C. Circuit Court: four were appointed by Democratic Presidents and four by Republican Presidents. Moreover, GOP Senators pointed out that their alleged obstructionism of President Obama's judicial nominees was incorrect. They noted, for instance, that more of the President's federal district judicial nominees were confirmed by the 112 th Senate \"than were approved during the past eight Congresses.\"\nDemocratic Senators made their own arguments on behalf of confirming the three nominees to the circuit court. As one Democratic Senator stated, opponents are trying \"to force us to govern as though President Obama hadn't won the 2012 election.\" President Obama also backed use of the nuclear option. The majority leader explained that the Senate works on \"collegiality just like judges do. But there comes a time when collegiality breaks down and you have to do something.\" He added: \"We need good, strong debate on nominations and everything else,\" but we do not need hours, days, weeks, and months of obstructive delay. \"Was it only a debate when my Republican colleagues decided the DC Circuit—some say the most important court in this country, even, some say, the Supreme Court—when they decided there were vacant seats there and for 5 years held up filling those seats? Is that debate? No. It is obstruction.\" Given this view, in a carefully scripted procedural scenario, and with a near party-line vote, Majority Leader Reid followed a series of steps to establish a new Senate precedent—majority cloture—to end filibusters on executive and judicial nominees, excepting only Supreme Court nominees.\nNote several key aspects of Senate procedure that were involved in the events that culminated on November 21, 2013. When a motion to reconsider is \"entered\" on an unsuccessful vote on a question in the Senate, that motion is debatable unless the underlying question, such as a motion to invoke cloture, is non-debatable. In the 2013 case, the three pertinent motions offered in sequence were: (1) the motion to proceed to the entered motion to reconsider; if that motion is successful, then; (2) the motion to reconsider is voted upon; and (3) a successful motion to reconsider returns the original question to the Senate for a new vote. The three motions were non-debatable because the underlying matter was a cloture vote, which is not a debatable question. This circumstance meant that all three votes in 2013 would take place without intervening debate; moreover, any appeal to the underlying question would also be decided without debate. Thus, Senator Reid used existing Senate procedures to effectuate his precedent in the following manner:\nOn October 31, 2013, after the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the nomination of Patricia Millet to serve on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Senator Reid entered a motion to reconsider that vote. On November 21, 2013, Senator Reid moved to proceed to the motion previously entered to reconsider the vote by which cloture on the Millett nomination was not invoked. The motion to proceed to the motion reconsider was adopted by a 57 to 40 vote. Senator McConnell moved to adjourn the Senate, but that was rejected by a vote of 46 yeas to 54 nays. The Senate then proceeded to reconsider the failed cloture vote on the Millett nomination. His motion was adopted by a vote of 57 yeas and 43 nays. However, the motion did not receive the 60 votes that would have been required under Rule XXII for a vote to invoke cloture. Senator Reid then raised a point of order that a vote on cloture under Rule XXII for all nominations, except for Supreme Court nominees, is a majority vote. (Notice the sweep of Reid's point of order: it covered all executive and judicial nominees except for those to the Supreme Court.) The President pro tempore, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, overruled Reid's point of order, pursuant to existing rules and precedents. Senator Reid immediately appealed Leahy's ruling. After a series of parliamentary inquiries, the Chair put the appeal to a vote without debate. Significantly, the appeal was treated as non-debatable due to its connection to a non-debatable question (cloture). The Chair was overruled by a vote of 48 yeas to uphold the ruling to 52 nays to overturn. As the President pro tempore stated: \"The decision of the Chair is not sustained.\" This vote established a new majority cloture precedent for most presidential nominees. Senator McConnell quickly tested the viability of the new precedent. He raised a point of order that nominees are fully debatable under Senate rules unless 60 votes are obtained to invoke cloture. \"Therefore, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.\" \"The Chair has not yet ruled,\" said Senator Leahy. He added, however, that \"under the precedent set by the Senate today, November 21, 2013, the threshold for cloture on nominations, not including the Supreme Court, is now a majority. That is the ruling of the Chair.\" Senator McConnell appealed the ruling of the Chair. On this vote, the Chair's ruling was upheld by a vote of 52 yeas to 48 nays. The Chair immediately presented to the Senate the pending cloture motion to end debate on the Millett nomination. Cloture was invoked by a vote of 55 yeas to 43 nays, short of the 60 previously required but sufficient for \"majority cloture\" under the new precedent.\nReaction among Senators was swift, as tension between the parties escalated even beyond that of recent years. On the majority side, one Democratic Senator stated that he had \"waited 18 years for this moment,\" and recommended that the Senate go even further: \"We need to change [the filibuster] as it pertains to legislation.\" Another Democratic Senator underscored that point: \"For a lot of us, this is only halfway to the finish line. We should get rid of the filibuster for legislation as well as nominations.\"\nBy contrast, Senate Republicans were quite upset. A GOP Senator viewed the majority leader's procedural maneuver as a \"raw exercise of political power\" that will permit the \"majority to do whatever it wants whenever it wants to do it.\" Another GOP Senator noted that the filibuster has been a part of the Senate for over 200 years. \"Both parties have used it, both parties have criticized it.\" But no majority party until today, he emphasized, had acted to alter fundamentally the character of the Senate by curbing extended debate on presidential nominations. Like the majoritarian House, the Senate majority was now positioned to enable a determined majority to amend any Senate rule by majority vote. Still another GOP minority lawmaker pointed out, \"The silver lining is that there will come a day when the roles are reversed,\" perhaps sooner than the majority party expected. Arguably, the vigorous debate by the two sides was less about filibusters against presidential nominations and more about the creation of a precedent that allows Senate rules to be changed by majority vote rather than the two-thirds supermajority specified in Rule XXII. Every minority party Senator (and three majority party Senators) voted against creation of the new precedent.\nFor the remainder of the 113 th Congress, Senate Republicans continued to delay action on presidential nominees, ironically by often using a Rule XXII procedure left unchanged by the new precedent: they used post-cloture time for consideration of nominations rather than agreeing to complete action earlier. They also employed other parliamentary tactics, such as objecting to unanimous consent requests or employing sharp rhetoric to castigate the majority party on the floor and in the media. Despite such actions, the majority party's use of the nuclear option precedent increased Senate approval of the President's nominations.\nFrom the Democratic perspective, Members noted that few in the public pay much attention to, or understand, parliamentary maneuvers on Capitol Hill. \"To the average American,\" noted the majority leader, \"adapting the rules to make the Senate work again is just common sense.\" Many Democrats, too, were irate at what they viewed as deliberate minority party obstructionism against the policies and nominees of their President. Others believed that if Republicans won control the Senate, they would not hesitate to \"go nuclear\" to achieve their objectives. Still other Democrats favored majority rule for both legislation and nominations regardless of which party controls the Senate. The Democratic majority leader remarked that he might use the nuclear option again in the 113 th Senate if the minority party regularly used dilatory tactics to frustrate party priorities. \"I'm not precluding anything,\" said the majority leader. \"It's just according to how we get along here.\"\nTwo separation of powers issues, among others, emerge from the new precedent. First, President Obama (and likely succeeding Presidents) gained greater influence in securing Senate approval of nominations to the federal bench and the executive branch. In the short term, with Democrats still in control of the Senate, President Obama was advantaged in winning additional confirmation of executive and judicial candidates who share his policy outlook. Instead of attracting 60 Senate votes to invoke cloture to end prolonged debate on most nominations, a majority vote now was sufficient to bring debate to a close.\nLonger-term, a political risk for the two parties is that one party would control both the White House and the Senate and be positioned by majority vote to confirm either liberal or conservative district and circuit court judicial nominees who share their philosophy. As one Republican Senator stated, \"There are a lot more ... [Clarence] Thomases out there that we would love to put on the bench.\" A Senate Democratic leader responded: \"We'd much prefer the risk of up-or-down votes and majority rule than the risk of continued total obstruction. That's the bottom line no matter who's in power.\"\nWith the GOP in control of the 114 th Senate (54 to 46) following the November 2014 mid-term elections, Senate Democrats and the White House contend that there has been a slowdown in the approval of judicial nominees. Senate Republicans disagree and insist that nominations are moving along \"at a rate comparable with the final two years of previous lame duck presidents....\" Traditionally, committee chairs set their panel's agenda. They can refuse to hold hearings on executive and judicial branch nominees or fail to report them for possible floor consideration. In brief, the Senate Democratic minority is reportedly grumbling that the GOP-controlled committees are slowwalking President Obama's nominees.\nSecond, given the 2013 majority cloture precedent, minority Senators of either party might begin to use other practices to foil Senate approval of nominations they oppose. For example, the \"blue slip\" process might be employed more frequently as a pre-floor blocking tactic. This long-standing policy of the Judiciary Committee, as established by the chair, allows Senators from the home-state of judicial nominees to prevent committee action either by not returning their \"blue slips\" to the panel or returning them with a negative recommendation. According to two scholars of the federal judicial appointments process:\nThe blue slip policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, as set by the chair, dates back to 1917. Under this policy, the committee chair seeks the assessment of Senators regarding district court, circuit court, U.S. attorney, and U.S. marshal nominations in their state. If a home state Senator has no objection to a nominee, the blue slip is returned to the chair with a positive response; however, if a Senator has some objection to the nominee and wants to stop or slow committee action, he or she can decide not to return the blue slip or return it with a negative response. Some, but not all, chairs of the Judiciary Committee have required a return of a positive blue slip by both of a state's Senators before allowing consideration of a nominee.\nIn short, if states have one or two minority party Senators, these Members are positioned to stymie consideration of judicial nominees, barring changes in Judiciary's blue slip policy. As a recent Judiciary chairman remarked: \"As long as the blue slip process is not being abused by home-state senators, then I will see no reason to change that tradition.\"\nMembers opposed to various presidential nominations might also launch committee filibusters. The Judiciary Committee is one of only two panels (Finance is the other ) that have a procedure for ending committee filibusters by majority vote. However, at least one minority party Member of the committee must vote with the majority. Rule IV of the Judiciary Committee states: \"The Chairman shall entertain a non-debatable motion to bring a matter before the Committee to a vote. If there is objection to bring the matter to a vote without further debate, a roll call vote of the Committee shall be taken, and debate shall be terminated if the motion to bring the matter to a vote without further debate passes with eleven votes in the affirmative, one of which must be cast by the minority.\" (In the 114 th Senate, 11 to 9 was the ratio of majority to minority Members on Judiciary.) A rash of orchestrated committee filibusters on judicial or executive branch nominees might provoke majority party committee members either to eliminate the minority Member requirement for ending prolonged panel debate at the Judiciary Committee or provoke other Senate committees to adopt rules to overcome committee filibusters.", "When the new Congress began on January 6, 2015, there was discussion among the Members of the incoming GOP Senate majority about whether to retain the 2013 precedent or return to the 60-vote requirement for cloture on all judicial (excepting the Supreme Court) and executive nominees. Republicans were divided on the issue. Some lawmakers wanted to overturn the 2013 precedent and restore the supermajority requirement for presidential nominees; others wanted to maintain majority cloture on nominations, partly because it would make it easier for the Republican Senate to confirm judicial and Cabinet nominees of a future Republican President. There was even sentiment to create a new precedent that would apply majority cloture to legislation repealing the Affordable Care Act. Even the contenders for the 2016 GOP presidential nomination and their supportive constituencies were divided on the issue. According to one account, Republican groups outside Washington are \"vowing to gut the filibuster in order to repeal the Affordable Care Act, while GOP senators pursuing the White House want to keep the time-honored 60-vote threshold.\"\nSenate Majority Leader McConnell favored the \"regular order\" and supported review of the matter by the Committee on Rules and Administration. However, he opposed use of the nuclear option to end the Senate's supermajority requirement for legislation. A close ally of Senator McConnell's, when asked if the majority leader would support majority cloture for legislation, replied, \"Absolutely not.\" He added, \"The filibuster protects the minority, and it is the only vehicle that allows the Senate to function in its historic role of protecting the minority.\" Many Senators also believe it would be a grave mistake for the Senate to \"become just like the House\" with its majority party dominance.\nOn opening day of the 114 th Congress (January 6), two minority party Senators introduced S.Res. 20 . As one of lead sponsors stated: \"It has been the tradition at the beginning of many Congresses that a majority of the Senate has asserted its right to adopt or amend the rules\" by majority vote. The Constitution, he added, makes it very clear that the \"Senate can adopt and amend its rules at the beginning of the new Congress by a simple majority vote.\" The other lead sponsor endorsed this view and also put forward six other ideas designed to improve the operations of the Senate. They included, for example, creating \"a process to consider rule changes at the start of each legislative session,\" ending \"the filibuster on the motion to proceed to legislation,\" and expediting the creation of conference committees by eliminating any cloture process for their establishment, with debate on their formation limited to two hours. S.Res. 20 , after an objection was made to its immediate consideration, was placed on the appropriate section of the Calendar of General Orders pursuant to Rule XIV, paragraph 6. Two GOP Senators \"floated a proposal that would make all nominations, including to the Supreme Court, subject to a simple majority. Republicans haven't acted since that January [2015] trial balloon.\"", "Legislating in the contemporary Senate can be a difficult enterprise. The chamber's rules and precedents grant significant procedural powers to each Senator regardless of party, geography, or ideology. In the Senate, the policymaking advantage usually goes to those who wish to delay or obstruct legislative action. History demonstrates that senatorial delay can be a virtue as the Senate can block or \"cool\" hastily conceived measures that emanate from the House of Representatives, the White House, or from other quarters. The Senate, in short, is an institution largely structured to promote deliberation—both to educate and persuade as well as to induce gridlock—and to protect minorities from majorities willing to steamroll measures or matters quickly through the Senate. A Senator or group of Senators can also use the possibility of a filibuster to extract important information from a reluctant executive branch agency or department.\nIndeed, the ability of any Senator to delay Senate action through prolonged debate might lead to a compromise acceptable to all sides. Of course filibusters or their threat also can prevent passage of legislation. This reality means that the daily life of today's Senate is often replete with filibusters, threats of extended debate, and cloture votes. As one Senator explained:\nYou have to think of the Senate as if it were 100 different nations and each one had the atomic bomb and at any moment any one of you could blow up the place. So that no matter how long you've been here or how short you've been here, you always know you have the capacity to go to the leader and threaten to blow up the entire institution. And, naturally, he'll deal with you.\nUnderstandably, Senators have struggled for decades over when or whether Senate rules, procedures, or traditions require change. The procedural quandary is that most Senators value the benefits to them as individuals provided by unlimited debate (or the threat thereof). Yet the Senate has often reformed and revised its rules and procedures in big and little ways. Consider the filibuster and Rule XXII, and how each has changed over time. For example, as a former Senate parliamentarian noted, \"For nearly 50 years after its adoption [in 1917], Rule XXII served a purpose more symbolic than real. From 1917 to 1927, cloture was voted on 10 times but it was adopted only four times. From 1931 to 1964, cloture was successful only twice.\" Today, filibusters, filibuster threats, and cloture votes are commonplace and employed on major and minor issues—with cloture votes often occurring multiple times on the same measure or nomination—and throughout various policymaking stages.\nSince 1917, both the vote to invoke cloture and the amount of time for post-cloture debate have been revised several times. Rule XXII is the focus of so much attention because it is the only formal rule to limit debate in the Senate. Debates surrounding changes to Rule XXII often concentrate on the right to debate versus the right to decide (or protecting minority rights versus allowing the majority to vote on a matter); the uniqueness of the Senate as an institution; the intent of the Framers (majority versus supermajority decision making); or who is advantaged or disadvantaged from proposed amendments to Rule XXII.\nTypically, revisions occur to Rule XXII when several conditions are met, such as: a determined and unified majority long frustrated in achieving their goals by the 60-vote hurdle required for cloture; a leader or set of leaders who craft a successful procedural and political strategy for achieving change, including persuading colleagues that their loss of personal power is more than offset by the Senate's enhanced ability to govern; and a public relations, or messaging, strategy designed to explain the necessity of the change and to rebut criticisms from those who might oppose the revision, whether colleagues, pundits, journalists, or outside groups. Other political and procedural forces are also relevant, such as the election of change-oriented lawmakers or crises of one sort or another (the sinking of U.S. merchant ships by German submarines that led to the 1917 adoption of Rule XXII or the once unbreakable post-cloture filibuster).\nWhat appears at issue today—and what Members of earlier eras also confronted—is whether Senate rules and practices require alteration to better meet the challenges of the day. In brief, do they require \"modernization\" to enhance the Senate's governing capacity and its role as a co-equal branch of government? Some Senators might suggest that the legislative system is working as intended and requires only periodic, small-bore improvements. They might also view the Senate and its individual Members as one of the few effective counterweights to an increasingly powerful executive branch.\nOther Members, mindful that many of today's lawmakers are not reluctant to exploit the chamber's procedures and practices for individual or political gain, might favor a Senate whose procedures tilt in a more majoritarian direction. They recognize that today's Senate has morphed into a 60-vote institution for passing measures and matters—a fundamental transformation from earlier Senates. There are also people who suggest that it is not the procedural rules that require amendment but the \"culture\" of the Senate that requires change, such as the revival of norms and values that strengthen civility, habits of cross-party compromise and collaboration, and vigorous debate anchored more in influencing policy and less in political messaging for the next election.\nUltimately, it is the procedural context that shapes how individual Members, committees, or the two parties raise issues and make—or avoid making—decisions. If certain Senate procedures cause unnecessary delay and hamper the Senate's ability to address clear, festering, and pressing national problems, then the time might be right for procedural, structural, or other changes. A comment made in 1971 by Senator Phil Hart of Michigan still resonates more than four decades later. \"The apparent inability of [the Senate] to take action on our domestic ills when the needs are so painfully clear is a basic cause of unrest and disaffection\" among the citizenry. Change is obligatory if institutions like the Senate are to have the capacity to handle a large and growing workload and a complex array of overlapping domestic and international issues. Long ago Thomas Jefferson said, \"As new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep pace with the times.\" In short, the Senate itself would determine whether or when to \"keep pace with the times.\"\nThat the Senate undergoes change constantly is a given. It responds to events, issues, and crises in different ways and speeds. The election of new Members every two years brings to the Senate additional energy, issues, and ideas. Procedural change, whether formal or informal, is commonplace. Yet a basic philosophical conflict suffuses many reform initiatives: preserving the Senate's important functions and traditions—for example, cooling popular passions with due deliberation—while enhancing its policymaking performance, oversight capacity, and longer-term focus. As Senator Byrd of West Virginia explained to a class of newly elected Senators, the Senate's \"purpose was and is to examine, consider, protect, and to be a totally independent source of wisdom and judgment on the actions of the lower house and on the executive. As such, the Senate is the central pillar of our Constitutional system.\"\nA final observation: It is understandable that there are many difficulties in managing the contemporary Senate where bipartisanship, collegiality, and compromise are sometimes in short supply. One consequence is that the Senate has evolved from an institution where the filibuster (or its threat) was an infrequent occurrence, to be used on significant matters only, to a new institutional reality where 60 votes are required to approve scores of measures and matters, major or minor. History suggests that this development, too, will change when the sentiments and votes of enough Senators are favorable to another approach, perhaps encouraged by politically active constituents and outside groups and organizations. Meanwhile, the many demographic, geographical, and ideological differences in the nation mean that determination, patience, and sheer hard work are fundamental to negotiating, reconciling, and resolving partisan, policy, and procedural disagreements among Senators and between the two parties. Illinois Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, a renowned Republican minority leader (1959-1969), made an apt comment about the art of governance in the mid-1960s that also applies to today's Senate: \"There are 100 diverse personalities in the U.S. Senate. O Great God, what an amazing and dissonant 100 personalities they are! What an amazing thing it is to harmonize them. What a job it is.\"" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "h0_full h2_full", "h4_full h2_full", "", "h2_full", "h2_title h3_title", "h2_full", "", "h3_full", "h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_full", "h3_title", "", "", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h4_title", "h4_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title h1_title", "", "h1_full", "", "", "h2_full", "", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h3_title", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title h1_title h4_title", "h2_full", "h1_full", "", "", "h4_full", "", "", "h4_title", "", "", "", "", "", "h4_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the filibuster?", "How has the filibuster been portrayed in the media?", "Why is the filibuster a target for change?", "What is Rule XXII?", "How has the frequency of filibusters changed in recent years?", "What has been a consequence of these recent occurrences?", "What do reformers argue?", "What evidence do reformers use to argue their point?", "What do opponents of Senate rule amendment argue?", "What do opponents believe about Congress?", "How do proponents agree with opponents?", "What is proponents' primary concern?", "What were the first initiatives to reform Rule XXII?", "Why were these initiatives instigated?", "What does this report examine?", "Why is this report important?", "What does this report discuss?", "What does the Afterword include?", ":Why is the 2013 case noteworthy?", "Why is this approach called the \"nuclear\" option?", "What does this option do?" ], "summary": [ "The filibuster (extended debate) is the Senate's most well-known procedure.", "Hollywood even highlighted its use in a famous 1939 movie entitled Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, starring actor Jimmy Stewart in the title role of Senator Jefferson Smith.", "Lengthy debate has many virtues (informing the public, for example) but the blocking potential of interminable debate has often made the filibuster a target for change by reform-minded Senators.", "Rule XXII requires 60 votes of Senators duly chosen and sworn to end debate on measures or motions—\"except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting.\"", "Real or threatened filibusters, along with cloture motions, have increased in recent Congresses.", "One consequence has been unsuccessful efforts by change-oriented Senators to amend Rule XXII without having to overcome the two-thirds supermajority hurdle.", "The contention of the reformers is that at the start of a new Congress, the Senate can amend its rules by majority vote—as the House does on its first day.", "They cite the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 5) as authority for their claim: \"Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,\" which implicitly means by majority vote, state the reformers.", "They point out that the Senate has adopted rules and the Constitution says nothing about the vote required to adopt those rules.", "Moreover, they contend that the Senate is a \"continuing body\"—a quorum to conduct business is always present given the staggered terms of Senators—with continuing rules.", "They agree that a majority of the Members can change Senate rules at any time.", "Their concern is Rule XXII's two-thirds requirement for invoking cloture on proposals to amend Senate rules, which can prevent a majority from altering Senate rules.", "From 1953 to 1975, initiatives to reform Rule XXII at the start of a new Congress were biennial rituals.", "They were instigated by Senators in each party frustrated by the chamber's inability to enact social and civil rights legislation because of opposition from other Members.", "The bulk of this report examines each Congress where reform actions occurred on \"opening day,\" which could extend for days, weeks, or months. Most of the reform attempts failed, but two efforts were successful: in 1959 and 1975.", "An analysis of the successes and failures of this nearly quarter-century era of opening day reform efforts could inform contemporary efforts to revise Senate rules by examining the controversies, conditions, and circumstances that produced the various outcomes.", "The report discusses, for example, the roles of various Senate Presidents (the Vice President) and party leaders, as well as the procedural strategies used by opponents and proponents of amending Rule XXII by majority vote at the start of a new Congress.", "The report also includes an \"Afterword\" that examines several subsequent and successful efforts to change Rule XXII in 1977, 1979, 1986, and 2013.", ":The 2013 case is noteworthy because it created a new Senate precedent that allows majority cloture on most executive and judicial branch nominees.", "This precedential approach is sometimes called the \"nuclear\" option because of the likelihood of strong opposition and contentious parliamentary fallout from Senators opposed to its use on consequential measures or matters.", "In brief, the nuclear option indirectly \"amends\" Senate rules by majority vote through the creation of a new precedent that alters the application or interpretation of a chamber's rule, such as Rule XXII, without changing its formal text." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, 0, 1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
CRS_RL31745	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Health Insurance Context", "Health Policy Context", "State High Risk Pools", "General Characteristics of State High Risk Pools", "Administration", "Premiums and Funding", "Benefits", "Eligibility", "Enrollment", "Federal Grants to State High Risk Pools", "107th Congress", "109th Congress", "110th Congress", "111th Congress", "Health Reform" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "In an effort to expand the options for health coverage, 35 states have established high risk health insurance pools. These programs target individuals who cannot obtain or afford health insurance in the private market, primarily due to preexisting health conditions. High risk pools (HRPs) generally cover people who have sought health coverage in the individual (nongroup) market, but have been denied coverage, received quotes from insurers that are higher than the premiums offered by the high risk pools, or received offers from insurers that permanently exclude coverage of preexisting health conditions.\nMany states also use their high risk pools to comply with the portability and guaranteed availability provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, P.L. 104-191 ). For eligible individuals moving from the group to nongroup market, HIPAA requires state-licensed health insurers to make coverage available to such individuals, and prohibits exclusion of coverage for preexisting conditions. To enforce these rules, states are given a choice. They may either enforce the HIPAA individual market guarantees (\"federal fallback\"), or establish an \"acceptable alternative state mechanism,\" such as a high risk health insurance pool.\nIn general, state high risk pools tend to enroll a small percentage of the uninsured. For example, approximately 200,000 individuals were enrolled in the 34 high risk pools in operation in 2008. In contrast, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that nearly 4 million additional persons were potentially eligible for enrollment. However, such limited enrollment reflects, in part, the narrow focus of these pools: individuals with preexisting health conditions, who do not have access to public or group health insurance, and seek coverage in the private, non-group market.\nIn addition to state-established high risk pools, the 111 th Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which President Obama signed into law ( P.L. 111-148 ) on March 23, 2010. PPACA, as amended, requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a temporary high risk pool program, prior to 2014, to provide health insurance coverage to certain individuals with preexisting health conditions who have been uninsured for six or more months. This report will focus on the original, state-established high risk pools.", "High risk pools fill a niche in the health insurance system—a patchwork system of private markets and public programs designed to meet the needs of different types of health care consumers. In the private health insurance market, most people get health coverage through the group market. This market provides health benefits to groups of people that are drawn together by an employer or other organization, such as a trade union. Such groups are generally formed for some purpose other than obtaining insurance, like employment.\nWhile most Americans receive their health coverage through the workplace—as a current employee, a dependent of an employee, or a retiree—some individuals do not have access to employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). They may be workers who do not qualify for an offer of health benefits from their employer (e.g., because the workers have part-time or seasonal employment status), or they may work for a company that does not provide health insurance at all, or they may be unemployed. Public programs also are a source of health coverage, but individuals and families must meet eligibility requirements in order to qualify for benefits. Individuals who cannot access ESI and are not eligible for public programs may seek health insurance in the nongroup (individual) market.\nApplicants to the individual insurance market must go through robust medical underwriting—the process by which an insurer considers information about an applicant and determines (1) whether to offer an insurance policy in the first place, and (2) the terms of that policy (e.g., the monthly premium). The information that a health insurer considers may include personal characteristics, such as an individual's health conditions, family medical history, and other relevant factors. Though uncommon, the insurance carrier may ask an applicant to undergo a physical exam, or provide medical specimens. In the group market, insurers forgo underwriting in the traditional sense, that is, reviewing each person's demographics and medical history. Instead, an insurer would consider the overall characteristics of the group, and calculate a premium for a set of benefits that would be charged to each person in the group, regardless of their individual health status. (For very small groups, insurers may individually underwrite policies, if permitted by law.)\nFederal and state laws restrict somewhat insurers' ability to reject applications or design coverage based on health factors in the nongroup market. Nonetheless, some applicants are rejected from the individual market altogether, others may receive insurance offers with riders that exclude coverage for a specific health condition or body part, or others may be charged premiums that are higher than those in the group market for similar coverage. Rigorous underwriting results in an enrollee population in the individual market that is fairly healthy (three out of four enrollees report that their health is excellent or very good ), thereby excluding persons with moderate to severe health conditions from this private market. High risk pools were designed to assist such individuals who—because of their health conditions—have very few options for private health coverage.", "High risk pools appeal to policymakers who prefer an incremental approach to coverage expansion and reliance on current state oversight of health insurance. Supporters of HRPs contend that states can use their existing regulatory infrastructure, as well as their knowledge of health care markets, to efficiently insure previously uninsurable individuals. Supporters also contend that the private, nongroup market will benefit. They reason that by removing high risk persons from the individual market and placing them in publicly subsidized insurance pools, coverage in the individual market will become more affordable. They argue that better risk spreading helps to stabilize the market, promote competition, and retain insurance carriers—earning the support of such organizations. Moreover, HRPs function as a safety net for the nongroup market by assuring that individuals have access to health insurance as long as they are able and willing to pay for it.\nOthers contend that high risk pools are generally too small and underfunded to meet the needs of the majority of persons who cannot access health insurance in the private market. By design, HRPs experience losses, but federal attempts to subsidize these losses have been limited. Premiums combined with other cost-sharing requirements can often make the coverage offered by these pools unaffordable. Moreover, most state HRPs exclude coverage for preexisting conditions for six months or more. As a result, some researchers remain skeptical that high risk pools will be able to substantially reduce the number of uninsured, particularly among those with serious medical conditions. With respect to reducing the number of people without health coverage, consumer groups generally advocate for expansion of the federal role in providing coverage, whether through existing public programs or broader health care reform, not unlike some of the private market reforms included under PPACA.\nWhile state high risk pools have existed since the mid-1970s, congressional support of state pools began in the 1990s. The enactment of HIPAA during the 104 th Congress specified state HRPs as acceptable mechanisms for complying with the group-to-individual market requirements. The 107 th Congress passed the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ), which authorized a new federal program to provide grants to state high risk pools and made appropriations for FY2003 and FY2004. With expiration of the authorizing legislation for the grant program to states, the 109 th Congress reauthorized the program through FY2010 and made appropriations for FY2006. The 110 th Congress passed legislation in December 2007 and the 111 th Congress passed legislation in March and December 2009 to provide additional appropriations to state high risk pools. (See detailed discussion under \" Federal Grants to State High Risk Pools \" section.)", "Currently, 35 states have high risk health insurance pools. States have a great deal of discretion regarding the establishment and operation of these pools, including covered benefits, eligibility requirements, pre-existing condition exclusion periods, and funding sources.", "", "State high risk pools usually are operated through state-established nonprofit organizations. While private insurance companies typically are responsible for daily administrative duties (along with pool administrative staff), traditional high risk pools bear the insurance risk. Boards oversee the governance of HRPs and usually consist of representatives from insurance companies, consumer groups, health care providers, and state agencies.", "In order to limit health insurance premiums for persons with costly medical conditions, all states cap high risk pool premiums (most are specified in statute). Almost all states have caps between 150% and 200% of standard risk rates. High risk pools generally operate at a loss, \"because it isn't feasible to pool a group of individuals known to have major health problems and expect their premium contributions to cover the entire cost.\" Thus, many state pools tap other sources of funding to cover their operating expenses.\nStates may augment premium collection with one or more of the following sources: assessments on insurers, in some instances combined with offsetting tax credits; general revenue; and other state sources. Almost all states with HRPs assess a fee on insurance carriers and health maintenance organizations; two states place an assessment on hospitals. Many state HRPs also receive grants from the federal government (see discussion under \" Federal Grants to State High Risk Pools \").", "Although health benefits provided through high risk pools vary across plans and states, they generally reflect coverage that is available in the private nongroup market. State pools usually offer more than one plan from which enrollees may choose. Deductibles and other cost-sharing requirements vary from state to state. Nearly all state HRPs have at least one plan with lifetime maximums on benefits (based on a dollar limit), except for Indiana and New Mexico. In contrast, most pools do not apply annual maximums on benefits, except for California, Louisiana, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. In addition, most state HRPs exclude coverage for preexisting health conditions for 6-12 months.", "States establish the eligibility criteria for high risk pools. As noted, many states allow HIPAA-eligible persons to enroll in their HRPs. HIPAA eligibles are persons who did not have or are losing coverage and seeking it in the individual market. They must meet the following requirements: (1) have at least 18 months of \"creditable coverage\" (specified in statute) without a significant break in that coverage (63 or more days); (2) most recent coverage must have been through a group health plan; (3) exhausted federal or state continuation coverage; (4) not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare; and (5) not have any other health insurance. For HIPAA eligibles, high risk pools guarantee the availability of health insurance and prohibit exclusion of coverage for preexisting conditions. High risk pools also are designed to address the insurance needs of non-HIPAA-eligible persons with costly medical conditions. A number of states provide for presumptive eligibility, allowing individuals to become automatically eligible for HRPs if they have a certain medical condition specified under state law. In addition to HIPAA eligibles and persons with specific conditions, many states allow individuals who have experienced coverage denials, coverage restrictions, or premium increases to enroll in high risk pools. Lastly, some states allow persons who receive the Health Coverage Tax Credit to enroll in their high risk pools.", "High risk pool participation varies significantly across states, with average enrollment ranging from a high of 27,187 participants in Minnesota to a low of 265 enrollees in Florida in December 2009. Among state HRPs, the enrollment distribution clusters toward the low end. To illustrate, two-thirds of state pools had participation below 4,000 individuals (23 states). In contrast, only seven states had more than 10,000 participants.", "Given that state high risk pools typically operate at a loss (see discussion above), the federal government has provided financial assistance to states during the past several years. Congress established a grant program, administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to provide seed grants to states that did not already have high risk pools but wanted to establish them, and operational and bonus grants to existing state pools. Once Congress appropriates funding for these grants, CMS announces the funding opportunity and collects and reviews applications. A state may receive up to $1 million in seed grant funding; operational grant amounts are determined by formula. (Not all states with existing HRPs receive grants.)", "With enactment of the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ), the federal government provided funding to state high risk pools for the first time. The Trade Act authorized and appropriated $20 million in the form of seed grants. Each qualifying state could receive up to $1 million to support the creation and implementation of a high risk pool. In 2003, CMS awarded seed grants to six states: Maryland ($1 million), New Hampshire ($1 million), Ohio ($150,000), South Dakota ($1 million), Utah ($52,618), and West Virginia ($1 million).\nThe Trade Act also authorized and appropriated $80 million to be split evenly over FY2003 and FY2004 to defray some of the operating losses experienced by states with existing high risk pools. Each operational grant could cover up to 50% of a pool's operating losses for the year. To qualify, each state must have established a high risk pool that restricts premiums to no more than 150% of the premium for standard risk rates in the state, offers a choice of two or more coverage options, and has in effect a mechanism designed to ensure continued funding of losses incurred after the end of FY2004. However, states may still be able to determine, within federal standards, how much to charge enrollees in out-of-pocket costs, what benefits to include under the plans, how long coverage for preexisting conditions may be excluded, and whom among otherwise uninsurable individuals will be eligible.\nTable 1 shows which states received operational grants for FY2003 and FY2004, and the funding levels. Nineteen states were awarded operational grants in FY2003; 22 states in FY2004.", "With expiration of authorizing legislation for the grant program, the House passed H.R. 4519 , the State High Risk Pool Funding Extension Act of 2006, on December 17, 2005. H.R. 4519 reauthorized federal grants to state high risk pools through FY2010, and changed the funding formula used for such grants. The formula for operational grants was changed to the following: 40% to all qualifying states in equal amounts, 30% based on state proportion of uninsured population among all qualifying states, and 30% based on state proportion of the high risk pool population. H.R. 4519 also allowed operational grants to cover up to 100% of pool losses and authorized the following amounts for FY2006: $15 million for seed grants and $75 million for operational and bonus grants. The Senate passed H.R. 4519 without amendment on February 1, 2006, and President Bush signed it into law ( P.L. 109-172 ) on February 10, 2006.\nAs part of the budget reconciliation process, the Senate passed S. 1932 , the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) conference agreement. DRA included provisions that would provide specific appropriations for the grants authorized under H.R. 4519 . Section 6202 of the Senate measure amended the Public Health Service Act to provide $90 million in appropriations for grants to states for FY2006. DRA provided $75 million for operational grants and $15 million for seed grants. The grants are distributed according to existing statutory requirements. This measure also included conforming language on enactment of H.R. 4519 . Pursuant to H.Res. 653 , the House agreed to the Senate-amended bill on February 1, 2006. On February 8, 2006, President Bush signed DRA into law ( P.L. 109-171 ).\nThe appropriations provided under DRA were used to extend federal funding for this program. On September 30, 2006, CMS awarded seed grants to five states that wanted either to establish high risk pools or conduct feasibility studies: California ($150,000), New York ($150,000), North Carolina ($150,000), Tennessee ($1 million), and Vermont ($1 million). That same year, CMS awarded grants to 31 states that experienced operational losses in 2005. Of those 31 states, 25 also received bonus grants, exhausting the entire appropriations for operational and bonus grants. Table 2 shows which states received operational and bonus grants.\nBecause the funding for seed grants was not exhausted with the 2006 awards, CMS awarded five seed grants in 2007. The states that received these grants were the District of Columbia ($150,000), Florida ($150,000), Georgia ($150,000), North Carolina ($850,000), and Rhode Island ($150,000).", "Pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ), Congress made additional funding available for grants to state high risk pools. CMS issued a grant notification letter to states on May 1, 2008. It stated that a total of $49,127,000 would be split to fund operational grants (two-thirds of the appropriated amount) and bonus grants (remaining one-third). Applications were due by June 9, 2008.\nOn July 21, 2008, CMS announced that 30 states received grants totaling $49, 126,500. Table 3 shows which states received grants and the combined grant amounts.", "The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ) provided $75,000,000 for grants to state high risk pools. CMS announced the availability of these grants in May 2009. On September 30, 2009, CMS awarded operational grants to 31 states and bonus grants to 28 states (see Table 4 ). Furthermore, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ) provided $55,000,000 in additional appropriations for high risk pools.", "The 111 th Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which President Obama signed into law ( P.L. 111-148 ) on March 23, 2010. PPACA, as amended, requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a temporary high risk pool program, prior to 2014, to provide health insurance coverage to certain individuals with preexisting health conditions who have been uninsured for six or more months. States can run the program or elect to have the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) operate the program in their states. The majority of states (29 states and DC) contracted to operate their own HRPs. HHS administers the HRPs in 21 states, under the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) name." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_title", "", "h1_full", "h0_title", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h2_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What percentage of the uninsured do state high risk pools enroll?", "How are high risk pools subsidized?", "What organizations administer these pools?", "How do benefit packages vary?", "What did the Trade Act of 2002 do?", "What issue did the 109th Congress take up?", "How did Congress deal with this issue?", "What did the Act authorize?", "How was the Act signed into law?", "What was the purpose of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005?", "How did Congress pass the DRA?", "Why did CMS award grants to states in 2005?", "What characterized the states that received grants?" ], "summary": [ "In general, state high risk pools tend to enroll a small percentage of the uninsured.", "The majority of high risk pools cap premiums between 150% to 200% of market rates, and pools are subsidized through insurer assessments and other funding mechanisms.", "State-established nonprofit organizations typically run these pools, with private insurance companies handling day-to-day operations, along with plan administrative staff. The majority of high risk pools cap premiums between 150% to 200% of market rates, and pools are subsidized through insurer assessments and other funding mechanisms.", "Although benefit packages vary across states and plans, they generally reflect health benefits that are available in the private insurance market.", "The Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) appropriated a total of $100 million for FY2003-FY2004.", "With the expiration of authorizing legislation for federal funding of state pools, the 109th Congress took up this issue.", "The House passed H.R. 4519, the State High Risk Pool Funding Extension Act of 2006, which reauthorized federal grants to state high risk pools through FY2010, and changed the funding formula used for such grants.", "The act authorized $15 million for seed grants and $75 million for operational and bonus grants for FY2006.", "The Senate passed H.R. 4519 without amendment, and it was signed into law (P.L. 109-172) on February 10, 2006.", "As part of the budget reconciliation process, the Senate passed S. 1932, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) conference agreement, which provided appropriations for the grants authorized under H.R. 4519. The measure also included conforming language on enactment of H.R. 4519.", "The House agreed to the Senate-amended DRA bill, and it was signed into law (P.L. 109-171) on February 8, 2006.", "The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) awarded grants to 31 states that experienced operational losses in 2005.", "Of those 31 states, 25 also received bonus grants. In 2006, CMS awarded seed grants to five states, and to another five states in 2007." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, -1, 1, 2, 2, -1, 0, -1, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3 ] }
GAO_GAO-16-104	{ "title": [ "Background", "Liquefied Natural Gas", "World Market for Natural Gas", "Federal Role in Maritime and LNG Industries", "DOE and Industry Expect the United States to Play a Large Role in the LNG Market over the Next 10 Years", "DOE and Industry Expect the United States to Become a Significant Exporter of LNG", "Customers of U.S. LNG Have Responsibility for Transporting LNG from Liquefaction Facilities", "About 100 or More LNG Carriers May Be Needed to Transport Expected U.S. LNG Exports in the Coming Years", "If the Proposed Requirement Does Not Reduce the Expected Demand for U.S. LNG, It Could Expand Employment for U.S. Mariners and Shipbuilders", "If Demand Is Not Reduced, Maritime Stakeholders Say the Proposed Requirement Could Expand Employment for U.S. Mariners, Though Time Would Be Needed for Training", "A Few U.S. Shipyards Expressed Interest in Building LNG Carriers, but a Number of Challenges Exist", "If LNG Customers Contract to Purchase U.S.-Built Carriers, Construction of Those LNG Carriers Could Provide Employment in U.S. Shipyards, according to Shipyard Representatives", "U.S.-Built Carriers Would Increase Transportation Costs and Would Likely Reduce Demand for U.S. LNG", "The Proposed Requirement Would Increase Transportation Costs For U.S. LNG Exports", "Increased Transportation Costs Would Reduce U.S. Competitiveness in the LNG Market", "Proposed Requirement and Changes in U.S. LNG Exports May Have Ripple Effects through the LNG Supply Chain", "Stakeholders Expressed Concerns about Potential Trade Implications", "Few Stakeholders Cited Safety and Reliability Benefits", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Natural gas is a fuel that can be used in many contexts, similar to gasoline, heating oil, and other crude-oil derivatives and is considered more environmentally friendly than oil derivatives. In its gaseous form, natural gas is transported by pipeline. LNG is natural gas cooled to -260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point it becomes a liquid, and its volume is reduced by 600 times—allowing for ease of transportation via specialized LNG carriers over long distances. This cooling process takes place at liquefaction facilities. Figure 1 illustrates this process.\nDepending on the context, different units of measurement are used to describe volumes of natural gas and liquefied natural gas, as well as their respective energy content. For the purposes of this report, the conversions used are outlined in table 1.", "Through 2015, the United States has been a net importer of natural gas, along with Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan, and others. Ocean transport of LNG began in the late 1950s and early 1960s. According to the International Gas Union, Japan and South Korea are currently the largest importers of LNG, and as of 2014, the largest supplier/exporter of LNG was Qatar, followed by Malaysia, Australia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Trinidad, and Algeria. As discussed in greater detail in the following section, according to DOE, the market for LNG has changed recently due mainly to technology enhancements in the extraction of natural gas from shale formations and changes in energy needs.", "Several federal agencies oversee or are involved in LNG exports or the U.S. maritime industry:\nDepartment of Energy: Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), the import or export of LNG and the construction or expansion of LNG facilities requires authorization from DOE. In 1984, DOE delegated the responsibility to approve or deny applications for LNG facilities to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).\nFederal Energy Regulatory Commission: In keeping with its obligation to authorize LNG facility siting and construction under the NGA, FERC reviews applications to construct and operate LNG export facilities onshore or in state waters. FERC’s review is considered a federal action and subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).\nCoast Guard: Within the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S.\nCoast Guard is responsible for administering and enforcing requirements for U.S.-flag registry (e.g., determining whether vessels meet U.S.-owned-and-built requirements). USCG is also responsible for credentialing mariners and maintains records on all mariners who hold valid merchant mariner credentials, including data on mariners who may serve on U.S.-flag vessels that support the DOD during times of war or national emergencies.\nMaritime Administration: MARAD’s mission is to foster and promote the U.S. Merchant Marine and the American maritime industry to strengthen the maritime transportation system—including the shipbuilding and repair industry—to meet the economic and national- security needs of the nation. MARAD administers the Federal Ship Financing Program (commonly referred to as Title XI based on the part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 that established the program), which provides a U.S. Government guarantee of private loans to (1) U.S. or foreign ship owners for the purpose of financing or refinancing either U.S. flag vessels or eligible export vessels constructed, reconstructed or reconditioned in U.S. shipyards and (2) U.S. shipyards for the purpose of financing advanced shipbuilding technology and modern shipbuilding technology of a privately owned, general shipyard facility located in the United States. In general, under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, appropriations to cover the estimated subsidy costs of a project must be obtained prior to the issuance of any letter of commitments for loan guarantees.\nDepartment of Defense: As we have noted, the military strategy of the United States relies, in part, on the use of commercial U.S.- flagged ships and crews and the availability of a shipyard industrial base to support national defense needs.\nIn addition to the roles described above MARAD and DOD jointly manage programs intended to increase capacity for the military, including those related to sealift capacity. Sealift is the process of transporting DOD’s and other federal agencies’ equipment and supplies required during peacetime and war. First, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program was established to provide DOD with “assured access” to commercial sealift and intermodal capacity to support the emergency deployment and sustainment of U.S. military forces. To meet national defense or other security needs, DOD may use commercial sealift capacity, to the extent it is available, to meet ocean transportation requirements. This commercial sealift capacity includes U.S.-and-foreign- flagged vessels and/or intermodal capacity to support DOD’s needs. In the event voluntary capacity does not meet DOD’s contingency requirements, DOD may activate VISA as necessary.\nA second program, the Maritime Security Program (MSP), is administered by MARAD and is intended to guarantee that certain kinds of militarily useful ships and their crews will be available to DOD in a military contingency. Currently, MSP provides direct payment of $3.1 million per year for up to 60 militarily useful U.S.-flagged vessels participating in international trade to support DOD. DOT determines the commercial viability and DOD determines the military usefulness of vessels that seek participation in MSP. According to MARAD, as of October 2015, there were 165 large oceangoing vessels operating under the U.S. flag, 139 of which have been categorized as militarily useful. If needed, vessels in MSP would be activated through the VISA program.", "", "According to DOE, due to advances in extraction technologies and growing worldwide demand for natural gas, the United States is expected to become a net exporter of natural gas in the next few years. For decades the United States has been a net importer of natural gas, and as recently as just a few years ago the prospects that the U.S. would become a net exporter in this market seemed doubtful. For example, EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2011 did not have any projections for net exports of natural gas by the United States, but the next year’s Energy Outlook did show projected exports and those projections in more recent years have risen.\nAccording to EIA, this evolution in the U.S. natural gas industry relates to the discovery of more energy resources as well as advances in hydraulic- fracturing and horizontal-drilling technologies. Moreover, studies we reviewed noted that the pricing of natural gas in many other regions of the world has traditionally been linked to oil prices, while in the U.S. prices are set based on supply and demand conditions in North America. Economic theory suggests that these differing price mechanisms in various regions of the world have encouraged some companies to invest in U.S. natural-gas liquefaction and export facilities with the intent to profitably sell U.S. natural gas in other regions where natural gas prices have generally been higher, particularly when oil prices are high. More recently, however, DOE officials told us that as the LNG export market has developed, oil-linked pricing is coming under pressure as buyers are benefiting from more options and demanding more flexibility in their purchases. Nevertheless, demand for natural gas is expected to be strong with growing demand in the coming years.\nBeyond the cost of natural gas, there are other key costs that are important in determining U.S. competitiveness in the LNG export market. Unlike the transport of natural gas by pipeline, the transport of LNG requires the product to be stored and transported at extremely low temperatures, necessitating LNG carriers to have expensive technology to accommodate such cold-storage transport. In terms of transportation costs, the United States does not have an advantage over some other sources of natural gas or LNG for the large importing countries in Europe and Asia. For example, according to a study we reviewed as of now, much of Europe is supplied with natural gas by pipeline. As a result, LNG from the United States is less likely to be an economical source of natural gas to that region under many possible market conditions. While some Asian markets—notably Japan and Korea—have little pipeline gas supply, exports from planned liquefaction facilities in Australia and East African countries will have a proximity advantage (that is, shorter and thus likely less expensive transportation) to Asian countries over the United States. As such, according to economic reasoning, the question of the extent to which a cost advantage in gas supply is offset by cost disadvantages in transport plays an important role in determining U.S. competitiveness in the world LNG market.\nRecent investments in liquefaction facilities are an important indicator that market conditions are such that the United States is expected to be competitive in the market for LNG exports. Despite higher transportation costs for U.S. LNG as compared to LNG from other countries into key export markets in Asia, investors were willing to commit substantial resources to develop the liquefaction facilities needed for that trade, as evidenced by their construction. In particular, five large scale liquefaction facilities are currently under construction in the United States, with one facility expected to come online by the end of 2015 and all five facilities expected to be operational within about 3 years (see table 2). The total daily capacity of these five facilities is nearly 10-billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas, which constitutes about 12.4 percent of expected U.S. natural gas production and approximately 18.1 percent of the world’s expected LNG capacity in 2020. The business model used by the U.S. facilities currently under construction has helped to increase the business certainty of the liquefaction facilities, likely increasing their ability to obtain financing. In particular, according to representatives from the five facilities, the liquefaction capacity being built in the United States has been contracted out under 20-year contracts to buyers—mostly importers in Asian countries. Further, these contracts specify that buyers must pay for liquefaction services provided by the specific facility whether or not they choose to use all the capacity for which they contracted (that is, regardless of the amount of gas the customer chooses to have liquefied).\nInvestments in facility construction, and the contracting of the associated capacity, have helped to position the United States as an emerging LNG exporter. Based on discussions with DOE officials, liquefaction facilities, and economic consulting firms, the expected level of U.S. exports over the next several years is tied, among other things, to the amount of liquefaction capacity of these five facilities. However, the fact that, according to liquefaction facility representatives, the liquefaction capacity is already under contract and liquefaction facilities are expected to receive payments for their full capacity does not mean that the capacity will necessarily be fully used all the time. Volatility in world market conditions may at times cause capacity to be underutilized due, for example, to periods of reduced demand such as during a recession. Moreover, other world suppliers are expected to enter the market over the next several years, and this could reduce the relative attractiveness of U.S. LNG. Even customers that have already purchased liquefaction capacity may choose not to use all the capacity for which they contracted from U.S. liquefaction facilities if new supply sources are more economical. As a result, some market uncertainty exists as to whether the full U.S. LNG capacity from the five facilities will, in fact, be exported over the next 20 years, even though liquefaction facility representatives stated that capacity is already under contract.\nAdditional uncertainties regarding U.S. exports of LNG relate to whether more capacity for liquefaction is likely to be developed beyond the capacity currently under construction. A number of additional liquefaction facilities have applied for approval from DOE and FERC in the past few years, and, as of September 2015, DOE has approved more than 30 companies to export LNG from large-scale liquefaction facilities. However, based on current demand, representatives from liquefaction facilities told us that it is unlikely that some of those additional facilities will ever be built. Thus, while confidence regarding U.S. exports in the next few years under expected market conditions is driven primarily by the capacity commitments in liquefaction capability, longer-term forecasts are more uncertain due to unknowns regarding macroeconomic conditions, increased exports by other countries, as well as whether additional liquefaction capacity will be profitable to develop.", "According to representatives from the liquefaction facilities we spoke with, under current business models and contracts, the costs associated with importing LNG (including, for example, feed gas, liquefaction services, and transportation) are separate, and U.S. liquefaction facilities have no responsibility for shipping LNG. According to representatives at all five U.S. liquefaction facilities, customers take possession of the LNG at each facility’s loading terminal, and customers arrange for LNG carriers to transport the LNG at their own expense. For example, representatives from one liquefaction facility explained that their customers may contract for the services of existing LNG carriers on long-term charters or may contract for construction of new carriers to transport U.S. LNG exports. See figure 2 for pictures of two styles of LNG carriers. A representative from another liquefaction facility told us that its customers have already contracted to build new LNG carriers to serve their needs in the new U.S. export market.\nTransportation costs borne by contracted overseas customers include vessel operating costs, such as fuel and labor, and capital costs, such as the purchase and financing of LNG carriers. Costs for transporting U.S. LNG vary depending on the destination. Thus, transportation costs affect the total delivered price of LNG to customers. Figure 3 shows an example from two liquefaction facilities of the costs that, combined, represent the total “landed” price of LNG for customers in Europe and Asia. According to representatives of the five liquefaction facilities, U.S. LNG customers are primarily from Asian countries, but some cargos are contracted to companies in Europe and would likely incur lower shipping costs.", "Estimates of the number of LNG carriers necessary for transporting U.S. LNG vary, but based on estimates of representatives from the five liquefaction facilities with whom we spoke, about 100 or more LNG carriers will be needed to transport U.S. exports once liquefaction facilities are fully operational. Stakeholders, including DOE officials and shipbuilder representatives, estimated the number of needed carriers to be as low as 25 and as high as 200. However, based on their knowledge of the contracted liquefaction capacity, representatives from liquefaction facilities, one shipbuilder, and an international association of LNG importers told us that about 100 LNG carriers will be needed for transporting U.S. exports and that most of these carriers have already been ordered or are under construction. This estimate is generally in line with our analysis of the needed carrier capacity to transport roughly 9.77 bcf per day (the currently contracted capacity of U.S. facilities) based on the factors below (see app. I for more information on this analysis):\nMost modern LNG carriers have a cargo volume of between 160,000 to 170,000 cubic meters.\nMost U.S. liquefaction capacity has been contracted to customers in Asia.\nAccording to a ship-building company we spoke with, a one-way voyage for an LNG carrier from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Japan can take approximately 30 days (or about 60 days, roundtrip) through the Panama Canal.\nAccording to the shipbroker and other maritime stakeholders we spoke with, the current world LNG carrier fleet includes over 400 carriers, with another 160 new carriers scheduled for delivery by the end of 2018. Maritime stakeholders we spoke with said there is currently an overabundance of LNG carriers available in the world’s LNG shipping market relative to current demand, due in part to a speculative rush of orders. However, these stakeholders expect this to change in the next few years as increased LNG capacity from the United States and Australia begins to come online and older LNG carriers are taken out of service, at which point additional carriers may be needed.\nAs mentioned previously, currently operating LNG carriers are nearly all foreign built and flagged. For example, a ship broker we spoke with estimated that Korean shipyards have built about 250 of the 350 LNG carriers delivered in the last 20 years and also have the largest share of LNG carriers under construction. According to MARAD officials and a shipbuilder representative, LNG carriers have not been built in the United States since 1980, and no LNG carriers are currently registered under U.S. flag.", "", "While we cannot reliably estimate the total number of U.S. mariner jobs that would be created due to the possibility that the proposed requirement could reduce demand for U.S. LNG (discussed in the next section), Coast Guard officials and representatives from four mariner unions estimated that each U.S.-flagged LNG carrier would likely employ a crew of between 40 and 52 mariners, as discussed below. According to Coast Guard officials and representatives from mariner unions we spoke with, LNG carriers typically require about 20 to 26 mariners to operate, depending on the type of propulsion system used in the vessel. According to representatives from mariner unions, this number is a fairly average crew size for a large ship; in comparison, the average container ship requires about 20 mariners. A ship’s crew is comprised of officers and unlicensed mariners. For example, according to representatives from one mariner union, a typical LNG carrier may be operated by 11 officers (including deck and engineering officers) and 15 unlicensed mariners (7 deck crew, 5 engine crew, and 3 stewards). To estimate the total number of mariner jobs each LNG carrier would support, mariner groups told us that this number should be doubled to 40 to 52 to account for vacation time, other types of leave, and training. Assuming that demand for U.S. LNG is not decreased and that 100 LNG carriers would be needed to transport the five U.S. facilities’ full capacity of LNG once they are fully operational, approximately 4,000 to 5,200 mariners could potentially be employed on U.S.-flagged LNG carriers. However, as discussed in the next section, implementation of the proposed requirement would likely lead to decreased demand for LNG.\nAll currently operating LNG carriers are foreign-flagged (as discussed previously) and, according to mariner unions we spoke with, employ few U.S. officers and no unlicensed U.S. mariners. According to representatives from the mariner groups we contacted, about 180 active U.S. officers have the training and experience to work on LNG carriers, but the last time any U.S. unlicensed mariners worked on LNG carriers may have been over a decade ago. While all U.S. flagged vessels are required to hire predominantly U.S. citizen mariners, maritime stakeholders told us that foreign-flagged vessels may be able to hire the least expensive crews available with the necessary skills.\nU.S. mariners may not be immediately available to operate LNG carriers due to training and experience requirements and expectations from carrier operators. In the shipping industry, there are minimum experience requirements for working on LNG carriers, as discussed below. Representatives from mariner unions we spoke with stated that the U.S. maritime industry has the capacity to accommodate the potential demand for LNG carrier crews and recruiting mariners would not be an issue. However, based on requirements for obtaining necessary credentials, ensuring officers and unlicensed mariners have sufficient experience and training could take years. According to a representative from one mariner union we spoke with, unlicensed mariners need to complete a one-week LNG-carrier training class. However, qualification for employment on LNG carriers also requires experience working on an LNG carrier. For example, Coast Guard requirements for a “tankerman” credential (certification required to work on a tank vessel, including LNG carriers) include at least 90 days of experience as well as at least 10 loadings or unloadings of liquid cargo while working on the tanker. According to Coast Guard officials, currently there about 300 U.S. mariners holding a national endorsement as Tankerman‐PIC (person in charge) that is valid for liquefied gas tank vessels. For an LNG carrier, the latter requirement could take 10 months or more to satisfy. According to representatives from a shipping brokerage company we spoke with, it could also be difficult for U.S. mariners to gain the necessary experience aboard a foreign-flagged LNG carrier (necessary due to the current lack of U.S.- flagged LNG carriers) because of the relatively higher costs associated with U.S. unlicensed mariners—discussed later in this report—compared with available foreign mariner crews competing for those jobs.\nIncreased employment opportunities for U.S. mariners, if they did occur, could have benefits related to military readiness. DOD and MARAD officials told us that any action that increases the number of U.S. mariners available to operate the reserve sealift fleet is beneficial. However, we found in August 2015 that while MARAD has stated that there is a need for additional mariners for military purposes DOD has had a sufficient number of mariners to meet its past needs. In fact, we found that according to Coast Guard data, the number of mariners potentially qualified to operate the reserve sealift fleet has increased, from 37,702 in 2008 to 54,953 in 2014. While MARAD estimates that only 11,280 of those mariners are available, we found that MARAD had not fully analyzed the availability of mariners for a prolonged activation, and we recommended MARAD conduct a full analysis. As such, it is unclear to what extent the additional mariner capacity possible under the proposed requirement would provide a benefit to military sealift capacity.", "Representatives from 3 of 11 companies we contacted operating large and active U.S. shipyards expressed interest in building LNG carriers. However, the shipyards would need to acquire the equipment and technology to build specialized LNG-containment systems that store LNG at minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit. In order to license this technology, shipyards must pay a licensing fee and successfully complete a qualification process, which includes building a mock-up of the containment system, to be certified to build the containment system. Although some U.S. shipyards are currently gaining experience building LNG-powered vessels, shipbuilders and others we spoke with stated that this experience is not comparable to building the large containment systems required for transporting LNG for trade. Specifically, LNG- powered vessels use containment systems with a capacity of about 900 cubic meters. These systems are generally purchased overseas and welded onto the vessel. Conversely, according to shipbuilders, LNG carriers have larger containment systems, with approximately 170,000 cubic meter capacity, that must be constructed within the carrier.\nBased on information from shipbuilders, we found that construction of LNG carriers in U.S. shipyards presents several challenges that could likely mean higher costs and longer lead and construction times than those for Korean shipyards, which currently build most LNG carriers:\nShipyard infrastructure: Only two of the three shipyards in our review currently have docks long enough to accommodate construction of the LNG carriers necessary for international trade (approximately 1,000 feet long) without substantial capital improvements.\nAvailability: The two shipyards with docks large enough to build these LNG carriers currently have vessel orders that take up their shipbuilding capacity through approximately 2018, after which representatives stated they may be available for building LNG carriers. However, we believe that given the limited dock space, orders they may receive in the near term for other types of vessels may delay future construction of LNG carriers.\nTimeline: Representatives from those two shipyards with docks long enough to build LNG carriers estimated that it would take about 4 to 5 years to build an LNG carrier from the time of initial contact with a buyer. According to one representative, the process of building capacity, preparing for construction, and constructing the first LNG carrier would include: development of carrier specifications, qualification to build the LNG containment system, detailed design of the carrier, construction of the carrier, installation of the containment system, and final testing of the carrier and containment system.\nProductivity: Representatives from those two shipyards stated their shipyard can produce one and two large vessels a year, respectively. Based on these rates, we estimate it would take over 30 years to build the 100-carrier fleet potentially needed for U.S. exports. These shipyard representatives stated that as more carriers are built, efficiency may increase and construction may gain speed. Increased efficiency might somewhat reduce the number of years it would take to provide an adequate fleet for this trade. In comparison, according to representatives from a ship brokerage, major Asian shipyards may be capable of delivering between 50 and 80 large ships in 1 year, for reasons discussed below.\nAs a result of U.S. shipyards’ capacity constraints, as well as their anticipated lower productivity than foreign shipyards, LNG carriers built in U.S. shipyards would likely cost more than those currently built in foreign shipyards. According to industry representatives we spoke with, new LNG carriers built in Korean shipyards, where the majority of LNG carriers are currently built, are generally priced from $200 to $225 million. Currently, no U.S. shipyards build LNG carriers, so there are no actual carrier prices for comparison. However, representatives from the three U.S. shipyards we spoke with estimated that U.S.-built carriers would cost about two to three times as much as similar carriers built in Korean shipyards, depending on factors such as volume. Based on this range cited by U.S. shipyards, the cost of U.S.-built LNG carriers could range from $400 to $675 million. Another factor that contributes to cost differences between U.S. and Korean shipyards, according to representatives from a shipping brokerage company we spoke with, is that Korean shipyards have made capital investments in equipment that increases efficiency such as cranes that can lift 2,000-4,000 tons, compared to cranes in U.S. shipyards that can lift 600 tons.", "Officials from the two U.S. shipyards with sufficient dock space stated that hiring of U.S. shipyard workers would depend on the number of LNG carriers ordered and would rely in part on foreign workers. Representatives from one shipyard roughly estimated that for an order of one large LNG carrier they might hire about 1,000 short-term U.S. workers and hire an additional 250 to 300 skilled Korean workers for the duration of the build time to ensure the work is done correctly. However, if they had contracts for a larger number of carriers, they would likely hire fewer Korean workers, who would gradually be transitioned out as U.S. workers were trained to complete the work. A representative from the second shipyard stated that the skills needed to build the LNG containment system do not exist in their current workforce, so for an order of two LNG carriers, they would likely hire skilled foreign shipyard workers to do the work in order to mitigate risk and increase schedule predictability, even if the costs of employing a foreign workforce may be slightly higher than using U.S. workers. Representatives also stated that they would be unlikely to increase capacity by opening another shipyard to build LNG carriers alongside other vessels, so they might not hire any additional new workers. Nonetheless, they noted that this LNG work would add to the stability of the shipyard’s current 1,100 shipbuilding jobs, and lead to a more skilled workforce.\nThis shipyard employment estimate is roughly comparable to estimates using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimates on job creation. Based on employment estimating tools from BLS, construction of a $450-million ship (as noted above, a conservative estimate of the cost to build an LNG carrier in the United States) is associated with 1,675 jobs in the shipbuilding industry. However there are a number of caveats associated with this estimate. For example, the numbers in BLS’s estimates represent averages for all types of ship and boat building, and are not specific to LNG carriers. Additionally, the number of shipbuilding workers would likely remain steady across the production of multiple ships over time, so it would not provide new jobs for every additional carrier ordered. For example, the estimated need for 100 LNG carriers to serve the U.S.\nLNG export market will not result in 167,500 jobs. And finally, while jobs may be created in the shipbuilding sector, a certain number of the jobs would likely be taken by people who are currently working in other construction or related industries, such as welders or other skilled trade workers. As such, while shipbuilding jobs might increase, not all of that increase necessarily represents net new jobs for the overall economy.\nIncreasing or stabilizing jobs in the shipbuilding industry for a period of time, if it occurred, could have additional benefits for military readiness. DOD officials told us that there is no military use for LNG carriers because the carriers are too specialized for current military needs. However, in addition to offering stability for U.S. shipbuilder jobs, as long as a market for U.S. LNG is at or near currently expected levels, the proposed requirement could help maintain shipbuilding capacity in the event it is needed for military purposes. Officials from DOD and MARAD stated that any actions that increase the capacity of U.S. shipyards as an industrial base would be indirectly beneficial for the Navy and military readiness in general.", "The proposed requirement would increase the cost of transporting LNG from the United States, which would decrease the competitiveness of U.S. LNG as compared to other sources. This decreased competitiveness may in turn reduce demand for U.S LNG. The extent of this reduction is unclear. Additionally, any reduction in demand for U.S. exports due to the proposed requirements and resulting changes to the LNG market may decrease jobs in other U.S. industries such as the liquefaction and the oil and gas industries.", "As we have noted, transportation costs for LNG are a fairly significant portion of the overall cost of the product in import markets. Based on information shared with us by representatives from U.S. liquefaction companies regarding current expected costs of the key phases for the LNG export supply chain—gas supply, liquefaction, and transportation— shipping costs are expected to make up about 26-percent of total costs for U.S. LNG delivered to an Asian market. Representatives from liquefaction companies, shipping companies, and an economic consulting company we spoke with currently expect U.S. LNG exports from the United States over the coming years to be transported on carriers built in foreign countries—primarily Korea and Japan. If these exports were required to be transported on U.S.-built and U.S.-flagged carriers, the costs associated with transport would be higher, as described below.\nThe requirement to ship U.S. LNG on U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers would affect both the cost of carrier construction, as noted above, as well as carrier operation. Our conversations with the 3 shipbuilders and 2 shipping companies have suggested that the purchase price of a U.S.- built LNG carrier is likely to be at least double—and could be significantly more—the cost of an LNG carrier constructed in South Korea. In addition, operating costs for U.S.-flagged carriers would be higher than for internationally flagged carriers. According to a 2011 MARAD study, U.S. crews are generally more highly paid than international crews and certain other operating costs associated with U.S. flagging requirements, such as insurance costs, are also higher. The study found that operations costs of U.S.-flagged vessels of various types were, on average, about 2.7 times that of foreign-flagged carriers. However, based on our discussions with one mariner union, the differential for the costs of crewing U.S-flagged LNG carriers compared to international carriers may be less than the cost differential for the types of vessels MARAD surveyed. This is because, according to three mariner unions we spoke with, LNG carriers require more highly skilled mariners, so crew costs for international LNG carriers are generally higher than crew costs on other types of ocean-going vessels.\nThe higher costs of building and operating U.S. LNG carriers may make it more challenging for shippers to obtain financing for construction of U.S.- built carriers than for carriers built in other countries. A critical question regarding any large capital project is whether potential investors believe that the asset will be profitable enough to warrant the investment, particularly if financial returns carry substantial risk. To better understand the cost implications of a requirement that U.S. LNG exports be carried on U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers, we conducted an analysis designed to develop a general estimate of the additional shipping revenues that investors must believe will be earned over the life of the investment to provide reasonable certainty that the investment is financially viable. Although we do not have data to conduct a detailed estimate, by making some hypothetical assumptions we are able to provide an illustration of the potential cost impact of a U.S.-built-and-flagged carrier requirement for LNG exports, if all other factors remain equal. These assumptions include:\nThe U.S.-built carriers would be financed through 25-year debt at a 4 percent rate of interest.\nA U.S.-built LNG carrier of approximately 170,000 cubic meter capacity will be priced at $450 million, about twice that of such carriers being constructed for this trade in Korea.\nOperating costs of the U.S.-flagged LNG carriers would be 50-percent higher than an internationally flagged LNG carrier (likely a conservative estimate, compared to the MARAD study cited above).\nA U.S. carrier would make six deliveries of LNG each year to an Asian destination. This suggests an annual capacity of over 23-trillion British thermal units (Btu) of energy per LNG export carrier.\nWe found that, under these assumptions, the additional transportation costs associated with a U.S.-built-and-flagged LNG carrier would be roughly $0.73 per MMBtu of delivered energy product. Based on our discussions with U.S. liquefaction companies, we understand that an estimated shipping rate for LNG from the U.S. to market destinations in Asia is roughly $3.00 per MMBtu under the status quo market environment, suggesting that a requirement for U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers to transport U.S. LNG would be associated with about 24-percent higher shipping rates if all of the additional cost were passed on to the buyer.", "Higher shipping rates likely associated with U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers would decrease the competitiveness of U.S. LNG, but the extent to which this would occur and its effects are uncertain. As we have noted, world supply and demand conditions determine the extent to which there is a market for U.S. LNG exports, and those conditions would be affected by higher shipping costs for U.S. LNG exports. The increase in shipping costs may increase the delivered price for U.S. LNG relative to non-US LNG and other energy sources. A higher relative price may in turn reduce demand for U.S LNG. However, it is difficult to know the extent to which these added costs would affect U.S. LNG exports because of the variety of additional supply and demand factors that may also affect purchasers’ decisions.\nFirst, leaving aside the higher cost of U.S. LNG to purchasers, the shipyard capacity in the United States could present a major limiting factor for accommodating U.S. exports under a U.S.-built-and-flagged requirement. As we noted earlier, the U.S. shipbuilding industry does not have the capacity to build the carriers needed for the expected level of this trade in the near term so it will take many years for enough carriers to be built to service the expected level of exports. As such, the manner in which any U.S.-built requirement is implemented would be a critical element in the market consequence of this requirement. If U.S.-built carriers were required within, for example, 5 years of the requirement’s passage, total carrier capacity available to ship LNG would itself be a major limiting factor for exports. Because capacity would likely only be able to come online gradually over more than 3 decades, limited LNG would likely be exported for some period of time, requiring purchasers to import from other sources in the early and intermediate years. This reduction in the currently planned exports of U.S. LNG may cause the U.S. export industry to not develop as currently planned—particularly if liquefaction facilities were unable to enforce provisions of their contracts that require them to pay regardless of services used (see further discussion below). Moreover, in the interim years, importers may be developing new sources for their product and contracting for long-term purchases from these other suppliers. Such circumstances would likely undermine any substantial development of U.S. exports. However, the ability to reflag international carriers to the U.S. flag might be able to occur in a more timely fashion such that this ability to reflag could mitigate a substantial impact on exports related to LNG carrier availability if the requirement for U.S.-built carriers were phased in over a longer term.\nA second factor that may influence the market effect of this requirement relates to customers’ existing financial commitments. As discussed previously, according to representatives of liquefaction facilities, all of the LNG liquefaction capacity for U.S. exports is already committed under 20- year contracts—that is, customers have already agreed to pay for liquefaction services for a long period of time whether they fully use the service or not. Additionally, according to liquefaction companies we spoke with, some of these customers have contracted to lease foreign-built carriers on a long-term basis and/or have contracted for the construction of new carriers in foreign shipyards for the transport of U.S. LNG. These existing financial commitments may constrain the manner in which these purchasers can adjust their business plans in response to a U.S. carrier requirement.\nSeveral stakeholders told us that implementation of the proposed requirement and associated increases in transportation costs could prompt customers to attempt to modify, renegotiate, or terminate their liquefaction contracts. Specifically, according to two liquefaction companies and a representative from an economic research and consulting company, customers might try to excuse their contractual obligations by invoking contract law doctrines such as force majeure (generally defined as unforeseeable circumstances outside the control of the contract parties that prevent compliance with a contract) or impracticability (generally defined as where contract performance of an act can only be rendered at excessive or unreasonable difficulty). While the outcome of such potential litigation is uncertain, any litigation could create delays and add to market uncertainty, which may, in turn, reduce the market for U.S. LNG. If customers are able to modify, renegotiate, or terminate these contracts, the liquefaction facilities would likely experience reduced profits, which might adversely affect their operations.\nSimilarly, purchasers would need to be able to finance the U.S.-built LNG carriers to be able to continue their plans to purchase U.S. LNG. As we noted, the increased cost of U.S.-built vessels could make it more challenging to finance these vessels. Moreover, existing commitments to lease or contract for foreign-built tankers could add an additional obstacle. If customers are not able to modify, renegotiate, or terminate contracts for leased tankers or for the building of new tankers in foreign shipyards, customers’ ability to purchase U.S. LNG may be constrained because they may not be able to finance additional tankers built in the United States. In that case, whether or not they must pay for liquefaction capacity they have contracted for (without receiving any LNG), purchasing U.S. LNG might no longer be a financially viable option.", "A reduction in the level of expected U.S. LNG exports due to higher shipping costs could have effects on sectors of the economy involved with the LNG export supply chain. Reduced or eliminated exports would render some or all of the capacity in liquefaction facilities unnecessary, so some jobs that have been or are expected to be created in these facilities would be lost. For example, representatives from one facility stated that they expect to employ more than 200 individuals once the facility becomes operational. Further, if contracts for the purchase of liquefaction were modified, renegotiated, or terminated by customers (for example, through the litigation process or through default), these facilities could be less profitable, which could lead to financial implications for their investors. Further, as discussed above, the potential gain in jobs in the shipbuilding and mariner occupations that the carrier requirement would be designed to promote might not be fully realized if U.S. LNG exports were reduced. If, for example, the market for U.S. LNG were eliminated, no LNG carriers would need to be built in the United States.\nIn addition, in the gas extraction industry, any reduction in exports would likely cause a small loss in the number of jobs, since there would be reduced demand for natural gas supplies. Another possible effect of reduced U.S. exports would be reduced revenues for oil and gas companies involved in energy extraction, which could have a further effect of reduced investments by these companies. Finally, reduced exports could lead to a small decrease in the price of natural gas in the domestic market, since more of the supply of the product would be maintained for domestic use.", "Representatives from economic forecasting firms, one shipbuilder, and one liquefaction company we spoke with stated concerns that the proposed requirement may have implications under existing trade agreements, including: potential legal action to challenge the requirement brought in various potential adverse effects on current or future trade negotiations, and potential retaliatory trade practices, such as foreign government action to protect one or more industries within their respective countries.", "A few stakeholders have proposed that the requirement may also have some safety and security benefits beyond military readiness. For example, one mariner union raised the possibility of U.S. carriers being perceived as safer than those built and/or flagged in other countries. However, other stakeholders, including the Coast Guard, stated there is no reason to believe U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers would be any safer than foreign LNG carriers. According to industry reports, as of February 2015, there have been no major accidents involving LNG carriers. Similarly, Coast Guard officials stated that they have protocols/procedures in place to help ensure safety of the United States from ships coming into U.S. port and that they saw no security benefit associated with reducing the number of foreign shippers entering U.S. waterways and ports.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Transportation and the U.S. Trade Representative for their review and comment. We also provided a draft of this report to DOL for informational purposes. DOE and DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate, as well as formal comments. In its comments, which are reprinted in full in appendix II, DOD stated that it appreciated that we noted that U.S. national security plans and strategies rely, in part, on the ability to draw on U.S. commercial ships and mariners as well as the existence of a domestic shipbuilding industrial base. USTR and DHS had no comments.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Transportation, and the U.S. Trade Representative. This report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "The Howard Coble Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 includes a provision for GAO to report on the number of positions that would be created in the United States maritime industry each year in 2015 through 2025 if liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported from the United States were required to be carried: (1) before December 31, 2018, on vessels documented under the laws of the United States; and (2) after such date, on vessels documented under the laws of the United States and constructed in the U.S. This report discusses: (1) current industry and Department of Energy (DOE) expectations for the market for U.S. exports of LNG, and how that market is expected to operate, (2) stakeholders’ views on how the proposed requirement to use U.S.-flagged-and-built carriers for LNG exports could affect jobs in the maritime, shipbuilding, and other related sectors, and (3) potential effects of the proposed requirement on the market for U.S. LNG and the broader U.S. economy, including the market for U.S. LNG and other industries.\nTo describe current industry and DOE expectations for the market for U.S. exports of LNG, and how that market is expected to operate, we collected and analyzed information on economic forecasts of the LNG market including the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook for several years, including 2015. We interviewed DOE officials and representatives from four economic research and consulting firms who have published reports on the prospective market for U.S. LNG and LNG liquefaction companies that have begun construction on U.S. liquefaction facilities to better understand DOE’s estimates about expected U.S. LNG exports and the world LNG market and to assure ourselves that the estimates were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We identified economic research and consulting firms for interviews based on work they performed relevant to this topic. We determined that reports issued by those companies were reliable for our purposes based on our reading of the methods and analysis used as described in their published reports. We also interviewed the four companies associated with the five approved and under-construction export facilities (as listed on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s list of approved import/export terminals in the continental U.S. as of July 2015) regarding their plans and expectations. We interviewed representatives from the identified economic research and consulting firms and energy companies regarding expected export capacity, customer plans, and the number of LNG carriers needed to transport expected U.S. LNG capacity. We also analyzed this information to develop our own estimate of the needed carrier capacity. To estimate the necessary number of carriers needed to transport U.S. LNG capacity, we made the following assumptions:\nU.S. liquefaction capacity of 9.77 bcf per day, based on information from the five under-construction U.S. facilities;\n330 liquefaction days per year, assuming that liquefaction facilities would operate at 90 percent productivity; carrier capacity of 170,000 cubic meters LNG, based on information from industry stakeholders; and six round-trip voyages per carrier, per year, based on: Information from the five liquefaction facilities that a majority of U.S. LNG capacity is contracted to customers in Asia, and\nStatements from stakeholders that a round trip voyage to Asia would take about 60 days.\nUnder these assumptions, we calculated a need for approximately 870 carrier voyages per year to transport U.S. LNG exports, or about 145 carriers total. However, depending on destination (some U.S. capacity has been contracted to customers in Europe, which would require less time per round trip), expected productivity of liquefaction facilities (at least one liquefaction facility we spoke with expects to operate at about 80 percent efficiency), and the amount of gas customers eventually purchase and liquefy (customers may, at one time or another, choose not to use their entire contracted capacity), we believe 100 carriers, as estimated by the liquefaction companies we spoke with, is a reasonable estimate of projected need.\nThe provision in the Act regarding this work specifies that GAO report on the number of positions that would be created in the U.S. maritime industry each year in 2015 through 2025 if the proposed requirement were implemented. As the proposed requirement has not been introduced as legislation as of October, 2015, the dates referenced in the Act may change. As such, to describe stakeholder views on the potential effects of the proposed requirements on maritime jobs and the economy and to determine the potential effects of these requirements on the market for U.S. LNG and the broader U.S. economy, we have referenced timeframes more generally, rather than referring to specific dates. To describe stakeholder views on the extent to which the requirement of U.S.-flagged-and-built carriers for LNG exports would affect jobs in the maritime, shipbuilding, and other related sectors, we collected and analyzed information on the capability and capacity of U.S. shipbuilders and estimated costs and requirements to build and operate LNG carriers based on documentary and testimonial evidence from selected maritime industry stakeholders. These stakeholders include representatives of three shipbuilding companies; two shipping companies (one shipbroker and one LNG carrier operator); the four major marine officer and unlicensed mariner unions in the United States; and officials from DOE, Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD), Department of Homeland Security’s U.S Coast Guard, and Department of Labor (DOL). We selected maritime stakeholders (including shipbuilders, mariner unions, and shipping companies) for interview based on recommendations from government and industry stakeholders and capacity to provide services related to LNG carrier construction and operation. For instance, we selected the shipping companies based on the fact that they are currently involved in shipping LNG. We selected U.S. shipbuilders from a list of 11 large and active shipbuilding companies in the United States as of April 2015 based on their stated interest and capacity to build LNG carriers. To estimate the employment required to support a given level of ship-building, we relied on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment Requirements Table (ERT), which is a commonly used methodology. However, this type of analysis has limitations:\nEstimates for the ERT are based on the ship and boat-building industry as a whole, using the Domestic Nominal ERT. According to BLS, it is not possible to obtain more precise estimates of the job supported in the construction of LNG carriers specifically.\nThe ERT is based on a snapshot of the economy at a given time and does not take into account changes in productivity based on increases in production (for example, economies of scale).\nAll estimates refer to jobs, but not necessarily full-time.\nThese estimates include the effect of inputs into production, but not the additional impact of spending by these employees on consumer goods. If these effects were included, (sometimes called multiplier effects) this would induce additional employment gains outside the shipbuilding industry.\nWe relied on the most recent ERT available, which was 2012, so the table does not take more recent changes into account.\nWe also interviewed MARAD, Department of Defense, and U.S. Coast Guard officials to obtain their views on potential benefits for military readiness, including U.S. maritime-industry capacity to meet military needs.\nTo identify the potential effects of the proposed requirement on the market for U.S. LNG and the broader U.S. economy, we collected and analyzed economic data and forecasts and testimonial evidence from the industry stakeholders and economic research and consulting companies we spoke to (discussed earlier) and assessed the resulting evidence using established economic theory and reasoning to describe potential effects on world demand for U.S. LNG and jobs in other relevant U.S. industries. To illustrate the cost impact of a U.S.-flagged-and-built carrier requirement for LNG exports, if all other factors remain equal, we developed a set of hypothetical assumptions based on statements from industry stakeholders, a 2011 MARAD report on the costs of operating U.S.-flagged carriers, and economic theory. These assumptions include:\nThe U.S.-built carriers would be fully funded through 25-year debt at a 4 percent rate of interest.\nA U.S.-built LNG carrier of approximately 170,000 cubic meter capacity will be priced at $450 million, about twice that of such carriers being constructed for this trade in Korea (a conservative estimate of construction costs, based on statements from shipyard representatives, and others).\nOperating costs of the U.S.-flagged LNG carriers would be 50-percent higher than an internationally flagged LNG carrier (likely a conservative estimate, compared to the MARAD report, based on statements from stakeholders that the different in cost might not be as large for LNG carriers and in an effort to ensure our analysis does not overestimate the potential costs of operating U.S.-flagged LNG carriers).\nA U.S. carrier would make six deliveries of LNG each year to an Asian destination. This suggests an annual capacity of just over 23 million MMBtu of energy per LNG export carrier.\nFor the purposes of estimating the potential costs of the proposed requirement, we made what we believe to be conservative estimates, including estimates of the cost of building LNG carriers in the United States and the costs of operating those carriers, in order to ensure that we do not overstate those potential cost effects. Due to the hypothetical nature of the proposed requirement as well as challenges related to predicting market outcomes, the estimated cost impacts are meant to be solely illustrative and should not be taken as a prediction. We interviewed U.S. Trade Representative officials and industry stakeholders regarding potential implications for U.S. trade. Additionally, we interviewed the U.S. Coast Guard and selected (as described above) U.S. LNG liquefaction companies and shipping companies regarding potential security implications for LNG customers related to transporting LNG via U.S.- flagged-and-built carriers.\nWe conducted this performance audit from March 2015 to December 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant Director; Amy Abramowitz; Pedro Almoguera; Ben Bolitzer; Ken Bombara; Brian Chung; Katie Hamer; Geoff Hamilton; Delwen Jones; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Josh Ormond; and Oliver Richard made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "", "", "", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h2_title h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How is the United States expected to change according to DOE?", "What is the purpose of liquefaction facilities?", "What will transport of the full capacity of the US liquefaction facilities require?", "What is the current state of LNG carriers for this transport?", "What could the proposed requirement to transport exports of LNG do?", "What do shipyard representatives say about building carriers?", "What do industry representatives say about building carriers?", "What does GAO say about the cost of building carriers?", "What do stakeholders say about building carriers?", "How would a reduction in the level of expected U.S. LNG exports impact the economy?", "What is Congress considering regarding shipbuilding?", "What provision in statute did Congress include for GAO?", "What does this report discuss?" ], "summary": [ "According to Department of Energy (DOE) and industry expectations, in the next few years the United States is expected to change from a net importer of natural gas to a net exporter, with those exports destined for different regions of the world, especially Asia.", "Five large-scale U.S. liquefaction facilities—necessary for conversion of natural gas to liquefied natural gas (LNG) (see fig. below)—are under construction with a projected capacity to export more than 12 percent of U.S. natural gas production in 2020.", "Based on estimates from these liquefaction facilities, transport of the full capacity of these liquefaction facilities will require about 100 or more LNG carriers.", "According to representatives from these five facilities, their liquefaction capacity has already been sold mainly through 20-year contracts and their customers are responsible for transporting the LNG to export markets. Currently operating LNG carriers are nearly all foreign built and operated. LNG carriers have not been built in the United States since before 1980, and no LNG carriers are currently registered under the U.S. flag.", "The proposed requirement to transport exports of LNG via U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers could expand employment for U.S. mariners and shipbuilders if it does not reduce the expected demand for U.S. LNG.", "According to representatives of U.S. mariner groups, between 4,000 and 5,200 mariners would be needed to operate the estimated 100 LNG carriers needed to transport the five U.S. facilities' full capacity of LNG once the five are fully operational. Based on the current capacity of U.S. shipyards we spoke with, building 100 carriers would likely take over 30 years, with employment in U.S. shipyards increasing somewhat or becoming more stable, according to shipyard representatives. Department of Defense (DOD) officials also indicated that any policy or requirement that increases and stabilizes jobs in the U.S. maritime industry could support military readiness.", "However, according to industry representatives, U.S. carriers would cost about two to three times as much as similar carriers built in Korean shipyards and would be more expensive to operate.", "Based on GAO analysis, these costs would increase the cost of transporting LNG from the United States, decrease the competitiveness of U.S. LNG in the world market, and may, in turn, reduce demand for U.S. LNG.", "The extent of these effects depends on customers' circumstances and business decisions. For example, several stakeholders told us implementing the proposed requirement may prompt customers to attempt to modify, renegotiate, or terminate their existing contracts for liquefaction. Additionally, limited availability of U.S. carriers in the early years of construction may decrease the amount of LNG that could be exported from the United States for a period of time, leading customers to seek alternate sources.", "Further, a reduction in the level of expected U.S. LNG exports could impact the broader U.S. economy, including potential job and profit losses in the oil and gas sector.", "Congress is considering whether to propose legislative language that would require U.S. LNG be exported via U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers with the goal of supporting U.S. shipbuilders and mariners.", "Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the number of vessel-construction and operating jobs that would be created in the U. S. maritime industry each year in 2015 through 2025 if exported LNG were required to be carried (1) before December 31, 2018, on vessels documented under the laws of the United States and (2) after such date, on vessels documented under the laws of and constructed in the United States.", "This report discusses (1) DOE and industry expectations for the market for U.S. LNG exports and (2) how the proposed requirement could affect jobs in the U.S. maritime industry and the broader U.S. economy." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1, 0, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_R44648	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Filling Candidate Vacancies During the Presidential Election Campaign", "Democratic Party Procedures", "Republican Party Procedures", "Precedents: Filling Vacancies in the Party Ticket in 1912 and 1972", "Succession Between Election Day and the Meeting of the Electoral College: Party Rules Still Apply", "Potential Challenges to Party Succession Rules", "Precedent: Death of Horace Greeley in 1872", "Succession Between the Electoral College Vote and the Electoral Vote Count by Congress", "Succession Between the Electoral Vote Count and Inauguration", "Post-9/11 Succession Issues", "The Inauguration Ceremony: A \"Designated Survivor\"", "Precedents: Gates, 2009; Shinseki, 2013", "Concluding Observations" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Presidential succession in the United States is governed by the 25 th Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that the Vice President \"shall become President\" should the incumbent chief executive die, resign, or be removed from office. The new President then nominates a successor Vice President, subject to confirmation by a majority vote of both houses of Congress.\nIn the event there is neither a President nor a Vice President, the Presidential Succession Act provides that the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and duly-confirmed Cabinet officers, in order of the seniority of their departments, would be eligible to act as President.\nThese provisions apply at all times when a duly-sworn President or Vice President holds office, but additional factors enter the equation during presidential election years. The three-to-four month period of the presidential general election campaign, from the national party conventions through election day, and the 10-week transition period, from election day to the January 20 inauguration, present a different range of succession issues concerning presidential and vice presidential nominees during the campaign and the President- and Vice President-elect during the transition. This situation is further complicated in elections when an incumbent President who is retiring or who has failed to win reelection prepares to leave office, while the incoming President-elect prepares for inauguration. It should be noted, however, that the period preceding the inauguration of Presidents who have been elected to a second consecutive term does not generally fall under the definition of a presidential transition. For instance, the period between President Barack H. Obama's election to a second term on November 6, 2012, and his inauguration on January 20, 2013, was not a transition period as defined in this report.\nFor the purposes of this report, \"presidential election campaign\" refers to the period between the national party nominating conventions, traditionally held in July or August of the election year, and election day, the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, which falls on November 8 in 2016. In modern times, the transition period is considered to start immediately after the general election, and extends through January 20 of the following year. The first part of the transition period extends from election day through the meeting of the electoral college, which, for the 2016 election, takes place on December 19. During this period, with few exceptions, the winning candidates are known on the basis of the popular vote tally and the projected electoral vote results. They are \"heirs apparent,\" the de facto President- and Vice President-elect. The transition's second phase begins when the electors cast their votes and the electoral vote is announced. At this point, the balance of scholarly opinion holds that the candidates who received a majority of electoral votes actually become the President- and Vice President elect.\nThis report examines succession procedures that apply to major party nominees for President and Vice President during the presidential election campaign and the first phase of the transition period, and for President-elect and Vice President-elect during the second phase of the transition period.\nPresidential transitions in the past half-century have generally been characterized by high levels of activity and frequent improvisation as the President-elect's team works to finalize personnel and policy arrangements for the incoming administration within a period of just over 10 weeks. The process takes on further significance and complexity when, as noted previously, a new President replaces a retiring or defeated incumbent, or when political party control of the executive branch also changes.\nSuccession and disability procedures concerning the President-elect and Vice President-elect provide a potential complicating factor during the election period and the transition. They are based on a combination of political party rules, federal law, and constitutional provisions, different elements of which apply at different times during the whole period between the national conventions and inauguration of the incoming chief executive. Depending on circumstances, Congress could be called on to make succession-related decisions of national importance in questions of the death, disability, or resignation of a President- or Vice President-elect.", "Vacancies in a major national party ticket during the presidential election campaign, which extends roughly from the party nominating conventions through election day in November, are covered by the rules of the political parties. Although it might be assumed that the vice presidential candidate would succeed in the event of a vacancy in the presidential nomination, in fact, both major parties provide for replacement by their respective national committees. Procedures established by the Democratic and Republican parties are detailed below.", "The Charter and By-Laws of the Democratic Party provide that vacancies on the presidential ticket would be filled by a special meeting of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Voting in the DNC would be per capita by individual members; a majority of members present and voting would be necessary to nominate a successor candidate.", "The Rules of the Republican Party provide that vacancies on the presidential ticket could be filled either by the Republican National Committee (RNC), or by the national convention, which could be reconvened at the call of the committee. Voting in the RNC would be by state, with the three committee members in each state delegation casting the same number of votes as the number of delegates assigned to it during the previous national convention; a majority of the votes cast would be necessary to nominate a successor candidate.", "The most recent example of filling a vacancy in a major party presidential ticket occurred in 1972, when the Democratic vice presidential nominee, Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, resigned from the ticket on August 1. The party's presidential nominee, Senator George McGovern, selected former Ambassador R. Sargent Shriver to fill the vacancy, and on August 8, a special meeting of the Democratic National Committee confirmed the nomination.\nAn earlier precedent occurred in 1912, when Vice President James S. Sherman, Republican President William H. Taft's running mate, died on October 30, just days before the November 5 general election. The Republican National Committee nominated Columbia University President Nicholas M. Butler to replace Sherman, and all eight Republican electors subsequently voted for Butler. Sherman's death and the ensuing vacancy had no influence on the outcome of the election, and Butler's appointment proved to be noncontroversial because Taft came in last in the three-way presidential election: former President Theodore Roosevelt had quit the Republican Party to run as the candidate of his own Progressive Party, thus splitting the Republican vote. Consequently, Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson won with a 41.8% plurality of the popular vote, but a very large electoral college majority of 435 electoral votes to 88 for Roosevelt and eight for Taft.", "Presidential transitions are generally considered to begin immediately after election day. Throughout the first phase of transition, which lasts through the meetings of the electoral college, the winning candidates are considered to be the next President and Vice President, but their status is informal and presumptive. It should be noted that there actually is no President- or Vice President-elect until after the electoral votes have been cast. The apparent winners, during this first period, are still the nominees of their parties. The use of the titles \"President-elect\" and \"Vice President-elect\" is a time-honored courtesy that anticipates the ultimate status of the candidates who won an apparent majority of electoral votes.", "If a vacancy happens in either position during this period, most commentators suggest that the political parties would follow their long-established rules, as detailed earlier in this report. In the event of the presidential nominee's death, it might be assumed that the vice presidential nominee would be chosen, but neither of the major parties requires this in its rules. Further, it is assumed that the electors, who are predominantly party loyalists, would abide by the national party's decisions. Given the unprecedented nature of such a situation, however, confusion, controversy, and a breakdown of party discipline among the members of the electoral college might also arise, leading to fragmentation of the electoral vote. For instance, an individual elector or group of electors might justifiably argue that they were nominated and elected to vote for a particular candidate, that the death or withdrawal of that candidate released them from any prior obligation, and that they were henceforth free agents, able to vote for any candidate they chose. The balance of opinion among constitutional scholars is that presidential electors are free agents, able to vote as they please, notwithstanding pledges or other commitments required by the state parties or state law to support the candidates of the party that nominated them. While the party national committees may thus appoint a replacement, they might not be able to guarantee that all electors would vote as instructed, particularly in the event of a closely contested election, or disputes over the national committee's choice of a replacement candidate or candidates.", "The historical record provides little guidance for this situation: only once in the nation's history has a presidential candidate died between the election and meeting of the electors. Horace Greeley, the 1872 presidential nominee of the Democratic and Liberal Republican Parties, died on November 29 of that year, 24 days after the election, but six days before the December 5 meeting of the electors. The Democratic National Committee did not meet to name a replacement candidate—63 Greeley electors voted for other candidates, while three voted for Greeley. When the joint session of Congress convened to count the electoral votes on February 12, 1873, the three Greeley votes were not recorded, \"the said Horace Greeley having died before the votes were cast.\" Even so, the question as to the validity of Greeley's electoral votes was of little concern, since the \"stalwart\" or \"regular\" Republican nominee, Ulysses S. Grant, had won the election in a landslide, gaining 286 electoral votes.", "The second period during which succession procedures would be invoked in the event a President-elect or Vice President-elect were to die or leave the ticket occurs between the time the electors vote and Congress counts the electoral votes. Presidential electors meet in their respective states to cast their votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December in the year of the presidential election, which falls on December 19 in 2016. Federal law sets January 6 of the following year as the date on which Congress convenes in joint session to count the electoral vote and declare the results.\nThe succession process during this period would turn on the issue of when the candidates who received an electoral vote majority actually become President-elect and Vice President-elect. The results of the electoral college are publicly known, but are the candidates who won a majority of electoral votes actually \"elect\" at this point, or do they attain this position only after the electoral college returns have been counted and declared by Congress on January 6? Some commentators doubt that there would be a President- and Vice President-elect before the results are certified. They maintain that this contingency would lack clear constitutional or statutory direction.\nThe balance of scholarly opinion, however, holds that once a majority of electoral votes has been cast, the winning candidates immediately become the President- and Vice President-elect, even though the votes have yet to be officially counted or the results declared. If this is the case, then Section 3 of the 20 th Amendment would apply as soon as the electoral votes were cast: namely, if the President-elect dies, then the Vice President-elect becomes the President-elect. This point of view receives strong support from the language of the 1932 House committee report accompanying the 20 th Amendment, which arguably settles the question. Addressing the issue of when there is a President-elect, the report stated:\nIt will be noted that the committee uses the term \"President elect\" in its generally accepted sense, as meaning the person who has received the majority of electoral votes, or the person who has been chosen by the House of Representatives in the event that the election is thrown into the House. It is immaterial whether or not the votes have been counted, for the person becomes the President elect as soon as the votes are cast .\nThe 20 th Amendment does not specifically address the question of vacancies created by situations other than death of the President- or Vice President-elect, including disability or their resignation, during this period. Section 3 of the amendment, however, authorizes Congress to \"by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified.... \" This contingency is considered in the next section of this report.", "During this period, provisions of the 20 th Amendment would cover several aspects of succession. As mentioned previously, Section 3 of the 20 th Amendment provides for succession in the case of the death of the President-elect, providing that the Vice President-elect becomes President-elect. Further, a Vice President-elect who succeeds under these circumstances would have the authority, after his or her inauguration, to nominate a replacement Vice President under the provisions of Section 2 of the 25 th Amendment.\nMoving beyond death of a President-elect, the 20 th Amendment does not appear to specifically cover such other circumstances as resignation from the ticket, disability, or disqualification of either the President- or Vice President-elect. In the case of a President-elect, however, if the language of the amendment were interpreted so that the aforementioned circumstances constituted a \"failure to qualify,\" then the Vice President-elect would act as President \"until a President shall have qualified.\" Under this construction, a Vice President-elect could arguably act as President until a disabled President-elect regained health, or, if the President-elect had resigned from the ticket, failed to regain health, or subsequently died from the effects of a disability, the Vice President might serve as acting President for a full four-year term.\nThe death, disability, or departure of the Vice President-elect is not specifically covered by the 20 th Amendment, but in this circumstance, the President would nominate a successor after being inaugurated, again in accordance with Section 2 of the 25 th Amendment.\nFinally, the 20 th Amendment empowers Congress to provide by law for instances in which \"neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified.\" Such legislation would declare \"who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.\" The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (the Succession Act) as amended (61 Stat. 380, 3 U.S.C. 19) implements this authority, providing that if, \"by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify [emphasis added], there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.\" The act further extends the order of succession to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the secretaries of the principal executive departments (the President's Cabinet). It should be noted that persons acting as President under the Succession Act would continue to do so only until a qualified individual higher in the order of succession is able to act. In this instance, the higher qualified official then supplants the lower.", "Concern about succession during the transition increased following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and centers primarily on presidential succession under the Succession Act.\nThe President-elect and Vice President-elect will both be covered by Secret Service protection throughout the transition period, but contemporary concerns also include a mass terrorist attack during or shortly after the presidential inaugural. While there would be a President, Vice President, Speaker, and President pro tempore during this period, who would be eligible to succeed in the event an attack removed these officials?\nThis question takes on additional importance since the Cabinet, an important element in the order of succession, is generally in a state of transition at this time. The previous administration's officers have traditionally resigned by January 20, while the incoming administration's designees are usually in the midst of the confirmation process. Further, only cabinet officers who hold regular appointments and who have been duly confirmed by the Senate are eligible to act as President under the Succession Act. It is possible to envision a situation in which not a single cabinet officer in the incoming administration will have been confirmed by the Senate under these circumstances, thus leaving succession an open issue should the Speaker and the President pro tempore also be unavailable.", "One safeguard for a situation such as that described above would be for some official or officials in the line of presidential succession not to attend the presidential inauguration ceremony. The State of the Union Message, traditionally delivered in person by the President before a joint session of Congress, offers a precedent in this case. In order to ensure continuity in the presidency, one member of the President's Cabinet, often referred to as the \"designated survivor,\" has not attended this event since at least 1984. This practice took on additional urgency following the terrorist attacks of 2001, and it is widely assumed that since that time, the designated survivor has been conducted to a secure location in order to guarantee continuity in the executive branch. In the interest of legislative branch continuity, beginning at least in 2004, Congress has similarly designated one or more Senators and Representatives (usually representing both political parties) who do not attend the State of the Union session.\nThe Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate would arguably be the appropriate candidates for this role: they are, respectively, first and second in the order of succession following the Vice President, ahead of members of the President's Cabinet. In order to guarantee executive continuity, either the Speaker or the President pro tem could arrange to be absent during the President's inauguration and other attendant public ceremonies. There is no legal requirement that they be present at the swearing in; moreover, the absence of one of these officials would make it possible to avoid hurdles associated with early confirmation of one of the incoming administration's cabinet nominees, as detailed later in this report.\nTwo alternatives focusing on the Cabinet could also reduce the possibility of a gap in the line of presidential succession under these circumstances. First, one or more incumbent cabinet officers of the outgoing administration might be retained in office (and, away from the inaugural ceremonies) at least until after the President- and Vice-President elect have been safely installed. Alternatively, one or more cabinet officers of the incoming administration could be nominated by the incumbent President, confirmed, and installed in office before the January 20 inauguration.\nOne advantage conferred by these related proposals would center on the fact that cabinet secretaries, unlike elected officials, do not serve set terms of office which expire on a date certain. Further, while the President-elect cannot submit cabinet nominations until assuming office, there is no legal impediment to prevent the outgoing incumbent from submitting any or all of his successor's nominations to the Senate after it convenes at the opening of the new Congress, which will take office on or after January 3, 2017.\nBoth the retention of incumbent cabinet secretaries pending Senate confirmation of their successors, or, alternatively, the pre-inaugural nomination and confirmation of one or more cabinet secretaries of the incoming administration would depend on reasonable levels of good will and cooperation between the incumbent President and his successor, and between the political parties in the Senate. Moreover, the latter option would arguably impose a sizeable volume of confirmation-related business on the newly sworn Senate during the short period between January 3 and January 20, or, possibly, the Senate in the previous Congress during the 10-week transition period.", "In 2008, events transpired that produced a designated survivor from the Cabinet. On December 1 of that year, President-elect Barack H. Obama announced that incumbent Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates would be retained in his position for an indefinite period as part of the incoming President's national security team. It was widely assumed that the incoming chief executive took this action to ensure continuity in the Defense Department at a time when the nation was engaged in two overseas military campaigns—Iraq and Afghanistan. It was subsequently announced on January 19, 2009, that Secretary Gates would not attend the presidential inauguration ceremonies. Contemporary press accounts reported that this was intentional: Bush Administration Press Secretary Dana Perino stated that, \"[i]n order to ensure continuity of government, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been designated by the outgoing Administration, with the concurrence of the incoming Administration, to serve as the designated successor during Inauguration Day, Tuesday, January 20 th .\"\nThe Obama Administration continued this practice in 2013, when Secretary of Veterans Affairs Eric Shinseki was assigned the role of designated survivor during the presidential inaugural ceremony in that year.", "Succession procedures during the presidential election campaign period and the transition are governed by party rules, federal law, and constitutional requirements. Candidates have been replaced only three times in the nation's history, in 1872, 1912, and 1972; each of these instances occurred prior to the meetings of the electoral college, and all were successfully addressed by party rules. It may be assumed that party rules would be adequate to provide for some future incident, although an extremely volatile post-election political climate or the prospect of a faithless elector or electors might introduce complicating factors, as noted previously in this report. With respect to the transition period itself, the 20 th and 25 th Amendments have anticipated most potential contingencies, and could be implemented to address a succession issue during the period between the meetings of the electoral college and inauguration of the President.\nIn the post-9/11 environment, attention focused largely on the potential for a terrorist incident that might result in the death or disability of a number of persons in the line of presidential succession, particularly during the public inauguration ceremonies. One option to ensure executive continuity would be for either the Speaker of the House or the President pro tempore of the Senate to be absent from the ceremony. Others involve the President's Cabinet, including (1) expedited confirmation of one of the incoming cabinet officers; (2) retention of one or more cabinet officer from the outgoing administration until the succession has been secured; and (3) ensuring that a duly-confirmed cabinet officer is not present at the inauguration or its attendant public ceremonies.\nSuccessful implementation of either cabinet option would, as noted earlier, depend on reasonable levels of good will and cooperation between a retiring President and the incoming chief executive, as well as between the political parties in the Senate. With respect to the former, the 2008-2009 transition offers positive examples for the future. As noted earlier, the independent and joint decisions of both administrations ensured that a senior cabinet officer would be in place, and in a safe place, during the public inauguration of President Obama. These two developments arguably suggest a precedent for consideration of succession issues in future presidential transitions." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h0_full h2_full h1_full", "h0_full h2_title h1_title", "", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_full h3_full h2_full", "h3_full h4_title", "h4_full", "h4_full", "h4_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How do procedures to fill vacancies of President or Vice President differ?", "What two vacancy periods are there?", "What is one period to consider for filling vacancies of the president or vice president?", "What would political parties do if the president or vice president died during this time?", "What rules apply after conventions are held?", "What do voters do on election day?", "What is one period to consider for filling vacancies of the President or Vice President?", "What rules apply if the elected were to die between the election and electoral college meeting?", "What happens if the President-elect dies between the date when electoral votes are cast and the January 20 inauguration?", "What language would cover such contingencies?", "To what extent does the 20th Amendment address Vice Presidential vacancies?", "What led to proposals to safeguard the line of presidential succession during the swearing-in ceremony?", "What is a designated survivor?", "What positions could a designated survivor hold?", "How has this idea of the designated survivor been implemented?" ], "summary": [ "Procedures to fill these vacancies differ depending on when they occur.", "What would happen if this occurred during presidential transition, either between election day and the December 19, 2016, meeting of the electoral college; or between December 19 and the inauguration of the President and Vice President on January 20, 2017?", "During the Election Campaign—Between the National Party Nominating Conventions and the Election.", "For the Democrats, the Democratic National Committee would select a replacement; for the Republicans, the Republican National Committee would select replacement, or it could reconvene the national convention to perform this task.", "After the conventions, which are usually held in July or August, and election day, November 8 in 2016, political party rules apply.", "On election day, voters choose members of the electoral college, which formally selects the President- and Vice President-elect several weeks later (December 19 in 2016).", "Between the Election and the Electoral College Meeting.", "Although the transition has begun, party rules still apply: a replacement candidate would be chosen by the national committees of either party, or by a reassembled Republican National Convention.", "During this period, succession is covered by the 20th Amendment to the Constitution: if the President-elect dies, the Vice President-elect becomes President-elect.", "Although the amendment does not specifically address the issues of disability, disqualification, or resignation during this period, its language, \"failure to qualify,\" could arguably be interpreted to cover such contingencies.", "Vacancies in the position of Vice President-elect are not mentioned in the 20th Amendment; they would be covered after the inauguration by the 25th Amendment.", "Following the events of September 11, 2001, concern about the possibility of terrorist attacks at the inauguration led to proposals to safeguard the line of presidential succession during the swearing-in ceremony, especially during a change of administrations.", "Most involve a \"designated survivor,\" a constitutionally eligible successor who would stay away from the ceremony in order to safeguard continuity in the office of the President.", "One option would be for an elected official in the line of succession, such as the Speaker of the House of Representatives or President pro-tempore of the Senate, to be absent from the ceremony. During a change of administrations, a Cabinet secretary of the new administration could be confirmed by the Senate and installed prior to the inauguration, or a Cabinet secretary from the outgoing administration could remain in office until after the inauguration. In either case, the designated survivor would be absent from the ceremony.", "Related precautions have been taken since the presidential inauguration of 2009. In that year, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a George W. Bush appointee who remained in office in the Barrack H. Obama Administration, did not attend the inauguration ceremony. In 2013, Veterans Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki stayed away from the swearing-in." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, 1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 6, 6, 6, 6 ] }
GAO_GAO-18-351	{ "title": [ "Background", "Multiple Factors Have Challenged Trust Fund Finances Resulting in Growing Debt", "Trust Fund Borrowing Will Likely Continue to Increase through 2050, and Multiple Options Could Reduce Future Debt", "Trust Fund Borrowing Will Likely Continue to Increase through 2050", "Adjusting Coal Tax Rates, Forgiving Interest, and Forgiving Debt Are Options That Could Improve the Trust Fund’s Future Financial Position", "Adjust Coal Tax Rates", "Multiple Options Could Reduce Future Trust Fund Debt and Would Distribute the Financial Burden Differently Among General Taxpayers and Industry", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Black Lung Disability Trust Fund Simulation Methodology", "Black Lung Benefit Expenditures", "Coal Tax Revenues", "Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Black Lung Disability Trust Fund Simulations", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "Black lung benefits include both cash assistance and medical benefits. Maximum cash assistance payments generally ranged from about $650 to $1,300 per month in fiscal year 2017, depending on the number of dependents the miner has. Miners receiving cash assistance are also eligible for medical benefits that cover the treatment of their black-lung- related conditions, which may include hospital and nursing care, rehabilitation services, and drug and equipment charges, according to DOL documentation. DOL estimates that the average annual cost for medical treatment in fiscal year 2017 was approximately $6,980 per miner.\nThere were about 25,700 total beneficiaries (primary and dependents) receiving black lung benefits during fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 1). The decrease in the number of beneficiaries over time has resulted from a combination of declining coal mining employment and an aging beneficiary population, according to DOL officials. Further, black lung beneficiaries could increase in the near term due to the increased occurrence of black lung disease and its most severe form, progressive massive fibrosis, particularly among Appalachian coal miners, according to HHS officials.\nBlack lung claims are processed by DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Contested claims are adjudicated by DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, which issues decisions that can be appealed to the Benefits Review Board. Claimants and mine operators may further appeal these agency decisions to the federal courts. If an award is contested, claimants can receive interim benefits, which are generally paid from the Trust Fund according to DOL officials, while their claims are in the appeals process. Final awards are either funded by mine operators—who are identified as the responsible employers of claimants—or the Trust Fund, when responsible employers cannot be identified or do not pay. In fiscal year 2017, black lung claims had an approval rate of about 29 percent, according to DOL data. Of the 19,430 primary black lung beneficiaries receiving benefits during fiscal year 2017, 64 percent (12,464) were paid from the Trust Fund, 25 percent (4,798) were paid by liable mine operators, and 11 percent (2,168) were receiving interim benefits, according to DOL officials.\nBlack Lung Disability Trust Fund revenue is primarily obtained from mine operators through the coal tax. The coal tax is imposed at two rates, depending on whether the coal is extracted from underground or surface mines. The current tax rates are $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4.4 percent of the sales price. Therefore, if a ton of underground-mined coal is sold for less than $25, than the tax paid would be less than $1.10. For instance, if a ton of underground-mined coal sold for $20, than it would be taxed at 4.4 percent of the sales price, or $0.88. To a lesser extent, the Trust Fund also receives other miscellaneous revenue from interest payments, and various fines and penalties paid by mine operators, among other sources, according to DOL documentation. Coal tax revenue is collected from mine operators by Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service and then transferred to the Trust Fund where it is then used by DOL officials to pay black lung benefits and the costs of administering the program.\nTrust Fund expenditures include, among other things, black lung benefit payments, certain administrative costs incurred by DOL and Treasury to administer the black lung benefits program, and debt repayments. When necessary for the Trust Fund to make relevant expenditures under federal law, the Trust Fund borrows from the Treasury’s general fund. When this occurs, the federal government is essentially borrowing from itself—and hence from the general taxpayer—to fund its benefit payments and other expenditures.", "Multiple factors have challenged Trust Fund finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenue, interest payments have grown, and legislative actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. Combined black lung benefit payments and program administrative costs exceeded Trust Fund revenue every year for the program’s first decade (fiscal years 1979 through 1989), resulting in the accrual of debt. During the Trust Fund’s first three fiscal years in particular, revenue covered less than 40 percent of the Trust Fund’s combined benefit payments and administrative costs. For instance, in fiscal year 1980, the Trust Fund received about $251 million in revenue and paid about $726 million in black lung benefits and administrative costs.\nBeginning in 1982, revenue increased as a result of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 that doubled the coal tax rates from $0.50 to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal and from $0.25 to $0.50 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price. Even with the tax rate increase, combined benefit payments and administrative costs continued to exceed revenue throughout the 1980s (see fig. 2). As a result, the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund to cover the annual differences between its expenditures and revenues, and by fiscal year 1989 the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund exceeded $3 billion.\nBeginning in fiscal year 1990, Trust Fund revenue generally began to exceed combined benefit payments and administrative costs, and, in fact, total Trust Fund cumulative revenue collected from fiscal years 1979 through 2017 exceeded total cumulative benefit payments and administrative costs incurred during these years. However, interest owed from earlier years of borrowing led to more borrowing and debt. From fiscal years 1979 through 1989, the Trust Fund borrowed—primarily through 30-year term loans according to Treasury officials—from Treasury’s general fund at interest rates that varied from about 6.5 percent to about 13.9 percent. In fiscal year 1985, for instance, the Trust Fund paid about $275 million in interest, which was equal to about half of the total revenue collected that year. Since fiscal year 1990, revenue has generally exceeded combined benefit payments and administrative costs, although interest payments on the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt kept the fund in a position whereby its total expenditures continued to exceed its total revenues. As a result, the principal amount of the Trust Fund’s total outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund increased and exceeded $10 billion by fiscal year 2008.\nLegislation has been enacted over the years that was expected to improve Trust Fund finances: In 1981, the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 doubled the coal tax rates from $0.50 cents to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal, and from $0.25 cents to $0.50 cents per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price (as mentioned previously).\nIn 1986, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 established a 5 year moratorium on interest accrual with respect to repayable advances to the Trust Fund (which we refer to as annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund), and increased the coal tax rates to $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal (up to 4.4 percent of the sales price), where they have remained since.\nIn 2008, the EIEA included provisions that were expected to eliminate the Trust Fund’s debt. Specifically, EIEA (1) generally extended the coal tax rates at their current rates until December 31, 2018 (after which they are scheduled to decrease to their original levels of $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0.25 per ton of surface- mined coal, up to 2 percent of the sales price); (2) provided for a one- time federal appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness (about $6.5 billion, according to DOL data); and (3) provided for the refinancing of the Trust Fund’s debt that was not forgiven as a result of EIEA (which we refer to as the Trust Fund’s legacy debt). Specifically, the Trust Fund’s legacy debt was refinanced with more favorable interest rates, according to DOL data. Interest rates on the refinanced legacy debt range from about 1.4 percent to about 4.5 percent.\nThe forgiveness and refinancing of Trust Fund debt along with extending the current coal tax rates through 2018 were expected to result in annual tax revenue that could be used to pay down interest and principal on the Trust Fund’s legacy debt, according to DOL and Treasury officials. These officials said that models showed that debt would be eliminated by fiscal year 2040; however, they noted that coal tax revenue has been less than originally projected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased market competition from other energy sources. As a result, the Trust Fund’s total expenditures continued to exceed revenue and the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund each year from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayments expenditures. In fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund’s total principal amount of outstanding debt, which includes its legacy debt and the amount borrowed from Treasury’s general fund that year, was about $4.3 billion (see fig. 3).", "", "Trust Fund borrowing will likely continue to increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the scheduled coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production, according to our moderate simulation. We simulated the effects of the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease on Trust Fund finances through 2050, and in this report, we generally present the results of a moderate case set of assumptions (see table 1). These simulations are not predictions of what will happen, but rather models of what could happen given certain assumptions. For more information on our simulation methodology see appendix I. In addition to the moderate case assumptions, we also simulated how Trust Fund debt could change through 2050 given various other assumptions, and the full range of results for all of our simulations are presented in appendix II.\nOur moderate case simulation suggests that Trust Fund revenue may decrease, from about $485 million in fiscal year 2018 to about $298 million in fiscal year 2019, due, in part, to the scheduled approximate 55 percent decrease in the coal tax. Our simulation, which incorporates EIA data on future expected coal production, also shows that annual Trust Fund revenue will likely continue to decrease beyond fiscal year 2019 due, in part, to declining coal production. Domestic coal production has declined from about 1.2 billion tons in 2008 to about 728 million tons in 2016, according to EIA. Based on these projections, our moderate simulation shows that Trust Fund annual revenue may continue to decrease from about $298 million in fiscal year 2019 to about $197 million in fiscal year 2050 (see fig. 4).\nWith the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulation suggests that expected revenue will likely be insufficient to cover combined black lung benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayment expenditures. Specifically, our moderate case simulation suggests that revenue may not be sufficient to cover beneficiary payments and administrative costs from fiscal years 2020 through 2050 (see fig. 5). For instance, in fiscal year 2029, simulated benefit payments and administrative costs will likely exceed simulated revenue by about $99 million. These annual deficits will likely decrease over time to about $4 million by fiscal year 2050 due, in part, to the assumed continued net decline in total black lung beneficiaries. Our simulation also therefore suggests that Trust Fund revenue may not be enough to also cover the debt repayment expenditures it must continue to make through fiscal year 2040, per the payment schedule established following the 2008 EIEA.\nOur moderate simulation suggests that the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund will likely increase from about $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2019 to about $15.4 billion in fiscal year 2050 (see fig. 6). Although the Trust Fund’s legacy debt decreases through fiscal year 2040, total Trust Fund expenditures—including combined benefit payments and administrative costs as well as debt repayments—will likely continue to exceed revenue which will require continued annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund. However, the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund could vary depending, in part, on future coal production and the number of new beneficiaries and could range between about $6 billion and about $27 billion in 2050, according to our simulations (see appendix II).", "We simulated three options that can affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050. Specifically, we simulated the effects of (1) adjusting the coal tax, (2) forgiving interest, and (3) forgiving debt. In each of the simulations, we compared the results of the option to a baseline in which the coal tax rates will decrease by about 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease. We compare interest and debt forgiveness options to a baseline which assumes the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease has taken effect, and that there is no interest or debt forgiveness. The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options.", "Using the moderate case, we simulated four options: (1) implementing the 2019 coal tax rate reduction to $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal; (2) maintaining the current coal tax rates of $1.10 per ton for underground-mined coal and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal; (3) reducing the tax rates by 25 percent (from $1.10 and $0.55); and (4) increasing these tax rates by 25 percent (see fig. 7). Increasing the tax rates by 25 percent was the only option that eliminated simulated Trust Fund debt by fiscal year 2050, according to our moderate case simulation.\nWe simulated three interest forgiveness options including forgiving interest on (1) legacy debt, (2) annual borrowing, and (3) all debt. Our moderate case simulation suggests that forgiving interest will not eliminate simulated debt by fiscal year 2050 (see fig. 8).\nWe simulated two debt forgiveness options by forgiving principal and interest on (1) legacy debt and (2) all debt. Our moderate case simulation suggests that both debt forgiveness options would reduce simulated Trust Fund borrowing by fiscal year 2050, but these options would not eliminate debt altogether as simulated revenue will likely not be enough to cover simulated expenditures (see fig. 9). In these cases, the Trust Fund will need to continue borrowing from Treasury’s general fund to cover annual deficits, and thus accumulate debt.\nWhile adjusting coal tax rates and forgiving interest or debt could reduce the Trust Fund’s simulated borrowing by 2050, implementing them could affect the coal industry or general taxpayers, according to stakeholders we interviewed. For instance, a coal industry representative noted that maintaining the coal tax at its current rate would continue to burden the coal industry and increasing the tax would exacerbate the burden at a time when coal production has been declining. Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be borne by the general taxpayer since Treasury borrows from taxpayers to lend to the Trust Fund as needed. These officials also said that making a one-time federal appropriation to forgive interest or debt would be the most transparent way to satisfy the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund.\nIn addition to the simulations, other options could affect the financial position of the Trust Fund including reducing black lung benefits, eliminating or adjusting the coal tax cap, or creating a variable coal tax. Our moderate case simulation suggests that completely eliminating black lung benefits as of fiscal year 2019 could reduce the Trust Fund’s borrowing from Treasury’s general fund in fiscal year 2050 from about $15.4 billion to about $6.4 billion. However, doing so would generally mean that coal tax revenue would be collected solely to fund the repayment of Trust Fund debt. Another option could be to eliminate or adjust the coal tax cap, which currently prevents mine operators from paying a coal tax of more than 4.4 percent of the price per ton of coal sold. If the coal tax cap were eliminated, for instance, mine operators would pay $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0. 55 per ton of surface-mined coal regardless of price sold, which could increase revenue. As an additional option, changing the structure of the coal tax to flexible rates that change based on an annual actuarial assessment of the Trust Fund could help to ensure that coal mine operators pay the necessary amount of tax to cover Trust Fund expenditures, without resulting in a Trust Fund balance or deficit.", "Multiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers. We simulated whether various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures. These options were selected, in part, based on interviews with Trust Fund stakeholders and the availability of DOL and other data. We approached these simulations from two perspectives. First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates. Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options. The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular combination of options.\nOur first set of options using the moderate case simulations are based on the current coal tax rates of $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, and show the amount of debt forgiveness in fiscal year 2019 needed to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain tax rates (see fig. 10). Specifically, our moderate case simulations show the following: Increasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 and would likely require no debt forgiveness. For this option, the simulated coal tax revenue would likely be sufficient to cover simulated Trust Fund expenditures, including combined benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayments. However, this option would place the burden solely on the coal industry that would be paying higher taxes at a time when coal production has been declining.\nMaintaining current coal tax rates could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $2.4 billion of debt forgiveness. This option would distribute the burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers.\nDecreasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $4.8 billion in debt forgiveness. This option would burden the coal industry less than maintaining the current tax rates, but would increase the burden on general taxpayers.\nDecreasing current tax rates by 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, would balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $7.8 billion in debt forgiveness. This figure comprises the Trust Fund’s total simulated outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019 ($6.6 billion), and an additional about $1.2 billion that would be required because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations. The coal industry would bear some of the financial burden of this option, while also placing a financial burden on general taxpayers.\nOur second set of options using moderate case simulations show the change in average coal tax revenue collected per ton to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain debt forgiveness options (see fig. 11). Specifically, our moderate simulations show the following:\nForgiving the Trust Fund’s legacy debt would allow for an average tax collected of about $0.59 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050. Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0.88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0.44 per ton on surface-mined coal.\nForgiving all Trust Fund debt would allow for an average tax collected per ton of coal sold of $0.47 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050. Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0.70 per ton on underground-mined coal and a tax of $0.35 per ton of surface-mined coal.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS) for review and comment. DOL, Treasury, and HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human Services, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s web site at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff should have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "We examined the extent to which (1) Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) debt may change through 2050 and (2) selected options to improve its future financial position. We interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as representatives from the National Mining Association and the United Mine Workers of America. We then selected options to simulate based, in part, on these interviews and the availability of DOL and other data. These options included adjusting the coal tax, forgiving interest on some or all Trust Fund debt, forgiving some or all Trust Fund debt, or various combinations of these options. The options we simulated are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. Our simulations are based on various assumptions and simulate Trust Fund revenues and expenditures from fiscal years 2016 through 2050. To develop these simulations, we used actual and projection data from (1) DOL for fiscal years 2015 through 2040; (2) Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis for fiscal years 2011 through 2015; (3) the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) for calendar years 2015 through 2050; and (4) the Office of Management and Budget for fiscal year 2017.", "To simulate future Trust Fund benefit expenditures, we simulated the number of beneficiaries each fiscal year, and the annual average amount of benefits received (cash assistance and medical benefits). To simulate the numbers of beneficiaries, we used DOL data on the (1) age distributions of miner and widow beneficiaries for fiscal year 2015; (2) mortality rates by age for miner and widow beneficiaries as of fiscal year 2015; and (3) numbers of beneficiaries—including married miners, single miners, widows, and miners receiving medical benefits only—in fiscal year 2015. We assumed—as DOL does in its Black Lung Budget and Liability Model—that all miners are men, all widows are women, and all spouses are 3 years younger than the miner. We also assumed that the age distribution of single miners is the same as for married miners, and that the age distribution of new miner and widow beneficiaries is the same as for miner and widow beneficiaries during fiscal year 2015. We used DOL’s mortality rates to simulate the number of beneficiaries of each age and type in each year, and used those numbers to then simulate the total number of beneficiaries of each type each year (see table 2).\nWe also assumed that there will be no new medical-benefit-only recipients.\nFormula The number of married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived and whose spouse survived. The total number of married miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of married miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of married miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total.\nThe number of single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of single miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived but whose spouse did not survive. The total number of single miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of single miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of single miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total.\nThe number of widow beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new beneficiaries who are widows age a in fiscal year y plus the number of widow beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a+2 in fiscal year y-1 who did not survive but whose spouse did survive. The total number of widow beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of widow beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of widow beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total.\nThe number of MBO beneficiaries of age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of MBO beneficiaries of age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived. The total number of MBO beneficiaries only in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of MBO beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y. Finally, we averaged the number of MBO beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total.", "To simulate future coal tax revenue, we used Treasury and EIA data to calculate (1) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at fixed dollar amounts of $1.10 and $0.55 per ton, respectively, in 2015; (2) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at variable dollar amounts per ton equal to 4.4 percent of the price in 2015; and (3) average prices of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at 4.4 percent of the price in 2015. We then used EIA data on projected amounts of total coal production, underground-mined coal production, lignite coal production, and coal exports, as well as projected average coal prices, for the period from 2015 through 2050 to simulate future coal tax revenues (see table 3).\nWe simulated other Trust Fund expenditures and revenues, including administrative costs and debt repayments (see table 4). For our simulations, total Trust Fund expenditures are the sum of black lung benefits (cash assistance and medical benefits), total administrative costs, repayment of interest and principal on outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund, and other expenditures. Total Trust Fund revenues are the sum of coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue, and exclude annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund. Annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund is the difference between total Trust Fund expenditures and revenues and is assumed to be repaid with interest the following year. If total revenues are greater than total expenditures, then the Trust Fund has a balance and would not have to borrow that year. In this case, we assumed that the Trust Fund will earn interest on that balance at the same rate on which interest would accrue on annual borrowing.\nWe simulated how the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease and various options including adjusting the coal tax, forgiving debt interest, and forgiving debt principal and interest may affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050 (see table 5). The options listed are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options.\nWe simulated option combinations for coal tax rates, interest forgiveness, and debt forgiveness to demonstrate how potential financial adjustments could affect future Trust Fund borrowing from Treasury’s general fund through fiscal year 2050. For options that involve adjusting coal tax rates, we estimated the amount of debt that would need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund’s revenues to be sufficient to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for fiscal years 2019 through 2050, including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund. Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenue for the same period, including coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue. Third, we calculated debt forgiveness as the difference between the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures from the first calculation and the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenues from the second calculation. When the amount of debt forgiveness is greater than the amount of debt outstanding, the Trust Fund would need an additional cash inflow in addition to forgiveness of all outstanding debt. Amounts of debt forgiveness less than zero suggest that no debt forgiveness is required.\nFor options involving forgiving debt (interest or principal), we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenue to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not receive any advances from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for the period from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2050, again including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund, minus the real discounted present value of miscellaneous revenues for the same period. Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of coal production for the same period. Third, we calculated the average tax per ton of coal as the first amount divided by the second amount.\nTo assess the sensitivity of each option, we ran each simulation 36 times using four different sets of assumptions about the numbers of future beneficiaries and nine different sets of assumptions about future coal production and prices (see table 6). Doing so provided a range of estimates about the Trust Fund’s future borrowing needs and provided insight on the sensitivity of its overall financial position relative to its various expenditures and revenues. The analysis also provided a range of estimates of the amount of debt forgiveness needed to bring the Trust Fund into balance by fiscal year 2050, assuming various coal tax rates, and the average tax collection per ton needed to do the same, and assuming various amounts of debt forgiveness.\nFrom the range of estimates that resulted from our sensitivity analysis, we selected cases with moderate expectations related to future Trust Fund expenditures and revenue. Specifically, for future expenditures, we assumed an average growth rate of new black lung beneficiaries for fiscal years 2003 through 2015 as a moderate case that reflects historical experience. For future revenue, we used a moderate coal production outlook based on EIA’s reference case, which reflects moderate expectations about future coal production based on various assumptions about economic growth, oil prices, technological innovation, and energy policy.", "We summarized the results of our simulations by showing the extent to which the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund’s (Trust Fund) balance—the sum of tax revenue and miscellaneous revenue less expenditures—may change in fiscal year 2050 for each option simulated. For example, with the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund would likely have a deficit in fiscal year 2050 of about $15.4 billion.\nMultiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers. We simulated how various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures. We approached these simulations from two perspectives. First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates. Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options.\nFor our first set of simulations, we calculated the amount of debt outstanding in fiscal year 2019 and the amount that would likely need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund to have sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures by fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. For example, before any options are implemented, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019—including both legacy debt and annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund—would likely be about $6.6 billion (after discounting and adjusting for inflation). Therefore, with implementation of the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent as scheduled in calendar year 2019, about 117.7 percent of that debt would need to be forgiven to balance the Trust Fund. In other words, balancing the Trust Fund would require forgiveness of $6.6 billion and an additional cash inflow of about $1.2 billion because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations (see table 8).\nFor our second set of simulations, we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would likely provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures in fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018. For example, if all principal and interest on Trust Fund legacy debt is forgiven, as of 2019, the estimated average tax that balances the Trust Fund is about $0.59 per ton (see table 9). Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0.88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0.44 per ton on surface-mined coal.", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Blake Ainsworth (Assistant Director), Justin Dunleavy (analyst-in-charge), Angeline Bickner, Courtney LaFountain, and Rosemary Torres Lerma made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were James Bennett, Melinda Bowman, Lilia Chaidez, Caitlin Cusati, Holly Dye, Alex Galuten, Carol Henn, John Lack, Emei Li, Almeta Spencer, Kate van Gelder, and Shana Wallace." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full", "h0_full h2_full", "h2_title h1_title", "h2_full h1_full", "h2_full h1_title", "h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What factors have challenged the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund?", "What actions have been taken to address these factors?", "How does the Trust Fund make expenditures?", "Why does the Trust Fund borrow money every year?", "Why has the Trust Fund continued to borrow money from the Treasury's general fund?", "Why is Trust Fund borrowing expected to increase?", "What could reduce future borrowing?", "Why could maintaining or increasing to coal tax be problematic?", "Why would forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt be detrimental?", "What does this report examine?", "What did GAO examine for this report?", "Who did GAO interview for the report?", "What options did GAO simulate in the report?", "To what extent did GAO endorse a particular option?" ], "summary": [ "Multiple factors have challenged Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenues, interest payments have grown, and actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt.", "Legislative actions were taken over the years including (1) raising the rate of the coal tax that provides Trust Fund revenues and (2) forgiving debt.", "When necessary to make expenditures, the Trust Fund borrows with interest from the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) general fund.", "Because Trust Fund expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue, it has borrowed almost every year since 1979, its first complete fiscal year, and as a result debt and interest payments increased. For example, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provided an appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness; about $6.5 billion was forgiven, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure).", "However, coal tax revenues were less than expected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased competition from other energy sources, according to DOL and Treasury officials. As a result, the Trust Fund continued to borrow from Treasury's general fund from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayment expenditures.", "GAO's simulation suggests that Trust Fund borrowing will likely increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production. The simulation estimates that Trust Fund borrowing may exceed $15 billion by 2050 (see figure).", "However, various options, such as adjusting the coal tax and forgiving interest or debt, could reduce future borrowing and improve the Trust Fund's financial position. For example, maintaining the current coal tax rates and forgiving debt of $2.4 billion could, under certain circumstances, balance the Trust Fund by 2050, whereby revenue would be sufficient to cover expenditures.", "However, a coal industry representative said that maintaining or increasing the coal tax would burden the coal industry, particularly at a time when coal production has been declining.", "Further, Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be paid by taxpayers.", "This report examines (1) factors that have challenged the financial position of the Trust Fund since its inception and (2) the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050, and selected options that could improve its future financial position.", "GAO reviewed Trust Fund financial data from fiscal years 1979 through 2017.", "GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor, Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of coal industry and union groups.", "Using assumptions, such as the about 55 percent coal tax decrease and moderately declining coal production, GAO simulated the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050. GAO also simulated how selected options, such as forgiveness of debt, could improve finances. The options simulated are not intended to be exhaustive.", "Further, GAO is not endorsing any particular option or combination of options." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-14-832	{ "title": [ "Background", "ILAB Could Improve Its Processes for Financial Oversight", "ILAB Guidance Lacks Deadlines and Criteria for Accepting or Rejecting Quarterly Financial Report Review", "Most Grantees Do Not Maintain Excess Federal Funds", "Child Labor Office Has Used Attestation Engagements to Monitor Grantees, while the Trade and Labor Office Is Planning Its First Engagement", "The Child Labor Office Uses Attestation Engagements to Provide Additional Oversight of Cooperative Agreements", "The Trade and Labor Office Has Not Yet Conducted an Attestation Engagement or Developed Guidance to Manage Such Engagements", "Guidance for Reporting Subgrantee Inventory of Equipment and Real Property Needs Improvement", "The Trade and Labor Office’s Performance Monitoring Efforts Need Improvement", "While the Child Labor Office Has More Comprehensive Performance Monitoring Requirements than the Trade and Labor Office, Both Offices Complied with Monitoring Requirements", "The Child Labor Office Has More Comprehensive Monitoring Requirements than the Trade and Labor Office, Which Lacks Common Indicators and Attestation Engagements", "The Majority of Grant Files Included Required Monitoring Elements", "Grantees from Both Offices Had Difficulty Meeting Annual Performance Targets", "The Child Labor Office Uses Attestation Engagements and Both Offices Use Midterm Evaluations to Make Adjustments during the Remainder of the Project", "Final Project Evaluations Have Informed Changes to Child Labor Projects, but Most Impact Evaluations Are Not Yet Complete", "Final Project Evaluations Underline Positive Effects as well as Cross-cutting Weaknesses", "ILAB Has Drawn Lessons Learned from Project Evaluations", "While ILAB Has Funded Impact Evaluations of Selected Components of Projects, Most Remain Incomplete, Making The Usefulness of Their Results Difficult to Determine", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Labor", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The mission of ILAB involves improving working conditions, promoting workers’ rights, and addressing the workplace exploitation of children and other vulnerable populations overseas. This work is carried out by its Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking (OCFT, referred to here as the child labor office) and its Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA, referred to here as the trade and labor office), through projects developed and funded by the offices and generally implemented by international or nongovernmental organizations. Figure 1 shows the structure of the ILAB office. In fiscal year 2013, Congress appropriated about $66.5 million to ILAB for international technical assistance and microfinance programs provided that “$40 million shall be for programs to combat exploitative child labor internationally” and “not less than $6.5 million shall be used to implement model programs that address worker rights issues.” Of that amount, the child labor office obligated about $56 million, and the trade and labor office obligated about $6.5 million for technical assistance projects.2013, ILAB obligated a total of about $225 million. During that time, the From fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year child labor office obligated about $176 million and the trade and labor office obligated about $49 million.\nILAB-funded projects are typically managed using cooperative agreements between ILAB and the project-implementing organization. According to child labor office management procedures and guidelines, a cooperative agreement is a form of a grant in which substantial involvement is anticipated between DOL and the grantee during the performance of the proposed activities. Furthermore, the procedures and guidelines state that the level of monitoring and accountability required by DOL is less than what is required in a contract, but more than in a regular grant. ILAB generally utilizes cooperative agreements with grant recipients to outline the project’s goals and implementation requirements, timelines, key project personnel, and roles and responsibilities of ILAB and grantee staff, as well as to set forth general provisions on administration, allowable costs, property acquisition and management, and closeout procedures upon completion of the project.\nThe child labor office’s technical assistance includes direct educational services, livelihood services, capacity building, and supporting research on international child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking. Among other responsibilities, the office funds and oversees cooperative agreements with organizations engaged in efforts to eliminate exploitative child labor around the world, particularly the elimination of the worst forms of child labor. Child labor includes those children (minors under age 18) working in the worst forms of child labor as outlined in ILO Convention and children engaged in work that is exploitative and/or interferes 182with their ability to participate in and complete required years of schooling. ILO Convention 182 defines, for the purposes of the convention, the worst forms of child labor as 1. all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; 2. the use, procuring, or offering of a child for prostitution, the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; 3. the use, procuring, or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; and 4. work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children.\nAccording to ILO Convention 182, the types of work referred to in number 4 above “shall be determined by national laws or regulations or by the competent authority, after consultation with the organizations of employers and workers concerned, taking into consideration relevant international standards.” Therefore, forms of work identified as hazardous for children may vary from country to country. According to ILAB, hazardous child labor could include children working in agriculture, in which they may use dangerous tools, carry heavy loads, and apply harmful pesticides. In El Salvador, for example, many children harvest sugarcane and coffee. These children are exposed to extreme weather, toxic substances, long workdays, and injuries from machetes and sharp knives. Other hazardous activities could include child labor in mines, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which children are forced to mine diamonds, copper, gold, and other minerals, exposing them to heightened risks of disease, inadequate shelter, and fatal accidents from the collapse of mineshafts and explosions. However, some work done by minors is considered acceptable. According to the ILAB website, children of legal working age (as defined by their country’s government) who perform work that does not hinder their mental, physical, or emotional development can be acceptable and contribute to their families’ welfare.\nThe child labor office funded 40 projects between fiscal years 2011 and 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2011, the child labor office funded a $13 million project to combat rural exploitative child labor in Peru that included education services, livelihood assistance, and research on child labor. Objectives of the project included reducing child dropout rates, increasing the agricultural productivity of households with child laborers to reduce the use of child labor, and reducing hazardous labor among adolescents. During our visit to the project, we observed a school that had extended class hours to keep children in school in the afternoons to provide an alternative to working. In addition, the project provided the community a threshing machine so children no longer needed to separate grains from stalks by hand.\nThe trade and labor office’s technical assistance focuses on projects to improve worker rights. According to the trade and labor office website, while there is no single definition or definitive list of workers’ rights, ILO identifies what it calls “fundamental principles and rights at work” that all ILO members have an obligation to respect and promote, including freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, effective abolition of child labor, and elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and occupation. Additionally, according to DOL’s website, United States trade law adds factors such as acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health to that list, calling them “internationally recognized labor rights.”\nWorkers around the world face unsafe working conditions, forced labor, long hours, workplace discrimination, and little or no right to representation or collective bargaining. In Peru, for example, indigenous communities are vulnerable to forced labor, including in the Amazon region, where indigenous adolescents and adults have been found under forced labor conditions, particularly in timber production and domestic service. Additionally, since 1991, Ukraine has experienced the second worst coal mine fatality rate in the world, with over 4,000 fatal accidents stemming from explosions and unsafe work conditions.\nThe trade and labor office funded 34 projects between fiscal years 2011 and 2013, including multicountry projects to advance worker rights and improve working conditions, such as the ILO Better Work program, which includes an independent monitoring system of garment factory conditions, as well as capacity building efforts targeting employers, workers and government officials. The trade and labor office has funded Better Work projects in several countries, including Cambodia and Haiti. For example, in fiscal year 2011, the trade and labor office provided $1 million to improve labor compliance in the footwear industry in Cambodia and to improve the capacity of labor law enforcement. Specifically, the project sought to address working conditions and improve the application of labor law and occupational health and safety regulations through training labor inspectors and providing capacity building and training to the Cambodian government to strengthen its capacity to govern the labor inspection system. During our visit to the project, we accompanied a project factory audit that included inspecting lighting, noise, and temperature levels in the factory; determining whether the factory conducted fire drills and provided access to first aid kits; and assessing the prevalence of sexual harassment.", "The child labor office and trade and labor office both have guidance for the financial monitoring of projects, but could improve their financial oversight. For example, we found that project managers completed their acceptance or rejection of about 20 percent of quarterly financial reports more than 90 days after receipt from the grantee, after the next quarter’s report was due. ILAB does not have guidance that provides time frames and criteria for accepting or rejecting quarterly financial reports. In addition, although the child labor office supplements federal financial of selected projects to, requirements with attestation engagementsamong other things, assess the accuracy and reliability of grantee financial and performance data, the trade and labor office has not yet implemented its plan to conduct such attestation engagements of its grants, although officials said they plan to do so by November 2014. Without addressing these gaps in financial oversight, it could be difficult for ILAB to ensure federal resources are used efficiently and effectively to achieve desired objectives.", "Standard provisions generally in ILAB cooperative agreements and federal regulations require ILAB-funded grantees to submit quarterly federal financial reports no later than 30 days after the end of each quarter. These grant-specific financial reports include information such as the grantee’s cash receipts, expenditures, and on-hand cash balances.\nProject managers said they use the financial reports, combined with other grantee information, to monitor the financial status of the project by comparing the rate of planned versus actual expenditures.\nThe child labor office has policies and guidance for project managers to review the grantee’s quarterly financial report within 30 days after receipt. Officials said review could entail project managers’ examining the report to ensure all required information is provided and following up with the grantee if there are any questions. The guidance requires project managers to accept the financial report in the DOL electronic grant management system to which the financial reports are submitted, called E-grants and provide a written response by e-mail to the grantee, but the guidance does not specify a time frame in which the acceptance or rejection of documentation in E-grants is to occur, nor does it define circumstances in which project managers should accept or reject a report. According to officials, the project manager’s review can take place without anything being recorded in E-grants, since E-grants records only the eventual formal acceptance or rejection of the quarterly financial report. According to officials, they do not want to reject a quarterly financial report for something that could be easily corrected, in part because rejecting the quarterly financial report can create delays for payments to the grantee. However, officials said that they can reject a financial report if they determine it is appropriate to do so. Child labor office officials told us that their staff who manage projects have an element in their performance standards related to meeting the 30-day review requirement.\nSimilarly, the trade and labor office also has policies and guidance for project managers to review the quarterly financial reports. According to the July 2013 trade and labor office guidance, project managers shall accept the financial report no later than 10 days after receipt if there are no issues with the report. If any discrepancies occur, according to the guidance, the project manager shall instead provide comments in E- grants and work with the grantee to address any issues prior to accepting the financial report. However, the guidance does not outline the circumstances in which project managers should reject a financial report. Officials told us that as of fiscal year 2014, project managers are now required to accept or reject the quarterly report no later than 30 days after receipt. According to trade and labor officials, the policy was revised in order to harmonize the standards with the child labor office and after determining there would not be a detrimental effect on the management of their projects. Trade and labor office officials also told us that their staff who manage projects have an element in their performance standards related to meeting this requirement.\nIn addition, ILAB’s 2014 Operating Plan includes an indicator that reports the number of financial reports reviewed and processed. The indicator defines financial reports as reviewed and processed when accepted in E- grants. However, child labor officials said that project managers’ quarterly reporting on the status of their review does not require that they formally accept the reports in E-grants. Child labor officials said that the data they report in the Operating Plan is based on the results of the project managers’ quarterly report review. We found that, for the quarter ending June 30, 2013, this indicator in the operating plan included 2 reports from the child labor office that were not accepted in E-grants. Officials said they intend to amend the definition to measure the number of financial reports accepted or rejected (rather than reviewed and processed).\nOur analysis of ILAB project managers’ review of grantees’ financial reports for the quarter ending June 30, 2013 showed that ILAB received 74 financial reports. We analyzed 71 financial reports for the timeliness of project manager review, as well as formal acceptance in E-grants. Forty-three of these reports were for child labor office grants, and 28 were for trade and labor office grants. Child labor officials provided evidence that 12 of the 43 child labor office financial reports (about 28 percent) were reviewed within 30 days after receipt from the grantee, as described in the child labor office’s policy manual (see table 1). Further, we found that 11 trade and labor financial reports (39 percent) were reviewed within 30 days after receipt from the grantee.\nTable 2 shows the percentage of quarterly financial reports ILAB project managers accepted in E-grants more than 90 days after the grantee’s submission. We found that child labor office project managers accepted financial reports more than 90 days after the grantee’s submission of the report in about 12 percent (5 reports) of the cases we reviewed. Trade and labor project managers accepted the financial reports more than 90 days after grantee submission in 32 percent (9 reports) of the cases we reviewed. Overall, we found that, for both offices in ILAB, 14 of the 71 financial reports we reviewed (about 20 percent) were accepted more than 90 days after receipt from the grantee. In these cases, acceptance of the report was not completed before the next quarter’s financial report was due. According to ILAB officials, the project manager’s acceptance of 10 of these 14 reports was late because of the lack of adequate transition of responsibilities between project managers, as well as problems grantees and ILAB project managers had using E-grants, which officials said were outside their control.\nStandards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agency management is to develop policies, procedures, and practices that fit the agency’s operations as it implements internal control standards.must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal as well as external events. Pertinent information should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame that permits people to perform their duties efficiently. Without guidance on a time frame in which federal financial report review must be completed, including acceptance in E-grants, or guidance on criteria for accepting or rejecting a financial report in E-grants, it can be difficult for ILAB project managers to identify and address financial issues in a timely manner, and determine if federal funds are being used as intended.", "Federal regulation requires that cash advances to a grantee be limited to the minimum amount needed and be timed to be in accordance with the actual, immediate cash requirements of the grantee in carrying out the purpose of the program. In addition, standard provisions generally in ILAB’s cooperative agreements explain that advance payments to the ILAB-funded grantee are authorized provided that the grantee’s financial management system meets certain requirements, including that the grantee have written procedures to minimize the time between the transfer of funds to the grantee and the grantee’s payments for project expenses. Further, the standard provisions in ILAB’s cooperative agreement template state that advances must be based on actual and immediate cash needs in order to minimize federal cash on hand in accordance with established policies. ILAB officials told us that its project managers are responsible for monitoring excess cash on hand as part of their review and acceptance of the financial report. According to ILAB officials, any concerns about excess cash require the project manager to follow up with the grantee.\nAs shown in table 3, we found that 47 out of 74 (over 60 percent) of the financial reports we reviewed did not show any federal cash on hand; however, 3 of the 74 financial reports had cash balances over $250,000. ILAB officials told us that project managers noticed this excess during their review of the financial reports and contacted the grantees to correct the issues.\nWe determined that these 3 grants represent over 70 percent of total cash on hand. In addition, 24 grants had less than $250,000 cash on hand, with balances ranging from $1,825 to $121,141. told us that they contacted the grantee, and the grantee responded that the balance was high because the grantee had not reconciled its accounts and had payments coming due, and would make the correction in the subsequent financial report. This grantee told us in September 2013 that it did not have written procedures for transferring cash from the federal payment management system to the grantee. These procedures could minimize the time between transfer of funds and payment of project expenses, as described by standard provisions generally found in ILAB’s cooperative agreement. The grantee provided its written cash transfer procedures to ILAB in December 2013.", "The child labor office has contracted for over 40 attestation engagements since 2005, while the trade and labor office is planning its first engagement and is in the process of developing guidance to manage the engagements. Attestation engagements are a key control to ensure that grants are operating as intended. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management is to implement control activities such as policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms needed to enforce its directives.", "According to child labor office officials, to supplement federal government reporting requirements for grantees,an attestation engagement program to provide additional financial and performance oversight of grantee activities. They engaged a certified public accounting firm to conduct attestation engagements of non-O:P in 2005 they designed and began grantees. ILO projects are audited by ILO’s designated external auditor.reviewed.\nDuring the period 2005–2013, 41 non-ILO projects were According to child labor office guidance, the purpose of these attestation engagements is to: (1) determine whether grantees are complying with the terms of their cooperative agreements and with DOL’s regulations for grants, (2) ensure that grantee financial reports are accurate and reliable, and (3) ensure that grantee performance data are accurate and reliable (performance will be discussed later in this report). The attestation engagement is divided into several broad areas, including the following: administrative procedures, internal controls, and fraud risk performance data, measures, and goals; budget; cash management; disbursements and financial reporting; and procurement and inventory management.\nWe reviewed the 7 attestation engagement reports issued between 2010 and 2013. These reports found 12 significant findings, 11 of which were related to performance issues, and 1 related to disbursements and financial reporting. According to the attestation report, the significant financial finding was of discrepancies between the actual amounts an implementing organization paid to employees, teachers, and volunteers and the amounts charged to the project during the period of performance. Other financial-related findings in these attestation reports that resulted in recommendations include the late submission of quarterly federal financial reports and unsupported payroll costs.", "The trade and labor office’s management procedures and guidelines state that all grantees are subject to attestation engagements (although it is not required), and at the time of our review, the trade and labor office had not engaged a contractor to perform attestation engagements. However, trade and labor office officials said they expect the first attestation engagement to take place by November 2014 after being delayed. In addition, at the time of our review, the trade and labor office had not yet developed official guidance for project managers to manage the attestation engagement. Attestation engagements are a key control that help ensure that cooperative agreements are operating as intended. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, and In addition, these mechanisms that enforce management’s directives.standards also call for continual monitoring and separate evaluations to assess the quality of performance over time.\nIn July 2014, trade and labor office officials said they were using the child labor office’s existing contract agreement to finalize a task order for the attestation contractor to conduct an attestation engagement and prepare guidance for future project managers to follow when utilizing attestation engagements to monitor their projects. They expect the guidance, which officials indicated will be similar to the child labor office’s guidance, to take about 6 weeks to complete once the task order is awarded. ILAB officials plan to have the contractor use this guidance to carry out the first attestation engagement.\nWithout attestation engagements, the trade and labor office may not be able to determine whether grantees are in compliance with the terms of their agreements, ensure that financial reports are accurate and reliable, and ensure that performance data are accurate and reliable. Further, without guidance on managing these engagements, the trade and labor office may not be achieving the objectives of the attestation engagements.", "The child labor office and trade and labor office require grantees to report an inventory of all equipment and real property to DOL to comply with federal regulations on DOL grants. Specifically, the guidance requires grantees to submit a list within 12 months of the award, at least once every 2 years, and as part of the closeout process. Each office’s guidance states that applicable provisions, including provisions in the cooperative agreement with the grantee, apply to the subgrantee. Standard provisions generally in ILAB’s cooperative agreements state that grantees must follow DOL’s policies in the acquisition, accounting for, and disposition of property. However, ILAB’s guidance does not specifically state that the grantee’s list include equipment and real property purchased by any subgrantees. For example, the child labor office’s inventory list template included in its 2013 management procedures and guidelines does not refer to subgrantees. Officials stated that ILAB’s legal and financial relationship is with the grantee, who is responsible for the subgrantee, including any inventory the subgrantee purchased with federal funds. ILAB officials said they would expect any subgrantee inventory to be included in the grantee’s inventory list at closeout if the equipment was purchased using federal funds. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agency management is to develop policies, procedures, and practices that fit the agency’s operations as it implements internal control standards and that internal controls and all transactions need to be clearly documented. Without specific guidance, it may not be clear whether grantees are including equipment and real property purchased by subgrantees. If the equipment and real property purchased by the subgrantees are not accurately reported by the grantee, there is a risk of a lack of accountability for assets purchased with DOL funds.", "While ILAB uses a number of tools to monitor its grants, the child labor office requirements have generally been more comprehensive than those of the trade and labor office. For example, in contrast to the child labor office, the trade and labor office does not have common indicators that are used across projects to assess overall progress in key areas. Grantees from both offices had difficulty meeting annual performance targets. Further, as stated above and again in contrast with the child labor office, the trade and labor office has not conducted attestation engagements of its grants. Without common indicators and attestation engagements, it is difficult for the trade and labor office to assess progress across projects and overall progress toward the office’s goals, and whether its grantees are in compliance with relevant regulations. Finally, both offices use midterm evaluations, conducted at about the midpoint of a project’s implementation, to make adjustments during the remainder of the project.", "", "The child labor office has monitoring requirements that the trade and labor office does not, including common indicators and attestation engagements. See figure 2 for a list of selected monitoring tools used by the child labor office and the trade and labor office.\nThe child labor office’s monitoring system has evolved over the years and includes technical progress reports (TPR), a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan (CMEP) for direct services and capacity-building grants, and common indicators that are used across projects. The office also uses project-specific attestation engagements as mentioned previously to assess financial and performance issues. The requirements are described in the child labor office management procedures and guidelines.\nChild labor office officials said that they emphasize the importance of monitoring and evaluation starting with the solicitation for applications. For fiscal year 2014 child labor office projects, solicitations require that about 8 percent of the grant award funding be used for monitoring and evaluation, according to officials. In addition, the monitoring and evaluation officer for the project is considered key project personnel so his/her qualifications are submitted with the grant application for ILAB’s review.\nThe trade and labor office, which, according to officials, generally funds projects that have shorter timeframes and smaller budgets than those of the child labor office, has somewhat different monitoring requirements. The trade and labor office requirements include TPRs, a performance monitoring plan (PMP), and project-specific indicators. The requirements are described in the trade and labor office management procedures and guidelines.\nOfficials from the trade and labor office said that they are in the process of developing new monitoring initiatives, including using attestation engagements—to assess both financial and performance issues—and developing common indicators for selected grants. The trade and labor office’s management procedures and guidelines state that all grantees are subject to attestation engagements, although they are not required. However, as stated above, the trade and labor office has not yet conducted any attestation engagements, although officials said they plan to conduct the first one by November 2014. Without attestation engagements, it is difficult for the trade and labor office to assess how well its grantees comply with DOL regulations and provisions of the cooperative agreement, as well as the reliability of the grantee’s financial and performance reports.\nOfficials from the trade and labor office said that they currently do not have common indicators because the types of projects the office currently funds are different in nature than projects funded in previous years. For example, the office’s current priority on strengthening the capacity of labor inspector governmental bodies is a new area for them. According to officials, the trade and labor office had common indicators in the past, but those indicators are not applicable to current projects, and they do not provide historical data on which to develop indicators that can be used across projects. The Government Performance and Results Modernization Act requires agencies to report an update on agency performance including actual results in achieving performance goals for the 5 preceding years. While the trade and labor office does include indicators in the agency’s fiscal year 2013 annual performance report, including the number of countries in which worker rights and/or working conditions are improved, the report also states that the indicator does not accurately represent the scale of improvements that might be made in a country or group of countries, and that ILAB will refine the indicator in fiscal year 2014 to more accurately measure ILAB’s work. According to trade and labor office officials, they are developing common indicators to better track progress over time. Without common indicators, it is difficult for the trade and labor office to assess overall progress toward its goals.", "Four (3 from the child labor office, 1 from the trade and labor office) of the 26 grant files we reviewed were missing one or more key monitoring elements, such as CMEPs or PMPs, baseline surveys, or indicator targets. Twenty-two of the grants included the required monitoring elements.\nCMEP/PMP: 2 projects (from the child labor office) did not complete the required CMEP or PMP. According to officials, the CMEPs for these projects are in draft form. Both projects are scheduled to end in less than a year.\nBaseline survey: 1 trade and labor project in the Maldives and 1 child labor project in Pakistan did not have a baseline survey.\nTargets: 1 trade and labor office project in the Maldives did not have targets for the project’s indicators.\nOfficials from both offices told us they use additional means to monitor grants, including site visits, phone calls, and e-mails, since they do not have an overseas presence. Officials from the child labor office and trade and labor office said they also rely on other ILAB staff and embassy officials to meet with grantees when they make site visits. We found that 22 of 26 grants in our sample had received at least one site visit. Project managers try to visit at least twice during the life of the project for child labor grants, according to officials. Trade and labor officials said they prioritize site visits according to need and budget. Four grants in our sample had not had site visits at the time of our review. For example,\nOfficials said they were not able to visit 1 project (Pakistan) because of security issues. ILAB officials said that manager for a project that began operating in 2013 in Cambodia, a site visit is planned for December 2014.\nIn our fieldwork countries, grantee officials stated that ILAB project managers are well informed and knowledgeable about the issues facing the projects. Grantee officials also said they have frequent communication with ILAB, and that ILAB project managers often have numerous comments on TPRs. Also during our fieldwork, we noted that U.S. embassy involvement in ILAB grants varied. For example, the labor officer in one of the embassies we visited in Asia was knowledgeable about ILAB projects in that country. In contrast, the labor officer in an embassy we visited in South America said there had been little information provided about a new ILAB project that was starting.", "According to child labor and trade and labor offices’ guidance, performance indicators and their associated targets are required for Officials from the child labor office said monitoring project performance.that they require potential grantees to submit life-of-project targets for the common indicators in their grant applications, and these targets then become part of the cooperative agreement. The child labor office’s common indicators include the measurement of the provision of education and livelihood services.\nThe child labor office also requires grantees to set annual fiscal year targets, including for the common indicators, to monitor project performance against overall life-of-project targets. Child labor office officials said that these annual targets can be modified, in consultation with ILAB, in the October TPR for the subsequent year.\nFor the most recent fiscal year, 2013, there were 9 active projects with common indicators in our sample that had fiscal year 2013 targets.analyzed 7 projects (see fig. 3).\nOf these 7 projects, 1 project met or exceeded targets for both common indicators, 4 projects met or exceeded the target for one indicator, and 2 projects did not meet the target for either indicator. For the 4 projects that met or exceeded the target for one indicator, these projects achieved 74 to 92 percent of the target for the other indicator.\nAs discussed previously, the trade and labor office does not have common indicators, but requires projects to develop project-specific indicators and targets. According to trade and labor office officials, in 2013, the trade and labor office began requiring the Better Work country projects it funds to develop and submit semiannual performance monitoring plans with indicators, targets, and actual results. Officials said that these indicators and targets were developed by Better Work. Each project has numerous individual indicators and targets.\nFor the most recent project time period available (varying between the end of 2012 and the end of 2013), we counted the number of indicators with targets for each of 6 projects, determined for how many of those indicators the target was met or exceeded, and determined how many projects achieved various levels of success in meeting or exceeding their targets (see fig. 4).\nFor 5 projects, the projects met or exceeded the targets for more than 50 percent of their indicators with targets. One project met or exceeded the targets for 14 percent of its indicators with targets, meaning it did not meet the targets for 86 percent.\nA project could miss an annual target but still achieve its life-of-project targets, and there are many reasons why grantees might not achieve their targets, according to ILAB officials. For example, natural disasters or civil unrest are outside of the grantee’s control and can result in a need to change project targets. However, projects can also miss their targets because of a flawed strategy that did not fully take into account the realities of the implementing environment. Child labor office officials said that they encourage grantees to set ambitious but realistic annual targets.", "Both offices hire independent contractors to conduct midterm project evaluations to assess project performance. Midterm evaluations for both offices and attestation engagements for the child labor office (which assess both financial and performance issues) identify areas for improvement during the second half of the project. We reviewed five child labor project midterm evaluations, five trade and labor project midterm evaluations, and seven child labor project attestation engagements to identify such improvements.\nThe midterm evaluations and attestation engagements we reviewed found that ILAB projects are making progress toward goals, but identified areas for improvement. Evaluators and auditors highlighted several positive aspects of the projects. For example, auditors found that, in several projects, parents, teachers, and other community members were appreciative of the project and noted that children in the project are improving literacy skills and learning other new skills, and have stopped work or are working fewer hours. In addition, in Jordan, auditors reported that parents and teachers said that children were exhibiting fewer aggressive behaviors, and some children are gaining access to education for the first time. In Nicaragua and Indonesia, auditors found that awareness of exploitive child labor had increased in the target communities. The midterm evaluation of a Better Work project in Vietnam found that the project was likely to achieve its intended objectives, including strengthening the capacity of unions in export-oriented workplaces within the garment sector.\nEvaluators and auditors also noted several areas for improvement, and ILAB officials responded. For example, project managers told us they use evaluations and attestation engagements as one way to have a check on source documentation that supports reported indicator results in TPRs because they do not and are not expected to examine source documentation, in part because it is not feasible for the material to be sent to Washington, D.C. Evaluators and auditors found cases in several projects where reported beneficiary data were not accurately supported. In addition, one attestation engagement we reviewed found that the project had misclassified beneficiaries because of incorrect understanding of the child labor office’s definitions for children withdrawn or prevented from involvement with child labor. As a result, according to the attestation report, the project provided training to its staff so that they could correctly classify project beneficiaries to more accurately report the correct number of beneficiaries to the child labor office. Further, the midterm evaluation of a project in Jordan found that children were not able to participate in education activities because they lacked transportation. In response, the project began providing children with transportation. Midterm evaluations for three Better Work projects noted that the projects lack long-term sustainability. Trade and labor office officials acknowledged that sustainability takes a long time to achieve and much effort from stakeholders and funding from the host government. In response to a 2012 evaluation of the global Better Work program, DOL stated that it would like a better understanding of the role that host country governments will play in either the general sustainability aspect of Better Work or in the specific area of enforcement, and how that government’s role ties into the future vision for the program. Trade and labor office officials said that while ILO’s approach to sustainability has been focused on cost recovery and financing of the Better Work program itself, trade and labor office officials said they have a broader view about what sustainability can mean. For example, training and improving the capacity of government labor inspectors so that a Better Work project is not needed is a form of sustainability. Updates on project activities in response to evaluation and attestation engagement recommendations are also included in TPRs, as relevant.", "ILAB officials said they have drawn lessons learned from final project evaluations that assess performance against goals and objectives, but it is too early to determine the usefulness of impact evaluations. The child labor office and trade and labor office both require final evaluations for all completed projects and have general guidance for disseminating the evaluation results to inform new projects. Project evaluations, such as the midterm and final evaluations, are assessments of performance against goals and objectives. They are used to answer questions about design, implementation, and results. The final evaluations identify project achievements as well as cross-cutting areas for improvement. Child labor office officials said they have drawn some lessons learned from the evaluations that they have incorporated into subsequent projects, including addressing monitoring and evaluation issues earlier in a project. Impact evaluations, in contrast to project evaluations, seek to answer cause-and-effect questions. Their purpose is to determine whether a program has an impact and to quantify how large the impact is. Because only two impact evaluations have been conducted to date for the child labor office, it is too early to determine the usefulness of their results. Officials from the trade and labor office said that they had not previously had dedicated funding to conduct impact evaluations, but are planning to start them with funding assistance from DOL’s Chief Evaluation Office.", "As with the midterm evaluations, the child labor office and the trade and labor office hire independent contractors to carry out final project evaluations to assess project performance. These evaluations are assessments of performance against goals and objectives. They are used to answer questions about design, implementation, and results. According to ILAB guidance, the final project evaluation is a key tool that helps both offices better prepare for new projects because evaluation findings are used for planning future projects. The child labor office requires a final evaluation no later than 3 months before the end of a project; the trade and labor office requires the final evaluation to take place at least 4 to 6 months prior to the end of the project period. Exceptions to these rules are allowed on a case-by-case basis. Both offices in ILAB have guidance about procedures project managers and independent evaluators need to follow. For example, the terms of reference for the evaluation specify key areas of focus that a final evaluation needs to cover, such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.\nFinal evaluations make recommendations to grantees and ILAB for improvement. In our sample of 26 projects covering both offices, there were 8 completed projects, all of which were funded by the child labor office between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2013. Of these 8, 1 did not have a final evaluation on file. Although the grantee of this project commissioned a contractor to perform the final evaluation, the child labor office could not accept the report because of its poor quality, according to officials.\nThe evaluations found that the projects were generally relevant to the local context and supported the main goals of DOL. Projects also had positive effects on raising awareness of child labor issues and, in some cases, empowering communities. However, our analysis of the evaluations found the following cross-cutting areas of weakness—issues with data, livelihoods and other support services, and project staffing— with potential consequences for project effectiveness and sustainability:\nData concerns: In 3 projects, the number of children withdrawn and prevented from involvement with child labor were not always counted or targeted in a consistent manner. In 2 projects, an emphasis on achieving preset numerical targets raised evaluators’ concerns about the quality of services delivered. Child labor officials told us establishing targets is a balancing act. For example, setting targets too low and ending up with final numbers far in excess of targets could also indicate flaws in project design.\nWeaknesses in livelihoods and other support services: Four of the final evaluations we reviewed found that vocational or skill training programs were not always appropriate, either because they were too short in duration, did not provide the beneficiaries the necessary tools, or lacked local labor market research, which could have secured beneficiary children apprenticeships and practical training with local employers. In addition, the evaluations of three projects found support could be strengthened for family livelihood and income generation activities to tackle the root causes of child labor, including household poverty and lack of educational opportunities. Further, four of the evaluations we reviewed recommended adding psychosocial support for beneficiary children.\nStaffing concerns: Staff problems in projects, such as high turnover rates, low pay, varying degrees of skill, and workload were raised in 4 final evaluations. One project experienced delays because the host government instituted a requirement that the project’s country director be a host country national, and as a result, would not grant a visa to the foreign-national director hired by the grantee.\nIn addition, to inform staff of recurring themes across project evaluations, the child labor office commissioned a synthesis report in 2012 that systematically reviewed the findings of 48 final project evaluations. The report found that projects generally met ILAB’s goals, such as achieving targets for withdrawing and preventing children from child labor, and increasing awareness about the importance of education for all children. The report also points to promising activities that were implemented across several countries, including well-conducted remedial classes and early-childhood development initiatives. However, the report found that the goal of ensuring the long-term sustainability of activities was not always achieved, mainly because recipient countries generally lack the necessary resources.", "Both the child labor office and the trade and labor office have guidance stating that one of the roles of project managers is to ensure that the office is applying learning from evaluations and feeding knowledge back into new and ongoing projects, as appropriate. Child labor officials told us they make adjustments to projects and strengthen processes based on evaluation recommendations, as needed. For example, the office anticipates fewer data quality issues with recent projects because the new CMEP process, which all new direct beneficiary projects have had to implement since fiscal year 2012, requires grantees to focus on data collection and reporting early in the project. Child labor officials also said they now require grantees to assess local labor market conditions, if they include vocational training in their project proposals, to ensure there is demand for the skills they plan to teach. For example, a 2013 solicitation for a project in Morocco states that applicants’ strategies must be based on labor market research to ensure that the services available through the project are linked with local employment options. In addition, the fiscal year 2010 appropriations conference report directed that funds may be used to support livelihood assistance activities as part of projects, which officials said addresses some of the issues about family livelihoods that evaluators raised in the past. Child labor officials also told us they strongly encourage grantees to hire local nationals as key personnel for their projects to satisfy potential host government requirements and avoid delays in project start, as well as build local capacity.\nTo disseminate the results of evaluations and their related lessons, the child labor office keeps an internal electronic repository of project evaluations organized by country, region, and topic, which staff can consult when scoping projects, according to officials. Child labor officials said they do not currently plan to produce more of the synthesis reports of evaluations, relying instead on the repository.\nSimilarly, the trade and labor office’s guidance lists steps project managers should follow to disseminate evaluation findings, including briefing interested parties in DOL within 2 weeks and sharing the report and its findings with all relevant stakeholders. Officials from the trade and labor office said all evaluations are on a shared drive accessible to project managers. ILAB officials also told us project managers share the findings and recommendations of evaluations in informal meetings.\nIn addition, external stakeholders can find evaluations on ILAB’s website, which makes publicly available most midterm and final evaluations of projects. DOL is in the process of uploading more evaluations, officials told us, as part of website improvements. It aims to have all evaluations available on its website. Two grantees we spoke to said that they used project evaluations from ILAB’s website to help them develop their grant proposals. One project manager also said that she encourages grantees to review these evaluations to see if they have lessons that are applicable for the grantees’ projects.", "In addition to final project evaluations, since 2008, the child labor office has provided funding to several organizations to carry out impact evaluations of specific activities in 7 projects. Two of these are complete. Unlike project evaluations, ILAB does not require impact evaluations, but conducts them to obtain information on what types of interventions are effective in reducing child labor and can be used as the basis for replicating successful activities.\nImpact evaluations seek to answer cause-and-effect questions. Their purpose is to determine whether a program has an impact and to quantify how large the impact is. For example, impact evaluations often involve randomly assigning eligible individuals or children to two groups, one of which participates in the program or activity that is being evaluated (treatment group), while the other does not (control group). The random assignment ensures that the two groups are statistically the same, and any difference seen later can be attributed to one group having participated in the program and the other not. Thus, impact evaluations measure program effectiveness typically by comparing the outcomes of the two groups.\nSo far, two impact evaluations have been completed. Three are still ongoing, and two have been halted, largely because of concerns about data quality, as well as delays and deviations from original implementation plans, which would potentially skew results, according to officials.\nThe child labor office considered a number of factors when selecting projects for impact evaluation, according to officials, including the size of the population served by the project; the implementing environment— whether the country was stable and receptive to the idea of an impact evaluation, as not all countries are—and whether the project included livelihood services. In 2013, the child labor office held a workshop for impact evaluation implementers to share lessons learned from their experience and report on progress.\nOne impact evaluation found that an extended-hours school activity in Bolivia had mixed effects on the school or work situation of beneficiary children, possibly increasing school enrollment among rural children while decreasing it among urban children. The evaluation also found no impact on participation in hazardous child labor. The other completed impact evaluation, of a project combating child labor through education and livelihood support in Egypt, found that the project had a significant positive impact on school enrollment, attendance, and time spent on school-related activities, especially for girls and young children. It also found that the amount of time beneficiary children were working had been reduced, but no evidence that the education project had an impact on the children’s overall participation in work, or their exposure to workplace hazards, suggesting that the intervention may need to be reformulated to reach the ultimate objective of withdrawing and preventing children from involvement in hazardous child labor.\nIn 2006, the child labor office also funded ILO to undertake six tracer studies, as part of the broader work on impact assessment, with an expected delivery date in 2011. Tracer studies look back at a sample of children who have already been provided educational services and present evidence on the extent to which such interventions have long- term effect on the lives of beneficiary children. ILO has supplied only four tracer studies to date, two of which are not available in English.\nBecause there are only two completed impact evaluations, both of which were carried out in 2013, out of the seven that have been funded by the child labor office since 2008, it is too early to gauge how the office will use them to inform future project design. As indicated earlier, the two impact evaluations conducted so far suggest that the education projects likely need modifications to have a significant effect on withdrawing and preventing children from participating in child labor. Similarly, since only four of the six tracer studies commissioned in 2006 were delivered, it is unclear how the tracer studies will inform future project design for the child labor office, especially when a language barrier limits their wide dissemination.\nTrade and labor officials said that in the past, the office did not have dedicated funding to commission impact evaluations of their projects but that they have recently begun one with financial assistance from DOL’s Chief Evaluation Office for that purpose. However, they noted that this assistance is not guaranteed in future years. According to officials, lack of funding is a real constraint given that the cost of evaluation is high compared with the cost of projects. For example, an impact evaluation currently under way of a worker rights project in Colombia cost about $950,000, which is over 60 percent of the project cost. Trade and labor officials told us the Colombia project was selected because similar projects are being considered in other Central American countries, so finding out about the impact of the project is important. Until recently, most of the trade and labor office’s largest grants have been directed towards the Better Work projects implemented by ILO, and ILO has commissioned an impact evaluation of these projects. Because DOL is not providing funding for this effort, the trade and labor office officials told us that it has access only to reports and data that ILO makes publicly available.", "Congress funds the child labor and trade and labor offices to, among other things, combat exploitative child labor internationally and implement model programs that address worker rights issues. These funds are used to address the conditions that could lead to disasters such as the factory collapse in Bangladesh and the tragedy of millions of children around the world facing harsh employment conditions and missing out on educational opportunities. DOL project managers use many tools to monitor whether projects are on track to meet objectives, but improving use of some of these tools could help DOL achieve its goals for the projects it oversees.\nProject managers use the quarterly financial report to ascertain how projects are managing their funds; however, ILAB guidance lacks deadlines and criteria for when quarterly financial reports must be formally accepted or rejected. For about 20 percent of the reports we reviewed, project managers did not formally accept them in DOL’s electronic grant management system until after the next quarter’s reports were due. This can make it difficult to identify and address financial issues in a timely way.\nBecause of a lack of specific guidance, grantees may not be clear about requirements to ensure that submitted inventory lists include inventory lists of subgrantees. If the equipment and real property purchased by the subgrantees are not accurately reported by the grantee, there is a risk of a lack of accountability for assets purchased with DOL funds.\nAttestation engagements can be key to ensuring that grants are operating as intended. Although the child labor office uses attestation engagements, the trade and labor office to date has not used them, although it plans to by November 2014. Without attestation engagements, it is difficult for the trade and labor office to assess how well its grantees comply with DOL regulations and provisions of the cooperative agreement, as well as the reliability of the grantees’ financial and performance reports.\nWhile the trade and labor office has project-specific indicators to measure the progress of individual grants, it lacks a way to assess performance across all of its grants. Without common indicators, it is difficult for the trade and labor office to assess overall progress toward its goals.\nFinancial and performance monitoring tools are key to ensuring that federal funds are used as intended and that programs are as effective as possible. Without improved oversight, these programs are at increased risk of not meeting the goals of improving working conditions, protecting workers’ ability to exercise their rights, and addressing the workplace exploitation of children and other vulnerable populations.", "To improve ILAB’s financial and performance monitoring, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor, in concert with ILAB management, take four actions: 1. to facilitate the effective financial oversight of its grants, establish guidance specifying time frames in which project managers must accept or reject quarterly financial reports and the criteria for accepting or rejecting the reports; 2. to better ensure accurate accounting of federal funds, revise ILAB policies to specify that subgrantee inventories of equipment and real property purchased with federal funds are included in inventory lists submitted by the grantee; 3. to improve financial and performance monitoring of trade and labor grants, implement the trade and labor office’s plan to conduct attestation engagements and develop guidance on the management of these engagements; and 4. to improve performance monitoring of trade and labor grants, ensure that the trade and labor office implement its plan to develop common indicators to track progress across projects.", "We provided a draft of this report to DOL for comment. We also provided relevant sections to the State Department for technical comment.\nIn its written comments, which are reproduced in Appendix II, DOL stated that it agreed with GAO’s recommendations to improve their financial and performance monitoring. Specifically, DOL reported that the child labor office is incorporating into its operation manual the same standard that the trade and labor office has recently established—which is for project managers to accept or reject quarterly financial reports within 30 days after the reports are due. In addition, DOL said that it will translate its informal guidance and standards for accepting or rejecting financial reports into formal written criteria. DOL also stated that it has taken measures to revise the language in ILAB’s cooperative agreements and management procedures and guidelines to specify that grantee inventory reporting requirements must include items purchased by subgrantees. Further, DOL explained that the trade and labor office has initiated the planning process for its first attestation engagement, including development of guidance for managing these engagements. Finally, DOL said that the trade and labor office is including six new common indicators in ILAB’s internal fiscal year 2015 operating plan.\nDOL and the State Department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Labor. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "This report reviews issues related to the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) international technical assistance. The objectives of this report examined how ILAB: (1) ensures the financial accountability of its technical assistance funds, (2) monitors the performance of its projects, and (3) evaluates its projects and uses the results of the evaluations.\nTo assess how ILAB ensures the financial accountability of its technical assistance funds, we reviewed ILAB management procedures and guidelines and operations manuals of the child labor office and the trade and labor office. These manuals contain chapters on cooperative agreements and procedures for audits of technical assistance programs. We also reviewed the ILAB cooperative agreement template and attestation engagement reports. To determine whether ILAB project managers are following ILAB’s guidance regarding timely review of quarterly financial reports, we selected the entire population of 74 financial reports submitted to ILAB for the quarter ending June 30, 2013. We selected the quarter ending June 30, 2013 on a nonprobability basis. We compared the date the grantee certified the financial report with the date ILAB project managers accepted it to determine whether the project manager was in compliance with ILAB’s guidance. Further, we analyzed the financial reports to determine the amount of cash the grantee reported as of June 30, 2013. To assess the reliability of the financial reports, we interviewed DOL officials about the E-grants system and asked about discrepancies we found during our review. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of determining the timeliness of acceptance of the financial reports and the amount of cash balances. In addition, we interviewed ILAB officials to understand the processes for financial monitoring of cooperative agreements. To the extent necessary, we compared the information obtained with GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.\nWe selected a nongeneralizable sample of 26 projects out of a total of 98 projects that were active in calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2013. To select this sample, we used lists of projects from fiscal years 2003 through 2012. These project lists are maintained by the child labor and trade and labor offices in ILAB. To determine the reliability of these lists, we met with the responsible officials and discussed how the lists are updated and maintained. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting ILAB’s funding and selecting our sample of awards to review. We selected the sample based on several factors, such as dollar value and geographic location. The sample represents about 44 percent of ILAB funding over these years and includes seven of the nine grants with the highest dollar value ($10 million or above). Our sample includes projects that are single-country, multicountry, completed, ongoing, direct services (such as education or livelihood support that the implementing organization provides directly to the targeted beneficiaries), capacity building, and in most geographic regions. Because our sample is nongeneralizable, it cannot be used to make inferences about the population of ILAB grants.\nTo examine how ILAB monitors the performance of its projects, we reviewed ILAB monitoring guidance, including management procedures and guidelines and operations manuals of the child labor office and trade and labor office. These manuals contain chapters on technical assistance/cooperative agreements, project administration, project oversight, and monitoring and evaluation. We developed a data collection instrument to assess the compliance of the 26 grants in our sample with selected monitoring requirements, such as technical progress reports, monitoring plans, and site visit reports. We identified these requirements based on ILAB guidance documents, including the management procedures and guidelines and the operations manuals from both the child labor office and the trade and labor office. One analyst completed the data collection instrument and another analyst verified the entries. In addition, we interviewed ILAB officials about any questions related to the data. To assess the extent to which the 12 active child labor projects in our sample achieved fiscal year 2013 targets for the child labor office’s two common indicators, we used the office’s indicator tracking sheet. To assess the reliability of the data in the tracking sheet, we used the actual results and fiscal year 2013 targets reported in each project’s October 2013 technical progress report. For 8 projects, we identified discrepancies between the tracking sheet and the technical progress reports. ILAB provided additional supporting documentation to resolve the discrepancies for 6 of those 8 projects and indicated that it was working with the grantees for the other 2 projects to clarify the data they had reported. We excluded these 2 projects from our analysis. We also excluded 3 projects that did not have fiscal year 2013 targets, leaving a total of 7 projects in our analysis. In addition, since the trade and labor office does not have common indicators used across all projects, we counted the number of indicators with targets for each of 6 ongoing trade and labor projects Better Work country projects in our sample and analyzed how many of those targets the project met or exceeded for the most recent project time period available (varying between the end of 2012 and the end of 2013). We pulled the indicator targets and results data from the data-tracking tables provided by these projects to ILAB. To assess the reliability of the data, we met with trade and labor officials to discuss how they verify grantee data. According to officials, the grantee is responsible for the accuracy of the data, and data quality is checked through audits and evaluations. However, the ILAB project manager does not engage in ongoing data validity checks. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting on compliance with monitoring requirements and project performance for the projects in our sample. We also met with knowledgeable officials from ILAB, including 11 project managers, to discuss how they provide oversight of their grants. In addition, we met with grantees at their headquarters in Washington, D.C., and in Ecuador, Peru, Cambodia, and Thailand, to obtain their perspectives on how ILAB monitors grants. We selected these locations based on, among other factors, size of grant, geographic location, and phase of the project.\nTo examine how ILAB evaluates its projects and uses the results of its evaluations, we reviewed seven final evaluations for the completed child labor projects in our sample and the two completed impact evaluations ILAB had conducted. We discussed the completed final evaluations and impact evaluations with ILAB officials, including project managers responsible for the projects, to discuss the evaluation findings and how ILAB used those findings. We also discussed ongoing impact evaluation efforts.\nThe trade and labor office projects in our sample were still ongoing at the time of our review, and thus did not yet have a final evaluation. the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Leslie Holen, Assistant Director; Christina Werth; Rachel Girshick; Jeff Isaacs; Seyda Wentworth; and Josiah Williams made key contributions to this report. Jill Lacey, Grace Lui, Karen Deans, and Etana Finkler provided technical assistance." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What does DOL's ILAB offer?", "What was the nature of these gaps in financial oversight?", "To what extent does the trade and labor office provide adequate oversight?", "What risks might emerge from this lack of oversight?", "What is the purpose of ILAB's final evaluations?", "How have officials used these evaluations?", "What is the purpose of impact evaluations?", "What does the International Labour Organization say about child labor?", "What does ILAB's child labor office provide funding for?", "What does this report examine?", "How did GAO get information for this report?", "How did GAO select this sample?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Labor's (DOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs' (ILAB) child labor office and trade and labor office both have guidance for the financial monitoring of grants, but could improve their financial oversight.", "For example, we found that project managers completed their acceptance or rejection of about 20 percent of quarterly financial reports more than 90 days after receipt from the grantee, after the next quarter's report was due. ILAB does not have guidance that provides time frames and criteria for accepting or rejecting quarterly financial reports.", "In addition, although the child labor office supplements federal financial requirements with attestation engagements of selected projects to, among other things, assess the accuracy and reliability of grantee financial and performance data, the trade and labor office has not yet implemented its plan to conduct such attestation engagements of its grants, although officials said they plan to do so by November 2014.", "Without addressing these gaps in financial oversight, it could be difficult for ILAB to ensure federal resources are used efficiently and effectively to achieve desired objectives.", "ILAB conducts final evaluations for all projects to assess the performance of the project, including an assessment of performance against goals and objectives.", "Officials said they have drawn lessons learned from these evaluations that they have incorporated into subsequent projects, including addressing monitoring and evaluation issues earlier in a project.", "ILAB has also commissioned impact evaluations to determine whether a project has an effect and to quantify how large the effect is, and two have been completed to date.", "According to the International Labour Organization, millions of children worldwide are engaged in labor that hinders their development. Recent incidents, including a factory collapse in Bangladesh, have highlighted poor working conditions overseas.", "ILAB's child labor office and trade and labor office provide funding to improve working conditions by supporting worker rights and combating child labor, mainly through international and nongovernmental organizations. The child labor office obligated about $56 million and the trade and labor office obligated about $13.5 million in fiscal year 2013.", "You asked us to review issues related to ILAB's international technical assistance. This report examines how ILAB (1) ensures the financial accountability of its technical assistance funds, (2) monitors the performance of its projects, and (3) evaluates its projects and uses the results of the evaluations.", "To address these objectives, GAO reviewed ILAB documents on financial requirements, performance monitoring, and evaluation. GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 26 grants that were active in calendar years 2011-2013.", "GAO selected this sample based on several factors, including dollar value and geographic location." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, 2, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-12-888	{ "title": [ "Background", "Consular Officers Rely on Overseas Support to Identify Fraud", "Consular Officers Also Rely on Domestic Fraud Prevention Efforts", "Issuance of Visas Has Generally Increased since 2003", "Nonimmigrant and Immigrant Visa Adjudication Processes Include Fraud Checks", "Nonimmigrant Visa Adjudication Process", "Certain Countries and Visa Categories Experience High Levels of Fraud, but Trends Evolve over Time", "Although Fraud Conditions Are Post-Specific, Certain Countries Have High Numbers of Suspected Fraud Cases", "Fraud Risks Evolve Over Time", "State Has a Variety of Tools and Resources to Combat Fraud, but Does Not Have a Policy for Systematically Utilizing Domestic Anti-Fraud Resources", "State Has Implemented New Technological Tools Intended to Enhance Its Visa Fraud Prevention Efforts", "State Compiles Various Internal Reports to Share Information about Fraud Trends and Available Resources", "State Has Expanded Anti- Fraud Activities Conducted by KCC", "Overseas Anti-Fraud Staffing Levels and Workload Vary by Post", "Although State Offers a Variety of Anti- Fraud Training Courses, Fraud Prevention Managers Are Not Required to Take Them", "State Offers a Variety of Anti-Fraud Training Courses", "State Does Not Require Fraud Prevention Managers to Take Anti- Fraud Courses", "State Does Not Track Enrollment of Fraud Prevention Managers in Anti-Fraud Courses", "Conclusion", "Recommendations", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology", "Appendix II: U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Classes of Admission", "Temporary visitors for business B-1", "Temporary visitors for pleasure B-2", "Temporary workers and trainees H-1B", "Visa Class R-2", "TD Treaty traders and investors E-1", "Intracompany transferees L-1", "Representatives of foreign information media I-1", "Students F-1", "Exchange visitors J-1", "Other categories A-1", "Visa Class G-4", "Appendix III: Case Studies", "Fraud Prevention Unit Case Study", "ARSO-I Case Studies", "U.S. Embassy Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic", "Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of State", "Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The mission of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is to protect the lives and interests of U.S. citizens overseas and to strengthen U.S. border security through the vigilant adjudication of U.S. passports and visas. Consular officers abroad have sole legal authority to adjudicate visa applications, and they receive overseas and domestic support to help identify visa fraud. Consular officers at overseas posts issue nonimmigrant visas to temporary visitors and immigrant visas to people who intend to immigrate to the United States. The adjudication processes for both nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications contain steps to check for fraud.", "Consular Affairs has more than 11,000 officers, local staff, and contractors working in over 300 locations around the world, including domestic visa centers and passport facilities. Within each consular section at overseas posts, consular officers adjudicate visa applications, serving as fraud detection officers on the first line of defense for border security. Consular officers are charged with facilitating legitimate travel while preventing ineligible aliens, including potential terrorists, from gaining admission to the United States. To help detect and prevent fraud, consular officers work with members of a Fraud Prevention Unit located in the consular section. In large posts, the Fraud Prevention Unit may be led by a Fraud Prevention Manager, and may be augmented at certain high- fraud posts by a Diplomatic Security Assistant Regional Security Officer In smaller posts, the Fraud Prevention Manager may be a Investigator.consular officer who has other responsibilities depending on the workload volume and prevalence of fraud at the post. Consular officers may also coordinate with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Visa Security Officer and an external anti-fraud working group.\nFraud Prevention Manager. Under the Bureau of Consular Affairs, fraud prevention efforts at the 222 visa-issuing posts are led by a Fraud Prevention Manager—a Foreign Service Officer assigned by consular management to investigate fraud cases, conduct fraud training, and provide information on fraud trends to the entire consular section. As of April 30, 2012, 81 percent of all visa issuing posts (180 of 222) had Fraud Prevention Manager positions filled by an entry- level officer or an officer of unspecified grade, and 84 percent of visa issuing posts (186 of 222) had Fraud Prevention Manager positions designated as part- time or rotational. As of April 30, 2012, 36 posts had full-time mid-level Fraud Prevention Managers serving for 2 years. An additional 40 posts had full-time entry-level Fraud Prevention Managers serving for 2 years in positions originally designated for mid-level officers. Officers assigned to part-time Fraud Prevention Manager positions have other consular-related duties in addition to preventing fraud. An officer filling the position on a rotational basis serves as the Fraud Prevention Manager for a designated period of time, typically 6 months, before moving on to other duties. State officials told us that the reason most Fraud Prevention Manager positions are part-time or rotational is in order to provide consular managers more flexibility in how they use consular staff, and also to provide officers with more opportunities to work on different activities.\nFraud Prevention Unit. At 94 percent of visa-issuing posts (208 of 222), Fraud Prevention Managers have locally employed staff to assist them in fraud investigations, forming a Fraud Prevention Unit. Out of the 3,700 locally employed staff working at consular posts, 417 are assigned to Fraud Prevention Units. These staff generally have special expertise in host country culture and language, as well as a network of local contacts to help develop leads on possible fraud. The Fraud Prevention Unit collects and verifies data for use in identifying fraud trends, analyzes individual fraud cases, and drafts and disseminates fraud reports. Tools utilized in individual fraud investigations vary from post to post, but may include physical document examination, visa record searches, facial-recognition review, phone calls to verify data, Internet searches, and site visits. Once all of the data have been collected, verified, and assessed, the Fraud Prevention Manager reviews the results and provides a final fraud finding to consular officers, who use the information to make a determination on whether to issue a visa to the applicant. If the Fraud Prevention Manager determines that the visa fraud may involve criminal activity, the case may be referred to Diplomatic Security agents at post for further investigation.\nAssistant Regional Security Officer Investigator. Under the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 84 Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigators (ARSO-I) are assigned to 75 high-fraud posts to protect the integrity of the visa system and disrupt criminal networks and terrorist mobility. ARSO-Is are Diplomatic Security Special Agents who specialize in criminal investigations of visa fraud. Diplomatic Security recommends that ARSO-Is spend 80 percent of their time working on visa fraud, and 20 percent of their time supporting other Diplomatic Security responsibilities, such as providing security to high- level visitors at post. ARSO-Is often work with local law enforcement and judicial officials to arrest and prosecute violators of local laws related to visa fraud, such as the fraudulent production of local identification documents used in applications for visas. Some investigations are connected to large-scale alien smuggling or human trafficking cases.\nDHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Visa Security Program. ICE deploys Visa Security Officers to assist the consular section at designated high-risk posts by providing advice and training to consular officers regarding specific security threats, reviewing visa applications, and conducting investigations with respect to consular matters under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security.\nExternal Anti-Fraud Working Group. At some posts, members of the Fraud Prevention Unit may coordinate with officials from other countries’ embassies and consulates to share fraud trends in an anti- fraud working group.", "Domestically, both State and DHS play a role in fraud prevention and detection. While the Secretary of State has the lead role with respect to foreign policy-related visa issues, DHS is responsible for reviewing implementation of the policy and providing additional direction.\nState’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Office has direct responsibility for visa policy and oversight for the operations of KCC and the National Visa Center in New Hampshire. These two centers prescreen visa applications for fraud and provide other support for visa adjudication worldwide.\nState’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Fraud Prevention Programs advises posts on visa and passport fraud questions, develops training material to manage fraud prevention programs, produces publications on fraud issues and trends, and coordinates with other U.S. agencies involved in preventing visa fraud.\nState’s Diplomatic Security Office of Overseas Criminal Investigations Branch provides managerial oversight, guidance, and support to ARSO-Is at overseas posts.\nDiplomatic Security domestic field offices support overseas investigations by investigating visa fraud that is connected to criminal networks within the United States.\nDHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Fraud Detection National Security Directorate is responsible for detecting, pursuing, and deterring immigration benefit fraud, and identifying persons seeking benefits who pose a threat to national security and public safety. In addition, Fraud Detection National Security Directorate staff conduct site visits and administrative inquiries within the United States on persons or entities suspected of immigration fraud and follow up with ICE investigators, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies on potential national security risks identified during background checks on immigration benefit applications.\nDHS’s ICE Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces work with federal, state, and local partners to detect, deter, investigate, and present instances of benefit fraud for criminal prosecution.\nDHS’s Customs and Border Protection agents serve as the last line of defense in protecting American borders. Customs and Border Protection agents verify that visitors have proper travel documents and valid visas, and have the discretion to not admit travelers with valid visas into the United States if the agent suspects the traveler intends to violate the terms of his or her visa.", "After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the number of visas issued initially declined, but has generally increased steadily since 2003, and State anticipates demand for visas to continue to rise. As seen in figure 1, in 2001, the United States issued almost 8 million nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, based on data from the Consular Consolidated Database. From 2001 to 2003, visa issuances declined by 34 percent. However, since then, the number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued has generally trended upward. In 2011, consular officers issued more than 7.5 million nonimmigrant visas, up 54 percent from 2003 levels. Approximately 75 percent of the 7.5 million nonimmigrant visas issued in 2011 were processed for temporary visits to the United States More than half (52 for business or personal reasons, such as tourism.percent) of the visas for temporary visits were issued to visitors from Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, State continues to see increases in visa demand for individuals residing in some of the world’s fastest-growing economies.\nWhile visa issuances have generally increased since 2003, visa refusals have fluctuated since 2006. In fiscal year 2011, more than 2.1 million nonimmigrant visa applicants worldwide were denied visas for entry into the United States. As seen in table 1, adjusted refusal rates for tourist visas in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico fluctuated between fiscal years 2006 and 2011. While refusals of visitors from Brazil, China, and Mexico have generally decreased in the last 6 years, refusals of visitors from India have increased. Visas may be refused for a number of reasons other than a suspicion of fraud, such as insufficient documentation or suspected immigration intent. When a consular officer suspects that the applicant’s travel or financial documents are counterfeit, the consular officer may deny the applicant’s request for a visa or may refer the case to the Fraud Prevention Unit for an additional fraud assessment.\nThe U.S. travel and tourism industry benefits from foreign visitors, and the U.S. government is working to accommodate an increase in demand for tourist travel. For example, State reported in 2010 that international tourists contributed $134 billion to the U.S. economy and supported over 1.1 million jobs. The Administration has encouraged State to increase visa processing capacity and reduce wait times for receiving a visa. In January 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order requesting that the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, develop an implementation plan to (1) increase nonimmigrant visa processing capacity in China and Brazil by 40 percent over the coming year and (2) ensure that 80 percent of nonimmigrant visa applicants are interviewed within 3 weeks of receipt of visa applications.", "", "Almost all nonimmigrant visa applicants submit an online visa application called the DS-160 through State’s web-based portal called the Consular Electronic Application Center, and then schedule a visa interview at a local U.S. embassy or consulate. Consular officers interview visa applicants, review the application and supporting documents, such as birth certificates, and make an initial decision to issue or deny the visa application. A consular officer may temporarily deny the visa in order to scrutinize the application for suspected fraud or to process it further administratively (see fig. 2).\nObtaining an immigrant visa is one part of a four part process for aliens outside of the United States to become a permanent resident of the United States. First, an eligible U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, called a petitioner, must file a petition (a paper form) with USCIS on behalf of the alien applying for lawful permanent resident status, who is called the beneficiary. Generally, the petitioner can be either a relative or employer, although there are visa categories in which the applicant can self petition, such as the diversity visa. USCIS has the sole authority to approve or deny the petition. Second, once a petition is approved and a visa number is available in the appropriate category, the beneficiary prepares for a visa interview by gathering required documentation and undergoing a medical exam. Third, the beneficiary, now called the applicant, submits an online visa application, either the DS-260 or the DS- 230, along with evidence supporting the applicant’s eligibility, such as a birth certificate or diploma. All aliens outside the United States apply for an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate in their current country of residence. As in the nonimmigrant visa process, the alien schedules a visa interview, submits fingerprints, and pays a visa application processing fee. During the interview, a consular officer reviews submitted documentation as well as biometric and other security and fraud checks, determines if the alien is subject to any ineligibilities, and confirms that the applicant has the required legal relationship with the petitioner. The consular officer then either approves or denies the visa application. If the visa application is approved, a visa is printed and placed in the applicant’s passport. Fourth, the applicant travels to the United States with his or her immigrant visa and packet of supporting documentation. Upon admission by a Customs and Border Patrol officer at the port of entry, the alien becomes a lawful permanent resident.", "Certain countries, such as Brazil, China, the Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico, had high numbers of suspected fraud cases in fiscal year 2010, and certain visa categories, such as work visas, student visas, and diversity visas, had high levels of fraud. Visa fraud has become more sophisticated over time with increased globalization, advanced technology, and ease of travel.", "State requires Fraud Prevention Managers to classify fraud levels at each post. Fraud Prevention Managers are required to submit a fraud assessment twice a year as part of the post’s bi-annual fraud summary. Fraud assessments rank a post’s fraud conditions as high, medium, or low, based on the ratio of visa applications referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit out of the total number of visa applications. The fraud assessment also includes the prevalence of corruption in the local environment, including the reliability of country documents and cooperation with local law enforcement. Additionally, ARSO-Is provide input into fraud assessments regarding the nature of criminal activity involving visas. According to State, a country with high numbers of suspected fraud cases may not necessarily be designated as a high-fraud country if its proportion of suspected fraud to visa applications is low.\nRecently, State has taken steps to improve its ability to compare fraud levels across posts. In the past, according to State officials, self-reported fraud levels had not been used to assess posts’ fraud conditions relative to other posts because posts had different methods for referring cases to Fraud Prevention Units. Referrals to Fraud Prevention Units are considered an accurate portrayal of the volume of fraud cases handled at individual posts because Fraud Prevention Managers must make a fraud assessment for all cases that are referred. In July 2012, State distributed new guidance that clarifies when consular officers should refer visa applications to Fraud Prevention Units. For example, new guidance instructs consular officers to refer applications to Fraud Prevention Units whenever the unit is expected to expend resources to verify some aspect of an applicant’s case or when consular officers cannot perform a needed task, such as verifying the employment of an applicant.\nThe volume of visas processed and the number of fraudulent applications vary from country to country. In general, fraudulent activity is found in a very small percentage of overall visas granted. Based on State’s Consular Consolidated Database, 6.9 million nonimmigrant and immigrant visas were issued worldwide in 2010. That same year, approximately 74,000 visa applications were referred to Fraud Prevention Units for additional scrutiny. Of these, about 16,000, or 22 percent, were confirmed as fraudulent in fiscal year 2010. Some countries may experience high visa demand but low numbers of suspected fraud cases, while other countries may experience high visa demand and high numbers of suspected fraud cases. For example, in 2010, consular officers throughout Brazil issued approximately 556,000 visas and referred about 3,000 visa applications to their Fraud Prevention Units, of which 750 (or 24 percent of visa applications suspected of fraud) were confirmed as fraudulent. Meanwhile, consular officers throughout India issued about 528,000 visas in 2010, referred about 5,200 visa applications to their Fraud Prevention Units, and confirmed about 2,600 (or 50 percent of visa applications suspected of fraud) as fraudulent. See figure 3 for the top 10 posts for referrals to Fraud Prevention Units among total nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications in 2010. Almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) were referred to Fraud Prevention Units in Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico in fiscal year 2010.\nState’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs reports that a majority of visa fraud involves nonimmigrant visa applicants who submit false documents or make false statements to obtain a tourist or business visitor visa. According to State officials, some visitor visa applicants provide fraudulent statements or documents, such as a false bank statement, to demonstrate strong ties with their home country and therefore overcome the presumption that they intend to use their temporary visitor visa to illegally immigrate to the United States. Denied visitor visa applications are not usually referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit unless the officer suspects the case could be linked to organized crime.\nOther kinds of fraud can be found in temporary worker visas, student visas, exchange visitor visas, immigrant visas, and diversity visas.\nTemporary Worker Visas: While State officials said that most work visas facilitate legitimate travel, fraud has been found among petitioners and applicants for both skilled worker and temporary agricultural worker visas. Some petitioners in the United States create phony companies and petition for workers to join them in the United States, usually with the applicants’ knowledge and participation in the fraudulent activity, according to State officials. Other examples of fraud include cases in which educational degrees were found to be fraudulent, signatures were forged on supporting documents, and workers performed duties or received payments significantly different from those described in the applications. A recent DHS study reported that 21 percent of skilled worker petitions they examined involved fraud or technical violations. In 2005, DHS began collecting an additional $500 fee on certain work visas to be used for fraud prevention and detection purposes.\nStudent Visas: Foreign students interested in studying in the United States must first be admitted to a school or university before applying for a visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas. The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews, collection of applicants’ fingerprints, and cross-references against multiple databases of information. In 2011, State issued over 486,000 student visas, of which 71 percent were issued to students from Asia. According to the Fraud Prevention Coordinator for India, fraud among student visa applications is common throughout India. For example, some exam centers that offer the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) are suspected of being complacent when students cheat on the exam in order to achieve high scores. If a student applicant cannot answer a consular officer’s questions in English, yet received 105 out of 120 on their TOEFL score, fraud may be present, according to a consular officer in New Delhi.\nExchange Visitor Visas: Summer Work and Travel (SWT) visas are a subset of the Exchange Visitor Program, and are susceptible to fraud. The Exchange Visitor Program fosters global understanding through educational and cultural exchanges. All exchange visitors are expected to return to their home country upon completion of their program in order to share their experiences. In 2011, 35 percent (108,717) of the total exchange visitors (306,429) were granted entry into the United States for the purpose of “Summer Work and Travel.” According to State officials, many SWT visa applicants misrepresent their status as students or their intentions for using the SWT visa. Additionally, many U.S. sponsors falsely represent their businesses and how they intend to employ SWT applicants. U.S. sponsors have been found to exploit SWT visa holders for financial gain. On May 10, 2012, State’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Exchange issued rules that are expected to protect the health, safety, and welfare of SWT program participants. The rules provide a cap on the number of annual SWT program participants that may be granted visas.\nImmigrant Visas: In 2010, State issued 482,052 immigrant visas. That same year, 21,013 immigrant visa applications were referred to Fraud Prevention Units and 4,984 (or about 24 percent) were confirmed as fraudulent. Immigrant visa fraud can take many forms. At several posts we visited, State officials said a common problem involved applicants who pay American citizens to marry them or who falsely represent their intentions to citizens and deceive them into marriage in order to obtain lawful permanent residence in the United States. In a typical immigrant visa fraud case, an individual divorces his or her spouse in a foreign country, marries an American citizen, and, after living in the United States for a certain period of time, obtains U.S. citizenship or legal permanent resident status, divorces the U.S. spouse, and remarries the original spouse so that they can reunite in the United States.\nDiversity Visas: The Diversity Visa Program was established through the Immigration Act of 1990 and provides up to 55,000 immigrant visas annually to aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States. Aliens register for the diversity visa lottery for free online and applicants are randomly selected for interviews through a lottery process. Upon being selected, a winner must apply for a visa, be interviewed, and be found eligible for the diversity visa. All countries are eligible for the Diversity Visa Program except those from which more than 50,000 immigrants have come to the United States over the preceding 5 years. In 2011, approximately 16.5 million people applied for the program and about 107,000 (7 percent) were selected for further processing. Of those selected, 75,000 were interviewed at posts for a diversity visa, and approximately 50,000 received visas. Because the program does not require a U.S.-based petitioner, it is particularly susceptible to fraud. Diversity visa fraud is rampant in parts of South Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and is particularly acute in areas where few individuals have independent access to the Internet.travel agents, or Internet café operators who help would-be applicants submit an entry for a fee. Many of these facilitators withhold the confirmation information that the entrant must use to retrieve his or A typical scenario includes visa facilitators, her selection status. To access the lottery notification, the facilitators may require winning applicants to either pay an additional exorbitant fee or agree to enter into a marriage with another of the facilitator’s paying clients solely for the purpose of extending immigration benefits.", "Visa fraud has evolved and become more sophisticated over time due to unscrupulous visa applicants who adapt to State’s efforts to combat fraud, increased globalization, advanced technology, and ease of travel. Fraud schemes are no longer centralized in individual countries. Criminal fraud rings, human smuggling networks, and trafficking rings work across multiple countries to circumvent State’s visa process. For example, in 2009, a typical route for traffickers from India who sought religious asylum in the United States originated in New Delhi and transited through Moscow, Dubai, Sao Paulo, and Mexico before reaching Texas, according to the Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator in New Delhi. In addition, new technologies have helped individuals and organizations adapt to State’s visa security features and develop increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. For example, high-quality micro-printing and new assembly methods have allowed imposters to duplicate State’s visa security threads and serial numbers. With global access to the Internet, fraud scams used in one country or continent have quickly made their way to others, and therefore high-fraud countries and posts have shifted from year to year. For example, only 4 countries were among the top 10 countries for visa fraud in both 2005 and 2010: the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, and Peru.", "Consular officers rely on State’s advanced information technology, fraud reports, and domestic and overseas fraud prevention resources to improve their ability to detect and deter fraud. However, State does not have a policy to systematically utilize its domestic anti-fraud resources to offset fraud workload overseas.", "The Consular Affairs Office of Consular Systems and Technology has deployed several new tools to counter fraud in the visa process, including the following:\nOnline Nonimmigrant Visa Application Form, DS-160: In the spring of 2010, State implemented the DS-160 online nonimmigrant visa application system, which requires applicants to submit all information electronically. With the collection of electronic information prior to the scheduled visa interview, State is able to research and analyze applicants’ data for indicators of fraud prior to an interview with a consular officer. Overseas, State encourages Fraud Prevention Units to conduct pre-screening checks of applicants’ visa history to identify aliases or discrepancies between current and previous applications.\nEnterprise Case Assessment Service (eCAS): In April 2011, State released eCAS, the first centralized system for Fraud Prevention Units to track and manage their nonimmigrant and immigrant visa fraud cases. eCAS is based in the Consular Consolidated Database, and Fraud Prevention Units use it to create, develop, and resolve fraud assessments. Previously, fraud cases were either designated as “fraud confirmed” or “fraud not confirmed.” With eCAS, fraud cases are now designated as “fraud confirmed,” “no fraud,” or “inconclusive,” which allows Fraud Prevention units more flexibility to designate that some cases have a suspicion of fraud but not enough evidence to confirm fraud. In the first 5 months of the system’s use, May 2011 through September 2011, 188 posts worldwide used eCAS to process over 43,000 fraud cases. According to State, in 2012 State released an eCAS module domestically that can also be used to process passport fraud cases, and State plans to extend this module overseas in 2013.\nMATRIX: In 2011, State released a new fraud prevention tool known as MATRIX that is accessible to Fraud Prevention Units and Diplomatic Security agents through State’s Consular Consolidated Database. MATRIX is a search tool that makes associations between information on a visa application and other records and data sources. MATRIX links information in the Consular Consolidated Database to other State records, USCIS records, and INTERPOL data. Fraud Prevention Managers and ARSO-Is can use MATRIX to link information contained on previous visa applications and to reveal similarities across multiple applications as an indicator of fraud. For example, according to Consular Affairs officials, MATRIX found that one applicant’s contact phone number in the United States matched the phone numbers used by 17 other applicants, a possible indication of fraud.\nDiversity Visa Entry Status Check: In 2010, State began an online verification system called the Entry Status Check that allowed all entrants of the 2010 Diversity Visa Program to electronically, individually, and privately check the status of their online submissions through a State website. This system eliminated the need for direct mailing of Diversity Visa correspondence and enhanced State’s ability to combat fraud. Prior to the electronic system, notification letters were physically mailed to the address listed on the application. Unscrupulous visa agents listed their own addresses so that the notification letters were delivered to them instead of the people selected in the lottery. The agent could demand thousands of dollars from an applicant in exchange for the letter.\nConsular Consolidated Database Search Rules to Identify Fraud Indicators: State is currently developing a new anti-fraud tool that will automatically search visa applications for fraud indicators and alert consular officials when fraud indicators are found. For example, State may find higher rates of fraud among visa applicants who rely on services provided by a particular local visa company. Consular officials in that country can request that State flag future visa applications listing that visa company’s name.", "State shares information between consular posts and headquarters regarding the latest fraud trends through reporting mechanisms such as validation studies, semi-annual fraud summaries, fraud digests, fraud notices, or reporting cables, Diplomatic Security monthly status reports, and Diplomatic Security program reviews.\nValidation Studies: State considers validation studies to be one of the best fraud-prevention tools available to consular officers. Posts conduct validation studies on visas that have been issued to determine the extent to which the visas have been misused, and posts send summaries of fraud risks to headquarters twice a year. Posts are required to conduct at least two validation studies per year, one on a visa category of the post’s choosing and one on visa referrals. Generally, consular officers select a sample of visa issuances and determine how many of the visa recipients departed the United States within the terms of their visas, how many remained in the United States longer than their visas allowed, and how many never traveled to the United States.the accuracy of adjudication decisions, and allow Consular Affairs officials to share emerging fraud trends across posts.\nSemi-Annual Fraud Summaries: State guidance calls for validation studies to be incorporated into posts’ Semi-Annual Fraud Summaries—reports submitted twice annually that provide input for improvements in fraud prevention guidance, training, and resources. State guidance notes that the summaries should discuss current country conditions that may contribute to fraud risks, such as the presence of organized crime networks. According to the guidance, the summaries should discuss fraud trends for nonimmigrant visas, immigrant visas, diversity visas, passports, and coordination with Diplomatic Security personnel, among other topics. These studies should discuss new information that may be used to establish new fraud indicators.\nFraud Digests: Since September 1996, State has published a monthly newsletter called the Fraud Digest that profiles worldwide fraud trends, fraud prevention techniques, and advances in areas such as fraud prevention technology and immigration document design. The digests are accessible on the web and are shared government-wide with approximately 3,600 subscribers, as of April 2012. The main audience for the digest is domestic and overseas consular personnel and Diplomatic Security agents.\nReporting Cables: State headquarters gathers and analyzes information from posts, and distributes guidance to posts through monthly reporting cables in order to update consular officers on evolving fraud trends.\nDiplomatic Security Monthly Status Reports: According to Diplomatic Security officials, ARSO-Is worldwide submit monthly status reports that delineate the number of hours spent on criminal investigations and training of foreign personnel. The status report also describes progress on the post’s visa cases, including preliminary queries for information and arrests. The information supplements data entered into the Diplomatic Security primary case management system known as the Investigative Management System, according to Diplomatic Security officials.\nDiplomatic Security Program Reviews: Diplomatic Security officials told us that Diplomatic Security program reviews are internal reports that highlight best practices at posts and make recommendations for improvements. To complete the program reviews, officials from Diplomatic Security’s Office of Criminal Investigations told us that they spend 2 days at each post answering standardized questions about training, pending cases, arrests, budget, and information systems, among other topics. Diplomatic Security aims to visit all posts with an ARSO-I presence once every 2 years, according to Diplomatic Security officials.", "KCC, located in Williamsburg, Kentucky, has become an important anti- fraud resource for State. State opened KCC in October 2000, to process worldwide diversity visa applications and reduce the workload on adjudicating officers at overseas posts. According to KCC officials, the number of local employees at KCC has increased from 40 to 273, including 54 staff working within a Fraud Prevention Unit. In August 2001, KCC began a pilot project to screen all nonimmigrant visa applications with facial recognition software. According to KCC officials, after the September 11, 2001 attack, State was required to store visa applications for 7 years. As a result, KCC officials began scanning old visa applications and uploading all biographic information and evidence of visa ineligibilities. All visa applicants’ biographic information, including both fingerprints and digitized photographs, is checked through State’s Consular Lookout and Support System database and facial recognition software.\nState describes KCC as an incubator for new consular projects, and KCC is in the process of expanding anti-fraud services to posts overseas, according to KCC officials. Currently, KCC provides prescreening services for selected posts overseas. Any post may request KCC assistance in conducting research and analysis on visa applications, either on an ad-hoc basis for individual cases, or on a pilot basis for larger-scale projects. For example, since over 50 percent of all skilled worker (H-1B) and intracompany transfers (L) visas are processed in India, KCC initiated a process to verify all petitioner information contained on these types of visa applications from posts in India, according to State officials. Globally, KCC screened 81,862 H-1B and L-1 applications for fraud in calendar year 2011. In addition to H and L visas, KCC conducts prescreening on several other visa classifications that are susceptible to fraud. According to State officials, KCC screeners and fraud analysts conduct basic checks, such as verifying the legal name of the business as well as more complex research including data mining, evaluation of the petitioning organization’s business viability, and phone calls to petitioning employers. Additionally, KCC fraud analysts may also refer the case to onsite Fraud Detection and National Security officers to request a visit to the proposed employment site. If derogatory information, such as a revocation of a prior petition, exists on a petitioning company, screeners enter all comments into the applicant’s online DS-160 form, for access by the consular officer, who makes the ultimate decision to issue or deny the visa.\nIn fiscal year 2012, State intends to prescreen 15 percent of all worldwide nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications prior to the visa interview, increasing to 50 percent by fiscal year 2013. To prescreen visa applications, KCC reviews and processes all sets of documents and data received from petitioners and beneficiaries. KCC employees conduct research on visa applicants and petitioners, and provide this information to consular officers overseas so that they have access to the information prior to interviewing a visa applicant in person. For example, we observed a KCC analyst conducting research on a summer work and travel visa application that listed the sponsor business as a restaurant. However, the KCC analyst determined that the physical address listed on the visa application was an adult entertainment venue, a business prohibited by the program. The KCC analyst notified the interviewing post of this finding so that the adjudicating officer would have knowledge of it before the interview. KCC now prescreens the vast majority of certain visa categories that have been associated with high rates of fraud, such as summer work and travel visas. From March 2011 to April 2012, KCC analysts researched over 9,000 companies participating in the Summer Work and Travel Program and found that 13 percent of them had fraud indicators. For example, some companies did not exist, the company’s phone number was invalid, or the company reported that it never expected a summer work and travel participant.", "Anti-fraud staffing levels in Fraud Prevention Units vary widely across overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. State assigns personnel to Fraud Prevention Units based on input from post management and consular affairs management at headquarters. Personnel from State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs said resource decisions for Fraud Prevention Units are driven by visa workload and other factors at posts, not by the number of fraud cases.statistics on the number of fraud cases confirmed, unconfirmed, or inconclusive are used by posts to direct anti-fraud strategies, Consular Affairs does not use these statistics to determine the appropriate distribution of personnel to Fraud Prevention Units.\nThe posts with the highest numbers of suspected fraud cases in 2011 were not assigned a number of Fraud Prevention Unit staff proportionate to the number of fraud cases, as seen in table 2. For example, one entry level officer and one mid-level officer in Santo Domingo, who were assigned to Fraud Prevention Manager positions, joined five locally employed staff in the Embassy’s Fraud Prevention Unit to combat the entire country’s visa fraud. With approximately 7,879 cases suspected of fraud in 2011, each member of Santo Domingo’s Fraud Prevention Unit investigated an average of 1,126 cases and each member of Guangzhou’s Fraud Prevention Unit investigated an average of 239 cases that year.\nAccording to State officials, while State plans to expand the use of KCC anti-fraud resources, there is no systematic process for overseas posts to formally request KCC prescreening assistance. State’s Program Evaluation Policy notes that program evaluation is essential for planning decisions, and evaluation findings should be integrated into program strategies and policies. However, State officials told us that anti-fraud pilot programs conducted at KCC are not formally evaluated and there is no established policy for posts to access domestic anti-fraud resources. Rather, KCC provides anti-fraud assistance to overseas posts on an ad- hoc basis based on informal communication.\nAccording to KCC’s Director, most posts have not requested KCC’s assistance because they are not familiar with all of the anti-fraud services that KCC can provide or how to request services. For example, a Fraud Prevention Manager in a high-fraud post that we visited told us that the post would like additional KCC prescreening of certain visa categories, but was unaware of how to request KCC assistance. Multiple State officials told us that most KCC prescreening initiatives have been due to institutional knowledge at the management level in the field. For example, all India-specific services provided by KCC were a direct result of a Consular Manager in India who was aware of the prescreening services KCC could provide.\nAccording to the KCC Director, there are clear benefits to utilizing KCC for fraud investigations. KCC staff are fully vetted U.S. citizens with secret clearances and access to all restricted databases used in visa adjudications. In addition, both Diplomatic Security and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service are represented at KCC, and are available to assist in fraud investigations. The majority of KCC staff are provided through a contractor, and the contract provides for the ability to adjust to changes in demand for services.", "Although State offers anti-fraud courses in a classroom setting and online, State does not require Fraud Prevention Managers to take them. In addition, State does not track Fraud Prevention Manager enrollment in anti-fraud courses, and therefore State does not know whether the large number of entry-level officers filling fraud prevention manager positions have taken the anti-fraud courses.", "The Foreign Service Institute has expanded the number of courses it offers Foreign Service Officers in fraud prevention and detection, covering topics such as advanced name checking, analytic interviewing, and emotional content analysis. The institute’s anti-fraud training courses include the following:\nBasic Consular Course (PC530): Commonly known as ConGen, PC530 is a 6-week course that all Foreign Service officers are required to take prior to their first consular tour. PC530 is also required for any officer heading to a consular tour who has neither done consular work nor taken ConGen in the preceding 5 years. The course contains a module covering security, accountability, fraud, and ethics, which includes training in detecting and preventing fraud.\nFraud Prevention for Consular Managers (PC541): This course is designed for Fraud Prevention Managers who are currently serving in the field, emphasizing anti-fraud and counterterrorism tools for consular officers.\nState also offers consular officers distance learning or online courses in detecting and preventing fraud. These courses are either prescheduled live courses, prerecorded or accessible 24 hours a day, or offered on- demand. Online consular training in fraud includes the following:\nDetecting Imposters (PC128): This course teaches students procedures for identifying imposters either at the interview window or in photographs.\nDetecting Fraudulent Documents (PC544): This course teaches consular officers how to determine whether a document has been altered or is counterfeit.\nNew Consular Technologies (eCAS and MATRIX): This course trains consular officers in how to use eCAS and MATRIX to combat visa fraud.\nState officials from the Office of Consular Systems and Technology said that its training programs are updated as soon as new features are rolled out, and the training typically focuses on new technology features. Consular officers are provided with manuals that explain the new software tools about a month in advance and can attend live and prerecorded training courses. While some consular courses can take about 2 hours, training in MATRIX is a prerecorded session that takes approximately 30 minutes. Although training on new technological tools is available and encouraged by State, a survey of Fraud Prevention Managers revealed that respondents’ lack of knowledge of some key anti-fraud tools indicated that updates were not uniformly reaching officers.", "While State encourages Fraud Prevention Managers to take updated fraud prevention training, the training is not required. Entry-level officers are required to complete 6 weeks of basic consular training prior to their arrival at post but are not required to take other advanced anti-fraud courses offered at the Foreign Service Institute or online, such as eCAS or MATRIX. For example, four of the five Fraud Prevention Managers we met with had not been trained in MATRIX. Advanced fraud training courses are targeted to mid-level officers, but the majority of Fraud Prevention Manager positions (180 of 222) were filled by an entry-level officer or an officer of unspecified grade. In 2011, a little more than half of the students enrolled in PC541 were entry-level officers, and State could not determine whether Fraud Prevention Managers were among them. Additionally, between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up approximately 22 percent (489 of 2,252) of the total number of students who registered for Detecting Imposters (PC128) and 21 percent (486 of 2,246) of the total number of students who registered for Detecting Fraudulent Documents (PC544). Without advanced fraud training courses, Fraud Prevention Managers may not know about the roles and responsibilities of KCC, or how to use the Consular Lookout and Support System name-check database and biometric systems. For example, two of the five Fraud Prevention Managers with whom we met were unfamiliar with the anti-fraud services available at KCC. According to the Office of Fraud Prevention Program’s country desk officers, the level of anti-fraud training offered to Foreign Service Officers largely depends on the officer’s experience level, years in the Foreign Service, and available time. Desk officers offer a 1-hour briefing of country-specific fraud issues and resources to all Foreign Service Officers prior to their deployment, but not all of the officers take advantage of the briefing, according to officials from the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs.\nIn addition, a significant period of time may pass between an entry-level officer’s completion of the basic consular course and the time when he or she assumes the role of Fraud Prevention Manager. Entry-level officers are required to take only limited fraud prevention training that does not include new anti-fraud technologies. For example, officers may not arrive at a post until they complete required language training, which can take 6 months to a year. Additionally, entry-level officers who are not on the consular affairs career track may serve a rotation in a different specialty area before serving a rotation in consular affairs. Finally, many entry-level officers are not assigned to the Fraud Prevention Manager position until after they arrive at post.", "While State offers these anti-fraud training courses, both in Washington D.C., and online, it does not track whether Fraud Prevention Managers are taking them. In 2012, four of the five Fraud Prevention Managers with whom we met had not been formally trained in MATRIX. Since its rollout, State has not tracked the number of Fraud Prevention Managers that have been trained in eCAS and MATRIX. In addition, State was unable to differentiate enrollment data by position and therefore could not confirm that Fraud Prevention Managers had enrolled in any fraud prevention course.", "State’s fraud prevention efforts protect the integrity of the visa process and help prevent people from exploiting the visa process to commit crimes or threaten the security of the United States. Fraud trends evolve over time as criminal networks and unscrupulous visa applicants seek to circumvent State’s visa application process. Meanwhile, the number of visas issued has risen steadily since 2003 and consular officers face increased pressure to expedite visa processing. The evolving nature of fraud and increases in the volume of visas adjudicated require State to continuously update its anti-fraud efforts. In recent years, State has taken steps to enhance the tools and services available to combat visa fraud, including the deployment of new anti-fraud technologies and resources improving State’s ability to prescreen applications for indicators of fraud and to readily access information from prior visa applications. However, these technologies and resources are only useful if consular officers know that they exist and know how to use them. Currently, the majority of Fraud Prevention Manager positions are filled by entry-level officers, who are not the targeted audience for advanced anti-fraud training, and State does not require them to be trained in all anti-fraud technologies. As a result, Fraud Prevention Managers may not be fully equipped to detect and combat fraud. Furthermore, posts increasingly rely on KCC to prescreen certain visa applications for fraud, and State intends to prescreen 50 percent of all visa applications worldwide prior to consular interviews. However, State does not have a policy that specifies how to systematically utilize the center’s resources, based on post workload and fraud trends. Therefore, State cannot be assured that a valuable tool to combat fraud is being strategically utilized. Absent effective support and training, Fraud Prevention Units may make uninformed decisions, thus enabling ineligible aliens, including potential terrorists, to gain admission to the United States.", "To further improve the visa fraud prevention process, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following two actions: (1) Formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources available at the Kentucky Consular Center, based on post workload and fraud trends, as determined by the department; and (2) Establish standardized training requirements for Fraud Prevention Managers, to include training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to track the extent to which requirements are met.", "We provided a draft of our report to State and DHS. State and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. State also provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV. State concurred with our recommendations.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 14 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested members of Congress and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, as well as other interested members of Congress. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8980 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.", "This report examines (1) countries and visa categories subject to the most visa fraud; (2) technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention. This report focuses on visa fraud, and not passport fraud.\nTo determine the countries and visa categories subject to the most visa fraud, and the evolution of fraud over time, we reviewed nonimmigrant and immigrant visa issuance data from the Consular Consolidated Database from 1992 to 2011. While we did not analyze State data on the number of visa applications during this time period, we reviewed visa refusal percentages by country. We did not review the reliability of these data because they were for background purposes only. We also reviewed State Fraud Digest reports from September 1996 through May 2012, semi-annual fraud summaries for some of the posts with the highest numbers of suspected fraud cases, and Diplomatic Security Monthly Status reports from fiscal year 2011. We also analyzed fiscal year 2010 and 2011 data on the number of visa applications referred to Fraud Prevention Units. We found 2010 data more reliable because State transitioned to a new fraud management system in the middle of fiscal year 2011, and formal guidance on how and when to refer cases to Fraud Prevention Units was not released until July 2012. We compared the 2005 Country Fraud Ranking of Posts to fiscal year 2010 data on the countries with the highest numbers of suspected fraud cases. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of indicating the countries that reported the highest volumes of reported fraud cases and made the most referrals. However, we found that these data may not accurately reflect the relative levels of actual fraud in each country due to possible differences in reporting by posts. We used fiscal year 2010 data for our analysis because State introduced a new data system in 2011, and we noted some potential problems with the 2011 data that arose due to the transition. State officials in the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs provided qualitative information on the types of visa categories that are subject to fraud. Lastly, we interviewed State officials at headquarters and abroad to discuss recent fraud trends.\nTo assess State’s use of technologies and resources to combat fraud, we met with State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Consular Systems and Technology to review State’s major data systems as well as the latest technological tools available to consular officers and Fraud Prevention Managers. Specifically, we received demonstrations on State’s newly deployed Enterprise Case Assessment Service (eCAS) used for tracking fraud cases, and MATRIX, a search tool used in fraud prevention. We visited the Kentucky Consular Center, an anti-fraud resource available to posts, and observed its activities. We interviewed State officials at posts regarding their usage of these tools and resources. To determine the reliability of data captured by eCAS on the number of cases referred to Fraud Prevention Units and the number of confirmed cases, we met with consular officers and Fraud Prevention Managers in five posts to determine how information was entered into eCAS. We determined that the eCAS system was widely used across posts and was sufficiently reliable to determine the general volume of fraud referrals.\nTo understand the training required of State officials responsible for combating fraud, we gathered information about training requirements and course enrollment from the Foreign Service Institute’s Student Training Management System. We interviewed Foreign Service Institute personnel regarding controls, strengths and limitations of the course enrollment data and determined it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also analyzed data on the number of direct hire and local staff working in all 222 visa-issuing consular posts as of December 2011 and reviewed data gathered by State liaisons from the Consular Workload Statistics System on the number and grade of officers assigned to Fraud Prevention Units at consular posts as of April 2012. We obtained staffing data from State’s GEMS database. We tested the data on direct hires and local staff working at visa-issuing posts for completeness, confirmed the general accuracy of the data with select overseas posts, and interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of Resource Management and Organizational Analysis concerning the reliability of the data. We assessed data on the number and grade of officers assigned to Fraud Prevention Units for reliability, and interviewed Consular Affairs officials regarding how the data was collected and entered into the database, the controls and reviews of the data collection, and the major strengths and limitations of the data. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Lastly, we conducted interviews with visa chiefs, Fraud Prevention Managers, and DS Assistant Regional Security Officers working in five overseas posts on issues related to consular staffing and resources, among other topics.\nWe visited U.S. consular posts in five countries—Brazil, the Dominican Republic, India, Jordan, and Ukraine. During these visits, we observed visa operations and interviewed consular staff and embassy management about visa adjudication policies, procedures, and resources. In addition, we spoke with officials from other U.S. agencies that assist consular officers in the visa adjudication process. We chose Brazil, the Dominican Republic, India, and Ukraine because each of the fraud prevention teams in these countries investigated 500 or more fraud cases in fiscal year 2010. We chose Jordan because of the nature of the fraud cases investigated in that country, which included security concerns.\nWe conducted our work from August 2011 through September 2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "Temporary workers with “specialty occupation”\nChile and Singapore Free Trade Agreement Aliens Nurses under the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999 Spouses and children of H-1, H-2, or H-3 visa holders Temporary workers with extraordinary ability or achievement in the sciences, arts, education, business, athletics, TV or film.", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "The following five case studies provide examples of the types of activities carried out by Fraud Prevention Units and Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigators (ARSO-Is) overseas.", "In Ukraine, we observed consular officers adjudicating visas for the Summer Work and Travel program. A consular officer suspected an applicant’s student identification was fraudulent, and he told the applicant to wait while he asked the Fraud Prevention Unit for assistance. The senior Locally Employed Staff (LES) person inspected the student ID and said it was most likely a fake. The consular officer asked the LES to assist in questioning the applicant. The LES reviewed the applicant’s school transcripts that were submitted with the visa application, and asked the applicant to provide the name of the school’s chancellor. The applicant could not provide the name. The Fraud Prevention Unit called the school to attempt to verify whether the applicant was currently enrolled, but the school would not verify the applicant’s status. The Fraud Prevention Unit told the consular officer that they believed the applicant was committing fraud on her application, and the consular officer denied the visa.", "", "U.S. Major League Baseball (MLB) teams award large signing bonuses to younger prospective players in the Dominican Republic, creating a significant economic incentive to make prospective players seem younger. As a result, MLB prospects often falsify their ages and sometimes their identities on visa applications to make them appear younger than they truly are. To date, ARSO-I Santo Domingo has facilitated the arrests of two MLB Dominican talent scouts, an MLB Investigator, and an MLB pitcher, among others, for participating in identity fraud. The pitcher, a Dominican citizen, assumed the identity of a younger person and obtained a contract to play professional baseball as a pitcher in the United States in 1999. The pitcher has since illegally obtained at least 10 nonimmigrant visas in his assumed identity. ARSO-I Santo Domingo confirmed the pitcher’s true identity and coordinated with the Dominican prosecutors’ office to obtain a Dominican arrest warrant. The pitcher later returned to the Dominican Republic and obtained travel documents and a new nonimmigrant visa petition from the MLB in his true identity, and applied for a nonimmigrant visa. The interviewing consular officer found the pitcher ineligible for the nonimmigrant visa due to identity fraud, and the ARSOI-I Santo Domingo subsequently facilitated his arrest by the Dominican National Police, based on his outstanding Dominican arrest warrant.\nIn December 2010, Sao Paulo Civil Police arrested a Brazilian who presented false documents in support of his U.S. visa application. This was the ninth arrest of applicants whom had named the same individual known to be a smuggler and fraudulent document vender on their visa application. Further investigation identified approximately 70 persons who had used false documents provided by the document vendor since 2009. ARSO-I Sao Paulo received information that the document vendor and his accomplices were also producing false documents in support of Canadian visa applications, and Italian and Brazilian passports. In March 2011, the Brazilian Federal Police, the State of Santa Catarina Civil Police, and the State of Santa Catarina Prosecutor’s office arrested the document vendor and three of his accomplices.\nImmigrations Customs Enforcement (ICE) contacted the Deputy Assistant Regional Officer Investigator in New Delhi after receiving information that a private translator was extorting money from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) refugee/asylum applicants. The translator had access to protected information from USCIS files. ICE spoke with an informant who was being threatened by the translator to pay significant sums or have her application denied. Preliminary investigations determined that the translator would “cold-call” asylum applicants. ARSO- I New Delhi and ICE interviewed the translator, three USCIS local employees, and three local guards. The translator denied obtaining personal identifiable information from embassy staff. As a result of this investigation, the translator was arrested upon departure of the Embassy, one local guard was terminated for accepting money from the translator, and one USCIS LES employee was put on administrative leave for divulging personally identifiable information.\nImmigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attaché contacted ARSO-I Kyiv for assistance with an individual present in Kyiv with an active INTERPOL Red Warrant for human trafficking. The fugitive was wanted in the Eastern District of Michigan for forced labor, money laundering, immigration and visa fraud, and witness tampering. ARSO-I Kyiv coordinated assistance with the Ministry of Internal Affairs Organized Crime Department. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs Organized Crime Department agents arrested the fugitive at his residence for immigration overstay charges. ARSO-I Kyiv and ICE Attaché Frankfurt escorted the fugitive from Kyiv to New York, where the fugitive was arrested by ICE agents.", "", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Anthony Moran (Assistant Director), Jon Fremont, Julia Ann Roberts, Katie Bernet, Karen Deans, Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Mary Moutsos, Mark Speight, and Maria Stattel made key contributions to this report. Others providing technical assistance include Claude Adrien and Emily Biskup." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h2_full h1_full", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "h0_full h3_title", "h0_full", "h0_full h3_full", "h1_full", "", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h2_title h3_title", "h3_full", "h2_full", "", "h3_full h1_full", "", "", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How do visa categories and country of origin affect fraud rates?", "In what way are many applications which fit this profile fraudulent?", "What other visa categories tend to be subject to fraud?", "Why do fraud trends evolve?", "How well do the fraud-prevention tactics of State scale up?", "How is State ensuring that fraud-prevention becomes more uniform across the board?", "How are overseas posts handling this challenge?", "How well are State resources made available to posts?", "To what extent do consular officers and FPMs participate in anti-fraud training?", "What is the profile of PFMs?", "What were the findings of the analysis of FPM training frequency?", "How does the division of power in visa fraud cases affect the process?", "How may visa fraud occur?", "Why is visa fraud a point of concern for the USA?", "How many visa categories exist?", "How does this report analyse the visa fraud-detection process in the United States?", "What was GAO's methodology?" ], "summary": [ "Certain countries and visa categories are subject to higher levels of fraud. In fiscal year 2010, almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) involved applicants from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico.", "Department of State (State) officials told GAO that fraud most commonly involves applicants for temporary visits to the United States who submit false documentation to overcome the presumption that they intend to illegally immigrate.", "Fraud is also perpetrated for immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary worker visas and student visas.", "In response to State efforts to combat visa fraud, unscrupulous visa applicants adapt their strategies, and as a result, fraud trends evolve over time.", "State has a variety of technological tools and resources to assist consular officers in combating fraud, but does not have a policy for their systematic use.", "For example, State recently implemented fraud prevention technologies such as a fraud case management system that establishes connections among multiple visa applications, calling attention to potentially fraudulent activity.", "Overseas posts have Fraud Prevention Units that consist of a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and locally employed staff who analyze individual fraud cases. In 2011, the ratio of Fraud Prevention Unit staff to fraud cases varied widely across overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads.", "The Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) is a domestic resource available to posts that verifies information on certain visa applications. However, KCC services are only provided on an ad-hoc basis, and State does not have a policy for posts to systematically utilize its resources. For example, an FPM at a high fraud post told GAO that the post would like to utilize KCC anti-fraud services for screening certain visa categories, but did not know how to request KCC assistance.", "Although State offers anti-fraud training courses at the Foreign Service Institute and online, it does not require FPMs to take them and does not track FPMs’ enrollment. Consular officers receive limited fraud training as part of the initial consular course, and FPMs are not required to take advanced fraud training in new technologies. Four out of the five FPMs with whom GAO spoke had not been trained in State's new fraud case management system.", "In addition, GAO found that 81 percent of FPM positions were filled by entry-level officers and 84 percent of FPM positions were designated as either part-time or rotational.", "Between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up about 21 percent of the total students who registered for a course on detecting fraudulent documents, and State could not guarantee that FPMs were among them.", "State’s Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security share responsibility for the prevention of visa fraud, which is a serious problem that threatens the integrity of the process.", "Some documents through illegal means, such as using counterfeit identity documents or making false claims to an adjudicating officer.", "Visa fraud may facilitate illegal activities in the United States, including crimes of violence, human trafficking, and terrorism.", "Foreign nationals may apply for entry into the United States under dozens of different visa categories, depending on circumstances.", "This report examines (1) countries and visa categories that are subject to the most fraud; (2) State's use of technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention.", "GAO examined State's reports and data on fraud trends and statistics, examined resources and technologies to counter fraud, and observed visa operations and fraud prevention efforts overseas and domestically." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 1, 1, -1, 4 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-12-692	{ "title": [ "Background", "HHS Has Increased Its Use of Title 42, but More Reliable Data Could Improve HHS’s Oversight", "Some Title 42 Employees Are Paid Above Executive Salary Levels", "HHS Does Not Have Reliable Data on the Use of Its Title 42 Authority", "HHS Did Not Consistently Adhere to Sections of Its Title 42 Policy and Lacks Guidance for Some Authority Provisions", "Section 209(f) Hiring and Conversions", "Section 209(g): Appointing and Compensating Fellows", "EPA Employs a Limited Number of Title 42 Fellows, Primarily in Leadership Roles", "EPA Appointment and Compensation Practices Were Generally Consistent with Its Guidance, but EPA Could Improve Resolution of Potential Conflicts of Interest", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services", "Appendix III: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The authority to appoint and set pay for special consultants and fellows was provided as part of the Public Health Service Act in 1944. Section 209(f) authorizes the employment of special consultants to assist and advise in the operation of the PHS. The PHS is comprised of most operating divisions within HHS—including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—as well as some staff divisions within the Office of the Secretary. See figure 1 for HHS’s organizational structure, including those operating divisions and main staff divisions considered to be within the PHS. Section 209(g) authorizes fellowships in the PHS for individual scientists who may be assigned for studies and investigations either in the United States or abroad. Sections 209(f) and (g) both authorize the establishment of regulations to further implement these authorities. HHS Office of the Secretary develops agencywide policy and guidance and operating divisions may set additional or supplemental policy as necessary. In 2005, Congress provided EPA with the authority to use section 209 to make a limited number of appointments in its Office of Research and Development (ORD).Congress initially granted this authority to EPA for fiscal years 2006 through 2011, but Congress amended the authority twice and currently EPA is permitted to employ up to 30 persons at any one time through fiscal year 2015. EPA issued regulations in 2006 implementing this authority, which closely follow HHS regulations.\nHHS regulations for section 209(f) provide that special consultants may only be appointed when the PHS cannot obtain services through regular civil service appointments or under the compensation provisions of the Classification Act of 1949. The regulations further provide that rates of compensation for special consultants are to be set in accordance with criteria established by the Surgeon General. The Surgeon General is part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. HHS has used this authority, for example, to appoint doctors and others with expertise in specialty fields to initiate or provide assistance in conducting medical research and set pay for those individuals at rates above those allowed under other federal government pay systems.\nHHS regulations covering section 209(g) provide that fellowships may be provided to secure the services of talented scientists for limited duration (up to 5 years) for health-related research, studies, and investigations. The regulations further provide that the Secretary may authorize procedures to extend the term of fellowships, may authorize stipends for the fellows, and is responsible for establishing appointment procedures beyond those set forth in the regulations.\nSome Title 42 employees earn pay within or exceeding pay levels found in the Executive Schedule. The Executive Schedule is a five-level, basic pay schedule applicable to the highest-ranking executive appointments in the federal government. Executive Schedule pay rates range from Executive Level V ($145,700 since 2010) to Executive Level I ($199,700 since 2010).\nOnly HHS and EPA are authorized to use Title 42 hiring authority. By contrast, regular hiring authorities such as those under title 5 of the U.S. Code—commonly referred to as Title 5—may be used by any federal agency. Pursuant to HHS and EPA policy, employees at HHS and EPA originally hired under Title 5 or other authorities may be converted to Title 42 in some circumstances. Under these policies, employees hired under Title 42 are eligible for performance bonuses, incentives, and other nonsalary payments made available to federal employees compensated under Title 5.\nTitle 42 employees most frequently work within one of three operating divisions:\nNIH is the nation’s medical research agency and is comprised of the Office of the Director and 27 institutes and centers, including the National Cancer Institute; National Institute on Aging; National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute; and the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine. Each institute and center has its own specific research agenda, often focused on a particular disease or body system. As the central office at NIH, the Office of the Director establishes NIH-specific policy and oversees the institutes and centers to ensure they operate in accordance with said policy. While most of its budget goes to extramural research personnel at more than 3,000 universities and research institutions, NIH also has intramural research laboratories on the NIH main campus in Bethesda, Maryland. The main campus is also home to the NIH Clinical Center, which is the largest hospital in the world totally dedicated to clinical research.\nFDA is responsible for, among other things, protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, the nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation. FDA is also responsible for regulating tobacco products.\nCDC conducts activities such as identifying and defining preventable health problems and maintaining active surveillance of diseases; serving as the PHS lead agency in developing and implementing operational programs relating to environmental health problems; and operational research aimed at developing and testing effective disease prevention, control, and health promotion programs.\nEPA uses section 209(g) as the basis for hiring some scientists within ORD, the scientific research arm of EPA. ORD’s work at EPA laboratory and research centers provide the science and technology to identify environmental hazards, assess risks to public health and ecosystems, and determine how best to control or prevent pollution. According to EPA documents and officials, EPA uses Title 42 to secure the services of experienced and talented scientists for renewable appointments where, because of the nature of the work and expertise needed, regular hiring authorities are impractical. EPA has not made appointments using section 209(f).", "During 2010, HHS had 6,697 employees who were appointed under sections 209(f) or (g). All but 27 of these employees served at NIH, FDA, or CDC, while the remaining employees served in the Office of the Secretary or within other operating divisions, as shown in figure 2.\nThe number of employees appointed under sections 209(f) and (g) increased overall at HHS by 25 percent from 2006 through 2010, as shown in table 1. Since 2006, the number of Title 42 employees grew by 15 percent at NIH, by 54 percent at FDA, and by 81 percent at CDC, while declining by 48 percent at the Office of the Secretary and all other operating divisions.\nThe increased use of Title 42 authority came during a period when HHS made recruiting and retaining mission-critical elements of its workforce a priority. HHS’s 2007-2012 Strategic Plan included strategic objectives: (1) recruiting, developing, and retaining a competent health care workforce, and (2) strengthening the pool of qualified health and behavioral science researchers. HHS officials generally attributed the increases in Title 42 employees to the agency’s response to urgent public health matters and effects of the economic downturn on the private sector and academia, which, according to officials, made the agency more attractive to prospective or on-board employees. Specifically, according to HHS:\nThe 15 percent increase from 2006 through 2010 at NIH can be attributed, in part, to the effects of the economic downturn on the biomedical research labor market. Officials told us that as extramural research funding available in the private sector and academia is shrinking, NIH is able to use Title 42 to more successfully recruit and retain biomedical investigators and clinical specialists.\nThe spike in Title 42 appointments at FDA in 2008 and 2009 is a result of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 and the Food Protection Plan, FDA’s strategy for protecting the nation’s food supply. Additionally, in 2008 FDA launched its first class of Commissioner’s Fellows (hired under section 209 (g) for up to a two year period) beginning with 50 fellows, another class of 50 in 2009, and a third class of 45 in 2010.\nAt CDC, increased use of Title 42 was attributed to the urgency of certain programs such as the overseas Global AIDS Program and those under the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response. For these programs, officials told us they needed employees with specialized scientific skills or training and experience and would not have been able to obtain them without Title 42.\nAs discussed later, we were unable to determine which section authority—sections 209(f) or (g)—was used more often because HHS section authority data was not reliable for this purpose.\nAs shown in table 2, NIH relies on Title 42 authority for a greater percentage of its total workforce than does FDA and CDC. In 2010, 25 percent of all NIH employees were Title 42 employees, while 10 percent of CDC employees and 6 percent of FDA employees were Title 42. NIH relied on Title 42 authority for a substantial portion—44 percent—of its total research and clinical practitioner workforce.\nTitle 42 employees at HHS serve in a variety of functional areas, including scientific and medical research support and in senior, director-level leadership positions. Base salary ranges for Title 42 employees varied by operating division and occupation. In 2010, almost 60 percent of Title 42 employees at NIH served in one of five general occupations: staff scientist, research fellow, senior investigator, clinical research nurse, and clinical fellow. Table 3 describes some of the general responsibilities and duties, educational characteristics, and salary data for these occupations at NIH.\nAt FDA and CDC, the most common occupation of Title 42 employees is a fellow. In 2010, 340 (39 percent) of FDA’s Title 42 employees were staff fellows. These positions are for promising research and regulatory review scientists. In general, staff fellows at FDA conduct or support research, provide technical direction and supervision to other researchers, publish scientific articles, and review contract and grant proposals designed to support their research projects. Staff fellows must have a doctoral degree in bio-medical, behavioral, or related science and, according to FDA policy, total compensation may not exceed certain pay limits ($155,500 in 2010) unless the Director of Human Resources and Management and Services grants an exception. FDA staff fellows’ base salary range in 2010 is approximately $42,000 to $224,000, with an average base salary of about $96,000 and a median salary of about $92,000. Three of 340 staff fellows at FDA earned more than $155,500 in 2010.\nOf CDC’s Title 42 employees in 2010, 687 (74 percent) were senior service fellows or associate service fellows appointed to study areas such as basic and applied research in medical, physical, biological, mathematical, social, biometric, epidemiological, behavioral, computer sciences, and other fields directly related to the mission of CDC. Senior service fellows must have a doctoral degree and associate service fellows must have a master’s degree. Senior service fellows had a base salary range in 2010 of approximately $49,000 to $155,500, with an average base salary of about $103,000 and a median salary of about $100,000. Associate service fellows had a base salary range of approximately $44,000 to $93,000, with an average base salary of about $69,000 and a median salary of about $71,000.", "The average base salary for all HHS Title 42 employees in 2010 was about $116,000 and the median salary was about $101,000. More than one-fifth of all Title 42 employees at HHS, however, earned a base salary above Executive Level IV ($155,500 in 2010). Congress regularly refers to executive salary levels in order to express minimum or maximum levels of pay authorized for positions in the federal government. For example, Congress has imposed a cap of Executive Level IV on salary (i.e., basic pay) rates where pay is fixed by administrative action under 5 U.S.C. § 5373. In a related effort to this audit, we are issuing a legal opinion on whether there are any statutory caps on pay for consultants and fellows appointed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) or (g), including whether the cap under section 5373 applies. Table 4 shows the number of Title 42 employees whose base salary is within or above the various Executive Salary Levels in 2010.\nHHS has converted a number of employees from positions under the General Schedule or other pay systems to positions under Title 42. Of the 1,183 new Title 42 appointees in 2010, 45 of them—or about 4 percent— were current HHS employees that were converted to Title 42 positions. Thirty of these conversions occurred at NIH. We also found that employees converted to Title 42 from other pay systems generally earned higher compensation than in their previous position. Employees converted in 2010 earned, on average, $34,000 more in base salary than earned in their previous position. However, many did not receive the same amount of nonsalary payments (including retention incentives) received while employed under the General Schedule or other pay system. Therefore, the average increase in total compensation (base salary and incentive or other nonsalary payments) was about $14,000 in 2010.\nUnder HHS policy, Title 42 employees are eligible to receive performance bonuses; recruitment, retention, and relocation incentives; and other nonsalary payments that are available to other HHS employees. In 2010, HHS issued nonsalary payments to 6,336 of its 6,697 Title 42 employees. Seventy-one percent of Title 42 employees earned ratings- based individual cash awards. Less than 1 percent (60) of Title 42 employees received nonsalary payments in the form of recruitment, retention, or relocation incentives.\nAccording to senior officials at HHS’s human resource office and NIH, Title 42 authority provides two primary benefits—appointment agility and compensation flexibility. These officials said appointment agility enables the agency to hire scientists, doctors, and other consultants to quickly fill knowledge, skill, and ability gaps so that medical research can move forward and to respond to medical emergencies. For example, according to HHS officials, the agency used Title 42 authority to quickly hire experts needed to develop a vaccine in response to the H1N1 flu pandemic of 2009. Appointment agility is also important because many research projects, particularly those at NIH, are not meant to be long-term and Title 42 appointments can align with project time frames better than hiring full- time permanent staff under regular hiring authorities. In some cases, the temporary appointment of a researcher with highly-specialized skills to assist with a limited-scope, limited-duration study may be more appropriate than a permanent position.\nAccording to officials, compensation flexibility helps HHS compete with the private sector and academia to hire and retain highly qualified employees with rare and critical skill sets, such as neuroscientists, applied researchers in dietary intakes, and engineers that can operate particle accelerators. HHS human resource officials stated the salaries HHS can offer to its top researchers are often not commensurate with private sector salaries. However, they said the higher compensation limits under Title 42 combined with other benefits—such as name recognition and access to advanced research equipment and technology not often available in the private sector or academia—can help offset compensation disparities and make HHS attractive to researchers, doctors, and scientists.", "Because HHS does not consistently electronically record the authority under which many of its Title 42 employees were appointed, the number of employees hired under either section 209(f) or (g) could not be determined. When an employee is hired under Title 42 authority, HHS human resource officials create a personnel record in its central personnel transaction system, the Enterprise Human Resources and Payroll (EHRP) system. A required field in the personnel record exists to select a code from a drop-down menu designating the general authority under which the individual was hired, such as Title 42 or Title 5 authority. The personnel record also contains an open-ended text field to manually enter a specific section authority such as sections 209(f) or (g), applicable to Title 42 authority. Our analysis of HHS data found thousands of cases where the section authority applicable to Title 42 was not recorded in EHRP. We also found that when the section authority field was used, there were more than 400 different types of entries made in the EHRP records.\nAccording to HHS officials, there are some data elements in the EHRP system—including the section authority under Title 42—that are unreliable. The majority of the unreliable data elements are those from nonrequired data entry fields. Whereas required fields must be completed before a personnel action is saved in the system, Title 42 section authority is a free-form, open-ended field and there is no system control in place to ensure the field is recorded or recorded accurately prior to saving the personnel action. Our case reviews found the section authority for appointment—such as sections 209(f) or 209(g)—was always documented on hard copy personnel action forms, but in many cases was not recorded in personnel records in the EHRP system.\nWe have previously reported that effective workforce planning and management require that human capital staff and other managers base their workforce analyses and decisions on complete and accurate personnel data. The lack of reliable information in this area may preclude HHS, Congress, and other organizations from providing effective oversight of the Title 42 program and evaluating its effectiveness. For example, the lack of section authority data in EHRP has made it difficult for HHS to provide accurate headcounts of employees hired under sections 209(f) or (g) and resulted in HHS overstating the number and operating division of its employees hired under these sections to oversight bodies, including Congress, and in response to this audit. We identified more than 600 instances where HHS erroneously included employees in its data submission to us that were not appointed under sections 209(f) or (g). Some erroneous cases included individuals we later found were hired under appointing authorities other than sections 209(f) or (g), including appointing authorities under 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b-8 and 210(g). One result of including these cases in error was HHS reported it had made appointments under 209(f) or (g) at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which would be prohibited by law. Our analysis found these appointments were made under different authorities.\nHHS officials acknowledged there were potentially many cases included that were not employees hired under sections 209(f) or (g) as it was sometimes difficult to discern from available data whether employees were hired under sections 209(f) or (g), rather than other authorities under Title 42. According to human resource officials, when attempting to report on the agency’s Title 42 employees, they chose to include questionable cases rather than risk an undercount.", "", "HHS did not consistently adhere to certain sections of its policy for hiring and converting employees under section 209(f). We conducted 28 case file reviews of appointments made under existing section 209(f) policy to determine the extent to which HHS practices were consistent with its policy.employees, the case file reviews indicate that HHS appointment practices are consistent with some aspects of its section 209(f) policy. For example, all appointees met education requirements for the type of scientific position being filled. While not an explicit requirement of the policy, HHS consistently documented the basis for compensation and any recruitment or retention incentives provided to section 209(f) employees. In some cases, however, HHS did not consistently adhere to its requirements, as shown in table 5.\nWhile not generalizable across the population of Title 42 incumbent is directly involved in or manages scientific research or activities, and administrative positions that require the incumbent to have scientific credentials.\nRequires that the same recruitment plan be used for both Title 5 and Title 42 to demonstrate that other available personnel systems failed to yield qualified candidates. Further, the policy also explains the process and documentation requirements necessary to demonstrate that other available personnel systems, including Title 5, the Senior Biomedical Research Service, and PHS Commissioned Corps, have failed to yield qualified candidates. Identifies specific positions and/or categories of positions at NIH that may be filled through section 209(f) without “exhausting” other recruitment mechanisms or authorities.", "HHS has no agencywide implementing policy for appointing and compensating employees hired as fellows under section 209(g), including details about what documents are needed to support the basis for appointments and compensation. We have previously reported that agencies should have clearly defined, well-documented, transparent, and consistently applied criteria for appointing and compensating personnel.\nIn lieu of guidance from HHS, the individual operating divisions established their own policies and guidance for appointing and compensating fellows under 209(g), each with different levels of detail, compensation limits, and documentation requirements. NIH has instructions for appointing fellows as well as guidance for the use of recruitment and retention incentives. FDA’s Service Fellowship Plan provides appointment and compensation setting procedures for section 209(g) fellows and caps total compensation at Executive Level IV, with some exceptions above that cap available for consideration. CDC’s policy for its 209(g) Fellowship Program provides provisions for all fellows and general compensation guidance. Top pay for a fellow is set at the equivalent of the Grade 15, Step 10 pay level.\nThe lack of an HHS-wide policy poses the risk that compensation decisions for section 209(g) fellows at HHS may not be made consistently across operating divisions. Although some guidance exists at the operating division level for setting compensation targets, in 11 of the 20 case studies we conducted of section 209(g) fellows, we found either no or insufficient documentation to support the basis for compensation. Without an agencywide policy, an agency cannot be assured that it is allocating its resources most appropriately. According to senior human resource officials at HHS, an agencywide policy is needed and the agency is developing a policy for appointment and compensating fellows under 209(g). However, it is not clear that the policy will address important issues such as documenting the basis for compensation. The section 209(g) policy was still in development as of May 2012.", "Congress provided EPA with the authority to use 42 U.S.C. § 209 to employ up to 30 persons at any one time through fiscal year 2015. EPA has appointed 17 fellows in ORD from 2006 to 2011 under section 209(g). Of the 17 fellows appointed under Title 42, 12 were hired from outside EPA, while the remaining 5 converted from other positions within EPA. Of the 17 appointments, 14 were selected through advertised competition. To date, all 17 fellows remain with EPA and appointments for the three fellows hired in 2006 have been renewed for another 5-year term.or conversion.\nSee figure 3 for the cumulative onboard Title 42 staff, by new hire integrated systems toxicology research program, was previously an Associate Dean at a university where the individual led similar research efforts, and leads an ORD division with more than 80 staff.\nAnother leads a research program by developing biological measures to assess the impact of environmental exposure on human health and serves as Director for the Environmental Public Health Division.\nThe lead scientist for bioinformatics within the National Center for Computational Toxicology (NCCT) is a Title 42 fellow, responsible for conducting data analysis and developing solutions for data management, and serving as senior advisor to the center’s director.\nAccording to EPA officials, Title 42 provides two important tools EPA needs to achieve its mission. First, EPA reported that Title 42 provides the flexibility to be competitive in recruiting top experts who are also sought after by other federal agencies, private industry, and academia. Prior to using Title 42, EPA had difficulty recruiting and retaining scientists in certain highly specialized disciplines under regular hiring authorities. We reported in 2001 that EPA faced significant challenges in recruiting and maintaining a workforce with mission-critical skills in key technical areas such as environmental protection, environmental engineering, toxicology, and ecology. EPA officials told us Title 42 has helped the agency recruit individuals in cases where, because of the specialization of expertise needed, authority to set pay over the limits of other hiring authorities was needed to be competitive in the labor market. As such, the minimum base salary for Title 42 employees at EPA is equal to the highest base pay level for employees paid under the General Schedule, and the maximum base salary is $250,000.\nEPA officials also stated Title 42 provides the appointment flexibility needed to align experts with specific skills to changing scientific priorities. One specific program where EPA cited the importance of using Title 42 in that way was in the development of the NCCT. There are four Title 42 fellows at NCCT, including its director. The fellows assist in the development of NCCT initiatives, such as the Computational Toxicology Research Program, a program that is developing alternatives to traditional animal testing. A 2010 review by the National Academy of Sciences National Research Council reported “the use of Title 42 appointments to develop NCCT is an excellent example of how such appointments can be used to build new capacity and advance the state of science.” EPA officials stated it is not the agency’s intention to hire a fellow long-term under Title 42, but rather employ the individual as long as a priority remains high. For the three fellows hired in 2006, EPA renewed the terms for another 5-year appointment.\nAnnual salaries range from approximately $153,000 to $216,000, with an average salary of about $176,000 and a median salary of about $171,000. As shown in table 6, 15 of the 17 EPA fellows had salaries exceeding Executive Level IV.\nOf the 12 new hires from outside EPA, 8 earned more in annual pay than earned in the position previously held, 3 earned less than in their previous position, and 1 appointee’s salary did not change. Salary changes from previous positions ranged from a decrease of $85,000 to an increase of $40,000, not including recruiting incentives. Eight of the 12 new hires received recruitment incentives ranging from $10,000 to $50,000. EPA documents indicate that the recruitment incentives were offered to compete with private industry and to aid in career transition. All five employees converted from other positions within EPA received a salary increase, ranging from $6,000 to $15,000. None of the converted employees received incentive payments.\nConverted employees generally assumed additional responsibilities as a Title 42 employee. Our case studies included four of the five EPA employees who converted to Title 42. Of the four appointees who came from within EPA, one was promoted from the lead oil research program scientist to the director of the land remediation and pollution division, one moved from being an associate director to a division director within the same national center, one was promoted from a branch chief to a division director, and one remained a director.\nIn December 2010, EPA began a pilot of using market salary data to estimate salaries of what Title 42 candidates could earn in positions outside of government given their education, experience, professional standing, and other factors. EPA used the market salary data to inform salary negotiations for the five fellows appointed since the implementation of the pilot. According to EPA officials, the market salary pilot concludes in December 2012 and its effect will be analyzed at that time.", "In appointing Title 42 fellows, EPA generally followed appointment guidance described in its Title 42 Operations Manual. The manual provides guidance for managers, supervisors, and human resources specialists implementing Title 42. In all 10 case files we reviewed, documents provided by EPA show Title 42 practices were generally consistent with its guidance and requirements. Table 7 shows some selected Title 42 appointment requirements and observations from our case reviews.\nWe conducted 10 case file reviews of EPA Title 42 employees and in 2 cases we discovered issues related to EPA’s procedures for mitigating potential financial conflicts of interest. EPA’s Title 42 employees are subject to the same laws and regulations that govern the ethical conduct of other federal employees. For example, covered Title 42 employees are required to submit a public financial disclosure report (SF-278) as part of the appointment process and annually thereafter. Title 42 employees are also covered under the criminal conflict of interest law, 18 U.S.C. § 208. Section 208 prohibits a federal employee from participating personally and substantially in a particular matter in which he or she has a personal financial interest. The statute is intended to prevent an employee from allowing personal interests to affect his or her official actions and to protect governmental processes from actual or apparent conflicts of interest. The application of the statute can be waived so that an employee need not divest his or her financial interest or recuse themselves from the particular matter, where the nature and size of the financial interest and the nature of the matter in which the employee would participate are unlikely to affect an employee’s official actions.\nEPA’s Title 42 guidance includes pre-employment ethics clearance procedures for identifying and mitigating potential conflicts of interest prior to appointment. As part of the procedures, an ethics official in EPA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC/Ethics) works with the candidate to ensure that all required information is reported on the disclosure form and to develop an ethics agreement, as necessary, to mitigate or resolve any identified potential conflicts. A job offer may only be extended after OGC/Ethics signs the public financial disclosure report. Although EPA has preappointment ethics clearance procedures as noted above, it does not have postappointment procedures in place to ensure Title 42 employees meet ethics requirements to which they have previously agreed. In two cases we reviewed, employees had potential conflict of interest situations arise after appointment resulting, in part, from the agency’s failure to ensure Title 42 employees followed agreed upon ethics requirements.\nIn one case, EPA general counsel determined stock owned by the candidate could be a potential conflict of interest and directed the candidate to either recuse himself from certain duties or divest himself of the stock as a condition of employment. The candidate agreed to divest of the stock and was subsequently hired. A year later, during the routine review of the employee’s annual financial disclosure form, EPA discovered that the employee still owned the stock. The employee was ordered to divest of the stock and this time immediately complied. EPA also reviewed the projects for which the employee was involved while still owning the stock and determined that the employee had not participated in any particular matter which would have constituted a conflict of interest. According to EPA, there was confusion concerning who, if anyone, was tasked to ensure the divestiture occurred. In another case, based on the review of the candidate’s public financial disclosure form, EPA and the candidate entered into an ethics agreement, which documented ethical constraints that would apply to the candidate and to caution the candidate about certain assets held. The agreement listed entities in which the individual held stock and advised that, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 208, the individual should not participate in any particular matter that affected any of the listed entities unless the individual first obtained a written waiver from EPA/OGC or the value of the asset was low enough to qualify under a regulatory de minimis exemption. Despite these efforts, a year later, while responding to the employee’s request for additional time to file the annual public financial disclosure form, EPA discovered that the employee was participating in a matter while holding stock in a company (a listed entity in the ethics agreement) that EPA/OGC initially believed could be affected by this matter. Concluding that the employee’s participation was a conflict of interest, EPA/OGC directed the employee, who had been working on the matter for approximately 3 days, to immediately stop working on the matter. The employee immediately complied and sold the stock holding in question in order to resume working on the matter. OGC/Ethics made no inquiry into the specific activities the employee engaged in during those 3 days. Almost 2 years later, OGC/Ethics officials now conclude that this company was not sufficiently affected by the matter to present a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208 in light of facts that subsequently emerged.\nEPA officials acknowledge that beyond these two cases, its efforts to identify and mitigate potential conflicts of interest after appointment can be improved and have taken steps to improve ethics oversight. For example, in order to increase overall awareness of ethics responsibilities, EPA reported it provided additional training to a senior ethics official and now copies Deputy Ethics Officials – officials responsible for assisting employees in being compliant with ethics requirements – when cautionary memoranda are issued. EPA also told us it has plans to develop mandatory training sessions for ethics officials in its field laboratories and centers and implement a process where employees hired under the Title 42 and other authorities send EPA OGC confirmation of such actions as stock divestitures or signed recusals. As details and implementation timelines for these plans were not available at the time of our review, it is not clear that these plans fully consider and address ethics issues that arise after appointment and ensure previously agreed upon ethics requirements are followed, as was the issue in the two cases above.", "HHS and EPA have used Title 42 to recruit and retain highly skilled, in- demand personnel to government service. Although HHS relies on Title 42 to fill some of its most critical scientific and medical research positions, the lack of complete data and guidance may limit the agency’s ability to strategically manage the use of the authority. HHS erroneously reported appointments made under sections 209(f) and (g) that would have been prohibited by law, indicating the agency’s data management practices may preclude effective oversight of the program and workforce planning. Effective oversight is particularly important in light of HHS’s increasing use of Title 42 and the number of employees earning salaries higher than most federal employees. Inconsistencies between HHS’s policies and practices related to section 209(f) may result in that authority being used in ways for which it was not intended. Recent changes to 209(f) policy issued by HHS should help the agency more consistently follow requirements. As appointments have been made under 209(g) without documentation showing the basis for compensation, relying on 209(g) guidance issued only at the operating division level may not be sufficient to ensure appointments and compensation under this authority are appropriate and consistent. HHS has acknowledged the need for agencywide 209(g) guidance, but has not determined if it will include requiring documentation showing the basis for compensation. EPA generally followed its Title 42 policies and has incorporated some modifications to improve its appointment and compensation practices; however, EPA’s current ethics guidance does not sufficiently ensure Title 42 employees meet ethics requirements after appointment. EPA acknowledged it could improve its postappointment ethics oversight and reported it has plans to ensure that Title 42 employees send OGC confirmation of stock divestitures and other ethics requirements. However, at the time of our review, EPA had not provided us with implementation plans or timeframes. Although its plans appear to be prudent steps for addressing the specific issues that arose in the cases we reported, it will be important for EPA to implement them as soon as possible to mitigate the risk of future potential conflict of interest issues.", "To help ensure HHS has the data and guidance necessary to effectively oversee and manage its Title 42 authority, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS take the following three actions:\nEnsure section authority—sections 209(f) or (g)—be consistently entered in appropriate automated personnel systems, such as making section authority a required, drop-down field in its personnel system where this information is initially entered.\nAs part of its effort to implement new section 209(f) guidance, systematically document how policy requirements were fulfilled when hiring or converting 209(f) employees. This could include such items as: − − the basis for which the position is considered scientific, recruitment and retention efforts made under other hiring authorities before using Title 42, − a conversion’s recognition as a national or international expert in − a conversion’s original scientific or scholarly contributions of major significance in the field, − a conversion’s leadership in the field equivalent to a full-tenured professor in academia, and − a conversion’s special knowledge and skills of benefit to the agency.\nAs part of its ongoing effort to develop agencywide policy for appointing and compensating employees hired under section 209(g), ensure the policy requires and provides guidance for documenting the basis for employee compensation.\nTo help improve enforcement of ethics requirements, we recommend the Administrator of the EPA direct the Designated Agency Ethics Official:\nAs part of its efforts to improve postappointment ethics oversight, develop and document a systematic approach for ensuring Title 42 employees are compliant with ethics requirements after appointment. Implement, as part of this approach, reported plans to require Title 42 employees to provide proof of compliance with ethics agreements to a designated ethics official within a reasonable timeframe after appointment.", "We provided the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the EPA an opportunity to comment on a draft of this report. The HHS Assistant Secretary for Legislation and EPA’s Acting Assistant Administrator for Research and Development provided written responses and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The agencies’ comments appear in appendix II and III.\nIn a June 7, 2012, letter responding to a draft of this report, HHS agreed with each of the three recommendations. HHS’s ongoing and proposed actions noted in the response address our concerns and are likely to improve the agency’s management and oversight of its Title 42 authority.\nHHS agreed with our first recommendation to ensure section authority is consistently entered in appropriate automated personnel systems. Specifically, HHS stated that as it moves forward with the implementation of a new enterprise human resources system, it will explore the possibility of using a drop-down field to enter Title 42 section authority. HHS stated that its Office of Human Resources will continue to work with the Operating Divisions and Staff Divisions to ensure that Title 42 personnel actions are processed in a consistent and accurate manner.\nHHS also agreed with our two recommendations addressing Title 42 policies. HHS stated that, in part due to our findings, it updated its section 209(f) policy to address our concern that HHS document how policy requirements were fulfilled when hiring or converting section 209(f) employees. In addition, HHS agreed with our recommendation to develop agencywide policy for appointing and compensating employees hired under section 209(g) authority. HHS stated that the section 209(g) policy will be implemented in the near future.\nIn a June 6, 2012, letter responding to our draft, EPA disagreed with the recommendation directed to EPA and our discussion of the second ethics case. Specifically, EPA requested that we update our discussion to note that the individual had not yet visited a site related to work on the matter. EPA stated that since the individual had not yet visited the site, EPA is not aware of any evidence that the employee personally and substantially participated in the matter.\nWe do not believe a change in the discussion of this ethics matter is warranted. GAO made no independent conclusions as to whether the individual’s participation during the brief period of time we note constituted personal and substantial participation in the matter and whether this was a conflict of interest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208. Rather, our discussion of this case, including whether the individual’s participation was a conflict of interest, was based exclusively on and attributed to conclusions made by EPA/OGC, both at the time of the event and in subsequent interviews conducted for this engagement.\nSpecifically, documentary evidence at the time of our review supports the fact that EPA’s concern was the individual’s participation in the matter in general, and that EPA’s concern was not influenced by the fact that the individual was not yet on site. As we reported, EPA/OGC directed the individual to stop working on the matter when it found he owned stock in a company that could be affected by the matter he was working on (the individual immediately stopped working on the matter and sold the stock in order to resume working on this matter.)\nEPA disagreed with our statement that it is not clear that EPA plans to develop an approach to address ethics issues that arise after appointment and ensure previously agreed upon ethics requirements are followed. In its comments, EPA noted that on February 17, 2012, it sent us a letter documenting the steps it has taken and plans to take to address postappointment ethics issues and ensure previously agreed upon ethics requirements are followed. Specifically in its February letter, EPA reported it recently implemented a process in which they now copy Deputy Ethics Officials when cautionary memoranda are issued to OGE 278 filers. EPA also reports it has plans to implement a process for public filers, including employees hired under the Title 42 special hiring authority, to ensure that they send OGC confirmation of stock divestitures, for example, or signed recusals.\nWe agree that providing cautionary memoranda to the officials responsible for assisting the employee in remaining compliant with ethics requirements is a step that could improve EPA’s postappointment ethics oversight and added this example to the report accordingly. However, because EPA did not provide a firm date or timelines for implementing its reported plan to ensure employees send OGC confirmation of stock divestitures or signed recusals, we did not revise the finding.\nEPA disagreed with the recommendation that it develop and document a systematic approach for ensuring Title 42 employees are compliant with ethics requirements after appointment and consider adding steps to the ethics clearance process that require Title 42 employees to provide proof of compliance with ethics agreements. EPA asked that we remove the recommendation or revise it to acknowledge the plans mentioned above and that EPA continues working towards implementation.\nWe acknowledge EPA is considering a plan to require proof of compliance with ethics agreements and, because we believe this is a prudent and needed step for improved ethics oversight, have revised the recommendation to reflect EPA’s plans. As the two ethics issues we reported occurred over two years ago and EPA has acknowledged improvements in its postappointment ethics oversight are needed, such plans should be implemented as soon as possible. We maintain that the recommendation is still necessary to ensure EPA develops detailed plans and begins moving toward implementation as soon as possible to mitigate the risk of additional potential conflict of interest issues.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2757 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.", "This report examines the extent to which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have (1) used authority under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g) to appoint and set pay for employees since January 2006, and (2) followed applicable agency policy, guidance, and internal controls for Title 42 appointments and compensation.\nTo address the first objective, we obtained and analyzed personnel data from HHS and EPA to describe Title 42 appointment and compensation trends at HHS and EPA since 2006, including the number of Title 42 employees; the types of occupations and positions held by Title 42 employees; compensation rates, including the number of Title 42 employees earning more than certain federal salary levels; the number of nonsalary payments (e.g., performance bonuses and retention incentives) provided to Title 42 employees and their purpose; and the number of civil servants that have been converted to Title 42 appointments and compensation changes associated with those conversions. We determined 2006 was the most appropriate beginning year for our analysis because, according to HHS human resource officials, personnel data prior to 2006 was likely not sufficiently reliable for our analysis. Also, EPA began using Title 42 in 2006. HHS data presented in this report is 2006 through the end of 2010, the last year of complete data available; and at EPA, 2006 through the end of 2011.\nWe conducted a variety of data tests and interviews with agency officials to correct and refine HHS Title 42 data and were able to develop a data set that was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We could not, however, report on the number of HHS Title 42 employees hired under a particular section authority—sections 209(f) or (g)—because section authority is not consistently recorded by HHS. For EPA, we performed data testing and interviewed agency officials to identify any data gaps or inconsistencies with compensation data provided and compared EPA data to information found in official agency documents. We determined that EPA’s data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.\nTo assess the extent to which HHS and EPA have followed applicable policy, guidance, and internal controls, we reviewed the policies and guidance at HHS and EPA in order to understand the conditions under which Title 42 appointees are to be recruited, appointed, compensated, and managed. We determined case file reviews would be the most appropriate approach to obtain the information needed to (1) compare practices with policy and guidance, and (2) provide illustrations and context for data analysis results. We conducted a total of 63 case file reviews out of 1,502 HHS cases within selected strata in two phases. In the first phase, we conducted 23 case file reviews to address data reliability concerns. The number of case file reviews in this phase was proportional to the frequency with which we identified and observed cases with data characteristics that deviated from our understanding of the purpose and use of sections 209(f) and (g). In the second phase, we conducted 40 case file reviews based on a random selection of cases that had characteristics related to various areas of HHS Title 42 policy and guidance.\nFor the HHS case file selection, cases were grouped into strata based on certain characteristics—such as hired under section 209(f), hired under section 209(g), newly hired in 2010, converted in 2010, or with aspects of data inconsistent with our understanding of Title 42’s purpose—and randomly selected from within those strata. For EPA, we selected 10 of the 17 Title 42 employees for case file reviews based on a cross section of (1) labs and centers within EPA to understand if Title 42 was implemented uniformly across the agency; (2) Title 42 candidate sources such as the private sector, academia, and conversions to determine if differences existed in recruitment and pay setting; (3) length of service as a Title 42 employee to understand the effect of recent appointment and compensation guidance; and (4) compensation characteristics. We developed a data collection instrument for both HHS and EPA file reviews to capture information that was uniform and comparable.\nAt the conclusion of each phase of our case file reviews, we analyzed the results and recorded our observations and listed the next steps—such as interviews with agency officials and further data analysis—needed to obtain further context for our observations. The results from the case file reviews and subsequent activities enabled us to understand the results of our data analyses and provided the basis for findings. We determined the number of case file reviews was sufficient to identify incidences where practices were or were not consistent with policies and guidance, but our findings are not generalizable to the entire population of sections 209(f) and (g) employees at HHS or EPA.\nWe conducted this performance audit from May 2011 through July 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Trina Lewis, Assistant Director; Shea Bader; Carl Barden; Laurel Beedon; Andrew Ching; Sara Daleski; Jeffrey DeMarco; Karin Fangman; Ellen Grady; James Lager; Cynthia Saunders; Jeff Schmerling; and Gregory Wilmoth made major contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h2_full", "h0_full h2_full h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How has HHS' use of special hiring authorities changed recently?", "What is the relationship between HHS and Title 42?", "Why is Title 42 beneficial for HHS?", "How well does HHS regulate their usage of Title 42?", "What is the current status of HHS' attempt to address these issues?", "How does EPA use Title 42?", "In what way does Title 42 benefit EPA?", "To what extent does the EPA monitor their Title 42 appointments?", "How have HHS and EPA been able to pay employees above typical federal employee limits?", "Why is GAO investigating the HHS and EPA hiring authority?", "How did GAO source information for their assessment?", "How does GAO recommend HHS improve their special hiring practices?", "How does this compare with GAO's suggestions for the EPA?", "How did the agencies respond to GAO's suggestions?", "To what extent does GAO consider the EPA's past actions as satisfactory?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) use of special hiring authorities under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g) has increased in recent years.", "Nearly all HHS Title 42 employees work in one of three HHS operating divisions: the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Title 42 employees at HHS serve in a variety of areas, including scientific and medical research support and in senior, director-level leadership positions. At NIH, one-quarter of all employees, and 44 percent of its researchers and clinical practitioners, were Title 42 appointees.", "HHS reported that Title 42 enables the agency to quickly fill knowledge gaps so medical research can progress and to respond to medical emergencies. HHS further reported Title 42 provides the compensation flexibility to compete with the private sector. In 2010, 1,461 HHS Title 42 employees earned salaries over Executive Level IV ($155,500 in 2010).", "HHS does not have reliable data to manage and provide oversight of its use of Title 42 because the section authority used to hire Title 42 employees is not consistently recorded into personnel systems. Moreover, HHS did not consistently adhere to certain sections of its 209(f) policy. For example, the policy states that 209(f) appointments may only be made after non-Title 42 authorities have failed to yield a qualified candidate, but GAO found few instances where such efforts were documented.", "HHS has recently issued updated 209(f) policy that addresses most of these issues. HHS is developing agencywide policy for appointing and compensating fellows under 209(g), but it is not clear the policy will address important issues such as documenting the basis for compensation.", "Since 2006, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used section 209(g) to appoint 17 employees. Title 42 employees lead scientific research initiatives and some manage or direct a division or office.", "According to EPA officials, Title 42 provides the flexibility to be competitive in recruiting top experts who are also sought by private industry, academia, and others. Also, Title 42 provides the appointment flexibility needed to align experts with specific skills to changing scientific priorities. Fifteen of EPA’s 17 Title 42 employees earned salaries over Executive Level IV in 2010.", "EPA appointment and compensation practices were generally consistent with its guidance; however, EPA does not have postappointment procedures in place to ensure Title 42 employees meet ethics requirements to which they have previously agreed.", "HHS and EPA have been using special hiring authority provided under 42 U.S.C. §§209(f) and (g)—referred to in this report generally as Title 42 or specifically as section 209(f) or section 209(g)—to appoint individuals to fill mission critical positions in science and medicine and, in many cases, pay them above salary limits usually applicable to federal government employees.", "GAO was asked to assess the extent to which HHS and EPA have (1) used authority under sections 209(f) and (g) to appoint and compensate employees since 2006, and (2) followed applicable agency policy, guidance, and internal controls for appointments and compensation.", "GAO analyzed agency Title 42 data, interviewed agency officials, and conducted file reviews.", "GAO recommends HHS (1) ensuresection authority—209(f) or 209(g)—be consistently entered in appropriatepersonnel systems, (2) systematically document how policy requirements were fulfilled when hiring or converting 209(f) employees, and (3) ensure agencywide 209(g) policy currently in development provides guidance for documenting the basis for employee compensation.", "GAO recommends EPA develop and document a systematic approach for ensuring Title 42 employees are compliant with ethics requirements after appointment.", "HHS agreed with GAO’s recommendations, while EPA disagreed, citing certain actions already taken.", "GAO acknowledges EPA’s plans to address these issues, but maintains the recommendation is needed to ensure implementation." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, 3, -1, 5, 6, -1, -1, 1, -1, 0, -1, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R44140	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Overview of Presidential Permitting Processes", "Agency Implementation of the Executive Orders", "Key Elements of the NEPA Review Process", "Agency-Specific Procedures", "State Department (Petroleum Products and Hazardous Liquids)", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Natural Gas)", "Department of Energy (Electricity)", "Facility Modifications and Permit Amendments", "Action Related to the Keystone XL Permit Application", "Summary of Presidential Decisions on the Keystone XL Pipeline", "Congressional Action Related to the Keystone XL Project", "Concluding Observations" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "For decades, executive permission in the form of a Presidential Permit has been required for the construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of certain facilities that cross the United States' borders with Canada and Mexico. The constitutional basis for the President's cross-border permitting authority was examined in a prior CRS report. However, questions remain about the manner in which this authority is exercised among the agencies to which it has been delegated. In particular, some Members of Congress and affected stakeholders seek greater clarity about how Presidential Permit applications are reviewed for various kinds of cross-border energy projects, including the degree to which there may be differences or similarities among the various agency approaches to evaluating environmental impacts of proposed projects and in determining whether they serve the national or public interest.\nWith few exceptions, requests for Presidential Permits for cross-border pipelines or electric transmission lines have involved projects extending a relatively short distance into a U.S. border state before connecting to some existing facility (e.g., a refinery in Texas or a power plant in Arizona). However, in the last decade, two long cross-border pipeline projects have been approved—TransCanada's Keystone and Enbridge Energy's Alberta Clipper. In operation since 2010, both projects transport oil sands crude from Alberta, Canada, deep into the United States via pipelines that are hundreds of miles long and cross multiple states. The size and scope of these projects led to increased national attention on the Presidential Permit process for subsequent proposals. In particular, there has been significant national attention on the Department of State's process for considering TransCanada's permit application for its proposed Keystone XL pipeline. The Trump Administration issued a Presidential Permit for that project on March 23, 2017.\nIn response to perceived delays in the review of the Keystone XL permit application, several legislative proposals in the 114 th Congress sought to change some specific or general aspects of the Presidential Permit process. Most notable was the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act ( S. 1 ), which was passed in Congress but vetoed by President Obama. Other legislative proposals in the 114 th Congress included the American Energy Renaissance Act of 2015 ( S. 791 and H.R. 1487 ) and the North American Energy Infrastructure Act ( S. 1228 ). Given the issues that arose in the wake of TransCanada's application for the Keystone XL pipeline, Congress may again propose legislation intended to expedite approval of future applications for Presidential Permits.\nThis report focusses on the Presidential Permit review processes for cross-border energy infrastructure as implemented by these agencies:\nThe Department of State for pipelines and similar facilities that transport liquids such as petroleum, petroleum products, and other hazardous liquids; The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for natural gas pipelines and associated facilities; and The Department of Energy (DOE) for electricity transmission lines and associated facilities.\nThis report compares practices among these three agencies with respect to how they define a proposed project's scope (which dictates the array of associated impacts they will review), conduct environmental reviews, and make final decisions on permit applications. It also includes a discussion of recent efforts by Congress to change those permitting processes.", "The State Department, FERC, and DOE each make their decisions regarding Presidential Permit applications largely within the context of their own interpretation of directives in a series of executive orders. The State Department makes its permitting decisions primarily in accordance with directives in Executive Order (E.O.) 11423, as amended by E.O. 13337. FERC and DOE make permitting decisions in accordance with E.O. 10485, as amended by E.O. 12038. Broadly speaking, each executive order requires the respective agency to do the following:\ngather necessary project-specific information from the applicant; seek input from specific outside federal agencies; and decide whether to seek input from additional local, state, tribal, or federal agencies or from members of the public.\nUnder the applicable executive order, each agency is required to issue a Presidential Permit if, after evaluating all relevant project information, the agency determines that the project would \"serve the national interest\" (pursuant to E.O. 13337) or be \"consistent with the public interest\" (pursuant to E.O. 10485). A permit must include any conditions that the permitting agency identifies as necessary to ensure that the project would, in fact, meet the public or national interest standard. (For the sake of brevity, the phrase public or national interest , as it is used later in this report, refers to the standard that is applied or procedures that are implemented by the authorized agency under the applicable executive order to determine whether a proposal will be \"consistent with the public interest\" or \"serve the national interest.\" It does not mean to suggest that such standards or procedures are the same for each agency.)\nDepending on the type of project- and site-specific impacts of the project, additional federal requirements may apply to the proposal. For example, natural gas pipelines are subject to requirements established by or pursuant to the Natural Gas Act.\nEach agency authorized to issue Presidential Permits informs its decisionmaking regarding such permits using information gathered in accordance with its procedures implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). In part, NEPA requires federal agencies to ensure that the environmental impacts of an action are identified and taken into consideration before making a final agency decision about the action. Permit conditions, such as mitigation measures and additional compliance requirements, are also generally identified during the NEPA review. For example, during the NEPA review, an agency may identify construction procedures or mitigation measures that the applicant must implement to ensure compliance with other applicable federal law, such as the Endangered Species Act or Clean Water Act.\nSince each agency is required to identify conditions under which a proposal must be implemented, it is rare that an agency denies a permit application. Instead, the permitting process is generally used to determine how a project must be implemented to comply with federal law (and meet the national or public interest standard) rather than whether it can be implemented. In 2015, the State Department under the Obama Administration did deny TransCanada's application for a Presidential Permit, finding that the pipeline would not meet the national interest. However, such a decision was a rare exception, not the rule.", "Each agency's permitting process involves the identification and analysis of project-specific impacts of a proposal. That information is gathered in accordance with executive order directives, the agency's NEPA implementation process, and any other applicable federal requirements. Once a Presidential Permit is issued, the applicant (then permittee) must site, construct, operate, and maintain the border-crossing facilities in accordance with conditions specified in the permit. As a result, subsequent modifications to the facility related to its siting, construction, operation, or maintenance may require additional authorization from the permitting agency.", "As stated above, each permitting agency identifies the impacts of a proposed project and conditions necessary to ensure it will meet the required public or national interest standards, largely within the context of identifying environmental impacts pursuant to NEPA. In 1978, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) promulgated regulations implementing NEPA that are broadly applicable to all federal agencies. In those regulations, each federal agency was required to adopt the CEQ regulations, supplement them as necessary to include procedures relevant to that agency's authority, and ensure that those procedures implementing NEPA are integrated into the agency's broader decisionmaking procedures. FERC, DOE, and the State Department subsequently did so. The resulting agency-specific NEPA review process is used to identify any potentially relevant issues or impacts that must be considered during the decisionmaking process.\nProcedures for determining the scope of the environmental review and the type of impacts analyzed during that review are delineated in both the CEQ and the individual agency NEPA regulations. NEPA requires federal agencies to provide a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) for \"major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.\" If the agency is uncertain whether a proposal would have significant impacts, it may prepare an environmental assessment (EA) to determine if an EIS is necessary, or a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) may be issued. Federal agencies may also identify categories of actions they are authorized to undertake that have been found to have no significant effect on the environment. Such actions are categorically excluded from the need to prepare an EIS or EA and are, hence, broadly referred to as \"categorical exclusions\" (CEs or CATEXs).\nGiven the various potential types of review required under NEPA (i.e., preparation of an EIS or EA or approval as a CE), the scope of project-specific information that will be used to inform an agency's public or national interest determination depends on whether the proposal will \"significantly\" affect the environment. That determination must be based upon each agency's evaluation of these effects of the proposal:\nDirect effects that are caused by the project and occur at the same time and place (e.g., impacts directly associated with the construction and operation of the cross-border facilities). Indirect effects that are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance but still reasonably foreseeable. Cumulative impacts on the environment that result from the incremental impacts of the action when added to other past, present, or reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (federal or nonfederal) or person undertakes that other action.\nThe definitions of these categories of impacts mean that, although a Presidential Permit may be for cross-border facilities, the scope of environmental review of domestic impacts is not limited to the evaluation of impacts that occur only at the border. With few exceptions, each agency has determined that it must evaluate the impacts of an entire project within the United States—from the border to its eventual connection in U.S. territory. For most projects, the consideration of direct and indirect impacts involves an evaluation of all new facilities that will be built as a result of the cross-border facilities, including other facilities constructed in the United States (such as a new power plant being fueled by, and built in conjunction with, a new cross-border natural gas pipeline). Although the permitting agency may have no authority to control those impacts—other than denying or conditioning the permit—NEPA obligates each agency to be aware of them and demonstrate that those impacts were fully considered in its decisionmaking process.\nFor any given Presidential Permit application, interested stakeholders may disagree with the permitting agency's decision regarding exactly what constitutes direct, indirect, or cumulative impacts. Such disagreements may relate to how far \"upstream\" or \"downstream\" from the project the agency must evaluate impacts. For example, some may argue that approving a cross-border pipeline may induce incremental production of oil or natural gas and that, hence, environmental impacts associated with the development and production of that oil or gas should be evaluated (e.g., the potential for incremental water use or greenhouse gas emissions, among other impacts). Others argue that such impacts are outside the control and responsibility of the permitting agency and should not have to be reviewed. Each agency evaluates project-specific impacts that are reasonably foreseeable. A host of complex factors may be relevant to an agency's determination of the impacts it will consider.\nAs noted above, NEPA requires an agency to review a proposal's potential to affect the quality of the human environment. The CEQ regulations define the \"human environment\" to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment, which may include economic or social effects. As DOE, FERC, and the State Department implement NEPA for their Presidential Permit processes, project impacts assessed include impacts to cultural or historical resources and those associated with project safety and security (i.e., impacts potentially subject to requirements established under laws other than NEPA). That is, each agency uses the NEPA process to evaluate potential project impacts beyond those that may be identified as \"environmental.\"\nEconomic or social effects are not intended by themselves to require preparation of an EIS. However, when an EIS is prepared, and economic or social and natural or physical environmental effects are interrelated, then the NEPA document must discuss all of these effects on the human environment. For pipelines and electric transmission lines, this generally means a review of construction and operational issues related to construction methods, safety, and reliability. It also includes the proposal's direct and indirect impacts on geology, soils, water resources, wetlands, vegetation, fisheries, wildlife, threatened and endangered species, land use, recreation, visual resources, cultural resources, air quality (including potential greenhouse gas emissions), noise, safety, and socioeconomics. For oil or natural gas pipelines, these analyses are prepared in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.\nDepending on the location of the project and the resources affected, a given project may have wide-ranging impacts that are also subject to an array of local, tribal, state, and federal law. The identification of such requirements may be useful to the permitting agency to ensure that the cross-border project would result in the construction and operation of facilities in the United States that comply with applicable state and federal environmental and safety requirements. Generally, the final EIS or FONSI for a cross-border pipeline or electric transmission line would identify other requirements the applicant must meet to obtain a Presidential Permit (e.g., pipeline safety regulations), as well as any other state or federal approvals required for other segments of the project (e.g., those established under the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, or National Historic Preservation Act). Overall, this process may result in federal approvals being processed more quickly but may blur the distinction between procedures that must be completed to ensure compliance with NEPA and actions that must be taken to ensure compliance with other laws related to the construction and operation of the entire project.\nOnce all project impacts are identified, each agency then determines what, if any, conditions must be included in the permit to ensure that the entire project is constructed, operated, connected, and maintained in a way that meets the agency's public or national interest standard. As a result, FERC, DOE, and the State Department have rarely denied permits based on project-specific impacts identified during the NEPA review process. Instead, each agency has generally specified conditions under which the proposal could be approved (i.e., the permit could be issued).", "Each agency authorized to issue Presidential Permits for cross-border energy facilities has discretion to determine whether the construction and operation of those facilities will meet its respective public or national interest standard, subject to judicial review. Each agency considers policy issues and other factors unique to the commodity of import or export (e.g., environmental or economic issues related to oil versus electricity imports). With respect to the construction and operation of the facilities themselves, the scope of each agency's review generally depends on the size and scope of the proposed project (e.g., the extent to which the construction of the cross-border facilities will result in the construction of any new pipelines, transmission lines, or related facilities in the United States).", "Executive Orders 11423 and 13337 direct the State Department to issue Presidential Permits for projects that \"serve the national interest.\" The orders do not define the phrase \"national interest,\" nor do they direct the State Department to evaluate specific factors before issuing a Presidential Permit. However, E.O. 13337 does require the State Department to refer the application and pertinent project information to and request the views of the Attorney General; Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; the Secretaries of Defense, the Interior, Commerce, Transportation, Energy, and Homeland Security, or the heads of those departments or agencies with relevant authority or responsibility over relevant elements of the proposed project; and, for applications concerning the border with Mexico, the U.S. Commissioner of the International Boundary and Water Commission.\nIn its interpretation of the executive order's directive, the State Department has asserted that, consistent with the President's broad discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs, it has significant discretion in deciding the factors it will examine when making a national interest determination. In the past, the State Department stated that the purpose of its permitting process is to consider the application in terms of how a proposed project would serve the national interest, taking into account the proposal's potential effect on energy security, environmental and cultural resources, the economy, and foreign policy. More specifically, apart from environmental considerations identified during the NEPA process, the State Department has identified the following as issues it has considered in past decisions:\nthe impacts the proposal would have on the diversity of supply and security of transport pathways for crude oil imported to the United States; the impact of a cross-border facility on the relations with the country to which it connects; the stability of various foreign suppliers of crude oil and the ability of the United States to work with those countries to meet overall environmental and energy security goals; the impact of the proposal on broader foreign policy objectives, including a comprehensive strategy to address climate change, bilateral relations with neighboring countries, and energy security; the potential economic benefits to the United States of constructing and operating the proposed project; and the relationship between the proposed project and goals to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and to increase use of alternative and renewable energy sources.\nWhile the State Department has identified these economic and strategic issues as potentially relevant to its national interest determination, project-specific issues identified during the NEPA process (e.g., the size of the project and types of resources potentially affected by it) are likely to affect the scope of issues the State Department will evaluate and the time it takes it to make that evaluation.\nState Department regulations implementing NEPA identify issuance of a permit for pipeline construction under E.O. 11423 as an action that normally requires an EA. Its NEPA regulations do not explicitly list actions that may require an EIS or be processed as a CE. Most cross-border oil pipeline facilities authorized by the State Department have involved projects that extend a relatively short distance into a border state. Most Presidential Permits for such projects have involved the preparation of an EA resulting in a FONSI. It was not until 2006 that the State Department determined that a proposed cross-border oil pipeline project would require an EIS. Since then, two additional pipeline proposals have involved the preparation of an EIS.\nThe three cross-border pipelines that have required preparation of an EIS are TransCanada's Keystone and Keystone XL pipelines and Enbridge Energy's Alberta Clipper. All three transport (or propose to transport) oil sands crude from Alberta, Canada, into the United States and extend across multiple states. As the footprint of such pipeline systems grows, so does the list of potential direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts and the public attention to the project, both in favor and opposed. Whereas past Presidential Permits were for pipeline systems that may have totaled less than a few hundred miles, the Keystone and Keystone XL (as it is currently proposed) total approximately 1,086 and 875 miles, respectively. These recent applications have raised issues that other Presidential Permits did not, such as issues related to the production of the oil in Canada, concern regarding potential spills far removed from the border, and life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production and use of oil sands crude.\nBroadly speaking, the State Department has considerable discretion with respect to making national interest determinations, so its conclusions for one project within its jurisdiction may not apply to another due to differences in project configuration, energy market conditions, technology, environmental conditions, and other important factors. Thus, Presidential Permit applications even for projects that appear similar are evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the agency and may realize different permit outcomes.", "Pursuant to E.O. 10485, FERC makes decisions regarding permit applications for natural gas pipelines that will cross the U.S. border with Mexico or Canada. The agency is required to issue a Presidential Permit if it determines that the project is consistent with the public interest and obtains the favorable recommendations of the Secretaries of State and Defense. FERC is authorized to establish permit conditions that, in its judgment, the public interest may require.\nPursuant to Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), FERC is also directed to approve the siting, construction, and operation of natural gas import/export facilities. FERC often integrates implementation of the Presidential Permit process, required under E.O. 10485, with its implementation of requirements established under Section 3 of the NGA. For example, for cross-border natural gas pipelines, FERC has generally issued a joint \"Order Issuing Presidential Permit and Granting Authorization Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act.\"\nUnder a separate directive in Section 3 of the NGA, any person seeking to import or export natural gas to or from the United States is required to obtain federal authorization to do so. Currently, DOE's Office of Fossil Energy is authorized to issue such approvals. Section 3 further provides that the export or import of natural gas to a nation that is a party to a free trade agreement requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas shall be deemed to be consistent with the public interest and that applications for such importation and exportation be granted without modification or delay. This provision applies to natural gas trade among the United States, Mexico, and Canada as all three nations are signatories to North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Still, FERC has drawn from the goals of NAFTA and its interpretation of Section 3 of the NGA when identifying the required scope of its public interest determination in evaluating applications for Presidential Permits. For example, in past approvals, FERC has noted that project construction was necessary to meet the expanding fuel demand for power generation and industrial activity in Mexico or Canada. Also, FERC has stated that it authorized the construction of facilities that will \"promote national economic policy by reducing barriers to foreign trade and stimulating the flow of goods and services between the United States and [Mexico or Canada] by facilitating the transportation of natural gas imports and exports authorized by DOE. \" FERC may also review potential impacts to private landowners.\nSection 7(c) of the NGA also authorizes FERC to issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity if the project will involve the construction and operation of a new interstate natural gas pipeline. When a border-crossing facility connects to or involves the construction of interstate pipelines, FERC has chosen to integrate its Presidential Permitting/Section 3 authorization process with its Section 7(c) authorization process.\nFERC's potential to have jurisdiction over both the cross-border facilities and its associated interstate pipeline—but not a strictly intra state pipeline—may lead to some confusion among stakeholders when identifying the various factors that FERC must assess in its NEPA review. A FERC order granting a Presidential Permit, issued jointly under Sections 3 and 7, may refer to jurisdictional versus nonjurisdictional facilities, meaning those project facilities over which FERC has siting jurisdiction versus those that are potentially relevant to the NEPA review but over which FERC has no siting jurisdiction—namely intrastate pipelines.\nDepending on the context, the identification of nonjurisdictional facilities may also be necessary to determine elements of the project that have some environmental or safety impacts that are subject to additional state or federal law. FERC may be obligated to evaluate the impacts of the construction and operation of such facilities even if it is not authorized to approve them. Identifying nonjurisdictional facilities may also be necessary to identify a start and end point for the project. For example, in FERC's final order authorizing Bakken Hunter, LLC, to build cross-border facilities, the identification of certain nonjurisdictional facilities was necessary to define the beginning and end point of the project.\nFERC regulations implementing NEPA include new gas import/export facilities among the projects it has identified as generally requiring the preparation of an EA, but they identify no cross-border projects that would generally require an EIS or CE. It appears that most Presidential Permits from FERC have involved the preparation of an EA resulting in a FONSI. Those projects have generally involved cross-border facilities that result in the construction of related facilities that extend a relatively short distance into a border state. Therefore, the scope of environmental review has been limited by the footprint of the projects. Consistent with the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA, the scope of FERC's review generally extends beyond the border-crossing facilities. For example, in 2013, FERC issued a Presidential Permit to NET Mexico Pipeline Partners that involved the construction of a 120-mile intrastate gas pipeline from Mexico into Texas. The preparation of FERC's EA and resulting FONSI involved analysis of the entire U.S. segment of the project.\nIn addition to the size of its footprint, other site-specific issues will affect a proposal's potential to have significant impacts. For example, in March 2014, FERC determined that an EIS was warranted for the Sierrita Pipeline Project, which involved the construction of 61 miles of new natural gas pipeline in Arizona. The project also required an authorization under Section 7 of the NGA. The environmental review process identified several adverse impacts associated with the project, including potential adverse impacts on certain cultural and natural resources in the state. The EIS also identified actions that could be taken to minimize those impacts. These actions would later be included as conditions of permit approval.", "Like FERC, DOE is responsible for issuing Presidential Permits for certain projects pursuant to E.O. 10485. Pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA), DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability—specifically the Permitting, Siting and Analysis Division—is responsible for authorizing electricity exports and issuing Presidential Permits for cross-border electric transmission lines. Also like FERC, the agency is required to issue a Presidential Permit if it determines that the project is consistent with the public interest and obtains the favorable recommendations of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The agency is also authorized to establish permit conditions that, in its judgment, the public interest may require.\nPresidential Permits issued by DOE in the past 10 years appear to be for facilities that import electricity into the United States or connect to existing facilities previously authorized to export electricity. Both actions are not subject to separate approval under the FPA. Still, in past Presidential Permits, DOE noted that it has consistently expressed its expectation that owners of international transmission facilities provide access across the border in accordance with the principles of comparable open access and nondiscrimination contained in the FPA.\nAccording to DOE, the two criteria used by the agency to determine if a project is consistent with the public interest, and thus warrants issuance of a Presidential Permit, are (1) environmental impact, identified pursuant to NEPA; and (2) impact on electric reliability, obtained by ascertaining whether the proposal would adversely affect the operation of the U.S. electric power supply system under normal and contingency conditions. With regard to a project's potential impact on electric reliability, it appears that DOE relies on information provided by the applicant to make that determination.\nDOE regulations implementing NEPA classify decisions regarding cross-border electric transmission projects as actions that normally require a CE or an EA resulting in a FONSI. Such projects have been found to have no significant impacts (under NEPA) because they involve minor or no new construction, involve the construction or reconstruction of power lines that extended a relatively short distance (i.e., into a single border state before connecting to existing facilities), or were built in a previously developed facility area. For example, in 2007, DOE issued a Presidential Permit to AEP Texas Central Company for a project that was processed as a CE. DOE determined the project did not require an EA or EIS because it met criteria applicable to projects that normally have no significant impact on the environment. In this instance, the project originated at a power company in Laredo, Texas, crossing 0.3 miles through the state before reaching and extending an additional 3.79 miles into Mexico.\nDOE has determined that an EIS was required for some proposals after the agency identified conditions unique to that project that would result in significant impacts. When that occurred, the project involved the construction of new power lines that crossed a significant distance within the United States or required additional authorizations under other federal or state law. One example is DOE's Presidential Permit issued to Montana Alberta Tie Ltd. for new transmission facilities at the U.S.-Canada border. The project also required authorizations from the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) under state law related to facility siting (a state action subject to the Montana Environmental Policy Act [MEPA]) and from the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) because the project would require a right-of-way grant for Transportation and Utility Systems and Facilities on Federal Land (also a federal action subject to NEPA). DOE planned to prepare an EA for the project. However, since MDEQ decided to prepare a more detailed assessment of the project under MEPA, DOE determined that it would prepare an EIS. DOE worked with MDEQ and BLM to issue a joint EIS that integrated each agency's NEPA/MEPA process.\nAnother example is the Champlain Hudson Power Express Project, which received a Presidential Permit from DOE in 2014. The proposed transmission lines would cross the U.S.-Canada border at Champlain, NY, and extend 336 miles through the state to the New York City metropolitan area. In its Federal Register notice regarding the environmental review of the project, DOE stated that \"after due consideration of the nature and extent of the proposed project, including evaluation of the 'Information Regarding Potential Environmental Impacts' section of the Presidential permit application, DOE has determined that the appropriate level of NEPA review for this project is an EIS.\"\nAccording to DOE, the time it takes to process a Presidential Permit application usually depends on the extent of the environmental analysis. A decision on a permit that involves the preparation of an EA resulting in a FONSI can usually be reached in six months. If an EIS is required to adequately address the full environmental consequences of the proposed action, processing the permit application could take 18 months or longer.", "As noted above, a Presidential Permit authorizes the siting, construction, operation, and maintenance of cross-border infrastructure projects. A permit is issued to a specific applicant and includes conditions that must be met for that specific project. Any subsequent modification to the permitted facility may require separate authorization from the permitting agency before it can proceed. That is, any changes to an authorized project before it is complete (i.e., issues related to siting and construction) or once it begins to operate (i.e., issues related to operation and maintenance) may require a new permit or, more often, an amendment to the existing permit.\nA new or amended permit is generally required if the permittee proposes a substantial modification to the authorized cross-border facility. What constitutes a \"substantial modification\" will vary in accordance with agency procedures and project-specific issues. The State Department has identified specific types of modifications that would generally require an amended Presidential Permit. The modifications are largely similar to those that have required a new or amended Presidential Permit from DOE or FERC. They include the following:\nA change in ownership or operation/maintenance responsibility. Presidential Permits are not transferable. A permittee must submit an application to the permitting agency explicitly requesting authorization to transfer the facility to a new owner/operator. A permanent change in the authorized conveyance. This includes changes to the permitted facilities that would be inconsistent with what is described in the permit. With respect to pipelines and transmission lines, such changes involve changes in the physical capacity of the conveyance (i.e., action that could change the amount of oil or gas imported/exported or changes that could affect U.S. electric reliability). Any other modification that would render inaccurate the definition of covered U.S. facilities described in the permit. This may involve a potentially wide array of changes. FERC explicitly requires a permittee to submit a new application before making any modifications to an existing facility that would involve significant state and local safety considerations that have not been previously addressed.\nA review of permits approved and applications pending between 2010 and 2015 before FERC, DOE, and the State Department indicates that a sizable percentage of the Presidential Permit applications involved requests to amend a permit for an already authorized cross-border facility. For example, as of August 2015, nine companies had 13 permit applications pending before the State Department for cross-border pipelines that transport liquid petroleum and petroleum products (see Table 1 ). Among those, three projects involved a request to approve new construction. The remaining involved new permits or modifications to existing permits for previously approved pipelines. Most of those pending applications involved a name change related to a change in ownership.\nDepending on the nature of the modification, an agency may amend an existing permit or require a new permit. A decision on whether a facility modification will require a new or amended Presidential Permit is made on a project-by-project basis in accordance with agency-specific requirements. To determine whether a new or amended permit is needed, the permittee will have to provide information to the respective agency regarding the modification. The State Department identifies actions related to cross-border facilities as falling into one of three categories. A permittee may be required to provide the State Department with certain information about the facility modification depending on which of the following categories the action fell:\n1. \"Red\" actions : a new border crossing or a change to an existing border crossing that is known to involve substantial modifications. These actions require the permittee to submit to the State Department both a notification of the change and an application to amend its permit. 2. \"Yellow\" actions : modifications that may have a material effect on Canadian or Mexican government operations but do not clearly involve substantial modifications to a border crossing. These actions require the permittee to submit project notification information to the State Department. The department will then determine if an amended Presidential Permit is required. 3. \"Green\" actions : regular maintenance and repair work to existing structures that requires no notification to the State Department and no new permit.\nA permittee would generally be aware of the permit conditions within which it must operate and the need to notify the permitting agency of any potential facility modifications—such restrictions are explicitly stated in the permit itself. For example, a Presidential Permit issued by the State Department in 2013 for the NOVA Chemicals natural gas liquids pipeline states that \"the permittee shall make no substantial change in the United States facilities, the location of the United States facilities, or in the operation authorized by this permit until such changes have been approved by the Secretary of State or the Secretary's delegate.\" The potential for an amendment may also be acknowledged in a Presidential Permit. For example, in August 2012, DOE issued a Presidential Permit to Energia Sierra Juarez that provided in part that the permit should be amended if subsequent phases of a related wind generation project necessitate changes to the facility, including higher capacity transmission lines or other changes that could impact the reliability of the U.S. power grid.\nFor any given project, however, the need for a new permit versus an amended permit may not be immediately clear. For example, in February 2012, DOE issued a new Presidential Permit to ITC Transmission to authorize the replacement of failed transformers at an authorized facility. DOE initially began processing that authorization as an amendment to an existing permit. However, because of the complexity of issues raised during that process, DOE determined that a new permit was needed.", "In recent years, largely within the context of the Obama Administration's consideration of the Presidential Permit application for the Keystone XL pipeline project, Congress has acted on numerous occasions to influence the State Department permitting process or to assert direct congressional authority over permit approval through new legislation.", "TransCanada applied for a Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline project several times—initially in 2008 and again, with a reconfigured pipeline route, in 2012. The Obama Administration denied both applications. On January 24, 2017, the Trump Administration invited TransCanada to resubmit its permit application for the pipeline and directed the relevant federal agencies to expedite their review of the application if resubmitted. Shortly thereafter, TransCanada submitted a new permit application to the State Department.\nOn March 23, 2017, the State Department issued a final Record of Decision and National Interest Determination (ROD/NID) documenting the State Department's determination that the project would serve the national interest. The ROD/NID authorized the issuance of a Presidential Permit, which was also issued on March 23.", "In the 112 th Congress, the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-78 ) included provisions requiring the Secretary of State to issue a Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL project within 60 days, unless the President determined the project not to be in the national interest. Subsequently, the State Department denied TransCanada's initial application for a Presidential Permit stating that it did not have time to complete the national interest determination within the 60-day deadline established in P.L. 112-78 . Other legislative proposals would also have imposed deadlines on a national interest determination for the Keystone XL project. All of these proposals were mooted by the State Department's initial denial of the permit following the enactment of P.L. 112-78 . Additional legislative proposals related to the Presidential Permit process followed TransCanada's second permit application.\nIn the 113 th Congress, several legislative proposals from the prior Congress were reintroduced. The Energy Production and Project Delivery Act of 2013 ( S. 17 ) would have eliminated the Presidential Permit requirement for the Keystone XL project. The Keystone for a Secure Tomorrow Act ( H.R. 334 ) and a Senate bill to approve Keystone XL ( S. 582 ) would have directly approved Keystone XL under the authority of Congress to regulate foreign commerce. The Northern Route Approval Act ( H.R. 3 ) would have eliminated the Presidential Permit requirement for Keystone XL. On March 22, 2013, the Senate passed an amendment to the FY2014 Senate Budget Resolution ( S.Con.Res. 8 ) that would have provided for the approval and construction of Keystone XL ( S.Amdt. 494 ). The North American Energy Infrastructure Act ( H.R. 3301 ) would have transferred permit authority for oil pipelines from the State Department to the Department of Commerce, required agencies to approve applications within 120 days of submission unless they determined the project to be not in the U.S. national security interest (as opposed to \"national interest\" more generally), and eliminated the need for new or revised Presidential Permits for pipeline modifications (e.g., reversal of flow direction), among other provisions. The Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act ( S. 2554 ), another Senate bill ( S. 2280 ), and a House bill to approve the Keystone XL pipeline ( H.R. 5682 ) would have granted final federal approval to the pipeline. None of these bills was enacted into law.\nAfter the November 2014 congressional elections, with greater majorities in both the House and Senate, Republican leaders stated their intention to again seek congressional authorization of the Keystone XL pipeline as a legislative priority in the 114 th Congress. Accordingly, several bills were introduced or reintroduced to support the approval of the pipeline. For example, the Keystone XL Pipeline Act ( S. 1 and H.R. 3 ) and the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act ( S. 147 ) would have explicitly authorized TransCanada to construct and operate the pipeline and cross-border facilities related to the Keystone XL pipeline proposal and specified that the final EIS prepared for the project would fully satisfy all NEPA requirements and any other federal laws that require federal agency consultation or review of the pipeline (including the Endangered Species Act). The Strategic Petroleum Supplies Act ( S. 82 ) would have suspended sales of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve until permits for the Keystone XL pipeline were issued. One legislative proposal ( S. 188 ) would have required that crude oil that entered the United States via the Keystone XL pipeline be used as a fuel or to manufacture another product in the United States but specified conditions under which the President could waive that requirement.\nOn January 29, 2015, the Senate passed the renamed Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act ( S. 1 ), as amended, by a vote of 62-36. The bill was passed in the House on February 11 by a vote of 270-152. S. 1 was sent to President Obama on February 24 and vetoed by the President the same day. President Obama stated that he vetoed S. 1 because it attempted \"to circumvent longstanding and proven processes for determining whether or not building and operating a cross-border pipeline serves the national interest.\" The Senate attempted to override the President's veto on March 4, but the override measure failed by a vote of 62-37. No further action on S. 1 was taken in the House.\nSome legislative proposals in the 114 th Congress would have modified the Presidential Permit process more broadly. For example, among other provisions, the American Energy Renaissance Act of 2015 ( S. 791 and H.R. 1487 ) would have eliminated the Presidential Permit requirement for all cross-border energy infrastructure (§2006). Instead, the bill would have required developers of cross-border oil pipelines or electric transmission lines to obtain a \"certificate of crossing\" for the cross-border segment of a proposed project from the Secretary of Energy (§2003(a)). The certificate would have to be issued within 120 days after final action under NEPA unless the project was found to be not in the \"national security interest\" of the United States (§2003(b)(1)). Permitting requirements for natural gas pipelines under Sections 3 and 7 of the NGA would have remained unchanged. The bill would also have eliminated the Presidential Permit requirement for the existing Keystone XL pipeline proposal, deeming its NEPA review to be satisfied (§2012).\nThe North American Energy Infrastructure Act ( S. 1228 ), like S. 791 and H.R. 1487 , would have eliminated the Presidential Permit requirement for cross-border energy infrastructure (§7). It also contained similar provisions with respect to certificates of crossing, but it would have maintained the State Department as the permitting agency for oil pipelines and would have maintained a \"public interest\" standard for approval (§4(b)). The bill did not seek approval of Keystone XL.", "Now that a Presidential Permit has been issued for the Keystone XL pipeline, Congress may continue to consider legislation addressing agency decisions regarding future Presidential Permit applications. Such options could include some that, arguably, would have been vetoed in the past—specifically, legislation that may alter or narrow authorities delegated to federal agencies by the President. For example, Congress could choose to consider legislation that would explicitly define the scope of federal agency reviews for some projects, change the agency responsible for authorizing such projects, or explicitly define the criteria that can or must be evaluated to determine whether a proposal is in the national or public interest." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "h0_title h1_full", "h0_full", "", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "How do agencies ensure compliance with NEPA?", "How does reviewing the entire project affect the timeline for the review?", "What have been the scale of recent pipeline projects?", "Why has the Keystone XL pipeline attracted so much attention?", "How was the TransCanada permit handled?", "What has been Congress' role in the Keystone XL permitting process?", "How might this affect future permitting decisions?", "How might Congress attempt to change the permitting process?", "Through what methods can Congress legally alter the permitting process?" ], "summary": [ "In documenting compliance with NEPA, each agency evaluates the direct and indirect effects, including any cumulative impacts, of issuing the permit. To do so, each agency generally looks at the effect of constructing the entire project, not just the portions that would cross the border (i.e., the action for which the Presidential Permit is required).", "Historically, evaluating impacts of the entire project would not necessarily involve a complex or particularly time-consuming review.", "With few exceptions, past applications for Presidential Permits have been for pipelines or transmission lines that extend a relatively short distance into a U.S. border state. Recently, however, several pipeline projects—Enbridge Energy's Alberta Clipper and TransCanada's Keystone and Keystone XL pipeline—have involved projects that are hundreds of miles long and cross multiple states.", "It was the larger scope of such projects that, in part, resulted in increased national attention to the most recent proposal, the Keystone XL pipeline.", "In 2015, the State Department under President Obama denied TransCanada's application for a Presidential Permit for the project, finding that it did not serve the national interest. However, a new permit application was approved on March 23, 2017, when the State Department, under the Trump Administration, found that the project did serve the national interest.", "From 2011 through 2015, as the State Department considered permit applications for the Keystone XL pipeline project, Congress proposed a number of bills intended to affect the State Department's decisionmaking process.", "Although a permit has been issued for that project, Congress may again consider legislative options to expedite agency decisions on future permit applications. Congress may choose to address issues that arose during the Keystone XL permitting process.", "For example, during the review, some stakeholders questioned the scope of the NEPA review—some were concerned that it was too broad, others that it was too narrow. Some also argued there was uncertainty over criteria the State Department used to determine whether the project would serve the national interest.", "Congress could potentially clarify these issues through legislation aimed at defining federal agency roles in authorizing cross-border projects." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, 0, 1, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 9, 9, 9, 9 ] }
CRS_RL32431	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "The 1997 PM2.5 Standards", "Overview: Key Issues", "Compliance Schedule", "Timeliness of Implementation Guidance", "The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and Other Federal Requirements", "EPA's 2006 Revisions to the PM NAAQS35", "Geographical Area Designation Process", "The NAAQS Designation Process46", "1997 PM2.5 NAAQS Designation Process", "1997 PM2.5 Area Designations Timeline", "Demonstrating Attainment with the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS", "The State Implementation Plan (SIP)", "EPA's Implementation Rule for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS", "Transportation Conformity", "Upwind Pollutant Contributions: § 126 of the CAA", "Grant Programs", "Recent Actions and Their Implications for Achieving Attainment of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS", "D.C. Circuit's Decision Vacating the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)97", "Completion of EPA's Review of the Particulates NAAQS and the October 2006 Changes113", "Current Periodic Review of the Particulates NAAQS", "Congressional Action Related to Particulates NAAQS Implementation", "Conclusion", "Appendix. Implementation of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS: Timeline and Delays" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are a core component of the Clean Air Act (CAA). NAAQS do not regulate emission sources directly; rather, they define the level of pollution in ambient (outdoor) air above which health and welfare effects occur. The statute requires that, based on a review of the scientific literature, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set (1) \"primary\" standards at a level \"requisite to protect the public health\" with an \"adequate margin of safety\" and (2) \"secondary\" standards at a level \"requisite to protect the public welfare.\" NAAQS have been promulgated for six principal pollutants classified by EPA as \"criteria pollutants\": sulfur oxides measured in terms of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone, lead, and particulate matter.\nThis report provides an overview of the NAAQS implementation process in the context of the 1997 standards for fine particulate matter (PM 2.5 ), which consists of particles less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter. The EPA and states are in the process of finalizing the implementation of the NAAQS for particulates promulgated in 1997, delayed because of court challenges and other factors. The EPA's 1997 revisions to the particulate matter standards (also referred to as the particulates NAAQS) included separate requirements for PM 2.5 for the first time. The PM 2.5 NAAQS have been the source of significant concern and national debate. Congress has been particularly interested in EPA's promulgation and implementation of the CAA standards, and has held numerous hearings on particulate matter (and ozone) NAAQS established in 1997.\nEPA's and states' experiences following the promulgation of the PM 2.5 NAAQS 13 years ago could provide relevant insights as EPA and states encounter issues in the initial stages of implementing the PM 2.5 NAAQS as revised in October 2006 and as the agency proceeds with its current review of the particulates NAAQS.", "Beginning in 1971, regulation and monitoring of particulate matter under the CAA focused primarily on total suspended particles (TSP) and, eventually, on coarse particles equal to or less than 10 micrometers in diameter (PM 10 ). After extensive analysis and review, EPA revised the particulates standards in 1997 to provide separate requirements for fine particulate matter (PM 2.5 ) based on its links to several types of cardiovascular and respiratory health problems, including aggravated asthma and bronchitis, and to premature death.\nThe primary (health) PM 2.5 NAAQS requirements, which became effective on September 16, 1997, are the same as the secondary (welfare) requirements. The 1997 PM 2.5 standards are set at\nan annual maximum concentration of 15 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 ), based on the three-year average of the annual arithmetic mean PM 2.5 concentrations from one or more community-oriented monitors, and a 24-hour maximum concentration of 65 µg/m 3 , based on the three-year average of the 98 th percentile of 24-hour PM 2.5 concentrations at each population-oriented monitor within an area.", "A key component of implementing the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS is EPA's designation of geographical areas for being in \"attainment\" (in compliance) or \"nonattainment\" (out of compliance) of the air quality standards for PM 2.5 . As of August 2008, EPA's final designations included all or part of 205 counties in 20 states and the District of Columbia for nonattainment of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. A combined population of almost 90 million resides in these nonattainment areas. The final designations were based on EPA's consideration of air quality monitoring data and recommendations provided by states and tribes. The designation of nonattainment areas raised questions and concerns, particularly for those areas designated as such for the first time.", "Nonattainment designation began a process in which states (and tribes) must develop and adopt emission control programs sufficient to bring air quality into compliance by a statutorily defined deadline. States were required to submit, by April 2008, their State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for how the designated nonattainment areas will meet the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. States with nonattainment areas were to be in compliance with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS by April 5, 2010, unless they are granted an extension. At the time this report was updated, EPA had not released a status of overall compliance with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS.\nAccording to EPA, with the exception of four areas in three states, states have either submitted the complete SIPs or the agency made a final approval that an area attained the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS based on 2006-2008 air quality data. In November 2009, EPA issued findings that Georgia, Illinois, and Pennsylvania missed deadlines for submitting plans, or elements of plans for four nonattainment areas. Nonattainment areas that miss deadlines for SIP submissions or that submit inadequate SIPs can be subject to sanctions, including a suspension of federal highway funds for new projects. Highway funding sanctions would not apply to the three states if within 24 months of the effective date of the findings notice EPA determines that they have submitted the required SIPs. Based on 2006 through 2008 air quality monitoring data, EPA has indicated that 19 of the 39 nonattainment areas were meeting the 1997 PM 2.5 standard as of June 2010. Under EPA's \"Clean Data Policy,\" certain nonattainment SIP submission requirements may be suspended if the area is monitoring attainment (see 40 CFR 50.1004(c)). See the section entitled \" Demonstrating Attainment with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS \" later in this report for more detailed discussion of EPA's findings.", "Concerns were raised regarding compliance deadlines because of EPA's delay in providing implementation procedures and guidance for achieving and maintaining compliance with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. The EPA published its final \"PM 2.5 implementation\" rule on April 25, 2007. Six petitions for review of EPA's implementation rule were filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit, and two petitions for reconsideration were filed with EPA. Given that states were required to submit their SIPs by April 2008, state and local air pollution control agencies, as well as some Members of Congress, had expressed their concerns about the delays in publishing a final implementation rule and the lack of guidance.", "The EPA concluded that, in many cases, implementing national strategies—including the 1999 visibility protection regulations (Regional Haze Rule); voluntary diesel engine retrofit programs; and federal standards scheduled to be implemented between 2004 and 2010 on cars, light trucks, heavy-duty, and nonroad diesel engines—would provide a framework for achieving attainment with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. The EPA's May 2005 final rule, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), was expected to serve as the primary tool to assist downwind states in meeting the PM 2.5 (and eight-hour ozone) NAAQS by mitigating interstate transport of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from electric generating units that contribute to the formation of PM 2.5 . CAIR covered 28 states in the eastern United States and the District of Columbia, including 26 jurisdictions in the PM 2.5 nonattainment region. As a preferred implementation strategy, EPA encouraged states to use a trading program to reduce emissions of target pollutants by up to 70% in a cost-effective manner.\nIn a July 11, 2008, decision ( North Carolina v. EPA ), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated CAIR, initially causing some states to reconsider implementation plans (SIPs) already submitted and pending submission for achieving or maintaining attainment with 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. The D.C. Circuit subsequently modified its decision on December 23, 2008, in response to an EPA motion, reversing its decision to vacate CAIR while EPA develops a replacement rule. The Circuit, however, left the substantive requirements of its July 2008 decision fully intact. That decision strongly suggests that there is no simple \"fix\" that would make CAIR acceptable to the court. The court's decision to vacate the rule drew the interest of some Members of Congress and was the subject of a July 29, 2008, congressional hearing.\nOn August 2, 2010, EPA published a proposed \"Transport Rule\" intended to supersede the current CAIR. The proposed rule would limit sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from electric generating units within 31 states in the eastern United States and the District of Columbia that affect the ability of downwind states to attain and maintain compliance with the 1997 and 2006 PM 2.5 and the 1997 ozone NAAQS. The proposal includes modifications in response to the Court's concerns, particularly with regard to certain aspects of emissions contributing to ozone. The implications of this proposal have already generated considerable debate among states, industry, and other stakeholders, and have been the topic of further deliberation by Congress. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety held a hearing on EPA's proposed alternative transport rule on July 22, 2010. EPA has scheduled three public hearings, and comments on the proposal must be received on or before October 1, 2010.", "Further complicating issues associated with achieving attainment of 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS, EPA promulgated revisions to the NAAQS for particulate matter on October 17, 2006, primarily a tightening of the 1997 standard for PM 2.5 . On November 13, 2009, EPA published its designations of 31 areas in 18 states, comprising 120 counties (89 counties and portions of 31 additional counties), for nonattainment of the revised 2006 24-hour PM 2.5 standard. The final designations, based on 2006 through 2008 air quality monitoring data, include counties that would be designated nonattainment for PM 2.5 for the first time, but the majority of the counties overlap with EPA's final nonattainment designations for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Most of the 1997 PM 2.5 nonattainment areas were only exceeding the annual standard; only 12 counties were exceeding both the 24-hour and the annual standards. Thus, tightening the 24-hour standard resulted in an increased number of areas being designated nonattainment based on exceedances of both the 24-hour and the annual standard.\nThe EPA had urged states to consider control strategies that may be useful in attaining the 2006 revised PM 2.5 NAAQS when developing control strategies for the 1997 PM 2.5 standards. The effective date of the final designations rule is December 14, 2009, 30 days from the date of publication in the Federal Register . Following formal designation, the states have three years to submit SIPs, and are required to meet the 2006 revised PM 2.5 NAAQS no later than five years from the date of designation unless granted an extension. Further delays in implementing the 1997 NAAQS could result in some stakeholders advocating moving directly to implementation of the 2006 standards.\nEPA's next round of the periodic review of the particulates NAAQS is under way. The agency announced its intention to accelerate the review, in part in response to a February 24, 2009, decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to grant petitions challenging certain aspects of the EPA's revised NAAQS, denying other challenges. The court's decision did not vacate the PM standards but remanded certain aspects of the annual PM 2.5 standard to EPA for reconsideration. EPA has targeted proposing any changes to the standards by February 2011, and October 2011 for final standards. Potential risk reduction estimates and initial staff recommendations reported in recently released draft EPA assessment s and an April 2010 review by the members of the current CASAC suggest the evidence supports further strengthening of the NAAQS for fine particulates. In the April 2010 review of EPA's draft assessment, members of the CASAC agreed that the evidence suggests the need for stricter PM 2.5 standards to adequately protect human health. The issue of whether particulates NAAQS should be strengthened or not, findings and recommendations included in EPA's assessments, and the implications with regard to the ongoing implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS will likely be subject to extensive comment and debate.", "", "The designation of geographical areas failing to comply with the NAAQS, based on monitoring and analysis of relevant air quality data, is a critical step in NAAQS implementation. The CAA establishes a process for designating nonattainment areas and setting their boundaries, but it allows the EPA Administrator some discretion in determining what the final boundaries of the areas will be. Areas are identified as \"nonattainment\" when they violate or contribute to the violation of NAAQS. Areas are identified as \"attainment/unclassified\" when they meet the standard or when the data are insufficient for determining compliance with the NAAQS.\nThe designation process is intended as a cooperative federal-state-tribal process in which states and tribes provide initial designation recommendations to EPA for consideration. In Section 107(d)(1)(A) (42 U.S.C. 7407), the statute states that the governor of each state shall submit a list to EPA of all areas in the state, \"designating as ... nonattainment, any area that does not meet ( or that contributes to ambient air quality in a nearby area that does not meet ) an air quality standard\" (emphasis added).\nFollowing state and tribal designation submissions, the EPA Administrator has discretion to make modifications, including to the area boundaries. As required by statute (Section 107(d)1(B)(ii)), the agency must notify the states and tribes regarding any modifications, allowing them sufficient opportunity to demonstrate why a proposed modification is inappropriate, but the final determination rests with EPA.", "PM 2.5 attainment or nonattainment designations were made primarily on the basis of three-year federally referenced PM 2.5 monitoring data. At the time the PM 2.5 NAAQS were being finalized in 1997, EPA began developing methods for monitoring fine particles. Using funding specifically authorized for this purpose in FY1998-FY2000 EPA appropriations, the agency worked closely with states and tribes to initiate the deployment of a portion of the network of 1,200 monitors in January 1999. The majority of the monitors were not in place until January 2000. States and tribes were expected to rely on data collected during 2000-2002 for their recommendations. The EPA considered the 2001-2003 data to make the final PM 2.5 designations published in January 2005.\nIn its guidance document, EPA identified several factors that would be considered in determining attainment with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS and specified data and conditions that would not be acceptable. The EPA's guidance also included a recommendation that states and tribes consider using the same boundaries for nonattainment for both the PM 2.5 and eight-hour ozone standards, to facilitate consistency in future implementation plans. The EPA expected that many of the PM 2.5 nonattainment areas would overlap with the eight-hour ozone designations.\nHowever, PM 2.5 designations do not include nonattainment classifications based on severity as specified by statute for PM 10 and ozone, which have two and seven classifications, respectively. PM 2.5 is governed by the general nonattainment planning requirements of Title I (Part A and Part D, subpart 1) of the act.\nThe EPA recognized that determining the geographic extent of nearby source areas that contribute to nonattainment would be complicated. The CAA does not specifically require combining neighboring counties within the same nonattainment area, but it does require the use of metropolitan statistical area boundaries in the more severely polluted areas (Section 107(d)(4)(A)(iv)). Echoing this requirement, and similar to the eight-hour ozone approach, EPA recommended that Metropolitan Statistical Areas or Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas serve as the \"presumptive boundary\" for nonattainment areas under the 1997 PM 2.5 standards.\nMetropolitan areas are generally treated as units, even when part of the area lies in a separate state or does not have readings exceeding the standards. In the latter case, even though a specific county may not exceed the standards, the pollution generated there is likely to influence PM 2.5 levels elsewhere in the metropolitan area. In addition, including the entire metropolitan area avoids the creation of additional incentives for sprawl development on the fringes of urban areas. For rural areas in violation of the 1997 PM 2.5 standards, EPA's guidance presumed that the full county would be designated a nonattainment area.\nThe EPA has generally used its discretion to expand the size of nonattainment areas or to combine areas that a state listed as separate areas into a single larger unit. As it did in implementing other NAAQS, EPA also combined nonattainment counties across state lines into the same nonattainment area, if the counties are part of the same metropolitan area. Although, according to EPA, staff in the regions and the agency's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards were available for assistance and consultation throughout the designation process pursuant to the statutory requirements for working with states, some states disagreed with EPA's final designations relative to the states' own recommendations.", "By the end of February 2004, 18 states and the District of Columbia had recommended 142 counties as potential nonattainment areas for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. After reviewing the state recommendations, EPA proposed modifications resulting in nonattainment designations for 244 counties in 21 states and the District of Columbia at the end of June 2004. As required by statute, EPA notified each of the affected states regarding their specific modifications, providing them with the opportunity to submit new information and demonstrate why a proposed modification was inappropriate. Some states responding to EPA's proposal continued to support their original recommendations.\nThe EPA's final PM 2.5 designation rule, published on January 5, 2005 (70 Federal Register 944-1019), established the boundaries for areas designated as \"nonattainment,\" \"unclassifiable\" (data not sufficient to make a determination regarding compliance), or \"attainment/unclassifiable.\" The EPA designated 47 areas, composed of 225 counties in 20 states and the District of Columbia, as nonattainment; 5 areas consisting of 7 counties as unclassifiable; and the remaining counties in the United States as attainment/unclassifiable.\nThe EPA's designations reflected minor modifications to its June 2004 proposal. Primarily, 19 counties were removed from the list of nonattainment areas, and other counties were redefined by designating only specified locations (\"partial\") within the county as nonattainment. In some cases, when considering factors defined in its guidance in conjunction with the additional information provided by the states and tribes, EPA determined that only those portions of a county that contained the significant sources of emissions should be considered as contributing to the violations. In other cases, the agency determined that if emissions from a large identifiable source in a county contribute to the violations in a nearby area, the portion of the county where the source is located would be designated nonattainment, even if it is not contiguous with the remainder of the designated area. The boundaries for these \"noncontiguous\" portions are based on legally recognized government boundaries, such as townships, tax districts, and census blocks.\nSome states and stakeholders continued to contend that several counties should not be designated nonattainment, particularly when taking into account 2004 PM 2.5 monitoring data. The EPA's final designations were based on monitoring data for the three-year period from 2001-2003. Monitoring data for 2004 were not available in time for EPA to meet its statutory deadline for PM 2.5 geographical area designations (see timeline and discussion later in this report). The final PM 2.5 designation rule, published on January 5, 2005, included provisions allowing states to submit no later than February 22, 2005, certified, quality-assured 2004 monitoring data that suggest a change in designation is appropriate for consideration (70 Federal Register 948). A nonattainment designation could be withdrawn if EPA agreed that the additional data warranted such a change.\nOn April 14, 2005, EPA published a final supplemental rule amending the agency's initial final designations published in January 2005 (70 Federal Register 19844). After reviewing 2002-2004 air quality monitoring data provided by several states, EPA determined that eight areas comprising 17 counties previously identified as not meeting the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS should be designated as \"in attainment\" (see Table 1 below). The EPA also changed four of the five areas designated as \"unclassifiable\" to \"attainment,\" based on 2002-2004 data. The EPA did not consider the modifications for these areas \"re-designations\" because the changes were made prior to the April 5, 2005, effective date of the initial designations.\nIn letters dated January 20, 2006, EPA denied six petitions submitted to the agency requesting reconsideration of the previous designations of one or more full or partial counties as nonattainment for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. The petitions were for counties in Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and West Virginia. In the August 25, 2008, Federal Register , EPA announced its determination that a three-county (Harrisburg, Lebanon, Carlisle ) Pennsylvania nonattainment area for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS was in attainment. The determination was based on certified ambient air monitoring data showing that the area has monitored attainment of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS since the 2004-2006 monitoring period. By the end of August 2008, final nonattainment designations were in effect for 39 areas, comprising 205 counties within 20 states (and the District of Columbia) nationwide, with a combined population of almost 90 million. The EPA map in Figure 1 highlights the nonattainment designation areas for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS.\nThe final designated nonattainment areas for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS were primarily concentrated in the central, mid-Atlantic, and southeastern states east of the Mississippi River, as well as in California. More than 2,900 counties in 30 states have been designated attainment/unclassifiable for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Some public interest groups maintain that at least 150 additional counties warranted nonattainment designations on the basis of emission sources in those areas. Any area initially designated attainment/unclassifiable may be subsequently re-designated to nonattainment if ambient air quality data in future years indicate that such a re-designation is appropriate. Likewise, as was the case for EPA's determination regarding the three-county area in Pennsylvania, areas initially designated nonattainment may be determined to be attainment areas if more current certified monitoring data support the designation.", "As noted earlier in this report, several areas previously designated nonattainment for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS currently have air quality that attains the level set by the standards based on certified ambient air monitoring data for the period 2006-2008. EPA identifies these areas through clean data/attainment determinations published in the Federal Register . Pursuant to 40 CFR 51.1004, this action by EPA suspends requirements for these areas to submit attainment demonstrations, associated reasonably available control measures, reasonable further progress plans, contingency measures, and other planning SIPs related to attainment of the1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS as long as the areas continue to meet the standard. EPA has indicated that as of June 2010, 19 of the 39 areas (includes multiple states and counties) originally designated nonattainment for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS were in attainment with the standard based on a preliminary assessment of air quality monitoring data for the three-year period 2006 to 2008.\nAccording to the February 2010 EPA report entitled Our Nation's Air: Status and Trends Through 2008 , nationally, annual and 24-hour PM 2.5 concentrations were 17% and 19% percent lower, respectively, in 2008 compared to 2001. Based on a comparison of results from PM 2.5 monitoring locations (565 sites) for two three-year periods, 2001-2003 and 2006-2008, EPA reported that almost all measured sites showed a decline or little change in measured PM 2.5 concentrations.\nOf the 565 monitoring sites, EPA reported that 16 sites in California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Utah, and West Virginia showed the greatest decreases in annual PM 2.5 concentrations, and five sites in California, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah showed the greatest decrease in 24-hour PM 2.5 concentrations. Four monitoring sites located in Montana, Arizona, and Wisconsin showed annual PM 2.5 concentrations at levels greater than 1 µg/m 3 in, but none were above the annual PM 2.5 NAAQS standard for the most recent three-year period (2006-2008). Nineteen sites located throughout all regions of the United States showed an increase in 24-hour PM 2.5 concentrations greater than 3 µg/m. 3 Seven of these sites, located in or near metropolitan areas in Arizona, California, Georgia, Montana, Virginia, and Washington, were above the 2006 24-hour PM 2.5 NAAQS standard for the most recent three year period.\nFor both the 24-hour and annual PM 2.5 standards, most of the areas that showed the greatest improvement in concentration levels when comparing the two three-year periods were the ones that generally had the highest in earlier years. Despite the reported overall progress, in 2008 nearly 37 million people lived in counties with measured concentrations exceeding both the annual and the 24-hour (based on EPA's 2006 revised standards) PM 2.5 national air quality standards, according to the February 2010 EPA report.", "Following the designation of an area as nonattainment, the state where the area is located must develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP) that demonstrates how attainment with the PM 2.5 standards will be achieved. Under Section 110 of the CAA, states must submit their SIPs to EPA within three years of designation; 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS SIPs were due April 5, 2008. To be approved, a SIP must demonstrate that the area will reach attainment of the standards by a specified deadline—April 2010 for 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS unless an extension allowed under the CAA is granted.\nSIPs include pollution control measures that are to be implemented by federal, state, and local governments, and rely on models of the impact on air quality of projected emission reductions to demonstrate attainment. On November 27, 2009, EPA published its findings that three states failed to meet the deadline for submitting complete SIPs (74 Federal Register 62251-62255). For the remaining designated areas, states either submitted a complete SIP or EPA made a final approval that the area attained the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS based on 2006-2008 air quality data. States with areas that have received final clean data determinations, including those that did not adequately satisfy the SIPs requirement, are not subject to the final action in the November 27, 2009, notice.\nIn the November 27, 2009, notice, EPA issued findings that Georgia, Illinois, and Pennsylvania missed deadlines for submitting plans, or elements of plans for four nonattainment areas: Atlanta, Georgia; St. Louis, (Illinois portion only); Liberty-Clairton, Pennsylvania; and Philadelphia-Wilmington, (Pennsylvania portion only). If acceptable plans have not been submitted within 18 months of the effective date (publication) of the November 2009 Notice (May 2011), states will begin to face sanctions.\nAs detailed in the November 27, 2009, Notice, Section 179(a)(1) of the CAA establishes specific consequences if EPA finds that a state has failed to submit a SIP or, with regard to a submitted SIP, if EPA determines it is incomplete or if EPA disapproves it. Specifically:\nPursuant to CAA section 179(a) and (b) and 40 CFR 52.31, the offset sanction identified in CAA section 179(b)(2) will apply in the area subject to the finding. [Any new or modified emission sources will require obtaining offset emissions]. If EPA has not affirmatively determined that the State has made a complete submission within 6 months after the emission offset sanction is imposed, then the highway funding sanction will also apply in areas designated nonattainment, in accordance with CAA section 179(b)(1) and 40 CFR 52.31. Additionally, any of these findings also triggers an obligation for EPA to promulgate a FIP [Federal Implementation Plan] if the state has not submitted, and EPA has not approved, the required SIP within 2 years of the finding.\nThe \"18-month clock\" will stop and subsequent sanctions will not take effect if EPA finds the state has made a complete submission within 18 months of the November 2009 Notice. States with nonattainment areas were to be in compliance with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS by April 2010, unless they were granted an extension.", "On April 25, 2007, EPA published its final rule that described the requirements that states and tribes must meet in their implementation plans to achieve and maintain attainment of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. In addition to detailing provisions necessary to demonstrate how the PM 2.5 NAAQS will be attained, the implementation rule included guidance for submitting a SIP demonstrating that reaching attainment within the five-year requirement is impractical. A number of provisions that generated several comments during the proposal were retained in the final rule, and continue to be the topic of debate. As noted earlier, petitions for legal review of EPA's implementation rule were filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and two petitions for reconsideration were filed with EPA.", "If new or revised SIPs for PM 2.5 attainment establish or revise a transportation-related emissions budget, or add or delete transportation control measures (TCMs), they trigger \"conformity\" determinations. Transportation conformity is required by the CAA, Section 176(c) (42 U.S.C. 7506(c)), to prohibit federal funding and approval for highway and transit projects unless they are consistent with (\"conform to\") the air quality goals established by a SIP and will not cause new air quality violations, worsen existing violations, or delay timely attainment of the national ambient air quality standards. Conformity becomes applicable within one year of the effective date of designating an area as nonattainment. EPA has promulgated several transportation conformity rules and rule amendments since its enactment as part of the 1990 CAA. The rules generally establish the criteria and procedures for determining whether transportation plans, transportation improvement programs (TIPs), or projects conform to a state's SIP.\nOn July 1, 2004, EPA published a final rule making transportation conformity regulations applicable explicitly to PM 2.5 nonattainment areas and included criteria and procedures for the new PM 2.5 and eight-hour ozone NAAQS. On May 6, 2005, EPA published a final rule further amending the transportation conformity regulations by adding transportation-related PM 2.5 \"precursors\" and specifying when these precursors must be considered in conformity determinations before and after PM 2.5 SIPs are submitted. The EPA established the criteria for determining which transportation projects must be analyzed for local particle emissions (referred to as \"hot spots\" ) in PM 2.5 nonattainment and maintenance areas, and revised existing requirements for projects in PM 10 areas, in a final rule published on March 10, 2006. Although petitioners challenged certain provisions of the July 2004 and March 2006 final rules with varying results, all PM 2.5 nonattainment areas have completed their initial transportation conformity determinations, and as a result their transportation plans and programs conformed to the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS according to EPA.\nOn March 24, 2010, EPA published a final rule amending the transportation conformity regulation primarily to incorporate the October 17, 2006, strengthening of the 24-hour PM 2.5 air quality standard and revocation of the annual PM 10 standard. The final rule, which affects implementation of conformity in PM 2.5 and PM 10 nonattainment and maintenance areas, also addresses a court remand concerning hot-spot analyses as they apply to PM 2.5 and PM 10 , as well as to carbon monoxide and nonattainment and maintenance areas.", "Whether any special consideration can be given to areas whose air quality is adversely affected by pollution from upwind areas is one of the more frequently raised issues in nonattainment areas. Unlike the larger coarse particles, which generally settle more rapidly and fall near their source of emission, the smaller PM 2.5 particles frequently remain in the atmosphere longer and can travel significant distances from their original source. The transport of PM 2.5 can contribute to, and in some cases can be the primary cause of, nonattainment in areas downwind of an emission source.\nSubpart 1 of the CAA allows EPA to \"classify the area for the purpose of applying an attainment date\" and to consider such factors as \"the availability and feasibility of pollution control measures.\" As referenced in the proposed PM 2.5 implementation rule, areas also may petition the agency under § 126 of the CAA to impose controls on upwind sources that significantly contribute to their nonattainment of the standard. The May 2005 promulgation of the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) was expected to address the interstate transport of pollutants (SO 2 and NOx) from electric generating units (EGUs) hindering downwind states from attaining the eight-hour ozone and 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Although modifying its decision in December 2008, the D.C. Circuit Court's July 2008 decision to vacate CAIR put the focus back on § 126 petitions as the available means to address interstate transport of air pollutants in the immediate future (a more detailed discussion of the Court's decision is provided later in this report under \" D.C. Circuit's Decision Vacating the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) \").\nEPA has never granted a § 126 petition in the manner outlined by the statute. EPA denied a 2004 § 126 petition from the state of North Carolina for several reasons, in part arguing that CAIR was a better mechanism for addressing the interstate transport of pollution to which North Carolina was subject than was the state's petition under § 126. North Carolina challenged this denial in court. Its challenge was stayed, pending the outcome of the CAIR lawsuit, of which North Carolina was a petitioner. With the CAIR case decided, EPA asked the D.C. Circuit to remand the North Carolina petition to the agency for reconsideration, which the court agreed to do on March 5, 2009. In December 2008, Delaware petitioned EPA under § 126 to impose emission controls on electric generating units in nine other states. New Jersey filed a § 126 petition with the agency on May 13, 2010, to address emissions from a Pennsylvania coal-fired power plant. Section 126(b) requires EPA to make the finding in the petition or deny it within 60 days. However, section 307(d) of the CAA provides extensions under certain circumstances for rulemaking. EPA has submitted such extensions for both the Delaware and New Jersey petition.\nEPA's proposed \"Transport Rule\" published August 2, 2010, is intended to supersede the current CAIR, and, in conjunction with other federal and state action, reduce the impact of transported emissions on downwind states. The proposal would include required reductions in SO 2 and NOx emissions in the following 24 jurisdictions that contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, a downwind area with respect to the annual PM 2.5 NAAQS promulgated in July 1997: Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.", "Although EPA does not have a grant program specifically designed to assist nonattainment areas, the agency generally provides grants to state air pollution agencies in support of their programs. Other sources of funding are also available. For example, states may obtain funding for projects intended to contribute to the attainment or maintenance of NAAQS under the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ). Congress authorized $8.6 billion for this program for FY2005-FY2009 under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) ( P.L. 109-59 ), signed into law on August 10, 2005.\nAuthorized initially by Congress under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA, P.L. 102-240 ) and funded by the Highway Trust Fund, CMAQ provides funding for surface transportation and other related projects that contribute to air quality improvements and congestion mitigation. In particular, the program is authorized to fund projects that contribute to the reduction of carbon monoxide (CO) and ozone concentrations. CMAQ funds are apportioned to a state based on its population and pollution reduction needs. States with no maintenance or nonattainment areas for ozone or CO are guaranteed a minimum of 0.5% of each fiscal year's authorized CMAQ funds.\nCMAQ was expanded to allow the use of funds for projects intended to reduce particulate concentrations under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21, P.L. 105-178 ). TEA-21 did not, however, change the apportionment formula that is based on CO and ozone. States with maintenance or nonattainment areas for only particulates receive the guaranteed minimum.", "A number of events, most notably the D.C. Circuit Court's July 2008 decision that would have vacated the EPA 2005 Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) in its entirety, have directly affected the timely implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Although, on December 24, 2008, the D.C. Circuit subsequently modified its original decision by temporarily reinstating the rule until EPA develops an alternative, the court's actions have raised a number a questions regarding implementation of the PM NAAQS. Also impacting implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS are EPA's final 2006 revisions of the PM NAAQS and subsequent final designation of nonattainment areas in November 2009, and actions regarding implementation of the agency's eight-hour ozone NAAQS. Finally, EPA has initiated the next round of periodic review of the PM NAAQS and announced its intent to expedite that review, targeting February 2011 for proposing any changes to the standards. All of these issues have garnered attention in Congress.", "The EPA's Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, or the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), published in May 2005, was identified as an important tool for helping states address the interstate transport of pollutants (SO 2 and NOx) from electric generating units (EGUs) hindering downwind states from attaining the eight-hour ozone and 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Under the EPA's approach to the SIPs, implementation of CAIR would have met the interstate transport (downwind state) provision of Section 110(a)(2)(D) of the CAA.\nOn July 11, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a decision vacating CAIR. However, on December 23, 2008, the court reversed itself by allowing CAIR to remain in effect until a new rule is promulgated by EPA, noting that vacating the old rule would \"temporarily defeat … the enhanced protection of the environmental values\" that the rule was designed to preserve. The court did not impose a specific deadline on EPA's development of the replacement rule, but it did say that it was not granting an indefinite stay of its July 2008 decision. As already discussed, on August 2, 2010, EPA published a proposed \"Transport Rule\" intended to supersede the current CAIR.\nAlthough CAIR generally had broad support among environmentalists and many in the regulated community, no less than 32 petitions for review of CAIR were consolidated and decided in North Carolina v. EPA . Some, including the state of North Carolina, argued that the rule was not strong enough to address pollution from upwind sources. Others, mostly individual utilities, contended that the rule's emission budgets would disproportionally affect certain operations and facilities. The D.C. Circuit found several of the key challenges valid, but decided against voiding only the successfully challenged portions. Noting that EPA regards CAIR as one integrated action, the court's July 11, 2008, decision would have vacated the entire rule (and its associated Federal Implementation Plan) and remanded it to EPA.\nIn developing CAIR, with respect to the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS, EPA modeled the emissions impacts of 37 eastern states on 62 eastern downwind counties projected by EPA to be in nonattainment in 2010. EPA found 23 states and the District of Columbia were projected to contribute significantly to 2010 PM 2.5 nonattainment. These states and the District constitute the region covered under CAIR's annual NOx and SO 2 caps.\nBased on air quality analyses in support of the CAIR, EPA predicted that 17 of 36 areas in the eastern United States designated as nonattainment (out of compliance) with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS would reach attainment by 2010 as a result of implementing CAIR in conjunction with other existing national programs. On the other hand, the EPA analyses recognized that as many as 19 of the areas would remain in nonattainment, highlighting the importance of local and state emission reduction efforts. The extent of pollution reduction projected to result from implementing CAIR had been the subject of considerable debate among stakeholders and some Members of Congress for some time prior to the July 2008 D.C. Circuit decision to vacate the rule in its entirety, and its subsequent decision to temporarily stay its decision.\nUnder EPA's implementation guidance for the SIPs outlining states' strategies for complying with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS, carrying out the CAIR would have met the interstate transport (downwind state) provision of § 110(a)(2)(D) of the CAA. As litigation regarding certain aspects of CAIR was pending, EPA reported that its implementation was continuing. According to EPA, all the states covered under CAIR chose to participate in the trading programs for SO 2 and NOx (or acknowledged an EPA Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) as a default); some also have established direct control programs complementing the trading programs. States had been working to put implementing rules in place, and some in the regulated community had been going forward with investing in equipment for CAIR.\nThe D.C. Circuit's original July 2008 decision vacating CAIR in its entirety presented a major setback to the implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 (and ozone) NAAQS. EPA's Director of Atmospheric Programs testified before Congress that\n... [i]n many cases, states in the CAIR region have relied heavily on the emission reductions required by CAIR as they conducted their modeling to show that they will meet the 1997 ambient air quality standards on time. These attainment demonstration components of the SIPs will likely need to be revised to show how the states will achieve the emission reductions previously required by CAIR.\nCurrent and pending SIPs from downwind states would have potentially been inadequate because they assumed the CAIR reductions in interstate transport of pollutants. SIPS from upwind states, on the other hand, could be inadequate if they do not prevent downwind nonattainment: the CAA makes clear that states are to impose controls on stationary sources of pollution that contribute significantly to downwind nonattainment or interfere with the maintenance of air quality standards in other states (§ 110(a)(2)(D)). This provision of the statute has been widely disregarded in the past, with little EPA effort (other than regional cap-and-trade programs) to address it. This reluctance to act can be challenged through CAA § 126 petitions, and the court's decision puts the focus on these petitions as the available means of addressing interstate transport of air pollutants in the immediate future. As discussed, EPA has never granted a § 126 petition in the manner outlined by the statute (see earlier discussion in this report under \" Upwind Pollutant Contributions: § 126 of the CAA \").\nOn September 24, 2008, EPA requested reconsideration of the court's July 2008 decision vacating CAIR, with suggestion for rehearing en banc (that is, a rehearing by the entire court), as did the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the National Mining Association, and the Utility Air Regulatory Group, in separate petitions. Granting reconsideration or a rehearing en banc is unusual, and success is especially unlikely given that the initial North Carolina v. EPA decision was unanimous and appeared to give the court little pause. Granting a rehearing requires the vote of a majority of the active duty judges on the D.C. Circuit. As requested by the court, a new round of legal briefings was filed in early November 2008. In a brief submitted on behalf of EPA November 17, 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice continued to support the request in the petition for a rehearing, but said that a stay of the decision long enough to allow implementation of a replacement regulatory regime would be preferable to complete vacatur.\nOn December 23, 2008, the D.C. Circuit, on EPA's motion, reversed its decision to vacate CAIR, allowing for EPA to develop a replacement rule. The Circuit, however, left the substantive requirements and findings of its July 2008 decision fully intact. The court's decision stated that there is no simple \"fix\" that would make CAIR acceptable to the court. It is also unclear whether the agency can salvage the regional cap-and-trade approach, which lies at the heart of CAIR, or if cap-and-trade on a smaller scale, whether intrastate or intra-company, would face better odds. In its July 2008 decision, the court found \"more than several fatal flaws\" in the rule, and concluded, \"No amount of tinkering will transform CAIR, as written, into an acceptable rule.\" The D.C. Circuit did not impose a specific deadline on EPA's development of the replacement rule in its December 2008 decision. However, the court did emphasize that it was not granting an indefinite stay of its July 2008 decision. Rewriting the regulations to address the court's objections posed significant difficulties for EPA.\nThe deadlines for states in nonattainment to submit SIPs and reach attainment (with the exception of exemptions) of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS have passed. While it is apparent that states were able to rely, to some extent, on reductions associated with the first phase of CAIR through 2010, continued reliance on CAIR for subsequent reductions is an area of some debate. According to EPA, current CAIR requirements for reductions remain in effect, and CAIR regional control programs continue their operations pending the agency's promulgation of an alternative transport rule. EPA anticipates finalizing the proposed \"Transport Rule\" published August 2, 2010, by late spring 2011.", "At the end of 2005, EPA completed its statutorily required review and assessment of relevant scientific studies to either reaffirm or modify the particulates NAAQS. Based on the review, on October 17, 2006, EPA promulgated revisions to the particulates NAAQS. Given the simultaneity of the 2006 particulates NAAQS as revised and the ongoing implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 standards, outcomes and challenges associated with the review and EPA's changes to the existing (1987 and 1997) NAAQS for PM 10 and PM 2.5 could affect the implementation schedule for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS.\nBased on its review and analysis of scientific studies available between 1997 and 2002, and determinations made by the Administrator, EPA's modifications to the particulates NAAQS tightened the current NAAQS primarily by strengthening the daily (24-hour) standard for PM 2.5 . The 2006 NAAQS lowered the daily PM 2.5 standard from 65 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 ) to 35 µg/m 3 and retained the annual standard at 15 µg/m 3 . The EPA left the existing (1987) daily standard for coarse particles (PM 10 ) in place at 150 µg/m 3 and relaxed the standard somewhat by revoking the existing annual maximum concentration standard of 50 µg/m 3 .\nAs anticipated, EPA's tightening of the PM 2.5 NAAQS resulted in the classification of more areas as \"nonattainment\" and in need of implementing new controls on particulate matter. States and local governments will be required to develop and implement new plans (SIPs) for addressing emissions in those areas that do not meet new standards. In a February 2006 advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) outlining an implementation plan for the transition to the 2006 particulates standards, EPA indicated that it would be beneficial for states to consider control strategies that may be useful in attaining the 2006 revised PM 2.5 NAAQS when developing their strategies for the 1997 PM 2.5 standards.\nOn November 13, 2009, EPA published its final designations of 31 areas in 18 states, comprising 120 counties (89 counties and portions of 31 additional counties), for nonattainment of the revised 2006 24-hour PM 2.5 standard. The final designations, based on 2006 through 2008 air quality monitoring data, include a few counties that would be designated nonattainment for PM 2.5 for the first time, but the majority of the counties identified overlap with EPA's final nonattainment designations for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. However, most of the 1997 PM 2.5 nonattainment areas were only exceeding the annual standard; only 12 counties were exceeding both the 24-hour and the annual standards. Thus, tightening the 24-hour standard resulted in an increased number of areas (and counties) being designated nonattainment based on exceedances of both the 24-hour and the annual standard—150 counties nationally.\nIn December 2008, EPA had announced designation of 211 counties and portions of counties in 25 states as nonattainment areas for the 2006 PM NAAQS based on 2005-through-2007 data. Publication of a final designation rule for the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS was delayed pending review by the agency under the current Administration. The review of the final designation rule, along with several other agency proposed and final actions introduced toward the end of the previous Administration, was initiated, in part, in response to a White House January 20, 2009, memorandum, and the Office of Management and Budget's subsequent January 21, 2009, memorandum, regarding regulatory review. During this review, EPA revised its designations based on more current monitoring data (calendar years 2006-2008).\nEPA's final designation rule became effective December 14, 2009 (30 days from the date of publication). Following formal designation, the states have three years to submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which identify specific regulations and emission control requirements that would bring an area into compliance. States are required to meet the 2006 revised PM 2.5 NAAQS no later than five years from the date of designation, unless granted an extension. EPA projects that states will be required to submit SIPs in November 2012, and would have to meet the new PM 2.5 standard in November 2014 (or 2019, if qualified for an extension). As discussed earlier, states must be in compliance with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS by April 2010, unless granted an extension.\nGiven the continuing delays in implementing the 1997 NAAQS and the D.C. Circuit's July and December 2008 decisions regarding the CAIR, some stakeholders advocated moving directly to implementation of the 2006 standards. However, the 2006 particulates NAAQS have faced challenges of their own. In December 2006, several states and industry, agriculture, business, and public advocacy groups separately petitioned the court to review the 2006 particulates NAAQS. A February 24, 2009, decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the petitions in part, denying other challenges, and remanded the standards to EPA for further consideration. While the court did not specifically vacate the 2006 PM standards, and their implementation will proceed, the decision and EPA's eventual actions have prompted renewed interest in PM NAAQS among members of Congress.\nDelaying publication of the final area designations for the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS delayed the expected effective date, which had been scheduled for April 2009. The effective date for the final designations is December 14, 2009.", "EPA's next round of the periodic review of the particulates NAAQS is under way. The agency announced its intention to accelerate the review, in part in response to the February 2009 D.C. Circuit court decision regarding the 2006 particulates NAAQS. EPA has indicated that it plans to propose any changes to the standards by February 2010 and has targeted October 2011 for final standards.\nPotential risk reduction estimates and initial staff recommendations reported in recently released draft EPA assessments suggest further strengthening of the NAAQS for fine particulates. The assessments include findings that indicate that more stringent annual and 24-hour PM 2.5 standards could potentially reduce mortality risk from long-term exposure as well as provide protection from high peak concentrations. In an April 2010 review of EPA's draft assessments, members of the CASAC agreed that the evidence suggests the need for stricter PM 2.5 standards to adequately protect human health.\nThe EPA's assessments and findings, and the issue of whether particulate NAAQS should be strengthened or not, will likely be subject to considerable comment and debate.", "Concerns regarding the potential impacts of the ozone and particulate standards have led to several attempts by Congress over the years to modify the implementation requirements. Attempts in recent years were generally attached to larger pieces of legislation, such as the energy and transportation bills, as well as proposed multi-pollutant bills to reduce emissions from coal-fired power plants. Although PM 2.5 has not been one of the primary pollutants specified in the multi-pollutant legislation previously considered, certain provisions of some of the bills could have potentially contributed to reducing PM 2.5 concentrations.\nThe D.C. Circuit's July 2008 decision to vacate CAIR put into play again the issue of a multi-pollutant strategy with respect to the electric utility industry—a framework based on a consistent set of emissions caps implemented through emission trading. Such an approach would not resolve all the issues surrounding CAIR, and would raise issues of its own:\nShould multi-pollutant legislation supplement or be a substitute for the current regulatory regime? How stringent should the emission caps be? What is an appropriate schedule for their introduction? How should they relate to existing CAA provisions? Should carbon dioxide be included with SO 2 , NOx, and mercury control programs? Should requirements be limited to the electric utility industry? Should EPA be provided with the authority to implement CAIR or other cost-based, market-oriented approaches to address NAAQS? Should there be comprehensive revision to the CAA to address the full scope of ozone and PM 2.5 NAAQS nonattainment and related issues, as well as other pollutant emissions from coal-fired power plants, and emerging environmental issues such as climate change?\nThese questions and related issues related to the CAIR were at the center of discussion during a July 29, 2008, hearing held by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, and on July 22, 2010, the committee held a hearing on EPA's proposed alternative transport rule.\nCongress could consider a more surgical legislative vehicle aimed specifically at providing EPA with the authority to implement some form of CAIR or other cost-based, market-oriented approaches to address NAAQS. The court's December 23, 2008, ruling and EPA's subsequent August 2010 proposed alternative transport rule seem to have lessened interest in such an approach. At the other extreme, Congress might consider a more comprehensive revision to the CAA to address not only ozone and PM 2.5 NAAQS nonattainment, but also other pollutant emissions and emerging environmental issues such as climate change.", "Implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS impacts a number of counties throughout the United States. EPA's final nonattainment designations included 39 areas, comprising 205 counties within 20 states (and the District of Columbia) nationwide, with a combined population of almost 90 million. A number of concerns have been raised regarding the potential impacts, and numerous questions have been triggered regarding the specifics of the implementation process for the 1997 standards. Similar concerns are likely to stimulate debate as EPA and states encounter issues in the initial stages of implementing the PM 2.5 NAAQS as revised in October 2006 and as the agency proceeds with its current review of the particulates NAAQS.\nAlready delayed considerably, implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS faced further uncertainty as a result of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's July 11, 2008, decision ( North Carolina v. EPA ) that would have vacated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). EPA projected that CAIR, in conjunction with other federal measures such as recent auto and truck emission standards, would be sufficient to demonstrate attainment in a large portion of monitored nonattainment counties by 2015, prior to the development and implementation of local measures. However, the court's subsequent December 23, 2008, ruling temporarily reinstating CAIR until EPA promulgates a replacement rule, allowed implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS to continue in the interim. EPA anticipates finalizing the proposed alternative to CAIR published on August 2, 2010, in spring of 2011, eliciting additional concerns with respect to the ongoing implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS in the interim.\nEPA promulgated revisions to the NAAQS for particulate matter on October 17, 2006, primarily a tightening of the 1997 standard for PM 2.5 . The tightening of the PM 2.5 standards increased the number of areas in nonattainment, and areas already designated nonattainment under the 1997 standard may need to adopt more stringent control measures to reach attainment. SIPs for the new 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS will not be due until December 2012, and attainment will not be required before December 2014. Under the CAA, states are required to meet the new standard \"as expeditiously as practicable,\" but no later than five years from the effective date of final nonattainment designations, unless granted an extension.\nCiting the historical delays associated with implementing the 1997 standards, some stakeholders have advocated leapfrogging to implementation of the 2006 standards instead. However, opponents contend that an approach relying on the schedule for the 2006 revised particulates NAAQS would further delay the projected benefits of reducing exposures to PM 2.5 . Delays in finalizing the nonattainment designations for the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS delayed the effective date of these designations, and subsequently implementation. In addition, the 2006 revised particulates NAAQS have sparked their own controversies, and judicial challenges have been upheld in part (other challenges were denied) by the court and remanded to the EPA for reconsideration. While the court did not specifically vacate the 2006 PM standards and their implementation will proceed, EPA's actions in response to the decision could have implications in the future. In part, in response to the court's decision, EPA initiated the next round of review of the PM NAAQS, and has announced its intent to expedite that review.\nAlthough 2006-2008 air quality data indicate that 19 of the 39 nonattainment areas for 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS have come into attainment, there are a number of states and cities that remain in nonattainment. Deadlines for states to submit their SIPs for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS have elapsed, as has the April 5, 2010, deadline for reaching attainment (unless granted an extension). In light of these expired deadlines and given the many issues surrounding the particulates NAAQS in general, the final phase of implementing the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS will likely remain an issue of considerable debate for many stakeholders and interest groups, as well as Congress.", "Because of legal challenges, the lack of a national monitoring network, and other factors, implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS has been delayed repeatedly since it was promulgated. The timeline presented in Table A-1 below reflects the most recent key milestone dates for implementing the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS, including actual completions. These milestones are driven primarily by statutory requirements. It follows an EPA milestone schedule outlined in an April 21, 2003, memorandum to EPA regional administrators that also provided the nonbinding guidance for implementation of the PM 2.5 area designations. Recognizing potential efficiencies associated with states and tribes being able to harmonize control strategies, the initial PM 2.5 schedule was intended to be similar to that for the eight-hour ozone program.\nThe PM 2.5 NAAQS requirement for three years of monitoring data to determine whether areas were meeting the established limits was one factor responsible for delaying implementation. Comprehensive monitoring data sufficient to make this determination and the attainment designations were not available in 1997. Recognizing this dilemma, in the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178 , Title VI), Congress revised the statutory deadline requirements for the new NAAQS, predicated on a previously released EPA Interim Implementation Policy. TEA-21 required states to submit designation recommendations within one year after receipt of three years of data meeting defined federal protocols, and required EPA to promulgate designations within one year after state recommendations were due, but not later than December 31, 2005.\nAs discussed earlier in this report, operation of the network of monitors was phased in from 1999 through 2000, making three-year monitoring data available at different points, depending on area location. Rather than a staggered designation schedule, which would likely have hampered cross-coordination of implementation plans, EPA proposed a single date for state and tribal recommendations and final EPA designations. The deadlines of February 15, 2004, for governors to submit their PM 2.5 designation recommendations and December 31, 2004, for EPA to promulgate designations for each state, were the result of Congress amending the CAA in the FY2004 omnibus appropriations ( P.L. 108-199 ).\nIn addition to the delay in establishing a monitoring network, the 1997 NAAQS standards were challenged in District Court by the American Trucking Associations, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and several other state and business groups. An initial May 1999 opinion by the District Court partially in favor of the plaintiffs was reversed by the Supreme Court in February 2001." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h2_title h1_title", "", "h0_title h2_title h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h2_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_title h2_title", "h2_full", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "h2_full", "h2_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "How is particulate matter regulated by the EPA?", "How were these standards established?", "How easily can these standards be changed?", "How does this report review past NAAQS?", "How did the EPA mark areas as out of compliance?", "Why is the non-compliance of these areas important?", "How will the nonattainment areas reach compliance?", "How punctual have states been with submitting their SIPs?", "What is the timeline for compliance?", "How has the implementation of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS been disrupted?", "How would the CAIR support the EPA's overall goal with regards to the NAAQS?", "How does this judiciary ruling affect the CAIR?", "How has the EPA responded to the judiciary ruling?", "What is the current outlook for the policy?" ], "summary": [ "Particulate matter (PM), including fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and larger, but still inhalable particles (PM10), is one of the six principal pollutants for which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act (CAA).", "EPA most recently revised the particulates NAAQS in October 2006, but is due to propose revised standards in February 2011 and promulgate them by October 2011.", "While currently much of the interest in the particulates NAAQS is focused on reviewing the NAAQS and speculation as to the degree of stringency of any new standards, implementing revised standards can take many years. EPA and states are in the early stages of implementing the 2006 revised standards, and have not finalized implementation of the standards promulgated in 1997 after years of litigation and other delays.", "This report outlines the implementation process for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS and describes issues raised as EPA and states developed and employed implementation strategies for achieving attainment.", "The EPA's final designation of 39 areas, consisting of 205 counties in 20 states and the District of Columbia, as \"nonattainment\" (out of compliance) areas for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS became effective in April 2005.", "A combined population of almost 90 million resides in these areas.", "States with PM2.5 nonattainment areas are required to develop comprehensive implementation plans, referred to as State Implementation Plans (SIPs), demonstrating how attainment will be reached by a designated deadline. SIPs include pollution control measures that rely on models of the impact on air quality of projected emission reductions to demonstrate attainment.", "States were required to submit SIPs for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS by April 2008, but EPA did not begin receiving most submissions until July 2008. On November 27, 2009, EPA published its findings that three states failed to meet the deadline for submitting complete SIPs. For the remaining designated areas, states either submitted a complete SIP or EPA made a final approval that the area attained the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS based on 2006-2008 air quality data.", "States must be in compliance by 2010, unless they are granted an extension.", "Notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's July 11, 2008, decision (North Carolina v. EPA) to vacate the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) introduced new concerns and disruptions with respect to the implementation of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS.", "Implementation of CAIR would have assisted states in addressing the interstate transport (upwind state) emission contributions in achieving attainment.", "The court's December 23, 2008, modified decision allows CAIR to remain in effect, but only temporarily until EPA promulgates a replacement rule, which could have future implications for implementing the PM2.5 NAAQS.", "On August 2, 2010, EPA published a proposed \"Transport Rule\" intended to supersede the current CAIR. In addition, other promulgated and proposed EPA rulemakings that influence various aspects of regulating air quality, including EPA's 2006 changes to the particulates NAAQS, continue to impact the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS implementation process.", "A number of issues will continue to be debated as the implementation of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS progresses." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0, 2, 2, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R43189	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Historical Summary of Federal Excise Taxes", "Administration", "Setting the Tax Rate", "Choosing the Stage of Production to Levy the Tax", "Transition Issues", "Excise Tax Reporting", "Revenue", "Interactions Between Federal and State and Local Excise Taxes", "Equity", "Efficiency", "General Behavioral Effects", "Luxury Taxes", "Sumptuary Taxes", "Benefit-Based Taxes", "Regulatory and Environmental Taxes", "Appendix. References to CRS Reports on Specific Excise Taxes" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Excise taxes are selective taxes on specific forms of consumption or behavior (compared to general sales taxes which tend to apply to all forms of consumption, with some exceptions). Today, federal excise taxes apply to a wide variety of consumer goods and economic activities, such as alcohol, tobacco, firearms and ammunition, gasoline, the industrial use of ozone-depleting chemicals, and indoor tanning services.\nThere are four common purposes of excise taxes: (1) sumptuary (or \"sin\") taxes, (2) regulatory or environmental taxes, (3) benefit-based taxes (or user charges), and (4) luxury taxes. Sumptuary (or \"sin\") taxes were traditionally imposed for moral reasons, but are currently rationalized, in part, to discourage a specific activity that is thought to have negative spillover effects (or \"externalities\") on society. Generally, sumptuary taxes in the United States refer to excise taxes on alcohol or tobacco consumption. Regulatory or environmental taxes are imposed to offset for external costs associated with regulating public safety or to discourage consumption of a specific commodity that is thought to have negative externalities on society. Benefit-based taxes are imposed to charge users for the benefits received from a particular public good and are often used for maintenance and upkeep of that public good. Lastly, luxury taxes are primarily imposed as one way to raise revenue, particularly from higher-income households.\nThe role of excise taxes has changed over time. Excise taxes narrowly imposed on the consumption of certain products, such as alcohol and tobacco, formed the basis for much of federal tax revenue until the modern income tax was enacted in the early 20 th century. Although excise taxes have played a diminishing role in the mix of federal revenue sources over time, there has been persistent interest in the possible use of excise taxes to raise revenue or provide disincentives to behavior that is believed by some to have negative effects on society (e.g., a tax on carbon emissions). On the other hand, there is also interest in reducing current excise tax rates as a means to encourage short-term growth in particular industries.\nThis report provides an introduction and general analysis of excise taxes. First, a brief history of the role of excise taxes is provided. Second, the various forms of excise taxes and their respective administrative advantages and disadvantages are described. Third, the effect of federal excise taxes on federal, state, and local tax revenue is discussed. Fourth, the economic effects of various types of excise taxes are analyzed. The effects on consumer behavior and equity among taxpayers could be important issues for assessment of current excise tax policy or for the design of new excise taxes. Lastly, the Appendix to this report contains a list of references to other CRS reports on specific excise taxes.", "Federal excise taxes have had a dynamic role within the U.S. tax system. The history of the federal excise tax system is often one that coincides with wars, serving as an emergency source of funds, or reflects periodic concerns about rising budget deficits. Except for taxes on tobacco and liquor, new excise taxes seem to have been used extensively for the control of social costs and as user charges in recent years.\nExcise taxes played a key fiscal role in the early history of the United States. The federal government initially relied on customs duties (tariffs) on foreign trade. In 1791, during the presidency of George Washington, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton implemented the first federal excise tax on whiskey. The whiskey tax was used as a means to fund the fledgling federal government, repay debts from the American Revolution, and help to establish federal supremacy over the states. The burden of the tax was controversial along geographic divisions (Westerners on the frontier tended to both consume more whiskey and use it as a medium of financial exchange) and ideological divisions (Federalists versus Anti-Federalists). This opposition peaked in the famous \"Whiskey Rebellion\" of 1794 in southwestern Pennsylvania, where President Washington led 13,000 troops to suppress an armed rebellion. After the suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, Congress passed excise taxes on tobacco, snuff tobacco, sugar, and carriages. In 1797, a direct tax was imposed on the ownership of houses, land, and slaves as tariff revenue declined during a period when European powers were engaged in war (with the United States sided against France). The unpopularity of the taxes contributed to Thomas Jefferson's defeat of Federalist Party candidate John Adams during the presidential election of 1800. All internal excise taxes were repealed in 1802, as the fiscal demand arising from the war in Europe abated.\nFederal excise taxes continued to play a significant role in public finances throughout the 1800s. Excises were temporarily reintroduced during the War of 1812, but were repealed from 1817 until the Civil War. Following the onset of the Civil War, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1861, which restored earlier excise taxes. Most of these excise taxes were repealed after the end of the Civil War, with taxes on distilled spirits and tobacco remaining in effect. In the decades after the Civil War, excise taxes accounted for between one-third and one-half of all federal revenue. Excises were the single largest source of internal revenue during this era. During the Spanish-American War (1898), excise tax revenue was a larger source of federal tax collections than even customs duties on foreign imports, as revenue from tariffs tended to decline during wartime. Emergency excise taxes were levied on a variety of items to fund military spending during the Spanish-American War, such as pianos, playing cards, yachts, and billiard tables. After the end of the war most of these emergency excise taxes were repealed.\nExcise taxes were utilized to fund war-time spending during the early 20 th century. Temporary excise tax provisions were imposed in the Revenue Act of 1918, passed during World War I, to help fund war-time spending, including the first excise tax on firearms, shells, and cartridges. As a result, excise tax collections quadrupled from 1914 to 1919. Excise tax revenues declined significantly after the beginning of Prohibition (falling to less than half of the pre-Prohibition revenue levels by 1930) but rebounded above the pre-Prohibition levels after the consumption of alcohol was made legal again after 1933. Existing excise tax rates were increased again virtually across-the-board around the time of World War II, and new taxes on luxury goods (such as toiletries and furs) were introduced. Additionally, Congress rejected adopting a general sales tax twice during this era (1932 and 1942), despite critiques that the costs of administering excises to a growing list of products was high and the revenue gained from many excises was small.\nExcise taxes underwent a time of dynamic reform during the latter half of the 20 th century. The Revenue Act of 1951 increased many excise tax rates in existence at the time (such as alcohol and tobacco) and increased the tax base for some user charges. However, the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-324) and the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-44) reduced the number of provisions and their respective tax rates. In particular, the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 eliminated most federal excise taxes with the goal being to \"help sustain economic expansion.\"\nCertain excise taxes were also expanded, in part, to reflect a desire for a wider role for the federal government. An example of this linkage between excise taxes and the expansion of federally provided public goods would be the modern highway system. The Highway Revenue Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-627) increased the federal gasoline tax (in effect since 1932) and directed its collections from the Treasury's General Fund specifically towards funding of public highways. Specific excise taxes linked to trust funds related to air travel, mining, waterway travel, oil spills, and other hazardous chemicals (among others) were created in the 1970s and 1980s. A rising budget deficit helped to bring about the excise tax increases in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90; P.L. 101-508 ). OBRA90 increased tax rates on distilled spirits (last increased in 1985), beer and wine (last increased in 1951), tobacco (last increased in 1982), and gasoline (last increased in 1982).\nSince 2000, excise taxes have played a diminishing role in the mix of federal revenue sources even as new provisions have been introduced. As discussed later in the \" Revenue \" section of this report, excise tax collections have increased in nominal amounts, but have decreased in inflation-adjusted (real) values and as a share of overall federal revenue. The rates on major excise taxes have remained unadjusted for inflation for years, such as the excise taxes on gasoline (since 1997) and alcohol (1991). The excise tax on tobacco was last increased with the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-3 ), but revenue from the tobacco tax has declined over time in part due to decreased demand for tobacco products.\nRecently, new excise taxes have been introduced. Several new excise taxes were created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152 , as amended), such as taxes on indoor tanning bed services, medical devices, and certain high-value insurance plans.\nThe future role of federal excise taxes in federal policy is still unclear. Excise taxes in the form of user charges could continue to play a role in financing public goods and services. Excises could be one tool to raise revenue, particularly in the absence of a general consumption tax at the federal level. Some long-standing excise tax proposals to correct a perceived social issue have also resurfaced in policy discussions. Some of these proposals could be targeted towards specific products or activities (e.g., a \"sugar-sweetened beverages\" tax), while others could affect a broad range of economic activity and raise a significant amount of revenue (e.g., a carbon tax).", "All forms of excise tax use some sort of physical control or measurement by the excise authorities to determine tax liability and ensure compliance with the law. This section of the report describes the different ways that excise taxes are structured, and the advantages and disadvantages of each model.", "For excise taxes intended to compensate for the social costs of certain activities, economic theory suggests that the excise tax rate should be set at a level that offsets the negative costs of that consumption to society.\nIn general, an excise tax rate can be applied in one of two ways:\nPer unit : where the tax rate is applied per individual unit produced, purchased, or sold. For example, different per-unit rates are levied on tobacco products based on the product type: 1,000 units of cigarettes or one pound of pipe tobacco. Ad valorem : where the tax rate is applied as a percentage of the value of the product, either based on the manufacturer's, wholesale, or retail price. For example, the excise tax on firearms and ammunition is set at 10% of the wholesale price for pistols and revolvers, and 11% for other firearms as well as shells or cartridges.\nEconomists say that per-unit excise taxes are more appropriate when marginal consumption of the targeted commodity is allegedly deleterious. For example, cigarette taxes are levied per unit sold because the alleged spillover effects of smoking (e.g., second-hand smoking) occur with every pack of cigarettes smoked. The excise tax on gasoline is levied per gallon of gasoline sold because the amount of gasoline consumed was a rough approximation of how much driving one did, and thus how much wear and tear a driver would impose on federally managed highways.\nHowever, arguments can be made against these justifications for per unit taxes. Per-unit taxes can invite issues of both horizontal and vertical equality (as addressed later in this report). Also, because per-unit taxes are often set at static rates in statute, these rates often fall in inflation-adjusted (or \"real\") terms. For example, the statutory federal excise tax rate on distilled spirits in 1951 was set to $10.50 per proof gallon (ppg). Legislation was passed in 1985 increasing the statutory tax rate from $10.50 to $12.50 ppg, and again in 1990 increasing the tax rate from $12.50 to $13.50 ppg. The excise tax rate on distilled spirits still remains at the 1990 level of $13.50 ppg, or $2.14 per 750ml bottle (a \"fifth\") of 80-proof liquor. If the 1951 tax rate was indexed for inflation, it would be over $95.65 ppg in 2013 dollars, or approximately $19.49 per 750 ml bottle of 80 proof liquor.\nIn contrast, ad valorem tax rates largely avoid a real decline in value because they are applied based on the price of commodity or activity rather than the quantity consumed or produced. Ad valorem rates can also be more progressive than per-unit rates especially if the commodity taxed is a luxury good (whereby demand increases more than proportionally as income rises). However, ad valorem rates also have the capability to be regressive if the consumers of the commodity are not limited to those at the upper end of the income distribution.", "An excise tax can also be levied at different stages along a commodity's production and distribution chain:\nProduction level: collected on sales by producers to wholesalers, retailers, or other producers. Transactions prior to the sale by the last producer are often partially exempted or taxed at reduced rates. Manufacturing level: collected on sales by manufacturers to wholesalers or retailers, including occasional direct sales to consumers. Wholesale level: collected on sales by the last wholesaler or manufacturer to retailers, including occasional direct sales to consumers. Retail level: collected on sales by retailers to final consumer, including wholesalers or manufacturers selling occasionally to consumers. Turnover taxes: collected on sales at all or nearly all stages, and also known as \"cascade taxes\" on account of their cumulative effects.\nGenerally, an excise tax that is levied at earlier stages in the production process has lower administrative costs and fewer opportunities for tax evasion. In most situations, consumers vastly outnumber producers. Trying to implement an excise tax at the level of the consumer retail outlet results often in a duplication of bureaucratic processes compared to a tax on manufacturers. For example, more than 303 billion cigarettes were purchased across the United States in 2010, but 85% of these cigarettes were manufactured by three companies. However, ad valorem taxes imposed at the manufacturer's level could provide an incentive for value-added options to be ordered further down the supply chain in an attempt to minimize the tax burden. For example, the manufacturer tax on firearms is levied on the assembly of a complete rifle, but any add-ons or modification kits to that rifle are not taxed.\nTaxes imposed at the manufacturing level could lead to an effective tax rate that is higher than the statutory tax rate. This outcome occurs because some manufactured goods have a long inventory life, and a considerable time period may elapse between when the tax is paid (when the good leaves the manufacturer's premises) and the date that the good is sold. In effect, the manufacturer incurs an interest cost to borrow the money to pay the tax.\nThe advantage of imposing a tax at the retail level is that it can more easily exclude certain consumers from an excise tax's revenue base, if desired. For example, farmers can receive an excise tax credit for certain fuel purchased for farm use, as this activity generally has a minimal effect on the quality of interstate highways. On the other hand, exemptions could diminish the effect of the tax on the original goal of the tax. An exemption, in the form of a refund, can be implemented through a manufacturer's tax, although this might require additional administrative resources.", "Special rules are sometimes used to accompany the imposition of a new excise tax or increases in any existing tax rates to prevent tax avoidance. If an excise tax is announced effective as of a specific date in the future, then individuals might stockpile the taxed commodity. One policy to prevent this behavior is a \"floor stocks\" tax, or an excise tax on all existing inventory as of a particular date. The floor stocks tax is usually imposed on the date a new tax takes effect or the date after a tax-rate increase takes effect; all new inventory subject to tax that is acquired after the new tax becomes effective is then subject to the new tax.", "Tax liability for most federal excise taxes is reported on IRS Form 720 \"Quarterly Federal Excise Tax Return.\" This form is generally due at the end of April, July, October, and January, and reports taxes due the preceding quarter ending March, June, September, and December, respectively. Most of the excise taxpayers using Form 720 must deposit the tax owed before filing the form with the IRS. Several excise taxes trigger a requirement to file a form in addition to Form 720 (e.g., Form 6197 [Gas Guzzler Tax], Form 2290 [Heavy Highway Vehicle Use Tax Return], and Form 6627 [Environmental Taxes]).", "Excise taxes have had a diminishing role in federal public finance over time. Several forms of data analysis, presented in this section, illustrate this point.\nOne concern with per unit excise taxes is that they are often set in statute at specific levels, thus the inflation-adjusted value, or real value , often falls over time. This trend usually continues absent legislative action to increase the statutory rates to reflect the effects of inflation. The decline in the real value of excise tax receipts over time is apparent in Figure 1 .\nAlthough nominal excise tax collections have increased from $11.86 billion in FY1960 to $56.17 billion in FY2012 (an increase of more than five times), real excise tax revenue has decreased by more than six times over that same period. In FY1960, excise tax collections amounted to approximately to $355.49 billion in 2012 constant dollars. The brief spike in excise tax collection during the early 1980s was largely due to the enactment of the excise tax on windfall profits in the oil industry, which was phased-out by 1993. While the number, rates, and types of excise taxes in effect have changed between 1960 and 2012, these data illustrate the declining role of excise taxes in federal public finance\nFurthermore, federal excise tax receipts as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) are lower today than they were in the past. As shown in Figure 2 , annual excise tax receipts averaged between 2.0% and 2.5% during the Great Depression, before hitting a peak above 3.0% of GDP during World War II. After the end of the war, federal excise tax receipts declined as a share of GDP — particularly after the reforms in the mid-1960s. After a brief spike in the early 1980s, largely due to the enactment of the oil industry windfall profits tax, excise tax revenue as a share of GDP trended back below 1.0% by the end of the 1980s. In FY2012, federal excise tax receipts were 0.5% of GDP.\nFederal excise taxes have also declined as a share of all federal tax receipts. As shown in Figure 3 , federal excise taxes comprised 45.8% of all federal tax receipts in FY1934. After the end of World War II, the share of federal tax receipts from excises began a slow decline below 15% towards a recent trend around 3.2% (in FY2012).\nThis decline in the share of federal tax receipts collected from excises corresponded with an increase in the role of other sources of tax receipts, notably from the individual income tax code. In 1934, individual income taxes amounted to 14.2% of all federal tax receipts and applied primarily to a narrow tax base. During World War II, the individual tax code supplanted excises as being the primary source of federal revenue, as income taxes accounted for 45.0% of all tax receipts in 1944 (compared to 10.9% from excises). Additionally, receipts from social insurance and retirement programs have increased over time.", "Higher federal excise tax rates tend to reduce state and local excise tax revenues derived from the same products (and vice versa ). As federal excise taxes increase the price of the targeted product, then consumer demand may decrease depending on the response of consumers. This decrease in consumer demand reduces the tax base. States can increase their excise tax rates to help offset any reductions in the tax base, although higher state taxes can also drive down demand for products subject to excise taxes.\nSimilar to trends at the federal level, though, excise tax collections comprise a relatively small share of state and local tax revenue. As shown in Figure 4 , personal property taxes were the largest source (34%) of tax revenue for state and local governments combined in 2012. Individual income taxes and general sales taxes accounted for 22% and 21% (respectively) of state and local tax collections in 2012. Excise taxes on motor fuel, tobacco, and alcohol have accounted for 5% of total tax collections.\nHowever, the data in Figure 4 underrepresent the amount of state tax revenue derived from tobacco sales because settlement payments from major tobacco companies to the states and territories are not included. In comparison, approximately $7.3 billion in payments were made by the major tobacco companies to the states in 2011 whereas state and local tax collections from tobacco excise taxes were approximately $17.5 billion (i.e., the payments to states amounted to 41.7% of state and local excise collections). Settlement payments allocated to each state and territory are largely based on tobacco consumption in that particular state or territory.", "Economists generally measure tax equity using two measures: vertical equity and horizontal equity. Vertical equity generally implies that households with a greater ability to pay the tax (i.e., a higher income) pay a greater share of their household income in taxes than households with a lesser ability to pay the tax. A tax system is progressive if higher income households pay a greater share of their income in tax than lower income households, whereas the converse is true in a regressive tax system. Horizontal equity indicates that households with similar abilities to pay actually pay similar amounts in tax. For example, all households earning a particular amount of income would pay the same amount in taxes in a tax system with perfect horizontal equity.\nNote that the excise tax rate on a particular good does not reflect its effects on equity. Even if all consumers are subject to the same tax rate of $1.00 per unit, the tax cannot be immediately deemed as \"equitable\" from an economic perspective. The tax's effects on equity will ultimately be a function of who bears the tax's burden.\nFigure 5 shows the distribution of excise taxes paid in 2009, by average tax rates, as calculated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Average tax rates represent the share of excise taxes paid as a share of pre-tax income.\nWith regard to vertical equity, excise taxes tend to be regressive. The lowest income quintile of taxpayers paid, on average, 1.5% of their income on excise taxes in 2009 whereas the highest quintile of taxpayers paid 0.4% of their income in excise taxes.\nA luxury tax may be less regressive than other forms of excise taxes, but it could be difficult to isolate the burden of such a tax to upper-income households. First, middle-income consumers might purchase goods classified as \"luxuries,\" such as jewelry or watches. Second, the definition of \"luxury\" changes over time. For example, a federal excise tax on telephone calls was first introduced in 1892 as a luxury tax to help finance the Spanish-American War. After several instances of repeal and reauthorization throughout the early 20 th century, the tax remained part of the permanent tax code from 1947 until 2006. Although one could make the argument in 1892 that telephone calls were \"luxury\" services, this was certainly not the case by the latter half of the 20 th century.\nWith regard to horizontal equity, excise taxes have different effects on households with the same level of income. Households that consume the taxed good pay a larger share of taxes out of their current income than households that do not consume the taxed good. Excise taxes can also create horizontal inequities across consumers of a taxed product if unequal tax rates are applied to various forms of that product (e.g., beer vs. wine vs. distilled spirits).", "In short, some excise taxes are intended to affect consumer choices. As such, they reduce economic efficiency by distorting what economists characterize as economically optimal consumer behavior. This distortion could be justified, in economic terms, if there is some sort of market failure whereby the consumer's price does not capture the effect of spillover effects to society that result from consumption of the good or service. Individual consumption of certain goods and services might have negative spillover effects, or externalities , on society. For excise taxes intended to compensate for the social costs of certain types of consumption, economic theory suggests that the excise tax rate should be set at a level that offsets the negative costs of that consumption to society. If taxes are used this way to reflect the full cost of a particular type of economic activity to society, then excise taxes can actually lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.", "All types of excise tax have some similar economic effects in a competitive industry. In the short run, an excise tax increases the price of the taxed product (by some fraction of the tax amount), and tax burden could be shared by producers or the consumers. Next, the quantity of the product demanded is reduced. Lastly, the price received by producers for the product is also reduced (i.e., producers receive less for the product post-tax compared to pre-tax).\nThe exact effect depends on the responsiveness, or elasticities , of demand and supply for the product (or the percent change in quantity demanded or supplied, respectively, divided by the percent change in price). The increase in retail price resulting from the tax will be greater as the elasticity of supply increases and the elasticity of demand falls. The effect on quantity will be greater as both the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply increase.\nIn regard to sharing the price burden, the more inelastic the demand is, the larger the share of the tax borne by consumers. The more inelastic the supply is, the larger the share borne by producers. In the limiting cases, consumers will bear the full burden if demand is completely inelastic, whereas producers will bear the full price burden if supply is completely inelastic. Put differently, an excise tax on a product with a relatively inelastic demand will have less of an effect on consumption.\nAdditionally, economic theory indicates that targeted excise taxes could have efficiency merits, but broadly drawn taxes that cover many product categories generally tend to lead to more distortions and reductions in economic activity than are warranted. From an efficiency perspective, the use of a broad-based tax on a wide range of activities (e.g., a general sales tax) would be preferable to a high excise tax rate on a small number of activities.", "Luxury taxes are usually levied to increase progressivity in the tax system or to increase revenue, not on the basis of improving economic efficiency.\nSome argue that luxury taxes in the past have dramatically reduced sales in the targeted industry. However, it is likely that demand for luxury goods is less sensitive to price changes than non-luxury goods, in part, because some luxury consumption goods are purchased by businesses rather than individuals (and could be deducted from a business's income tax returns as a business expense).\nA common case study cited in the analysis of luxury taxes includes the luxury boat industry during the early 1990s. Opponents of the luxury tax argued that the yacht industry experienced drastic reductions in sales following the enactment of a 10% ad valorem luxury tax in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90). According to this logic, the imposition of the excise tax was largely to blame for the decline in sales and rise in unemployment in the industry. However, economic analysis indicates that the yacht sales were beginning to decline from their peak in 1988 (before the tax), and that sales of yachts were more sensitive to changes in personal disposable income and corporate profits after tax rather than price changes due to the tax. In any case, the tax was repealed in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103-66 ).", "Sumptuary tax increases are often based on market failures, relating to externalized costs of individual behavior associated with public health, public safety, and additional financial burdens placed on publically financed health services. In short, studies measuring the respective size of the externalities for alcohol and tobacco involve very complicated, technical calculations of lifetime external costs and savings associated with alcohol and tobacco consumption that are often subject to controversy and methodological scrutiny. An advanced review of this literature is beyond the scope of this particular report. Still, studies suggest that current law per-unit tax rates on cigarettes exceed the magnitude of the estimated net externalities whereas the opposite could be true for alcohol taxes.\nBehavioral responses to sumptuary taxes vary by consumption good. Demand for beer is not particularly responsive to changes in price (e.g., demand is inelastic). Meta-analyses tend to find the demand for beer is more inelastic (i.e., less responsive) to changes in price than demand for either wine or distilled spirits. However, studies diverge on the question of whether demand for wine is more or less elastic than distilled spirits. In comparison, CBO estimates the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes to be between (0.3) and (0.7), and that the average elasticity of the number of smokers is (0.3). In other words, a 1% increase in the price of cigarettes results in between a 0.3% and a 0.7% decrease in demand, and a 1% rise in the price of cigarettes results in roughly a 0.3% decrease in the number of smokers.\nCompared to a sumptuary tax on a product that is relatively elastic, a tax on a product that is relatively inelastic often results in a higher tax burden on lower-income households (due to the regressive nature of the tax) with a smaller degree of change in consumption.", "If properly structured, benefit-based taxes could enhance economic efficiency by reducing the spread between private and social costs. In short, inefficiency arises because private markets tend to overproduce economic activities that lead to negative social externalities and underproduce economic activities that lead to positive externalities, absent government intervention. Theory suggests that government intervention can better incorporate social costs into the prices perceived by any one individual. However, it is often difficult to derive the \"correct\" tax rate that precisely accounts for the marginal social effects of an economic activity.\nBenefit-based taxes can affect consumer demand for public goods if the link between the tax and the use of the public good is clearly apparent. A lack of a direct link between the tax and the use of the public good could lead to declining revenues available for upkeep and maintenance of the public good. For example, one could argue that the purchase of gasoline does not necessarily lead to wear and tear on federal highways; some of this fuel could be used by drivers that commute just along local roads. Thus, many benefit-based taxes are levied on rough proxies that affect forms of consumption unrelated to the ultimate goal of the policy.\nAn alternative policy could include more direct forms of benefit-based taxation, but there could be a tradeoff between the targeting precision of a tax and its administrative costs. For example, although a retail tax on gasoline sales might be an imperfect proxy for highway usage, it is less complicated than administering an excise tax based on the weight and mileage of every motor vehicle using a federal highway. The costs of the latter form of tax administration might exceed the benefits.", "Much like benefit-based taxes, regulatory and environmental taxes are typically imposed on economic activities that generate externalities. Whereas benefit-based taxes are concerned with an underproduction of some positive externality (e.g., a public good), regulatory and environmental taxes, however, are usually concerned with the overproduction of some negative externality (e.g., pollution). These negative externalities could include losses from damage to plants and animals and to their habitats, rapid deterioration to physical infrastructure, and various harmful effects on human health and mortality. Economic theory indicates that a tax on the marginal production of these negative externalities could be used as a disincentive for harmful production processes and as a means of compensating society for the cleanup and mitigation of those externalities.\nIn the choice between a tax on pollution (or the regulation of some other activity with negative spillover effects on society) and a total ban on its production, economists generally prefer a tax. From an economic perspective, a society's \"optimum level\" of pollution is usually not zero; instead, economists look to minimize total waste disposal costs. These costs could include residual waste or by-product recycling, input switching to safer materials, production modification, or other technology adoption. It can be expected that marginal pollution costs increase with increased waste disposal activities as greater investment in more advanced (and more costly) cleanup technologies and mitigation strategies is necessary. Put differently, there may be a point where the marginal cost of eliminating a particular unit of pollution may exceed the marginal benefit. The tax increases the private costs of pollution to reduce the spread between private and social costs.\nTo achieve optimum,economic efficiency, the excise tax rate would be set at a level such that the marginal, private cost of pollution is equal to the marginal, social benefits of production. Economic theory suggests that the tax should be imposed directly upon the activity which gives rise to the negative externality. The statutory incidence (or burden) of the tax may differ from the economic incidence, because the latter is affected by elasticities. Thus, consumers may bear some or all of the tax through higher prices.", "" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "h0_title", "h0_title", "", "", "h0_full", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How are excise taxes commonly collected?", "What is the rationale behind sumptuary taxes?", "How can this principle be used to benefit the environment?", "Why are benefit-based taxes imposed?", "What is the impetus for luxury taxes?", "How has the role of excise taxes changed over time?", "How do excise taxes from 1960 compare to those from 2012?" ], "summary": [ "There are four common types of excise taxes: (1) sumptuary (or \"sin\") taxes, (2) regulatory or environmental taxes, (3) benefit-based taxes (or user charges), and (4) luxury taxes.", "Sumptuary taxes were traditionally imposed for moral reasons, but are currently rationalized, in part, to discourage a specific activity that is thought to have negative spillover effects (or \"externalities\") on society.", "Regulatory or environmental taxes are imposed to offset external costs associated with regulating public safety or to discourage consumption of a specific commodity that is thought to have negative externalities on society.", "Benefit-based taxes (which include user charges) are imposed to charge users of a particular public good for financing and maintenance of that public good.", "Lastly, luxury taxes are primarily imposed as one way to raise revenue, particularly from higher-income households.", "Excise taxes play a much smaller role in financing the federal government than they did in the past.", "In 1960, federal excise tax collections were $355.49 billion (in 2012 constant dollars, after accounting for inflation). In FY2012, federal excise tax collections were $56.17 billion (roughly one-sixth of their 1960 value in 2012 constant dollars). Federal excise taxes comprised 7.0% of all federal revenue in 1973, whereas they comprised 3.2% in 2012." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 0, 0, -1, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-12-188	{ "title": [ "Scope and Methodology", "Background", "Action Being Taken to Address Limitations of U.S. Nuclear Weapons", "Types of Limitations, DOD Concerns, and Mitigation Actions", "NNSA Has Not Developed a Corrective Action Plan to Improve the Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance Program", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "To determine the number and type of nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed each weapon’s current MAR and associated NNSA guidance. We then interviewed officials from NNSA and the national laboratories to obtain clarification on technically complicated limitations. NNSA and DOD do not group limitations into types or categories. However, in order to report unclassified weapon limitation information in this report, we developed categories for types of limitations based on the MAR information. Using content analysis methodology, two analysts independently assessed each limitation and coded it as a certain type of limitation. To determine DOD officials’ concerns with the limitations’ impact for nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning, we interviewed officials in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Navy and Air Force lead project officers from each weapon’s Project Officer Group and interviewed and received briefings from officials in STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command For Global Strike, the entity responsible for preparing and maintaining the nation’s nuclear war plan. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed the last five annual assessment reports (fiscal years 2006 to 2010) to determine what limitations the STRATCOM Commander reported. We also interviewed the current chairman of a technical advisory group who is responsible for completing the majority of the STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment report and reviewed prior GAO work on the annual assessment process. To determine what, if any, mitigation actions DOD and NNSA currently engage in or plan to complete to address nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed NNSA guidance and interviewed NNSA, national laboratory, and DOD officials. To determine how NNSA manages and reports on nuclear weapon limitations, we reviewed (1) established procedures governing the MAR development and revision process, (2) NNSA guidance on nuclear weapon limitations, and (3) documents associated with an ongoing joint DOD/NNSA review of nuclear weapon military requirements. We compared the documents with the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. To determine if certain nuclear weapon limitations were potentially no longer applicable, we compared limitations with the most current information related to corrective actions as well as the current applicability of military requirements, as reported by NNSA guidance on limitations and officials from NNSA, the national laboratories, and DOD.\nTo determine the extent to which NNSA has taken actions to address its recommendations on its surveillance program, we reviewed NNSA’s draft October 2010 management review and analyzed key NNSA documentation related to implementation efforts. This documentation includes a draft version of NNSA’s surveillance program manual; charters establishing the roles and responsibilities for entities responsible for managing the program; draft project management tools; and newly established procedures for establishing, executing, and tracking surveillance testing requirements. In addition, we interviewed key NNSA personnel, including the acting senior technical advisor for surveillance, about NNSA’s planned efforts to address its recommendations. We also compared NNSA’s actions against the federal standards for addressing recommendations from management reviews contained in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control. To determine the national laboratories’ role in the surveillance program, we conducted site visits, toured select facilities used to conduct surveillance tests, interviewed officials, and received briefings from officials at LLNL and SNL.information in writing from LANL.\nWe conducted our work from October 2010 to February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs is responsible for the manufacture, maintenance, refurbishment, surveillance, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Most modern nuclear weapons consist of three sets of components—a primary, a secondary, and a set of nonnuclear components enclosed in a case. When detonated, the primary and secondary components, which together are referred to as the weapon’s “nuclear explosive package,” produce the weapon’s explosive force, or “yield.” LANL, located in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and LLNL, located in Livermore, California, have design responsibility for the nuclear explosive package. SNL, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, has design responsibility for nonnuclear components. Some nonnuclear components—collectively called “limited-life components”— have shorter service lives than the weapon itself and, therefore, must be periodically replaced. The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile consists of eight weapons systems. Table 1 shows the weapon systems in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, their dates of entry into the stockpile, and the laboratories and military services responsible for each system.\nIn February 2007, we reported on the process that DOD and DOE have established for fulfilling the annual assessment of the safety, performance, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment of the nuclear stockpile is based primarily on the advice of a technical advisory group and provides an operational perspective; (2) the technical advisory group holds an annual conference where each entity involved in managing the stockpile—national laboratories, Project Officer Groups, NNSA, and DOD—present briefings to provide a complete perspective on the various issues affecting the stockpile; and (3) the laboratory director’s annual assessment is derived primarily from ongoing activities associated with NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as the results of weapon system and component level tests conducted We found that (1) the by NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program as well as data that provides an assessment of a weapon’s current reliability.\nNNSA’s stockpile surveillance program comprises the Core Surveillance Program and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign, which are funded separately. Under the Core Surveillance Program, the national laboratories and production plants evaluate weapons and weapon components for the attributes of function, condition, material properties, and chemical composition through the following:\nSystem-Level Laboratory Testing. For such tests, units from each stockpiled weapon are chosen annually, either randomly or specifically, and sent to the Pantex Plant for disassembly, inspection, reconfiguration, and testing by the national laboratories.\nSystem-Level Flight Testing. These tests drop or launch a weapon with its nuclear material removed. NNSA coordinates flight testing with DOD, which is responsible for providing the military assets (e.g., aircraft and missiles) needed to drop or launch a weapon.\nComponent and Material Testing. These tests are conducted on nuclear and nonnuclear components and materials by both the national laboratories and the production plants that manufactured them.\nNNSA defines campaigns as technically challenging, multiyear, multifunctional efforts to develop and maintain the critical capabilities needed to continue assessing the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile without underground testing. tomography (CT) image analysis tool for a particular nuclear component, which NNSA officials said they believe will enhance its ability to identify potential defects or anomalies. NNSA plans to conduct approximately 30 of these CT component tests in fiscal year 2012 under Core Surveillance, according to planning documents. Figure 1 shows the interrelationships among the segments of NNSA’s Stockpile Surveillance Program.", "For all U.S. nuclear weapons in the current nuclear stockpile, NNSA identified 52 weapon limitations, and of these, the majority fall into six types. DOD officials told us that a few limitations are a concern due to the potential impact on DOD weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning, but these officials also said that current and planned mitigation actions generally address their concerns with weapon limitations. We found that NNSA guidance to DOD on some limitations contains incomplete information, and DOD officials told us that the way NNSA communicates the potential impact of limitations on nuclear weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning is sometimes unclear. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid—because, among other things, corrective action to address the limitation is complete—while some limitations will remain in effect until DOD changes potentially outdated military requirements.", "We characterized the 52 limitations that NNSA identified for all U.S. nuclear weapons into 10 types of limitations based on our analysis of each weapon’s MAR and associated guidance documents as well as through interviews with officials from NNSA, the national laboratories, and DOD. Eighty-six percent of these limitations fall into 6 types: detonation safety under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety. According to DOD officials, a large majority of these weapon limitations do not impact DOD nuclear weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning activities. However, some DOD officials expressed concerns to us over the impact of a few weapon limitations, such as increased maintenance costs or additional issues to consider when developing war plans. For most limitations about which they raised concerns, DOD officials told us that current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should address these concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told us there may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size. Moreover, officials at one national laboratory told us that a smaller stockpile may not be able to support required mitigation actions if additional limitations, especially those that result in large decreases to weapon reliability, are identified in the future. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states that the United States is currently considering future stockpile reductions that would be based on a variety of factors, including the continuing implementation of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program.nuclear weapon limitations and the percentage of those limitations by type.", "NNSA has begun to implement some of the recommendations from its draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program, but NNSA has not developed a formal corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. The draft October 2010 review, conducted jointly by NNSA and the three national laboratories, makes multiple recommendations to NNSA to address a number of weaknesses in the surveillance program, such as the lack of federal leadership in program management and the absence of formal, documented processes for surveillance planning and management. Actions NNSA has taken to implement the recommendations include the following:\nThe creation of a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance (senior advisor) position. This position was created in response to the review’s recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership for the surveillance program. According to the official position description, the senior advisor is to serve as the agency’s lead official for surveillance execution and integration and is responsible for providing direction and oversight to major surveillance modernization efforts. The senior advisor reports directly to the senior NNSA official responsible for overseeing stockpile activities related to research, development, design, and production. NNSA designated an acting senior advisor in October 2010 and hired a permanent senior advisor in July 2011. According to NNSA officials, the senior advisor has brought leadership to the surveillance program. For example, when a dispute between national laboratory and production plant officials on the appropriate safety standards for handling a toxic chemical caused a backlog of a key component test, the acting senior advisor was able to mediate this dispute, and the component testing was resumed.\nEstablishment of a formal requirements-setting process. NNSA formalized the process for having the national laboratories submit surveillance testing requirements and having NNSA’s production plants evaluate the requirements. The process is being applied to surveillance testing requirements for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. Specifically, the national laboratories determine surveillance testing requirements; production plants review these requirements for technical feasibility and resource availability; and a new committee adjudicates unresolved conflicts in priorities. Previously, NNSA had set surveillance testing requirements informally and on an annual basis. National laboratories and production plant officials said that informal planning created problems in executing surveillance tests because, among other reasons, they did not have sufficient time to schedule tests around other stockpile work—such as life extension programs—that used the same personnel and equipment.\nA new surveillance governance structure. This structure is intended to promote integrated planning and prioritization as recommended by the management review. Elements of the new structure include the Surveillance Integrated Requirements Working Group (requirements group) and the Surveillance Enterprise Steering Committee (steering committee). Established in July 2011, the requirements group resolves mismatches between surveillance testing requirements and financial, human, and material resources. Specifically, this group examines surveillance testing requirements and assesses the impact of uncompleted tests. Established in May 2011, the steering committee is the highest-level organization in NNSA solely responsible for surveillance; the steering committee approves surveillance testing requirements and will resolve disputes between the national laboratories and the production plants that are not resolved by the requirements group.\nManagement of the requirements process through a centralized database called the Quality Evaluation Requirements Tracking System. In line with the review’s recommendation regarding critical communication and information pathways, NNSA will require each entity in the Core Surveillance process to use this system to input, access, or manage surveillance data. For example, within this system, the laboratories will issue surveillance testing requirements, and the plants will track progress and document completion of tests. NNSA will use the data in this system as a basis for the formal performance measures the agency uses to hold the national laboratories and production plants accountable for the execution of surveillance activities.\nCodification of surveillance governance and processes. Codification supports the review’s recommendation to implement a disciplined and integrated management process, with clear roles and responsibilities. NNSA is codifying surveillance governance and processes in section 5 of the Requirements Management Integration (RMI) manual. When completed, this manual will include the charters for key entities in the newly established surveillance governance structure and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, according to NNSA officials. The manual will also include at least 12 guidance documents to serve as project management tools. For example, one such document codifies the process for investigating anomalies identified through surveillance activities; another addresses the process for adjusting surveillance schedules or plans. The guidance documents are all currently in draft, with completion expected by the end of September 2012, according to NNSA surveillance program planning documents. The 2010 management review cited the critical need for clear roles and responsibilities for all individuals and committees throughout the surveillance enterprise; it found that the number of committees with undefined or poorly defined roles and responsibilities, combined with inadequate documentation, clearly contributed to NNSA’s past difficulties in modernizing the surveillance program.\nBetter Integration of Core and Enhanced Surveillance. As of August 2011, NNSA charged the managers of the Core Surveillance Program and the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign with defining integration points between them. NNSA also began developing an RMI guidance document detailing how the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign should develop new diagnostic tools. The 2010 review found that NNSA lacked a clearly defined interface between the Core Surveillance Program and Enhanced Surveillance Campaign and that the lack of a documented process for promoting integration, among other things, has resulted in the underutilization of Enhanced Surveillance Campaign capabilities in the Core Surveillance Program’s testing activities. In June 2011, the acting senior advisor told us that integration between Core and Enhanced Surveillance is central to the surveillance program’s future and that increased integration presents a management challenge. Two of the surveillance program’s objectives are to detect precursors of aging weapon components sufficiently early for corrective action in existing weapons and to ensure any defects are not repeated in life extension programs. According to NNSA officials, these objectives depend on the continued development of Enhanced Surveillance Campaign technologies that are then used to improve the number and scope of the Core Surveillance Program’s component and material tests.\nNational laboratory and DOD officials we spoke with generally viewed NNSA’s current and planned actions to improve the surveillance program as positive developments. However, these actions are not guided by a formal corrective action plan. According to an OMB circular that defines management’s responsibility for internal control in federal agencies, federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address weaknesses found in program operations, as identified through management reviews, inspector general and GAO reports, program evaluations, and financial statement audits. Corrective action plans are to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress to resolve the findings of audits and reviews. The circular also states that agencies should periodically assess and report on the progress of those plans. Furthermore, under the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, federal managers are to take steps to ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved by completing, within established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management’s attention. A corrective action plan would provide a framework for such time frames, as well as a mechanism for holding management accountable for meeting the time frames. According to the acting senior advisor, NNSA did not address many of the findings and recommendations in its three previous surveillance program management reviews primarily because the agency did not have a specific approach for implementation. This statement echoes the 2010 draft management review finding that the prior reviews’ recommendations were not implemented because, among other reasons, NNSA did not have a well- defined, documented process for executing the surveillance program. In May 2011, more than 6 months after NNSA issued its draft October 2010 management review, the acting senior advisor directed the steering committee to establish a working group to develop a plan to implement the review’s recommendations, but both the scope and time frame of this plan remain uncertain. In the interim, NNSA officials have requested reports on individual actions taken to implement the review’s recommendations but not on the agencywide effort to implement these recommendations. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) ensure that the draft review’s recommendations are fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.", "It is critical that U.S. nuclear capability continues to reassure our allies and deter potential adversaries. With most weapons currently in the stockpile having been produced over 20 years ago and being sustained beyond their original design lifetimes, it is a testament to NNSA, the national laboratories, and the production plants that DOD officials were confident that nuclear weapon limitations do not currently reduce the effectiveness of the nation’s strategic deterrent. However, several factors raise concerns with the limitations and NNSA’s management of them. First, some limitations require mitigation actions, which can impose logistical burdens, increased security risks, and war planning restrictions on the Air Force, Navy, and STRATCOM. DOD officials said they would have less flexibility in mitigating limitations in the future should the stockpile’s size be reduced as future arms control agreements are pursued. Second, NNSA guidance on limitations does not always clearly communicate to DOD the potential impacts that limitations have on nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning and does not include all identified limitations; it is uncertain if the risks associated with limitations are comprehensively identified and analyzed. Third, NNSA’s current list of nuclear weapon limitations may not reflect the most up-to- date information, and the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review may not contain enough specificity to ensure a relevant and reliable count of limitations.\nThe stockpile surveillance program provides critical data that informs stockpile decisions. A smaller, aging stockpile calls for increasingly complex and time-sensitive data. NNSA’s multiple actions taken in response to recommendations in its draft 2010 surveillance program management review demonstrate the agency’s commitment to improving the program. NNSA is planning to fully address the findings and implement the recommendations contained in its draft review. However, it is unclear how or if NNSA will do so because the agency has not developed a comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-123 that details actions that agency personnel must take to implement the recommendations with specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress of this implementation. Completion of such a plan would provide the agency with a reasonable basis for ensuring that recommendations are fully implemented. Without such a plan, NNSA is in danger of not implementing many of the draft review’s recommendations, as it failed to do in its three previous surveillance program management reviews. For example, previous delays in integrating Core and Enhanced Surveillance have been attributed, in part, to a lack of a documented process. Furthermore, the successful development and completion of a comprehensive corrective action plan would demonstrate to key congressional and DOD stakeholders NNSA’s commitment to improving the surveillance program. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will provide itself and key stakeholders with these assurances.", "To improve the processes used to test and report on the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, we are making four recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, as appropriate:\nTo improve the clarity of information NNSA provides to DOD about nuclear weapon limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, (1) expand the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD so that it includes each existing limitation and (2) assess, and revise as appropriate, the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD to ensure it clearly describes the potential impacts that each limitation may have on nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning.\nTo improve the reliability and relevance of information associated with limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, determine if the findings of the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review can be used to eliminate certain limitations.  To increase confidence in NNSA’s ability to fully address all findings and recommendations from its draft surveillance management review, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration prepare and complete a comprehensive corrective action plan in accordance with OMB Circular No. A-123. This plan should identify the detailed actions that agency personnel must take to fully implement the recommendations in the review and include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress of this implementation. This corrective action plan should also address how to better integrate Core and Enhanced Surveillance.", "We provided NNSA and DOD with a draft of this report for their review and comment. In its written comments, NNSA said that GAO did a commendable job in reviewing a highly complex and technical area. NNSA agreed with two of the four recommendations and “agreed in principle” with the other two recommendations. NNSA also outlined the actions that it plans to take to address all four of the report’s recommendations. The complete text of NNSA’s comments is presented in appendix I. NNSA also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.\nFor two of the recommendations, NNSA stated that the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Management will oversee the development and execution of a corrective action plan for the nuclear stockpile surveillance program and ensure that the findings of the joint DOD and NNSA military requirements review be appropriately implemented. NNSA agreed in principle with the other two recommendations aimed at clarifying the information NNSA provides to DOD on nuclear weapon limitations. NNSA stated that it agrees with the desired outcome of these two recommendations, but NNSA concluded that a key procedural weakness in the process used to report on weapon limitations is the absence of a document that formally communicates DOD’s position on limitations. NNSA said that it will ask the Nuclear Weapons Council to require that military service lead project officers provide NNSA with a consolidated DOD response each time a MAR is issued, and that this response could include any concerns with nuclear weapon limitations. We agree with NNSA that the management of nuclear weapon limitations requires active participation from both NNSA and DOD through the Nuclear Weapons Council. If NNSA and DOD follow through with these planned actions, we believe that the agencies will be responsive to our recommendations.\nIn its written comments, DOD agreed with all four of the report’s recommendations and said that the process by which nuclear weapon limitations are managed needs to be addressed. DOD said that it will coordinate with NNSA, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, to implement our recommendations. The complete text of DOD’s comments is presented in appendix II.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, the appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director; Patrick Bernard; and Alisa Beyninson made key contributions to this report. Colin Chambers, Penney Harwell-Caramia, Jon Kucskar, Michelle Munn, Kevin O’Neil, Tim Persons, Rebecca Shea, Carol Shulman, and Kiki Theodoropoulos provided technical assistance." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "", "h0_full h2_full h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h2_full", "h0_full h2_full", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What are the limitations for U.S. nuclear weapons?", "What is the implication of these limitations?", "How are these limitations being addressed?", "How useful is the current guidance at analyzing limitations?", "What is the current state of the weapons limitation review?", "How has NNSA taken action to improve their reviews?", "To what extent are these steps considered to be successful?", "What would be the nature of this corrective action plan?", "Why did the recommendations remain unimplemented?", "Why is the corrective action plan important?", "Why is regular maintenance of the US nuclear stockpile critical?", "How is the nuclear weapons program overseen?", "How does the NNSA evaluate the stockpile?", "Why did GAO review the NNSA limitation review process?", "How did GAO source its information?" ], "summary": [ "For the 52 NNSA identified limitations for all weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, 86 percent fall into six types: detonation safety under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety.", "Some DOD officials expressed concern over the impact that certain weapon limitations have on weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning.", "According to DOD officials, current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should address most limitations for which the officials raised concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told GAO that there may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size.", "For each weapon system, NNSA provides DOD with guidance containing additional information on nuclear weapon limitations. However, GAO found that this guidance does not cover all limitations and some DOD officials said that it may not provide them with relevant information for some limitations. Specifically, the guidance addresses approximately 60 percent of all limitations but does not include limitations based on certain weapon components. In addition, one senior DOD official stated that the guidance did not help clarify the potential impact that a particular limitation may have on weapon operation and maintenance.", "The applicable military service is now conducting its own analysis of this limitation’s potential impact. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid because, among other reasons, corrective action to address the limitations is complete. In addition, it is uncertain if an ongoing DOD and NNSA review of nuclear weapon military requirements will be used to eliminate limitations based on potentially outdated military requirements.", "NNSA has begun to implement some recommendations from the agency’s draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program but has not developed a corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. For example, NNSA (1) created and staffed the position of Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance in response to the review’s recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership and (2) established a formal process for setting surveillance testing requirements.", "National laboratory and DOD officials GAO interviewed generally viewed NNSA’s actions as positive steps to improve the program. However, NNSA has not developed a corrective action plan, as called for by Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123.", ":According to this circular on management controls, federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address program operations weaknesses identified through management reviews, among other things. Such plans are to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress and hold management accountable.", "According to a senior level NNSA official, the agency did not implement many of the recommendations from three prior surveillance program management reviews primarily because there was no specific approach for implementation.", "Without a corrective action plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) ensure that the draft October 2010 management review’s recommendations are fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.", "Most weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were produced over 20 years ago and are being sustained beyond original design lifetimes. It is critical to ensure that these weapons are safe, secure, and reliable to perform as the nation’s nuclear deterrent.", "The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for the nation’s nuclear weapons program.", "NNSA identifies nuclear weapon limitations—areas where military requirements may not be met—and conducts nonnuclear tests to evaluate the condition and reliability of weapons through its nuclear stockpile surveillance program.", "GAO was asked to determine the (1) number and types of such limitations and any concerns raised by Department of Defense (DOD) officials, and (2) actions NNSA has taken to implement its prior recommendations for the nuclear stockpile surveillance program.", "GAO reviewed agency documents, analyzed limitations, and interviewed key NNSA and DOD officials." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1, 1, -1, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-19-449	{ "title": [ "Background", "Explosives and Their Production", "Explosive Molecules and Formulations Used in Nuclear Weapons", "Ongoing and Planned LEPs and NNSA’s Other Modernization Plans", "NNSA’s Sites, Infrastructure, and Workforce Levels for Explosives Activities", "Selected Leading Practices in Federal Strategic Planning", "NNSA’s Sites Conduct a Range of Interdependent Explosives Design and Production Activities, and NNSA Has Adopted a Centralized Approach to Managing Them", "NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Identified Management Challenges for Explosives-Related Activities and Have Taken Some Actions in Response, but Have Not Addressed Issues Affecting the Accuracy of Infrastructure Data", "NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Identified Challenges in Ensuring an Adequate Supply of Specialized Explosive Materials and Have Taken Some Actions to Address Them", "Lost Recipes", "Fragile Supplier Base", "NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Have Identified Infrastructure and Workforce Challenges and Are Taking Actions to Address Them, but NNSA Has Not Fully Addressed the Accuracy of Infrastructure Data", "Infrastructure Is Aging and Deteriorating", "Some Infrastructure Data on Explosives-Related Assets Are Inaccurate", "Storage Areas for Explosives Are Filled to or Near Capacity", "Difficulties in Contractors Recruiting and Training Skilled Staff", "NNSA’s Strategic Plan for Explosives Does Not Describe Some Management Challenges and Is Not Fully Consistent with Leading Practices for Strategic Planning", "NNSA’s Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials Describes Some Challenges NNSA Officials and Contractor Representatives Have Identified but Not Others", "NNSA Followed Leading Practices for Strategic Planning, but Some Elements Present in Effective Strategic Plans Have Not Been Fully Developed", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration", "Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Explosives include high explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics. Propellants and pyrotechnics are sometimes referred to as low explosives. All three types of explosives serve essential functions in nuclear weapons. Figure 1 illustrates key explosive-containing components found in a generic nuclear weapon as well as the types of explosives these components contain.\nHigh explosives are the most common explosive by volume in nuclear weapons. There are two classes of high explosives used in nuclear weapons: insensitive high explosives (IHE) and conventional high explosives (CHE). An IHE is less susceptible to accidental detonation than a CHE and less violent upon accidental ignition, therefore it is safer to handle. NNSA places a premium on safety throughout all phases of explosives activities, including research and development, testing, production, and storage, because handling any explosive material is inherently dangerous, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives.\nProducing a high explosive material generally follows four steps, as shown in figure 2: (1) synthesis—producing raw explosive molecules; (2) formulation—mixing raw explosive molecules with binding ingredients to form an explosive mixture; (3) pressing—compacting formulated explosives into shapes of the required density; and (4) machining— cutting away excess material to achieve the final shape. Analytical, mechanical, safety, and performance testing are to occur after each step.\nDuring synthesis, technicians use chemicals to produce fine, powder-like raw explosives. During formulation, technicians combine the explosive powder with plastic binder ingredients to produce a mixture that exhibits the physical and performance properties desired. Formulated explosives used by NNSA often appear like small, irregularly shaped pebbles, known as prills, as shown in figure 3.\nDuring pressing, the third step, technicians compact formulated explosives into a solid form. During machining, the fourth step, technicians use computer-controlled equipment to cut and shape the explosive into its final shape. After the explosive has been machined, technicians join explosive and non-explosive parts into functional components during subassembly. Small-scale synthesis and formulation and production-scale pressing, machining, and subassembly activities are carried out at multiple NNSA sites.\nAfter each step of the production process, NNSA’s sites conduct tests to ensure that explosives meet NNSA’s safety and performance requirements. During safety testing, scientists conduct a variety of tests to ensure that explosives meet DOE’s safety requirements. Regarding performance testing, scientists conduct other tests that require specialized equipment. For example, scientists use scanning equipment, like heat flow sensors, for thermal testing on formulated explosive material. Scientists also conduct tests using X-ray imaging equipment to evaluate weapon characteristics by detonating a “mockup.” The mockup uses a high explosive main charge—the explosive material that surrounds the nuclear core, known as the pit—and a nonfissile surrogate material that has similar physical properties to plutonium. The mock implosion is called a hydrodynamic test because the surrogate material and other components become hot enough to flow like fluid.", "High explosive molecules used in U.S. nuclear weapons include but are not limited to high melting explosive (HMX), pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) and triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB). First fielded in conventional weapons in World War II, HMX and PETN were later introduced into several components in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and are still used in them today. DOE first introduced TATB into the nuclear stockpile in 1979, and it is still the only molecule that DOE considers to be an IHE (see sidebar). In all U.S. nuclear weapons, the main charge is made of formulations of HMX or TATB. DOD also uses HMX and TATB in certain conventional weapons.\nTATB: NNSA’s Key Insensitive High Explosive Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) is a key insensitive high explosive that is currently used in National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DOD) military applications, including nuclear and conventional weapons. Scientists first synthesized TATB in 1888 but did not initially recognize it as an explosive. In 1966, Los Alamos National Laboratory developed the industrial method for synthesizing TATB. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, two domestic manufacturers supplied TATB to DOD and NNSA. However, when the Cold War ended and a U.S. nuclear test moratorium began, the demand for TATB declined, and both manufacturers ceased production by 1993. DOD then acquired TATB from a U.K.-based firm until its plant closed in 2005. Beginning in 2007, DOD and NNSA collaborated to re-establish a manufacturing capability for TATB in the United States. Specifically, DOD’s Holston Army Ammunition Plant (Holston), which is located in Kingsport, Tennessee, began producing TATB in 2014. DOD has qualified the Holston-produced TATB for use in conventional weapons but NNSA has not yet qualified it for use in nuclear weapons because the material properties of the formulated material are not yet up to NNSA standards, according to NNSA documentation. available binding ingredient to create a plastic bonded explosive. Each explosive formulation is designed for a specific application. The performance requirements for explosive formulations in nuclear weapons are more stringent than those for conventional weapons for DOD formulations to ensure both performance and safety. Explosives scientists commonly use the term “recipe” to describe the ingredients and many variables in the process—such as the temperature, mixing speed, or container size—used to make explosive molecules and formulations that meet specific performance requirements.", "In December 2018, NNSA completed the last production unit for the W76- 1 LEP, marking the completion of warhead production for the first LEP in which NNSA undertook full-scale design activities for weapon systems since 1982. Five other LEPs and stockpile modernization efforts were ongoing as of January 2019, as shown in table 1. As we concluded in an April 2017 report, this is a particularly challenging time for NNSA, as the agency plans to simultaneously execute LEPs and modernization efforts along with major construction projects, such as efforts to modernize NNSA’s uranium and plutonium manufacturing capabilities.", "NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise consists of eight government-owned sites managed and operated by seven contractors. Five of these sites conduct explosives activities: Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, Pantex, and Nevada. In addition to these sites, NNSA relies on several third-party suppliers of explosive materials and related equipment. The largest of these is Holston, which is a government-owned, contractor-operated facility that primarily produces explosives for DOD. Holston is NNSA’s sole supplier of explosives used in main charges.\nThe infrastructure that supports NNSA’s explosives activities consists of thousands of real property assets, which are to be tracked in FIMS. The database is managed for NNSA missions by its Office of Safety, Infrastructure and Operations. According to NNSA officials and DOE documents, FIMS helps managers understand the current state of NNSA infrastructure and inform infrastructure modernization funding decisions. We have previously reported on concerns about the accuracy of the FIMS database with respect to certain data fields that were not assessed as part of this review. DOE has taken sufficient steps to address recommendations we have previously made about FIMS.\nWorkforce levels for explosives activities have generally increased in recent years, which contractor representatives attribute to the increase in workload because of LEP and modernization efforts. Table 2 shows NNSA contractor representatives’ estimates for actual full-time equivalents (FTE) and percentages of FTEs engaged in explosives activities at each of the five sites over the last 5 fiscal years.", "The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as amended (GPRA) requires, among other things, that federal agencies develop strategic plans. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to federal executive branch agencies on how to prepare their agency-wide strategic plans in accordance with GPRA requirements, as updated and expanded by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. We have reported that these requirements also can serve as leading practices for strategic planning at lower levels within federal agencies, such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or initiatives. In addition, we have reported in the past on federal agencies’ strategic planning efforts and have identified additional useful practices to enhance agencies’ strategic plans. The leading practices in federal strategic planning that we selected are: (1) involving stakeholders, such as federal agencies, state governments, or others, in defining the mission and desired outcomes, which helps ensure that their expectations and interests are met and that resources and efforts are targeted at the program’s highest priorities; (2) assessing external and internal forces, which helps managers anticipate future challenges and make adjustments before potential problems become crises; and (3) covering at least a 4-year period while making adjustments as needed to reflect the operating environment.\nFurther, our past work has shown that effective strategic plans should include several specific elements. These elements include: (1) a comprehensive mission statement that explains why a program exists and what it does; (2) long-term goals and objectives that specify how an agency will carry out its mission and explain what results are expected from the program; (3) strategies to achieve the goals and objectives that are specific enough to allow an agency to assess whether the strategies will help achieve those goals; (4) a description of how performance measures will be used to assess progress toward long-term goals; and (5) the identification of external factors that could significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals.", "NNSA’s five sites involved in explosives conduct interdependent activities to design and produce explosives and about 100 different nuclear weapon components that contain explosive materials. Each of the sites assumes primary responsibility for certain explosives activities—such as Livermore conducts design, research, and development of new IHE main charge formulations; Pantex produces all main charges; Los Alamos conducts design and production of main charge detonators as well as explosives research and development; Sandia conducts design and production of nonnuclear explosive components; and Nevada conducts large experimental explosive shots to support design activities. However, most of these activities require the participation of multiple sites. The following examples illustrate some of the collaborative, interdependent activities that NNSA’s sites and their suppliers undertake to design and produce explosive components found in nuclear weapons.\nMain charge for the W80-4 LEP. Livermore manages design activities for the W80-4 LEP, including for its main charge. The main charge used in the W80-4 warhead will consist of newly synthesized TATB, formulated with a new binding ingredient, according to contractor representatives. As NNSA officials and contractor representatives explained during our site visits to Livermore and Pantex, Livermore scientists redeveloped the specific process for TATB synthesis and formulation that is being used in the W80-4 LEP, first in small test batches and then in larger amounts. Next, Livermore sent its specifications for synthesis and formulation to Holston, which has produced successively larger batches. As the design and cost study phase of the W80-4 LEP continues, Livermore and Pantex continue to receive and test these batches of formulated explosive and work with Holston to ensure that production lots meet NNSA specifications. In coordination with Livermore, Pantex will press and machine the finished main charges for the W80-4 when the LEP reaches the production phase. Pantex will receive formulated TATB from Holston and conduct its own tests to ensure the quality of the initial production lots and pressing, machining, and subassembly processes.\nDetonators. The design and production of main charge detonators involves several NNSA sites and their suppliers. According to contractor representatives, Livermore and Los Alamos share the responsibility for designing the main charge detonators, and Los Alamos will produce all the detonators. As part of production, Los Alamos reprocesses the PETN used in detonators from a stockpile of DOD-grade material purchased 30 years ago. Other detonator parts come from third-party suppliers and from NNSA’s Kansas City National Security Campus, another NNSA site that does not have a role in designing or producing explosives, according to contractor representatives. Los Alamos produces and tests completed detonators and then sends them to Pantex for weapon assembly, according to contractor representatives.\nSpin rocket motors. Sandia plays the primary role in designing spin rocket motors. Spin rocket motors use pyrotechnics and propellants and are a key component in the B61 and B83 bombs. Contractor representatives at Sandia said that they supply the explosives to third- party suppliers, who produce the motors. The completed spin rocket motors are sent to Sandia for inspection and testing, and after Sandia approves the components, they are shipped to Pantex for weapon assembly, according to contractor representatives.\nComponent manufacturing research. In addition to designing and producing components for LEPs and modernization efforts, NNSA sites also collaborate on other explosives research and development programs, such as on component manufacturing processes. For example, Los Alamos, Livermore, Sandia, and Pantex are collaborating on additive manufacturing processes for explosives. Additive manufacturing differs from traditional manufacturing in that it builds components by depositing material rather than by cutting material away during machining. This research effort seeks to introduce additive manufacturing into the explosives production process, producing explosive parts with highly complex geometries while meeting NNSA’s safety and performance requirements, according to a contractor representative.\nIn May 2018, according to NNSA documentation, NNSA began implementing a new enterprise-wide approach to improve the management and coordination of explosives activities across its sites. In the past, each program that used explosives—such as an LEP or a research and development program—developed or procured them independently of other programs, without formal coordination to ensure each program’s awareness of other programs’ requirements or time frames. Under the new enterprise-wide approach, NNSA has taken several steps to centralize management at an enterprise level and to coordinate explosives activities across its sites. Specifically: In May 2018, NNSA established the Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager (enterprise manager) position to help coordinate NNSA’s explosives activities. The agency issued a May 2018 memorandum formally establishing the position, signed by the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. The memorandum specified that the enterprise manager should encourage collaboration among the sites and programs that conduct explosives activities.\nIn September 2018, the enterprise manager established NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee (coordinating committee) to identify coordination challenges across the enterprise and emerging needs for critical explosive materials, among other purposes. The coordinating committee is composed of NNSA officials and contractor representatives from NNSA’s sites, is chaired by the enterprise manager, and is expected to meet at least once a year. According to NNSA documents, the coordinating committee met twice in 2018 and identified a number of future actions requiring input from the sites, such as defining future needs associated with the production of main charge explosive materials.\nIn December 2018, NNSA issued the strategic plan for energetic materials. This strategic plan states that it will help NNSA organize its efforts to meet weapon delivery schedules for the overall energetics community. Prior to the strategic plan’s final issuance, the enterprise manager provided a draft to coordinating committee members to solicit their comments.\nHowever, more recent action taken by NNSA indicates that the enterprise approach to managing high explosives is continuing to evolve. First, according to NNSA officials, in 2019 NNSA is planning to reorganize the Office of Defense Programs—which is responsible for all stockpile activities. This reorganization could affect the approach to managing high explosives activities. Specifically, officials said part of this reorganization is the creation of a new organization for production activities, which is expected to divide production activities into several groups oriented around different weapons components. It is currently unclear under which production group explosives activities will fall because there are production activities associated with explosives for both nuclear and nonnuclear components, according to NNSA officials.\nSecond, in December 2018, NNSA officials indicated that they are considering elevating high explosives to a “strategic material” and managing it more similarly to NNSA’s existing approach for managing other strategic materials, such as plutonium. NNSA’s strategic materials managers are overseen by a senior NNSA official and appointed to manage each material as a program, with a budget and dedicated staff, according to NNSA documentation. NNSA does not consider the high explosives enterprise manager to be managing a program; therefore, the enterprise manager does not have an explosives budget or dedicated staff, according to NNSA officials. NNSA officials said they anticipate issuing an analysis of alternatives study in spring 2019 that will contain a recommendation to the NNSA Administrator on how explosives activities should be managed going forward, which could reflect a shift toward managing high explosives as a strategic material.", "NNSA officials and contractor representatives have identified a number of challenges related to NNSA’s supply of explosive materials, infrastructure, and staff recruitment and training. First, NNSA’s supply of certain highly specialized explosive materials is dwindling, and NNSA officials and contractor representatives stated that it is challenging to reproduce or procure these materials. Second, officials and contractor representatives identified infrastructure that is aging and deteriorating, inaccurate information on that infrastructure, and storage areas filled to near capacity as challenges. Finally, according to NNSA contractor representatives, there are difficulties in recruiting and training qualified staff. NNSA has taken some actions to address these challenges, such as starting to recreate “recipes” for specialized materials and modernize aging infrastructure, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives. However, taking additional steps to improve the quality of information about its explosives infrastructure would give the agency more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and the enterprise manager have the quality information necessary to support management decisions.", "NNSA’s Challenges Producing Fogbank The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has had challenges in the past producing materials other than explosives that are essential to the successful operation of nuclear weapons. In 2000, NNSA began a life extension program (LEP) to replace or modernize components for W76 warheads, which are delivered by submarine-launched ballistic missile systems. NNSA had to delay production of the refurbished warheads when it encountered problems in manufacturing an important material that NNSA refers to as “Fogbank.” In March 2009, we reported that NNSA had lost knowledge of how to manufacture the material because it had kept few records of the process when the material was made in the 1980s, and almost all staff with expertise on production had retired or left the agency, leaving the production process for Fogbank dormant for about 25 years. As we reported, NNSA’s loss of the technical knowledge and expertise to manufacture Fogbank resulted in a 1-year delay in the W76-1 LEP and an unexpected cost increase of nearly $70 million. According to NNSA officials, production challenges with Fogbank have since been resolved, and the last production unit for the W76-1 LEP was completed in December 2018.\nNNSA’s supply of certain highly specialized explosive materials is dwindling. These materials have specific chemical and physical characteristics that fulfill precise performance requirements in nuclear weapons, such as detonation within nanoseconds, according to contractor representatives. One such material, titanium sub-hydride potassium perchlorate (THKP), is used in actuators to open valves, among other things, according to contractor representatives. TATB, the IHE molecule used in main charges, is another such material, according to contractor representatives. In some cases, contractor representatives said that only one container or production lot of specialized material was ever produced that met NNSA’s specifications. The inventories of these materials have dwindled as ongoing LEPs, modernization efforts, and research and development activities draw on them. For example, only a small container of THKP remains. Additional inventory will be required to meet the needs of four of the five ongoing LEPs and modernization efforts, as well as for any future needs, according to contractor representatives from Sandia. Similarly, although Pantex has a stockpile of legacy TATB for the B61-12 LEP, contractor representatives said that new material will be needed to meet the requirements of planned and future LEPs and modernization efforts.\nNNSA officials stated that reproducing and procuring these highly specialized materials presents challenges for the agency. According to NNSA documents and officials, lost recipes and a fragile supplier base contribute to these challenges (see sidebar).", "Some specialized materials were created decades ago, and the knowledge base to successfully produce them is now gone. According to NNSA documents, technical knowledge of material production processes can be lost when long intervals occur between production orders. In some cases, processes were not well documented or were infrequently practiced and proven. Thus, NNSA sites must spend considerable effort to recreate the recipes and techniques for producing these materials. Sandia representatives explained that sometimes a single company or even an individual created these materials and has since ceased production or is now deceased. For example, THKP was produced exclusively for Sandia by DOE’s Mound Site near Dayton, Ohio, which closed in 1994. The THKP production process was designed by an individual at the Mound Site who is now deceased. In some cases, according to contractor representatives, a single container of explosives (or a single production lot) met anticipated future needs for quality and quantity when it was originally produced, so production was discontinued. Contractor representatives explained that replicating the material exactly is nearly impossible because of the large number of variables, such as the mixing speed and temperature, that must be controlled for, even if the ingredients are identical to those used many years ago, which is not often the case.\nTo address the challenge of lost recipes, Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore, and Pantex are all working to reproduce materials with performance and physical properties similar to those of legacy materials and prepare for their full-scale production. For example, Livermore scientists said they are conducting research to synthesize new TATB that is uniquely suited to NNSA’s needs. According to NNSA contractor representatives, the synthesis process will be refined until it can be replicated by Holston for the W80-4 LEP. Additionally, Los Alamos scientists are researching the formulation process with legacy TATB for the B61-12 main charges. The chemical formulation of binder material used in the past has slightly changed, affecting the structural strength of formulated TATB. Without the proper strength, this formulated explosive cannot be pressed effectively, according to contractor representatives. Sandia is also working to re-establish the THKP production process.\nNNSA is also working to address the challenge of lost recipes by developing a comprehensive master list for explosive materials. The list tracks information such as the suppliers involved and specific production challenges. According to NNSA and contractor officials, collecting and sharing such information across the sites related to explosive production processes, specifications, and performance will help prevent lost recipes in the future.", "Even if the sites can replicate lost recipes for explosive materials, NNSA’s supplier base for those materials is fragile. As previously reported and according to NNSA documentation, finding suppliers willing and able to provide required parts and materials can be difficult. Contractor representatives told us that this difficulty arises because of the small quantities of explosive parts and materials NNSA procures, the irregular nature of NNSA’s procurements, and the agency’s exacting performance requirements. For example, neutron generators contain explosive parts that Sandia orders irregularly, in batches numbering only in the hundreds. These parts have such exacting requirements for size and timing that they are hand-made under microscopes. Sandia contractor representatives explained that sometimes the laboratory’s part and material orders may represent only 1 to 3 percent of a company’s total production.\nTo address this challenge, NNSA is working to purchase materials more consistently to ensure that companies can rely on NNSA as a steady customer and be comfortable working to meet NNSA’s exacting requirements. Contractor representatives said that ensuring consistency in production can help maintain the expertise needed to avoid having to reconstitute a specialized process, which can be costly. For example, the effort to restart TATB synthesis and formulation cost approximately $13 million and added 3-1/2 years to the original TATB production schedule, according to Los Alamos contractor representatives. Contractor representatives at Pantex and Los Alamos said that they plan to support continuous production of synthesized TATB and formulated explosives at Holston in the future to avoid delays in restarting production (see sidebar).\nA Fragile Supplier Base for Other Material The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has identified challenges with a fragile supplier base for other specialized materials that are used in explosives-related experiments and research. For example, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) in New Mexico requires highly specialized test vessels to conduct essential nuclear weapons research. Specifically, Los Alamos’s Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) uses X-ray machines to record three-dimensional interior images of mock nuclear materials that are imploded using explosives. The exploding components are contained in steel vessels. This facility is unique because it is the world’s most powerful X-ray machine for analysis of these implosions (called hydrodynamic tests). The vessels used at DARHT are made of specialized steel that does not need to be heat-treated during repairs, allowing the laboratory to easily repair them after explosive testing. There is currently a small supplier base (domestic and international) for manufacturing these vessels. Los Alamos contractor representatives are concerned with vendor availability, capability, and willingness to produce vessels because of the small number the laboratory has purchased in the past—they currently have seven operational vessels. Also, contractor representatives said they are concerned that the workforce which knows how to create this specialized steel is nearing retirement. To help ensure a continued future supply of the vessels, Los Alamos is working with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and the Nevada National Security Site, which use similar vessels, to develop a multi-year procurement plan to encourage suppliers to continue to produce the specialized steel used in their manufacture.\nNNSA supplier challenges are complicated further when a supplier is foreign or there is only one domestic supplier. According to NNSA documentation, using a foreign supplier may leave NNSA vulnerable to a potential national security risk. Even when the only supplier is domestic, single-point failure is a concern should that supplier delay or cease production, according to contractor representatives. NNSA officials provided an example involving Holston, NNSA’s sole supplier of TATB. According to NNSA officials and contractor representatives, Holston also serves DOD customers that order far larger quantities of explosives, and Holston is required to prioritize those customers’ orders using DOD procurement priority ratings, which may mean that NNSA orders are delayed. For example, Livermore placed an order for the W80-4 main charge explosives at Holston that was to be fulfilled by March 2019, but that order was delayed while the plant worked to finish a DOD order with a higher-priority rating. In addition to this delay, Livermore’s order will be further delayed because Holston had an explosive incident in January 2019 and ceased operations for 3 weeks, according to Livermore and DOD contractor representatives. As a result of both these delays, the W80-4 LEP will have to postpone a hydrodynamic test and other studies, complicating an already tight design and development schedule. This will delay the W80-4 LEP at least 2 months, according to Livermore officials.\nTo minimize the potential for future production delays at Holston, NNSA is working to elevate the priority of all its orders for explosives. Some DOD nuclear weapon delivery platforms have the highest-priority DOD rating, and NNSA officials said they have received permission from DOD to apply this rating to the DOE explosives orders for the nuclear warheads associated with those delivery platforms, including explosive orders for the B61-12 LEP. NNSA officials said they cannot currently use the highest-priority rating for orders associated with the W80-4 LEP because the delivery platform for that LEP does not have the highest-priority rating. NNSA officials are working with DOD and DOE attorneys to obtain permission for using DOD’s highest-priority rating. A contractor representative at Livermore said that in addition to NNSA’s efforts, the Air Force is working separately to obtain permission to use the highest- priority rating for this delivery platform. If the Air Force is successful, NNSA could use that delivery platform’s new high-priority rating for its W80-4 LEP orders. The Livermore contractor representative said that they believe the Air Force will receive permission to use the highest- priority rating before NNSA does.\nIn situations where a supplier cannot or will not produce a specialized material or related component, NNSA is exploring options for producing those materials or components itself. NNSA officials said that they are conducting an analysis of alternatives to meet synthesis, formulation, and production requirements to be completed by the spring of 2019. The analysis will include an option for in-house production of TATB at Pantex. NNSA documentation indicates that Pantex could independently produce the TATB needed for current and future LEPs and modernization efforts with a substantial investment, exact figures for which may be reported upon completion of the analysis of alternatives. Similarly, contractor representatives from Sandia said that in the absence of qualified suppliers, they are working to produce explosive materials, such as THKP as discussed above.", "NNSA has also identified challenges with its explosives infrastructure, infrastructure data, and workforce. Specifically, NNSA’s infrastructure is aging and deteriorating, some infrastructure data are inaccurate, and some storage areas are near capacity. In addition, recruiting and training qualified staff have presented a challenge to NNSA. As we have previously reported, these challenges are shared across the nuclear security enterprise and are not confined to explosives activities. NNSA is taking several actions to address these challenges, as described below, but data inaccuracies remain related to NNSA’s explosives-related assets.", "According to NNSA documentation, no mission risk is greater than the state of the agency’s aging infrastructure. The NNSA 2019 Master Asset Plan states that 40 percent of the explosives infrastructure of NNSA’s sites is insufficient to meet mission needs, which can lead to contamination of explosive products or limit the use of facilities. Contractor representatives told us that such contamination has occurred. For example, Pantex contractor representatives said that batches of explosives have been contaminated in its main formulation building by rust falling from the rafters and grass blowing through cracks in the walls. Similarly, Los Alamos contractor representatives said that detonator subassemblies have been rejected at the laboratory because of contamination from foreign debris, such as dust particles that enter through cracks in exterior doors.\nIn addition, older facilities were not built to modern safety standards and pose risks to explosives activities and employees, according to contractor representatives and NNSA documents. At Los Alamos, the design of several older facilities is insufficient to meet current needs, which negatively affects both productivity and safety. For example, the Los Alamos’s High Explosives Chemistry Laboratory is a 1950s era building that is difficult to adapt to modern instrumentation, and electrical and other system failures cause approximately 20 percent downtime, according to contractor representatives. This building is also under a state of continuous limited operation because the laboratory must work under a decreased net explosive limit to keep employees safe while handling explosive materials because the facility lacks adequate blowout walls, according to contractor representatives. Contractor representatives at Los Alamos said that the decreased explosive limits in this facility have hampered their productivity levels. Contractor representatives at Pantex stated that the intrusion of water in key facilities poses electrocution risks, can damage expensive equipment, and can affect production because of downtime when explosives activities must be suspended because of severe weather. Further, we observed facilities at Pantex with water leaks in the roof and floor; some of these facilities house expensive equipment that must be stored under plastic sheeting to prevent water damage. One such facility is Pantex’s Analytics and Chemistry Laboratory, built in 1943 and shown in figures 4 and 5.\nNNSA and its sites have taken some actions to address this infrastructure challenge. For example, Los Alamos plans to replace its High Explosives Chemistry Laboratory by 2026, and Pantex recently constructed a new building to replace an aging pressing facility and has plans to begin construction on a new analytical laboratory and a formulation building in the 2020s. NNSA documentation states that the new pressing facility will improve operational safety and security thereby enhancing the quality and efficiency of operations. Pantex’s planned analytical laboratory and formulation buildings, however, will not be completed in time to support the currently scheduled B61-12 LEP and W88 alteration modernization effort. Further, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives, site infrastructure modernization plans are budget dependent and funding for infrastructure modernization efforts is not always certain.", "Contractor representatives told us and we observed during site visits that some of the data on explosives-related assets in the FIMS real property database were inaccurate and out of date. NNSA policy and the FIMS user’s guide state that NNSA and sites should review and update the capabilities, or programmatic mission(s) associated with each asset, such as being explosives-related, every 5 years, or more frequently if mission requirements change or there are changes in an asset’s physical condition or use. However, 8 of the 22 randomly selected assets from the four sites that we observed contained data in FIMS that were inaccurate because either the information on an asset was out of date or the asset should never have been listed as explosives-related. Some contractor representatives told us that they did not understand why some of their sites’ assets had been characterized as primary assets related to the high explosives mission. For example, an inert storage closet at Pantex and a tool shed at Livermore were labeled as primary explosives-related assets, but according to contractor representatives, they can no longer be used to store explosives because they do not meet appropriate safety standards. Figure 6 illustrates the inert storage at Pantex, which officials said had not been used for any explosives operations for at least 20 years, despite “explosives storage” labeling on the door, but was still characterized as a primary explosives-related asset. However, according to NNSA officials, NNSA was, at the time of our review, in the process of revising guidance on how to associate capabilities with assets. The contractor representatives may not have been aware of the initial guidance the asset was characterized under or of the change underway at the time of our site visit.\nIn other cases, contractor representatives told us that the asset name did not indicate its current use. For example, FIMS data on explosives-related assets at Los Alamos has a “plastics building” that had not been used for manufacturing and assembling plastics for 20 years. Although it currently houses explosives-related work, the building’s name in FIMS had not been updated. Additionally, Los Alamos’s FIMS data indicated that the site had a “day room” that to contractor representatives’ knowledge had never been used for any explosives activities although its purpose has changed over time.\nWe found additional inaccuracies related to various measures of explosives-related assets reported in FIMS. For example, we found at least 94 erroneous entries on the gross square footage of the 1,266 assets identified as having some type of explosives-related capability.\nFor example, FIMS data indicated that a road at Livermore, a bunker at Sandia, and an asset named “recreational/fitness” at Pantex were 3, 1, and 2 gross square feet, respectively. The data listed replacement values of at least $1 million for each of these assets. Los Alamos’s data contained similar errors, such as electrical cables recorded as measuring zero square feet.\nNNSA officials and contractor representatives identified potential causes for inaccuracies in the FIMS data. For example, contractor representatives who work on explosives activities do not enter explosives- related asset information in FIMS, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives. Instead, FIMS administrators, who manage information on infrastructure across NNSA sites, said they update FIMS using information that subject matter experts or building managers provide to them, typically in an annual data call. FIMS administrators may therefore not be aware of information that is dated or otherwise incorrect for explosives-related assets. In addition, entering information in certain data fields in FIMS was difficult for assets that were not buildings, according to one FIMS administrator. For example, piping and other utilities may be replaced or updated in sections over time, and it can be difficult to know which date to record for age in FIMS. Because our review included only a limited sample of explosives-related assets, we could not determine the full extent of the FIMS data inaccuracies.\nNNSA managers use data from FIMS for planning purposes on infrastructure modernization decisions. According to NNSA officials, data from FIMS feeds into other databases that are used to inform infrastructure funding decisions, such as developing the Integrated Priority List that helps NNSA determine the most critical infrastructure modernization projects. While NNSA relies on these data to make planning and funding decisions, our observations of explosives-related assets shows that these data may not be useful in informing the agencies’ infrastructure modernization decisions. Federal internal control standards state that managers should make decisions using quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis. By taking steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data— such as by reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with their primary and secondary programmatic missions, ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide, and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for assets that are not buildings— NNSA would have more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and the enterprise manager have the quality information necessary to support management decisions on explosives-related activities.", "DOE’s requirements for explosives storage limit the amount and type of explosives that can be stored in a single location, since certain explosives may react when stored together. Explosives must be properly stored throughout their life cycles, from the synthesis of raw explosives to their use in weapon assembly or testing. According to a senior NNSA official and site contractor representatives, some sites are running out of space where they can safely store explosives. As contractor representatives from Pantex told us and we observed on our site visit, bunkers for storing explosives are filled to or near capacity, especially for storage in high- security areas. According to contractor representatives, this is problematic because Pantex has the greatest need of all NNSA sites for explosives storage because of its role in producing explosives, receiving and holding explosive parts from across the nuclear security enterprise prior to weapon assembly, and assembling and disassembling weapons. Contractor representatives from Los Alamos also voiced concern about being near their capacity to store detonator cable assemblies and other explosives awaiting shipment for installation in weapons or for testing.\nNNSA officials and contractor representatives said that they are tracking the shortage of sufficient explosives storage and in some cases have plans to expand current capacity. Los Alamos contractor representatives also said that they are moving forward with constructing a small staging facility that will be collocated with their detonator production facility. It is expected to cost less than $5 million so it will not affect larger line item infrastructure projects. Contractor representatives at Pantex explained that although some storage areas have been identified for replacement, they are, as yet, unfunded projects. In the near term, contractor representatives said that they have other, more pressing infrastructure modernization project needs than explosives storage. They said that they are closely monitoring their storage capacity and expect ongoing modernization efforts to free up some storage space as weapons are assembled.", "According to NNSA documents and contractor representatives, the contractor workforce at NNSA sites needs to grow to meet the demands of ongoing and future explosives work, but contractors face difficulty recruiting and training qualified new staff to perform this specialized work, which often requires a security clearance. In 2018, Pantex estimated that it needed 211 FTE contractor staff to adequately carry out the site’s explosives activities. However, Pantex contractor representatives indicated that as of November 2018, they had 172 FTEs on board. A major recruitment challenge is competition from industry. Contractor representatives at multiple sites told us that they often compete with large corporations and industries in the local area that offer well-paying jobs for qualified new staff, such as for engineers. For example, site contractor representatives told us that Los Alamos and Sandia compete with Facebook in Albuquerque to attract qualified staff; and Pantex competes with various oil and gas companies in Texas. To address this challenge, contractor representatives from Pantex have recently expanded outreach to local colleges and universities, and NNSA has held job fairs to attract new staff.\nLengthy training and clearance processes that are required for specialized explosives work present another challenge. Pantex representatives said recent graduates are required to undergo on-the-job training that can take years before they are ready to safely engage in certain explosives activities. NNSA officials and contractor representatives said that this training challenge is exacerbated by the delays in processing security clearances. NNSA contractor representatives said that some new hires have waited more than a year, and some more than 2 years, to receive clearances to conduct required work or training. In December 2017, we identified delays in obtaining personnel security clearances as a government-wide risk. We also added this issue to our March 2019 High-Risk List. To mitigate this challenge, contractor representatives from Pantex said that they are hiring students before they finish college so that security clearances can be granted by the time students are ready to begin their first day on the job or at least closer to that time. Los Alamos has decided to hire and train individuals without clearances, who must wear red vests and be escorted at all times while their clearances are finalized. We observed numerous workers in this temporary and escorted status during our site visit. Contractor representatives at Livermore said that they also use escorts for new staff without clearances. However, contractor representatives said that requiring additional staff as escorts is costly, can decrease productivity, and has safety impacts because additional staff must be present during activities involving high explosives.", "NNSA’s 2018 strategic plan for energetic materials describes some identified explosives-related challenges discussed above, as well as further actions to address these challenges, but does not describe other challenges NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified. This strategic plan incorporates some leading practices for strategic planning. However, some of the strategic plan’s elements have not been fully developed consistent with selected leading practices for strategic planning.", "The strategic plan for energetic materials, which includes comments from coordinating committee members, describes some of the challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified in conducting explosives activities, which we discussed above. Specifically, it describes some challenges related to the supply of explosive materials and to infrastructure modernization, including the following:\nSupply of explosive materials. The strategic plan describes both the supply of explosive materials as well as the supply of pre-cursor ingredients as a challenge facing NNSA. The strategic plan also identifies a number of actions NNSA is taking to bolster the supply chain, such as re-establishing the capability to manufacture THKP.\nInfrastructure modernization. The strategic plan notes that explosives-related “facilities require recapitalization to support LEP activities, improve efficiencies, reduce downtime, and maintain baseline capabilities.” It also identifies several interrelated actions NNSA is taking to address infrastructure challenges, such as re- purposing some facilities and eliminating others that are inadequate, too costly to maintain, or no longer needed. In addition, the strategic plan describes the challenge of adequate storage for explosives and includes actions to annually monitor and track storage conditions at the sites as well as provide long-term, low-temperature, moisture-free storage for explosives.\nHowever, based on our review of the strategic plan, it does not discuss three of the challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives had identified: the quality of data on infrastructure information, workforce levels, and safety. First, the data quality challenge related to infrastructure information, such as inaccuracies in FIMS, is not discussed in the strategic plan, although NNSA officials and contractor representatives we interviewed identified it as a challenge that may affect its planning and decision-making related to explosives activities.\nSecond, the strategic plan does not discuss workforce challenges. While the strategic plan states that NNSA “recognize(s) that staffing is an important aspect for supporting energetics, it assumes that ongoing efforts across the nuclear security enterprise related to workforce are successful.” Since the enterprise manager does not track workforce levels across the enterprise, as previously noted, it is unclear how NNSA can determine if its contractors’ workforce efforts across the enterprise are successful and whether levels are adequate to achieve the goals of the strategic plan for explosives over time.\nThird, outside of infrastructure improvement, the strategic plan also does not directly discuss the challenge of safety, although it affects all explosives activities and challenges that NNSA has identified. Because of the inherent danger of explosives activities, safety is important, and even when protocols are followed, unintended events can occur that affect human safety—as illustrated by a safety incident last year. The incident occurred at a Los Alamos facility in April 2018 when a small explosive pellet deflagrated during pressing, causing two people to incur short-term hearing loss. One of those people was an escort and was only required to be present because of the delay in security clearance processing, a challenge discussed above. According to a December 2018 Los Alamos document, pressing operations had resumed at the facility. Although the cause of the incident is still unclear, it provided an opportunity to make safety improvements in the facility at Los Alamos, according to contractor representatives. According to a Los Alamos document about the incident, a key lesson learned was that safety records like maintenance logs, blast calculations, and materials safety testing results need to be archived and readily accessible to staff before the start of any work activities. The inherent challenge of safety in explosives and key lessons learned, such as this one, are not discussed in the strategic plan.\nNNSA officials said that they are planning to revise the strategic plan for energetic materials in 2020 but did not state that they would include the challenges of data quality, workforce, or safety. All three of these challenges may impede NNSA’s ability to achieve the goals described in the plan for explosives activities. We have previously identified selected leading practices in strategic planning. These practices specify that agencies should define strategies that address management challenges that threaten an agency’s ability to meet its long-term strategic goals. As NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by discussing the data, workforce, and safety challenges it faces and the actions it plans to address them, as appropriate, or documenting the rationale for why the challenges were not included, NNSA would have better assurance that its strategies address these challenges.", "In developing its strategic plan for energetic materials, NNSA followed several key leading practices in strategic planning that we have identified in our past work, including the following: Involving stakeholders, such as federal agencies, state governments, or others, in defining the mission and desired outcomes helps ensure that their expectations and interests are met and that resources and efforts are targeted at the program’s highest priorities. When developing the strategic plan, NNSA shared a draft with members of the coordinating committee and incorporated their comments to ensure that their interests and expectations were met.\nAssessing external and internal forces helps managers anticipate future challenges and make adjustments before potential problems become crises. For example, external forces (e.g., emerging technological trends and new statutory requirements) and internal forces (e.g., culture, management practices, and business processes) may influence the program’s ability to achieve its goals. When developing the strategic plan, NNSA officials and coordinating committee members considered external and internal forces. For example, the officials and members discussed the availability of explosives from external suppliers, such as Holston, compared to the potential costs or challenges related to internal NNSA production of explosives.\nCovering at least a 4-year period, while making adjustments as needed to reflect significant changes to the operating environment, is also a key strategic planning practice. The strategic plan covers more than 4 years of explosives activities. For example, there is a performance goal to re-establish a reliable THKP supply by 2024. In addition, NNSA officials have discussed their intention to update the plan as their operating environment changes.\nOur past work has also shown that effective strategic plans should include specific elements. We reviewed NNSA’s Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials and found that the strategic plan includes most of these elements, but we also found that some of the strategic plan’s elements have not been fully developed. Specifically:\nMission statement. According to leading federal strategic planning practices, a comprehensive mission statement should explain why a program exists and what it does. The strategic plan does not clearly identify a mission statement but includes an overarching “strategy to ensure the availability of energetic materials and products for the stockpile.” When asked to identify the energetics mission statement, the two contractor representatives who led the development of the strategic plan told us that they consider this “strategy” to be the energetics mission. However, a strategy cannot be a mission, since a strategy is how a mission may be achieved.\nLong-term strategic goals and objectives, strategies, and performance goals. There are several interrelated elements on long- term strategic goals, objectives, strategies, and performance goals, according to leading strategic planning practices. These include that long-term strategic goals and objectives should specify how an agency will carry out its mission and explain what results are expected from the program. The strategic plan includes four long-term strategic goals for meeting its mission, some strategies for achieving its goals, and some performance goals to assess progress related to ensuring the availability of explosives. They are also logically linked to each other. For example, the strategic plan’s goal to sustain and modernize the energetics infrastructure relates to the strategic plan’s strategy to eliminate facilities that are inadequate, too costly to maintain, or no longer needed. However, we found that responsibilities for achieving the strategic plan’s four goals are not clearly assigned within NNSA, and the four goals are not consistently quantifiable. For example, the third goal is to “manage the energetics supply chain,” but the strategic plan does not specify who is responsible for achieving this goal within NNSA. Further, this long-term strategic goal is not quantifiable because it describes a general process and does not define the expected results, which may make it difficult for NNSA to assess progress in meeting the goal.\nAccording to leading strategic planning practices, strategies should be specific enough to allow an assessment of whether they will help achieve those goals, such as by describing the resources needed, including the staff responsible to achieve a program’s goals and objectives. We found that the strategic plan contains several strategies for achieving goals, but some of them are not specific enough to clearly identify the types of resources required, such as the parties responsible for achieving them. For example, under the goal of managing the energetics supply chain, there is a strategy to “plan, track and assess the energetics strategic posture,” but the strategic plan does not specify what is meant by the energetics strategic posture or who is responsible for undertaking these actions. This strategy is also limited because it does not describe the resources needed to achieve the broader goal.\nAccording to leading strategic planning practices, performance goals should be used to assess progress toward long-term goals and should include (1) the specific activities within the program that will be assessed for performance and (2) the level of performance to be achieved for each measure. We found that the strategic plan has 50 performance goals, most of which were quantifiable—or able to be assessed for performance or progress. However, some were not quantifiable, such as to “enhance or advance energetics formulations for additive manufacturing.” This performance goal also does not set milestones, such as a time frame for completion, or staff assigned to achieve it, contrary to leading strategic planning practices. Further, the level of performance for some goals was not fully developed. For example, the performance goal “to reduce substandard mission- critical facilities below 10 percent” does not clarify whether the goal is to reduce the current number of inadequate and substandard facilities by 10 percent (a change of about 50 facilities) or reduce the total number of inadequate and substandard facilities to be less than 10 percent of all facilities (a change of about 500 facilities). This performance goal also does not set time frames for measuring performance or list responsible parties associated with it. Another performance goal that was not fully developed is to “manage the energetics supply chain,” which falls under the long-term strategic goal of “sustaining and modernizing the infrastructure.” In addition, this performance goal is identical to a long-term strategic goal in the strategic plan titled “manage the energetics supply chain.” A performance goal should not replicate a strategic goal, since long- term strategic goals are broader in nature than performance goals. Moreover, this particular performance goal is not quantifiable, does not set a time frame for completion, and does not list a responsible party to carry out specific activities to achieve the goal.\nExternal factors. According to leading strategic planning practices, external factors that could significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals, such as economic trends or actions by Congress, state and federal agencies, or other entities, should be identified. The strategic plan identifies some external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of strategic goals. Specifically, the strategic plan notes that DOD’s demand for explosives from Holston could affect NNSA’s ability to achieve its goals. According to NNSA officials and documents, DOD’s demand for explosives is increasing, and Holston is already struggling to meet DOD’s needs. According to Holston contractor representatives, DOD is expanding Holston’s production capabilities for HMX, research development explosive (RDX), and insensitive munitions explosive (IMX) which when completed will relieve pressure on TATB production. In addition, the strategic plan identifies challenges to its supplier base, such as the difficulty of sourcing explosive materials from non-U.S. suppliers and that the small size of NNSA’s orders provides limited economic incentive for commercial vendors. However, the strategic plan does not identify other external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of strategic goals, such as actions taken or not taken by Congress. Specifically, modernizing the explosives infrastructure will require appropriations for the significant capital investment needed, but the uncertainty of future appropriations in a challenging fiscal environment is an external factor not identified in the strategic plan. In addition, the strategic plan does not acknowledge that other NNSA programs may compete for funds or affect infrastructure modernization priorities at a given site.\nNNSA officials, including the enterprise manager, stated that they are aware that the strategic plan for energetic materials has limitations, such as performance goals that are not specific or are difficult to quantify. NNSA officials said that they released the strategic plan quickly as it was the first of its kind for explosives activities, and they believed the explosives community would receive the most benefit it if it was published as soon as possible, though it was not fully complete. Further, they said that they intend to revise the strategic plan in the next year or so. As NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, including fully developed elements of an effective plan—such as a clear mission statement and quantifiable performance goals that set time frames for completion and list responsible parties who will carry out specific activities for all strategic goals—would help NNSA make the strategic plan useful in measuring goal achievement and assessing accountability.", "NNSA is undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear weapons, and explosives are essential to the functioning of these weapons. Five NNSA sites conduct a range of interdependent activities to design and produce explosives. NNSA has identified several challenges in carrying out these activities and is taking actions to address them. For example, NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified challenges related to producing highly specialized materials and are working to re-establish their supply. However, NNSA managers may be relying on inaccurate FIMS data on infrastructure related to explosives activities to make modernization decisions, because we found a number of inaccuracies in FIMS data on explosives activities. NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified a few potential causes for these inaccuracies; however, because our review included only a limited sample of explosives-related assets, we could not determine the full extent of the FIMS data inaccuracies. According to NNSA officials, NNSA has taken some initial steps to revise guidance, which we find encouraging as these revisions may help improve accuracy of FIMS data. By taking additional steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data—such as reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with their primary and secondary programmatic missions, ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide, and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for assets that are not buildings—NNSA would have more reasonable assurance that officials, contractor representatives, and the enterprise manager have the quality information necessary to support management decisions on explosives-related activities.\nIn addition, the strategic plan for energetic materials—which represents a positive step toward managing explosives in a forward-looking, enterprise-wide approach—does not discuss three of the significant challenges that NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified related to explosives activities. NNSA officials said that they are planning to revise the strategic plan in 2020 but did not state that they would incorporate data quality, workforce, or safety challenges. As the agency revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by discussing these challenges and actions planned to address them, as appropriate, or documenting the rationale for why the challenges were not included, NNSA would have better assurance that it is effectively managing challenges that present risks to achieving its objectives.\nThe strategic plan for energetic materials also does not contain fully developed elements that we have previously reported that effective strategic plans should include, such as a fully developed mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities. NNSA officials said that they intend to revise the strategic plan in 2020. As NNSA revises its strategic plan for energetic materials, by including fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan—such as a fully developed and clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, have time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals— NNSA would help make the strategic plan more useful in measuring goal achievement and assessing accountability.", "We are making the following three recommendations to NNSA: NNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager and relevant NNSA officials and contractor representatives at NNSA sites should take steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data related to NNSA’s infrastructure supporting explosives activities. These steps should include reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with primary and secondary explosives missions; ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide; and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for explosives assets that are not buildings. (Recommendation 1)\nNNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include discussion of identified challenges related to explosives activities, such as data quality, workforce levels, and safety as well as any actions to address them, as appropriate, or document the rationale for why identified challenges were not included. (Recommendation 2)\nNNSA’s Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA’s Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan, such as a clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals. (Recommendation 3)", "We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NNSA for review and comment. In its written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix I, NNSA concurred with the report’s recommendations and described actions that it intends to take in response to our recommendations. NNSA also provided technical comments, which we considered and incorporated in our report as appropriate. DOE did not comment on our findings and recommendations.\nIn response to our first recommendation, NNSA stated that it recognizes the need to improve infrastructure data consistency and accuracy and intends to complete several actions by March 31, 2020 to improve its infrastructure data. For example, DOE’s Infrastructure Executive Committee is conducting a comprehensive review of the existing 178 data elements in FIMS and has proposed deleting or adjusting 66, which it believes will sharpen its focus on data quality for the remaining data elements. In addition, among other actions, NNSA stated it is implementing the Mission Dependency Index 2.0 initiative, which is expected to provide greater consistency and accuracy on reporting asset capability and determining consequence to mission.\nIn response to our second and third recommendations, NNSA stated that it is planning to revise its Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials by October 31, 2019. NNSA stated that the update to its plan will include a discussion of the identified challenges to explosives activities as well as fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director), Eric Bachhuber (Analyst in Charge), Natalie Block, Scott Fletcher, Ellen Fried, Rob Grace, and Dennis Mayo made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Cindy Gilbert, Penney Harwell Caramia, Dan C. Royer, Jeanette Soares, Kiki Theodoropoulos, and Khristi Wilkins." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h3_full h2_full", "h3_full", "h2_full", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How does the NNSA develop explosive materials?", "What is the scale of nuclear weapon components?", "To what extent do these sites collaborate?", "How are resources shared between sites?", "What challenges exist for NNSA's explosives activities?", "How is NNSA approaching these challenges?", "How does the NSSA plan to address these challenges?", "Why might this plan be considered incomplete?", "Why was the plan released in its incomplete state?", "How will the plan be completed?", "Why is the continued revision of the plan important?", "Why is GAO reviewing NNSA's high explosive capabilities?", "What does GAO's report contain?", "How did GAO collect its information?" ], "summary": [ "Five National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) contractor-operated sites conduct activities to design and produce explosive materials.", "There are about 100 different nuclear weapon components that contain explosive materials (see figure).", "Each site assumes primary responsibility for certain activities, but most activities require collaboration by multiple sites, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives.", "In 2018, NNSA began adopting a centralized approach to managing these activities and coordinating them across its sites.", "NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified several challenges related to explosives activities, such as the agency's dwindling supply of explosive materials, aging and deteriorating infrastructure, and difficulty recruiting and training qualified staff. For example, only a single container of one specialized material remains.", "NNSA officials and contractor representatives indicated that the agency is taking some actions to address these challenges, such as working to replenish the supply of dwindling, highly specialized materials.", "NNSA's strategic plan for explosives activities addresses some of the challenges agency officials and contractor representatives have identified, and NNSA followed several key leading practices in developing its strategic plan.", "However, some of the plan's elements have not been fully developed consistent with selected leading practices. For instance, the plan does not include a fully developed mission statement, and some performance goals are not quantifiable.", "NNSA officials stated that they are aware of the strategic plan's limitations and that they released it quickly to ensure that the explosives community could use it as soon as possible.", "NNSA officials said that they intend to revise the strategic plan in the next year or so.", "As NNSA revises its strategic plan, by including fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan, NNSA would help make the strategic plan more useful in measuring goal achievement and assessing accountability.", "The Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to review NNSA's high explosive capabilities specific to nuclear weapons.", "This report examines (1) explosives activities that NNSA and its sites conduct and how NNSA manages them; (2) challenges NNSA officials and contractor representatives identified in conducting these activities and the extent to which NNSA has taken actions to address them; and (3) the extent to which NNSA's strategic plan for explosives activities describes further actions, if any, to address the challenges identified and follows leading practices for strategic planning.", "GAO reviewed NNSA documents related to explosives activities, including its strategic plan; compared the plan with leading practices; and interviewed NNSA officials and site representatives." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1, 1, 1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_R45253	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Background", "Evolution of 911", "Current State of 911", "No 911 Services", "Basic 911 Services", "Enhanced 911 Services (E911)", "Next Generation 911 Services (NG911)", "Issues for Congress", "Governance", "Governance Options", "Funding", "Technology—Interoperability and Security", "Interoperability", "Cybersecurity", "Congressional Actions", "Conclusion" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Since 1968, state and local 911 systems have provided assistance to people in need. 911 systems are fast, reliable, and effective, and are credited with saving many lives. However, many 911 centers (also known as Public Safety Answering Points or PSAPs) continue to use legacy telephone technologies that can receive 911 voice calls, but cannot accept data (e.g., text, photos). Recent advancements in technology have enabled the creation of a more advanced 911 system that can interact more easily with modern communication devices.\nNext Generation 911 (NG911) technologies offer callers the ability to either call 911 or send data (e.g., text, photos, or video) to PSAPs. NG911 technologies offer PSAPs the ability to accept data, share data with first responders, provide accurate location information, interconnect with other centers, and re-route calls during emergencies. There is general consensus that PSAPs should migrate to NG911; however, the migration will be costly and complex, and will require coordination between state and local 911 agencies and telecommunication providers.\nNG911 technologies are expected to change the way 911 systems operate and interoperate. Local 911 systems may need to create or revise policies to accommodate the new technology. Similarly, with the ability to interconnect systems, there is potential to create a nationwide 911 system, which may create the need for new policies to ensure PSAPs are interoperable and secure. An issue for Congress will be in finding the right level of federal involvement to support the deployment of NG911 nationwide, while respecting state and local authorities over 911 services.", "", "Before the 1960s, there was no universal emergency phone number (i.e., 911) for the public to call to report an emergency or request assistance. People called the local police or fire department directly; callers often had to look up local agency numbers, which could delay the response and cost lives in certain emergencies (e.g., fire, drowning).\nFire safety organizations argued that a single nationwide number for people to call during fires would reduce response times and save lives. In 1967, President Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice declared that a single telephone number should be established to report emergencies or request assistance. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) partnered with American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), the regulated telephone monopoly at the time, to establish a nationwide number. AT&T proposed 911 as the universal number because it was easy to remember, and was not used for other purposes.\nOn February 16, 1968, in Haleyville, AL, the first 911 call was made. Since then, 911 services have expanded to nearly every jurisdiction in the nation, covering most of the United States. In 2017, almost 99% of the U.S. population had access to 911 services. People rely on 911 services; annually, PSAPs receive an estimated 240 million calls for help.\nWhile 911 is the nationwide number to call for emergencies, there is not one nationwide 911 network; the nation's 911 network includes 5,783 separate state and local PSAPs, each of which is operated by a different entity and serves a specific area, typically a county. When a person dials 911, a telecommunications provider (e.g., telephone company, wireless provider) routes the call over a dedicated line to the appropriate PSAP; the PSAP receives calls through its phone systems, and uses computer software to manage 911 caller information (e.g., phone number, location) and to dispatch public safety (e.g., police, fire) to the scene; public safety agencies receive information from the PSAP through computer-aided dispatch systems. The three entities (i.e., telecommunication providers, PSAPs, and public safety agencies) work together, through shared technologies and written agreements to operate, maintain, and upgrade 911 services.", "The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 ( P.L. 106-81 ) directs the FCC to make 911 the universal emergency telephone number for all communication devices (e.g., landline, wireless devices), and to encourage and facilitate the prompt deployment of a nationwide, seamless communications infrastructure for emergency services. Progress has been made; however, there are disparities in services across jurisdictions.", "In some areas of the nation, people do not have access to traditional 911 services. For example, in some areas of Alaska, people are instructed to dial a 1-800 number for assistance, and the number can vary by region. The caller will connect to a public safety agency, but their location will not be automatically conveyed to the public safety agency. In the 2017 National 911 Progress Report, the total number of counties with no 911 authority is 53, based on 47 states reporting; of the 53 counties reporting, 38 were in Alaska.", "Some localities are limited to Basic 911 services. In these jurisdictions, the call is connected to a PSAP, but the call-taker may not receive the phone number or location of the caller; the call-taker may need to ask the caller for their exact location, delaying the response. There are a few jurisdictions limited to Basic 911. The 2017 National 911 Progress Report listed the total number of 911 authorities offering Basic 911 as 9, based on 47 states reporting.", "Most jurisdictions offer some level of Enhanced 911 (E911) services, which provide call-takers with additional location information of callers. In E911 systems, private carriers identify the location of the caller, use the location to route the call to the appropriate PSAP, and send the location to the call-taker. The National Emergency Numbers Association (NENA), a 911 advocacy association, reports that 93% of counties offer some level of E911 services.\nMost PSAPs can receive location information for both landline and wireless callers. Some PSAPs cannot. The 2017 National 911 Progress Report found that 345 authorities can receive landline location information, but not wireless (e.g., cell phone) location information.\nFor mobile callers, the FCC requires wireless carriers, within six months of a request by the PSAP, to provide the location of wireless callers. Under Wireless Phase I (WPI), carriers must provide PSAPs with the wireless number and the cell site from which the call originated. Under Wireless Phase II (WPII), carriers must provide WPI information and the coordinates of the caller. The 2017 National 911 Progress Report found that 3,302 PSAPs out of 5,783 PSAPs had the technologies in place to receive WPII calls.", "Some areas have begun to implement NG911. NG911 systems use Internet Protocol (IP) based technologies to deliver and process calls. NG911 systems include Emergency Services Internet Protocol network (ESInet), IP-based software services and applications, databases, and data management processes that interconnect to PSAP equipment. In NG911 systems, PSAPs can accept voice calls from a variety of devices (e.g., mobile phones, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), such as Skype), and data (e.g., texts, photos). NG911 systems enable PSAPs to interconnect, and for PSAPs to connect to other public safety systems, including the new public safety broadband network, also known as the First Responder Network (FirstNet).\nThe 2017 National 911 Progress Report found that 22 states were making progress toward implementing NG911. Most states and localities are not engaged in a full-scale replacement of legacy systems, but are implementing NG911 networks incrementally, as circumstances and funding enable. In order for upgrades to occur, both telecommunications providers and PSAPs must make changes to their systems to send and receive enhanced location information and data.", "911 systems are operated by state and local entities. Each PSAP uses different technologies, is in different phases of upgrade, and is dependent on different sources of funding. Each 911 agency has its own agreements with local carriers, whose networks are also in various stages of upgrades. As a result, there is variability in 911 levels of services across jurisdictions.\nThere is consensus that upgrades to 911 systems are needed to ensure 911 systems are compatible with modern devices. However, the adoption of NG911 may change the structure of the nation's 911 system from a system of individual PSAPs to one of interconnected PSAPs, and drive the need for national policies to ensure 911 systems are compatible, interoperable, and secure.\nAs the migration begins, issues for Congress may include addressing the migration of 911 to IP-based 911 systems (e.g., NG911); whether national policies are needed to ensure systems are interoperable and secure; the federal role in establishing and implementing national 911 policies; and mechanisms for ensuring state and local compliance with national policies. A key issue for Congress may be determining the level of federal involvement in the deployment of the NG911 and the development of policies (governance, funding, and technology policies) that support the deployment without infringing on state and local authorities over 911 services.", "State and local entities make all decisions related to PSAPs, including decisions related to equipment, solutions, and vendors they will use, and whether and when to upgrade. Congress directed several federal agencies to support state and local 911 efforts, including:\nThe National 911 Program Office in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) form the Implementation Coordination Office (ICO). The ICO is the lead agency on 911, facilitating coordination between federal, state, and local entities. The ICO was charged with preparing an IP migration plan, grant guidance, and a cost study on NG911 implementation. The FCC was required to provide recommendations to Congress on the legal and statutory framework needed for NG911 transition, in coordination with NHTSA, NTIA, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The FCC coordinates 911 improvements with \"public safety agencies, wireless carriers, technology vendors, equipment manufacturers, and local wireline carriers.\" The FCC requires carriers to provide 911 services and manufacturers to ensure equipment is E911 compliant; investigates and reports on 911 outages; enforces rules on the handling of 911 calls by carriers; and reports on 911 fee diversion by states. DHS was required to coordinate with NHTSA on the cost study, and focuses on NG911 interoperability and cyber security issues, risks, and solutions. The Disability Rights Section of the Department of Justice implements the Americans with Disabilities Act to ensure equal access to 911 for the disabled.\nStakeholders have acknowledged that \"as states and localities continue to implement NG911, and begin to explore interconnection with other states' 911 systems, federal agencies may need to take steps to help ensure state NG911 networks are interoperable and connected.\"", "Some stakeholders contend that current federal governance structures can support the deployment of NG911. The FCC has set timelines for carriers to improve 911 services and developed guidance on PSAP architecture and cyber security of NG911 systems. The ICO has developed NG911 governance documents, shared technical guidance and standards for NG911 systems, and incentivized investment in NG911 through grants to state and local entities. However, without funding for state and local migration to NG911, implementation may be limited.\nSome Members of Congress have proposed increasing responsibilities for the ICO to accelerate deployment through increased coordination, development of a nationwide NG911 strategy and model documents for NG911 systems (e.g., model governance structures, federal purchasing agreements), and grant funding. Some have concluded that appointment of a single agency will help to accelerate state and local NG911 deployment. In a 2015 study on NG911, researchers found \"The first step to completing an NG911 transition ... is that of establishing one single entity that has the responsibility and authority to oversee the transition. Just as this is the first step in establishing a state ESInet, it is also the first step in establishing a nationwide ESInet.\"\nSome have debated whether the ICO or FCC should lead the NG911 effort. Both are needed to support NG911 migration. The FCC collaborates with carriers, and relies on its rulemaking authority to drive improvements to private telecommunication networks. The ICO is also developing a roadmap to define, through a collaborative process, federal roles and responsibilities for NG911 deployment. Congress may consider if the federal roles defined are adequate and if the federal agencies supporting NG911 have the resources to carry out their new tasks. While the FCC has been able to drive improvements to private telecommunication network through its rulemaking authority, the ICO has relied on grants to drive improvements to state and local 911 systems. Congress may provide the ICO with additional authorities to guide the transition, but without an effective funding model for NG911 deployment, the ICO's ability to accelerate NG911 deployment may be limited.\nIn 2013, stakeholders suggested that an advisory committee that includes government, 911, and industry representatives may assist in the deployment of NG911. New legislation supports the creation of a short-term advisory board to ensure NG911 interoperability. A permanent advisory committee could provide recommendations on NG911 deployment and policies; review the impact of emerging technologies on 911 services; promote technical standards, interoperability and security requirements, and policies that support a technologically and competitively neutral environment; and facilitate coordination between 911 stakeholders and industry representatives. As an example, the Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC), established by the FCC under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, provides recommendations and technical guidance on telecommunication issues, including NG911.\nThere are several 911 organizations that support NG911 deployment. National 911 leaders have formed the NG911 NOW Coalition which has set a goal \"for all 911 systems and centers in all 56 states and territories to have sufficiently funded, standards-based, end-to-end, IP-based 911 capabilities, and will have retired legacy 911 systems, without any degradation in service to the public by 2020.\" The timeline coincides with an industry timeline to migrate private networks to IP-based systems by 2020. The Coalition has adopted a collaborative approach to advancing NG911 deployment, working with a wide array of stakeholders (e.g., federal, state, local, industry) to advance NG911 deployment. The timeline has created a shared goal for state and local 911 agencies; however, with limited funding, NG911 deployment may remain incremental.\nThere is consensus that additional federal leadership may be needed to support NG911 deployment and coordinate NG911 efforts. There is also agreement that state and local entities should retain authorities over 911 services, including the timing of NG911 upgrades. An issue for Congress may involve determining the appropriate federal role in and support of NG911 deployment, in light of the longstanding state and local authorities over 911 services.", "Stakeholders have cited limitations in funding as a barrier to NG911 deployment. In 2018, members of four key 911 organizations sent a letter to Congress seeking funding for NG911 deployment. Stakeholders argued federal funding is needed to support migration to NG911, improve 911 services, and enable communications between 911 and public safety networks.\nThe FCC conducted an NG911 cost study in 2011, to estimate the cost associated with transitioning from a legacy 911 system to an NG911 system. The FCC found (in 2011) that it would cost $2.68 billion over 10 years to provide the broadband connectivity to PSAPs needed for next generation architecture. It did not include estimates of the cost of new PSAP equipment, dispatch software, security software, personnel, training, which are expected to be substantial. For example, in Oregon, the cost of equipment, software, maintenance, and upgrades was estimated at $18 million (in 2011). In Tennessee, the cost of deploying the NG911 infrastructure (not including PSAP equipment) was estimated at $50-60 million.\nStates and localities use multiple sources to pay for 911 services: grants, state and local funds, 911 fees on phone bills, and other revenue (e.g., traffic tickets). In most states, 911 fees are used to support current 911 operations; some states have diverted a portion of their 911 fees for other purposes. Congress has called on states to stop diverting 911 fees, and has denied grant funding for those states that do. For some states, the fees diverted exceed the grant amount; thus, there is no incentive to stop diverting. The FCC has also called on states to stop diverting 911 fees, and to dedicate those funds to 911 improvements, including NG911. Most states have noted that the revenue collected—$2.7 billion annually—cannot support both current 911 services and NG911 deployment (e.g., infrastructure improvements, equipment, personnel, training).\nCongress has supported 911 improvements through grant funding, but funding has been limited. In 2009, the National 911 Program Office awarded over $40 million in matching funds to states and localities to improve 911 services. Seventeen states invested in IP network implementation (i.e., ESInets). An additional $115 million was made available through P.L. 112-96 for 911 improvements; however, the funds represent a small portion of what it is expected to cost to deploy a nationwide NG911 network.\nP.L. 112-96 required the ICO, FCC, and DHS to conduct a report on costs for requirements and specifications related to NG911. The purpose of the report was to serve as a resource for Congress as it considers creating a coordinated, long-term funding mechanism for the deployment and operation for NG911. The cost study is under review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and, once released, may help to inform congress of future funding needed for NG911 deployment. Various possible funding options to spur investment in NG911 include:\nA one-time infusion of funding to spur NG911 deployment may help to accelerate investment in NG911, including IP-based infrastructure, equipment, personnel, and training. A one-time grant may help to upgrade some PSAPs, but may not provide enough funding to upgrade all PSAPs. Annual grant funds to support NG911 deployment may fund activities in state NG911 plans, support integration with other systems (e.g., FirstNet), and address other issues (e.g., planning, training). Funding provided over several years, with matching contributions, could incentivize states to invest in NG911 and enable PSAPs to better plan and prioritize improvements. Innovation grants which provide funding to entities pursuing innovative solutions for deploying NG911, including public-private partnerships, shared systems, regional investments, consolidation of PSAPs to achieve cost savings, cooperative purchasing agreements, and other innovative projects.\nFunding is expected to remain a challenge throughout the migration. States and localities will need funding (e.g., existing 911 revenues from 911 fees) to support operational costs of 911 systems, as they are migrating to NG911. Once NG911 systems are installed, states and localities will need funding for personnel and training, education of the public, and integration of PSAPs with other systems (e.g., other PSAPs and FirstNet) . While grants may help to accelerate deployment, grants are not intended to provide long-term sustainable funding for 911 system operations. Key considerations for Congress include ensuring that 911 fees are used for 911 services and improvements, 911 services are sustained during the NG911 build-out, and states and localities have long-term funding solutions for NG911 systems.", "The implementation of NG911 will require technical changes to 911 systems. Nationwide standards and policies may be needed to ensure state and local PSAPs will be interoperable, and can safely interconnect. Key issues that may require increased federal involvement in the deployment of a new nationwide NG911 system include interoperability and security.", "The adoption of NG911 technologies will enable PSAPs to interconnect, changing the structure of the nation's 911 system from a set of disconnected state and local PSAPs to a nationwide system of connected PSAPs. Experts note that NG911 technologies and the ESInets that support them are hierarchical; connection will occur regionally at first, and then nationally.\nCurrently, state and local 911 agencies decide on their own solutions, technologies, and vendors. With the emergence of NG911 as the path forward for state and local PSAPs, it is necessary for all involved (e.g., federal, state, and local governments, standards development organizations, and manufacturers) to adopt common technical standards that will enable interoperability.\nThe potential development of a single nationwide 911 network presents many policy issues for Congress. For example, to achieve the benefits of an interconnected system, PSAPs will need to use standards-based technology that will ensure interoperability. Currently, the standards are being developed through a consensus-based approach that incorporates the input of a wide variety of stakeholders. However, there is no requirement for state and local entities to purchase equipment that complies with those standards. Agencies can adopt technologies that suit their needs, or are more affordable, but that may not facilitate interoperability with other 911 centers.\nCongress may consider actions that would encourage adoption of technical standards that will promote interoperability. Such options could include:\nrequiring state and local entities to comply with technical standards that promote interoperability, overriding state and local authorities over 911 services; authorizing federal grants to promote technical standards; and directing the ICO and its partner agencies to drive adoption of standards through current authorities (e.g., coordination with state and local leaders, grants, guidance, and FCC regulations related to certification of equipment).\nNENA, an ANSI-accredited standards development organization (SDO), has developed standards for NG911, known as i3 standards. NENA's i3 standards were developed by consensus, and are widely accepted and supported by industry, public safety practitioners, and commercial partners. The i3 standards are not yet formally accredited, but are in the process. The 911 community has appeared to adopt i3 standards, along with a suite of related standards; states that are moving forward on NG911 deployment have included the standard in their NG911 deployment plans and Request for Proposals. However, adoption of i3 standards by state and local 911 agencies is not required, creating a risk that state and local NG911 systems will not be interoperable.\nInteroperability is designed to enable PSAPs to serve as back-up to each other during power outages and disasters, creating redundancies in the nation's 911 system. To try to ensure PSAPs are interoperable, Congress may consider several actions:\nInclude language in future legislation related to NG911 requiring compliance with \"accredited,\" non-proprietary, consensus-based standards, to move NG911 standards toward accreditation. Insert language in federal grants funding NG911, requiring compliance with accredited standards to ensure federally-funded investments are interoperable. Extend the role of the ICO to support state and local purchases through joint purchasing agreements and language in RFPs that include NG911 interoperability requirements, and standards-based purchasing provisions. Encourage the development of a framework that facilitates cooperation between stakeholders and supports deployment of a standards-based NG911 system. The adoption of NG911 would enable PSAPs to connect with other IP-based public safety systems, such as FirstNet. A nationwide NG911 system could provide first responders with pictures, videos, and other data which could increase situational awareness, and improve response. While integration with FirstNet is encouraged in P.L. 112-96 , the two systems are being deployed separately. Stakeholders assert that 911 is not a stand-alone service, that \"[it] is part of a larger emergency communications stakeholder community that includes emergency management, interoperable communications, first responders, communications service providers, and related entities at all levels of government,\" and should be integrated.\nCongress may require or encourage coordination between FirstNet and the federal agencies supporting NG911 to plan for the integration of the two systems as they are being developed, to realize the benefits of an interconnected NG911-public safety system.", "As PSAPs are able to send data (e.g., photos), security risks are expected to increase. There is risk that an attack on a PSAP could impact other PSAPs. There is risk that having a large concentration of sensitive information traveling through one network may increase the system's chances of being viewed as a target for cyberattacks. The President's National Security Strategy recognized a need to identify networks that may be vulnerable to attack, especially those networks where a single attack could have cascading and catastrophic consequences.\nCongress may leverage previous studies or commission a new study on NG911 network vulnerabilities to identify actions that can increase security of NG911 systems. The CSRIC has proposed continual network monitoring and information-sharing to mitigate vulnerabilities in wireless networks. Congress can also encourage or require 911 agencies to leverage the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, which promotes planning to identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover from cyber attacks. Experts assert that a combination of technologies, human solutions (e.g., training), and cybersecurity agreements between shared networks (e.g., PSAP and FirstNet) can help mitigate risks.\nWhile there is a national interest in promoting consistent cybersecurity policies across all PSAPs, there are no mechanisms in place to require state and local adoption of these best practices, which may present a risk to the NG911 network and the systems to which they interconnect.", "A Congressional Next Generation 911 Caucus, led by Senator Klobuchar, Senator Burr, Representative Eshoo and Representative Shimkus, educates lawmakers, constituents, and communities about 911 issues. In the 115 th Congress, two legislative actions were advanced:\nKari's Law of 2017 ( P.L. 115-127 ) requires that multi-line telephone systems permit users to directly dial 911 without having to first dial 9 or any other code.\nNext Generation 911 Act of 2017 ( S. 2061 ) recognizes the transition to NG911 as a national priority, expands the ICO's authority, establishes an Advisory Board to advise on interoperability, creates a grant program, directs the FCC to study best practices in cybersecurity, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study resiliency of PSAPs.", "With the adoption of NG911 technologies underway, and the potential for a single nationwide system for 911, there may be a need for nationwide policies related to interoperability and security to ensure the effective deployment of NG911 nationwide. Issues for Congress may include current federal roles and responsibilities, funding options, and technology policies that could advance the deployment of NG911 while considering longstanding state and local control over 911 services." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h0_full h3_full h2_full h4_full", "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full h2_full", "h2_full h1_title h3_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h3_full", "h4_full h3_title h1_full", "", "", "h3_full h1_full", "h4_full h1_title", "h4_full", "h4_full h1_full", "", "h4_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why is the 911 system being currently discussed?", "What has taken place in those five decades?", "To what extent is the 911 system used across the United States?", "Why is there a need for next-generation 911 technology?", "To what extent can PSAPs interconnect?", "How uniformly are PSAPs upgrading to fit modern needs?", "How does this discontinuity affect callers?", "How modernized are the PSAPs?", "To what extent does the current PSAP setup match the system needs?", "How have telecommunications providers been adapting to increased cell phone usage?", "How have PSAPs had to change to better serve cell phone calls?", "What gaps exist in the upgraded technology?", "How has Congress supported the modernization of 911 services?", "How are IP-based systems superior to current implementations?", "To what extent are IP-based systems already used?", "Why are NG911 systems being considered?", "Why haven't the new systems been implemented already?", "How will the new capabilities complicated existing policies?", "How will NG911 affect regional 911 systems?", "How will a nationwide 911 system be regulated?" ], "summary": [ "In 2018, Congress and 911 advocates celebrated the 50th anniversary of the first 911 call.", "Over the past 50 years, states and localities have adopted 911 as the number to call during emergencies, established 911 centers (also known as Public Safety Answering Points or PSAPs) to receive and manage 911 calls, managed and funded their local PSAPs, and educated the public on 911 use.", "Today, 911 services are available in most jurisdictions in the United States, people know 911 is the number to call in emergencies, and 911 systems have helped to save lives.", "In some areas of the nation, people do not have access to traditional 911 services.", "In other areas, PSAPs use different technologies and cannot interconnect.", "Additionally, PSAPs are at various stages of upgrade; as a result, 911 services may vary from one jurisdiction to the next. For example, some PSAPs can receive text messages, while others cannot.", "The variation in service may confuse callers who expect 911 services to be consistent across jurisdictions, and may delay the response.", "Further, most PSAPs rely on legacy telephone technologies, adopted decades ago to receive voice calls from landline phones, and the home address associated with the phone number.", "With 80% of 911 calls now coming from mobile devices (e.g., cell phones), 911 systems have had to be adjusted to accommodate wireless calls and their location information.", "Telecommunication providers that serve 911 centers have had to configure their systems to route wireless 911 calls to the appropriate PSAP and to transmit the caller's number and location information which, for mobile callers, is a complex task.", "Similarly, PSAPs have had to adjust their systems to accept 911 calls and location information for wireless callers.", "While PSAPs can now accept calls from wireless devices, and some location information for wireless callers, most cannot accommodate text messages, photos, or videos—communications that are commonly used by consumers today.", "Since 2008, Congress has urged the adoption of Internet Protocol (IP) based systems to improve 911 services.", "IP-based systems can: accept data communications (e.g., text, photos, videos) to allow those in danger to text 911 when they cannot call; leverage computer-based geolocation applications to accurately locate callers; enable interconnections between PSAPs, allowing PSAPs to re-route calls during emergencies, building redundancies into the nation's 911 system; and interconnect with other public safety systems to enable information-sharing during response.", "Some states have begun implementing next generation of 911 (NG911) technologies (e.g., installing a basic IP network or Emergency Services Internet Protocol Network (ESInet)); however, funding has been a challenge, and progress has been relatively slow.", "There is general consensus that upgrades to 911 systems are needed, and that adoption of NG911 technologies will improve 911 services.", "However, the implementation is expected to be costly and complex. Both private telecommunication networks and 911 systems will need to be upgraded to achieve the full benefits of NG911 technologies. Further, adoption of NG911 will change the way PSAPs operate and interoperate.", "PSAPs will be able to accept different types of data, and will need to establish policies and procedures for handling this new information.", "NG911 will also enable PSAPs to interconnect to form regional 911 systems, and for regional systems to connect to form a single nationwide 911 network.", "The formation of a single nationwide network may drive the need for new policies related to the governance, funding, interoperability, and security of the nation's 911 centers. An issue for Congress is determining the appropriate level of federal involvement in the implementation and oversight of a nationwide NG911 system that will support the deployment, while still respecting state and local authorities over 911 services." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, 0, 1, 1, 3, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-19-225T	{ "title": [ "Background", "The Navy Fleet Faces Challenges in Rebuilding Readiness and the Costs Associated with Expanding the Fleet to Enhance Readiness in the Future Are Unknown", "Navy Has Taken Steps to Address Training Shortfalls in the Surface Fleet", "The Fleet Faces Persistent Maintenance and Personnel Challenges as the Navy Seeks to Rebuild Readiness", "Maintenance Delays for Ships and Submarines Reduce Time for Training and Operations", "Navy Processes for Determining Manning of Ships Do Not Account for All Ship Workload", "Navy Plans to Expand Its Fleet but Full Costs Are Unknown and Manning an Expanded Fleet Likely Will Be Challenging", "Navy and Marine Corps Aging Aircraft and F-35s Face Maintenance and Supply Challenges That Affect Readiness Rebuilding Now and in the Future", "Aircraft Availability Has Been Limited by Aging Fleets with Maintenance and Supply Challenges", "Pilot Shortages Have Worsened in Recent Years and Are Projected to Remain through 2023", "New F-35 Aircraft Facing Sustainment and Operational Challenges", "GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "Appendix I: Implementation Status of Prior GAO Recommendations Related to Navy and Marine Corps Readiness", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "We testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in September 2017 after four significant mishaps at sea resulted in the loss of 17 sailors’ lives and serious damage to Navy ships. We reported on some of the Navy’s challenges, including the degraded condition and expired training certifications of ships homeported overseas, reductions to ship crews that contributed to sailor overwork and safety risks, and an inability to complete maintenance on time. Since that time, the Navy has completed two internal reviews to address these and other challenges, identifying 111 recommendations to improve surface fleet readiness. The Navy formed an executive group to guide and closely track the implementation of recommendations, and its reform efforts are ongoing. As of November 2018, the Navy reported that it had implemented 78 (i.e., 70 percent) of these recommendations. Navy officials recognize that full implementation will take significant time and management attention to address the fundamental readiness challenges identified. In figure 1, we show photographs of two of the four Navy ships involved in significant mishaps that occurred in 2017. Both the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain were involved in collisions that resulted in sailor fatalities.\nDOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded its readiness; in response, the department has made rebuilding readiness a priority. The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment. Nevertheless, DOD reported that readiness of the total military force remains low and has remained so since 2013. Our work has shown that the Navy has experienced increasing maintenance challenges as a high pace of operations has continued and maintenance has been deferred. Maintenance and personnel challenges also hinder readiness recovery of Navy aircraft. For the Marine Corps, our work has shown that ground force readiness has improved and remained stable in recent years, but acute readiness problems remain in aviation units.\nOver the past year, DOD has made department-wide progress in developing a plan to rebuild the readiness of the military force, with the military services providing regular input on the status of their readiness recovery efforts. In August 2018, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a Readiness Recovery Framework that the department is using to guide the services’ efforts and plans to use to regularly assess, validate, and monitor readiness recovery. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have recently revised readiness goals and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance. We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s progress in achieveing its overall readiness goals.\nDOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring in a challenging context that requires the department to make difficult decisions regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future challenges. Our work has shown that an important aspect of this, across all of the services, is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in operational use and procuring new ones to overcome rapidly advancing future threats.", "Based on updated information we received in November 2018, the Navy has taken steps to provide dedicated training time so its surface forces may meet existing Navy training standards and their training is certified when they deploy. However, the Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges. As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges.", "After the collisions in 2017, the Navy focused on training surface ship crews to its existing standards. We testified in September 2017 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan and 37 percent of training certifications for these surface ship crews had lapsed as of June 2017. Since that time, the Navy has worked to ensure surface ships are certified before they are deployed. For example, the Navy has established controls to limit waivers that allowed training lapses to worsen, now requiring multiple high-level approvals for ships to operate uncertified. Based on our analysis of updated data, the Navy has improved markedly in the percentage of cruisers and destroyers with lapsed certifications in Japan, from 41 percent of certifications expired in September 2017 to 9 percent as of November 2018, with less than 3 percent of certifications expired on ships in operational status.\nWhile the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that crews are certified prior to deploying, training for amphibious operations and higher-level collective training may not be fully implemented for several years. In September 2017, we reported that some Marine Corps units were limited in their ability to complete training to conduct an amphibious operation—a military operation that is launched from the sea to introduce a landing force ashore—by several factors, including a decline in the number of amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 32 as of November 2018, access to range space, and a high pace of deployments, among others. We recommended that the Navy and the Marine Corps develop an approach to mitigate their amphibious operations training shortfalls as the services await the arrival of additional amphibious ships into the fleet. Marine Corps officials told us that the Marine Corps and the Navy are working together to maximize amphibious training opportunities. Additionally, the Navy has plans to phase in high-level collective training into the operational schedules of its ships homeported in Japan over the next several years. Previously, advanced and integrated training involving multiple ships was conducted ad hoc if at all for ships homeported in Japan. Such collective training is important because the 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the department’s principal priority is to prepare for threats from strategic competitors due to the magnitude of the threat they pose. However, in November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command told us that fully implementing its training approach to prepare for advanced adversaries would not be fully implemented across the fleet for several years.", "We have reported that the Navy faces persistent challenges in completing maintenance on time and providing sufficient manning to its ships. Unless these challenges are addressed, the Navy will be hampered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future.", "Our work has found that the Navy has been unable to complete ship and submarine maintenance on time, resulting in continuing schedule delays that reduce time for training and operations and create costly inefficiencies in a resource constrained environment. The Navy’s readiness recovery is premised on the rigorous adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules. However, we reported in May 2016 on the difficulty that both the public and private shipyards were having in completing maintenance on time. We reported that, from 2011 through 2014, about 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers. We updated these data as of November 2018 to include maintenance periods completed through the end of fiscal year 2018 and found that the Navy continues to struggle to complete maintenance on time. For fiscal years 2012-2018, our analysis for key portions of the Navy fleet shows that 30 percent of Navy maintenance was completed on time, leading to more than 27,000 days in which ships were delayed and unavailable for training and operations as shown in figure 2 below.\nIn addition to affecting training and operations, maintenance delays are costly. In November 2018, we examined attack submarine maintenance delays and reported that the Navy was incurring significant operating and support costs to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that are delayed getting into and out of shipyard maintenance periods. We estimated that over the past 10 years the Navy has spent $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle no longer certified to conduct normal operations—while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see figure 3). We recommended that the Navy analyze how it allocates its maintenance workload across public and private shipyards. DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards. In an update provided in November 2018, the Navy told us that they are developing a contracting strategy to conduct two additional depot maintenance periods at private shipyards in the future.\nOur prior work has shown that three primary factors at the naval shipyards contribute to maintenance delays:\nPoor conditions and aging equipment limit the ability of the shipyards to meet current and future demands. We reported in September 2017 that facility and equipment limitations at the shipyards contributed to maintenance delays for the aircraft carriers and submarines, hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy. Specifically, we found that the shipyards would be unable to support an estimated one-third of maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years. We recommended that the Navy take steps to improve its management of shipyard investments; the Navy concurred with this recommendation and we are encouraged by its response. For example, the Navy has developed a plan for the optimal placement of facilities and major equipment at each public shipyard, which the Navy estimates can ultimately increase its maintenance efficiency by reducing personnel and materiel travel by an average of 65 percent. This equates to recovering about 328,000 man days per year—an amount roughly equal to that of an aircraft carrier maintenance period. However, the Navy’s preliminary estimate —that this effort will require an estimated $21 billion and 20 years to address—is well beyond historical funding levels, and does not include some potentially significant costs (e.g., for utilities, roads, or environmental remediation).\nShipyard workforce gaps and inexperience are limiting factors.\nThe Navy has reported a variety of workforce challenges at the Navy’s four public shipyards such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providing personnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in critical skills. The Navy has noted that some occupations require years of training before workers become proficient. According to Navy officials, a large portion of its workforce is inexperienced. For example, 45 percent of the Puget Sound and 30 percent of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyards’ skilled workforce have fewer than 5 years of experience. According to DOD officials, workforce shortages and inexperience contribute to maintenance delays. For example, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, two submarines were delayed approximately 20 months, in part because of shortages in ship fitters and welders, among other skilled personnel. Most of DOD’s depots, which include the naval shipyards, have taken actions to maintain critical skills through retention incentives, bonuses, and awards. We plan to issue a report examining DOD’s depot skill gaps, including those at the naval shipyards, later this month.\nDepot supply support may not be cost-effective. In June 2016, we reported that the naval shipyards and other depots had not implemented actions that would likely improve the cost-effectiveness of their supply operations. Specifically, the Navy had not transferred certain functions to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) at the shipyards in the same manner as the Navy and Air Force did for their aviation depots. The Navy and Air Force aviation depots that transferred these functions to DLA had reaped a number of efficiencies in their supply operations, including a 10-percent reduction in backorders over a 5-year period. We recommended that the Navy analyze whether such a transfer of functions is warranted at the shipyards and the Navy concurred with the recommendation. However, as of October 2018, the Navy had not conducted a comprehensive analysis of transferring these functions and had provided no plans to do so.", "In May 2017, we reported that the Navy’s process for determining manpower requirements—the number and skill mix of sailors needed on the Navy’s ships—did not fully account for all ship workload. The Navy was using outdated standards to calculate the size of ship crews that may have been leading to overburdened crews working long hours. We recommended steps to help ensure the Navy’s manpower requirements meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet, and the Navy has been studying ship workload and revising its guidance. As of November 2018, the Navy was continuing to analyze the manpower requirements of its ship classes to better size and compose ship crews, and the Navy was also working to improve shipboard manning. However, these efforts are not yet complete and it is too early to assess their effectiveness. Until manpower requirements are reassessed across the fleet, the Navy risks that ship crews will continue to be undersized and sailors will be overworked with potential negative effects on readiness and safety.\nAdditionally, the Navy provided information in November 2018 that showed that it is taking steps to ensure that ships have a minimum percentage of crew assigned and with the appropriate skills. The Navy has prioritized manning its surface ships homeported overseas. The Navy established a minimum threshold of filling at least 95 percent of authorized billets in its ship crews with sailors (referred to as fill), with a minimum goal of 92 percent of those sailors having the right qualifications for the billet (known as fit). According to Navy officials, the Navy is for the most part meeting its fill goals Navy-wide, but has not consistently met its fit goals. However, during group discussions in November 2018 with ship crews and interviews with Navy officials in Japan, we learned that the Navy’s methods for tracking fit and fill do not account for sailor experience and may be inaccurately capturing the actual presence of sailors onboard and available for duty on its ships. Moreover, sailors consistently told us that ship workload has not decreased, and it is still extremely challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough sleep. Navy officials told us that manning challenges will continue through at least fiscal year 2021 as the Navy increases its end strength and trains its new sailors to gain the proper mix of skills to operate and maintain the fleet.", "To meet continued operational demands, the Navy is planning for the most significant fleet size increase in over 30 years. According to the Navy’s fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan, the Navy plans to build and maintain a fleet of 355 battle force ships—an increase of about 25 percent above the Navy’s current force of 287 ships. To reach its goal, the Navy plans to buy 301 ships through 2048 and extend the service life of its 66 Arleigh Burke class destroyers and up to 7 attack submarines. Together, the fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan and the service life extensions would allow the Navy to reach a 355-ship fleet by the 2030s.\nCongressional Budget Office reporting and our past work have shown that the Navy has consistently and significantly underestimated the cost and timeframes for delivering new ships to the fleet. For example, the Navy estimates that buying the new ships specified in the fiscal year 2019 plan would cost $631 billion over 30 years while the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that those new ships would cost $801 billion—a difference of 27 percent. We also reported in June 2018 that acquisition outcomes for ship classes built during the last 10 years have often not achieved cost, schedule, quality, or performance goals that were established. Furthermore, we have reported that: all 8 of the lead ships delivered over the past decade that we reviewed were provided to the fleet behind schedule, and more than half of those ships were delayed by more than 2 years, and six ships of different classes valued at $6.3 billion were delivered to the Navy with varying degrees of incomplete work and quality problems.\nAs a result of past cost and schedule problems, our work has shown that the Navy has a less-capable and smaller fleet today than it planned over 10 years ago. The Navy has also received $24 billion more in funding than it originally planned in its 2007 long-range shipbuilding plan but has 50 fewer ships in its inventory today, as compared with the goals it first established. Therefore, we have reported that as the Navy moves forward in implementing its shipbuilding plan it will be paramount for the Navy to learn from and apply lessons learned from the past.\nIn addition to the cost of buying the ships and submarines to expand fleet size, the Navy will likely face affordability challenges with regard to the manning of an expanded fleet with the right number of sailors with the right mix of skills. In May 2017, we reported that the personnel costs for surface ship classes in fiscal years 2000-2015 were the largest share of total operating and support costs and that careful planning will be needed as new ships are brought into the fleet. We also reported that crew sizes on recently inducted ship classes grew from original projections as the Navy gained experience operating them. For example, the total crew size of Littoral Combat Ships has grown from 75 in 2003 to 98 personnel in 2016, a 31-percent increase. Navy officials told us that they plan to better articulate the personnel and resources needed for a larger fleet after fully accounting for workload and right-sizing ship crews. The Navy’s end strength has since increased by over 11,000 personnel from fiscal year 2017 levels, which should help alleviate manning challenges as the fleet grows. In November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command provided us with projections of its manning shortfalls continuing through at least fiscal year 2021 and steps it was planning to take to mitigate them.", "Our work has shown that Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by aging aircraft, delayed maintenance, and insufficient supply support. Pilot and maintenance personnel shortfalls further limit readiness recovery across legacy air platforms. The growing F-35 program, which is meant to replace many aging aircraft, has presented additional operational and sustainment challenges, which will likely persist into the future if not corrected. DOD, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have emphasized mission capability of critical aviation platforms— including the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s and F-35s—and are taking steps to improve availability, but these efforts will take time to realize results.", "Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated with aging aircraft fleets, depot maintenance, and supply support challenges that limit the services’ ability to keep aviation units ready. The Navy and Marine Corps spend billions of dollars each year on sustainment, such as for spare parts and depot maintenance, to meet aircraft availability goals. However, aircraft availability rates have generally declined since fiscal year 2011. While specific aircraft availability data are considered sensitive by the Navy and the Marine Corps, and cannot be discussed in detail, we found in September 2018 that the Navy and the Marine Corps generally did not meet aircraft availability goals in fiscal years 2011-2016 for the seven aircraft we reviewed. In updating data in November 2018, we found that none of the aircraft met aircraft availability goals for fiscal years 2017 and 2018.\nAccording to the Navy, the pace of operations has increased wear and tear on its aircraft and decreased the time available for maintenance and modernization—a necessity for an aging fleet. For example, the average age of a legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet is 26 years, of an AV-8B Harrier is 21 years, and of the C-2A Greyhound is 29 years. Both services expect these aircraft will continue to be used for the foreseeable future and in some cases into the 2030s.\nThe Navy and the Marine Corps face delays in the arrival of the F-35 to replace their legacy F/A-18A-D Hornets and AV-8B Harriers. To compensate for the delay, the Navy and the Marine Corps are planning to procure additional aircraft, such as the F/A-18E-F Super Hornet, and extend the service life and upgrade the capabilities of their legacy aircraft. However, these efforts and the sustainment of the Navy and Marine Corps legacy aircraft fleet face key challenges as shown in figure 4.\nSpecifically, our prior work has shown that the Navy and the Marine Corps are confronted with two sets of challenges in sustaining their aircraft:\nDepot maintenance complexities for aging aircraft and spare parts availability. Depot maintenance on aging weapon systems, including Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, becomes less predictable as structural fatigue occurs and parts that were not expected to be replaced begin to wear out. While the Navy and the Marine Corps reported that sustainment funding accounts, such as those for depot maintenance and spare parts, have been funded at increased levels in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, efforts to improve spare parts availability take time to produce results due to long lead times for acquiring some items. In addition, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft face challenges associated with diminishing manufacturing sources and parts obsolescence. DOD has a program intended to manage these risks, but we reported in September 2017 that its implementation varied across DOD weapon system program offices. We made recommendations to improve the program’s management; DOD concurred and has initiated improvement efforts.\nMaintenance personnel inexperience and retention. The Navy has had difficulty attracting and retaining skilled maintainers, such as sheet metal workers and machinists at its aviation depots (i.e., Fleet Readiness Centers), which directly affects its ability to complete planned maintenance. Some of the depots experienced challenges attracting and retaining skilled personnel due to competition with nearby contractors that are able to offer higher pay, according to Navy depot officials. Similar to the shipyards, the aviation depots also lack experienced personnel, affecting the efficiency and quality of maintenance. For example, 41 percent of the skilled workers at Fleet Readiness Center Southwest have 2 years or fewer of experience. Workforce inexperience and attrition of skilled personnel were some of the reasons cited for machining defects detected in the landing gear for F/A-18, E-2, and C-2A aircraft by a recent Navy report. All of the depots have undertaken retention efforts such as incentives, bonuses, and awards to address these issues.\nUntil the Navy and Marine Corps address maintenance and supply challenges it will be difficult to meet Secretary of Defense-established mission capability goals. Specifically, in September 2018, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum emphasizing that a key component of implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy is ensuring critical aviation platforms meet their mission capability targets by the end of fiscal year 2019. The memorandum established a goal of achieving a minimum of 80-percent mission capable rates for various aircraft, including for the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ F/A-18 inventories, by the end of fiscal year 2019 while also reducing operating and maintenance costs. To accomplish this, the Navy and the Marine Corps developed the Return to Readiness strategy in November 2018 that includes a broad array of actions to improve the availability of spare parts and evaluate the application of best commercial practices to naval aviation sustainment, among other actions. Office of the Secretary of Defense and Navy program officials told us, and based on our prior work we agree, that this goal will be challenging to achieve by the end of fiscal year 2019.", "We reported in April 2018 that fighter pilot shortages in the Navy and the Marine Corps have been worsening in recent years and shortfalls are projected to remain through at least fiscal year 2023. Our analysis of Navy and Marine Corps data showed that the Navy’s shortage of first operational tour fighter pilots more than doubled from 12 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 26 percent in fiscal year 2017. Similarly, the Marine Corps’ overall shortage of fighter pilots quadrupled from 6 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 24 percent in fiscal year 2017.\nAlso, as we reported in April 2018, service officials attributed the pilot shortages to reduced training opportunities and increased attrition due to career dissatisfaction, among other factors. Officials from both services stated at the time that they have ensured that deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots by using various approaches including using senior pilots to staff junior positions and having pilots deploy more frequently and for longer periods. However, we reported that squadron leaders and fighter pilots said that these approaches had a negative impact on the fighter pilot training and retention and ultimately may be exacerbating the situation.\nFurther compounding their pilot shortages, we also found that the services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect an increased fighter pilot workload. As a result, the reported shortage actually could be greater. The services were taking actions, including increasing retention incentives for fighter pilots. To help determine the magnitude of the shortages and help target strategies to better meet their personnel needs, we recommended, and the Navy and Marine Corps agreed, to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements.", "Sustainment challenges are not just an issue for older aircraft, but represent an enduring challenge for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft—a key component to the future of tactical aviation for the Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy and Marine Corps are both flying F-35s now as the program ramps up development, and they plan to procure nearly 700 aircraft over the coming decades. The sustainment costs of the F-35 fleet are projected to exceed $1 trillion over its 60-year life cycle. In October 2017, we reported that:\nF-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were available (i.e., the aircraft were safe to fly, available for use, and able to perform at least one tasked mission) about 52 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 65-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units and\nF-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were fully mission capable (i.e., the aircraft were capable of accomplishing all tasked missions) about 15 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 60-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units.\nWe also reported on numerous sustainment challenges leading to less than desirable outcomes for F-35 warfighter readiness. For example, F-35 aircraft were unable to fly 22 percent of the time because of parts shortages from January 2017 through August 7, 2017. Additionally, DOD’s capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots were 6 years behind schedule, which resulted in average part repair times that are twice that of the program’s objective.\nAs DOD gains experience with the F-35, our work has shown that the department has encountered additional challenges. In 2017, the Marine Corps became the first military service to station F-35 aircraft overseas, transferring aircraft to Iwakuni, Japan. While in the Pacific, DOD expects to disperse its F-35s into smaller detachments to outmaneuver the enemy and counter regional threats. However, in April 2018, we reported that this approach posed logistics and supply challenges. In June 2018, we reported that the F-35 program had not improved its reliability and maintainability over the past year and continued to fall short on half of its performance targets. Furthermore, we found that the program may not meet its required targets before each variant of the F-35 is expected to demonstrate maturity—the point at which the aircraft has flown enough hours to predictably determine reliability and maintainability over its lifespan. This means that the Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned. Among other outcomes, this could result in higher maintenance costs and lower aircraft availability than anticipated which also could pose readiness challenges in the future. As we reported in October 2017, the poor reliability of certain parts is already contributing to shortages of F-35 spare parts.\nChallenges posed by the F-35 program are largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include or consider key requirements. Our work has shown that planning for sustainment and aligning its funding are critical if DOD wants to meet its aircraft availability goals and effectively deploy to support operations. To address the challenges associated with F-35 sustainment and operational deployment, we recommended that DOD revise its sustainment plans, align associated funding, and mitigate the risks associated with key supply chain-related challenges for deployed F-35s in the Pacific, among others. DOD concurred with these recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to address them. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Secretary of Defense has established an 80-percent mission capability goal for critical aviation assets, including the F-35. Due to current low availability and numerous sustainment issues, the F-35 fleet will be challenged in meeting the goal.\nIn sum, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ significant readiness challenges have developed over more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure. Both services have made encouraging progress identifying the causes of their readiness decline and have begun efforts to arrest and reverse it; however, our prior work shows that fully addressing the persistent readiness challenges will require years of sustained management attention. Our work cited today contains 25 specific recommendations to the Navy and the Marine Corps and an additional 20 recommendations to various other DOD components to assist these services in rebuilding the readiness of their forces and in modernizing for the future. Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces.\nChairmen Wicker and Sullivan, Ranking Members Hirono and Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.", "If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John H. Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or [email protected].\nContact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Clarine Allen; Steven Banovac; John Bumgarner; Chris Cronin; Benjamin Emmel; Cynthia Grant; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Tobin McMurdie; Shahrzad Nikoo; Carol Petersen; Cody Raysinger; Michael Silver; John E. “Jet” Trubey; and Chris Watson.", "Over the past 4 years, we have issued a number of reports related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness and we used them to develop this statement. Table 1 summarizes the recommendations in these reports. The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with most of the 45 recommendations and has many actions underway. However, DOD has not fully implemented any of the recommendations to date. For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and any progress made in implementing them are summarized in tables 2 through 16.", "Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified. Report numbers with a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified. Classified and sensitive but unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request.\nNavy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet. GAO-19-229. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2018.\nAir Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future. GAO-19-120T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2018.\nWeapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified. GAO-18-678. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2018.\nWeapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need Clarification. GAO-18-146SU. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.\nMilitary Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a Readiness Rebuilding Plan. GAO-18-441RC. Washington, D.C.: August 10, 2018. (SECRET)\nMilitary Personnel: Collecting Additional Data Could Enhance Pilot Retention Efforts. GAO-18-439. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2018.\nF-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development Is Nearly Complete, but Deficiencies Found in Testing Need to Be Resolved. GAO-18-321. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2018.\nWarfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons Across the Military Services. GAO-18-464R. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.\nMilitary Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home. GAO-18-253. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2018.\nMilitary Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements. GAO-18-113. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2018.\nMilitary Aircraft: F-35 Brings Increased Capabilities, but the Marine Corps Needs to Assess Challenges Associated with Operating in the Pacific. GAO-18-79C. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2018. (SECRET)\nNavy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training. GAO-18-212T. Washington, DC.: December 1, 2017.\nF-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting Readiness and Cost Transparency. GAO-18-75. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2017.\nDefense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks. GAO-17-768. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2017.\nNavy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training. GAO-17-789. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2017.\nNavy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet. GAO-17-809T. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2017.\nNaval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions That Affect Operation. GAO-17-548. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2017.\nNavy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet. GAO-17-798T. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2017.\nNavy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets GAO-17-503. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2017 (reissued on Oct 31, 2017).\nDepartment of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017.\nMilitary Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges. GAO-17-462C. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017. (SECRET)\nNavy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality. GAO-17-418. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2017 Offshore Petroleum Discharge System: The Navy Has Not Mitigated Risk Associated with System Limitations. GAO-17-531C. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2017. (SECRET)\nNavy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews. GAO-17-413. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2017.\nMilitary Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-841. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2016.\nMilitary Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan. GAO-16-534C. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2016. (SECRET)\nDefense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations. GAO-16-450. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016.\nNavy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness. GAO-16-481RC. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2016. (SECRET//NOFORN)\nMilitary Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan. GAO-16-466R. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2016.\nF-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its Central Logistics System. GAO-16-439. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2016.\nNavy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports. GAO-15-329. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015.\nThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h2_title h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What challenges does the Navy face in rebuilding readiness?", "What is the current status of these changes?", "To what extent is ship maintenance an area of concern?", "What factors affect sailor workload?", "How does the Navy plan to address these challenges?", "How has Naval and Marine aircraft availability changed?", "How does this affect next-generation aircraft?", "How is DOD addressing this shortcoming?", "What is the timeline for these improvements?", "What role does maintaining readiness play in national security?", "How have the Armed Forces approached this issue?", "What is the current outlook of their efforts?" ], "summary": [ "The Navy has taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faces persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it seeks to rebuild ship and submarine readiness.", "While the Navy has corrective actions underway, they will take years to implement. Following ship collisions in 2017, the Navy has taken steps to ensure its crews are trained to standards prior to deployment and made significant progress in those efforts.", "However, the Navy has struggled to complete ship maintenance—with only 30 percent of maintenance completed on time since fiscal year 2012—leading to thousands of days that ships were unavailable for training and operations (see figure).", "Additionally, manning shortfalls and experience gaps continue to contribute to high sailor workload and are likely to continue through at least fiscal year 2021.", "The Navy has developed a plan to improve shipyards and is re-examining its ship manning, among other actions; however, these positive steps have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations. Looking to the future, the Navy has indicated that it wants to grow its fleet to meet demands. However, the costs of such growth are not yet known and would likely require resourcing well above currently planned levels.", "Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited due to numerous challenges (see figure). Specifically, the seven aircraft GAO reviewed have generally experienced decreasing availability since fiscal year 2011 and did not meet availability goals in fiscal years 2017 and 2018.", "The F-35—the future of naval aviation—also has not met availability goals due to part shortages and poor sustainment planning.", "In September 2018, the Department of Defense established aggressive targets for aircraft availability.", "While the Navy and Marine Corps are taking actions to improve aircraft availability, including addressing GAO's recommendations, aviation readiness will take many years to recover.", "The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment.", "The Navy and Marine Corps are working to rebuild the readiness of their forces while growing and modernizing their aging fleet of ships and aircraft.", "However, achieving readiness recovery goals will take years as both services continue to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-13-264	{ "title": [ "Background", "Operational Improvements Largely Target Key Airports for Benefits, but Lack Integration and Have Limited Results to Date", "FAA Has Made Certain Trade-offs in Designing and Implementing PBN Efforts to Deliver Midterm Benefits", "Mixed Progress in Other Key NextGen Improvement Areas Could Limit Benefits", "Airborne and Surface Traffic Management", "Integration of Improvements Is Minimal", "FAA Is Addressing Some Obstacles, but Project Prioritization, Stakeholder Participation, and Consistent NextGen Leadership Remain Challenges", "Flight Procedure Implementation Process Is Being Streamlined, but Impact Will Not Be Known for Several Years", "New Efforts May Better Address New Procedure Requests, but Do Not Proactively Identify Needs", "Standards and the Air Traffic Controller Handbook Are Being Amended", "FAA Has Involved More Stakeholders, but Is Not Fully Engaging Airports", "Consistent NextGen Leadership Remains a Challenge", "FAA Has Limited Data to Demonstrate Midterm NextGen Benefits, and More Information Is Needed in NextGen Plans", "Performance Metrics Are Being Developed and Linked to Targets", "Information on Some Costs and Benefits Is Available, but Insufficient to Encourage Airline Investments in the Midterm", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: FAA Performance Areas and Metrics", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "FAA’s planning for the midterm includes improvements based on existing technologies that respond to recommendations made in 2009 by the RTCA task force. The agency seeks to demonstrate tangible NextGen benefits to build industry support and encourage future needed investments from airlines and others to complete the transformation of the air-traffic control system. Industry investments can be significant; for example, FAA estimates that it would cost $260,000 in 2011 dollars to equip—or $525,000 to retrofit—a commercial aircraft with a Required Navigation Performance (RNP) package, which allows precision curved flight paths. In 2012, 50 percent of the domestic commercial aircraft fleet was RNP equipped. In 2011, RTCA reported that 80 percent of the airline fleet at high-density airports might need to be RNP equipped to accrue significant benefits for operators. In total, FAA estimates that airlines will need to invest $6.6 billion—of the estimated $18.1-billion overall implementation cost shared between airlines and FAA—on avionics through 2018 to realize the full potential benefits from NextGen capabilities.\nThe RTCA task force and the NAC work group identified priority operational improvements that could provide substantive benefits and are viewed as feasible to implement between now and the end of 2018, and we grouped these into three improvement areas:\nPerformance Based Navigation (PBN), which uses satellite-based guidance to route aircraft and improve approaches at airports. There are two main types of PBN procedures, including Area Navigation (RNAV) and RNP, which vary in the level of precision guidance they can provide.\nEnhanced airborne and surface traffic management, which includes tools that help air traffic controllers merge and sequence planes in the air and on the ground.\nAdditional or revised aviation safety standards, such as those that establish the minimum required distances between aircraft in the air or minimum visibility distances to the ground. These changes are made possible by leveraging advances in technology and are anticipated to maintain or enhance safety.\nFAA and the aviation industry have emphasized the interrelated nature of NextGen’s many components (see fig. 1). Although NextGen improvements in each of these three areas offer some benefits when implemented individually, they achieve the greatest benefits when integrated, according to FAA officials, air traffic controllers, and other industry stakeholders, including airline representatives.\nThrough 2018, FAA’s implementation of key NextGen operational improvement areas is focused on 30 core airports and key air-traffic control facilities. These air-traffic control facilities include terminal radar- approach control (TRACON) facilities and the 20 traffic control centers that manage enroute traffic throughout the NAS. In an effort to help FAA prioritize the implementation of NextGen, in 2012 the NAC work group identified seven priority multi-airport metroplexes based on an assessment of operational need (see fig. 2). Because of the integrated nature of the NAS, improvements or changes to a portion of the airspace or at one airport can affect other parts of the system.\nA number of offices within FAA, including ATO, the Office of Aviation Safety, and the Aeronautical Navigation Product Group (AeroNav Products), are involved in the management and implementation of NextGen, as well as the NextGen Office, which oversees implementation and reports directly to the Deputy Administrator. The NextGen Office is tasked with linking NextGen’s strategic objectives with operational requirements in an effort to ensure integration and implementation across FAA program offices. The NextGen Office includes a Performance and Outreach Office that is tasked with providing information on implementation progress, enabling successful collaboration and decision making with internal and external stakeholders, and reporting on performance measurements. At present, the position heading the NextGen office is vacant, which is further discussed later in this report. FAA’s Office of Environment and Energy develops and coordinates policy relating to NextGen’s environmental impact, including noise and emissions. In 2011, this office developed a new NextGen National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Plan to help ensure timely, effective, and efficient environmental review of proposed NextGen improvements.\nTo address the majority of current flight delays throughout the NAS, the RTCA task force identified the implementation of new PBN procedures as a high priority initiative. Requests for new air-traffic control procedures, including PBN procedures, can come from a variety of sources, including airlines, airports, Congress, or individual air-traffic control facilities. According to FAA, there are core steps and processes that are common to the development of most procedures and involve a number of offices within the agency.\nATO designs and develops procedures and conducts environmental reviews. According to FAA officials, environmental reviews typically take from 30 days to 2 years, depending on project factors such as the presence of sensitive environmental resources (e.g., national parks) and the potential for significant impacts such as noise or emissions. ATO also helps implement new procedures once they have been published by providing needed documentation or training to air traffic controllers.\nThe Office of Aviation Safety establishes design criteriaprocedures and conducts safety testing, such as flight simulations testing that includes controllers and pilots. It also grants operations approval and certification for aircraft equipment used to fly air-traffic control procedures.\nAeroNav Products tests new procedures against design criteria and includes new procedures on published charts for pilots. AeroNav Products also maintains existing procedures, which need to be assessed every 2 years to assure that they still meet criteria and that conditions have not changed to render the existing procedures unsafe.\nThe other priority operational improvements, including those related to airborne and surface traffic management and enhanced standards, are largely managed by offices within ATO and the Office of Aviation Safety.\nThe conditions around an airport may change over time, making procedures unsafe. For example, new construction may result in taller structures around an airport or other changes that would affect minimal altitude requirements. categorical exclusion—then the agency generally need not prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement.\nFor the development of new flight procedures, FAA assesses the potential environmental impacts of proposed changes, including changes to carbon dioxide emissions and noise levels for communities below the new or changed routes. New or revised routes above 3,000 feet above ground level (AGL) typically qualify for categorical exclusion in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act introduced two new categorical exclusions, one of which categorically excluded RNAV and RNP procedures below 3,000 feet AGL at core airports and certain other airports, absent extraordinary circumstances.extraordinary circumstances would include significant increases in noise over noise-sensitive areas (e.g., homes, schools, hospitals) under the new or changed flight path. Noise screening and carbon dioxide emissions analysis are required for procedures from 3,000 feet AGL to 7,000 feet AGL for arrivals and up to 10,000 feet AGL for departures. Noise screening may be required up to 18,000 feet AGL for special resources, such as national parks or wilderness areas. For changes closer to the ground, below 3,000 feet AGL, more environmental review may be required because of the potential for significant noise or emissions increases. Figure 3 illustrates the appropriate level of NEPA review needed for actions at various heights AGL.", "FAA is concentrating its operational improvement efforts at key airports and metropolitan areas and focusing primarily on PBN procedures, including in its Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) initiative and another effort in the Seattle metropolitan area called “Greener Skies over Seattle” (Greener Skies). Increasing the number and use of PBN procedures is viewed as a way to accelerate the delivery of benefits, such as fuel savings, to airlines in some of the most- congested metroplex areas. To deliver benefits more quickly and avoid some obstacles that have hampered prior NextGen efforts, FAA has made trade-offs in selecting sites and the scope of proposed improvements, concentrating on those projects that can demonstrate some benefits in the midterm and leaving more time-consuming but potentially higher benefit-yielding projects for the longer term. The agency has also made some progress in the other key operational improvement areas, such as upgrading airborne traffic management to enhance the flow of aircraft in congested airspace and revising standards to enhance airport capacity. By contrast, FAA has made more limited progress enhancing surface traffic management at airports, which will likely limit overall benefits in the midterm. Finally, there has been little integration of key operational improvements, which limits the potential benefits offered by any single improvement as well as the potential impacts on the NAS.", "FAA’s primary effort to implement new PBN procedures in the midterm is the OAPM initiative, which focuses on priority metroplexes with airport operations that have a large effect on the overall efficiency of the NAS. This initiative is also designed to provide benefits to airlines and airports in those metroplexes. If OAPM proceeds as planned, FAA expects to begin to demonstrate benefits at the eight sites that are currently active by the end of 2015. (See fig. 4.) Projects at five additional sites are expected to be fully operational before the end of 2017, according to current FAA plans. With the exception of the Houston project, each OAPM project has about a 3-year implementation time frame, which includes 12 to 18 months for the environment assessment process.\nOAPM focuses primarily on implementing PBN procedures—long viewed as a cornerstone of NextGen—and any necessary airspace redesign for deployment of the new procedures.foundation for flight paths, airspace design, route separation, and obstacle clearance. (See fig. 5 for an illustration of these procedures.) Potential PBN benefits include shorter, more direct flight paths, reduced aircraft fuel burned—and resulting reductions in carbon dioxide emissions—and reduced noise in surrounding communities. The following are the key types of PBN procedures.\nRNAV procedures, which are enabled by technology available on nearly all commercial aircraft in the United States, provide aircraft with routing flexibility and more efficient flight paths than conventional procedures, and can allow improved access to airports in congested airspace or in bad weather. In 2011, 96 percent of the domestic commercial fleet was equipped for RNAV. As of January 10, 2013, there were over 12,500 public RNAV procedures available for all aircraft capable of flying them.\nRNP procedures (a subset of RNAV) add additional onboard-aircraft performance monitoring and alerting and require additional equipment as well as specialized crew training. In some cases, RNP can increase aircraft access to airports in adverse weather and terrain and help air traffic controllers keep aircraft operations at one airport from interfering with aircraft operations at adjacent airports by using curved flight paths. As mentioned above, in 2012, approximately 50 percent of the domestic commercial fleet was equipped for RNP. As of January 10, 2013, 352 public RNP procedures are included on charts for pilots.\nOptimized Profile Descent (OPD) procedures allow aircraft to descend from cruise altitude to final approach more efficiently, eliminating or reducing the level offs or step downs of a traditional descent. Low or idle engine power settings save fuel and reduce emissions. OPD procedures also require less dialogue between air traffic controllers and pilots, which may improve safety by reducing the potential for miscommunications.\nAccording to reports by teams planning OAPM implementation, OAPM’s benefits for airspace users will stem mostly from implementing OPD procedures enabled through the use of RNAV and the resulting reductions to fuel use and associated fuel costs. (See fig. 6.) For example, FAA projected that shorter routes and OPDs at its eight active sites could save at least 29-million gallons of fuel and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 299,000 metric tons annually when fully implemented. In turn, improved efficiency and predictability at key metroplexes is expected to improve the efficiency of the NAS. FAA estimated total annual benefits resulting from new OAPM procedures and associated airspace changes using aircraft simulators. As previously mentioned, all eight active sites are predicted to begin demonstrating benefits in the 2013 through 2015 time frame.\nTo achieve the time frames of its OAPM initiative, FAA has made trade- offs, which are summarized below, between procedures that yield some benefits and can be implemented relatively quickly and those that could result in greater benefits but would take much longer to implement.\nExcluded new procedures that would require route changes below 3,000 feet AGL or very close in to the airport. Although all new flight procedures require NEPA review, those deemed to have extraordinary circumstances such as significant environmental impacts—including a significant increase in noise or emissions around an airport—would require a full environmental impact statement, which can take several years to complete. By excluding changes closer to the airport, FAA is seeking to avoid the lengthy environmental reviews that have delayed the implementation of some other FAA efforts. For example, we previously reported that FAA’s airspace redesign effort in the New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia area has provoked significant community opposition, including legal challenges to the environmental review process used by FAA. That effort, which began in 1998, is currently scheduled for completion in 2016. Representatives from airlines, equipment manufacturers, and industry associations that we spoke with acknowledged that there could be additional efficiency benefits from new PBN procedures closer to the airport. For example, new procedures that would allow for tight turns for the arrival into the airport can reduce flight times and associated fuel use and costs and facilitate the flow of air traffic flying into or out of different airports in a metroplex, as well as increasing predictability of flight schedules. Nonetheless, most of these stakeholders did not believe that these potential additional benefits warranted the longer project timeframes that would be necessary to complete more detailed environmental reviews.\nExcluded new procedures that would require new design criteria. FAA officials explained that having to wait for new design criteria for procedures could jeopardize the OAPM time frames. Outside of the OAPM initiative, FAA acknowledged that its staff had at times initiated work on a requested PBN procedure only to discover that the design criteria—which ensure the safety of procedures—do not yet exist for the desired procedure. FAA officials stated that new design criteria would be needed to more widely deploy PBN procedures, but that effort is being undertaken independently of the OAPM initiative.\nExcluded sites with ongoing airspace redesign projects. Concerns about potential implementation delays also factored into FAA’s decision about which metroplexes to address in the midterm. Some industry stakeholders have voiced concerns that FAA did not include in its current OAPM plans the New York/Philadelphia metroplex, which is the nation’s most congested airspace and contributes to over half of domestic flight delays. However, FAA decided to exclude that metroplex in light of the Record of Decision for the existing environmental reviews for FAA’s ongoing airspace redesign work for that area, because the agency did not want to initiate a new environmental review process.\nIn addition to the OAPM initiative, FAA has other PBN initiatives that aim to deliver midterm benefits in less congested areas. For example, FAA’s Greener Skies project, which was initiated by Alaska Airlines, aims to deliver benefits to the Seattle metroplex beginning in 2013, and was shaped by local considerations. new set of PBN procedures planned for implementation in March 2013.\nGreener Skies was initiated by Alaska Airlines in collaboration with Boeing, other airlines, and the Port of Seattle, which operates Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Greener Skies became an FAA-sponsored NextGen initiative in 2010.\nThe procedures are designed to shorten flight tracks and route aircraft over water. FAA estimates that the new Greener Skies procedures would reduce annual fuel consumption by 112,420 barrels annually, resulting in potential annual savings of $13.5 million. To facilitate implementation of the project, a number of potentially beneficial procedures were scoped out of the Greener Skies effort based on local concerns. For example, FAA officials and other Greener Skies participants stated that new procedures to the east of the airport were not included because of known community concerns about new aviation noise in those areas and to avoid any changes that could violate noise commitments made in a recent Record of Decision. In addition to Greener Skies, FAA also has non-OAPM PBN efforts in place in Denver and Minneapolis.\nAccording to analysis done by Alaska Airlines, of the 27 RNP charts that are carried by the airline’s flight crews, 5 of the routes in Alaska were flown more than 40 percent of the time, while at least 11 of the routes in the lower 48 states were flown less than 1 percent of the time. number of times by air traffic controllers. Southwest Airlines has expressed similar concerns about not being able to obtain projected benefits of new PBN procedures. For example, in 2011 the airline reported that its usage of RNP procedures had dropped, in part, because approval to use existing procedures was often not granted by air traffic controllers. Some controllers told us that using new PBN procedures can be difficult for a number of reasons, including a lack of guidance and tools, which will be further discussed later in this report. Finally, in some cases, pilots prefer to fly traditional routes—particularly if the PBN route is longer or less efficient than a shortcut that may be approved by an air traffic controller on a traditional procedure when conditions allow it. According to FAA officials, when conditions do not allow for such shortcuts, pilots can use the PBN procedures.\nFAA does not currently have a system to track the use of PBN procedures, and is unable to provide information on the extent to which existing procedures are either unused or are used on a limited basis. There are currently no automatic data collection systems to track the use of procedures, either on the aircraft flying the routes or at the air-traffic control facilities managing those aircraft. FAA officials stated that current efforts to track the use of procedures through pilot reporting have been hindered by insufficient and unreliable data. Without a way to systematically measure the use of particular procedures, the agency may not recognize routes that need to be revised to ensure that airlines are able to get expected benefits such as reduced fuel use or improved access in bad weather. As we have previously reported, critical success factors for goal setting and performance management by leading organizations include systematically measuring their performance to guide goal-setting, managerial decision-making, resource allocations, and day-to-day operations.", "", "Through 2018, FAA is focusing on updating its Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), which is an airborne arrival-sequencing program that assigns times when aircraft destined for the same airport should cross certain points in order to reach the destination airport at a specific time and in an efficient order. TMA can enhance the effectiveness of new PBN procedures, particularly when controllers are mixing traffic using different types of procedures and aircraft with different levels of equipment (e.g., RNP equipped mixed with non-RNP equipped aircraft). For example, controllers can better merge aircraft on conventional, straight flight paths with those on PBN curved approaches and obtain a clearer picture of traffic on the ground and in terminal airspace when TMA is used with surface management tools (see fig. 7). Currently, TMA is primarily used for arrival sequencing by certain air-traffic control facilities at times when the demand for arrivals exceeds the capacity of a specific airspace or airport. The upgrades could allow for TMA to be used more often, for more purposes (e.g., sequencing aircraft further away from the airport), and at additional facilities.\nMany of the active OAPM teams recommended upgrades to TMA’s capabilities for their respective air-traffic control facilities; such upgrades could provide significant benefits to priority metroplexes, as well as at core airports faced with similar congestion issues. For example, the North Texas OAPM study team recommended separating the traffic to Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport from Dallas Love Field’s airport traffic more efficiently, largely through TMA upgrades. North Texas OAPM team members told us that implementation of the procedures they are developing would depend principally on planned TMA upgrades. Likewise, the Houston OAPM study team recommended that arrival procedures it identified for the Houston metroplex to increase efficiency be managed using an enhanced TMA system. FAA has worked to align its plans for upgrading the TMA system with issues and concerns raised For example, FAA plans to launch a new time-based by OAPM teams.metering capability for PBN, which could help facilitate the corresponding launch of new PBN procedures in four priority metroplexes.\nAs part of its upgrades to airborne traffic management, FAA is also deploying a system to improve air traffic management in metroplexes by sharing information between adjoining air-traffic control facilities. The new system allows these facilities to share information and workload. It has been deployed at air-traffic control facilities for key metroplexes— including Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, and San Francisco—and FAA plans to complete the installation at at least three other sites by the end of 2014. Finally, FAA is implementing a system that will enable the sequencing of aircraft further from the destination airport—current sequencing typically occurs at the border between the enroute and terminal airspace. This system is to be implemented at one site in 2014, and the agency plans to subsequently install it at all others, but locations and timeframes have not been specified.\nFAA-led surface-traffic management enhancements are not expected to begin to be implemented until 2015 at the earliest, mostly through the greater use of automated departure-queue management programs that These existing are already in place at a number of metroplex airports.programs include queue-managements programs currently in use at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York and in Memphis, for example, which allow pilots to put their aircraft into a virtual departure queue before leaving the gate or ramp area instead of taxiing out and waiting on the runway for takeoff. Fuel savings, reduced taxiway congestion, and enhanced safety are among the benefits. FAA is working to determine which surface-traffic management capabilities to implement through testing with air traffic controllers, airlines, general aviation, and airport operators. While the airports have not yet been identified and the capabilities are still being determined, according to FAA officials, the agency tentatively plans to complete the rollout of enhanced surface- traffic management improvements by the end of the midterm.\nFAA is also developing a new surface-management capability system, the Terminal Flight Data Manager, but does not plan to implement it until at least 2017, which will likely limit potential midterm benefits. According to FAA, reductions in surface traffic congestion largely depend on the new system’s implementation. Further, the Terminal Flight Data Manager is also key to producing desired efficiency benefits—that is increasing arrivals and departures at busy metroplex airports where demand for runway capacity is high or where there are multiple runways with conflicting traffic. As a result, the agency will not be able to manage traffic throughout all phases of a flight—referred to as “end-to-end metering”— until these improvements are completed, including the integration of TMA enhancements with the Tower Flight Data Manager.envisioned for the midterm, end-to-end metering is now scheduled to be implemented in the long term (by 2025).\nFAA has already implemented systems to increase the safety of surface traffic. To improve safety for taxi and surface movement at airports, for example, FAA installed Airport Surface Detection Equipment–Model X (ASDE-X)—a ground monitoring system—for 35 major airports from 2003 to 2011. FAA is also installing Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) for another 9 busy and complex airports. These operational improvements were prioritized by the RTCA task force and enhance safety and traffic flow on runways, taxiways, and some ramps and allow for collaborative decision making among air traffic controllers and pilots.\nFAA has recently approved a few revisions to existing standards, which should benefit a handful of airports in the midterm, but further revisions are required before the envisioned efficiency and capacity benefits of midterm NextGen improvements can be fully realized. A key component of FAA’s NextGen plans involves updating separation and other flight safety standards to better accommodate modern aircraft and advances in technology. Separation standards—required minimum distances used for safely spacing aircraft from other aircraft, terrain, and objects—have a large effect on airport capacity and the overall capacity of the NAS. Consequently, according to FAA and industry stakeholders, updating separation and other standards could increase the efficiency, capacity, and predictability of the NAS. By contrast, if standards are not updated to facilitate the use of new technologies and procedures, projected NextGen benefits might not be achievable to the same degree. Such revisions to standards can be time intensive because safety assessments are required to ensure the safety of the changes. Figure 8 provides examples of key additional or revised standards that FAA is pursuing through 2018.\nRecent work completed by FAA’s Closely Spaced Parallel Operations working groupairport and several smaller airports. In 2008, the working group initiated a could soon provide benefits to one large metroplex series of research studies to investigate the potential for reducing runway separation standards—the required distance between runway centerlines for simultaneous use—to provide increased arrival and departure capacity in all weather conditions. After a lengthy safety assessment, the working group determined in 2011 that this standard could be reduced from 4300 feet to 3600 feet. FAA is proceeding with the implementation of the new standard. According to FAA officials, once this new standard is implemented, it will benefit four airports immediately. FAA’s 2012 NextGen Implementation Plan indicates that such reductions in runway separation standards should improve overall capability on runways, especially during poor weather conditions, but does not provide any quantitative estimates of benefits from this new standard.\nFAA has also recently revised standards in two key metroplex areas in an effort to increase capacity and efficiency.\nIn October 2011, FAA implemented a new standard that decreases the required angle of divergence between aircraft using RNAV departure procedures on the same or parallel runways at Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International Airport—the busiest airport in the NAS. According to FAA, this reduction has given controllers the ability to allow between 8 and 12 additional aircraft to depart the airport every hour and is expected to save airlines $10 million annually from reduced fuel burn on taxiways.\nThroughout 2011 and 2012, FAA implemented several revised standards at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) that FAA officials said could improve airport efficiency. An FAA official and industry representatives who participated in this initiative noted that these revisions should help address capacity issues at the airport created by regional wind and fog patterns. Revised standards include a lower visibility minimum for certain types of approaches, as well as departures. FAA also increased the use of the airport’s optimal runway configurations during various wind conditions.", "FAA has had varying success in integrating its NextGen implementation efforts, and stakeholders see opportunities for additional integration to better deliver benefits in the midterm. In 2010, the NAC approved of FAA’s plans to focus its early OAPM efforts on new PBN procedures and airspace changes to expedite the delivery of benefits for operators, but suggested that FAA incorporate additional operational improvements— such as revised standards—into future OAPM efforts. In 2012, the NAC recommended that FAA incorporate into future OAPM efforts additional midterm operational improvements, such as enhanced airborne and surface-traffic management tools and other capabilities to enhance the capacity of metroplex areas. FAA has coordinated the development of PBN procedures with the implementation of airborne-traffic management tools in some OAPM projects when study teams identified improvements that would facilitate the implementation or usage of new PBN routes, but this integration has not been systematic for current OAPM efforts. For example, in response to a request from the North California OAPM team, FAA has added the San Francisco metroplex to the list of metroplexes that will receive an upgraded TMA system, which would allow the enroute center to manage traffic in concert with those air-traffic control facilities that manage surrounding airspace. The consideration of other non-PBN improvements, however, has been done at the discretion of OAPM teams—rather than being included as a goal of the overall OAPM effort— and has been largely limited to enhancements to TMA.\nMore broadly, FAA’s obstacles study pointed to the lack of airborne management tools as a key obstacle to the use of existing PBN procedures, including tools that help air traffic controllers sequence aircraft and better predict and visualize the flight trajectories of aircraft on PBN procedures. These tools are needed to fully use RNP curved approaches in congested metroplex areas, according to the study. One such tool will not be operationally available until 2016, according to FAA’s 2012 NextGen Implementation Plan, and the plan did not clearly indicate how or where this capability would be rolled out. Stakeholders have raised concerns that the lack of some key tools will slow the potential benefits of PBN efforts, including those associated with the OAPM initiative. Likewise, as mentioned above, the rollout of surface-traffic management improvements are scheduled to begin in 2015 at a few airports, which may hinder FAA’s ability to deliver the full benefits of its other improvement efforts, including PBN.", "As noted above, FAA’s current operational improvement efforts have involved certain trade-offs to achieve some near and midterm benefits, in large part, because of the context within which these improvements are being made. FAA has long-established processes and requirements in place that have made the U.S. airspace among the safest in the world. A number of those processes are, however, complex, lengthy, and at times, unclear as they relate to new technologies, procedures, and capabilities. FAA has a number of efforts under way to help overcome previously identified, overarching obstacles to NextGen implementation, such as streamlining processes and updating the air traffic controller handbook Many of these efforts are scheduled to and procedure design criteria.take a number of years, particularly when proposed changes must be evaluated to ensure that they will maintain, if not enhance, the system’s current level of safety. Some, such as those aimed at increasing stakeholder involvement in planning and implementation of PBN procedures, do not, however, fully address previously identified obstacles. Nor do they change FAA’s overall approach to identifying potential PBN procedures for development or amendment, which relies on requests from airlines and other stakeholders without determining their impact on improving efficiency in the NAS. Finally, continued uncertainty about the FAA’s leadership of NextGen affects the agency’s ability to manage and oversee the various improvements and efforts needed to achieve the full implementation of NextGen.", "FAA and others have identified the process for developing PBN and other new flight procedures as a challenge. For example, in 2009 the RTCA task force recommended streamlining the operational approval and certification processes for new flight procedures. Likewise, an FAA report described the existing process as a bundle of interconnected, overlapping, and sometimes competing processes. It also found variations and contradictions in existing guidance on procedure development and implementation, which result in a process that is “far from optimal, frequently generates rework, and on occasion results in the implementation of low- or no-benefit procedures.” To address these challenges, FAA initiated the Navigation Lean (NAV Lean) initiative to focus on streamlining the implementation and amendment processes for all flight procedures, releasing a report with planned improvements in 2010. FAA anticipates that the initiative will cumulatively cut 40 percent off the time needed to implement new procedures (assuming a full environmental impact statement is not required), though it acknowledged that it will be difficult to measure actual time saved. ATO and the Office of Aviation Safety share responsibility for overseeing the initiative, which began with the identification of overarching issues that negatively affect procedure implementation efficiency. The NAV Lean working groups identified nine issue areas with 21 associated recommendations, which focus, among other things, on minimizing the workload and delayed implementation associated with minor amendments of procedures, amending agency guidance to clarify and promote preparation of focused environmental assessments, and overcoming challenges to the development and implementation of criteria for flight procedures. (See fig. 9.)\nAccording to the NAV Lean implementation plan, all planned improvements are scheduled to be completed from 2013 through 2015. FAA envisions that some are likely to produce benefits soon after implementation. However, FAA has acknowledged that it will have difficulty setting a baseline from which to measure many of the NAV Lean improvements. Agency officials, for example, told us that it would not be possible to determine how long the current PBN procedure implementation process takes both because the process varies for each effort and because agency databases do not track the amount of time taken for individual steps in the process. They explained that the more than 40 percent cumulative NAV Lean timesaving estimate was developed by asking officials the amount of time they expected to save in the procedure development process. In February 2013, FAA reported that it had made progress on all but one of the recommendations and had completed work on three recommendations, including a recommendation regarding the use of focused NEPA reviews in some circumstances. However, it is too early to determine outcomes associated with the implementation of these recommendations such as developing more procedures in less time.\nAs part of addressing concerns about the length of its environmental review process, FAA released guidance on preparing concise and focused environmental assessments for proposed FAA actions (including new procedures) in January 2011. Lengthy environmental reviews have been identified as an obstacle to the timely implementation of PBN by FAA and others. Environmental considerations were frequently not addressed until late in the procedure development process. The NAV Lean working group found that previous FAA guidance on the preparation of environmental assessments did not adequately address circumstances where the environment analysis could be more narrowly focused on only certain potential environmental impacts. In those circumstances, FAA offices should be preparing environmental assessments that consider all impact categories for applicability and significance, but focus the analysis only on the impact categories (e.g., noise) where there is potential for significant impacts caused by the proposed action (i.e., procedures). FAA anticipates that for small, non-OAPM projects involving one airport, “focused” environmental assessments could potentially take from 3 to 6 months, with a cost of $300,000 or less. For more complex OAPM projects—involving multiple airports and the assessment of numerous new flight procedures—focused environmental assessments generally will have 12- to 18-month time frames. By contrast, FAA officials estimate that non-focused environmental assessments traditionally take 6 months to 2 years for new flight procedures and cost $300,000 to over $1 million.\nAlthough FAA has used focused environmental assessments for other types of proposed agency actions, FAA is first applying the new guidance to procedure-related actions for projects in Houston and Denver. Thereafter, the agency intends to use the new guidance at select OAPM sites (i.e., based on their complexity, number of potential environmental impacts, local considerations, and where proposed changes would not qualify for a categorical exclusion under NEPA), and will apply this approach to other projects as appropriate. FAA is also working to enhance or integrate several environmental screening and modeling tools—by including fuel burn analysis in its noise screening tools and incorporating environmental screening into a traffic simulator used to design PBN procedures. These screening tools allow procedure developers to evaluate environmental implications early in the design process and determine the potential for extraordinary circumstances that would warrant environmental assessments rather than categorical exclusions. FAA has also been developing a new tool—the Aviation Environmental Design Tool—to facilitate its environmental assessment process.\nThe FAA reauthorization act included a second new categorical exclusion for new PBN procedures that would result in measurable reductions in fuel consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, and noise, on a per-flight basis, as compared to aircraft operations that follow existing procedures. cumulatively for all flights, and FAA has not yet identified an approach for such per-flight assessments. According to FAA officials, no currently available methodology resolves the technical problems involved in making such a determination, so the agency has not applied this new categorical exclusion. FAA officials have requested NAC’s input on how to address these technical challenges.\nPub. L. No. 112-95, § 213(c)(1), (2), 126 Stat., 49 (2012). amendments from the regional and national prioritization processes. This would allow FAA to make minor changes to existing—but potentially underused—RNAV arrival and departure procedures more expeditiously. This could be an efficient and cost-effective way for FAA to increase PBN usage.\nWhile NAV Lean does not assign one FAA office responsibility for developing and implementing new procedures, implementation of several NAV Lean recommendations will provide additional tools to allow for better coordination among ATO, the Office of Aviation Safety, AeroNav Products, and others involved in the process. In 2012, FAA’s obstacles study pointed to the lack of an accountable FAA office for the development of PBN to oversee a coherent design, development, production, and implementation strategy for new procedures. FAA is developing a web-based system to allow each interested party to access procedure designs and suggest improvements or mitigate potential problems throughout the development process. This is expected to result in a more cohesive procedure-development process when implemented in 2015. Furthermore, NAV Lean efforts are also intended to strengthen the role of the United States Instrument Flight Procedures Panel to improve coordination among parties responsible for the development and implementation of procedure design criteria.", "The RTCA task force and the NAC work group have pointed to the importance of prioritizing the implementation of key operational improvements, including focusing on the most appropriate PBN options such as RNAV or RNP. FAA officials said that they are in the early stages of developing a toolbox for those requesting new procedures, which would match solutions to identified problems and allow the agency to better target its efforts. FAA does not currently assess individual procedure requests—which can be made by a number of parties, including airlines—to determine if the proposed new procedures would generate expected benefits or resolve problems for airports or airspace. Rather, once a request for a new PBN procedure is received it is prioritized for development as requested on a first-come, first-served basis. Requests for new RNP procedures do not currently trigger an assessment by FAA (or by the requester) of the potential to use a less- costly option to resolve the underlying problem or gain the expected benefits.procedures could be used by more aircraft and pilots than the more precise RNP curved routes that were being or had been developed. Over 90 percent of commercial aircraft are equipped for RNAV procedures— which also allow for curved flight paths—and the RTCA task force recommended that FAA should focus on leveraging RNAV and reserve RNP to locations where tighter turns are needed.\nFAA officials noted that, in some cases, new RNAV Industry stakeholders have argued that third parties could play a greater role in the development of flight procedures, a move that would help FAA respond to the current demand for new PBN procedures in the face of The FAA reauthorization act called for the limited agency resources. agency to establish a program for qualified third parties to develop, test, and maintain flight procedures. In May 2012, FAA awarded a $2.8- million contract to GE’s Naverus and a partner to develop two RNP approach procedures each at five mid-sized airports. The contractors are to design, evaluate, and maintain these RNP approaches and be responsible for providing environmental data and analysis to FAA to support categorical exclusions and for drafting any required NEPA reviews, for review and approval by FAA. According to FAA officials, the pilot project will allow FAA to assess the potential for third parties to have an expanded role in helping address those PBN procedures that FAA, FAA has because of a lack of resources, may be unable to address.made progress in recent years in developing a framework plan for leveraging third-party procedure developers and overseeing them. The potential of third party procedure development may be limited, however, given that there are currently two third-party procedure developers—GE’s Naverus and Boeing’s Jeppesen—that are eligible to develop public RNP approach procedures. The use of third-party developers may be more costly than the in-house FAA development and maintenance of procedures. FAA officials estimate that new RNP procedures cost $58,100 on average to develop, conduct safety testing, and implement— and $2,300 per year to maintain—when these efforts are undertaken in house. This total is significantly less than the $280,000 average cost for each of the 10 procedures that are being developed by the third party, although these FAA procedure-development costs do not include additional expenses for any NEPA reviews above a categorical exclusion. If an environmental assessment is required, then FAA costs could exceed $58,100, as the cost of conducting a focused environmental assessment can range from $0 to $300,000.\nDespite efforts to streamline the development of flight procedures, FAA does not have a process to proactively identify those PBN procedures that would best further NextGen goals. Much of the work done by the RTCA task force and the NAC work group has focused on prioritizing improvements, and the identification of needed new routes might prove beneficial in easing congestion in the NAS and key airspace, or in solving local problems that have ripple effects across the NAS. OAPM was designed, in part, to fill this void, but for airspace or airports that are not included in the initiative, FAA depends on stakeholders to initiate requests. Once requests are made, however, they are added to the procedure-development queue, and are not assessed against other PBN procedures in the queue to determine their respective potential to benefit the NAS or to resolve problems at specific airports. Further, requests may be driven by where a requesting airline flies and not where new procedures are most needed. In 2012, Airlines for America, an airline trade organization, led an effort—called 20/20—to identify those 20 new procedures most wanted by airlines, as well as the 20 procedures they viewed as most in need of amendment. Four of the identified new procedures were at airports included in the OAPM initiative, so participating airlines agreed that FAA should address those new procedures through ongoing airspace redesign efforts. Of the remaining 16 identified procedures, 13 were found to already be under development by FAA. Similarly, for procedures needing revision, FAA found that 13 of the 20 identified procedures were already in the process of being revised. In the absence of a procedure-development tracking tool, such as is being developed as part of NAV Lean, airlines were not able to monitor FAA’s procedure development process for these routes. In response to the 20/20 effort, FAA agreed to track the development of the 16 desired new routes on its website, although it is not tracking those procedures Without a systematic that were identified for revision on the website.means to identify procedures that are most critical to achieving NextGen goals and sharing information about its plans and progress in developing needed new procedures, it will be difficult for FAA to provide reasonable assurance that its efforts are efficiently delivering benefits.\nOAPM or similar efforts may present an opportunity to assess the utility of some existing, but underused, conventional air-traffic control routes in a more efficient, systematic way. FAA maintains more than 22,000 PBN and conventional procedures in the NAS, and the agency is looking to cancel underused or redundant flight procedures. As noted, these procedures cost $2,300 or more per year to maintain and may be used only occasionally, if at all.unneeded routes, in a 2011 report, the Flight Safety Foundation proposed a process to identify 800 such procedures for potential elimination, representing a 12 percent reduction in the total number of ground-based approach procedures and a 4 percent reduction in the total number of procedures. Identifying these procedures for decommissioning could result in savings of approximately $1.8 million per year—or about $18 million over 10 years—in maintenance costs. An official with AeroNav Products pointed out that when OAPM teams assess current needs within a metroplex’s airspace, they are ideally positioned to identify some of the existing procedures that could be decommissioned, although they are not currently tasked with assessing the continued utility of existing routes. Once good candidates for route decommissioning are identified, FAA could further assess these routes and begin the public-notification process that leads to decommissioning.", "The lack of design criteria can impede the development of new procedures. FAA’s obstacles study, for example, notes that AeroNav Products is often unable to design a requested procedure because the criteria for the procedure have yet to be developed by the Office of Aviation Safety. According to the report, this lack of a coherent design, development, production, and implementation strategy slows down the process and creates frustration among air traffic controllers and system users, such as airlines. FAA officials in the Office of Aviation Safety responsible for developing PBN criteria told us that their units have made progress in recent years in updating the design criteria to better use the capabilities of PBN to respond to requests for new procedures. They also told us that they are currently focused on clarifying and consolidating all the PBN criteria into one document to make it easier for air traffic controllers and others, and have in place several efforts related to specific design criteria, such as updating the criteria for holding—a maneuver used to delay an aircraft already in flight—for RNAV and RNP procedures. However, officials in the Office of Aviation Safety and other FAA officials acknowledged that much work remains to be done to develop new criteria before PBN can be deployed nationwide. Several officials also acknowledged that it can be difficult to meet user requests for new PBN design criteria given variations in terrain and changing technology, especially because the safety tests that are often required for changing or amending the design criteria can be time and labor intensive.\nRTCA has pointed to the potential for changes in the way FAA tracks and assesses any errors—notably losses of separation where aircraft come in closer proximity than allowed—made by air traffic controllers to encourage closer adherence to existing standards by eliminating incentives to add buffers between planes. For example, the RTCA task force recommended and FAA implemented a non-punitive reporting system for losses of separation. For more information about FAA’s new systems for assessing losses of separation caused by controllers, see GAO, Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved Availability of Risk- Based Data Could Further Improve Safety, GAO-12-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2011). procedures to parallel runways. Potential solutions are then forwarded to FAA for consideration, such as a 2011 proposal that would better leverage the safety benefits of PBN to change certain separation standards for the use of parallel runways based on safety assessments conducted by the Greener Skies team.\nFAA’s primary effort to address issues with the air traffic controller handbook is also part of the Greener Skies initiative. The Greener Skies team has identified 95 needed changes in FAA orders and regulations to date to address obstacles that have contributed to limiting the usage of PBN procedures. FAA’s obstacles study noted that the lack of standard language for controllers and pilots for certain types of PBN procedures could create uncertainty in communications, which would require such a change to the handbook. Officials we interviewed at a Seattle-area air- traffic control facility acknowledged that they had known for years before the Greener Skies project began that the handbook was outdated. According to these officials, although FAA has published many PBN routes throughout the NAS, from a controllers’ perspective, there were few rules in place for using those procedures. For example, under the current handbook there is little guidance on how to safely give less than the standard separation for merging planes—as is often done for traditional procedures in clear weather conditions—even if the aircraft are on precise paths. The separation standards heavily influence the guidance in the controller handbook, because much of a controllers’ responsibility is to keep safe distances between aircraft. According to FAA’s obstacles study, these concerns have led controllers to not approve the use of PBN procedures, in some cases.\nFAA and others have also pointed to the need for additional training of air traffic controllers as a potential obstacle to the use of PBN procedures, and FAA’s obstacles study suggested developing a national training plan for PBN operations. While we did not look at the extent of training provided when PBN procedures are implemented at individual airports, the larger-scale initiatives in our review have included time and resources for controller training. For example, OAPM plans dedicate from 9 to 15 months to the implementation phase, which includes controller training. Officials with the North Texas team told us that some new OAPM procedures, such as OPDs, would require significant changes from the way local controllers traditionally managed aircraft, so adequate training would be especially important for the successful implementation of their OAPM procedures. Likewise, officials from the Seattle-area TRACON noted that it had taken them about 2 months to develop the controller training for using new Greener Skies procedures.", "FAA is making progress in systematically involving industry stakeholders, air traffic controllers, and other key subject matter experts in its initiatives, including OAPM and Greener Skies, as well as surface-traffic management initiatives. As we have previously reported, collaboration has been an ongoing challenge for FAA. For example, officials with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey told us that the failure to include controllers early in the procedure design process for the airspace redesign effort for the New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia area— some of the most complex and congested airspace in the world— contributed to the 4-year-plus implementation delay, because some proposed routes had to be amended following controller input. As such, we as well as others have made numerous recommendations that FAA should collaborate better with key stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of NextGen and enhance results. Many of these key stakeholders are also involved in other efforts to improve capacity in the NAS, such as the development of new or expanded runways, which are or will be pursued concurrently with NextGen. FAA officials, local controllers, airline officials, and others generally agreed that FAA has made significant progress in recent years in its ability to collaborate to achieve results. For example, FAA officials and industry stakeholders emphasized that OAPM is highly collaborative, as the study teams and design teams include local air traffic controllers and airline officials, FAA officials with experience in airspace redesign and other fields, environmental specialists, and others. The following are among the anticipated benefits of this collaborative approach.\nEnhances PBN usage: A number of FAA officials and air traffic controllers told us that FAA now recognizes that new procedures are much less likely to be used if controllers are not involved in the design. New procedures developed without controller input may not be feasible from an operational or safety perspective, and controllers may not see that the new routes are advantageous. Controllers serving the Seattle metroplex told us that their level of involvement in Greener Skies was more extensive and occurred earlier than in any previous procedure or airspace project. According to FAA officials and airline representatives, the inclusion of airline stakeholders in the design process also helped keep industry informed and involved and helps assure that the proposed procedures can be flown by participating airlines.\nAddresses community concerns: We have previously reported that the inclusion of airports in PBN procedure development and other projects can help address potentially adverse environmental—often noise- related—community impacts, since these entities often have primary responsibility for addressing community concerns and are likely more familiar than FAA with the airport’s environmental impacts and the surrounding communities. According to best practices established by ACRP regarding community involvement in airport projects, trust and respect are the keys to a long-term relationship between stakeholders—in this case between FAA and airport representatives, who are responsible for addressing community concerns about airport-related noise.\nWhile FAA has made progress involving airports in NextGen projects, several FAA officials, a representative of Airport Councils International- North America (ACI-NA), and officials from several airports said that FAA is not fully leveraging the expertise of airport officials about local community concerns, although the ACI-NA representative noted that FAA has begun to involve airports earlier as the OAPM effort has continued. Airport officials in one OAPM metroplex told us that FAA had not adequately included them in early planning for new PBN routes. Consequently, the airport hired environmental consultants to analyze, among other things, the potential noise impacts of proposed PBN procedures and submitted concerns to FAA. In addition, although the Port of Seattle was initially involved in designing procedures for Greener Skies, airport officials told us that they were concerned that FAA had not included them during the environmental assessment process or in conducting local outreach. The project has raised some community concerns about aircraft noise from new flight paths, and some neighborhoods have expressed concerns that FAA had not clearly explained the potential noise impact on their neighborhoods. New aviation noise is one of the largest obstacles to NextGen implementation, according to FAA officials and others. It can be difficult to address community concerns about aviation noise, but FAA may be able to mitigate such concerns by involving airport officials more closely in procedure design and community outreach efforts. FAA officials involved in another OAPM team, for example, noted that local airport officials, who were not included in initial route planning for the metroplex, later provided information about potential community impacts that FAA had not anticipated. Information provided by FAA on establishing OAPM study teams, however, does not include guidance on the timely involvement of airport representatives on these teams, if such involvement is appropriate; rather the information indicates that OAPM teams should brief airport authorities as the process continues. This is in contrast to the best practices established by ACRP, which state that educating—in this case briefing—interested stakeholders after the fact is not sufficient for effective involvement; rather, proactive involvement is required. A collaborative approach for NextGen that involves key stakeholders, such as airport officials, would better position FAA to fully leverage those stakeholders’ expertise, help identify possible solutions, and facilitate implementation of NextGen improvements.", "Although the RTCA task force and NAC work group did not make recommendations regarding NextGen organizational issues, more broadly, FAA has struggled to have the leadership in place to manage and oversee NextGen implementation. In the past, industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about the fragmentation of authority and lack of accountability for NextGen, two factors that could delay its implementation. Leading practices of successful organizations reflect that programs can be implemented most efficiently when managers are empowered to make critical decisions and are held accountable for results. To ensure accountability for NextGen results, several stakeholders suggested that an office was needed that would report directly to the FAA Administrator or the Secretary of Transportation. FAA has made organizational changes in the past in an effort to address these concerns.\nBeginning in 2011, FAA made additional changes to its NextGen organizational structure to address NextGen leadership issues. Specifically, FAA reorganized the structure of the office responsible for carrying out NextGen implementation, moving the office from within the ATO to under FAA’s Deputy Administrator. According to FAA, this change increased NextGen’s visibility within and outside the agency and created a direct line of authority and responsibility for NextGen. In addition, in February 2012, the FAA reauthorization act designated that the Director of JPDO—who is responsible for NextGen planning and coordination— and created a new leadership report directly to the FAA Administrator position—the Chief NextGen Officer.\nWhile these changes indicate a positive step towards addressing accountability issues, FAA continues to work to fill NextGen leadership positions. As of February 2013, FAA had not yet made all the organizational changes called for by the FAA reauthorization act. The Administrator has indicated that the new Deputy Administrator will serve as Chief NextGen Officer and that a search is on for qualified candidates for both the Deputy Administrator and Assistant Administrator of NextGen positions. The Administrator, who was sworn-in to the office in January 2013, has not yet clearly defined the relationship between the JPDO Director and other NextGen officials. Appointing a new Deputy Administrator to also serve as Chief NextGen Officer and concluding its candidate search for the Assistant Administrator of NextGen position, would better position FAA to resolve these remaining leadership challenges.", "", "FAA has made some progress developing performance metrics, which we recommended that the agency do in 2010. The NAC recommended in 2011 that FAA adopt performance areas used by ICAO and, as of February 2013, FAA had adopted 6 of the 11 ICAO performance areas.FAA provided information about 5 of these performance areas— Environment, Safety, Efficiency, Capacity, and Cost Effectiveness—and the metrics associated with these areas. Performance metrics for the sixth performance area—Predictability—are being developed. As we have reported in the past, having performance measures is important, because they allow an agency to track its progress in achieving intended results and develop contingency plans if milestones to complete tasks are not met, both of which can be particularly important during the implementation stage of a new program. Performance metrics would also enable stakeholders, such as airlines, to hold FAA accountable for results, as well as to make their own business decisions about whether to invest in equipment needed to enable the use of NextGen technologies and procedures.\nFAA is currently conducting an agency-wide effort to review and harmonize its performance metrics to bring order, consistency, and accuracy to metrics reporting across its lines of business. The agency began this effort to address several problems, including managing and monitoring an increasing number of metrics and inconsistent metrics names and definitions. Once the harmonization is complete, ATO will create a website to display the harmonized metrics, which, according to FAA officials, will provide information for many FAA activities, including the implementation of NextGen. The ongoing modifications to performance metrics must be completed before FAA can establish baselines from which it can measure progress. Baselines are essential to compare past performance to current performance. For some established metrics for which FAA already has extensive data, establishing a baseline is not expected to be a challenge. By contrast, establishing a baseline for new metrics for which FAA has not yet collected data may present challenges and is expected to take time.\nFAA is also developing additional NextGen performance metrics in response to the FAA reauthorization act, in addition to responding to the NAC recommendations. FAA was mandated to establish and, beginning in 2013, to track 12 performance metrics to measure progress for implementing some NextGen capabilities and improvements. Although these new reauthorization metrics do not clearly link to the existing NextGen key performance areas mentioned above, some of the reauthorization metrics are similar to and reflect the same information that is already expected to be measured. According to FAA officials, 7 of the reauthorization performance metrics are already established, however the agency faces some challenges in developing 5 of the remaining metrics. For example, FAA is working with the NAC to identify a technically feasible way to measure and report on the amount of fuel used between key city-to-city (city-pair) markets—one of the required new metrics. It is not known at this time if these key city pairs will include some or all locations where midterm NextGen operational improvements are being implemented.\nFAA has made minimal progress in developing goals for NextGen, which we also recommended in our 2010 report. FAA’s Destination 2025 report establishes cross-cutting agency-wide goals for the midterm, although these are not all related to the implementation of NextGen. Agency officials emphasized that Destination 2025 goals were intended to be aspirational and that FAA business plans, which are developed by each individual business office, would provide NextGen targets and goals. However, agency officials in the NextGen Office acknowledged that individual business offices are still developing their respective targets. When FAA provided information to us in January 2013 about its efforts to align goals and performance metrics, the goals included in Destination 2025 were used as the source for many of the included metrics. As we reported in 2010, having goals and performance measures in place will enable FAA to provide stakeholders, interested parties, Congress, and the American people with a clear picture of where implementation stands at any given time, and whether the technologies, capabilities, and operational improvements that are being implemented are resulting in positive outcomes and improved performance for operators and passengers. Thus, we continue to believe that fully addressing our 2010 recommendations has merit. (See app. II for more information about performance areas and metrics.)", "FAA has begun to report on implementation progress and benefits at certain airports and metroplexes, as well as for some capabilities, but implementation and benefits information is incomplete. In March 2012, FAA made publically available the NextGen Performance Snapshot website to provide post-implementation performance data. The website is designed to emphasize the link between NextGen investments and benefits. To date, information on the website provides performance progress on the near-term implementation of some, but not all, locations and initiatives where FAA has implemented NextGen capabilities.January 2013, the website had information on established metrics for three performance areas—efficiency, environment, and access. Efficiency is reported at the core 30 airports; environment and access are reported As of at the NAS-wide level. For example, the NextGen Performance Snapshot website reports some efficiency data, such as the average number of minutes that it takes flights to taxi-in and taxi-out at each of the core 30 airports, and environmental data, such as NAS-wide noise exposure data for the U.S. population. In the absence of specific NextGen targets, we looked to track FAA’s progress vis-à-vis the NextGen-related goals in Destination 2025 on FAA’s NextGen Performance Snapshot website, but found it difficult to do so. Information presented was in many cases neither in the same format nor on the same scale as goals in Destination 2025. For example, one goal in Destination 2025 is to improve throughput at core airports during adverse weather by 14 percent through 2018, but the NextGen Performance Snapshot website tracking progress did not include this information either as an average or for individual core airports. Likewise, another Destination 2025 goal is to reduce the amount of fuel burned per miles flown by at least 2 percent annually—which corresponds to international objectives accepted by ICAO—but information provided showed changes in the cumulative amount of fuel burned per kilometers flown. According to agency officials, the NextGen Performance Snapshot website is currently undergoing improvements that will include more meaningful measures and additional reporting levels—such as metroplex and key city-pair views—to more fully demonstrate progress at core airports, prioritized metroplexes, and across the NAS. An updated NextGen Performance Snapshot website has the potential to help stakeholders—such as airports and airlines—and the public understand the progress and some benefits occurring at various airports and metroplexes across the nation in a more systematic way, as well as providing a link between these benefits and the investments made in NextGen by FAA and others.\nFAA is also developing a PBN assessment tool—the PBN dashboard—to enable FAA to assess the PBN capabilities at individual airports and within the NAS. According to FAA officials and the contractors developing the dashboard, it will be able to measure PBN usage and impacts and changes to conditions (fleet, equipage, etc.). Representatives from one airline we spoke with said that they currently do not collect the information on procedure usage that FAA needs for the dashboard. In response to industry stakeholders’ aforementioned concerns and perceptions that some published PBN procedures have provided limited benefits or have not been sufficiently used, FAA had undertaken some analyses to determine how often published PBN procedures are being used. This analysis of flight track data for airspace around some airports showed that more aircraft were following the airborne routes of published PBN procedures than was being reported by airlines or air-traffic control facilities. However, the analysis was unable to determine whether the aircraft were actually flying the published PBN procedure or merely following the same track on the conventional procedure. FAA officials stated that the dashboard could help FAA better assess the extent to which the fleet is able to use existing procedures. The OAPM study team for South/Central Florida used the dashboard to determine the percentage of operations at each airport in the metroplex that would benefit from proposed new procedures. It is unclear the extent to which the dashboard will be used to measure the impact of improvements or assess progress toward overarching NextGen goals. FAA officials do not plan to use the dashboard to proactively identify additional needed procedures at individual airports or make the dashboard available to external stakeholders, such as airlines, that may want to identify additional needed procedures.\nRTCA, NextGen Equipage: User Business Case Gaps (Sept. 2011). is currently equipped. For example, RTCA noted that FAA’s long-range implementation plans should provide information on the roll out of RNP procedures at specific airports—the type of information that would be useful for airlines that are considering investing in this technology. However, RTCA found that the plans lacked such information. Nor do FAA implementation plans identify criteria with which additional sites would be selected in the case of demonstration projects. Without greater certainty on when and where NextGen improvements are planned, airlines and others are unlikely to invest in the equipage (and conduct the associated staffing and training) that will help achieve the full benefits of NextGen implementation. FAA has estimated that total industry equipage could cost $6.6 billion—compared to $11.5 billion in NextGen implementation costs for FAA—through 2018. Deciding whether to invest in most of that equipage is at each airline’s discretion.", "The implementation of NextGen is expected to enhance safety, improve efficiency, and result in a reduction in the environmental costs of aviation. Achieving the benefits of NextGen is a collaborative task that not only relies on timely and reliable information on progress implementing NextGen, but also depends heavily on airlines’ and other stakeholders’ continued or increased investments in NextGen technology and training. The improvements included in NextGen plans are often interrelated, with benefits in one area dependent on the full implementation of other operational improvements.\nFAA does not have a system for systematically tracking the use of existing PBN procedures. As a result, FAA is unable to assure that investment in these routes is worthwhile or that they justify the cost to develop and maintain them. In the absence of data on the use of existing PBN routes, airlines and other stakeholders remain unconvinced that the investments needed for the full implementation of NextGen will be justified. Such information could help the agency demonstrate the value of PBN technologies and any resulting benefits, as well as allow the agency to identify routes that need to be revised to increase their use.\nWithout a process for proactively identifying new PBN procedures based on NextGen goals and targets, requests for new PBN procedures largely originate from outside FAA. While the agency has attempted to work with industry stakeholders, such as airlines in the 20/20 effort, to identify needed routes, results have been mixed. The use of criteria to proactively identify needed routes at individual airports, such as criteria used by the NAC to prioritize metroplexes, could enable FAA to identify routes that can maximize benefits for the NAS. Furthermore, FAA does not assess requests received to determine whether the requested route or type of procedure (e.g., RNAV or RNP) maximizes potential benefits. Since requestors, such as airlines, may have their own reasons for requesting routes at certain locations or using specific technologies, their requests may not correspond with NextGen goals or result in the most efficient use of resources for PBN implementation or vis-à-vis the needs of other users.\nThe NAC work group recommended that FAA develop an integrated approach to increase airspace efficiency in key metroplexes, including OAPM sites. While FAA has consistently emphasized the importance of integrating key operational improvements to maximize NextGen benefits, FAA has primarily focused its midterm efforts on PBN and has not systematically integrated airborne- and surface traffic management and revised standards into these efforts. FAA officials explained that non-PBN improvements were not systematically included in the first round of OAPM, in part, to achieve OAPM time frames. However, with the implementation of some first round improvements, as well as progress made in developing and deploying some non-PBN improvements, FAA is better positioned to systematically integrate PBN and other improvements going forward. Insufficient integration of key improvements decreases midterm NextGen benefits, since these benefits are interdependent.\nFurthermore, by not including the identification of unused flight routes for decommissioning in OAPM and similar efforts, FAA could be missing an opportunity to leverage the expertise of participating stakeholders. Decommissioning unused or little-used conventional, non-PBN procedures could allow FAA to make better use of its resources by reducing maintenance costs.\nFAA has made progress in recent years in ensuring the inclusion of stakeholders in NextGen efforts, especially air traffic controllers. Some airport officials, however, expressed concern that FAA had not fully involved them in current efforts or involved them too late in the process, although a representative with ACI-NA noted that FAA has recently begun to involve airports more significantly in NextGen design and implementation efforts. However, FAA has not developed guidelines for the timely and consistent inclusion of these stakeholders. Some FAA officials told us that they had not fully appreciated the potential value that airport officials could provide. A collaborative approach that timely involves key stakeholders—including the agency, airport officials, air traffic controllers, and airlines—enables FAA to fully leverage the expertise of these stakeholders, helps identify the best possible solutions, and facilitates the implementation of those improvements.\nFAA has made some progress in developing and aligning performance metrics and goals since we recommended these actions in 2010. It is important for FAA to complete this work to measure progress and demonstrate benefits across the NAS, gain confidence, and engender needed investments to support the full implementation of NextGen. Furthermore, RTCA and others have pointed to the importance of having stable, long-term implementation plans for NextGen capabilities and determining specific location benefits and implementation dates, but FAA’s NextGen implementation plans do not detail such deployment information. As a consequence, airlines and other stakeholders have been reluctant to invest in expensive avionics, including RNP equipage.", "To help ensure that NextGen operational improvements are fully implemented in the midterm, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following five actions: work with airlines and other users to develop and implement a system to systematically track the use of existing PBN procedures; develop processes to proactively identify new PBN procedures for the NAS, based on NextGen goals and targets, and evaluate external requests so that FAA can select appropriate solutions; require consideration of other key operational improvements in planning for NextGen improvements, including PBN projects at metroplexes such as OAPM, as well as the identification of unused flight routes for decommissioning; develop and implement guidelines for ensuring timely inclusion of appropriate stakeholders, including airport representatives, in the planning and implementation of NextGen improvement efforts; and assure that NextGen planning documents provide stakeholders information on how and when operational improvements are expected to achieve NextGen goals and targets.", "We provided the Department of Transportation (DOT) with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT responded by email and did not agree or disagree with our recommendations, but provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.", "Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) progress implementing key Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) operational improvements in the midterm and demonstrating benefits from these improvements. To do so, we addressed the following questions: 1) What key operational improvements is FAA pursuing to deliver NextGen benefits with existing technologies through 2018? 2) To what extent is FAA addressing known obstacles to the implementation and usage of NextGen operational improvements? 3) To what extent is FAA measuring and demonstrating midterm NextGen benefits and assessing outcomes?\nTo address these three questions, we reviewed our prior reports, met with FAA officials with a role in implementing NextGen, including units within the NextGen Office, the Office of Aviation Safety, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Aeronautical Navigation Products (AeroNav Products), and the Office of Environment and Energy. We reviewed FAA planning documents for NextGen, including the 2012 NextGen Implementation Plan and work plans for individual lines of business within FAA, as well as FAA reports and briefings related to ongoing NextGen efforts, including the Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) initiative, and FAA process and procedure documentation. We also interviewed aviation stakeholders and experts with knowledge and experience related to NextGen implementation: representatives from industry associations, including RTCA, Airlines for America, and the Airports Council International–North America; airlines, including Alaska Airlines and Southwest Airlines, which have both advocated for the increased use of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures; airports involved in OAPM efforts in North Texas and Southern California, in the Greener Skies over Seattle (Greener Skies) initiative, and in surface improvement efforts for airports in New York and New Jersey; avionics and aircraft manufacturers and other aviation vendors, including Boeing, Honeywell, and Raytheon; and air traffic controllers with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and at individual air-traffic control facilities, including facilities involved in the OAPM effort in North Texas and the Greener Skies initiative.\nTo assess the status of FAA’s implementation of key operational improvements and the potential benefits to be achieved, and identify challenges to the full implementation of those key operational improvements, we assessed FAA implementation progress for operational improvements that were recommended by RTCA’s Midterm Implementation Task Force (RTCA task force) in 2009 and those that were prioritized by the Integrated Working Capabilities Work Group of the NextGen Advisory Council (NAC work group) in 2012. (See table 1.) RTCA’s recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA’s policy, program, and regulatory decisions, and have been incorporated into FAA’s current NextGen implementation plans. Likewise, the NAC—which includes representatives from industry and FAA’s senior leadership— advises FAA on the implementation of NextGen. The recommendations made by the RTCA task force and NAC work group represent consensus views in the aviation community regarding which operational improvements FAA should prioritize and where those improvements should be implemented in the midterm—through 2018—but do not include all operational improvements in FAA’s implementation plans. They are limited to those improvements that use existing technologies. We grouped these operational improvements into three key improvement areas for midterm NextGen implementation: 1. Performance Based Navigation (PBN), 2. enhanced airborne and surface traffic management, and 3. additional or revised aviation safety standards.\nTable 1 provides a listing of the operational improvements recommended by the RTCA task force and NAC work group. Operational improvements are grouped by the implementation portfolios used by FAA in its planning documents.\nTo determine how FAA is addressing known obstacles to the implementation of NextGen operational improvements, we identified obstacles and challenges to developing, implementing, or fully using key NextGen improvements primarily from findings and recommendations made by the RTCA task force and an FAA study on obstacles to PBN implementation. To obtain information about FAA efforts to address these obstacles, we reviewed agency reports and documents, including FAA’s report on efforts to streamline the process for developing and implementing flight procedures, and spoke with officials from relevant program offices and facilities, including environmental review specialists and air-traffic control facilities. To assess agency progress toward addressing these obstacles and identify ongoing challenges, we spoke with industry experts and stakeholders, including airport officials, airline representatives, avionics manufacturers, members of the NAC work group and the Performance Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee, and air traffic controllers. We also assessed certain FAA efforts against established criteria, including best practices for stakeholder involvement from the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) and for organizational goal-setting and performance measurement.\nSee GAO, NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA’s Metrics Can Be Used to Report on Status of Individual Programs, but Not of Overall NextGen Implementation or Outcomes, GAO-10-629 (Washington, D.C: July 27, 2010). This report assessed FAA’s progress in developing performance goals and metrics against criteria established by GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). and Outreach Office. We also interviewed NAC officials. To evaluate the consistency and meaningful output that would be provided by the NextGen key performance areas, metrics, and measures, we compared and analyzed information that was provided in FAA agency-wide reports and metrics documentation, the NextGen Performance Snapshot website, and the FAA reauthorization act. We reviewed FAA reports, NextGen business case documentation, and the publicly available information on NextGen implementation and expected benefits. We also interviewed industry stakeholders, including representatives from airports, airlines, and equipment manufacturers to assess the extent to which available information builds confidence and buy-in toward full NextGen implementation. Finally, we compared available information with best practices for performance plans.\nWe conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through April 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "The following table provides the description of FAA performance areas and metrics. Although some of the performance metrics contained in this table have been established, FAA may continue to refine these metrics to ensure that the measurements align with agency targets and goals. FAA also has a few new metrics under development, and the agency is working to identify a technically feasible way to implement them.", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Ed Laughlin, Assistant Director; Russ Burnett; Jessica Bryant-Bertail; Aisha Cabrer; Tim Guinane; Bert Japikse; Delwen Jones; Molly Laster; and Josh Ormond made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full h3_full h2_full", "h0_full h3_title", "", "", "", "h3_full", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h2_title", "h2_full", "h2_full", "h3_full h2_full h1_full", "", "", "h0_full h4_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why is FAA trying to implement NextGen in the midterm?", "What are the benefits and risks of implementing NextGen so quickly?", "What are some of the trade-offs that FAA made?", "How has FAA improved in other key areas?", "How could the interdependency of improvements affect FAA's progress in the midterm?", "What is the current status of FAA's NextGen implementation efforts?", "How is FAA planning to overcome obstacles to NextGen implementation?", "How effective is FAA's plan for these obstacles?", "How might FAA's reliance on requests for new procedures affect the national airspace system?", "Why is it important for FAA to quickly and effectively address these obstacles?", "In what way does FAA demonstrate its progress in implementing midterm improvements?", "How is FAA's handling of midterm improvements affecting airlines?", "How effective is FAA's website about NextGen implementation?", "How could FAA better appeal to airlines for investments?", "What is NextGen?", "How will NextGen benefit the aviation industry?", "What is FAA doing to deliver midterm benefits for NextGen?", "Why might it be difficult for FAA to deliver benefits in the midterm?", "What was GAO asked to review about FAA?", "What about FAA did GAO then examine?", "What resources did GAO use to review FAA's efforts?" ], "summary": [ "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is pursuing key operational improvements to implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the \"midterm,\" which is 2013 through 2018. These improvements focus on establishing Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures at key airports, but benefits could be limited in the midterm.", "PBN uses satellite-based guidance to improve air-traffic control routes (known as \"procedures\"). These procedures can deliver benefits to airlines, such as fuel savings and increased efficiency, particularly in congested airspace. To deliver benefits more quickly, FAA made trade-offs in selecting sites and in the scope of proposed improvements.", "To deliver benefits more quickly, FAA made trade-offs in selecting sites and in the scope of proposed improvements. For example, FAA is not implementing procedures that will trigger lengthy environmental reviews. These trade-offs, with which airlines and other stakeholders generally agree, will likely limit benefits from these PBN initiatives early in the midterm.", "FAA has also made some progress in other key operational improvement areas, such as upgrading traffic management systems and revising standards to improve aircraft flow in congested airspace.", "However, FAA has not fully integrated implementation of all of its operational improvement efforts at airports. Because of the interdependency of improvements, their limited integration could also limit benefits in the midterm.", "FAA has efforts under way to help overcome overarching obstacles to NextGen implementation identified by an advisory task force, but challenges remain, and many of these efforts are scheduled to take a number of years.", "FAA efforts include, for example, a new process for focused and concise environmental reviews for some proposed actions (e.g., new procedures), where a detailed analysis of the environmental impacts is limited to only those categories involving potentially significant impacts, such as increased noise or emissions.", "Some of these efforts do not, however, fully address previously identified obstacles. FAA has not fully addressed obstacles to selecting new PBN procedures that will best relieve congestion and improve efficiency, for example.", "FAA continues to rely on requests for new procedures from airlines and other stakeholders. This reliance may or may not result in procedures that maximize benefits to the national airspace system.", "Not addressing remaining challenges could delay NextGen implementation and limit potential benefits.", "FAA has made progress in developing NextGen performance metrics, but according to key stakeholders, FAA currently provides limited data to demonstrate its progress in implementing midterm improvements and the associated benefits. FAA is in the process of harmonizing performance metrics across all agency programs to ensure that metrics align with agency targets and goals.", "However, information is incomplete on the midterm improvements and their benefits at selected airports, and airlines and others lack access to needed information to make fully informed investment decisions.", "FAA has developed a website to report on NextGen implementation, but published information is not fully tied to FAA's implementation goals.", "FAA's plans also provide limited information about future implementation, such as locations and expected benefits. Better performance and planning information would provide airlines with a stronger basis for making decisions to invest an estimated $6.6 billion on NextGen technology through 2018.", "FAA, collaborating with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing NextGen, an advanced technology air-traffic management system that FAA anticipates will replace the current ground-radar-based system.", "At an expected cost of $18 billion through 2018, NextGen is expected to enhance safety, increase capacity, and reduce congestion in the national airspace system.", "To deliver some of these benefits in the midterm, FAA is implementing operational improvements using available technologies.", "Delivering midterm benefits could build support for future industry investments, but a task force identified obstacles, such as FAA's lengthy approval processes.", "GAO was asked to review FAA's midterm NextGen efforts.", "GAO examined (1) key operational improvements FAA is pursuing through 2018, (2) the extent to which FAA is addressing known obstacles to the implementation of NextGen operational improvements, and (3) the extent to which FAA is measuring and demonstrating midterm benefits.", "GAO reviewed FAA documents, as well as the task force's recommendations to FAA, and interviewed FAA and airport officials and aviation experts." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_RL34365	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Background", "Peculiarities of Harbor Navigation", "Challenges of Piloting Bigger Ships", "Slow-speed Handling Characteristics", "Maritime Pilotage", "Pilotage Requirements Vary Among U.S. Ports", "Pilot Training", "State Pilot Associations", "Federal Pilots", "Dual Oversight", "State Pilot Associations Are Regulated Monopolies", "Vessel Traffic Services", "VTS Development", "Safety and Security", "VTSs and JHOCs", "Issues for Congress", "Oversight of Pilot Performance", "Should VTSs Operate More Like ATCs?", "Ship Design Standards", "Poor-Handling Vessels", "VTS Expansion", "Requiring a Passage Plan", "Language Barriers", "Other Issues", "Near-Miss Data", "Coast Guard Staffing Practices", "Legislative Activity in the 110th Congress" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "On November 7, 2007, at about 8:30 a.m., the container ship Cosco Busan sideswiped one of the towers of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, ripping a 100-foot by 12-foot gash into the side of the hull and releasing over 50,000 gallons of the ship's bunker fuel into the Bay. Throughout the morning, and at the time of the accident, there was heavy patchy fog, and the pilot had delayed the ship's departure from the Oakland pier by 90 minutes because of the fog. About three minutes before the accident, but apparently too late to avoid the collision, the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), which monitors harbor traffic, contacted the ship's pilot. The VTS told him that he was running parallel to the bridge and inquired whether his intended course was still to pass beneath the delta and echo spans of the bridge, as he had informed VTS earlier.\nAlthough several investigations are pending, the suspected cause of the accident is pilot error. Considering the number of ships transiting U.S. harbors everyday, accidents are rare. This is largely the result of the skill and expertise of pilots and the navigation support services they receive from VTSs. When accidents occur, the public impact of the oil or fuel spilled can be large, as the Cosco Busan accident demonstrated.\nAs a result of tanker safety improvements implemented in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, the amount of oil spilled by oil tankers has been declining significantly and is now approaching the amount of oil spilled by non-tank vessels. According to the Coast Guard, the Cosco Busan has a fuel capacity of 52,000 barrels , larger than the fuel capacity of the majority of ocean-going non-tank vessels calling at U.S. ports which have a fuel capacity between 10,000 and 20,000 barrels. However, 360 vessels calling U.S. ports have a fuel capacity over 50,000 barrels and 100 vessels have a fuel capacity over 70,000 barrels. While the fuel oil carried by non-tank vessels is a relatively small fraction of the oil carried as cargo in tankers, it is still of sufficient quantity to cause an environmental catastrophe and significant economic loss if spilled.\nMuch attention has focused on the timeliness of the Coast Guard's response to the Cosco Busan spill, but the accident has also raised questions about oversight of pilot proficiency and the role of VTSs in harbor navigation. Congress has thus far held three hearings on the accident and has introduced legislation in reaction to the accident. Other, preexisting legislation related to ship navigation is pending (see the last section of this report). Important policy questions for Congress include whether there is a need for further independent oversight of pilot performance; whether VTSs' should operate more like Air Traffic Control centers; and whether the pilot and ship captain should be required to agree on a passage plan before transiting a harbor? Ever-larger ships, difficult or challenging slow-speed handling characteristics of some of these ships, and rising port traffic that is increasingly foreign-flagged may be cause for a review of pilotage, vessel traffic services, and other safety-related navigation services in U.S. ports.\nThis report describes the role of pilots and VTSs in the safe navigation of ships in U.S. harbors and reviews the controversy over the governance of pilot associations, the appropriate level of interaction between the VTS and pilot, and other proposals for improving the safety of harbor navigation. The report's focus is on the prevention of ship collisions and groundings in harbors and thus does not discuss oil spill response and clean-up. This report also does not discuss the legal liabilities of carriers and mariners in ship accidents.", "", "The skill and knowledge required to navigate a ship in a harbor versus at sea is significantly different. Most ship collisions, allisions, and groundings occur in harbors, because that is where navigation becomes constricted by land, shallow water, other vessels, and man-made structures like jetties, bridges, and piers. Tide and river currents are also an important factor in harbors but not at sea. A ship's response to the water displacement of a passing vessel, a channel's bank, and minimal under-keel clearance are hydrodynamics peculiar to a harbor's constricted waters. A fully loaded ship moving at typical harbor speed in a channel with a following tide may not be able to stop, even with engines in reverse and the assistance of tugs, for one or more miles.", "Ever-larger ships, increasing port traffic, and ships carrying especially dangerous cargo have put a premium on the skill and knowledge of today's harbor pilots. In 2005, ocean-going vessels over 10,000 deadweight tonnage (dwt) made over 61,000 U.S. port calls, or an average of 167 per day. From 2001 to 2006, container ship calls at U.S. ports increased by 14% while the average size of containerships increased by 25%. The Cosco Busan, with a capacity of 5,500 TEUs, is a member of the fifth generation of container ships built between 2000 and 2005. The ship is over 130 feet wide and just over three football fields long (901 feet). From 2001 to 2006, port calls by smaller container ships (those with less than 4,000 TEU capacity) decreased by 15%, while port calls by large container ships like the Cosco Busan or bigger (those with more than 5,000 TEU capacity) increased by 241%. Unlike the largest oil tankers, which load and unload their cargo at offshore pipelines or transfer their cargo to lightering ships at the harbor's entrance, container and other types of ships must transit the harbor to load and unload. Ships carrying cargo that can be especially dangerous or damaging to the environment have also increased in number. From 2001 to 2005, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carrier calls increased by 31% and tanker calls increased by nearly 10%. Because of a boom in shipping in recent years, especially in the dry bulk sector, there is also concern that older ships that otherwise would have been sent to the scrap yard are still plying the seas and picking up dry bulk cargo at ports like those along the lower Mississippi River, which is a load center for bulk cargoes.\nAccording to one observer, many ships transiting U.S. harbors may simply be \"too big for their ditches.\" In other words, they exceed the size that the shipping channel was originally designed for. While ships are designed and built for a particular route, over the life of a ship lasting from 20 to 25 years, markets change and ships end up calling other ports. Often, shipping channels are deepened rather than widened, which some argue is an indication that economics (ship productivity) motivates dredging more than safety concerns. In other words, it is argued that efforts are made to accommodate ship displacement but not maneuverability. For example, when two ships pass each other in opposite directions at a certain segment in the Houston ship channel, they perform a maneuver called \"Texas Chicken\" because the two ships pass so close to one another that they use the displacement from the other vessel for the extra water they need to avoid grounding on the edges of the channel. A certain concrete structure in the Port of Long Beach is referred to as the \"can opener\" because of the risk it poses to ships transiting the harbor.", "In addition to their sheer size, the biggest ships can have some handling characteristics that pilots need to compensate for when maneuvering them in constricted waters. Deep-sea speed is given higher design priority than shallow and restricted water maneuverability in the design of cargo ships. For example, high powered engines designed to achieve faster deep-sea cruising speeds can have a minimum bare steerage speed of about eight knots, which is a relatively high speed in constricted waters. In contrast, deep-sea speed is less important for cruise ships and they exhibit better slow-speed maneuverability. As ships are getting bigger, the relative size of their rudders is getting smaller; not a problem at sea but it does have an adverse impact on controllability at slower speeds in narrow channels and in shallow water. Ships with a higher profile, like car carriers, container ships (when fully stacked with containers on deck), and cruise ships, are much more susceptible than other ships to the influences of cross winds during slow speed maneuvering.", "Maritime pilots are hired by ocean carriers to take command of the navigation of their ships through harbors. They are navigational specialists for a particular harbor. They board ships at the entrance to a harbor (with use of a pilot boat or in rare cases a helicopter) and take position at the bridge alongside the master of the vessel (or the officer in charge of the watch) and other bridge crew. Using his/her experience and intimate knowledge of the navigation through a particular harbor, the pilot will order instructions to the helmsmen to steer the ship through the harbor and may direct tugboats, if they are assisting. While the pilot is in command of the navigation of the ship through the harbor, the captain of the ship remains in command of the ship and retains ultimate responsibility for its safe passage. Only under emergency situations is a captain likely to countermand the pilot's orders. Often the pilot will board the ship with a computer laptop or other handheld device that contains his/her own set of charts for that harbor as well as ship tracking technology. The laptop may also be plugged into the ship's navigation console to incorporate the ship's navigation technology into the pilot's navigation software. When the pilot boards the ship, the captain is required to inform the pilot about the navigation particulars of the ship, such as the draft, air draft (highest point on the vessel), and maneuvering characteristics. A \"pilot card\" is used for this purpose. Although English is the required language of international shipping, language can be a barrier to expansive communication between the pilot and captain.", "Most U.S. ports require that a ship hire a pilot—that is, it is compulsory. In some ports, hiring a pilot may be voluntary. In these cases, if a ship captain regularly calls at a port and is confident that he/she can navigate the ship through the harbor, the captain may elect not to hire a pilot, but the shipping line will still be charged either the full pilotage fee or some portion thereof. For liability reasons, many shipping lines will take on a pilot even if not compulsory. On the West and Gulf Coasts, the pilot usually navigates the ship from the harbor entrance to the dock (and vice versa), but on the East Coast, some ports require a \"docking pilot\" to takeover from the pilot when docking the ship. Docking pilots are usually former tugboat captains and are not members of the local pilot association. In Louisiana, in addition to hiring a harbor pilot, shipping lines may also be required to hire one or two \"river pilots\" depending on how far up the Mississippi River the ship is transiting (to call at the Port of Baton Rouge or South Louisiana). Especially large ships may be required to hire two pilots, or a full pilot and an assist pilot.", "A pilot may be a graduate of a maritime academy with sea experience. If a pilot has little sea experience, he/she may begin with an apprenticeship under the supervision of a senior pilot lasting several years. Eventually an apprentice pilot will have to pass a written exam that includes, among other things, drawing the chart for the harbor, in every detail, by memory. A new pilot will begin solo piloting on smaller vessels and will typically have to have piloted a minimum number of ships in each size range before advancing.\nAs explained below, there are pilots who hold state licenses and those that hold federal licenses or endorsements. The requirements for obtaining a state license vary from port to port, but states generally require that an applicant hold a federal pilot's license as a minimum requirement. Obtaining a state pilot license generally requires more hands-on experience than obtaining a federal pilot license.", "A maritime pilot typically works as an independent contractor in a pilot's association at a given port. The association takes care of administrative functions for the pilots such as dispatching pilots to vessels, maintaining pilot boats, and billing and collecting pilotage fees. Pilots are assigned to ships on a rotating basis and the shipping line has no choice in the selection of the pilot. Pilot associations are regulated by a state board of commissioners, or in some cases, by city government. Typically, a pilot board is comprised of three to ten members who serve part-time. Representation on the board must consist of a specific ratio of pilots, members of the broader maritime industry in the port area, and members of the public not connected with the maritime industry. The pilot board is responsible for ensuring the qualifications of the pilots, setting pilotage fees charged to the vessel operators, and reviewing the performance of pilots. Pilotage fees are based on the draft and/or tonnage of the vessel and, in some cases, the distance piloted. Pilots do not work in a competitive environment and pilot associations are effectively local or regional monopolies. The pilot association only selects enough member pilots to service the traffic at hand. State and local pilot associations only have jurisdiction over the pilotage of ships in the foreign trade—that is, ships carrying international cargo.", "The federal government has jurisdiction over the pilotage of ships in the domestic trade: for example, a tank vessel carrying oil from Alaska to California. Typically, a sea captain engaged in the domestic trade will carry a Coast Guard pilot's endorsement on his/her captain's license and therefore will not need to hire a pilot upon entrance to a harbor but rather has the authority to pilot the vessel in that harbor. This type of federal pilot authorization is the most common. There are also a few independent federal pilots that are not employed by a coastwise shipping line, but offer their piloting service at the particular port for which they are licensed. Like the state pilot license, the federal pilot license pertains to a specific port, therefore, the ship captain must obtain a pilot license for each port that he/she expects to call on a routine basis. Generally, all state and local pilots licensed to pilot foreign trade vessels also hold a federal license to pilot ships in the domestic trade. As mentioned above, most state and local pilot associations require a federal pilot's license as a minimum requirement for being allowed to work towards a state pilot's license. The federal government will grant a federal pilot's license to anyone that qualifies, unlike the states that limit the granting of licenses based on their perceived need for pilot services.", "Significantly, the Coast Guard cannot suspend or revoke the license of a pilot for misconduct while he or she is piloting a foreign trade vessel. The courts have ruled that the pilot in this instance is acting solely under the authority of a state license. Conversely, a state cannot do the same to a pilot while piloting a vessel in the domestic trade, because the courts have ruled that in this instance the pilot is acting solely under the authority of his/her federal license. However, the Coast Guard does have the authority (46 U.S.C. 2302) to levy a civil penalty of up to $25,000 against a person who operates a vessel in a negligent manner and charge a person operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner with a class A misdemeanor.\nThe dual regulatory structure of piloting dates back to the mid-1800s. As ports in colonial America began to develop, the colonies instituted their own pilotage requirements as pilotage was a long-established tradition in Europe. In 1789, the First Congress allowed the states to continue to govern pilotage practices \"until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress.\" It was not until the mid-1800s after the introduction of steam vessels that Congress began to play a role in pilotage. In 1871, Congress enacted a law that required steam powered ships in the coastal trade to have federally licensed pilots and preventing the states from requiring state pilots for these ships. A 1912 U.S. Supreme Court decision affirmed that federal jurisdiction over pilotage pertains only to ships engaged in the domestic trade while the pilotage of ships engaged in the foreign trade fell to state jurisdiction, until Congress decided otherwise. This bifurcated regulatory structure continues today.\nThe bifurcated nature of pilot oversight is a product of legislative history and questions have been raised why oversight is not purely based on safety considerations. Whether a ship is carrying domestic or international cargo is not a factor in safe harbor navigation. The NTSB questions how the Coast Guard can adequately perform its safety mission without direct oversight over the pilotage of the vast majority of vessel transits in U.S. harbors. Moreover, with the current trend of substituting oil from Alaska (which accounts for most U.S. coastal shipping) with imported oil, further diminution of U.S. coastal shipping seems probable. On the other hand, one could argue that captains of coastwise trade vessels are deployed on voyages of much shorter duration than international voyages, are likely to call at a limited number of U.S. ports more frequently, and therefore can gain the expertise and knowledge of navigation necessary for safe transit in those ports. In contrast, sea captains on international voyages, it is argued, do not gain the same level of harbor expertise and knowledge because of much longer voyages and potential assignment to voyages with different port callings. It is also argued by state pilot associations that because the geography and the nature of maritime traffic varies tremendously among ports, it is best left to each individual port to decide the level of pilot expertise and performance required to ensure safe harbor navigation.", "With a handful of exceptions, most ports have just one pilot association servicing that port. However, there is generally nothing in state laws prohibiting a competing pilot association from forming. It was only during the sailing era that competition among pilots in a harbor was the norm. Pilot associations defend their monopoly status as being necessary to prevent commercial interests from trumping safety. They contend that in a competitive environment, economic pressures from the shipping lines would inevitably undermine their safety prerogative. Also, pilot associations argue that if they granted licenses to all those who applied and met the requirements, pilots would not obtain an adequate number of transits to maintain their expertise in a given harbor. How an apprenticeship training program would function if senior pilots knew that their trainees would soon be competing against them is also a concern. State licensed pilots further contend that it is important that the pilot be an independent contractor, not a member of the crew employed by the ship operator, as is typically the case with federal pilots. It is argued that an independent contractor status insulates the pilot from cost pressures that could otherwise cloud the pilot's judgment.\nThe state pilot system has been criticized for being a relatively closed profession and claims of nepotism have been directed at some pilot associations. A study by the Marine Board of the National Academies noted that \"pilots generally have been reluctant to address colleague performance because of social and business relationships, potential loss of earning for affected individuals, and especially concern that any form of oversight might expose them to liability for a colleague's performance.\" The integrity and credibility of pilot oversight was highlighted by a 1986 ship and barge collision on the Mississippi River in Louisiana. The NTSB found that the pilot of the ship may have caused or contributed to five of six accidents in the previous five years, but the pilot commission and the pilot performance review panel, both of whose membership was comprised entirely of pilots, had not taken any disciplinary action against the pilot. Since that accident, Louisiana has amended its piloting regulations to include non-pilots on pilot boards, other states have generally done the same, and some states do not allow any pilots to be on the board. However, criticism of the monopoly structure of the pilot system in Louisiana continues and the Cosco Busan accident has raised this criticism against the San Francisco Bar Pilots as well. The pilot of the Cosco Busan had been involved in a ship grounding in the same harbor in February 2006.\nPilotage fees also motivate the debate regarding the monopoly structure of pilotage. Ship operators are concerned with the level of pilotage fees they pay. Likewise, port authorities and other maritime service providers in a port are concerned that the level of pilotage fees may drive business away from their port. Thus, in addition to navigation safety, port economics continues to drive a debate over pilot governance.", "To assist the pilot and crew with safe navigation, the Coast Guard has established vessel traffic services (VTS) in many ports. From the VTS, Coast Guard \"watchstanders\" can monitor and provide guidance to harbor traffic with the use of electronic communication, radio, radar, differential global positioning system (DGPS), surveillance cameras, and binoculars. A VTS operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. VTSs vary depending on the geography and the nature and volume of vessel traffic in a port area, but VTSs generally are staffed with both uniformed and civilian Coast Guard watchstanders. Currently there are VTSs in eleven U.S. ports staffed by 155 civilian and 130 active-duty personnel. The Coast Guard estimates that about 43 active-duty watchstanders will transfer in and out of VTSs annually. VTSs may also be staffed by members of a \"maritime exchange\" from which they have evolved. U.S. ports without a Coast Guard-led VTS have a maritime exchange that provides \"VTS-like\" services, and are more accurately called Vessel Traffic Information Services (VTIS). A maritime exchange may be jointly operated or run by a pilot association and be staffed by pilots. VTSs and VTISs are funded from some combination of user fees charged to vessel operators, financing from port authorities, state governments, and the Coast Guard.", "The original purpose of maritime exchanges was to alert ship service providers in port (i.e., agents, pilots, tugs, stevedores, longshoremen unions, terminals, U.S. Customs, and other vendors and government agencies) of a ship's pending arrival. Before the development of current technology, a lookout was posted with a telescope, signal flags, and flashing signal lights. While maritime information exchange is still the central function of marine exchanges, in the 1960s and 1970s they also began offering a VHF radio communication and radar system for pilots and captains to avoid collisions and groundings. Participation was initially voluntary and unregulated and there were no protocols. However, after a ship collision in San Francisco Bay in 1971, Congress passed the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-340), which directed the Coast Guard to establish VTS systems at ports where the Coast Guard deemed necessary. In the 1970s, VTSs were established in San Francisco, Puget Sound, New York, New Orleans, and Houston-Galveston. VTSs were added in Morgan City, Port Arthur, Louisville, Valdez, Los Angeles, and Sault St. Marie thereafter. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, made participation in the VTS mandatory where they existed.", "As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack and the heightened concern for port security, harbor traffic monitoring and ship tracking has received a boost in federal attention and funding. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-295 ) requires ships over 300 gross registered tons (grt) to be equipped with Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders, which electronically transmit ship information, location, speed, and direction. AIS data can be transmitted ship-to-ship or between ships and shore-side VTSs or maritime exchanges. For security reasons, the Coast Guard is planning to extend shore-side AIS receivers and transmitters nationwide, but currently this technology is fully operational at just several major U.S. ports.\nAIS was introduced into the shipping industry as a safety measure prior to 9/11. To some extent, it allows for the replacement of voice radio communications with electronic communication, which is regarded as more efficient, less distracting to the mariner, and a less error-inducing medium for data transmission. Some vessel collisions have been caused, in part, because a pilot was communicating by radio with more than one other vessel and mistook communication from one vessel for another. It is highly desirable that VTS communications to the pilot or master be as non-intrusive on the mariner as possible. For instance, in the Cosco Busan accident, when the Coast Guard was asked why the VTS watchstander had not alerted the pilot earlier or repeatedly, the Coast Guard replied that VTS personnel are trained \"not to distract the pilot with interruptions during any critical maneuver.\"\nWith the introduction of AIS, there was some speculation and debate that a ship could determine its location without the need for navigation buoys and determine the location of other ships without the need for a shore-side VTS. However, now that ship tracking and monitoring has become a security objective, shore-side communication and tracking facilities are viewed as a necessary component.", "The Coast Guard has also created Joint Harbor Operational Centers (JHOCs) to improve port security and safety. JHOCs were authorized in the SAFE Port Act ( P.L. 109-347 , section 108). They are intended to be \"fusion centers\" for federal law enforcement (namely the Coast Guard, Navy, and Customs and Border Protection) and local law enforcement (port authority police or state or city police assigned to a port area) to share intelligence and equipment (e.g., patrol boats) and coordinate response when the need arises. The Coast Guard is planning to co-locate JHOCs and VTSs. JHOCs are currently operational at Norfolk, San Diego, Charleston, and Seattle; and the Coast Guard plans to create a JHOC at each major port area.", "Given the trend towards larger ships, an expected increase in port traffic, and a probable lag in the expansion of shipping channels and terminal facilities due to fiscal and environmental constraints, Congress may consider several issues related to the safety of harbor navigation.", "In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress required that all pilots commanding ships in Prince William Sound be operating under the authority of their Alaska pilot license in addition to their federal license. This created a system of dual accountability—to the State of Alaska and to the U.S. Coast Guard. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended that all state pilots be required to operate under Coast Guard authority to address a \"lack of adequate, consistent accountability of state pilots.\" Under this requirement, a state-licensed pilot would not be allowed to pilot either a foreign trade vessel or a domestic trade vessel if his/her federal license was revoked. The NTSB contends that the consequences of a major marine accident, particularly in terms of environmental damage, cannot be considered merely local in effect, and therefore, federal oversight of pilot performance is appropriate. The NTSB has also stated that \"the near total immunity from Federal control enjoyed by state pilots prevents the Coast Guard from carrying out its congressional mandate to ensure safety on all Federal waterways.\"\nHowever, past Congresses have not favored granting the Coast Guard additional legislative authority over state-licensed pilots. The Coast Guard's response to a 1988 NTSB recommendation regarding this matter states as follows: \"The Coast Guard concurs with the intent of this recommendation, and recognizes the need for establishing better disciplinary control over some State-licensed pilots. However, past Coast Guard efforts to obtain the recommended authority have not been successful in Congress.\"\nThe Coast Guard requested this authority as a provision in S. 682 , which was enacted as the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-474 ), but the provision was not included in final passage of the bill. At that time, the American Pilots Association argued against the provision on the grounds that the Coast Guard was not as knowledgeable and experienced as local pilots with the local conditions in each harbor, due in part to the continual rotation of Coast Guard staff every two to three years. Therefore, the association argued the local pilots were in the best position to properly judge the performance of their peers. Shipping lines, however, argued in favor of the provision, stating that \"when there is misconduct, or there is slippage in the quality, the evaluation of that should be at the Federal level so that we have uniform excellence all over the country, and it does not depend on the particular political climate of the State to determine whether you are going to have good pilots or bad pilots.\"\nThe desire for an independent assessment of pilot performance was also voiced by the Marine Board of the National Academies, noting that \"measures to confirm maintenance of pilot knowledge and skills are informal; systematic measures are not used to detect and correct degraded capabilities before such weaknesses become factors in marine accidents\" and that \"the effectiveness of corrective action at the state level by pilot associations and pilot boards has been uneven.\" The Marine Board did not call for the Coast Guard to have disciplinary authority over state pilots, but called for the creation of a national commission on pilotage, chartered by Congress, that would set national baseline standards for pilot training and qualifications and would accredit each port's piloting system.", "The Coast Guard notes emphatically that VTS is an advisory service, not a traffic control center. The Coast Guard describes VTSs as providing a range of four basic services that represent an increasing continuum of involvement: 1) monitoring of harbor traffic, 2) providing information to mariners so that they can navigate more safely or efficiently, 3) advising or recommending a course of action to a vessel (usually infrequently), and (4) in rare circumstances, directing a vessel to move to a certain location or hold at anchor or at the dock until safe to proceed, but without giving direct maneuvering orders. While VTSs are often compared to an air traffic control tower, the major difference is that VTSs do not give specific \"conning\" orders to the pilots, such as heading and speed. However, the level of VTS involvement in harbor navigation varies depending on the circumstances of the harbor. For instance, in busy harbors or in harbors with a drawbridge, the VTS may enforce a harbor traffic management plan that dictates one-way traffic or order of procession through a waterway. In these cases, the VTS could be described as traffic management, as opposed to positive traffic control.\nWhether VTSs could operate more like an ATC, which navigation experts refer to as \"shore-based pilotage\" or \"remote pilotage,\" is a topic of speculation and debate. Pilots and other navigation experts assert that there is no way of replacing the eyes of an experienced, on-board mariner. Pilots describe turning a ship like to turning a car on ice—it slides through the turn, and pilotage is described as a process of continually watching how the ship responds to a maneuver, which will dictate the pilot's next command. How a ship responds is affected by the characteristics of the ship, weather, and water conditions. A pilot needs to be aware of multiple cues: wind, tide and river currents, (in the case of estuaries); the salt water versus fresh water mix that affects buoyancy. These are all factors that only an on-board mariner is in position to discern. Pilots stress that visual cues and references are still of paramount importance in their trade and doubt whether any kind of advanced VTS system could replace the process of continual evaluation by an on-board pilot.\nIf conning a ship is beyond the present capability of a VTS, Congress might still move to assess whether the VTS should exert more control over harbor traffic in bad weather conditions. The Coast Guard already has authority to restrict vessel movements during hazardous weather conditions, but does not regularly do so. One reason may be that the Coast Guard lacks standards to judge the maneuvering capabilities of vessels in constricted waters (see below).", "Lawmakers might consider whether more scientific information and analysis about ship maneuverability in harbor waters is needed. While the IMO in 2002 developed maneuverability standards for ships in deep, unrestricted water at sea speed, no analogous performance standards for ships in shallow, constricted water at slow speed have been established. Because there is no standard, the Coast Guard cannot establish harbor restrictions for certain ships that may be less controllable during hazardous weather conditions. These standards would arguably also help pilots better predict the maneuvering capabilities of vessels and aid in the development of pilot training simulators and manned physical models to more accurately reflect real-life conditions.", "Given the particular handling characteristics of some vessels, policymakers might elect to consider whether there should be a more systematic method for pilots to share their experiences with vessels requiring special attention, both within their harbor and among pilots from other harbors where the ship regularly calls. This was a recommendation of the U.S. Coast Guard following an investigation into a 1997 ship collision in the Chesapeake Bay.", "Although the cost effectiveness of VTSs can be disputed on a port by port basis, Congress may act to assess the need for VTSs in other U.S. ports, particularly those that have experienced large traffic growth. For instance, at the Port of Savannah, vessel calls have increased by 34% in the last half-decade and in the last decade, the port jumped from 11 th to 4 th largest in the country in terms of TEU throughput. The port has also recently become a major gateway for LNG imports.\nFor security reasons, the Coast Guard is actively pursuing its ability to track ships further from shore using AIS technology. Congress may examine whether there are any safety benefits to this expansion, such as avoiding ship collisions at the approaches to harbors.", "The NTSB has consistently recommended that the pilot and master of the vessel first establish a detailed passage plan of how the transit of the vessel is going to proceed through the harbor. The pilot would inform the master of his intended course, noting \"the essential features and relevant checkpoints of maneuvers to be undertaken:\" such as where he specifically intends to pass under a bridge, maneuver around a shallow area, pass by a channel buoy; and contingency plans for unexpected incidents. Because the master and the bridge crew essentially provide another set of eyes, the NTSB contends that a passage plan would allow the ship's crew to be a more effective check on the ship's position and movement, though some accident investigations reveal a reluctance on the part of the bridge crew to \"speak up\" or \"challenge\" the pilot and some masters may consider the pilot's arrival as a chance to get some rest. A passage plan could also foster teamwork, or more specifically, \"Bridge Team Management\" (BTM, a.k.a. Bridge Resource Management, BRM), a concept adopted from the airline industry that, among other things, emphasizes good communication among those manning the bridge. A common thread that runs through many marine accident reports is a lack of communication between the pilot and bridge crew. BTM has become part of the required training curriculum for pilots and bridge crews.\nThe Coast Guard has not supported the NTSB's recommendation, arguing that it would \"impinge on the traditional master/pilot relationship\" and that \"the pilot cannot be expected to establish a 'game plan' with the master when so many aspects of a passage cannot be predetermined. The Coast Guard believes there are sufficient Federal regulations and customary practices which apply in master/pilot relationships.\" A Canadian survey of mariners found that while 80% of the pilots responding claimed that they \"always\" or \"often\" inform the master of a passage plan, less than half of the masters said that they do. On the other hand, while 96% of officers of the watch and 95% of masters responded that the officers of the watch always or often monitor the ship's movement, only about 50% of pilots responded that officers of the watch always or often monitor the ship's movement. The report noted that foreign masters who are not familiar with local navigation conditions rely largely on the pilots and thus the verification of a pilot's passage plan becomes only a formality but, at the same time, Canadian masters who are well aware of the local conditions may also pay little attention to the pilot's passage plan. In 2003, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations body that establishes safety standards for international shipping, recommended that the information exchanged between the pilot and master include, among other things, \"general agreement on plans and procedures, including contingency plans, for the anticipated passage.\" Thus, while a passage plan maybe considered good practice, an unresolved issue is whether it has any consistent value and whether it should become a regulatory requirement.", "Given the global nature of the shipping business, language is always an issue in international shipping operations. English is the standard language of shipping and the IMO has developed a navigational code of basic commands in English. However, the pilot, captain, crew, and VTS can communicate in whatever language everyone is most familiar with, if different from English. On foreign-flagged ships, the captain may be the only crew member that understands English, or at least the basic IMO phraseology, and therefore may need to translate the pilot's commands to the helmsman. The largest single source of ship crews, both officers and unlicensed seamen, is the Philippines, in large part because of their English language skills. More recently, China, India, the Ukraine, and Russia have also become major suppliers of seamen. In light of the increasing diversity of seamen, Congress may wish to examine whether language barriers are an increasing problem in ship navigation and whether there is a need for additional enforcement of English language proficiency among ship crews calling U.S. ports. Congress may opt to examine how the aviation sector has addressed this problem.", "", "Congress might consider whether to establish a database of near misses like that in the aviation sector. The Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration looked into establishing a data base of near misses in the marine environment in 1997, but the project was disbanded in part because of legal and practical concerns about mariner confidentiality.", "An ongoing concern expressed by some Members of Congress and some in the maritime industry is a lack of technical expertise by Coast Guard safety personnel due to its practice of continually rotating staff by subject area and location. This issue has been raised regarding limitations in the capabilities of VTSs to exert more control over vessel movement and the agency's capability to judge pilot performance. Some have called for removing some safety functions from the Coast Guard to a civilian agency, at which professional continuity could be better fostered. The Coast Guard has responded to this criticism with a plan, among other things, to increase civilian positions in the marine safety program, strengthen marine safety career paths, and increase hiring from maritime academies. The Coast Guard further argues that there are synergies between its maritime safety and security missions. Therefore, the Coast Guard maintains that these missions should be carried out by the same agency.", "In the aftermath of the Cosco Busan accident, Senators Boxer and Feinstein introduced legislation that would give authority to the VTS to direct a vessel's speed and direction in an emergency and require pilots to use laptop navigational equipment under certain circumstances ( S. 2430 ). The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2007 ( H.R. 2830 ) would require the Coast Guard to conduct a vessel safety risk assessment for Cook Inlet and the Aleution Islands of Alaska. The Senate version ( S. 1892 ), in addition to this provision, would require the Coast Guard to study and report on human errors that have caused oil spills and near-misses in the last ten years as well as any data deficiencies impeding such a study, and includes several provisions regarding the secure marine transport of especially hazardous cargo. The Hydrographic Services Improvement Act Amendments of 2007 ( H.R. 3352 / S. 1582 ) authorizes funding to NOAA through FY2012 for its coastal surveying and nautical chart functions. The Ocean and Coastal Mapping Integration Act ( H.R. 2400 , which passed the House) and the Ocean and Coastal Exploration and NOAA Act ( S. 39 , reported by the Senate Commerce Committee) provides funds for updating and integrating survey information for U.S. coastal regions.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ) requires the DHS Inspector General to investigate the role of the San Francisco VTS in the Cosco Busan accident and the Coast Guard's response to the spill and issue a report by April 1, 2008." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why are maritime pilots useful to large ships?", "How is pilotage regulated?", "What is the job of a state pilot board?", "What degree of control does the U.S. Coast Guard have over ship pilots?", "What are the purpose of VTS stations?", "Why have there been new proposals regarding safety-related navigation services?", "Why do some experts want stronger federal oversight of pilots?", "How would the government increase oversight of pilots?", "What are obstacles to federal oversight of pilots?", "What is the common opinion regarding VTs?", "What are some issues that can be brought up in assessing the safety of ship navigation?" ], "summary": [ "Because of the additional challenges of navigating large ships through the constricted waters of a harbor, most U.S. ports require shipping lines to hire a maritime pilot. Maritime pilots, through a lengthy apprenticeship process and many years of experience, have gained intimate knowledge of the navigational requirements of a particular harbor.", "Despite the federal government's prominent role in regulating interstate commerce, Congress has largely left it to the various coastal states to regulate pilotage.", "Pilots are licensed by the state for ships engaged in foreign trade (\"registered\" vessels carrying international cargo), which accounts for the vast majority of port calls. Typically a state pilot board oversees the hiring, training, and performance of pilots, as well as setting pilotage rates charged to the shipping lines.", "The U.S. Coast Guard has jurisdiction only over pilots of ships engaged in domestic trade and the courts have ruled that the Coast Guard does not have the authority to suspend or revoke the license of pilots for violations while piloting a foreign-trade ship.", "To assist pilots, the busiest U.S. ports have established VTS stations to monitor ship traffic and provide relevant information to pilots, such as the location of other ships. While often compared to an air traffic control tower, a VTS is not directly involved in the movement of vessels and is more accurately described as an advisory service than a traffic control center.", "Ever-larger ships, difficult or challenging slow-speed handling characteristics of some of these ships, and rising port traffic that is predominantly foreign-flagged have led to proposals concerning pilotage, VTSs, and other safety-related navigation services in U.S. ports.", "Given the federal interest in marine environmental protection and the Coast Guard's mission to ensure the safety of shipping in U.S. waters, some experts have advocated stronger federal oversight of pilots.", "They recommend that the Coast Guard or a national commission establish national standards for pilot training and proficiency or that the Coast Guard be given disciplinary authority over state-licensed pilots.", "State pilots resist greater federal oversight, arguing that the unique geography and navigational requirements of each port justifies local oversight.", "Whether VTSs should exert more direct control over vessel movement is also raised as a safety measure, but most acknowledge that an experienced on-board mariner is probably in the best position to direct a vessel's movement.", "Requiring that a pilot and ship captain first agree on a harbor passage plan, investigating language difficulties between pilots and foreign crews, and Coast Guard rotational staffing practices, are other issues policymakers may examine in assessing the safety of ship navigation in U.S. harbors." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_RL31798	{ "title": [ "", "What Is Data Mining?", "Limitations of Data Mining as a Terrorist Detection Tool", "Data Mining Uses", "Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) Program", "Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II)", "Secure Flight", "Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot Project", "Other Data Mining Initiatives", "Able Danger", "Automated Targeting System (ATS)", "National Security Agency (NSA) and the Terrorist Surveillance Program", "Novel Intelligence from Massive Data (NIDM) Program", "Data Mining Issues", "Data Quality", "Interoperability", "Mission Creep", "Privacy", "Legislation in the 108th Congress", "Legislation in the 109th Congress", "Legislation and Hearings in the 110th Congress", "For Further Reading" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Data mining involves the use of sophisticated data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets. These tools can include statistical models, mathematical algorithms, and machine learning methods (algorithms that improve their performance automatically through experience, such as neural networks or decision trees). Consequently, data mining consists of more than collecting and managing data, it also includes analysis and prediction.\nData mining can be performed on data represented in quantitative, textual, or multimedia forms. Data mining applications can use a variety of parameters to examine the data. They include association (patterns where one event is connected to another event, such as purchasing a pen and purchasing paper), sequence or path analysis (patterns where one event leads to another event, such as the birth of a child and purchasing diapers), classification (identification of new patterns, such as coincidences between duct tape purchases and plastic sheeting purchases), clustering (finding and visually documenting groups of previously unknown facts, such as geographic location and brand preferences), and forecasting (discovering patterns from which one can make reasonable predictions regarding future activities, such as the prediction that people who join an athletic club may take exercise classes).\nAs an application, compared to other data analysis applications, such as structured queries (used in many commercial databases) or statistical analysis software, data mining represents a difference of kind rather than degree . Many simpler analytical tools utilize a verification-based approach, where the user develops a hypothesis and then tests the data to prove or disprove the hypothesis. For example, a user might hypothesize that a customer who buys a hammer, will also buy a box of nails. The effectiveness of this approach can be limited by the creativity of the user to develop various hypotheses, as well as the structure of the software being used. In contrast, data mining utilizes a discovery approach, in which algorithms can be used to examine several multidimensional data relationships simultaneously, identifying those that are unique or frequently represented. For example, a hardware store may compare their customers' tool purchases with home ownership, type of automobile driven, age, occupation, income, and/or distance between residence and the store. As a result of its complex capabilities, two precursors are important for a successful data mining exercise; a clear formulation of the problem to be solved, and access to the relevant data.\nReflecting this conceptualization of data mining, some observers consider data mining to be just one step in a larger process known as knowledge discovery in databases (KDD). Other steps in the KDD process, in progressive order, include data cleaning, data integration, data selection, data transformation, (data mining), pattern evaluation, and knowledge presentation.\nA number of advances in technology and business processes have contributed to a growing interest in data mining in both the public and private sectors. Some of these changes include the growth of computer networks, which can be used to connect databases; the development of enhanced search-related techniques such as neural networks and advanced algorithms; the spread of the client/server computing model, allowing users to access centralized data resources from the desktop; and an increased ability to combine data from disparate sources into a single searchable source.\nIn addition to these improved data management tools, the increased availability of information and the decreasing costs of storing it have also played a role. Over the past several years there has been a rapid increase in the volume of information collected and stored, with some observers suggesting that the quantity of the world's data approximately doubles every year. At the same time, the costs of data storage have decreased significantly from dollars per megabyte to pennies per megabyte. Similarly, computing power has continued to double every 18-24 months, while the relative cost of computing power has continued to decrease.\nData mining has become increasingly common in both the public and private sectors. Organizations use data mining as a tool to survey customer information, reduce fraud and waste, and assist in medical research. However, the proliferation of data mining has raised some implementation and oversight issues as well. These include concerns about the quality of the data being analyzed, the interoperability of the databases and software between agencies, and potential infringements on privacy. Also, there are some concerns that the limitations of data mining are being overlooked as agencies work to emphasize their homeland security initiatives.", "While data mining products can be very powerful tools, they are not self-sufficient applications. To be successful, data mining requires skilled technical and analytical specialists who can structure the analysis and interpret the output that is created. Consequently, the limitations of data mining are primarily data or personnel-related, rather than technology-related.\nAlthough data mining can help reveal patterns and relationships, it does not tell the user the value or significance of these patterns. These types of determinations must be made by the user. Similarly, the validity of the patterns discovered is dependent on how they compare to \"real world\" circumstances. For example, to assess the validity of a data mining application designed to identify potential terrorist suspects in a large pool of individuals, the user may test the model using data that includes information about known terrorists. However, while possibly re-affirming a particular profile, it does not necessarily mean that the application will identify a suspect whose behavior significantly deviates from the original model.\nAnother limitation of data mining is that while it can identify connections between behaviors and/or variables, it does not necessarily identify a causal relationship. For example, an application may identify that a pattern of behavior, such as the propensity to purchase airline tickets just shortly before the flight is scheduled to depart, is related to characteristics such as income, level of education, and Internet use. However, that does not necessarily indicate that the ticket purchasing behavior is caused by one or more of these variables. In fact, the individual's behavior could be affected by some additional variable(s) such as occupation (the need to make trips on short notice), family status (a sick relative needing care), or a hobby (taking advantage of last minute discounts to visit new destinations).\nBeyond these specific limitations, some researchers suggest that the circumstances surrounding our knowledge of terrorism make data mining an ill-suited tool for identifying (predicting) potential terrorists before an activity occurs. Successful \"predictive data mining\" requires a significant number of known instances of a particular behavior in order to develop valid predictive models. For example, data mining used to predict types of consumer behavior (i.e., the likelihood of someone shopping at a particular store, the potential of a credit card usage being fraudulent) may be based on as many as millions of previous instances of the same particular behavior. Moreover, such a robust data set can still lead to false positives. In contrast, as a CATO Institute report suggests that the relatively small number of terrorist incidents or attempts each year are too few and individually unique \"to enable the creation of valid predictive models.\"", "Data mining is used for a variety of purposes in both the private and public sectors. Industries such as banking, insurance, medicine, and retailing commonly use data mining to reduce costs, enhance research, and increase sales. For example, the insurance and banking industries use data mining applications to detect fraud and assist in risk assessment (e.g., credit scoring). Using customer data collected over several years, companies can develop models that predict whether a customer is a good credit risk, or whether an accident claim may be fraudulent and should be investigated more closely. The medical community sometimes uses data mining to help predict the effectiveness of a procedure or medicine. Pharmaceutical firms use data mining of chemical compounds and genetic material to help guide research on new treatments for diseases. Retailers can use information collected through affinity programs (e.g., shoppers' club cards, frequent flyer points, contests) to assess the effectiveness of product selection and placement decisions, coupon offers, and which products are often purchased together. Companies such as telephone service providers and music clubs can use data mining to create a \"churn analysis,\" to assess which customers are likely to remain as subscribers and which ones are likely to switch to a competitor.\nIn the public sector, data mining applications were initially used as a means to detect fraud and waste, but they have grown also to be used for purposes such as measuring and improving program performance. It has been reported that data mining has helped the federal government recover millions of dollars in fraudulent Medicare payments. The Justice Department has been able to use data mining to assess crime patterns and adjust resource allotments accordingly. Similarly, the Department of Veterans Affairs has used data mining to help predict demographic changes in the constituency it serves so that it can better estimate its budgetary needs. Another example is the Federal Aviation Administration, which uses data mining to review plane crash data to recognize common defects and recommend precautionary measures.\nIn addition, data mining has been increasingly cited as an important tool for homeland security efforts. Some observers suggest that data mining should be used as a means to identify terrorist activities, such as money transfers and communications, and to identify and track individual terrorists themselves, such as through travel and immigration records. Initiatives that have attracted significant attention include the now-discontinued Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) project conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the now-canceled Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) that was being developed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). CAPPS II is being replaced by a new program called Secure Flight. Other initiatives that have been the subject of congressional interest include the Able Danger program and data collection and analysis projects being conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA).", "In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, many questions were raised about the country's intelligence tools and capabilities, as well as the government's ability to detect other so-called \"sleeper cells,\" if, indeed, they existed. One response to these concerns was the creation of the Information Awareness Office (IAO) at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in January 2002. The role of IAO was \"in part to bring together, under the leadership of one technical office director, several existing DARPA programs focused on applying information technology to combat terrorist threats.\" The mission statement for IAO suggested that the emphasis on these technology programs was to \"counter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness useful for preemption, national security warning, and national security decision making.\" To that end, the TIA project was to focus on three specific areas of research, anticipated to be conducted over five years, to develop technologies that would assist in the detection of terrorist groups planning attacks against American interests, both inside and outside the country. The three areas of research and their purposes were described in a DOD Inspector General report as:\n… language translation, data search with pattern recognition and privacy protection, and advanced collaborative and decision support tools. Language translation technology would enable the rapid analysis of foreign languages, both spoken and written, and allow analysts to quickly search the translated materials for clues about emerging threats. The data search, pattern recognition, and privacy protection technologies would permit analysts to search vast quantities of data for patterns that suggest terrorist activity while at the same time controlling access to the data, enforcing laws and policies, and ensuring detection of misuse of the information obtained. The collaborative reasoning and decision support technologies would allow analysts from different agencies to share data.\nEach part had the potential to improve the data mining capabilities of agencies that adopt the technology. Automated rapid language translation could allow analysts to search and monitor foreign language documents and transmissions more quickly than currently possible. Improved search and pattern recognition technologies may enable more comprehensive and thorough mining of transactional data, such as passport and visa applications, car rentals, driver license renewals, criminal records, and airline ticket purchases. Improved collaboration and decision support tools might facilitate the search and coordination activities being conducted by different agencies and levels of government.\nIn public statements DARPA frequently referred to the TIA program as a research and development project designed to create experimental prototype tools, and that the research agency would only use \"data that is legally available and obtainable by the U.S. Government.\" DARPA further emphasized that these tools could be adopted and used by other agencies, and that DARPA itself would not be engaging in any actual-use data mining applications, although it could \"support production of a scalable leave-behind system prototype.\" In addition, some of the technology projects being carried out in association with the TIA program did not involve data mining. However, the TIA program's overall emphasis on collecting, tracking, and analyzing data trails left by individuals served to generate significant and vocal opposition soon after John Poindexter made a presentation on TIA at the DARPATech 2002 Conference in August 2002.\nCritics of the TIA program were further incensed by two administrative aspects of the project. The first involved the Director of IAO, Dr. John M. Poindexter. Poindexter, a retired Admiral, was, until that time, perhaps most well-known for his alleged role in the Iran-contra scandal during the Reagan Administration. His involvement with the program caused many in the civil liberties community to question the true motives behind TIA. The second source of contention involved TIA's original logo, which depicted an \"all-seeing\" eye atop of a pyramid looking down over the globe, accompanied by the Latin phrase scientia est potentia (knowledge is power). Although DARPA eventually removed the logo from its website, it left a lasting impression.\nThe continued negative publicity surrounding the TIA program contributed to the introduction of a number of bills in Congress that eventually led to the program's dissolution. Among these bills was S. 188 , the Data-Mining Moratorium Act of 2003, which, if passed, would have imposed a moratorium on the implementation of data mining under the TIA program by the Department of Defense, as well as any similar program by the Department of Homeland Security. An amendment included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ) required the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General to submit a joint report to Congress within 90 days providing details about the TIA program. Funding for TIA as a whole was prohibited with the passage of the FY2004 Department of Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-87 ) in September 2003. However, Section 8131 of the law allowed unspecified subcomponents of the TIA initiative to be funded as part of DOD's classified budget, subject to the provisions of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, which restricts the processing and analysis of information on U.S. citizens.", "Similar to TIA, the CAPPS II project represented a direct response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. With the images of airliners flying into buildings fresh in people's minds, air travel was now widely viewed not only as a critically vulnerable terrorist target, but also as a weapon for inflicting larger harm. The CAPPS II initiative was intended to replace the original CAPPS, currently being used. Spurred, in part, by the growing number of airplane bombings, the existing CAPPS (originally called CAPS) was developed through a grant provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to Northwest Airlines, with a prototype system tested in 1996. In 1997, other major carriers also began work on screening systems, and, by 1998, most of the U.S.-based airlines had voluntarily implemented CAPS, with the remaining few working toward implementation. Also, during this time, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (sometimes referred to as the Gore Commission) released its final report in February 1997. Included in the commission's report was a recommendation that the United States implement automated passenger profiling for its airports. On April 19, 1999, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the security of checked baggage on flights within the United States (docket no. FAA-1999-5536). As part of this still-pending rule, domestic flights would be required to utilize \"the FAA-approved computer-assisted passenger screening (CAPS) system to select passengers whose checked baggage must be subjected to additional security measures.\"\nThe current CAPPS system is a rule-based system that uses the information provided by the passenger when purchasing the ticket to determine if the passenger fits into one of two categories; \"selectees\" requiring additional security screening, and those who do not. CAPPS also compares the passenger name to those on a list of known or suspected terrorists. CAPPS II was described by TSA as \"an enhanced system to confirm the identities of passengers and to identify foreign terrorists or persons with terrorist connections before they can board U.S. aircraft.\" CAPPS II would have sent information provided by the passenger in the passengers name record (PNR), including full name, address, phone number, and date of birth, to commercial data providers for comparison to authenticate the identity of the passenger. The commercial data provider would have then transmitted a numerical score back to TSA indicating a particular risk level. Passengers with a \"green\" score would have undergone \"normal screening,\" while passengers with a \"yellow\" score would have undergone additional screening. Passengers with a \"red\" score would not have been allowed to board the flight, and would have received \"the attention of law enforcement.\" While drawing on information from commercial databases, TSA had stated that it would not see the actual information used to calculate the scores, and that it would not retain the traveler's information.\nTSA had planned to test the system at selected airports during spring 2004. However, CAPPS II encountered a number of obstacles to implementation. One obstacle involved obtaining the required data to test the system. Several high-profile debacles resulting in class-action lawsuits have made the U.S.-based airlines very wary of voluntarily providing passenger information. In early 2003, Delta Airlines was to begin testing CAPPS II using its customers' passenger data at three airports across the country. However, Delta became the target of a vociferous boycott campaign, raising further concerns about CAPPS II generally. In September 2003, it was revealed that JetBlue shared private passenger information in September 2002 with Torch Concepts, a defense contractor, which was testing a data mining application for the U.S. Army. The information shared reportedly included itineraries, names, addresses, and phone numbers for 1.5 million passengers. In January 2004, it was reported that Northwest Airlines provided personal information on millions of its passengers to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from October to December 2001 for an airline security-related data mining experiment. In April 2004, it was revealed that American Airlines agreed to provide private passenger data on 1.2 million of its customers to TSA in June 2002, although the information was sent instead to four companies competing to win a contract with TSA. Further instances of data being provided for the purpose of testing CAPPS II were brought to light during a Senate Committee on Government Affairs confirmation hearing on June 23, 2004. In his answers to the committee, the acting director of TSA, David M. Stone, stated that during 2002 and 2003 four airlines; Delta, Continental, America West, and Frontier, and two travel reservation companies; Galileo International and Sabre Holdings, provided passenger records to TSA and/or its contractors.\nConcerns about privacy protections had also dissuaded the European Union (EU) from providing any data to TSA to test CAPPS II. However, in May 2004, the EU signed an agreement with the United States that would have allowed PNR data for flights originating from the EU to be used in testing CAPPS II, but only after TSA was authorized to use domestic data as well. As part of the agreement, the EU data was to be retained for only three-and-a-half years (unless it is part of a law enforcement action), only 34 of the 39 elements of the PNR were to be accessed by authorities, and there were to be yearly joint DHS-EU reviews of the implementation of the agreement.\nAnother obstacle was the perception of mission creep. CAPPS II was originally intended to just screen for high-risk passengers who may pose a threat to safe air travel. However, in an August 1, 2003, Federal Register notice, TSA stated that CAPPS II could also be used to identify individuals with outstanding state or federal arrest warrants, as well as identify both foreign and domestic terrorists (not just foreign terrorists). The notice also states that CAPPS II could be \"linked with the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program\" to identify individuals who are in the country illegally (e.g., individuals with expired visas, illegal aliens, etc.). In response to critics who cited these possible uses as examples of mission creep, TSA claimed that the suggested uses were consistent with the goals of improving aviation security.\nSeveral other concerns had also been raised, including the length of time passenger information was to be retained, who would have access to the information, the accuracy of the commercial data being used to authenticate a passenger's identity, the creation of procedures to allow passengers the opportunity to correct data errors in their records, and the ability of the system to detect attempts by individuals to use identity theft to board a plane undetected.", "In August 2004, TSA announced that the CAPPS II program was being canceled and would be replaced with a new system called Secure Flight. In the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 ( P.L. 108-334 ), Congress included a provision (Sec. 522) prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for \"deployment or implementation, on other than a test basis,\" of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, \"or other follow on/successor programs,\" until GAO has certified that such a system has met all of the privacy requirements enumerated in a February 2004 GAO report, can accommodate any unique air transportation needs as it relates to interstate transportation, and that \"appropriate life-cycle cost estimates, and expenditure and program plans exist.\" GAO's certification report was delivered to Congress in March 2005. In its report, GAO found that while \"TSA is making progress in addressing key areas of congressional interest ... TSA has not yet completed these efforts or fully addressed these areas, due largely to the current stage of the program's development.\" In follow-up reports in February 2006 and June 2006, GAO reiterated that while TSA continued to make progress, the Secure Flight program still suffered from systems development and program management problems, preventing it from meeting its congressionally mandated privacy requirements. In early 2006 TSA suspended development of Secure Flight in order to \"rebaseline\" or reassess the program.\nIn December 2006, the DHS Privacy Office released a report comparing TSA's published privacy notices with its actual practices regarding Secure Flight. The DHS Privacy Office found that there were discrepancies related to data testing and retention, due in part because the privacy notices \"were drafted before the testing program had been designed fully.\" However, the report also points out that\nmaterial changes in a federal program's design that have an impact on the collection, use, and maintenance of personally identifiable information of American citizens are required to be announced in Privacy Act system notices and privacy impact assessments.\nIn a February 2007 interview, it was reported that TSA Administrator Kip Hawley stated that while TSA has developed a means to improve the accuracy, privacy, and reliability of Secure Flight, it would take approximately one-and-a-half years to complete. This would be followed by an additional year of testing, leading to an anticipated implementation in 2010.\nOn August 23, 2007, TSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for implementing Secure Flight, as well as an NPRM proposing Privacy Act exemptions for Secure Flight, in the Federal Register . A Privacy Act System of Records Notice (SORN) was also published in the same edition of the Federal Register . In addition, a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for Secure Flight was posted on the TSA website.\nAlong with the Secure Flight NPRM, on August 23, 2007, TSA published a related but separate final rule regarding the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for screening passengers of international flights departing from or arriving to the United States. TSA states\nWe propose that, when the Secure Flight rule becomes final, aircraft operators would submit passenger information to DHS through a single DHS portal for both the Secure Flight and APIS programs. This would allow DHS to integrate the watch list matching component of APIS into Secure Flight, resulting in one DHS system responsible for watch list matching for all aviation passengers.\nAccording to the August 23, 2007 Secure Flight NPRM, in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), \"TSA would receive passenger and certain non-traveler information, conduct watch list matching against the No Fly and Selectee portions of the Federal Government's consolidated terrorist watch list, and transmit boarding pass printing instructions back to aircraft operators.\" Currently, air carriers are responsible for comparing passenger information to that on government watch lists.\nThe NPRM states that TSA would collect Secure Flight Passenger Data that includes a combination of required and optional information. Passengers would be required to provide their full names, \"as it appears on a verifying identity document held by that individual.\" In addition, passengers would be asked, but not required, to provide their date of birth, gender, Redress Number or known traveler number. However, the NPRM does propose circumstances in which aircraft operators would be required to provide the optional information to TSA if it already has obtained that information \"in the ordinary course of business.\" The NPRM states\nIf a covered aircraft operator were to input data required to be requested from individuals into the system where it stores SFPD—such as data from a passenger profile stored by the aircraft operator in the ordinary course of business—the aircraft operator would be required to include that data as part of the SFPD transmitted to TSA, even though the individual did not provide that information at the time of reservation.\nIn addition, aircraft operations would be required to provide TSA, if available, a passenger's passport information, and \"certain non-personally identifiable data fields\" including itinerary information, reservation control number, record sequence number, record type, passenger update indicator, and traveler reference number. Secure Flight would not utilize commercial data to verify identities, nor would it use algorithms to assign risk scores to individuals.\nIn the NPRM TSA proposes a tiered data retention schedule. The purpose for retaining the records would be to facilitate a redress process, expedite future travel, and investigate and document terrorist events. Under this schedule, the records for \"individuals not identified as potential matches by the automated matching tool would be retained for seven days\" after the completion of directional travel. The records for individuals identified as \"potential matches\" would be retained for seven years following the completion of directional travel. The records of individuals identified as \"confirmed matches\" would be retained for 99 years.\nThis original NPRM included a 60-day comment period, ending on October 22, 2007. However, in response to deadline extension requests received, on October 24, 2007, TSA published a notice in the Federal Register extending the public comment period an additional 30 days, ending November 21, 2007.\nOn November 9, 2007, TSA published a final SORN and a final rule regarding Privacy Act exemptions for Secure Flight.", "Similar to TIA and CAPPS II, which were born out of an initial reaction to concerns about terrorism, the impetus and initial work on MATRIX grew out of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. MATRIX was initially developed by Seisint, a Florida-based information products company, in an effort to facilitate collaborative information sharing and factual data analysis. At the outset of the project, MATRIX included a component Seisint called the High Terrorist Factor (HTF). Within days of the terrorist attacks, based on an analysis of information that included \"age and gender, what they did with their drivers license, either pilots or associations to pilots, proximity to 'dirty' addresses/phone numbers, investigational data, how they shipped; how they received, social security number anomalies, credit history, and ethnicity,\" Seisint generated a list of 120,000 names with high HTF scores, or so-called terrorism quotients. Seisint provided this list to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the United States Secret Service (USSS), and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), which, according to a January 2003 presentation, made by the company, led to \"several arrests within one week\" and \"scores of other arrests.\" Although the HTF scoring system appeared to attract the interest of officials, this feature was reportedly dropped from MATRIX because it relied on intelligence data not normally available to the law enforcement community and concerns about privacy abuses. However, some critics of MATRIX continued to raise questions about HTF, citing the lack of any publicly available official documentation verifying such a decision.\nAs a pilot project, MATRIX was administered through a collaborative effort between Seisint, the FDLE, and the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), a \"Florida-based nonprofit research and training organization, [that] specializes in law enforcement, juvenile justice, and criminal justice issues.\" The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) served as the \"Security Agent\" for MATRIX, administering control over which agencies and individuals had access to the system. FDLE was also a participant state in MATRIX. IIR was responsible for administrative support, and was the grantee for federal funds received for MATRIX.\nThe analytical core of the MATRIX pilot project was an application called Factual Analysis Criminal Threat Solution (FACTS). FACTS was described as a \"technological, investigative tool allowing query-based searches of available state and public records in the data reference repository.\" The FACTS application allowed an authorized user to search \"dynamically combined records from disparate datasets\" based on partial information, and will \"assemble\" the results. The data reference repository used with FACTS represented the amalgamation of over 3.9 billion public records collected from thousands of sources. Some of the data contained in FACTS included FAA pilot licenses and aircraft ownership records, property ownership records, information on vessels registered with the Coast Guard, state sexual offenders lists, federal terrorist watch lists, corporation filings, Uniform Commercial Code filings, bankruptcy filings, state-issued professional licenses, criminal history information, department of corrections information and photo images, driver's license information and photo images, motor vehicle registration information, and information from commercial sources that \"are generally available to the public or legally permissible under federal law.\" The data reference repository purportedly excluded data such as telemarketing call lists, direct mail mailing lists, airline reservations or travel records, frequent flyer/hotel stay program membership or activity, magazine subscriptions, information about purchases made at retailers or over the Internet, telephone calling logs or records, credit or debit card numbers, mortgage or car payment information, bank account numbers or balance information, birth certificates, marriage licenses, divorce decrees, or utility bill payment information.\nParticipating law enforcement agencies utilized this information sharing and data mining resource over the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) secure intranet (RISSNET). The RISS Program is an established system of six regional centers that are used to \"share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many locations across jurisdictional lines.\" The RISS Program is used to combat traditional law enforcement targets, such as drug trafficking and violent crime, as well as other activities, such as terrorism and cybercrime. According to its website, RISS has been in operation for nearly 25 years, and has \"member agencies in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, and England.\"\nSome critics of MATRIX suggested that the original intentions and design of the pilot project echoed those of DARPA's highly criticized TIA program. However, while it is difficult to ascribe intention, an ongoing series of problems did appear to have affected the trajectory of the project. In August 2003, Hank Asher, the founder of Seisint, resigned from the company's board of directors after questions about his criminal history were raised during contract negotiations between Seisint and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. In the 1980s, Asher was allegedly a pilot in several drug smuggling cases. However, he was reportedly never charged in the cases in exchange for his testimony at state and federal trials. Similar concerns had surfaced in 1999 when the FBI and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reportedly cancelled contracts with an earlier company Asher founded, DBT Online, Inc.\nSome civil liberties organizations also raised concerns about law enforcement actions being taken based on algorithms and analytical criteria developed by a private corporation, in this case Seisint, without any public or legislative input. Questions also were raised about the level of involvement of the federal government, particularly the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, in a project that is ostensibly focused on supporting state-based information sharing. It has been reported that the MATRIX pilot project has received a total of $12 million in federal funding—$8 million from the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and $4 million from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) at the Department of Justice (DOJ).\nThe MATRIX pilot project also suffered some setbacks in recruiting states to participate. The lack of participation can be especially troubling for a networked information sharing project such as MATRIX because, as Metcalfe's Law suggests, \"the power of the network increases exponentially by the number of computers connected to it.\" While as many as 16 states were reported to have either participated or seriously considered participating in MATRIX, several chose to withdraw, leaving a total of four states (Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) at the conclusion of the pilot on April 15, 2005. State officials cited a variety of reasons for not participating in MATRIX, including costs, concerns about violating state privacy laws, and duplication of existing resources.\nIn its news release announcing the conclusion of the pilot, the FDLE stated that as a proof-of-concept pilot study from July 2003 to April 2005, MATRIX had achieved many \"operational successes.\" Among the statistics cited, the news release stated that\nBetween July 2003 and April 2005, there have been 1,866,202 queries to the FACTS application. As of April 8, 2005, there were 963 law enforcement users accessing FACTS. FACTS assisted a variety of investigations. On average, cases pertained to the following: Fraud—22.6% Robbery—18.8% Sex Crime Investigations—8.6% Larceny and Theft—8.3% Extortion/Blackmail—7.0% Burglary/Breaking and Entering—6.8% Stolen Property—6.2% Terrorism/National Security—2.6% Other—19.1% (e.g., assault, arson, narcotics, homicide)\nIt was also announced that while the pilot study would not be continued, due to a lack of additional federal funding, that Florida and other participating states were \"independently negotiating the continued use of the FACTS application for use within their individual state[s].\"", "", "In summer 2005, news reports began to appear regarding a data mining initiative that had been carried out by the U.S. Army's Land Information Warfare Agency (LIWA) in 1999-2000. The initiative, referred to as Able Danger, had reportedly been requested by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as part of larger effort to develop a plan to combat transnational terrorism. Because the details of Able Danger remain classified, little is known about the program. However, in a briefing to reporters, the Department of Defense characterized Able Danger as a demonstration project to test analytical methods and technology on very large amounts of data. The project involved using link analysis to identify underlying connections and associations between individuals who otherwise appear to have no outward connection with one another. The link analysis used both classified and open source data, totaling a reported 2.5 terabytes. All of this data, which included information on U.S. persons, was reportedly deleted in April 2000 due to U.S. Army regulations requiring information on U.S. persons be destroyed after a project ends or becomes inactive.\nInterest in Able Danger was largely driven by controversy over allegations that the data mining analysis had resulted in the identification of Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, as a terrorist suspect before the attacks took place. While some individuals who had been involved in Able Danger were reportedly prepared to testify that they had seen either his name and/or picture on a chart prior to the attacks, the identification claim was strongly disputed by others.\nOn September 21, 2005, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on Able Danger to consider how the data could or should have been shared with other agencies, and whether the destruction of the data was in fact required by the relevant regulations. While the Department of Defense directed the individuals involved in Able Danger not to testify at the hearing, testimony was taken from the attorney of one of the individuals, as well as others not directly involved with the project.\nOn February 15, 2006, the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities held a joint hearing on Able Danger. The first half of the hearing was held in open session while the second half of the hearing was held in closed session to allow for the discussion of classified information. Witnesses testifying during the open session included Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence; Erik Kleinsmith; Anthony Shaffer, and J.D. Smith.\nIn September 2006, a Department of Defense Inspector General report regarding Able Danger was released. The investigation examined allegations of mismanagement of the Able Danger program and reprisals against Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Anthony Shaffer, a member of the U.S. Army Reserve and civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DoD Inspector General \"found some procedural oversights concerning the DIA handling of LTC Shaffer's office contents and his Officer Evaluation Reports.\" However, the investigation found that\nThe evidence did not support assertions that Able Danger identified the September 11, 2001, terrorists nearly a year before the attack, that Able Danger team members were prohibited from sharing information with law enforcement authorities, or that DoD officials reprised against LTC Shaffer for his disclosures regarding Able Danger.\nIn December 2006, the then-Chairman and then-Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Roberts and Senator Rockefeller respectively, released a letter summarizing the findings of a review of Able Danger conducted by Committee staff. According to the letter, the results of the review, begun in August 2005, \"were confirmed in all respects by the DoD Inspector General investigation of the Able Danger program (Case Number H05L9790521).\" The letter further stated that the review \"revealed no evidence to support the underlying Able Danger allegations\" and that the Committee considered the matter \"closed.\"", "On November 2, 2006, DHS posted a System of Records Notice (SORN) in the Federal Register regarding the deployment of the Automated Targeting System (ATS), to screen travelers entering the United States by car, plane, ship, or rail. Originally developed to help identify potential cargo threats, ATS is a module of the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). TECS is described as an \"overarching law enforcement information collection, targeting, and sharing environment.\" ATS is run by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CPB). The Federal Register notice states that \"ATS builds a risk assessment for cargo, conveyances, and travelers based on criteria and rules developed by CPB.\" The notice further states that \"ATS both collects information directly, and derives other information from various systems.\" Information collected may be retained for up to forty years \"to cover the potentially active lifespan of individuals associated with terrorism or other criminal activities.\"\nAccording to a November 22, 2006 privacy impact assessment, ATS itself is composed of six modules:\nATS-Inbound—inbound cargo and conveyances (rail, truck, ship, and air) ATS-Outbound—outbound cargo and conveyances (rail, truck, ship, and air) ATS-Passenger (ATS-P)—travelers and conveyances (air, ship, and rail) ATS-Land (ATS-L)—private vehicles arriving by land ATS-International (ATS-I)—cargo targeting for CPB's collaboration with foreign customs authorities ATS-Trend Analysis and Analytical Selectivity Program (ATS-TAP) (analytical module)\nAccording to DHS, \"ATS historically was covered by the SORN for TECS.\" The November 2, 2006 SORN was \"solely to provide increased noticed and transparency to the public about ATS\" and \"did not describe any new collection of information.\" However, the disclosure raised a number of issues about various facets of the program, including proposed exemptions from the Privacy Act; opportunities for citizens to correct errors in the records; how the risk assessments are created; if any previous testing has been conducted; and the effectiveness of the system.\nIn its July 6, 2007 report to Congress, the DHS Privacy Office stated that of the six modules that compose ATS, only two—ATS Inbound and ATS Outbound (which became operational in 1997)—\"engage in data mining to provide decision support analysis for targeting of cargo for suspicious activity.\" In contrast, the DHS Privacy Office report states that the ATS Passenger module does not meet the definition of data mining referred to in H.Rept. 109-699 (this definition is discussed in more detail in \"Legislation in the 109 th Congress,\" below). Whereas the ATS Passenger module calls for a search or examination of a traveler based on the traveler's personally identifying travel documents, the data mining definition in H.Rept. 109-699 only includes a search that \"does not use a specific individual's personal identifiers to acquire information concerning that individual.\"\nOn August 6, 2007, the Privacy Office of the Department of Homeland Security published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing Privacy Act exemptions for the Automated Targeting System, in the Federal Register . A Privacy Act System of Records Notice (SORN) was also published in the same edition of the Federal Register . In addition, a revised Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for ATS was posted on the DHS website.\nAccording to the NPRM, ATS-P module records exempt from the Privacy Act would include \"the risk assessment analyses and business confidential information received in the PNR from the air and vessel carriers.\" Records or information obtained from other systems of records that are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act would retain their exemption in ATS. In the NPRM, DHS states that the exemptions are needed \"to protect information relating to law enforcement investigations from disclosures to subjects of investigations and others who could interfere with investigatory and law enforcement activities.\"\nThe August 6, 2007 SORN is a revised version of the November 2, 2006 SORN \"which responds to those comments [received in response to the November 2006 SORN], makes certain amendments with regard to the retention period and access provisions of the prior notice, and provides further notice and transparency to the public about the functionality of ATS.\" The changes include\nReducing the \"general retention period for data maintained in ATS\" from 40 to 15 years, and adding a requirement that users obtain supervisory approval to access archived data in the last eight years of the retention period. Allowing \"persons whose PNR data has been collected and maintained in ATS-P [to] have administrative access to that data under the Privacy Act.\" Individuals will also be able to \"seek to correct factual inaccuracies contained in their PNR data, as it is maintained by CBP.\" Adding booking agents as a category of people from whom information is obtained, in acknowledgment that booking agents' identities are included in itinerary information. Amending the categories of people covered by ATS \"to include persons whose international itineraries cause their flight to stop in the United States, either to refuel or permit a transfer, and crewmembers on flights that overfly or transit through U.S. airspace.\" Clarifying \"the categories of PNR data collected and maintained in ATS-P to more accurately reflect the type of data collected from air carriers.\" Removing \"two of the routine uses included in the earlier version of the SORN—those pertaining to using ATS in background checks.\"\nThis revised SORN became effective on September 5, 2007.", "In December 2005 news reports appeared for the first time revealing the existence of a classified NSA terrorist surveillance program, dating back to at least 2002, involving the domestic collection, analysis, and sharing of telephone call information. Controversy over the program raised congressional concerns about both the prevalence of homeland security data mining and the capacity of the country's intelligence and law enforcement agencies to adequately analyze and share counterterrorism information. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held two hearings regarding the issue on February 6 and February 28, 2006.\nAlthough details about the program are classified, statements by President Bush and Administration officials following the initial revelation of the program suggested that the NSA terrorist surveillance program focused only on international calls, with a specific goal of targeting the communications of al Qaeda and related terrorist groups, and affiliated individuals. It was also suggested that the program was reviewed and reauthorized on a regular basis and that key Members of Congress had been briefed about the program.\nIn his weekly radio address on December 17, 2005, President Bush stated:\nIn the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation, I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. Before we intercept these communications, the government must have information that establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks.\nPresident Bush also stated during his radio address:\nThe activities I authorized are reviewed approximately every 45 days. Each review is based on a fresh intelligence assessment of terrorist threats to the continuity of our government and the threat of catastrophic damage to our homeland. During each assessment, previous activities under the authorization are reviewed. The review includes approval by our nation's top legal officials, including the Attorney General and the Counsel to the President. I have reauthorized this program more than 30 times since the September the 11 th attacks, and I intend to do so for as long as our nation faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and related groups.\nIn a January 27, 2006, public release statement, the Department of Justice stated:\nThe NSA program is narrowly focused, aimed only at international calls and targeted at al Qaeda and related groups. Safeguards are in place to protect the civil liberties of ordinary Americans.\nThe program only applies to communications where one party is located outside of the United States. The NSA terrorist surveillance program described by the President is only focused on members of Al Qaeda and affiliated groups. Communications are only intercepted if there is a reasonable basis to believe that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda. The program is designed to target a key tactic of al Qaeda: infiltrating foreign agents into the United States and controlling their movements through electronic communications, just as it did leading up to the September 11 attacks. The NSA activities are reviewed and reauthorized approximately every 45 days. In addition, the General Counsel and Inspector General of the NSA monitor the program to ensure that it is operating properly and that civil liberties are protected, and the intelligence agents involved receive extensive training.\nOn February 6, 2006, in his written statement for a Senate Committee on the Judiciary hearing, U.S. Attorney General Gonzalez stated:\nThe terrorist surveillance program targets communications where one party to the communication is outside the U.S. and the government has \"reasonable grounds to believe\" that at least one party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda, or an affiliated terrorist organization. This program is reviewed and reauthorized by the President approximately every 45 days. The Congressional leadership, including the leaders of the Intelligence Committees of both Houses of Congress, has been briefed about this program more than a dozen times since 2001. The program provides the United States with the early warning system we so desperately needed on September 10 th .\nIn May 2006 news reports alleged additional details regarding the NSA terrorist surveillance program, renewing concerns about the possible existence of inappropriately authorized domestic surveillance. According to these reports, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NSA contracted with AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth to collect information about domestic telephone calls handled by these companies. The NSA, in turn, reportedly used this information to conduct \"social network analysis\" to map relationships between people based on their communications.\nIt remains unclear precisely what information, if any, was collected and provided to the NSA. Some reports suggest that personally identifiable information (i.e., names, addresses, etc.) were not included. It also has been reported that the content of the calls (what was spoken) was not collected. Since the emergence of these news reports, BellSouth has issued a public statement saying that according to an internal review conducted by the company, \"no such [alleged] contract exists\" and that the company has \"not provided bulk customer calling records to the NSA.\" Similarly, Verizon has issued a public statement saying that due to the classified nature of the NSA program, \"Verizon cannot and will not confirm or deny whether it has any relationship to the classified NSA program,\" but that \"Verizon's wireless and wireline companies did not provide to NSA customer records or call data, local or otherwise.\" Together, AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth are the three largest telecommunications companies in the United States, serving more than 200 million customers, accounting for hundreds of billions of calls each year.\nIn a January 17, 2007 letter to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, then-Attorney General Gonzalez wrote that:\na Judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization. As a result of these orders, any electronic surveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.\nThe letter further stated that \"the President has determined not to reauthorize the Terrorist Surveillance Program when the current authorization expires.\"\nThe program and the alleged involvement of telecommunications companies has been the subject of several lawsuits. For a discussion of these legal issues, see CRS Report RL33424, Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. In July 2008, Congress passed and the President signed into law H.R. 6304 , the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-261 ). Among its provisions, Title VIII of the act provides a measure of protection from civil actions to telecommunications companies that provided assistance to government counterterrorism surveillance activities between September 11, 2001, and January 17, 2007. For a discussion of this legislation, see CRS Report RL34279, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33539, Intelligence Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]", "As part of its efforts to better utilize the overwhelming flow of information it collects, NSA has reportedly been supporting the development of new technology and data management techniques by funding grants given by the Advanced Research Development Activity (ARDA). ARDA is an intelligence community (IC) organization whose mission is described as \"to sponsor high-risk, high-payoff research designed to leverage leading edge technology to solve some of the most critical problems facing the Intelligence Community (IC).\" ARDA's research support is organized into various technology \"thrusts\" representing the most critical areas of development. Some of ARDA's research thrusts include Information Exploitation, Quantum Information Science, Global Infosystems Access, Novel Intelligence from Massive Data, and Advanced Information Assurance.\nThe Novel Intelligence from Massive Data (NIMD) program focuses on the development of data mining and analysis tools to be used in working with massive data. Novel intelligence refers to \"actionable information not previously known.\" Massive data refers to data that has characteristics that are especially challenging to common data analysis tools and methods. These characteristics can include unusual volume, breadth (heterogeneity), and complexity. Data sets that are one petabyte (one quadrillion bytes) or larger are considered to be \"massive.\" Smaller data sets that contain items in a wide variety of formats, or are very heterogeneous (i.e., unstructured text, spoken text, audio, video, graphs, diagrams, images, maps, equations, chemical formulas, tables, etc.) can also be considered \"massive.\" According to ARDA's website (no longer available) \"some intelligence data sources grow at a rate of four petabytes per month now, and the rate of growth is increasing.\" With the continued proliferation of both the means and volume of electronic communications, it is expected that the need for more sophisticated tools will intensify. Whereas some observers once predicted that the NSA was in danger of becoming proverbially deaf due to the spreading use of encrypted communications, it appears that NSA may now be at greater risk of being \"drowned\" in information.", "As data mining initiatives continue to evolve, there are several issues Congress may decide to consider related to implementation and oversight. These issues include, but are not limited to, data quality, interoperability, mission creep, and privacy. As with other aspects of data mining, while technological capabilities are important, other factors also influence the success of a project's outcome.", "Data quality is a multifaceted issue that represents one of the biggest challenges for data mining. Data quality refers to the accuracy and completeness of the data. Data quality can also be affected by the structure and consistency of the data being analyzed. The presence of duplicate records, the lack of data standards, the timeliness of updates, and human error can significantly impact the effectiveness of the more complex data mining techniques, which are sensitive to subtle differences that may exist in the data. To improve data quality, it is sometimes necessary to \"clean\" the data, which can involve the removal of duplicate records, normalizing the values used to represent information in the database (e.g., ensuring that \"no\" is represented as a 0 throughout the database, and not sometimes as a 0, sometimes as an N, etc.), accounting for missing data points, removing unneeded data fields, identifying anomalous data points (e.g., an individual whose age is shown as 142 years), and standardizing data formats (e.g., changing dates so they all include MM/DD/YYYY).", "Related to data quality, is the issue of interoperability of different databases and data mining software. Interoperability refers to the ability of a computer system and/or data to work with other systems or data using common standards or processes. Interoperability is a critical part of the larger efforts to improve interagency collaboration and information sharing through e-government and homeland security initiatives. For data mining, interoperability of databases and software is important to enable the search and analysis of multiple databases simultaneously, and to help ensure the compatibility of data mining activities of different agencies. Data mining projects that are trying to take advantage of existing legacy databases or that are initiating first-time collaborative efforts with other agencies or levels of government (e.g., police departments in different states) may experience interoperability problems. Similarly, as agencies move forward with the creation of new databases and information sharing efforts, they will need to address interoperability issues during their planning stages to better ensure the effectiveness of their data mining projects.", "Mission creep is one of the leading risks of data mining cited by civil libertarians, and represents how control over one's information can be a tenuous proposition. Mission creep refers to the use of data for purposes other than that for which the data was originally collected. This can occur regardless of whether the data was provided voluntarily by the individual or was collected through other means.\nEfforts to fight terrorism can, at times, take on an acute sense of urgency. This urgency can create pressure on both data holders and officials who access the data. To leave an available resource unused may appear to some as being negligent. Data holders may feel obligated to make any information available that could be used to prevent a future attack or track a known terrorist. Similarly, government officials responsible for ensuring the safety of others may be pressured to use and/or combine existing databases to identify potential threats. Unlike physical searches, or the detention of individuals, accessing information for purposes other than originally intended may appear to be a victimless or harmless exercise. However, such information use can lead to unintended outcomes and produce misleading results.\nOne of the primary reasons for misleading results is inaccurate data. All data collection efforts suffer accuracy concerns to some degree. Ensuring the accuracy of information can require costly protocols that may not be cost effective if the data is not of inherently high economic value. In well-managed data mining projects, the original data collecting organization is likely to be aware of the data's limitations and account for these limitations accordingly. However, such awareness may not be communicated or heeded when data is used for other purposes. For example, the accuracy of information collected through a shopper's club card may suffer for a variety of reasons, including the lack of identity authentication when a card is issued, cashiers using their own cards for customers who do not have one, and/or customers who use multiple cards. For the purposes of marketing to consumers, the impact of these inaccuracies is negligible to the individual. If a government agency were to use that information to target individuals based on food purchases associated with particular religious observances though, an outcome based on inaccurate information could be, at the least, a waste of resources by the government agency, and an unpleasant experience for the misidentified individual. As the March 2004 TAPAC report observes, the potential wide reuse of data suggests that concerns about mission creep can extend beyond privacy to the protection of civil rights in the event that information is used for \"targeting an individual solely on the basis of religion or expression, or using information in a way that would violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.\"", "As additional information sharing and data mining initiatives have been announced, increased attention has focused on the implications for privacy. Concerns about privacy focus both on actual projects proposed, as well as concerns about the potential for data mining applications to be expanded beyond their original purposes (mission creep). For example, some experts suggest that anti-terrorism data mining applications might also be useful for combating other types of crime as well. So far there has been little consensus about how data mining should be carried out, with several competing points of view being debated. Some observers contend that tradeoffs may need to be made regarding privacy to ensure security. Other observers suggest that existing laws and regulations regarding privacy protections are adequate, and that these initiatives do not pose any threats to privacy. Still other observers argue that not enough is known about how data mining projects will be carried out, and that greater oversight is needed. There is also some disagreement over how privacy concerns should be addressed. Some observers suggest that technical solutions are adequate. In contrast, some privacy advocates argue in favor of creating clearer policies and exercising stronger oversight. As data mining efforts move forward, Congress may consider a variety of questions including, the degree to which government agencies should use and mix commercial data with government data, whether data sources are being used for purposes other than those for which they were originally designed, and the possible application of the Privacy Act to these initiatives.", "During the 108 th Congress, a number of legislative proposals were introduced that would restrict data mining activities by some parts of the federal government, and/or increase the reporting requirements of such projects to Congress. For example, on January 16, 2003, Senator Feingold introduced S. 188 the Data-Mining Moratorium Act of 2003, which would have imposed a moratorium on the implementation of data mining under the Total Information Awareness program (now referred to as the Terrorism Information Awareness project) by the Department of Defense, as well as any similar program by the Department of Homeland Security. S. 188 was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.\nOn January 23, 2003, Senator Wyden introduced S.Amdt. 59 , an amendment to H.J.Res. 2 , the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003. As passed in its final form as part of the omnibus spending bill ( P.L. 108-7 ) on February 13, 2003, and signed by the President on February 20, 2003, the amendment requires the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General to submit a joint report to Congress within 90 days providing details about the TIA program. Some of the information required includes spending schedules, likely effectiveness of the program, likely impact on privacy and civil liberties, and any laws and regulations that may need to be changed to fully deploy TIA. If the report was not submitted within 90 days, funding for the TIA program could have been discontinued. Funding for TIA was later discontinued in Section 8131 of the FY2004 Department of Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-87 ), signed into law on September 30, 2003.\nOn March 13, 2003, Senator Wyden introduced an amendment to S. 165 , the Air Cargo Security Act, requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress within 90 days providing information about the impact of CAPPS II on privacy and civil liberties. The amendment was passed by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the bill was forwarded for consideration by the full Senate ( S.Rept. 108-38 ). In May 2003, S. 165 was passed by the Senate with the Wyden amendment included and was sent to the House where it was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.\nFunding restrictions on CAPPS II were included in section 519 of the FY2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-90 ), signed into law October 1, 2003. This provision included restrictions on the \"deployment or implementation, on other than a test basis, of the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II),\" pending the completion of a GAO report regarding the efficacy, accuracy, and security of CAPPS II, as well as the existence of a system of an appeals process for individuals identified as a potential threat by the system. In its report delivered to Congress in February 2004, GAO reported that \"As of January 1, 2004, TSA has not fully addressed seven of the eight CAPPS II issues identified by the Congress as key areas of interest.\" The one issue GAO determined that TSA had addressed is the establishment of an internal oversight board. GAO attributed the incomplete progress on these issues partly to the \"early stage of the system's development.\"\nOn March 25, 2003, the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census held a hearing on the current and future possibilities of data mining. The witnesses, drawn from federal and state government, industry, and academia, highlighted a number of perceived strengths and weaknesses of data mining, as well as the still-evolving nature of the technology and practices behind data mining. While data mining was alternatively described by some witnesses as a process, and by other witnesses as a productivity tool, there appeared to be a general consensus that the challenges facing the future development and success of government data mining applications were related less to technological concerns than to other issues such as data integrity, security, and privacy. On May 6 and May 20, 2003 the Subcommittee also held hearings on the potential opportunities and challenges for using factual data analysis for national security purposes.\nOn July 29, 2003, Senator Wyden introduced S. 1484 , The Citizens' Protection in Federal Databases Act, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Among its provisions, S. 1484 would have required the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to submit to Congress a report containing information regarding the purposes, type of data, costs, contract durations, research methodologies, and other details before obligating or spending any funds on commercially available databases. S. 1484 would also have set restrictions on the conduct of searches or analysis of databases \"based solely on a hypothetical scenario or hypothetical supposition of who may commit a crime or pose a threat to national security.\"\nOn July 31, 2003, Senator Feingold introduced S. 1544 , the Data-Mining Reporting Act of 2003, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Among its provisions, S. 1544 would have required any department or agency engaged in data mining to submit a public report to Congress regarding these activities. These reports would have been required to include a variety of details about the data mining project, including a description of the technology and data to be used, a discussion of how the technology will be used and when it will be deployed, an assessment of the expected efficacy of the data mining project, a privacy impact assessment, an analysis of the relevant laws and regulations that would govern the project, and a discussion of procedures for informing individuals their personal information will be used and allowing them to opt out, or an explanation of why such procedures are not in place.\nAlso on July 31, 2003, Senator Murkowski introduced S. 1552 , the Protecting the Rights of Individuals Act, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Among its provisions, section 7 of S. 1552 would have imposed a moratorium on data mining by any federal department or agency \"except pursuant to a law specifically authorizing such data-mining program or activity by such department or agency.\" It also would have required\nThe head of each department or agency of the Federal Government that engages or plans to engage in any activities relating to the development or use of a data-mining program or activity shall submit to Congress, and make available to the public, a report on such activities.\nOn May 5, 2004, Representative McDermott introduced H.R. 4290 , the Data-Mining Reporting Act of 2004, which was referred to the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census. H.R. 4290 would have required\neach department or agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any activity or use or develop data-mining technology shall each submit a public report to Congress on all such activities of the department or agency under the jurisdiction of that official.\nA similar provision was included in H.R. 4591 / S. 2528 , the Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2004. S. 2528 was introduced by Senator Kennedy on June 16, 2004 and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 4591 was introduced by Representative Berman on June 16, 2004 and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.", "Data mining continued to be a subject of interest to Congress in the 109 th Congress. On April 6, 2005, H.R. 1502 , the Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2005, was introduced by Representative Berman and was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary , the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Homeland Security. Section 402, Data-Mining Report, of H.R. 1502 would have required that\nThe Head of each department or agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any activity to use or develop data-mining technology shall each submit a public report to Congress on all such activities of the department or agency under the jurisdiction of that official.\nAs part of their content, these reports would have been required to provide, for each data mining activity covered by H.R. 1502 , information regarding the technology and data being used; information on how the technology would be used and the target dates for deployment; an assessment of the likely efficacy of the data mining technology; an assessment of the likely impact of the activity on privacy and civil liberties; a list and analysis of the laws and regulations that would apply to the data mining activity and whether these laws and regulations would need to be modified to allow the data mining activity to be implemented; information on the policies, procedures, and guidelines that would be developed and applied to protect the privacy and due process rights of individuals, and ensure that only accurate information is collected and used; and information on how individuals whose information is being used in the data mining activity will be notified of the use of their information, and, if applicable, what options will be available for individual to opt-out of the activity. These reports would have been due to Congress no later than 90 days after the enactment of H.R. 1502 , and would have been required to be updated annually to include \"any new data-mining technologies.\"\nOn June 6, 2005, S. 1169 , the Federal Agency Data-Mining Reporting Act of 2005 was introduced by Senator Feingold, and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Among its provisions, S. 1169 would have required any department or agency engaged in data mining to submit a public report to Congress regarding these activities. These reports would have been required to include a variety of details about the data mining project, including a description of the technology and data to be used, a discussion of the plans and goals for using the technology when it will be deployed, an assessment of the expected efficacy of the data mining project, a privacy impact assessment, an analysis of the relevant laws and regulations that would govern the project, and a discussion of procedures for informing individuals their personal information will be used and allowing them to opt out, or an explanation of why such procedures are not in place.\nOn July 11, 2005, H.R. 3199 , the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 was introduced. On July 21, 2005, Representative Berman introduced H.Amdt. 497 to H.R. 3199 , which would required the Attorney General to submit a report to Congress on the data mining initiatives of the Department of Justice and other departments and agencies as well. The provision stated, in part;\nThe Attorney General shall collect the information described in paragraph (2) from the head of each department or agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any activity to use or develop data-mining technology and shall report to Congress on all such activities.\nH.Amdt. 497 was passed on July 21, 2005 by a 261-165 recorded vote and appeared as Section 132 of H.R. 3199 . Also on this day, H.R. 3199 was passed by the House and sent to the Senate. On July 29, 2005, the Senate passed an amended version of H.R. 3199 . The Senate version did not contain a comparable provision on data mining. The bill went to a House-Senate conference in November 2005. Section 126 of the conference report ( H.Rept. 109-333 ) filed on December 8, 2005 included a provision for a report on data mining by the Department of Justice alone, rather than other departments and agencies as well. The provision stated, in part:\nNot later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on any initiative of the Department of Justice that uses or is intended to develop pattern-based data mining technology...\nThe bill was signed into law as P.L. 109-177 on March 9, 2006.\nOn October 6, 2005, H.R. 4009 , the Department of Homeland Security Reform Act of 2005, was introduced by Representative Thompson, and was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Section 203(c)(16) would have directed the Chief Intelligence Officer, as established in Section 203(a):\nTo establish and utilize, in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer of the Department, a secure communications and information technology infrastructure, including data-mining and other advanced analytical tools, in order to access, receive, and analyze data and information in furtherance of the responsibilities under this section, and to disseminate information acquired and analyzed by the Department, as appropriate.\nOn December 6, 2005, H.R. 4437 , the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 was introduced by Representative Sensenbrenner and was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Homeland Security. On December 8, 2005, the Committee on the Judiciary held a markup session and ordered an amended version of H.R. 4437 to be reported. On December 13, 2005, the Committee on Homeland Security discharged the bill, which was subsequently referred to and discharged from the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Ways and Means. On December 16, 2005, H.R. 4437 was passed by the House and sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.\nSection 1305, Authority of the Office of Security and Investigations to Detect and Investigate Immigration Benefits Fraud, of H.R. 4437 would have granted the Office of Security and Investigations of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services at the Department of Homeland Security the authority to:\n(1) to conduct fraud detection operations, including data mining and analysis;\n(2) to investigate any criminal or noncriminal allegations of violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act or title 18, United States Code, that Immigration and Customs Enforcement declines to investigate;\n(3) to turn over to a United States Attorney for prosecution evidence that tends to establish such violations; and\n(4) to engage in information sharing, partnerships, and other collaborative efforts with any—\n(A) Federal, State, or local law enforcement entity;\n(B) foreign partners; or\n(C) entity within the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).\nOn July 12, 2006, Senator Feingold introduced S.Amdt. 4562 to H.R. 5441 , the Homeland Security Department FY2007 appropriations bill. S.Amdt. 4562 is substantively similar to S. 1169 , although only applies to departments and agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, rather than the entire federal government. S.Amdt. 4562 was agreed to by unanimous consent and was included in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 5441 as Section 549. According to the conference report ( H.Rept. 109-699 ) Section 549 was deleted from the final bill that was passed into law ( P.L. 109-295 ). However, the conference report also included a statement on data mining by the conference managers expressing concern about the development and use of data mining technology and;\n\"direct[s] the DHS Privacy Officer to submit a report consistent with the terms and conditions listed in section 549 of the Senate bill. The conferees expect the report to include information on how it has implemented the recommendation laid out in the Department's data mining report received July 18, 2006.\"", "Data mining has been the subject of some of the earliest proposed bills and hearings of the 110 th Congress. On January 10, 2007, S. 236 , the Federal Agency Data-Mining Reporting Act of 2007 was introduced by Senator Feingold and Senator Sununu, and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Among its provisions, S. 236 would require any department or agency engaged in data mining to submit a public report to Congress regarding these activities. These reports would be required to include a variety of details about the data mining project, including a description of the technology and data to be used, a discussion of the plans and goals for using the technology when it will be deployed, an assessment of the expected efficacy of the data mining project, a privacy impact assessment, an analysis of the relevant laws and regulations that would govern the project, and a discussion of procedures for informing individuals their personal information will be used and allowing them to opt out, or an explanation of why such procedures are not in place.\nAlso in the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on January 10, 2007 entitled \"Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of Government Data Mining Programs.\" The witnesses included a former Member of Congress and several individuals from research centers and think tanks. Collectively, they highlighted a number of perceived strengths and weaknesses of data mining, as well as the continually evolving nature of the technology and practices behind data mining. The witnesses also addressed the inherent challenge of simultaneously protecting the nation from terrorism while also protecting civil liberties.\nOn February 28, 2007, Senator Reid introduced S.Amdt. 275 to S. 4 the Improving America's Security by Implementing Unfinished Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Section 504 of this amendment, entitled the Federal Agency Data Mining Report Act of 2007, was identical to S. 236 , as introduced. During the Senate floor debates held on S. 4 in early March 2007, several amendments to the data mining section of S. 4 were introduced.\nOn March 6, 2007, Senator Kyl introduced S.Amdt. 357 to S.Amdt. 275 of S. 4 . The purpose of S.Amdt. 357 was described as \"to amend the data-mining reporting requirement to protect existing patents, trade secrets, and confidential business processes, and to adopt a narrower definition of data mining in order to exclude routine computer searches.\" Later on March 6, 2007, Senator Kyl offered a modification to S.Amdt. 357 that used definitions of data mining and database very similar to those that appear in P.L. 109-177 the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, and that slightly changed the original language of S.Amdt. 357 regarding protection of patents and other proprietary business information.\nOn March 8, 2007, Senator Feingold introduced S.Amdt. 429 to S.Amdt. 275 . S.Amdt. 429 is very similar to S. 236 , as introduced, with a few differences. One difference is that the initial description used to partially define data mining is changed to include \"a program involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses of 1 or more electronic databases....\" Another difference is that the data mining reporting requirement excludes data mining initiatives that are solely for \"the detection of fraud, waste, or abuse in a Government agency or program; or the security of a Government computer system.\" Another difference is the inclusion of language requiring that the data mining reports be \"produced in coordination with the privacy officer of that department or agency.\" S.Amdt. 429 also includes language detailing the types of information that should be included in the classified annexes of the data mining reports (i.e., classified information, law enforcement sensitive information, proprietary business information, and trade secrets), and states that such classified annexes should not be made available to the public.\nLater on March 8, 2007, Senator Feingold introduced S.Amdt. 441 to S.Amdt. 357 . S.Amdt. 441 is substantively the same as S.Amdt. 429 , but with a technical modification.\nOn March 13, 2007, S.Amdt. 441 was agreed to by unanimous consent, and S.Amdt. 357 , as modified, and as amended by S.Amdt. 441 was agreed to by unanimous consent. Also on March 13, 2007, S. 4 passed the Senate by a 60-38 vote. The data mining provision appears as Section 604 in S. 4 . As originally passed by the House in January 2007, the House version of S. 4 , H.R. 1 , did not contain a comparable provision on data mining.\nOn March 21, 2007, the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security held a hearing entitled \"Privacy and Civil Rights in Homeland Security.\" The witnesses included Hugo Teufel III, the Chief Privacy Officer at DHS; Daniel Sutherland of the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at DHS; and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Collectively they addressed some of the data mining activities being carried out by DHS, in particular the use of the Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement (ADVISE) data mining tool, and the precautions taken by DHS to protect citizens' privacy and civil liberties.\nOn April 12, 2007, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary voted to approve a revised version of S. 236 , the Data Mining Act of 2007. On June 4, 2007, the Committee reported the bill. With one exception, this revised version of S. 236 is substantively identical to data mining provision passed as Section 604 in S. 4 , and later as Section 804 of P.L. 110-53 in July 2007 (discussed below). As passed by the Committee, S. 236 includes a provision regarding penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained in the annex of any reports submitted to Congress.\nOn June 15, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2638 , concerning FY2008 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security. The accompanying House Report ( H.Rept. 110-181 ) includes language prohibiting funding for the Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement (ADVISE) data mining program until DHS has completed a privacy impact assessment for the program. ADVISE is alternatively described as a technology framework, or a tool, for analyzing and visually representing large amounts of data. ADVISE is being developed by the Directorate for Science and Technology at DHS. The accompanying Senate Report ( S.Rept. 110-84 ) for S. 1644 , concerning FY2008 DHS appropriations, also includes similar language recommending that no funding be allocated for ADVISE until a program plan and privacy impact assessment is completed.\nOn July 9, 2007, the Senate took up H.R. 1 , struck all language following the enacting clause, substituted the language of S. 4 as amended, and passed the bill by unanimous consent. Differences between H.R. 1 and S. 4 were resolved in conference later that month. The data mining provision that appeared as Section 604 in S. 4 was retained as Section 804 in the agreed upon bill. On July 26, 2007, the Senate agreed to the conference report ( H.Rept. 110-259 ) in a 85-8 vote. On July 27, 2007, the House agreed to the conference report in a 371-40 vote. On August 3, 2007, the bill was signed into law by the President as P.L. 110-53 .", "CRS Report RL32802, Homeland Security: Air Passenger Prescreening and Counterterrorism , by [author name scrubbed] and William Krouse. Out of print; available from author ([phone number scrubbed]).\nCRS Report RL32536, The Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot Project , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf).\nCRS Report RL30671, Personal Privacy Protection: The Legislative Response , by [author name scrubbed]. Out of print; available from author ([phone number scrubbed]).\nCRS Report RL31730, Privacy: Total Information Awareness Programs and Related Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws , by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report RL31786, Total Information Awareness Programs: Funding, Composition, and Oversight Issues , by [author name scrubbed].\nDARPA, Report to Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program , May 20, 2003, http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.pdf .\nDepartment of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Information Technology Management: Terrorism Information Awareness Program (D-2004-033) , December 12, 2003 http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/FY04/04-033.pdf .\nDepartment of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Survey of DHS Data Mining Activities (OIG-06-56) , August 2006 http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-56_Aug06.pdf .\nDepartment of Homeland Security, Office of Legislative Affairs, Letter Report Pursuant to Section 804 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 , February 11, 2008,\nhttp://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_datamining_2008.pdf .\nDepartment of Homeland Security, Privacy Office, 2007 Data Mining Report: DHS Privacy Office Response to H.Rept. 109-699 , July 6, 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_datamining_2007.pdf .\nDepartment of Homeland Security, Privacy Office, Report to the Public on the Transportation Security Administration ' s Secure Flight Program and Privacy Recommendations , December 2006, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-secure-flight-122006.pdf .\nDepartment of Homeland Security, Privacy Office, Report to the Public Concerning the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot Project , December 2006, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-secure-flight-122006.pdf .\nJeff Jonas and Jim Harper, Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining , CATO Institute Policy Analysis No. 584, December 11, 2006 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa584.pdf .\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence, Data Mining Report , February 15,2008, http://www.dni.gov/reports/data_mining_report_feb08.pdf ." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "", "h0_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_full", "h2_full", "h2_full", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "h2_full", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is data mining typically used for?", "How is data mining used for homeland security?", "How does data mining benefit private-sector industries?", "In what way is data mining used in the public sector?", "What data mining programs have attracted congressional interest?", "How has data mining changed the scope of data homeland security must analyze?", "In what way is data quality a factor in data mining?", "How do databases affect data mining?", "What is mission creep?", "What are questions that need to be considered about data mining?", "How might these questions be answered or considered in the future?" ], "summary": [ "Data mining has become one of the key features of many homeland security initiatives. Often used as a means for detecting fraud, assessing risk, and product retailing, data mining involves the use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets.", "In the context of homeland security, data mining can be a potential means to identify terrorist activities, such as money transfers and communications, and to identify and track individual terrorists themselves, such as through travel and immigration records.", "Data mining is becoming increasingly common in both the private and public sectors. Industries such as banking, insurance, medicine, and retailing commonly use data mining to reduce costs, enhance research, and increase sales.", "In the public sector, data mining applications initially were used as a means to detect fraud and waste, but have grown to also be used for purposes such as measuring and improving program performance.", "Some efforts that have attracted a higher level of congressional interest include the Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) project (now-discontinued) and the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) project (now-canceled and replaced by Secure Flight). Other initiatives that have been the subject of congressional interest include the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX), the Able Danger program, the Automated Targeting System (ATS), and data collection and analysis projects being conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA).", "However, some of the homeland security data mining applications represent a significant expansion in the quantity and scope of data to be analyzed.", "As with other aspects of data mining, while technological capabilities are important, there are other implementation and oversight issues that can influence the success of a project's outcome. One issue is data quality, which refers to the accuracy and completeness of the data being analyzed.", "A second issue is the interoperability of the data mining software and databases being used by different agencies.", "A third issue is mission creep, or the use of data for purposes other than for which the data were originally collected.", "Questions that may be considered include the degree to which government agencies should use and mix commercial data with government data, whether data sources are being used for purposes other than those for which they were originally designed, and possible application of the Privacy Act to these initiatives.", "It is anticipated that congressional oversight of data mining projects will grow as data mining efforts continue to evolve." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 ] }
GAO_GAO-16-483	{ "title": [ "Background", "Overview of NICS Process", "ATF Firearm Retrieval Process", "Grant Programs for Record Submissions Used in NICS Checks", "States Vary in Their Use of Indicators That Identify Domestic Violence Records That Prohibit a Firearm Transfer", "22 States Use Indicators to Identify Criminal History Records That Prohibit Firearm Transfers, Which Include Domestic Violence Records", "MCDV records in the Interstate Identification Index", "State Challenges in Submitting Criminal Records and DOJ Assistance", "Protection Orders in NCIC", "State Challenges in Submitting Protection Orders and DOJ Assistance", "Most States Submit a Limited Number of Domestic Violence Records to the NICS Index, Because Such Records Are More Often Made Available to Other Systems Checked by NICS", "Misdemeanor Crimes of Domestic Violence", "Protection Orders", "Most NICS Checks Involving Domestic Violence Records Are Completed before Firearm Transfers Take Place, but About 6,700 Firearms Were Transferred to Prohibited Individuals Since 2006; DOJ Could Analyze Denial Data to Help Establish Priorities", "About 70 Percent of MCDV-Related Denials Were Completed within 3 Business Days, Which Is a Lower Percentage than for Other Prohibiting Categories", "More than 500 Firearms Transferred Each Year to Individuals with Prohibiting Domestic Violence Records Because Denial Determinations Were Made after 3 Business Days", "Challenges the FBI and States Face in Completing Checks Involving Domestic Violence Records and Actions Taken to Address Challenges", "Challenges Conducting Checks", "State Actions to Address Challenges", "DOJ Actions to Complete Timely and Accurate NICS Checks", "FBI Does Not Analyze Some Available Data to Monitor the Timeliness of NICS Checks and Share Results to Help Set Priorities", "Conclusions", "Recommendation for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology", "Appendix II: State Options for Conducting Background Checks Using the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS)", "Appendix III: Protection Orders in the National Crime Information Center Protection Order File for States, District of Columbia, and Territories, 2006 through 2015", "State", "Category Total", "State", "Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "NICS is used by federally licensed firearm dealers to initiate a background check on individuals seeking to possess or receive a firearm. The permanent provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) took effect on November 30, 1998. Under the Brady Act, before a firearm dealer can transfer a firearm to an unlicensed individual, the dealer must initiate a background check through NICS to determine whether the prospective firearm transfer would violate federal or state law. Under federal law, generally there are 10 categories of individuals who are prohibited from receiving or possessing a firearm, including individuals convicted of a MCDV and those subject to a qualifying domestic violence protection order. States can also establish their own prohibitions in addition to the federal prohibitions. During a NICS check, descriptive data provided by an individual, such as name and date of birth, are used to search three national databases—managed by the FBI—containing criminal history and other relevant records to determine whether or not the person is disqualified by law from receiving or possessing firearms. The majority of the records found in these three databases come from states and territories, though federal and international criminal justice agencies also contribute some records.\nInterstate Identification Index (III): The III is a system for the interstate exchange of criminal history records. III records include information on persons who are indicted for, or have been convicted of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year or have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.\nNational Crime Information Center (NCIC): NCIC is an automated database of criminal justice-related records consisting of 21 files (7 property files and 14 person files), accessible to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The files pertain to, among other things, information on wanted persons (fugitives), persons subject to protection orders, and stolen property.\nNICS Index: The NICS Index is a database that was created for use in connection with NICS background checks and contains information on persons determined to be prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm.\nIn general, states make MCDV records available to the III and protection orders to the NCIC Protection Order file. To facilitate determining if a MCDV record or protection order would prohibit an individual from receiving or possessing a firearm, state and local criminal justice agencies can identify (“flag”) prohibiting records from among all the other records that they provide to the III and NCIC. The flagged criminal history records and protection orders, as well as records submitted to the NICS Index, have been pre-validated by the submitting agency as prohibiting an individual from receiving or possessing a firearm, thereby expediting the NICS check process. For criminal records in the III, agencies can use the Identification for Firearms Sales (IFFS) flag to indicate a prohibiting record for both persons who have been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year or a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. For records in the NCIC, agencies can flag a prohibiting protection order with the “Brady Indicator,” which flags orders related to domestic violence that prohibit the individual from receiving or possessing firearms under federal law.\nAccording to the FBI, approximately 23.1 million background checks were run through NICS during 2015, of which the FBI’s NICS Section processed about 9 million transactions and designated state and local criminal justice agencies processed about 14.1 million. The FBI has a goal of completing 90 percent of all NICS checks immediately, and completes the vast majority of checks before firearms are transferred. FBI officials noted that the NICS Section has achieved this goal every year since 2003, and had a 90.4 percent immediate determination rate in 2015. States may choose among three options for performing NICS checks: (1) the state can conduct all of its own background checks, referred to as point of contact (POC) states; (2) the state and FBI’s NICS Section can share responsibility for background checks, referred to as partial-POC states; or (3) the NICS Section can conduct all background checks for a state. Figure 1 shows the general NICS check process for gun purchases through a firearm dealer.\nThe Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, and ATF regulations establish the types of MCDV convictions and domestic violence protection orders that prohibit a person from possessing a firearm under federal law. Specifically, federal law prohibits individuals who are subject to qualifying MCDV convictions or active domestic violence protection orders from possessing or receiving a firearm. As defined by ATF regulations, a qualifying MCDV is generally an offense that is a misdemeanor offense under federal, state, or local law, includes the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, and involves an intimate partner relationship between the defendant and the victim, among other things.\nAs defined in ATF regulations, a qualifying protection order generally must include issuance after a hearing where the defendant was given actual notice and the opportunity to participate; the restraint of future conduct by the defendant, such as harassing or stalking of an intimate partner or child of the intimate partner or defendant; and a finding that the defendant represents a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner or child, or by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury, among other things.", "ATF is responsible for, among other things, retrieval of firearms that have been transferred to prohibited individuals. Specifically, when the FBI determines, after 3 business days, that an individual to whom a firearm was transferred is prohibited from receiving or possessing a firearm, the FBI refers this delayed denial case to ATF. ATF reviews delayed denial cases it receives from the FBI to confirm the prohibition, and then refers the case to an ATF field office for potential retrieval actions. ATF field offices conduct additional research by coordinating with local law enforcement agencies. If ATF determines that a person should not have been denied, ATF notifies the FBI that the firearm transaction was not prohibited and that the transfer was permissible. If ATF confirms that the person who received the firearm was prohibited, an ATF official contacts the firearm purchaser to coordinate transferring the firearm to a licensed dealer or a third party who is not a prohibited person, or seizes the firearm.", "The goal of the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) is, among other things, to improve the nation’s safety and security by enhancing the quality, completeness, and accessibility of criminal history record information by providing direct financial and technical assistance to states and tribes to improve their criminal record systems and other related systems. For example, according to the 2016 grant solicitation, the funds can be used to, among other things, assist states and tribes in finding ways to make more records available to NICS through the III, NCIC, and NICS Index and to address gaps in the federal and state records currently available in NICS. All states and five territories have received NCHIP grant funds at least once since the inception of the NCHIP grants in 1995. The NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) implements the grant provisions of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA) to improve records available to NICS and help eligible states and tribes improve completeness, automation, and transmittal of records to state and federal systems. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, appropriated $73 million for grants to states to upgrade criminal and mental health records for NICS, of which no less than $25 million shall be for grants made under the authorities of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007. These grants were to, among other things, assist states and tribes in supplying accurate and timely court orders and records of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence for inclusion in federal and state law enforcement databases used to conduct NICS background checks. Since 2011, DOJ has placed a funding priority on NARIP grant projects that increase the number of mental health records accessible to NICS. According to the grant solicitations, states must use a portion of awarded funds to make such records accessible to NICS unless the state can provide information showing that another prohibiting category represents a greater information gap.", "", "", "Twenty-two states voluntarily participate in the Identification for Firearms Sales (IFFS) program and flag criminal records in the III that prohibit an individual from receiving or possessing a firearm. States can use the IFFS flag to identify disqualifying convictions in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year. States can also use the IFFS flag to identify disqualifying MCDV records, but the total number of MCDV records that states make available to the III for use during NICS checks is generally unknown. FBI officials noted that it is not possible to identify all of the domestic violence records in the III because there is no automatic process that can disaggregate these records from the 88 million other criminal records. As of October 2015, states used the IFFS flag to indicate that approximately 5 million (6 percent) of 88 million total III records were firearm disqualifying for the range of criteria, including domestic violence records.\nAccording to NICS Section and BJS officials, states predominantly make MCDV records available for NICS checks through the III versus the NICS Index. NICS officials said that they encourage states to enter criminal records into III because the records are then available for all criminal justice purposes, not just NICS checks. BJS was responsible, under the NIAA, for collecting initial state estimates of the number of MCDV records, among the other prohibiting categories, that exist at the local or originating agencies and the number of records that are or could be made available to NICS. However, in 2012, BJS decided to stop collecting state record estimates because feedback from focus groups comprised of FBI and state officials and analysis of the collected record estimates demonstrated that certain estimates were not sufficiently reliable for their intended use due to factors such as states using widely different methods to estimate the number of records.\nAccording to FBI guidance, NICS examiners and POC states can deny a firearm transfer based on a disqualifying IFFS flag after verifying that the person seeking to obtain the firearm matches with the record and reviewing the criminal record information that is returned from the NICS check without verifying that the other elements of the firearm prohibition for MCDVs were met. Officials from three of five POC states we spoke with said they will deny a firearm transfer if the IFFS flag indicates there is a firearm-disqualifying record. Officials from the other two POC states said they will conduct additional research prior to denying the firearm transfer, such as obtaining and reviewing a police report or court record, to verify that all of the prohibiting criteria are met.", "Based on our discussions with officials from eight states, DOJ, SEARCH, and NCSC, we identified two general challenges (versus challenges related to flags) that state officials most frequently cited as negatively affecting their ability to make criminal records—both felony and misdemeanor records—available to the III: (1) lack of fingerprinted arrest records, such as when law enforcement cites and then releases an individual and (2) incomplete criminal records where the arrest record does not have a final disposition. These are consistent with challenges we have previously reported.\nFingerprints not collected and cite-and-release practices: As we previously reported, incomplete or missing criminal history records can result from law enforcement officials citing and releasing individuals without formally arresting and fingerprinting them. Criminal records without fingerprints are not available in the III, and hence, these records would not be available for a NICS check. Officials from four of the eight states we contacted said their state has laws that allow law enforcement officials to issue a citation to individuals for misdemeanor crimes, including crimes that are domestic-violence related, instead of a formal, fingerprinted arrest. Officials from the remaining four states said their state has laws that require a fingerprinted arrest for misdemeanor crimes that could be related to domestic violence. Officials from two states said they are using federal grant funds, such as NCHIP or NARIP, to enter non-fingerprinted MCDV records into the NICS Index. For example, Nebraska officials are using NARIP funds to develop a court process that will automatically identify MCDV records that qualify for the federal firearm prohibition and enter these records into the NICS Index. DOJ also provides grant funds to states to purchase mobile live scan devices that digitally record and electronically transmit fingerprint images or to place live scan devices in courtrooms to help ensure that all arrests have a fingerprinted arrest record in the III. From fiscal years 2009 through 2015, DOJ provided approximately $6 million of the $95 million in NARIP grants to 13 states specifically for MCDV and protection order projects.\nCriminal history records not complete: States may face challenges in providing complete criminal records (records that have the arrest charge and the disposition of the arrest, such as conviction or acquittal), which can make it challenging to determine if an individual should be prohibited under federal law from receiving or possessing a firearm. Officials from seven of the eight states we contacted said providing complete criminal records to the III, which include felony and misdemeanor records, was a challenge. As we previously reported, DOJ has engaged in various efforts to address state challenges in providing complete criminal history records. For example, states have used NCHIP grant funds to improve the completeness of domestic violence records available to NICS by updating records that only contain arrests to include disposition information and upgrading and automating criminal history record systems to capture data on dispositions from courts and prosecutors. According to senior BJS officials, from fiscal years 2006 through 2015, DOJ provided approximately $11 million of the $137 million in NCHIP grants to states and territories specifically for protection order and MCDV projects. DOJ also helps states by sharing best practices through informational websites and reports and on-site technical assistance. For example, under a DOJ grant through the Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, the NCSC created a web-based toolkit that identifies, among other things, best practices on how to overcome disposition reporting and coordination challenges among state and local criminal justice agencies. According to DOJ officials, the toolkit was completed in April 2016.", "According to FBI data, all states; Washington, D.C.; and two territories enter protection orders to the NCIC protection order file, and 47 states; Washington, D.C.; and two territories also submit orders with the “Brady Indicator,” which flags orders related to domestic violence that prohibit the individual from receiving or possessing firearms under federal law. In 2015, approximately 334,000 (37 percent) of the 907,000 protection orders in NCIC had the Brady Indicator (see fig. 2). State participation in the NCIC protection order file is voluntary, and the extent to which states enter protection orders into the NCIC varies (see appendix III for state and territory protection order data). FBI officials said that they encourage states to enter protection orders into the NCIC protection order file rather than the NICS Index because these protection orders are then available for all criminal justice purposes, not just NICS background checks.\nAccording to FBI officials, the total number of domestic violence-related protection orders in NCIC is unknown because the only way to identify these protection orders is through the use of the Brady Indicator. States are not required to use the Brady Indicator when entering protection orders into NCIC and vary in the degree to which they voluntarily flag disqualifying protection orders. Some states have developed practices for using the Brady Indicator on protection orders. For example, Washington state officials said that the state courts and law enforcement agencies consistently use the Brady Indicator to identify firearm prohibiting protection orders. State officials developed a standardized protection order form that captures all the information needed to determine if the order qualifies for the federal firearm prohibition. Additionally, state officials offered training to court staff on how to use the form to determine the Brady Indicator setting for the protection order. Officials from one of the states we spoke with said that they do not encourage law enforcement officials to use the Brady Indicator on protection orders because of the complexity of the flag setting. The officials added that high staff turnover in the local law enforcement agencies responsible for entering the protection order information could also result in staff incorrectly flagging protection orders with the Brady Indicator.\nAccording to FBI guidance, NICS examiners and POC states can deny a firearm transfer based on a disqualifying Brady Indicator after verifying that the protection order is active without verifying that the other elements of the firearm prohibition for protection orders were met. Officials from three of five POC states we spoke with said they follow this guidance and rely on the Brady Indicator to deny firearm transfers after verifying the protection order is active without further research on whether the protection order disqualifies firearm transfers. Officials from two other states said they prefer to conduct additional research to ensure the protection order meets the criteria to prohibit a firearm transfer prior to denying a firearm transaction, such as reviewing a copy of the petition for the protection order.", "Officials from five of the eight states we spoke with said that they generally do not face challenges entering protection orders into the NCIC protection order file. Officials from the other three states said they face challenges entering protection orders to NCIC due to the NCIC entry requirements or the lack of resources and staff. For example, to enter a protection order into NCIC, the protection order must contain certain information, such as name, sex, and race, and it must include at least one numeric identifier, such as date of birth or social security number. Officials from one state said that it is not always possible to collect all the required information, and, as a result, each year the state will average approximately 1,200 to 1,400 protection orders that they cannot enter into NCIC. Officials from another state said that they lacked sufficient staff and resources to enter all protection orders that do not involve a familial relationship into NCIC. Officials from the third state said that the state and local criminal justice agencies did not have the staff and resources to respond to “hit” inquiries 24 hours a day on protection orders. As a result, only one district court in the state enters protection orders into NCIC.\nDOJ has grant programs available to states to, among other things, facilitate submitting protection orders to NCIC and also to provide judicial education on administering protection orders in domestic violence situations and handling firearm prohibitions. For example, Nebraska state officials said they used NARIP and NCHIP grant funds to develop a mechanism for law enforcement agencies to enter protection orders directly into NCIC. The officials said the portal has significantly increased the number of protection orders entered into the NCIC. States have also used NCHIP grants to validate and enter protection orders into the NICS Index. For example, Pennsylvania officials said they received a 2015 NCHIP grant award to develop a process to enter protection orders into the NICS Index that did not have all the information the FBI requires for entry into NCIC. The officials said that these protection orders currently are only available for in-state law enforcement purposes or firearm checks and entering these protection orders into the NICS Index would make them available for firearm checks outside of the state. Lastly, DOJ’s Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) offers multiple grants to state and local criminal justice agencies, victim services organizations, and other entities that address domestic violence. For example, OVW grants fund programs and staff that assist domestic violence victims in obtaining a protection order, train judges on when it is appropriate to include a firearm prohibition in a protection order, and enforce protection order conditions, such as removing firearms from the subject of the protection order.\nDOJ has engaged in other efforts to help states enter protection orders into the NCIC, such as in person and distance trainings, sharing best practices, conferences, and audits. For example, the NCSC worked with DOJ to develop an online training course for judges on how to develop protection orders under domestic violence situations. Additionally, under the direction of BJS, the NCSC and SEARCH plan to publish a series of reports describing, among other things, the challenges states face in providing NICS-related records and best practices that states have used to make these records available. BJS made available the first of these reports on mental health records in March 2016, and a BJS official said the next report on protection orders will be available by late summer 2016. FBI also conducts audits of states with access to certain FBI systems, such as NCIC, every 3 years. These audits can help improve, among other things, the accuracy and completeness of protection orders in NCIC by reviewing a sample of protection orders and comparing these protection orders against supporting documentation. For example, DOJ auditors identified a state where the NCIC protection orders did not contain all available information, and the state redesigned its existing protection order system to capture the additional information into NCIC.", "States can submit pre-validated, firearm disqualifying MCDV records and protection orders to the NICS Index for use solely during NICS checks. Pre-validated records are those that can be used to immediately deny a firearm transfer, and are notated by the use of the Brady Indicator, IFFS flag, or made available in the NICS Index. Pre-validated records expedite NICS checks because NICS examiners and POC states can automatically deny firearm transfers based on a NICS Index entry. However, the FBI encourages states to first submit MCDV records and protection orders to the III and NCIC, respectively, because these databases are used for general criminal justice purposes in addition to firearm sales. States may also enter records into the NICS Index if the respective records in the III or NCIC do not contain all the information needed to determine whether the record would prohibit a firearm transfer.", "The total number of MCDV records that states entered into the NICS Index increased from approximately 19,000 in fiscal year 2008 to approximately 97,000 in fiscal year 2015. This increase largely reflects the efforts of five states whose MCDV records made up approximately 91 percent of these records in the NICS Index in fiscal year 2015 (see fig. 3). Thirty-seven states had MCDV records in the NICS Index as of September 30, 2015, and 18 states had made available more than 100 MCDV records to the NICS Index.\nSome states have developed processes to submit pre-validated prohibiting MCDV records to the NICS Index in order to expedite NICS checks or make records available to NICS that are not available in other FBI databases, such as the III. For example, Connecticut state officials said they developed a process where court personnel identify potentially prohibiting MCDV records and then a centralized clerk validates the records as firearm-prohibiting and enters them into the NICS Index. The officials noted that the motivation to enter MCDV records into the NICS Index was to ensure that all prohibiting MCDV records were made available for NICS checks because (1) Connecticut state law allows for cite and release arrests for misdemeanor crimes and (2) the information needed to determine if the record prohibits a firearm transfer may not be available in the state primary court records or the criminal history repository. Officials from two POC states we spoke with said they entered disqualifying MCDV records into the NICS Index as they identified these records during a NICS checks in order to expedite potential future NICS checks of the same individual.", "The total number of protection orders that states entered into the NICS Index increased from approximately 700 in fiscal year 2008 to approximately 55,000 in fiscal year 2015. This increase in protection orders predominantly reflects the effort of one state. Specifically, approximately 47,000 (85 percent) of the approximately 55,000 records were due to New York’s efforts to enter protection orders into the NICS Index starting in fiscal year 2014 (see fig. 4). New York state officials said they used federal grant funding to develop an automatic process that uses protection order information collected by court clerks to identify disqualifying protection orders and then enter these records into the NICS Index and the NCIC. Officials said the motivation for this process is to ensure that all disqualifying protection orders are available for NICS checks and to facilitate and expedite the NICS check process. In total, 23 states had protection orders in the NICS Index as of September 30, 2015.", "", "FBI data show that about 70 percent of NICS checks involving prohibiting MCDV records were denied within 3 business days. Specifically, about 41,000 of the approximately 59,000 MCDV denials from fiscal years 2006 through 2015 were denied within 3 business days, with the remaining 18,000 transactions (30 percent) denied after 3 business days. No other category had more than 20 percent of its denials delayed beyond 3 business days. FBI data also show that about 28,000 (94 percent) of the approximately 30,000 domestic violence protection order denials from fiscal years 2006 through 2015 were denied within 3 business days, with the remaining 2,000 transactions (6 percent) denied after 3 business days (see fig. 5).\nAccording to our analysis of FBI data, denial determinations for checks involving MCDV records also took longer than checks for other prohibited categories. For example, while the FBI denied 70 percent of MCDV- related checks within 3 business days, it took the Bureau 9 business days to determine 90 percent of all MCDV denials from fiscal years 2006 through 2015. As a comparison, it took the FBI 3 business days to determine 90 percent of criminal conviction denials during the same time period (see fig. 6).\nOur analysis of FBI data also found that the number of business days needed to complete 90 percent of MCDV denials has improved over time—decreasing from 12 days in fiscal year 2006 to 7 days in fiscal year 2015 (see fig. 7). Other prohibiting categories also required fewer business days to complete 90 percent of denials over time. For example, criminal convictions decreased from 5 business days in fiscal year 2006 to 2 business days in fiscal year 2015. FBI officials were not aware of what actions have contributed to the reduced number of days to reach denial determinations.\nIn addition, NICS examiners were not able to complete many checks initiated by the NICS Section before the FBI was required to stop investigating and purge information related to the transactions from NICS. The FBI is required to purge information related to unresolved NICS checks within 90 days after the check was initiated. According to FBI officials, the FBI purges unresolved NICS checks after 88 days to ensure that they comply with the regulation. Our analysis of FBI data show that 171,994 (2.1 percent) of the 8,256,688 checks that the FBI initiated in 2014 had no proceed or denial determination made by the FBI within 88 days. According to FBI officials, these cases were categorized as unresolved and the FBI does not track the outcomes of these cases. Our analysis indicates that if the 2014 denial rates of NICS checks involving domestic violence records applied to these unresolved checks, approximately 1,930 would have been denied during 2014 for all categories, of which about 130 because of a MCDV record and about 56 because of a protection order. FBI officials said they do not identify or track information on unresolved checks—such as the possible prohibiting offense that led to the check needing additional review or the reason a determination was not made—due to system limitations and multiple prohibiting categories being researched. The officials told us that because they use all available resources to make a final determination, it is unclear to them if tracking additional information could help reduce the number of unresolved checks. For example, they noted that, in accordance with some states’ records management practices, some records they would need to complete the checks are no longer available and have been destroyed.", "According to FBI data, more than 500 firearms were transferred to individuals with prohibiting MCDV records or prohibiting protection orders each year from fiscal years 2006 through 2015—about 6,700 total transfers—because the FBI denial determination was made after 3 business days, which resulted in the FBI referring these cases to ATF for firearm retrieval. Under federal law, firearm dealers may transfer a firearm to an individual if the dealer has not received a response from the NICS Section after 3 business days. In cases where a proceed or denial determination cannot be made within 3 business days, NICS examiners continue to conduct research to determine whether an individual is eligible for a firearm. The officials added that the NICS Section is to refer any firearm transactions that they deny after 3 business days—known as a delayed denial—to ATF for firearm retrieval if the NICS examiner determines that the dealer has already transferred the firearm to the individual.\nFBI data show that the FBI referred a total of 6,221 MCDV delayed denials and 559 protection order delayed denials to ATF for potential firearm retrieval from fiscal years 2006 through 2015 because individuals with prohibiting domestic violence records acquired a firearm. During the same period, according to FBI data, the number of NICS checks the FBI processed increased from about 5.2 million checks in fiscal year 2006 to about 9 million checks in fiscal year 2015. Also, from fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the number of FBI referrals to ATF related to domestic violence declined from more than 1,200 to about 550 and remained between 520 and 670 through fiscal year 2015 (see fig. 8). FBI officials were not able to explain how the number of referrals to ATF has remained relatively constant since fiscal year 2008 while the number of NICS checks increased. The FBI was not able to specifically identify the cause of the decline in firearm transfer referrals to ATF from 2006 to 2008, but noted that a change in the NICS process could account for the initial decline.", "", "Officials from the NICS Section said that it can be difficult to determine the outcome of a NICS check—proceed or denied—when a prohibiting category has multiple criteria that must be met in order to prohibit a firearm transfer. As previously discussed, in order to deny a firearm transfer for the MCDV and protection order prohibiting categories, multiple criteria must be met, including the element of force, the relationship between the offender and victim, and due process. Another challenge is that states differ on the criminal offenses that can be considered an MCDV. For example, some states have assault, battery, or disturbing the peace offenses while other states have specific domestic violence offenses.\nOfficials from the NICS Section and POC states we contacted said that it may take more than 3 business days to complete checks that involve multiple criteria in part because of the required coordination with local agencies to obtain information related to the criteria. Officials from one POC state noted that communication and document retrieval can sometimes take a week or longer to obtain the necessary information to make a determination. State officials said it often takes time to identify which office or agency to contact in order to gain access to the necessary information. Examiners from three POC states we contacted said it can be difficult to get the necessary information in a timely manner. Also, according to officials from two states, some local agencies charge a fee for copies of documents which they said can inhibit accessing necessary information to make a determination. Officials from three states we spoke with also said they face particular challenges retrieving older criminal records because they are not electronic or have been purged from state criminal record repositories.", "Officials from the eight states we contacted identified some actions they have taken to address challenges to completing checks before firearm transfers occur.\nPre-validating prohibiting domestic violence records: Officials from six of the eight states we spoke with have established processes to proactively identify or pre-validate prohibiting domestic violence records to help get checks completed faster. Pre-validated records are those that can be used to immediately deny a firearm transfer, and are notated by the use of the Brady Indicator, IFFS flag, or made available in the NICS Index. For example,\nConnecticut officials said they have developed a process in which potentially prohibiting MCDV records are identified, independently validated, and then entered into the NICS Index. The officials told us this effort was to help ensure that all prohibiting MCDV records were made available for NICS checks.\nNew York officials said they identify federal and state prohibiting MCDVs using a text banner that explicitly states that an individual is prohibited from purchasing a firearm on their criminal history records. The officials said they have also utilized federal grant funds to develop a calculation process to identify firearm prohibiting protection orders to make them available in the NICS Index.\nPennsylvania officials said they use the IFFS flag to indicate when an arresting charge is a firearm disqualifier. Pennsylvania also uses an automated process that includes identifying the relationship between the victim and offender to apply the Brady Indicator to prohibiting protection orders.\nNebraska officials said they use a system for NCIC protection order entries to assist in identifying firearm-prohibiting criteria, which is verified and supplemented by law enforcement officials. The system then applies the Brady Indicator based on criteria provided to the system.\nNew Mexico officials said they report relevant court records to the NICS Index and use a computer query program to identify MCDV records and protection orders that should be included.\nWashington state officials said they use the Brady Indicator to flag prohibiting domestic violence protection orders entered into the NCIC protection order file.\nAllowing additional time to complete checks before firearm transfers: Three of our eight sample states have passed laws that allow additional time to complete checks (for all prohibiting categories) before a firearm is transferred. Specifically, Washington law provides for 10 business days to complete a NICS check. Washington examiners said that the additional time is necessary to identify prohibiting criteria and to make a determination if an individual is prohibited. Pennsylvania law requires a 48 hour mandatory wait period before a firearm can be transferred even when a background check is completed within 3 business days and provides for a temporary delay of a firearm transfer if there is a potential prohibiting MCDV record to allow for obtaining all information necessary to make an accurate determination. Pennsylvania officials noted that the temporary delay can be extended indefinitely to prevent a firearm transfer to an individual prohibited due to a domestic violence record. Connecticut law allows up to 60 days to conduct a NICS check for an eligibility certificate, which is required to purchase a firearm in the state and an eligibility certificate is not issued if a final determination of eligibility cannot be made.\nOther actions taken to help complete checks before firearm transfers occur: According to Texas officials, Texas references state statutes on all criminal records that are submitted to the FBI. The officials said this allows examiners to more quickly identify prohibiting crimes and make accurate determinations. Some POC states, such as Washington and Nevada, enter records into the NICS Index after state officials have researched and identified a prohibiting record in order to expedite future checks involving the same individual. In addition to state actions, the NICS Section adds records to the NICS Index when prohibiting criteria are identified and the information is unable to be updated in III or NCIC.", "DOJ has also taken actions to help make timely determinations of NICS checks, including providing grants to states to improve records. To help ensure accurate determinations, DOJ conducts a secondary review of denial determinations, and established an appeal process for individuals who believe they were wrongfully denied the ability to purchase a firearm.\nGrants: As previously mentioned, DOJ provides NCHIP and NARIP grant funds to states to improve general record availability and to better ensure that arrest records and corresponding court dispositions are available for NICS checks. According to DOJ guidance for grant applications, gaps in records significantly hinder the ability of NICS to quickly and accurately confirm whether a prospective purchaser is prohibited from acquiring a firearm. Officials from BJS, the agency responsible for soliciting grant proposals and issuing funds, said that, to the extent possible, they work closely with the FBI to ensure projects are addressing challenges related to prohibited categories. For example, states can use grant funds to help make more records available for use in NICS checks. Officials from one state we spoke with, New York, said they utilized federal grant funds to help make more records available in the NICS Index, thereby addressing gaps in records from the state.\nSecondary review of denial determinations: ATF, within DOJ, is responsible for reviewing denied firearm transactions. Specifically, ATF reviews all delayed denial referrals it receives from the FBI, after the FBI has reviewed the case and made the determination that a firearm was transferred to a prohibited individual. According to ATF officials, when the FBI makes a delayed denial determination and refers a case to ATF for retrieval, ATF reviews the referrals to determine whether the denial is valid and a retrieval action is necessary. ATF’s process helps ensure that prohibited individuals do not retain possession of a firearm. ATF officials said they sometimes find that the firearm was not transferred, or that the denied individual should have been allowed to purchase the firearm. According to our analysis of ATF data, ATF referred about 76 percent of domestic violence-related delayed denials to its field offices for retrieval actions from October 1, 2006, through July 13, 2015. ATF determined through its review process that the remaining 24 percent of referrals did not need to be sent to the field for retrieval because the firearm was not transferred, the firearm was returned to the dealer without ATF intervention, or the denial was overturned.\nAppeals: DOJ has a process for individuals to appeal a decision when they are denied a firearm. According to FBI data, from fiscal years 2006 through 2015, the FBI received about 188,000 total appeals. The data also show that about 35,000 of those denial determinations were overturned on appeal.", "DOJ and the FBI have taken steps to help improve the timely completion of NICS checks but have not established procedures to assess or monitor how long it takes to complete checks for each prohibiting category, which could help inform FBI and other DOJ entities on which areas they should prioritize resources, such as grant funding and training. Specifically, the FBI and other DOJ entities have identified some state practices that could help improve the timely completion of NICS checks. In addition, DOJ issues grants to states in order to help make more records readily available during NICS checks and reduce the time needed to conduct research and make final determinations. BJS officials responsible for administering grants noted that they work with the NICS Section to the extent possible to coordinate and prioritize grant funding. FBI officials also said that they are in the process of changing how they manage the receipt of information from states, such as dispositions and incident reports, in an effort to reduce the amount of time necessary to complete NICS checks.\nHowever, the FBI does not assess or monitor how long it takes to complete checks for each prohibiting category. According to NICS Section officials, an analysis of denial data would not affect how the FBI conducts checks because the time required to make determinations (i.e., proceed or denial) is dependent on the availability of information supplied by states. BJS officials noted that an analysis of the time required to complete checks for each prohibiting category could help them identify areas in which they could conduct state outreach and assist states in providing more complete records, such as through the use of grant funding.\nOur analysis of FBI denial data shows that completing NICS checks involving certain prohibiting categories, including those we focused on for this report—MCDV and protection orders—present challenges. Specifically, more than 500 firearms were transferred to individuals with prohibiting domestic violence records each year from 2006 through 2015. Our analysis also found that the time needed to complete checks involving domestic violence records declined between fiscal years 2006 and 2015, but DOJ and FBI officials were not able to identify what actions they may have taken that contributed to the improvement.\nThe mission of the NICS Section is to enhance national security and public safety by providing the timely and accurate determination of a person’s eligibility to possess firearms in accordance with federal law. However, as discussed previously, some NICS checks are delayed and denied after the firearm has already been transferred to the prohibited individual because information necessary to complete a background check prior to a firearm transfer is not immediately available and additional research must be conducted. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that internal control monitoring should assess the quality of performance over time and ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. Monitoring is to be performed continually and ingrained in the agency’s operations, and managers are to evaluate findings to determine if any corrective actions are needed. Ongoing monitoring or analysis similar to the analysis we conducted could help the FBI determine if specific prohibiting categories present greater challenges in completing determinations than other categories and, in turn, the FBI could use the results and provide them to other DOJ entities to help establish priorities. For example, BJS could use the results of the FBI’s analysis to help prioritize grants to states or focus state training and outreach to address challenges with specific prohibiting categories, among other actions.", "Sustained federal and state efforts to support NICS background checks are critical in helping to ensure public safety. The national system of criminal background checks relies first and foremost on the efforts of state and local governments to provide complete and accurate records to the FBI. State and local governments often rely on DOJ’s guidance, grants, and identification of practices that can help mitigate challenges in conducting background checks. DOJ has steps in place to reduce the risk of erroneously denying individuals from possessing firearms and an appeals process for individuals who believe they were wrongfully denied the ability to possess a firearm. However, because it has not assessed its data to identify which prohibiting categories result in more delayed denials and firearm transfers to prohibited individuals, the agency cannot reasonably ensure it has effectively prioritized resources and tools to assist states in providing more complete and accurate records for those categories.", "To help the NICS Section achieve its mission to enhance national security and public safety by providing the timely and accurate determination of a person’s eligibility to possess firearms, we recommend that the Director of the FBI monitor NICS check outcomes for specific categories of prohibited individuals to assess timeliness and provide this information to other DOJ entities for use in establishing priorities and tools to assist states in submitting more complete records for use during NICS checks.", "We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOJ. DOJ provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV. DOJ agreed with our recommendation.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.", "To describe the extent to which states identify domestic violence records for use during National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) checks, we analyzed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data on the number of domestic violence records that states identified and made available to NICS, including those protection orders flagged with the Brady Indicator, provided by states and territories from 2006 through 2015. We selected this time frame in order to have a sufficient length of time to identify trends in the number of records available to NICS. To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned knowledgeable officials about the data and the systems that produced the data, reviewed relevant documentation, and examined the data for obvious errors. We determined that some of the data were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. Specifically, we did not report the Identification for Firearms Sales (IFFS) flag data from 2006 through 2014 due to inaccurate flag settings and the lack of controls on who could modify the flag settings. These issues were corrected for 2015, so we determined that the 2015 IFFS flag data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.\nWe were not able to identify all of the domestic violence records that states have made available to the FBI because of challenges in disaggregating some of these records from other criminal history records, but to the extent possible we took steps to identify trends in the data. We analyzed, on a more limited basis, the number of records that each state had made available regarding other prohibiting categories, such as mental health records, to provide context for trends we identified related to domestic violence records. We also analyzed the last 3 years of FBI state audit findings to report on general challenges states face with respect to the accuracy, validity, and completeness of domestic violence records. Additionally, we analyzed U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Criminal History Improvement Program and NICS Act Record Improvement Program grant solicitations and award amounts to identify prioritization and trends in the grant award decisions.\nIn addition, we interviewed officials from eight selected states (Connecticut, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington) to gain an understanding of their processes for submitting domestic violence records to the FBI and the extent to which they have encountered challenges, if any, in submitting records. We selected this non-generalizable sample of states to reflect a range of factors, including five point of contact (POC) states and three non-POC states, the number of domestic violence records they currently make available to the FBI and whether they have received grant funding to improve their record submissions. Additionally, we interviewed groups with an interest in, among other things, individuals with a history of domestic violence and firearm background checks, including Everytown for Gun Safety, the National Rifle Association, and the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, SEARCH—the National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics—and the National Center for State Courts. Finally, we interviewed officials from various DOJ components with responsibility for maintaining NICS records or supporting related activities, including the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division and NICS Section, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to obtain additional perspectives on the records states provide for use during NICS checks.\nTo determine the extent to which NICS checks involving domestic violence records are completed before firearm transfers take place, we analyzed DOJ documentation and data to identify trends in total number of NICS checks, denials, delayed denials, firearm retrievals, and days required to determine the outcome of a check. Specifically, we obtained record level FBI data on NICS check denials and delayed denials— 798,401 records from fiscal years 2006 through 2015—and analyzed NICS transaction dates, denial codes, prohibiting categories, and other information to identify the length of time it took examiners to make a denial determination, by year and by prohibiting category. We did not analyze record level data on proceeded NICS checks because FBI is required to purge all identifying information related to the NICS transaction.\nTo illustrate variation in the amount of time denials in different prohibiting categories took, we compared the number of business days taken to complete 90 percent of denials by category. For most prohibiting categories, once 90 percent of denials were completed, the percentage completed each subsequent day was diminishingly small. Specifically, after most prohibiting categories reached a 90 percent denial rate, the rate increased by less than 2 percent each day. We also obtained data from ATF and the FBI on retrieval referrals and appeals by individuals denied a firearm for fiscal years 2006 through 2015 and analyzed these data to identify trends in NICS checks appeals. To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned knowledgeable officials about their information collection procedures and systems, reviewed relevant documentation, and examined data for obvious errors. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.\nTo determine whether challenges exist that may increase the time it takes to complete a NICS check, we analyzed testimony from DOJ and the selected states regarding characteristics of domestic violence records that can present challenges and lead to checks exceeding the federally allowed 3 business days before a firearm can be transferred. We also obtained documentation and testimony from DOJ and selected states regarding federal and state efforts to increase the number of checks completed before firearms are transferred, including grant awards and training to states. We also interviewed DOJ management and program officials to determine DOJ’s efforts to help NICS and states overcome challenges that could contribute to delayed denials, including guidance, training, and actions to share best practices. We analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from ATF about its efforts to review delayed denial cases prior to initiating a firearm retrieval, challenges it faced, and actions that could minimize the number of retrieval efforts. Finally, we compared DOJ’s actions to monitor the outcomes of the checks and use the results to establish and manage program priorities against criteria outlined in federal internal control standards.\nWe conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to July 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "Appendix II: State Options for Conducting Background Checks Using the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS)\nStates have three options for conducting NICS checks, referred to as non-point of contact (non-POC), full point of contact (full-POC), and partial-POC states. In non-POC states, Federal Firearm Licensees initiate a NICS check by contacting the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) NICS directly by telephone or via the Internet and any required follow-up research is performed by NICS Section staff. In full-POC states, Federal Firearms Licensees initiate a NICS check by contacting one or more state organizations, such as a state or local law enforcement agency, to query NICS databases and related state files and then, if necessary, the state organization carries out any required follow-up research. In partial POC states, Federal Firearm Licensees initiate a NICS check for handgun purchases or permits by contacting the state who then queries NICS and state files but contacts the NICS to initiate checks for long gun purchases, such as shot guns or rifles.\nAccording to the DOJ-funded report, states elect POC or non-POC status for various reasons, such as a state’s attitude toward gun ownership, since many POC states have prohibiting legislation that is stricter than federal regulations. For example, Oregon has five statutorily prohibiting categories of misdemeanor convictions in addition to domestic violence. Additionally, there may be an economic incentive for states to elect non- POC status, since implementing and operating a POC may cost a state more money than it can collect in fees charged to Federal Firearm Licensees for conducting background checks. For example, DOJ reported that Idaho elected not to become a full-POC state because of the added expense of performing background checks for long gun purchases.", "", "", "", "Legend: Total = Total protection orders active during the year Brady = Total protection orders with a disqualifying Brady Indicator. The Brady Indicator flags protection orders related to domestic violence that prohibit the individual from receiving or possessing firearms under federal law.", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above Eric Erdman, Assistant Director, and Andrew Curry, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Winchee Lin, John Hocker, Billy Commons, Dominick M. Dale, Michele C. Fejfar, Eric D. Hauswirth, and John Yee made significant contributions to the work." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h3_title", "h3_full", "", "", "h0_title", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h2_full", "h3_full h1_full", "h2_title", "", "", "h2_full", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "", "h0_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How do states differ in their domestic violence records?", "How do these records affect one's ability to purchase a firearm?", "What is the relationship between domestic violence records and NICS checks?", "What does FBI data show about NCIS checks?", "What happened when these indviiduals had prohbiting domestic violence records?", "How might the speed of FBI response affect these firearm transfers?", "How does the FBI's completion of denials differ between those involving MCDV convictions and those involving domestic violence protection orders?", "To what extent are domestic violence records available in NICS databases?", "How has DOJ taken steps to improve NICS?", "How could the FBI work together with DOJ in improving these systems?", "What is NICS used for?", "What kinds of people might be prohibited from possessing firearms?", "In what situation might a firearm dealer be able to transfer a firearm to an individual without FBI input?" ], "summary": [ "Most of the 50 states submit domestic violence records—misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV) convictions and domestic violence protection orders—to the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for use during National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) checks, but states vary in their efforts to identify (“flag”) such records that prohibit an individual from obtaining a firearm under federal law. The total number of prohibiting domestic violence records that states submit to the FBI is generally unknown because states are not required to flag prohibiting records and there is no automated process to disaggregate such records from other records checked by NICS.", "For example, in 2015, 22 states voluntarily participated in a program to identify criminal history records that prohibit individuals from obtaining firearms, which can include domestic violence records. FBI data also show that 47 states identified domestic violence protection orders that prohibit firearm purchases.", "Since not all domestic violence records that states submit to the FBI meet federal prohibiting criteria, flagging prohibiting records can help expedite NICS checks.", "For fiscal years 2006 to 2015, FBI data show that most NICS checks involving domestic violence records that resulted in denials were completed before firearm transfers took place (see table).", "However, about 6,700 firearms were transferred to individuals with prohibiting domestic violence records, which resulted in the FBI referring these cases to DOJ's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives for firearm retrieval.", "Under federal law, firearm dealers may (but are not required to) transfer a firearm to an individual if the dealer has not received a response (proceed or denial) from the FBI after 3 business days.", "FBI data also show that during fiscal year 2015, the FBI completed 90 percent of denials that involved MCDV convictions within 7 business days, which was longer than for any other prohibiting category (e.g., felony convictions). The FBI completed 90 percent of denials that involved domestic violence protection orders in fewer than 3 business days.", "According to federal and selected state officials GAO contacted, the information needed to determine whether domestic violence records—and in particular MCDV convictions—meet the criteria to prohibit a firearm transfer is not always readily available in NICS databases and can require additional outreach to state agencies to obtain information.", "DOJ has taken steps to help states make prohibiting information more readily available to NICS—such as through training and grant programs—but does not monitor the timeliness of checks that result in denials by prohibiting category.", "Ongoing monitoring could help the FBI determine if specific prohibiting categories present greater challenges in making determinations than other categories and, in turn, the FBI could provide the results to other DOJ entities to help them establish priorities, such as for grants, state outreach, or training.", "The FBI and designated state and local criminal justice agencies use the FBI's NICS to conduct background checks on individuals seeking to obtain firearms.", "Persons prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms include individuals who have domestic violence records that meet federal disqualifying criteria.", "Under federal law, firearm dealers may transfer a firearm to an individual if the FBI has not made a proceed or denial determination within 3 business days." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 0, 0, 0 ] }
CRS_R45516	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Program Overview", "Credit Assistance Process", "Subsidy Cost", "Program Funding", "Projects Financed", "Issues for Congress", "Funding", "Calculation of Subsidy Cost", "Federal Share", "Federal Share for Major Public Transportation Capital Projects", "Speed of Administrative Decisionmaking", "Broadening Eligible Uses of TIFIA Loans" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program provides long-term, low-interest loans and other types of credit assistance for the construction of surface transportation projects. The TIFIA prog ram, administered by the Build America Bureau of the Department of Transportation (DOT), was reauthorized most recently in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act ( P.L. 114-94 ) from FY2016 through FY2020. Direct funding for the TIFIA program to make loans is authorized at $300 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020, but state departments of transportation can also use federal-aid highway grant money, both formula and discretionary, to subsidize much larger loans.\nThe primary goal of the TIFIA program, historically, has been to enable the construction of large-scale surface transportation projects by providing low-interest, long-term financing to complement state, local, and private investment. The TIFIA program has been one of the main ways in which the federal government has encouraged the development of public-private partnerships (P3s) and private financing in surface transportation often backed by new, but sometimes uncertain, revenue sources such as highway tolls, other types of user charges, and incremental real estate taxes. Since its enactment in 1998 as part of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178 ) through FY2018, the TIFIA program has provided assistance of $32 billion to 74 projects with a total cost of about $117 billion (in FY2018 inflation-adjusted dollars).\nCongress has used the TIFIA program as a model for other initiatives, notably the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) program, administered by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers. Several recent proposals would expand TIFIA assistance. For example, the Trump Administration's $200 billion infrastructure plan, based on leveraging state, local, and private resources, proposed adding several billion dollars of budget authority for TIFIA and expanding eligibility to ports and airports. The experience of TIFIA over the past decade shows, however, that there are limits to financing projects in this way. These limits include the number of projects that can take advantage of credit assistance, the difficulties of developing revenue mechanisms to service loans, the typical need for grant funding to make up a portion of the capital, and the difficulties of attracting private investment to risky projects, particularly those for which demand is uncertain or hard to predict.", "Credit assistance provided by the TIFIA program can be in the form of loans, loan guarantees, and lines of credit. To date, all TIFIA assistance except one loan guarantee has been in the form of loans. Loans and loan guarantees can be provided up to a maximum of 49% of project costs; lines of credit can be for an amount up to a maximum of 33% of project costs. Despite the higher limit established in law, DOT has generally limited loans and loan guarantees to no more than 33% of project costs, so as \"to ensure that the DOT shares the credit risk with other participants.\"\nProjects eligible for TIFIA assistance include highways and bridges, public transportation, transit-oriented development, intercity passenger bus and rail, intermodal connectors, intermodal freight facilities, and the capitalization of a rural projects fund. Eligible applicants for TIFIA assistance include state and local governments, railroad companies (including Amtrak), transit agencies, and private entities.\nSurface transportation projects are not evaluated for TIFIA assistance based on their projected benefits and costs. Instead, projects are assessed on creditworthiness, the ability of borrowers to repay their loans, and a number of other eligibility criteria. To be judged creditworthy, a project's senior debt obligations and the borrower's ability to repay the federal credit instrument must receive investment-grade ratings from at least one, but typically two, nationally recognized credit rating agencies. Generally, a project must cost $50 million or more to be eligible for assistance, but the threshold is $15 million for intelligent transportation system projects and $10 million for transit-oriented development projects, rural projects, and local projects. Another requirement is that loans must be repaid with a dedicated revenue stream, typically a project-related user fee, such as a toll, but sometimes dedicated tax revenue.\nThe attractiveness of TIFIA financing is its low cost, its flexibility, and its long duration, features that are hard to match in the private capital market. Federal credit assistance provides funds at a low fixed rate, the Treasury rate for a similar maturity; for rural infrastructure projects, federal assistance is provided at half the Treasury rate. Loans are available for up to 35 years from the date of substantial completion of a project. Repayments can be deferred for up to five years after substantial completion, and amortization can be flexible. In some circumstances, TIFIA can reduce the transaction costs of borrowing, which for tax-exempt bonds typically include underwriter fees, bond counsel expenses, and the cost of borrowing funds before they are needed (known as \"negative carry\"). The Riverside County Transportation Commission in California is using TIFIA financing to build the I-15 Tolled Express Lanes Project, and has estimated that using traditional bond financing in lieu of a $150 million TIFIA loan would have cost an additional $25 million for the $471 million project.\nThe characteristics of TIFIA financing can make it easier for project sponsors to attract the less patient and less flexible capital that is typically offered in the private market. This is especially important for projects like new toll roads, for which usage and revenue may take several years to grow to cover debt repayment. TIFIA financing is available with a senior or subordinate lien, but is typically used as subordinate debt, meaning it is in line to be repaid after the project's operational expenses and senior debt obligations. However, the TIFIA statute includes a provision which requires that in the event of a project bankruptcy, the federal government will be made equal with senior debt holders. This is referred to as the \"springing lien,\" and has led some to ask whether TIFIA financing is truly subordinate. The springing lien issue notwithstanding, TIFIA financing is generally thought to reduce project risk, thereby helping to secure private financing at rates lower than would otherwise be available.\nFinancing projects instead of relying on pay-as-you go funding can mean such projects can be constructed years earlier than otherwise. TIFIA, therefore, is a means to accelerate project delivery and the benefits that flow from new infrastructure. Because of its advantages in terms of cost and flexibility, TIFIA may increase the number of projects that can be financed and thus provided on an accelerated schedule. In its 2016 report to Congress, DOT cited the example of managed lanes on U.S. 36 connecting Boulder and Denver, CO, a project it says was delivered 20 years earlier than anticipated because of TIFIA assistance.", "Applications for credit assistance to DOT are accepted at any time. Formal acceptance into the program for evaluation follows a letter of interest from the project sponsor in a format prescribed by DOT. However, DOT recommends that project sponsors contact DOT much earlier for technical assistance to discuss and develop an application. This can involve an emerging project agreement between DOT and the project sponsor.\nAcceptance into the TIFIA program requires a fee of $250,000 that is used to cover the costs of DOT's outside financial and legal advice. Additional amounts may be necessary if DOT's costs exceed $250,000. DOT notes that fees for a single project are typically between $400,000 and $700,000. For projects with estimated costs of less than $75 million, DOT is permitted to draw on federal funds to cover its costs, up to a total of $2 million annually, rather than charging fees to prospective borrowers.\nPrior to submitting a formal application for credit assistance, DOT will review the letter of interest, the independent financial analysis, and any other supporting material. A key element of this review is an analysis of the creditworthiness of the project sponsor and the quality of the revenue pledged to repay the federal government. DOT also requires an oral presentation by the project sponsor. If these are satisfactory, DOT will invite the project sponsor to submit a formal application. The statute requires DOT to determine within 30 days whether the application is complete or whether additional material needs to be submitted. Within 60 days of that determination, DOT must inform the applicant whether the application has been approved or not. DOT staff make a recommendation to the DOT Council on Credit and Finance, with the Secretary of Transportation making the final decision.\nIn addition to the regular credit assistance process, the FAST Act required DOT to create an expedited application process for low-risk projects. These are defined as projects requesting $100 million or less in credit assistance, with a dedicated revenue stream unrelated to project performance (e.g., a dedicated sales tax) and standard loan terms.\nLike highway and public transportation projects that receive federal grants, projects financed under TIFIA are subject to laws and regulations concerning planning requirements; review and mitigation of environmental effects; the use of domestic iron, steel, and manufactured goods; and payment of prevailing wages. For example, projects must comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) regarding the effects of the project on the human and natural environment. Typically, the NEPA analysis must be well advanced before a letter of interest is submitted. A TIFIA loan or other credit assistance will not be made until a final NEPA decision has been issued.\nThe process for securing assistance has been praised for being predictable, but it has also been criticized for being slow and bureaucratic. For example, an official of Transurban, an Australia-based operator of toll roads, told Congress that the company did not pursue a TIFIA loan for the I-395 high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes in Virginia, in part because of the slowness of the approval process. There has also been criticism that the TIFIA program office has become more risk-averse, favoring low-risk projects that might be able to obtain financing from conventional sources.", "Credit programs like TIFIA are governed by the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) of 1990. Under FCRA, the cost to the federal government of a credit program is the administrative cost plus the subsidy cost of the credit assistance. According to FCRA, the subsidy cost is \"the estimated long-term cost to the government of a direct loan or a loan guarantee ... calculated on a net present value basis.\" The subsidy cost estimate takes into account potential losses to the government resulting from loan defaults. Budget authority is typically provided to cover subsidy and administrative costs of a credit program. Costs of the TIFIA program are met by funding from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) authorized by the FAST Act.\nWhen a loan is made, the subsidy cost amount is taken from the available budget authority and added to money borrowed from the Treasury to make the loan. When the principal and interest are repaid by the borrower, money is transferred back to the Treasury. Budgeting for credit programs is done for a cohort of loans, which is a group of loans funded by one fiscal year's appropriation. If the subsidy cost estimate proves correct, the cost to the government, outside of the budget authority already provided, will be zero.\nThe amount of credit assistance available to borrowers from an amount of budget authority is determined by the subsidy rate after administrative costs are subtracted. The subsidy rate is the subsidy cost as a percentage of the dollars disbursed. As an example, if administrative costs are ignored, for every $100 of budget authority at a subsidy rate of 10%, the federal government can loan out $1,000 because it expects to eventually receive back $900 calculated in today's dollars. The budget authority covers the subsidy cost, which in this case is $100. As the subsidy rate declines, the government can provide more credit assistance because it expects a greater amount to be repaid by borrowers. With a subsidy rate of 5%, the TIFIA program could lend $2,000 for every $100 of budget authority ($100/5% = $2,000).\nForecasts of the cost of credit assistance necessarily rely on estimates of the interest rate (a Treasury bond with the same maturity as the loan), the repayment of loans, and the rate of defaults. Because conditions can change, agencies must reestimate the subsidy rate periodically, generally annually, for outstanding loans and loan guarantees. These reestimates appear in the Federal Credit Supplement published in the President's annual budget submission. Estimates and reestimates of the TIFIA subsidy rate are done by DOT in cooperation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The subsidy rate and its reestimation provide information about the level of risk being undertaken by DOT and the subsequent performance of TIFIA-assisted projects. A single subsidy rate is calculated for all loans originated in a given fiscal year.\nThe original subsidy rate for TIFIA loans originated in fiscal years with loans still outstanding ranges from 15.16% to 3.36%. The subsidy rate for FY2019 is estimated to be 6.3%. Current reestimates of these original subsidy rates range from -8.06% to 46.12%. The subsidy rate is negative when the government expects to receive repayments greater than the amount of loans, on a net present value basis. The increased (+) or decreased (-) cost to the government of these reestimates is reflected in the net lifetime reestimate amount ( Table 1 ).\nBased on the subsidy rate, the cost to the government has been approximately 7 cents for every dollar financed, according to DOT. However, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) notes that this does not take into account the market value of the financial risk to which taxpayers are exposed by federal credit programs such as TIFIA. CBO estimates that including this financial risk the TIFIA program costs 33 cents for every dollar financed.", "The FAST Act authorized $275 million for the TIFIA program in each of FY2016 and FY2017, $285 million in FY2018, and $300 million in each of FY2019 and FY2020. These amounts are much lower than those authorized in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ), which greatly enlarged the TIFIA program ( Figure 1 ). Seen in isolation, this reduced DOT's capacity to issue loans by approximately $7.25 billion in FY2016, assuming a 10% subsidy rate and excluding administrative costs.\nHowever, the FAST Act also allows states to use funds from three other highway programs to pay for the subsidy and administrative costs of credit assistance: the discretionary Nationally Significant Freight and Highway Projects Program, known as INFRA grants; the formula National Highway Performance Program; and the formula Surface Transportation Block Grant Program. This use of grant funds has the potential to increase TIFIA financing much above the direct authorization, but at the discretion of state departments of transportation. Payment of the TIFIA subsidy cost has also been allowed as part of the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) Transportation Discretionary Grants program (formerly TIGER program).\nAlthough direct funding for the TIFIA program was reduced in the FAST Act, DOT has not been limited in providing credit assistance. Funding for the TIFIA program is available until expended, and thus unused money accumulates from year to year. Unobligated budget authority in the TIFIA program was $1.65 billion at the end of FY2018, according to DOT. This amount has accumulated despite a clawback provision in MAP-21 that reduced TIFIA's budget authority by $640 million. The clawback provision was subsequently abolished in the FAST Act, presumably because of the reduction in the TIFIA program's authorization.", "Except for one loan guarantee, every credit agreement under the TIFIA program to date has been a loan. Through FY2018, TIFIA had provided loans worth about $32 billion (in FY2018 inflation-adjusted dollars). The overall cost of the 74 projects supported by TIFIA loans is estimated to be $117 billion (FY2018 dollars). The average project cost is about $1.5 billion and the average loan amount $430 million (both in FY2018 dollars). Consequently, the average TIFIA share of project costs has been about 28%. Over the 20-year history of the program, the average number of loans has been about four per year, worth about $1.6 billion (FY2018 dollars). The enlargement of the TIFIA program in FY2013 led to an increase in lending, but much of that occurred in a single year, FY2014 ( Figure 2 ).\nAbout two-thirds of TIFIA loans have gone to highway and highway bridge projects and another quarter to public transportation. Two loans (3%) have gone to railroad projects and another five (7%) to other surface transportation projects, including a combined parking and public transportation facility at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago.\nTIFIA assistance has been geographically limited, with projects in 21 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico receiving financing. Ten states account for about 80% of the 74 projects supported. These are California, Texas, Virginia, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Washington, New York, North Carolina, and Maryland.\nUser charges, including highway tolls, are the revenue pledge most often made by borrowers, accounting for half of the projects. Various taxes, particularly sales taxes, and general revenues make up most of the other half of project revenue pledges.\nAt the time of DOT's most recent report to Congress on TIFIA, issued in August 2016, 86% of TIFIA loans were performing as expected, 8% were exceeding expectations, and 6% were performing below expectations. Through FY2018, two TIFIA-assisted projects have gone into bankruptcy, the South Bay Expressway toll road project in San Diego, CA, and the SH-130 toll road project (segments 5 and 6) near Austin, TX. The San Diego Association of Governments bought the South Bay Expressway project after it went bankrupt, and, according to DOT, \"repaid all outstanding TIFIA indebtedness.\" According to the DOT, the SH-130 TIFIA loan was converted to 34% ownership of the new company that will operate the toll road until 2062, a payment to the government of $15 million, and remaining debt of $87 million. It is uncertain whether the federal government will eventually receive payment equal to the amount of principal and interest that were originally payable on the $430 million TIFIA loan.\nThe TIFIA program is the federal government's main tool for encouraging the establishment of public-private partnerships (P3s) and the investment of private capital in surface transportation. The low cost of borrowing, term length, and repayment flexibility can lower financial risk for private investors. P3s offer several advantages over traditional procurement methods, including additional capital, private management expertise, and risk transfer. By encouraging private finance and insisting on creditworthiness standards, the program relies, in part, on market discipline to stimulate projects with favorable benefits versus costs.\nAlthough the TIFIA program has supported the creation of P3s and leveraged private capital for transportation projects, government involvement remains more important in TIFIA-supported projects. According to one analysis of the TIFIA program through 2016, about one-third of TIFIA-supported projects (23 projects) were developed as P3s and the other two-thirds were governmentally procured. The 23 P3 projects had total project costs of $33 billion, of which 29% came from government grants, 28% TIFIA loans, 28% other debt, 13% private equity, and 1% other capital.\nTIFIA was initially designed to support large and very costly projects for which grant funding was unlikely to be enough. Despite this, there have been complaints that relatively few projects can take advantage of the program. Most typical highway and public transportation projects cost much less than the TIFIA thresholds for eligibility and have no obvious revenue stream to generate a repayment mechanism. Modifications to the TIFIA program, such as lower cost thresholds, lower interest rates for rural projects, and waived fees for smaller projects, have sought to make financing more accessible. However, to date, the size of TIFIA-supported projects does not appear to have declined. The smallest project since the passage of MAP-21 in July 2012, for example, is the U.S. 36 Managed Lane/Bus Rapid Transit Project between Boulder and Denver, CO, which had a total cost of $175 million. But this is phase 2 of a project that totaled almost $500 million. Moreover, there have been no TIFIA loans to rural project funds.", "", "In addition to the use of direct program funding, TIFIA assistance can be obtained by using other federal-aid highway funds, both discretionary and formula, and discretionary BUILD program (formerly TIGER program) funds. There have been a few BUILD program-funded TIFIA loans, but to date no states have traded formula grant funding for a larger loan. At the moment, states do not have to make that trade because the TIFIA program is not in danger of running out of budget authority. DOT calculated that unobligated budget authority in the TIFIA program at the end of FY2018 was $1.65 billion. This amount of end of fiscal year unobligated budget authority is much higher now than it was in FY2012, but the level has stabilized over the past few years ( Table 2 ).\nIf the TIFIA program does exhaust its direct funding in the future, an unanswered question is whether states will choose to use grant funding to pay the subsidy and administrative costs of a loan. A similar option, the capitalization of a state infrastructure bank with grant funds, has largely gone unused, partly because states have planned to commit these funds to traditional projects years in advance.\nCongress could increase the lending capacity of the TIFIA program by authorizing and appropriating additional funding. However, there may not be enough suitable projects to make use of significantly greater budget authority, even if eligibility is expanded beyond surface transportation to include port, aviation, and economic development projects. To date, the greatest value of loans issued in any year has been about $8 billion. The average since the expansion of the program in FY2013 has been about $3.5 billion (in FY2018 dollars).\nMore applications for credit assistance might result from lowering the fees and other costs associated with federal support. One option is to reduce the fees for projects of $75 million or more. All else equal, however, this would increase the administrative costs of the program and reduce its lending capacity. Another option is to increase the threshold below which one credit agency rating is needed rather than two on the senior debt and the federal credit instrument. Currently, the threshold is $75 million, but S. 3631 (115 th Congress) proposed to increase it to $150 million.", "The calculation of the TIFIA program's subsidy cost has generally been conservative. To date, two TIFIA-financed projects have gone bankrupt, and, according to DOT, 6% of loans were underperforming in 2016. A less conservative calculation by DOT and OMB could allow DOT to lend a greater amount with the same amount of budget authority.\nIt does appear that the federal government has adjusted its subsidy cost estimates downward over the past few years in recognition of DOT's loss experience under the TIFIA program. However, the lack of defaults may be due to the types of projects being assisted and the generally favorable economic conditions. An enlarged TIFIA program might mean assisting more risky projects, leading to a higher subsidy rate, all else being equal. The 20-year experience of the TIFIA program, furthermore, is possibly less informative than it appears. The share of loans that have been fully repaid is about 15%. Many of the projects that have received assistance are permitted to defer interest and principal payments and have very long amortization schedules, so there is still a great deal of uncertainty as to how they will perform over the long term. For example, the I-495 high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes project in Northern Virginia received credit assistance in 2007 and the lanes opened in 2012, but interest payments did not begin until 2017. Principal repayments are not scheduled to begin until 2032, and are to continue until loan maturity in 2047.\nUltimately, decisions about the level of risk that the TIFIA program is willing to take are made by DOT's Credit Council and the Secretary of Transportation within the limits of the program's statutory requirements. However, a critic of TIFIA's decisions on risk has suggested developing \"an underlying risk framework and underwriting standards within which loans can be negotiated,\" and \"creating a federal advisory committee to evaluate industry trends and periodically assess the effectiveness of TIFIA's risk framework in meeting its policy objectives.\"", "MAP-21 greatly enlarged the TIFIA program and at the same time raised the maximum federal share from 33% to 49% of eligible project costs. However, DOT announced after the statutory change that it would typically provide up to 33% and would provide amounts between 33% and 49% only in exceptional circumstances. To date, no project has received more than 33%. TIFIA appears to be maximizing its leveraging of nonfederal resources, but it may be limiting the projects that could use a larger share of TIFIA assistance. For example, the American Public Transportation Association has argued that an increased federal share \"would enable TIFIA credit assistance to meaningfully support certain projects with large public benefits that may be difficult to finance conventionally without federal credit support, while still ensuring other investors share in project costs and risks.\"", "By statute, the Secretary of Transportation may consider a TIFIA loan as part of the nonfederal share for federally funded highway and public transportation projects if the loan is repaid from nonfederal funds. For major public transportation capital projects seeking funding from the federal Capital Investment Grant (CIG) program (also known as \"New Starts\"), the Trump Administration has decided that it \"considers U.S. Department of Transportation loans in the context of all Federal funding sources requested by the project sponsor when completing the CIG evaluation process, and not separate from the Federal funding sources.\" In the CIG program, the maximum federal share of a project is 80%, although the share of funding permissible from the CIG program alone is lower. If projects seeking CIG grant funding receive unfavorable ratings because they are also proposing to use large TIFIA loans, then CIG project sponsors are more likely to request smaller TIFIA loans or perhaps to seek alternatives to TIFIA program financing. Low ratings on transit projects drawing on TIFIA loans could also stop them from moving forward. An option for Congress, such as H.R. 731 (116 th Congress), is to require TIFIA loans to be considered part of the nonfederal share of surface transportation projects.", "Some project sponsors have stated that the process for obtaining TIFIA assistance led them not to seek TIFIA loans. A number of proposals have been suggested to speed up approvals, such as regular and more frequent DOT credit council meetings, increased administrative spending to more quickly assess applications, regular publication of information on the time it takes to reach application milestones, and changes to the Letter of Interest process to provide greater schedule certainty. The FAST Act required DOT to expedite projects thought to be lower-risk—those requesting $100 million or less in credit assistance with a dedicated revenue stream unrelated to project performance and standard loan terms—but it is not clear what effect this could have, as only two projects have received TIFIA loans of less than $100 million since the passage of the FAST Act. S. 3631 (115 th Congress) proposed additional criteria for expedited loans for public agency borrowers. Other options, though possibly more controversial, would be to expedite reviews with experienced sponsors or to prioritize the evaluation of certain projects, such as those with national benefits or that involve significant private capital, over others.", "The Trump Administration has proposed broadening the eligibility of TIFIA assistance from highways and public transportation to ports and airports. S. 3647 (115 th Congress) would have allowed $10 million in TIFIA program funds to pay the subsidy costs of credit assistance to airport-related projects. One reason TIFIA eligibility has been limited to surface transportation projects is that funding for the program comes from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), which traditionally has been supported by revenues from highway users. Now that the HTF has relied heavily on general Treasury funds for a decade, Congress may want to revisit this limitation. If TIFIA were to begin making loans to a broader set of projects, DOT likely would need to bring in expertise to provide analysis and advice on these new sectors.\nAnother option for broadening eligibility is to create a new entity such as a national infrastructure bank. Such proposals in the 115 th Congress include the National Infrastructure Development Bank Act of 2017 ( H.R. 547 ), the Partnership to Build America Act of 2017 ( H.R. 1669 ), and the Building and Renewing Infrastructure for Development and Growth in Employment (BRIDGE) Act ( S. 1168 ). Most proposals include a wide range of infrastructure projects, including transportation, water, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure. One purported advantage of a national infrastructure bank over other loan programs, such as TIFIA, is that it would have more independence in its operation, such as in project selection, and have greater expertise at its disposal.\nMost infrastructure bank proposals assume the bank would improve the allocation of public resources by funding projects with the highest economic returns regardless of infrastructure system or type. Selection of the projects with the highest returns, however, might conflict with the traditional desire of Congress to ensure funding for various types of projects. In the extreme case, major transportation projects might not be funded if the bank were to exhaust its lending authority on water or energy projects offering higher returns.\nThe limitations of a national infrastructure bank include its duplication of existing programs like TIFIA. Most legislative proposals for infrastructure banks do not address this duplication, leading to questions about how each would run in parallel. Would a national infrastructure bank avoid current TIFIA-type projects or would it \"compete\" with the TIFIA program to finance these projects? The addition of a national infrastructure bank seems unlikely to increase the number of surface transportation projects involving major credit assistance without other substantial changes in the way such projects are typically funded and financed." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h0_full h3_full h2_full h1_full", "h2_full h3_title h1_full", "", "h2_full", "", "h3_full h2_full h1_full", "h0_title h4_title", "h0_full h4_full", "", "h4_full", "", "", "h4_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What does the TIFIA program do?", "How is the TIFIA funded?", "How has TIFIA's funding balance affected states?", "What was the purpose of the FAST Act?", "What is the primary goal of the TIFIA?", "How has the federal government used the TIFIA program?", "What makes a project sponsor eligible for TIFIA assistance?", "How might a project sponsor develop a funding mechanism to be eligible for TIFIA assistance?", "What is the cost profile of TIFIA programs?", "How could financing projects instead of relying on pay-as-you go funding benefit project timelines?", "Why is the TIFIA program cost effective?", "How does TIFIA's budget authority compare to its loan capacity?", "Why does the loan success rate mean that an appropriation doesn't need to cover as much?", "How has the TIFIA program helped projects since 1998?", "What kinds of projects does the TIFIA program typically help?", "Why might TIFIA have only helped 74 programs since its enactment?", "Why would stakeholders want to discuss the TIFIA program's funding?", "Why is the TIFIA program criticized?", "What could Congress do to address the large unexpended balance of the TIFIA program?", "What arguments have been raised in favor of replacing TIFIA?" ], "summary": [ "The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, administered by the Department of Transportation's Build America Bureau, provides long-term, low-interest loans and other types of credit assistance for the construction of surface transportation projects (23 U.S.C. §601 et seq.).", "Direct funding for the TIFIA program is authorized at $300 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020. Additionally, state departments of transportation can use other federal-aid highway grant money, both formula and discretionary, to subsidize much larger loans.", "To date, states have not had to use other grant funding to subsidize credit assistance because the TIFIA program has a relatively large unexpended funding balance.", "The TIFIA program was reauthorized from FY2016 through FY2020 in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94).", "The primary goal of the TIFIA program, historically, has been to enable the construction of large-scale surface transportation projects by providing financing to complement state, local, and private investment.", "The TIFIA program has been one of the main ways in which the federal government has encouraged the development of public-private partnerships (P3s) and private financing in surface transportation often backed by new, but sometimes uncertain, revenue sources such as highway tolls, other types of user charges, and incremental real estate taxes.", "To be eligible for TIFIA assistance, a project sponsor must be deemed creditworthy, that is, a good risk for repaying its debts, and must have a dedicated source of revenue for repayment.", "Project sponsors, therefore, are required to develop a funding mechanism, whether this is a new user fee or tax or the repurposing of existing fees and taxes.", "Changes to the TIFIA program have sought to make TIFIA assistance more accessible to less costly projects, but so far every TIFIA-supported project has cost $175 million or more.", "Financing projects instead of relying on pay-as-you go funding from taxes and other existing revenues can mean such projects can be constructed years earlier.", "TIFIA, therefore, is a means to accelerate project delivery and the benefits that flow from new infrastructure. The TIFIA program is also a relatively low-cost way for the federal government to support surface transportation projects because it relies on loans, not grants, and the TIFIA assistance is typically one-third or less of project costs.", "Another advantage from the federal point of view is that a relatively small amount of budget authority can be leveraged into a large amount of loan capacity. Program funding of $300 million can support approximately $4 billion in TIFIA loans.", "Because the government expects its loans to be repaid, an appropriation need only cover administrative costs and the subsidy cost of credit assistance.", "Since its enactment in 1998, the TIFIA program has provided assistance of $32 billion to 74 projects with a total cost of about $117 billion (in FY2018 inflation-adjusted dollars).", "About two-thirds of TIFIA loans have gone to highway and highway bridge projects, and another quarter to public transportation.", "The average TIFIA-supported project cost is $1.5 billion, and the average TIFIA loan is $430 million (both in FY2018 dollars). TIFIA has supported at least one project in 21 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, but the top 10 states account for about 80% of the 74 projects supported.", "The TIFIA program is likely to be considered in the 116th Congress during the reauthorization of the surface transportation programs. Program funding is one issue that may be discussed, because some stakeholders would like more budget authority despite a relatively large unexpended balance and the existing authority of states to use grant funding to pay the subsidy cost of credit assistance.", "Criticisms of the program and its implementation include the often slow decisionmaking process, the program's increasing risk aversion, and the limitation of the federal share of project costs to 33%, despite a statutory limit of 49%.", "Because of the relatively large unexpended balance, Congress might considered broadening the use of TIFIA assistance to nonsurface transportation and nontransportation infrastructure. Another option might be to create a national infrastructure bank, a federal infrastructure financing entity largely independent of other executive branch agencies, to take the place of TIFIA and other federal infrastructure credit assistance programs.", "Another option might be to create a national infrastructure bank, a federal infrastructure financing entity largely independent of other executive branch agencies, to take the place of TIFIA and other federal infrastructure credit assistance programs." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
CRS_RL34606	{ "title": [ "", "Overview", "Broad-Scale Studies and Proposals", "Congressional Sources", "Initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s", "Developments in the 1980s and 1990s", "GAO Study in 2000", "Congressional Interest in the Internet and the \"Digital Divide,\" 1999-Present", "Complaint-Handling Offices and Congressional Casework", "Executive Sources", "Non-Governmental Sources", "Differences Among Offices", "Reasons for Differences", "Powers and Duties", "Jurisdictions", "Locations", "Controls", "Neutrality", "Resources", "Electronic and Traditional Communications", "Development of E-government", "Websites and the Internet", "Benefits and Concerns", "Benefits", "Concerns", "Concluding Observations", "Appendix. Examples of Ombudsman-like Entities" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "A variety of offices at the federal level respond to complaints, grievances, and concerns from the public about government programs, services, and operations. These entities, which differ in important respects, are variously referred to as complaint-handling, advocacy, public counsel, coordinative, and ombudsman offices. Despite their differences, they exhibit a common purpose—to represent the public in such matters—which is reflected in the classic ombudsman: that is, a high-ranking official who may be situated outside the executive and possessing independent resources and powers. This notion, which has developed over more than a century, has its modern genesis in Sweden and its evolution largely in European parliamentary regimes. An \"ombudsman,\" which is a Swedish word that broadly means \"one who represents someone,\" is viewed as a servant of the public. As such, the position has been described as follows:\nan independent high-level officer who receives complaints, who pursues inquires [sic] into the maters [sic] involved, and who makes recommendations for suitable action. He may also investigate on his own motion. He makes periodic public reports. His remedial weapons are persuasion, criticism and publicity. He cannot as a matter of law reverse administrative action.\nIn brief, the concept of ombudsman has come to mean, in the words of former Senator Edward Long, \"a guardian of the people's rights against abuses and malfunctions by government, its programs, and its officials—a sort of watchman over the law's watchmen.\"\nThe U.S. federal government has not adopted the \"classic\" ombudsman. Instead, the government has multifarious forms of ombudsmen-like offices. Even the entities that carry the same title (of \"ombudsman,\" for example) differ in their powers, functions, duties, activities, jurisdictions, independence, and resources. In comparison to one another, for instance, some offices are limited to receiving complaints or grievances from the public and passing them on to relevant units within the agency—without necessarily following up on them. Other complaint-handling entities do follow up on such charges, examine the agency's operations, and, in some cases, mediate or resolve disputes between the aggrieved party and the agency. Still other entities may be proactive; that is, they seek out certain clientele groups to notify them about relevant government services, assist them in gaining access to these, and ensure that such services are delivered properly and fully. Separate from these functions and duties, some ombudsman-like offices issue reports (periodic and/or episodic) to agency officials, Congress, and/or the public, while others have no such obligation or practice.\nSeveral recent statutes reflect these different characteristics, as well as varying position titles.\nThe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which expanded the government's powers to combat terrorism, established a new entity or added to the responsibilities and roles of existing ones to help protect civil rights and civil liberties. Three with enhanced responsibilities are in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): a Privacy Officer and an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, along with additional special duties for the inspector general (IG). In addition, a new position—the Civil Liberties Protection Officer—was created in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), to help protect civil liberties and privacy in policies and procedures under the ODNI. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 incorporated a number of separate bills, including the Wounded Warrior Act. The legislation is designed to aid returning wounded military personnel in receiving appropriate medical care, when they are in the service (and in the Department of Defense), as well as after they are discharged (and under the jurisdiction of the Department of Veterans Affairs). The provisions—based on the recommendations of several governmental commissions (notably, the Dole-Shalala Commission) and congressional panels that were highly critical of the care given to injured veterans —established Federal Recovery Coordinators and Transition Patient Advocates to assist them. These positions are intended to reduce, if not prevent, complications, uncertainties, and delays from arising in the first place and, if they do arise, mitigate their impact. If such problems arise, the coordinators and advocates are positioned to respond on their own or at the behest of the veterans. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) amendments signed into law on December 31, 2007, created several new positions to assist the public in gaining access to government information. Public Liaisons in each federal agency are to be designated by a Chief FOIA Officer, who is also responsible for monitoring FOIA implementation and facilitating public understanding of the purposes of FOIA's exemptions. The purposes of the Public Liaisons are to serve as an official to whom a FOIA requester can raise concerns about service from the FOIA Requester Center; to assist in reducing agency delays in responding to requests and increase the transparency and understanding of the status of requests; and to assist in the resolution of disputes between a requester and the agency. The law also required the creation of an Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) in the National Archives and Records Administration; it is to review executive-branch agency compliance with FOIA policies, recommend FOIA policy changes to Congress and the President, offer mediation services between FOIA requesters and administrative agencies, and issue advisory opinions if mediation has not resolved a dispute. The American National Red Cross Governance Modernization Act of 2007 established an ombudsman in the American National Red Cross (ANRC). Although it is not a federal agency, the ANRC is federally chartered and charged with assisting federal government efforts in disaster relief. The ombudsman's office, while modest at this stage, serves as a neutral party that provides voluntary, confidential, and informal processes designed to facilitate the resolution of problems between the ANRC and others.\nIllustrating the ad hoc and specialized focus of ombudsmen-like offices at the federal level is one advanced in the 111 th Congress by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It has proposed an Ombudsman for Intelligence Community (IC) Security Clearances, who would be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. Applicants for a security clearance in any component in the IC would be given contact information for the ombudsman, who would report annually to the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence with regard to the number of persons contacting the ombudsman and a summary of their concerns, complaints, and questions.\nAttempts to establish a government-wide ombudsman at the federal level or to standardize ombudsman-like offices have received attention—from Congress, the executive, international organizations, academia, relevant professional societies, and the press—sporadically since at least the mid-1960s. These across-the-board plans, however, have remained on the drawing board.\nBy comparison, national-level offices of ombudsman have proliferated in Sweden and elsewhere. Finland established such an office nearly 100 years ago. In the 1960s, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Spain, Tanzania, Great Britain, and Northern Ireland established ombudsmen. In the 1970s, France, Portugal, and Austria established such offices. Countries including South Africa, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Columbia, the Republic of Georgia, and Zimbabwe have established national or sub-national offices of ombudsman in the last 20 years to curb human rights abuses and aid in democratic transitions. According to the International Ombudsman Institute, about 120 countries currently employ ombudsmen at the national or sub-national level of government. The European Union appointed its first European Ombudsman on July 12, 1995. Some of the ombudsmen in other countries serve at the national level and have broader jurisdictions and a greater degree of independence—especially those in parliamentary regimes—than their American namesakes.\nThis overview is not a comprehensive study of various complaint-handling, ombudsman, or advocacy offices. Instead, it examines and provides examples of ombudsman-like offices, recognizing their variations. Differences among these instrumentalities include those noted below.\nOrigins: Was the office created internally within an agency, or mandated by Congress or the President? Powers and duties: Does the entity simply receive complaints and pass them along, or does it also follow up on complaints after an agency response; does it resolve disputes between the agency and the complainant, or does it engage in proactive efforts, such as providing outreach and special assistance to individuals? Jurisdictions: Is there one complaint-handling entity for an entire agency, or several entities with separate jurisdictions; if the latter, how confined are these? Locations: Is the ombudsman-like office situated within a \"parent\" agency or made independent of it? Resources: What is the level of funding and resources that the entity receives? Controls: Who appoints and removes the officer, and who determines the office's budget and spending priorities?\nThese criteria are not discrete. The characteristics overlap and are utilized in a variety of combinations in federal agencies and organizations, offering a gamut of ways and means for the public to petition the government. The variations among the attributes also suggest important differences in the capacity and capability of each office.", "Interest in institutionalizing a centralized or standardized complaint-handling role in the federal government began in the mid-1960s. Although no proposals along these lines have been adopted, a number of studies and recommendations have emerged over the years. These have come from Members of Congress, executive and administrative officers, and nongovernmental organizations.", "Over the past five decades, Congress has periodically looked into legislating complaint-handling mechanisms with intense interest in the 1960s and sporadic attention in the following decades.", "Legislative proposals for complaint-handling mechanisms began in 1963. Three years later, the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure launched an extensive examination of ombudsmen and other complaint-handling offices and, in 1970, considered proposals to create a public counsel corporation. On May 9, 1973, Representative Wayne Owens introduced H.R. 7680 to create an Office of Congressional Ombudsman, which would have allowed legislators to request investigations of federal agencies—drawing help from both the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office, now the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The bill, however, was not reported by the House Committee on House Administration. On November 6, 1973, Representative Les Aspin sponsored H.R. 11257 , which proposed the addition of an ombudsman position within House members' staffs. The same fate awaited this bill; it was not reported by the House Committee on House Administration.\nIn the mid-1970s, the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs examined proposals for an office of consumer affairs, a plan that President Jimmy Carter later endorsed. Despite the backing, it was not authorized. Shortly before this development, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee issued its Study on Federal Regulation , an extensive six-volume effort that devoted an entire volume to public participation in agency proceedings. In this study, the panel looked at different devices—including an office of public counsel, an independent consumer agency, and various other complaint-handling offices—that served or could serve as a conduit for citizen grievances, complaints, or questions about the implementation of public policy or, beyond this, as an advocate for citizen interests. No legislation, however, was enacted.", "A variety of complaint-handling offices were written into legislation throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, including offices in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Federal Student Aid Office (FSA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In the early 1990s, GAO examined access to, and utilization of, the ombudsman program under the Older Americans Act, as well as the handling of beneficiary complaints under Medicare.", "Many of the older and circumscribed ombudsman studies had been confined to the \"paper age\" and did not consider the impact and implications of computers and the Internet on complaint-handling entities, procedures, practices, and resources. An exception to this was a survey by GAO of 32 \"high impact agencies\"—those handling about 90% of federal contact with the public—and their use of electronic communications, especially the Internet, to receive citizen complaints and comments. The study found that the overwhelming majority of agencies (i.e., 29 agencies) had a website to receive complaints and comments from the public—21 had an e-mail link for program comments and complaints, and 28 had an e-mail link for comments to the agency webmaster—in addition to receiving information via telephone and mail. The survey, however, was limited in two ways: (1) it did not include the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which has substantial contact with the public; and (2) the survey inquired only about an agency's receipt of complaints and comments, not about such other possible Internet-based, website uses, including categorizing, cataloging, storing, and disseminating information. Nonetheless, GAO's review represented the first such cross-agency survey of Internet-based complaint handling and served as a first step to more extensive and detailed studies.\nGAO's review commented on the status of two federal efforts to develop centralized Internet-based hubs for citizens attempting to access information about federal programs or services: (1) http://www.consumer.gov/ , operated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); and (2) the USA.gov site, developed by the General Services Administration's Office of Citizen Services and Communications. The ongoing FTC site presents consumer information and links to complaint forms grouped by topic or subject area (e.g., food, product safety, and health), rather than by agency; because of this orientation, a citizen does not need to know the responsible agency when submitting a comment or lodging a complaint. The GSA site serves as \"the U.S. government's official web portal.\" As such, it provides links to government grants, available jobs, and information on combating identity theft. The site also links to the Federal Citizen Information Center (FCIC), which has a list of federal agencies that document complaints against private companies. In addition, the GSA site includes a page of links to government agencies and elected officials.", "Beginning at the end of the 20 th century and continuing into the 21 st , Congress—as well as the executive and private parties—has considered the rise of the Internet, its accessibility, and impact, with particular attention to the \"digital divide.\" This phenomenon (discussed further in the section on e-government) recognizes a distinct division between individuals, groups, and organizations with access to, as well as skills and resources in using, the Internet versus those without these attributes. Congressional hearings were held in 1999-2002, in part based on an executive branch study (discussed below); these efforts, in turn, supported a provision in the E-Government of 2002 to authorize a study to make recommendations to correct \"disparities in access to the Internet.\"\nCongress's attention has extended to ways to increase Internet access, skills, and resources across the board, but often with particular attention to the poor, minorities, and rural residents, the groups most likely to be on the disadvantaged side of the \"divide.\" Proposed legislative remedies center on increasing access to the Internet in general and computer equipment, skills, and resources, rather than on Internet access to specific governmental operations and services in particular, including complaint handling. Despite this orientation, such legislative efforts could, indirectly and to varying degrees, contribute to a better understanding of the impact of the Internet on complaint-handling and accessing information about government programs, operations, and activities. Along these lines, two CRS memoranda in 2000 looked into the use of the Internet in the context of complaint handling.", "Implicitly and often explicitly, proposals to establish a government-wide ombudsman have generated concerns about its impact on congressional casework. In an earlier era, it was not entirely clear what effects the creation of ombudsmen or complaint-handling offices in the executive had on Congress in terms of the casework function of legislators. The question had been complicated in the past—according to Stanley V. Anderson (an authority on ombudsmen), writing in the late 1960s—by \"a paucity of information on the treatment of grievances by elected officials in general, and by legislators in particular.\"\nTimes have changed since then, as numerous studies have detailed the high priority and significant resources Members and their offices devote to casework across the board. In political scientist Richard F. Fenno Jr.'s 1978 seminal study, Home Style: House Members in their Districts , this activity is recognized as an essential, albeit time-consuming, ingredient in securing the legislator's elected office. According to Fenno, casework is\na highly valued form of activity. Not only is the constituent service universally recognized as an important part of the job in its own right. It is also universally recognized as powerful reelection medicine.\nThis and supportive findings elsewhere may help to explain the general reluctance among legislators to relinquish congressional casework to an administrative officer, who is not under their immediate control and direction. This feature of executive ombudsmen is in stark contrast to caseworkers in Member offices. In the latter, staffers are hired and promoted by the Members, who also determine the caseworkers' duties and assignments, and can insist on their responsiveness to constituent requests. As a consequence, casework is well-institutionalized in Member offices and sometimes beyond. It is even directly aided and reinforced by executive agencies that provide casework resources, noticeably in high-demand, high-profile areas.\nTestimony on the earliest ombudsman proposals of Representative Henry Reuss raised concerns that legislators would continue to act on public complaints by themselves, leaving the ombudsman underutilized. In defending the 1965 incarnation of his legislation to create an \"American Ombudsman,\" Reuss countered criticism by stressing the heavy workload brought about by casework and its adverse impact on other congressional functions and responsibilities, particularly lawmaking, which he saw as primary.\nThe role Congressmen have assumed as the citizen's advocates against the bureaucracy is important and valuable in our system of government. It has helped to prevent injustices and to promote good administration. But the job of handling constituents' cases has become so burdensome that it is interfering with the primary job of Congressmen as legislators.\nThe Member also emphasized that a government-wide ombudsman or public counsel would head a professional office, with sufficient funding, trained and experienced personnel, and powers to pursue complaints and inquiries (via congressional offices or directly from the public) effectively and efficiently. The ombudsman's reporting requirements to Congress, in Representative Reuss's view, could aid its oversight endeavors.\nAt about the same time, however, opposing views gained currency in Congress. These centered on the projected tangible costs of an overarching executive branch ombudsman, as well as the intangible costs to congressional responsibilities and interests. A special Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, reporting in 1966, addressed an ombudsman plan. After hearing from some legislators in favor of such a government-wide office and recognizing its adoption in other countries, however, the bipartisan, bicameral panel determined that such an entity at the federal level in the United States would be expensive, both in its funding and its impact on Congress.\nThe extent of the problem in the United States is such that the adoption of the proposal would require creation of a large office or department.\nThe [J]oint [C]ommittee, after careful consideration, decided against recommending creation of such an office at this time. We believe that casework is a proper function of the individual Member of Congress and should not be delegated to an administrative body.", "The executive has also conducted research and sponsored initiatives in this field over the past three decades. In 1975, for example, the Office of Consumer Affairs in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services (HHS)) contracted for a feasibility study to improve the handling of consumer complaints. A part of that effort examined federal government programs for resolving consumer complaints and their adequacy, examining 12 executives of independent agencies in depth.\nLater, as noted above, President Jimmy Carter supported the concept of an office of consumer affairs or representation. When that broad effort failed, however, he settled for a consumer affairs advisor.\nIn 1990, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) commissioned a study of ombudsmen in federal agencies, including detailed case studies on six of them, along with a short history of the ombudsman movement in America. The report supplemented an ACUS recommendation to establish ombudsmen in \"federal agencies that administer programs with major responsibilities involving significant interactions with members of the general public.\"\nAnother related development was President Clinton's 1993 Executive Order 12862 on \"Setting Customer Service Standards.\" It called on agencies to make information, services, and complaint systems easily accessible, and to provide a means to address customer complaints. A 1996 study by the National Performance Review provided illustrations of efforts to meet these goals, including the availability of toll-free phone lines and websites.\nIn 1999, the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) reported on its study of the \"digital divide.\" It found that computer use in general, and Internet access in particular, had increased measurably in the previous few years. Nonetheless, computer availability and Internet accessibility remained below the national average for certain groups: minority, low-income, rural, and single-parent households. The focus of the NTIA study was on computer resources, skills, and literacy—especially for the disadvantaged—for education, jobs, careers, and business opportunities. Nonetheless, the NTIA review had implications for access to government information and complaint-handling offices for the disadvantaged—Americans who might need these the most.\nA far-reaching survey appeared in 2000 and was updated in 2003. In a report to the National Taxpayers Advocate on independent advocacy agencies, Jeffrey Lubbers examined nearly 30 such entities, ranging from the IRS National Advocate Service itself to Long-Term Care Ombudsmen. The report, in addition to describing some of the characteristics of the offices, gave attention to state ombudsmen, as well as standards of conduct, such as those offered by the American Bar Association (discussed below.). Professor Lubbers found \"an increasing number of independent officers and agencies established within existing departments and agencies\" and that these are \"becoming prominent.\" The offices, however, are not standardized. They vary, for instance, in number within their parent departments and agencies, as well as in resources, jurisdiction, and degree of independence.", "The academic community, professional societies, and the press have also analyzed and assessed complaint-handling mechanisms. As noted above, however, these are often limited to one or a few entities. Nonetheless, several early studies opened a window into the organization and operation of some ombudsman-like offices at the time.\nProminent among these was a 1968 volume from the American Academy of Political and Social Science entitled The Ombudsman or Citizen ' s Defender , which included several chapters on the American scene. At the same time, the American Assembly raised the question of An Ombudsman for American Government? , examining practices and proposals affecting federal, state, and local government. A further examination of the U.S. experience appeared the next year in a compilation of papers under the auspices of the Institute for Government Studies. Since then, other scholarly and legal studies have reviewed various aspects of complaint-handling offices at the federal level. These include a proposal for a federal ombudsman (1972); the ways and means by which certain federal agencies handled citizen complaints, based on survey responses from 64 separate units (1974); improved complaint-handling procedures in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1979); and a comparison of ombudsmen-like offices in the United States with similar ones in other countries (1985).\nLater accounts have also considered the ombudsman phenomenon in the United States. One journal article reported that the United States lagged behind European democracies in the creation of ombudsmen and showed no signs of catching up. U.S. ombudsmen also differed among agencies; and a number of agencies that dealt with the public extensively did not have institutionalized complaint-handling offices. Still other examinations focused on specific types of complaint-handling procedures and practices (e.g., those associated with the Immigration and Naturalization Service—now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) or on a specific office (e.g., a proposal to create a public counsel in the National Labor Relations Board).\nSeveral professional societies—including the American Bar Association (ABA), the United States Ombudsman Association, the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen (CFO), and the International Ombudsman Association (IOA)—offer ombudsman job listings, as well as training seminars for investigation techniques. Additionally, the ABA and the United States Ombudsman Association recommend standards to be adopted when instituting ombudsmen or modifying already existing ombudsman offices. Moreover, the ABA's website offers a definition of ombudsman and a typology for its various iterations, separating them into four distinct categories: classical, advocate, organizational, and executive. According to the ABA, an ombudsman protects \"the legitimate interests and rights of individuals with respect to each other; individual rights against the excesses of public and private bureaucracies; and those who are affected by and those who work within these organizations.\" Only some of the more specific ombudsman categories apply directly to U.S. federal ombudsman offices, while others exist in the United States only in a modified form.\nThe Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen has stressed that ombudsmen must be \"confidential [in receiving and responding to complaints], neutral and independent.\" The CFO also advocates a single, government-wide pay scale for all federal ombudsman. In addition, the coalition seeks a statute mandating that all federal ombudsmen—internal or external—constitute a separate, autonomous office, and that they report directly to their agency heads.", "Although most earlier studies are dated or limited to certain entities, these efforts reveal a wide variety of complaint-handling mechanisms at the federal level. Differences in the current collection of offices and positions that respond to complaints, grievances, concerns, and questions from the public arise along a number of distinct dimensions: their powers and duties, jurisdictions, locations, controls, neutrality, resources, and use of electronic and traditional communications. Variations among the offices are reflected in their titles: Federal Student Aid Ombudsman; Medicare Beneficiary Ombudsman; Taxpayer Advocate; Ombudsman at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Federal Recovery Coordinators and Transition Patient Advocates for wounded military personnel; Aviation Noise Ombudsman; Environmental Protection Agency Public Liaison; Superfund Ombudsman; Freedom of Information Act Office of Government Information Services and Public Liaisons; Construction Metrication Ombudsman; and Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer or, alternatively, Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Officer.", "The variations among the complaint-handling offices have emerged for a number of reasons. These include the piecemeal fashion in which the offices were created; the unique set of circumstances associated with each establishment; and different establishing mechanisms (e.g., legislation or administrative directive, issued by the agency head at his or her own volition or in response to a presidential directive). Additional reasons for differences are the varied rationales accompanying each construct. These range from protecting individual rights and liberties, to safeguarding the health and welfare of the public, to assisting in determining an individual's tax obligations to the government. The rationales also extend to aiding selective clientele, such as small businesses in obtaining government contracts and private firms in converting to the metric system to meet federal construction specifications.\nIn addition to these reasons are different expectations for each office, ranging from simply receiving and passing on complaints to relevant units within an agency, to investigating such complaints independently, to reaching out to the public proactively. Other explanations for the variations are the absence of a philosophical consensus underlying the classic ombudsman concept as applied to the United States; opposition to the creation of some ombudsman-like offices; and conflict over certain powers, authorities, and responsibilities. These conditions have, on occasion, resulted in initial compromises or later changes in the offices' structure, location, independence, and resources.\nConsequently, existing federal complaint-handling offices vary with regard to their basic characteristics—including powers and duties, jurisdiction, location, controls, neutrality, resources, and communications. These differences, in turn, affect independence, autonomy, and capacity.", "The complaint-handling office could be empowered only to receive complaints and pass them on to the organization in the agency responsible for the program or operation. By comparison, the office could be authorized to follow up on grievances, making recommendations for resolving a problem, or determining whether the agency's response is satisfactory. Still other ombudsman-like entities, beyond being passive recipients of complaints, might adopt a proactive approach. They could, for instance, be authorized to conduct surveys among persons or groups who receive a government service or who are affected by an agency action, in order to identify a perceived problem and determine how widespread and serious it is. The Environmental Protection Agency Public Liaison can conduct independent investigations into cases that prompt concerns of improper agency action. The office does not have legal force, but it publishes its findings, offering the public a more transparent view of the EPA.\nSeparately, a complaint-handling office could be authorized—or required—to perform additional duties to educate the public and keep the agency head and Congress informed. These could include notifying the agency head (not just the bureau or program director) immediately about serious or widespread concerns; issuing periodic reports summarizing the office's findings, actions, and agency responses to the agency head, Congress, and the public; and testifying before congressional committees about the office's findings, recommendations (if any), and subsequent actions.", "The jurisdictions of complaint-handling offices also differ, depending upon the range of agencies and programs covered. An office's jurisdiction could be limited to a particular program administered by a single bureau within an agency or expanded to all programs administered by the entire agency. The jurisdiction could also encompass a set of related programs or operations that are carried out by several federal agencies.\nThe complaint-handling offices' jurisdictions could differ on other grounds, including whether they extend into the private sector. A jurisdiction could be confined to the agency, per se, thus dealing only with complaints and concerns about the conduct of its employees and its administration of programs; or it could be extended, where appropriate, to private sector organizations or firms that the agency is regulating.", "The specific locations of complaint-handling offices could also vary. Offices could be placed within agencies, as most are now, or exist independently of the agencies where they have jurisdiction—like the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman. Some ombudsman-like offices operate out of a centralized federal government location, like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ombudsman, while others have decentralized, regional offices, like the Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Ombudsmen.\nA single ombudsman-like office could be granted government-wide jurisdiction and located in the Executive Office of the President. Although there is no such comprehensive ombudsman in the federal government, a single office could serve as a central clearinghouse for complaints and grievances affecting all federal agencies. Additionally, such a complaint-handling office—if it were to exist under public law—could be given greater control over its resources and more overall autonomy than the typical agency-specific offices in the federal government. An alternative arrangement would be to establish several complaint-handling offices, each with jurisdiction over a number of related agencies. Under this plan, each office would operate independently of the agencies about which it receives complaints.", "Different types of controls might be applied to a complaint-handling office and its head. Appointment and removal powers over the head of the office could vary. He or she could be appointed and be removed in one of three ways, which would affect the office's independence. He or she could be (1) appointed by, and removed by, the head of the agency—the usual way currently; (2) appointed by, and removed by, the President alone; or (3) appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and removed by the President. Other controls over the office could also be established to determine who in agency management would supervise the office, to whom its head would report, and who would determine its resources.", "Some ombudsman offices are created as neutral third parties that can facilitate dispute resolution. Others, by contrast, are designed as advocates for the complainant. The ABA, for example, called for a distinct category of \"advocate ombudsmen,\" which includes offices like the National Taxpayer Advocate within the Internal Revenue Service, and Veterans Affairs Patient Advocates. Other offices, like the Federal Student Aid Ombudsman, are required to perform as neutral \"fact-finders\" when looking into a complaint.\nIn May 2006, the CFO updated the ABA's Standards for the Establishment and Operations of the Ombuds Offices. Both the CFO and ABA require an ombudsman to perform as a neutral actor who \"conducts inquiries and investigations in an impartial manner, free from initial bias and conflicts of interest.\" Impartiality, however, does not prohibit the ombudsman from advocating \"within the entity for change where the process demonstrates a need for it.\"", "Each office's budget, staff, and other resources—and control over them—could also differ, depending upon its statutory authority, range of duties and responsibilities, degree of independence, and internal office priorities. For instance, a complaint-handling office might invest heavily in computer technology—for example, setting up its own website and inputting information from paper correspondence into its own computerized data base—while other offices might maintain a more traditional approach, such as receiving and responding to grievances and questions primarily by mail, facsimile, and phone.\nThe office's budget and resources could be controlled independently by agency administration, be derived from the administrative and operating expenses of the agency to which it is attached, or be given a line item in the agency's appropriation act.\nHiring authority and practices could also differ—as could control of other resources, such as office space, supplies, communications equipment, training programs, and travel funds. In this regard, the head of the complaint-handling office might possess specific authority that would enable him or her to control all such resources. By contrast, the officer might not be granted such authority; in this case, the head would have to rely, for instance, on existing agency personnel who would rotate in and out of the office and on receiving office space, supplies, and equipment at the discretion of agency management.", "Though many government agencies do not have a formal or institutionalized public complaint-handling office, all have established ways, new or old, for the general public to contact agencies. These include the Internet, as well as telephone lines and the traditional mail system.", "The adoption and development of electronic government (e-gov) have been both a cause and effect of the E-Government Act of 2002. It was intended to \"promote the use of the Internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen participation in Government ..., to provide citizen-centric Government information and services ..., [and] to promote access to high quality Government information and services across multiple channels.\" E-gov, in general, and the E-Government Act, in particular, have added new modes of communication between government and citizens, and have increased the accessibility, speed, and efficiency of receiving and responding to public inquiries.\nDespite these advances, some recent studies have discovered weaknesses and limitations in several aspects of e-gov: what it currently does (e.g., primarily providing information); how well it does it (declining levels of satisfaction); and what it has been unable to do satisfactorily (particularly, progressing into the \"transactions stage,\" referring to exchanges among entities in the same agency, among agencies at the same level of government, among governments at different levels, and among government agencies, private sector stakeholders, and the general public).\nDespite such growing pains, e-gov and the Internet have become prominent features of the government-citizen interaction, including within the ombudsman and complaint-handling function. Even with this advance, however, government-citizen communications continue through traditional forms as well.", "The 2002 E-Government Act called upon federal agencies to establish domain directories for their websites. Many of these are for general access to information sources, not necessarily for complaint handling specifically. Nonetheless, several different websites—major and minor—demonstrate a range of offerings.\nIn July 2003, the General Services Administration (GSA) unveiled USA Services, which promised to answer all citizen inquiries—whether submitted by e-mail, conventional mail, telephone, or in-person—within two days. The initiative was described as a \"comprehensive 'customer service department'\" for citizens. USAServices.gov serves as the initiative's web portal and offers citizens and agencies assistance in communication and information access. Additionally, the federal government offers an Internet gateway to all of its agencies and services: USA.gov, formerly known as both WebGov and FirstGov. The website lists all government agencies, and offers links to each one's website, along with links to state, local, and tribal government websites. Citizens, visitors, employees, and businesses are offered their own entry portals into the website through a web page designed to offer information and services that would be most pertinent to that user. The site also includes a link to the Federal Citizen Information Center, which offers a list of agencies the public can use to register complaints against private businesses.\nAnother federal site—Data.gov—was started by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2009. As an information resource, Data.gov is intended \"to increase public access to high value, machine readable datasets generated by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.\"\nAlthough most agencies and departments have websites that outline their mission and duties, there remains a general dearth of formal agency-wide ombudsman-like offices, even at those that serve a substantial number of people. Instead, agencies have adopted other similar offices for more specialized or select clientele. The Social Security Administration (SSA), for example, has a toll-free telephone number (1-800-772-1213 or TTY 1-800-325-0778) for complaints and an online complaint form. The SSA also has a website that informs members of the public of various administrative services that are available online, on the phone, or at their offices. Online, for example, clients can calculate their benefits or apply for help with Medicare prescription drug costs. The website also includes maps and directions to local offices. If clients are dissatisfied with the response to their complaints—whether made over the phone or at the local SSA office—they may appeal to a higher level of the SSA.\nThe Department of Transportation hosts an Aviation Consumer Protection Division (ACPD) that serves as a last resort for airline consumers who are dissatisfied with service and attempts by a company to remedy the problem. The ACPD clearly states that the individual airlines are better suited to resolving disputes with consumers, but the division offers consumers the opportunity to have their complaints published in the division's monthly Report of Consumer Complaints , as well as to register the complaints in the federal database. Although this service handles grievances about private sector operations, for the most part, it also responds to consumer complaints that involve an aviation regulatory issue. Complaints about airline safety are channeled to the Federal Aviation Administration's hotline, while transportation security issues are handled in-house or routed to the Transportation Security Administration in the Department of Homeland Security.\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has four different, topically organized online complaint forms available for consumers. The complaint topics are general complaints, obscenity and indecency, slamming, and telemarketing. Consumers who do not have online access may send complaints and supporting documentation via mail.\nSimilarly, other \"high-impact\" federal agencies provide e-mail links or online forms for citizens or customers to use when lodging their complaints. The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission's website, for example, includes a toll-free customer hotline and online complaint forms for the general public, doctors, fire investigators, police, or others to use to report an injury or death caused by a product. Although such complaints are usually generated by private sector products, the submissions could also involve the Commission's regulatory and enforcement responsibilities.\nAnother site for e-gov communications is http://www.business.gov/ . Launched in 2004 as the official business link to the U.S. government, it is managed by the Small Business Administration in partnership with 21 other federal agencies.", "Use of the Internet for government-citizen communications, especially for complaint handling, offers benefits, while at the same time, raising concerns.", "The potential of the Internet for making complaint handling more efficient and effective is significant. Ideally, government web portals could provide \"one stop\" for inputting and accessing complaint-related information for an entire agency—or at least a particular office or program. This, in turn, could lead to increased sharing of information and data within and among federal agencies, between the federal government and state and local governments, and between the federal government and private sector organizations and the general public. This development might also encourage standardization in receiving and responding to complaints, as well as other operational and organizational characteristics of ombudsman-like offices, including resources and independence.", "Nonetheless, concerns exist with regard to the inclusiveness, accessibility, and availability of Internet-based information and the government's responsiveness to complaints. Reflective of this is the \"digital divide,\" which sees the population separated into \"haves and have-nots\" in terms of Internet access and use (discussed above). This divide separates those with requisite computer skills, resources, and Internet access from those without these. The latter group lacks the capability to issue complaints and comments through this medium and to discover what information is held in Internet-based data banks.\nAnother concern about reliance on the Internet for complaint handling is that it might be manipulated. For instance, an organized interest group might encourage its membership to flood a website with complaints—substantiated or not, witnessed first-hand or not—about a particular agency or program. Although this same problem could arise by way of other means of communications (mail or telephone, for example), these traditional avenues would be more cumbersome, more difficult, and possibly more costly to use. In effect, it would be easier to mount massive attacks through the Internet than through more traditional communications media.\nUse of the Internet as a source for collecting public complaints also prompts worries about maintaining the anonymity of the complainant. These worries might be mitigated, to a degree, through the rise in toll-free hotlines and centralized websites like USA.gov, which could allow for anonymous reporting and protecting a complainant's identity.", "Although there is no authoritative, comprehensive, detailed survey of current federal complaint-handling offices, earlier studies (even if dated and limited), along with the coverage here, provide useful information with which to describe, examine, and compare them. One observation, for instance, is that such offices appear to be growing in number and prominence as well as range of activities, duties, and services.\nAs noted throughout this report, federal complaint-handling offices exhibit different forms, capacities, and designations. The variations range from the individual office's powers, resources, duties, and functions, to its jurisdiction, location, controls, neutrality, and adoption of new technologies—notably the Internet. The activities, services, and duties of ombudsman-like entities, for instance, cross a wide spectrum, from the nearly passive to the proactive. The range extends from simply receiving a complaint and passing it on to appropriate offices; to following up on it and notifying the complainant of the results; to helping resolve disputes between the agency and complainant. Some offices report findings to agency officials, Congress, and/or the public, while others do not. Some are proactive—for instance, conducting outreach efforts to the public or select groups—while others are not. A few even embark on preemptive efforts—that is, they intervene on behalf of clientele from the beginning to the end of a service, thereby reducing, if not preventing, problems from arising in the first place—while most offices do not.\nThe variations among the offices reflect their piecemeal establishment—at different times, for different reasons, and for different purposes, duties, and functions. Some, for instance, are designed to assist a particular clientele who conduct business with an agency or who are the primary recipients of its services. Other entities may be intended to meet the needs of the public at large or broad sectors of it. Variations also arise over time and across policy areas, as the needs and demands of government and society change. Recent constructs demonstrate this. The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs Federal Recovery Coordinators for wounded military veterans were prompted by instances of inadequate medical care. And the creation of a Privacy Officer and an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in the Homeland Security Department was due to concerns about the possible intrusiveness and potential impact of the government's new anti-terrorism powers.\nEfforts to establish a government-wide ombudsman, create complaint-handling offices throughout the executive branch, and/or standardize such entities have existed since the mid-1960s. None of these one-size-fits-all initiatives, however, has been enacted into law. Instead, the legislative and administrative solutions—to meet the challenge of responding to a large and growing number of inquiries, grievances, and concerns from the public—have arisen on an ad hoc basis, focusing on particular agencies and specific problem areas. Even in the few cases where a single statute has called for similar offices in a number of agencies—such as Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) pubic liaisons, construction metrication ombudsmen, and banking agency ombudsmen—these entities have been highly specialized, responding to a select clientele in a distinct policy or subject area.\nAs a consequence of their varied attributes and development, ombudsman-like entities vary in their roles, capabilities, and independence. These constructs thus reflect certain fundamental characteristics of American national government: dispersed and decentralized power, the absence of uniformity and standardization among similar institutions, and competition between the executive and legislature for control over government organizations and operations.", "American National Red Cross\nAlthough it is not a federal government agency, the American National Red Cross (ANRC) is an organization chartered by public law. Its charter established the basic purposes of the organization, one of which is serving as a disaster relief organization for the United States.\nCongress also mandated, in the Governance Modernization Act of 2007, an ANRC Ombudsman, who began operating in October 2007. Besides the Ombudsman, the office presently consists of three positions: two analysts, who compile annual reports to Congress and the ANRC Board of Governors, and an ombudsman service representative, who receives incoming telephone complaints.\nWhile the ombudsman position was created by Congress, the duties of the office have been delineated by the organization's Board of Governors. The post is to serve as a neutral party that\nprovides a voluntary, confidential, and informal process to facilitate fair and equitable resolutions to problems brought before it; and explores a range of alternatives or options to resolve the problems. The position serves as both an internal and external ombudsman, fielding complaints from employees, blood donors, volunteers, financial donors, disaster victims, and other Red Cross clients.\nDepartment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Small Business Ombudsman\nIn the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of the Census houses an Office of the Small Business Ombudsman. It is the \"primary advocate between the small business community and the Census Bureau and ... provide[s] services and opportunities for the small business community in an effort to simplify and reduce the reporting burden on requested forms.\" As such, the Ombudsman\nprovides technical assistance through a small business toll free number and a small business website; provides Internet assistance for small businesses in completing report forms; and expands the use of electronic reporting, data sharing, and the use of administrative records.\nDepartment of Defense\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has a number of different ombudsman-like offices. Most of these, however, are \"internal; \"that is, the offices and positions, such as the Federal Recovery Coordinators, provide services to military and civilian personnel within the department. Nonetheless, DOD also has several different types of external ombudsman-like offices, as the following examples illustrate:\nBase Transition Coordinators (BTCs) attached to individual military bases undergoing realignments and closings (BRAC), whose involvement ends with the completion of the base closure and reuse; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) Ombudsman, whose jurisdiction covers both domestic and foreign contractors; Ombudsman of the Employer Support of the National Guard and Reserve (ESGR), a permanent office whose participation on behalf of eligible service personnel might be a one-time event or recurrent; and select ombudsmen operating at Navy medical centers, whose voluntary participation on behalf of family members of patients at individual command centers might be short-term and sporadic or long-term and continuous.\nBase Transition Coordinators for Military Base Reuse\nIntroducing its community guide to military base reuse, the Department of Defense recognizes that it \"has been closing military bases and assisting Defense-impacted communities through its Defense Economic Adjustment Program for more than 35 years.\" The program has increased in prominence most recently, because of the Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) initiative affecting a large number of military bases. Among the many local, state, and federal entities involved in each case is a DOD Base Transition Coordinator (BTC), described as \"the local, on-site, Federal point of contact who works as an ombudsman for the community.\" As such, the BTC \"is a key contact, problem solver and information source for the local community, especially in relation to environmental cleanup and property disposal.\"\nDefense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Ombudsman\nThe role of the DPAP Ombudsman is to assist companies, both domestic and foreign, interested in performing contracts to satisfy DOD requirements, following the instructions of the DPAP Contract Policy and International Contracting Directorate. In the case of a foreign company, it may contact the Ombudsman if the company \"has difficulty fully understanding contracting rules and regulations, or if it thinks it was unfairly excluded from defense procurement.... \" The DPAP Ombudsman also provides contact information for the benefit of U.S. companies in doing business with various foreign governments.\nEmployer Support of the National Guard and Reserve Ombudsman\nThe Employer Support of the National Guard and Reserve (ESGR) Ombudsman is designed to ensure smooth transitions for soldiers returning from their military duty by ensuring that they return to their civilian jobs—or equivalent positions—without complication. This assignment results in the ESGR being a combination of an internal ombudsman (for active duty military personnel) as well as an external ombudsman (for discharged personnel reentering the private sector).\nPresident Richard M. Nixon established the ESGR in 1971 as a \"conduit between the DOD and the nation's employers when the United States changed to an all-volunteer force,\" by ensuring that service members would have their prior civilian jobs or equivalent jobs when they returned to their homes. In 1994, Congress passed the Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Its purposes are\n(1) to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result from such service; (2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing service in the uniformed services as well as to their employers, their fellow employees, and their communities, by providing for the prompt reemployment of such persons upon their completion of such service, and (3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because of their service in the uniformed services.\nThe ESGR is currently tasked to\nrecognize outstanding support from employers of service members; increase awareness of the law; and resolve employment conflicts through informal mediation.\nMore than 900 ombudsmen are located within 56 ESGR \"field committees\" that help resolve disputes between employers and employees. Complaints against an employer can be filed online. If the ombudsman is not making progress toward the resolution of a dispute within seven days, the case is referred to the Department of Labor. The ombudsmen, however, report their findings and suggestions to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. A service member seeking to nominate his or her employer for outstanding service can fill out an online nomination form at the ESGR website.\nNMCP Navy Family Ombudsman\nThe Navy Family Ombudsman, operating out of the Naval Medical Center Portsmouth (NMCP), assists families of military personnel needing medical services there. The Ombudsman duties include providing information, referrals, and contacts with regard to complaints, concerns, and questions. The Ombudsman, \"an officially appointed volunteer,\" serves as: the primary communications link between families and the command; the channel of official information from the command; and a link to related services and facilities, including legal assistance, military medical facilities, professional counseling, and various relief societies. Through outreach programs and other ways, the Ombudsman also acts \"as an advocate for the command's families.\"\nUSNHGUAM Ombudsman\nThe Ombudsman attached to the U.S. Navy Hospital in Guam is, like the one at the NMCP, a volunteer, trained to \"offer support and guidance to command families and acts as an official liaison between command and the command families.\" As such, the Ombudsman serves as the primary link between the command families and the command; serves as a communicator of information between the two; communicates regularly with command families, via newsletters, careline, phone tree, and e-mail; provides information and outreach to family members; interacts and cooperates with relevant organizations, including the American Red Cross as well as appropriate military legal and medical treatment entities; refers individuals in need of professional assistance to appropriate resources (for counseling, for instance); and acts as an advocate for command families.\nDepartment of Education Federal Student Aid Ombudsman\nThe Department of Education houses the Federal Student Aid (FSA) Ombudsman. Created in 1998 by amendments to the 1965 Act of Higher Education, the FSA Ombudsman's office received its first cases in late September 1999. Appointed by the FSA's Chief Operating Officer (COO), the FSA Ombudsman serves as a neutral fact-finder in disputes between students with loans and the FSA. The officer serves at the discretion of the COO (there is no fixed term for the position) and reports directly to the COO. The Ombudsman can recommend resolutions, but cannot compel the FSA to overturn its previous decisions. The service is free, but operates only as a last resort—provided the FSA has not already begun legal proceedings against a person receiving the loan.\nThough the Ombudsman cannot enforce his or her decisions, the position was created to\nresolve disputes from a neutral, independent viewpoint; informally conduct impartial fact-finding about complaints; recommend solutions (without the authority to reverse decisions); work to bring about changes that will help prevent future problems for other student loan borrowers; and research problems and determine whether the complainants have been treated fairly.\nIf the Ombudsman determines that a complaint is justified, he or she is to help a student negotiate with the agency or other parties involved in the dispute.\nPrior to requesting help from the FSA Ombudsman, a person seeking assistance is asked to review an online checklist of other options for resolving the dispute. If the person then determines himself or herself qualified for ombudsman assistance, he or she may send a letter to the office, telephone, or fill out the online Ombudsman Assistance Request Form. The ombudsman office does not assist the public in filling out loan forms, nor does it help find ways to pay off loans.\nDepartment of Health and Human Services\nThe Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) houses a number of distinct complaint-handling and client-assistance offices. Among them are the following.\nFood and Drug Administration Ombudsman\nWhen Food and Drug Administration (FDA) employees were found to be inadequately performing their duties in reviewing pre-market generic drug applications, the commissioner issued a \"managerial fiat\" creating the FDA Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman provides several services, including the following:\nreviews marketing or investigational applications; provides information on import or export issues; offers explanations in response to citizen petitions or general inquiries; and ensures a fair hearing of claims of unfair or unequal treatment. The office also serves as the FDA's Product Jurisdiction Officer, who determines the jurisdiction of a product headed for review if the jurisdiction is questionable. The office, however, predominantly handles complaints about regulatory issues or FDA policies.\nLong-term Care Ombudsman\nThe Long-term Care Ombudsman (LTCO) began as a demonstration program in 1972, but was mandated by statute in the Older Americans Act, which is currently administered by the Administration on Aging (AOA). The LTCO office consists of more than 1,000 paid, and nearly 14,000 volunteer, staffers, who are located in the 50 states and three additional locales—Washington, DC, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Serving an estimated 280,000 people per year, the ombudsman\nidentifies, investigates, and resolves complaints made by, or on behalf of, residents; provides information to residents about long-term care services; represents the interests of residents before governmental agencies and seek administrative, legal, and other remedies to protect residents; analyzes, comments on, and recommends changes in laws and regulations pertaining to the health, safety, welfare, and the rights of residents; educates and informs consumers and the general public regarding issues and concerns related to long-term care, and facilitates public comment on laws, regulations, policies, and actions; promotes the development of citizen organizations to participate in the program; provides technical support for the development of resident and family councils to protect the well-being and rights of residents; and advocates for changes to improve residents' quality of life and care.\nLTC ombudsmen are a blend of state and federal oversight. Though each state ombudsman office operates differently, most house their Office of the State LTC Ombudsman within the individual state's unit on aging. The National Long Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center offers \"support, technical assistance and training to the State Long Term Care Ombudsman Programs and their statewide networks of almost 600 regional (local) programs.\" The ombudsmen tread a line between acting as neutral fact-finders and as advocates for older Americans. Additionally, the ombudsmen often deal with third party private entities—an apparent rarity for federal government ombudsmen.\nMedicare Beneficiary Ombudsman\nCreated by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, the Medicare Beneficiary Ombudsman is intended to ensure that those eligible for Medicare have reliable and current information about\ntheir Medicare benefits and whether they have the information needed to make good health care decisions; their rights and protections under the Medicare Program; and the procedures for getting problems and disputes resolved.\nThe Ombudsman is to aid Medicare recipients in filing appeals if they believe their insurance did not pay proper amounts for their medical services. Recipients can also file complaints or ask for help joining or leaving a given Medicare program. The job of the Ombudsman requires him or her to take an overview of the Medicare system and ensure that the appeals process is operating properly at all government levels. The officer reports to both the Medicare Administrator and the Director of the Office of External Affairs, and is also required to submit an annual report to Congress.\nSpecialized Jurisdictional Ombudsmen\nThe FDA also has four additional ombudsmen who serve as the points of contact for specific public complaints connected to the subject of their jurisdiction. The specialized ombudsmen are located at four centers:\nCenter for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER); Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER); Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH); and Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) Ombudsman\nIf any of them cannot resolve or remedy a complaint, the issue is to be sent to the FDA Office of Ombudsman.\nDepartment of Homeland Security\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) houses a number of ombudsman-like offices. In addition to several connected with immigration and transportation matters, three others are an outgrowth of the authorities and responsibilities that the department received under legislation dealing with anti-terrorism. The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), importantly, gave additional duties to the Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, as well as the inspector general, in the Department of Homeland Security. All three entities originated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the department.\nPrivacy Officer\nThe Privacy Officer's \"mission is to minimize the impact on the individual's privacy, particularly the individual's personal information and dignity, while achieving the mission of the Department of Homeland Security.\" According to DHS, to meet this end, the Officer, who reports directly to the Secretary,\nrequires compliance with the letter and spirit of federal laws promoting privacy; centralizes Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act operations within the Privacy Office to provide policy and programmatic oversight and support operational implementation within the components; provides education and outreach to build a culture of privacy and adherence to fair information principles across the department; communicates with the public through published materials, formal notices, public workshops, and meetings; and coordinates with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, to ensure that relevant programs, policies, and procedures are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner and that Congress receives appropriate reports.\nOfficer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties\nThe mission of the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRCL) is to \"protect civil rights and civil liberties and to support homeland security by providing the Department with constructive advice on the full range of civil rights and civil liberties issues the Department will face, and by serving as an information and communication channel with the public regarding all aspects of these issues.\"\nAccording to its statutory authority, the OCRCL is to\nreview and assess information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of DHS; make public through the Internet, radio, television, or newspaper advertisements information on the responsibilities and functions of, and how to contact, the OCRCL; help the DHS Secretary, directorates, and offices of DHS to develop, implement, and periodically review DHS policies and procedures to ensure that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into DHS programs and activities; oversee compliance with constitutional, statutory, regulatory, policy, and other requirements relating to the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals affected by the programs and activities of DHS; coordinate with the Privacy Officer to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and that Congress receives appropriate reports regarding such programs, policies, and procedures; and investigate complaints and information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties, unless the inspector general of the Department determines that any such complaint or information should be investigated by the inspector general.\nOffice of Inspector General\nThe third component, the inspector general in the Department of Homeland Security, has been given certain ombudsman-like responsibilities (similar to those required of the IG in the Department of Justice). The DHS IG is to\nreceive and review complaints and information from any source alleging abuses of civil rights and liberties by DHS officials and employees, including contractors; initiate investigations of such alleged abuses; consult with and refer investigations which the IG decides not to investigate to the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; and publicize and provide convenient public access to information regarding the procedures to file complaints and the status of corrective action taken by the Department.\nTransportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights and Liberties\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) operates two distinct ombudsman-like offices. One handles internal matters, for the most part, while the other deals with external complaints.\nMost public inquiries and concerns are handled by the Office of Civil Rights and Liberties in the External Compliance Division of TSA. The Office's mission is:\nto ensure that the civil rights and liberties of the traveling public are respected throughout screening processes, without compromising security; to ensure that agency processes and procedures do not discriminate against the traveling public, and respect the constitutional freedoms of the traveling public; to ensure that the External Compliance Division meets its mission by providing civil rights guidance and services to TSA program offices, including security offices, technology offices, and communications offices; and to review TSA policies and procedures to ensure that the civil rights and liberties of the traveling public are taken into account.\nUnited States Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman\nThe 2002 Homeland Security Act created the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Ombudsman. Unlike most other ombudsman-like offices in the federal government, the USCIS Ombudsman operates separately from the agency about which it receives complaints. The Ombudsman, instead, is located under the aegis of the Department of Homeland Security and reports to the DHS Secretary or Deputy Secretary, not to a USCIS official. The USCIS Ombudsman's mission, as specified in its establishing legislation, is threefold:\nassist individuals and employers in resolving problems with USCIS; identify areas in which individuals and employers have problems dealing with USCIS; and propose changes to mitigate identified problems.\nA client seeking Ombudsman services may fill out an online form and mail it to the USCIS Washington, DC, office, where it is to be reviewed. Potential clients should receive a response to their case within 45 days. As with other complaint-handling offices, complainants may leave anonymous postings on the office's website. Like the Federal Student Aid Ombudsman, the USCIS Ombudsman can neither overturn the agency's decisions nor make exceptions to its regulations. The Ombudsman may, however, facilitate a resolution and offer formal and informal recommendations to USCIS to help it serve patrons. The office also submits an annual report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.\nUnlike offices that act as conduits only, the USCIS Ombudsman serves as an advocate for the complainants—including those experiencing delays because of the backlogs in processing immigration requests. The office also conducts outreach programs, including teleconferences and site visits. It is attempting, moreover, to create an online form that can be submitted via the Internet to expedite complaint processing, as well as establish a Virtual Ombudsman Office online that would offer a way to eliminate costly data entry.\nDepartment of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, CNMI Ombudsman\nThe Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Office of Insular Affairs in the Department of the Interior (DOI) has an affiliated Ombudsman with a confined jurisdiction and clientele: the Ombudsman is charged with providing \"assistance to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' 30,000 [foreign] workers with labor and immigration complaints.\" Often known as the Federal Ombudsman, the office was established to assist foreign workers to gain a better understanding of the laws and policies affecting them. In so doing, according to a press release, the Ombudsman's office \"works hand-in-hand with the CNMI's Department of Labor and Immigration, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the Department of the Interior to ensure activities are properly coordinated and developed.\"\nDepartment of Justice Office of Inspector General\nThe USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, passed shortly after the 9/11terrorist attacks, gave the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) certain ombudsman-related responsibilities, particularly related to civil rights and liberties matters. One of the provisions of the act, which expanded government powers in anti-terrorism efforts, directs the IG to designate an official to carry out certain duties:\nreview information and receive complaints alleging a violation of civil rights and civil liberties; make information about the functions and responsibilities of the office, including how to contact the official, available through the Internet, radio, newspapers, and television; and report semi-annually to the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary about the implementation of these requirements.\nThese functions are connected to complaints from individuals alleging abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by DOJ employees, including contractors. To respond to relevant allegations, the IG has established two special entities—a Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Complaints unit, along with a special section in the OIG Investigations Division—which are directed to\nreview information and receive complaints alleging such abuses; identify the more serious allegations and assign them to OIG employees for investigation; and refer other complaints to department components for their review and handling (and refer still others to different federal departments and agencies which have jurisdiction over the policies in question).\nDepartment of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Noise Ombudsman\nAn Aviation Noise Ombudsman (ANO) is located in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation. Created by the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, the office \"serves as a public liaison for issues about aircraft noise questions or complaints.\" The ANO usually intervenes, however, only when a complainant thinks FAA officials who had been contacted about noise problems are not responsive to an inquiry or grievance.\nDepartment of the Treasury\nSeveral different types of ombudsman-like offices are located in the Department of the Treasury. One responds to the general public, while the others respond to a select clientele in the banking industry.\nInternal Revenue Service Taxpayer Advocate Service\nThe Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS), headed by the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has undergone a number of permutations over its history, which dates from the late 1970s. Formerly titled the Office of Ombudsman, TAS is located within the Internal Revenue Service, but operates independently of any other office within the agency. Each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico has at least one local taxpayer advocate, who attempts to expedite lingering taxpayer issues and recommend \"administrative and legislative changes\" to IRS policies and operations.\nThe first taxpayer advocate was appointed by the IRS commissioner in 1979. In 1988, the Office of Taxpayer Ombudsman was officially mandated by Congress in P.L. 100-647 . Later, the 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2—intended \"to provide increased taxpayer protections\" —changed the title and altered the responsibilities of the office by creating the Taxpayer Advocate.\nTwo years later, the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, which also created an IRS Oversight Board, changed the name of the office and its head again: the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate under the supervision and direction of the National Taxpayer Advocate. The 1998 act also strengthened the office's oversight functions. The NTA is now required to submit an annual report to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance by June 30 of each year. The report must include Advocate initiatives to improve IRS services, as well as potential recommendations to the existing system. No employee of the IRS, including the commissioner, is permitted to review or comment on the report before it is submitted to Congress.\nIn addition, the 1998 amendments reinforced the expanded duties of the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate, requiring it to\nassist taxpayers in resolving problems with the Internal Revenue Service; identify areas in which taxpayers have problems in dealings with the Internal Revenue Service; propose changes, to the extent possible, in the administrative practices of the Internal Revenue Service to mitigate problems; and identify potential legislative changes that may be appropriate to mitigate such problems.\nIn 2000, the office became known as the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS), which handles both systemic IRS issues and individual taxpayer complaints. The Advocate currently reports directly to the IRS commissioner and has no term limit. The National Taxpayer Advocate is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with both the Commissioner of the IRS and the IRS Oversight Board.\nThough the TAS has the word \"advocate\" in its title, the position has a two-fold goal: it advocates for fair and efficient operation of the IRS, as well as directly for individual taxpayers themselves. Any person or business suffering \"economic harm\" or \"experiencing delays\" in the resolution of a tax problem has free access to a taxpayer advocate. A taxpayer may seek an advocate by contacting the TAS via a toll-free number and asking an IRS employee to complete and submit a required form (form 911). The taxpayer may also request and fill it out himself or herself. The completed form is sent to the appropriate taxpayer advocate, who—once assigned—is required to remain an advocate for the private party until any IRS dispute is resolved. The advocate, whose service is confidential, is independent of all other IRS offices.\nOffice of the Comptroller of the Currency Ombudsman\nThe Ombudsman in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—which operates under the Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994—is one of five in \"appropriate federal banking agencies\" established by the act and one of two in the Department of the Treasury. The ombudsman is to\nact as a liaison between the agency and any affected person with respect to any problem in dealing with the agency resulting from its regulatory activities; and assure that safeguards exist to encourage complainants to come forward and preserve confidentiality.\nIn so doing, the OCC Ombudsman is to report weaknesses in OCC policy and may stay any appealable agency decision.\nOffice of Thrift Supervision Ombudsman\nThe Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is one of the five federal entities required by the Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 to have an Ombudsman. All five Ombudsmen are to follow the same statutory directives, that is, to serve as liaisons between the agency and any affected parties with respect to problems in dealing with agency regulatory activities and to encourage complainants to come forward. The jurisdictions and clientele differ among these Ombudsmen. The OTS ombudsman is to respond to questions, concerns, and complaints from federally chartered thrift institutions. He or she is to \"assist the thrift community in resolving such matters relating to regulatory oversight that may hinder their institution.\" Although hired and paid by OTS, the Ombudsman is to be \"an advocate for equity ... and is required to perform his duties in an objective and neutral manner.\"\nDepartment of Veterans Affairs\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) houses several ombudsman-like offices, including the following.\nBoard of Veterans' Appeals Ombudsman\nFor military service members who claim that they have been unfairly denied medical treatment for an injury received or condition caused during duty, the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) is to determine whether they are eligible to receive benefits. The BVA Ombudsman is to assist in this matter in two basic ways:\nremedy unsatisfactory experiences with the department; and make certain that communication with the BVA is clear and timely.\nThe BVA website also offers links to a variety of VA offices, including the Debt Management Center and the National Personnel Records Center. Like similar ombudsman positions, the BVA Ombudsman does not have the ability to require other VA centers or offices to take specific action. The Ombudsman, however, receives complaints from eligible parties and attempts to ensure that the BVA is operating effectively.\nFederal Recovery Coordinators and Transition Patient Advocates\nFor injured combat veterans, there are two newly created statutory positions to handle aspects of their recovery. Though neither the Transition Patient Advocate (TPA) nor the Federal Recovery Coordinator operates in the classic ombudsman capacity, they both serve to help returning soldiers navigate the veterans' medical system.\nOne hundred TPAs currently operate within VA hospitals across the country. The TPA program, which began in May 2007, consists almost entirely of former soldiers who offer assistance and advice as peers to soldiers who return from service with a severe injury. The TPAs are part of a three-person team assigned to each returning Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) soldier with a severe injury. The other two members of the team are a program manager and a case manager—usually a nurse or social worker. The TPA's job is to \"ensure a smooth transition of wounded service members through VA's health care system.\" In so doing, the TPA can aid in meeting the everyday needs—including scheduling medical appointments—of a returning soldier who is enrolled at any of the 1,308 VA facilities.\nIn addition to the 100 TPAs working at the Veterans Affairs medical treatment centers, the VA joined forces with the Department of Defense (DOD) to add 10 \"Federal Recovery Coordinator\" positions. The two departments created the coordinator positions after the Report of the President's Commission on Care for America's Returning Wounded Warriors, commonly known as the Dole-Shalala Commission, recommended their creation. The recovery care coordinators, who are separate from a three-person case management team, are to\ncoordinate services between VA and DOD and, if necessary, private sector facilities; serve as the ultimate resource for families with questions or concerns about VA, DOD, or other federal benefits; and ensure the appropriate oversight and coordination for care of active duty service members and veterans with major amputations, severe traumatic brain injury, spinal cord injury, severe sight or hearing impairments, and severe multiple injuries.\nThe Federal Recovery Coordinator focuses on the long-term recovery of each returning wounded soldier, whereas the TPA focuses on day-to-day needs. Also, in contrast to the TPAs, the recovery coordinators may offer their services to all returning injured soldiers, regardless of whether they are receiving treatment at VA facilities.\nEnvironmental Protection Agency\nThe Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has several prominent complaint-handling offices.\nOffice of Inspector General Public Liaison\nThe Public Liaison (formerly the ombudsman) currently operates within the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Congress created an ombudsman function within the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response with an amendment to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1984. The position initially dealt only with hazardous waste matters. Later, EPA extended the position past its 1988 legislative authorization and expanded its jurisdiction to include Superfund sites. After a July 2001 GAO report critical of the ombudsman office, EPA proposed a controversial transfer of the Office of Congressional and Public Liaison to the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The GAO report found several structural weaknesses in the ombudsman office at the time:\nEPA's national ombudsman is located within the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER), the organizational unit whose decisions the ombudsman is responsible for investigating, and his budget and staff resources are controlled by unit managers within OSWER.... [T]his arrangement undermines another fundamental requirement of an effective ombudsman: impartiality.\nEPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman determined that moving the ombudsman into the IG office would give the ombudsman \"more independence and the impartiality necessary to conduct credible inquires,\" while critics of the move—including Robert J. Martin, the EPA Ombudsman at the time—insisted that the transfer would \"put the ombudsman even more firmly under the authority\" of EPA administrators. In January 2002, Martin filed a motion in federal district court to block the proposed move. Three months later, however, a federal district judge dismissed the motion, paving the way for the ombudsman to be moved into the OIG. Martin resigned his post, which was renamed Public Liaison, shortly after the move. According to the EPA, the Public Liaison\nreceives, reviews, and processes complaints and allegations about agency programs and activities; writes and publishes reports of agency needs and desired assessments; and prevents and detects fraud, waste, and abuse.\nIn addition to the Public Liaison, 10 regional EPA ombudsmen receive complaints about regulatory polices regarding Superfund sites. The public can contact the Office of Congressional and Public Liaison, located in Washington, DC, by telephone, mail, facsimile, or e-mail.\nAlthough the Public Liaison cannot require EPA to make changes to policies or practices, he or she can \"refer\" cases to agency management for \"review or action,\" or refer the case to an outside agency—such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation—for further review, if warranted. In most cases, the complaint comes in through the Public Liaison's \"hotline,\" which includes a toll-free phone number. It may also be submitted via e-mail, traditional mail, or in-person. Complainants may remain anonymous. The Liaison then reviews the complaint and determines whether the agency has performed its duties in an acceptable manner. All other waste management complaints are to be handled by the liaison, while criminal investigations are to be referred to a different office.\nSmall Business Ombudsman\nThe EPA created the Small Business Ombudsman (SBO) function in 1982. In 1986, the SBO began also serving as the EPA's Asbestos Ombudsman. The position is established to\nserve as a liaison between small businesses and the EPA to promote understanding of Agency policy and small business needs and concerns; staff a small business hotline that provides regulatory and technical assistance information; maintain and distribute an extensive collection of informational and technical literature developed by the various EPA program offices; make personal appearances as a speaker or panelist at small business-related meetings; meet with more than 45 key national trade associations representing several million small businesses and with state and regional ombudsmen who serve businesses on the local level; provide guidance on the development of national policies and regulations that impact small businesses; and track development and implementation of regulations affecting small business in support of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.\nThe Ombudsman's primary responsibility is to respond to telephone inquiries about regulatory requirements and pollution prevention. The office also prepares a semi-annual newsletter that is sent to its constituency, which includes members of the public, small business owners, legislators, employees, and agency managers. In addition to the main ASBO office, there are 10 Regional Fairness Boards, each consisting of five members, who are small business owners in their local communities.\nFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation Ombudsman\nThe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures deposits in U.S. banks, includes an Office of the Ombudsman (OO). It is one of five such offices established by the Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994. The OO has two primary charges under the act:\nact as a liaison between the agency and any affected person with respect to any problem such party may have in dealing with the agency resulting from the regulatory activities of the agency; and assure that safeguards exist to encourage complainants to come forward and preserve confidentiality.\nThe OO, however, does not act as an \"advocate\" for individual complainants and it cannot conduct in-depth investigations or require changes in management decisions. Nonetheless, it may clarify FDIC policies and direct complaints to the appropriate division or office, while maintaining the complainant's anonymity. The rash of bank failures in 2008 and 2009, moreover, prompted an expansion in the ombudsman office; it includes a new unit designed to give \"borrowers an additional venue for having their concerns addressed by the FDIC,\" additional staff, and a new guide for borrowers confronted by a failed bank and the subsequent receivership process.\nFreedom of Information Act Entities\nThe Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Amendments of 2007 created two ombudsman-like posts: Public Liaisons and an Office of Government Information Services.\nPublic Liaisons\nThe 2007 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act required the creation of public liaison positions throughout much of the executive branch to ensure prompt and proper responses to the public's FOIA requests. The amendments called for the designation of \"one or more FOIA Public Liaisons\" in each agency, leaving the determination of the size of the staff up to department and agency heads. As instructed by the amendments, \"each agency shall make available its FOIA Public Liaison, who shall assist in the resolution of any disputes between the requester and the agency.\" The Liaison is permitted, moreover, to attempt non-binding dispute resolutions as an alternative to litigation. In addition, each agency is to designate a Chief FOIA Officer who will, in turn, \"designate one or more FOIA Public Liaisons.\"\nOffice of Government Information Services\nThe 2007 FOIA Amendments also provided for the creation of an Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) within the National Archives and Records Administration. The law required the new office to\nreview policies and procedures of administrative agencies under this section; review compliance with this section by administrative agencies; and recommend policy changes to Congress and the President to improve the administration of this section. The office began operations in September 2009.\nGeneral Services Administration Construction Metrication Ombudsman\nThe General Services Administration (GSA) has established a highly specialized ombudsman with narrow jurisdiction: the Construction Metrication Ombudsman (CMO), located in the Administration's Senior Procurement Executive. The CMO, as with counterparts in other agencies, stems from a statutory requirement that\nthe head of each executive agency that awards construction contracts within the United States and its territories shall designate a senior agency official to serve as a construction metrication ombudsman who shall be responsible for reviewing and responding to complaints from prospective bidders, subcontractors, suppliers, or their designated representatives related to—(A) guidance or regulations issued by the agency on the use of the metric system of measurement in contracts for the construction of Federal buildings; and (B) the use of the metric system of measurement for services and materials required for incorporation in individual projects to construct Federal buildings.\nIn so doing, the CMO is required to respond to each complaint in writing within 60 days and make a recommendation to the head of the agency for an appropriate resolution. After the agency head has made a decision, based on this recommendation, the ombudsman is to communicate it in writing to the affected parties and to the public in a timely manner, as well as to all appropriate offices within the agency. The CMO is also charged with monitoring the implementation of the decision.\nNational Aeronautics and Space Administration Procurement Ombudsman and Center Procurement Ombudsman\nIn 1996, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established a Procurement Ombudsman, along with related Center Procurement Ombudsmen in the Administration's eight centers. Created administratively (NPD 5101.32), the Procurement Ombudsman is to \"take action to resolve concerns, disagreements, and recommendations submitted by interested parties that cannot be resolved at the Center level, or those having agency-wide implications.\" Basically, the office was created \"to address the procurement concerns of NASA contractors before they become problems.\"\nTo accomplish this, the NASA Ombudsman is to respond to relevant inquiries and concerns, work with appropriate NASA officials to resolve concerns, and refer specific matters to appropriate Center Procurement Ombudsmen. Additional responsibilities for the Agency and Center Procurement Ombudsmen include collecting and distributing relevant facts and information, reviewing and resolving complaints relative to certain types of contracts, and maintaining a log to track individual cases from receipt to disposition.\nNational Credit Union Administration Ombudsman\nThe National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) houses an Ombudsman, who \"investigates complaints and recommends solutions\" related to \"regulatory issues that cannot be resolved at the operational (regional) level.\" The Ombudsman is to help the complainants resolve disputes by defining options and recommending actions to the parties involved. The Ombudsman, however, cannot decide on matters in dispute or advocate the position of the complainant, NCUA, or other parties.\nThe position is one of five created by the Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, which also covers the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The enactment directs them to act as liaisons between the agency and any affected persons with respect to problems associated with regulatory activities and to encourage complainants to come forward.\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence Civil Liberties Protection Officer\nThe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 provided for a number of ombudsman-like offices connected with the protection of civil rights, civil liberties, and individual privacy. In addition to those in the Department of Homeland Security is the Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); the CLPO is appointed by and reports directly to the Director. The Civil Liberties Protection Officer's duties, among others, are to ensure that\nthe protection of civil liberties and privacy is appropriately incorporated in the relevant ODNI policies and procedures; the use of technologies sustains, and does not erode, privacy; and complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in the administration of programs and operations of the ODNI are reviewed and assessed and, as appropriate, investigated.\nSmall Business Administration\nTwo separate offices in the Small Business Administration (SBA)—Ombudsman and Advocacy—provide various types of complaint-handling services, information, outreach, and other forms of assistance to clients in the small business community. In light of their possible overlap, the two offices issued a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to foster increased cooperation between them, recognizing that \"both work to provide a more small business friendly regulatory environment.\" The MOU spells out their separate roles and responsibilities.\nSBA Ombudsman\nCongress created the SBA's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman, now known as the National Office of the Ombudsman, in the Small Business Regulatory Fairness Enforcement Act of 1996. Under the act, the Office is designed to\nestablish a means to receive comments from small businesses regarding federal agency compliance and enforcement activities; conduct hearings in each of the 10 federal regions to solicit comments on small business concerns to ensure that these businesses have an avenue through which they can comment on agency enforcement activities; and issue annual reports to the SBA Administrator and Congress evaluating the enforcement activities of agency personnel, including a rating of the agency's responsiveness to small businesses.\nIn receiving comments, the Ombudsman serves as a liaison between small businesses and federal agencies. These comments are to be forwarded to federal agencies for a high-level review; and the agencies are requested to consider the fairness of their enforcement actions, after which the Ombudsman is to send a copy of the agencies' responses to the small businesses. In some cases, fines have been lowered or eliminated and decisions changed in favor of small businesses. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman cannot change, stop, or delay a federal agency enforcement action.\nSBA Office of Advocacy\nSBA also houses a distinct Office of Advocacy, headed by a chief counsel. The office, established in 1976, is broadly designed to examine the role of small businesses in the American economy, including the impact and effectiveness of regulations on them, and make recommendations with regard to such determinations. In so doing, the Office is to provide relevant data and information to the small business community and the federal government. The Advocacy Office may also file amicus curiae briefs on regulatory matters before federal appellate courts. The regional advocates are to help to ensure communication between the small business community and the chief counsel, and provide a link between the counsel, local businesses, and state and local governments. Part of this process may involve receiving complaints and concerns from small businesses, but the Advocate is not obligated to respond to individual pleas as is the Ombudsman.\nU.S. Agency for International Development Acquisition and Assistance Ombudsman\nThe U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) established an Acquisition and Assistance (AA) Ombudsman in 1999, in part prompted by the earlier Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. The role of the Ombudsman is to ensure \"equitable treatment of all parties participating in USAID's grants and contracts (for acquisitions and assistance) throughout the process.\" The AA Ombudsman is tasked with managing complaints about specific AA proceedings and with facilitating the resolution of differences through an informal, impartial administrative review of the agency action in question. Operating as a neutral intermediary, the Ombudsman is to maintain the anonymity and confidentiality of complainants.\nU.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Small Business Ombudsman\nIn 1996, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) established a Small Business Ombudsman (SBO) to serve as a liaison to that community to answer inquiries, provide information, and proffer advice and guidance about compliance with the statutes, regulations, and policies under the CPSC's jurisdiction. The SBO also is to provide technical guidance to small businesses attempting to resolve problems with the Office of Compliance and the Office of Hazard Identification and Reduction. Along with these activities, the Ombudsman is to maintain a liaison with its counterpart in the Small Business Administration and \"an ongoing dialogue with national trade associations that represent small businesses.\"\nU.S. Postal Service Consumer Advocate\nIn 1970, Congress passed the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA), which transformed the struggling United States Post Office Department into the United States Postal Service (USPS), an independent establishment in the executive branch. One of its components is a Consumer Advocate.\nThe workload of USPS, the largest federal civilian employer, is heavy. It delivers more than 212 billion pieces of mail annually to more than 120 million homes and businesses in the United States and its territories and commonwealths. When customer complaints arise over its service, responses usually follow several stages, initially with the local post office. At the national level, the Postal Service established a Consumer Advocate of the Postal Service as another way to improve customer service. The Advocate, created in 1971 by then-Postmaster Winton M. Blount, is to respond to customer concerns in several ways. It aids customers whose insured parcels were lost or damaged during mailing. If USPS denies the indemnity claim, the Customer Advocate adjudicates an appeal. The Advocate also independently measures customer satisfaction and customer perspectives, relying on nearly 900,000 survey results annually. A patron seeking assistance from the Consumer Advocate can request it from the local mail carrier; call, write, or visit the local post office; or call the USPS national hotline." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 1, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h2_title h1_title", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full h2_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why does this report compare federal complaint-handling, ombudsman, and advocacy offices?", "What specific differences does the report compare?", "What are external ombudsman?", "What are internal ombudsmen?", "What characterized initial interest in establishing a government-wide ombudsman?", "How did President Clinton address this legislative interest?", "How did the private and public sectors react to President Clinton's plans?", "To what extent has transformative ombudsman reform occured?", "Why are there a variety of ombudsman-like offices?", "To what extent does there exist a list of these offices?" ], "summary": [ "Federal complaint-handling, ombudsman, and advocacy offices have different forms, capacities, and designations. This report, which reviews the state of research in this field and the heritage of such offices, examines and compares them, along with recent legislative developments and past proposals to establish a government-wide ombudsman.", "In so doing, the report identifies the basic characteristics of these offices, recognizing differences among them with regard to their powers, duties, jurisdictions, locations, and resources, as well as control over them.", "This study covers only ombudsman-like offices at the federal level that deal with the public, sometimes known as \"external ombudsmen.\"", "It does not cover \"internal ombudsmen,\" that is, offices created to handle complaints from employees and resolve disputes between them and management; ombudsman-like offices in the private sector; or similar entities at other levels of government in the United States or abroad, except to note differences among them.", "Legislative interest, albeit sporadic, in establishing a government-wide ombudsman or standardizing individual offices across-the-board dates to the early 1960s. These efforts extended in the 1970s to proposals to establish an independent office of consumer representation or consumer affairs, a plan that President Jimmy Carter later endorsed.", "Another initiative emerged in 1993, when President William Clinton—through an executive order \"Setting Customer Service Standards\"—directed executive departments and agencies to make information, service, and complaint-systems easily accessible and provide means to address such complaints. The order also called for agencies to set customer service standards, survey customers, report to the President on those surveys, and publish customer service plans.", "A subsequent government-wide customer satisfaction survey, incidentally, found a similar range of satisfaction between the private and public sectors.", "Notwithstanding these efforts over the past five decades, no comprehensive, across-the-board transformations have occurred.", "Nonetheless, numerous individual offices have been established, modified, and proposed by administrative directives, public laws, and congressional bills. This piecemeal approach—reflecting different demands in both the government and society over time and across policy areas—has resulted in a variety of ombudsman-like offices.", "Although a complete, authoritative identification and description of current offices does not exist, a number of studies—from past and contemporary eras, along with the examples here—provide a wide sampling of complaint-handling and advocacy offices for examination and consideration as models." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 0, 1, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R40208	{ "title": [ "", "Developments in the First Half of 2014", "South China Sea Tensions and Sino-Vietnam Relations1", "Bilateral Nuclear Energy Agreement Signed8", "Introduction", "U.S. Interests and Goals in the Bilateral Relationship", "Vietnam's Interests and Goals in the Bilateral Relationship", "A Ceiling on the Relationship?", "Human Rights in the U.S.-Vietnam Relationship", "Congress's Role", "Brief History of the Normalization of U.S.-Vietnam Relations", "Major Issues in U.S.-Vietnam Relations", "Diplomatic Ties", "High Level Meetings, the July 2013 Summit, and the Comprehensive Partnership", "The South China Sea Dispute", "The Lower Mekong Initiative", "Economic Ties32", "Trade Initiatives: GSP, TIFA, BIT, and TPP", "Trade Friction", "U.S. Foreign Assistance to Vietnam", "Human Rights Issues", "Overview", "Human Rights in U.S.-Vietnam Relations", "Press and Internet Freedoms", "Ethnic Minorities", "Religious Freedom", "Workers' Rights46", "Human Trafficking50", "The Vietnam Human Rights Act", "Military-to-Military Ties", "Military Assistance", "Vietnam War \"Legacy\" Issues", "Agent Orange58", "Unexploded Ordnance59", "POW/MIA Issues", "Conditions in Vietnam", "Economic Developments", "Vietnam's Energy Plans71", "Vietnam's Politics and Political Structure", "Vietnam's Leadership Team", "The National Assembly77", "Vietnam-China Relations", "History", "Relations Today", "The Environment", "Selected Legislation in the 113th Congress" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "", "In the late spring of 2014, longstanding tensions between Vietnam and China over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea flared, deepening U.S.-Vietnam cooperation on maritime security issues in Southeast Asia. In early May, the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) moved a large exploratory oil rig into waters that Vietnam says lie on its continental shelf. The rig was positioned about 120 nautical miles from Vietnam's coast and less than 20 nautical miles from one of the Paracel Islands claimed by both China and Vietnam. Around 80 Chinese ships, including some Chinese coast guard and naval vessels, reportedly entered the area escorting the rig. Vietnamese patrol boats and fishing boats have entered the same waters, and a number of collisions between the Chinese and Vietnamese boats have occurred. Both sides blame the collisions on the other. China has said that the oil rig will remain in the area until August.\nThe U.S. State Department issued a statement describing China's deployment of the rig as a \"provocative ... unilateral action\" that \"appears to be part of a broader pattern of Chinese behavior to advance its claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the region.\" Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Danny Russel, speaking in June 2014, said that both China and Vietnam need to \"exercise restraint,\" and that both \"should remove all of their ships, and China should remove the oil rig.... \" The United States has not taken a position on specific territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Instead, the Obama Administration has focused on claimants' behavior.\nAmong legislative initiatives that touch on the South China Sea disputes, H.R. 4495 , the Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, states that U.S. policy urges all parties to the disputes to \"refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities.\" S.Res. 167 , which the Senate passed in July 2013, \"condemns\" maritime vessels' and aircrafts' use of coercion, threats, or force in the South China Sea and East China Sea to assert disputed maritime or territorial claims or alter the status quo. Among other items, S.Res. 167 \"supports\" U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific, including in partnership with other countries, to support the freedom of navigation.\nAs discussed in the \" The South China Sea Dispute \" section below, since 2010 the Administration has focused on encouraging all parties to negotiate a multilateral code of conduct and has criticized many of China's actions in the South China Sea for raising tensions in the region. Negotiations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China over a Code of Conduct started in 2013, although rising tensions and divisions over what should be included in such a code have made progress difficult. China's actions in the South China Sea also have led the Obama Administration and the Vietnamese government to intensify collaboration in a number of security and maritime-related areas and fora. For instance, in December 2013 the United States said it would provide Vietnam with $18 million in assistance, including five fast patrol vessels, to enhance Vietnam's maritime security capacity. When asked during his confirmation hearing how to help foster a peaceful resolution to the South China Sea disputes, Ted Osius, the Obama Administration's nominee to be ambassador to Vietnam, said \"I think we should explore further expansion of Vietnam's maritime domain awareness and how we can help Vietnam build its capacity to deal with the challenges in the South China Sea.\" He also said that it may be time to consider relaxing U.S. restrictions on the sale of military items to Vietnam. For more on U.S.-Vietnam military-to-military relations, see the \" Military-to-Military Ties \" section below.\nOne reason many policymakers and observers were surprised by China's move to position the oil rig in disputed waters is that over the past two years, Hanoi and Beijing had expanded high-level ties and appeared to be committed to efforts to manage their maritime disputes. In 2011, the two countries signed an Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime Issues. Two years later, a 2013 bilateral agreement created working groups to discuss joint development in the disputed areas and a hotline to deal with fishery incidents. For Vietnam, maintaining stability and friendship with its northern neighbor is critical for economic development and security; Hanoi usually does not undertake large-scale diplomatic moves without first calculating Beijing's likely reaction. To date, even as it has protested the oil rig and China's cordon around it, Hanoi appears to be trying to avoid taking moves that could provoke Beijing, such as increasing its naval presence in the area, inviting U.S. Navy ships for unscheduled port visits, or initiating a legal case against China's actions and/or claims. For more background on Sino-Vietnamese relations, see the \" Vietnam-China Relations \" section below.\nA factor influencing leaders in Hanoi is a significant anti-Chinese sentiment inside Vietnam. These emotions surfaced in the days after CNOOC's positioning of its oil rig. Protests involving thousands of Vietnamese ensued. Reportedly most occurred in urban areas, were peaceful, and appeared to be tolerated by Vietnamese authorities, who generally prevent large-scale gatherings. According to a Wall Street Journal investigation, Vietnamese human rights activists used the oil rig as an opportunity to organize the protests and many participants chanted slogans calling on the need for Vietnam to \"change\" in order to be \"strong.\"\nShortly after the peaceful protests occurred, Vietnam experienced its worst reported violent unrest in years in industrial areas on the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City and in central Vietnam. Reportedly thousands of Vietnamese rioted, torching and creating large-scale damage at hundreds of foreign-owned factories. A number of individuals, perhaps including some Chinese nationals, appear to have been killed, though reports vary. According to several reports, most of the factories that were damaged were Taiwanese owned, though several of these employed many Chinese managers and laborers. Some Korean and Vietnamese factories also were damaged. According to some reports and analyses, the rioters appeared to be motivated at least in part by long-standing labor grievances. The aforementioned Wall Street Journal investigation reported that the rioters looted many of the targeted factories. In response, Vietnamese authorities reportedly arrested hundreds.", "U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation on nuclear energy and nonproliferation has grown in recent years along with closer bilateral economic, military, and diplomatic ties. In 2010, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding that Obama Administration officials said would be a \"stepping stone\" to a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, under which the United States could license the export of nuclear reactor and research information, material, and equipment to Vietnam. In early May 2014, the two countries signed this agreement, and the Administration submitted it to Congress for review. Three bills have been introduced to date that would approve the agreement with Vietnam. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez introduced a resolution that would approve the agreement ( S.J.Res. 36 ) on May 22. On June 9, 2014, Senator Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced S.J.Res. 39 and Representative Adam Kinzinger with Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Eliot Engel introduced H.J.Res. 116 . Both of these bills provide for the approval of the U.S.-Vietnam nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement will enter into force upon the 90 th day of continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless Congress enacts a Joint Resolution of disapproval.\nAt least three issues are expected to be prominent if and when Congress takes up the agreement: (1) whether the agreement should have included stronger nonproliferation commitments, such as a legally binding commitment by Vietnam not to build uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities; (2) the extent to which U.S. companies might benefit from an agreement; and (3) the extent to which Vietnam's human rights record and the growing U.S.-Vietnam strategic relationship should affect the decision to enter into a nuclear energy agreement.\nIn a move related to the bilateral nuclear energy agreement signing, in May 2014 Vietnam's government announced that it would participate in the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led group of about 100 countries that was established in 2003 to increase international cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. In the past, Vietnamese officials said they would not join PSI because it operates outside the United Nations system.", "Since 2002, overlapping strategic and economic interests have led the United States and Vietnam to improve relations across a wide spectrum of issues. Starting in 2010, the two countries accelerated this process, effectively forming a partnership on several fronts. Obama Administration officials identify Vietnam as one of the new partners they are cultivating as part of their \"rebalancing\" of U.S. priorities toward the Asia-Pacific, a move commonly referred to as the United States' \"pivot\" to the Pacific. In 2010, the two countries mobilized a multinational response to China's perceived attempts to boost its claims to disputed waters and islands in the South China Sea, and they have continued to work closely on issues of maritime freedom and security. Additionally, the Obama Administration encouraged Vietnam to be a \"full partner\" in the ongoing 12-country Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiations and has given a higher priority to cleaning up sites contaminated by Agent Orange/dioxin used by U.S. troops during the Vietnam War. Over the past several years, the two sides also have signed a new agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation and have increased their non-proliferation cooperation. In 2013, President Obama and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang met in the White House and announced a bilateral \"comprehensive partnership\" that is to provide an \"overarching framework\" for moving the relationship to a \"new phase.\" As discussed in detail below, the biggest obstacle to the two countries taking a dramatic step forward in their relationship is disagreements over Vietnam's human rights record.", "Currently, factors generating U.S. interest in the relationship include growing trade and investment flows, the population of more than 1 million Americans of Vietnamese descent, the legacy of the Vietnam War, the perception that Vietnam is becoming a \"middle power\" with commensurate influence in Southeast Asia, and shared concern over the rising strength of China. U.S. goals with respect to Vietnam include opening markets for U.S. trade and investment, furthering human rights and democracy within the country, countering China's increasing regional influence, cooperating to ensure freedom of navigation and operation in and around the South China Sea, and expanding U.S. influence in Southeast Asia. The array of policy instruments the United States employs in relations with Vietnam includes trade incentives and restrictions, foreign assistance, cooperation in international organizations, diplomatic pressures, educational outreach, and security cooperation. Since 2010, strategic concerns about China have taken on a larger role in the Obama Administration's formulation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam.", "For Vietnam's part, since the mid-1980s, Hanoi essentially has pursued a four-pronged national strategy: (1) prioritize economic development through market-oriented reforms; (2) pursue good relations with Southeast Asian neighbors that provide Vietnam with economic partners and diplomatic friends; and (3) deepen its relationship with China, while (4) simultaneously buttressing this by improving relations with the United States as a counterweight to Chinese ambition. By virtue of its economic importance and great power status, the United States has loomed large not only in Vietnam's strategic calculations, but also in domestic developments. For instance, Vietnam's protracted decision from 1999 to 2001 to sign and ratify the landmark bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the United States—which Congress approved in October 2001—helped to break the logjam that had effectively paralyzed debate in Hanoi over the future direction and scope of economic reforms. Additionally, notwithstanding the legacies of the Vietnam War era, the Vietnamese public appears to hold positive views of the United States.\nThere are a number of strategic and tactical reasons behind Vietnam's efforts to upgrade its relationship with the United States. Many Vietnamese policymakers seek to counter Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia, and preserve its territorial and other interest in the South China Sea, by encouraging a sustained U.S. presence in the region. Vietnam also needs a favorable international economic environment—for which it sees U.S. support as critical—to enable the country's economy to continue to expand so it can achieve its goal of becoming an industrialized country by 2020. Securing greater access to the U.S. market, which already is the largest destination for Vietnam's export, would boost Vietnam's economy and is a major reason Vietnam is participating in the TPP negotiations.", "Ultimately, the pace and extent of the improvement in bilateral relations is limited by several factors, including Hanoi's wariness of upsetting Beijing, U.S. scrutiny of Vietnam's human rights record, and Vietnamese conservatives' suspicions that the United States' long-term goal is to end the Vietnamese Communist Party's (VCP's) monopoly on power through a \"peaceful evolution\" strategy. However, it is possible that these concerns could be lessened, and the possibilities for strategic cooperation increased, if the United States and Vietnam both believe China is becoming unduly assertive in Southeast Asia.", "As was true of their predecessors, Obama Administration officials have continuously expressed concerns—including via public criticisms—about human rights incidents. Indeed, criticisms of Vietnam's human rights record appear to have played a significant role in convincing the Administration to oppose a number of items desired by Hanoi, such as expanding the types of arms that U.S. companies can sell to Vietnam. Concerns over human rights also appear to have been part of the reason the Administration chose not to hold a standalone summit meeting until July 2013. Likewise, Vietnamese leaders do not appear willing to fundamentally alter their treatment of dissenters or minority groups in order to more rapidly advance strategic relations with the United States.\nHowever, differences over human rights have not prevented the two countries from improving relations overall, despite many signs that human rights conditions have deteriorated over the past few years. Barring a much more dramatic downturn in Vietnam's human rights situation, Administration officials appear to see Vietnam's human rights situation not as an impediment to short-term cooperation on various issues, but rather as a ceiling on what might be accomplished between the two countries, particularly over the long term.", "Throughout the process of normalizing relations with Vietnam, Congress has played a significant role. Not only has Congress advanced and designed bilateral initiatives, and provided oversight and guidance, but it also has shaped the bilateral interaction by imposing constraints and providing relevant funding, as well as through its approval process for agreements. Many Members have been at the forefront of efforts to highlight human rights conditions in Vietnam, as well as \"legacy issues\" of the Vietnam War, such as recovering the remains of missing U.S. troops and providing for the environmental remediation and the provision of health care services to areas contaminated by Agent Orange/dioxin used by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. In the 1990s and early 2000s, many Members of Congress who favored improved bilateral relations provided the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations with political backing for their policies of upgrading relations with Vietnam. Notably, these voices either have left Congress or appear to have become less vocal in recent years, coinciding with a rising perception that Vietnam's human rights situation has deteriorated. U.S. and Vietnamese participation in the TPP talks may provide Congress with another opportunity to exert influence over U.S.-Vietnam relations; Congress must approve implementing legislation if the TPP is to apply to the United States.\nSometime in 2014, Congress may also take up the U.S.-Vietnam nuclear energy cooperation agreement. However, the rules regarding consideration of such \"123 agreements\" reduce Congress' ability to use them to influence U.S. policy: the agreements enter into force upon the 90 th day of continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless Congress enacts a Joint Resolution of disapproval. Even if both chambers of Congress pass such a resolution, it is subject to a Presidential veto.", "The United States' post-World War II military involvement in Vietnam began in the early 1960s, with the dispatch of military advisers to assist the South Vietnamese government (officially known as the Republic of Vietnam) in its battles with communist North Vietnam and indigenous (i.e., South Vietnamese) communist forces and their allies. Thereafter, the U.S. presence escalated. By the time the Nixon Administration withdrew U.S. forces in 1973, millions of U.S. troops had served in Vietnam, with more than 50,000 killed.\nThe war became increasingly unpopular in the United States and in Congress. In 1973, following the conclusion of a Paris Peace Agreement that brought an end to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, Congress began cutting Nixon Administration requests for military and economic assistance to South Vietnam.\nU.S.-Vietnam diplomatic and economic relations were virtually nonexistent for more than 15 years following North Vietnam's victory in 1975 over South Vietnam. The United States maintained a trade embargo and suspended foreign assistance to unified Vietnam. Obstacles to improved relations included U.S. demands that Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia (which Vietnam invaded in 1978), U.S. insistence on the return of and information about U.S. Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIAs), and Vietnamese demands that the United States provide several billion dollars in postwar reconstruction aid, which they claimed had been promised by the Nixon Administration.\nA series of actions by Vietnam following the end of the Vietnam War had a long-term negative effect on U.S.-Vietnamese relations. Stymied in its efforts to establish relations with the United States, Vietnam aligned itself economically and militarily with the Soviet Union. In addition, it invaded Cambodia and installed a government backed by 200,000 Vietnamese troops. China conducted a one-month military incursion along Vietnam's northern border in 1979, which led to nearly three decades of disputes over the land border, and kept strong military pressure on Vietnam until 1990. U.S. policy toward Vietnam was also influenced by the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese \"boat people,\" including many ethnic Chinese, who fled or were expelled under Vietnam's harsh reunification program.\nDevelopments in the mid- and late 1980s set the stage for the rapid normalization of ties in the following decade. Inside Vietnam, disastrous economic conditions and virtual diplomatic isolation led the VCP to adopt (at its 6 th National Party Congress in 1986) a more pragmatic, less ideological, line. Hanoi adopted market-oriented economic reforms (dubbed doi moi , or \"renovation\"), loosened many domestic political controls, and began to seek ways to extract itself from Cambodia.\nU.S.-Vietnam cooperation on the POW/MIA issue began to improve following a 1987 visit to Vietnam by General John Vessey, President Reagan's Special Emissary for POW-MIA Issues. As Vietnam withdrew forces from Cambodia in 1989 and sought a compromise peace settlement there, the George H. W. Bush Administration decided to improve relations with Hanoi, which was also interested in restoring ties to the United States. In April 1991, the United States laid out a detailed \"road map\" for normalization with Vietnam. Later that year, Vietnam allowed the United States to open an office in Hanoi to handle POW/MIA affairs.\nIn 1993, President Clinton built on the thaw by signaling the end of U.S. opposition to Vietnam receiving international financial assistance. In February 1994, President Clinton announced the end of the U.S. trade embargo on Vietnam. Two months later, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P.L. 103-236 ), which contained a \"Sense of the Senate\" section expressing that chamber's support for the normalization of relations with Vietnam. Despite congressional efforts to tie normalization to the POW/MIA issue and Vietnam's human rights record, President Clinton continued to advance U.S. relations with Vietnam. He appointed the first post-war ambassador to Vietnam in 1997 and signed the landmark U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement (BTA) in 2000. Throughout this period, the normalization process was made possible by Vietnam's strategic desire to improve relations with the United States, continued improvements in POW/MIA cooperation, Vietnam's ongoing reform efforts, and by Vietnam's general cooperation on refugee issues. President Clinton visited Vietnam from November 16-20, 2000, the first trip by a U.S. President since Richard Nixon went to Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) in 1969. The visit was notable for the unexpected enthusiasm expressed by ordinary Vietnamese, who thronged by the thousands to greet or catch a glimpse of the President and the First Lady. These spontaneous outbursts, combined with the President's public and private remarks about human rights and democratization, triggered rhetorical responses from conservative Vietnamese leaders. During the visit, Vietnamese leaders pressed the United States for compensation for Agent Orange victims, for assistance locating the remains of Vietnam's soldiers still missing, and for an increase in the United States' bilateral economic assistance program.\nProgress towards the resumption of normal bilateral relations continued under the George W. Bush Administration. Despite growing concerns about the Vietnamese government's human rights record, Congress ratified the U.S.-Vietnam BTA in October 2001 and the new agreement went into effect on December 10, 2001. Under the BTA, the United States granted Vietnam conditional normal trade relations (NTR), a move that significantly reduced U.S. tariffs on most imports from Vietnam. In return, Hanoi agreed to undertake a wide range of market-liberalization measures. Vietnam's conditional NTR status was renewed every year until December 2006, when Congress passed P.L. 109-432 , a comprehensive trade and tax bill, which granted Vietnam permanent NTR status as part of a wider agreement that saw Vietnam become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as of January 11, 2007.\nDuring the Bush Administration, the United States and Vietnam dramatically upgraded diplomatic and strategic aspects of their relationship to the point where the two countries had all-but-normalized bilateral relations, at least from the U.S. point of view. However, many Vietnamese still consider relations to not be completely normalized until the United States provides more compensation for purported victims of \" Agent Orange \" and/or drops its legal categorization of Vietnam as a non-market economy.", "", "", "In the middle of the last decade, leaders in both Hanoi and Washington, DC, sought new ways to upgrade the bilateral relationship. As part of this process, both countries began increasing the number, frequency, and breadth of high-level bilateral visits. During each of the four years of George W. Bush's second term, the United States and Vietnam held an annual summit. The Bush Administration appeared to use these top-level meetings to encourage economic and political reforms inside Vietnam, as well as to signal the two countries' budding partnership on strategic issues. During the Obama Administration, the intensity and frequency of high-level bilateral meetings have expanded.\nUntil 2013, an exception to frequent bilateral meetings was at the leaders' level (i.e. between the U.S. President and either the Vietnamese President or Prime Minister). For the first five years of his presidency, despite multiple trips to Southeast Asia and the desire of Vietnamese officials to hold a summit meeting, President Obama neither visited Vietnam nor held a standalone meeting with Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang or Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. The Obama Administration appeared to be reluctant to schedule one in part due to concerns about the perceived deterioration in Vietnam's human rights conditions.\nThis changed in July 2013, when President Barack Obama hosted a meeting at the White House with Vietnam's President Sang. It was President Sang's first trip to the United States. The two presidents announced a bilateral \"comprehensive partnership\" that is to provide an \"overarching framework\" for moving the relationship to a \"new phase.\" Among other items, the partnership is to include an increase in high level exchanges, the conclusion of a TPP agreement, and the discussion of constructing new and improved embassies. The two sides agreed to create new mechanisms for cooperation across nine sectors. Bilateral cooperation already has been underway, in some cases for years, in most of the items listed in each sector. At the leaders' joint remarks following their meeting, President Sang announced that President Obama had agreed to \"try his best\" to visit Vietnam before the end of his term in office.\nBoth sides had sought the completion of an official partnership for years, but progress had stalled, apparently due to U.S. concerns about Vietnam's human rights situation and to some Vietnamese concerns about creating a perception in Vietnam and China that Hanoi was drawing too close to Washington. According to the two presidents, in their meeting they discussed progress in the TPP negotiations, maritime disputes in the South China Sea, Vietnam's human rights situation, people-to-people ties, and war legacy issues. The United States reportedly resisted Vietnam's push for declaring a \"strategic partnership,\" which according to one analysis generally includes a multi-year plan of action and a high-level joint mechanism to oversee implementation across all sectors of cooperation.", "Since 2007, even as Vietnam and China have deepened their ties, bilateral tensions have intensified over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. China has taken a number of actions to assert its claims since 2007, including reportedly warning Western energy companies not to work with Vietnam to explore or drill in disputed waters, announcing plans to develop disputed islands as tourist destinations, cutting sonar cables trailed by seismic exploration vessels working in disputed waters for PetroVietnam, and in May 2014, positioning the large CNOOC oil and gas exploration rig in disputed waters. For its part, Vietnam also has stepped up its presence in the disputed areas. For instance, since 2005 Vietnam has been active in soliciting bids for the exploration and development of offshore oil and gas blocks off its central coast, in areas disputed with China, and Vietnam's last two Five Year Plans placed a strong emphasis on offshore energy development. Both Vietnam and China have seized fishing boats and harassed ships operating in the disputed waters.\nVietnam has been active in soliciting international support to pressure China not to act unilaterally on its claims. A primary target of the Vietnamese campaign has been the United States, which takes no position on the question of sovereignty over disputed South China Sea landmasses. Vietnamese officials tend to say that while they do not expect the United States to take sides in the dispute, it would be helpful if the United States did more to emphasize, through language or actions, that all parties to the dispute—including China—should adhere to common principles, such as promoting transparency, adhering to the rule of law, refraining from undertaking unilateral actions, and committing to the freedom of the seas and navigation.\nIn 2010, the Obama Administration dramatically raised its involvement in the South China Sea disputes. In July of that year, then-Secretary of State Clinton stated at that year's annual ASEAN Regional Forum gathering of foreign ministers from the Asia-Pacific region that freedom of navigation on the sea is a U.S. \"national interest\" and that the United States opposes the use or threat of force by any claimant. Clinton also said that \"legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features,\" which many interpreted as an attack on the basis for China's claims to the entire sea. Since 2010, such remarks have become a staple of U.S. officials' statements on the South China Sea disputes, and U.S. policy since then has been to work with Asian countries like Vietnam to include the disputes on the agenda of regional fora. China generally objects to discussing maritime security issues in multilateral settings, preferring to deal with the matter bilaterally. Relatedly, the Obama Administration also has continued its policy of upgrading its defense ties with and the capacities of many Southeast Asian militaries, including with Vietnamese security forces.", "One aspect of the Obama Administration's upgrading its relationship with Vietnam involves forming partnerships in multilateral fora. One such group, created in 2009, is the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), comprised of the United States and the lower Mekong countries (i.e., Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam). The State Department describes the initiative as \"the primary U.S.-led platform for advancing Mekong sub-regional integration\" and boosting development among Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam (Burma joined the LMI in 2012). To this end, the group aims to foster cooperation and capacity building among the members in the areas of agriculture and food security, \"connectivity\" (promoting physical, institutional, and people-to-people connections), education, energy security, the environment and water, and health. Another motivation for the LMI is to monitor and coordinate responses to the construction of dams—particularly but not exclusively those being built in China—and other projects on the upper portions of the Mekong that are affecting the downriver countries. Foreign ministers from participating countries have held five meetings, the last during Secretary Kerry's July 2013 visit to Brunei to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting.\nInitially, the LMI largely encompassed or overlapped with existing U.S. regional aid programs and did not represent a significant increase to existing levels of U.S. funding. In July 2012, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phnom Penh, then-Secretary of State Clinton announced the creation of the Asia Pacific Strategic Engagement Initiative (APSEI), which would significantly expand LMI programming. The first stage of the Initiative included a three-year, $50 million program, the \"Lower Mekong Initiative 2020.\" LMI 2020 is coordinated by the USAID regional office in Bangkok, Thailand, and administered largely through East Asia and Pacific (EAP) regional programs and the Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A). The Obama Administration expects to spend around $16.2 million for LMI programs in FY2014 and has requested $10.4 million for FY2015.", "Economic ties arguably are the most mature aspect of the bilateral relationship, as symbolized by the two countries' participation in the TPP negotiations. Since the mid-2000s, the United States has been Vietnam's largest single-country export market; in 2013, exports to the United States represented about 18% of Vietnam's total exports. However, China is Vietnam's single largest trading partner. By value, nearly 30% of Vietnam's imports in 2013 came from China. Collectively, U.S. firms have become one of the country's largest sources of foreign direct investment (FDI). Since 2002, Vietnam has run an overall current account deficit with the rest of the world, though strong export growth in 2012 and 2013 narrowed the gap to near zero in 2013.\nU.S.-Vietnam trade has soared since the early 2000s. As shown in Table 1 , trade flows were nearly $30 billion in 2013, more than three times the level they were in 2006, the year before the United States restored permanent normal trade relations status to Vietnam. Increased bilateral trade also has been fostered by Vietnam's market-oriented reforms and the resulting growth in its foreign-invested and privately owned sectors. Over the last three years, Congress has appropriated approximately $10 million each year to support Vietnam's economic reforms. Most of the increase in U.S.-Vietnam trade since 2001 has come from the growth in imports from Vietnam, particularly clothing items. Indeed, Vietnam has emerged as the United States' second-largest source of imported clothing, after China, and is a major source for footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery.", "Vietnam has applied for acceptance into the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program and is participating in negotiations toward a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. The United States also has expressed an interest in closer economic relations, but has told Vietnam that it needs to make certain changes in the legal, regulatory, and operating environment of its economy to conclude the BIT agreement, as well as to qualify for the GSP program. Legislation submitted in the 113 th Congress, H.R. 1682 (Lofgren), would prohibit Vietnam's entry into the GSP program unless the Vietnamese government made certain improvements in the human rights and trafficking in persons arenas.\nThe most ambitious trade initiative with Vietnam involves negotiating a multilateral free trade agreement under the TPP. According to many sources, Vietnam's presence in the talks has created challenges because in contrast to most other participants it is a developing economy with considerable government intervention. As part of its desire to use the TPP talks to achieve greater access to the U.S. market, Vietnam is trying to persuade the United States to accept more liberal rules of origin for clothing and textile trade, among other items. U.S. and other backers of Vietnam's participation in the negotiations believe that it further opens a sizeable market to U.S. exports and investments, could accelerate economic reforms in Vietnam, and could set a precedent for the entry into the agreement of other countries, such as China, with sizeable government intervention in their economies.", "As bilateral economic relations have expanded, so have trade disputes. Significant areas of friction include clothing trade, fish (particularly catfish), the United States' designation of Vietnam as a \"non-market economy\" (NME), and Vietnam's record on protecting intellectual rights. Trade in catfish has been particularly controversial, both with Vietnam and within the United States. In 2008, in response to continued growth in imports of catfish-like fish (called tra and basa) from Vietnam, the 110 th Congress passed legislation that transferred the regulation of catfish from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which generally is viewed as maintaining stricter inspection standards than the FDA. The Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ) included language that confirmed the inspection transfer to USDA, as well as defined catfish to include basa and tra exported from Vietnam. The Vietnamese government strongly protested these actions as largely protectionist measures. In general, while bilateral trade disputes have been irritants, as of mid-2014 they have not spilled over to affect the course or tone of bilateral relations.", "As the normalization process has proceeded, the United States has eliminated most of the Cold War-era restrictions on aid to Vietnam. U.S. assistance has increased markedly from the approximately $1 million that was provided when assistance was resumed in 1991. Annual aid levels increased steadily during the 1990s, rising to the $20 million level by 2000. The George W. Bush Administration raised bilateral assistance by an order or magnitude—aid surpassed $100 million by the late 2000s—and made Vietnam one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid in East Asia. U.S. assistance to Vietnam in FY2011 was over $140 million. For FY2014, the Obama Administration expects to spend over $100 million on aid programs in Vietnam. Most of the decline comes from reduced spending on programs to combat HIV/AIDS and to promote market-oriented reforms. In recent years, some Members of Congress have attempted to link increases in non-humanitarian aid to progress in Vietnam's human rights record (see the \" Human Rights Issues \" section).\nThe U.S. bilateral aid program has been dominated by health-related assistance. In particular, spending on HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention in Vietnam has risen since President Bush designated Vietnam as a \"focus country\" eligible to receive increased funding to combat HIV/AIDS in June 2004 under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Some Vietnamese, as well as some Western aid providers, have questioned the wisdom of allocating these sums of money for Vietnam, which does not appear to have a severe HIV/AIDS problem. Other sizeable U.S. assistance items include programs assisting Vietnam's economic reform efforts and governance, programs to combat trafficking in persons, and de-mining programs. Cumulatively, since 2007 Congress has appropriated over $100 million for dioxin removal and related health care services (for more details, see the \" Agent Orange \" section).\nThe governments of the United States and Vietnam run a number of educational exchange programs. These generally total around $10 million a year, a sum not included in the above estimates of U.S. assistance.", "", "Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state. The government security organs maintain an extensive surveillance network throughout the country that allows it to monitor the daily activities of Vietnamese citizens when it chooses to do so. For more than a decade, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) appears to have followed a strategy of informally permitting (while not necessarily legalizing) most forms of personal and religious expression while selectively repressing individuals and organizations that it deems a threat to the party's monopoly on power. On the one hand, the gradual loosening of restrictions since Vietnam's doi moi (\"renovation\") economic reforms were launched in 1986 has opened the door for Vietnamese to engage in private enterprise and has permitted most Vietnamese to observe the religion of their choice.\nOn the other hand, the authorities crack down harshly on what they deem to be anti-government activity. According to numerous accounts, since at least early 2007 the Vietnamese government's suppression of dissent has intensified and its tolerance for criticism has lessened markedly. These trends appear to have continued into the first half of 2014, particularly with ongoing arrests of Internet activists, notwithstanding the government's release of some high-profile political prisoners in the early spring. As opposed to a massive suppression, the Vietnamese government's actions appear to be selective, targeting specific individuals and organizations that have called for the institution of democratic reforms and/or publicly criticized government policy on sensitive issues, such as policy toward China. The government increasingly has targeted bloggers and lawyers who represent human rights and religious freedom activists, particularly those linked to pro-democracy activist networks. Many of the targeted blogs, bloggers, and lawyers have criticized Vietnam's policy toward China and/or have links to pro-democracy activist groups.\nMore dissident groups began to appear publicly beginning in 2006. It is unclear to what extent these groups or their various goals are supported by the broader Vietnamese public. Most analysts believe that the pro-democracy movement in Vietnam is much too weak to pose any systemic threat to the VCP. However, the government's heightened sensitivity and stiffened response may be due to its concerns about growing public discontent over alleged government corruption, land seizures by government institutions and officials, worsened economic conditions, and a sense among some Vietnamese that Hanoi has been unable to prevent China from asserting its maritime claims at Vietnam's expense. Additionally, reported power struggles among Vietnam's top leaders may be contributing to the intensified crackdown.", "In general, differences over human rights between the U.S. and Vietnamese governments have not prevented the two countries from improving the overall relationship. Barring a dramatic downturn in Vietnam's human rights situation, Obama Administration officials appear to see Vietnam's human rights situation not as an impediment to short-term cooperation on various issues, but rather as establishing a ceiling on what might be accomplished. In the view of some policymakers and observers, the two countries increasingly are bumping up against this ceiling.\nOver the past four years, criticisms of Vietnam's human rights record, including from some Members of Congress, appear to have played a significant role in convincing the Administration to oppose a number of items desired by Hanoi, including expanding the types of arms that U.S. companies can sell to Vietnam. Additionally, concerns about Vietnam's human rights record are likely to complicate Congress' debate over a TPP agreement, if the current negotiations are successful. It is unclear to what extent—if at all—the Obama Administration has attempted to use the TPP negotiations as a way to encourage Vietnamese officials to make changes in its human rights regime. If applied, such pressure is unlikely in the view of some to have much impact unless and until a final TPP agreement begins to take shape.", "Vietnam has a variety of newspapers and magazines available, but virtually all of them are published by government or party organizations. For example, Thanh Nien , a leading daily newspaper, is published by the Vietnam National Youth Federation. In recent years, Vietnam's press has demonstrated a greater willingness to cover stories and issues that could be controversial or risk post-publication reprisals from the Vietnamese government, such as allegations of official corruption or incompetence. At times, the Vietnamese government appears to appreciate these stories, if they support the Party's specific efforts to target particular instances of corruption among VCP and government officials. However, a journalist or publication that crosses the vague and fluid boundary of acceptability to Party leaders frequently faces official retribution, including loss of job, temporary closure, fines, and possibly imprisonment.\nBesides increasingly targeting journalists and bloggers, the Vietnamese government also has brought charges against lawyers who have represented the accused in court or have spoken out against the Vietnamese government. Many of the targeted blogs, bloggers, and lawyers criticized Vietnam's policy toward China and/or have links to pro-democracy activist groups such as Bloc 8406, the banned Democratic Party of Vietnam, or the banned Independent Workers' Union of Vietnam. There are reports that these groups have received help from expatriate Vietnamese, including some in the United States, a charge that Vietnamese officials often make in conversations with their U.S. counterparts.", "Ethnic minorities account for the majority of the population in three regions of the country: the Central Highlands (home to Montagnard groups), the Northwest Highlands (Hmong), and along portions of the Mekong Delta in the south (Khmer). A number of these minority groups report cases of discrimination, which the State Department calls \"longstanding and persistent,\" and repression. The situations in all three regions are complicated. In each, the individuals and groups that frequently clash with government authorities are often ethnic minorities, belong to religious groups (such as Protestant denominations) that are not legally recognized by the government, and/or at various points in history have opposed being ruled by Vietnam's dominant ethnic group (the Kinh) and/or by the communist government.\nMany of the larger-scale tensions between the government and minority groups occur because of protests against land seizures by local government officials. Indeed, corruption related to inappropriate land taking and use is one of the most sensitive and problematic issues for Vietnam. In Vietnam, the state owns the land on behalf of the people of Vietnam. Residents and investors can buy and sell \"land-use rights,\" but the government legally can reclaim land, often with allegedly low levels of compensation. Many of the larger-scale tensions between the government and minority groups (including religious minorities) occur when land used by these groups—which already feel they have been the victims of discrimination, harassment, or worse—is seized by local government officials, some of whom allegedly personally profit from the transaction. According to several sources, abuses against the \"Montagnards\" who live in the country's Central Highlands region appear to have fallen since the last major anti-government protests in 2004. Various government programs have attempted to improve educational and economic opportunities for minorities in the region. (For the location of the Central Highlands region, see Figure 1 at the end of this report.) However, accurate reporting is complicated by restrictions on foreigners' access to the region and ability to meet freely with Montagnards who have fled to Cambodia. No major demonstrations appear to have taken place in the Central Highlands since 2008. Some human rights advocates have criticized the U.S. government for failing to advocate sufficiently for the release of the scores, if not hundreds, of Montagnards whom Vietnamese authorities have imprisoned since 2001, as well as for the dozens of Montagnards who have fled to Thailand seeking asylum in a third country. Additionally, some Montagnard Americans have complained that the Vietnamese authorities either have prevented them from visiting Vietnam or have been subjected to interrogation upon re-entering the country on visits. As for the Northwest Highlands, in 2011, Vietnamese authorities reportedly forcibly suppressed protests by ethnic Hmong, the first such unrest in that region in years.\nReports of abuses against ethnic Khmer in the Mekong Delta region peaked in 2007 and 2008, when widespread protests erupted against local government land seizures. There do not appear to have been large-scale demonstrations or protests since that time, though it is unclear whether this is due to the resolution of the underlying issues or to the government's crackdown against the protest leaders.", "Buddhism is the dominant religion in Vietnam, comprising approximately half of the population, according to the State Department. An estimated 7% of the population is Roman Catholic, which is concentrated in the southern part of the country. Other religious groupings include Cao Dai organizations (2.5%-4.0%), Hoa Hao (the one officially recognized sect comprises 1.5%-3.0% of the population), and Protestant groups (recognized groups comprise 1%-2%).\nAccording to a variety of reports, most Vietnamese now are able to observe the religion of their choice in accordance with Vietnamese laws and regulations governing religious observance, which require religious groups to be officially recognized and registered. However, while the freedom to worship generally exists in Vietnam, the government strictly regulates and monitors the activities of religious organizations. Periodically, authorities have increased restrictions on certain groups. Although the constitution provides for freedom of religion, Vietnamese law requires religious groups to be officially recognized or registered. According to many reports, the government uses this process to monitor and restrict religious organizations' operations. Additionally, many groups either refuse to join one of the official religious orders or are denied permission to do so, meaning that these groups' activities technically are illegal. This legal status can make their leaders and practitioners vulnerable to arrest and harassment. Human Rights Watch and other groups have reported harassment over the past three years against a number of unrecognized branches of several faiths, including the Cao Dai church; the Hoa Hao Buddhist church; independent Protestant house churches (particularly in the Central Highlands); Khmer Krom Buddhist temples in the Mekong Delta; and the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV).\nDisputes between the government and religious groups have been growing in recent years over the seizure of church and temple land by local governments. Many of these cases involve recent confiscations for both civic reasons (e.g., public works projects) and also for resale that allegedly benefits local government officials and/or their families.\nSome noted religious figures in Vietnam are politically active. When such figures are subjected to official abuse, it is not always clear whether they are targeted for their religious or political activism. For example, Roman Catholic priest Father Nguyen Van Ly is one of a number of prominent religious leaders who have also been vocal in their opposition to the VCP and their support for multi-party democracy, and as a result, have been convicted of crimes against the Vietnamese government.\nIn 2004, the State Department designated Vietnam as a \"country of particular concern\" (CPC), principally because of reports of worsening harassment of certain ethnic minority Protestants and Buddhists. When the Vietnamese responded by negotiating with the Bush Administration and adopting internal changes, the two sides reached an agreement on religious freedom, in which Hanoi agreed to take steps to improve conditions for people of faith, particularly in the Central Highlands. The May 2005 agreement enabled Vietnam to avoid punitive consequences, such as sanctions, associated with its CPC designation. The agreement was faulted by human rights groups on a number of grounds, including the charge that religious persecution continues in the Central Highlands. Vietnam was redesignated a CPC in the 2005 and 2006 Religious Freedom Reports.\nIn November 2006, the State Department announced that because of \"many positive steps\" taken by the Vietnamese government since 2004, the country was no longer a \"severe violator of religious freedom\" and was removed from the CPC list. The announcement, which came two days before President Bush was due to depart to Hanoi for the APEC summit, cited a dramatic decline in forced renunciations of faith, the release of religious prisoners, an expansion of freedom to organize by many religious groups, and the issuance of new laws and regulations, and stepped up enforcement mechanisms. Over the course of 2006, as part of the bilateral U.S.-Vietnam human rights dialogue, Vietnam released a number of prominent dissidents the Bush Administration had identified as \"prisoners of concern.\" Vietnam also reportedly told the United States that it would repeal its administrative decree allowing detention without trial. The U.S. Committee on International Religious Freedom, among others, disputed the Administration's factual basis for the decision to remove Vietnam from the CPC list, arguing that abuses continue and that lifting the CPC label removes an incentive for Vietnam to make further improvements. Members of Congress introduced several pieces of legislation that have called on the State Department to re-list Vietnam as a CPC.", "Vietnam's participation in the TPP trade negotiations and application to join the GSP program have focused attention on labor conditions in Vietnam. The government and the VCP's efforts to maintain one-party rule while adapting to rapid social and economic changes may help to explain the often contradictory trends that can be observed in Vietnam's evolving labor rights regime.\nThe U.S. government and a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch have been critical of Vietnam's restrictions on workers' rights. There is a general recognition that Vietnam has made significant improvements in its labor laws, but that local government enforcement and business compliance remain ongoing problems. The State Department's 2013 human rights report on Vietnam singled out problems with suppression of independent labor unions, failure to enforce laws governing the right to organize, forced or compulsory labor, child labor, and unacceptable working conditions.\nWorkers in Vietnam have the legal right to collective bargaining. At present, all labor unions in Vietnam must be a member of the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). The VGCL is supposed to organize a union within six months of the establishment of any new business, regardless of its ownership—state, foreign, or private. Human Rights Watch also has raised concern about the ability of Vietnamese workers to call an official strike, especially at state-owned enterprises (SOEs).\nVietnamese workers are not legally allowed to form unions independent of the VGCL, and efforts to organize independent unions in Vietnam reportedly have been thwarted by government suppression, including the arrest and imprisonment of union leaders. Some analysts have argued that restrictions of the right of association in Vietnam have impeded the improvement of labor rights in other areas. According to some reports, there were signs that the aforementioned May 2014 riots against foreign-owned firms in industrial areas near Ho Chi Minh City were partly motivated by workers' frustrations with factory conditions.\nOther observers, however, counter that since the launch of doi moi , worker rights have made progress despite the restrictions on the independent right to organize. These observers point out that hundreds of unaffiliated (and therefore unofficial) \"labor associations\" have sprouted without significant repression, that the VGCL has evolved into a more aggressive advocate for workers, and in many recent cases, Vietnamese workers have gone on strike reportedly because they felt that they were not well-represented by the official union. The State Department reports that in the first half of 2013, the Vietnamese government took \"no action\" against the more than 150 strikes that occurred, despite the fact that none were technically legal.", "Vietnam is both a source and destination for people trafficked for forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Additionally, state-owned and private labor export companies send tens of thousands of Vietnamese construction, fishing, and manufacturing workers overseas, where many are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Among Asian expatriate workers, Vietnamese reportedly incur some of the highest debts, due among other factors to high recruitment fees.\nSince 2001, the first year in which the State Department issued a Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protect Act, as amended (TVPA, Div. A of P.L. 106-386 ), Vietnam has variously been designated a \"Tier 2\" (in 2001-2003, 2005-2009, and 2012) or a \"Tier 2 Watch List\" (in 2004, 2010, and 2011) country. In the 2012 TIP report, Vietnam's tier ranking improved to \"Tier 2,\" a ranking the 2013 and 2014 reports maintained. Countries designated as Tier 2 do not fully comply with the minimum standards to eliminate severe forms of human trafficking, but are making significant efforts to do so. Vietnam's elevation to Tier 2 status in the 2012 TIP Report was due in large part to the adoption of a new law to prevent and combat human trafficking in March 2011 and the completion of a five-year national action plan to combat human trafficking. The new law went into effect on January 1, 2012, and included an expanded list of prohibited trafficking-related acts. The 2014 TIP report listed the government's prosecution and conviction of some transnational sex trafficking offenders, as well as the issuance of regulations under the 2012 trafficking law, as evidence that it is making \"significant efforts\" to comply with the minimum standards for eliminating trafficking. H.R. 1897 / S. 1649 , the Vietnam Human Rights Act, contains a sense of the Congress provision declaring that Vietnam's activities to combat human trafficking are insufficient to justify its \"Tier 2\" status.", "Since the 107 th Congress, when Members of Congress became concerned with Vietnamese government crackdowns against protestors in the Central Highlands region, various legislative attempts have been made to link U.S. assistance to the human rights situation in Vietnam. A number of measures entitled \"The Vietnam Human Rights Act\" have been introduced, with most proposing to cap existing non-humanitarian U.S. assistance programs to the Vietnamese government at existing levels if the President does not certify that Vietnam is making \"substantial progress\" in human rights.\nAs introduced, the most recent version of the Vietnam Human Rights Act ( H.R. 1897 / S. 1649 in the 113 th Congress) would prohibit increases in many forms of U.S. non-humanitarian assistance to the Vietnamese government unless (a) Vietnam's human rights conditions are certified as improving, or (b) the President issues a waiver. The bill explicitly exempts specific categories of assistance such as dioxin remediation and HIV/AIDS programs, and it would grant the President waiver authority that allows him to exempt any programs that are deemed to promote the goals of the act and/or to be in the national interests of the United States. Among other items, H.R. 1897 / S. 1649 also state that the sense of Congress is that the United States should not reduce Vietnamese language services of the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia; that Vietnam should be redesignated as a country of particular concern for religious freedom; and that Vietnam's activities to combat human trafficking are insufficient to justify its elevation to \"Tier 2\" status in the State Department's annual trafficking in persons report. The act would require the State Department to file an annual report to Congress on various items. The House passed H.R. 1897 on August 1, 2013, by a vote of 405-3 (Roll Call 435).\nProponents of the Vietnam Human Rights Act argue that additional pressure should be placed on the Vietnamese government to improve its human rights record. Critics have argued that the bill could chill the warming of bilateral political and security ties and could weaken economic reformers in ongoing domestic political battles inside Vietnam.", "At the end of the previous decade, the United States and Vietnam began upgrading their military-to-military relationship, driven in large measure by Vietnam's increased concerns about China and enabled by over a decade of smaller, trust-building programs between the two military bureaucracies. In the 1990s, the bulk of military-to-military cooperation consisted of programs dealing with \"legacy\" issues from the Vietnam War era. Notably, the two militaries developed a cooperative relationship in locating the remains of U.S. missing servicemen. Since at least the early 2000s, the Pentagon and State Department began seeking to expand and deepen security relations and military ties with Vietnam. More than a decade later, many of these efforts have borne fruit. An International Military Education and Training (IMET) agreement was signed in 2005, followed two years later by the United States allowing sales of non-lethal defense items to Vietnam. In August 2010, the United States and Vietnam held their inaugural Defense Policy Dialogue, a high-level channel for direct military-to-military discussions. Previously, the main formal vehicle for the two militaries to hold regular annual dialogues had been through the U.S.-Vietnam Security Dialogue on Political, Security, and Defense Issues, a forum that is run by the U.S. State Department and Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and includes officials from the two countries' militaries. Other signs of a deepening military-military relationship include U.S.-Vietnam joint naval engagements (involving noncombat training), Vietnamese shipyards repairing U.S. noncombatant naval vessels, cooperation in peacekeeping and search-and-rescue training operations, and the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense sending Vietnamese officers to U.S. staff colleges and other military institutions. Notwithstanding these developments, the evolution of bilateral military ties has come incrementally and more slowly than many U.S. military planners would prefer. Vietnamese military officials generally have been resistant to taking major steps forward, perhaps due to a concern of alarming China.", "The United States-Vietnam IMET agreement allows Vietnamese officers to receive English language training in the United States. In 2007, the United States modified International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regarding Vietnam by allowing licenses for trade in certain non-lethal defense items and services to Vietnam. Such transactions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. In FY2009, the United States provided foreign military financing (FMF) for Vietnam for the first time. According to annual State Department reports covering fiscal years 2007-2010, the department licensed the export of approximately $98.5 million of defense articles and $3.7 million of defense services to Vietnam during that time. Regarding foreign military sales (FMS), according to the State Department, Vietnam has submitted letters of request for helicopter spare parts and English language labs. In FY2009, the United States extended foreign military financing (FMF) for the Vietnamese government for the first time. According to State Department officials, \"very little\" of the approved FMF has been spent, with most going toward English training labs/instructors, spare parts for helicopters, and ship radios. As mentioned earlier, in December 2013 the United States said it would provide Vietnam with $18 million in assistance, including five fast patrol vessels, to enhance Vietnam's maritime security capacity.\nVietnamese leaders have asked the Obama Administration and Members of Congress to remove U.S. restrictions on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam, and have stated that they will not consider bilateral relations to be fully normalized until that decision is taken. Under questioning from Senator John McCain during his June confirmation hearing to be Ambassador to Vietnam, Ted Osius said that because Vietnam had made \"some progress\" in improving selected human rights conditions, it \"may mean it's time to begin exploring the possibility of lifting the ban\" on lethal weapons sales. When asked for more explanation, Osius added, \"what we haven't done is lay out a precise roadmap for what would get the Vietnamese to lifting the lethal weapons ban. And it may be time to consider that.\"", "", "One major legacy of the Vietnam War that remains unresolved is the damage that Agent Orange, and its accompanying dioxin, has done to the people and the environment of Vietnam. According to various estimates, the U.S. military sprayed approximately 11-12 million gallons of Agent Orange over nearly 10% of then-South Vietnam between 1961 and 1971. One scientific study estimated that between 2.1 million and 4.8 million Vietnamese were directly exposed to Agent Orange. Vietnamese advocacy groups claim that there are over three million Vietnamese suffering from serious health problems caused by exposure to the dioxin in Agent Orange.\nIn the past, this issue generally was pushed to the background of bilateral discussions by other issues considered more important by the United States and/or Vietnam. As the relationship has improved and matured, and with most other wartime \"legacy\" issues now resolved, the issue of Agent Orange/dioxin has emerged as a regular topic in bilateral discussions and is one to which several Members of Congress have brought attention. Recently, the U.S. government has shown a greater willingness to cooperate on some aspects of the issue. Since 2007, Congress has appropriated nearly $110 million for dioxin removal and related health care services in Da Nang, and has begun an environmental assessment of the Bien Hoa airbase near Ho Chi Minh City. However, the Vietnamese government and people would like to see the United States do more to remove dioxin from their country and provide help for victims of Agent Orange.", "According to estimates, U.S. military aircraft dropped between 5 million and 7.8 million tons of ordnance on Vietnam during the war. An estimated 800,000 tons of unexploded ordnance (UXO) remain from the Vietnam War, including bombs and landmines that contaminate 20% of the country's area and affect 5% of its arable land. There reportedly have been over 105,000 Vietnamese casualties from UXO since the end of the Vietnam War, including roughly 35,000 deaths. In 2012, there were 73 casualties. Less than 10% of UXO and landmine survivors reportedly have access to rehabilitation programs.\nInternational donors spent $8.7 million on clearance and related activities in Vietnam in 2012. The largest donors were the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Germany. Between 1993 and 2012, the United States provided nearly $35.5 million for demining efforts and $26.8 million for programs for war victims. In recent years, the United States has spent roughly $4.5 million annually on demining programs through the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Activities (NADR) foreign assistance account. Separately, since 1989, USAID's Leahy War Victims Fund has supported programs for prosthetics, physical rehabilitation, occupational training, employment, and access for the handicapped.\nIn December 2013, the United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation to overcome the effects of \"wartime bomb, mine, and unexploded ordnance\" in Vietnam. Unlike Laos and Cambodia, two countries heavily impacted by Vietnam War-related UXO, the Vietnamese government, through the National Mine Action Center, takes a predominant role in running and funding the country's demining efforts. In 2010, the Vietnamese government approved a five-year plan to remove UXO from up to 5,000 square kilometers (1,931 square miles) in six provinces with the help of international donors.\nAccording to some experts, more international assistance would be forthcoming if Vietnam acceded to international treaties on landmines and cluster munitions, created a civilian-led, transparent national authority on UXO, and maintained a comprehensive database. Some U.S. NADR funding has been devoted to strengthening the capacity of the Vietnam Bomb and Mine Action Center, assisting Vietnam in implementing a national strategy for addressing UXO, and creating a centralized database.", "Officially, more than 1,000 Americans who served in Indochina during the Vietnam War era are still unaccounted for. From 1975 through the late 1990s, obtaining a full accounting of the U.S. POW/MIA cases was one of the dominant issues in bilateral relations. Beginning in the early 1990s, cooperation between the two sides increased. By 1998, a substantial permanent U.S. staff in Vietnam was deeply involved in frequent searches of aircraft crash sites and discussions with local Vietnamese witnesses throughout the country. The Vietnamese authorities also have allowed U.S. analysts access to numerous POW/MIA-related archives and records. The U.S. Defense Department has reciprocated by allowing Vietnamese officials access to U.S. records and maps to assist their search for Vietnamese MIAs. The increased efforts have led to account for nearly 700 missing U.S. service personnel. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese remain missing from the Vietnam War period. For years, Vietnam has expressed in interest in receiving U.S. help in locating and identifying the remains of these MIAs. In November 2010, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vietnam's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLISA) agreed to a two-year program under which the United States was to spend $1 million to help Vietnam locate and recover the remains of the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese soldiers missing from the Vietnam War.", "For the first decade after reunification in 1975, Vietnamese leaders placed a high priority on ideological purity and rigid government controls. By the mid-1980s, disastrous economic conditions and diplomatic isolation led the country to adopt a more pragmatic line, enshrined in the doi moi (renovation) economic reforms of 1986. Under doi moi , the government gave farmers greater control over what they produce, abandoned many aspects of central state planning, cut subsidies to state enterprises, reformed the price system, and opened the country to foreign direct investment (FDI). After stalling somewhat in the late 1990s, economic reforms were accelerated in the early 2000s, as Vietnam made sweeping changes that were necessary to enter the WTO. Politically and socially, the country became much less repressive, even tolerating some expressions of dissent in certain areas that had been considered sensitive. That said, although Vietnam appears to be a freer country than it was two decades ago, according to many sources human rights conditions have worsened compared to the middle of the last decade, particularly for dissenters. There are signs that factional battles among Vietnamese leaders have intensified since at least 2011. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who has held his post since 2006, has come under increasing criticism for allegations of corruption of his allies and for an array of nationwide economic problems.", "During the 25 years since the doi moi reforms were launched, Vietnam was one of the world's fastest-growing countries. Agricultural production has soared, transforming Vietnam from a net food importer into the world's second-largest exporter of rice and the second-largest producer of coffee. The move away from a command economy also helped reduce poverty levels from around 60% in the early 1990s to less than 20% two decades later, and the government has set a goal of becoming a middle-income country by 2020. A substantial portion of the country's growth has been driven by foreign investment.\nAfter years of annual growth rates above 7%, Vietnam's economic growth has slowed considerably following the global financial crisis of 2007. The shocks of the crisis hit Vietnam's economy hard, in part due to Vietnam's dependence on trade and on foreign direct investment inflows, and the subsequent economic difficulties increased social strife and raised concerns about the country's economic stability. Although macro-economic conditions appear to have stabilized somewhat, some of these concerns linger. In 2013, Vietnam's real GDP grew by around 5.4%, about the same level as the previous year, and its inflation rate was around 6%, significantly lower than the double-digit price increases earlier in the decade. Over the past decade, Vietnam has seen a rising income and wealth disparity, which at times has fueled discontent among Vietnam's poor and lower-income population.\nDespite its considerable economic gains over the past generation, Vietnam remains a poor country; per capita GDP in 2013 was about $4,000 when measured on a purchasing power parity basis. Economists point to Vietnam's failure to tackle its remaining structural economic problems—including unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a weak banking sector, massive red tape, and bureaucratic corruption—as major impediments to continued growth. According to some sources, many if not most of Vietnam's SOEs are functionally bankrupt, and require significant government subsidies and assistance to continue operating. Although thousands of SOEs officially have been partially privatized since the early 1990s under the government's \"equitization\" program, most of these are small and medium-sized firms, and the government still owns substantial stakes in them. Other SOE reform measures are being discussed.", "As Vietnam's economy has grown, so have its energy demands, which, according to one source, grew by 15% annually in the first decade of the 2000s. To help keep pace with its growing energy demand, Vietnam plans to build several nuclear power plants—and the first in Southeast Asia—in the coming decades. It is against this backdrop that Vietnam and the United States negotiated their aforementioned bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreement. (See the \" Bilateral Nuclear Energy Agreement Signed \" section above.) In 2011, the Prime Minister's office published an energy plan that called for nuclear power providing around 10% of the country's electricity needs by 2030 and other projections forecast that nuclear power will provide nearly a third of the country's electricity by 2050. Construction on the first plant, to be built by a Russian company in Phuoc Dinh, Ninh Thuan province, was planned to start in 2015. In January 2014, however, Vietnam's Prime Minister announced a delay until 2020, potentially pushing back the planned completion of the first reactor to the mid-2020s. Difficulties in training staff for the planned nuclear power program have been mentioned by news reports as a possible reason for the delay. Two additional 1,000 MWe reactors are planned to be built in nearby Vinh Hai ( Ninh Thuan 2 plant) and be brought on-line by 2026.", "In general, Vietnam's experiments with political reform have lagged behind its economic changes. A new constitution promulgated in 1992, for instance, reaffirmed the central role of the VCP in politics and society, and Vietnam remains a one-party state. In practice, the Communist Party sets the general direction for policy while the details of implementation generally are left to the four lesser pillars of the Vietnamese polity: the state bureaucracy, the legislature (the National Assembly), the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA), and the officially sanctioned associations and organizations that exist under the Vietnamese Fatherland Front umbrella.\nThe Party's major decision-making bodies are the Central Committee, which has 175 members, and the Politburo, which has 14 members. Membership on the Politburo generally is decided based upon maintaining a rough geographic (north, south, and central) and factional (conservatives and reformers) balance. The three top leadership posts are, in order of influence, the VCP general secretary, followed by the prime minister, and the president. Since the death in 1986 of Vietnam's last \"strong man,\" Le Duan, decision-making on major policy issues typically has been arrived at through consensus within the Politburo, a practice that often leads to protracted delays on contentious issues.", "In mid-January 2011, the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) held a weeklong National Congress, the 11 th since the Party was founded. Party Congresses, held every five years, are often occasions for major leadership realignments and set the direction for Vietnam's economic, diplomatic, and social policies.\nAt the 11 th Party Congress, delegates selected Nguyen Phu Trong (born 1944), formerly the chairman of Vietnam's National Assembly, to serve as the next VCP General Secretary, Vietnam's top post. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (b. 1949, pronounced \"dzung\") retained his membership in the 14-member Politburo, and was reappointed to his post by the National Assembly later in 2011. Likewise, the Assembly approved the Party Congress's decision to select Truong Tan Sang (b. 1949) as Vietnam's next president. Dung and Sang are both believed to have sought to become general secretary. Despite his apparent re-appointment, Dung's power base is believed to have been reduced at the Congress. Trong and Sang are both believed to be assertive rivals and according to some analysts battles between them have hamstrung Vietnamese policymaking.", "Over the past 10-15 years, Vietnam's legislative organ, the National Assembly, has slowly and subtly increased its influence to the point where it is no longer a rubber stamp. In recent years the Assembly has vetoed Cabinet appointments, forced the government to revise major commercial legislation, and successfully demanded an increase in its powers. These include the right to review each line of the government's budget, the right to hold no-confidence votes against the government, and the right to dismiss the president and prime minister (though not the VCP general secretary).\nIt remains to be seen how much influence the Assembly will ultimately have over policymaking, given the VCP's dominant role and the centralization of decision-making in Vietnam. More than 85% of parliamentarians are Party members, and the VCP carefully screens all candidates before elections are held. Moreover, the Communist Party and the central government generally have encouraged the National Assembly's evolution into a more robust body, to help create the legal system and culture most Vietnamese leaders feel are necessary to support a modern, middle-income state. The latest elections for National Assembly members were held in May 2011.", "", "Vietnam's relations with China, Vietnam's most important bilateral relationship, have been fraught with ambivalence for thousands of years. China ruled Vietnam for over 1,000 years until Vietnam successfully fought for its independence in the year 939. During China's Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China ruled Vietnam from 1407 to 1428, until another rebellion drove the Chinese out. Despite this restoration of Vietnam's independence, Ming China continued to exert a profound influence on Vietnamese culture and governance, particularly among the elite.\nIn the 20 th Century, for nearly 25 years after China's Communists defeated Chinese Nationalist forces in 1949, Beijing was an important patron for Vietnamese communists who fought first against French colonial rule and then against South Vietnam and the United States. Long-repressed Sino-Vietnamese tensions resurfaced in the 1970s, coinciding with the United States' military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 and communist North Vietnam's defeat of the U.S.-backed Republic of Vietnam in 1975. Beijing and Hanoi clashed over competing territorial claims, and China sought to limit Vietnamese influence in Cambodia, which also had territorial disputes with Vietnam. The turning point came in late 1978. In November of that year Vietnam formed an alliance with the Soviet Union, which had emerged as China's number one threat. The following month, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, partly in response to the communist Cambodian government's incursions into Vietnamese territory. In early 1979, China attacked Vietnam for a two month period, in a brief but bloody border conflict, during which the two sides severed relations. Vietnamese forces exacted an unexpected heavy toll on Chinese troops. Military skirmishes continued during the 1980s. In the 1990s the two sides restored relations, which have expanded greatly over the past quarter century.", "In recent years, Sino-Vietnam relations have followed seemingly contradictory trends. On the one hand, since Vietnam and China repaired relations in the early 1990s, China has become Vietnam's most important bilateral partner and its biggest trading partner. Maintaining stability and friendship with its northern neighbor is critical for Vietnam's economic development and security, and Hanoi does not undertake large-scale diplomatic moves without first calculating Beijing's likely reaction. Over the past four years, Hanoi and Beijing have continued to expand their diplomatic and party-to-party ties and appear to be seeking ways to prevent their maritime disputes from spilling over into other areas of the relationship. Many Vietnamese, particularly in the VCP, see China's Communist Party as an ideological bedfellow, as well as a role model for a country that seeks to allow more market forces into its economy without threatening the Communist Party's dominance. China also is Vietnam's largest trading partner.\nOn the other hand, Vietnam's historical ambivalence and suspicions of China have increased in recent years due to concerns that China's expanding influence in Southeast Asia is having a negative effect on Vietnam. These concerns, in turn, have led Vietnamese leaders to take steps to lessen their dependence on and vulnerabilities to Chinese influence. For instance, since the late 2000s Vietnam has sought to upgrade its relations with outside powers, such as the United States and Japan. In other moves widely interpreted as related to increased maritime tensions, Vietnam in 2009 signed contracts to purchase billions of dollars of new military equipment from Russia, including six Kilo-class submarines that reportedly have begun to arrive in Vietnam. According to Vietnam's most recent Defense Ministry White paper, released in 2009, Vietnam's defense budget increased by nearly 70% between 2005 and 2008.\nThat said, Hanoi feels like it must tiptoe carefully along the tightrope between Washington and Beijing, such that improved relations with one capital not be perceived as a threat to the other. Vietnamese leaders have become increasingly sensitive to rising domestic criticism that they are being overly solicitous toward China. Vietnam's trade deficit with China has soared over the past decade, which sometimes causes bilateral trade friction; Chinese imports represent around a quarter of Vietnam's total imports by value, up from less than 10% in 2000.", "Rapid industrialization, agricultural development, and urbanization have brought an array of environmental challenges. As Vietnam's Environment Administration (VEA), which is part of the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE), writes on its website, \"apparently, environmental pollution and economic development is a paradoxical development of the country.\" Among the problems that the VEA and outside observers cite are water pollution, inadequate sewage treatment facilities, deforestation, overuse of pesticides, and destruction of natural coastal and riverine features such as mangrove forests. Vietnam has a number of environmental laws and regulations, such as the 2005 Environmental Protection Law, but enforcement is frequently identified as a problem. Compounding the challenges is Vietnam's historic vulnerability to storms and flooding, particularly along the low-lying central coastal region. The government estimates that asset losses due to natural disasters subtract around 1.5% of GDP annually, with nearly three-quarters of the losses occurring in the central provinces.\nIt is not clear to what extent the Vietnamese government has reconciled the tension between its environmental challenges and its overriding domestic goal of becoming a middle-income economy by 2020. Doi moi 's emphasis on growth and output often has created a disincentive for officials and factory managers to comply with environmental regulations, as many have learned that they likely will not be punished for polluting if they increase production.\nIn climate modeling exercises, Vietnam often is listed as one of the most vulnerable countries to the possible effects of climate change. This is due to its climate, long coastline, and topography (particularly the extent of its low-lying, populated coastal areas), among other factors. Rising sea levels and increased precipitation associated with a warming climate are anticipated to combine with other phenomena (e.g., sinking river deltas associated with groundwater withdrawal, floodplain engineering, and sediment trapped by dams) to exacerbate problems such as salt-water intrusion and flooding; these impacts may particularly affect Vietnam's poorer communities. Additionally, Vietnam's rapid economic growth has led to increased energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions. According to one source, Vietnam's carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption doubled between 2002 and 2011, and the government is exploring a number of options to reduce its emissions.\nEnvironmental cooperation is one of several areas targeted for expansion in the U.S.-Vietnam \"comprehensive partnership.\" According to information provided by the State Department, the United States spent over $35 million between 2009 and early 2014 on environmental programs in Vietnam. Nearly all of these funds were spent on climate change issues. In December 2013, Secretary of State Kerry in Hanoi announced that USAID would launch a Vietnam Forest and Deltas Program, under which around $25 million will be spent to help four provinces in Vietnam's Mekong delta region adapt to climate change and restore the region's \"natural ecosystems.\" The project also is designed to help Vietnam develop and implement its national level climate change policies. It is unclear to what extent these funds represent new monies, a repackaging of existing programs, or a combination of the two.", "H.R. 772 (Faleomavaega). States that the United States has an interest in ensuring that \"no party threatens or uses force or coercion unilaterally to assert maritime territorial claims in East Asia and Southeast Asia, including in the South China Sea.... \" Condemns Chinese vessels' \"use of threats or force\" in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Supports U.S. military operations to uphold freedom of navigation rights in the waters and air space of the South China Sea and East China Sea. Requires the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report on the negotiations over a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Introduced February 15, 2013; referred to House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.\nH.R. 1682 (Lofgren). Adds Vietnam to the list of countries ineligible for participating in the Generalized System of Preferences program unless the President certifies that Vietnam is meeting certain requirements in human rights and combating human trafficking. Contains a presidential waiver provision. Introduced April 23, 2013; referred to House Ways and Means Committee.\nH.R. 1897 (Smith)/ S. 1649 (Boozman). Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2013. Prohibits increases in many forms of U.S. non-humanitarian assistance to Vietnam over FY2012 amounts unless (a) Vietnam's human rights conditions are certified as improving, or (b) the President issues a waiver. States that the sense of Congress is that the United States should not reduce Vietnamese language services of the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia; that Vietnam should be redesignated as a country of particular concern for religious freedom; and that Vietnam's activities to combat human trafficking are insufficient to justify its elevation to \"Tier 2\" status in the State Department's annual trafficking in persons report. Requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress on various matters. H.R. 1897 was introduced May 8, 2013; passed by the House 405-3 (Roll Call 435) on August 1, 2013; referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee. S. 1649 was introduced November 5, 2013; referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee.\nH.R. 2519 (Lee) . Directs the Departments of State and Veterans Affairs to provide assistance and support research to help \"covered individuals\" affected by Agent Orange. Defines \"covered individual\" as a Vietnam resident who is affected by health issues related to Agent Orange exposure between January 1, 1961, and May 7, 1975, or who lives or had lived in or near geographic areas in Vietnam that continue to contain high levels of Agent Orange, or who is affected by such health issues as the child or descendant of such resident. Introduced June 26, 2013; referred to House Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs.\nH.R. 4495 (Forbes). The Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act. Contains a number of provisions regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea and various countries' actions there. States that the United States has an interest in \"maintaining freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce\" in the South China Sea. States that U.S. policy urges all parties to the disputes to \"refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities.\" Introduced April 28, 2014; referred to House Armed Services Committee and House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.\nH.R. 4254 (Royce). Imposes financial and immigration sanctions on certain Vietnamese who are complicit in human rights abuses. Requires the President to submit to Congress a list of individuals complicit in certain human rights abuses. Introduced March 14, 2014; referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ways and Means Committee, Financial Services Committee, and Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security.\nH.J.Res. 116 (Kinzinger)/ S.J.Res. 39 (Reid). State that Congress approves of the U.S.-Vietnam nuclear cooperation agreement. H.J.Res. 116 introduced June 9, 2014; referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs. S.J.Res. 39 introduced June 9, 2014; referred to Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.\nH.Res. 218 (Royce). \"Encourages\" the State Department to redesignate Vietnam as a country of particular concern for \"particularly severe violations of religious freedom.\" \"Urges\" the State Department to demonstrate that the expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations will depend on improvements in religious freedom in Vietnam. Introduced May 16, 2013; referred to the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.\nS. 929 (Cornyn). The Vietnam Human Rights Sanctions Act. Requires the President to (a) compile and submit to Congress a list of Vietnamese deemed to be complicit in human rights abuses, (b) prohibit these individuals from entering the United States, and (c) impose financial sanctions on these individuals. Authorizes the President to waive sanctions to comply with international agreements or if in the U.S. national interest. Expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should designate Vietnam as a country of particular concern (CPC) with respect to religious freedom, and that bilateral relations cannot expand unless Vietnam's human rights conditions improve. Introduced May 9, 2013; referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.\nS.J.Res. 36 (Menendez). States that Congress favors the U.S.-Vietnam nuclear cooperation agreement. Except for certain allied countries and institutions, prohibits issuance of any export license pursuant to a nuclear cooperation agreement 30 years after the agreement's entry into force. Introduced May 22, 2014; referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee.\nS.Res. 167 (Menendez). States that the United States has an interest in freedom of navigation and overflight in Asia-Pacific maritime domains. \"Condemns\" maritime vessels' and aircrafts' use of coercion, threats, or force in the South China Sea and East China Sea to assert disputed maritime or territorial claims or alter the status quo. \"Supports\" ASEAN and China's efforts to develop a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. \"Supports\" U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific, including in partnership with other countries, to support the freedom of navigation. Introduced June 10, 2013; passed by the Senate by unanimous consent July 29, 2013." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "", "", "", "h0_full h2_title h1_title h4_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h2_full", "h2_full h1_title h4_title", "h4_full h1_full", "", "h0_full", "h0_title h4_title h3_title", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "h3_full", "", "", "h3_full", "h4_title h3_title", "h4_full", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why did the U.S. and Vietnam have minimal relations until the mid-1990s?", "What led the U.S. and Vietnam to begin expanding relations?", "What is a driving factor for the U.S. and Vietnam to develop relations?", "Why are some Americans in favor of improving relations with Vietnam?", "Why do some Americans disprove improving relations with Vietnam?", "To what extent do Vietnamese Americans drive continued U.S. interest?", "Why do Vietnamese leaders want to improve relations with the Untied States?", "Why are some Vietnamese officials dubious about the United States?", "What is Vietnam's most important international relationship?", "Why is the U.S. crucial to Vietnam's economy?", "How has trade with the United States changed over the years?", "What is the relationship between the U.S., Vietnam, and the TPP?", "What are the steps necessary to implement a TPP agreement in the U.S.?", "What has characterized annual U.S. aid since the late 2000s?", "What effect does Vietnam's human rights record have on developing relations?", "What kind of government does Vietnam have?", "What have human rights observers noticed about the Vietnamese government over the years?" ], "summary": [ "After communist North Vietnam's victory over U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975, the United States and Vietnam had minimal relations until the mid-1990s.", "Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1995, overlapping security and economic interests have led the two sides to expand relations across a wide range of sectors.", "In 2013, President Obama and his Vietnamese counterpart announced a \"comprehensive partnership\" that is to provide a framework for moving the relationship to a \"new phase.\" A key factor driving the two countries together is a shared concern about China's increased assertiveness in Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea.", "In the United States, voices favoring improved relations have included those reflecting U.S. business interests in Vietnam's growing economy and U.S. strategic interests in expanding cooperation with a populous country—Vietnam has over 90 million people—that has an ambivalent relationship with China.", "Others argue that improvements in bilateral relations should be contingent upon Vietnam's authoritarian government improving its record on human rights.", "The population of more than 1 million Vietnamese Americans, as well as legacies of the Vietnam War, also drive continued U.S. interest.", "Vietnamese leaders have sought to upgrade relations with the United States in part due to the desire for continued access to the U.S. market and to their worries about China's expanding influence in Southeast Asia.", "Also, some Vietnamese officials remain suspicious that the United States' long-term goal is to erode the Vietnamese Communist Party's (VCP's) monopoly on power.", "That said, Vietnam's relationship with China is its most important.", "The United States is Vietnam's largest export market and in some years its largest source of foreign direct investment.", "Bilateral trade in 2013 was almost $30 billion, a more than 60% increase since 2010.", "The United States and Vietnam are 2 of 12 countries negotiating the TPP.", "To go into effect, legislation to implement a TPP agreement (if one is reached) would require approval by both houses of Congress.", "Since the late 2000s, annual U.S. aid typically surpasses $100 million, much of it for health-related activities.", "Human rights are perhaps the most contentious issue in the relationship. Although disagreements over Vietnam's human rights record have not prevented the two sides from improving relations, they appear to limit the pace and extent of these improvements.", "Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state ruled by the VCP, which appears to be following a strategy of informally permitting (though not necessarily legalizing) most forms of personal and religious expression while selectively repressing individuals and organizations that it deems a threat to the party's monopoly on power.", "Most human rights observers contend that for the past several years, the government has intensified its suppression of dissenters and protestors." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 8, 8, 8 ] }
GAO_GAO-13-430	{ "title": [ "Background", "Development and Implementation of MUEs", "MAC Local Coverage Policies", "Almost All 2011 Payments for Services with Unpublished MUEs Were within Established Limits", "Over 99 Percent of 2011 Payments Were for Services under Unpublished MUE Limits", "Use of More Restrictive Local Contractor Edits for Certain Services Could Have Reduced Payments by an Additional $7.8 Million", "Payments That Exceeded MUE Limits Were Concentrated within Certain Services and States", "CMS Has Not Systematically Examined Claims That Exceeded Unpublished MUE Limits to Determine Whether They Were Proper", "CMS’s Contractors Did Not Systematically Examine Claims for Services above Unpublished MUE Limits to Determine If They Were Appropriate", "Payments That Exceeded MUE Limits Were Concentrated among Certain Providers", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services", "Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "Most Medicare beneficiaries receive their care on an FFS basis, with providers submitting claims for payment for each service provided. In addition to the Part A/B and DME MACs that process and pay claims, CMS also employs other types of contractors to specifically address fraud and improper payments. These include: Recovery Audit contractors (RA), which review claims postpayment in four RA jurisdictions to identify improper payments and Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPIC), which review claims on a pre- and postpayment basis in seven ZPIC jurisdictions to identify potential fraud.\nAll of these contractors use data analysis to identify providers who bill improperly, whether by mistake or intentionally, to help target their claims review. CMS has expanded its Integrated Data Repository, which was set up to integrate Medicare and Medicaid claims, beneficiary, provider, and other data, and is currently populated with 5 years of historical Part A, Part B, and Part D paid claims data. CMS’s contractors can use these data to analyze previously undetected indicators of aberrant billing activity throughout the claims processing cycle. CMS intends to develop shared data models and is pursuing data sharing and matching agreements with other federal agencies to identify potential fraud, waste, and abuse throughout federal health care programs. CMS has set expectations that RAs and ZPICs will provide information on types of potentially problematic claims to help the agency identify vulnerabilities.\nCMS has also recently developed a “Fraud Prevention System” which uses predictive modeling technology to screen all FFS claims before payment is made. Claims are streamed through the Fraud Prevention System prior to payment and analyzed on the basis of algorithms that include other information, such as past billing, to identify patterns of potentially fraudulent billing by providers. The billing is prioritized for risk of fraud, with the highest-priority cases investigated by ZPICs. Prior to applying predictive models to claims prepayment, CMS tests the algorithms to try to ensure that resources are targeted to the highest-risk claims or providers while payment of claims to legitimate providers continues to occur without disruption.", "Consistent with Medicare law, CMS sets national coverage and payment policies regarding when and how services will be covered by Medicare, as well as coding and billing requirements for claims.developed national payment policies related to MUEs to limit potentially CMS has improper and excess payments to providers for many services, especially those that are prone to potential fraud or that result from billing errors. A CMS MUE Workgroup, which includes staff from CMS and the MUE contractor, is responsible for developing the national MUE limits, in consultation with the medical community. MUE limits are developed as per-day limits on the number of units of a given service or medical product that can be provided by the same physician to the same beneficiary. The limits are developed on the basis of coding conventions defined in the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Current Procedural Terminology manual, national and local policies and edits, coding guidelines developed by national societies, analysis of standard medical and surgical practice, as well as an analysis of current provider billing practices. Prior to their implementation, proposed MUE limits are released for a review and comment period to the AMA, national medical/surgical societies, and other national health care organizations. However, unpublished MUEs are not released for comment. The MUE files are updated quarterly and new limits may be added at these times.\nAlthough MUEs were developed as limits on the number of units of a service a provider could bill for a beneficiary in a single day, as we previously reported they are not implemented as such. Specifically, they do not look at total units on all claims from one provider for the same beneficiary across an entire day, and the limits may therefore be exceeded. A claim can have multiple lines and providers may bill multiple units of the same service for the same beneficiary on the same day on multiple lines of a claim. In processing the claim, contractors’ automated systems only examine the number of units on each claim line. If the number of units on the claim line exceeds the MUE limit, the entire claim line is denied. However, as long as the units on a claim line are at or below the MUE limit, they are paid. Thus, the automated claims- processing systems allow the MUE per-day limits to be exceeded for a beneficiary if providers bill multiple units of the same service on multiple claim lines. The systems also allow limits to be exceeded for a beneficiary if a provider bills for multiple units of the same service performed on the same day on different claims. When claiming multiple units of the same service for one beneficiary, providers may, but are not required to, include a “modifier”— a special code that indicates why the additional units are medically necessary.", "MACs may develop local coverage policies as long as these policies are consistent with national policies. To implement these local policies, some MACs have developed local edits for certain services. Similar to the national MUEs, these local edits set limits on the maximum number of units that may be billed by a provider for the same beneficiary on the same day. Providers may not exceed the local limits by billing additional units on multiple claim lines, unless they include modifiers to explain why the additional units are medically necessary. The local edits were developed for services that may be overused or abused in their jurisdiction, including services for which the MUE limits were being frequently exceeded. Without these local edits, the MUE limits would be exceeded much more frequently. The local limits were developed on the basis of clinical input from the MAC’s medical directors and other clinicians, as well as analysis of claims data.", "The vast majority of Medicare payments in 2011 for services with unpublished MUEs were for services where the numbers of units were at or below the per-day MUE limits. However, because the MUE limits were not implemented as per-day limits, approximately $14 million was paid for services that exceeded MUE limits. Moreover, by applying on a national basis the more restrictive local limits used by some contractors, (which are implemented as per-day limits), we found that CMS could have lowered payments by an additional $7.8 million. We also found that payments exceeding unpublished MUE limits were concentrated within certain services and states.", "In 2011, Medicare paid approximately $23.9 billion for 1,845 types of services with unpublished MUEs. The vast majority—about 99.9 percent—was paid for services where the number of units providers billed was at or below the per-day MUE limits. The MUE contractor indicated that the limits were generally set high, so that the MUEs would not deny claims for medically necessary services.\nHowever, because MUEs were not implemented as per-day limits, approximately $14 million was paid for services where total units billed by a provider for a beneficiary on the same day exceeded the MUE limits. These payments were made for units of services exceeding MUE limits that were billed on multiple lines of a claim or across multiple claims. Although the automated claims-processing systems check each claim line, they do not check all units billed by a provider for a beneficiary on the same day to see if they exceed the limit. While providers may use modifiers on claim lines to indicate when it is medically necessary to exceed the MUE limits, no modifiers were included for the approximately $14 million in payments that we identified as exceeding the unpublished MUE limits to explain why the additional units were medically appropriate. CMS does not expect its contractors to check claims to determine if modifiers are included when billing additional units of services related to unpublished MUEs on multiple lines. CMS officials stated that because the MUEs are unpublished, providers may not know a given service has an MUE and therefore may not include a modifier when billing for services.\nSee GAO-13-102. some MUEs that are likely to become DOS edits include those where it is anatomically impossible to exceed the MUE limit. For example, anatomical limits such as having only two eyes limits the number of times a given procedure could be performed for which a provider could submit a claim on the same day for the same patient. CMS officials told us that they probably will not apply this policy to some of the unpublished MUEs where clear anatomical or other restrictions may not exist, such as those for some Part B drugs and DME. Contractors that we interviewed were aware of the new policy, had seen the draft version, and were generally supportive of the effort.", "Our examination of 13 services where MACs developed more restrictive local edits than the unpublished MUEs showed Medicare payments could have been reduced had CMS examined these edits and adopted them as part of its program integrity responsibilities. If CMS had used these limits and implemented them as per-day edits, instead of using the unpublished MUE limits on these services, Medicare payments would have been lowered by an additional $7.8 million. This indicates that there is a potential for additional savings if some of these local edits were applied nationally. Four of the MACs from whom we requested local edits had implemented edits related to unpublished MUEs. At least three of the contractors had more restrictive limits for the 13 services we analyzed.\nContractors told us that they had developed more restrictive edits because the MUE limits were being exceeded frequently or they had observed potentially fraudulent or abusive billing for these services. While the unpublished MUE limits were implemented at a claim-line level, contractors told us that their local limits were implemented as per-day limits. Contractors also told us that CMS does not request information on their local edits, nor do they routinely share them with CMS. The MUE contractor told us that the MUE Workgroup was aware of one contractor’s local edits for certain services with unpublished MUEs, but was not aware of other contractors’ local edits for these services. Because CMS has not communicated with its contractors regarding their local edits or monitored their use, it is not evaluating these local edits. As a result, it may be missing an opportunity to identify situations in which savings could be achieved by implementing some of the local edits nationally.", "Payments for services that exceeded the per-day MUE limits were concentrated within certain services. For example, of the over 1,800 services with unpublished MUEs, 717 had payments that exceeded the MUE limits. Of these, 20 services accounted for almost half of all payments that exceeded the MUE limits, with the top service alone accounting for over 8 percent of such payments. Many of these top 20 services were for prescription drugs, DME, and clinical laboratory services.\nPayments for services that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits also tended to be concentrated in certain states. Five states with the highest payments that exceeded the MUE limits (Arkansas, California, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) accounted for almost half of these payments, although they accounted for 30 percent of total payments for all services with unpublished MUEs.", "CMS and its contractors do not have a system in place for examining claims to determine the extent to which providers may be exceeding unpublished MUE limits and whether payments for such services were proper. Payments that exceeded MUE limits were concentrated among certain providers, which could facilitate such examination.", "CMS officials and contractors that we interviewed said they do not have a system in place for regularly examining claims related to services with unpublished MUEs from providers that most often exceeded MUE limits.While CMS has several strategies to reduce improper payments, and it reviews aberrant billing patterns at a provider level, that is, across all services billed by the provider, officials told us that they have no plans to review services specifically related to MUEs. Similarly, contractors told us that they do not examine claims specifically related to MUEs, although they do review claims to detect other aberrant billing patterns and identify emerging new vulnerabilities. For example, one contractor told us it evaluates weekly billing reports to examine whether its medical review strategies are appropriate and focused on problem areas. It also reviews data from multiple other sources including reports from the Office of the Inspector General and those we have issued, and findings from the RAs. However, the contractor’s reviews are conducted at a provider level, that is, across all services billed by the provider but not specifically for services with unpublished MUE limits. As a result, providers may be unlikely to have their billing reviewed more closely if they frequently bill above unpublished MUE limits, but do not have other aberrant billing patterns.\nWe provided a list of 10 providers with payments of at least $3,000 that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits in each contractor’s jurisdiction to the contractors we interviewed to determine if they were scrutinizing these providers’ billing patterns. One contractor told us that it was reviewing claims submitted by 1 of the 10 providers that was included on the list we had forwarded to them. The contractor had received a potential fraud referral on this provider, although not specifically related to billings for services with unpublished MUEs. However, the remaining contractors were not reviewing any of the providers we identified.", "We found that a small number of providers accounted for a large share of payments for services that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits. For example, 419 providers received at least $5,000 for services that exceeded the unpublished MUEs in 2011. Of these, the 100 providers with the highest payments that exceeded the MUE limits accounted for nearly 44 percent of total excess payments, although they accounted for only about 1 percent of total payments for all services with unpublished MUEs. In addition, the provider with the highest payments that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits alone accounted for about 4 percent of these payments, although this provider accounted for less than 0.1 percent of total payments for all services with unpublished MUEs.\nCertain provider types were more likely to have payments that exceeded the MUE limits. About 26 percent of the top 100 providers exceeding unpublished MUE limits included clinical laboratories and DME providers. Researchers have noted that there is potential for fraud and abuse with some laboratory services that can be self-referred, such as certain pathology tests. For example, a pathologist examining a surgical pathology specimen may self-refer by ordering and performing additional tests on the pathology specimen without seeking the consent of the original ordering physician. Some contractors we interviewed told us that certain DME items, such as diabetic testing supplies, are prone to potentially fraudulent billing. CMS has also estimated improper DME billing of 66 percent in fiscal year 2012—higher than for any other service measured.", "Developing more cost-effective strategies for ensuring the appropriateness of Medicare payments could help ensure the long-term sustainability of the program. Although almost all payments for services with unpublished MUEs were made for services at or below the MUE limits, we found that there are still opportunities to realize savings. When analyzed on a per-day basis, payments that potentially should not have been made for services that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits totaled approximately $14 million. In November 2012, we recommended that CMS implement MUEs that assess all quantities of services provided to the same beneficiary by the same provider on the same day—in other words, as per-day limits—but allow the limits to be exceeded if the provider included modifiers to explain the medical necessity of exceeding the limits. The MUE contractor recently announced that CMS began implementing our recommendation for certain services as of April 1, 2013. However, CMS officials told us these are unlikely to be applied to some of the services with unpublished MUEs, such as Part B Drugs and DME services. We continue to believe that our recommendation should be implemented for all MUEs to help strengthen the financial health of the program.\nContinuously seeking new methods for improving oversight of provider payments is another important way to strengthen program integrity. Contractors’ local edits could serve as a resource for CMS to use in developing or revising MUEs and in reducing payments for services that are potentially improperly billed. Unpublished MUEs were developed for services and items that have been fraudulently or abusively billed in the past. Therefore, systematically examining billing information and claims from providers that exceed these limits and do not use modifiers to indicate the excess units are medically appropriate, could help identify improper payments and could inform CMS’s program integrity efforts.", "To improve the effectiveness of the unpublished MUEs and better ensure Medicare program integrity, we recommend that the CMS Administrator take the following two actions: examine contractor local edits related to unpublished MUEs to determine whether any of the national unpublished MUE limits should be revised; and consider periodically reviewing claims to identify the providers exceeding the unpublished MUE limits and determine whether their billing was proper.", "We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment and received written comments, which are reprinted in appendix I. In its written comments, HHS concurred with both our recommendations. For the recommendation to examine contractor local edits related to unpublished MUEs, HHS concurred and indicated that CMS would review making revisions to the MUEs in order to ensure that the edit levels are appropriate on the basis of input from national health care organizations, providers, Medicare Administrative Contractors, and CMS personnel, as well as data analysis. For the second recommendation, HHS concurred and indicated that CMS would conduct further analysis to determine the appropriate actions, if necessary.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of CMS, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Sheila K. Avruch, Assistant Director; Iola D’Souza; Eagan Kemp; Richard Lipinski; and Laurie Pachter made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "h0_full h3_full h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h3_full h2_full", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h2_title h1_full", "h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h0_full h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How much of Medicare's payments were allocated for services that exceeded excess billing limits?", "How were these limits set?", "How did CMS implement these limits?", "How does CMS plan to update their MUE policy?", "Why could claims exceed limits?", "What did GAO find regarding the claims limits?", "How has CMS responded to these findings?", "How well did CMS have a system for examining claims?", "What did GAO find in terms of the payments?", "How were these limits concentrated?", "What else is known about these top 100 providers?", "Why is it important that CMS improve this program?", "Why might CMS be under scrutiny?", "How has CMS taken measures to prevent future improper payments?", "Why are the limits unpublished?", "What is the purpose of GAO in this case?", "What is examined in GAO's report on the MUEs?", "How did GAO conduct its examination?" ], "summary": [ "Less than 0.1 percent of payments Medicare made in 2011 were for amounts of services that exceeded certain unpublished limits for excess billing and where the claims did not include information from the providers to indicate why the additional services were medically necessary.", "These limits are set by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--as a means to avoid potentially improper payments.", "To implement these limits, CMS established automated controls in its payment systems called Medically Unlikely Edits (MUE). These MUEs compare the number of certain services billed against limits for the amount of services likely to be provided under normal medical practice to a beneficiary by the same provider on the same day--for example, no more than one of the same operation on each eye.", "CMS plans to begin implementing MUEs for some services as per-day limits for services where it would be impossible to exceed the limits for anatomical or other reasons. Medicare contractors that pay claims may develop local edits, which can set more restrictive limits for some services than the national unpublished MUE limits.", "As GAO has previously reported, claims could exceed the limits because the MUEs are not set up as per-day limits that assess all services billed by a provider for a single beneficiary on the same day.", "GAO's analysis of claims data applying a few of these more restrictive local limits showed that by applying them instead of the relevant national MUE limits, CMS could have lowered payments by an additional $7.8 million.", "However, CMS is not evaluating these local edits to determine if these lower limits might be more appropriate. To the extent that these and other local edits are not evaluated more systematically, CMS may be missing an opportunity to achieve savings by revising some national MUEs to correspond with more restrictive local limits.", "CMS and its contractors did not have a system in place for examining claims to determine the extent to which providers may be exceeding unpublished MUE limits and whether payments for such services were proper. CMS officials and contractors told us that they examine aberrant billing patterns at a provider level, that is, across all services billed by the provider, but not specifically for services with unpublished MUE limits.", "GAO found that payments that exceeded MUE limits were concentrated among certain providers and types of specialties, in certain states, and for certain services.", "For example, the top 100 providers with payments that exceeded the MUE limits accounted for nearly 44 percent of total payments that exceeded the MUE limits, although they accounted for only about 1 percent of total payments for all services with unpublished MUEs.", "Moreover, about 26 percent of the top 100 providers included clinical laboratories and durable medical equipment providers, both of which have been identified in the past as having high potential for fraudulent billings.", "Because unpublished MUEs were developed for services and items that have been fraudulently or abusively billed in the past, without systematically examining billing information and claims from the top providers exceeding those limits CMS may be missing another opportunity to improve its program integrity efforts.", "CMS has estimated improper Medicare fee-for-service payments of $29.6 billion in fiscal year 2012.", "To help prevent improper payments, CMS has implemented national MUEs, which limit the amount of a service that is paid when billed by a provider for a beneficiary on the same day.", "The limits for certain services that have been fraudulently or abusively billed are unpublished to deter providers from billing up to the maximum allowable limit.", "GAO was asked to review issues related to MUEs.", "This report examines the extent to which CMS has (1) paid for services that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits and (2) examined billing from providers that exceeded unpublished MUE limits.", "GAO analyzed Medicare claims related to these limits in 2011, and interviewed CMS officials and selected contractors in states with high improper payments." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 5, -1, 0, 1, 2, 0, -1, 0, 1, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_RL34131	{ "title": [ "", "Theories of Liability and Sources of Immunity", "Federal Tort Claims Act", "Discretionary Function Exception", "Immunity for Corps of Engineers Projects Under the Discretionary Function Exception", "Flood Control Act of 1928", "United States v. James: Immunity for Flood Project Waters", "Central Green Company v. United States: Immunity for Floods and Floodwaters", "Levee Failure and Hurricane Katrina Flooding", "New Orleans Hurricane Protection System", "Failure of the Hurricane Protection System", "Hurricane Katrina Liability", "Federal Tort Claims Act", "Flood Control Act of 1928", "Negligence", "Floodway Activation and Mississippi River Basin Flooding of 2011", "Corps' Authority to Activate Floodways", "Flowage Easements", "Floodway Operation and Immunity Under the FTCA and FCA" ], "paragraphs": [ "When the Mississippi River rose to near record levels in 2011, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) intentionally broke several levees along the river, thereby flooding normally protected areas in order to prevent greater damage elsewhere. The decision to detonate levees has been controversial, with opponents arguing that levee detonation combined with the resulting flooding may render extensive amounts of farmland unproductive for a generation. The 2011 Mississippi River floods brought renewed attention to federal liability for floods, which has been the subject of ongoing litigation since Hurricane Katrina.\nHurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August 2005, bringing with it rain, high-velocity winds, and a large storm surge, and leaving behind a massive path of destruction. Much of the extensive damage that occurred resulted when the storm surge breached levees and floodwalls protecting New Orleans. Some of these structures were part of the federally authorized Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project (LPV), constructed by the Corps and maintained by local levee districts. By August 31, 2005, 80% of New Orleans was under water. While some flooding was expected in New Orleans, primarily because the city sits below sea level and lacks natural drainage, the extent of inundation was unprecedented.\nIn many instances, like that of Katrina, floods occur when natural conditions prove too extreme for flood control structures or those structures fail. In other instances, like that of the 2011 Mississippi River flooding, the Corps may flood certain lands in order to reduce damage to other areas. This report examines the legal issues resulting from flood damage in both instances. It analyzes the general framework of liability claims for flood damage and federal government immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA). The report specifically analyzes claims for federal liability for damage caused by Katrina. Finally, it examines the legal issues surrounding the Corps' decision to activate floodways along the Mississippi River in 2011.", "As a threshold issue, any suit against the federal government (including the Corps) must overcome the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity means that the government cannot be sued. Congress, however, may waive sovereign immunity and allow the federal government to be sued in specific circumstances. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it has the right to sue the government. The FTCA and the FCA govern when lawsuits may be filed against the federal government for flood damages.\nThe FTCA and the FCA frequently appear as defenses to the same claim. One federal circuit court has held that the FTCA does not overrule or invalidate the immunity provision of the FCA. Courts generally consider the underlying liability claim only after determining that the immunity provisions do not apply.", "The FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign immunity if a harmful act of a federal employee causes damage. Specifically, the FTCA creates liability for the following:\ninjury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act of omission occurred.", "The FTCA contains a number of exceptions under which the United States may not be held liable even if negligent. Among these, the discretionary function exception prevents the government from being sued for\nany claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.\nThe Supreme Court has provided clarification on the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. In Dalehite v. United States , the Court described discretion as being \"more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.\" In United States v. Varig , the Supreme Court found that an agency's execution of a decided-upon action is also a discretionary action. In United States v. Gaubert , the Court stated a two-part test for applying the discretionary function exception. Under the test, (1) the challenged conduct must involve an element of judgment or choice, and (2) the judgment or choice must be based on considerations of public policy.\nClaims arising from the performance (or non-performance) of mandatory functions required by statute are actionable under the FTCA. Thus, if the government fails to comply with an action required by Congress, the government is not protected from liability. If an action includes both mandatory and discretionary elements, the court must determine which part of the government action Congress specifically required, and which part involved discretion. For example, although Congress specifically required construction of the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System, how it was constructed was discretionary.", "Courts typically interpret the discretionary function exception broadly. Generally, the discretionary function exception has prevented claims against the United States for water damage to real property resulting from negligent design or construction of flood control or irrigation projects. In Vaizburd v. United States , plaintiffs alleged that a Corps project to reduce storm damage and protect the shoreline damaged their property because of negligent design and implementation. The court used the Gaubert two-part test to find that the Corps exercised discretion in the design, planning, and implementation of the project. The court found that the Corps chose from several different project plan designs in light of a number of policy considerations, including cost, reliability, resource allocation, environmental protection, and political implications. The court also found that even though the project was required by statute, the actual implementation of the project was not dictated by any plan, regulation, or statute, and thus, the Corps had discretion in how to implement the project. Accordingly, even if there has been negligent design or implementation, the presence of choice and judgment may allow the discretionary function exception to preclude any claim against the United States.\nA discretionary function can exist in the choice of materials for a required project. In United States v. Ure , the plaintiff argued that the government was negligent in constructing an irrigation canal that burst and flooded the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff claimed the government's duty to ensure against breaks was breached because the canal had not been constructed with a stronger (and more expensive) material. Ultimately, the court found that the government's cost-based decision not to use stronger material was subject to the discretionary function exception.\nSimilarly, when the government builds infrastructure to withstand a certain level of storm, although recognizing that more powerful storms are possible, courts have held that the discretionary function exception applies. In Valley Cattle Co. v. United States , the plaintiff contended that the government was negligent and liable for damages because its flood preparations could handle only a \"two-year storm\" despite knowledge that much stronger storms hit the area. The court found that the government made decisions at the planning level to prepare only for a two-year storm based on policy factors, and was immune from liability because of the discretionary function exception.\nEven deciding to delay project improvements can excuse liability under the discretionary function exception. In National Union Fire Insurance v. United States , the court held the Corps' decision to delay a small improvement to a breakwater while planning for a larger improvement was a choice immune from liability. Despite the Corps' awareness of problems with the breakwater protection prior to the plaintiff's property being damaged, the court held that the FTCA's discretionary function exception applied because the Corps had made a decision regarding timing of the improvements. The court also found that considering the cost of greater safety is a discretionary function.\nUnder some circumstances, maintenance has been found not to be a discretionary action. In E. Ritter & Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers , the court found the government liable for failing to maintain a flood control project. Although the Corps had decided not to maintain the banks of the project, the court found that the discretionary function exception did not automatically apply whenever a decision was involved. Relying on the second prong of the Gaubert test, the court found that only government decisions based on considerations of public policy are protected by the exception. The court found the discretionary function exception did not apply because operating the project incorrectly was not part of the Corps' mandated policy to prevent flooding.\nIn more recent cases, courts have found that the level of maintenance of a government project involved considerations of public policy. In a case based on the National Park Service's (NPS's) failure to maintain a road, the court looked at whether a decision had been made regarding maintenance. It considered that the NPS had developed a maintenance task list, and that maintaining that particular road was to occur following other projects. According to the court, scheduling was discretionary, since agencies are allowed to establish priorities \"by balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding.\" In a similar case, NPS trail maintenance was held to be a discretionary action. In that case, the court reviewed the policy-prong of the Gaubert test to find that agencies are allowed to balance public policy against \"the constraints of resources available to them.\"", "Even if litigants are able to refute the discretionary function exception and sue the government under the FTCA, the FCA offers additional immunity to the federal government. Section 702c of the FCA provides that \"no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States from any damage from or by floods or flood waters.\" Section 702c immunity is not available exclusively to the Corps, but rather may also be available to the Bureau of Reclamation within the Department of the Interior. The overall breadth and scope of FCA immunity from liability is the subject of considerable controversy and litigation. Despite the Supreme Court's comment that \"it is difficult to imagine broader language,\" the case history of the FCA evidences a more nuanced application.\nIn response to a large flood that devastated the Mississippi River Valley in 1927, Congress enacted the FCA in order to fund large flood control projects while limiting government liability for those projects. Essentially, the FCA's immunity provision allowed the government to assist in preventing flood damage without simultaneously subjecting itself to liability if its efforts could not control all damage.", "The Supreme Court applied Section 702c immunity broadly in United States v. James . In that case, the petitioners filed wrongful death claims against the government after two recreational boaters drowned in the reservoirs of federal flood control projects. The Court wrote that the language of Section 702c was unambiguous and should be given its \"plain meaning.\" Damage under the act included both personal and property damage. In reaching its conclusion, the court looked at the purpose of the act, which was to limit federal liability for flood control projects. In dicta, the court reasoned that the terms flood or flood waters applied to \"all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that such projects cannot control.\" This holding was interpreted by most courts to mean that if a public works project has flood control as one of its purposes, Section 702c immunity would apply.\nFollowing the James decision, the courts disagreed on the relationship a federal project must have to flood control in order for the government to have immunity. While all circuits agreed that federally funded public works projects \"wholly unrelated\" to flood protection purposes are not entitled to Section 702c immunity, confusion arose among the circuits regarding exactly how connected the project must be to flood control in order to invoke Section 702c immunity.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court declined to address this issue in 1992 when it denied review in Hiersche v. United States . In Hiersche , the family of a diver under contract with the federal government to inspect fish screens on the Columbia River sued the government for wrongful death after the diver was fatally injured. The family alleged that the death was caused by the government employees' failure to shut off water flow to the fish bypass system according to plan. The Court declined to review the case, and Justice Stevens issued a concurring memorandum explaining that while it is generally the Court's \"duty to resolve conflicts among the courts of appeals,\" some conflicts, including issues presented in Hiersche , \"can be resolved more effectively by Congress.\" Justice Stevens further discussed Section 702c immunity, stating:\nThe statute at issue here is an anachronism. It was enacted 18 years before the [FTCA] waived the Federal Government's sovereign immunity from liability for personal injuries. At the time of its enactment, no consideration was given to the power generation, recreational, and conservation purposes of flood-control projects, or to their possible impact on the then nonexistent federal liability for personal injury and death caused by negligent operation of such projects. Today this obsolete legislative remnant is nothing more than an engine of injustice. Congress, not this Court, has the primary duty to confront the question whether any part of this harsh immunity doctrine should be retained.\nCongress remains able to reconsider issues of federal immunity related to flood damage and flood control projects legislatively. As statutory provisions of immunity, it is within Congress's authority to define the scope of the protections offered by both the FTCA and FCA.", "In 2001 the Supreme Court revisited its interpretation of Section 702 immunity in Central Green Company v. United States . The Court held that the portion of the James decision that referred to flood control projects was dicta, rendering the bulk of litigation following James of little precedential value. In Central Green , the Court did not focus on the character of the federal project or the purpose it served, but looked at the waters that caused the damage and the purpose for their release. The unanimous Court held that \"in determining whether § 702c immunity attaches, courts should consider the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage rather than the relation between that damage and a flood control project.\"\nLike the discretionary function exception, Section 702c immunity had been claimed in a broad range of cases. A federal district court refused to grant Section 702c immunity for a wrongful death claim in which the victim died after driving into a lake that was created by a flood control project. The victim's family argued that the government negligently designed the road such that drivers were led into the lake. The court explained that \"simply because waters are in some way related to a flood control project is insufficient\" to satisfy immunity requirements under Central Green and noted that there was \"no evidence that the lake overflowed or that [the victim] drowned because flood waters engulfed her car.\" Without such a link to floods or floodwaters, the court reasoned that the government could not claim Section 702c immunity.\nHowever, when floodwaters released during the operation of a flood control project cause injury or death, Section 702c immunity applies under Central Green . When federal operators opened spillway gates at Fort Loudoun Dam in 2003 to discharge water in order to maintain flood control capacity in lakes upstream from the dam, boaters were pulled by undercurrents and ultimately drowned. A federal district court held that the government was immune from liability because the operation of the spillway gates was a flood control activity.", "In the aftermath of Katrina, numerous legal claims were filed against the government for flood damage. A fundamental question has been whether the breaches occurred because the storm surge was greater than the hurricane protection system was designed to contain, or whether faulty design, construction, or maintenance of the system caused the breaches. Studies indicate that both problems may have played a part. According to a National Hurricane Center (NHC) report, most of the breaches resulted from overtopping, where the water exceeded the protective structures, but some New Orleans floodwall breaches occurred before the surge exceeded the structures' design, meaning the floodwalls failed. Litigation against the federal government and some contractors is ongoing and has been consolidated under the heading In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation , in the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The legal defenses available to the federal government depend on the facts underlying the specific flooding incident. Therefore, some background regarding Hurricane Katrina's flooding of New Orleans is necessary to analyze the legal issues.", "New Orleans is situated below sea level and is virtually surrounded by water, with Lake Pontchartrain to its north and the Mississippi River to the south. Not far to the east is the Gulf of Mexico. The city faces flooding risks from the Mississippi River, coastal storms, and heavy precipitation. A system of levees and floodwalls was designed to protect the city from the river and coastal storms. Levees are typically broad, earthen structures, while floodwalls are made of concrete and steel, built atop a levee or in place of a levee. The infrastructure around New Orleans represented a combination of federal and local investments and responsibilities, and is referred to in this report as the Hurricane Protection System. Like most of the nation's flood and storm damage reduction infrastructure, many of the levees and floodwalls in New Orleans were built by the federal government but are maintained by local governments and local levee districts once they are completed. Some portions of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPV), the project most relevant to the Katrina failures, were under construction when Katrina struck. Consequently, while some portions of the system were managed by the levee districts, other portions were still under the Corps' jurisdiction.\nSince the 1965 Lake Pontchartrain Act, more than 20,000 acres of coastal wetlands have been lost because of some storm damage reduction projects in Louisiana. Because marshlands may slow storm surges, a finding that storm reduction projects reduced protective wetlands may affect the Corps' liability. Moreover, some media reports asserted that the Corps was planning \"an array of hurricane-protection projects\" in the region surrounding New Orleans in 2002. Such plans might indicate a decision by the Corps to design a new system rather than improve an existing one, and could affect the Corps' liability.", "With respect to the failure of the Hurricane Protection System in New Orleans, a central question has been whether the design of the levees and floodwalls was exceeded or whether they were poorly designed, constructed, or maintained. A significant amount of flooding in New Orleans resulted from structural failure of levees and floodwalls, allowing waters from Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne, and other stormwaters to flow into the low-lying city. Although the protection system was designed to withstand a Category 3 hurricane and Hurricane Katrina was a Category 3 storm at the time of landfall, its storm surges were higher than normal for such a storm. In addition, Katrina dumped more than five inches of rainfall on New Orleans in eight hours.\nThe Hurricane Protection System failed in approximately 50 locations and for a variety of reasons. The vast majority of those failures occurred because waters that exceeded the design capacity of the system flowed over the floodwalls. However, evidence gathered by a panel of experts commissioned by the Corps suggests that at least four levees/floodwalls were breached before they exceeded their design capacity.\nFollowing Katrina, the Corps commissioned an extensive report via a multiparty task force known as the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET). The IPET report did not identify one failure, but a series of failures, noting that if one part of the city's flood protection system failed, the risk of failure to the others consequently increased. IPET found \"differences in the quality of materials used in levees, differences in the conservativeness of floodwall designs, and variations in structure protective elevations due to subsidence and construction below the design intent due to error in interpretation of datums\" all contributed to inconsistent protection within the system. The IPET report states that the 17 th Street and London Avenue levees experienced foundation failures prior to water levels reaching the design levels of protection. The storm surges in the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) exceeded design levels, but IPET also found that the walls had subsided by more than 2 feet, contributing to the amount of overtopping that occurred.\nAnother theory is that the levees were overtopped or breached because the storm surge was enhanced by the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). MRGO (also known as Mr. Go) is a 76-mile navigational channel between the Port of New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. It is designed as a shortcut for ships. Studies have reviewed whether MRGO became a hurricane highway, or a funnel, accelerating the movement of water from the Gulf into the IHNC. While IPET found that MRGO did not accelerate the movement of the water, it did find that a portion of MRGO allowed Lake Borgne waters to be pushed into the interior of New Orleans. IPET found that this connection amplified the surge level and velocity through the interior of the city and raised the level of Lake Pontchartrain. In turn, that increased the pressure on the levees throughout the area, according to IPET.", "", "To determine whether FTCA's discretionary function exception applies to the various claims in the Katrina litigation, the court would apply the Gaubert test: (1) the challenged conduct must involve an element of judgment or choice, and (2) the judgment or choice must be based on considerations of public policy. Hence, to be successful, a suit based on the FTCA would have to show that policy decisions and government discretion did not play any part in building the Hurricane Protection System. The resolution of these questions should be independent of any decision regarding negligence or fault.\nCongress authorized and delegated primary design and construction responsibility to the Corps for the Hurricane Protection System in the Flood Control Act of 1965. The construction of the system was ongoing when Hurricane Katrina hit the city in 2005. In the decades preceding Katrina, the Corps had revised the design and construction of the Hurricane Protection System for a number of reasons, including cost, environmental factors, technical issues, additional land requirements, and aesthetic issues. Thus, the overall design and construction required balancing many different policy factors, supporting the government's invocation of immunity under the discretionary function exception.\nA more difficult issue may be liability related to maintenance of the system. As discussed earlier, the courts are inconsistent as to whether maintenance is a discretionary action. Courts tend to find that decisions contrary to public policy and unsupported by documentation of the public policy considerations are not discretionary. The Corps' ongoing evaluation of a new Hurricane Protection System could bolster the argument that the Corps was considering public policy when it chose to work on a new system, rather than expend funds on an existing system. It also is not clear who was responsible for maintaining the various levees and floodwalls, because local levee districts managed them only after they were completed, and not all were completed. Discretionary immunity would not apply if persons at the operational level failed to maintain the system according to a prescribed protocol. For example, if inspections had to meet specific guidelines, or if various assessments were strictly prescribed, there may be little or no discretion involved. However, any documented choice involving prioritization would likely be considered a discretionary action, exempting the government from liability.\nThus far, the district court has recognized that the FTCA's discretionary function exception applied to alleged negligence related to dredging of the 17 th Street Canal. The court explained that the decision to issue a dredging permit \"was a policy judgment left to the Corps to balance a myriad of factors, including flood hazards as opposed to the needs and welfare of the people.\" Accordingly, challenges related to those particular Corps actions have been barred under the FTCA.\nOn the other hand, the court held that the Corps could not invoke discretionary function immunity with respect to the maintenance and operation of MRGO. In that case, the court explained that the Corps' actions \"were in direct contravention of professional engineering and safety standards\" and that such actions \"are not policy.\" Furthermore, the court found that the government did not meet the Gaubert test, citing the Corps' failure to comply with its mandatory duty under the National Environmental Policy Act when it did not report that \"MRGO was causing significant changes in the environment\" and the effects that such changes may have on the surrounding community. The application of FTCA's discretionary function exception to other claims, including those relating to the actions of contractors engaged by the Corps to prepare for lock replacement on the Industrial Canal, remain to be determined.", "Even if the government cannot invoke discretionary function immunity, a plaintiff would have to overcome the broad Section 702c immunity of the FCA. To the extent courts find that the waters causing damage were floodwaters released because of the Hurricane Protection System, a flood control project, the Corps would likely be immune with respect to claims based on that system's failure. The district court has found that the Corps was immune from liability for damages associated with the levee breaches of various canals in New Orleans. Although the court rejected the government's contention that Section 702c immunity attached so long as the damages were caused by floodwaters, it noted that immunity under the FCA was broad. Accordingly, the court explained that \"immunity arises where damage is caused by flood waters emanating from a flood control project\" and barred challenges related to the breaches of certain levees in the LPV.\nHowever, the court has indicated in a number of its decisions that Section 702c immunity does not apply to the extent that \"the United States may be found liable for damages caused by negligence that is extrinsic to the LPV.\" The court has held that damages caused by the Corps' operation and maintenance of MRGO fall into this category and do not qualify for immunity under the FCA. The decision was based on the court's understanding of the requirements of Central Green and Graci v. United States , a 1971 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that Section 702c immunity did not apply to MRGO. In Graci , which followed Hurricane Betsy, litigants argued the construction of MRGO caused their properties to flood. The circuit court refused to find Section 702c immunity applied to all flood damage actions, explaining that such an absolute immunity would be contrary to the government's intent to waive immunity for negligent acts of its employees under the FTCA. According to the district court in In re Katrina Canal Breaches , damages caused by floodwater unrelated to a flood control project cannot qualify for immunity under the FCA. Rather, the court reiterated its requirement that Section 702c immunity applies only if the water responsible for the damages is floodwaters and has a nexus to a flood control project. Because the court determined that MRGO was unrelated to the LPV flood control project, it did not meet the requirements for FCA immunity.", "Only after a court determines that the government is not immune under the FTCA and the FCA would it consider the negligence of the federal government. To prove that the government was negligent, the plaintiffs must show that the federal government owed them a duty when it built a particular project, that the government breached its duty, that the breach caused harm, and that the plaintiffs were injured as a result of that breach.\nIn claims in which the court finds that no immunity applies, the government may still avoid a finding of liability. A common defense for negligence claims is that the damage was caused by an act of God, in this case, a hurricane. The act of God defense appears to apply the most easily to those levees and floodwalls that were overtopped by the waters. They essentially failed because their design capacity was exceeded by the unusually high storm surges brought on by Katrina. However, as was discussed earlier, some of the overtopping occurred because some levees and floodwalls had subsided by as much as 2 feet. Also, plaintiffs may argue that the storm surge was extreme because of MRGO. Furthermore, the government's liability may be diminished if the court finds that it is not solely responsible for the damages incurred.\nThus far, the court has reached the merits of the negligence claim in only one instance—a set of claims involving the maintenance and operation of MRGO. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that MRGO was \"a substantial cause\" for the breaching of part of the levee system and the subsequent flooding that occurred. The court cited the Corps' duty under Louisiana law for landowners \"to discover any unreasonably dangerous condition and either correct that condition or warn of its existence,\" which it found the Corps failed to do. Upon finding that the Corps had been negligent in maintaining MRGO, the court held the Corps liable for the resulting damages.", "Beginning in April 2011, a series of severe storm systems combined with increased water levels due to snowmelt caused some of the largest floods in the Mississippi River Basin area in the last century. Simultaneous flooding of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers in late April threatened the safety of Cairo, IL, a town located at the confluence of the two rivers. As river levels continued to rise, the Corps prepared to activate the floodway system of the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project (MRTP). The floodway system allows the Corps to artificially crevasse or open certain levees along the Mississippi River to flood areas normally protected by the levees in order to alleviate flood damage to other areas. After activating the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway near Cairo, the Corps subsequently activated floodways downstream as the river's crest travelled south, raising questions of the Corps' liability and potential remedies for affected landowners.", "Congress authorized the MRTP pursuant to the FCA in response to a flood that devastated the Mississippi River Basin in 1927. In order to prevent such damage in the future, the MRTP was designed as a system of civil works to protect against flooding and to maintain navigation of the river channel. The MRTP included a series of floodways that were designed to divert floodwaters in order to provide relief to other segments of the levee system when the river's waters reached certain levels.\nThe MRTP includes four floodways: the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway (Missouri); the Morganza floodway (Louisiana); the West Atchafalaya floodway (Louisiana); and the Bonnet Carre floodway (Louisiana). In May 2011, the Corps intentionally breached the levee protecting the Bird's Point-New Madrid floodway by detonating a hole in the levee to divert floodwaters to protect Cairo, IL, a town located at the confluence of the flooding Mississippi and Ohio rivers. The Corps also opened floodgates on the Morganza floodway to alleviate pressure on the levees protecting Baton Rouge and New Orleans and opened the Bonnet-Carre floodway to prevent floodwaters from reaching New Orleans. The Corps' activation of the Bird's Point-New Madrid and Morganza floodways was only the second use of each since their respective completion in 1933 and 1953, and the activation of the Bonnet-Carre floodway was the ninth use since its completion in 1932.\nThe Corps' initial decision to activate the floodway system at Bird's Point-New Madrid raised questions about the agency's authority to purposely flood some lands to save others. In the case of Bird's Point-New Madrid, detonation of the levee according to the floodway operation plan was expected to flood 130,000 acres in Missouri, an area about 35 miles long and between 3 and 10 miles wide. The decision was particularly controversial because the Corps' decision would protect either an Illinois town or Missouri farmland and residences. Accordingly, Missouri filed a lawsuit challenging the Corps' authority to operate the floodway at the expense of Missouri residents' homes and farms.\nA federal district court rejected Missouri's challenge to the Corps' authority to operate the floodway system at Bird's-Point-New Madrid. The court relied on precedent from a 1984 case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to find that the Corps' decision to operate the floodway could not be reviewed by courts. In that case, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the floodway system and noted that Congress authorized both the construction of the levees and the artificial breaching of those levees when water exceeded certain levels set by the operations plan. The Eighth Circuit explained that because Congress broadly delegated authority to operate the levee, providing \"no additional standards for determining whether and where to crevasse the levee,\" courts must afford the Corps' decision a \"high degree of deference\" since it required highly technical expertise. Accordingly, the district court refused to bar the Corps from artificially crevassing the levee in response to the 2011 floods.", "The Corps' decisions to divert floodwaters through the MRTP floodway system meant that property owners that typically were protected by the levee and floodway structures instead suffered flooding to their land, homes, farms, or other property. The government generally cannot deprive a property owner of the possession or use of his property without compensating the owner for the loss caused by the government's action. In the case of the MRTP's floodway system, Congress had provided for the acquisition of \"flowage rights for additional destructive flood waters that will pass by reason of diversions from the main channel of the Mississippi River.\" The acquisition of these rights could occur through a variety of legal methods, including acquiring title to the property itself or acquiring a right-of-way. For the purposes of this report, such a right will be referred to generally as a flowage easement.\nAcquisition of flowage easements from property owners of potentially affected land allows the government to operate levees without risk of liability for the resulting damages from operating the floodways. As the district court explained in Missouri v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers , \"under those easements, the landowners released and held harmless the United States for any and all damages that occur as the result of flooding.\" By selling flowage easements to the government, property owners were compensated for damage resulting from the operation of the floodway at any future time. Flowage easements are a property right and as such are transferred in the same manner as the title to property is transferred. If the original owner of property assumed the risk of future flooding and agreed to not hold the government liable for damages resulting from operation of the floodway, subsequent owners would be bound by that promise as well. Although the subsequent owner would not consent to such risk directly, the attachment of the easement to the property means that the subsequent owner had notice of the risk as part of his or her purchase of the property.\nSome questions of liability regarding the sufficiency of the flowage easements have been raised since the Corps initiated floodway operations. The Corps has not acquired such easements to all lands affected by operation of the various floodways. For example, with respect to the Bird's Point-New Madrid floodway, the Corps has asserted that it \"obtained all flowage easements necessary to legally operate the Floodway.\" Although there has been public debate regarding the Corps' failure to obtain easements for all affected property, the Eighth Circuit has held that such a failure does not justify barring the operation of the floodway. Rather, the court noted that landowners had other adequate legal remedies, including seeking compensation from the government in courts for the resulting damage.\nIn addition to challenging whether the Corps had acquired the necessary easements, some of the landowners affected by the operation of the MRTP have claimed that \"to the extent any easements existed, they were insufficient to allow the flowage of water and debris over the plaintiffs' land and property in the force and magnitudes that existed during the flood.\" The landowners argue that the scope of the easements was exceeded by the damage caused by the Corps' operations. Specifically, concerns have been raised about the amount of sediment that would cover the floodway after the waters recede and whether the Corps would owe additional compensation for excess sand and gravel that might be deposited on the land by floodwaters.", "The focus of legal challenges related to the 2011 Mississippi floods has focused on the Corps' authority with respect to the MRTP and the sufficiency of floodway easements. No claims related to the FTCA appear to have been filed alleging negligence in the operation of the floodways. In legal challenges to previous decisions to operate the floodways, however, courts have emphasized the degree to which Congress deferred to the Corps' discretion in MRTP operations. Therefore, if an FTCA claim is filed, parties may find it difficult to challenge the Corps' actions under the Gaubert test. Given the recognition of the role of the Corps' judgment in how to operate the system and the policy considerations involving the impacts of flooding on the natural and human environment, it appears that the Corps would be able to defend such challenges under the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.\nIn addition to authorizing the MRTP, as discussed above, the FCA also granted immunity to the government, including the Corps, for damages caused by floods or floodwaters. Under the Central Green analysis, the Corps could avoid liability for damage caused by its operation of the floodways depending on the character of the waters causing damage and the purpose of their release. In the case of the 2011 floods, the waters causing damage are clearly floodwaters that were diverted through the floodway as a primary facet of the MRTP, one of the nation's largest flood control projects. Therefore, it appears likely that Section 702c immunity would apply." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_title h2_title", "", "", "", "h0_title h2_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full h2_full h1_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "h0_full h1_title", "", "h0_full", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What action has the federal government taken to prevent damage from flooding?", "Who managed these projects?", "How successful were these projects?", "What is an example of said damage?", "How have these floods changed national perception?", "What have been the consequences of flood damage?", "What is the nature of lawsuits filed against the federal government for flood damange?", "What does this report examine?", "What specifics does it consider?", "On what event does it focus?" ], "summary": [ "Over the past century, the federal government has undertaken a number of civil works projects to prevent widespread damage from flooding of various waterways.", "These flood control projects generally have been designed and constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).", "Despite the existence of these flood control structures, floods have caused major damage to various regions of the country.", "Hurricane Katrina was the most costly natural disaster ever to hit the United States. Striking land in August 2005 as a Category 3 hurricane, Hurricane Katrina left 80% of New Orleans under water. Since Katrina, a number of major floods in the midwestern states have caused significant damage.", "In the wake of these floods, the issue of federal liability for flood damage is receiving attention in the media and in Congress.", "The costly and unprecedented nature of recent flood damage has led to an upsurge in litigation over flood damage liability.", "Some lawsuits filed against the federal government, particularly after Katrina, assert government liability for damages resulting from the failure of levees and floodwalls designed and constructed by the Corps. Other lawsuits claim federal liability for damages resulting from the Corps' decision to activate floodways during the 2011 Mississippi River flooding.", "This report examines federal liability for flood damage and analyzes legal defenses available to the federal government.", "Specifically, it provides an overview of the discretionary function exemption under the FTCA and immunity under the FCA as applied to Corps projects.", "The report also considers the Corps' potential liability for damages caused by levee failure during Hurricane Katrina and the activation of floodways during the 2011 Mississippi flooding." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, 3, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3 ] }
GAO_GAO-19-166	{ "title": [ "Background", "Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Migration", "Climate Change Impacts on Migration that May Affect National Security", "U.S. Government Agency Roles Related to Climate Change", "Executive Branch Actions Related to Climate Change and Migration from Fiscal Years 2014 through 2018", "Executive Actions", "Presidential Budget Requests for Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018", "Strategy Documents Affecting State, USAID, and DOD", "State, USAID, and DOD Have Discussed the Potential Effects of Climate Change on Global Migration, but State Does Not Provide Clear Risk Assessment Guidance", "Agencies Discussed the Effects of Climate Change on Migration in Their 2014 Adaptation Plans", "Few of the State and USAID Risk Assessments We Reviewed Identified the Nexus of Climate Change and Migration as a Risk", "State Lacks Clear Guidance on its Process for Assessing Climate Change-Related Risks", "State, USAID, and DOD Have Been Involved in Various Climate Change Related Activities, but None Were Focused Specifically on Migration, and Their Participation Has Declined", "State Activities", "Multilateral Efforts", "USAID Activities", "Adaptation Efforts", "Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Assistance Efforts", "DOD Activities", "Interagency Forums", "Conclusions", "Recommendation for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Regional Focus on Climate Change as a Driver of Global Migration", "Bangladesh: Climate Change, Migration, Stability and Security", "Total Population 164,700,000", "Net Migration Rate per 1000 people -3.2", "Map of Bangladesh", "Brazil: Climate Change, Migration, Stability and Security", "Human Development Index High Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita $14,103 Remittances as % of GDP 0.1 Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry as % of GDP 4.6 % Population in Cities 86.3 Net Migration Rate per 1000 people 0.0", "Greenland: Climate Change, Migration, Stability and Security", "Total Population 56,000", "Nigeria: Climate Change, Migration, Stability and Security", "Total Population 190,900,000 Fragile States Index #14 out of 178", "Syria: Climate Change, Migration, Stability and Security", "Total Population 18,300,000", "Net Migration Rate per 1000 people -41.8", "Map of Syria", "Marshall Islands: Climate Change, Migration, Stability and Security", "Total Population 100,000 Fragile States Index Not Available Human Development Index High Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita $3,819 Remittances as % of GDP 14.8 Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry as % of GDP 15.9 % Population in Cities 76.7 Net Migration Rate per 1000 people Not Available", "Haiti: Climate Change, Migration, Stability and Security", "Total Population", "Appendix III: Department of State Global Climate Change Initiative Adaptation Activities Funded in Fiscal Years 2014 through 2017", "Activity name", "Activity name", "Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State", "Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development", "Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "According to international and U.S. government sources, climate change poses serious risks to many of the physical and ecological systems upon which society depends, although the exact details of these impacts are uncertain. Climate change may intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, and sea level rise. Climate change is also increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including sudden- onset disasters, such as floods, according to key scientific assessments. These effects of climate change may alter existing migration trends across the globe, according to IOM. (See appendix II for further discussion of climate change as a driver of migration in seven geographic regions.) For example, sea level rise, a slow-onset disaster, may result in the salinization of soil and drinking water, thereby undermining a country or community’s ability to sustain livelihoods and maintain critical services, which could cause some people to migrate. Sudden-onset disasters may also contribute to migration as people flee natural disasters, in most cases leading to temporary displacement. For example, people may either voluntarily migrate, or be forced to migrate, to earn money needed to rebuild damaged homes after flooding, especially as extreme weather events increase in intensity and number. If unable or unwilling to migrate, people may find themselves trapped or choosing to stay in deteriorating conditions. Sources agree that the effects of climate change generally impact internal migration, while migration across international borders due to climate change is less common.\nIn deciding whether to migrate, people weigh multiple factors including economic and political factors, social or personal motives, or demographic pressures. The effects of climate change add another layer of complexity to this decision, but there is debate about the role climate change plays in migration. Figure 1 depicts how climate change may influence other factors that drive the decision to migrate or stay.\nThere are limitations to reliably estimating the number of people displaced by climate change because there are no reliable global estimates for those migrating due to slow-onset disasters, and estimates for those migrating due to sudden-onset disasters are based on limited data, according to IOM. The lack of reliable data is due in part to the multi- causal nature of migration. Further, IOM notes that forecasts for the number of environmental migrants by 2050 vary from 25 million to 1 billion. They and others have questioned the methodologies used to arrive at even these broad estimates.", "Migration, potentially driven by climate change, may contribute to instability and result in national security challenges, according to some international organizations and national governments. For example, an influx of migrants to a city may put pressure on existing resources, resulting in tensions between new migrants and residents, or between the population and its government. The U.S. Global Change Research Program has also stated that migration, such as displacement resulting from extreme weather events, is a potential national security issue. At different times, the United Nations General Assembly and, in 2014, DOD have deemed climate change to be a threat multiplier, as the effects of climate change could increase competition for resources, reduce government capacity, and threaten livelihoods, thereby causing instability and migration. Further, the U.S. intelligence community considers climate change to increase the risks of humanitarian disasters, conflict, and migration.\nIdentifying the cause of a conflict, however, is complicated, and experts debate the connections linking climate, migration, and national security. For example, IOM has reported that existing evidence on climate migration and instability must be considered with caution. Further, some studies stress that other factors can mitigate the effects of climate change on migration and stability, including governance and community resilience, as the World Bank has reported.", "State, USAID, and DOD are among the U.S. government agencies with a role in responding to issues related to climate change, including as a driver of migration.\nState interacts with foreign governments and international organizations focused on climate change and migration primarily through the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM).\nUSAID supports a range of development programs that help to mitigate the effects of climate change through the Bureaus for Economic Growth, Education and Environment; Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; Food Security; Asia; and Africa; and individual USAID missions. Additionally, USAID’s Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) and Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) lead and coordinate the U.S. government’s emergency responses to sudden- and slow-onset disasters, and complex emergencies overseas.\nDOD assists in the United States’ humanitarian response to sudden- onset disasters abroad through its six geographic combatant commands, with support from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Joint Staff’s Office of Humanitarian Engagement.", "Climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the policy documents we reviewed for either the current or previous administrations during fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Our review of executive actions, budget requests, and executive branch strategies that affected State, USAID, and DOD found only brief mentions of climate change as a driver of migration. None of the documents we reviewed reflected a priority for assessing or addressing climate change as a driver of migration, although these documents reflect a shift in administrations’ climate change priorities more generally.", "The previous administration issued two executive orders and a presidential memorandum related to climate change. These executive actions had a policy of improving climate preparedness and resilience, factoring climate-resilience considerations into agencies’ international development decisions, and creating forums for interagency coordination. In March 2017, the current administration issued a subsequent executive order revoking some of the previous executive actions related to climate change. See figure 2 for a timeline of these executive actions.\nThe previous administration issued three executive actions related to climate change, which included requirements focused on agencies’ considerations of the impacts of climate change and established forums for interagency coordination. The current administration issued an executive action related to energy independence and climate change.\nExecutive Order 13653: Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change. Executive Order 13653 stated that agencies—including State, USAID, and DOD—shall, among other things, develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives. Executive Order 13653 also established the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience.\nExecutive Order 13677: Climate-Resilient International Development. Executive Order 13677 requires State, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies with direct international development programs and investments to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, and to adjust relevant strategies as appropriate, among other things. Executive Order 13677 also established the Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development as part of the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience.\n2016 Presidential Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security. The 2016 presidential memorandum required, among other things, that agencies, including State, USAID, and DOD, develop an agency-specific approach to address climate-related threats to national security. It also required agencies to develop implementation plans that would describe how they would identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, including migration and displacement, and the resulting impacts on national security, among other requirements, and stated that the effects of climate change can lead to population migration within and across international borders, spur crises, and amplify or accelerate conflict in countries or regions already facing instability. The 2016 memorandum also established the Climate and National Security Working Group.\nExecutive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth. Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653 and the 2016 presidential memorandum, among other things, as seen in figure 2.", "Priorities related to climate change shifted between the past two administrations as reflected in a recent budget request that reduced some climate change funding affecting U.S. foreign assistance.\n2017 Presidential Budget Request. The previous administration stated in its fiscal year 2017 budget request that “the challenge of climate change will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other” and that “it is imperative for the United States to couple action on climate change at home with leadership internationally.” The fiscal year 2017 budget request sought $1.3 billion in discretionary funding to advance the goals of the Global Climate Change Initiative, which was established in 2010 and aimed to promote resilient, low-emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U.S. foreign assistance. The $1.3 billion in requested funding included $750 million in U.S. funding for the Green Climate Fund, a multilateral trust fund designed to foster resilient low-emission development in developing countries.\n2018 Presidential Budget Request. The current administration, in its fiscal year 2018 budget request, did not include any funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative. In addition, the current administration’s budget request stated that it “Eliminate the Global Climate Change Initiative and fulfill the President’s pledge to cease payments to United Nations’ (UN) climate change programs by eliminating U.S. funding related to the Green Climate Fund. . .”", "Some strategies from the current and previous administrations that affect State, USAID, and DOD, among other agencies, reflect a shift in priorities related to climate change. For example, the previous administration cited climate change as a “top strategic risk” in its 2015 National Security Strategy and stated that climate change is an urgent and growing threat to U.S. national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water. The current administration does not discuss climate change in its 2017 National Security Strategy. Additionally, State and USAID have a Joint Strategic Plan to help the agencies achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy. The previous State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan included a strategic goal on “promoting the transition to a low-emission, climate-resilient world” that proposed leading international actions to combat climate change. The current State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan does not have a climate change goal.", "State, USAID, and DOD were required by executive orders to assess climate change-related risks to their missions and, for State and USAID, to their strategies, among other things. In response to Executive Order 13653, which has since been revoked, the agencies completed adaptation plans that integrated considerations of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives. In response to Executive Order 13677, which has not been revoked, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents. Although these executive orders did not require a specific assessment of climate change as a driver of migration, all three agencies have discussed the effects of climate change on migration in their adaptation plans and risk assessments. However, State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies.", "State, USAID, and DOD each completed adaptation plans in 2014 that included limited discussions of migration as one potential effect of climate change. Executive Order 13653 directed the agencies to develop or continue to develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives. Each adaptation plan was to include, among other things, a description of how the agency would consider the need to improve climate adaptation and resilience.\nState. In its 2014 adaptation plan, State included a brief discussion of climate change as one of multiple factors that potentially will drive migration and impact its mission. State reported that the specific impacts of climate change on the ability of the department to promote peace and stability in regions of vital interest to the United States were unknown. For example, according to the plan, an increase in heavy precipitation events around the world could damage the electric grid and transportation and energy water infrastructure, upon which State depends, making it difficult to maintain operations and diplomatic relations. In its plan, State reported that climate change impacts may threaten international peace, civil stability, and economic growth through aggravating existing problems related to poverty and environmental degradation. Further, environmental and poverty- related issues and regional instability could stress relationships with some foreign governments. However, the plan noted that specific impacts of climate change on conflict, migration, terrorism, and complex disasters were still unknown.\nUSAID. In its 2014 adaptation plan, USAID included a brief discussion of migration as one potential effect of climate change that could also impact security. USAID stated that the impact of climate change on its programs and operations, if left unaddressed, could compromise the agency’s ability to achieve its mission. Further, USAID’s plan referred to increased migration as a potential risk of climate change. Flooding and other extreme climate events can result in increased migration, among other impacts, that could affect existing and planned USAID programming. In particular, programs in areas like agriculture and food security, global health, water and sanitation, infrastructure, and disaster readiness and humanitarian response are vulnerable to climate change, according to USAID. In the infrastructure area, climate change may necessitate new protective measures for coastal homes and infrastructure, and in some cases even mass evacuations or permanent migration. USAID stated that climate change could further reduce or alter the distribution of already limited resources like food and water, or force temporary or permanent migration of communities. According to the plan, in areas with high risk factors for conflict, climate change stresses can aggravate tensions and contribute to conflict.\nDOD. In its 2014 adaptation roadmap, DOD included a brief discussion of migration as one of multiple potential effects of climate change that could impact national security. DOD referred to climate change as a threat multiplier that can aggravate other risks around the world, with migration being one effect that could increase requests for DOD to provide assistance. The roadmap stated that as climate change affects the availability of food and water, human migration, and competition for natural resources, the department’s unique capability to provide logistical, material, and security assistance on a massive scale or in rapid fashion may be called upon with increasing frequency. Furthermore, DOD stated that the impacts of climate change may cause instability in other countries by, among other things, impairing access to food and water, damaging infrastructure, uprooting and displacing large numbers of people, and compelling mass migration. These developments, according to the department, could undermine already fragile governments that are unable to respond effectively, or challenge currently stable governments, as well as increase competition and tension between countries vying for limited resources.", "In response to Executive Order 13677, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents. Though these assessments are not specific to migration, a few of the assessments identified the nexus of climate change and migration.\nState. State required climate change risk assessments for all new integrated country strategies drafted in 2016 or later. We reviewed 10 integrated country strategies from the two regions that were the first to implement the climate change risk assessment requirement— Africa, and East Asia and the Pacific. All 10 of the strategies included climate change risk assessments, one of which—Cambodia— identified migration as a risk for the country. The Cambodia strategy states that internal migration due to climate change hinders access to health care and the prevention of infectious diseases like malaria. We also reviewed 10 strategies from State’s functional and regional bureaus for assessments of climate-related risks, including 3 functional bureau strategies (State/PRM, State/OES, and State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs) and 7 regional bureau strategies. All of the functional bureau strategies we reviewed identified climate change as a risk and State/PRM cited the impact of climate change on migration. Of the regional bureau strategies we reviewed, we found that one, the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk in its region. For example, the strategy states that climate change is becoming increasingly disruptive, potentially increasing migration due to rising sea levels. None of the other six regional bureau strategies we reviewed identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk or challenge. However, five regional bureaus identified climate change as a risk or challenge and one identified migration as a risk or challenge.\nUSAID. USAID also requires the integration of climate risk management into all country or regional development cooperation strategies drafted since October 1, 2015. Missions must document in a climate change appendix to the strategy any climate risks they identified and how they considered climate change in their strategy. As of August 2018, USAID had completed five country or regional development cooperation strategy updates initiated since October 1, 2015—Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe—and all five included the required appendix. Of the five updated strategies, three—Uganda, Tunisia, and East Africa—discuss the indirect effect of climate change on migration, among other issues. For example, Uganda’s 2016-2021 country strategy states that increased frequency and duration of droughts is likely to be the most significant climate‐related change in Uganda. The strategy also notes that droughts have affected, and will continue to affect, water resources, hydroelectricity production, and agriculture, among other sectors. As agriculture, forestry, and fisheries decline in Uganda, the strategy asserts that people will migrate to urban areas, leading to the formation of slums. We also reviewed USAID’s nine regional development cooperation strategies, one of which—East Africa—had been updated since the requirement to include climate risk management. Of the other eight strategies that have yet to be updated, seven identified climate change as a challenge or risk and three identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk. For example, the Southern Africa regional development cooperation strategy states that water scarcity, natural disasters, and other climate change related events will most likely increase migration throughout the region. Additionally, the Asia regional development cooperation strategy discusses the risks of climate change in urban areas. In Asia, the number of migrants seeking economic opportunities in urban centers is likely to increase. According to the strategy, migrants are moving into hazard-prone areas located along coastlines, flood plains, and other low-lying areas in many Asian primary and secondary cities—areas that experts predict will experience more frequent and intense storm surges, floods, and coastal erosion as a result of climate change.", "The requirement in Executive Order 13677 to assess climate change- related risks to agency strategies remains unchanged; however, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change- related risks to its integrated country strategies. Specifically, State’s 2016 guidance for developing integrated country strategies stated that all missions should assess the risk of climate change on their strategies’ goals and objectives and included reference to the climate risk screening tool—a method that missions could use to assess climate change risks. State issued new guidance to its missions in 2018, but this guidance does not include information on the process for assessing climate change-related risks to agency strategies. According to State officials, the 2018 guidance for integrated country strategies does not reference climate change risk assessments because, in September 2017, State decided that the strategies should not single out climate change risks in a separate appendix. State officials said this decision resulted, in part, from the new administration’s shift in priorities on climate change. Officials also said that this decision reflects a new approach to risk management by State and that the missions could choose to include climate change and other potential risks in the general risk discussion section of their strategies. Officials from State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources said that it is now up to each mission to decide whether a strategic objective may have a climate challenge. However, those missions that choose to include an assessment of climate change risks are not provided guidance on the process for doing so and there is no reference to the climate risk screening tool—or to climate change at all—in the 2018 guidance.\nExecutive Order 13677 directed State to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, among other things. Subsequently, a State cable from September 2016 further explained that State would implement the executive order’s requirement by screening for climate risks as part of the process for drafting all new integrated country strategies. Additionally, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that documentation is a necessary part of an effective internal control system. If management determines that a principle is not relevant, management must support that determination with documentation that includes the rationale of how, in the absence of that principle, the associated component could be designed, implemented, and operated effectively.\nBecause State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies, it is less likely that the current round of strategies will include the assessment of climate- related risks. It is also possible that those missions that choose to conduct climate change risk assessments will not do so in a consistent manner. Such assessments might identify climate change as a driver of migration, as at least one previous assessment did under the 2016 guidance. Thus, without clear guidance, missions may not examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives and could miss opportunities to improve the climate resilience of foreign assistance activities.", "For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, State, USAID, and DOD had some activities that could potentially address climate change as a driver of migration, although none of these activities specifically focused on the issue. For example, USAID has climate change adaptation activities, but to date migration has not been a focus of this programming. With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, agencies have reduced some of these activities.", "State’s offices that are focused on the issues of climate change (State/OES) and migration (State/PRM) have participated in multilateral activities related to climate change as a driver of migration and funded adaptation and other activities related to the issue. State officials said that the agency does not, however, have any activities that specifically address migration due to climate change or environmental factors.", "State has participated in multilateral activities related to climate change and migration. With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, the United States has disengaged from some of these multilateral activities (see table 1).\nIn addition to State’s participation in the multilateral activities described in table 2, State has provided funding for activities related to climate change and capacity building that address natural disasters. These activities may involve efforts potentially related to migration. For example, according to State:\nState provided about $2 million per year, between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which analyzed the impacts of climate change on migration in its most recent assessment report.\nState/PRM provided about $4 million, between fiscal years 2014 through 2018, for IOM’s Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, which provides guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disasters. IOM provides training to countries on these guidelines. State/PRM officials said that this initiative is not specifically related to climate change and does not focus on specific types of disasters but does mention sudden-onset disasters. Officials also said that IOM tries to promote a climate change perspective in its trainings.\nState/OES provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative to eight projects during fiscal years 2014 through 2017. (See appendix III for a description of all eight projects.) State/OES officials said that these projects help countries prepare for the impacts of climate change, potentially reducing the pressure to migrate. However, to these officials’ knowledge, none of these projects directly supported activities related to migration. For example, State/OES provided a $4 million grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network. This network focuses on increasing the capacity of governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risks in planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address these risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets. Adaptation activities occurred in over 35 countries.\nWith the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, State discontinued some of these efforts. For example, funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative was not included in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2018. State/OES officials said that the agency does not plan to fund additional adaptation activities and has not requested additional funding for the activities. According to a State official, PRM had been in discussion with IOM to develop a project proposal that would have assisted the governments of Small Island Developing States in adapting their migration policies to account for challenges and opportunities associated with environmental degradation, ecosystem loss, climate change impacts, and natural disasters. State/PRM stopped further development of the proposal following the change in administrations. Additionally, according to a State official, the department made some efforts at the end of the previous administration to develop a formal position on the topic of climate change as a driver of migration. For example, State drafted an internal document to help clarify its role in responding to the humanitarian aspects of sudden-onset and slow-onset climate events. This initial work stopped under the current administration.", "USAID officials said that, with respect to the agency’s climate-related programming, its climate change adaptation programming was the most likely to include activities related to migration or displacement, although a broad swath of USAID development programming has the potential to build host country resilience. Officials stated that, to date, migration has not been a primary motivation for the agency’s climate-related or disaster assistance programming. However, officials said that, in a humanitarian crisis or under some economic conditions, development programming can reduce displacement or the pressure to migrate—such as by fostering greater resilience to drought or other adverse conditions—and that this is also true of climate-related programming. USAID also provides humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters that displace people. Officials said that USAID recognizes the links between displacement and natural disasters, but that the agency does not have specific programs linking disaster assistance, migration, and climate change.", "USAID identified about 250 activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Our analysis of the descriptions of these activities determined that none directly mentioned any efforts specifically related to migration. Officials emphasized that the connection between climate change and migration tends to be indirect and shaped by other more immediate factors. USAID’s data on activities that received adaptation funding identified 38 beneficiary countries, as well as activities described generally as implemented at the regional or global level. For activities where USAID’s data identified a specific region, most activities were located in Africa followed by Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.\nExamples of the types of activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 include:\nThe Mali Climate Change Adaptation Activity, which aims to build resilience to current climate variability and increase resilience to longer-term climate change effects. This activity is also working to strengthen the capacity of Mali’s meteorological agency to provide improved climate information as well as to incorporate climate considerations into local-level planning. The total estimated cost is about $13 million over 5 years.\nThe activity for Climate-Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods, which ended in September 2018, aimed to increase Bangladesh’s resilience to natural hazards by working with community-based organizations, government ministries, and technical agencies. This activity provided technical assistance to the Government of Bangladesh and local communities to improve ecosystem conservation and resilience capacity. The total estimated cost was about $33 million in funding over 6 years.\nThe activity for Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion, which aims to support pastoralists in Ethiopia via expansion of markets and long-term behavior change (see fig. 3). USAID officials cited this activity as an example of adaptation efforts that indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration. The activity has three interrelated objectives: increasing household incomes, enhancing resilience, and bolstering adaptive capacity to climate change among pastoral people in Ethiopia. An evaluation of the activity found that migration is a coping strategy for dealing with climate shocks, although participants said that drought is becoming more frequent, placing a severe strain on traditional coping mechanisms, such as migration and selling cattle, and that permanent migration is not a preferred strategy. The total estimated cost is about $60 million in funding over 6 years.\nWith the shift in priorities related to climate change, funding for USAID’s climate change adaptation activities has decreased. Missions may continue to fund their adaptation activities with discretionary funds or other earmarked, sector funding, provided the activities further the funding source’s objective, according to USAID. For example, in some cases, missions are using Water sector funding to continue some of their adaptation work. USAID also said that among the agency’s goals are to increase the resilience of USAID partner countries to recurrent crises, including climate variability and change.", "In addition to USAID’s climate change adaptation programming, USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP provide emergency humanitarian assistance to people affected by sudden-onset disasters—such as hurricanes and floods—and slow-onset and extended disasters, including droughts and conflicts. Some of this assistance helps people who have been displaced by disaster. USAID officials stated that although disasters cause mainly temporary displacement, the relationship among humanitarian assistance, climate change, and migration is very complex and depends on both climatic and non-climatic factors. USAID/OFDA responded to 267 disasters from fiscal year 2014 through June 2018, according to agency data. For example, USAID/OFDA responded to the effects of Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in October 2016, as seen in figure 4, including helping temporarily displaced people.", "DOD assists in the U.S. government response to overseas disasters, including helping people displaced by such disasters, regardless of the cause of the disaster. These efforts are not specific to climate change as a driver of migration. For example, officials from DOD’s geographic combatant commands said that, to the extent they address climate change, migration is not a focus of those efforts and they view migration as caused by security and economic issues.\nBetween fiscal years 2014 and 2018, Congress has appropriated to DOD between $103 and $130 million per year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid. Officials said that the geographic combatant commands use most of this funding for steady state humanitarian assistance related to health, education, basic infrastructure, and disaster preparedness with a smaller amount set aside for immediate disaster assistance although that varies based on emergency requirements. DOD officials said that they have not seen any changes to this funding or associated activities with the change of administrations in fiscal year 2017. DOD officials we spoke with also emphasized that USAID/OFDA is the lead agency for the U.S. government’s response to disasters overseas. USAID/OFDA formally requested DOD support on about 10 percent of the foreign disaster assistance provided by USAID/OFDA, according to USAID data for fiscal year 2014 through June 2018 and DOD officials. DOD assistance is typically provided for the largest, most complex disasters, according to agency officials.\nAccording to a July 2015 assessment conducted by the geographic combatant commands, while their activities vary, each command works with partner nations to increase their abilities to reduce the risks and effects from environmental impacts and climate-related events, including severe weather and other hazards. For example, in the report, U.S. Southern Command stated that it had requested funding to pre-position assets for when a severe storm threatens Haiti to be able to respond immediately to a potential disaster. U.S. Southern Command officials said that they work with partner nations to encourage residents experiencing extreme weather to remain where they are because it is easier to provide help to people who stay in one place. Officials from U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command also said that the major factors driving migration in their regions are security and economic issues.", "State, USAID, and DOD have participated in interagency forums regarding climate change, which may have addressed its effects on migration. With changes to priorities regarding climate change in fiscal year 2017, these forums have been disbanded or are not meeting.\nThe Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience. The Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established to facilitate the integration of climate science in policies and planning of government agencies, including by promoting the development of climate change related information, data, and tools, among other things. Additionally, the council was to develop, recommend, and coordinate interagency efforts on priority federal government actions related to climate preparedness and resilience. According to State officials, the council began working with the National Security Council and other agencies to facilitate greater interagency cooperation on adaptation. In addition, a task force on the council was discussing the federal role in addressing displacement related to climate change. The council was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653, which had established the council.\nThe Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development. The Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development, of which State and USAID were members, was established by Executive Order 13677 and placed under the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience. The working group’s mission includes developing guidelines for integrating considerations of climate-change risks and climate resilience into agency strategies, plans, programs, projects, investments, and related funding decisions, among other things. Additionally, the working group was tasked with facilitating the exchange of knowledge and lessons learned in assessing climate risks to agency strategies, among other things. USAID officials said that the working group had not discussed climate change as a driver of migration. While the working group has not been formally disbanded, it has not met since at least November 2017 according to USAID.\nThe Climate and National Security Working Group. The Climate and National Security Working Group, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established by the 2016 presidential memorandum. The chairs of the working group were to coordinate the development of a strategic approach to identify, assess, and share information on current and projected climate-related impacts on national security interests and to inform the development of national security doctrine, policies, and plans, among other things. According to the memorandum, the working group was to provide a venue for enhancing the understanding of the links between climate change- related impacts and national security interests and for discussing opportunities for climate mitigation and adaptation activities to address national security issues. This working group was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked the 2016 presidential memorandum, which had established the working group.", "State, USAID, and DOD assessments and activities have not focused specifically on the nexus of climate change and migration. State did identify migration as a risk of climate change in at least one of its climate change risk assessments for the department’s country strategies. However, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies. State’s current guidance for these country strategies no longer mentions a climate change risk assessment and does not provide missions with information about the climate risk screening tool that can be used to conduct such an assessment. As such, missions are less likely to examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives, or to do so in a consistent manner, and thus may not have the information they would need to identify migration as a risk of climate change. By clearly documenting and providing guidance on how to assess the risk of climate change, State would ensure that the department examines the potential risks of climate change on its foreign assistance activities.", "We are making the following recommendation to State: The Secretary of State should ensure that the Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources provides missions with guidance that clearly documents the department’s process for climate change risk assessments for integrated country strategies. (Recommendation 1)", "We provided a draft of this product to State, USAID, and DOD for review and comment. State provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix IV. In its comments, State did not oppose the recommendation and noted that the agency will update its integrated country strategy guidance by June 30, 2019 to inform missions that they have the option to include an annex on climate resilience, as well as other topics. However, State also indicated that the agency will begin working with stakeholders to consider whether to recommend that the Secretary of State ask the President to rescind Executive Order 13677: Climate- Resilient International Development.\nUSAID also provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix V. In its letter, USAID provided some additional information about its programs and its proposed transformation effort. USAID and DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional requesters, Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or [email protected], or Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.", "This report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes State, USAID, and DOD activities, if any, that are related to climate change and global migration. We chose fiscal years 2014 through 2018 as our time frame based on our review of recent executive orders related to climate change. We selected State, USAID, and DOD because the agencies’ missions of diplomacy, development, and defense provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad.\nTo describe executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, we reviewed documents that reflect priorities of the previous and current administrations. Specifically, we reviewed budget requests and enacted appropriations between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for funding priorities related to climate change and U.S. foreign assistance. In addition, we reviewed executive actions and executive branch strategies that applied to State, USAID, and DOD between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for executive and national security priorities related to climate change. For example, we reviewed the current and previous national security strategies. strategies and seven regional bureau strategies. For USAID, we examined the five country and regional strategies that were required to include a climate risk assessment at the time of our review: Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. We also reviewed all nine USAID regional strategies. For both State and USAID, we reviewed the selected strategies by searching for information related to migration and climate change. To determine whether State clearly documents the department’s current climate risk assessment process for integrated country strategies, we compared State’s 2018 guidance for developing integrated country strategies with standards related to documentation in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and previous State guidance issued in 2016, which was created in response to Executive Order 13677’s requirements to assess climate change risks to strategies, among other things. to these issues. The agency then provided us with data for about 250 activities from its annual operational plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, the 3 years during the period we reviewed in which it received adaptation funding. USAID identified these activities based on whether the agency had tagged them in its plans as having an “adaptation key issue.” USAID excluded projects that had planned attributions to the adaptation key issue of less than $250,000 in a given fiscal year, as well as certain other activities such as those that focused on project support. We then conducted an automated review of the activity description fields provided by USAID for terms related to migration and other descriptive information such as locations of activities. Because no USAID adaptation activities specifically mentioned migration, for the purposes of this report we chose illustrative examples to provide context for the types of activities the agency has funded.\nDOD officials we met with did not identify any specific activities related to climate change as a driver of migration. DOD officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the geographic combatant commands generally discussed DOD activities related to humanitarian assistance and disaster response as most relevant to our inquiry. Because DOD works in coordination with USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance on disaster assistance we also reviewed USAID data on its disaster response activities during this period.\nWe determined that the USAID and State adaptation project data and USAID disaster assistance data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing these efforts.\nState, USAID, and DOD to obtain information on whether changes in government priorities related to climate change affected their activities.\nWe conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to January 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "This appendix provides a review by region of observed and projected climate change effects, migration trends, and challenges in stability and security. Multiple sources we used for this overview make a connection between climate change and such events as rising sea levels, higher temperatures, and an increase in the number and severity of extreme weather events. The following regions are discussed: Asia, South America, the Arctic, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Oceania, and Central America and the Caribbean. We have provided an overview for each region and a focus on one country or territory in the region. international and regional organizations, including a variety of organizations within the United Nations, the World Bank, regional development banks, the European Union, and others. Third, we reviewed relevant public documents from U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Fourth, we reviewed academic sources, research institutions, and documents from the relevant country’s national government. population. Economic conditions may be a factor for people deciding whether to migrate or stay in their country of origin.\nRemittances as Percent of GDP: The money international migrants transfer to recipients in their country of origin, expressed as a percentage of the origin country’s GDP. Sources agree that remittances support resilience in origin countries.\nAgriculture, Fishing, Forestry as Percent of GDP: A measure of the value added to an economy from the agricultural sector, which includes forestry, hunting, fishing, and the cultivation of crops and livestock, expressed as a percentage of the country’s GDP. Countries that depend on the agricultural sector may be vulnerable to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank.\nPercent of Population in Cities: The population living in areas classified as urban according to criteria each country uses. Today, more than half of the global population lives in cities. Migration, in some cases due to climate change, is an important driver of urban growth, according to IOM. Cities are also expected to face increasing risks from rising sea levels, flooding, storms, and other climate change effects.\nNet Migration Rate: A measure of the number of people leaving a country compared to the number of people entering a country, expressed as a number per 1,000 people.\nThe effects of climate change in Asia may impact migration and stability according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In coastal areas, effects of climate change include rising sea levels, storm surges, and others. Receding glaciers in mountanous areas may also cause flooding, and monsoons in a warmer climate may be more severe. Heat extremes and more rainfall are a particular concern in Southeast Asia. Changes in precipitation and drought in Asia may exacerbate food security challenges, and contribute to people deciding to migrate. Increases in migration, partly stemming from the effects of climate change in surrounding rural areas, may put pressure on existing urban infrastructure. Rural migrants may settle in informal communities on the outskirts of cities, areas that have little resilience to natural disasters. Although the World Bank and others agree that climate change largely causes internal migration, some evidence shows that the impact of climate change contributes to cross-border migration in Asia. Large numbers of migrants, along with other destabilizing factors, may contribute to instability and conflict, according to the IPCC. The effects of climate change on livelihoods, for example, could increase migration, strain governance, and contribute to conflict as a result. Bangladesh is one example where decreased yields from agriculture and fisheries have contributed to migration to the country’s coastal cities, which face their own climate change challenges.", "", "Bangladesh’s high population density and geography make the country susceptible to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank, and others. Bangladesh’s coasts and river banks are vulnerable to sudden-onset events such as tropical cyclones and flooding. Cyclone Aila in 2009, for example, caused widespread flooding in the southern coastal areas of Bangladesh and impacted millions of people. The storm washed away embankments that protected coastlines and caused severe damage to crops and livelihoods. Tropical Cyclone Mora in 2017 damaged thousands of homes and displaced an estimated 200,000 people. Increases in the number and intensity of tropical cyclones, which some predict will occur in a warmer climate, could have severe impacts on homes, livelihoods, and food security. Bangladesh also experiences many slow-onset climate change events, such as rising sea levels and increasingly severe droughts, which are projected to intensify with climate change. Bangladesh would lose an estimated 17.5 percent of its land if the sea level rose 1 meter, as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported. Projected changes in precipitation levels could cause drought and food insecurity in the northwest and salt-water intrusion could reduce crop yields in the southwest.", "", "Migration is a common adaptation strategy to climate change in Bangladesh, according to the ADB. For example, some farmers have adapted to salt water intrusion and destroyed crops by switching to salt- tolerant rice production or shrimp cultivation. Others have migrated, often to Bangladesh’s cities to find work less dependent on agriculture. Many new migrants to Bangladesh’s cities live in informal settlements that lack the resilience to withstand sudden-onset climate events. The capital city, Dhaka, is a common destination for migrants displaced by salt-water intrusion, flooding, and river erosion, according to IOM. Dhaka, like many coastal cities in South Asia, is located on a low-lying riverbank and faces increasing risks of extreme flooding. For example, past floods in Dhaka have destroyed homes and contaminated drinking water, creating significant health hazards. In some cases, individuals migrate to cities temporarily for work and return home after the agricultural off season ends. Bangladeshis also provide a significant number of labor migrants to the Gulf States and Malaysia. Remittances from international migrants represent 5.4 percent of the country’s GDP, and may help to support resilience to climate change, according to IOM, and others. These migration trends may intensify in the future. One study estimates 9.6 million people will migrate from 2011 to 2050 due to the effects of climate change.\nChallenges in Stability and Security Migration due to climate change is cited as a potential destabilizing factor in Bangladesh by ADB, and others. The low-income population in Bangladesh is dependent on agriculture, making the effects of climate change—including impacts on food security—a particular concern. By 2030, these effects on livelihoods and food security could increase the poverty rate in Bangladesh by 15 percent, as the IPCC has reported. Given the proximity of Bangladesh to India, some individuals may also choose to cross the border. Increased migration to India is a potential concern, according to some sources, as India may not have the resources to absorb large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants.\nThe CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: 2007); and Population Council, “Effects of Future Climate Change on Cross-Border Migration in North Africa and India,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2010).\nThe effects of climate change in South America vary by region, according to the the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as potentially impacting migration and stability. On the coast, risks include sea level rise, depletion of fisheries, and coral reef bleaching, according to IOM. Coastal cities with growing populations are particularly vulnerable. Melting glaciers in the Andean mountain region, and increased rainfall are expected to change the distribution of water resources, and impact food production as global demand for food is growing. Desertification and land degradation, complicated by the effects of climate change, are contributing to migration from rural areas to cities in South America, as IOM has reported. An estimated 77 percent of people living in high risk areas in South America are located in cities, according to IOM. IOM predicts that as these people feel the effects of sea level rise and water scarcity, they will migrate from the large coastal cities to smaller urban areas. While South America has experienced economic growth in the last decade, poverty rates remain high, and the effects of climate change, including possible migration, may exacerbate inequalities, putting further pressure on cities to meet the needs of their populations. Water security in particular is expected to disproportionaly impact low-income communities, according to the IPCC. For example, in Brazil, drought in the northeast may increase migration to southern cities that are facing rising sea levels and landslides, with consequences for food, water, and energy security.", "", "Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Brazil’s cities and rural regions may encounter a range of climate change effects, according to the IPCC and IOM. Rural areas, particularly in the northeast, could experience significant impacts from climate change partly due to poverty rates, and historical vulnerability to drought. Higher temperatures are expected to affect crop yields and household incomes, especially for low-income communities. In northeastern Brazil, temperatures are expected to increase and rainfall to decrease. The northeast could see a 22 percent reduction in precipitation by 2100, according to IPCC projections. Brazil’s coastal areas, including cities, are also vulnerable to rising sea levels, heavy precipitation, flooding, and landslides. The vast majority of Brazil’s population, about 86 percent, lives in cities, many in coastal areas, according to the United Nations Development Program. As their populations have grown, urban areas have extended out. This urban growth in Brazil’s megacities has caused further increases in temperature, rainfall, and landslides. For example, current levels of urbanization in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo may already be responsible for the 2°C warming observed in the city over the last 50 years, as well as the rise in extreme rainfall, according to the IPCC. The metropolitan area is expected to extend its area 38 percent by 2030. Multiple studies of the effects of urbanization on Sao Paulo’s climate suggest higher temperatures affect convective rainfall, which occurs when warm air rises, condenses to form clouds, and produces extreme rain. Other concerns are the depletion of coral reefs and mangrove forests on Brazil’s coastlines, and decreases in biodiversity.\nMigration from drought in northeastern Brazil to cities has increased urban populations, putting more people at risk of displacement from flooding and landslides. Migration from the northeast is a historical trend in Brazil, as economic migrants have sought seasonal jobs in more productive agricultural regions, or moved permanently to southern cities. Projected declines in rainfall have led some to predict further increases in migration in northeastern Brazil, as the IPCC has reported. However, remittances from family members who leave Brazil’s northeast support resilience for those who remain and may help to reduce migration. Already environmental factors contribute to migration to cities, including to favelas, informal settlements often constructed in hilly areas and floodplains outside of Brazilian cities. A significant number of the favela residents in Rio de Janeiro are migrants from northeastern Brazil, according to IOM. These new migrants may be at risk of further displacement if heavy rainfall, flooding, and other climate change effects destroy their vulnerable homes. For example, heavy rainfall in April 2010 resulted in landslides across Rio de Janeiro, displacing an estimated 5,000 people, according to a report from the World Bank. Brazil is also a destination for migrants from other countries in the region. Migrants from Venezuela searching for jobs and improved food security have come in growing numbers in recent years, as have migrants from Haiti fleeing a series of natural disasters, as IOM has reported.\nChallenges in Stability and Security Although Brazil ranks 106th out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index, the effects of climate change may contribute to challenges with water, food, and energy access according to the IPCC. Decreased rainfall could decrease agricultural productivity, with potential health impacts for poor populations. These conditions are of particular concern in northeastern Brazil, as extreme weather and low crop yields are associated with more violence, according to the IPCC. Brazil also receives about 70 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power, according the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent droughts caused power cuts across many major cities. Although not linked to the effects of climate change, absorbing a growing number of migrants fleeing political and economic instability in Venezuela may impact the broader region, according to the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Intelligence Council. Neighboring countries, including Brazil, may struggle to absorb the influx of migrants. On average, 800 Venezuelans are crossing the border to Brazil every day in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency.\nThe effects of climate change in the Arctic, including higher temperatures and melting ice, have contributed to shifts in migration across the Arctic, and may have security implications. Increasing temperatures may have a variety of impacts in the Arctic, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The effects of rising temperatures are disrupting livelihoods and food security, especially for indigenous communities, and opening up untapped natural resources to extraction. Both trends have impacted migration flows in the Arctic. Rising temperatures and melting ice have opened up previously inaccessible waterways in the Arctic, with implications for national security, according to the Department of Defense and others. Greenland, located in the Arctic and considered part of Kingdom of Denmark, exhibits many of these trends.", "", "Greenland is experiencing the effects of climate change, including glacial and ice melt, shifts in wildlife distribution, and newly available oil and mineral deposits, among others. The Greenland Ice Sheet covers approximately 80 percent of Greenland’s land mass. The ice sheet’s melting rate is slow, but uncertain. Increases in temperature greater than 1°C may result in the near loss of the entire ice sheet over a millennium and significant sea level rise, according to the IPCC. In the short term, predicting the ice sheet’s melting rate is a challenge as predictions vary in the scientific community. Accurate predictions would support mitigation and adaptation efforts in vulnerable areas. Rising temperatures and shrinking ice cover have shifted the distribution and migration patterns of marine mammals and fish, and impacted food security according to the IPCC and the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states. For example, the economy in Paamiut, Greenland, depended primarily on cod fisheries until changing climate conditions caused cod to disappear, and the town was slow to adapt to newly available shrimp. Similarly, fisheries in Disko Bay, Greenland, have struggled to adapt to new conditions. Rising temperatures and the resulting reduction in ice cover have required a shift to fishing from boats in open water instead of hunting and fishing over ice cover. Lastly, warming and ice melt may make significant oil and mineral deposits accessible for extraction in the future. The potential expansion of extraction industries makes environmental sustainability another possible concern. For example, an estimated 31 billion barrels of oil and gas may exist off the coast of Northeast Greenland, according to the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011-2020 Arctic Strategy. The strategy stresses the importance of assessing and reducing risks to the environment resulting from the exploration and extraction of oil and gas.\nThe effects of climate change are predicted to contribute to internal and external migration in Greenland. For example, young people are increasingly leaving indigenous communities in rural areas for cities in Greenland in search of work, as traditional livelihoods become unsustainable. Greenland is home to a majority indigenous population, primarily Inuit, whose traditional hunting and fishing practices require travel across ice. In the past, people adapted to seasonal changes to support livelihoods by migrating, and the practice was embedded into indigenous social structures. With reduced ice cover, however, migrating to hunt, fish, and maintain connections to community is more dangerous or restricted. Government policies promoting centralized services, such as health care and education, have also played a role in the shift away from migration as a way of life. As a result, indigenous livelihoods are more difficult to maintain, and young people often migrate to towns and cities in Greenland, or to Denmark, for education. At the same time, warmer temperatures have made mineral extraction feasible. As the extraction industry grows, new jobs may draw migrants from outside the Arctic region. In 2011 companies spent $100 million on the exploration of minerals in the Artic, and the estimated number of new mines is expected to require more workers than now live in the region.17 79Currently, more people leave than migrate to Greenland.\nThe local Inuit population in Uummannaq, Greenland relies heavily on ice coverage for fishing and travel by traditional dog-sled.\nBrookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples (January 30, 2013).\nBrookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.\nThe effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa vary depending on the region and have impacts on migration and security, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Coastal areas, for example, in West and East Africa are at risk from sea level rise that could affect major cities. Drought and the risk of desertification in the Sahel is cited as a concern, as is increased rainfall in parts of Central Africa accompanied by lower agricultural yields. As desertification threatens the livelihoods of farmers and herders, and drought makes fishing more challenging, rural dwellers may be more likely to migrate to cities, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Urbanization and population growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is already making densely populated cities vulnerable to flooding, storms, and erosion, increasing the number of people at risk of displacement by sudden-onset disasters. Climate change effects and changing migration flows across Sub-Saharan Africa may impact access to natural resources and contribute to existing tensions and conflicts, according to UNEP and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In Nigeria, the effects of climate change may effect a variety of livelihoods and increase migration south, while also exacerbating existing conflicts.", "", "The effects of climate change on Nigeria may impact the country’s agriculture and economy, according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Higher temperatures and decreased rainfall have contributed to drought in northern Nigeria. Desertification is also a concern. Some regions in northern Nigeria have less than 10 inches of rain a year, an amount that has decreased by 25 percent since the 1980’s, according to USIP. In other areas across Nigeria flooding has resulted in major crop losses, according to UNEP. Rising sea level, water inundation, and erosion are concerns in Nigeria’s coastal areas. Rising sea level is predicted to pose medium to very high risks to Africa’s coastal areas by 2100, according to the IPCC. Future sea level rise could result in the inundation of over 70 percent of the Nigerian coast. A rise of 0.2 meters in sea level could risk billions of dollars in assets, including oil wells near the coast. Even without a rapid rise in sea level, Nigeria’s coastal areas could experience erosion and significant land loss by 2100, as the IPCC has reported.\nThe effects of climate change on livelihoods in northern Nigeria may contribute to migration to the south according to UNEP, while conflict in the north drives separate migration trends. As the effects of climate change make farming and fishing more challenging elsewhere in Nigeria, migration to southern coastal cities may increase. Traditionally, farmers, herders, and fishery workers migrated for temporary employment during the off season, including migration to Nigeria’s cities to work in the oil industry. Permanent migration south as well as to cities may become more common if land suitable for farming decreases. As fish habitats like Lake Chad dry up, fishery workers may also migrate. Larger urban populations on the coast will put more people at risk of sea level rise, water inundation, and erosion, according to the IPCC. A rise in sea level of 1 meter could put over 3 million people at risk of displacement as the IPCC has reported. Herders have also moved further south due to increased drought in northern Nigeria, as UNEP and USIP have reported. A 2010 survey of herdsmen in Nigeria, for example, found that nearly one-third of them had migrated southeast as a result of changes in the natural environment, according to the UNEP. The ongoing conflict with Boko Haram, while not caused by climate change, has further resulted in millions of displaced people across the Lake Chad region, including many Nigerians who have fled to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.\nNigerian refugees at the Minawao camp in Cameroon.\nChallenges in Stability and Security The effects of climate change, migration, and conflict are interconnected in Nigeria, as USIP has reported. The country is ranked 14th of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index. Events in northwest Africa, including Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, have underscored concerns about the region’s vulnerability to the spread of violent extremism. The effects of climate change may exacerbate these concerns, according to USIP. Nigerians fleeing attacks from Boko Haram in the north have gone to communities in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger that are already experiencing food shortages due in part to climate change. These neighboring countries as a result have fewer resources to support both their own residents and the newer refugees. Non-state actors may also take advantage of government inaction on the effects of climate change. Boko Haram, for example, has justified its acts of violence by pointing to government failures, according to the USIP. Separately, increased drought in the north may aggravate historic tensions over land and water use between farmers in the south and herders migrating from the north, according to UNEP. Nigeria’s oil fields on the coast, which represent a significant part of the economy, are also at risk from sea level rise. Potential losses in oil revenue could impact Nigeria’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and conflict at home. Increased violence within its borders could also affect Nigeria’s ability to support regional peacekeeping missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2003 to 2018, where Nigerian troops worked to restore security after a civil war.\nThe effects of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa, including on its desert regions, may impact water access and compound migration and stability challenges, according to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Over 60 percent of the population already experiences high or very high water stress, according to the World Bank. Coupled with unsustainable water use, climate change may further exacerbate challenges with water security. The region continues to experience rising temperatures and declining annual rainfall, trends that contribute to the severity and length of drought, land degradation, and desertification. Decreased water security affects the livelihood and quality of life of farmers in the region, contributing to an increase in their migration to the cities and more urbanization, according to the World Bank. In contrast, many people are expected to migrate away from coastal cities as a result of sea level rise, according to UNEP. These potential migrations would be taking place in a region that already hosts large numbers of migrants such as those displaced by conflict and violence, including 18 percent of the world’s refugees, according to the International Organization for Migration. Challenges in water security may put greater pressure on unstable governments in the region, by intensifying existing tensions and conflicts between populations and their governments as well as between countries that share sources of water. The conflict in Syria illustrates the complex nature of climate change, migration, and conflict in the region, and the challenges to accurately assessing the links among the three, as noted in a technical paper commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).", "", "Rising temperatures and declining rainfall have contributed to recent droughts in Syria, a trend that may continue. The country underwent an extended drought from about 2006 until 2011. During the drought an estimated 60 percent of Syria experienced severe crop failure, and accompanying impacts on food security. Some studies have linked the length and severity of the drought in Syria to climate change, as USAID has reported. Others, however, have pointed to government land and water use policies, combined with the effects of climate change, as responsible for the severity of the drought. Agricultural policies, for example, encouraged farmers to grow water intensive crops like wheat, and supported inefficient irrigation practices, policies which further depleted ground water and made the region more vulnerable to decreases in rainfall linked to climate change. Across the Middle East, the rising temperatures and declining rainfalls of recent decades may worsen, according to the World Bank. If these trends continue, countries in the Middle East, including Syria, could continue to experience periods of severe drought and reduced crop yields.", "", "Migration Trends The ongoing conflict in Syria, in which migration due to climate change may have been a contributing factor, has caused large-scale migration to neighboring countries in the Middle East and to Europe. Leading up to the civil war, prolonged drought, among other factors, had increased migration to Syrian cities. Because of the drought, in 2009, over 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihoods in the agricultural sector, while nearly 1 million experienced food insecurity. In 2010, an estimated 200,000 people migrated from farms in rural areas to cities, according to a UN report. The conflict in Syria, which began in 2011, has further displaced large numbers of people within the country and across the Middle East, as we have previously reported.At the beginning of the conflict, Syrians, as well as Iraqi and Palestinian refugees who had been residing in Syria, fled mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. As the conflict persisted, refugees fled in larger numbers to Turkey, with the UNHCR reporting that nearly 1 million Syrians sought protection in that country in 2015. Starting that year, a growing number of Syrians risked dangerous sea voyages to reach countries in Europe, such as Greece, Germany, and Sweden. As of June 2017, more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees were living in neighboring countries, including more than 3 million in Turkey, and more than 1 million in Lebanon.\nChallenges in Stability and Security Sources agree that the Syrian conflict is a significant security challenge that has resulted in large scale migration across the Middle East and to Europe. Yet the link between prolonged drought, rural to urban migration, and the current conflict in Syria is uncertain. Some academic sources argue that the increased strain on urban infrastructure and resources due to the rural to urban migration played a role in Syria’s growing instability. Others highlight the complex nature of the Syrian conflict, pointing to broader political factors that exacerbated resource scarcity and inequality. For example, as the drought intensified, the Syrian government downplayed the severity of the humanitarian crisis, as described in research cited in a technical report commissioned by USAID.result, appeals to the international community for emergency aid received minimal support. Combined with existing sectarian divisions, ongoing revolutions across the Middle East, and other factors, the government’s response to the drought may have contributed to the current conflict. Migration and displacement are a concern in the region, according to the Department of Defense and others. The U.S. government has provided significant humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees in the Middle East, including in Lebanon and Jordan, as we have previously reported.However, a technical report commissioned by USAID has cautioned that the ongoing conflict in Syria makes it difficult to conduct research and draw conclusions related to climate, migration and conflict.\nAs a The effects of climate change on Oceania, particularly rising seas, may significantly impact coastal populations and increase migration in the future, as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have reported. Rising temperatures and declining rainfall may also contribute to lower yields from fisheries and agriculture, and a significant decrease in coral reef cover. Extreme weather events, including higher temperatures, wind, and rainfall, have already increased in number and intensity across the region. In the majority of Pacific island nations, of those who migrate, more people leave than come, according to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Observatory on Migration. The majority of migration in the region is economically driven. In the future, climate change may further impact these migration patterns across the region, according to the IPCC. Climate change has already exacerbated challenges that aid-dependent nations in the region face, restricting livelihoods and resources and contributing to pressures to migrate. The costs of climate change, including a decline in crop yields, a rise in energy demands, and a loss of coastal land, are predicted to be significant. The ADB estimates these costs will reach 12.7 percent of the Pacific regions’ GDP by 2100. Increased migration may also impact political stability and play a role in geopolitical rivalries within the region, according to the IPCC. The effects of climate change, especially rising sea levels, may result in forced migration from the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the Marshall Islands) and have additional impacts on the U.S. defense infrastructure on the islands.", "", "Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Rising sea levels are a grave threat to the Marshall Islands.The country consists of islands, low-lying atolls—coral caps sitting on top of submerged volcanoes—making it particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. On average, the Marshall Islands are 2 meters above sea level. In Majuro, the country’s most populous atoll, observed rates of sea level rise are already twice as fast as the global average. Population centers experience significant flooding, with damage to roads, houses, and infrastructure, especially during La Niña years, which are significantly wetter and more prone to extreme rainfall. Flooding is expected to worsen with rising sea levels, with consequences for the availabity of drinking water. On Roi-Namur island, for example, a 0.4 meter rise in sea level combined with wave-driven flooding is predicted to make groundwater undrinkable year round as early as 2055. This salt water inundation may contaminate already limited groundwater across the Marshall Islands. Lastly, during the 1940s and 1950s, the Marshall Islands was the site of 67 U.S. nuclear weapons tests on or near Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. Projected increases in frequency of flooding may negatively impact efforts to contain radioactive material stored on Runit Island.\nA number of factors have increased migration from the Marshall Islands, including to the United States. In 1986, the United States entered into a compact of free association with the country that allowed its citizens to migrate to the United States, as we have previously reported. As a result, more than 20,000 Marshallese now live in the United States.People are more likely to migrate abroad as the effects of climate change on the Marshall Islands—including rising sea levels—increasingly impact livelihoods.The threat of mass displacement and forced migration is also a concern, as the International Organization for Migration has reported. However, Marshallese culture has a strong connection to the land, which means that many view migration as a last resort. For people still living in the Marshall Islands, they face overpopulation in urban centers and displacement by sudden-onset disasters like cyclones and flooding. Factors influencing people deciding to move abroad include displacement, lack of economic opportunity—sometimes exacerbated by climate change—and limited access to health care. Climate change is likely to increase risks to public health in the country.Increased rainfall, for instance, may expand mosquito breeding grounds, raising the risk of diseases like dengue fever. The country’s limited health care system may further contribute to migration from the islands.\nChallenges in Stability and Security In the future, the Marshall Islands may become uninhabitable. This prospect threatens the existence of the Marshall Islands as a sovereign state, as well as the United States defense facilities located on the islands. The total loss of land could result in the Marshall Islands being uninhabitable, which raises problems of migration, resettlement, cultural survival, and sovereignty. Relocation of the population of the Marshall Islands, and of other Pacific Island nations at risk of rising seas, could cause significant geopolitical challenges.The Marshall Islands are also of strategic importance for the United States. Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States has permission to use several islands— including Kwajalein Atoll, the location of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Range—until 2066. The country’s proximity to the equator makes the Marshall Islands ideal for missile defense and space work. Yet the island’s defense infrastructure and operations are at significant risk due to rising sea levels, flooding, and diminishing supplies of potable water. As the Department of Defense has noted, climate change will have serious implications for the department’s ability to maintain its infrastructure and ensure military readiness in the future.\nDOD, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (Alexandria, VA: June 2014).\nThe effects of climate change on Central America and the Caribbean may increase migration and exacerbate poverty rates, as the National Intelligence Council has reported. The climate in Central America and the Caribbean is predicted to be warmer and dryer. The Caribbean’s extensive coastlines and low-lying areas are vulnerable to sea level rise and an increase in sudden-onset disasters, including hurricanes and storm surges. Drought is a particular concern in Central America, where declines in rainfall have reduced crop yields and threatened livelihoods in recent years. Some evidence shows that drought in parts of Central America has contributed to migration north, including to the United States. Population growth, especially in coastal cities, has increased the number of people at risk during hurricane season, and the number and intensity of hurricanes have grown in recent years. Some attribute the increase in intensity to higher sea surface temperatures caused by climate change. However, there remains debate about long term hurricane trends. Recent hurricanes have caused displacement, and significant losses and damages—including to infrastructure—across the region. The depletion of coral reefs and mangrove trees, natural barriers to coastal erosion and flooding, has exacerbated vulnerability to storms in coastal areas. Climate change is likely to have negative impacts on tourism in the Caribbean, where the industry is an important part of the economy, according to Inter-American Development Bank. Climate change impacts on the economy may make it increasingly difficult for governments to reduce poverty and move towards environmental sustainability. Haiti’s geography, location, and high poverty rates make the country especially vulnerable.", "", "Haiti is highly vulnerable to climate change effects, partly due to its long coastline.Hurricanes routinely make landfall in the country, and increases in rainfall and wind speeds associated with hurricanes are likely. Severe hurricanes, including Hurricane Matthew in September 2016, have hit Haiti in recent years. Hurricane Matthew was the first category 4 storm in Haiti since 1964. Damage from severe flooding and severe winds during the hurricane affected over 2 million people and created significant food security and public health challenges. Significant deforestation has further exacerbated Haiti’s vulnerability to hurricanes, as trees previously provided a natural barrier to the erosion that strong winds and more rainfall can cause. Rising temperature and highly variable rainfall have led to extreme drought and flash flooding, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).32 2 These trends decrease crop yields, affecting the livelihoods of farmers, and threaten water access. Projected increase in temperature and decreases in rainfall are likely to intensify drought in Haiti’s interior.\nUSAID, Haiti: Environment and Climate Change Fact Sheet (January 2016).\nMigration Trends Slow-onset climate events, such as drought, and rising sea levels, and sudden-onset events, including earthquakes, affect Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Haiti is also particularly exposed to extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, which can lead to displacement. In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 230,000 people and left close to 1.5 million people homeless. According to IOM, the recurrence of environmental disruptions increases risks and vulnerabilities. When Hurricane Sandy struck Haiti in October 2012, the country had still not recovered from the 2010 earthquake. The worsening of climate change effects around the world, particularly in low-income countries, may increase the number of people wanting to immigrate to the United States, where approximately 700,000 Haitians live today.Remittances from family members living outside Haiti make up a significant portion of the economy, at 24.7 percent of GDP. The majority of these remittances come from the United States, as we have previously reported.34 4Remittances may support resilience to climate change effects as migrants send money home for disaster recovery and adaptation.\nChallenges in Stability and Security Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, has experienced political instability for most of its history, and ranks 12th of 178 on the Fragile States Index. The government has a low capacity to respond to additional challenges like those related to climate change, according to USAID. The Ministry of Environment, for example, is a relatively new organization within the Haitian government, and local and regional governments have a limited ability to enforce environmental laws and regulations. The United States has provided substantial aid to Haiti, both in disaster response and broader development projects. Official development assistance for Haiti in 2015, for instance, totaled slightly more than $1 billion. According to a January 2018 UN report, 2.8 million people were still in need of humanitarian assistance.\nGAO, Remittances To Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels, GAO-18-313 (Washington, D.C., March 8, 2018).", "The Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative for eight projects for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 (see table 2).\nThe Global Climate Change Initiative was established in 2010 to promote resilient, low- emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U.S. foreign assistance and was divided into three main programmatic initiatives: (1) Adaptation assistance, (2) Clean Energy assistance, and (3) Sustainable Landscapes assistance.", "The primary purpose of these contributions to the LDCF was to address the adaptation needs of the least developed countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. The LDCF financed the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action, which identify a country’s priorities for adaptation actions.\nInitial grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network. The network is focused on increasing the capacity of national and subnational governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risk considerations in sector planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets.\nColombia, East Caribbean (Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ethiopia, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo) and, under current consideration, East Caribbean (Dominica, Suriname), and Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu)\nThe cost amendment intensified the technical support on National Adaptation Plans to select countries dependent upon specific country adaption needs. In addition, the cost amendment continued the learning and progress from the initial grant.\nImplemented through the Department of Treasury, this funding supported a Treasury grant to the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Multi Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank. This activity established the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Foundation and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company, among other things.", "The goal of PIER is to increase private sector investment in resilience to climate change in eight developing countries. The first phase of the project will assess and identify opportunities for private investment in resilience, as well as build public and private capacity for climate risk assessment in all the countries. In the second phase, public and private sector partners will develop and pilot climate risk-reduction investment models in four of the countries. The third phase will publicize the piloted investment models and lessons learned among the eight countries.\nImplemented through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, this activity aims to implement a capacity-building partnership with India to promote effective climate resilient decision making at national, state, and local levels.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contacts named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Miriam Carroll Fenton (Assistant Director), Kristy Williams (Assistant Director), Rachel Girshick (Analyst-in-Charge), Nancy Santucci, Miranda Cohen, Aldo Salerno, Neil Doherty, and Judith Williams. Alexander Welsh, Justin Fisher, and Joseph Thompson provided technical and other support.", "Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs to Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and Collaboration at Overseas Installations. GAO-18-206. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2017.\nCompacts Of Free Association: Actions Needed to Prepare for The Transition of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to Trust Fund Income. GAO-18-415. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2018.\nRemittances to Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels. GAO-18-313. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2018.\nSyrian Refugees: U.S. Agencies Conduct Financial Oversight Activities for Humanitarian Assistance but Should Strengthen Monitoring. GAO-18-58. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2017.\nInternational Food Assistance: Agencies Should Ensure Timely Documentation of Required Market Analyses and Assess Local Markets for Program Effects. GAO-17-640. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2017.\nHigh-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2017.\nFederal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies Obligated at Least $277.6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014. GAO-16-797. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2016.\nCoast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps. GAO-16-453. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2016.\nClimate Information: A National System Could Help Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Decision Makers Use Climate Information. GAO-16-37. Washington, D.C.: November 23, 2015.\nHurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters. GAO-15-515. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2015.\nHigh-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-15-290. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2015.\nStandards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. GAO-14-704G. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2014.\nCombating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management. GAO-14-518. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2014.\nClimate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts. GAO-14-446. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2014.\nExtreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s Resilience. GAO-14-364T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2014.\nClimate Change: State Should Further Improve Its Reporting on Financial Support to Developing Countries to Meet Future Requirements and Guidelines. GAO-13-829. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2013.\nHigh-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013.\nInternational Climate Change Assessments: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Oversight of U.S. Funding. GAO-12-43. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.\nClimate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help Government Decision Making. GAO-12-238T. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2011.\nForeign Relation: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U.S. Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, GAO-02-119. Washington D.C.: January 22, 2002." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4, 2, 3, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "h2_title", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h3_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What occurred from 2014 to 2018 in terms of federal actions on climate change?", "What specifically happened in 2016?", "To what extent was migration emphasized overall?", "How have government agencies discussed the link between climate change and migration?", "What specific actions have these agencies taken?", "How has State evolved its approach?", "What may happen without the presence of clear guidance?", "Why is it important to consider the effects of climate change?", "What is one reason that climate change would affect migration?", "How else might it have such an effect?", "What was the GAO asked to do?", "What does this report include?", "How was this report conducted?" ], "summary": [ "From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, a variety of executive branch actions related to climate change—such as executive orders and strategies—affected the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including their activities that could potentially address the nexus of climate change and migration.", "For example, a fiscal year 2016 presidential memorandum—rescinded in 2017—required agencies to develop implementation plans to identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, among other things.", "In general, however, climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the executive branch actions. For example, a fiscal year 2014 executive order—also rescinded in 2017—requiring agencies to prepare for the impacts of climate change did not highlight migration as a particular concern.", "State, USAID, and DOD have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in agency plans and risk assessments.", "For example, State and USAID required climate change risk assessments when developing country and regional strategies, and a few of the strategies reviewed by GAO identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk.", "However, State changed its approach in 2017, no longer providing missions with guidance on whether and how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies. In doing so, State did not include in its 2018 guidance to the missions any information on how to include climate change risks, should the missions choose to do so.", "Without clear guidance, State may miss opportunities to identify and address issues related to climate change as a potential driver of migration.", "The effects of climate change, combined with other factors, may alter human migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration.", "For example, climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, causing populations to move from an area.", "Climate change can also intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, or sea level rise, potentially altering longer-term migration trends.", "GAO was asked to review how U.S. agencies address climate change as a potential driver of global migration.", "For State, USAID, and DOD, this report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the agencies discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes agency activities on the issue.", "GAO analyzed documents on administration priorities; reviewed agency plans, risk assessments, and documentation of agency activities; and interviewed agency officials." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-16-290	{ "title": [ "Background", "Overall Budget Estimates and Plans for Modernization Differed Little from the Previous Year’s, but Certain Programs Changed to a Greater Degree", "Overall Budget Estimates for Modernization Increased Slightly from Those in 2015 Plans but with Some Significant Realignments and Changes within Program Areas", "Budget Estimates for Some Major Modernization Efforts Have Increased Significantly", "Budget Estimates Do Not Reflect All Elements of Modernization Plans, although the Full Cost Difference May Be Difficult to Assess", "Major Modernization Efforts Beyond the Future- Years Nuclear Security Program May Cost More Than Budget Estimates Reflect", "Estimates for Some Major Modernization Efforts in NNSA’s Budget Materials Were Lower Than Its Program-Specific Estimates", "Some Costs Are Not Included in Modernization Budget Estimates, and Dependency on Other Programs Could Lead to Increases in Estimates", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Figures Showing Life Extension Program and Alteration Budget Estimates and Cost Ranges from the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan", "Appendix III: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment", "Staff Acknowledgment" ], "paragraphs": [ "Congress funds NNSA’s modernization efforts through various programs and activities within the Weapons Activities appropriations account that generally address the following four areas:\nThe stockpile area includes weapons refurbishments through LEPs and other major weapons alterations and modifications; surveillance efforts to evaluate the condition, safety, and reliability of stockpiled weapons; maintenance efforts to perform certain minor weapons alterations or to replace components that have limited lifetimes; and core activities to support these efforts, such as maintaining base capabilities to produce uranium and plutonium components. NNSA allocates funds to activities that directly support the stockpile area through Directed Stockpile Work within the Weapons Activities appropriation account.\nThe infrastructure area includes government-owned, leased, and permitted physical infrastructure and facilities supporting weapons activities. NNSA’s 2016 nuclear security budget materials include information on two major types of infrastructure activities: (1) Infrastructure and Safety and (2) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, which includes two major construction projects. First, the Uranium Processing Facility is a construction project to replace enriched uranium capabilities currently located in the aging Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex. This project is part of a larger strategy to maintain NNSA’s enriched uranium capability by relocating enriched uranium operations performed in Building 9212 into other existing buildings by 2025 and by constructing a series of smaller buildings. Second, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement construction project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is part of NNSA’s broader plutonium infrastructure strategy, is composed of subprojects to move analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities into two existing facilities. NNSA’s broader plutonium infrastructure strategy also includes the construction of at least two additional modular structures that the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan reports will achieve operating capacity by 2027. The Uranium Processing Facility and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement construction projects are both part of NNSA’s major modernization efforts.\nThe research, development, testing, and evaluation area is composed of programs that are technically challenging, multiyear, multifunctional efforts to develop and maintain critical science and engineering capabilities. These capabilities enable the annual assessment of the safety and reliability of the stockpile, improve understanding of the physics and materials science associated with nuclear weapons, and support the development of code-based models that replace underground testing.\nThe other weapons activities area includes budget estimates associated with nuclear weapon security and transportation, as well as legacy contractor pensions, among other things.\nThe four areas are interconnected. For example, experiments funded under the research, development, testing, and evaluation program area can contribute to the design and production of refurbished weapons, which is funded under the stockpile program area. The infrastructure program area offers critical support to both the stockpile and the research, development, testing, and evaluation program areas by providing a suitable environment for their various activities, such as producing weapons components and performing research and experimentation activities.\nThe U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is composed of seven different weapons types, including air-delivered bombs, ballistic missile warheads, and cruise missile warheads (see table 1).", "NNSA’s 2016 budget estimates for modernization total $297.6 billion over 25 years, which is a slight increase from the 2015 estimates of $293.4 billion; however, for certain program areas or individual programs, budget estimates changed more significantly. The overall increase was moderated by a shift of two counterterrorism programs to another area of NNSA’s budget. Program areas increased by as much as 13.2 percent or decreased by as much as 18.1 percent. Within the stockpile program area, which experienced the biggest increase, budget estimates for some LEPs and an alteration increased significantly because of changes in production schedules and scope, among other things.", "According to the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA’s estimates for the next 25 years total $297.6 billion for modernization activities—an increase of approximately $4.2 billion, or 1.4 percent (in nominal, or current dollar, values), from the $293.4 billion NNSA reported in the 2015 plan. These budget estimates, which are for activities in the Weapons Activities area, are provided in the four areas discussed above: stockpile; infrastructure; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and other weapons activities. The overall increase was moderated by the shift of two counterterrorism programs from the Weapons Activities budget into NNSA’s separate Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget. The two counterterrorism programs that were moved out of the Weapons Activities budget together totaled approximately $8 billion. According to NNSA’s 2016 budget justification, this realignment is intended to provide greater clarity regarding the total funding and level of activity in the counterterrorism area. The realignment of these programs, along with other smaller decreases in the other weapons activities category, together accounted for an 18.1 percent decrease in the other weapons activities category during the 25-year period covered by the plan. Without the realignment of the two counterterrorism programs, the increase in NNSA’s overall Weapons Activities budget in the 2016 plan would have been considerably larger, totaling approximately $12.3 billion, or 4.2 percent, over the 2015 Weapons Activities budget. Table 2 details the changes in NNSA’s 25-year budget estimates from 2015 to 2016 for the four main areas in which modernization efforts are funded under Weapons Activities.\nIn addition, budget estimates changed significantly for certain program areas and individual programs. Notably, the 2016 budget materials estimate that during the next 25 years, $117.2 billion will be needed for the stockpile area, which is an increase of $13.7 billion, or 13.2 percent, over the prior year’s budget materials. Part of this increase resulted from the addition of approximately $3 billion to support the Domestic Uranium Enrichment program, as well as increases in estimates for weapons refurbishment activities, particularly LEPs, as discussed later in this report. The 2016 budget materials indicate a decrease of approximately $1.8 billion for infrastructure activities during the next 25 years, compared with the 2015 estimates, in part because of reductions in recapitalization and site operation budget estimates. The 2016 budget materials increased proposed spending on research, development, testing, and evaluation activities by approximately $900 million during the same period. This increase resulted in part from an increase in estimates for the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield program.\nBudget estimates in the Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan cover 2015 to 2039, while those in the 2016 plan cover 2016 to 2040. We compared the two sets of estimates by summing up the current dollar values for each, which is how NNSA reports the estimates. The total from the 2016 plan is different from the 2015 plan’s total in that the former includes the year 2040 and excludes the year 2015. Because of the effect of inflation, this comparison could make the difference between the 2016 projection and the 2015 projection appear higher than it would be in the case of a comparison of the two series in real dollar values or in a comparison that looks strictly at the years that overlap from each plan.", "In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, estimates for some major modernization projects increased significantly from those in 2015. Specifically, regarding the weapons refurbishment efforts—which are captured within the stockpile category in the budget— the 2016 budget materials indicate that during the next 25 years, $49.8 billion will be needed to support LEPs and other weapons alteration activities, which is an increase of $8.2 billion, or 19.6 percent, compared with the prior year’s estimate of $41.7 billion. This increase resulted partly from the change in the scope and schedule for some programs, as discussed below.\nThe W88 Alteration 370 effort expanded to include a conventional high explosive replacement while retaining the original schedule for a first production unit in 2020. To support this replacement, NNSA shifted planned spending for other programs—including $15.1 million originally planned for the W76-1 LEP—toward this effort. The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan reported that the agency also shifted planned spending intended for surveillance of B61 and B83 bombs into the conventional high explosive replacement effort. The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan estimated the total cost for the W88 Alteration 370 at $2 billion over the 25-year period covered by the plan, while the 2015 plan estimated the total cost at $1.2 billion, for an increase of approximately $0.8 billion.\nThe cruise missile warhead LEP (renamed the W80-4 LEP) now has a first production unit planned for 2025—2 years earlier than the first production unit in the 2015 plan. This shift in schedule is intended to align with revised Air Force plans for the carrier missile. The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan estimated the total cost for the LEP at $8.2 billion over 25 years, while the 2015 plan estimated the total cost at $6.8 billion, for an increase of approximately $1.5 billion.\nThe Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan included a budget estimate for the B61-13 LEP that did not appear in the 2015 plan. This LEP, which NNSA officials stated is intended to replace the B61-12 LEP, is currently planned to begin in 2038, with an estimated cost of approximately $1.2 billion from 2038 through 2040.\nBudget estimates for the three interoperable warhead LEPs—the IW- 1, 2, and 3—together accounted for an increase of $5.6 billion over 25 years when compared with the Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan budget estimates. According to the plan, this increase resulted from updated estimates developed through an expanded methodology that incorporated additional stakeholder input into the process that NNSA used to arrive at the estimates, and which resulted in a better understanding of schedule and cost uncertainty. NNSA officials stated that they continue to use stakeholder input to update and assess the cost estimate methodology.\nThe budget estimates for the B61-12 and W76-1 LEPs together accounted for a decrease of almost $1 billion when compared with 2015 estimates. NNSA officials stated that this decrease is the result of the LEPs’ costs winding down as the programs come to an end.\nTable 3 shows the changes in budget estimates for the weapons refurbishment activities under way during the 25-year period covered by the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.\nMilestone dates for most major modernization projects generally remained the same in the 2016 plan compared with the previous year. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review included discussion of a number of planned major modernization efforts for NNSA, while other efforts have been identified in later versions of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and in the 2011 update to the DOD-DOE joint report. Table 4 shows key milestone dates for LEPs and major construction efforts as they have changed since 2010.\nEstimates for the two major construction projects we reviewed—the Uranium Processing Facility and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement construction project—did not change or saw a reduction in estimates along with a recategorization of costs. These projects, included in the infrastructure category in NNSA’s budget materials, support NNSA’s uranium and plutonium strategies, respectively. The Uranium Processing Facility project budget line in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan stayed the same as reported in the 2015 plan, with a total estimated budget of $5.2 billion from 2015 through the project’s planned completion in 2025.\nThe 2016 budget estimates for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement construction project decreased, and in comparison to the 2015 budget materials, these estimates also shifted from one budget category to another. The Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan included a line for budget estimates for this project; however, the estimates were zero for each year except for 2012. The 2015 plan included budget estimates that totaled $3.1 billion in the program readiness subcategory under the infrastructure category, which NNSA officials stated were ultimately intended for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement construction project. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA shifted $1.7 billion in planned spending out of program readiness and into the construction project’s line item, also under the infrastructure category. This shift appears to be an increase in the total amount for major construction activities in the 2016 budget materials. However, as noted above, the overall total for infrastructure declined slightly, in part because NNSA officials said that they determined that the remainder of the $3.1 billion from program readiness is not required to support the project. Nevertheless, the $1.7 billion reported in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan is $214 million lower than the total estimates that NNSA reported in its 2016 congressional budget justification, which included a more detailed construction project data sheet for the project. An NNSA official confirmed that this amount should have been included in the plan and its omission was the result of a data entry error. Consequently, the amount for the project in the construction line item should be approximately $1.9 billion.\nThe Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan includes a goal to stop the growth of the agency’s deferred maintenance backlog. The plan notes that there has been limited availability for capital and maintenance funding in recent years, but NNSA officials stated that they are working to ensure that there is no increase in deferred maintenance relative to the level at the end of 2015. In August 2015, we found that NNSA’s infrastructure budget estimates were not adequate to address its deferred maintenance backlog and that the backlog would continue to grow. We recommended that in instances where budget estimates do not achieve DOE benchmarks for maintenance and recapitalization investment over the 5-year budget estimates, NNSA identify in the budget materials the amount of the shortfall and the effects, if any, on the deferred maintenance backlog. We also recommended that until improved data about the importance of facilities and infrastructure to mission are available, NNSA clarify in the budget materials for the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program the amount of the deferred maintenance backlog that is associated with facilities that have little to no effect on programmatic operations and is therefore low priority to be addressed. NNSA concurred with our recommendations. Specifically, NNSA agreed to include more information on maintenance, recapitalization, and deferred maintenance on excess facilities and stated that it will address them in the 2017 budget request or budget support materials as appropriate. Similarly, NNSA officials agreed that until improved data about the importance of facilities and infrastructure to the mission are available, they plan to clarify in the budget materials for the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program the amount of the deferred maintenance backlog that is associated with facilities that have little to no effect on programmatic operations and is therefore low priority to be addressed.", "The estimates in NNSA’s 2016 nuclear security budget materials may not align with plans for some major modernization efforts for several reasons. In particular, the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan includes several major modernization efforts that may require more funding in some years than the plan reflects, raising questions about the alignment of NNSA’s modernization plans with potential future budgets. In addition, for some nuclear weapon refurbishment programs, the low end of NNSA’s internally developed cost ranges exceeds the estimates included in the budget materials. Further, some costs, such as those for certain infrastructure upgrades, are not included in NNSA’s budget estimates, and dependency on other NNSA programs could lead to increases in program costs. NNSA officials provided various reasons for the discrepancies, which they said could be addressed in future planning.", "The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan’s estimates for Weapons Activities are $4.4 billion higher than the out-year projections for funding levels in the President’s budget provided in the DOD-DOE joint report. Specifically, for the years 2021 through 2025—the 5 years after the 2016 Future-Years Nuclear Security Program—the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan’s Weapons Activities budget estimates total $56.6 billion. However, these budget estimates exceed a set of out-year projections for nuclear modernization and sustainment activities over the same time period. Specifically, the DOD-DOE joint report included additional information on out-year projections in the 2016 President’s budget for Weapons Activities through 2025. These out-year projections total $52.2 billion from 2021 to 2025, or $4.4 billion less than DOE’s budget estimates over the same time period (see table 5).\nThis misalignment between the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and the estimates described as out-year projections in the President’s budget in the DOD-DOE joint report corresponds to a challenging period for NNSA modernization efforts, as the agency plans to simultaneously execute at least four LEPs along with several major construction projects, including efforts to modernize NNSA’s uranium and plutonium capabilities. The differences between these two sets of numbers raise questions about the alignment of NNSA’s modernization plans with potential future budgets. NNSA notes this issue in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and states that it will need to be addressed as part of fiscal year 2017 programming. According to an NNSA official from the office that coordinated production of the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the additional line of out-year projections in the 2016 President’s budget was included in the 2016 DOD-DOE joint report at the request of the Office of Management and Budget. This official told us that the out-year projections included in the DOD-DOE joint report represent DOE’s evaluation of what modernization activities will cost for these years based on current plans and available information. NNSA officials also stated that the President’s budget information was included in the 2016 DOD-DOE joint report to show that the administration has not yet agreed to fund these activities beyond the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program at the level reflected in NNSA’s budget estimates. In addition, NNSA officials stated that there is a high level of uncertainty in the budget estimates beyond the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, which makes planning beyond 5 years difficult.", "On the basis of our analysis of NNSA’s internally developed cost ranges for certain major weapon modernization efforts, we found that the low end of these ranges sometimes exceeded the estimates that NNSA included for those programs in its budget materials. We analyzed NNSA’s budget estimates for nuclear weapon refurbishments over the 25 years covered in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan— the W76-1, the B61-12, the B61-13, the W80-4, and the IW-1, 2, and 3 LEPs, as well as the W88 Alteration 370. The Directed Stockpile Work category in the plan and in the 2016 Future-Years Nuclear Security Program contain detailed budget information on weapon refurbishment efforts that includes specific budget estimates for each effort as well as high and low cost ranges that NNSA developed for them. For each effort, we assessed the extent to which the budget estimates aligned with its high-low cost estimates. Specifically, we examined instances where the low end of the cost range estimates was greater than the budget estimates.\nWe found that the annual budget estimates are generally consistent with NNSA’s internal cost estimates; that is, in most years, the annual budget estimates for each weapon refurbishment effort fall within the high and low cost ranges that NNSA developed for each program. However, in some years, NNSA’s budget estimates for some refurbishment efforts may not align with modernization plans. Specifically, for some years, the low end of cost ranges that NNSA developed for some LEPs exceeds the budget estimates. This indicates potential misalignment between plans and budget estimates for those programs in those years, or the possible need for NNSA to increase budget estimates for those programs in the future. For instance, see the following:\nThe B61-12 LEP’s budget estimates during the 5-year period covered by the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program align with plans.\nHowever, the low cost range estimate of $195 million for the final year of production in 2025 exceeds the budget estimate of $64 million. NNSA officials said that this difference is not a concern because this misalignment occurs during the final year of the LEP effort and this estimate may overstate costs for the end of B61-12 program.\nThe W88 Alteration 370’s low cost range estimate exceeds its budget estimate for 2020. The budget materials report that the program’s budget estimate that year is $218 million; however, the low point of the cost range is $247 million. NNSA officials stated that this is not a concern because there is flexibility to address possible misalignments in future programming cycles. NNSA officials also stated that the total estimates for this program are above the total of the midpoint cost estimates for 2016 through 2020 and that funding for 2016 to 2019 is fungible and could be carried over to cover any potential shortfall in 2020.\nThe W80-4 LEP’s low range cost estimate of $476 million exceeds its budget estimates of $459 million for 2020. NNSA officials stated that because the budget estimates for this LEP are above the low point of its estimated cost range during other years, the misalignment in 2020 represents a small incongruity in an otherwise sound LEP profile.\nThe budget estimates for the IW-1 LEP are within the high and low estimated cost ranges for most years. However, the IW-1’s low cost range estimate of $175 million exceeds its budget estimate of $113 million in 2020, which is its first year of funding. NNSA officials said that by shifting funding projected for 2021 to 2020, the IW-1 budget estimates would still be within the cost ranges.\nFor the W76-1 LEP, we compared the budget estimates in the 2016 Future-Years Nuclear Security Program and the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan with internal cost estimates NNSA developed for the LEP. We found that the budget estimates for all years within the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, except for 2018, are below NNSA’s internal cost estimates for that program, raising questions about whether the budget for the LEP is aligned with anticipated costs. According to NNSA officials, the W76-1 LEP is nearing completion, and the model used to develop internal cost estimates for the W76-1 is predicting the LEP’s end-of-program costs in a way that may not reflect the rate at which the program winds down. For more information on the LEPs and their budget estimates and cost ranges in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, see appendix II.\nNNSA officials stated that the intent in providing budget estimates and cost range estimates for each weapon refurbishment effort is to show general agreement between the two sets of estimates. Notwithstanding the differences we identified between budget estimates and low-end cost range estimates for certain efforts in certain years, NNSA officials stated that the budget estimates and the cost range estimates are in general agreement for each LEP and alteration in terms of total costs and trend. In addition, NNSA officials stated that there is some flexibility in the funding for these efforts, and that the programs may carry over some funds from one year to the next if needed to cover costs, depending on the reason for the misalignment, among other things.\nIn our August 2015 report on NNSA’s nuclear security budget materials, we found that not including information that identifies potential misalignments in LEP budget estimates compared with the LEP internal cost estimates can potentially pose risks to the achievement of program objectives and goals, such as increase in program costs and schedule delays. NNSA agreed with our recommendation from that report to provide more transparency with regard to shortfalls in its budget materials. Specifically, NNSA said that it would include, as appropriate, statements in future Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plans on the effect of funding an LEP effort at less than suggested by a planning estimate cost range. NNSA officials also said that the agency plans to incorporate this recommendation, among others, into its 2017 budget materials.", "We identified instances where certain modernization costs were not included in budget estimates or may be underestimated. For example, see the following:\nThe budget estimates for the W88 Alteration 370 with a conventional high explosive replacement—or “refresh”—are understated, according to NNSA officials. The budget estimates for the refresh reported in the 2016 budget materials are roughly $300 million less than the refresh requires. Officials told us that the initial budget planning for the refresh contained a cost of approximately $500 million. However, NNSA found that this estimate was incorrect and increased it to approximately $800 million. NNSA officials stated that this project is still in the process of establishing a new, official baseline, which officials expect to complete in 2016.\nThe 2016 budget materials may not contain all necessary costs for NNSA’s efforts to maintain its enriched uranium capability, which include relocating select operations performed in Building 9212 to other existing buildings and constructing a series of smaller buildings. Specifically, NNSA officials stated that the budget estimates in the 2016 budget materials for these efforts do not include the costs associated with infrastructure upgrades (such as ceiling repairs and heating, air conditioning, and other controls systems) in two existing buildings at the Y-12 site. NNSA officials stated that the scope to maintain operations in the existing facilities is being developed and prioritized into a multiyear effort among multiple programs, separate from the Uranium Processing Facility project. According to another NNSA official, these costs were still under development, but the official estimated that the upgrades may cost tens of millions of dollars for each building.\nThe costs of the plutonium infrastructure strategy—in which NNSA is currently preparing to move analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities into existing facilities as part of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement construction project while also considering constructing new modular buildings under a separate project—are also uncertain and possibly underestimated. This uncertainty is due to the fact that NNSA has not yet determined the number of additional modular buildings that may be required, although the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan calls for at least two. NNSA officials also stated that estimated costs for these efforts have not yet been baselined and that the cost of such a project cannot be estimated with any certainty until it has proceeded further into the planning process and established a baseline.\nIn addition to some costs not being included in budget estimates, the estimates for some NNSA modernization efforts could increase in the future because of their dependency on successful execution of other NNSA programs. Specifically, NNSA managers for the LEPs stated that some of these programs could incur future cost increases or schedule delays because of other NNSA programs supporting the LEPs. For instance, NNSA officials told us that the W80-4 LEP will require a new insensitive high explosive to support the system. This is because the B61- 12 LEP is consuming the currently available stocks of insensitive high explosive. As a result, NNSA is developing a new insensitive high explosive to meet the needs of the W80-4 LEP. However, NNSA officials told us that the performance of the new explosive currently being produced is not comparable to the quality of existing explosive being consumed by the B61-12 LEP. Consequently, these officials stated that the costs of the W80-4 LEP could rise because of additional funding that may be required to further develop the new explosive. The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan notes that as design options are down selected, the budget estimate for the W80-4 may shift in response.\nAn NNSA official also stated that the IW-1 LEP budget estimates in the 2016 budget materials are predicated on NNSA successfully modernizing its plutonium pit production capacity. The official stated that if there are delays in the current plutonium infrastructure strategy, the IW-1 LEP will bear costs that are greater than currently estimated to produce the number of additional plutonium pits it needs to support the program. The Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan notes that estimates for programs in their earlier stages, such as the IW-1 LEP, are subject to uncertainty. We previously found that NNSA has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays in its earlier strategies to modernize its plutonium pit production support facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory. We have ongoing work examining the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement construction project in more detail.", "We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NNSA for their review and comment. NNSA provided written comments, reproduced in appendix III, in which it stated that it will continue to enhance information on potential funding levels in future budget supporting materials.\nNNSA also provided technical comments separately, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of NNSA, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.", "Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) budget estimates and plans for modernization activities reflected in its fiscal year 2016 nuclear security budget materials differ, if at all, from those in its fiscal year 2015 budget materials and (2) the extent to which the fiscal year 2016 nuclear security budget materials align with modernization plans as presented in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.\nWe limited the scope of our review to NNSA’s Weapons Activities appropriations account, because NNSA’s activities in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan are funded by this account. This scope is consistent with that of our August 2015 review. We focused our review on major modernization efforts—that is, the refurbishment of nuclear weapons through life extension programs (LEP) and alterations and major construction efforts to replace existing, aging facilities for plutonium and uranium. The budget projections in the 2015 and 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plans each contain budget dollar figures for 25 years, presented in current dollar values. Our report presents all figures in current, or nominal, dollars, which include projected inflation, unless otherwise noted. Further, all years noted in our report refer to fiscal years, unless otherwise noted.\nTo determine the extent to which NNSA’s budget estimates and plans for modernization activities differed from those in the 2015 nuclear security budget materials, we compared the information in the 2016 materials with the information in the 2015 materials. NNSA’s nuclear security budget materials are composed of two key policy documents that are issued annually: the agency’s budget justification, which contains estimates for the 5-year Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which provides budget estimates over the next 25 years. Specifically, we (1) compared differences between the 2016 and 2015 budget materials in the four broad modernization areas—stockpile; infrastructure; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and other weapons activities—and (2) compared differences between the 2016 and 2015 budget materials for specific weapons refurbishment activities and major construction projects. We interviewed knowledgeable officials from NNSA about changes we identified between the 2016 and 2015 budget materials. We also reviewed a third, integrated document on plans for the nuclear deterrent that includes information on the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy’s (DOE) modernization budget estimates. This annual report that DOD and DOE are required to submit jointly to the relevant Senate and House committees and subcommittees is referred to as the section 1043 report; in our report, we refer to it as the DOD-DOE joint report. We compared the information in the 2016 DOD-DOE joint report with that in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.\nTo determine the extent to which NNSA’s budget materials align with its modernization plans, we compared information on the budget estimates in the 2016 budget materials with the information on modernization plans in the materials as well as the DOD-DOE joint report, reviewed prior GAO reports to provide context for the concerns we identified, and interviewed NNSA officials to obtain further information on changes to modernization plans and discussed any perceived misalignments with them.\nFor weapons refurbishment efforts under way during the 25 years covered by the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, we analyzed NNSA’s budget estimates for all those to be conducted over the 25-year period by comparing them against NNSA’s internally developed cost ranges for each LEP. According to DOE officials, for all LEPs besides the W76-1, DOE uses two different approaches to estimate the costs of LEPs. Under the first approach, according to officials, DOE develops specific budget estimates by year through a “bottom-up” process. DOE officials describe this as a detailed approach to developing the LEP budget estimates, which, among other things, integrates resource and schedule information from site participants. Under the second approach, which DOE refers to as a “top-down” process, DOE uses historical LEP cost data and complexity factors to project high and low cost ranges for each LEP distributed over the life of the program using an accepted cost distribution method. Officials noted that the values in these cost ranges reflect idealized funding profiles and do not account for the practical constraints of the programming and budgeting cycle. For the W76-1 LEP, DOE has developed specific budget estimates by year.\nBecause the W76-1 LEP is the basis of DOE’s top-down model, DOE does not develop high and low cost ranges for it. Instead, DOE published the W76-1 LEP estimates in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan as a comparison between the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program request and a single LEP model line. For the W76-1 LEP, we compared the budget estimates with the LEP model line.\nFor all LEPs besides the W76-1, we assessed the extent to which the specific bottom-up budget estimates were aligned with the high-low cost ranges developed through the top-down model. Specifically, we examined where the specific budget estimates were under the low end of the cost range predicted by the top-down model. We did this by reviewing charts in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and the underlying data for those charts. In instances where the low cost range exceeded the budget estimates, we followed up with NNSA officials for additional information.\nTo assess the reliability of the data underlying NNSA’s budget estimates, we reviewed the data to identify missing items, outliers, or obvious errors; interviewed NNSA officials knowledgeable about the data; and compared the figures in the congressional budget justification with those in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan to assess the extent to which they were consistent. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes, which were to report the total amount of budget estimates and those estimates dedicated to certain programs and budgets and to compare them to last year’s estimates.\nWe conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to March 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has developed budget estimates for its nuclear weapons life extension programs (LEP) and major alterations: the B61-12, the W76-1, the W80-4, the IW-1, the IW-2, the IW-3, and the B61-13 LEPs, as well as for the W88 Alteration 370. The estimates include NNSA’s internally developed high and low cost ranges for each program. The budget estimates appear as bars for each year, while the high and low cost ranges are represented by lines across the figures. The following figures present budget estimates for each LEP and alteration. Similar figures also appear in the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.\nB61-12: The B61 bomb is one of the oldest nuclear weapons in the stockpile. The B61-12 LEP will consolidate and replace the B61-3, -4, -7, and -10 bombs. According to the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, this consolidation will enable a reduction in the number of gravity bombs, which is consistent with the objectives of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The first production unit of the B61-12 is planned for 2020; the program is scheduled to end in 2026. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that the B61-12 LEP will require a total of $5.7 billion from 2016 to 2026. See figure 1 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.\nW76-1: The W76 warhead was first introduced into the stockpile in 1978 and is deployed with the Trident II D5 missile on the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The W76-1 LEP is intended to extend the original warhead service life and address aging issues, among other things. The first production unit was completed in September 2008, and the program will end in calendar year 2020. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that approximately $847 million will be required for this program from 2016 to 2021. See figure 2 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.\nW80-4: The W80-4 LEP is intended to provide a warhead for a future long-range standoff missile that will replace the Air Force’s current air- launched cruise missile. The first production unit is planned for 2025, and the program is scheduled to end in 2032. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that the W80-4 LEP will require approximately $8.2 billion from 2016 to 2032. See figure 3 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.\nW88 Alteration 370: Among other things, the W88 Alteration 370 will replace the arming, fuzing, and firing subsystem for the W88 warhead, which is deployed on the Navy’s Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile system. In November 2014, the Nuclear Weapons Council decided to replace the conventional high explosive main charge, which led to an increase in costs for the alteration. The first production unit is planned for 2020, and the program is scheduled to end in 2026. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that the program will require a total of $2 billion from 2016 to 2026. See figure 4 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.\nIW-1: The IW-1, also known as the W78/88-1, is the first ballistic missile warhead LEP in NNSA’s interoperable strategy to transition the stockpile to three interoperable ballistic missile warheads and two air-delivered warheads The first production unit is planned for 2030; the 2016 budget materials do not report an end date for the LEP. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that the program will require a total of $13.4 billion from 2020 to 2040. See figure 5 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.\nIW-2: The IW-2 is an interoperable warhead intended to replace the W87/88 warhead. The Nuclear Weapons Council has not yet developed a more detailed implementation plan for this LEP. The first production unit is planned for 2034; the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan does not contain a projected end date. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that the program will require a total of $12.1 billion from 2023 to 2040. See figure 6 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.\nIW-3: The IW-3 is intended to provide the third interoperable warhead for NNSA’s future strategy for the stockpile. The first production unit is not yet specified, and there is not yet a budgeted end date. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that a total of $6.3 billion will be required for this program from 2030 to 2040. See figure 7 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.\nB61-13: According to NNSA officials, the B61-13 LEP is intended to replace the B61-12 bomb. The first production unit is not yet specified, and there is not yet a budgeted end date. In the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA estimates that a total of $1.2 billion will be required for this program from 2038 to 2040. See figure 8 for an illustration of budget estimates against projected cost ranges.", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, William Hoehn (Assistant Director), Antoinette Capaccio, Pamela Davidson, Philip Farah, Bridget Grimes, Carol Henn, Aaron Karty, and Cynthia Norris made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "h0_full h2_title h3_title", "h0_full h3_full", "h0_full h2_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What were the budgeting allocations and estimates of the NNSA during 2016?", "In what way have these budget estimates changed for certain programs?", "In areas do NNSA's modernization efforts occur?", "What does the stockpile budget look like?", "How does this compare to other activities?", "What is the relationship between budget estimates and projections for the FY2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan?", "What other reasons are given for this discrepancy?", "How has GAO contributed to understanding the estimates?", "What examples are given in terms of these instances?", "What was GAO's overall recommendation to NNSA?", "How has NNSA responded to GAO's report?", "Why are nuclear weapons discussed at the federal level?", "How has the U.S. changed its relationship with nuclear weapons?", "What does the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review illustrate?", "What is GAO's relationship to nuclear security?", "What are these materials?", "What does this report discuss?" ], "summary": [ "In the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) fiscal year 2016 budget materials, the estimates for efforts related to modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile total $297.6 billion for the next 25 years—an increase of $4.2 billion (1.4 percent) in nominal dollar values (as opposed to constant dollar values) compared with the prior year's budget materials.", "However, for certain program areas and individual programs, budget estimates changed more significantly than the overall estimates.", "NNSA's modernization efforts occur in four areas under the Weapons Activities appropriation account: stockpile; infrastructure; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and other weapons activities.", "For the stockpile area, budget estimates over 25 years increased by 13.2 percent over the nominal values in the Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan . Within the stockpile area, the estimates for life extension programs (LEP), which refurbish nuclear weapons, increased by 19.6 percent compared with the prior year's estimate, in part because of changes in the scope and schedule for some programs.", "In contrast, estimates for the other weapon activities area decreased by 18.1 percent, mainly because NNSA shifted two counterterrorism programs out of the Weapons Activities budget and into NNSA's separate Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget.", "The estimates in NNSA's 2016 nuclear security budget materials may not align with all elements of modernization plans for several reasons. First, the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan includes estimates for 2021 through 2025 that are $4.4 billion higher than the same time period in a set of out-year projections for funding levels that were included in a joint report by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. NNSA noted this issue in the 2016 plan and stated that it will need to be addressed as part of fiscal year 2017 programming.", "In addition, in some years, NNSA's budget estimates for certain weapons refurbishment efforts are below the low point of the programs' internally developed cost ranges. For example, the W88 Alteration 370 budget estimate of $218 million for 2020 was below the low end of the internal program cost range of $247 million. NNSA officials stated that the total estimates for this program are above the total of the midpoint cost estimates for 2016 through 2020 and that funding for 2016 to 2019 is fungible and could be carried over to cover any potential shortfall in 2020.", "GAO also identified instances where certain modernization costs were not included in the estimates or may be underestimated, or where budget estimates for some efforts could increase due to their dependency on successful execution of other NNSA programs.", "For example, an NNSA official said that budget estimates for the IW-1 LEP—which is NNSA's first interoperable ballistic missile warhead LEP—are predicated on NNSA successfully modernizing its plutonium pit production capacity. This official stated that if there are delays in modernizing this capacity, the IW-1 LEP could bear greater costs than currently estimated.", "In August 2015, GAO recommended that NNSA provide more transparency with regard to shortfalls in its budget materials.", "NNSA agreed and said that it plans to implement this recommendation starting in its 2017 budget supporting documents.", "Nuclear weapons are an integral part of the nation's defense strategy.", "Since 1992, the United States has shifted from producing new nuclear weapons to maintaining the stockpile through refurbishment.", "The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review —which outlines U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities, and force posture—identified long-term stockpile modernization goals for NNSA that include sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal and investing in a modern infrastructure.", "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 included a provision for GAO to report annually on NNSA's nuclear security budget materials.", "These materials are composed of NNSA's budget request justification and its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan , which describes modernization plans and budget estimates for the next 25 years.", "This report assesses (1) changes in the estimates in the 2016 budget materials from the prior year's materials and (2) the extent to which NNSA's 2016 budget materials align with plans for major modernization efforts." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1, 3, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 4, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_R40744	{ "title": [ "", "Historical Development", "Origins of the 8(a) Program", "Federal Programs for Small Businesses", "Federal Programs for Racial and Ethnic Minorities", "1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act and Subsequent Regulations", "Expansion of the 8(a) Program to Include \"Disadvantaged\" Groups", "Current Requirements", "Requirements In General", "Eligibility for the 8(a) Program", "\"Business\"", "\"Small\"", "\"Unconditionally owned and controlled\"", "\"Socially disadvantaged individual\"", "\"Economically disadvantaged individual\"", "\"Good character\"", "\"Demonstrated potential for success\"", "Set-Asides and Sole-Source Awards Under Section 8(a)", "Discretion to Subcontract Through the 8(a) Program", "Monetary Thresholds and Subcontracting Mechanism Under 8(a)", "Other Requirements", "Requirements for Tribally, ANC-, NHO-, and CDC-Owned Firms", "Eligibility for the 8(a) Program", "\"Small\"", "\"Business\"", "\"Unconditionally owned and controlled\"", "\"Socially disadvantaged\"", "\"Economically disadvantaged\"", "\"Good character\"", "\"Demonstrated potential for success\"", "Report of Benefits for Firms Owned By ANCs, Indian Tribes, NHOs, and CDCs", "Set-Asides and Sole-Source Awards", "Other Requirements", "Constitutionality of the 8(a) Program", "Comparison of the Requirements Pertaining to Different Types of 8(a) Firms" ], "paragraphs": [ "C ommonly known as the \"8(a) Program,\" the Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program is one of several federal contracting programs for small businesses. The 8(a) Program provides participating small businesses with training, technical assistance, and contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides and sole-source awards. A \"set-aside\" is an acquisition in which only certain contractors may compete, while a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. Eligibility for the 8(a) Program is generally limited to small businesses \"unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States\" that demonstrate \"potential for success.\" However, small businesses owned by Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), Community Development Corporations (CDCs), Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs) are eligible for the 8(a) Program under somewhat different terms. In FY2014, the federal government spent over $16 billion on contracts and subcontracts with 8(a) firms. Other programs provide similar assistance to other types of small businesses (e.g., women-owned, HUBZone).\nThe 8(a) and other programs for small businesses are of perennial interest to Congress, given that\nIt is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including but not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.\nHowever, recent Congresses have had particular interest in the 8(a) Program because of the recession of 2007-2009, its effects on minority-owned small businesses, and small businesses' role in job creation.\nThis report provides a brief history of the 8(a) Program, summarizes key requirements, and discusses legal challenges alleging that the program's presumption that members of certain racial and ethnic groups are socially disadvantaged violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.", "", "The current 8(a) Program resulted from the merger of two distinct types of federal programs: those seeking to assist small businesses in general and those seeking to assist racial and ethnic minorities. This merger first occurred, as a matter of executive branch practice, in 1967 and was given a statutory basis in 1978.", "Congress first authorized a federal agency to enter into prime contracts with other agencies and subcontract with small businesses for the performance of these contracts in 1942. The agency was the Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC), which was created partly for this purpose, and Congress gave it these powers in order to ameliorate small businesses' financial difficulties while also \"mobiliz[ing] the productive facilities of small business in the interest of successful prosecution of the war.\" The SWPC's subcontracting authority expired along with the SWPC at the end of the World War II. However, in 1951, at the start of the Korean War, Congress created the Small Defense Plants Administration (SDPA), which was generally given the same powers that the SWPC had exercised. Two years later, in 1953, Congress transferred the SDPA's subcontracting authorities, among others, to the newly created Small Business Administration, with the intent that the SBA would exercise these powers in peacetime, as well as in wartime. When the Small Business Act of 1958 transformed the SBA into a permanent independent agency, this subcontracting authority was included in Section 8(a) of the act. At its inception, the SBA's subcontracting authority was not limited to small businesses owned and controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged. Under the original Section 8(a), the SBA could contract with any \"small-business concerns or others,\" but the SBA seldom, if ever, employed this subcontracting authority, focusing instead upon its loan and other programs.", "Federal programs for racial and ethnic minorities began developing at approximately the same time as those for small businesses, although there was initially no explicit overlap between them. The earliest programs were created by executive orders, beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt's order on June 25, 1941, requiring that all federal agencies include a clause in defense-related contracts prohibiting contractors from discriminating on the basis of \"race, creed, color, or national origin.\" Subsequent Presidents followed Roosevelt's example, issuing a number of executive orders seeking to improve the employment opportunities of members of various racial and ethnic groups. These executive branch initiatives took on new importance after the Kerner Commission's report on the causes of the urban riots of 1966 concluded that African Americans would need \"special encouragement\" to enter the economic mainstream.\nPresidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon laid the foundations for the present 8(a) Program in the hope of providing such \"encouragement.\" Johnson created the President's Test Cities Program (PTCP), which involved a small-scale use of the SBA's authority under Section 8(a) to award contracts to firms willing to locate in urban areas and hire unemployed individuals, largely African Americans, or sponsor minority-owned businesses by providing capital or management assistance. However, under the PTCP, small businesses did not have to be minority-owned to receive subcontracts under Section 8(a). Nixon's program was larger and focused more specifically on minority-owned small businesses. During the Nixon Administration, the SBA promulgated its earliest regulations for the 8(a) Program. In 1970, the first of these regulations articulated the SBA's policy of using Section 8(a) to \"assist small concerns owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable businesses capable of competing effectively in the market place.\" A later regulation, promulgated in 1973, defined \"disadvantaged persons\" as including, but not limited to, \"black Americans, Spanish-Americans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts.\" However, the SBA lacked explicit statutory authority for focusing its 8(a) Program on minority-owned businesses until 1978, although courts generally rejected challenges alleging that SBA's implementation of the program was unauthorized because it was \"not specifically mentioned in statute.\"", "In 1978, Congress amended the Small Business Act to give the SBA statutory authority for its 8(a) Program for minority-owned businesses. Under the 1978 amendments, SBA can only subcontract under Section 8(a) with \"socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns,\" or businesses which are least 51% owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals and whose management and daily operations are controlled by such individual(s).\nThe 1978 amendments established a basic definition of \"socially disadvantaged individuals,\" which included those who have been \"subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities.\" They also included congressional findings that \"Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and other minorities\" are socially disadvantaged. Thus, if an individual was a member of one of these groups, he or she was presumed to be socially disadvantaged. Otherwise, the amendments were generally seen to grant the SBA discretion to recognize additional groups or individuals as socially disadvantaged based upon criteria promulgated in regulations. Under these regulations, which include a three-part test for determining whether minority groups not mentioned in the amendment's findings are disadvantaged, the SBA recognized the racial or ethnic groups listed in Table 1 as socially disadvantaged for purposes of the 8(a) Program. The regulations also established standards of evidence to be met by individuals demonstrating personal disadvantage and procedures for rebutting the presumption of social disadvantage accorded to members of recognized minority groups.\nThe 1978 amendments also defined \"economically disadvantaged individuals,\" for purposes of the 8(a) Program, as \"those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged.\" Later, the SBA established by regulation that personal net worth of less than $250,000 at the time of entry into the 8(a) Program ($750,000 for continuing eligibility) constitutes economic disadvantage.", "Although the 8(a) Program was originally established for the benefit of disadvantaged individuals , in the 1980s, Congress expanded the program to include small businesses owned by four \"disadvantaged\" groups .\nThe first owner-group to be included was Community Development Corporations (CDCs). A CDC is\na nonprofit organization responsible to residents of the area it serves which is receiving financial assistance under part A of this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§9805 et seq .] and any organization more than 50 percent of which is owned by such an organization, or otherwise controlled by such an organization, or designated by such an organization for the purpose of this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§9801 et seq .].\nCongress created CDCs with the Community Development Act of 1981 and instructed the SBA to issue regulations ensuring that CDCs could participate in the 8(a) Program.\nIn 1986, two additional owner-groups—Indian tribes and Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs)—became eligible for the 8(a) Program when Congress passed legislation providing that firms owned by Indian tribes—which include ANCs —were to be deemed \"socially disadvantaged\" for purposes of the 8(a) Program. In 1992, ANCs were further deemed to be \"economically disadvantaged.\"\nThe final owner-group, that of Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs), was recognized in 1988. An NHO is defined as\nany community service organization serving Native Hawaiians in the State of Hawaii which (A) is a nonprofit corporation that has filed articles of incorporation with the director (or the designee thereof) of the Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, or any successor agency, (B) is controlled by Native Hawaiians, and (C) whose business activities will principally benefit such Native Hawaiians.", "Under the current 8(a) Program, participating firms are eligible for set-asides or sole-source awards of federal contracts, as well as training and technical assistance from SBA. Detailed statutory and regulatory requirements govern eligibility for the Program; set-asides and sole-source awards to 8(a) firms; and related issues. These requirements are generally the same for all participants in the 8(a) Program, although there are instances where there are \"special rules\" for 8(a) firms owned by groups. An Appendix to this report compares the requirements applicable to individual owners of 8(a) firms to those applicable to groups owning 8(a) firms (i.e., ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes).", "", "Eligibility for the 8(a) Program is limited to \"small business[es] which [are] unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States, and which demonstrate[] potential for success.\" Each of these terms is further defined by the Small Business Act; regulations that the SBA has promulgated to implement Section 8(a); and judicial and administrative decisions. The eligibility requirements are the same at the time of entry into the 8(a) Program and throughout the Program unless otherwise noted.", "Except for small agricultural cooperatives, a \"business\" is a for-profit entity that has a place of business located in the United States and operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy by paying taxes or using American products, materials, or labor. For purposes of the 8(a) Program, businesses may take the form of individual proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, joint ventures, associations, trusts, or cooperatives.", "A business is \"small\" if it is independently owned and operated; is not dominant in its field of operations; and meets any definitions or standards established by the Administrator of the SBA. These standards focus primarily upon the size of the business as measured by the number of employees or its gross income, but they also take into account the size of other businesses within the same industry. For example, businesses in the field of \"scheduled passenger air transportation\" are \"small\" if they have fewer than 1,500 employees, while those in the data processing field are \"small\" if they have a gross income of less than $32.5 million.\nAffiliations between businesses, or relationships allowing one party control or the power of control over another, generally count in size determinations, with the SBA considering \"the receipts, employees, or other measure of size of the concern whose size is at issue and all of its domestic and foreign affiliates, regardless of whether the affiliates are organized for profit.\" Businesses can thus be determined to be other than small because of their involvement in joint ventures, subcontracting arrangements, or franchise or license agreements, among other things, provided that their income or personnel numbers, plus those of their affiliate(s), are over the pertinent size threshold.", "Participants in the 8(a) Program must be \"at least 51% unconditionally and directly owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are citizens of the United States\" unless they are owned by an ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe. Ownership is \"unconditional\" when it is not subject to any conditions precedent or subsequent, executory agreements, voting trusts, restrictions on or assignments of voting rights, or other arrangements that could cause the benefits of ownership to go to another entity. Ownership is \"direct\" when the disadvantaged individuals own the business in their own right and not through an intermediary (e.g., ownership by another business entity or by a trust that is owned and controlled by one or more disadvantaged individuals). Non-disadvantaged individuals and non-participant businesses that own at least 10% of an 8(a) business may generally own no more than 10 to 20% of any other 8(a) firm. Non-participant businesses that earn the majority of their revenue in the same or similar line of business are likewise barred from owning more than 10% (increasing to 20%-30% in certain circumstances) of another 8(a) firm.\nParticipants must also be controlled by one or more disadvantaged individuals. \"Control is not the same as ownership\" and includes both strategic policy setting and day-to-day management and administration of business operations. Management and daily business operations must also be conducted by one or more disadvantaged individuals unless the 8(a) business is owned by an ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe. These individuals must have managerial experience \"of the extent and complexity needed to run the concern\" and generally must devote themselves full-time to the business \"during the normal working hours of firms in the same or similar line of business.\" A disadvantaged individual must hold the highest officer position within the business. Non-disadvantaged individuals may otherwise be involved in the management of an 8(a) business, or may be stockholders, partners, limited liability members, officers, or directors of an 8(a) business. However, they may not exercise actual control or have the power to control the firm or its disadvantaged owner(s), or receive compensation greater than that of the highest-paid officer (usually the CEO or President) without SBA approval.", "Socially disadvantaged individuals are \"those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within American society because of their identities as members of groups and without regard to their individual qualities.\" Members of designated groups, listed in Table 1 , are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of social disadvantage for purposes of the 8(a) Program, although this presumption can be overcome with \"credible evidence to the contrary.\" Individuals who are not members of designated groups must prove they are socially disadvantaged by a preponderance of the evidence. Such individuals must show (1) at least one objective distinguishing feature that has contributed to social disadvantage (e.g., race, ethnic origin, gender, physical handicap, long-term residence in an environment isolated from mainstream American society); (2) personal experiences of substantial and chronic social disadvantage in American society; and (3) negative impact on entry into or advancement in the business world. In assessing the third factor, the SBA will consider all relevant evidence produced by the applicant, but must consider the applicant's education, employment, and business history to see if the totality of the circumstances shows disadvantage. Groups not included in Table 1 may obtain listing by demonstrating disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence.", "Economically disadvantaged individuals are \"socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or similar line of business who are not socially disadvantaged.\" Individuals claiming economic disadvantage must describe it in a personal statement and submit financial documentation. The SBA will examine their personal income for the past three years, their personal net worth, and the fair market value of the assets they own. However, principal ownership in a prospective or current 8(a) business is generally excluded when calculating net worth, as is equity in individuals' primary residence. For initial eligibility, applicants to the 8(a) Program must have a net worth of less than $250,000. For continued eligibility, net worth must be less than $750,000.", "In determining whether an applicant to, or participant in, the 8(a) Program possesses \"good character,\" the SBA looks for criminal conduct; violations of SBA regulations; current debarment or suspension from government contracting; managers or key employees who lack business integrity; and the knowing submission of false information to the SBA.", "For a firm to have demonstrated potential for success, it generally must have been in business in the field of its primary industry classification for at least two full years immediately prior to the date of its application to the 8(a) Program. However, the SBA may grant a waiver allowing firms that have been in business for less than two years to enter the 8(a) Program when (1) the disadvantaged individuals upon whom eligibility is based have substantial business management experience; (2) the business has demonstrated the technical experience necessary to carry out its business plan with a substantial likelihood of success; (3) the firm has adequate capital to sustain its operations and carry out its business plan; (4) the firm has a record of successful performance on contracts in its primary field of operations; and (5) the firm presently has, or can demonstrate its ability to timely obtain, the personnel, facilities, equipment, and other resources necessary to perform contracts under Section 8(a).", "Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes agencies to award contracts for goods or services, or to perform construction work, to the SBA for subcontracting to small businesses participating in the 8(a) Program. A \"set-aside\" is an acquisition in which only certain contractors may compete, while a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. Although the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) generally requires that agencies obtain \"full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures\" when procuring goods or services, set-asides and sole-source awards are both permissible under CICA. In fact, an 8(a) set-aside is a recognized competitive procedure. Agencies are effectively encouraged to subcontract through the 8(a) Program because there are government-wide and agency-specific goals regarding the percentage of procurement dollars awarded to \"small disadvantaged businesses,\" among others. Awards made via set-asides or on a sole-source basis count toward these goals, and businesses participating in the 8(a) Program are considered small disadvantaged businesses.", "There are few limits on agency discretion to subcontract through the 8(a) Program. However, the SBA is prohibited by regulation from accepting procurements for award under Section 8(a) when\n1. the procuring agency issued a solicitation for or otherwise expressed publicly a clear intent to reserve the procurement as a set-aside for small businesses not participating in the 8(a) Program prior to offering the requirement to SBA for award as an 8(a) contract; 2. the procuring agency competed the requirement among 8(a) firms prior to offering the requirement to SBA and receiving SBA's acceptance of it; or 3. the SBA makes a written determination that \"acceptance of the procurement for 8(a) award would have an adverse impact on an individual small business, a group of small businesses located in a specific geographical location, or other small business programs.\"\nAdditionally, SBA is barred from awarding an 8(a) contract, either via a set-aside or on a sole-source basis, \"if the price of the contract results in a cost to the contracting agency which exceeds a fair market price.\"\nOtherwise, agency officials may offer contracts to the SBA \"in [their] discretion,\" and the SBA may accept requirements for the 8(a) Program \"whenever it determines such action is necessary or appropriate.\" The courts and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) will generally not hear protests of agencies' determinations regarding whether to procure specific requirements through the 8(a) Program unless it can be shown that government officials acted in bad faith or contrary to federal law.", "Once the SBA has accepted a contract for the 8(a) Program, the contract is awarded either through a set-aside or on a sole-source basis, with the amount of the contract generally determining the acquisition method used. When the anticipated total value of the contract, including any options, is less than $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts), the contract is normally awarded without competition. In contrast, when the anticipated value of the contract exceeds $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts), the contract generally must be awarded via a set-aside with competition limited to 8(a) firms so long as there is a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers and the award can be made at fair market price. Sole-source awards of contracts valued at $4 million ($7 million or more for manufacturing contracts) may only be made when (1) there is not a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers at a fair market price, or (2) the SBA accepts the requirement on behalf of an 8(a) firm owned by an Indian tribe, an ANC or, in the case of Department of Defense contracts, an NHO. Requirements valued at more than $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts) cannot be divided into several acquisitions at lesser amounts in order to make sole-source awards.", "Other key requirements of the 8(a) Program include the following:\nInability to protest an 8(a) firm's eligibility for an award : When the SBA makes or proposes an award to an 8(a) firm, that firm's eligibility for the award cannot be challenged or protested as part of the solicitation or proposed contract award. Instead, information concerning a firm's eligibility for the 8(a) Program must be submitted to SBA in accordance with separate requirements contained in Section 124.517 of Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations . Maximum of nine years in the 8(a) Program : Firms may participate in the 8(a) Program for no more than nine years from the date of their admission into the Program, although they may be terminated or graduate from the program before nine years have passed. One-time eligibility for the 8(a) Program : Once a firm or a disadvantaged individual upon whom a firm's eligibility was based has exited the 8(a) Program after participating in it for any length of time, neither the firm nor the individual is generally eligible to participate in the 8(a) Program again. When at least 50% of the assets of one firm are the same as those of another firm, the firms are considered identical for purposes of eligibility for the 8(a) Program. Limits on ownership of 8(a) firms by family members of current or former 8(a) firm owners : Individuals generally may not use their disadvantaged status to qualify a firm for the 8(a) Program if the individual has an immediate family member who is using, or has used, his or her disadvantaged status to qualify a firm for the 8(a) Program. Limits on the amount of 8(a) contracts that a firm may receive : 8(a) firms may generally not receive additional sole-source awards once they have received a combined total of competitive and sole-source awards in excess of $100 million, in the case of firms whose size is based on their number of employees, or in excess of an amount equivalent to the lesser of (1) $100 million or (2) five times the size standard for the industry, in the case of firms whose size is based on their revenues. Additionally, 8(a) firms in the \"transitional stage,\" or the last five years of participation, must achieve annual targets for the amount of revenues they receive from non-8(a) sources. These targets increase over time, with firms required to attain 15% of their revenue from non-8(a) sources in the fifth year; 25% in the sixth year; 35% in the seventh year; 45% in the eight year; and 55% in the ninth year. Firms that do not display the relevant percentages of revenue from non-8(a) sources are ineligible for sole-source 8(a) contracts \"unless and until\" they correct the situation. Limitations on subcontracting : Although not only under the authority of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act or applicable only to 8(a) businesses, limitations on subcontracting require that small businesses receiving contracts under a set-aside perform an amount of work that equals certain minimum percentages of the amount paid under the contract. Specifically, small businesses must generally perform at least 50% of the costs of the contract incurred for personnel with its own employees, in the case of service contracts; and at least 50% of the cost of manufacturing supplies or products (excluding the cost of materials), in the case of manufacturing contracts.", "Tribes, ANCs, NHOs or CDCs themselves generally do not participate in the 8(a) Program. Rather, businesses that are at least 51% owned by such entities participate in the 8(a) Program, although the rules governing their participation are somewhat different from those for the 8(a) Program generally.", "", "Firms owned by Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and CDCs must be \"small\" under the SBA's size standards. However, certain affiliations with the owning entity or other business enterprises of that entity are excluded in size determinations unless the Administrator of Small Business determines that a small business owned by an ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe \"[has] obtained, or [is] likely to obtain, a substantial unfair competitive advantage within an industry category\" because of such exclusions. Other affiliations of small businesses owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes can count in size determinations, and ANC-owned firms, in particular, have been subjected to early graduation from the 8(a) Program because they exceeded the size standards.", "Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes must be \"businesses\" under the SBA's definition. Although ANCs themselves may be for-profit or nonprofit, ANC-owned businesses must be for-profit to participate in the 8(a) Program.", "Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, or Indian tribes must be unconditionally owned and substantially controlled by the ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe, respectively. However, under SBA regulations, tribally or ANC-owned firms may be managed by individuals who are not members of the tribe or Alaska Natives if the firm can demonstrate:\nthat the Tribe [or ANC] can hire and fire those individuals, that it will retain control of all management decisions common to boards of directors, including strategic planning, budget approval, and the employment and compensation of officers, and that a written management development plan exists which shows how Tribal members will develop managerial skills sufficient to manage the concern or similar Tribally-owned concerns in the future.\nNHO-owned firms must demonstrate that the NHO controls the board of directors. However, the individual who is responsible for the NHO-owned firm's day-to-day management need not establish personal social and economic disadvantage. CDCs are to be managed and have their daily operations conducted by individuals with \"managerial experience of an extent and complexity needed to run the [firm].\"", "As owners of prospective or current 8(a) firms, Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and CDCs are all presumed to be socially disadvantaged.", "By statute, ANCs are deemed to be economically disadvantaged, and CDCs are similarly treated as economically disadvantaged. Indian tribes and NHOs, in contrast, must establish economic disadvantage at least once. Indian tribes must present data on, among other things, the number of tribe members; the tribal unemployment rate; the per capita income of tribe members; the percentage of the local Indian population above the poverty level; the tribe's access to capital; the tribe's assets as disclosed in current financial statements; and all businesses wholly or partially owned by tribal enterprises or affiliates, as well as their primary industry classification. However, once a tribe has established that it is economically disadvantaged for purposes of one 8(a) business, it need not reestablish economic disadvantage in order to have other businesses certified for the 8(a) Program unless the Director of the Office of Business Development requires it to do so.\nWhen determining whether an NHO is economically disadvantaged, SBA will consider \"the individual economic status of NHO's members,\" the majority of whom \"must qualify as economically disadvantaged\" under the same standards as individual applicants to the 8(a) Program. Specifically:\nFor the first 8(a) applicant owned by a particular NHO, individual NHO members must meet the same initial eligibility economic disadvantage thresholds as individually-owned 8(a) applicants. For any additional 8(a) applicant owned by the NHO, individual NHO members must meet the economic disadvantage thresholds for continued 8(a) eligibility.", "When an organization owns an actual or prospective 8(a) firm, all members, officers, or employees of that organization are generally not required to show good character. The regulations governing tribally and ANC-owned firms explicitly address the issue, stating that the \"good character\" requirement applies only to officers or directors of the firm, or shareholders owning more than a 20% interest. NHO-owned firms may be subject to the same requirements in practice. With CDC-owned firms, the firm itself and \"all of its principals\" must have good character.", "Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may provide evidence of \"potential for success\" in several ways, including by demonstrating that\n1. the firm has been in business for at least two years, as shown by individual or consolidated income tax returns for each of the two previous tax years showing operating revenues in the primary industry in which the firm seeks certification; 2. the individuals who will manage and control the daily operations of the firm have substantial technical and management experience; the firm has a record of successful performance on government or other contracts in its primary industry category; and the firm has adequate capital to sustain its operations and carry out its business plan; or 3. the owner-group has made a firm written commitment to support the operations of the firm and has the financial ability to do so.\nThe first of these ways for demonstrating potential for success is the same for individually owned firms, and the second arguably corresponds to the circumstances in which SBA may waive the requirement that individually owned firms have been in business for at least two years. There is no equivalent to the third way for individually owned firms, and some commentators have suggested that this provision could \"benefit ANCs [and other owner groups] by allowing more expeditious and effortless access to 8(a) contracts for new concerns without having to staff new subsidiaries with experienced management.\"", "Although implementation of this requirement has been delayed, 8(a) firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes must submit information annually to the SBA showing\nhow the Tribe, ANC, NHO or CDC has provided benefits to the Tribal or native members and/or the Tribal, native or other community due to the Tribe's/ANC's/NHO's/CDC's participation in the 8(a) … program through one or more firms. This data includes information relating to funding cultural programs, employment assistance, jobs, scholarships, internships, subsistence activities, and other services provided by the Tribe, ANC, NHO or CDC to the affected community.", "Like other participants in the 8(a) Program, firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes are eligible for 8(a) set-asides and may receive sole-source awards valued at less than $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts). However, firms owned by ANCs and Indian tribes can also receive sole-source awards in excess of $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts) even when contracting officers reasonably expect that that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers and the award can be made at fair market price. NHO-owned firms may receive sole-source awards from the Department of Defense under the same conditions.", "Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes are governed by the same regulations as other 8(a) firms where certain of the \"other requirements\" are involved, including (1) inability to protest an 8(a) firm's eligibility for an award; (2) maximum of nine years in the 8(a) Program (for individual firms); and (3) limits on subcontracting. However, the requirements for such firms differ somewhat from those for other 8(a) firms where one-time eligibility for the 8(a) Program; limits on majority ownership of 8(a) firms; and limits on the amount of 8(a) contracts that a firm may receive are involved. Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may participate in the 8(a) Program only one time. However, unlike the disadvantaged individuals upon whom other firms' eligibility for the 8(a) Program is based, ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may confer eligibility for the 8(a) Program upon firms on multiple occasions and for an indefinite period. Additionally, although ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may not own 51% or more of a firm obtaining the majority of its revenues from the same \"primary\" industry in which another firm they own or owned currently operates or has operated within the past two years, there are no limits on the number of firms they may own that operate in other primary industries. Moreover, ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may own multiple firms that earn less than 50% of their revenue in the same \"secondary\" industries. Finally, firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may continue to receive additional sole-source awards even after they have received a combined total of competitive and sole-source 8(a) contracts in excess of the dollar amount set forth in Section 124.519 of Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations , while individually owned firms may not. However, firms owned by any of these four types of entities are subject to the same requirements regarding the percentages of revenue received from non-8(a) sources at various stages of their participation in the 8(a) Program as other 8(a) firms.", "The 8(a) Program has periodically been challenged on the grounds that the presumption that members of certain racial and ethnic groups are disadvantaged violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The outcomes in early challenges to the program varied, with some courts finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring such challenges because they were not economically disadvantaged, or were otherwise ineligible for the program; and other courts finding that the program was unconstitutional as applied in specific cases. More recently, in its 2012 decision in DynaLantic Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense , the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the 8(a) Program was not unconstitutional on its face because (1) \"breaking down barriers to minority business development created by discrimination and its lingering effects\" constitutes a compelling government interest; (2) the government had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that race-based action was necessary to further this interest; and (3) the 8(a) Program is narrowly tailored to \"minimize the burden on non-minority firms.\" However, the court found that the program was unconstitutional as applied in the military simulation and training industry because the Department of Defense (DOD) conceded it had \"no evidence of discrimination, either in the public or private sector, in the simulation and training industry.\"\nParticularly in its rejection of the facial challenge to the 8(a) Program, the court emphasized certain aspects of the program's history and requirements when finding that the government had articulated a compelling interest for the program and had a strong basis in evidence for its actions. Specifically, the court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the 8(a) Program was \"not truly remedial,\" but rather favored \"virtually all minority groups … over the larger pool of citizens,\" because non-minority individuals may qualify for the program, and all 8(a) applicants must demonstrate economic disadvantage. The court also noted that the history of the 8(a) program prior to 1978 (when Congress expressly authorized set-asides for disadvantaged small businesses) had evidenced that race-neutral methods were insufficient to promote contracting with minority-owned small businesses. The court further noted that the 8(a) Program was intended to be a business development program, not a means to \"channel contracts\" to minority firms; that Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act expressly provides that awards may be made through the 8(a) Program only when SBA determines that \"such action is necessary and appropriate\"; and that the act requires the President and SBA to report annually to Congress on the program, thereby ensuring that Congress has evidence as to whether there is a \"continuing compelling need for the program.\" Similarly, in finding that the program was narrowly tailored to meet the government's interests, the court noted (1) that goals for contracting with small disadvantaged businesses are purely aspirational, and there are no penalties for failing to meet them; (2) the nine-year limits on program participation for individual owners and firms; and (3) that SBA may not accept a requirement for the 8(a) Program if it determines that doing so will have a adverse effect on another small business or group of small businesses. The court emphasized that the last two factors, in particular, helped ensure that race-conscious remedies do not \"last longer than the discriminatory effects [they are] designed to eliminate,\" and \"work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit.\"\nA 2015 decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Rothe Development, Inc. v. Department of Defense subsequently adopted the reasoning of the DynaLantic court in finding that the 8(a) Program is not unconstitutional on its face. In so doing, the court noted the same attributes of the 8(a) Program that the DynaLantic court had emphasized. In particular, in its brief discussion, the court noted the following six factors:\n1. alternative, race-neutral remedies had proved unsuccessful in addressing the discrimination targeted here; 2. the 8(a) Program is \"appropriately flexible\" because it imposes no quotas and prescribes no consequences for failure to meet the aspirational goals as to the percentage of federal contract dollars awarded to small disadvantaged businesses; 3. the program is neither under- nor over-inclusive, since it \"does not provide that every member of a minority group is disadvantaged\"; 4. the program imposes temporal limits on individuals' participation in the program, and SBA continuously monitors participants' eligibility; 5. the aspirational goals for contracting with small disadvantaged businesses are \"numerically proportionate\" to the evidence regarding the availability of minority firms that are ready, able, and willing to perform government contracts; and 6. various aspects of the 8(a) Program minimize the program's burden on non-minority firms (e.g., SBA cannot accept a contract for award through the 8(a) Program if it determines that doing so would have an \"adverse impact\" on other small businesses).\nThe decision in Rothe has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The litigation in DynaLantic , however, was reportedly settled by the parties while their appeals to the D.C. Circuit were pending.", "" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 3, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 1, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_title", "", "", "h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_full h1_title", "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_title", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the 8(a) Program?", "What does this program provide?", "What is a set-aside?", "What is the scale of government spending on the 8(a) Program?", "What other programs are similar to the 8(a) Program?", "What is the working definition of social disadvantage?", "What does it mean to be economically disadvantaged?", "Why may this amount change?", "How does SBA determine \"good character\"?", "How is potentiality for success determined?", "Why may some businesses not be under the same requirements?" ], "summary": [ "Commonly known as the \"8(a) Program,\" the Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program is one of several federal contracting programs for small businesses.", "The 8(a) Program provides participating small businesses with training, technical assistance, and contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides and sole-source awards.", "A \"set-aside\" is an acquisition in which only certain contractors may compete, while a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition.", "In FY2014, the federal government spent over $16 billion on contracts and subcontracts with 8(a) firms.", "Other programs provide similar assistance to other types of small businesses (e.g., women-owned, HUBZone).", "Members of certain racial and ethnic groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged, although individuals who do not belong to these groups may prove they are also socially disadvantaged.", "To be economically disadvantaged, an individual must have a net worth of less than $250,000 (excluding ownership in the 8(a) firm and equity in one's primary residence) at the time of entry into the program.", "This amount increases to $750,000 for continuing eligibility.", "In determining whether an applicant has good character, SBA looks for criminal conduct, violations of SBA regulations, or debarment or suspension from federal contracting.", "For a firm to have \"potential for success,\" it generally must have been in business in the field of its primary industry classification for two years immediately prior to applying to the program.", "However, small businesses owned by Alaska Native Corporations, Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations are eligible for the 8(a) Program under somewhat different terms." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, 4 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 ] }
CRS_R42051	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act", "Coverage Expansions and Market Reforms Prior to 2014", "Coverage Expansions and Market Reforms Beginning in 2014", "Estimated Budgetary Impact", "Estimated Impact on Insurance Coverage", "Revenues", "Savings from Payment and Delivery System Reforms", "Automatic Annual Spending Reductions Under the Budget Control Act", "BCA Overview", "BCA's Spending Reduction Procedures", "Direct Spending", "Discretionary Spending", "FY2013 Sequestration", "Future Automatic Spending Reductions (FY2014-FY2021)", "Impact on Health Reform Spending", "Mandatory Spending on Insurance Coverage Expansion", "Other Mandatory Spending", "Discretionary Spending", "Federal Administrative Expenses" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "On March 1, 2013, President Obama ordered the sequestration (i.e., cancellation) of $85.33 billion in FY2013 budgetary resources from nonexempt budget accounts across the federal government. The FY2013 sequestration order was issued pursuant to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA), as amended by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). Under the BCA, the FY2013 sequestration was to be ordered on January 2, 2013. A provision in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) delayed the order by two months.\nThe FY2013 sequestration is the first of a series of automatic spending reductions under the BCA, as amended by ATRA, that are required each year through FY2021. These annual spending reductions were triggered by the failure of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to propose, and Congress and the President to enact, legislation to reduce the deficit by an amount greater than $1.2 trillion over the period FY2012-FY2021.\nBased on the calculations of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the FY2013 sequestration requires a 7.8% reduction in nonexempt defense discretionary spending and a 7.9% reduction in nonexempt defense direct (i.e., mandatory) spending over the course of the fiscal year. The sequestration also requires reductions of 5.0% to nonexempt nondefense discretionary spending, 2% to Medicare, and 5.1% to other nonexempt nondefense mandatory programs.\nThere is considerable interest among policymakers in whether the automatic spending reductions triggered by the BCA will impact implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Among its many provisions, ACA restructures the private health insurance market, sets minimum standards for health coverage, and, beginning in 2014, will require most U.S. residents to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a penalty. The law creates competitive private health insurance marketplaces—or exchanges—in each state through which individuals and small employers, beginning in 2014, will be able to shop for, select, and enroll in qualified health plans. Qualifying individuals and families will be able to receive federal subsidies to reduce the cost of purchasing coverage through the exchanges.\nIn addition to expanding private health insurance coverage, ACA, as enacted, requires state Medicaid programs to expand coverage to all eligible nonelderly, non-pregnant individuals under age 65 with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Under ACA, the federal government will initially cover 100% of the expansion costs, phasing down to 90% of the costs by 2020. Medicaid law allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to withhold existing federal Medicaid matching funds if states refuse to comply with the expansion. However, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Medicaid expansion violated the Constitution by threatening states with the loss of their existing federal Medicaid matching funds. The Court precluded the HHS Secretary from penalizing states that choose not to participate in the Medicaid expansion (see text box).\nACA also amends the Medicare program in an effort to reduce the rate of its projected growth; imposes an excise tax on insurance plans found to have high premiums; and makes many other changes to the tax code, Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and other federal programs.\nACA is projected to have a significant impact on federal direct spending and revenues. The law includes direct spending to subsidize the purchase of health insurance coverage through the exchanges, as well as increased outlays for the expansion of state Medicaid programs. ACA also includes numerous mandatory appropriations to fund temporary programs to increase access and funding for targeted groups, provide funding to states to plan and establish exchanges, and support many other research and demonstration programs and activities. The costs of expanding public and private health insurance coverage and other spending are offset by revenues from new taxes and fees, and by savings from payment and health care delivery system reforms designed to slow the growth in spending on Medicare and other federal health care programs.\nImplementing ACA also is affecting discretionary spending, which is provided in and controlled by annual appropriations acts. The law established numerous new grant programs and provided for each an authorization of appropriations. It also reauthorized appropriations for many existing grant programs.\nThis report examines how automatic spending reductions triggered by the BCA might affect health reform implementation under ACA. It is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview of ACA's health insurance reforms and some analysis of the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) estimates of the impact of the law's implementation on federal direct spending and revenues. The second section examines the automatic spending reductions under the BCA. The final section discusses which types of health reform spending are likely subject to, or exempt from, those reductions. The report is periodically revised and updated to reflect important legislative and other developments.", "The primary goal of ACA is to increase access to affordable health insurance for the millions of Americans without coverage and make health insurance more affordable for those already covered. In addition, ACA makes numerous changes in the way health care is financed, organized, and delivered. These provisions are intended to slow the growth in health care costs and improve the quality of care by aligning payment incentives to increase efficiency and achieve savings; organizing care delivery systems to promote accountable, patient-centered, and coordinated care; and establishing benchmarks for better health outcomes.\nWhile many of the key provisions of the law do not take effect until 2014, some provisions are already in place, and others are being phased in over the next few years.", "ACA created several temporary programs to increase access and funding for targeted groups. They include (1) temporary high-risk pools for uninsured individuals with preexisting conditions; (2) a reinsurance program to reimburse employers for a portion of the health insurance claims' costs for their 55- to 64-year-old retirees; and (3) small business tax credits for employers with fewer than 25 full-time equivalents (FTEs) and average annual wages below $50,000 that choose to offer health insurance.\nIn addition, ACA included a series of private insurance market reforms, several of which have already taken effect. Health plans may no longer impose lifetime limits on the dollar value of essential benefits, rescind coverage (except in cases of fraud), or deny coverage to children up to age 19 based on a preexisting condition. Also, young adults up to age 26 generally must be allowed to remain on their parents' plans. Finally, plans must cover recommended preventive services and immunizations without any cost-sharing (i.e., out-of-pocket costs such as deductibles and co-pays).", "The major expansion and reform provisions in ACA take effect in January 2014. Each state will have a health insurance exchange through which eligible individuals and small employers are able to purchase coverage from private health insurance plans offering standardized benefit and cost-sharing packages. In 2017, states may allow larger employers to purchase health insurance through the exchanges, but are not required to do so. Some states have chosen to establish their own State-Based Exchange, while others will work with the federal government in a State Partnership Exchange. A Federally-Facilitated Exchange will operate in states that choose not to establish their own exchange.\nRefundable tax credits will be available to individuals and families who enroll in exchange plans, provided their income is generally at or above 100% and does not exceed 400% of the FPL, to help offset the cost of the insurance premiums. In addition, certain individuals and families receiving the premium credit will be eligible for a subsidy to lower their cost-sharing.\nACA's market reforms are further expanded in 2014, with no annual limits on the dollar value of essential benefits permitted, and no exclusions for preexisting conditions allowed regardless of age. Plans offered within the exchanges and certain other plans must meet essential benefit standards, requiring them to cover emergency services, hospital care, physician services, preventive care, prescription drugs, and mental health and substance use disorder treatment, among other specified services. Premiums may vary by limited amounts, but only based on age, family size, geographic area, and tobacco use. Finally, plans must sell and renew policies to all individuals and may not discriminate based on health status.\nBeginning in 2014, most U.S. citizens and legal residents will be required to have insurance or pay a penalty. In its June 28, 2012, decision, the Supreme Court ruled that ACA's individual insurance mandate is within Congress's constitutional power to levy taxes (see earlier text box). As plans will no longer be able to restrict coverage of individuals with health problems, the individual mandate is intended to ensure that healthy individuals participate in the insurance market rather than waiting until they need health care services. Increasing the number of healthy persons in the risk pool helps spread the risk.\nACA requires employers with more than 200 full-time employees that offer health insurance benefits to automatically enroll new employees in a coverage plan, though employees must be given adequate notice and the opportunity to opt out. Employers with 50 or more full-time employees that have at least one employee who is enrolled in an exchange plan and receiving a premium tax credit may be subject to penalties, whether or not they provide health insurance coverage to their employees.\nAs already noted, ACA requires state Medicaid programs to expand coverage to all nonelderly, non-pregnant legal residents with incomes up to 133% of FPL. Under the Supreme Court's decision, however, states may now choose whether to expand their Medicaid programs without fear of penalty. Several states have announced that they plan to opt out of the Medicaid expansion. States making that decision would forgo a substantial amount of federal funding. The federal government will provide 100% of the costs of the expansion for the first three years, phasing down to 90% in the years thereafter. Moreover, if a state decides not to expand its Medicaid program, low-income adults below the poverty line (i.e., below 100% FPL) who were not covered by, or eligible for, the state's existing Medicaid program, and who were seeking instead to purchase insurance coverage through an exchange (in accordance with the individual insurance mandate), would in general be ineligible for the subsidies, which begin at 100% FPL.\nFinally, ACA requires states to maintain the current CHIP structure through FY2019, and extends CHIP appropriations through FY2015.", "At the time of ACA's enactment in March 2010, CBO and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that the law's provisions to expand insurance coverage would result in gross costs of $938 billion over the 10-year period FY2010-FY2019. Gross costs include the exchange subsidies and related spending (e.g., exchange planning and establishment grants), increased spending on Medicaid and CHIP, and tax credits for certain small employers. CBO and JCT further estimated that those costs would be partially offset by an estimated $150 billion from penalties paid by uninsured individuals and employers, an excise tax on high-premium insurance plans, and net savings from other effects that coverage expansion is expected to have on tax revenues and outlays. Thus, CBO and JCT projected in their March 2010 baseline budget projections that ACA's insurance coverage provisions would result in net costs of $788 billion (i.e., $938 billion - $150 billion) over the FY2010-FY2019 period.\nThe net costs of coverage expansion under ACA are further offset by (1) new revenues from taxes and fees (other than those related to insurance coverage, mentioned above); and (2) direct spending savings from payment and delivery system reform provisions that are designed to slow the rate of growth of Medicare spending and improve outcomes and the quality of care. In the March 2010 baseline, CBO and JCT projected that the new revenues and direct spending savings—briefly described in separate sections below—would total $912 billion over the 10-year period FY2010-FY2019. Based on those projections, CBO and JCT estimated overall that ACA implementation would reduce federal deficits by $124 billion over that period.\nCBO and JCT have updated their estimates of ACA's impact on federal direct spending and revenues several times since March 2010. Table 1 summarizes five sets of estimates, including the initial March 2010 estimates and the most recent ones, which were released in May 2013. Note that the more recent estimates include only the gross and net costs of insurance coverage expansion. They do not include updated projections of the law's other offsetting revenues and direct spending savings.\nCBO and JCT's estimates of the gross and net costs of expanding insurance coverage have grown over time. For example, gross costs increased from $938 billion in the March 2010 estimates to $1,798 billion in the May 2013 estimates (see Table 1 ). Net costs increased from $788 billion to $1,363 billion over the same period. The increase in gross cost is primarily due to changes in the timing of the 10-year budget window over which these estimates are made. The March 2010 estimates cover the period FY2010-FY2019, whereas the February 2011 and March 2012 estimates begin and end two years later—FY2012-FY2021—and thus capture an additional two years of spending on exchange subsidies and Medicaid expansion. The two most recent sets of estimates shown in the table, which were released in August 2012 and May 2013, cover the periods FY2013-FY2022 and FY2014-FY2023, respectively. Each one captures yet another year of spending on coverage expansion.\nACA, as enacted, requires each state to expand its Medicaid program by 2014 or risk losing federal matching funds for the existing program. CBO and JCT's budgetary estimates prior to the Supreme Court's decision assumed that every state would expand eligibility for coverage under its Medicaid program as specified in ACA. In the August 2012 and May 2013 estimates, which reflect the Court's decision, CBO and JCT now project that some states will opt out of the Medicaid expansion altogether while others will delay Medicaid expansion until after 2014. That translates into a reduction in Medicaid enrollment and less annual spending on Medicaid than previously estimated. However, annual spending on subsidies is projected to increase due to higher enrollment in the exchanges.\nThe May 2013 cost estimates also reflect (1) the lower marginal tax rates in ATRA, which reduced the tax benefit associated with employment-based health insurance and are projected to lead to a reduction in such coverage and higher enrollment in insurance exchanges; and (2) CBO's revised analysis of the health status of newly eligible Medicaid enrollees, who are now expected to be healthier and less costly than previously projected. Other factors influencing the ACA budgetary estimates include (1) changes in the economic outlook, (2) enactment of legislation modifying ACA's insurance coverage provisions, (3) HHS decisions and policies on ACA implementation, (4) reduced growth in national health expenditures, and (5) technical changes in the estimating procedures used by CBO and JCT. Overall, CBO and JCT's various estimates of the cost of ACA's coverage expansion provisions have not changed much for any given year. However, as noted above, the total costs have grown significantly as the 10-year budget window has shifted to include more years of coverage expansion.", "Table 2 shows CBO and JCT's March 2012 and May 2013 estimates of the impact of ACA implementation on insurance coverage among legal nonelderly U.S. residents. In the March 2012 baseline, prior to the Supreme Court's decision, CBO and JCT estimated that ACA would increase the number of nonelderly Americans with health insurance by 33 million in 2022. Expansion of the Medicaid and CHIP programs was expected to enroll 17 million additional individuals in 2022, accounting for roughly half of the increase in coverage. The other half was due to a projected increase in private health insurance coverage. An estimated 22 million people were expected to purchase their own coverage through insurance exchanges in 2022. However, about 6 million fewer people were projected to obtain coverage through their employers or purchase individual coverage directly from insurers, resulting in an estimated net increase in the number of people with private insurance coverage of about 16 million.\nAs a result of the Supreme Court decision, CBO and JCT now estimate that fewer people will be covered by the Medicaid program, more people will obtain health insurance through the exchanges, and more people will remain uninsured. The May 2013 baseline projects that in 2022 an additional 13 million people will be covered by Medicaid and CHIP, which is 4 million fewer people than previously estimated. Twenty-four million people will be enrolled in exchanges, which is 2 million more people than the earlier estimate. CBO and JCT also project that 7 million fewer people will have employment-based coverage, more than double the March 2012 estimate. That change is due in large part to ATRA's reduction in marginal tax rates, which reduced the tax benefit associated with employment-based health insurance. CBO and JCT anticipate that the change in tax law will increase the number of employees who shift out of such coverage. Overall, CBO and JCT now estimate that ACA will increase the number of nonelderly Americans with health insurance by 25 million in 2022, about 8 million fewer people than previously estimated (see Table 2 ).", "The increase in revenues is achieved largely by raising taxes on high-income households and by imposing fees on insurers and on manufacturers and importers of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. In the February 2011 baseline, CBO and JCT estimated that those revenues would total $520 billion over the 10-year period FY2012-FY2021 (see Table 1 ).", "ACA included numerous Medicare payment provisions intended to reduce the rate of growth in spending. They include reductions in Medicare Advantage (MA) plan payments and a lowering of the annual payment update for hospitals and certain other providers. ACA establishes an Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) to make recommendations for achieving specific Medicare spending reductions if costs exceed a target growth rate. IPAB's recommendations will take effect unless Congress overrides them, in which case Congress would be responsible for achieving the same level of savings. Also, ACA provides tools to help reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in both Medicare and Medicaid.\nOther provisions establish pilot, demonstration, and grant programs to test integrated models of care, including accountable care organizations (ACOs), medical homes that provide coordinated care for high-need individuals, and bundling payments for acute-care episodes (including hospitalization and follow-up care). ACA created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMI) to pilot payment and service delivery models, primarily for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. The law also establishes new pay-for-reporting and pay-for-performance programs within Medicare that will pay providers based on the reporting of, or performance on, selected quality measures.\nAdditionally, ACA creates incentives for promoting primary care and prevention; for example, by increasing primary care payment rates under Medicare and Medicaid, covering recommended preventive services without cost-sharing, and funding community-based prevention and employer wellness programs, among other things. The law increases funding for community health centers and the National Health Service Corps to expand access to primary care services in rural and medically underserved areas and reduce health disparities. Finally, ACA requires the HHS Secretary to develop a national strategy for health care quality to improve care delivery, patient outcomes, and population health.\nIn the February 2011 baseline, CBO and JCT estimated that the health care payment and delivery system reform provisions in ACA would result overall in a net reduction in direct health care spending of $732 billion over the period FY2012-FY2021 (see Table 1 ).", "As noted in the introduction to this report, the FY2013 sequestration is the first in a series of automatic annual spending reductions triggered under the BCA by the failure of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to propose, and Congress and the President to enact, deficit-reduction legislation.", "The BCA, enacted on August 2, 2011, was the product of negotiations between the President and Congress to raise the nation's debt ceiling and avoid the federal government reaching its borrowing limit. The BCA gave the President the authority to increase the debt limit by at least $2.1 trillion (and up to $2.4 trillion) in three installments, and established a process for Congress to block the second and third installments by passing a joint resolution disapproving the debt limit increase. The President exercised this authority and raised the debt limit by a total of $2.1 trillion to $16.394 trillion. In early February 2013, as the government approached that borrowing limit, the President signed the No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013, which suspended enforcement of the debt limit and raised it on May 19, 2013, to the level of debt accumulated to that point.\nIn addition, the BCA established a process for reducing the federal deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the 10-year period FY2012-FY2021. First, the law placed enforceable limits, or caps, on discretionary spending for each of those 10 fiscal years. For FY2012 and FY2013, separate caps for security and nonsecurity spending were created. For each of the remaining eight fiscal years (i.e., FY2014-FY2021), a single cap for total discretionary spending was established. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that adhering to the discretionary spending limits, which grow by approximately 2% each year, would reduce federal spending by $917 billion between FY2012 and FY2021, compared to the projected level of spending if annual appropriations were to grow at the rate of inflation.\nSecond, the BCA included procedures and a timetable for enactment of a bill to reduce the federal deficit. The law created a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (Joint Committee), composed of an equal number of Democrats and Republicans from the House and Senate. The Joint Committee was instructed to develop legislation to reduce the federal deficit by at least $1.5 trillion through FY2021. It had until November 23, 2011, to approve a bill and have it considered by the House and Senate under special procedures that prevent amendments and limit debate in both chambers. If, by January 15, 2012, Congress and the President failed to enact a Joint Committee bill reducing the deficit by an amount greater than $1.2 trillion over the period FY2012-FY2021, then automatic annual spending reductions would be triggered beginning in FY2013.\nOn November 21, 2011, the co-chairs of the Joint Committee announced that the group had been unable to reach agreement on a legislative proposal to cut the deficit and would not be submitting a bill to Congress. Pursuant to the BCA, therefore, the President was required to order FY2013 spending reductions on January 2, 2013. That deadline was delayed until March 1, 2013, by ATRA.", "Based on the formula in the BCA, the automatic spending reductions triggered by the failure of the Joint Committee must cut $109.33 billion in each fiscal year over the period FY2013-FY2021. That amount is equally divided between defense and nondefense spending, each of which is subject to a $54.67 billion annual cut. Importantly, ATRA reduced the cuts for FY2013 by $24 billion, which means that both defense and nondefense spending are subject to $12 billion less in cuts in FY2013 (i.e., $42.67 billion, instead of $54.67 billion). The annual spending reduction in each spending category—defense and nondefense—is further divided proportionately between discretionary spending and nonexempt direct (i.e., mandatory) spending.", "Under the BCA, direct spending reductions are executed each year by an automatic across-the-board cancellation of budgetary resources—a process known as sequestration—for nonexempt accounts. The sequestration process was first established in 1985 by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA), commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Initially, sequestration was tied to annual maximum deficit targets. If the budget deficit exceeded those target levels, then automatic across-the-board spending cuts would be triggered. The BBEDCA has been amended several times, notably by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which tied sequestration to new statutory spending limits, and most recently by the BCA. The sequestration process is subject to exemptions and to certain rules, which are specified in Sections 255 and 256, respectively, of the BBEDCA. Several of those provisions relate to health spending under ACA and are discussed below.\nUnder the sequestration rules, reductions in Medicare payments to health care providers and health plans (which account for most of Medicare spending) are capped at 2%. Many other federal direct spending programs, accounting for most of the government's entitlement and other direct spending (excluding Medicare), are exempt from sequestration altogether.", "Discretionary spending reductions in FY2013 also are achieved through a sequestration of nonexempt discretionary appropriations (see discussion below). The sequestration rules exempt some discretionary spending, notably for veterans' health care and Pell grants. For each of the remaining fiscal years (i.e., FY2014-FY2021), however, discretionary spending reductions will be achieved by lowering the BCA-imposed discretionary spending cap by the total dollar amount of the reduction. Thus, policymakers will get to decide how to apportion the cuts within the lowered spending cap rather than having the cuts applied across-the-board to all nonexempt accounts through sequestration.\nIt should also be noted that ATRA reduced the FY2013 discretionary spending cap by $4 billion and the FY2014 discretionary spending cap by $8 billion—equally divided in each year between defense and nondefense spending—to help offset the $24 billion reduction in the FY2013 Joint Committee sequestration. Each year's spending cap is enforced by a second sequestration process, which is separate from the Joint Committee sequestration discussed in this report.", "The BCA required the OMB to calculate, and the President to order, the sequestration of FY2013 budgetary resources from nonexempt accounts on January 1, 2013. As already noted, that deadline was delayed by ATRA until March 1, 2013. The BCA requires the spending reductions for each subsequent fiscal year (i.e., FY2014-FY2021) to occur at the time of the President's annual budget submission in early February. It should be emphasized that the details of the spending reductions triggered by the BCA depend on the statutory interpretations and analysis of OMB. Each year, OMB will be responsible for determining the proportional allocation of required cuts to discretionary and direct spending in both the defense and nondefense categories. It also has exclusive authority in applying the exemptions and special rules related to sequestration.\nOn September 14, 2012, pursuant to the Sequestration Transparency Act of 2012 (STA), OMB released a report on the potential impact of a BCA-triggered FY2013 sequestration on direct and discretionary spending. The report provided a breakdown of exempt and nonexempt budget accounts, and included estimates of the FY2013 funding reductions in nonexempt accounts. The STA directed OMB to estimate the effects of sequestration based on FY2012 funding levels. The estimates, which OMB emphasized were preliminary and subject to revision, predated ATRA's enactment and thus did not take into account the law's $24 billion reduction in required spending cuts for FY2013.\nOn March 1, 2013, the President ordered a sequestration of FY2013 budgetary resources in accordance with OMB's final calculations of the dollar amounts of the reduction to each nonexempt budget account. Those calculations, which take into account ATRA's $24 billion adjustment, were provided in a report submitted to Congress.\nTable 3 summarizes OMB's calculations for FY2013 nondefense spending reductions under the March 1 sequestration. OMB calculated that sequestration would reduce nonexempt discretionary spending by 5.0% and spending under nonexempt mandatory programs by 5.1%. Because the sequestration was ordered before enactment of full-year appropriations for FY2013, OMB calculated the percentage reduction for discretionary spending based on annualized funding levels under the six-month FY2013 continuing resolution (CR), which generally funded discretionary programs at their FY2012 levels plus 0.612% . OMB then applied that percentage to the funding levels under the six-month CR to determine the dollar amount reduction for each nonexempt account.\nOn March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013. It funds most HHS discretionary programs—those that receive funding through the Labor-HHS-Education and the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations acts—at their FY2012 levels minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% , with some anomalies. Thus, final discretionary funding levels in the FY2013 full-year CR are slightly lower than the annualized funding levels provided in the six-month CR. Pursuant to the BBEDCA (as amended by the BCA), OMB did not recompute the percentage reduction for discretionary spending, but instead appears to have applied the dollar amount reductions calculated based on the six-month CR to the marginally lower final FY2013 levels.\nSequestration also imposes cuts of 2% on (1) Medicare payments to health plans and health care providers, and (2) mandatory spending on health centers and Indian health (see the discussion in the report's final section under \" Discretionary Spending \").", "As discussed earlier, the BBEDCA, as amended by the BCA, requires further annual spending cuts of $109.3 billion—evenly split between defense and nondefense spending—in each year from FY2014 through FY2021. While an analysis of the potential impact of those future cuts is beyond the scope of this report, it is important to keep in mind the following general points regarding nondefense spending:\nNonexempt nondefense mandatory programs will continue to be subject to sequestration each year, which will work in essentially the same way as in FY2013. However, the reduction percentage will be higher in FY2014 and subsequent years than in FY2013 because the total nondefense spending cut is larger (i.e., $54.67 billion rather than the ATRA-adjusted $42.67 billion that applies to FY2013). OMB estimates that the FY2014 sequestration will reduce nonexempt nondefense direct spending by 7.3%. Reductions to Medicare payments and mandatory spending on health centers and Indian health will remain capped at 2%. Annual reductions in nonexempt nondefense discretionary spending over the period FY2014-FY2021 will be achieved by a reduction in the BCA-imposed discretionary spending caps, rather than through sequestration. Again, the overall percentage cut will be higher in FY2014 and subsequent years than in FY2013 because the total nondefense spending reduction will be greater. However, unlike the largely indiscriminate process of sequestration in which the reduction percentage is applied across-the-board to all nonexempt programs, congressional appropriators will be able to decide which discretionary programs to cut in order to keep overall nondefense discretionary spending within the cap. Therefore, discretionary spending on veterans' health care and some other programs that are exempt under the sequestration rules will no longer be protected and may be subject to reductions through the regular appropriations process.", "The final section of this report discusses the potential impact of the BCA-triggered automatic spending reductions, both in FY2013 and in future years, on the following types of ACA-related spending: (1) mandatory spending on insurance coverage expansion, including exchange subsidies and Medicaid; (2) other mandatory spending; (3) discretionary spending; and (4) federal administrative expenses.", "It appears that most of ACA's projected spending on expanding insurance coverage is not subject to sequestration. First, the BBEDCA exempts the Medicaid and CHIP programs from sequestration. According to CBO and JCT's May 2013 estimates, Medicaid and CHIP outlays are projected to account for $710 billion, or 39%, of the gross costs of $1,798 billion for coverage expansion over the FY2014-FY2023 period (see Table 4 ).\nSecond, the refundable tax credits available to individuals and families with incomes between 100% and 400% of the FPL for purchasing insurance coverage through the exchanges also appear to be exempt from sequestration. While the ACA premium tax credits are not specifically exempted from sequestration, the BBEDCA provides a general exemption for refundable individual tax credits. These premium tax credits have the effect of limiting the cost of purchasing coverage to a specified percentage of income. Based on CBO and JCT's May 2013 estimates, the premium tax credits account for approximately $920 billion, or 86%, of ACA's total exchange subsidies and related spending of $1,075 billion over the FY2014-FY2023 period (see Table 4 ). Exchange subsidies and related spending, in turn, represents about 60% of the $1,798 billion in gross costs for coverage expansion.\nIn addition to the premium tax credits for purchasing coverage through an exchange, certain individuals and families receiving the credits are also eligible for coverage with lower cost-sharing (i.e., out-of-pocket costs such as deductibles and co-pays) than otherwise required under the law. This is achieved through a cost-sharing subsidy, which is paid directly to the insurer to cover the extra costs associated with lower patient cost-sharing. In the absence of any exemption under BBEDCA, the cost-sharing subsidies are fully sequestrable at the rate applicable to nonexempt nondefense mandatory spending. Based on CBO and JCT's May 2013 estimates, the cost-sharing subsidies account for an additional $149 billion, or 14%, of ACA's total exchange subsidies and related spending over the FY2014-FY2023 period (see Table 4 ).\nFinally, mandatory spending on the small employer tax credits to help offset the cost of purchasing health insurance for their employees also appears to be fully sequestrable at the rate applicable to nonexempt nondefense mandatory spending. These credits are available to for-profit and nonprofit employers with fewer than 25 FTEs and average annual wages of less than $50,000. According to CBO and JCT's May 2013 estimates, the small employer tax credits are projected to cost $14 billion over the FY2014-FY2023 period, or about 1% of the $1,798 billion in gross costs for coverage expansion (see Table 4 ).", "ACA included numerous mandatory appropriations that provide billions of dollars to support new and existing grant programs and other activities. Many of the provisions are annual appropriations of specified amounts for one or more fiscal years. A few of them are multiple-year appropriations, in which the amount appropriated is available for obligation for a definite period of time in excess of one fiscal year (e.g., for the period FY2011-FY2014). Often the provision includes additional language stating that the funds are to remain available \"until expended\" or \"without fiscal year limitation.\"\nACA appropriated billions of dollars for a number of temporary programs for targeted groups, including (1) $5 billion for the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP), a temporary insurance program to provide health insurance coverage for uninsured individuals with a preexisting condition; (2) $5 billion for a temporary reinsurance program to reimburse employers for a portion of the costs of providing health benefits to early retirees aged 55-64; and (3) $6 billion for the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program, to establish temporary health insurance cooperatives. ACA also included money for states to plan and establish health insurance exchanges. The law provided $10 billion for the FY2011-FY2019 period—and $10 billion for each subsequent 10-year period—for the CMI to test and implement innovative payment and service delivery models, and it funded an independent board (i.e., IPAB) to provide Congress with proposals for reducing Medicare cost growth and improving quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries.\nACA created four special funds and appropriated substantial amounts to each. First, the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF) is providing a total of $11 billion in annual appropriations over five years (FY2011-FY2015) to help fund health center operations and the National Health Service Corps. (A separate ACA appropriation provided $1.5 billion for health center construction and renovation.) Second, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) is supporting comparative effectiveness research through FY2019 with a mix of annual appropriations—some of which are offset by revenues from a fee imposed on private health plans—and transfers from the Medicare trust funds. Third, the Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF), for which ACA provided a permanent annual appropriation, is intended to support prevention, wellness, and other public health-related programs and activities authorized under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). Finally, ACA provided $1 billion to the Health Insurance Reform Implementation Fund (HIRIF) within HHS to help cover the initial administrative costs of implementing the law.\nIn addition, ACA appropriated $2.4 billion for maternal and child health programs. Overall, the law included more than $100 billion in direct appropriations over the 10-year period FY2010-FY2019, including $40 billion to provide two more years of funding for CHIP (see Table 4 ).\nA few of the appropriations in ACA are included in CBO and JCT's estimates of the gross costs of insurance coverage expansion (e.g., PCIP, CO-OP, exchange establishment grants). All the remaining amounts—including funding for community health centers, health workforce programs, and public health activities—are captured in CBO's overall estimate of the impact of the law's payment and delivery system reform provisions on direct spending.\nGenerally, the annual appropriations in ACA are fully sequestrable at the rate applicable to nonexempt nondefense mandatory spending. That includes annual appropriations for PPHF, PCORTF, exchanges grants, and the maternal and child health programs. However, for reasons discussed below, sequestration of ACA's annual CHCF appropriation is capped at 2%.\nFor any given fiscal year in which sequestration is ordered, only new budget authority for that year (including advance appropriations that first become available for obligation in that year) is reduced. Unobligated balances (non-defense only) carried over from previous fiscal years are exempt from a sequestration order. Thus, the March 1, 2013, sequestration of FY2013 budgetary resources does not apply to unobligated ACA funds that were appropriated in a prior fiscal year (i.e., FY2010-FY2012) and are still available for obligation.\nThe exemption for unobligated balances carried over from prior fiscal years applies to a number of ACA appropriations that provide multiple-year funding or that specify that the funds are to remain available \"until expended\" or \"without fiscal year limitation.\" One example is the PCIP program to provide health insurance coverage for eligible individuals who have been uninsured for six months and have a preexisting condition. The program terminates on January 1, 2014. ACA appropriated $5 billion in FY2010, to remain available without fiscal year limitation, to pay claims against the PCIP that are in excess of the premiums collected from enrollees. Any unobligated PCIP funds still available for obligation in FY2013 are exempt from sequestration. Another example is CMI, which received a $10 billion multiple-year appropriation in FY2011 to remain available for obligation through FY2019.", "ACA implementation will affect not only direct spending and revenues but also discretionary spending, which is provided in and controlled by annual appropriations acts. The law reauthorized appropriations for numerous existing discretionary grant programs and activities authorized under the PHSA, and permanently reauthorized appropriations for programs and services provided by the Indian Health Service (IHS). ACA also created a number of new discretionary grant programs and provided for each an authorization of appropriations.\nMany of ACA's discretionary spending provisions authorized annual appropriations of specified amounts for one or more fiscal years. Other provisions authorized the appropriation of specified amounts for FY2010 or FY2011 and unspecified amounts—such sums as may be necessary, or SSAN—for later years. A few provisions authorized multiple-year appropriations, available for obligation for a period in excess of one fiscal year. Numerous other provisions simply authorized the appropriation of SSAN, in a few cases without specifying any fiscal years.\nFunding for all these discretionary programs depends on actions taken by congressional appropriators, a process that may lead to greater or smaller amounts than the sums authorized by ACA. With Congress now operating under enforceable discretionary spending caps imposed by the BCA, it may prove difficult to secure funding for new programs and activities. To date, few new discretionary grant programs authorized by ACA have received funding through the annual appropriations process, though a handful of programs have received funding from the PPHF. Even maintaining current funding levels for existing programs with broad support and an established appropriations history can be a challenge when there is pressure to reduce federal discretionary spending.\nCBO estimated that ACA's discretionary spending provisions, if fully funded by future appropriations acts, would result in appropriations of almost $100 billion over the period FY2012-FY2021 (see Table 4 ). However, most of that funding—about $85 billion—would be for programs that were in existence prior to, and were reauthorized by, ACA; namely, the National Health Service Corps, the health centers program, and the IHS.\nIn general, ACA-related discretionary spending in FY2013 is fully sequestrable at the rate applicable to nonexempt nondefense discretionary spending. Importantly, OMB has concluded that the sequestration rules under BBEDCA Section 256, which include a 2% limit on cuts in spending on community health centers, migrant health centers and the IHS, apply only to mandatory spending reductions and not to cuts in discretionary spending. Thus, while FY2013 discretionary spending on all health centers is fully sequestrable, cuts in CHCF (mandatory) funding for community health centers and migrant health centers are capped at 2%.\nFor each of the remaining years (i.e., FY2014-FY2021), discretionary spending reductions will be achieved through a downward adjustment of the revised statutory spending caps. In contrast to the automatic spending reductions achieved through sequestration, lowering the annual discretionary spending caps allows Congress and the President to determine through the annual appropriations process which accounts are to be reduced, and by how much, in order to meet those caps. Lowering the annual discretionary spending caps also may make it more difficult to maintain funding levels for existing programs.", "In general, under BBEDCA Section 256, federal administrative expenses are subject to sequestration, regardless of whether they are incurred in connection with a program or activity that is otherwise exempt or subject to a special rule. Thus, while the ACA refundable tax credits may be exempt from sequestration, the federal administrative expenses associated with the program would be fully sequestrable. Section 256 provides an exception for federal payments to state and local governments that match or reimburse these governments for their own administrative costs. Such payments are not considered federal administrative expenses and are subject to sequestration, but only to the extent that the relevant federal program is subject to sequestration. For example, federal payments to state Medicaid programs for administrative costs would be exempt from sequestration because the Medicaid program as a whole is exempt.\nHowever, as discussed in the previous section, OMB has determined that the sequestration rules in BBEDCA Section 256 apply only to mandatory spending reductions required by the Joint Committee sequestration, and not to reductions in discretionary spending. With regard to federal administrative expenses, OMB concluded that mandatory administrative expenses for an otherwise exempt (i.e., non-sequestrable) program are subject to sequestration (pursuant to Section 256), whereas discretionary administrative expenses for an otherwise exempt (i.e., non-sequestrable) program are not sequestrable.\nCBO has projected that both the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) within HHS and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will incur substantial administrative costs to implement ACA. CBO estimated that the costs to the IRS of implementing the eligibility determination, documentation, and verification processes for premium and cost-sharing subsidies will probably total between $5 billion and $10 billion over 10 years. It further estimated that the costs to CMS for implementing the changes in Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP, as well as some of the reforms to the private insurance market, will require similar amounts over 10 years.\nACA provided $1 billion in mandatory funds through the HIRIF to help cover the initial administrative costs of implementation. The Administration's FY2013 budget projected that all the HIRIF funds would be obligated by the end of FY2012 and so requested more than $1 billion in new discretionary funding for CMS and the IRS to pay for ongoing administrative costs of ACA implementation. However, Congress did not provide any new discretionary funds for FY2013 for ACA implementation.\nIn FY2013, CMS reportedly will spend about $1.5 billion on ACA implementation, primarily to establish federally facilitated insurance exchanges in states that elect not to run their own exchanges and to engage in consumer education and outreach. HHS officials recently announced that, in the absence of any new FY2013 discretionary funding for ACA implementation, the department will use funds from the following sources:\n$235 million in unobligated HIRIF funds carried over from FY2012; $454 million from PPHF; $450 million from the non-recurring expenses fund; and $116 million from the Secretary's authority to transfer funds from other HHS accounts.\nOn April 9, 2013, HHS announced that it planned to use up to $54 million of the PPHF funds to award grants to eligible entities in states with a Federally-Facilitated Exchange or State Partnership Exchange to develop and implement navigator programs. The purpose of these programs is to provide outreach and education to raise awareness about the exchanges, and to help consumers establish eligibility for, and enroll in, qualified health plans offered through the exchanges.\nOn May 9, 2013, HHS announced the availability of $150 million in FY2013 CHCF funds for Health Center Outreach and Enrollment Assistance grants. This funding will be awarded based on a formula to all eligible health centers that currently receive federal operating funds. Health centers will use the funding to hire and train new staff to conduct outreach and facilitate enrollment in the exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP. These efforts are intended to complement the navigator programs nationwide." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "h2_title h3_title", "", "h2_full", "h3_full", "h3_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What did the 2011 Budget Control Act establish?", "What specific mechanisms did it employ?", "What other ways did the BCA trim spending?", "What might happen if Congress and the President are unable to enact a Joint Committee bill?", "How are the reductions achieved?", "What is the relationship between the BCA and the ACA?", "What effect will the new law have on healthcare coverage?", "How will the law affect individuals and families?", "What did ACA do to increase health insurance access?", "What other programs did ACA fund?", "What is the nature of these appropriations?", "What costs are exempt from sequestration?", "How does ACA address discretionary funding?", "How did the law affected appropriations for programs?", "What does the Congressional Budge Office predict about ACA?" ], "summary": [ "The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) established new budget enforcement mechanisms for reducing the federal deficit over the 10-year period FY2012-FY2021.", "The BCA placed statutory limits, or caps, on discretionary spending for each of those 10 fiscal years, which will save an estimated $0.9 trillion during that period.", "In addition, it created a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (Joint Committee) with instructions to develop legislation to reduce the federal deficit by at least another $1.5 trillion through FY2021.", "In the event that Congress and the President were unable to enact a Joint Committee bill—as turned out to be the case—then automatic annual spending reductions would be triggered beginning in FY2013 and extending through FY2021.", "Under the BCA, the reductions will be achieved by a combination of sequestration (i.e., an automatic across-the-board cancellation of budgetary resources) and, beginning in FY2014, by lowering the discretionary spending caps.", "The potential impact of spending reductions triggered by the BCA on health reform spending under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) appears to be somewhat limited.", "The new law included direct spending to subsidize the purchase of health insurance coverage through the exchanges, as well as increased outlays for the Medicaid expansion. Under the rules governing sequestration, all Medicaid spending and most of the spending on subsidies is exempt from any reduction, and cuts to Medicare are capped at 2%.", "Certain individuals and families will be able to receive federal subsidies to reduce the cost of purchasing coverage through the exchanges.", "ACA sought to increase access to affordable health insurance by expanding the Medicaid program and by restructuring the private health insurance market. It set minimum standards for private insurance coverage, created a mandate for most U.S. residents to obtain coverage, and provided for the establishment by 2014 of state-based insurance exchanges for the purchase of health insurance.", "ACA also included numerous mandatory appropriations that provide billions of dollars to support temporary programs to increase coverage and funding for targeted groups, provide funds to states to plan and establish exchanges, and support many other research and demonstration programs and activities.", "Generally, these appropriations are fully sequestrable. However, for any given fiscal year in which sequestration is ordered, only new budget authority for that year is reduced.", "Unobligated balances carried over from previous fiscal years are exempt from sequestration.", "ACA also is having an effect on discretionary spending, which is subject to the annual appropriations process.", "The law reauthorized appropriations for numerous existing discretionary grant programs authorized under the Public Health Service Act, permanently reauthorized funding for the Indian Health Service (IHS), and created a number of new grant programs and provided for each an authorization of appropriations.", "In addition, the Congressional Budget Office projected that both the Department of Health and Human Services and the Internal Revenue Service will incur substantial administrative costs to implement ACA's policies and programs. ACA-related discretionary spending generally is fully sequestrable." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, 3, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3 ] }
GAO_GAO-15-407	{ "title": [ "Background", "FirstNet Is Making Progress Meeting Responsibilities but Lacks Certain Elements of Effective Internal Controls", "FirstNet Is Making Progress Carrying Out Statutory Responsibilities", "Planning the Public Safety Network", "Consulting Stakeholders", "FirstNet Has Not Assessed Risk or Established a Complete Control Environment", "Risk Assessment", "Control Environment", "FirstNet Faces Difficult Decisions in Determining How to Pay for a Nationwide Public-Safety Network Estimated to Cost Billions", "Cost of a Public Safety Network Estimated to be at least $12 Billion over First 10 Years", "Various Factors Will Influence Cost of FirstNet’s Public Safety Network", "Extent of Commercial Partnerships", "Use of Existing Infrastructure", "Efforts to Ensure Network Reliability", "Network Coverage", "FirstNet Faces Difficult Decisions about User Fees and Commercial Partnerships in Determining How to Become Self-Funding", "User Fees", "Commercial Partnerships", "Although Early Builder Projects Are Providing Lessons, FirstNet Has Not Developed a Plan to Evaluate Them", "Early Builder Projects Have Learned Lessons As They Develop Public Safety Networks", "Governance", "Financing the Network", "Conducting Outreach", "Planning for Network Deployment", "FirstNet Has Processes in Place to Identify Early Builder Project Lessons but Has Not Developed a Written Evaluation Plan", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Copy of Survey to FirstNet Single Points of Contact", "Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Department of Commerce", "Appendix IV: Comments from the First Responder Network Authority", "Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (2012 act) established numerous responsibilities for FirstNet, most of which relate directly to developing the nationwide public-safety broadband network (hereafter, public safety network). It is intended that this network will be a new, nationwide, broadband telecommunications network. Public safety users, and potentially other “secondary” users, may be assessed fees to use the network, much as they may currently pay for the use of commercial wireless networks. In establishing this network, FirstNet must issue open, transparent, and competitive Requests for Proposals (RFP) to private sector entities for the purpose of building, operating, and maintaining the public safety network; develop RFPs that include appropriate timetables for construction, and network coverage areas and service levels, among other things; enter into agreements to use, to the maximum extent economically desirable, existing commercial, federal, state, local, and tribal infrastructure; promote competition in the public-safety equipment marketplace by requiring that equipment for the public safety network be built to open, non-proprietary standards; promote integration of the public safety network with public-safety address special considerations for areas with unique homeland or require deployment phases that include substantial rural coverage milestones; and develop the technical and operational requirements for the public safety network, as well as the practices and procedures for managing and operating it.\nIn establishing the infrastructure for the public safety network, the 2012 act requires FirstNet to include the following network components, as shown in figure 1: core network of data centers and other elements, all based on commercial standards; connectivity between the radio access network (RAN) and the public Internet or the Public Switched Telephone Network, or both; and network cell-site equipment, antennas, and “backhaul” equipment, based on commercial standards, to support wireless devices operating on frequencies designated for public safety broadband.\nIn developing the public safety network, FirstNet must work with a variety of stakeholders. The 2012 act required FirstNet to be headed by a 15- member board with 3 permanent members (the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget) and 12 individuals appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. The appointed members are required to have public safety experience or technical, network, or financial expertise. The 2012 act also required FirstNet to establish a standing public-safety advisory committee to assist it in carrying out its responsibilities and consult with federal, regional, state, local, and tribal jurisdictions on developing the network. For state, local, and tribal planning consultations, FirstNet is required to work with the state Single Points of Contact (SPOC) who have been designated by each state, territory, and the District of Columbia (hereafter, states).\nThe 2012 act requires FirstNet to notify the states when it has completed its RFP process for building, operating, and maintaining the public safety network. Once a state receives the details of FirstNet’s plans, it has 90 days either to agree to allow FirstNet to construct a RAN in that state or notify FirstNet, NTIA, and FCC of its intent to deploy its own RAN. A state that “opts out” of FirstNet’s plan to build that state’s RAN has an additional 180 days from that notification to develop and complete RFPs for the construction, maintenance, and operation of the RAN within the state; the state must send FCC an alternative plan for constructing, operating, and maintaining its RAN. The plan must demonstrate that the state’s proposed RAN would comply with certain minimum technical requirements and be interoperable with FirstNet’s network. FCC shall either approve or disapprove the plan. In addition, a state that opts out is required to apply to NTIA for an agreement to use FirstNet’s spectrum capacity.\nVarious federal agencies will provide assistance and support to FirstNet. For example,\nThe National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of Commerce, in consultation with FCC, DHS, and the Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice, is required to conduct research and assist with the development of standards, technologies, and applications to advance wireless public-safety communications.\nThe Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) program, a joint NTIA and NIST effort, performs research on behalf of FirstNet to advance public-safety communications interoperability.\nDHS, through both the Office of Emergency Communications and the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, supports the establishment of the public safety network and collaborates with public safety and government officials at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels to help ensure the network meets the needs and technical requirements of users in the public safety community.\nThe 2012 act also required FCC, the entity responsible for managing and licensing commercial and non-federal spectrum use—including spectrum allocated to public safety—to take certain steps to support FirstNet. It also authorized FCC to provide FirstNet with technical assistance and to take any action necessary to assist FirstNet in effectuating its statutory duties and responsibilities. Radio frequency spectrum is an essential resource for wireless communications, including the planned public-safety network. The energy in electronic telecommunications transmissions converts airwaves into signals to deliver voice, text, and images. These signal frequencies are allocated for specific purposes, such as television broadcasting or Wi-Fi, and assigned to specific users through licenses.\nAllocating sufficient spectrum for wireless emergency communications has long been a concern for Congress. The 2012 act required FCC to reallocate the “D Block,” a previously commercial spectrum block located in the upper 700 megahertz (MHz) band, to public safety and to grant a license to FirstNet for the use of both the existing public-safety broadband spectrum in the upper 700 MHz band and the D Block. FirstNet now has a license to operate the nationwide public-safety broadband network on spectrum in the upper 700 MHz band, specifically 758-769 MHz and 788- 799 MHz (see fig. 2 below). In October 2013, FCC adopted consolidated technical service rules governing the 700 MHz band of spectrum licensed to FirstNet and was prepared to accept and process applications for equipment certification in that spectrum band consistent with the newly consolidated rules. FCC has conducted specified spectrum auctions, as required by the 2012 act, so that auction proceeds could be used to fund FirstNet. The 2012 act provides $7 billion from the spectrum auction proceeds to FirstNet for “buildout” of the public safety network, reduced by the amount needed to establish FirstNet. The 2012 act requires FirstNet to be self-funding beyond this initial $7 billion.\nEfforts to establish local and regional public-safety networks are also ongoing, and predate the 2012 act. In 2009, public safety entities began requesting waivers from FCC’s rules to allow early deployment of interoperable public-safety wireless broadband networks in the upper 700 MHz spectrum band authorized for public safety use. Through 2011, FCC granted waivers to 22 jurisdictions for early deployment of such networks.altered the regulatory landscape for the 700 MHz band” and sought However, FCC recognized that the 2012 act “fundamentally comment on the disposition of waiver jurisdiction deployments. In May 2012, NTIA partially suspended seven grant projects for the waiver jurisdictions that received funding from the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP), a federal grant program to promote the expansion of broadband infrastructure. NTIA suspended the projects in part to ensure the projects supported the development of FirstNet’s public safety network. In July 2012, FCC decided to hold all waiver authorizations ineffective as of September 2, 2012, and said it would allow such jurisdictions to continue to deploy public-safety broadband services in the existing public-safety broadband spectrum (later extended to include the D Block) under certain limited circumstances consistent with FirstNet’s future use of the spectrum. FCC granted FirstNet the 700 MHz public-safety broadband-spectrum license in November 2012, and in February 2013, FirstNet announced it would begin negotiations with the original waiver jurisdictions on SMLAs. With FirstNet in control of the 700 MHz public-safety broadband-spectrum license pursuant to its FCC license, the jurisdictions had to secure an SMLA with FirstNet to lift their partial funding suspension and resume work. By August 2014, FirstNet secured SMLAs with five original waiver jurisdictions; in this report, we refer to these jurisdictions as early builder projects. Figure 3 shows timelines for the early builder projects and the amount of federal funding they received to deploy their networks. As part of their SMLAs with FirstNet, the early builder projects agreed to report to FirstNet on their use of the spectrum, their progress, and on key-learning conditions, among other things. FirstNet has not yet determined if or how the early builder project networks will be incorporated into its nationwide network.\nThree other original waiver jurisdictions were awarded BTOP funds to deploy local and regional public-safety broadband networks, including the State of Mississippi, the San Francisco Bay Area in California, and the City of Charlotte in North Carolina. However, for various reasons, these jurisdictions were unable to reach SMLAs with FirstNet and the projects were canceled.\nEven with the establishment of the public safety network, first responders will continue to rely on their current LMR systems for mission-critical voice communications. We previously reported that a major limitation of a public-safety broadband network is that it will not provide first responders with “mission-critical” voice capabilities—that is, voice capabilities that meet a high standard for reliability, redundancy, capacity, and flexibility necessary during emergencies—for several years. Long Term Evolution (LTE), the technical standard for the public-safety broadband network, is a wireless broadband standard that is not currently designed to support mission-critical voice communications.are currently providing voice over LTE capabilities, but these capabilities do not currently meet public safety’s mission-critical voice requirements because key elements needed for mission-critical voice—such as group calls—are not part of the LTE standard. Therefore, public safety agencies will continue to rely on their LMR systems for mission-critical voice for the foreseeable future, and the public safety network will supplement, rather than replace, current LMR systems.", "", "FirstNet has made progress carrying out its statutory responsibilities in three areas—(1) establishing its organizational structure, (2) planning the public safety network, and (3) consulting with stakeholders—but could face challenges in each of these areas. Figure 4 provides a timeline of select events in FirstNet’s progress meeting its statutory responsibilities since the 2012 act’s passage.\nAs a newly created entity within the federal government, FirstNet has taken a number of steps to establish its organizational structure and hire staff. As required by the 2012 act, the Secretary of Commerce appointed FirstNet’s inaugural board members in August 2012. FirstNet’s Board established Governance and Personnel, Finance, Technology, and Outreach Committees to review, approve, and oversee FirstNet’s activities. As required by the 2012 act, FirstNet’s Board also established the Public Safety Advisory Committee (PSAC) in February 2013—one year after the 2012 act’s passage—and adopted the PSAC’s charter in June 2014.\nThe PSAC’s membership represents a broad cross section of public safety disciplines and state, local, and tribal governments. In addition to the board and the PSAC, FirstNet has established organizational units and hired key personnel to lead and perform its work. In April 2013—over a year after the 2012 act’s passage—the FirstNet Board selected an Executive Director to lead its day-to-day operations. Since then, FirstNet has hired, and continues to hire, other senior management personnel to lead its organizational units (such as a Chief Counsel and Chief Administrative, Financial, and Information Officers), and Directors and organizational chiefs to further lead and perform its work. FirstNet has also hired, and continues to hire, general staff. As of February 2015, FirstNet had over 120 employees, including full-time equivalent federal employees, contractors, and personnel on detail from other agencies. FirstNet confirmed in February 2015 that it may hire up to 42 additional full-time equivalent federal employees in fiscal year 2015 and that it will evaluate and adjust needed staffing levels on an ongoing basis. See figure 5 for an overview of FirstNet’s organizational structure. Additionally, in June 2014, FirstNet opened its “corporate” headquarters in Reston, Virginia, and, in March 2014, a technical center to serve as its technical, engineering, and network design headquarters in Boulder, Colorado.\nStakeholders we spoke with and surveyed expressed concern that organizational issues have slowed FirstNet’s progress and could continue to do so. In particular, in response to our survey, numerous SPOCs noted either that FirstNet’s placement within NTIA could create “bureaucratic” obstacles or that FirstNet should be more independent from NTIA. One survey respondent and another subject matter expert we interviewed also noted that this placement creates conflicting expectations—that is, stakeholders expect FirstNet to behave like both a commercial wireless carrier and a government entity, and these expectations can sometimes be in conflict. However, FirstNet officials told us that while FirstNet has leveraged its relationship with NTIA in administrative and legal matters, it exercises strong independence in decisions that are directly program- related.\nNumerous stakeholders we surveyed and interviewed were also concerned about the pace of FirstNet’s hiring, noting that the federal hiring process is too slow, has not allowed FirstNet to hire staff quickly enough, and has delayed FirstNet’s progress. For example, FirstNet hired its management team for state plans, consultation, and outreach in late 2013 to early 2014, then hired State and Local, Tribal, and Federal Outreach Leads in June and August 2014, almost 2 years after FirstNet’s board members were appointed. Additionally, FirstNet is still in the process of hiring staff for key positions. For example, as of February 2015 FirstNet was re-filling the Chief User Advocacy Officer and Director of Communications positions, was planning for the hiring of a Chief Procurement Officer, and was in the process of hiring staff to lead regional consultation teams that it plans to establish, among other positions. As of February 2015, it was also still hiring key technical positions—including Director of Devices, Director of Standards, and Director of Core Network—and re-filling the Chief Technology Officer position. According to FirstNet officials, FirstNet faces challenges hiring as quickly as it would like, in part due to government hiring procedures, but is seeking direct hire authority from the Office of Personnel Management and is exploring other authorities it could use to expedite hiring.", "To plan the public safety network and help ensure that its approach is open and transparent and meets the 2012 act’s requirements and that interested parties have a formal way to comment on FirstNet’s strategy and decisions, FirstNet intends to follow the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) process for its comprehensive network-services procurement. This process will culminate in one or multiple RFPs for “network solution(s)”—that is, proposals for the building, deployment, operation, and maintenance of the public safety network. To help draft the RFP(s), FirstNet has sought comments through a Notice of Inquiry (NOI), RFIs, and Public Notices. Specifically, in October 2012, NTIA, on behalf of FirstNet, issued an NOI to seek input on the network’s potential architecture.RFIs on specific technical aspects of the network and on devices and From April to November 2013, FirstNet issued 12 detailed applications for public safety. NTIA and FirstNet received over 400 comments to the NOI and RFIs, and FirstNet has used these as a source of market research in assessing industry capabilities and developing the technical design of the network. Building off these efforts, in September 2014 FirstNet issued an RFI that sought further comment on a number of issues, such as network coverage, pricing, deployment strategies, security, prioritization among network users, and customer service, among other things. According to this RFI, FirstNet’s current approach is to follow a performance-based procurement strategy, whereby FirstNet does not dictate the specific network solution that bidders responding to the RFP(s) must provide, but, rather, outlines objectives and encourages bidders to develop proposals that will meet those objectives. Additionally, although the 2012 act exempts FirstNet from portions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), FirstNet has chosen to follow an APA-like process in order to provide more opportunities for interested parties to comment on its interpretations of the 2012 act’s requirements. Therefore, in September 2014, FirstNet also issued a Public Notice seeking comment on a number of its preliminary interpretations, such as how to define its rural coverage milestones and eligible network users.FirstNet received 185 responses to the September 2014 RFI and Public Notice from a broad range of respondents, such as states, public safety entities, private companies, and associations. FirstNet issued a second Public Notice in March 2015 and expects to issue a draft RFP in spring 2015.\nIn addition to its efforts seeking public comment, FirstNet has also received technical input from a variety of stakeholders, such as FCC, the PSAC, the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC), and the PSCR program. As required by the 2012 act, the FCC’s Technical Advisory Board for First Responder Interoperability issued minimum technical requirements for the public safety network in May 2012. The report provided recommendations on LTE standards; network user equipment, device management, and evolution; and quality of service, among other things. FirstNet has also asked the PSAC to provide recommendations on various topics, including a framework for establishing the priority of public safety entities on the network. In May 2014, NPSTC provided FirstNet with guidance on what makes communication systems “public-safety grade.” Additionally, FirstNet has provided the PSCR—which is based in Boulder, Colorado, where FirstNet’s technical center is also located—with funding to research interoperability standards, test and evaluate potential network features, and model and simulate network data traffic.\nSpecifically, SPOCs responded this 33 percent of the time. For question wording, see appendix II question 5 (b-g). network, and the practices, procedures, and standards for managing and operating the network. Still, even in these instances, SPOCs’ level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction was mostly “moderate.” While many stakeholders we surveyed and interviewed noted that FirstNet’s progress has been too slow, some also noted that they were satisfied with FirstNet’s progress given the complex nature of FirstNet’s tasks and that it is a government entity subject to federal rules and regulations. Some also said that FirstNet’s progress has improved recently, especially as FirstNet has hired more staff.", "FirstNet has initiated a process to consult with the public safety community in each state through the SPOC. FirstNet first worked to establish informal mechanisms for coordinating with the SPOCs. For example, FirstNet began holding regional workshops in May 2013, quarterly SPOC webinars in January 2014, and monthly calls with SPOCs in February 2014. FirstNet began its formal state consultation process by delivering an initial consultation package to each SPOC in April 2014; the package contained a checklist for the SPOCs to complete in preparation for an initial consultation meeting. FirstNet is using these meetings to gather information on each state’s unique challenges, needs, and processes to inform its development of the public safety network and, in particular, state RAN plans. Initial state consultation meetings began in July 2014—when FirstNet conducted its first consultation with Maryland— and FirstNet expects these initial meetings to continue through 2015, with additional rounds to follow. As of April 16, 2015, FirstNet had conducted initial consultation meetings with 18 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.\nIn addition to its consultation with SPOCs, FirstNet officials have conducted outreach to other stakeholders. For example, from October 2013 to February 2015, FirstNet officials visited 39 states and territories while participating in 187 events, such as state town halls and public safety, industry, and government (including federal, state, local, and tribal) conferences. To engage with tribal entities, FirstNet staff visited eight tribal nations in 2014, and sought the advice of the PSAC on tribal outreach, education, and inclusive consultation strategies. To engage with federal entities, FirstNet has hired a director of federal outreach, designated DHS’s Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) as the primary body to FirstNet for federal consultation, and participated in meetings with ECPC and other agencies. To engage with vendors interested in doing business with FirstNet, FirstNet has held vendor meetings and appointed an industry liaison to coordinate vendor outreach. In addition to this targeted outreach, FirstNet also launched a public website in March 2014, where it regularly posts updates, presentations, board-meeting minutes, a list of upcoming speaking engagements, and other information. The 2012 act also created a State and Local Implementation Grant Program (SLIGP), administered by NTIA, to provide states with funds to plan for the public safety network and to consult with FirstNet. Starting in July 2013, NTIA awarded $116 million in SLIGP grants.\nWe believe FirstNet’s consultation and outreach activities generally align with core principles for effective stakeholder participation that we have developed and used in previous reports. For example, we found during the course of our review that FirstNet is using an open and clearly defined decision-making process, actively conducting outreach, involving stakeholders throughout the process, using formal and informal participation methods, and including all stakeholders.\nThe majority of stakeholders we surveyed were generally satisfied with the level of FirstNet’s consultation and outreach, but others were dissatisfied and said that they would like more new information. In response to our survey, 54 percent of SPOCs said they were either “moderately” or “very” satisfied with FirstNet’s overall level of consultation, coordination, and communication, while 22 percent said they were either “moderately” or “very” dissatisfied. However, numerous stakeholders we surveyed and interviewed said that they would like more new and detailed information and that they would like FirstNet to focus more on certain aspects of the public safety network during outreach. For example, in response to our survey, SPOCs most frequently indicated that there should be a “large increase” in how much FirstNet focuses on various technical aspects of developing the network in its state outreach.SPOCs also said that the lack of new information from FirstNet, such as details about the network’s design, hampers their ability to conduct local outreach. However, in response to our survey many SPOCs also acknowledged that the level of new and detailed information exchanged will likely increase once they hold their initial state consultation meeting with FirstNet. Additionally, officials from one federal agency with public safety responsibilities said they would have liked to see more in-depth outreach to federal entities, given that federal agencies will have a large pool of potential network users. In January 2015, FirstNet formally initiated its federal consultation process. As part of this process, FirstNet will conduct meetings with federal entities in 2015 similar to the initial consultation meetings it is conducting with states.", "Internal controls are the plans, methods, policies, and procedures that an entity uses to fulfill its mission, strategic plan, goals, and objectives. An effective internal control system increases the likelihood that an entity will achieve its objectives. We assessed FirstNet’s policies and practices against two components of an effective federal internal control system: risk assessment and control environment.two components because risk assessment provides the basis for developing appropriate risk responses and control activities and the control environment is the foundation for an internal control system. For those two components, we found that—although FirstNet has begun establishing policies and practices that are consistent with federal standards—FirstNet lacked certain elements that contribute to the proper implementation of effective internal control systems. While FirstNet has stated that it is relying on the Department of Commerce’s and NTIA’s internal controls where it has not developed its own, it is also important for FirstNet to implement its own controls, as the Commerce Office of Inspector General (OIG) noted as early as February 2014 in a memo on the management challenges facing FirstNet.", "In an internal control system, according to federal internal control standards, management should assess risks facing the entity as it seeks to achieve its objectives. Specifically, entities should first clearly define their objectives then identify and analyze risks from both internal and external sources. Analyzing risks generally includes estimating the risk’s significance, assessing the likelihood of its occurrence, and deciding how to respond to it. Risk assessments inform an entity’s policies, planning, and priorities, and help entities develop responses to the risks they face, so that they can achieve their objectives. Control activities respond to these risks.\nFirstNet has set objectives and taken some steps to assess risks. Specifically, FirstNet has set three key objectives: 1. Provide FirstNet services that are critical to public safety users and differentiate FirstNet services from commercial broadband services, such as through reliability, resiliency, coverage, functionality, interoperability, quality of service, priority access, pre-emption, and applications. 2. Reduce costs for public safety entities by leveraging the value of excess network capacity with partners. 3. Provide mechanisms for public safety entities (directly or indirectly through the states) to benefit from the economies of scale created by FirstNet in terms of purchasing, partnering, and information/data.\nFirstNet has further delineated how it will accomplish these objectives in a “roadmap” that identifies additional long-term and short-term objectives and milestones. FirstNet has established a Program Management Office to, according to FirstNet officials, help set internal timelines and monitor the completion of tasks needed to achieve these objectives and reach these milestones. Additionally, the Department of Commerce and FirstNet have performed some risk assessment activities. In February 2014, the Commerce OIG issued a memorandum outlining the top management challenges facing FirstNet. To support development of the roadmap, FirstNet created a “risk register” that identifies some risks related to its financial sustainability as well as possible counter-measures.\nHowever, FirstNet has not yet fully assessed risks it may face in accomplishing its objectives. FirstNet officials told us in November 2014 that they have not yet done so because they are in the process of defining risk factors and, again in December 2014, because they are in the process of conducting a legal compliance risk assessment of certain key risk areas. In December 2014, FirstNet officials also said that they intend to perform periodic risk assessments in various areas to manage and mitigate risks on an iterative basis. However, as of February 2015, FirstNet has not yet completed these risk assessment activities. As a result, we were unable to evaluate the extent to which these activities align with the elements of risk assessment detailed in the federal internal control standards, and therefore, it remains unclear how effective FirstNet’s efforts will be in helping it to identify and respond to obstacles to fulfilling its responsibilities.\nAs FirstNet completes these assessments, we believe that it is important that it incorporate all of the elements of risk assessment detailed in the federal internal control standards. Lacking complete risk assessments (that is, assessments that incorporate these elements), FirstNet’s control activities may not be designed to respond to the appropriate risks. In previous work, we found that when an agency worked quickly to establish a new program, it resulted in the agency’s hastily designing an internal control system that was not based on complete risk assessments and that the agency responded to risks in a reactive, rather than a proactive, manner. Thus, it was unclear whether the controls appropriately responded to risk or were the best use of the agency’s resources. Additionally, we are concerned that the complexity of FirstNet’s responsibilities and objectives, makeup of FirstNet’s Board of Directors, and challenges that FirstNet will face attracting users to its network and becoming self-funding illustrate the multitude of potential risks FirstNet faces in achieving its objectives. For example, as we point out later in this report, various factors could hinder whether public safety entities adopt the public safety network—and thus how much user fee revenue FirstNet can collect—which could pose risks to FirstNet’s ability to become self- funding. Given this, complete risk assessments could help FirstNet appropriately design its full internal control system and achieve its objectives while maximizing use of its available resources.", "The control environment is the foundation for an internal control system and provides the basic structure that helps an entity achieve its objectives. To help set this environment, according to federal internal control standards, an entity should establish an organizational structure and delegate authority establish appropriate human-capital practices for hiring, developing, evaluating, retaining, supervising, and disciplining personnel; demonstrate a commitment to competence, such as by establishing expectations of competence and holding personnel accountable by evaluating their performance; demonstrate a commitment to integrity and ethical values, such as by setting a positive “tone at the top,” providing and evaluating adherence to ethical and behavioral guidance, and removing temptations for unethical behavior; and have an oversight body that oversees the entity’s internal control system.\nFirstNet has taken a number of steps to begin establishing an effective control environment. As described above, FirstNet has established an organizational structure with clearly designated responsibilities and has explored hiring options that would allow it to recruit individuals more quickly. According to FirstNet officials, to develop staff, FirstNet has also leveraged its relationship with the Department of Commerce by using the Department’s training facilities as it works to create FirstNet-specific training. Per Department of Commerce policy, FirstNet’s Senior Executive Service employees are subject to applicable competency and evaluation plans and other employees are evaluated using a performance appraisal process. Additionally, FirstNet has taken steps to identify and manage potential conflicts of interest. For example, FirstNet has held ethics briefings, distributed ethics documents, held ethics counseling and training, and instituted a Board Member Vendor Interaction Policy to establish processes for board members interacting with vendors with a potential interest in FirstNet’s procurement efforts. FirstNet has also established and disseminated a variety of guidance documents, such as policies on employee timekeeping, expenses, travel, information technology rules of behavior, and telework. Finally, FirstNet’s Board Committees and FirstNet senior management’s Compliance Committee oversee FirstNet’s activities and the Commerce OIG and others perform additional oversight.\nHowever, FirstNet has not yet finished establishing its control environment. While FirstNet has a variety of separate guidelines and policies, it does not have a uniform and cohesive standards of conduct policy. Specifically, although FirstNet officials told us that they intend to develop a code/standards of conduct policy, which is an important form of ethical and behavioral guidance for personnel, they have not yet developed this item as of February 2015. According to FirstNet officials, FirstNet has not yet done so because, as a “start-up” entity, building up the organization while making progress meeting statutory responsibilities is a balancing act affected by FirstNet’s priorities and resources.\nNonetheless, absent standards of conduct, we are concerned that FirstNet may not be able to address deviations in its personnel’s conduct and performance, and take corrective actions in a timely manner. Indeed, FirstNet itself established a special committee in May 2013 to review ethical concerns raised by one of its board members. Similarly, in a December 2014 report, the Commerce OIG identified concerns with FirstNet’s financial disclosure reporting and contracting practices, among other things. The report highlighted that the FirstNet Board, out of necessity, includes members with significant ties to the telecommunications industry that make strategic decisions regarding FirstNet’s operations and, thus, are at increased risk of encountering conflicts of interests. Although FirstNet has taken corrective actions since the Commerce OIG’s investigation, we believe that establishing and evaluating adherence to standards of conduct may help FirstNet ensure that all its personnel are held accountable for their actions. By establishing this item, FirstNet could also foster stakeholder trust in its ability to meet its statutory responsibilities and be a good steward of public funds.", "", "Various entities have estimated the cost to construct and operate a nationwide network for public safety from a low of $12 billion to a high of between $34 and $47 billion, over the first 10 years. As shown in table 1, a variety of entities have developed cost estimates for a public-safety broadband network, although they have used different assumptions about the network’s scope. Key assumptions influencing these estimates include whether the network is constructed, operated, or financed in partnership with commercial entities, and the number of sites needed to provide the network’s coverage. For instance, FCC’s 2010 estimate assumes costs would be decreased through a high level of cooperation with commercial carriers. These estimates also vary, for instance, on how much they expect ongoing maintenance and operation to cost. However, some differences among these estimates are difficult to identify since some of the estimates do not explicitly state all their assumptions.\nThe actual costs per site for early builder projects vary but are generally less than the estimates above. As discussed more below, five early builders are constructing local or regional broadband networks for public safety. Some of these projects have begun construction and provided us with cost data. The new cell towers (and associated LTE equipment) for the regional network in the Los Angeles area average $196,000 per site. For equipment being attached to existing towers and sites, the average cost is $102,000. For the regional project in Adams County, Colorado, the cost per site is approximately $75,000. This cost reflects sites utilizing existing infrastructure that does not require strengthening. For budgetary purposes, the Adams County project has estimated the development of a new site at $500,000, an estimate that includes acquisition of land, tower construction, and utilities.\nGAO-09-3SP. associated documentation were deemed business sensitive. Therefore, we cannot say if the estimate is in line with the best practices associated with the credible and accurate characteristics of our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.", "Cost estimates notwithstanding, various factors will influence the cost of constructing and operating FirstNet’s public safety network, including (1) the business model used, especially the extent of commercial partnerships; (2) use of existing infrastructure; (3) efforts to ensure network reliability; and (4) network coverage.", "FirstNet’s business model, especially the extent to which it partners with commercial carriers or other private enterprises, will influence the cost to construct and operate the public safety network. The 2012 act gives FirstNet the authority to engage in a variety of commercial partnerships. Such partnerships could involve a private-sector partner that would contribute resources to the network (e.g., infrastructure) and accept some risk in the form of profits or losses. FirstNet would then contribute other resources to the partnership (e.g., spectrum) conditioned on the network satisfying social objectives (i.e., enhancing public safety communications). In a partnership, public safety and commercial users could share the public safety network’s infrastructure and spectrum, with public safety given priority to all network capacity during times of emergency. Regardless of the approach, some public safety stakeholders we spoke with maintained the need for FirstNet to work with commercial partners in building and operating the network for it to be financially sustainable. One study calculated that the value of serving both commercial and public safety users is greater than the costs of the additional capacity and signal reliability requirements placed on the network to serve both public safety and commercial users, demonstrating a strong business case for a public-private partnership.", "The use of existing infrastructure will influence the cost to construct and operate FirstNet’s public safety network. Under agreements to share existing wireless network infrastructure, FirstNet may be able to make use of, for example, cell towers, antennae, cabling, radio-processing equipment, backup power facilities, and the links between towers and the nearest communications hub, to the extent economically desirable to do so. According to FCC estimates, capital costs would be 2.5 times greater without this form of sharing. Given these potential financial savings, a few public safety stakeholders we spoke with maintained that FirstNet should use at least some existing infrastructure for the network. The use of existing infrastructure can have limitations though. For instance, using existing infrastructure can limit the design and coverage of the network, since existing towers and buildings can only facilitate certain network coverage given their physical location. Negotiating access to existing infrastructure can also be a time-consuming process, especially with government-owned or controlled facilities, and where contracts must by executed with multiple owners, ultimately slowing down network deployment. For example, when we spoke with Swedish officials about the public-safety communications network in their county, they said that they sought to use existing infrastructure, to save costs, when constructing their network, but faced problems in their largest cities convincing tower owners to allow the government to rent the towers. Furthermore, there is a risk when public safety entities rely on infrastructure owned by commercial operators, particularly if they have to rely on a single provider in any given location that can then charge high fees.", "FirstNet’s approach to ensure the public safety network is safe, secure, and resilient (that is, the overall reliability of the network) will also influence the cost to construct the network. FirstNet is required by the 2012 act to “ensure the safety, security, and resiliency of the network.”\nThis interoperable network in Sweden is called the “Rakel” network and is primarily used for voice communications.\nPub. L. No. 112-96, § 6206(b)(2)(A), 126 Stat. 156, 212.\nFirstNet is still determining how it will satisfy this requirement. As previously described, NPSTC published a report to provide guidance for FirstNet as it constructs and implements the public safety network. NPSTC concluded that a “public-safety grade” communications system should be designed to resist failures due to manmade or natural events as much as practical, and that the public safety network must be constructed to meet as many of these requirements as possible. If FirstNet implements all of NPSTC’s best practices, though, it will significantly add to the cost of building the network. For example, transmission sites, such as cell towers, should have backup power sources when used for public safety communications, according to NPSTC. Existing commercial sites, however, generally do not have such backup, primarily to reduce costs in extremely competitive markets. FCC, for instance, has reported that it could cost $35,000 per site to harden existing commercial LTE sites.", "The public safety network’s coverage will also influence the cost to construct and operate the network. The 2012 act requires FirstNet to establish a “nationwide” network, but does not define the level of coverage that constitutes “nationwide.” Generally speaking, increasing the area covered by the network, as well as the extent to which coverage penetrates buildings, increases the amount of infrastructure needed, and thus the cost of the network. It may be relatively affordable, for example, to cover large segments of the population concentrated in relatively small areas. For instance, one stakeholder we spoke with suggested that FirstNet could provide service to as much as 25 percent of all potential customers by covering just the 8 largest metropolitan areas. Providing coverage outside dense metropolitan areas can be particularly expensive. One study has shown that a nationwide public-safety broadband network would generally be profitable in urban areas and unprofitable in rural areas. This study demonstrated that a network built with a commercial partnership could cover 94 percent of the U.S. population and break even because urban areas could subsidize coverage in rural areas.", "Although FirstNet has various revenue options it is authorized to use to become self-funding, it is unclear how FirstNet will use those authorities. As the cost estimates discussed above illustrate, FirstNet’s network will likely cost tens of billions of dollars to construct and initially operate. As also noted above, FirstNet is required to be self-funding. To meet the costs of building and maintaining the network, FirstNet may generate revenue through user fees and commercial partnerships, the latter of which can involve the secondary use of the network for non-public safety services. However, FirstNet faces difficult decisions determining how to best utilize these revenue sources. Additionally, regardless of the effectiveness of FirstNet’s use of these revenue sources, the public safety network will likely have net negative income in the first few years of operation.", "More than 75 percent of survey respondents noted that the network would be “very useful” to emergency management, emergency medical services, fire services, and law enforcement. For question wording, see appendix II question 1. ability to have reliable access to broadband data throughout the state would improve interoperability,” as well as a first responder’s ability to deliver critical services in a timely manner.\nDespite the demand for the public safety network, a variety of challenges could hinder adoption and thus user fee revenue:\nFee size: If FirstNet’s user fee is too high it could hinder public safety adoption, and if it is too low it could bring in too little revenue. Numerous stakeholders we spoke with noted that FirstNet’s cost would play a role in whether they adopt the public safety network and that user fees must be competitive with existing commercial services. According to a few public safety entities we spoke with and the SPOCs we surveyed, public safety entities currently pay $20-$100 per user or device, per month, for commercial services. While low user fees would be attractive to public safety entities and therefore may increase adoption, they would also bring in a relatively smaller amount of revenue per user. As a FirstNet Senior Program Manager reported in December 2014, there is a trade-off with low user fees between adoption and the network’s financial sustainability. Some stakeholders also noted that the cost of equipment and devices needed to access the public safety network could limit adoption, especially since public safety entities are continuing to invest in their LMR devices and equipment.\nUser base: While a large user base can potentially bring in significant user fee revenue, it could be challenging to manage. The 2012 act established that FirstNet’s primary customers will be entities that provide “public safety services.” How FirstNet interprets the definitions of “public safety services” established in the 2012 act will expand or contract the potential sources of revenue. As one public safety official we spoke with noted, the network has more value to public safety entities when there are more users on the network, because entities will all be able to communicate with each other. Another public safety official we spoke with suggested that certain users could be required to adopt the public safety network. Government users in Sweden, for instance, are required to pay a user fee, regardless of their use of the network, to generate revenue that is necessary to support the national network’s maintenance and operations. However, a large user base can require priority and preemption rules, if certain users are to have privileged access to the network. According to some public safety officials we spoke with, such rules can be difficult to establish among public safety entities.\nCoverage: Widespread network coverage can attract more users, and thus user fee revenue, but is expensive to construct and maintain. As the FirstNet Senior Program Manager reported in December 2014, there is a trade-off with increased coverage between adoption and the network’s financial sustainability. Further, FirstNet does not have total control over the network’s coverage, since states may opt out and build their own RANs. Nevertheless, some of the public safety entities we spoke with said that the network’s coverage would play a role in whether they adopt the public safety network, noting in particular that the coverage should be at least as good as existing commercial services. One public safety entity we spoke with said that existing commercial coverage is inadequate, while two other entities said that the coverage is adequate normally, but the service becomes unusable during large events because of the number of users on the network. However, as noted above, providing extensive coverage, especially in rural areas, can be very costly. Indeed, a few SPOCs noted in survey responses that providing rural coverage in their states would be challenging, with one commenting that “it is inconceivable that FirstNet will be able to deploy a terrestrial network in the vast areas that are unpopulated or sparsely populated.”\nReliability: Although FirstNet is required to construct a resilient network, practices to ensure this can be costly. Some public safety officials we spoke with said that the network’s reliability would play a role in whether they adopt the public safety network. A few officials specifically said that if the network did not reliably work when first utilized by public safety, adoption would suffer, since public safety has a low tolerance for unreliable technology. However, as noted above, ensuring reliability requires significant capital expenses. As the FirstNet Senior Program Manager reported in December 2014, there is also a trade-off with hardening the network between the extent of adoption and the network’s financial sustainability.\nCompounding these challenges are other factors that might hinder adoption. For instance, officials from some public safety entities told us that public safety tends to take a “wait and see” approach to adopting new technology. Public safety, according to an official we spoke with, can be reluctant to buy and use new technology and services because if those things do not work it can put lives in jeopardy. Furthermore, according to officials from two public safety entities we spoke with, some entities may not see a need for a nationwide public-safety network if they operate in areas with few large-scale emergencies.", "FirstNet can also generate revenue through commercial partnerships, but the extent of commercial interest in these partnerships, and therefore the value of this authority for FirstNet, is currently unknown. Under the 2012 act, FirstNet can receive payment for the use of the public safety network’s capacity by non-public safety users as well as use of the network’s infrastructure. The value of secondary access to the public safety network’s capacity depends in part on the availability of the spectrum, which itself will be determined in part by the capacity available given the network’s design. According to one major carrier we spoke with, no business is likely to enter into a partnership with FirstNet because its public-safety user base has not been defined, and thus the network’s capacity available to secondary (commercial) users is unknown. According to this carrier, the risk would be too high for a commercial entity to enter into an agreement without knowing exactly how they will be able to use FirstNet’s network. If public safety preempts all commercial traffic, then the commercial entity will struggle to generate income from this venture and may lose favor with its customers. However, another major carrier we spoke with maintained that FirstNet will have to partner with at least one commercial carrier to be financially sustainable, and given the significant investments in LTE infrastructure made by commercial carriers, FirstNet would do well to utilize some of this infrastructure through commercial partnerships. Although the historic Advanced Wireless Services spectrum auction that FCC concluded in late January 2015 could indicate demand for spectrum capacity among commercial carriers, the extent of carrier interest in partnering with FirstNet is not yet fully known. In particular, there may be some benefits to existing commercial carriers in partnering with FirstNet, but these companies may prefer to expand their businesses by directly competing with FirstNet and offering their own public safety products. Notably, when FCC presented the D Block spectrum for auction in 2008 with public safety encumbrances, it received no qualifying bids and thus the D Block was not licensed. The lack of commercial interest in the D Block was due in part to uncertainty about how the public-private partnership would work, which raises further questions about FirstNet’s ability to partner with commercial carriers.", "", "Officials from the five early builder projects, as well as the three canceled projects, told us that they have learned a number of lessons while developing their public-safety broadband networks that may be useful as FirstNet develops its public safety network. Specifically, the early builders identified lessons about (1) governance, (2) financing the network, (3) conducting outreach, and (4) planning for network deployment.", "Officials from the early builder projects cited governance lessons associated with developing a new network for public safety. As we reported in February 2012, governance is a key element for interoperable networks. By providing a framework for collaboration and decision making with the goal of achieving a common objective, governance structures can promote interoperability and help ensure public safety networks are secure and reliable. The 2012 act established FirstNet as the governing entity for a nationwide public-safety network, and as such, early builder project officials described governance challenges that FirstNet may face. For example, officials from one project told us some public safety entities may not have a clear understanding of FirstNet’s goals and plans. The officials told us localities are willing to participate in the public safety network, but FirstNet will face difficulty in establishing timely technical decisions and effective policies that keep pace with local enthusiasm to participate. The officials said FirstNet can address this challenge by setting expectations about what the network will provide, including the specific intent, purpose, and planned capabilities. A SPOC working with one of the projects described challenges that FirstNet will face in determining how to diplomatically work with tribal nations. For example, whereas each state will have a designated SPOC, tribes are sovereign nations within a state but will not have a designated SPOC, which could pose governance challenges. The SPOC told us it is unclear whether FirstNet has planned for how the “opt in” or “opt out” process will work for tribal nations, when the 2012 act requires state governors to make the state decision. The SPOC also told us that a tribe representative in his state met with him to share concerns about how public safety entities only have broadband coverage near the edge of their reservation’s limits. The SPOC noted that the tribe has become a partner of the early builder project and that this partnership underscores how their state has developed close relationships with tribes through state-level liaison efforts, federal grant programs, and its early builder project. According to the SPOC, FirstNet should work closely with states and leverage these relationships to work with tribal nations.", "Officials from the early builder projects also learned lessons related to financing a new public safety network that could be applicable to FirstNet. Although the 2012 act provides FirstNet with funding sources and options, as described above, utilizing such sources could be challenging according to early builder project stakeholders. Officials from a project told us they will face sustainability challenges due to the limited number of users that will be able to utilize their network. According to the officials, their project will not be able to charge their users enough to make the operations sustainable without pricing the users out of the services. The officials told us a possible way to address this challenge would be to expand the service to public safety entities in neighboring metropolitan areas and airport services areas that have established broadband infrastructure. Similarly, officials from one of the projects said their network will be in an “uneasy” financial position initially because the number of users subscribing to the network will likely be low. Further, the officials noted that a small user base could make it difficult to maintain the network because user fees are expected to pay for a significant portion of network operations and maintenance. According to a SPOC working with one of the projects, determining user fees to cover ongoing maintenance and administrative costs has been a financial challenge. To decide user fees, project officials are considering factors including the potential for public-private partnerships and how to define the scope of the user base. As we found in February 2012, obtaining adequate funds to build, operate, and maintain a public safety network could be challenging.", "Mobile “deployables” can also be referred to as “deployable networks.” A deployable network typically includes “deployable assets” such as “cells on wheels” that provide localized wireless network service to areas where coverage is minimal or compromised. These assets typically provide fully functional service via vehicles such as trailers, vans, and trucks. challenges in their state on the topic of network coverage. According to the SPOC, their state’s public safety community and tribal nations became frustrated with FirstNet’s inconsistent messaging about the network’s coverage and capability. The inconsistent messaging created challenges for the SPOC in convincing frustrated potential users to remain engaged in the state’s FirstNet planning efforts. We also spoke with a SPOC closely involved in one of the early builder projects who described strategies that his state’s project used in conducting outreach. For example, the project developed contact lists for each site deployment location and for primary and secondary stakeholders, and distributed materials in public safety locations including police stations. According to the SPOC, FirstNet will need to sustain a level of excitement in its outreach for the public safety network.", "Officials from the early builder projects as well as the canceled public- safety projects also described lessons they learned about planning their network’s deployment that could benefit FirstNet. Officials from one project told us they learned specific lessons about site selection, permits and site access agreements, and equipment choices. The officials also told us they selected the RFP response that was the most economical in its use of existing infrastructure. Officials from another project told us how they chose to deploy in densely populated areas with high-crime rates, where public safety coordination is typically challenging and in most need of improvement. The officials also said they provided guidance to local police departments that helped them avoid procuring communications devices that would not be compatible with the project or FirstNet’s public safety network. An official from one of the canceled projects said his team faced several challenges including local zoning conditions that affected project schedule and cost, a newly passed city code that required towers to withstand higher wind loads and that increased costs, and commercial competitors lowering their subscription rates to compete with the planned public-safety network. Officials from an ongoing project told us their project initially identified “buildout” sites but learned that environmental assessments would need to be completed for each site. Doing these assessments would threaten the project’s ability to follow its project schedule. To address the challenge, the project narrowed its buildout site pool to exclude marshlands and other areas with obstructive tree lines and to include publicly owned sites such as police and fire stations. With the publicly owned sites identified, project officials worked with their state’s legislature to pass an exemption to state environmental reviews. According to a SPOC we spoke with, the project’s efforts on this issue will reduce the project’s overall build time. The official from the project told us that an important lesson learned is to thoroughly understand all of the process steps and risks prior to plan execution. According to the project official, it will be important for FirstNet to be able to navigate similar issues and challenges.", "While FirstNet has taken steps to collect and evaluate lessons learned from the early builder projects, it could do more to ensure that the lessons are properly evaluated. We have previously found that a well-developed evaluation plan for projects like the early builder projects can help ensure that agencies obtain the information necessary to make effective program and policy decisions. A well-developed evaluation plan should include, at a minimum, several key features including the following: well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives; criteria or standards for determining project performance; a clear plan that details the type and source of data necessary to evaluate the project, methods for data collection, and timing and frequency of data collection; and a detailed data-analysis plan to track performance and evaluate the projects’ final results. procedures and experiences. According to a SPOC involved in one of the projects, FirstNet’s key-learning conditions cover a comprehensive set of issues and should provide valuable data for FirstNet. Under the SMLAs, the projects also agree to provide FirstNet with quarterly reporting on their project’s use of FirstNet’s spectrum, progress achieving project milestones, and in some cases, the experiences of their network users. In October 2014, FirstNet provided the projects with quarterly report templates, instructions, and timing for completing the reports. Additionally, FirstNet intends to gain knowledge from the projects through contractors who have been assigned to each project to provide information and collect formal and informal lessons.contractors are using an informal lessons log to track observed lessons and whether they have been incorporated into the technical documents used to guide FirstNet’s acquisition of a comprehensive network solution. FirstNet officials also told us that they hold weekly meetings to review early builder project status, progress on SMLA key-learning conditions, and informal key lessons. Finally, in April 2014 FirstNet authorized the PSAC to establish an Early Builder Working Group to provide advice on the strategies and lessons learned related to the early builder network development, outreach, and consultation. As of January 2015, the PSAC planned to submit the Early Builder Working Group’s first series of recommendations to FirstNet.\nAlthough FirstNet has taken these steps, we are concerned that it lacks a detailed data-analysis plan to track the performance and results of the early builder projects. For the early builder projects, their performance and results are captured in the observations and lessons learned reported to FirstNet and identified by consultants. Tracking the early builder projects’ observations and lessons against FirstNet technical documentation is necessary to ensure that the lessons have been addressed and also facilitates transparency and accountability for FirstNet’s decision-making. Even though FirstNet staff and contractors remain in close contact with the early builder projects, without a data- analysis plan to track those projects it is unclear how FirstNet intends to evaluate the projects’ observations and lessons and determine whether or how the lessons are addressed. As a result, we believe that FirstNet could miss opportunities to leverage key lessons related to governance, finance, outreach, and network deployment. Given that the early builder projects are doing, in part, on a regional and local level what FirstNet must eventually do on a national level, a complete evaluation plan that includes a detailed data-analysis plan could play a key role in FirstNet’s strategic planning and program management, providing feedback on both program design and execution. Furthermore, such a plan could provide FirstNet officials the opportunity to make informed midcourse changes as they plan for the public safety network, and help ensure that lessons from these projects are evaluated in ways that generate reliable information to inform future program-development decisions.", "The lack of interoperability in public safety communications has been a long-standing concern given the essential role these communications play in protecting lives, health, and property. The 2012 act provided FirstNet with the basic resources necessary—such as spectrum and initial capital—to establish an interoperable broadband network for all public safety entities. However, there is no guarantee that FirstNet will be able to successfully develop and operate this nationwide network. FirstNet is tasked with a complex and challenging mission to establish the network, which researchers have estimated could cost as much as $47 billion to construct and operate over its first 10 years. Furthermore, FirstNet faces a multitude of risks, significant challenges, and difficult decisions in meeting its statutory responsibilities, including determining how to become a self-funding entity. If FirstNet fails to generate enough revenue to operate the network over the long-term, for example, it could jeopardize the existence of this new public safety network. At this time, the extent to which FirstNet can generate revenue through partnerships with commercial carriers remains unknown, especially given that some commercial carriers could choose to compete with FirstNet. However, FirstNet is taking certain actions to help ensure that its public safety network is successful. For instance, to date it has effectively consulted with stakeholders and maintained a rigorous cost estimate.\nAlthough FirstNet has started to establish an internal control system to help it meet its statutory responsibilities, we found FirstNet could strengthen its internal controls. In particular, while FirstNet has begun taking some steps to assess risks, it has not fully assessed the risks it faces. Complete risk assessments would help FirstNet respond to risks in a proactive manner and make the best use of its resources by appropriately responding to the most pressing risks. FirstNet could also strengthen its internal controls by fully establishing its control environment, which is the foundation for an effective internal control system. Currently, FirstNet has not established a cohesive standards of conduct policy, which means FirstNet may not be able to address deviations in conduct and performance and take corrective actions in a timely manner. Establishing and evaluating adherence to standards of conduct would help FirstNet ensure that all its personnel are held accountable for their actions and foster stakeholder trust in FirstNet’s ability to meet its statutory responsibilities.\nEarly builder projects have learned important lessons related to governance, finance, outreach, and network deployment that could be useful to FirstNet as it develops its plans to establish a nationwide network. However, FirstNet lacks a detailed data-analysis plan to track the projects’ observations and lessons learned. Without such a plan, it is unclear how FirstNet intends to evaluate the early builder projects and ensure that the lessons have been addressed and incorporated, if applicable, into FirstNet’s planning. As a result, FirstNet could miss opportunities to leverage the key lessons the projects learned. A complete evaluation plan for the early builder projects that includes a detailed data-analysis plan would increase transparency and help FirstNet’s strategic planning and program management, which are important given the complexity of FirstNet’s mission. Furthermore, such a plan would provide FirstNet officials the opportunity to make informed midcourse changes as they plan the nationwide network and help ensure that lessons from these projects are evaluated in ways that generate reliable information to inform future network-deployment decisions.", "To improve the accountability and transparency of FirstNet’s operations, and ensure that FirstNet is gaining as much knowledge from the early builder projects as possible, we recommend that FirstNet take the following two actions: strengthen FirstNet’s internal control system by fully assessing risks, developing standards of conduct, and evaluating performance against these standards, and develop an evaluation plan that includes a detailed data-analysis plan for the early builder projects’ performance and results, including how the observations and lessons learned reported to FirstNet and identified by consultants will be evaluated.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce and Homeland Security, FCC, and FirstNet for their review and comment. The Department of Commerce and FirstNet provided written comments, reprinted in app. III and IV, respectively. DHS, FCC, FirstNet, and NTIA (within the Department of Commerce), provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.\nIn its written comments, the Department of Commerce stressed that it takes its oversight responsibilities with respect to FirstNet seriously, is committed to the success of the public-safety broadband network, and supports the response provided to us from FirstNet. In its written comments, FirstNet stated that it agreed with all of our recommendations and noted activities that it will undertake to implement them. Regarding strengthening internal controls, FirstNet stated that it is cognizant that, as a newly formed government entity, it must continue its efforts to establish comprehensive internal control policies and procedures. FirstNet reiterated that it has initiated a legal compliance risk assessment focusing on key legal risk areas and stated that it will also undertake a full risk assessment. FirstNet also stated that it plans to establish supplemental standards of conduct, which will operate in conjunction with applicable regulations and existing FirstNet and Department of Commerce policies. Regarding an evaluation plan for lessons learned from the early builder projects, FirstNet stated that it will develop an appropriate evaluation plan consistent with the principles we specified. FirstNet noted that it has already enacted a standard operating procedure that ensures information and lessons from the projects are appropriately distributed within FirstNet, and it will use this process to disseminate the findings gathered under the evaluation plan.\nWe will send copies of this report to FirstNet as well as the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Homeland Security, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.", "This report examines the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) and its progress towards establishing a nationwide public-safety broadband network (hereafter, the public safety network). Specifically, we reviewed (1) the extent to which FirstNet is carrying out its responsibilities and establishing internal controls for developing the public safety network, (2) how much the public safety network is estimated to cost to construct and operate and how FirstNet plans to become a self-funding entity, and (3) what lessons can be learned from local and regional public-safety network projects.\nTo determine the extent to which FirstNet is carrying out its responsibilities and establishing internal controls, we reviewed FirstNet documentation and conducted interviews. We reviewed all of FirstNet’s Requests for Information, Notices, and annual reports to Congress. We also reviewed relevant board-meeting materials and resolutions, presentations to stakeholders, press releases and blog posts, and other documentation. We interviewed and received written responses from FirstNet, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and Department of Commerce officials to obtain further information on their efforts. We compared FirstNet’s efforts and progress carrying out its responsibilities against requirements established in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (2012 act). However, we did not review FirstNet’s progress against every responsibility established for it in the 2012 act, because it is not possible for FirstNet to have made progress on some responsibilities. For instance, FirstNet cannot develop terms of service for the use of the public safety network without first developing the network, the design of which is itself dependent on consultation with a wide variety of stakeholders. We did compare FirstNet’s efforts establishing internal controls against criteria established in the federal Standards for Internal Control.policies and practices against the first two components of internal control: control environment and risk assessment. We chose these two components because the control environment is the foundation for an For the scope of this review, we chose to evaluate FirstNet’s internal control system and risk assessment provides the basis for developing appropriate risk responses and control activities. We also assessed FirstNet’s outreach efforts against core principles for effective stakeholder participation identified by our previous reports. Further, as described below, we interviewed a variety of public safety officials about their perspectives on FirstNet’s progress to date.\nGAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009). detailed understanding of the cost model, such as how it was prepared, the assumptions underlying it, and the documentation supporting it. We also interviewed FirstNet officials about how it plans to become self- funding.\nTo assess the factors that will influence the cost of the public safety network and challenges FirstNet may face in becoming self-funding, we conducted a variety of interviews and reviewed documents. As described below, we interviewed officials involved in early builder projects, as well as state and local public-safety entities. We also interviewed subject matter experts who were interviewed for our previous report on emergency communications. Additionally, we interviewed two major commercial wireless carriers for their perspectives on building and operating a public safety network. We also reviewed FirstNet documentation, academic literature suggested to us by subject matter experts, and reports published by FCC and the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC).\nTo identify lessons that can be learned from local and regional public- safety broadband network early builder projects, we interviewed project officials and reviewed documentation from FirstNet and the projects. Specifically, we conducted site visits and phone interviews with officials from—and involved in—the five current projects (Los Angeles, CA; Adams County, CO; New Jersey; New Mexico; and Harris County, TX), the three projects that were canceled (Charlotte, NC; Mississippi; and San Francisco, CA), and state and local public-safety entities in the project jurisdictions. We also reviewed the Spectrum Manager Lease Agreements that each of the five current projects established with FirstNet, and documentation related to how FirstNet plans to collect lessons learned from the projects, such as Key Learning Condition Plans, project quarterly reporting requirements, and other documentation provided by project officials. We also interviewed and obtained written responses from FirstNet officials to obtain more information about their plans to evaluate and utilize lessons from the projects. We assessed FirstNet’s plans to evaluate and utilize lessons from the projects against key features of a well-developed evaluation plan for pilot projects identified by our previous reports.\nThe 5 U.S. territories we surveyed were American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. service, three emergency management or communications, and two general public safety entities.", "", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino (Assistant Director), Susan Baker, Kyle Browning, David Hooper, Kristen Kociolek, Abishek Krupanand, Jason Lee, Josh Ormond, Nalylee Padilla, Amy Rosewarne, Kelly Rubin, Grant Simmons, Andrew Stavisky, and Michael Sweet made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full h3_full", "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full", "", "", "h0_full h2_title", "h0_full h2_full", "h0_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "", "h0_full", "h3_full h4_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What are FirstNet's responsibilities?", "What will be included in the wireless network?", "To what extent has FirstNet accomplished its goals?", "What progress has FirstNet made?", "What are the gaps in this progress?", "Why is assessment important for FirstNet?", "What difficult decision is FirstNet facing?", "What is the estimated scale of the cost?", "How might the actual cost be influenced?", "What is needed for FirstNet to become self-funding?", "What is the current status of FirstNet's evaluation efforts?", "What is one example of this current status?", "What has GAO determined about such projects?", "Why would a better evaluation plan help FirstNet?", "On what do public safety officials rely for emergency communications?", "Why was FirstNet created?", "What specifics did the 2012 act lay out?", "How has FirstNet begun this work?", "How did the GAO examine FirstNet's progress in establishing the network?", "How did GAO conduct this evaluation?" ], "summary": [ "FirstNet is charged with the complex and challenging task of establishing a new, nationwide, wireless broadband network for public safety entities, in consultation with federal, state, local, and tribal stakeholders.", "The network will initially support interoperable data communications, and later integrate mission-critical voice capabilities as public safety standards for voice communications are developed.", "The First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) has made progress carrying out its responsibilities established in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (the 2012 act) but lacks certain elements of effective internal controls.", "FirstNet has made progress establishing an organizational structure, planning for the network, and consulting with stakeholders. FirstNet has also begun establishing policies and practices consistent with federal internal control standards. Officials told GAO that they plan to continue to do so.", "However, FirstNet has not fully assessed its risks or established standards of conduct—which is an important form of ethical guidance for its personnel .", "Given that FirstNet faces numerous risks to achieve its complex objectives, fully assessing risks could help FirstNet achieve its objectives and maximize use of its resources.", "A nationwide public-safety broadband network has been estimated by various entities to cost billions of dollars, and FirstNet faces difficult decisions determining how to fund the network's construction and ongoing operations.", "These estimates indicate the cost to construct and operate such a network could be from $12 to $47 billion over the first 10 years.", "The actual cost of FirstNet's network will be influenced by FirstNet's (1) business model, especially the extent of commercial partnerships; (2) use of existing infrastructure; (3) efforts to ensure network reliability; and (4) network coverage. For example, the cost of the network may be higher if FirstNet does not utilize partnerships and some existing infrastructure.", "To become self-funding, FirstNet is authorized to generate revenue through user fees and commercial partnerships. However, FirstNet faces difficult decisions in determining how to best utilize these revenue sources.", "FirstNet has taken steps to collect and evaluate information and lessons from the five “early builder projects” that are developing local and regional public-safety networks, but could do more to ensure that the lessons are properly evaluated.", "For example, FirstNet has asked the projects to report on the experiences of their networks' users and has assigned contractors to collect and log lessons. However, FirstNet does not have a plan that clearly articulates how it will evaluate those experiences and lessons.", "Although FirstNet told GAO that it remains in close contact with early builder projects, GAO has previously found that a well-developed evaluation plan for projects like these can help ensure that agencies obtain the information necessary to make effective program and policy decisions.", "Given that the early builder projects are doing on a local and regional level what FirstNet must eventually do nationally, an evaluation plan can play a key role in FirstNet's strategic planning and program management, providing feedback on both program design and execution and ensuring FirstNet has not missed opportunities to incorporate lessons the projects have identified.", "For communications during emergencies, public safety officials rely on thousands of separate systems, which often lack interoperability, or the ability to communicate across agencies and jurisdictions.", "The 2012 act created FirstNet within the Department of Commerce to establish, for public safety use, a nationwide, interoperable, wireless broadband network, which will initially support data transmissions.", "The 2012 act established numerous responsibilities for FirstNet, provided $7 billion for network construction, and required FirstNet to be self-funding beyond this initial allocation.", "As part of the effort, FirstNet is working with five “early builder projects” that are building local and regional public-safety broadband networks.", "GAO was asked to examine FirstNet's progress in establishing the network. GAO assessed (1) FirstNet's progress carrying out its responsibilities and establishing internal controls, (2) how much the network is estimated to cost and how FirstNet plans to become self-funding, and (3) what lessons can be learned from the early builder projects.", "GAO reviewed FirstNet documentation and public-safety network cost estimates, surveyed all state-designated FirstNet contacts, and interviewed FirstNet officials and public safety stakeholders selected for their telecommunications and public safety experience." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, 2, 4, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 0, -1, -1, 1, 1, -1, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_RL34726	{ "title": [ "", "Overview of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act", "Jurisdiction in Cases Against Foreign Defendants", "Subject Matter Jurisdiction", "Personal Jurisdiction", "U.S. Court of Appeals Decision in In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (\"Terrorist Attacks III\")", "Background", "Charity and Princes as \"Agencies and Instrumentalities\" of the Kingdom", "The SHC Charity", "Officials", "Relevant FSIA Exceptions", "Commercial Activities Exception", "Tort Exception", "Princes Sued in Their Personal Capacities", "In Re Terrorist Attacks on Remand to the District Court", "The \"Entire Tort\" Rule", "The Discretionary Act Exclusion", "U.S. Court of Appeals' Dismissal of Claims Against Private Banks", "The Anti-Terrorism Act", "The Alien Tort Statute and Other Causes of Action", "Legislative Developments", "Previous Legislative Activity", "114th Congress, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act", "Amendments to the FSIA", "Civil Liability Under the Anti-Terrorism Act" ], "paragraphs": [ "N umerous legal and practical obstacles, such as the infeasibility of locating Al Qaeda operatives, stand in the way of victims seeking to establish liability in U.S. courts against, and recover damages from, the terrorists who planned and carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks. Victims, however, have sued numerous individuals and groups with less direct ties to the attackers, including defendants who allegedly provided monetary support to Al Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001.\nIn r e Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 , is a consolidated case that includes, among other claims, claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, several Saudi princes, a Saudi banker, and a Saudi charity. Plaintiffs argued that these Saudi defendants played a \"critical role\" in the September 11 attacks by giving money to Muslim groups, which in turn funded Al Qaeda. In August 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed dismissals of the claims against the Saudi defendants. However, part of the reasoning for the dismissals was later overturned, and the plaintiffs were permitted a second chance to bring their suit against the Saudi government and government-owned charity. This effort also failed on sovereign immunity grounds at the district court, however, and is once again on appeal at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This report explains the legal bases for the dismissals and provides an update to the status of the case.\nTo address some issues involving the interpretation of the FSIA, among other related matters, Congress is considering the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act ( S. 2040 , H.R. 3815 ).This report addresses relevant legislative developments in its final section.", "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA) applies to all foreign states and their \"agencies and instrumentalities.\" Immunity for sovereign nations against suits in U.S. courts has a long history and is based on the principle that conflicts with foreign nations are more effectively addressed through diplomatic efforts than through judicial proceedings. Congress passed the FSIA to codify these long-standing principles and to clarify limitations on the scope of immunity that had emerged in international practice.\nThe FSIA contains both a general, presumptive rule against litigation in U.S. courts and a number of exceptions permitting suits. As a general rule, foreign states, together with their agencies and instrumentalities, are \"immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and from the states.\" However, the FSIA authorizes jurisdiction over foreign nations in several exceptions. Namely, a foreign state is not immune from U.S. courts' jurisdiction where (1) the foreign state has waived its immunity; (2) the claim is a specific type of admiralty claim; (3) the claim involves commercial activities; (4) the claim implicates property rights connected with the United States; (5) the claim arises from tortious conduct that occurred in the United States; (6) the claim is made pursuant to an arbitration agreement; or (7) the claim seeks money damages against a designated state sponsor of terrorism for injuries arising from a terrorist act.\nThe exception for designated state sponsors of terrorism provides jurisdiction over cases involving designated \"state sponsor[s] of terrorism\" in suits involving \"personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.\" However, the exception seems to apply only to countries designated by the U.S. Department of State as state sponsors of terrorism. This list currently includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. At the time suit was brought in the In re Terrorist Attacks litigation, the previous terrorism exception remained in force.", "Before asserting jurisdiction to accept a case, a federal court must establish its authority over the dispute involved and the parties to the litigation. In other words, courts must assert both subject matter jurisdiction over each claim and personal jurisdiction over each defendant in a case. For cases involving foreign defendants, the analyses for subject matter and personal jurisdiction differ according to whether the FSIA applies.", "For claims by U.S. plaintiffs against foreign non-state defendants to whom the FSIA does not apply—for example, claims against individuals or non-government owned corporations—federal law authorizes subject matter jurisdiction as long as the \"amount in controversy\" exceeds $75,000.\nIn contrast, for claims against foreign states and their instrumentalities, the FSIA is a jurisdictional gatekeeper. The FSIA denies subject matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign defendants entitled to immunity. Conversely, the FSIA authorizes subject matter jurisdiction over claims in which a foreign state would be entitled to immunity under the FSIA but for the application of an exception. Individual foreign officials are not covered by the FSIA if they are sued in their capacity as individuals, but may be immune from suit under the common law of foreign sovereign immunity. One such defendant, the former president of two of the Saudi-run charities sued for alleged involvement in funding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, prevailed in a motion to dismiss the lawsuit against him on the basis of common-law foreign sovereign immunity.", "Personal jurisdiction is the second threshold hurdle for assertion of judicial authority in cases involving foreign defendants. Whereas subject matter jurisdiction governs courts' power over particular claims, personal jurisdiction governs courts' power over particular defendants. Thus, even if a court establishes jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim, it cannot exercise its authority over a defendant for whom it lacks personal jurisdiction.\nPersonal jurisdiction requires both statutory authority and satisfaction of Fifth Amendment due process standards. As with subject matter jurisdiction, statutory authority for personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants follows one of two distinct routes according to the FSIA's application. If the defendant is a foreign state or its agency or instrumentality, personal jurisdiction is statutorily authorized under the FSIA if subject matter jurisdiction is established. Alternatively, for a defendant who is not a foreign state or its agency or instrumentality, the ordinary procedure for obtaining statutory authority for personal jurisdiction applies; typically, a federal court must find statutory authority for personal jurisdiction in the laws of the state in which it sits.\nHowever, constitutional limits apply regardless of a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction. Under the due process clause, personal jurisdiction is constitutional if (1) defendants have had \"certain minimum contacts with\" the judicial forum attempting to assert jurisdiction, and (2) asserting such jurisdiction \"does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\" The type and quantity of contacts necessary to constitute \"minimum contacts\" differ according to the type of personal jurisdiction—general or specific—that applies. General jurisdiction, which allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant for any claim, does not require contacts related to the specific claim in the case but instead requires \"continuous and systematic\" contacts with a forum. Conversely, specific jurisdiction, which limits a court's jurisdiction over a defendant to claims in a particular case, involves no \"continuous and systematic\" requirement; instead, it requires that a defendant's contacts with the forum \"relate to\" or \"arise out of\" the claim at issue in the case.", "In August 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) affirmed dismissals of claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi charity, Saudi princes, and a Saudi banker in In r e Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 . Plaintiffs in the case were victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks. They alleged that the Saudi defendants had supported Al Qaeda's financial backers prior to the attacks and were therefore civilly liable for plaintiffs' injuries. However, the court of appeals did not reach the merits of these allegations.\nInstead, the court held that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the claims against the Saudi defendants. The legal bases for this holding were lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and lack of personal jurisdiction. The most significant aspects of the court of appeals' opinion were interpretations of the FSIA, namely (1) its interpretation of \"agency or instrumentality\" under the FSIA as extending both to the Saudi charity and to individuals sued in their official capacities, and (2) its interpretation of the commercial activities and tort exceptions under the FSIA as having a narrower scope than plaintiffs had advocated.\nThe Supreme Court later abrogated the first of these holdings, and the Second Circuit reversed its own position with respect to the tort exception to foreign sovereign immunity. In December 2013, the Second Circuit ordered these claims against Saudi Arabia and its agencies or instrumentalities be reinstated in the interest of justice to determine whether the tort exception applies. The district court again dismissed the claims based on foreign sovereign immunity, and the case is on appeal at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.", "In r e Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 ( In re Terrorist Attacks ) is a case consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion reviewed dismissals of only a subset of the claims at issue in the case.\nPlaintiffs in In r e Terrorist Attacks are individuals and businesses injured by the September 11 terrorist attacks. They brought claims based on state and federal tort law and various federal laws, including the Torture Victim Protection Act, for injuries suffered as a result of the attacks.\nThe dismissed claims fall into four categories: (1) claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; (2) claims against four Saudi princes in their official capacities; (3) claims against the Saudi High Commission for Relief to Bosnia and Herzegovina (the SHC), a charitable organization operated in connection with the Saudi government; and (4) claims against a banker and Saudi princes in their personal capacities. Underlying all of the claims was the allegation that defendants had \"played a critical role in the September 11 attacks by funding Muslim charities that, in turn, funded al Qaeda.\"\nThe appeals court in 2008 affirmed dismissals of the first three sets of claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Because the FSIA precludes courts from asserting jurisdiction over claims against foreign states, one of the FSIA exceptions must apply before a U.S. court may assert jurisdiction over the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or any of its \"agencies or instrumentalities.\" As discussed below, the Second Circuit held that none of the FSIA exceptions applied.\nThe fourth set of claims (those brought against princes in their personal capacities) fell outside of the scope of the FSIA. Nonetheless, as discussed below, the court dismissed those claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.", "Because a foreign state's \"agency or instrumentality\" is entitled to the same immunity to which the state itself is entitled under the FSIA, a key threshold question was whether the SHC and the princes sued in their official capacities qualified as agencies or instrumentalities under the FSIA. The FSIA defines \"agency or instrumentality\" as any entity which is (1) a \"separate legal person, corporate or otherwise\"; (2) \"an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof\"; and (3) not a U.S. citizen or created under the laws of a third country.", "Whether the SHC was an agency or instrumentality turned on whether it was an \"organ\" of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The court applied a multi-factor test, derived from a previous Second Circuit decision and from decisions from other circuits, to determine whether SHC was such an \"organ.\" Specifically, the court applied the following five criteria: \"(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity, (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries, (4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law.\" Emphasizing that the Saudi government had formed SHC and paid its employees, the court held that the SHC was an organ, and thus was an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom.", "The plaintiffs sued four Saudi princes for actions taken within their official capacities. All four princes held positions of power in the SHC; three of the princes were members of the country's \"Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs,\" the body responsible for monitoring and approving \"Islamic charitable giving both within and outside the Kingdom\"; and the fourth prince was the SHC's president, in addition to his roles as a provincial governor and crown prince.\nAlthough several other federal courts of appeals had ruled on the extension of foreign sovereign immunity to foreign officials, treatment of officials under the FSIA was a question of first impression for the Second Circuit. Raising a number of textual arguments and referencing the FSIA's legislative history, the court held that individuals acting within their official capacities were indeed \"agencies\" of their states and were therefore entitled to immunity under the FSIA to the same extent as their states. The court noted that at the time the FSIA was enacted, Congress expressed a desire to codify common law principles, one of which was that immunity extends to a state's officials. The court also emphasized the potential erosion of immunity for foreign states if immunity extended only to government actions distinct from the actions of officials as individuals, noting that \"the state cannot act except through individuals.\"\nThe Second Circuit's holding was consistent with the conclusions of five of the six other federal courts of appeals that had considered whether an individual may be protected as an agent or instrumentality. Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit) had reached the opposite conclusion. In Terrorist Attacks III , the Second Circuit characterized the Seventh Circuit as an \"outlier\" on this issue. However, after the Fourth Circuit also adopted the minority position, the Supreme Court granted review and established the minority position as the correct one. Consequently, jurisdiction over remaining Saudi officials is subject to the same inquiry that applies to other individuals and possibly a determination as to whether common law immunity applies. Because the officials dismissed from this case were not part of the motion to vacate, plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to pursue their lawsuit against them on remand. Claims against them in their official capacity would likely be deemed to be claims against the state or its instrumentality in any event.", "After holding that the FSIA applied not only to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia but also to Saudi officials and the SHC as an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom, the court of appeals next examined whether any FSIA exception applied. First, the court held that the terrorist state exception did not apply because the U.S. State Department has not designated the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a state sponsor of terrorism. Next, although the court found two other exceptions—the commercial activity and tort exceptions—\"potentially relevant,\" neither exception applied to the Saudi defendants.", "To support their argument that the commercial activities exception should apply to the Saudi defendants, the In r e Terrorist Attacks plaintiffs characterized defendants' charitable contributions to Muslim groups as a form of money laundering. The court rejected this characterization as incompatible with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the commercial activities exception.\nThe FSIA defines \"commercial activity\" as \"a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.\" The court noted the \"circularity\" of this definition and relied upon the Supreme Court's definition of \"commercial activity\" (for the context of the FSIA exception) as \"the type of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.'\" Under this definition, the court noted that the appropriate focus in determining whether an action constitutes \"commercial activity\" is on an action's nature rather than its purpose. With this framework, the court upheld the district court's finding that defendants' \"charitable contributions\" fell outside the scope of the commercial activities exception by reason of their non-commercial nature, regardless of the contributions' alleged money laundering purpose. This portion of the decision remains undisturbed.", "Finally, the court of appeals rejected the tort exception as inapplicable to claims against the Saudi defendants. Specifically, the court noted that Congress's purpose in enacting the tort exception was to create liability for incidents such as traffic accidents that occur in the United States. Furthermore, the court was concerned about the effect that an expanded tort exception would have on the other FSIA exceptions. It emphasized that if the exception were expanded to include all conduct conceivably characterized as tortious, the tort exception would \"vitiate\" the terrorist state exception's limitation to designated terrorist states. In a separate case, a later panel of the appellate court disagreed with this aspect of the decision, however, effectively overturning it for the Second Circuit. In December 2013, the appellate court granted the plaintiffs relief from judgment in the interests of justice, sending the case back to the district court to determine whether the tort exception applies or whether the defendants were entitled to immunity based on the discretionary nature of their actions. The lower court was also asked to determine whether the \"entire tort\" rule would apply, in which case the fact that the relevant Saudi government activity took place outside the United States would make the tort exception inapplicable.", "For claims made against a Saudi banker and against several Saudi princes for actions taken in their personal capacities, subject matter jurisdiction was not precluded by the FSIA. However, the appeals court upheld the district court's determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Saudi defendants sued in their personal capacities.\nSpecifically, the court concurred with the district court's finding that the princes sued in their personal capacities lacked sufficient contacts with the forum to permit personal jurisdiction under the constitutional \"minimum contacts\" standard. Plaintiffs argued that the minimum contacts test was satisfied because the defendants had purposefully directed activity at the judicial forum by supporting the attacks. The court rejected this argument, acknowledging that it had been a successful argument in cases where defendants were \"primary participants\" in the terrorist acts but holding that the banker and princes' activities were too attenuated from the actual attacks to satisfy due process requirements. Similarly, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that potential foreseeability of the terrorist attacks was a sufficient basis for establishing minimum contacts. It noted that foreseeability alone is insufficient to pass constitutional muster for personal jurisdiction; instead, the constitutional standard requires \"intentional\" conduct, \"expressly aimed\" at residents in the forum.", "On remand to the district court, Judge Daniels of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the SHC, holding the FSIA tort exception does not apply because of the \"entire tort\" rule, and suggested that the discretionary act exception to the tort exception might otherwise apply to preclude jurisdiction.", "The Second Circuit applies the so-called \"entire tort\" rule to determine whether the conduct of a foreign government or its instrumentality is subject to the FSIA tort exception. The Supreme Court has described the tort exception as \"cover[ing] only torts occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.\" Consequently, it is insufficient to overcome immunity to allege that an injury or damage occurred within the United States; it must also be demonstrated that the defendant's tortious conduct occurred within the United States. In affirming the dismissal with respect to the Saudi Joint Relief Committee (SJRC) and the Saudi Red Crescent Society (SRC), the appellate court did not appear to foreclose a finding of jurisdiction unless all conduct associated with the injury occurs wholly within the United States, but rather only that some tortious act must be committed by the defendant in the United States. In the case of the Saudi charities, the appellate court stated that all of the defendants' conduct had occurred abroad, and noted in a footnote that\nAlthough the September 11, 2001 attacks constitute a \"tort,\" the SJRC and the SRC are not alleged to have participated in that \"tort.\" Instead, the \"torts\" allegedly committed by the SJRC and the SRC only involve giving money and aid to purported charities that supported al Qaeda. … The September 11, 2001 attacks thus are distinct and separate from the \"torts\" allegedly committed by the SJRC and the SRC.\nConsequently, it is possible that the indirect nature of the defendants' alleged support for the terrorist attacks has some bearing on the application of the \"entire tort\" rule, so that a more direct role in orchestrating from abroad a terrorist attack that takes place in the United States would nevertheless qualify for jurisdiction under the tort exception.\nThe district court found that the same considerations that applied to the charities also commanded immunity for the Kingdom and the SHC. The plaintiffs, recognizing that their allegations about indirect funding for the attacks would not satisfy the tort exception, sought to allege that the activities of certain \"operational level agents and alter-egos\" of Saudi Arabia within the United States in connection with the attacks are attributable to Saudi Arabia. The court found that there was an insufficient factual basis to conclude that any of these individuals were employees of Saudi Arabia acting within the scope of their employment when they carried out the allegedly tortious activities in the United States.", "Neither the appellate court nor the district judge had occasion to determine whether the discretionary function exclusion to the FSIA tort exception would apply to the Saudi government and the SHC, since immunity was already protected under the \"entire tort\" rule. However, the district judge set forth the applicable two-part rule for determining whether immunity is retained for otherwise tortious conduct:\n(1) the acts alleged to be negligent must be discretionary, in that they involve an element of judgment or choice and are not compelled by statute or regulation, and\n(2) the judgment or choice in question must be grounded in considerations of public policy or susceptible to policy analysis.\nHe noted the 2005 district court decision in Terrorist Attacks I granting the defendants immunity for decisions involving which charities to fund, specifically, the holding that \"Saudi Arabia's treatment of and decisions to support Islamic charities are purely planning level 'decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy.\" With respect to the SHC, the previous judge had explained that \"SHC's alleged misuse of funds and/or inadequate record-keeping—even if it resulted in the funds going to terrorists—was the result of a discretionary function and cannot be the basis for overcoming SHC's immunity.\"\nCourts have regarded the FSIA discretionary act exclusion as analogous to the similar exclusion for U.S. sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, some courts have found the discretionary act exclusion inapplicable to tortious acts in the United States that amounted to illegal conduct. A district court in the D.C. Circuit found in Letelier v. Republic of Chile that an assassination occurring on U.S. soil under the direction of a foreign government was not a discretionary act within the meaning of the FSIA tort exception, stating the following:\nWhile it seems apparent that a decision calculated to result in injury or death to a particular individual or individuals, made for whatever reason, would be one most assuredly involving policy judgment and decision and thus exempt as a discretionary act under section 1605(a)(5)(A), that exception is not applicable to bar this suit. As it has been recognized, there is no discretion to commit, or to have one's officers or agents commit, an illegal act.... Whatever policy options may exist for a foreign country, it has no \"discretion\" to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the assassination of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law. Accordingly there would be no \"discretion\" within the meaning of section 1605(a)(5)(A) to order or to aid in an assassination and were it to be demonstrated that a foreign state has undertaken any such act in this country, that foreign state could not be accorded sovereign immunity … for any tort claims resulting from its conduct.\nSimilarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that the discretionary act exclusion does not apply in the case of a foreign official who, while acting in his home country, orders a killing in the United States that would be a violation of the domestic law of that country. Both of these cases applied the tort exception to injuries in the United States orchestrated from abroad, suggesting that the \"entire tort\" rule either is not in use in these appellate circuits or that it is not to be taken literally. That is, courts may tend to view direct involvement on the part of a foreign official overseas in tortious activity that takes place on U.S. territory as included in the same tort, while indirect contribution by means of lawful conduct could be viewed as at most a separate tort or as a discretionary act.\nIf the appellate court reverses the district court's dismissal of the suit on \"entire tort\" grounds, the case will likely return to the district court for a determination of whether the suit is precluded on grounds that the alleged tortious acts retain immunity as discretionary functions.", "In a separate decision in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against five defendants whose cases had been dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. These defendants were (1) Al Rajhi Bank, (2) Saudi American Bank, (3) Saleh Abdullah Kamel, (4) Dallah al Baraka Group LLC, and (5) Dar Al–Maal Al–Islami (\"DMI\") Trust. Plaintiffs brought claims against these defendants under a common-law tort theory as well as the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and the Torture Victims' Protection Act (TVPA).", "The ATA provides in 18 U.S.C. §2333 that U.S. nationals injured in their person, property, or business \"by reason of an act of international terrorism\" can recover treble damages, plus costs, but does not describe who can be held liable. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the defendants were liable for knowingly providing financial support and services to charities that supported Al Qaeda, but did not identify any actions on the part of the defendants that proximately caused their injuries. Citing its recent holding in Rothstein v. UBS AG , the appellate court held that the ATA does not encompass liability on an aiding-and-abetting theory, but, rather, based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase \"by reason of,\" requires a showing of proximate cause.", "The Alien Tort Statute provides federal jurisdiction for tort claims brought by non-U.S. citizens seeking damages for conduct that violates the \"law of nations or a treaty of the United States.\" While the Supreme Court in 2004 held that the statute does not provide a cause of action for such lawsuits, it permitted courts to give effect to the statute for civil actions arising from the violation of a very narrow class of international norms \"defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18 th century paradigms\" that were understood to govern at the time of the ATS's drafting in 1789. The Second Circuit concluded that international terrorism did not meet this standard as of September 11, 2001. Quoting its 2003 opinion in United States v. Yousef , the court stated the following:\nWe regrettably are no closer now ... to an international consensus on the definition of terrorism or even its proscription; the mere existence of the phrase \"state-sponsored terrorism\" proves the absence of agreement on basic terms among a large number of States that terrorism violates [customary] international law. Moreover, there continues to be strenuous disagreement among States about what actions do or do not constitute terrorism, nor have we shaken ourselves free of the cliché that \"one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.\" We thus conclude ... that terrorism—unlike piracy, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—does not provide a basis for universal jurisdiction [under customary international law].\nThe court also rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on the Torture Victim Protection Act for a cause of action, following the Supreme Court's interpretation of that law as providing for a right of action only against natural persons who act under color of foreign law. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' complaints based on common law tort theories, holding that they did not demonstrate that the defendants breached any duty of care owed to the plaintiffs or that their actions proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries.", "In Terrorist Attacks III , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted narrow interpretations of the commercial activities and tort exceptions under the FSIA, appearing to preclude efforts by September 11 victims and other plaintiffs seeking recovery in U.S. courts against foreign officials and government-controlled entities like the Saudi charity. Plaintiffs' efforts to hold non-government financial institutions liable for providing material to terrorist organizations have also seemingly been stymied by the courts' interpretations of the ATA as precluding secondary liability for terrorist acts and requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that the support alleged was a proximate cause of their injuries or losses. Several bills have been introduced in Congress that would broaden the FSIA tort exception explicitly to cover terrorist acts that occur within the United States and make other changes that could boost plaintiffs' efforts against some of the Saudi defendants.", "The 111 th Congress held a hearing to consider S. 2930 , the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which, among other measures, would have amended the tort exception to the FSIA specifically to cover terrorist attacks within the United States.\nIn the 112 th Congress, new legislation was introduced to reduce some of the burdens faced by victims of state-sponsored terrorism in the United States who seek to bring lawsuits against foreign officials. S. 1894 , the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, was ordered to be reported favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2012. A companion bill, H.R. 5904 , did not receive further action.\nIdentical versions of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act were introduced in the 113 th Congress as S. 1535 and H.R. 3143 . S. 1535 was reported favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee with some amendments to the findings and provisions addressing aiding and abetting liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and was passed by the Senate in December 2014. The House did not vote on either version of the bill.\nThe bills would have amended the tort exception to the FSIA expressly to include \"any statutory or common law tort claim arising out of an act of extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, terrorism, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act.... \" Although the aspect of the Terrorist Attacks III decision interpreting the tort exception as inapplicable to terrorist acts occurring in the United States was effectively overruled by another panel of judges, it is possible that other courts could read the terrorism exception as foreclosing suits against states not designated as sponsors of terrorism. The tort exception would also have been amended to clarify that there is no rule holding that the \"entire tort\" must occur within the United States, but rather that such claims are covered \"regardless of where the underlying tortious act or omission occurs.\"\nAdditionally, the bills would have expanded liability for foreign government officials in civil actions for terrorist acts no matter where they occur by amending 18 U.S.C. Section 2337, which currently exempts all government officials. The amended version of Section 2337 would have exempted only U.S. officials. H.R. 3143 would have included the provision of material support for terrorism in the jurisdiction provision, although its revision of the ATA cause of action did not expressly include liability for material support.", "The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) has returned to the 114 th Congress as S. 2040 , which the Senate passed by voice vote on May 17, 2016, after accepting an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Senator Cornyn, and H.R. 3815 , which was introduced late in 2015 and referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitution and Civil Justice.", "H.R. 3815 would amend the FSIA tort exception in 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(5) by limiting the type of injury to \"physical injury\" rather than \"personal injury,\" and specifically excluding \"any claim for emotional distress or derivative injury suffered as a result of an event or injury to another person that occurs outside of the United States.\" It would include \"any statutory or common law tort claim arising out of an act of extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, terrorism, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act, or any claim for contribution or indemnity relating to a claim arising out of such an act\" to the tortious acts or omissions for which foreign sovereign immunity may be abrogated. It would also eliminate the \"entire tort\" rule by providing that the non-commercial tort exception covers physical injuries, deaths, and property damage or loss occurring in the United States \"regardless of where the underlying tortious act or omission occurs.\"\nThe discretionary function exclusion would remain unchanged; however, the bill would include among congressional findings that \"no country has the discretion to engage knowingly in the financing or sponsorship of terrorism, whether directly or indirectly.\"\nS. 2040 (as passed by the Senate) would create a new exception to the FSIA for acts of international terrorism that occur on U.S. territory, to be codified as 28 U.S.C. §1605B. \"International terrorism\" is defined with reference to the ATA, including the exclusion for \"acts of war.\" The amendment would dispense with the \"entire tort\" rule and the statutory discretionary act exclusion for such cases only, leaving current law intact with respect to the FSIA non-commercial tort exception in other cases. Under the bill, a plaintiff could seek money damages from a foreign state for physical injury to person or property or death caused by both (1) an act of international terrorism in the United States, and (2) a tortious act or acts on the part of the foreign state or official, employee, or agent of that foreign state acting within the scope of his or her employment, regardless of where the tortious conduct took place. The bill would also clarify that a tortious act or omission would not give rise to jurisdiction where it constitutes \"mere negligence.\" Finally, it would clarify the relationship between the FSIA exception and the ATA's civil liability exception precluding suits against foreign officials. If the new FSIA exception applies, a U.S. national could pursue an ATA lawsuit against the foreign state.\nS. 2040 would provide for exclusive federal court jurisdiction over foreign states under the new FSIA provision, and would authorize the Attorney General to intervene in such cases to seek a stay of the civil action if the Secretary of State certifies that the United States is engaged in good faith discussions with the defendant state to resolve the claims. The court would be authorized to issue a stay for 180 days, which could be renewed for additional 180-day periods if the Secretary of State certifies that such negotiations remain ongoing.", "All current versions of JASTA include a finding by Congress that expresses approval in the context of civil liability under the ATA for the test established by the D.C. Circuit for aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability. The D.C. Circuit defined aiding and abetting as including the following elements:\n(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury;\n(2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance;\n(3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.\nConspiracy, according to the D.C. Circuit, gives rise to civil liability when it consists of\n(1) an agreement between two or more persons;\n(2) to participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner;\n(3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement;\n(4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme.\nThe bills would implement secondary liability in somewhat different ways. S. 2040 (as passed by the Senate) and H.R. 3815 would amend the ATA to provide for secondary liability in the case of an act of international terrorism planned, committed, or authorized by an entity designated as a foreign terrorist organization at the time of the planning, commission, or authorization of the attack. The House bill would also apply liability in the case of an entity designated as a foreign terrorist organization as a result of the attack that gives rise to the lawsuit. Secondary liability would attach under the Senate bill to any person who \"aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires\" with the perpetrator; it also expressly adopts the definition for \"person\" from Section 1 of Title 1 to define who may be held secondarily liable. The House bill would authorize secondary liability against anyone who aided, abetted, or conspired with the perpetrator, without clarifying what type of intent or knowledge would be necessary to establish liability. Neither bill would explicitly elucidate whether criminal liability under the material support provisions of the ATA would also establish civil liability, as some courts have found, but language in the findings section suggest the intent that the knowing or reckless provision of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, whether directly or indirectly, should give rise to liability.\nH.R. 3815 would amend the ATA to remove the immunity of foreign officials from lawsuits as currently provided in 18 U.S.C. §2337(2). It would also add a provision to the ATA to address issues plaintiffs have confronted in establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign nationals. H.R. 3815 would declare that\nThe district courts shall have personal jurisdiction, to the maximum extent permissible under the 5 th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, over any person who commits or aids and abets an act of international terrorism or otherwise sponsors such act or the person who committed such act, for acts of international terrorism in which any national of the United States suffers injury in his or her person, property, or business by reason of such an act in violation of section 2333.\nS. 2040 (as passed by the Senate) would leave the foreign official exclusion under the ATA intact, but, as noted above, would permit lawsuits by U.S. nationals against the foreign state itself if the new FSIA exception is triggered. Aliens as well as U.S. nationals would likely be able to bring lawsuits under causes of action other than the ATA if jurisdiction is available under the new FSIA exception." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "", "", "", "", "h0_full h2_full h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full", "h2_full", "", "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full", "h2_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What hinders 9/11 victims' attempts to establish liability in U.S. courts?", "How has this affected victims' behavior post-9/11?", "What is one such example?", "What did the courts consider in trying the Saudi defendants?", "How did the U.S. Court of Appeals rule on this question?", "How did they substantiate this ruling?", "How did this Second Circuit later rule on this precedent?", "What did the court rule in 2013?", "How did it rule in 2015?", "What was the fate of this decision?" ], "summary": [ "Practical and legal hurdles, including the difficulty of locating hidden Al Qaeda members and the infeasibility of enforcing judgments in terrorism cases, hinder victims' attempts to establish liability in U.S. courts against, and recover financially from, those they argue are directly responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks.", "Instead, victims have sued numerous individuals and entities with only indirect ties to the attacks, including defendants who allegedly provided monetary support to Al Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001.", "Within the consolidated case In re Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, one such group of defendants was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, several Saudi princes, a Saudi banker, and a Saudi charity. Plaintiffs argued that these Saudi defendants funded groups that, in turn, assisted the attackers.", "A threshold question in In re Terrorist Attacks was whether U.S. courts have the power to try these Saudi defendants.", "In August 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed dismissals of all claims against the Saudi defendants, holding that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the claims.", "Specifically, the court of appeals held that in this case, U.S. courts lack (1) subject matter jurisdiction over the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, because the Kingdom is entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA) and no statutory exception to immunity applies; (2) subject matter jurisdiction over the Saudi charity and Saudi princes acting in their official capacities, because they are \"agents or instrumentalities\" of the Kingdom and thus, under the FSIA, are entitled to immunity to the same extent as the Kingdom itself; and (3) personal jurisdiction over Saudi princes sued in their personal capacities, because the princes had insufficient interactions with the forum to satisfy the \"minimum contacts\" standard for personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment due process clause.", "In 2011, the Second Circuit reversed itself with respect to the immunity of non-terrorist states, finding that the tort exception under the FSIA does not exclude terrorist acts that take place within the United States.", "In 2013, the court ordered these claims against Saudi Arabia and its agencies or instrumentalities be reinstated in the interest of justice to determine whether the tort exception applies.", "The district court again dismissed the claims in 2015 on the basis that the \"entire tort\" defendants were alleged to have committed did not occur within the United States.", "This decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R44188	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "TANF Funding and History", "Financing the Pre-TANF Programs", "The 1996 Law: \"Freezing\" Historical Funding Levels in the Basic TANF Block Grant", "Additional Federal Funds", "The State Maintenance of Effort (MOE) Requirement", "How States May Use TANF Funds", "Federal Funds Expended Under TANF", "Transfers of Federal Funds", "Reservation of Unused Funds", "Expenditures Countable Toward the Maintenance of Effort (MOE) Requirement", "How States Have Used TANF Funds", "Selected TANF Financing Issues", "The Budget Baseline and TANF", "The Impact of Inflation on the Block Grant", "Funding Based on the TANF-Relevant Population", "The Allocation of Federal TANF Funds among the States", "Recessions and the TANF Block Grant", "TANF Reserve Funds", "The TANF Contingency Fund", "Uses of TANF Funds", "Conclusion" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states, territories, and Indian tribes for benefits and services to help ameliorate, or address the root causes of, childhood economic disadvantage. It was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, PRWORA, P.L. 104-193 ), which ended the pre-welfare reform program of cash assistance, rewrote the federal rules for cash assistance for needy families, and gave states broad flexibility to meet TANF's statutory goals.\nThis report discusses the financing of the TANF block grant. It\ndescribes the national funding level, the distribution of funds among the states, and the basis for these funding levels; describes how states may use TANF funds; describes how states have actually used TANF funding; and discusses selected policy issues regarding TANF funding.", "The 1996 welfare reform law that created TANF based the bulk of its funding on historical expenditures in its predecessor programs. Therefore, the amount of funding a state receives in TANF today depends on the size of its pre-TANF programs before the enactment of that law.", "Before the 1996 welfare reform law, federal grants helped states fund the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs of cash assistance for needy families with children; Emergency Assistance (EA) for families with children; and the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) training program, which provided employment services and education to AFDC recipients. These three programs provided matching grants to states, reimbursing them for a share of the expenditures in their programs. Thus, the federal government and the states shared in the costs of these programs. The system of matching grants for cash assistance for needy families dated back to the Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271).\nUnder the pre-TANF cash welfare program of AFDC, federal funding was generally provided at the Medicaid matching rate. Under that rate, states with lower per-capita incomes received a higher match, with a statutory minimum matching rate of 50% (for higher income states) and a maximum matching rate of 83% (for the lowest income states). Federal grants for AFDC benefits, AFDC administration (matched at a 50% rate), and EA (matched at a 50% rate) were not subject to caps; federal funds reimbursed states in full for a share of expenditures in their programs. Federal grants for JOBS were subject to annual caps, with matching funds provided up to the cap. The matching rate for JOBS was the Medicaid matching rate, though the statutory minimum matching rate for JOBS was 60% instead of 50%.\nThe amount of federal funding in the predecessor programs for a state depended on the expenditures in the state. While there were some federal rules for these predecessor programs, states had a great deal of discretion in determining which families were financially \"needy,\" and hence eligible for benefits, and the amount of benefits received in the state. Under AFDC, there was a great deal of state variation in both income eligibility thresholds and benefits paid in the states, creating variation in state grants relative to their cash assistance caseloads or population related to the program (e.g., number of poor children). This variation is depicted in Figure 1 , which shows the relationship between the AFDC maximum benefit for a family of three in January 1995 and the amount of federal funding per poor child under AFDC and related programs in 1995. As shown, there is a clear relationship between the size of the AFDC benefit provided by a state and federal funding provided per poor child: states with higher maximum benefits also received more federal funding per poor child. For example, in January 1995 Mississippi paid a maximum benefit for a family of three of $120 per month; its grant per poor child in FY1995 was $343. On the other hand, in that month Alaska paid a maximum benefit of $923 per month for a family of three; its FY1995 grant per poor child was $2,403.", "The 1996 welfare reform law substantially rewrote the rules for state cash assistance programs, imposing time limits on benefit receipt and revamping work requirements for adult recipients of aid. Along with these policy changes was a change in the financing of state cash assistance programs and other activities from matching grants to a block grant.\nThe 1996 law consolidated into TANF the three predecessor programs—AFDC, EA, and JOBS—creating a single funding stream. The bulk of the funding is provided in a basic block grant. That block grant reflects peak spending for each state during the FY1992 to FY1995 period in TANF's predecessor programs. (For the formula used in the computation and TANF basic block grant per state, see Table A-1 .) The total of the basic block grant distributed to the 50 states and the District of Columbia is $16.5 billion per year. This is also known as the State Family Assistance Grant. It is not adjusted for changes in conditions either nationally or in each state, such as changes in prices (inflation), the cash assistance caseload, or the population (e.g., poor children). According to the House Committee report accompanying the legislation that became the 1996 welfare reform law, states were given fixed funding to provide them \"with an incentive to help recipients leave welfare because, unlike current law, States do not get more money for having more recipients on the welfare rolls.\"\nThough the 1996 welfare reform law contemplated no increases in the basic TANF block grant for future years, it also provided that a state could receive no less under the block grant than it historically did under the old system of matching grants to the states. That is, it was \"held harmless\" for the change in financing. However, having the TANF block grant based on historical expenditures had a number of additional implications. One of these is that it also \"froze\" the differences among the states in federal funding relative to their populations. Figure 1 shows how these differences were related to state decisions about their AFDC program; Figure 2 shows a sharp regional pattern in these differences, portraying FY1995 federal funding in TANF's predecessor programs per poor child. Grants per poor child for FY1995 varied from $2,530 in Connecticut to $263 in Arkansas. Generally, grants per poor child in states in the South were less than grants per poor child in states in the N ortheast and Midwest, along the Pacific Coast, and Alaska and Hawaii.\nThese state differences have been continued over time as each state's basic block grant has remained \"frozen\" since FY1997. Figure 3 shows the basic TANF block grant (State Family Assistance Grant) per poor child in FY2013. The regional pattern of historical funding differences per poor child from the pre-TANF programs remained in place during that year. In general, funding per poor child was lower in FY2013 than in FY1995 (there were more poor children in 2013 than in 1995), but states in the South continue to have lower grants per poor child than those in the Northeast and Midwest, and along the Pacific Coast. Note that these dollars per poor children are in nominal dollars, not adjusted for inflation. The impact of inflation is discussed in the \" Selected TANF Financing Issues \" section of this report.\nThough funding became more limited, states were given increased flexibility in how funds could be spent. Under TANF, states have the authority to spend their block grants on activities to address both the effects of economic disadvantage (e.g., cash assistance) and what were viewed as some of the root causes of childhood disadvantage (e.g., preventing out-of-wedlock pregnancies and promoting the formation and maintenance of two-parent families).", "The $16.5 billion basic block grant has constituted the bulk of federal funding each year since the enactment of TANF. However, this basic funding has been supplemented in most years by some additional grants to states funded in the TANF law. The additional funding streams are listed below:\nSupplemental grants . During consideration of legislation that led to the 1996 law, funding frozen at levels based on historical expenditures was thought to disadvantage two groups of states: (1) those that had relatively high population growth and (2) those that had historically low welfare grants relative to poverty in the state. One of the purposes of supplemental grants was to address the differences in state funding per assistance family or per poor person shown in Figure 2 . The other purpose was to provide additional funding to states with high rates of population growth. In total, 17 states qualified for supplemental grants: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. Funding for TANF supplemental grants was discontinued after June 30, 2011. Welfare-to-Work Grants . In 1997, President Clinton proposed additional funding for \"welfare-to-work\" grants on the presumption that the basic TANF block grant provided insufficient funding for the increased emphasis on moving cash assistance recipients to work. Congress accepted the proposal in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-33 ), providing $3 billion over two years (FY1998 to FY1999) to augment TANF funds with special \"welfare-to-work\" grants. These grants were administered through the Department of Labor (DOL) rather than the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), where TANF is administered, and at the state and local level through the workforce system. Additionally, funding was split between formula grants to states (and then passed-through to local workforce boards) and competitive grants. No new welfare-to-work funding was provided after FY1999. Contingency Fund. The fixed basic grant under TANF also led to concerns that funding might be inadequate during economic downturns. The 1996 welfare reform law established a $2 billion \"regular\" TANF contingency fund. To draw upon contingency funds, a state must both (1) meet a test of economic \"need\" and (2) spend from its own funds more than what the state spent in FY1994 on cash, emergency assistance, and job training in TANF's predecessor programs. The original $2 billion in the contingency fund was depleted in early FY2010; annual appropriations have provided new contingency fund monies for FY2011 through FY2015. Emergency Contingency Fund . The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provided an additional $5 billion for FY2009 and FY2010. This was partially in response to the anticipated depletion of the regular contingency fund and partially to address that the contingency fund had not always responded to changes in economic circumstances (see Figure 9 ). Unlike regular contingency funds, which could be used for any TANF activity, the ARRA \"Emergency Contingency Fund\" (ECF) financed only increased spending on basic (cash) assistance, short-term emergency aid, and subsidized employment. No ECF funding was provided after FY2010. Bonus Funds . The 1996 welfare reform law, while giving states flexibility, had a number of provisions to hold a state accountable for its performance in meeting TANF's statutory goals. These accountability provisions included two \"bonus funds\"—one for states with reduced out-of-wedlock pregnancy rates and a second that provided bonuses for states with \"high\" levels of performance in meeting TANF's statutory goals. The bonus for reduced out-of-wedlock pregnancies was funded at up to $100 million per year and up to five states could receive funds; the \"high-performance bonus\" provided an average of $200 million per year to states that qualified for it. FY2005 was the last year for which states received bonus funds.\nFigure 4 shows total TANF state grant funding for FY1997 through FY2015. As shown, funding has remained at approximately the same level with slight annual variations since FY1998, with the exception of a spike in funding from the \"Emergency Contingency Fund\" during FY2009 and FY2010. (The funding level discussed here is without adjustment for inflation. The impact of inflation on grants is discussed in the \"Issues\" section of this report.) However, there were no additional \"Emergency Contingency Funds\" after FY2010, and supplemental grants were ended after FY2011.\nThough the overall level of federal TANF grants to states in FY2015 is about the same as in earlier years, the composition of the grants differs. In the earlier years, funding in addition to the basic block grant came from welfare-to-work grants, supplemental grants, and bonus funds. For FY2012 through FY2015, the only funds in addition to the basic block grant for states were from the contingency fund. While overall funding levels in FY2015 were similar to overall levels in the early 2000s, the group of states that received contingency funds in that year differed from the group of states that received supplemental grants and bonus funds in earlier years. Also, as discussed in \" Recessions and the TANF Block Grant ,\" the level of funding provided by the contingency fund has not been responsive to improvements in the economy over the FY2011 through FY2015 period.", "TANF consolidated and replaced programs that provided matching grants to the states. This meant that there were considerable state dollars contributing to the pre-TANF programs. It also meant that the federal and state shares in financing these programs varied by state, as the Medicaid matching rate is higher in states with lower per-capita incomes than in those with higher per-capita incomes.\nTANF requires states to maintain spending from their own funds on TANF or TANF-related activities. States are required in the aggregate to maintain at least $10.4 billion in spending on specified activities for needy families with children. The $10.4 billion, called the maintenance-of-effort level, represents 75% of what was spent from state funds in FY1994 in TANF's predecessor programs of cash, emergency assistance, job training, and welfare-related child care spending. States are required to maintain their own spending of at least that level, and the MOE requirement increases to 80% of FY1994 spending for states that fail to meet TANF work participation requirements (discussed below). State expenditures under this requirement are often referred to as state MOE funds. (MOE levels by state are shown in Table A-2 .)\nIt should be noted that the MOE sets a minimum amount for required state spending. There are incentives in TANF law for states to spend more than this minimum amount. First, more state spending than the minimum is required to access the TANF contingency fund. Second, states may receive a \"credit\" (reduction) in their TANF work participation standards if they expend more than the minimum required under the MOE.", "TANF is a broad-purpose block grant that gives states the flexibility to use its funds to address both the effects of, and the root causes of, childhood economic disadvantage. There are two sets of rules: those that relate to the use of federal TANF grants, and those for which state expenditures count toward meeting the TANF MOE state spending requirement.", "States have broad discretion on how they expend federal TANF grants. States may use TANF funds \"in any manner that is reasonably calculated\" to accomplish the block grant's statutory purpose. That purpose is to increase the flexibility of states in operating a program designed to\n1. provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; 2. end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; 3. prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and 4. encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.\nIn addition, states may also expend federal TANF grants on any activity financed by pre-TANF programs. These are known as \"grandfathered\" activities.\" Examples of activities that do not meet a TANF goal but may be financed by TANF grants include foster care payments and funding for juvenile justice activities, if they were financed in the pre-TANF programs.", "In addition to expending federal funds on allowable TANF activities, federal law permits a limited amount of the federal TANF basic block grant to be used for other programs. A maximum of 30% of the TANF block grant may be used for the following combined transfers or expenditures:\nTransfers to the Child Care and Development Block Grant; Transfers to the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), with a maximum transfer to the SSBG set at 10% of the basic block grant; As a state match for \"reverse commuter grants,\" providing public transportation from inner cities to the suburbs.", "States may reserve unused federal TANF funds for use in later fiscal years. Funds may be reserved without fiscal year limit. This permits states to \"save\" any federal funds not needed in one fiscal year for use in other years—for example, to save for a recession or any other event (e.g., natural disaster) that might cause an increase in the demand for TANF funds.", "The range of expenditures on activities that states may count toward the maintenance of effort requirement is—like the authority to spend federal funds—quite broad. The expenditures need not be in the \"TANF program\" itself, but in any program that provides benefits and services to TANF-eligible families in cash assistance, child care assistance, education and job training, administrative costs, or any other activity designed to meet TANF's statutory goals. States may count expenditures made by local governments toward the MOE requirement. Additionally, there is a general rule of federal grants management that permits states to count as a state expenditure \"third-party\" (e.g., nongovernmental) in-kind donations, as long as they meet the requirements of providing benefits or services to TANF-eligible families and meet the requirements of the types of activities that states may count toward the MOE requirement.", "TANF allows states to spend their funds on a wider range of activities than did the pre-1996 programs. AFDC was a cash assistance program; Emergency Assistance provided grants to states for a range of activities that provided short-term assistance; and JOBS was an employment services and education and training program for AFDC adult recipients.\nThe number of families receiving cash assistance reached its historical peak in March 1994, at 5.1 million families. In the mid- and late 1990s, the cash assistance caseload shrank rapidly, with a 64% decline in the number of families with children receiving cash assistance from FY1995 to FY2000. (See CRS Report R43187, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Size and Characteristics of the Cash Assistance Caseload , by [author name scrubbed].) Spending on cash assistance declined correspondingly.\nFigure 5 shows both the level and composition of spending in FY1995 under the pre-TANF programs and in FY2000 and FY2014 under TANF. While the overall funding levels in FY1995 and FY2014 were similar, the composition of spending was different. The figure shows that in FY1995, AFDC cash assistance accounted for 70% of all spending under TANF's predecessor programs. In FY2014, cash assistance accounted for 26% of all TANF and MOE dollars. Child care expenditures represented 3% of total pre-TANF expenditures in FY1995, a share that grew to 16% of all spending in FY2014. On the other hand, work, education, and training expenditures grew only from 5% to 7% of total spending from FY1995 to FY2014.\n\"Other work supports\" represents spending for state refundable tax credits (such as state versions of the earned income tax credit) and transportation aid. Other work supports represented $4.5 billion in FY2014, or 14.3% of total TANF and MOE dollars.\nThe figure shows that the largest increase in expenditures (particularly during the FY2000 to FY2014 period) was in \"other spending.\" Under TANF, this category represents a wide range of benefits and social services related to families with children. It includes funding for services related to child abuse and neglect, pre-kindergarten and other early childhood programs, short-term emergency aid, state responsible-fatherhood and marriage programs, and programs for adolescents. The expenditure reporting system in place for FY2014 did not have enough information to categorize much of this spending properly. However, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implemented a new reporting system for FY2015 and later years that will permit a better characterization of spending in the \"other\" category.", "The TANF funding level, both nationally and for each state, is rooted in what states spent in the early to mid-1990s in the pre-TANF programs that were focused on cash assistance for needy families with children. The 1996 welfare reform law contemplated no adjustments for changes that have been made to those funding levels since the enactment of TANF. The law also authorized and provided TANF funding through FY2002. However, extensions of TANF funding since FY2002 have maintained basic block grant funding at the $16.5 billion level with no change—neither increases or decreases—extending the \"freeze\" in funding for now close to 20 years.", "Addressing any of TANF's financing issues would be done in the context of the current federal budget environment and rules that govern the congressional budget process. Though TANF law says that its benefits and services are not entitlements to individuals, the amount of block grant funding is set in authorizing law (the Social Security Act) and thus represents an entitlement to the states. Thus, in the federal budget process, TANF is considered \"mandatory\" spending. Mandatory spending is subject to \"pay-as-you-go\" rules. These rules would require legislation to increase spending for TANF to be offset by corresponding decreases in other mandatory spending programs or through increases in revenue.\nIn congressional budgeting, spending increases or decreases are measured relative to a current law budget baseline that is computed under the rules of the Budget Act. For the basic TANF block grant, this represents the $16.5 billion funding amount because that amount is statutorily determined. Like the block grant itself, the baseline for future years contemplates no changes to this funding amount due to changes in circumstances (e.g., inflation or population change).\nThe rules for computing the TANF baseline are the same as for other mandatory spending programs with statutorily set grant amounts, such as the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) or mandatory funding for the Child Care and Development fund. However, these rules differ from those of mandatory programs that provide direct benefits for individuals. The baselines for those programs are based on estimates of their caseloads (families, individuals served) and benefit amounts. In addition, the TANF baseline differs from those computed for discretionary grant programs in that they generally are provided an annual adjustment for inflation. Under current budget rules, total discretionary programs are subject to a statutory cap and the baseline for discretionary spending is limited to the cap.", "Over time, price inflation reduces the purchasing power of a dollar. Hence, the frozen $16.5 billion per year basic TANF block grant can \"buy\" less in FY2015 than it did in FY1997. Figure 6 shows the gradual reduction in \"real\" funding from the TANF basic block for FY1997 through FY2014, and as projected under the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) August 2015 economic forecast for FY2015 through FY2025. In FY2013, the TANF basic block grant could \"buy\" 31% less in goods and services than it could in FY1997. In FY2015, the block grant is estimated to purchase 33% less than it did in FY1997. If the basic block grant remains at the current funding level and prices increase over the FY2015 through FY2025 period as forecast by CBO, the block grant's purchasing power would in FY2025 be close to half of what it was in FY1997 (a 46% reduction).\nAs discussed in \" The Budget Baseline and TANF ,\" adjusting the basic block grant for inflation would be viewed as increased spending under the current congressional budget rules. If Congress sought to increase TANF funding to keep pace with inflation, CBO estimates it would increase cumulative spending by $22 billion over the next 10 years. Under current budget rules, this cost would have to be offset by a corresponding decrease in other mandatory spending and/or increase in revenues.", "In addition to not being adjusted for inflation, the basic TANF block grant is also not adjusted for changes in the relevant population for TANF. However, with TANF there is no clear-cut answer about a relevant population to which TANF funding should be compared. The relevant population depends on opinions about whether TANF should be focused on providing benefits and services to the cash assistance population; whether the current size of the cash assistance caseload is indicative of meeting the needs of the population eligible for TANF cash assistance; or whether TANF should be viewed as a block grant to address child poverty more broadly.\nThis report examines inflation-adjusted TANF funding relative to the following three populations:\nThe number of families receiving TANF cash assistance . As discussed in the \"How States Have Used TANF Funds\" section of this report, a large share of actual TANF expenditures were made on activities that were not related to traditional cash assistance programs (cash aid, administration, or work activities), and hence were made on populations other than families receiving cash assistance. Thus, showing TANF funding relative to the cash assistance population is an illustrative measure showing the amount of federal dollars that would be available if TANF funds were focused on those families receiving cash assistance. The estimated number of families eligible for TANF-funded cash assistance . This reflects the number of families estimated as eligible under state TANF program rules regarding family types and income and asset rules. Not all families who are eligible for TANF cash assistance actually receive benefits. Some families who are eligible do not apply or do not receive benefits for other reasons. It is estimated that a large share of the decline in the TANF cash assistance caseload resulted from a decline in the share of families eligible for cash assistance who actually received assistance. In 1997, an estimated 73% of families eligible for assistance received TANF-funded cash aid. By 2012, this percentage had declined to 30%. This is an illustrative measure showing the amount of federal dollars that would be available per family for all families eligible for cash aid. The estimated number of poor families with children . This is an illustrative measure to show TANF funding relative to the broader population targeted by all TANF benefits and services to address both the effects of and the root causes of child poverty.\nFigure 7 shows TANF basic funding per family receiving cash assistance, eligible for cash assistance, and with children and in poverty for 1997, 2000, and 2013.\nThe figure shows that by any of these three measures, TANF basic funding per family increased from FY1997 to FY2000. In the late 1990s, the cash assistance caseload, the number of families eligible for cash assistance, and the number of poor families with children all declined sufficiently to more than offset the effects of inflation. That is, even adjusted for inflation, states had more resources per family in 2000 than in 1997 under any of the three measures.\nHowever, the circumstances in the post-2000 period differed substantially from those in TANF's early years. Child poverty increased during the 2000s, with some of the increase occurring even before the deep 2007-2009 recession. The number of families estimated as eligible for TANF cash assistance rose together with child poverty. Yet the TANF cash assistance caseload continued to decline, albeit at a slower pace than it did in the late 1990s.\nThe figure shows that by any of these three measures, basic TANF funding per cash assistance family declined from 2000 to 2013. However, in 2013 basic TANF funding per family receiving cash assistance remained above that of 1997. For the other two measures, TANF funding per family had declined sufficiently by 2013 so that its inflation-adjusted value was below that of 1997. In 2013, TANF basic funding per family eligible for cash assistance was 35% below its 1997 level when considering the effects of inflation. That year, TANF basic funding per poor family with children was 37% below its 1997 level when considering the effects of inflation.", "In addition to the total basic block grant being based on the early to mid-1990s levels, each state's funding is also based on what it received in federal grants in TANF's predecessor programs during this period. As discussed in \" The 1996 Law: \"Freezing\" Historical Funding Levels in the Basic TANF Block Grant ,\" when the law was enacted there were differences among the states in terms of funding per family receiving assistance or per poor child. The block grant froze these historical state differences in the current allocation of federal TANF funds.\nHow would a TANF block grant representing equal grants per poor child change the TANF allocations among the states? If the basic TANF block grant was altered to base state funding on poor children (equal grants per poor child) rather than historical expenditures, the allocation among the states would be very different. If this allocation is done in a budget-neutral way—maintaining the total basic block grant at $16.5 billion—such a change would result in large increases in funding for some states, and large decreases for others. States that have lower than national average grants per poor child under the current formula would be the states with funding increases, and those with higher than national average grants per poor child would experience funding decreases. Thus, there would be a regional pattern to the reallocation of funding: typically, states in the South would have their grants increased, and California and those in the Northeast and Midwest would experience funding decreases.\nFigure 8 shows this regional pattern, and provides information on the percentage change from the current allocation that would occur with a reallocation of funds based on equal grants per poor child (child poverty in 2013). The state that would experience the largest increase would be Texas, with a 267% rise in its basic block grant relative to current law. The District of Columbia would be the jurisdiction with the largest decrease in block grant funding, with a cut of 64.5%. (For dollar allocations under equal grants per poor child and comparison with current law, see Table C-1 .)", "During the consideration of the 1996 welfare reform law, the fixed basic grant under TANF led to concerns that funding might be inadequate during economic downturns. TANF law includes two provisions to address such concerns: reserve funds and a \"contingency fund.\"", "TANF law permits states to \"reserve\" unused basic block grant funds; for example, saving funds during periods of economic growth to have extra funding available during recessions. However, at the end of FY2013, unspent funds were at their lowest (inflation-adjusted) level in the history of the block grant. There was a slight increase in unspent TANF funds from the end of FY2013 to the end of FY2014.\nFigure 9 shows the amount of unspent TANF funds in inflation-adjusted (constant 2014) dollars for FY1997 through FY2014. As shown in the figure, states accumulated unspent funds in the early years of the block grant. However, the value of unspent funds declined after FY2000. At the end of FY2014, the constant dollar value of unspent funds was 66% lower than it was at the end of FY2000.", "The 1996 welfare reform law created a separate $2 billion fund to provide extra TANF funding during periods of economic hardship through a contingency fund. States would need to meet criteria of economic need in order to access the fund. The criteria of economic need are (1) a three-month average state unemployment rate of at least 6.5% and at least 10% higher than in the corresponding three months of either of the prior two years; or (2) the state's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programs (SNAP) caseload is at least 10% higher than it was in FY1994 or FY1995. Additionally, in order to access the TANF contingency fund states also have to spend more from their own funds than they spent in FY1994 on TANF-related programs.\nFigure 10 shows TANF contingency fund grants and their relationship to the unemployment rate for FY1998 through FY2014. As shown in the figure, the contingency fund often has not behaved as a countercyclical source of extra TANF funds. The fund was little used before FY2008. Grants did not increase together with the unemployment rate during the 2001 recession. States generally did not sufficiently increase their own spending, criteria required to access this fund, during that recession.\nBeginning in 2008, grants did increase with the more severe recession of 2007-2009. With the increase in access, it was projected that the $2 billion contingency fund would be exhausted. In fact, the fund was exhausted in early FY2010. Figure 10 also shows grants from the ARRA ECF. It was the ECF—and not the regular contingency fund—that provided the bulk of extra TANF funding in response to the recent severe recession. The ECF expired at the end of FY2010.\nFollowing the exhaustion of the original $2 billion for the TANF contingency fund, Congress provided it with annual appropriations in subsequent years. Over all years from FY2010 to FY2014, all states except Wyoming (which became ineligible during FY2014) were considered economically needy because they had higher SNAP caseloads than prior to welfare reform (FY1994 or FY1995). SNAP caseloads are projected to remain above those levels for the indefinite future. Therefore, the TANF contingency fund may continue to spend most of its annual appropriations into the future despite the economic recovery.\nThere are some implications of the potential lack of a counter-cyclical funding source for TANF. During the past recession, state government budgets were stressed, with many states cutting back on spending to meet balanced budget requirements. However, for the period when the ECF provided states with extra funds, states generally maintained their TANF benefit amounts. When the ECF expired at the end of FY2010, a number of states reduced their benefits and tightened eligibility for cash assistance.\nCongress could opt to redesign the TANF contingency fund so that it would be more responsive to changes in economic conditions than the current contingency fund. That is, it could create a fund that would spend less than is currently projected during good economic times, and would provide a higher level of funding in case the economy falls into recession. Though a fund to provide extra grants during recessions might help TANF respond to future economic downturns, there are a number of difficulties in developing such a fund. Each recession is different—and there is no guarantee that a program that would have been responsive in past recessions will be responsive in future recessions.", "The uses of TANF grants by states to fund a wide range of benefits and services—some well outside the scope of benefits and services related to families receiving cash assistance—have raised some fundamental questions about the TANF block grant.\nIs its primary purpose to fund cash assistance and services for families receiving cash assistance, particularly those services that could move families from assistance to work? or Is TANF truly a broad-purpose block grant giving states the financial flexibility to provide a wide range of benefits and services to address childhood economic disadvantage?\nState organizations, in general, have argued in favor of retaining the flexibility of the TANF block grant. There have been calls to rein in spending on certain activities to focus more dollars on cash assistance families. There has also been interest in tightening certain rules related to what expenditures can be counted toward the TANF MOE, restricting the ability of states to count \"third-party\" donated services as part of their MOE.", "The bulk of TANF funding is based on what states spent in the pre-TANF programs in the early to mid-1990s. A freeze in the bulk of TANF funding that was originally authorized for 5 years (FY1997-FY2002) has now extended to close to 20 years. However, a number of considerations are raised by any potential changes in TANF funding, including the following:\nUnder current budget rules any increase in TANF funding would have to be offset by spending reductions or revenue increases elsewhere in the budget. Addressing certain issues in a budget-neutral manner—such as disparities in funding among the states—could result in a large redistribution of funding from some states to others. There are different perspectives with which to evaluate the adequacies of TANF funding.\nThese different perspectives lead policymakers to fundamental questions about TANF and its goals in conjunction with addressing its financing issues.\nHistory of the TANF Block Grant Funding\nTable A-1 shows how the TANF basic block grant was derived. The TANF basic block grant (state family assistance grant) provides each state a grant based on its peak funding during the early to-mid 1990s. The data underlying the formula were the federal share of expenditures in TANF predecessor programs for FY1992 through FY1995. The formula provided that each state receive the greatest of\nthe average federal share of expenditures in these programs for FY1992 through FY1994 (column A); the federal share of expenditures for these programs in FY1994, adjusted for states that amended their EA programs in FY1994 or FY1995 (column D); or 4/3 times the federal share of expenditures for these programs in the first three quarters of FY1995 (column E).\nTable A-2 provides the amount of federal funding through the TANF basic block grant by state as well as state MOE levels at 75% and 80% rates of FY1994 predecessor program state expenditures. The MOE is 75% of FY1994 predecessor program state expenditures, but if a state fails to meet TANF work participation standards, the MOE rises to 80% of FY1994 expenditures.\nTable A-3 shows the total TANF grants to states for FY1997 through FY2015.\nFederal and State Expenditures Under TANF and its Predecessor Programs\nTable Showing Allocations Based on Poor Children Compared with the Current TANF Basic Block Grant\nUnspent TANF Funds" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full", "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h2_full", "h3_full h1_title", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "h3_title", "", "h3_full", "h1_full", "h3_full h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is TANF?", "Why was TANF created?", "What else did this law support?", "What determines the TANF funding?", "Under what grant does most of TANF fall?", "What amount is the block grant based on?", "What TANF requirement is placed on states?", "What extra TANF funding have states received?", "What was the result of cash assistance caseload decline?", "What was the affect of FY1995 on TANF funding?", ":How did cash assistance change from FY1995 through FY2000?", "What programs does TANF support?", "What has caused TANF financial issues?", "How has inflation been important when considering TANF financial issues?", "Why are TANF funding levels different throughout different states?", "How would economic downturn affect TANF?", "How could Congress address TANF?", "What are the constraints of these budget rules?" ], "summary": [ "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states, Indian tribes, and territories to help them fund a wide range of benefits and services for needy families with children.", "It was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, which rewrote the rules for cash assistance programs for these families.", "The 1996 law also created TANF as a broad-purpose block grant with state flexibility to design programs to address both the effects of and root causes of childhood economic disadvantage.", "TANF funding is based on the amount of federal and state expenditures in its predecessor programs (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and related programs) in the early to mid-1990s.", "The bulk of federal TANF funds is in a basic block grant.", "Both the national total of the basic block grant, $16.5 billion per year, and each state's grant are based on federal funding in the predecessor programs during this period.", "States must also expend a minimum amount of their own funds on TANF or TANF-related programs under the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement. That minimum totals $10.4 billion per year. The MOE is based on state expenditures in the predecessor programs in FY1994.", "Over time, states have received some extra TANF funding: welfare-to-work grants, contingency funds, supplemental grants, and bonus funds. However, these grants were small relative to the basic block grant and MOE funding.", "The cash assistance caseload declined substantially in the late 1990s from its 1994 peak, resulting in a decline in spending on TANF basic assistance.", "In FY1995, under TANF's predecessor programs, AFDC cash assistance represented 70% of total expenditures in the programs consolidated into TANF.", "By FY2000 cash assistance had declined to 40% of total TANF and MOE funds; in FY2014 cash assistance represented 26% of all TANF and MOE funds.", "TANF also provides funds for state-subsidized child care programs ($5.1 billion or 16% of total FY2014 TANF and MOE funds) as well as a wide range of services, including those addressing child abuse and neglect and pre-kindergarten programs.", "Most of TANF's financing issues relate to its fixed level of funding, based on programs and conditions that existed in the early and mid-1990s. Neither the national total funding level nor each state's level of funding has been adjusted for changes since then, such as inflation, the size of the cash assistance caseload, or changes in the poverty population.", "From FY1997 through FY2014, the TANF block grant lost 32% of its value due to inflation alone.", "The TANF allocation \"locked in\" historical differences among the states that resulted in a wide range of funding levels relative to the number of poor children.", "Further, TANF potentially lacks a source of sufficient additional funding in case of a future economic downturn.", "Should Congress seek to address these issues, it would do so in the context of budget rules that apply to TANF as a mandatory program with fixed funding.", "Current budget rules would require legislation to increase TANF funding to contain corresponding offsets by reducing other mandatory funds and/or increasing revenues." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 1, 0, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 4 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 ] }
CRS_R41071	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "APEC's Approach to Trade Liberalization", "Results of the 2009 Meetings in Singapore", "The Meetings", "Other Major Events", "APEC and U.S. Trade Policy in Asia", "APEC Organization and Operation", "APEC's Role in Regional Integration", "APEC's Substantive Trade Liberalization Measures", "APEC and International Trade", "APEC and \"Human Security\"", "Implications for Congress", "Previous Congressional Actions on APEC", "Pending Legislation", "Issues in the 111th Congress", "Financial Support", "APEC as Vehicle for Promoting a FTAAP", "Progress on the Doha Round", "Focus on Human Security Issues", "Competition for Regional Influence", "Appendix. Annotated Chronology of Past APEC Meetings" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Congress and the Executive Branch have historically identified the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) as potentially important in the promotion of liberalized international trade and investment in Asia, and possibly the rest of the world. APEC is unusual among various trade associations in its reliance on consensus-based, voluntary reductions in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers—as well as a variety of trade facilitation measures—to promote trade and investment liberalization not only between APEC members, but for all international trade and investment, an approach often referred to as \"open regionalism\" (see \" APEC's Approach to Trade Liberalization \" below). In addition to its primary trade mission, APEC provides a venue at which the United States can hold bilateral and multilateral discussions on non-economic matters of concern in the Asia-Pacific region, such as international security and human rights.\nOver the last few years, however, the United States' position as a leader in the region has been challenged by China. China's accession to the WTO, its recent efforts to negotiate bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) across Asia (including the ASEAN-China FTA), and its unilateral liberalization of its trade regime, has arguably placed China as a major competitor to the United States.\nMany argue that the United States should re-energize its involvement in Asian trade discussion and elevate the importance of APEC to reassert U.S. leadership. They advocate both increased financial assistance to APEC, through the annual contribution and specific assistance programs, and alteration in U.S. laws and policies on key issues. Others say that APEC should reformulate its mission by focusing more narrowly on trade facilitation and economic integration, abandoning many of the working groups that are not central to the core goals, and strengthening the Secretariat. The annual Leaders' Meeting continues to provide prestige and offer an opportunity for heads of state, particularly those of smaller countries, to interact with top U.S. officials. APEC offers the additional benefit of including Taiwan and Hong Kong as member economies, unlike most other regional groupings.\nCritics of APEC, however, point to its apparent slow progress as a demonstration of its ineffectiveness. For example, the Bogor Goals set the year 2010 for the achievement of trade and investment liberalization for APEC's \"developed economies.\" Some experts maintain that it is doubtful that APEC will ever fulfill the Bogor Goals, in part because of its reliance on voluntary compliance. As a result, some would recommend a shift in U.S. trade policy in Asia to a focus on more formal trade associations, such as the TPP.\nOne indicator of previous congressional interest in APEC is the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 ( P.L. 109-163 ). That legislation called for the President to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the \"emergence of China economically, diplomatically, and militarily; promote mutually beneficial trade relations with China; and encourage China's adherence to international norms in the areas of trade, international security, and human rights.\" It continues by specifying that this comprehensive strategy should \"identify and pursue initiatives to revitalize United States engagement in East Asia.\" The act then states, \"The initiatives should have a regional focus and complement bilateral efforts. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) offers a ready mechanism for pursuit of such initiatives .\" [emphasis added]\nThe notion that APEC may be an effective forum for advancing U.S. interests in Asia is shared by the Obama Administration. In his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, U.S. Senior Official for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Kurt Tong referred to APEC as a \"valuable asset to the United States\" and as \"a primary venue for multilateral engagement with the Asia-Pacific on economic and other key interests.\" On another occasion, Tong referred to APEC as \"the premier economic organization in the Asia-Pacific region.\" Tong's sentiments regarding APEC were echoed by U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Ron Kirk during his December 15, 2009 presentation at a Washington International Trade Association (WITA) seminar when he referred to APEC as a \"critical forum\" for the United States.\nIt is unclear, however, what role APEC will play in future U.S. trade policy in Asia. The Bush Administration saw APEC as a vehicle for regional economic integration in the Asia Pacific region under the concept of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). This was widely seen as a counterforce to the efforts of some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pursue an alternative \"Asian only\" model for regional economic integration that would exclude the United States. On December 14, 2009, USTR Kirk formally notified Congress that the United States would enter into negotiations with the members of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) about U.S. participation in the regional trade agreement. The Obama Administration's interest in the TPP has raised questions about its commitment to APEC's vision of \"open regionalism\" and the FTAAP.\nThe uncertainty about the future role of APEC in U.S. trade policy comes just before the target deadline for the first of APEC's Bogor Goals—open trade and investment among the industrialized APEC members by 2010—and a year before the United States is scheduled to host the association's meetings in 2011. According to some analysts, the next two years could be a critical time for APEC's development.\nThe 111 th Congress could take action on APEC in several ways. First, Congress may choose to consider the level of direct and indirect financial support provided to APEC. Second, Congress may take into account U.S. commitments to APEC when considering legislation on various trade and non-trade issues. Third, Congress may increase oversight of APEC-related activities and programs of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of State and other federal departments and agencies.\nAlthough the U.S. government in the past has considered APEC as important, questions remain as to whether APEC has proven a reliable mechanism for advancing U.S. interests in Asia and if Congress and the White House shared a common view of what the U.S. interests in Asia are. In particular, the organizational and operational structure of APEC is unusual among multilateral associations, reflecting an atypical approach to trade liberalization. As a result, APEC's approach, organization, and operations may make it difficult for the United States to promote its positions on various issues through its activities in APEC.", "APEC began in 1989 as an Australian initiative—backed by Japan and New Zealand—in recognition of the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies and in response to the free-trade areas that had developed in Europe and North America. From that initiative, APEC has grown into an association of 21 \"member economies\" bordering the Pacific Ocean that are working cooperatively to promote economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. It is the only international trade organization, besides the World Trade Organization, in which China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are members.\nDuring the 1994 meetings in Bogor, Indonesia, APEC established the \"Bogor Goals\" of \"free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing economies.\" These goals have been reaffirmed at the Leaders' Meeting each subsequent year.\nIn contrast to most other multilateral organizations, APEC is a cooperative forum in which members arrive at decisions via consensus. All commitments made by members are voluntary; APEC has no formal enforcement mechanisms to compel members to comply with any trade liberalization policies previously declared at APEC meetings—an approach often referred to as \"open regionalism.\" Point 9 of the 1994 \"APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve\" states, \"APEC economies that are ready to initiate and implement a cooperative arrangement may proceed to do so while those that are not yet ready to participate may join at a later date.\"\nThe underlying notion of the APEC approach to trade liberalization is that voluntary commitments are easier to achieve and more likely to be implemented than obligatory commitments derived from agreements negotiated by more traditional—and potentially, confrontational—methods. By establishing a common vision or goal for the organization, the belief is that future APEC discussions can make more rapid progress towards the organization's goals by seeking consensus views with which members are willing to comply.\nBy contrast, trade agreements negotiated according to more traditional approaches tend to foster confrontation and expectations of reciprocal concessions. Lacking a shared goal or objectives, it may be difficult to resolve differences among the parties and complete a trade agreement. Later on, if any party to the agreement feels that it was inequitable, they may fail to comply with the terms of the agreement, or withdraw from the agreement in its entirety, even if there are formal sanction or grievance provisions within the agreement.\nCritics of the APEC approach warn that its voluntary nature can lead to inaction, with slow and marginal movement to the achievement of the Bogor Goals. In addition, because APEC lacks compliance requirements, members could reverse trade and investment liberalization commitments during economic downturns.\nAPEC strives to meet the Bogor Goals in three \"broad areas\" of cooperation. First, members consult with each other to formulate individual and collective actions to liberalize merchandise and service trade, as well as international investment. Second, members discuss their domestic regulations and procedures to find ways of facilitating international business. Third, the members engage in \"Economic and Technical Cooperation,\" or ECOTECH, to provide training and foster greater cooperation among APEC members.\nIn 1995, APEC created a template to achieve the Bogor Goals in its \"Osaka Action Agenda.\" The Osaka Action Agenda emphasizes APEC's \"resolute opposition to an inward-looking trading bloc that would divert from the pursuit of global free trade\" by accepting a set of fundamental principles for APEC's trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. These principles include comprehensiveness; WTO consistency; comparability; non-discrimination; transparency; flexibility; and cooperation.", "The November 2009 APEC meetings in Singapore were the first for President Obama, and came in the midst of an extended trip to Asia that included stops in China, Japan, and South Korea. The trip provided President Obama with an opportunity to present his vision for U.S. policy towards Asia in general and APEC in particular, as well as to announce his decision to enter into negotiations with the members of the TPP.\nBesides President Obama, the 2009 delegation included Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, and USTR Ron Kirk. Over the last few years, some APEC members had been critical of the Bush Administration's seeming disregard for the trade organization, and the lack of high-level representatives in the U.S. delegation. The strength of the U.S. delegation in 2009 was a symbolic act that was generally well received by other APEC members.", "As in previous years, the main focus of attention was on the Leaders' Meeting, which was held on November 14-15, 2009, and its associated statements. However, the event's more substantive outcomes came from the Ministerial Meeting, held on November 11-12, 2009. President Obama also held three bilateral meetings with leaders from other APEC members.\nBoth the Leaders' Meeting and the Ministerial Meeting focused on the same themes—supporting balanced growth, resisting protectionism, fostering trade and investment liberalization, accelerating regional economic integration, and enhancing human security. The meetings were principally concerned about economic and trade issues, but there was limited discussion of non-trade issues, such as countering terrorism, preparing for natural disasters, and ensuring that people have sufficient access to safe food.\nIn their post-meeting declaration, the APEC leaders endorsed the G-20 goals of strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. However, the APEC leaders added an additional criteria—economic growth must also be inclusive. In their efforts to achieve these goals, the leaders agreed to: \"gradually unwind global imbalances;\" adopt fiscal, monetary, trade, and structural policies consistent with the new growth paradigm; broaden access to economic opportunities; and \"protect the environment and mitigate climate change.\" The leaders also agreed to resist protectionism, support the conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2010, continue to explore ways forward with a possible Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), strengthen economic and technical cooperation, enhance human security, combat corruption, and improve governance and transparency. In their joint declaration, the leaders mentioned the 2007 APEC Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security, and Clean Development, that set out a APEC-wide target of reducing energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030.\nThe joint statement issued following the Ministerial Meeting provided more detail to the general principles contained in the Leaders' Declaration. For example, in APEC's efforts to foster more inclusive growth, each member pledged to focus more resources on education, worker retraining, and greater assistance to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In addition, APEC members said they would strengthen their social safety nets to enhance economic security. Similarly, to promote sustainable growth, APEC members pledged to reduce barriers to trade and investment for environmental goods and services (EGS), as well as to facilitate the diffusion of climate-friendly and other EGS technologies.\nAs evidence of APEC's efforts to promote greater regional economic integration, the ministers cited various existing and new initiatives. As part of APEC's \"At the Border\" integration program, the members were developing more \"business-friendly\" rules of origin and adopting more consistent policies towards the trade in services. On the subject of \"Behind the Border\" integration, the ministers pointed to programs designed to lower the cost of starting a business, facilitating investment, strengthening intellectual property rights protection, and aligning national standards with international-recognized specifications. \"Across the Border\" connectivity was to involve increasing interconnectivity of transport, logistical, and digital systems; enhancing trade facilitation programs to reduce transaction costs; and improving the security of trade routes and the exchange of trade data.\nMuch of the ministers' concerns about human security centered on food security and safety. During the last few years, there were periodic reports of food shortages in Asia that contributed to some nations prohibiting the export of staple grains (such as rice). While the food shortage reports were generally false, APEC members are concerned about the retreat from trade liberalization that occurred during this period. In addition, there have been repeated incidents of unsafe food products exported by APEC members. In their joint declaration, the APEC ministers agreed to enhance efforts to avoid unwarranted restrictions of food exports, while at the same time taking steps to ensure that food exports were safe.\nOther topics addressed in the ministers' joint statement included: continued regional cooperation to combat the H1N1 virus; improving governance; promoting gender equality and maximizing economic opportunities for women; greater development for the region's tourism industry; and strengthening the APEC Secretariat.\nA separate and concurrent finance ministers' meeting also issued a joint statement detailing the efforts APEC members would take to \"support strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.\" There was consensus that the pace of implementing \"exit strategies\" should consider the pace of recovery in the different APEC economies, but that the members should confer with one another to avoid inconsistencies or undo harm. To that end, there was agreement to work with international financial institutions—such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to \"evaluate the collective consistency\" of members' economic policies. The finance ministers also committed to \"strengthen financial supervision to prevent the re-emergence in the financial system of excess credit growth and excess leverage…\" At the same time, they accepted the \"need to further capital market development and integration…\" An apparent effort by Secretary Geithner to accept the desirability of \"market-oriented\" exchange rates was toned down in the joint statement. The ministers agreed to \"undertake monetary policies consistent with price stability in the context of market-oriented exchange rates that reflect underlying economic fundamentals.\"", "Besides the traditional Leaders' Meeting and the Ministerial Meeting, the 2009 APEC meeting featured the first official U.S.-ASEAN meeting, and three bilateral meetings between President Obama and other APEC leaders. The U.S.-ASEAN meeting was significant not only because it was unprecedented, but that it also reaffirmed the new U.S. policy towards Burma, in which the United States keeps its current sanctions in place, but is willing to engage in high-level talks with representatives of Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Following the meeting, the leaders released a joint statement, which began with their agreement to hold a second meeting in 2010. Among other things, the joint statement indicated that the United States \"welcomed ASEAN's plan to achieve an ASEAN Community by 2015,\" and \"agreed on the need for a broader and deeper ASEAN-U.S. cooperation.\"\nDuring his time in Singapore, President Obama held three bilateral meetings with other leaders of APEC members. Bilateral meetings of this type have been a common feature of the APEC meetings because it is one of a few occasions each year when a significant number of Asian leaders are gathered together. In 2009, bilateral meetings were held with President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia. The main topics of discussion with President Medvedev were nuclear disarmament and Iran. By tradition, the U.S. President meets with the leader of the host member. In this year, President Obama met with Singapore's Prime Minister Lee. A number of issues were discussed, including the global economic recovery, regional economic integration, and the future role of APEC. The U.S.-Indonesia bilateral meeting was reportedly a more wide-ranging discussion. Among the topics discussed were the Copenhagen meeting on climate change, educational cooperation, trade and investment relations, and global economic recovery.\nAlthough the official theme for the 2009 APEC meetings—\"Sustaining Growth, Connecting the Region\"—was reflected in the official declarations and statements, the global economic recovery and the U.S. announcement of its intention to began formal negotiations about TPP membership drew more media attention.\nLittle attention was paid to the impending milestone for the Bogor Goals in 2010—the year by which \"industrialized economies\" were to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific. Japan, the host of the 2010 meetings, has indicated an interest in using the event to take stock of APEC's progress on achieving the Bogor Goals. By contrast, the United States, which will host the 2011 meetings, appears to favor a more \"forward looking\" orientation for APEC meetings over the next few years. Japan has decided that the next Leaders Meeting will be held in Yokohama on November 13-14, 2010. During his speech in Singapore, President Obama announced that the 2011 Leaders' Meeting is to be held in Honolulu. Russia has announced the 2012 Leaders' Meeting is to be held in Vladivostok.", "During the later part of 2009, the Obama Administration gradually began to reveal the outlines of its trade policy in Asia. While many aspects of the Obama trade policy demonstrate continuity with the policies of past administrations, there are some elements that distinguish it from the approach of the Bush Administration. The United States continues to support the goals of trade and investment liberalization, and the possible formation of a regional trade agreement—goals shared by administrations for many years past. However, the Obama Administration has taken actions that may indicate a shift in style and focus in U.S. trade policy in Asia.\nOne initial difference that has drawn much attention and substantial praise in the region is a broader and more sustained interest in the region. The Bush Administration was frequently criticized for paying little attention to Asia outside of its relationship with China and its concerns about North Korea. Since assuming office, several senior administration officials have traveled to the region besides President Obama. The first official foreign visitor to the White House in 2009 was Prime Minister Taro Aso of Japan. President Obama also participated the first U.S.-ASEAN meeting and announced the decision to explore membership in the TPP. In both word and deed, the Obama Administration has indicated an interest in Asia that encompasses more than China and North Korea.\nHowever, it remains unclear how the various initiatives of the Obama Administration coalesce to form a consistent trade policy in the region that is compatible with the goals of trade and investment liberalization. In addition, it is uncertain how APEC fits into the overall U.S. vision for the future relations in the region. In particular, negotiations to join the TPP and greater interest in the U.S.-ASEAN relations may indicate a turn away from APEC as, in the words of Tong, \"the primary venue for multilateral engagement with the Asia-Pacific.\"\nThe TPP talks appear to be replacing APEC as the main vehicle for advancing trade and investment liberalization in the region. This shift was seemingly acknowledged by Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis in January 2010 when he stated, \"It is our aim for the TPP to create a platform for economic integration across the Asia-Pacific region.\" However, in his speech, Marantis did acknowledge that APEC is \"a flexible organization that provides an environment where economies are willing to take on pressing and new barriers.\" And, as host to the APEC events in 2011, the United States will have \"an incredible opportunity to put forward a bolder vision for APEC and allow us to eliminate barriers to trade and investment impeding greater economic integration in the region.\"\nThe formal notification of Congress of the intent to enter into discussions with the current members of the TPP and three other interested parties—Australia, Peru and Vietnam—about possible U.S. membership in the trade association creates tension with APEC's approach to trade liberalization and the previous goal of creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) under the auspices of APEC. The current TPP is a formal, obligatory trade agreement that extends trade benefits exclusively to parties to the agreement, and at the same time, protects selected domestic markets and industries in each member country from international competition. The APEC model for trade liberalization is based on the voluntary elimination of trade and investment barriers that are extended to all nations.\nAnother source of ambiguity in the Obama Administration's trade policy in Asia is its developing relations with ASEAN. In 2009, the United States acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a step that would allow the United States to formally join discussions led by ASEAN with other nations about the creation of a pan-Asian regional trade agreement. While no step has been taken in this direction to date, the option remains open.\nIn October 2009, Senior Official for APEC Tong stated that the Obama Administration sees APEC as providing the \"best and most established regional mechanism for practical cooperation and action\" on economic issues. A few weeks later, Tong was asked specifically asked if the recent U.S. trade initiatives in Asia indicated that the United States had \"given up the idea of forming an FTA [free trade agreement] in the Asia-Pacific region.\" In his answer, Tong stated that the United States still sees a Asia-Pacific free trade area as a \"long-term objective,\" but the United States is trying to determine the best means of achieving that objective \"tactically, organizationally.\" At a seminar held after the APEC meetings, USTR Kirk presented the U.S. interest in TPP as reflecting an interest in utilizing the organization as a model for future trade relations, as well as updating U.S. policy in response to the new global economic environment. Despite these reassurances as to the importance of APEC, many observers perceive a trade policy shift away from APEC and towards the TPP, at least in the short-run.", "APEC's unusual approach to trade liberalization is reflected in its organization and operation. APEC's organization consists of a small Secretariat in Singapore, which reports to the members of five separate groups: the preeminent Leaders' Meeting, the APEC Business Advisory Council, the Ministerial Meeting, the Sectoral Minister Meetings, and the Senior Officials Meetings. The Secretariat, in turn, supervises the work of six different groups: the Committee on Trade and Investment, the Economic Committee, the Steering Committee on ECOTECH, the Budget and Management Committee, Special Task Groups, and Working Groups. Each member of APEC seconds representatives to work on the Secretariat's staff to serve as program directors.\nSource: APEC website, http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec/structure.html .\nThe focal point of APEC activities is the annual Leaders' Meeting in which the APEC leaders set goals, publicize them, and seek to provide momentum for the process. This is usually held in October or November of each year, and is customarily attended by heads of state except for Taiwan which, because of China's objections, sends a special representative. The first Leaders' Meeting was held in 1993 on Blake Island, near Seattle, Washington.\nMajor decisions are generally affirmed and/or announced at the Leaders' Meeting. Although APEC confines its agenda primarily to economic issues, the leaders often hold bilateral meetings during the Leaders' Meeting to discuss international security, human rights, and other issues.\nMost of the decisions announced at the Leaders' Meeting are first considered in a series of Ministerial Meetings held throughout the year. These include the respective ministers dealing with trade, finance, transportation, telecommunications, human resources development (education), energy, environment, science and technology, and small and medium-sized enterprises. The largest ministerial is the annual Joint Ministerial Meeting which immediately precedes the Leaders' Meeting. It usually is attended by foreign trade or commerce ministers from member states. The various Ministerial Meetings make recommendations to the Leaders' Meeting; they do not have the authority to act independently on behalf of APEC.\nWorking under the direction of the various APEC ministers, the Senior Officials coordinate the activities of the various committees, working groups and task forces within APEC. Senior Officials Meetings are held three or four times a year. The current U.S. Senior Official for APEC is Kurt Tong.\nThe APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) consists of up to three individuals appointed by each APEC member. It provides advice on implementing the APEC agenda and other specific business-related issues. ABAC also can make comments on the recommendations of the various Ministerial Meetings.\nMost of the specific tasks before APEC are addressed in committees, working groups, or expert groups that deal with economic issues of importance to the region. For implementing the Bogor goals, the Committee on Trade and Investment plays the key role. APEC has ten working groups that work on specific areas of cooperation and facilitation: (1) Trade and Investment Data, (2) Trade Promotion, (3) Industrial Science and Technology, (4) Human Resources Development, (5) Energy Cooperation, (6) Marine Resource Conservation, (7) Telecommunications, (8) Transportation, (9) Tourism, and (10) Fisheries. Each working group has one or more shepherds (members) who take responsibility for coordinating the work of the group.\nThe APEC chair rotates annually and since 1989 has been held by (in order): Australia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Brunei, People's Republic of China, Mexico, Thailand, Chile, South Korea, Vietnam, Australia, Peru, and Singapore. Japan is to be the chair in 2010, the United States is to be chair in 2011, and Russia is to be the chair in 2012.\nDecisions within APEC's various organizational bodies are based on the consensus approach of APEC. Most committees, working groups, and special task groups have representatives from all 21 members, and select their leadership from amongst themselves. Members may delay or refrain from any action recommended or approved by a meeting, committee, working group or special task force without facing sanctions or recriminations from other members. However, all decisions and agreements of the various meetings, committees, and working groups must be implemented by the organization in accordance with the Osaka Action Agenda.\nAPEC actions take place at three levels: actions by individual members; actions with the confines of APEC; and collective APEC actions with respect to other multinational organizations. The primary form of individual member actions are the \"Individual Action Plans,\" or IAPs. Each year, APEC members submit at the Ministerial Meeting an IAP that spells out what steps the member has taken and/or will take to advance their trade regime towards the achievement of the Bogor Goals. IAPs typically are organized along both sectoral (e.g., architectural services) and topical (e.g., customs procedures) lines. Although members cannot impose changes on each other's IAPs, the Osaka Action Agenda calls on each member to consult, submit, and review the IAPs to foster comparability, transparency, and cooperation amongst the IAPs.\nThe internal actions of APEC generally involve research on topics related to trade liberalization, the exchange of best practices, and the standardization of policies and procedures related to international trade and investment. In some cases, APEC will create a working group on a particular topic, with the goals of generating a \"collective action plan,\" or CAP. In some cases, the CAPs are little more than a topical summary of the member IAPs; in other cases, the working group plays a more active role in promoting trade liberalization and facilitation via the CAPs.\nAnother example of an APEC's internal action is the \"APEC Business Travel Card,\" an idea advanced by the ABAC. Business travelers possessing an APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) are allowed fast-track entry and exit through special APEC lanes at major airports, and multiple, visa-free entry amongst members that recognize the card. In September 2007, the United States became a \"transitional member\" to the ABTC scheme, providing possessors expedited visa appointments at U.S. embassies and consulates, and expedited immigration processing through airline crew lanes upon arrival at any U.S. international airport port of entry.\nCollective actions of APEC usually involve joint or coordinated efforts to advance trade and investment liberalization in other multilateral organizations. APEC's collective actions have recently focused on helping complete the Doha Round of the WTO. For example, following the 2006 Leaders' Meeting in Hanoi, APEC released a statement on the \"Doha Development Agenda of the WTO\" that affirmed the members' \"collective and individual commitments to concluding an ambitious and balanced WTO Doha agreement\" by each member \"moving beyond our current positions in key areas of the Round.\" The key areas mentioned were \"trade-distorting farm support,\" \"market access in agriculture,\" \"real cuts in industrial tariffs,\" and \"new openings in services trade.\"", "Possibly the premier issue facing future meetings of APEC is its relevance for the possible creation of some form of open trade and investment association in the region. At present, there are several overlapping and sometimes competing models. for trade and investment integration in the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN has its own FTA, known as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Over the last few years, ASEAN has concluded FTAs with several trading partners—including Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—raising the possibility of a broader multilateral trade association centered around ASEAN. ASEAN, Australia and Japan have all put forward models for the possible creation of an Asian economic community, similar to the European Union.\nAn expanding TPP, as envisioned by Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Marantis, also raises questions about APEC's relevance. Although it has been presented by both the Bush and the Obama Administration as an initiative designed to complement APEC, the TPP has the potential to supplant APEC as a vehicle for trade and investment liberalization in the region, though for the moment its membership is much more limited. In addition, the United States may find TPP's obligatory administrative process easier to understand than APEC's consensus-based \"open regionalism.\" It may also be easier to transform the TPP than APEC into the U.S.-backed FTAAP.\nEven with its \"open regionalism\" approach to trade and investment liberalization, APEC has been seen since its inception as a possible vehicle for liberalizing both regional and global trade. In general, observers focus on two methods by which APEC may help foster greater trade and investment liberalization. The first method is by forming a coalition during WTO negotiations. The efforts of the APEC Geneva Caucus during the Doha discussions are often cited as an example of how APEC can help promote trade and investment liberalization.\nThe second method is more controversial. Over the last decade, the number of Asia-Pacific bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) has grown dramatically. According to one observer, \"The result is a competitive form of liberalization. As occurred within APEC itself, there are competing models of FTAs that cannot be integrated.\" A reporter described the phenomena as follows:\nThe trade diplomacy of east Asia has become so blindingly complex that even the metaphors are getting muddled. The subtitle of one academic paper on free trade agreements (FTAs) suggests using \"spaghetti bowls as building blocks.\" Another describes a \"patchwork of bilateral hub-and-spoke FTAs in a noodle bowl.\"\nAccording to some experts, the growth of bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) amongst APEC members represents an unsystematic, but organic process that could lead to the formation of an APEC-wide regional trade agreement (RTA) much like the proposed FTAAP. According to this view, the actions of APEC—via the IAPs, CAPs, model measures, and the various committee reports—form a commonality of perspective on issues, thereby permitting some members to conclude limited BTAs. However, there is also a view that sees ASEAN's growing network of FTAs as a more likely base than APEC for the creation of a Asian RTA. In either case, the idea is that over time a network of BTAs will form the basis for the creation of an Asian RTA.\nHowever, other experts view the proliferation of BTAs as forming a barrier to trade and investment liberalization. As described by one scholar, \"The resulting web of agreements and negotiations is fragmented, uncoordinated, and uneven in content and coverage.\" Because many BTAs are politically (not economically) motivated, the emerging BTAs in Asia generally suffer from several problems—WTO-incompatibility; narrow sector focus; discriminatory rules of origin (ROOs)—that make future amalgamation of the BTAs nearly impossible. As one expert describes it:\nThe predictable results of foreign policy-driven FTA negotiations light on economic strategy are bitty, quick-fix sectoral deals. Politically sensitive sectors in goods and services are carved out.... Little progress is usually made in tackling domestic regulatory barriers.... Finally, the sway of power politics can result in highly asymmetrical deals, especially when one of the negotiating parties is a major player.\nEven if the merger of the various BTAs into an Asia-Pacific RTA were accomplished, there are concerns that the resulting agreement would institutionalize a number of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in the region. A U.S. trade official was quoted as saying, \"Bilateral FTAs being pursued by China, and Japan, and Korea to some extent, risk falling to the lowest common denominator. As one commentator once quipped, 'they are neither F, nor T, nor A.'\"\nSome observers go on to argue that the rising number of BTAs in the region is generating dynamics that are preventing the formation of a FTAAP and progress in the Doha Round, despite the best efforts of APEC. One scholar writes:\nI note how the current discussions with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to establish a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP),\" writes one scholar, \"was also proposed at APEC's Santiago summit just two years ago. It failed then as it will probably fail now because of the immense political and technical challenge of harmonizing a large number of heterogeneous bilateral FTAs into a unified regional agreement.\"\nAnother scholar is even more dismissive of APEC's potential, writing, \"It cannot be expected to contribute anything serious to regional economic integration.\"\nOthers see a slightly different effect of the BTAs on prospects for the creation of a FTAAP. In this view, the stalled Doha Round is fostering the further disintegration of the global trading system, generating a rising number of BTAs, and increasing the risk of the creation of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) that might be discriminatory towards inter-regional trade. The fear is that the EAFTA would become another barrier to the completion of the Doha Round, and possibly generate protectionist reactions from the European Union and the United States.\nTo counteract these trends, some experts say the United States should push for the creation of a more inclusive and comprehensive FTAAP. In this view, by advancing the idea of a FTAAP via APEC or the TPP, the United States might improve the prospects for the Doha Round, as non-APEC members may prefer to see progress at the WTO over the creation of a FTAAP. However, even if Doha talks remain stalled, discussion of the creation of a FTAAP could limit the growth of BTAs in Asia, and/or help insure that any new BTAs are less discriminatory and WTO-compatible. In summary, supporters of this view see APEC playing four roles in this new regional dynamic. Those roles are:\n1. Organizing regular meetings of regional trade and finance ministers and political leaders to advance the process at the multilateral and bilateral levels;\n2. Reinforcing the 'Bogor Goal' of free and open trade and investment by 2010/2020 and authenticating neoliberal trade policies;\n3. Developing \"model measures\" for FTAs and RTAs to achieve \"high quality\" liberalization and consistency; and\n4. Promoting WTO-plus FTAs that are consistent with the policy agenda of the international and regional financial institutions.", "Skeptics have frequently criticized APEC for being \"all talk and no show.\" They maintain that APEC is unable to significantly reduce trade barriers because of its lack of an enforcement mechanism. However, according to studies conducted by APEC, its members have implemented substantive trade liberalization measures over the last 20 years, and those measures have contributed to significant trade growth in the region. APEC's trade liberalization measures include both sizable reductions in tariff rates and meaningful trade facilitation reforms.\nA 2005 study conducted by APEC found that the average tariff rate among APEC members had declined from 16.9% in 1989 to 5.5% in 2004 – a drop of nearly 66% in 15 years. The report also determined that nearly half of all APEC tariff lines were set at 5% or less. In addition, a range of non-tariff trade barriers (such as quotas, import and export levies, licensing, and export subsidies) had been eliminated by APEC members as part of their voluntary IAPs. While no subsequent study has been released, APEC members have continued to lower their tariff and non-tariff trade barriers over the last five years.\nIn addition to the substantial reduction in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, APEC has also contributed to the growth of regional trade by fostering the enactment of a variety of trade facilitation measures. For the international trading community, transaction costs associated with the compliance with various administrative measures—such as certification requirements, or country-specific rules of origin, product standards, and shipping documents—can hinder international trade. APEC programs designed to standardize trade documents, rules of origin, product labeling and safety requirements reduced the transaction cost of trade by 5% between 2002 and 2006. During the 2007 Leaders' Meeting, the members of APEC made a commitment to a further 5% reduction in transaction costs by 2010.", "The primary goal of APEC is to foster international trade by means of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. Since its inception in 1989 and the adoption of the Bogor Goals in 1994, APEC members have lowered their trade restrictions to varying degrees. With nearly two decades of history, one question is whether or not there has been a corresponding rise in APEC members' foreign trade accompanying their liberalization and facilitation efforts.\nFigure 2 compares the growth of intra-APEC and total APEC exports to the growth of global exports from 1970 to 2006. Starting in 1981, total APEC exports begin growing faster than global exports, and intra-APEC exports are outstripping total APEC exports. However, the pace of export growth slows for all three categories in 1995, with noticeable downturns in APEC exports occurring in 1998 and 2001, corresponding to the Asia financial crisis and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Since the downturn in 2001, the pace of world export growth has increased, and the pace of APEC export growth has increased even more.\nImport statistics reveal a similar pattern to exports (see Figure 3 ). From 1970 to 1980, there is little difference in the import growth rate for intra-APEC, total APEC, and the world. Starting in 1981, APEC's imports—both from amongst its members and from the world—begin to increase faster than world imports. The divergence between APEC import growth and world imports continues until 1997, when the Asian financial crisis precipitates a sharp decline in APEC's imports and global imports in 1998. For the next two years—1999 and 2000—global imports and APEC's imports recover, only to drop once again following the attacks on September 11, 2001. Import levels grew modestly in 2002 for both APEC and the world, and then accelerated starting in 2003, with APEC's import growth rate outstripping that of the world.\nWhile the trade data appear to support the notion that APEC has promoted trade growth for its members, the results are not conclusive. Although APEC's exports and imports have grown at a faster rate than world trade figures since the creation of APEC, it is uncertain if its trade growth is the result of trade liberalization and facilitation, or caused by other economic factors. During the time period in question, APEC's members included several of the fastest growing economies in the world—for example, China and Vietnam—so the average economic growth rate for APEC members was higher than the global average. APEC's greater economic growth rate could be sufficient to explain most of its better trade performance compared to global figures.\nThe higher growth rate of trade among APEC members may also reflect changes in the global supply chain. The production of consumer goods is increasingly driven by major retailers and multinational corporations who source products from manufacturers and sourcing companies around the world. In turn, these companies subcontract out the production of subcomponents and parts to several other companies who may operate in several different countries. The subcomponents and parts are then shipped to possibly another country for final assembly. As a result, the initial order from the major retailer may initiate a chain of international trade flows that possibly exceeds the total value of the final goods produced.\nSuch multinational supply chain networks are fairly common among the Asian members of APEC. Some may have been intentionally established among APEC members because of the association's relatively low trade barriers. For certain product categories—including clothing, textiles, consumer electronics, and toys—many of these supply chains depend on orders from U.S., European, or Japanese retailers or brand name distributors to initiate the multinational manufacturing of the consumer products. Also, a large percentage of these supply chains have their final assembly operations in China, but source the parts and components from several different Asian nations.\nHowever, the fact that intra-APEC exports and imports are growing at a faster rate than total APEC trade raises concerns about possible trade diversion. On the one hand, the greater growth of intra-APEC trade could be the result of lower intra-APEC trade barriers stemming from the members' actions via their IAPs and CAPs, and the spread of RTAs and FTAs amongst APEC members. On the other hand, the higher intra-APEC trade expansion could represent the diversion of trade from other nations as APEC members form preferential bilateral trade agreements that siphon off trade from non-APEC members.\nIf APEC members have indeed benefited from more rapid trade and economic growth during the past few decades, they may also suffer more from the decline in trade and economic growth precipitated by the global financial crisis. As orders from Europe, Japan and the United States decline, the network of trade in intermediate goods associated with the Asian supply chains will decline even more quickly.", "Initially, APEC was viewed as a purely economic forum. APEC carefully kept its distance from political matters for fear that such issues would cause divisions within the group—particularly among China, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, and the United States. Such divisions could thwart cooperation in achieving economic goals. Consideration of non-economic issues was confined to bilateral meetings held before and after the Leaders' Meeting.\nIn 1995, the issue was raised of whether APEC should be expanded to include consideration of regional security issues. The consensus in 1995 among APEC members seemed to be that regional security issues should be discussed in the ASEAN Regional Forum and other fora rather than in APEC.\nStarting in 2001, however, security was added to the official agenda of the Leaders' Meeting. At the October 2001 meetings in Shanghai, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon overshadowed the economic agenda. The Leaders issued a joint statement condemning the attacks—APEC's first joint statement on non-economic issues. Since 2001, the agenda for the Leaders' Meeting has included issues related to \"human security,\" with a focus on three topics: terrorism, disease, and disasters.\nIn 2009, APEC's interest in human security focused primarily on the issue of \"enhancing human security.\" Within that broad concept, APEC's discussions centered on two issues – improving food security within the region and responding to the H1N1 pandemic. On the topic of food security, the main concerns were ensuring that people had reliable access to an adequate supply of safe and affordable food. Regarding the H1N1 pandemic, APEC's goal was to build a regional capacity to respond to outbreaks in the region.", "Past Congresses and the Bush Administration identified APEC as the primary regional institution in the Asia-Pacific for promoting open trade and practical economic cooperation. APEC is also seen as a useful forum for advancing U.S. concerns on issues related to human security.\nSince APEC's inception in 1989, congressional interest and involvement with APEC has focused on two areas: (1) direct and indirect financial support for APEC; and (2) oversight of U.S. participation in APEC.", "Section 424 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, authorized the President to maintain United States membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and provided for U.S. contributions of APEC out of appropriations for \"Contributions to International Organizations.\" The level of direct U.S. financial support for APEC for FY2010 was $900,000 per year. In addition, $4.497 million is included in the FY2010 budget under the State Department's Office of International Conferences of the Diplomatic & Consular Programs for preparation work for the 2011 APEC meetings.\nSection 2540 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 made \"a non-communist country that was a member nation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as of October 31, 1993\" eligible to participate in a loan guarantee program \"arising out of the financing of the sale or long-term lease of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services.\"\nThe Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-127 ) included a finding by Congress that:\n... during the period 1996 through 2002, there will be several opportunities for the United States to negotiate fairer trade in agricultural products, including further negotiations under the World Trade Organization, and steps toward possible free trade agreements of the Americas and Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); and the United States should aggressively use these opportunities to achieve more open and fair opportunities for trade in agricultural products.\nIn the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ), Congress finds:\n... other economic and regional fora, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, and the Western Hemisphere Financial Ministers, have been used to marshal political will and actions in support of combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards.\nFinally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 ( P.L. 109-163 ) included as the sense of Congress:\nthat the President should present to Congress quickly a comprehensive strategy to—\n(1) address the emergence of China economically, diplomatically, and militarily;\n(2) promote mutually beneficial trade relations with China; and\n(3) encourage China's adherence to international norms in the areas of trade, international security, and human rights.\nTo be included in that strategy are \"[a]ctions to encourage United States diplomatic efforts to identify and pursue initiatives to revitalize United States engagement in East Asia. The initiatives should have a regional focus and complement bilateral efforts. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) offers a ready mechanism for pursuit of such initiatives.\"", "Several bills have been introduced during the 111 th Congress that explicitly refer to APEC. Some are directly targeted at U.S. policy towards APEC. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Travel Cards Act of 2009 ( H.R. 3192 and S. 1633 ) would require that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State establish an \"APEC Business Travel Program\" that would issue APEC Business Travel Cards (ABTCs). As previously mentioned, the United States the became a \"transitional member\" to the ABTC program in September 2007, but progress has been slow.\nThe Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 ( H.R. 2410 ) includes a sense of Congress that \"engagement is Asia must be a cornerstone of United States foreign policy in the 21 st Century\" and that APEC is to pay an important role in that policy. To that end, the President should appoint \"APEC Coordinators\" in appropriate departments and agencies that \"shall, in consultation with the United States Ambassador to APEC, set department- and agency-wide guidelines for each such department's or agency's participation at APEC.\" In addition, the legislation would require that the Secretary of State appoint a small business liaison to APEC, create a dedicated webpage to improve communication between the government and the small business community about APEC; and to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committee about the status of plans for hosting the APEC meetings in 2011. The Foreign Relations Authorization and Reform Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 ( H.R. 2475 ) has similar provisions. H.R. 2410 was passed by the House of Representatives on June 10, 2009 and referred to the Senate on June 22, 2009; H.R. 2475 awaits action in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.\nThe United States-China Diplomatic Expansion Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2311 ) is designed to increase funding for U.S. relations with China. However, it would also authorize the appropriation of $3 million in fiscal year 2010 for the financial support of APEC.\nOther proposed legislation attempts to use APEC to foster a consistent global approach to key issues. The Energy Security Through Transparency Act of 2009 ( S. 1700 ) would require the federal government to attempt to persuade the members of APEC to adopt regulations similar to those of the United States governing the operation of extractive industries.", "For the 111 th Congress, issues related to APEC could arise in a variety of direct and indirect ways. In addition to the issue of U.S. financial support for APEC, Congress may choose to express its sense on different policy issues. Also, there are oversight issues raised by U.S. participation in various APEC activities and, in particular, with respect to the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States.", "The most direct issue would be the level of U.S. financial support for APEC. Although the President does have the authority under current federal law to determine the level of APEC's funding without action by Congress, Congress may choose to take up this issue (see above). For example, Congress could consider setting funding levels, directly or indirectly, for APEC's trade facilitation programs independently from the amounts previously appropriated.\nIn addition, Congress may consider expressing its preferences regarding the agenda and content of the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States, possibly via appropriation legislation that provides funding for those meetings. The 110 th Congress appropriated $2.3 million in FY2009 and $4.497 million in FY2010 for the 2011 meetings, but additional funding is likely to be needed. In his proposed FY2011 budget, President Obama has requested an additional $38.220 million for hosting APEC meetings in 2011.", "Past Congresses have recognized the potential of APEC as a vehicle for promoting free trade. In addition, to the issue of a possible Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, negotiations over regional trade integration under APEC would likely raise issues related to labor rights and environment protection, and whether the United States would be able to respond to foreign country violations of labor or environmental standards with economic sanctions or monetary fines (as stipulated in the U.S.-Singapore/Chile FTAs).", "Successful completion of the Doha Development Round is a high priority for the Obama Administration. In the past, APEC has been viewed as a reliable ally to the United States during Doha negotiations. Congress could take steps to promote the use of APEC to help break the current stalemate.", "In addition to the various economic and trade issues, Congress may also consider issues pertaining to human security as a result of the U.S. involvement with APEC. For example, U.S. recognition of the APEC Business Travel Card could raise domestic security concerns to the expedited visa and entry privileges extended to card bearers. Similarly, concerns about a potential influenza pandemic may engender interest in providing more support to APEC's primary forum on health issues, the Health Working Group.", "From a geopolitical perspective, APEC is a leading forum through which the United States can broadly engage the Asia-Pacific region. The United States is not currently included in the other regional multilateral associations, such as ASEAN and the East Asian Summit (EAS), and no other forum includes such a wide range of Asian economies. From a strategic perspective, many experts believe APEC could play a useful role in advancing U.S. interests in the region. Others, however, think other for a—such as the TPP—may be more effective mechanisms at this time.", "The following table provides a brief summary of the past APEC Meetings. For more details about each meeting, see the official APEC web page, http://www.apec.org/ ." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h4_full h2_full h1_full", "", "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h2_full", "", "", "", "h3_full", "", "h4_title", "", "h4_full", "h4_title", "h4_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What was the focus of the 2009 APEC meeting?", "What did the Leaders' Declaration focus on?", "What characterized the main topics in the Ministerial Meeting?", "What is the importance of the next two years for APEC?", "What nations will take responsibility for the upcoming meetings?", "What has the Obama Administration planned for this meeting?", "What has changed the US's sole focus from APEC?", "What other options may the US look at?", "What is ASEAN?", "What is the historical success of APEC?", "What data that supports this?", "How could the success of APEC be contributed to other factors?", "Why might APEC policy change?", "How has Congress already altered APEC?", "What other actions could be taken?", "What else may influence Congressional action related to APEC?" ], "summary": [ "The 2009 APEC Leaders' and Ministerial Meetings focused on balanced growth, resisting protectionism, fostering trade and investment liberalization, accelerating regional economic integration, and enhancing human security.", "In the Leaders' Declaration, APEC presented a new \"growth paradigm\" based on balanced, sustainable, and inclusive growth.", "In the Ministerial Meeting, one of the main topics was efforts to be taken at, behind, and across borders to promote regional economic integration.", "The next two years may be a critical period for APEC and its achievement of the Bogor Goals.", "The 2010 meetings are to be held in Yokohama, Japan—the target year for APEC's industrialized members to achieve the Bogor Goals. The United States will host the 2011 meetings.", "The Obama Administration has chosen Honolulu as the host city for the 2011 Leaders' Meeting, but has not given a clear indication of APEC's role in U.S. trade policy.", "Several alternative avenues for the promotion of trade integration in Asia have emerged, challenging the past U.S. focus on APEC.", "In November 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would to enter into negotiations with the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP), a free trade agreement between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.", "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is promoting the creation of various forms of an all-Asian free trade association that could exclude the United States.", "Historical trade data is consistent with the premise that APEC has been successful in promoting greater trade within its member economies and with the rest of the world.", "Both the exports and imports of APEC members have grown faster than global trade since the creation of APEC.", "However, APEC's greater trade growth may be attributable to other factors than the liberalization of trade and investment policies among its members.", "The 111th Congress may reexamine U.S. policy towards APEC.", "It has already increased APEC-related funding in FY2009, in part to provide for the preparations for the 2011 APEC meetings to be held in the United States.", "In addition, there are other actions Congress may choose to take with respect to APEC, depending on its determination of APEC's role in relation to trade promotion initiatives in Asia.", "Congressional attitudes and actions may also be influenced by the Obama Administration's trade policies in Asia—and the role APEC plays in those policies." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 1, -1, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 6 ] }
CRS_RS20173	{ "title": [ "", "Health Insurance (HI) Trust Fund", "What It Is", "Income and Outgo", "Board of Trustees", "Annual Trustees' Report", "2009 Health Insurance Trustees Report—Key Findings", "2008 Operations", "Projected Insolvency Date", "Short- and Long-Range Financial Soundness", "Projection Factors", "Issues", "Status of Program as a Whole", "Required Response", "Prospects" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "", "Medicare is the nation's health insurance program for individuals aged 65 and over and certain disabled persons. Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A or Hospital Insurance (HI); Part B or Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI); Part C or Medicare Advantage (MA); and Part D, the prescription drug benefit. Medicare's financial operations are accounted for through two trust funds, the HI trust fund and the SMI trust fund, which are maintained by the Department of the Treasury.\nThe Part A program is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers; these are credited to the HI trust fund. The trust fund is an accounting mechanism; there is no actual transfer of money into and out of the fund. Income to the trust fund is credited to the fund in the form of interest-bearing government securities. (The securities represent obligations that the government has issued to itself.) Expenditures for services and administrative costs are recorded against the fund. As long as the trust fund has a balance, the Treasury Department is authorized to make payments for it from the U.S. Treasury.\nThe Part B and D programs are financed primarily through a combination of monthly premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI trust fund. For beneficiaries enrolled in MA, Part C payments are made on their behalf in appropriate portions from the HI and SMI trust funds.", "The primary source of income credited to the HI trust fund is payroll taxes paid by employees and employers; each pays a tax of 1.45% on earnings. The self-employed pay 2.9%. Unlike Social Security, there is no upper limit on earnings subject to the tax. Additional income consists of (1) premiums paid by voluntary enrollees who are not automatically entitled to Medicare Part A through their (or their spouse's) work in covered employment; (2) government credits; and (3) interest on federal securities held by the trust fund. Since 1994, the HI fund has had an additional funding source: the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93) increased the maximum amount of Social Security benefits subject to income tax from 50% to 85% and provided that the additional revenues would be credited to the HI trust fund.\nPayments are made from the trust fund for covered Part A benefits, namely, hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, some home health services, and hospice care. Payments are also made for administrative costs associated with operating the program.", "By law, the six-member Board is composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Labor, the Commissioner of Social Security, and two public members (not of the same political party) nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Secretary of the Treasury is the Managing Trustee. The Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is designated Secretary of the Board.", "The Board makes an annual report on the operations of the trust fund. Financial projections included in the report are made by CMS actuaries using major economic and other assumptions selected by the trustees. The report includes three forecasts ranging from pessimistic (\"high cost\") to mid-range (\"intermediate\") to optimistic (\"low cost\"). The intermediate projections represent the Trustees' best estimate of economic and demographic trends; they are the projections most frequently cited. The 2009 report was issued May 12, 2009.", "", "In calendar year (CY) 2008, total income to the HI trust fund was $230.8 billion. Payroll taxes of workers and their employers accounted for $198.7 billion (86.1%), interest and government credits for $17.5 billion (7.6%), premiums (from those buying into the program) for $2.9 billion (1.3%), and taxation of Social Security benefits for $11.7 billion (5.1%). The program paid out $235.6 billion—$232.3 billion (98.6%) in benefits and $3.3 billion (1.4%) for administrative expenses. The balance at the end of 2008 was $321.3 billion. In FY2008, total income was $229.7 billion, and total disbursements were $230.2 billion; the distribution of income sources and expenditures was similar to those recorded for CY2008. (See Table 1 .)", "The 2009 report projects that, under intermediate assumptions, the HI trust fund will become insolvent in 2017, two years earlier than projected in the 2008 report. This change primarily reflects lower payroll tax income due to the current economic recession. The 2009 report projects insolvency nine years earlier than did the 2003 report, issued prior to the enactment of Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. 108-173 ). That law added to HI costs, mainly through higher payments to rural hospitals and to private plans under the MA program.\nBeginning in 2004, tax income (from payroll taxes and from the taxation of Social Security benefits) began to be less than expenditures. Expenditures began to exceed total income in 2008. When income falls short of expenditures, costs are met by drawing on HI fund assets through transfers from the general fund of the Treasury until the fund is depleted.", "The 2009 report states that the fund fails to meet the short-range (i.e., 10-year, 2009-2018) test of financial adequacy since total HI assets at the start of the year are estimated to decline to below 100% of expenditures during 2012.\nFurther, a substantial actuarial deficit exists over the full long-range projection period (2009-2083). For projections beyond 2018, the trustees do not use actual dollar figures due to the difficulty of comparing dollar values for different time periods. Instead, they measure long-range financial soundness by comparing the fund's income rate (the ratio of tax income to taxable payroll) with its cost rate (the ratio of expenditures for insured persons to taxable payroll). Under the 2009 intermediate assumptions, the trustees state that cost rates are projected to exceed income rates by a steadily and rapidly growing margin. In 2009, the income rate is projected at 3.13, while the cost rate is projected at 3.57, a negative gap of 0.44 percentage points (compared to a negative 0.23 in 2008 and a negative 0.03 percentage points in 2007). This gap is projected to widen to 0.62 percentage points in 2015, 1.10 in 2020, and 8.30 in 2080. By 2080, tax income will cover less than one-third of projected expenditures. Summarized over the 75-year period, the actuarial deficit is 3.88%. (The 2008 75-year estimate was 3.54%.) Looked at another way, the trustees estimate the present value of unfunded HI obligations through 2083 at $13.8 trillion.\nThe trustees state that substantial changes would be required to maintain financial soundness over the 75-year projection period. For example, income could be increased by immediately increasing the payroll tax rate for employees and employers combined from 2.90% to 6.78%. Alternatively, expenditures could be reduced, but this would require an immediate decrease in benefits of 53%. These changes could be implemented more gradually through the period, but they would ultimately have to be more stringent.", "The trustees' projections of income and outgo reflect several demographic and economic variables. These include the consumer price index, fertility rate, workforce size and wage increases, and life expectancy. They also include estimates specific to the HI program, including the expected use and cost of inpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility, and home health services.\nBeginning in 2011, the program will also begin to experience the impact of major demographic changes. First, baby boomers (persons born between 1946 and 1964) begin to turn age 65 and become eligible for Medicare. The baby boom population is likely to live longer than previous generations. This will mean an increase in the number of \"old\" beneficiaries (i.e., those 85 and over). The combination of these factors is estimated to contribute to the increase in the size of the HI population from 44.9 million in 2008 to 47.5 million in 2011, and 78.9 million in 2030. Accompanying this significant increase is a shift in the number of covered workers supporting each HI enrollee. In 2008, there were about 3.7. This number is predicted to decrease to 2.4 in 2030 and 2.1 by 2080.\nThe combination of expenditure and demographic factors results in an increase in the size of the HI program relative to other sectors of the economy. According to the 2009 report, if no changes are made in current Medicare law, the HI program's cost is expected to rise from 1.58% of GDP in 2008 to 2.75% in 2030, and 4.96% in 2080.", "", "As noted, HI and SMI are financed very differently. HI is funded by current workers through a payroll tax, while SMI is funded by premiums from current beneficiaries and federal general revenues. Because of this financing, the SMI trust fund's income is projected to equal expenditures for all future years. Historically, therefore, the major focus of concern was the HI fund. More recently attention has also turned to the rapid increase in SMI costs, which have been growing significantly faster than GDP. For a number of years, the trustees have been emphasizing the importance of considering the program as a whole and the fact that the projected increases are unsustainable over time. To further emphasize this point, in 2002 they began issuing a single report covering the entire program.\nThe enactment of MMA made the consideration of the future of the total program more critical. The legislation increased spending under Parts A, B, and C. In addition, it added a new prescription drug benefit under Part D; spending for this benefit is recorded as a separate account in the SMI trust fund. The trustees note that these changes have important implications. In 2005, total Medicare expenditures represented 2.73% of GDP. In 2006 (the first year of the new drug benefit), total expenditures were 3.11% of GDP. The percentage is expected to increase to 7.23% by 2035 and to 11.18% by 2080. The trustees note that over the past 50 years, total federal tax receipts have averaged 11% of GDP. They further note that projected Medicare costs will exceed those for Social Security by 2028, and be more than double the cost of Social Security by 2083.", "There is concern that over time the economy will be unable to support the increasing reliance on general revenues which in large measure comes from taxes paid by the under-65 population. In response, MMA (Section 801) required the trustees report to include an expanded analysis of Medicare expenditures and revenues. Specifically, a determination must be made as to whether general revenue financing will exceed 45% of total Medicare outlays within the next seven years (on a fiscal year basis). General revenues financing is defined as total Medicare outlays minus dedicated financing sources (i.e., HI payroll taxes; income from taxation of Social Security benefits; state transfers for prescription drug benefits; premiums paid under Parts A, B, and D; and any gifts received by the trust funds). The 2006 report projected that the 45% level would first be exceeded in FY2012; the 2007 report projected that it would first be exceeded in 2013, while both the 2008 and 2009 reports project the first year at 2014. The four findings were within the required seven-year test period. The reports, therefore, made a determination of \"excess general revenue Medicare funding.\"\nMMA (Sections 802-804) requires that if an excess general revenue funding determination is made for two successive years, the President must submit a legislative proposal to respond to the warning. The Congress is required to consider the proposals on an expedited basis. However, passage of legislation within a specific time frame is not required. On January 6, 2009, the House approved a rules package ( H.Res. 5 ) that nullifies the trigger provision for the 111 th Congress.\nBecause the Medicare trustees issued such a warning in 2008, the MMA required that the President submit legislation to Congress responding to the warning within the 15-day period, beginning on the date of the budget submission to Congress this year. However, the President considers this requirement to be advisory and not binding, in accordance with the Recommendations Clause of the Constitution. The President's 2010 budget includes proposals that if enacted would bring the share of Medicare funded by general revenues below 45% (estimated Medicare savings are $92.3 billion over the five-year budget period, $287.5 billion over the 10-year budget period, and about $49.9 billion in 2014). The budget requests that these savings be set aside in a reserve fund for health care reform. Finally, the President's budget asserts that there are more significant ways to measure the health of the Medicare program than the warning, such as the overall financial burden of the program on the U.S. economy, the number of workers for each Medicare beneficiary, and/or Medicare spending as a percentage of GDP.", "The financial outlook for the HI trust fund, and for Medicare as a whole, continues to raise serious concerns. There are no simple solutions to address the problems raised by the aging of the population, the downturn in the economy, and the rapid growth in health care costs. Trustees and many other observers continue to warn that the magnitude of the impending deficit and the expanding drain on the federal budget need to be addressed. Even in the short run, correcting the financial imbalance in the HI trust fund will require substantial changes to program income and/or expenses. At the same time, observers express concern about the impact of any solution on quality of care and on beneficiaries' out-of-pocket costs. It seems likely that in the short term, Congress will focus its attention on specific Medicare issues—for example, payment updates for certain types of providers. It may also consider Medicare spending reductions as part of broader health reform legislation or as part of legislation (such as budget reconciliation) designed to reduce overall federal spending." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h2_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h2_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is Medicare?", "What are the different parts of Medicare?", "What characterizes the Part A program?", "How is the Part B program financed?", "What is Part D of Medicare?", "How do beneficiaries receive Medicare service?", "How are HI and SMI trust funds overseen?", "How has the future of HI changed since 2008 projections?", "How does this effect the evaluation of the HI fund?", "What is the financial state of the SMI fund?", "What is the stance of trustees regarding Medicare?", "What concerns exist regarding the financeability of Medicare?", "What does the MMA require?", "How is this relevant to the future of Medicare spending?", "What does this mean for potential presidential action?" ], "summary": [ "Medicare is the nation's health insurance program for individuals aged 65 and over and certain disabled persons.", "Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A or Hospital Insurance (HI); Part B or Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI); Part C or Medicare Advantage (MA); and Part D, the prescription drug benefit.", "The Part A program is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers; these are credited to the HI trust fund.", "The Part B program is financed through a combination of monthly premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI trust fund.", "A separate account in the SMI trust fund accounts for the Part D drug benefit; Part D is financed through general revenues and beneficiary premiums.", "Beneficiaries can choose to receive all their Medicare services, except hospice, through managed care plans under the MA program; payment is made on their behalf in appropriate parts from the HI and SMI trust funds.", "The HI and SMI trust funds are overseen by a board of trustees that makes annual reports to Congress.", "The 2009 report projects that under intermediate assumptions, the HI trust fund will become insolvent in 2017, two years earlier than projected in 2008.", "The HI fund fails to meet both the short- and long-range tests for financial adequacy.", "Because of the way it is financed, the SMI fund does not face insolvency; however, the trustees project that SMI expenditures will continue to grow rapidly.", "The trustees stress the importance of considering the Medicare program as a whole.", "There is concern that over time the economy will be unable to support the increasing reliance on general revenues, which in large measure come from taxes paid by the under-65 population.", "The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) requires that if the Medicare trustees project that 45% or more of Medicare's funding will come from general tax revenues within the current fiscal year or next six years, for two years in a row, the President must submit legislation to slow spending.", "For the fourth consecutive year, the 2009 Trustees Report estimated that general revenue funding will exceed 45% of total Medicare expenditures within seven years (in 2014).", "As a result of this new warning, in 2010, the President will be required to submit a legislative proposal to Congress that would lower the ratio below the 45% level." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 2, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
GAO_GAO-18-638	{ "title": [ "Background", "USPS’s Competitive Products Are Almost Always Scanned Correctly, Although Some Missed and Inaccurate Scans Occur", "USPS Has Designed Policies and Procedures to Support Accurate Scanning of Competitive Products, but Limitations Could Contribute to Scanning Errors", "USPS’s Scanning Policies and Procedures Are Not Based on Standards for Operational Internal Controls", "USPS Has Standard Operating Procedures for Scanning Competitive Products, but They May Not Guarantee Accurate Scanning", "USPS Holds Regular Training and Meetings to Support Accurate Scanning", "USPS Generates Reports for Tracking Scanning Performance, but Reports May Not Be Used Consistently by Managers to Resolve Scanning Issues", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Comments from the U.S. Postal Service", "Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "USPS has a wide range of domestic competitive products that are a growing sector of its business. The volume of USPS’s competitive products increased from approximately 750 million pieces in fiscal year 2008 to 4.9 billion pieces in fiscal year 2017. Revenue from these products increased from about 10 percent of all USPS mail revenues in fiscal year 2008 to about 28 percent in fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 1). USPS forecasts that continued growth in e-commerce will increase the volume of its competitive products, especially for the “last-mile” delivery service to consumers—which involves delivery from retail locations and fulfillment centers (i.e., where online orders are processed, packaged, and shipped out to USPS for delivery) to customers. USPS reported that in fiscal year 2017, revenue from competitive products exceeded USPS’s expectations by $500 million due to the growth in e-commerce and successful marketing and sales campaigns. USPS expects increased competition, though, in the first- and last-mile delivery services—collection and delivery of packages—from other delivery providers.\nTo remain competitive in the competitive product delivery market, USPS officials have stated that information gained from scanning is leveraged to provide customers with real-time visibility for the location of a competitive product in USPS’s delivery process as well as accurate estimates of the delivery time of USPS’s competitive products. Further, USPS’s latest strategic plan states that this information is one factor used to reduce its own costs through optimizing its network, including processing facilities, post offices, and numerous other facilities across the United States, and streamlining its operations.\nUSPS delivers competitive products across the nation, which it divides into seven postal areas comprised of 67 postal districts (see fig. 2). Managers at each level—postal area, postal district, and post office—are responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performance of the level below them. For example, each district manager is accountable to the area vice president. Postmasters, who manage individual post offices, are accountable to district managers and also monitor the performance of employees at their post office.\nTo track the movement of competitive products, USPS leverages automation (i.e., scanning by postal-processing equipment) and passive and active scan technology (i.e., scanning devices used by postal employees) to capture barcode information. In addition, when competitive products are not able to go through all the automated scans, USPS employees are to manually scan barcodes that have been placed on each item. These barcodes link the item with information in USPS’s databases such as: the delivery address, the type of USPS product, and when the item was accepted by USPS. According to USPS procedures, competitive products could be scanned up to 13 times to generate visibility necessary for USPS, mailers, and customers to track their packages as they move through USPS’s network (see fig. 3). For example, the first scan of the product—the “Acceptance” scan—is made when the item is dropped off at the post office or by a carrier if the product is picked up at a mailbox or customer address. The last scan—the “Acceptable Delivery Event” scan—generally means the item was successfully delivered to the addressee or that a delivery attempt was made (e.g., the product requires a signature but the recipient was not at home so another attempt will need to be made or the recipient will need to pick up the product). The interim scans reflect the product’s progress through the postal network, including through mail-processing plants and equipment. The scan data are transmitted to USPS’s data systems throughout the day. Scan information from these systems is available to USPS managers as well as mailers and customers who wish to track the progress of their items.\nUSPS’s employees use devices to scan competitive products in postal facilities and on delivery routes (see scans 1, 2, and 11–13 in fig. 3). Carriers usually use a handheld Mobile Delivery Device (MDD) to scan a package’s barcode. MDDs contain Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and transmit package scanning data and carrier location data using a cellular network. USPS employees working inside post offices or other facilities use similar scanning devices without GPS technology, such as the handheld Intelligent Mail Device (IMD) to perform the manual scans (see fig. 4).", "USPS reports we reviewed indicate that competitive products are almost always scanned and scanned correctly. USPS has an overall organizational goal of accurately scanning 100 percent of all mail pieces—both competitive and other products—that have a barcode. This includes scanning each competitive product at several points from acceptance, as described earlier. However, individual management employee-performance goals for scanning are set slightly lower than 100 percent, as USPS officials stated that they recognize that some scanning issues, such as for missing or damaged barcodes, may occur across post offices. According to USPS data we reviewed for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018, all but one of USPS’s 67 districts met USPS’s scanning goals for all five required scans for competitive products. Additionally, in one district we visited, a USPS internal report showed that every group of post offices in the district met its scanning goal for the arrival-at-unit scan for the week, the preceding 4 weeks, and the year-to- date periods, and all but one group of post offices met their scanning goals for the acceptable delivery scan for the same measurement period.\nIn addition, representatives for mailers we interviewed that use USPS’s competitive products stated that they were generally satisfied with USPS’s scanning performance. Representatives of all the major mailers we spoke with that rely on USPS’s delivery network said they believed that USPS is generally scanning competitive products accurately, although issues still occur. Representatives of mailers told us that they receive scanning data from USPS for their items throughout the day, with some mailers receiving the data every 15 minutes, a rate that allows them to track their items through USPS. Some mailers use this information to calculate the expected time of delivery and monitor USPS’s progress against their own estimates of delivery time to measure USPS’s performance. Representatives for major mailers we spoke with said they also get complaints from customers if items are late, lost, or inaccurately scanned, so the customers provide another source of information on any scanning issues. Four of the five representatives for major mailers we interviewed that sent items via USPS competitive products told us that they have seen improvement in USPS’s scanning performance in recent years. Additionally, all of the representatives for mailers we spoke with stated that USPS has increased the amount of scanning and the information provided from the scans in recent years.\nAlthough USPS has a high scanning rate, some missed and inaccurate scans for competitive products do occur, errors that could potentially affect millions of competitive products. For example, several USPS OIG reports between 2016 and 2018 found that instances of missed or inaccurate scans still occurred both nationwide and that in nine USPS districts they analyzed, were due in part, to post office personnel not always following proper scanning procedures and post office supervisors not adequately monitoring how scanning procedures were implemented. For example, the USPS OIG analyzed approximately 2 billion delivery scans over a 6-month period in 2017 and found that 1.9 million delivery scans (about 0.1 percent) occurred at the post office instead of at the delivery address and were considered improper scans. Furthermore, examples of USPS’s internal reports we reviewed containing scanning performance results showed that a small percentage of competitive mail items had not been scanned. For example, one USPS internal report for a district we visited showed that for one week, USPS employees in the district missed about 0.73 percent of the expected delivery scans for competitive products. Due to USPS’s large volume of competitive products, a small percentage of products not scanned can represent large numbers of items. For example, about 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan in one district’s 2018 year-to-date report we reviewed.\nAdditionally, the representatives of mailers we interviewed also reported occasional scanning issues with USPS’s competitive products. Most of the mailers’ representatives stated that when they see competitive items missing scanning data, it is generally an isolated situation and USPS usually fixes the issue. According to these representatives, USPS provides them with points of contact to work with to resolve scanning issues immediately and on a regular basis. However, one major mailer’s representative we spoke with stated that even though USPS’s employees are generally good at scanning packages, inaccurate delivery scanning is an issue. The representative stated that about 8 to 10 percent of the company’s products sent through USPS were scanned by carriers as delivered, but not at the customer’s delivery address—contrary to USPS’s standard operating procedures for scanning. The representative stated that, although this percentage has decreased in recent years, the mailer would like to see that number decrease further because delivery to the destination address assures them that the item was left as close as possible to the customer.\nUSPS is taking some steps to address missed or inaccurate scans. For example, USPS officials stated that the current electronic scanning device carried by almost all carriers on their routes does not prevent scanning a mail item as delivered to an address that is not the delivery address associated with the item’s barcode information. They also stated that USPS is updating scanning devices to alert carriers when they scan items as delivered when not physically at the correct delivery address. According to USPS officials, as of May 2018, 80 percent of hand-held electronic scanning devices used by USPS carriers had this functionality and that this functionality is being fine-tuned. This capability, though, still does not preclude all scanning errors, as it only affects the final delivery scan. USPS officials also stated that employees may still encounter scanning issues, such as damaged barcodes, which could lead to missed scans.", "", "USPS has not based its operational policies and procedures, such as those that support the accurate scanning of competitive products, on any standards for internal controls. USPS officials told us that they have not used any specific criteria for designing, implementing, and operating an internal control system for meeting its operational policies and internal controls, such as those that help ensure competitive products are accurately scanned. According to USPS officials, USPS does not follow the COSO Framework to design, implement or evaluate its operational internal controls as they believe that the COSO Framework standards are traditionally related to internal controls over financial reporting. In addition, USPS officials stated that USPS is not required to follow Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and therefore USPS does not follow these standards as well. Instead, USPS officials stated that USPS has designed its operational policies and internal controls over the years based on its unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices. However, officials could not identify any specific standards or framework they had followed.\nWe have reported that standards for the design, implementation, and operation of their internal-control system provide an overall framework for establishing and maintaining an effective internal-control system—which is a key factor in achieving an entity’s mission. Further, internal controls help managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. USPS has options to choose from in selecting standards for internal controls. Two widely used standards are the COSO Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which was adapted for federal entities from the COSO Framework. Both standards are designed to help an entity design, implement, and maintain an effective internal-control system. Such a system should encompass all aspects of an entity’s objectives, including operations, reporting, and compliance objectives, and can help an entity adapt to shifting environments, evolving demands, changing risks, and new priorities. Non-federal entities can adopt either of these standards in their efforts to design, implement, and operate an effective internal control system.\nAs stated above, we found that the COSO Framework to be a reasonable and relevant set of internal control standards to evaluate USPS’s operational internal-control activities. However, we and the USPS OIG have applied both the COSO Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government in evaluating USPS’s operational internal controls in recent reports. Without standards for an effective internal-control system for its operational policies and procedures for scanning competitive products, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to deliver those important products.", "USPS management has designed standard operating procedures to provide assurance that competitive products are scanned accurately. We found some of these procedures to be consistent with the COSO Framework, which states that an organization should deploy control activities through policies that establish what is expected and procedures that put policies into action. USPS has developed a scanning policy for its products, stating that “properly scanning all barcodes will result in World Class Visibility and be instrumental in retaining and growing our shipping business and providing valuable data to drive improved operational performance and reduce costs.” USPS also has procedures that establish the responsibilities of employees for accurately scanning barcodes for competitive products at various points in the mail flow. Although USPS officials stated that employees should rely on prompts from their scanning devices to ensure scans are done correctly, USPS communicates these procedures in three main ways: documents, such as City Carrier Handbook and Rural Carrier Handbook, that outline scanning procedures and that explain carriers’ duties, including scanning; job aids, such as posters showing proper scanning procedures (see fig. 5); and, standard work steps or guidance that lists procedural steps either for competitive products or for scanning mail in general (see fig. 6).\nFollowing these procedures is important to fulfill USPS’s scanning goals. As stated above, the USPS OIG found instances of missed or inaccurate scans for competitive items in recent reports. Further, the USPS OIG also recently found that USPS employees at all 15 postal facilities it visited in the Los Angeles District did not follow correct scanning procedures for USPS’s competitive Parcel Return Service product, leading to inconsistent counts for these products. Such errors can put USPS at risk of not collecting revenue for these products. The USPS OIG has made several recommendations in its recent reports to USPS management to reinforce the importance of these procedures to employees. USPS officials agreed with some of these recommendations and stated that they are taking action to address them.\nWhile reinforcing these procedures can be helpful, we found that USPS’s scanning procedures may not provide the necessary assurance for accurate scanning because they are not consistent. For example:\nThe USPS’s City Carrier Handbook states that mail with a barcode should be scanned at the delivery point (or address).\nHowever, a standard operating procedures document for city carriers at a post office we visited stated that carriers must scan each delivery confirmation mail piece but did not specify that this scan had to be at the delivery point or address. Locally developed procedures may not be uncommon, as one district manager told us that USPS headquarters allows managers to make a certain amount of flexibility to adapt the standard operating procedures for each post office.\nThe USPS document, SCANNING at a Glance: Delivering 100% Visibility, states that all mail items that require delivery scanning should be scanned at the delivery address, but this document also provides additional scanning procedures not contained in the City Carrier Handbook and other standard operating procedures documents we examined. In particular, the document contained procedures for scanning to account for mail being held for customers on vacation; scanning items correctly to account for mail not delivered to business that were closed; and for mail that was refused by the addressee.\nThis inconsistency in USPS’s scanning procedures has likely occurred because many of the documents have been updated at different times and have not always reflected new operations. For city carriers, the online version of the USPS’s City Carrier Handbook was last updated in April 2001. USPS officials stated that the most recent update regarding scanning was issued in November 2015 via a separate Postal Bulletin. Further, a separate standard operating procedure document for city carriers at a post office we visited was dated June 2006. For rural carriers, the most recently updated scanning procedures we found was dated 2013. As a result, some of these documents are not updated with the latest information on new scanning procedures. In a related example, the USPS OIG recently found that employees at three of the six USPS facilities the USPS OIG visited did not have an adequate understanding of the procedures for processing election and political mail due, in part, to guidance that was not updated, even though the procedures were centrally documented on an internal USPS website.\nUSPS officials recognized this issue and stated that these handbooks are not updated regularly as the content of the handbooks are subject to labor negotiations. Therefore, new procedures are presented to USPS employees outside of the handbooks. However, given that these efforts rely on employees to orally communicate information, having consistent documented procedures is even more important. In addition to stating that the organization should deploy control activities through policies and procedures, the COSO Framework states that senior management should communicate objectives clearly through the organization so that other management and personnel understand their individual roles in the organization. By not having consistent procedures, USPS risks not clearly communicating to its employees how they should carry out scanning procedures and therefore contributing to scanning errors. As discussed below, USPS officials told us that management updates its procedures typically through regular meetings with employees, which are documented in handouts or slides. USPS officials stated that management stresses the importance of scanning and that employees should follow the prompts on their electronic devices when scanning competitive products. However, employees can still scan competitive products as delivered even if they are not, as device prompts can be misread, misinterpreted, or ignored. Furthermore, even with current prompts, scanning errors can and do occur.\nConsistent procedures, clearly communicated to employees, have become increasingly important as USPS hires new employees to handle, in part, anticipated growth in the volume of competitive packages. For example, GAO analysis of USPS data showed that USPS’s carrier workforce increased by 6.4 percent between fiscal years 2015 and 2017. The USPS OIG has found that these new employees require training and guidance to properly perform their roles and to reduce turnover.", "In addition to deploying policies and procedures to achieve an organization’s objectives, the COSO Framework states that an organization should internally communicate objectives and responsibilities that are necessary to support the functioning of internal controls. This process can be accomplished through training and meetings. Specifically, the COSO Framework states that training should enable individuals to develop competencies appropriate for assigned roles and responsibilities, among other things, and that active forms of communication such as face-to-face meetings are often more effective than passive forms such as broadcast e-mails and intranet postings.\nTo communicate how its procedures should be correctly implemented, USPS has developed both initial and on-going training for employees. USPS officials stated that new employees are formally trained in scanning procedures when they start their employment. For example, carriers are trained how to use USPS’s electronic scanning devices, when to scan competitive items, the correct codes to use for different delivery situations (i.e., signature required, vacation holds, how to code where a package was left at a delivery address). Any new procedures can be introduced through presentations given by managers during meetings, as described below. Required regular meetings may be tracked by USPS management to ensure they are completed. Some district officials we spoke with stated that they certify that their employees have received required training and send that certification to area and USPS headquarters officials. Additional training also helps USPS reinforce correct scanning procedures. When scanning procedures are not being followed or scanning goals are not met at a post office, USPS officials stated that reminders of the correct procedures designed to reinforce USPS’s scanning procedures are presented to employees through presentations, posters, job aids, and additional documents such as carriers’ handbooks. For example, the representative of the major mailer we spoke with that had 8 to 10 percent of competitive products not scanned to the final delivery address stated that training was needed for both new and experienced carriers to reinforce that they should scan items at the delivery address.\nTo further ensure the accurate scanning of competitive products, USPS reported that it holds internal and external meetings. Specifically, these meetings are designed to:\nReinforce procedures: Post office managers can use stand-up talks— weekly meetings between management and employees at the post office—to discuss scanning issues with employees and opportunities to address those issues. For example, the postmaster at one post office we visited stated that this post office reinforces the standard work procedures designed to improve the scanning performance of employees during these meetings. Carriers and clerks can ask questions and learn why they are asked to do something or how to do a specific task, allowing for additional training and reinforcement of procedures. For example, we reviewed a handout developed by USPS headquarters to provide managers with talking points for service talks. This handout provided information on carriers delivering and scanning accurately and instructions on scanning at point of delivery on rural routes.\nIntroduce new procedures: USPS officials told us that post office managers use stand-up talks to introduce new procedures and processes with carriers and clerks. For example, postmasters stated that they used these meetings to introduce and train carriers on new scanning features at the post offices. USPS district and area management develop and disseminate memos and handouts to assist managers conducting these meetings. We reviewed handouts USPS provided to managers for service talks. These handouts provided information on the rollout of some of the most recent scanning procedure changes.\nContinuously improve operations: District managers we interviewed stated that post offices with low scanning performance scores are placed on a district’s list of underperforming post offices. USPS district managers we interviewed told us that they meet with these post offices to determine how each post office plans to improve its scanning performance. District management also conducts audits of underperforming post offices and post offices that are in need of improvement. Our review of one district office’s service review checklist identified the key areas of audit for underperforming post offices.\nReassess procedures: Representatives of mailers we interviewed told us that they meet with USPS representatives to discuss ways USPS can share scanning information for competitive products.", "Given that inaccurate scans can and do occur, it is important that postal managers explore and investigate any instances of missed or inaccurate scans. To do so, USPS managers—including area vice presidents, district managers, and postmasters—use a variety of reports as tools to ensure that the required scans are made at the appropriate place and time, and take action to monitor the status of competitive products, track lost items, and identify scanning issues. USPS headquarters designs reports used by managers to review performance at the local level across the country. Managers at each level are responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performances of the level below them. For example, the postmaster monitors performance of employees at the post office and is accountable to the district manager. In turn, each district manager is held accountable by the area vice president.\nTo monitor performance of scanning of competitive products, these managers have access to several USPS data systems to generate reports. They can use the reports to monitor scanning performance of carriers and clerks at each post office and to identify the causes of scanning issues, such as missing or incorrect scans. Managers can also use these reports to track the status of competitive products or to investigate customer complaints of lost items. Some examples of reports available to managers include the following:\nReport 1: USPS officials told us that each post office receives this report from their District Office. The report identifies competitive products that do not have all the required scans, such as scans when the item arrives at the post office or when a delivery attempt was made. For example, one district official sends postmasters weekly reports on competitive products that do not have all the required scans. The officials told us that these reports help managers investigate the cause of incorrect scans identified in the report and how to prevent future occurrences.\nReport 2: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by district managers to proactively identify scanning irregularities, such as scans that may be out of sequence or multiple competitive products that are scanned at the same time but are for different addresses. District management can query postmasters about these scans and ask them to investigate the reason for the irregularities and determine if the scan was appropriate.\nReport 3: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by postmasters to monitor scanning status and performances for each competitive product that has received an arrival scan but lacks a delivery scan. While this may indicate a problem, it could also just reflect that the final scan had not been made by the end of the day or the scan that had not been uploaded into the USPS data systems when the report was generated.\nWhile having these reports are helpful, their full potential to help USPS managers may be limited because USPS lacks detailed and up-to-date standard operating procedures for how managers should use these reports or conduct other activities to efficiently investigate and resolve scanning issues. USPS’s Scanning Performance: Delivery Standard Operating Procedures for managers are a list of bullet points outlining managers’ responsibilities to meet scanning performance target goals and not a list of detailed procedures for managers to follow, such as how to use Report 1 to identify items that do not have all the required scans. In addition, USPS officials told us that this list has not been updated since approximately October 2005. The COSO Framework states that organizations should internally communicate information, including objectives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary to support the functioning of internal control. Further, it states that a process should be in place to communicate required information to enable all personnel to understand and carry out their internal-control responsibilities.\nAbsent such communication, managers may take different actions to address problems or may have difficulty knowing where to find the appropriate information to locate a missing item to resolve a customer’s complaint quickly. For example, one post office manager told us that he will look at the scanning history in the USPS data systems to determine if the item received an acceptable delivery event scan or what the status of the item is on the route, while another post office manager told us he will use GPS data to see where the scans were made to determine if the item was delivered to the right address. If managers do not know where to find the appropriate information, they may spend more time investigating and be less efficient in resolving issues.\nFurther, not having detailed standard operating procedures means managers may not be aware of all the reports available to them. For example, some post office managers told us that they use Report 3 while other post office managers told us that this report was not available to them. Without using Report 3, some managers told us that they look in several sources to find the same information needed to resolve the issue, such as locating a lost package. Some managers told us that USPS management discontinued the report because it was being misused by some managers. Specifically, managers told us that some managers were manually entering scanning or service-performance information retroactively to improve their performance scores. However, they told us that USPS management recently made Report 3 available to managers again but changed features to reduce any misuse.\nAdditionally, USPS may miss opportunities to prevent scanning issues from happening again by not clearly communicating how managers should use the various reports to address specific scanning issues. For example, the USPS OIG recently determined that instances of missed and inaccurate scans for competitive products were a result of USPS management not adequately monitoring the implementation of those procedures. Without detailed procedures to guide managers in finding and using specific information in available reports and other tools, managers will not have consistent information to use to investigate and resolve customer complaints quickly or accurately. In addition, new managers may not know where to go for the most appropriate information and how to use this information to address some issues.", "As competitive products have become essential to USPS’s economic viability, it is increasingly important for USPS to accurately track them to remain competitive in this market. While USPS may be scanning most mail accurately, there continue to be instances where mail is not scanned accurately or is missing scans. Given the volume and growth in these competitive products, even a small percentage of inaccurately scanned products could be a large number of such products. Since USPS’s procedures were developed absent standards for internal control, the adoption of a set of internal control standards could enhance USPS’s efforts to continuously improve the design, implementation, and evaluation of its operational internal controls for scanning of competitive products. Further, since USPS’s standard operating procedures for scanning are located in numerous documents and are not always consistent—and given USPS’s reliance on stand-up talks and meetings to keep employees current—USPS employees may not always have accurate scanning procedures easily accessible to them. Having consistent standard operating procedures is increasingly important to ensure that employees are making accurate scans. Additionally, standard procedures that guide managers to investigate and resolve scanning issues would help managers more efficiently address these issues and ideally prevent these issues from happening again.", "To improve USPS’s competitive products scanning, we recommend that the Postmaster General take the following three actions.\nThe Postmaster General should identify and adopt a set of internal control standards that can be used as the basis for operational internal-control activities, such as those for scanning competitive products. (Recommendation 1)\nThe Postmaster General should improve the communication of standard operating procedures for scanning competitive products by, for example, updating or consolidating USPS documents, job aids, and standard work steps. (Recommendation 2)\nThe Postmaster General should create standard operating procedures for managers on how to address inaccurate scans and use available reports to investigate and resolve scanning issues. (Recommendation 3)", "We provided a draft of this product to USPS for its review and comment. USPS’s comments are reproduced in appendix I.\nUSPS stated that it cannot agree with our recommendation to identify and adopt a set of internal control standards for USPS’s operational internal control activities at this time. Although USPS has adopted an internal control framework for its financial internal control activities, USPS does not know what the benefits and costs are of adopting internal control standards for its operational internal control activities. As a result, USPS agreed to conduct a cost study to determine whether to commit resources to identifying and adopting a set of internal control standards for its operational internal control activities. We are encouraged that USPS is planning to conduct such a study and anticipate that performing this study will result in the implementation of an appropriate set of internal control standards. USPS agreed with the two recommendations regarding scanning procedures and committed to completing corrective actions by November of 2018.\nIn its general comments, USPS noted that our reference to the USPS OIG’s report, Processing Readiness for Election and Political Mail for the 2018 Midterm Elections did not appear germane to the scanning of competitive mail. We recognize that this report was focused on a different type of mail, but as USPS noted in its letter, we use the OIG report as a related example of how USPS has taken efforts to improve the communication of its scanning procedures to employees. Therefore, we determined that our use of the report is appropriate. We have added information from the OIG report to characterize the OIG’s recommendations and USPS’s actions to address those recommendations.\nUSPS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Postmaster General, the Chairman of the Postal Regulatory Commission, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.", "", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Kyle Browning (Assistant Director); Greg Hanna (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Hansen; Thanh Lu; John Mingus; Faye Morrison; Malika Rice; Amy Rosewarne; Crystal Wesco; Elizabeth Wood; and Matthew Zaun made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full h2_full", "h0_full", "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h2_full", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "To what does the term competitive products in the USPS refer?", "How are competitive products handled by USPS?", "What is the reliability of scanning for competitive products?", "What data supports this?", "What do stakeholders suggest about the efficacy of USPS's scanning?", "To what extent does USPS secure accurate scanning?", "What is the basis for USPS scanning procedures?", "Why might this limit USPS?", "What issue does USPS have with document scanning?", "What does mean for employee performance?", "To what extent does USPS address scanning errors?", "What is the risks that might stem from USPS's lack of procedures?", "What was the GAO asked to review?", "What does this report cover?", "What resources did the GAO use for this report?" ], "summary": [ "Mail products over which the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not exercise market dominance, such as many of its packages, are called competitive products.", "These items are scanned throughout the mail delivery system to track their progress (see figure).", "USPS data show that these products are almost always scanned.", "For example, USPS data showed that for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018; all but one of USPS's 67 districts met their scanning goals.", "Additionally, mailers that account for a high volume of USPS's competitive products told GAO that they believed USPS was generally scanning products correctly. For example, a report from one USPS district showed that for one week, 0.73 percent of the products delivered were missing a scan and that for the fiscal year to date almost 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan.", "USPS has designed and implemented procedures and activities to help ensure accurate scanning, but some limitations could contribute to scanning errors. For example, USPS has not based its operational procedures for scanning on any internal control standards.", "USPS officials said the procedures were based on USPS's unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices, but the officials could not identify specific standards or a framework that they followed as the basis for the procedures. USPS officials said they did not believe any internal controls standards applied to these procedures.", "By not basing procedures on standards, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to scan and measure the performance of competitive products.", "Additionally, USPS's scanning procedure documents, such as for outlining specific delivery scanning steps, are not always consistent, and USPS relies on more informal methods, such as meetings with employees to communicate changes.", "Thus, employees may not have accurate procedures available to them.", "Finally, USPS lacks procedures to help managers identify and address incorrect scans, address customer complaints or otherwise address scanning irregularities. For example, USPS's guidance for managers is limited to a list of bullet-points that do not detail the steps managers should follow to resolve scanning irregularities. In addition, this list has not been updated since 2005.", "Without consistent or detailed procedures, USPS's employees and managers may not scan items accurately or find information needed to resolve scanning issues—a situation that could hinder USPS's ability to reduce inaccurate or missing scans for these important mail products.", "GAO was asked to review USPS's scanning policies and procedures.", "In this report, GAO (1) describes USPS's scanning performance and (2) examines how USPS ensures accurate scanning.", "GAO reviewed USPS's policies and procedures and assessed them against internal control standards; interviewed officials from USPS and five high-volume mailers; and conducted site visits to six post offices in two USPS districts that represented a range of volume, number of routes, and performance." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 2, 1, -1, 0, 1, -1, 3, -1, -1, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-19-268	{ "title": [ "Background", "DHS’s 2012 Memorandum on Addressing Allegations of Unlawful Profiling", "TSA’s Use of Behavior Detection", "Overview of Optimized Behavior Detection Training", "TSA’s Oversight of Behavior Detection", "Passenger Complaint Review and Referral Process", "Screeners Using Behavior Detection Receive Basic and Recurrent Training Related to Profiling, and TSA Evaluates Training Effectiveness Using the Kirkpatrick Model", "Screeners Conducting Behavior Detection Receive Training on TSA’s Policies and Procedures That Prohibit Unlawful Profiling", "TSA Evaluates Training Courses Using the Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model", "TSA Has Oversight Policies for Behavior Detection and Prohibits Unlawful Profiling but Does Not Specifically Assess Whether Profiling Occurs", "TSA Received About 3,700 Complaints Alleging Violations of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties from October 2015 to February 2018 and Recommended Screener Training to Address Complaints", "The TCC Received 3,663 Complaints Related to Passenger Screening and a Majority of the Complaints Alleged Discrimination or Profiling Based on Personal Attributes and Characteristics", "TSA’s Multicultural Branch Reviewed More Than 2,000 Complaints and Recommended a Range of Screener Training", "TSA’s Multicultural Branch Analyzes and Shares Passenger Complaint Data to Inform Screener Training", "Conclusions", "Recommendation for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Additional Training Related to Unlawful Profiling", "Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Complaints Submitted to the Transportation Security Administration Contact Center", "Appendix III: GAO Analysis of Complaints Submitted to the Transportation Security Administration Contact Center by Airport", "Appendix IV: Agency Comments", "Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "In 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum directing TSA to take a number of actions in response to allegations of profiling by behavior detection officers. These actions included, among others, working with the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to (1) review, and revise as necessary, behavior detection officer training policies, training curriculum, and supervisory guidance to ensure they adequately address and train against profiling; (2) enhance data collection to facilitate appropriate supervision and monitoring of behavior detection activities; and (3) ensure passengers are aware of complaint mechanisms and ensure complaints are appropriately handled.\nTSA has taken some actions to address these directives. For example, TSA has revised its standard operating procedures and training materials to more clearly instruct personnel trained in behavior detection and other TSA personnel on how to avoid unlawful profiling; initiated a study to collect data on the race and national origin of passengers referred for behavior detection screening and examine whether disparities exist in the referral trends, and if so, whether these differences suggest discrimination or bias in the referral process; and issued a Management Directive establishing TSA policy and procedures for receiving, documenting, and referring passenger screening complaints resulting from the application of TSA security screening policies and procedures, including processes for all involved offices in headquarters and the field that handle passenger complaints.", "The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the nation’s civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all passengers and property transported by commercial passenger aircraft. At the approximately 440 TSA-regulated airports in the United States, all passengers, their accessible property, and their checked baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft or entering the sterile area of an airport pursuant to statutory and regulatory requirements and TSA-established standard operating procedures. TSA began using behavior detection in 2006 as an added layer of security to identify potentially high- risk passengers.\nThrough the end of fiscal year 2016, TSA’s behavior detection screening process was a stand-alone program that used specially trained behavior detection officers to observe passengers at the screening checkpoint and engage them in brief verbal exchanges. During this period, behavior detection officers had brief interactions with passengers in the queue leading up to the screening checkpoint. If the behavior detection officers determined during this interaction that a passenger exhibited a certain number of behavioral indicators, the behavior detection officer was to refer the passenger for additional screening or, if circumstances warranted, contact a law enforcement officer. According to TSA procedures, if a passenger was referred for additional screening, one behavior detection officer conducted a pat-down of the passenger and search of his or her personal property while another checked documents and conversed with the passenger, attempting to understand why the behavioral indicators were being displayed and continuing to look for additional behavioral indicators. If a passenger did not exhibit a certain number of additional indicators, he or she was allowed to proceed to the boarding gate. If the passenger did exhibit a certain number of additional indicators, or other events occurred, such as the discovery of a fraudulent document, the behavior detection officer was to call a law enforcement officer. The law enforcement officer then would determine next steps, which could include questioning the passenger or conducting a criminal background check. The law enforcement officer then determined whether to release the passenger, refer the passenger to another law enforcement agency, or arrest him or her.\nIn fiscal year 2017, consistent with the Aviation Security Act of 2016, TSA eliminated the stand-alone behavior detection officer position. TSA transferred the former behavior detection officers to serve as part of the screener workforce and began assigning them to the checkpoint to screen passengers. According to TSA officials, when screeners trained in behavior detection are assigned to a position, TSA policies and procedures permit them to use behavior detection when applicable. Furthermore, TSA’s checkpoint standard operating procedures do not currently include the use of behavior detection, as behavior detection’s use continues to be guided by its own policies established in 2016.\nHowever, some screeners trained in behavior detection continue to use behavior detection to support passenger screening canine teams as part of expedited screening. As part of this process, screeners trained in behavior detection work in conjunction with canine teams to observe passenger behavior and identify passenger behaviors that may indicate that a passenger poses a higher risk to the aviation system.", "The Training and Development Division (Training Division), within TSA headquarters, oversees the development, delivery, and evaluation of training programs for TSA employees. The National Training Plan, developed annually by the Training Division and Security Operations, contains the core curriculum for screeners to meet their yearly training requirements. In addition, Security Operations works with the Traveler Engagement Division to develop and deliver specific training on topics such as disability profiling, racial profiling, and screening transgender persons.\nIn August 2017, TSA began training screeners on its new behavioral indicators. TSA revised the behavioral indicators by eliminating and combining some of the indicators used to observe passenger behavior, which TSA refers to as Optimized Behavior Detection. According to TSA officials, Optimized Behavior Detection includes 36 revised behavioral indicators—which TSA pared down from a list of 96 indicators. As of January 2019, TSA officials told us out of the approximately 43,000 screeners nationwide, a total of 2,541 screeners had been trained at 117 airports in Optimized Behavior Detection.\nScreeners must be trained in passenger and accessible property screening before they are eligible to attend Optimized Behavior Detection training. Upon successful completion of Optimized Behavior Detection training, screeners are permitted to utilize behavior detection in accordance with the standard operating procedures, such as when operating in conjunction with canine teams or screening airport and airline workers. In addition, screeners must complete all requirements in the National Training Plan which includes elements of training on TSA’s mechanisms for preventing unlawful profiling.", "TSA’s Security Operations is responsible for overseeing the use of behavior detection. TSA’s behavior detection policies and procedures prohibit screeners from selecting passengers for additional screening based on race, ethnicity, religion, and other factors, whether through behavior detection or other security measures. This responsibility includes overseeing officers trained in behavior detection to ensure they conduct behavior detection without regard to race/ethnicity, color, gender/sex, gender identity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or disability, in accordance with constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and other legal and DHS policy requirements to protect the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals. Although the stand-alone behavior detection officer position was eliminated and the program ended in 2017, the requirement to conduct oversight and verify compliance with TSA policies still applies when behavior detection is used, such as when behavior detection is used in conjunction with passenger screening canine teams. According to TSA’s policies and procedures, supervisors must conduct oversight observations of behavior detection activities a minimum of 8 hours every 14 days to verify and document compliance with behavior detection policies, standard operating procedures, the handbook, and training, among other things, and submit a compliance checklist documenting the review to TSA Security Operations.", "The TSA Contact Center (TCC) is the primary point of contact for collecting, documenting, and responding to public questions, concerns, or complaints regarding passengers’ screening experience; reports and claims of lost, stolen, or damaged items; and complaints submitted by TSA employees. The TCC may refer screening complaints for resolution to other TSA headquarters offices, depending on the specific allegation. For example, complete complaints alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties, which include allegations implicating color, race, ethnicity, gender, genetic information, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, and parental status, must be referred to the Multicultural Branch. Figure 1 describes the TCC’s complaint review process.\nTSA’s Multicultural Branch is responsible for collecting, monitoring, and adjudicating passenger complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations at the passenger screening checkpoint, including complaints alleging unlawful profiling and discrimination, among other things. The Multicultural Branch receives complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations from several sources within TSA including the TCC. When TCC officials determine a complete complaint involves a potential civil rights or civil liberties violation, they are to forward the complaint to the Multicultural Branch where staff are to input the complaint into a database and track the resolution of each complaint they receive. The Multicultural Branch, in consultation with Security Operations, determines whether a screener followed standard operating procedures while screening the complainant by reviewing available video of an incident or interviewing witnesses who saw the incident.\nDepending on the nature and severity of the allegation, TSA airport staff may also elevate the complaint and evidence to the airport’s Assistant Federal Security Director (FSD) for Screening. If the investigation finds fault with the screener, the screener’s supervisor or manager is to determine the corrective action to be taken. Corrective actions specified in TSA’s guidelines for disciplinary actions to address misconduct range from mandating that the screener take additional training to correct the behavior to terminating the screener’s employment for multiple repeat offenses or a single egregious action. Following the outcome of the complaint review and any resulting corrective actions, the TSA headquarters unit or the TSA customer support manager at the airport is to communicate the status of the resolution, if any, to the complainant— such as by using a template letter that explains TSA’s policies and procedures or issuing an apology. According to Multicultural Branch protocols for reviewing passenger complaints, complaints may be resolved in three ways:\nClosed-Administratively: If the complainant does not respond within 10 days to the Multicultural Branch’s first contact for additional information, such as a request for additional information on the alleged civil rights and civil liberties violation, the complaint is to be closed.\nClosed-No Jurisdiction: Complaints that are not within the Multicultural Branch’s jurisdiction, such as complaints involving rude and unprofessional conduct that are not related to allegations of civil rights and civil liberties violations, are to be closed and referred to other TSA offices or the TSA designated point of contact at the airport for further handling.\nClosed-Resolved: Following the outcome of the investigation, the Multicultural Branch is to send a letter to the complainant summarizing the allegations reviewed, explaining whether TSA procedures were followed, and in some cases, issuing an apology or informing the complainant of the type of training offered to the screener(s). The Multicultural Branch may recommend training and provide refresher training materials for distribution at the airport to the screener(s) involved, if identified, or for all screeners at the airport’s checkpoint at which the complaint originated. According to TSA officials, the Multicultural Branch recommends training when standard operating procedures for screening were not followed or when it determines that the proactive measure of refresher training would be useful. According to TSA, the designated TSA point of contact at the airport is required to verify when the training is completed.", "", "Before screeners are eligible to conduct any behavior detection activities, they must first complete a 5-day Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training course, and undergo on-the-job training at their local airport. This course includes an overview of DHS and TSA policies that prohibit unlawful profiling, and trains screeners to apply behavioral indicators to passengers without regard to race/ethnicity, color, gender/sex, gender identity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or disability. Participants must complete the Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training course and pass a 40 question job knowledge test at the end of the class, in addition to completing 32 hours of on-the-job training under the supervision of an officer already trained in behavior detection. If a participant fails the job knowledge test, he or she is to receive 1 hour of remedial training before retaking the test. Screeners must pass the test in two attempts to be eligible to conduct behavior detection activities.\nIn the four Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training courses we attended, the training instructors covered TSA’s policies on prohibiting unlawful profiling on day one of the course, and explained that profiling passengers based on discernible traits was not only illegal, but that such practices are ineffective at identifying potentially high-risk passengers. In addition, the course manual included a copy of DHS’s 2013 memorandum defining racial profiling, which all participants were required to review. To test their understanding of TSA policy and the Optimized Behavior Detection Standard Operating Procedures, the instructors presented various scenarios to engage participants in practicing how they would apply behavior detection at the checkpoint.\nThe 2018 National Training Plan required behavior detection–trained screeners to complete four recurrent technical training courses related to behavior detection, including two that contain material reinforcing DHS’s and TSA’s policies prohibiting unlawful profiling. Screeners participate in each of the four interactive training courses using a computer and the courses contain knowledge checks that the participant must answer correctly before completing the training. Table 1 describes the training courses screeners trained in behavior detection are required to complete and appendix I includes a list of additional training related to unlawful profiling.", "TSA determines the effectiveness of particular training programs using the Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model, a commonly accepted training evaluation model endorsed by the Office of Personnel Management and used throughout the federal government. In May 2018, TSA updated its training standards based on the ADDIE model, a methodology comprising five phases: Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation (ADDIE). TSA uses the Kirkpatrick model as part of the evaluation stage of ADDIE. The Kirkpatrick model consists of a four-level approach for soliciting feedback from training course participants and evaluating the impact the training had on individual development, among other things.\nTSA conducts Levels 1 and 2 evaluations on selected training courses. Table 2 provides an overview of the Kirkpatrick model and the evaluation levels for courses related to behavior detection and unlawful profiling.\nTSA officials told us they will continue to evaluate the Optimized Behavior Detection Basic Training course and Level 3 evaluations are under development, as they roll out their training evaluation process. According to TSA’s Training Standards, a review team determines the frequency of curriculum review, which should occur at least once every 5 years. As part of this review, TSA plans to leverage data reported in evaluations at Kirkpatrick Levels 1 through 3.", "TSA’s 2016 Optimized Behavior Detection Program Handbook and Operational Oversight Compliance Guidance require supervisors to conduct routine checks of behavior detection operations to monitor compliance with standard operating procedures. TSA’s behavior detection Operational Oversight Compliance Guidance outlines seven specific assessments of behavior detection operations and includes a checklist for each assessment for managers to document completion of these routine oversight tasks. According to TSA officials, these assessments should occur when screeners use behavior detection in conjunction with canine operations and while screening airline and airport workers, among other activities. When conducting these assessments, supervisors are to conduct 1-hour observations and use detailed checklists to document how screeners trained in behavior detection perform the behavior detection in practice. For example, one checklist requires supervisors to observe how screeners trained in behavior detection monitor passenger flow and communicate with passengers while observing for behavioral indicators, such as ensuring screeners using behavior detection do not ask passengers intrusive or offensive questions, among other activities related to the use of behavior detection.\nHowever, our review of the oversight checklists found that they do not specifically instruct supervisors to monitor for compliance with procedures intended to prohibit unlawful profiling. According to TSA officials, TSA’s guidance and checklists do not include this type of monitoring for unlawful profiling because officials believe that the training screeners receive, adherence to the standard operating procedures, and the general supervisory oversight in place are sufficient to prevent unlawful profiling and could alert supervisors to situations where unlawful profiling happens. However, the 2013 DHS memorandum on DHS’s policy on unlawful profiling states that each component, including TSA, should both implement specific policy and procedures on racial profiling, and ensure all personnel are trained and held accountable for meeting the standards set forth in DHS policy. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish and implement activities to monitor the internal control system and evaluate the results, as well as remediate identified internal control deficiencies. Such a mechanism could be an item added to a checklist for supervisors to document, based on their observations, whether screeners selected individuals for additional scrutiny in a manner consistent with policies and procedures.\nAnother oversight mechanism, as noted in DOJ’s guidance on the use of race and other factors, could be studying the implementation of policies and procedures that prohibit unlawful profiling through targeted, data- driven research projects. As previously discussed, in 2013, TSA initiated a study and collected data through October 2017 on passengers referred for secondary screening to monitor compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling. TSA discontinued the study and did not analyze the data collected because the stand-alone behavior detection program ended in November 2017. As a result of not conducting the analysis, TSA does not know what the data would have shown regarding compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling.\nTSA officials said they plan to update the behavior detection and checkpoint screening policies, procedures, and guidance during fiscal year 2019. As a part of this update, TSA officials told us they plan to include language in the standard operating procedures reinforcing the use of behavior detection simultaneously with other checkpoint duties, such as the document checker position. However, TSA officials told us they are not planning to add an oversight mechanism specific to profiling as part of the updates because, as previously noted, they believe screener training, adherence to the standard operating procedures, and general supervisory oversight are sufficient. Developing a specific oversight mechanism, such as a checklist or a data-driven study, to monitor screeners’ compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling would provide TSA with greater assurance that its personnel are adhering to these policies when using behavior detection, and better position TSA to identify potential incidents of unlawful profiling.", "", "The TCC received 3,663 complaints related to passenger screening alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties from October 2015 through February 2018. These complaints are not specific to behavior detection activities and generally reflect alleged conduct occurring at the screening checkpoint through the application of screening measures. We analyzed the 3,663 complaints and found that the majority (2,251 of 3,663) of the complaints alleged discrimination or profiling based on personal attributes and characteristics. For example, the TCC received complaints alleging discrimination that involved assertions by passengers that they had been selected for pat-downs based on race and ethnicity, among other reasons, when the passengers believed they did not trigger an alarm prompting the pat-downs. The TCC also received complaints related to passengers’ transgender identity alleging selection for additional screening because of their transgender status. Additionally, the TCC received passenger complaints alleging that screening procedures were aggressive or inappropriate for senior citizens. Table 3 provides a list of complaint types based on our analysis. In addition, appendix II provides additional detail about our content analysis of complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations, and appendix III provides a list of 10 airports most often identified in the complaints.\nAs TSA’s primary point of contact for passenger complaints, the TCC is responsible for the initial review and referral of all complaints that involve allegations of civil rights and civil liberties violations to the Multicultural Branch. According to the TCC standard operating procedures, TCC analysts review the complaints to ensure that they contain the necessary information to be considered complete, including the airport, passenger’s name, date of the incident, and description of the alleged civil rights and civil liberties violation. In addition, complaints reported over the phone or made on behalf of another person without the person’s consent are initially considered incomplete. For complaints that are not complete, the TCC sends the passenger a document request for information when the passenger has provided correct contact information. According to TCC officials, passengers often do not provide the correct contact information or do not respond with the necessary information to complete the complaint. TCC officials said that incomplete complaints are typically sent to the Multicultural Branch for informational purposes. Multicultural Branch officials told us that they consider information from incomplete complaints to inform its policy and training initiatives, and to improve how TSA engages with the public.\nFrom October 2015 through February 2018, the TCC referred 51 percent (1,865) of the 3,663 complaints it received to the Multicultural Branch for review. The TCC reported that 48 percent (1,764) of the 3,663 complaints did not have complete information necessary for further review, such as the airport and date of the incident. According to TSA officials, these complaints were sent to the Multicultural Branch for informational purposes. TCC’s passenger complaint data show that the remaining 1 percent (34) of the complaints were from TSA employees and were referred to other TSA offices for review.", "TSA’s Multicultural Branch receives and reviews complete complaints related to allegations of violations of civil rights and civil liberties that are referred to it from the TCC, DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, TSA’s Disability Branch, and TSA personnel at airports. From October 2015 through February 2018, the Multicultural Branch received 2,059 complaints alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties, as shown in figure 2. Multicultural Branch officials stated that the majority of these complaints were referred from the TCC.\nAs shown in figure 2, for 1,066 (52 percent) of the complaints, Multicultural Branch staff found indications of potential discrimination, such as instances of rude or unprofessional conduct that included the use of race or other protected characteristics. According to Multicultural Branch staff, to resolve the 1,066 complaints, they recommended a range of refresher training. Multicultural Branch staff explained that when issues are identified, their policy is to address the issues through screener training. Multicultural Branch officials reported that these trainings were provided through National Shift Briefings, which were circulated across TSA, or through training provided at a particular airport. For example: In one of the complaint cases we reviewed, a passenger alleged profiling based on headwear. Multicultural Branch officials used camera recordings and statements from officers involved in the encounter to substantiate that screening procedure violations had occurred. As a result, Multicultural Branch officials recommended refresher training to the airport on headwear screening protocols for all screeners at the airport to review.\nIn another complaint case we reviewed, a passenger alleged profiling based on the use of a tribal-issued photo identification card. In response, Multicultural Branch officials sent refresher training on verifying tribal identification and the screening of Native American passengers to the TSA designated point of contact at the airport involved for distribution to TSA personnel identified in the complaint.\nIn a third complaint reviewed, a passenger alleged being profiled at the screening checkpoint, without including any additional details. According to TSA officials, based on the particular allegations of the complaint and the lack of details, TSA was unable to substantiate the allegations made in the complaint. As a result, Multicultural Branch sent National Shift Briefings on TSA’s policies and procedures that prohibit unlawful profiling and inappropriate comments to the TSA designated point of contact at the airport involved for distribution to TSA personnel identified in the complaint.\nAs shown in figure 2, there were 993 complaints that the Multicultural Branch reviewed but did not address through training. The Multicultural Branch closed 121 of these complaints because it determined that the complainant did not provide sufficient information about the alleged civil rights and civil liberties violation for Multicultural Branch review and the complainant did not respond with additional information requested by the Multicultural Branch within 10 days. The Multicultural Branch determined that the remaining 872 complaints were not substantiated based on its review of the camera recording of the alleged incident, or were not within its jurisdiction. For the complaints not within its jurisdiction, the Multicultural Branch referred them to other TSA offices, to TSA officials at the airport or airports identified in the complaints for review, or to other federal agencies (e.g., U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Transportation, or the Federal Aviation Administration) as appropriate. These complaints involved allegations of unprofessional conduct and other issues that did not involve allegations of civil rights and civil liberties violations.\nAccording to Multicultural Branch guidance, the designated TSA point of contact at the airport along with the Multicultural Branch analyst are to determine appropriate next steps for resolving complaints, such as preparing a briefing for screeners that is tailored to address the concerns raised by the complainant. TSA officials stated that resolutions to the complainant are tailored to reflect the allegation, type of inquiry conducted, and investigation of the facts and evidence underlying the complaint. TSA’s responses to the complainant include, but are not limited to, apologizing for the screening experience or informing the complainant about the next steps such as the agency’s plans to address the complaint or underlying conduct that gave rise to the complaint. For example, in a letter we reviewed, TSA apologized for the “unprofessional and inappropriate personal questions” the passenger experienced during screening, and stated that refresher training would be distributed to screeners at the airport involved. According to documentation we reviewed related to this complaint, the Multicultural Branch sent refresher training materials on avoiding inappropriate comments to the designated TSA point of contact at the airport involved. In addition, TSA’s office of Human Capital Employee Relations reported that it took a range of disciplinary actions—from letters of reprimand to termination—for 100 screeners from October 2015 through February 2018, in part in response to passenger complaints alleging civil rights and civil liberties violations.", "TSA’s Multicultural Branch regularly collects and analyzes data on passenger civil rights and civil liberties and discrimination complaints and their resolution status, and shares this information with TSA executive leadership, TSA airport customer service managers, and screeners in the field, among others. Multicultural Branch officials told us their staff are assigned to specific airports based on geographic region, and they continually analyze passenger complaints referred to their office from the TCC to identify trends. Staff members meet weekly to discuss trends in complaints for their geographic regions, and they review weekly, quarterly, and annual reports on the number and category of complaints referred to their office by the TCC. In addition, Multicultural Branch officials track the resolution of the cases for which they have jurisdiction and submit this information to their senior leadership each week. Specifically, the Multicultural Branch uses a database to track complaints by type, airport, submission date, and resolution status, such as how many cases are open, closed, or whether they have been resolved.\nMulticultural Branch officials share trends in complaints throughout TSA in several ways, including conference calls, monthly briefings, reporting metrics to TSA executive leadership, and on-site training events at airports each year. For example, Multicultural Branch officials hold monthly conference calls with customer service managers at airports to review complaint trends, upcoming on-site airport trainings, and job aids they have developed to help screeners understand issues, such as screening passengers wearing religious headwear. Multicultural Branch officials stated they also share information with screeners and supervisors through National Shift Briefings that are distributed at all airports, and focus on bringing awareness to screeners on events they need to be aware of when screening passengers, such as religious observances occurring that month.\nAccording to TSA officials, the Multicultural Branch uses its analysis of passenger complaints and the results of complaint investigations to develop training aids and materials on areas where they determine screeners need more training, such as multicultural awareness or screening of transgender passengers. For example, the Multicultural Branch has developed briefings focusing on unlawful profiling and unconscious bias which reiterated that unlawful profiling is against TSA policy, defined unconscious bias, and provided scenario-based examples. Additionally, members from the Multicultural Branch hold on-site training for screeners at selected airports each year based on complaint data analysis and other factors. These training sessions last three days, include topics stemming from complaint data TSA has analyzed, and can include webinars, role-playing, and other forms of instruction.", "DHS and TSA have policies prohibiting unlawful profiling—using race, ethnicity, gender, or other protected characteristics to identify passengers for additional screening—when using behavior detection, as well as other screening measures. While TSA has oversight guidance and checklists to monitor screeners’ use of behavior detection, these policies and procedures do not include a specific mechanism to monitor whether screeners may be using behavior detection to unlawfully profile passengers. Although TSA officials report that they are working to update the standard operating procedures in 2019, they currently have no plan to add a specific mechanism to monitor compliance with policies that prohibit unlawful profiling. Developing a specific oversight mechanism would provide TSA with greater assurance that screeners are adhering to such policies and help TSA identify any potential incidents of unlawful profiling.", "We are making the following recommendation to TSA.\nThe TSA Administrator should direct Security Operations to develop a specific oversight mechanism to monitor the use of behavior detection activities for compliance with DHS and TSA policies that prohibit unlawful profiling. (Recommendation 1)", "We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided written comments which are reproduced in appendix IV. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions planned to address it. Security Operations, TCC, and the Multicultural Branch also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nDHS correctly noted in its letter that GAO’s analysis of civil rights and civil liberties complaints related to every aspect of TSA’s passenger and baggage screening and is not specific to behavior detection. We agree with DHS’s observation, as this analysis provides information on what passengers alleged in their complaints and how TSA addressed them. It is important to note that the complaint data provided by TSA did not preclude behavior detection activities as a potential contributing factor to any number of the complaints submitted.\nWith regard to our recommendation, that the TSA Administrator should direct Security Operations to develop a specific oversight mechanism to monitor the use of behavior detection activities for compliance with DHS and TSA policies that prohibit unlawful profiling, DHS stated that TSA plans to take additional steps to continue to ensure behavior detection activities adhere to polices that prohibit unlawful profiling. In fiscal year 2019, TSA plans to modify existing oversight checklists used by managers and supervisors to include specific terminology for monitoring unlawful profiling. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by September 30, 2019. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact William Russell at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.", "The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provided examples of refresher training materials that are provided to screeners on TSA’s prohibition on the use of unlawful profiling at the passenger screening checkpoint. Table 4 provides information on these materials, including the methods used to distribute the materials to screeners.", "From October 2015 through February 2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Contact Center (TCC) received 3,663 complaints that it classified as alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties. Of the 3,663 complaints, the TCC received 707 complaints, or about 19 percent, by phone. Table 5 summarizes our analysis of the complaints the TCC received.", "From October 2015 through February 2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Contact Center (TCC) received 3,663 complaints that it classified as alleging violations of civil rights and civil liberties. The TCC received 707 of these complaints, or about 19 percent, by phone. Of the 3,663 complaints, Los Angeles International Airport was identified most often in the complaint data. Table 6 lists the 10 airports most often identified in these complaints.", "", "", "William Russell, (202) 512-8777 or [email protected].", "In addition to the contact named above, Ellen Wolfe (Assistant Director), Natalie Maddox (Analyst in Charge), Saida Hussain, and Brendan Kretzschmar made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the report were Alyssa Bertoni, David Dornisch, Ben Emmel, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Tom Lombardi, Amanda Miller, Sam Portnow, Rachel Stoiko, and Adam Vogt." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "", "h1_full", "", "h0_full", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the TSA policy regarding bias or profiling in behavior detection?", "What resources does the TSA have for assessing behavior detection?", "Where does this checklist fall short?", "What comprised TSA's statement about bias training?", "What would be a more appropriate action for TSA to take?", "How did the TSA begin behavior detection?", "How does TSA prohibit profiling?", "What raised suspicion about bias in TSA behavior detection?" ], "summary": [ "Transportation Security Administration (TSA) policy requires managers to ensure behavior detection is conducted without regard to race or ethnicity, among other factors.", "TSA uses seven oversight checklists to assess whether behavior detection activities are conducted in accordance with TSA policy, such as monitoring whether screeners trained in behavior detection observe and engage passengers correctly.", "However, these checklists do not instruct supervisors to monitor for indications of profiling.", "TSA officials stated that the training screeners receive, adherence to operating procedures, and general supervisory oversight are sufficient to alert supervisors to situations when unlawful profiling may occur.", "However, developing a specific mechanism to monitor behavior detection activities for compliance with policies prohibiting unlawful profiling would provide TSA with greater assurance that screeners are adhering to such policies.", "In 2016, TSA began using behavior detection in a more limited way to identify potentially high-risk passengers who exhibit certain behaviors it asserts are indicative of stress, fear, or deception, and refer them for additional screening or, when warranted, to law enforcement.", "TSA's policies and procedures prohibit unlawful profiling, i.e., screeners are prohibited from selecting passengers for additional screening based on race, ethnicity, or other factors.", "Allegations of racial profiling have raised questions about TSA's use of behavior detection." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 0, 3, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-16-638	{ "title": [ "Background", "Urban and Rural Transit", "Transit ITS", "Transit Funding for ITS", "Federal ITS Program", "Selected Urban Transit Providers Reported Using Most Types of ITS, and Some Reported Using More Advanced Technologies", "DOT’s 2013 Survey Found Broad Deployment of ITS in Major Metropolitan Areas", "Selected Urban Transit Providers Reported Deploying the Majority of ITS Technologies, Mainly on Bus Services", "Large and Medium Urban Transit Providers Are Sharing ITS Data", "Large and Medium Urban Transit Providers Reported Using Advanced Technologies", "Small Urban and Rural Providers Are Primarily Using Four ITS Technologies, and Use of Other ITS Is Limited", "Roughly Three-Quarters of Small Urban and Rural Transit Providers Are Using Security Systems", "About Half of Small Urban and Rural Providers Are Using Computer-Aided Dispatch, Automatic Vehicle Location, and GIS", "Most Small Urban and Rural Transit Providers Are Not Using Other ITS Technologies, Primarily because of Technology Costs or Perceived Lack of Need", "Transit Providers Reported Five Key Benefits from ITS, but Benefits Are Difficult to Measure and Deployment Challenges Exist", "Transit Providers Reported Five Primary Benefits from ITS Deployment", "Certain Benefits of Transit ITS Are Difficult to Quantify", "Transit Providers Face an Assortment of Challenges in Deploying and Using ITS", "Funding Challenges", "Leadership and Workforce Challenges", "Technology Procurement and Vendor Challenges", "DOT Supports ITS Deployment Through a Variety of Training and Technical Assistance Resources, but Providers’ Use of These Resources Is Limited", "DOT Offers a Number of Resources to Promote and Support ITS Technologies", "Transit Providers Are Generally Relying on Non- Federal Resources to Inform Their ITS Deployment", "Better Outreach and Information Collection Could Improve DOT’s Promotion of ITS", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Small Urban and Rural Transit ITS Survey", "Survey Population and Sample Design", "Administration of Survey and Quality Assurance", "Sampling Error and Estimation", "Non-Sampling Error", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Transportation", "Appendix III: Public Transit Stakeholders GAO Interviewed", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "According to APTA, 6,800 organizations— ranging from large multi-modal systems in major metropolitan areas to single-vehicle special demand- response service providers that transport senior citizens and the disabled—provided public transportation in 2013. While it is difficult to establish the exact dimensions of urban and rural transit service because transit providers headquartered in urban areas may also serve rural areas, urban transit providers primarily serve areas with populations of 50,000 or more. Within this category, small urbanized areas are those with populations under 200,000, and include small cities, college towns, and vacation or resort areas, while large urbanized areas are those with 200,000 or more people, including the country’s major metropolitan areas. The 834 agencies that serve urban areas accounted for more than 98 percent of all transit passenger trips in 2013, according to APTA.\nNon-urbanized, or rural, areas have populations of fewer than 50,000 people. In 2013, approximately 1,400 public transit agencies operated in rural areas, accounting for 1.5 percent of all passenger trips, according to APTA. Transit providers in rural areas operate in a variety of environments, serving areas that may span thousands of square miles in remote areas—meaning that trips may be long with only a few riders at any given time—or be located in more developed rural areas surrounding major cities. Compared to large urban systems, rural transit providers generally have low budgets, few employees, and small vehicle fleets. However, these transit systems provide vital mobility and connections to essential services for the approximately 75 million people who live in rural America.\nTransit providers serve the public through a variety of transportation modes. In this report, we use the following descriptions of transportation modes:\nFixed-route bus service: rubber-tired passenger vehicles that operate on fixed routes and schedules over roadways. Diesel, gasoline, battery, or alternative fuel engines power these vehicles. This category includes bus rapid transit, commuter bus, and trolley bus.\nParatransit: accessible, origin-to-destination transportation service that operates in response to calls or requests from riders. It is an alternative to fixed-route transit service, which operates according to regular schedules along prescribed routes with designated stops.\nDemand-response (also referred to as dial-a-ride): vehicles that operate in response to calls or requests from passengers. Small buses, vans, or taxis to provide transportation service that is not on a fixed route or schedule. For example, transportation may be provided for individuals whose access may be limited or whose health condition prevents them from using the regular fixed-route bus service.\nCommuter rail: vehicles that operate along electric or diesel- propelled railways and provide train service for local, short distance trips between a central city and adjacent suburbs.\nHeavy rail: vehicles that operate on electric railways with high-volume traffic capacity. This mode has separated rights-of-way, sophisticated signaling, high platform loading and high-speed rapid-acceleration rail cars operating singly or in multi-car trains on fixed rails.\nLight rail: vehicles that operate on electric railways with light-volume traffic capacity. The mode may have either shared or exclusive rights- of-way, low or high platform loading, or single or double car trains.", "ITS encompasses a broad range of wireless and wire line communications-based information and electronic technologies, including technologies for collecting, processing, disseminating, or acting on information in real time to improve the operation and safety of the transportation system. DOT identifies 11 core technologies that are useful for public transit providers to deploy. Figure 1 illustrates how seven ITS technologies are used on a transit bus and how the public may interact with them when utilizing fixed-route bus service.\nOther ITS technologies not depicted in figure 1 include:\nCommunication technologies: technologies that pass information from one user to another in a useable form via wire, wireless, radio, the Internet, or other links to facilitate interaction among drivers, dispatchers, emergency responders, and other personnel.\nGeographic information systems (GIS) & data management: systems that manage and create spatial data such as location of bus stops, routes, transit facilities and the regional street network. The management, analysis, communication, and display of this information supports automatic vehicle location, automatic passenger counters, computer aided dispatch, and other technologies.\nMaintenance management systems: technologies that monitor everything from fuel and other fluid levels to engine temperature.\nWeather information systems: the hardware, software, and communications interfaces necessary to provide real-time information on weather conditions to transportation agencies and their customers.\nDeployment of transit ITS may involve a variety of transportation stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Transit ITS technologies may be proprietary systems sold by technology firms in the private sector. Transit providers may also hire consulting firms to assist them in the ITS procurement and deployment process, including developing system requirements and the request for proposals from vendors. Further, the operation of certain ITS, such as a transit signal priority system, involves not only the transit provider but the municipality that owns and operates the traffic signal equipment. Smaller neighboring transit providers may also participate in an ITS deployment, such as a regional electronic fare collection system, spearheaded by a larger transit provider. Metropolitan planning organizations may serve a key role in planning ITS deployment, as they have responsibility for the regional transportation processes in urbanized areas.", "Transit providers may use FTA formula and discretionary grants, among other sources, for projects that include ITS deployments. They may also acquire ITS components such as security systems through funding provided by the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, state and local governments may use their own funds to finance ITS projects. The primary formula grant programs that transit providers could use to fund ITS are (1) urbanized area grants, which provide funds to urban areas for capital projects, such as purchasing buses, planning, job access and reverse commute projects, and operating and other expenses, and (2) rural area grants, which provide funds to states and tribal areas to be used for capital, operating, and other expenses to support public transportation in rural areas.\nThe Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act authorizes several competitive grant programs that recipients could use to fund transit ITS projects, including (1) the Advanced Transportation and Congestion Technologies Deployment Initiative, which provides grant funding for recipients to deploy a range of technologies, including transit ITS such as advanced traveler information systems and electronic pricing and payment systems, and (2) the Pilot Program for Innovative Coordinated Access and Mobility, which funds innovative projects that improve the coordination of transportation services with non-emergency medical transportation services, and could include ITS projects. Other FTA competitive funding programs that have been used, at least in part, for transit ITS include:\nVeterans Transportation and Community Living Initiative (VTCLI): VTCLI has funded projects in urban, suburban, and rural communities to strengthen and promote “one-call” information centers and other tools that enable veterans, active service members, military families, and others to learn about and arrange for locally available transportation services that connect them with work, education, health care, and other vital services in their communities.\nMobility Services for All Americans (MSAA) Deployment Planning Projects: DOT’s MSAA initiative aims to improve transportation services and access to employment, healthcare, education, and other community activities through a coordinated effort enabled by various ITS technologies and applications. MSAA funds are awarded to selected local and regional organizations to plan coordinated mobility services. Funded projects use ITS to coordinate deployment of on- demand public transportation systems, such as paratransit, for people with mobility issues. The grants help provide vital services for veterans, seniors, people with disabilities, and others who rely on community transportation providers to access everyday needs such as employment, medical care, and groceries.\nTransit providers often integrate ITS technologies into other capital purchases, like new buses; therefore, it is difficult to determine the total amount of FTA funds transit providers use solely for ITS. Although this does not represent total ITS spending, FTA officials estimated that the federal funds awarded for engineering, acquiring, constructing, rehabilitating/renovating, and/or leasing signal and communication equipment, surveillance/security systems, route signing, mobile fare collection equipment, vehicle locator systems, and signage (all of which, according to officials, would be considered ITS) totaled nearly $527 million in fiscal years 2012 through 2014.", "Congress established the federal ITS program in the Intelligent Vehicle- Highway Systems Act of 1991, which was enacted as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) to research, develop, and operationally test ITS technologies and promote their implementation. More recently, the FAST Act authorized $100 million annually for the federal ITS program for fiscal years 2016 through 2020, the same levels the previous surface transportation authorization— Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21)—authorized for fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, the JPO coordinates the federal ITS program and initiatives in consultation with other surface transportation modal administrations across DOT, including the Federal Highway Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, FTA, Maritime Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The JPO supports the overall advancement of ITS through investments in major research initiatives, such as research on advanced connected vehicle and automation technologies, exploratory studies, and a deployment support program that includes technology transfer and training.", "", "DOT has reported that transit providers located in major U.S. cities have deployed a majority of the core transit ITS technologies described above. To determine the extent to which ITS technologies have been deployed, DOT conducts a survey on a regular basis that measures ITS deployment by state and local transportation agencies—including transit providers.\nThe results of DOT’s most recent survey from 2013 indicated that 142 transit providers had deployed many of the core transit ITS technologies across several types of transit vehicles, including buses (see table 1). The survey also showed that these transit providers had deployed traveler information systems—using technologies such as websites, mobile applications, and electronic message signs at transit stops and stations—to provide customers with information on routes, schedules, fares, and real-time information on vehicle arrival and departure times. Transit providers also reported on planned ITS deployment between 2013 and 2016, and the survey found that future deployment focused on computer-aided dispatch, automatic vehicle location, traveler information systems to provide transit information in real time, and improvements to electronic fare payment systems.", "Similar to the JPO’s 2013 survey results, the 31 large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us they had deployed most of the ITS technologies in our review. As shown in table 2, officials from the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed reported deploying 9 of the 11 ITS technologies in our review, but medium urban transit providers reported deploying some of these to a slightly lesser extent. Only three of the selected large and medium urban transit providers had deployed a weather information system, which as described above, consists of equipment such as pavement and water- level sensors to monitor weather conditions. The large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed generally told us that they had deployed most of the technologies across several modes of service to some extent, but primarily on their bus services. Exceptions were traveler information systems, which the majority reported using across all modes of services, and GIS, which they used in concert with their computer- aided dispatch and automatic vehicle location systems and for transit planning, and which can be applied across all modes of service.\nWhile officials across the selected transit providers reported deploying these technologies, we found there was variation by provider in the specific features and types of technologies deployed. Specifically, there was variation among providers in both the type of traveler information— such as real-time information on vehicles’ schedule adherence versus static information on routes, schedules, and fares—and the ways in which the information was provided, such as through websites, text messages, and electronic message signs at transit stops. We found another example in security systems, where, depending on the provider, different components were deployed, such as on-vehicle cameras, audio surveillance, and silent alarms. There were also differences in the length of time the large and medium urban transit providers had deployed certain ITS technologies. For example, officials from 13 of the 18 large urban transit providers told us that they had deployed automatic vehicle location and computer-aided dispatch technologies prior to 2010, and 6 transit providers said that they are currently updating or have updated these technologies at least once since then. Officials from 7 of the 13 medium urban transit providers said they were in the process of deploying or had deployed these technologies in or after 2010.\nAlthough a majority of the large and medium urban transit providers reported that they had deployed transit signal priority, the extent to which they used this technology varied by provider. For example, most of the transit providers that reported using transit signal priority told us they did so in a limited manner, such as along one or two major corridors in their transit system, or on their bus rapid transit service. We previously found that transit signal priority is the most common ITS technology included in bus rapid transit projects. While 18 large and medium urban transit providers reported using transit signal priority, if only to a limited extent, officials from six of these transit providers told us they had plans to expand or would like to expand its use. Officials from three of the medium urban transit providers who were not using transit signal priority told us that the technology was being considered in their plans for proposed bus rapid transit projects.", "Transit providers are now making some of the data collected from their ITS technologies, such as GIS, computer-aided dispatch, automatic vehicle location, and automatic passenger counters, available to the public, a concept which is known as “open data.” A 2015 Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) study on open data found an increasing number of transit providers have begun making their schedule and real-time operational data available to the public since 2010. Open data has resulted in numerous benefits and innovations that could not have been accomplished solely by transit staff, such as the proliferation of mobile phone applications developed by outside entities that provide passengers with access to transit information. Officials from 22 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that they had made data from their ITS technologies open to the public, and officials from the majority of these providers said that outside software developers had used or hoped to use this data to create mobile applications for their passengers. Officials from three of the large and medium urban transit providers reported that having external entities develop mobile applications reduced costs and saved staff time.\nTo make ITS data available to the public or other users, transit providers must use a data standard that allows users to open and read the information contained. According to the literature, General Transit Feed Specification (GTFS) is the standard adopted by most transit providers and enables them to share static schedule information. Officials from 28 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers reported using GTFS, while 12 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers reporting using GTFS-realtime, which allows transit providers to format real-time vehicle information and service alterations. Several of the large and medium urban transit providers told us they use GTFS because it allows them to publish their data into Google transit maps. Two of the transit providers we interviewed told us that while they have not made their data open to the public, they have formatted their data into GTFS to allow it to be used for Google transit maps.\nIn addition to sharing data with the public, the large and medium urban transit providers in our review reported that they share data with regional transportation stakeholders to support multimodal planning and management. For example, officials from one of the large urban transit providers we interviewed told us they shared their data with local university researchers who received funding through the local metropolitan planning organization to archive regional transportation data, including transit and highway performance data. According to these officials, these data have been used for research and regional transportation planning. According to DOT, an Integrated Corridor Management (ICM) approach, where transportation agencies operate transportation corridors in a coordinated and integrated manner, can include providing multimodal traveler information en-route in addition to pre-trip information as travel conditions change. Officials from a large urban transit provider that is using ICM along a major road corridor told us that having integrated data on real-time traffic conditions, transit, and parking availability has enabled travelers to make better travel decisions and reduces congestion on roadways.", "As we have described above, the large and medium urban transit providers are deploying the majority of the core transit ITS technologies in our review; however, some of the transit providers described using more innovative types or features of these technologies. Many of the ITS technologies in our review represent a range of systems or components from which a transit provider can select different options, depending on needs and desired uses, and some of these options are more sophisticated than others. For example, there are various types of electronic fare payment systems available to transit providers. Some types, such as mobile phone payment applications, are considered more advanced than others, including magnetic stripe cards. Transit providers may also select different fare systems, including closed systems, which use smart cards that store cash value and can only be used within that transit system or on other transit systems that accept that smart card, or a more advanced open system, which accepts numerous payment types, such as credit or debit cards, issued by other organizations. For technologies such as computer-aided dispatch, maintenance management systems, and security systems, transit providers can choose from a variety of offered features, some of which may be considered more advanced than others. In addition, according to DOT, the proliferation of mobile devices and real-time information has led to a shift over the past several years in the way transit providers can disseminate traveler information to their existing and potential passengers. For example, new opportunities have emerged for transit providers to offer mobile ticketing and mobile applications for passengers to retrieve real-time transit information, conduct trip planning, and make transit reservations (see fig. 2). Below are examples of some of the more advanced types and features of ITS technologies.\nSmart card electronic fare payment: Officials from 15 of the 18 large urban transit providers and 4 of the 13 medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that they have deployed a smart card electronic fare payment system. Four large urban transit providers have deployed an open payment system.\nPredictive and real-time maintenance management systems: Officials from six large urban transit providers and one medium urban transit provider told us they have deployed maintenance management systems that can transmit maintenance information to the provider in real time or make predictions when vehicle parts may fail.\nTraveler information and mobile fare payment smartphone applications: Many of the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed have made smartphone applications available to their passengers. These applications can provide traveler information or the ability to pay fares electronically. Specifically, 15 of the 18 large urban transit providers and 4 of the 13 medium urban transit providers we interviewed said they have deployed smartphone applications that provide passengers real-time transit information. Officials from one of the large urban transit providers told us that they were about to deploy a smartphone application that allows passengers to make ride requests, instead of calling a dispatcher, on their demand-response service that connects residents living in less-populated areas to transit. Additionally, officials from five large urban transit providers and two medium urban transit providers told us they have deployed mobile ticketing, and two of these providers told us they were using or were developing a smartphone application that used mobile ticketing in creative ways. These capabilities included providing passengers with the ability to purchase mobile tickets for transit and special events, such as tickets to the state fair or local zoo, and linking mobile ticketing to private ride-hailing companies to help passengers reach destinations that are outside the transit service area.\nThere are several factors beyond the size of the transit provider and population served that may contribute to a transit provider’s decision to adopt more advanced technologies. We found several examples from literature and our interviews of transit providers located in smaller areas deploying advanced ITS technologies. The JPO has reported that there are a number of factors that influence ITS adoption across transportation agencies, including: agency characteristics, such as their risk tolerance, level of knowledge and expertise, and adoption rate of peer agencies; external environmental characteristics, such as agency budgets, funding opportunities, agency priorities, and presence of a technology champion; and the characteristics of the transportation user, such as public acceptance and attitudes toward proposed technologies.\nWe found examples of advanced ITS adoption among small urban and rural transit providers in some of the studies that we reviewed and from stakeholder interviews. For example, a 2015 Transit Cooperative Research Program report on next generation electronic fare payment systems highlighted the experiences of one small urban transit provider’s upgrade to smart card-enabled electronic fare payment. Officials from one of the industry associations we interviewed told us that smaller transit providers may receive and use grants to invest in more innovative technologies. For example, FTA officials provided us with examples of how transit providers are using MSAA and VTCLI grants to deploy ITS technologies in innovative ways to help improve human service transportation in rural areas. An official from another industry association told us that smaller transit providers located in niche communities, such as cities where universities or vacation destinations are located and communities that border metropolitan cities, are using more innovative ITS technologies. These communities have riders that have certain expectations of and are more reliant on transit and these factors drive providers to adopt advanced technologies.", "We surveyed a stratified random sample of 312 small urban and rural transit providers to learn about the extent of their use of ITS technologies. This sample is generalizable to a target population of 314 Section 5307 recipients serving small urbanized areas and 582 Section 5311 sub-recipients serving non-urbanized (rural) areas that reported to the FTA’s National Transit Database in reporting year 2013. We refer to this target population as “small urban and rural transit providers.”", "We estimate that nearly 75 percent of small urban and rural transit providers use ITS through the deployment of security systems. Of those providers, approximately 81 percent are using closed circuit TV cameras and 58 percent are using audio surveillance; other less-common systems include silent alarms, object detection sensors, and covert microphones (see fig. 3). Further, we estimate that of those transit providers that are using this technology, about 69 percent of small urban and rural providers use security systems on their bus fleet, and approximately 72 percent use this technology on demand-response vehicles. According to the JPO, urban and rural public transportation systems can benefit from the implementation of security systems because they can be used to monitor the safety and security of passengers, employees, equipment, and materials.", "Small urban and rural transit providers are also using other ITS technologies. Based on the survey results, we estimate that about half of small urban and rural providers are using computer-aided dispatch, automatic vehicle location, and GIS. Approximately 55 percent of small urban and rural providers are using computer-aided dispatch software. According to a 2010 North Dakota State University study on technology adoption by small urban and rural transit providers, computer-aided dispatch packages are a core component of rural transit technology systems, and may provide record-keeping and billing capabilities, improve the accuracy of reservations, and give transit providers the ability to provide real-time customer information.\nFurther, we estimate that approximately 51 percent of the target population is using automatic vehicle location technology. By providing the real-time position of transit vehicles to a central location, this technology can enable transit dispatchers to increase the average number of rider pick-ups per hour. Additionally, approximately 47 percent of small urban and rural providers reported using a GIS system. According to a DOT report on rural ITS, although GIS is assumed to be a component in urban ITS deployment, it can be a significant stand-alone technology for rural transit agencies. The report states that GIS applications have given smaller operators new tools for improving service planning and operations and may provide the basis for additional deployment, such as automatic vehicle location and computer-aided dispatch.", "Although about half of small urban and rural transit providers reported using the three aforementioned technologies, based on our survey results, we estimate that most small urban and rural transit providers are not using each of five other technologies in our review: maintenance management systems, traveler information systems, automatic passenger counters, electronic fare payment, and transit signal priority. Estimated use of these five technologies is illustrated in figure 4.\nIn some cases, small urban providers are using technologies that we did not find widely deployed by rural providers. For example, according to our survey, approximately 50 percent of small urban providers are using a variety of means to provide traveler information (see table 3).\nWe estimate that about half or more of small urban and rural providers that are not using traveler information systems, automatic passenger counters, electronic fare payment, and maintenance management systems reported the cost of the technology as the reason they are not using that technology. Additionally, most of the small urban and rural transit providers that are not using transit signal priority indicated that they do not perceive a need for this technology in their operations. In open- ended responses to the survey, some small urban and rural transit providers offered other reasons they were not currently using ITS. For example, five providers reported they are not using a maintenance management system because they contract out their maintenance services; four providers said that they do not use automatic passenger counters because they either provide only demand-response service, or they manually count passengers; and finally, four providers reported that they do not use electronic fare payment because they do not charge a fare for their transportation services.\nSmall urban and rural providers reported that their plans to deploy ITS in the future focus on security systems and automatic vehicle location. For each of the nine technologies, our survey asked transit providers that indicated they were not using the technology if they had plans to deploy it in the next five years (see fig. 5).", "", "Each ITS technology a transit provider deploys may provide a unique set of benefits, and DOT has reported on some of these benefits based on the results of its regular ITS deployment survey and in evaluations of ITS benefit studies from the JPO’s Knowledge Resources Databases. For example, DOT’s 2013 ITS deployment survey showed that transit providers rated communication technologies, automatic vehicle location, and security cameras as having provided them with the highest benefits. Also, in DOT’s 2014 updated report on information on the benefits, costs, and lessons learned regarding ITS deployment studies, the agency reported findings that transit providers experienced improvements in operations and fleet management, such as achieving improved service reliability through computer-aided dispatch, decreased transit travel times through the use of transit signal priority, and increased ridership from using traveler information systems. We asked the large and medium urban transit providers in our review to describe the types of benefits their ITS has collectively generated. Transit providers we interviewed identified benefits from ITS broadly related to improvements in administration, operations, and customer satisfaction. Below are descriptions and examples of the five main types of benefits reported by the majority of the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed.\nImprovements in on-time performance and schedule adherence: Officials from 25 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers said that data from their ITS technologies—such as automatic passenger counters, automatic vehicle location, and computer-aided dispatch—have improved or were expected to improve the extent to which service remains on schedule, which has improved their on-time performance. For example, officials from 7 of these providers told us computer-aided dispatch and automatic vehicle location enable them to monitor service in real time and react to situations that might create service delays—such as traffic, accidents, or vehicle breakdowns—by holding buses or creating route detours. Further, officials from 4 of the large and medium urban transit providers said they have used information from these technologies to change schedules to better reflect actual arrival and departure times, which has improved their on-time performance.\nEnhanced safety: Officials from 24 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that ITS technologies—such as automatic vehicle location, computer-aided dispatch, and various elements of their security systems—have improved the safety of their passengers and operators by helping them prevent, manage, and review incidents, such as criminal behavior and accidents. For example, officials from 3 of these transit providers told us that automatic vehicle location and computer-aided dispatch have reduced the number of accidents by automating some of the driver’s tasks, including providing drivers with turn-by-turn directions and automating bus stop announcements, and eliminating some of their distractions. Also, officials from 7 of the large and medium urban transit providers told us that audio and video surveillance technologies have enabled their organizations and emergency responders to monitor and better respond to incidents.\nMore efficient scheduling and routing: Officials from 24 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers told us that data from their ITS technologies—such as automatic passenger counters, automatic vehicle location, computer-aided dispatch, and electronic fare payment systems—have enabled them to make improvements to their transit service. For example, officials from 16 of the transit providers experiencing this benefit told us these technologies provide them with more precise information, such as passenger travel behavior and traffic congestion. This information enables them to make data-driven decisions about service—such as routes, schedules, and bus stop locations—that make travel more efficient. Some of these officials told us that prior to these systems, agencies made service changes based on customer complaints and on-site observations, which was less efficient, required more resources, and was less accurate.\nImprovements in reporting and record-keeping: Officials from 21 of the 31 urban transit providers told us that ITS technologies including automatic passenger counters, automatic vehicle location, computer-aided dispatch, and maintenance management systems have improved their ability to document and report new or more accurate data. For example, officials from 11 of these providers said that they are now able to collect additional and more accurate statistics, such as on their on-time performance, number of bus passengers by stop, and vehicle health and parts inventory. In addition, officials from 7 of the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that these technologies have made it easier to collect and report data on transit service to their governing boards and to meet federal reporting requirements. For example, 3 of the large and medium urban transit providers told us that they are able to use ITS technologies to automatically collect information such as number of passengers rather than sending staff out to collect this information.\nIncreased customer satisfaction: Officials from 17 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers told us that ITS technologies, especially traveler information systems, have improved customer satisfaction. For example, officials from 10 of these transit providers attributed this increase in customer satisfaction to their expanded use of traveler information systems, which have enabled them to provide their customers with improved ability to access travel information, through such venues as websites, mobile phone applications, and electronic signs at transit stops. Additionally, 3 of the large and medium urban transit providers told us that customer satisfaction has improved with the deployment of electronic fare payment options. For example, officials from 1 provider told us that they believe that some of their customers want to be able to make all of their transactions using smartphones.\nAccording to our survey results, small urban and rural transit providers rated the same top five benefits from using ITS as the 31 large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed (see table 4). In order to reduce the respondent burden and due to potential difficulties isolating the impacts of individual ITS technologies, our survey asked small urban and rural transit providers to report on the great or slight benefits of their collective ITS technologies. We are therefore unable to attribute the benefits they reported to individual technologies.\nWe also found from our interviews that the 31 large and medium urban transit providers achieved other types of benefits to a lesser extent, such as cost savings, increased operator satisfaction, increased ridership, greater staffing efficiencies, and reduced travel and wait times. Officials from the selected large and medium urban transit providers also described other types of benefits they have experienced from ITS technologies, such as enhanced communication capabilities between dispatchers and drivers, improved marketing, and the ability to keep drivers more accountable. For example, officials from one large urban transit provider told us they were able to use data from their electronic fare payment system to measure the impact that a recent marketing promotion had on ridership, and officials from another large urban transit provider told us they have used their adoption of some ITS technologies in their marketing campaigns to improve their image and attract new customers. In addition, transit providers can use their technologies together, and officials said this combined use can increase the magnitude of the benefit they experience. For example, three of the large urban transit providers told us they use data from automatic passenger counters, which indicate many passengers get on and off at particular transit stops, in tandem with electronic fare payment data, which can provide the exact travel patterns of passengers because it can track the locations passengers get on and off vehicles and show how riders are transferring between service modes. Such combinations of technologies can lead to precise information on ridership behavior that can contribute to benefits such as more efficient routing and scheduling. See figure 6 for an illustration of how other benefits may be derived from combinations of ITS technologies.", "About half of the transit providers we interviewed and most small urban and rural transit providers surveyed found it difficult to measure or have not measured the benefits they experienced from ITS deployment. Officials from 11 of the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that it can be difficult to quantify the benefits of using ITS technologies for a number of reasons, such as that it may be difficult to identify a unit of measurement for enhanced safety or greater staff efficiency, for example. Several of these officials also told us that it was difficult for them to attribute benefits exclusively to ITS deployment or identify the specific ITS technology that created the benefit. For example, officials from three of the large and medium urban transit providers told us that ITS technologies are integrated—often installed at the same time— and may result in similar benefits, making it challenging for them to specify which ITS technology made the positive impact. In addition, factors other than ITS deployment may contribute to an observed benefit. For example, officials from two large urban transit providers told us they have experienced reduced travel times, but it would be difficult to determine whether this was caused by using transit signal priority due to factors such as the ability of passengers to pay for their fares prior to entering the vehicle, city traffic, and the number of boarding passengers. Also, officials from four of the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that their ridership levels have increased, but this could be a result of different ITS technologies, such as traveler information systems or electronic fare payment, or other factors, such as improved service. Furthermore, we estimate that approximately 71 percent of the small urban and rural transit providers were not able to quantitatively measure any benefits received from ITS. Officials from five large and medium urban transit providers told us that they had not measured benefits from ITS deployment for a variety of reasons, such as the deployment had occurred too recently to be able to measure any benefits.\nDespite these challenges, we found several examples in our interviews, survey, and review of recently published ITS studies where transit providers and researchers quantified some of the benefits of ITS deployment. Officials from several of the large and medium urban transit providers that we interviewed reported that they had quantified several benefits using a variety of methods, such as: Increased customer satisfaction, through passenger surveys and reviews of customer service call rates; Improvements in on-time performance and schedule adherence, through reviewing performance data; and\nCost savings, by estimating the value of conducting preventative maintenance or reduction of staff that was a result of deployed ITS technologies.\nOfficials from two of the large urban transit providers told us that they collaborated with university researchers to measure the benefits obtained from specific ITS deployments and found that traveler information systems had a positive impact on customer satisfaction and transit signal priority resulted in reduced travel times. According to officials from these providers, the university researchers were able to isolate these technologies from some of the factors mentioned above that may also influence the experienced benefit. Among the small urban and rural transit providers that reported taking steps to measure ITS benefits, 15 providers told us they analyzed either ridership or on-time performance data to document the impact of ITS deployment. We also found recent ITS studies that measured the benefits experienced by transit providers that had deployed ITS technologies such as traveler information systems and transit signal priority. For example, a 2011 study that analyzed the impact of implementing transit signal priority on 27 intersections along a corridor in Minneapolis found that transit signal priority reduced bus travel times by 3 to 6 percent.", "", "Transit providers face a variety of challenges in securing funding for an ITS deployment. For example, officials from 12 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us that ITS projects may compete for funding with an agency’s state-of-good-repair needs. In 2013, FTA estimated that more than 40 percent of buses and 25 percent of rail transit assets were in marginal or poor condition. We have previously reported that transportation officials must identify priorities and make tradeoffs between funding projects that preserve or add new infrastructure and those that improve operations, like ITS. Officials from one large urban provider told us that technology has historically been a second-tier funding project next to capital funds for bridges, stations, and upkeep of infrastructure, and a medium urban provider stated that because transit providers have so many needs, it can be difficult to say that acquiring new technology is a bigger need than new buses, for example. Another large urban provider told us that every project within an agency has to obtain funds based on its merits, and while providing real- time information at every transit center in a city may be useful, for example, this project may rank lower among the agency’s priorities. A 2014 JPO report identified securing funding as a challenge when ITS is competing for attention with “ribbon-cutting” projects that have higher visibility. According to officials from one large urban provider, it can be difficult for ITS to compete with other projects internally, in part because it can be hard to measure the return on investment from ITS. Officials from another large urban provider told us they have seen an increase in competition for funding between bus and rail needs, due to rail maintenance and costs associated with positive train control requirements. Officials from seven large and medium urban transit providers told us that competition for external funding with other transportation agencies can also be a challenge. For example, officials from a large urban provider told us that highway projects tend to receive more funding than public transit from federal programs such as the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ).\nTransit providers may also face obstacles in funding the operations and maintenance costs associated with ITS systems, as we reported in 2012. Officials from 16 large and medium urban providers we interviewed indicated that preparing for the future operations and maintenance costs related to ITS deployment is a key challenge. For example, officials from one large urban transit provider said that the maintenance and support contracts for ITS technologies are expensive, and that those expenses are more difficult to predict than the capital costs associated with implementing ITS. The officials said they also anticipate higher operational costs in the future based on the need for unlimited cellular data plans to collect real-time data from their vehicles.\nFinally, limited opportunities to fund ITS are a challenge, according to officials from 20 of the 31 medium and large urban transit providers we interviewed. As we reported in 2012, funding is an ongoing challenge in the transit community, as transportation agencies face difficult decisions regarding the allocation of their transportation funding. Many have faced severe revenue declines in recent years, restricting the availability of funds for transportation improvements. For example, officials from one medium urban provider said that the economic recession resulted in fewer local funds available for transit. Officials from a large urban provider told us that transit providers must plan and execute new software deployments effectively because there may not be funding available to correct a mistake for 5 to 10 years if the agency makes a poor decision in selecting a vendor or the software selected does not meet a business need.\nIn our survey of small urban and rural transit providers, we asked respondents to rate their experiences with a number of different challenges, including several similar funding-related challenges they have encountered with ITS (see table 5).\nAdditionally, we estimate that 22 percent of small urban and rural providers experienced unexpected costs in deploying, operating, or maintaining ITS technology. Costs cited include increases in annual licensing and maintenance fees, the need for additional internet speed and storage, software upgrades, cellular service, and training costs.", "The familiarity and comfort of a transit provider’s leadership and workforce with ITS technologies and their benefits—from a board of directors to bus operators—may have a significant impact on its ability to successfully deploy these technologies. According to a 2015 ITS America report on ITS deployment challenges, a transit provider’s board of directors may not be familiar with ITS technologies and the potential benefits they bring to operations and ridership. Similarly, we reported in 2012 that leaders do not always place a priority on ITS, especially in the context of limited funding, and other infrastructure projects can take precedence. Officials from nine of the large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed reported that obtaining support for deploying technologies from leadership and decision-makers in the organization can be a challenge. Officials from a large urban provider, for example, told us that because ITS projects may not be as exciting as projects such as implementing a new rail line or replacing rail cars, staff may have to spend time explaining the value of an ITS project to board members. Officials from another urban provider told us that their general manager has been able to gain the support of their board members by taking them to ITS conferences so they can see firsthand what other transit providers are doing.\nThe introduction of transit ITS also has the potential to significantly alter the work and responsibilities of a transit provider’s workforce, including dispatchers and operators. Officials from 21 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers indicated that the workforce may be reluctant to embrace new technology that changes their job responsibilities. For example, officials from a medium urban provider explained that bus operators were initially resistant to the installation of surveillance systems, but their apprehension subsided after they learned that the video footage could prove that they were not at fault for particular incidents that occurred on the bus. Officials from a large urban provider also told us that transit staff tends to include “lifers” who were hired with one expertise and it can be difficult to train them to work with new technology, or the funding for that training may not be available.\nITS is a rapidly developing field that requires a specialized workforce familiar with emerging technologies. Officials from 14 of the 31 providers we interviewed said that a lack of technical expertise in the workforce is a deployment challenge. For example, officials from one large urban provider said that it can be difficult to find applicants who have worked with certain proprietary ITS products, and as a result, they train new staff in-house with vendor support. The agency risks losing its investment if staff leave the organization or department. Additionally, officials from one medium urban provider told us that it can be difficult to attract and maintain staff with technical expertise because their union rules are more protective of senior staff, and it is largely younger, more recent hires who can adapt to new technologies.\nIn our survey, we asked small urban and rural transit providers about the extent to which they encountered similar leadership and workforce challenges with ITS (see table 6).\nThe success of an ITS deployment may depend on effective coordination between several transportation stakeholders in a region, and we have previously found that ITS coordination across agencies is a challenge. Complex systems such as electronic fare payment and transit signal priority may involve multiple entities, including neighboring transit providers and cities, among others. Officials from seven large and medium urban transit providers considered coordinating ITS deployment across agencies to be a challenge. Officials from two large urban providers told us that obtaining buy-in from regional partners on their respective regional fare collection systems was difficult because of resource limitations and apprehension from smaller regional providers about a larger agency moving forward with decisions about the system without their input. Officials from a large and medium provider told us they have had difficulty implementing transit signal priority in their cities because state or local transportation authorities have opposed the system or have not upgraded the fiber optic network so that traffic signals are connected.", "Transit providers using federal funds typically purchase ITS technologies from technology vendors through the federal procurement process. However, officials at three large and medium providers said that it may take months to years to procure technology from the request for proposal to actual deployment, a point at which the deployed technology is already old and could be replaced or upgraded. Officials from two large urban transit providers told us that FTA’s “Buy America” requirements—which require manufactured products used in a project receiving FTA funds to be produced in the U.S.—are also a factor in prolonging the procurement process, as agencies may have difficulty meeting the requirements.\nOfficials from 16 of the 31 large and medium urban providers told us they have experienced challenges in working with ITS vendors. Issues cited by providers we spoke with include (1) difficulty changing vendors after ITS has been deployed, (2) turnover among vendor staff during ITS projects, and (3) difficulty getting vendors to work with one another to integrate ITS amid concerns about making changes to proprietary systems. Officials from a large urban provider told us that even though contracts may make the vendors responsible for integrating ITS technologies, the costs are passed on to the transit provider. According to DOT, including ITS standards such as Transit Communications Interface Profiles (TCIP) in procurements can help to integrate different technologies by establishing a common framework for the exchange of information between systems, and allows the transit provider to go beyond a single vendor when considering an upgrade or adding to an existing system. However, an ITS consultant we spoke with said that developing standards to enable different vendors’ products to work together is one of the biggest challenges in the industry as it requires vendors to share information, and implementing the interfaces between technologies may add to the cost of a project.\nOur survey asked small urban and rural transit providers about the challenges they encountered related to working with ITS vendors. Although most small urban and rural providers did not rate limited vendor support as a particular challenge, 33 percent indicated that vendors offer ITS technology solutions that are not designed for the smaller scale of small urban and rural transit systems. (See table 7.)\nSuccessful ITS deployment requires the capacity to reliably transmit data, such as vehicle location, between systems. We have previously reported that rural areas can have conditions that increase the cost of deploying broadband Internet infrastructure and services, such as remote areas with challenging terrain like mountains, which increase construction costs, or conditions that make it difficult to recoup deployment costs, such as relatively low population densities and incomes. Similarly, in their comments on our survey, three rural transit providers reported that geographic conditions in rural areas, such as mountains and large service areas, can limit connectivity. For example, one rural provider reported that “mapping technology” (e.g., GIS) may not recognize all of the rural roads in an area, which limits its usefulness for a demand-response service. Finally, an official from the National Rural Transit Assistance Program (RTAP) told us that infrastructure and access to data are inadequate in rural areas, and the lack of investment in making communications more reliable to reduce cell phone dead zones and connect drivers to dispatchers is making rural communities structurally isolated.", "", "The JPO and FTA provide a variety of information resources related to transit ITS deployment. In addition to their responsibility for conducting ITS research, development, and testing, the JPO runs programs to support transportation providers in the deployment of ITS technologies. According to JPO officials, they design their programs to be applicable to any transportation mode, including highways, railroads, and transit, but they also develop resources that are transit-specific. To help inform them of the transit community’s resource needs, JPO officials told us that they coordinate with officials from FTA and transit industry groups, such as APTA and CTAA, and consider other information, such as relevant research and ITS deployment information from DOT’s ITS deployment survey of state and local transportation agencies. The following are some of the ITS information resources that are made available to the transportation community, including some that are more targeted to transit providers: JPO Technical Assistance Programs: The JPO offers a number of technical assistance programs covering various ITS topics, including ITS standards implementation, systems engineering, and ITS architecture implementation, which JPO officials told us include the interests of the transit community.\nITS Professional Capacity Building Program (PCB Program): The JPO offers different ITS learning opportunities for transportation agencies, including transit providers, to ensure the effective implementation and operation of ITS. These opportunities include web-based and classroom training, webinars, on-line resources, peer-to-peer assistance, and their Knowledge Resources Databases, which include past studies of ITS benefits, costs, and lessons learned, and some of these are more focused on transit. For example, the JPO provides online training modules on ITS transit standards, ITS transit fact sheets that describe transit-specific ITS technologies, transit-targeted webinars, and has identified transit ITS research in its Knowledge Resources Databases. Additionally, according to JPO officials, it coordinates jointly with FTA and APTA on an annual ITS Best Practices Workshop for transit providers and with APTA and ITS America on the Passenger Transportation Systems and Services Committee of the Transportation Management Forum, which is an industry forum that focuses on transit ITS issues.\nIn addition to the ITS resources the JPO provides, FTA—and within FTA, RTAP, which promotes the delivery of transportation services in rural areas—also provides support to transit providers in their ITS deployment through research, testing, evaluation, training, and outreach. For example, the National Transit Institute (NTI), which provides training and educational programs for the transit industry and is funded by an FTA grant, offers transit ITS courses, such as an introductory workshop on ITS data management, training on using ITS standards when purchasing ITS technologies, and a course on rural technology adoption, which FTA officials told us includes ITS technologies. FTA officials also told us that FTA headquarters staff provide guidance to transit providers that contact them with questions about ITS deployment and have quarterly calls with their 10 regional offices to discuss ITS development in their regions. Some of RTAP’s activities include providing technical assistance and training materials to rural transit providers, surveying state RTAP managers, and participating in conferences and webinars, which an RTAP official told us include information on ITS deployment. For example, RTAP developed technical guidance for moving data into the GTFS format to enable transit providers to adopt website trip planning, and on-line training that introduces ITS technologies for scheduling and dispatching to rural transit systems.", "Few of the transit providers we interviewed and surveyed reported using DOT resources, particularly JPO resources. For example, officials from 10 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us they had used JPO resources. Additionally, based on our survey results, we estimate that about two percent of small urban and rural transit providers received some form of technical assistance from the JPO, such as for the planning, deployment, operation, or maintenance of ITS technologies. In addition to asking these providers questions about receiving JPO’s general technical assistance, we also asked them about resources received through the JPO’s PCB Program. And, of the 233 small urban and rural transit providers who responded to our survey, 43 indicated they were aware of the training, technical assistance, and knowledge resources programs provided by the JPO PCB Program and 24 reported using any of these resources. Consistent with this information, JPO officials told us the data they collect on use of PCB Program resources showed low participation rates by transit providers and estimated that, based on historical participation, transit providers comprise 3 to 5 percent of the program’s users, or about 1,100 to 1,800 transit providers in fiscal year 2015. JPO officials told us that transit providers participate in certain PCB Program offerings more than others.\nFor example, they said that approximately 6 to 10 percent of the webinar attendees and archives users represent transit providers and these figures may be higher depending on the topic of the webinar.\nMore transit providers in our review reported using FTA resources for ITS deployment than JPO resources. For example, officials from 14 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers told us that they had received FTA assistance. Most of these transit providers reported that FTA assistance was related to the administration of grants rather than technical deployment, or that they received assistance through NTI courses that officials from four providers said were focused on technology in general and may not have included information on ITS. Likewise, our survey found that small urban and rural transit providers had also used FTA resources more than JPO resources. For example, based on our survey results, we estimate that about 33 percent and 17 percent of small urban and rural transit providers had received some form of technical assistance from FTA and RTAP, respectively, such as in the planning, deployment, operation, or maintenance of ITS technologies.\nThe transit providers in our review reported relying mostly on non-federal resources for assistance with ITS deployment. For example, 22 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers that we interviewed told us that they rely on peer or regional transit providers and officials from 7 of these transit providers told us that other transit providers are their main source of ITS information. Officials from several of these transit providers told us they are part of peer networking groups where information about ITS is shared, such as a consortium of transit chief information officers and an organization of bus transit providers that compare performance and identify best practices. The large and medium urban transit providers also reported relying on industry groups and vendors for ITS information. For example, officials from 18 of the 31 selected large and medium transit providers said they rely on groups such as APTA, and officials from 7 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers said that they rely on vendors and attending annual vendor user conferences. Based on our survey results, we estimate that small urban and rural transit providers receive technical assistance—such as in the planning, deployment, operation, and maintenance of ITS technologies—from state DOTs (52 percent) and ITS vendors (48 percent) more frequently than from FTA (33 percent).\nJPO and FTA officials told us that transit providers may not be using federal ITS resources because these providers may not have the ability to send staff to training opportunities and the topics may not be of interest to them. For example, FTA officials told us they have not received a lot of demand for NTI courses to include ITS-focused training because transit providers have high turnover of staff and staff may not have ITS expertise. Although JPO officials told us they coordinate with various stakeholders to ensure their resources are responsive to transit community needs, officials from JPO, FTA, and RTAP told us that transit providers may not be using JPO resources because these resources are more focused on urban areas and highway transportation, including advanced connected vehicle technologies, which are not of current interest to the transit community. Officials from five of the large and medium urban transit providers and four public transit stakeholders we interviewed, including officials from two industry associations and one ITS consultant, told us that the information provided was either outdated, focused on highways rather than public transit, or otherwise did not match their needs. JPO officials told us that they expect participation rates to increase among the transportation community with their publication of new ITS Standards Training Modules in late 2015, which they say are applicable to transit. JPO officials also told us that they solicit and review feedback on their PCB Program offerings. For example, officials said they obtain feedback from users of their Knowledge Resources Databases through an online feedback link and formally twice a year through a webinar. They said that the transit providers that have provided feedback have reported that the information on lessons learned is valuable, but would like more reports on costs of technologies. These officials said that overall, given the complexity and number of different types of users of the databases, it is very difficult to meet everyone’s needs. Officials noted that they also collect live participation and on-demand use numbers of the PCB Program, but only began collecting more detailed user data for these programs in 2014. With more detailed data on each PCB Program offering, they said they hope to focus more on the types of transportation stakeholders using their resources in 2016 to help them better understand the reach and effectiveness to various stakeholders, and incorporate this information into the PCB Program’s strategic plan and assign PCB Program resources as needed.", "Although DOT, through JPO and FTA, offers a variety of different ITS resources, as discussed above, most of the transit providers in our review were unaware of the resources offered through the JPO and reported relying largely on resources other than those offered through DOT. In addition, officials from DOT and industry groups, as well as an ITS consultant and several transit agencies, generally said DOT’s ITS support programs and research may not reflect the needs of the transit community, particularly in rural areas, because, for example, these programs focus on urban areas, highway ITS, and connected vehicle technologies. We and the National Academies’ Transportation Research Board (TRB) have previously identified a number of leading practices for successfully encouraging the adoption of new technologies that may improve the extent to which transit providers use DOT resources. These leading practices include (1) choosing appropriate methods to promote the use of technology by the target audience and (2) monitoring technology adoption. Improving the availability and awareness of DOT resources is a key component to promoting the use of technology by the target audience and can enhance efforts to assist others in making decisions regarding the use of technologies. Also, monitoring technology adoption can provide lessons about efforts to encourage technology implementation. For example, according to a TRB report on promoting technology use, such monitoring of information is needed for managing technology promotion activities and for successfully assessing progress toward the goals of those activities.\nMaking users aware of ITS resources JPO officials told us that they advertise PCB Program offerings through e- mail lists that include the major transit industry associations and FTA staff, who they say consistently share news and information with transit, state, regional, and local stakeholders, and the private sector. They also told us that many individual transit providers subscribe to their e-mails. There are other ways that transit providers hear about their offerings, according to JPO officials, including advertisements through ITS America- sponsored webinars and newsletters. When there are products for a specific audience, such as transit-specific offerings, JPO officials said they will make additional efforts to inform that audience of the products’ availability. DOT officials also told us that FTA publishes information on PCB Program opportunities and JPO has a dedicated multimodal knowledge and technology task that includes outreach and marketing. Despite these efforts, officials from RTAP, two ITS consultants, and officials from 12 of the 31 large and medium urban transit providers we interviewed told us they were unaware of the resources offered through the JPO. We estimate that the majority of small urban and rural transit providers are also unaware of JPO’s PCB Program offerings. Specifically, based on our survey, we estimate that about 75 percent of small urban and rural transit providers are unaware of JPO’s PCB Program training, 85 percent are unaware of PCB Program technical assistance, and 85 percent are unaware of PCB Program knowledge resources information. The ITS consultants we spoke with told us that outside of federal resources the level of support transit providers may receive for ITS deployment varies and transit providers generally rely on vendors for technical support. Improving the availability and awareness of DOT resources could help transit providers take advantage of these resources.\nWithout greater efforts from DOT to make the transit community more aware of federal resources, transit providers may be missing information that could help them make the most informed ITS deployment decisions.\nAs described earlier, the JPO monitors the adoption of ITS technologies through the ITS deployment survey and uses this information, according to JPO officials, to understand the level of deployment and to help them make decisions on how to encourage the future deployment of ITS technologies through its information resources. However, the deployment survey has focused on technology adoption by transportation providers, including but not limited to transit, that are located in major metropolitan areas and does not collect deployment data from transit providers that primarily serve small urban and rural areas. JPO officials told us they have no plans to survey rural transit providers because these providers are generally very small and serve specialized functions often associated with federal programs, such as the transportation of elderly to medical appointments, which would have required them to contact each provider individually to get information and that this was outside of the project’s scope. Additionally, officials told us the purpose of the survey is to document trends and to understand how ITS deployment, which generally occurs in larger cities, has progressed, although some of the information JPO collects may include deployment in small cities because providers in larger cities may also provide service in those areas. However, we estimate from our survey results that a majority of small urban and rural transit providers are using several ITS technologies— such as security systems, computer-aided dispatch, and automatic vehicle location—but have experienced challenges in using funding opportunities for ITS as well as the operational costs associated with these technologies. Additionally, we estimate from our survey that small urban and rural providers have plans to continue deploying ITS in the next 5 years. While there may be some difficulties in including small urban and rural transit providers in DOT’s deployment survey, there may be other ways to monitor their ITS deployment, including engaging with state DOTs to collect information on rural transit ITS. FTA considers state DOTs a useful resource in understanding rural transit issues as they distribute section 5311 rural grant funding to the state’s subrecipient rural transit providers. Including the deployment of ITS by small urban and rural transit providers in its ITS monitoring efforts may provide the JPO with information to customize ITS resources to address the challenges faced by this transit community. Without greater efforts from DOT to tailor its resources to include the needs of small urban and rural transit, these transit providers may be missing information that could inform their ITS deployment decisions.", "As public transit ridership grows, ITS technologies provide opportunities for transit providers to improve planning, increase the efficiency of their operations, and make their services more attractive to riders. In the nation’s major metropolitan areas, transit providers are using ITS in new and innovative ways to improve fare collection and keep the public informed about the status of transit services, even in real time through smartphone applications. Although less prevalent, ITS technologies are helping transit providers in small communities and rural areas increase their scheduling capabilities, enhance the safety of their services, and improve their reporting and billing processes. However, in deploying ITS, the transit community faces challenges related to identifying ITS funding opportunities, paying for the operations and maintenance costs of technology, integrating systems, and managing the disruption that the introduction of new technologies can bring to the transit workforce.\nAlthough DOT provides a variety of information resources to promote and support the use of transit ITS technology including technical assistance and classroom and online training, few of the transit providers in our review were aware or making use of these resources, relying instead on information and support from peer transit providers, industry groups, ITS vendors, and state DOTs. DOT could improve the awareness and applicability of these resources through greater use of leading practices for successfully encouraging the adoption of new technologies. Specifically, DOT could better ensure that federal ITS resources reach their intended audience and help make informed ITS deployment decisions by developing a strategy to increase the transit community’s awareness of these resources. Additionally, including the deployment of ITS by small urban and rural transit providers in ITS monitoring efforts could help DOT customize ITS resources to address the challenges these providers face. Without greater efforts from DOT to make the transit community more aware of federal ITS resources and tailor these resources to the needs of smaller providers, transit providers may be missing information that could help them make the most informed ITS deployment decisions.", "To improve access to and awareness and applicability of ITS resources for ITS deployment, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the ITS JPO, in coordination with FTA, to take the following two actions: develop a strategy to raise awareness of JPO’s training, technical assistance, and knowledge resources for transit ITS deployment in the transit community, and include ITS adoption by small urban and rural transit providers in ITS monitoring efforts.", "We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT concurred with both of our recommendations. In its comments, which we have reproduced in appendix II, DOT noted that it is leveraging its FAST Act authorities to further evaluate and validate its efforts to advance urban and rural ITS; for example, the JPO is developing a course catalog to describe its knowledge resource offerings and is considering developing a small urban and rural ITS transit survey as part of the 2019 ITS Deployment Survey. DOT also provided technical comments on the draft, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation and the appropriate congressional committee. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or members of your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.", "This report addresses: (1) the extent to which selected transit providers in large urban areas use Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS); (2) the extent to which transit providers in small urban and rural areas use ITS; (3) the benefits and challenges transit providers experience in deploying ITS; and (4) the extent to which transit providers have utilized the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) resources to promote and support ITS.\nTo determine the extent of ITS use among transit providers in large urban areas, we reviewed 2013 data on national ITS deployment from DOT. On the basis of interviews with DOT officials and analysis of the 2013 ITS deployment data, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted site visits to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Portland and Eugene, Oregon; and Tampa and Orlando, Florida, to observe transit ITS deployments. We selected these site visits based on criteria including geographic dispersion and recommendations by JPO and FTA officials and industry stakeholders. During these site visits, we obtained documentation and interviewed officials from stakeholders in public transit decision-making including municipalities, academic researchers, state departments of transportation, and metropolitan planning organizations. We are not able to generalize our findings in these site visits to the whole country but used the other sources mentioned above to gain a more general perspective.\nWe also conducted semi-structured interviews on the use of ITS with a judgmental sample of 31 transit providers serving large urban areas. We selected transit providers that were geographically dispersed across the country and represented the variety of transit modes offered in these areas. We separated the transit providers into two categories: medium urban: 13 providers serving urbanized areas with populations of 200,000–1 million, and large urban: 18 providers serving urbanized areas with populations of more than 1 million.\nBecause we used a judgmental sample of transit providers, findings from these interviews cannot be generalized to a broader population. However, we determined that the selection of these transit providers was appropriate for our design and objectives and that these interviews would generate valid and reliable evidence to support our work.\nWe also interviewed officials from related industry associations such as the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), Community Transportation Association of America (CTAA), and Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITS America), and representatives from two ITS vendors and four independent ITS consultants. We selected the ITS vendors based on interviews with several transit providers in large urban areas that utilized their products, and the consultants based on a review of published transit ITS reports.", "To determine the extent of ITS use among transit providers in small urban and rural areas, we conducted a web-based survey of transit providers from November through December 2015. Results of this survey and the survey instrument have been published in GAO-16-639SP, an E- supplement to GAO-16-638 and can be found at the GAO website.", "We constructed the population of transit providers for our survey sample using reporting year 2013 data for recipients of Section 5307 FTA urbanized area formula grants and sub-recipients of Section 5311 FTA non-urbanized area formula grants in FTA’s National Transit Database (NTD). Using data from the NTD’s urban module, we determined that there were 314 providers that primarily served small urban areas. Using the NTD’s rural module, we identified 1310 providers that primarily serve rural areas. We excluded from this population transit providers that reported as urban recipients, rural recipients reporting separately, intercity bus providers, and 7 agencies that were also included in the urban module. To target the population of rural providers to those that are most likely using ITS, we also excluded transit providers with fleets of 10 or fewer vehicles. The outcome was a survey sample frame of 314 small urban providers and 582 rural providers. We selected a stratified random sample of 312 transit providers: 146 small urban providers and 166 rural providers. We obtained contact information for the rural transit providers from CTAA. During our data collection, we identified two organizations that were not currently providing transit service and removed them from our sample as out of scope. We obtained completed questionnaires from 233 respondents, or about a 75 percent response rate. The survey results can be generalized to the target population of 314 transit providers that serve small urban areas and 582 transit providers with more than 10 vehicles that serve rural areas. And, as noted above, we are issuing an electronic supplement to this report that shows a more complete tabulation of our survey results.", "We developed a questionnaire to obtain information about transit providers’ use of ITS technologies. On November 23, 2015, we sent an initial e-mail alerting agency contacts to the upcoming web-based survey, and a week later, the web-based survey was also delivered to recipients via e-mail message. Our e-mail message described the purpose and topic of the survey, and encouraged the respondent to consult with other individuals in the provider’s organization if that would increase the accuracy of their responses. The web-based survey requested information on types of ITS technologies deployed and any reasons for not deploying a technology; costs, benefits, and challenges associated with ITS; sources of funding and technical support; and federal resources used. To help increase our response rate, we sent a reminder e-mail on December 14 and called agency officials. The survey was available to respondents from November 30 through December 18, 2015.\nTo pretest the questionnaire, we conducted cognitive interviews with officials from 7 transit providers with knowledge about their organization’s use of ITS. Each pretest was conducted on the phone. We selected pretest respondents to represent small urban and rural areas in different parts of the country. We conducted these pretests to determine if the questions were burdensome, understandable, and measured what we intended, and to ensure we could identify an appropriate individual who was knowledgeable about ITS use to respond to the survey. On the basis of feedback from the pretests and expert review we modified the questions as appropriate.", "To produce the estimates from this survey, answers from each responding case were weighted in the analysis to account statistically for all the members of the population, including those who were not selected or did not respond to the survey. Estimates produced from this sample are generalizable to the population of transit providers that served small urban areas and transit providers with more than 10 vehicles that served rural areas as reported to the FTA’s National Transit Database in reporting year 2013.\nBecause our results are based on a sample and different samples could provide different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (for example, plus or minus 10 percentage points). We are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in this report include the true values in the study population. Unless we note otherwise, percentage estimates based on all transit agencies have 95 percent confidence intervals of within plus or minus 10 percentage points. Confidence intervals for survey estimates are presented in our supplemental survey product (GAO-16-639SP).", "In addition to the reported sampling errors, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce other types of errors, commonly referred to as non-sampling errors. For example, differences in how a particular question is interpreted, the sources of information available to respondents, or the types of people who do not respond can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We included steps in both the data collection and data analysis stages for the purpose of minimizing such non-sampling errors.\nWe took the following steps to increase the response rate: developing the questionnaire, pre-testing the questionnaires with small urban and rural transit providers, conducting multiple follow-ups to identify the appropriate contact at some organizations and to encourage responses to the survey, and contacting respondents to clarify unclear responses.\nTo identify the benefits and challenges that transit providers in large urban, small urban, and rural areas are experiencing from deploying ITS, we interviewed JPO and FTA officials, industry associations, officials from public transit stakeholders in our site visits, and 31 transit providers in large urban areas, surveyed transit providers in small urban and rural areas, and reviewed published research on ITS. We analyzed the interviews, survey results, and published research to identify commonly cited benefits and challenges. To determine how DOT promotes and supports the use of ITS technologies, we interviewed officials from the JPO and FTA about the federal resources and assistance available to support deployment and how transit providers use these resources. We reviewed the JPO’s program and strategic planning documents, including documents related to the Professional Capacity Building Program. In addition, we reviewed the JPO’s efforts to promote and support ITS technologies, including various studies, guidance, websites, and the JPO’s ITS databases. We determined the extent to which transit providers are utilizing DOT’s ITS resources by asking transit provider officials about their awareness and use of the training, technical assistance, or knowledge resources programs offered by the JPO, whether they had used these programs, and how helpful they had found them to be, in interviews and through the survey. In prior work, we and the National Academies’ Transportation Research Board identified leading practices for successfully encouraging the adoption of new technologies.\nWe conducted this performance audit from March 2015 through June 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "Appendix III: Public Transit Stakeholders GAO Interviewed Federal agencies Federal Transit Administration U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office Academic institutions Carnegie Mellon University North Dakota State University, Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute, Small Urban and Rural Transit Center University of South Florida, Center for Urban Transportation Research Industry associations American Public Transportation Association Community Transportation Association of America Intelligent Transportation Society of America ITS consultants Brendon Hemily C.R. Peterson Consulting, LLC Trillium Solutions ITS vendors Clever Devices RouteMatch Software Metropolitan planning organizations Lane Council of Governments Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission Municipalities City of Orlando City of Portland Public transit providers Antelope Valley Transit Authority Bi-State Development Agency (Metro Transit—St. Louis)\nCasco Bay Island Transit District Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority (LYNX)", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made important contributions to this report: Susan Zimmerman (Assistant Director), James Ashley, Namita Bhatia-Sabharwal, Anne Doré, Heather MacLeod, Cheryl Peterson, Justin Reed, Malika Rice, Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "", "", "", "", "h0_title", "", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_title", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "h2_title", "", "", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What has been a large source of ITS deployment?", "How do providers use ITS data?", "What advanced ITS have large and medium urban transit providers deployed?", "How might small urban and rural transit providers use ITS technologies?", "Why might such provides not use more advanced ITS technologies?", "What did the GAO find to be the benefit of ITS?", "What were some other benefits mentioned by large and medium urban transit providers?", "What is an example of combined technology?", "Why are ITS benefits hard to quantify?", "What challenges do transit providers face when trying to integrate ITS?", "How does the DOT promote ITS deployment?", "WHy might DOT employees not use ITS tech?", "How does DOT survey results influence the use of ITS tech?", "How could DOT help with more widespread ITS adoption?", "What would be the result of the DOT not taking such action?" ], "summary": [ "Selected large and medium urban transit providers have deployed most Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) technologies, such as automatic vehicle location (AVL) and electronic fare payment.", "Most of these providers reported sharing data collected from ITS with the public or regional transportation providers to enable technology innovations and improve regional planning.", "Large and medium urban transit providers have also deployed advanced types of ITS technologies, such as smart phone applications to provide passengers with travel information and mobile ticketing.", "GAO estimates that small urban and rural transit providers are using security systems, computer-aided dispatch, AVL, and geographic information systems to, among other things, monitor safety and security and improve record-keeping and billing capabilities.", "However, most small urban and rural transit providers are not using other ITS technologies—such as automatic passenger counters or electronic fare payment—due to the cost of the technologies or because there is no perceived need.", "Transit providers GAO surveyed and interviewed reported various benefits from ITS including improved scheduling and routing, on-time performance and schedule adherence, and customer satisfaction.", "In addition, many large and medium urban transit providers reported that using combinations of technologies can increase benefits.", "By using technologies such as AVL and electronic fare payment together, for example, transit providers can obtain more precise ridership information, which can further improve their planning.", "However, transit providers GAO interviewed and surveyed noted that it can be difficult to quantify the benefits of using ITS technologies because, as reported by large and medium urban providers, it may be difficult to identify a unit of measurement, such as for greater staff efficiency, or attribute benefits to either ITS deployment or a specific technology.", "Transit providers also face an assortment of deployment challenges, including competing for funding internally with state-of-good-repair needs, reluctance from the transit workforce and leadership to embrace ITS technologies, coordinating deployment across regional agencies, and integrating technologies purchased from different vendors.", "The Department of Transportation (DOT) offers a variety of information resources to support ITS deployment, but few of the transit providers interviewed or surveyed reported using these resources.", "DOT officials, selected large and medium transit providers, and other public transit stakeholders told GAO that the transit community may not be using these resources because transit providers lack sufficient staff and the information provided may not reflect the transit community's needs.", "Additionally, DOT does not include small urban and rural transit providers in its ITS deployment survey, a tool officials said is used in designing information resources.", "DOT could improve the awareness and applicability of ITS resources by developing a strategy to raise awareness of DOT's resources available to the transit community and monitoring the adoption of ITS by transit providers in small urban and rural areas.", "Without greater efforts from DOT to make the transit community more aware of federal ITS resources and to tailor these resources to the needs of smaller providers, transit providers may be missing information that could help them make the most informed ITS deployment decisions." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1, 3, -1, 0, 1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, -1, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
CRS_R44003	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "U.S. Assessments and Responses9", "Estimates and Analyses of Foreign Fighters", "U.S. Strategy and Partner Engagement", "European Assessments and Responses33", "European Fighters: Increasing Numbers and Growing Concerns", "European Policy Responses", "The European Union", "Belgium", "France", "Germany", "Spain", "The United Kingdom", "Russia and the Western Balkans", "U.S.-European Cooperation and Challenges123", "Historically Close Ties", "Confronting the Growing Foreign Fighter Threat", "Potential Obstacles", "Issues for Congress" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Flows of foreign fighters to the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq are recent examples of a broader phenomenon that has seen tens of thousands of individuals travel to various conflict zones in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere over the last three decades. In February 2015, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that more than 20,000 foreign fighters—including at least 3,400 Westerners—had traveled to the Syria-Iraq region since 2011. U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Nicholas Rasmussen has asserted that the numbers of those seeking to fight in Syria or Iraq are \"unprecedented,\" that they \"are going up,\" and that the majority of recent recruits are joining the Islamic State terrorist organization (also known as ISIL or ISIS).\nAmong Western citizens who have become foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq in the last few years, the largest contingents are believed to be from countries in Europe. Some European estimates of foreign fighter flows (from official and unofficial sources) are higher than U.S. assessments, and suggest that upward of 4,000 or 5,000 Europeans may have traveled to the conflict zone. Smaller numbers of Americans, Canadians, and Australians have also sought to join the fighting. As of February 2015, U.S. officials estimated that more than 150 U.S. persons had traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to support armed groups there since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011. There are no unclassified comprehensive figures available on how many Americans have joined the Islamic State organization relative to other armed groups, in part because the affiliation of many individuals is revealed only following their detention or death.\nWhile there is limited data that would allow a definitive assessment of the threat posed by individuals who have traveled to Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere as foreign fighters, U.S. officials have noted that there is a risk that \"these individuals may eventually return to their home countries battle-hardened, radicalized, and willing to commit violence.\" Such fears have been heightened considerably by the January 2015 terrorist attacks in France, in which at least 17 people were killed over the course of several days in three related incidents that targeted the Paris headquarters of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo , police officers, and a kosher supermarket. The perpetrators of the attacks were French-born Muslims; at least one suspect reportedly traveled to Yemen in 2011 for terrorist training, while another pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group. Prior to the Paris attacks, the May 2014 murder of four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium—allegedly carried out by a French Muslim who had spent a year with Islamist fighters in Syria—also raised alarm bells in both Europe and the United States about returning fighters.\nIn addition, security services in Western countries are increasingly concerned that some citizens and residents may be inspired by Islamist extremist propaganda to commit attacks at home without ever traveling abroad. Many point to the two separate attacks in Canada in October 2014, which targeted members of the armed forces and the Canadian Parliament, and the hostage-taking incident in Sydney, Australia, in December 2014, as worrisome examples of \"lone wolf\" attacks carried out by \"self-radicalized\" Muslims. Fears of \"copycat\" incidents have also increased following the February 2015 shootings in Copenhagen, Denmark, in which a gunman killed two individuals and wounded several police officers at two separate locations—a cafe hosting a free speech discussion and a synagogue—broadly mirroring the Paris attacks. The suspect, a young Danish-born citizen of Palestinian descent, appears to have been radicalized in prison and may have been interested in traveling to fight in Syria or Iraq.\nU.S. and European officials further note the potential propaganda value of Western Muslims engaged in fighting in Iraq or Syria. Some analysts have speculated that the Islamic State group may view Americans or other English speakers as particularly useful for targeting potential recruits in Western countries. Western fighters have appeared in several Islamic State propaganda videos. Intelligence services believe that the beheadings of three Americans and two United Kingdom citizens between August and November 2014, videotaped and posted online, were carried out by a British member of the Islamic State organization. Some intelligence officials have also suggested that the Islamic State group recruits Americans and other Westerners specifically for their presumed ability to reenter the United States and Europe with less scrutiny.\nThe United States has close, long-standing bilateral law enforcement and intelligence relations with most European countries. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and the 28-member European Union (EU) have also worked to enhance their counterterrorism and homeland security cooperation. In recent years, U.S. and European policymakers have sought to exchange \"best practices\" on ways to prevent radicalization, counter violent extremism (CVE), and tackle the potential foreign fighter threat. The United States and European governments also worked together to pass U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014, which seeks to combat the foreign fighter phenomenon worldwide.\nIn the wake of the Paris attacks, the White House convened a \"Summit on Countering Violent Extremism\" on February 17-19, 2015, in Washington, DC. This three-day event featured discussions with U.S. community leaders, civil society groups, and law enforcement officials on domestic CVE efforts, as well as talks with U.S. business and technology leaders on tackling radicalization online. The summit also included an international component in which representatives from over 60 countries (including the mayor of Paris and other high-ranking European and EU officials) discussed preventive measures and shared \"best practices.\"\nU.S. officials and analysts contend that the potential foreign fighter threat underscores the importance of close law enforcement ties with key European allies and existing U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements, including those related to tracking terrorist financing and sharing airline passenger data. Some U.S. policymakers, including several Members of Congress, have expressed particular worries about European fighters in Syria and Iraq because of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The VWP permits short-term visa-free travel to the United States from 38 countries, most of which are in Europe (see Appendix A ). In July 2014, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder asserted during a speech in Norway, that \"We have a mutual and compelling interest in developing shared strategies for confronting the influx of U.S. and European-born violent extremists in Syria. And because our citizens can freely travel, visa-free ... the problem of fighters in Syria returning to any of our countries is a problem for all of our countries.\"\nHearings in the 113 th and 114 th Congresses have addressed the potential foreign fighter threat, and several pieces of legislation have been introduced on the VWP. While some Members of Congress appear to support limiting or suspending the VWP, others indicate a preference for strengthening its existing security controls. The Obama Administration continues to support the VWP as a key facilitator of transatlantic trade and tourism. In November 2014, however, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced that VWP travelers would be required to submit additional advanced biographic information to enable more accurate and comprehensive screening because of the possible dangers posed by foreign fighters.\nThis report discusses U.S. and European assessments of and responses to the foreign fighter phenomenon. It focuses on government policies primarily in Western European countries and analyzes EU measures to counter the foreign fighter threat given the EU's largely open internal borders and that 23 EU member states belong to the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. It also briefly evaluates foreign fighter outflows and responses in the Western Balkans and Russia. The report concludes with a discussion of U.S.-European cooperation, primarily in the law enforcement and intelligence areas, and addresses issues of particular concern for Congress, such as the VWP.", "Conflicts in Syria and Iraq have attracted thousands of individuals from dozens of countries to fight alongside a broad spectrum of armed groups over the last 10 years. In Iraq, the anti-U.S. insurgency and the outbreak of sectarian warfare drew thousands of fighters to the country, particularly during 2003 to 2008, and predominantly from the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Iran supported Shiite militia groups during this period. While the vast majority of insurgent operations in Iraq were carried out by Iraqis, Sunni foreign fighters actively participated in fighting against U.S. forces, and some sources suggest that foreigners disproportionately were employed by some Sunni insurgent forces—including antecedents of the Islamic State organization—in suicide bombings and other high-profile attacks.\nIn 2008, U.S. military sources estimated that foreigners made up roughly 10% of the personnel of the Islamic State of Iraq (also known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor to the Islamic State), who were then estimated to have declined from as many as 10,000 fighters to roughly 2,000 to 3,000 fighters. These sources further reported that, in 2008, foreigners constituted roughly 1% of the 23,000 detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq. U.S. officials accused the Syrian government of President Bashar al Asad of facilitating the flow of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq during this period, and the U.S. military reportedly took action inside Syria in at least one instance in part to disrupt such flows. An outflow of foreign fighters from Iraq increasingly was reported by the international media from 2008 onward. In subsequent years, some governments in the Middle East and North Africa took steps to prosecute, monitor, and/or rehabilitate foreign fighters and individuals who facilitated their travel to Iraq, with varying outcomes.", "The unrest and conflict that began in Syria in 2011 reinvigorated the flow of foreign fighters to the area, and transnational networks active in sending fighters to Iraq reportedly reactivated and adapted their operations to send recruits to insurgent groups fighting the Asad government in Syria. By February 2014, U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper publicly assessed the overall strength of the insurgency in Syria at \"somewhere between 75,000 or 80,000 or up to 110,000 to 115,000 insurgents, who are organized into more than 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings.\" According to then-National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Deputy Director Nicholas Rasmussen, \"Syria remains the preeminent location for independent or Al Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of extremists, some of whom we assess may seek to conduct external attacks.\" NCTC also has acknowledged that Islamic State sympathizers \"could conduct a limited, self-directed attack here at home with no warning,\" but that \"any threat to the U.S. homeland from these types of extremists is likely to be limited in scope and scale.\" Further explication from U.S. government sources of the nature and scale of such a threat is generally unavailable from unclassified sources.\nAs noted previously, U.S. authorities judge that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the Syria-Iraq region since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011; of this figure, at least 3,400 are believed to be Westerners, including roughly 150 Americans. U.S. officials suggest that foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq hail from more than 90 countries. Roughly 10,000 foreign fighters are thought to have joined the Islamic State group, according to U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, General John Allen. More detailed U.S. government assessments of the national origins and current organizational affiliations of foreign fighters in Syria have not been made publicly available.\nU.S. officials estimate that a handful of Americans have died fighting in the Syrian conflict since 2012. They also assert that military operations against the Islamic State group since August 2014 have killed thousands of fighters, including an unknown number of foreigners.\nIn general, nongovernment open-source analyses available as of early 2015 are close to U.S. government public estimates of the size, general make-up, and affiliations of foreign fighters in Syria. Figures released in January 2015 by the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) suggest that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq, with as many as 11,000 from the Middle East, 3,000 from the countries of the former Soviet Union, and up to 4,000 from Western Europe. Such independent assessments also indicate that the flow of foreign fighters to Syria since 2011 has been unprecedented in terms of its scope and speed relative to other comparable conflicts. Echoing these analyses, in September 2014, then-NCTC Deputy Director Rasmussen testified before Congress that, \"The rate of travelers into Syria exceeds the rate of travelers who went into Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last ten years.\"\nInformation released by insurgent groups in Syria suggests that foreign fighters have affiliated themselves with entities drawn from across the ideological spectrum of opposition groups described by U.S. officials. However, open sources strongly suggest that a plurality if not a majority of foreign fighters active in Syria have affiliated themselves with armed Islamist groups, including U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations such as Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State. Many groups in Syria, which range from relatively moderate to more extreme in ideology and action, have issued appeals for foreign support and have utilized foreign fighters (see Appendix B for more information on foreign fighter recruitment).\nSome debate exists regarding the utility of foreign fighters to local groups, however. Foreigners may face language barriers and difficulties integrating with local populations or group members of other nationalities. Like other foreign fighters, the roles that Americans play in these organizations are likely to vary depending on an individual's skills and/or the needs of the group. In a December 2014 interview, General Allen stated that foreign fighters who lack military qualifications often become suicide bombers.\nSyrian government forces also have been bolstered by support from thousands of Lebanese Hezbollah personnel along with an unknown number of Iraqi Shiite militia members. In addition, U.S. officials have accused the government of Iran of deploying members of its security services to Syria in support of the Asad government. At least one source asserts that some Asad regime air strike missions may be piloted by Russians.\nVarious nongovernmental assessments have analyzed the makeup and activities of foreign fighter contingents in Syria from a number of different countries. These assessments reveal a range of historical and current patterns of recruitment, travel, group dynamics, and engagement in combat. Nevertheless, independent open source analyses of so-called \"martyrdom\" (death) notices, self-reported insurgent operations material, individuals' social media postings, foreign government estimates, and international press sources provide only limited information on the backgrounds and affiliations of some recent foreign fighters in Syria.\nIndividual accounts of foreign fighters' travel to Syria and Iraq suggest that potential recruits use both direct and circuitous routes to make their way to the conflict zone. While it appears that some individuals seek to mask their intended destinations and means of travel, others do not. Many foreign fighters, especially from Europe, reportedly travel through Turkey en route to opposition-held areas of northern Syria and Iraq. Turkey's multiple air connections and its long border with Syria that spans remote and in some places mountainous terrain have made Turkey a key transit location for fighters bound for Syria and Iraq.", "U.S. officials from the intelligence community, State Department, and agencies concerned with domestic security assess, monitor, and respond to threats posed by foreign fighters active in Syria and Iraq. Diplomatic and intelligence efforts focus on coordinating with source, transit, and returnee destination countries to strengthen shared responses and preventive measures. In March 2014, the State Department named Ambassador Robert Bradtke as \" senior adviser for partner engagement on Syria foreign fighters.\" According to a department spokesperson, Ambassador Bradtke was charged with leading \"a comprehensive effort, including marshalling representatives from a number of U.S. departments and agencies, to encourage key European, North African, and Middle Eastern partners to prioritize the threat, address vulnerabilities, and adapt to—and prevent—foreign fighters.\"\nTestifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in December 2014, Ambassador Bradtke laid out seven areas in which the United States is engaging with regional partners in order to counter foreign fighters:\nInformation - sharing . The United States is working bilaterally to bolster information sharing on known and suspected terrorists and called on partners to make greater use of multilateral arrangements for sharing information, such as Interpol's Foreign Fighters Fusion Cell. Law enforcement cooperation . The United States is assisting local law enforcement authorities in partner countries to bring suspected terrorists to trial. Capacity- building . The United States is working with partner countries to strengthen their infrastructure, including through stronger counterterrorism legislation and improved interagency coordination. Halting external financing . The Treasury Department is working with regional partners to identify cases in which individuals or organizations are raising funds to support the Islamic State or other terrorist groups. Counter-messaging . The United States has sought to counter the Islamic State's message (and that of other terrorist groups) by using social media, including efforts led by the State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Countering violent extremism . The United States is sharing its experience with countering violent extremism programs and working with partners to build their capacity to implement similar programs. Border and aviation security . The United States is implementing measures, including increased screening and preclearance at overseas airports, and enhancements to the Electronic System for Travel Authorization and the Visa Waiver Program (see \"Issues for Congress\" for more information).\nThe United States has also sought to address the potential foreign fighter threat through the United Nations. In August 2014, the U.S. government supported the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2170, which strengthened international sanctions designed to combat the Islamic State group, Jabhat al Nusra, and Al Qaeda-affiliated entities. The resolution calls upon all U.N. member states \"to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF [Jabhat al Nusra] and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaeda.\" Resolution 2170 also reiterates member states' obligation to prevent terrorist travel, limit supplies of weapons and financing, and exchange information on the groups.\nOn September 24, 2014, President Obama led a session of the U.N. Security Council focused on strengthening international responses to the threat posed by foreign fighters traveling to conflict zones, especially in Syria and Iraq. The session concluded with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178, which requires U.N. member states, consistent with international law, to \"prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities.\"\nIn particular, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 calls on all U.N. member states to ensure the ability in their domestic laws to prosecute and penalize their nationals and others departing their territories for foreign fighter-related crimes. In December 2014, Ambassador Bradtke asserted to Congress, \"Several countries have already enacted or proposed legislation to permit such prosecution; other countries have stepped up their enforcement of existing laws. We continue to urge partners to meet their obligations under UNSCR 2178, and are offering assistance to partners who may need help in doing so.\" U.N. Security Council Resolution 2199, adopted on February 12, 2015, reaffirms several requirements to restrict flows of arms, combat financing, and prevent trade in Syrian and Iraqi cultural property; it also establishes a reporting mechanism on international implementation of existing related resolutions, including the foreign fighter-related provisions in UNSCR 2178.", "", "Like the United States, European governments and the 28-member European Union (EU) have become increasingly alarmed by recent events in Syria and Iraq, especially the threat posed by the Islamic State organization to both regional stability and domestic security. EU leaders have asserted that \"the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the Islamist-extremist export of terrorism on which it is based, is a direct threat to the security of the European countries.\" Given the growing number of European citizens or residents of Muslim background fighting in the conflict zone, security services have become steadily more concerned about the potential danger such trained militants might pose if and when they return to Europe. Worries also exist about \"lone wolf\" attacks from those who may not have traveled abroad but have been inspired by Islamist extremist propaganda. Several incidents over the last year have heightened such fears, including\nThe May 24, 2014, murder of four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium. This attack was allegedly carried out by a French Muslim who had spent a year with Islamist fighters in Syria. Security officials assert that the suspect may have been associated with the Islamic State organization. The beheadings of three Americans and two UK citizens between August and November 2014 by a suspected British member of the Islamic State group. The January 7, 2015, attack in Paris, France that targeted the office of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and subsequent related incidents on January 8-9 that targeted a police officer and a kosher market. Seventeen people in total died in the attacks. The three perpetrators were French-born Muslims, with possible ties to Al Qaeda in Yemen and the Islamic State organization. The January 15, 2015, police raids in Belgium against a suspected Islamist terrorist cell believed to be planning an imminent attack, reportedly targeting police officers. Two suspects (both Belgian citizens of Muslim background) were killed during the raids by police in Verviers, near the German border; 13 others were arrested throughout the country as part of the alleged plot. The February 14-15, 2015, shootings in Copenhagen, Denmark, in which a Danish Muslim is believed responsible for killing two individuals, one at a cafe hosting a discussion on free speech with a controversial Swedish cartoonist and another at a synagogue; five police officers were also wounded in the attacks.\nAlthough it is difficult to assess the precise number of Muslims from Europe who have joined rebel or extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, European officials believe that their ranks have been increasing, with more European Muslims fighting in the current conflict than in previous ones. As of early January 2015, estimates from Europol, the EU's joint criminal intelligence body, suggest that at least 3,000 and upward of 5,000 EU citizens have left Europe to fight in Syria, Iraq, and other conflict zones. As noted earlier, a January 2015 study by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) indicates that up to 4,000 individuals from Western Europe have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the fighting (roughly double the Centre's December 2013 projections).\nAs seen in Figure 1 , key European countries of origin reportedly include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The conflict in the Syria-Iraq region has also attracted fighters from Turkey and countries with majority Muslim populations in the Western Balkans (especially Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo), as well as from Muslim communities in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union.\nExperts assert that many fighters from Europe have become associated with Islamist extremist groups opposing the Asad regime, including the Islamic State as well as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra. While European Muslims who have gone to fight in Syria or Iraq may already have been radicalized to some extent at home, authorities worry that fighters may return not only with more extremist views but also with enhanced training and weapon skills. Some studies suggest that returned Muslim fighters are more likely to commit acts of violent extremism than Muslims in the general population, and that their attacks are more lethal than those carried out by individuals who lack fighting or training experience abroad.\nAt the same time, analysts question how widespread the threat is, noting that only a small proportion of foreign fighters have actually committed acts of violence upon returning to their home countries. Experts also point out that many Europeans who have gone to fight in countries such as Iraq or Syria may have done so in part because of feelings of disaffection with Western societies and have no plans to return home, while others have been or will be killed. Furthermore, some European fighters may return traumatized and disillusioned by the brutality of the conflict and have no intention of committing violence at home.", "European governments have been addressing security concerns raised by European fighters with a wide array of measures, including increasing surveillance, combating terrorist recruitment, prohibiting travel, detaining returning fighters, and bolstering counterterrorism legislation. Individuals suspected of having traveled to fight in Syria or Iraq, planning such travel, or recruiting others have been arrested in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom (among other countries) on a range of different terrorism charges. Some of these governments, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have also sought to stop citizens or residents from traveling to the Syria-Iraq region under rules that permit the confiscation of passports or travel identification documents on security grounds. In addition, several European governments are considering strengthening existing anti-terrorism legislation to ensure that their laws permit prosecuting those who travel or attempt to travel abroad for terrorist purposes (often termed informally as \"jihadi travel\"), as required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 of September 2014.\nEuropean policymakers are also seeking ways to combat radicalization and extremist propaganda, especially on the Internet and social media. Over the last decade, most European governments have developed counter-radicalization initiatives, although they vary in intensity; Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom are recognized as having some of the most comprehensive programs. European officials and analysts contend that efforts to prevent radicalization and encourage de-radicalization are crucial to the fight against violent extremism, especially in Muslim communities, and must be undertaken at the national and local levels, in partnership with community and civil society groups. Given the role that information technology and the Internet now play in the ability of Islamist extremists to communicate their ideology, particularly among tech-savvy youth, some European governments are increasingly focused on developing online counter-narratives and working with Internet and social media companies to limit or remove radical content.\nAs European countries struggle to address the potential threat posed by returning fighters, a debate has arisen over the proper balance between security measures and \"softer\" approaches that promote de-radicalization and rehabilitation. Some experts caution against automatically pursuing criminal charges against all returnees, noting that prisons often serve as fertile recruiting grounds for Islamist extremists. Two of the perpetrators in the January 2015 attacks in Paris, as well as the suspect in the February 2015 attacks in Copenhagen, are believed to have been radicalized in prison. EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove has asserted that incarcerating all returning fighters would be an \"invitation\" to further radicalization; he called for authorities to distinguish between hardened fighters and those who return traumatized or disillusioned, and for rehabilitation programs both inside and outside prisons. Some commentators point to a program in Aarhus, Denmark, which seeks to rehabilitate returning fighters—helping them find jobs or attend school—and more broadly aims to improve Muslim integration, as a possible successful model; local officials also attribute such efforts to significantly decreasing the number of youths from Aarhus leaving to fight in Syria or Iraq.\nDespite these efforts, finding ways to stem the flow of European fighters to the Syria-Iraq region and keep track of those who go and return remains challenging. European governments face budgetary and personnel resource constraints in seeking to identify and monitor a growing number of potential assailants. Prosecuting individuals preemptively is difficult in many European countries because most existing laws require a high level of proof that a suspect has actually engaged in terrorism abroad or has returned to commit a terrorist act. Certain tools for preventing travel, such as confiscating passports, can entail lengthy legal processes.\nAnalysts also note that while some European countries have laws that restrict so-called \"jihadi travel,\" others do not yet. Consequently, national efforts by some European governments to stop such travel could be impeded by participation in the Schengen area of free movement, to which most European countries belong, and which permits individuals to travel without passport checks among participating states. For example, a French citizen could circumvent French travel restrictions to Syria or Iraq by leaving and reentering Europe from another EU country without such restrictions, and then traveling back to France.\nGiven the Schengen system and the EU's largely open internal borders, many analysts contend that steps must be taken at the EU level to better combat the potential threat posed by European fighters. Those of this view argue that an EU-wide approach is especially necessary to increase intelligence-sharing among the bloc's 28 member states and to harmonize national criminal laws (especially on \"jihadi travel\"). The EU has been working on a range of measures to address the foreign fighter phenomenon, but reaching agreement among member states and between EU institutions on certain initiatives—such as establishing an EU-wide system for the collection of airline passenger name record (PNR) data—has been difficult.", "Over the past two years, the 28-member EU has paid significant attention to the possible foreign fighter threat, with the issue figuring prominently at numerous high-level EU ministerial meetings. Although the primary responsibility for countering terrorism lies with individual member states, EU leaders have long recognized that the Union can and should play a supportive role in responding to the cross-border nature of terrorist threats. EU efforts since 2013 have focused broadly on preventing the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, improving information exchanges and the detection of foreign fighter travel, ensuring an adequate criminal justice response throughout the EU, enhancing counter-radicalization strategies, and engaging more closely with third countries. Despite the EU's political commitment, however, some experts suggest that concerns about protecting national sovereignty, data privacy, and civil liberties have slowed progress on some measures.\nThe terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen in early 2015 have injected greater urgency and momentum into EU initiatives to combat the foreign fighter phenomenon. At the EU's informal heads of state and government meeting on February 12, 2015, leaders outlined several key goals to guide EU work in the near term. These include the following:\nenhancing information-sharing among member states and with EU bodies such as Europol (the EU agency that handles criminal intelligence) and Eurojust (the EU agency responsible for prosecutorial coordination in cross-border crimes); finalizing an EU-wide system for the collection of airline Passenger Name Record data to help counter terrorist threats and improve information exchanges among EU member states; strengthening external EU border controls by making full use of existing security tools provided in the framework that governs the Schengen area of free movement; preventing radicalization by detecting and removing Internet content that promotes terrorism or extremism, developing communication strategies to foster tolerance and counter terrorist ideologies, and addressing societal factors and situations in prisons that may contribute to radicalization; implementing strengthened EU rules to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing; increasing cooperation to curb the illicit trafficking of firearms given that the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen appear to have been carried out with military-grade weapons that are illegal in most European countries; and improving cooperation with international partners, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and the Western Balkans.\nIn March 2015, EU justice and home affairs ministers directed Europol to establish a new EU Internet Referral Unit to help combat radicalization and violent extremism online. This unit is expected to monitor terrorist content on the Internet and social media platforms and work with service providers to flag and remove such content. EU policymakers have been holding discussions with Internet and social media companies, such as Google, Twitter, and Facebook, to explore what more can be done to tackle radicalization and counter jihadist propaganda online. EU leaders called for the new Internet Referral Unit to be operational by July 2015.\nBeside the work at EU level, a group of EU member states most affected by the foreign fighter phenomenon (the so-called \"Group of Nine\") have been meeting regularly since 2013 under the leadership of Belgium (and now France) to share information on the nature of the threat, compare policy measures, and discuss intensified European cooperation. In July 2014, most of these countries agreed to an \"action plan\" broadly aimed at stopping Europeans from going to fight in Syria and Iraq, improving the monitoring of returning European fighters, and increasing information exchanges. European officials assert that many of the initiatives discussed in the \"Group of Nine\" have since been taken up at EU level.\nAs noted earlier, however, forging common EU policies to counter the potential foreign fighter threat has been challenging. Establishing an EU-wide PNR system has been under discussion for years, but a proposal originally put forward in 2011 has been stalled since 2013 in the European Parliament—a key EU institution—because of data privacy concerns (see text box for more information). Political pressure to adopt an EU PNR system has intensified significantly following the January 2015 attacks in Paris. EU governments assert that an EU-wide PNR system is particularly crucial to helping law enforcement authorities identify previously unknown suspects. EU officials also argue that some member states have already established, or are working on establishing, their own national PNR collection systems and that finalizing the EU PNR proposal is necessary to ensure harmonization across the EU on PNR collection, usage, and data protection practices.\nIn February 2015, the European Parliament passed a resolution on anti-terrorism measures and pledged to work toward finalizing a revised PNR proposal by the end of the year. Nevertheless, observers caution that various Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) believe that a revised PNR proposal—also presented in February 2015—could still infringe too much on the right to privacy and other fundamental rights. Objections focus in particular on the PNR proposal's blanket retention of data and the length of time the data would be retained. Some influential MEPs argue that greater attention instead should be placed on improving intelligence-sharing among European law enforcement authorities and assert that while the PNR proposal mandates the collection and retention of PNR data, it does not go far enough in ensuring that it is meaningfully shared. MEPs may also seek to link approval of the PNR proposal to progress on controversial EU data protection reforms under discussion since 2012.\nOther potentially key ideas—such as harmonizing national laws to make traveling abroad for terrorist purposes a criminal offense in all 28 EU countries, or increasing intelligence-sharing to track extremists leaving for and returning from the Syria-Iraq region—are among the most difficult for the EU to agree upon and implement. This is largely because such measures relate to police and judicial issues long viewed as central to a nation-state's sovereignty.\nIn December 2014, EU justice and home affairs ministers decided to consider revising the EU's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism—which sets out a common EU definition of terrorism and common criminal penalties—in light of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 that calls on all U.N. member countries to ensure that their laws permit the prosecution of foreign fighter-related offenses. Presently, the EU's common definition does not specifically criminalize traveling or attempting to travel abroad for terrorist purposes, nor the receiving of terrorist training. While some EU member states have created such offenses already in their criminal codes, others have not yet done so.\nEU officials recognized the need to ensure that all EU member states fully comply with the provisions of UNSCR 2178. However, some EU governments initially appeared hesitant to consider amending the EU's common terrorism definition. They argued that implementing UNSCR 2178 could be done more quickly at the national level given that harmonizing criminal laws across the EU is often arduous because of varying national prerogatives on crime and punishment and concerns that EU-wide measures could infringe on national legal systems. Other member states and some EU policymakers countered that explicitly criminalizing foreign fighter-related offenses in the common definition would help avoid prosecution gaps and facilitate cross-border law enforcement and judicial cooperation in the longer term.\nPast ideas to enhance EU-wide intelligence capabilities or create a centralized EU intelligence agency have also foundered on sovereignty issues. The EU has a small Intelligence Analysis Center (INTCEN) to provide analysis, early warning, and situational awareness to EU institutions and member states in the fields of security, defense, and counterterrorism, but INTCEN does not have collection capabilities or the ability to conduct clandestine operations. Despite the Paris and Copenhagen attacks, the EU is not expected to pursue any significant changes to INTCEN's mandate.\nSome member states may view even limited information-sharing measures focused on foreign fighters and returnees as potentially compromising national intelligence sources or methods. EU officials have been encouraging member states to make greater use of existing common databases to help keep better tabs on foreign fighters and returnees. Such databases include the Schengen Information System (SIS)—which contains information on suspected criminals, forged identity documents, and stolen vehicles and property—and Europol's Focal Point Travellers database, established in 2013 to collect and analyze information on suspected European fighters. However, these databases depend on receiving information from member state law enforcement authorities and can only be effective EU-wide tools if national police and intelligence agencies provide them with relevant information. EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove contends that while member states have begun providing more information to Europol's Focal Point Travellers database, the amount of data provided continues to fall short of expectations; reportedly, just four EU members contribute 80% of the data to Focal Point Travellers.\nStrengthening external EU border controls has also been somewhat controversial as EU leaders seek to balance enhancing security with protecting the fundamental right of European citizens to the freedom of movement. Some press reports indicate that only about 30% of passports presented by travelers entering or leaving the Schengen area are checked electronically to see if they are lost, stolen, or counterfeit. The European Commission (the EU's executive) has been encouraging member states to increase electronic checks at the EU's external borders. EU leaders have also agreed to \"systematic\" checks against relevant law enforcement databases of EU citizens flagged as possible terrorist suspects or returning fighters at the external borders. However, the EU has stopped short (for now) of heeding the demands of some member states (including France and Spain) to amend the Schengen Borders Code—the detailed set of rules governing both external and internal border controls in the Schengen area—to permit more extensive checks of EU or other Schengen country nationals at the external borders.\nThe European Commission and the European Parliament largely oppose any changes to the Schengen Borders Code. They fear that some European countries and populist politicians would use any possible revision process of the external border control rules as an opportunity to push for re-imposing internal border controls as well. The Commission and the Parliament maintain that Schengen's current rules provide enough flexibility to enhance external EU border controls and better combat the potential foreign fighter threat.", "Over the last two years, the Belgian government has become increasingly alarmed about the growing number of European citizens or residents of Muslim background fighting in Syria and Iraq and the potential dangers that returning fighters may pose. Fears in Belgium have been especially acute since the May 24, 2014, attack in which four people were shot and killed at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. This attack was allegedly perpetrated by a French Muslim who had spent the past year with Islamist fighters in Syria; French and Belgian officials assert that the suspect may have been associated with the Islamic State organization.\nOn January 15, 2015, Belgian authorities broke up a terrorist cell believed to have been planning an imminent attack, reportedly on Belgian police officers. Two suspects (both Muslims) were killed in Verviers, an eastern town near the German border; one of those killed was a Belgian national, the other held dual Belgian-Moroccan citizenship. Thirteen other individuals were detained throughout Belgium in connection to the plot; several of those arrested may have traveled to and returned from Syria. Following these raids, Belgium also deployed roughly 300 troops in Brussels and Antwerp to guard sensitive locations, including Jewish sites, embassies, and the headquarters of the European Union (which is based in Brussels).\nOver 600,000 Muslims live in Belgium, comprising 5%-6% of Belgium's total population of roughly 11 million. Many Muslims in Belgium are the children or grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa (especially Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) or Turkey. Belgian authorities assert that as of early 2015, about 380 Belgians have tried to leave in order to fight in Syria and Iraq and that 330 have succeeded in doing so; official sources also estimate that 180 individuals from Belgium are in the region or en route, and that approximately 50 have died in the conflict. Some independent studies assess that the number of Belgians who have traveled or attempted to travel to the Syria-Iraq region is slightly higher; recent estimates from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation suggest that up to 440 Belgians may have joined the fighting in Syria and Iraq. Both official and unofficial sources indicate that Belgium has one of the highest number of foreign fighters per capita of any European country.\nSome observers describe Belgium as having a \"well-developed underground jihadist pipeline.\" Belgian law enforcement has focused on Sharia4Belgium, an extremist Islamist group, as a key recruiter of fighters for Syria and Iraq. Now banned, Belgian officials estimate that 10% of Belgians fighting in Syria and Iraq had links to Sharia4Belgium. In February 2015, 45 members of Sharia4Belgium were convicted by a court in Antwerp of terrorism-related offenses. The group's leader, who was found to have radicalized dozens of young men and recruited them to fight abroad, was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Most of those convicted were tried in absentia as they are believed to still be in Syria or Iraq, while several are presumed dead.\nTo combat the potential foreign fighter threat, Belgium has employed a mix of security measures and prevention efforts. In early 2013, Belgium updated its criminal code to include several new terrorism-related offenses, which cover public incitement, recruitment, and providing or receiving terrorist training (in Belgium or abroad). While these measures do not specifically criminalize traveling to participate in foreign conflicts, Belgian officials assert that they may be used to prosecute foreign fighters. Experts note, however, that collecting evidence of such activities in conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq, or proving terrorist intent, may make such prosecutions difficult. A proposal in 2013 from the Belgian Interior Ministry to criminalize leaving Belgium to become a foreign fighter was rejected by the Belgian cabinet for several reasons, including fears that it would discourage families of potential fighters from reporting their concerns, and that it could be mistakenly construed as a sign of Belgian support for the Asad regime in Syria.\nBelgian authorities have sought to ensure strong coordination between law enforcement and intelligence services, both at the national level and with local levels. A Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment maintains a list of those who may have traveled or are known to have traveled to Syria or Iraq, as well as those who appear to harbor intentions to do so; this list is routinely shared with various federal, regional, and local authorities. The Coordination Unit also systematically investigates and assesses the potential threat posed by each known returning fighter. In cases lacking enough evidence for a criminal prosecution, such returning fighters are referred to local authorities for follow-up and reintegration efforts; they may also be subject to monitoring by the security services.\nBelgium has also devoted significant attention to prevention and counter-radicalization efforts. In April 2013, the Belgian government adopted a new counter-radicalization strategy aimed at improving knowledge about the radicalization process, promoting social measures to help blunt factors that may lead to radicalization, enhancing the resilience of vulnerable groups, and increasing awareness at the local level. A new anti-radicalization unit has been created within the Belgian Interior Ministry tasked with deterring individuals from becoming foreign fighters and supporting local strategies to counter radicalization. Prevention measures implemented by various municipalities throughout Belgium have included combining police work with community engagement, establishing mentoring programs for at-risk youth, and providing free counseling services for families of aspiring foreign fighters. In addition, Belgian authorities have been active in developing narratives to counter Islamist extremist propaganda and on working with Internet and social media companies to reduce radical content online.\nIn the wake of the January attacks in Paris and the subsequent police raids in Belgium, press reports indicate that the Belgian government plans to pursue additional counterterrorism and counter-radicalization measures. These may include expanding the list of existing offenses for which it would be possible to strip dual nationals of their Belgian citizenship, providing authorities with the ability to take away identity documents (in addition to confiscating passports or other travel documents) to impede travel to Syria or Iraq, making it easier to freeze assets of suspected terrorists or their supporters, and enhancing efforts to tackle radicalization processes in penitentiary facilities. Belgian officials are also reportedly reconsidering a version of the proposal initially rejected in 2013 to criminalize traveling to a conflict zone. The Belgian government has also proposed an extra €300 million (roughly $348 million) for counterterrorism initiatives.\nFurthermore, Belgium has played a leadership role in seeking to promote a Europe-wide response to the potential dangers posed by foreign fighters. As discussed previously, under Belgium's initiative, the so-called \"Group of Nine\" EU member states most affected by the foreign fighter phenomenon began meeting regularly in 2013 to exchange information and promote greater Europe-wide cooperation. Belgian officials assert that many of the steps now being considered and undertaken at EU level were initially developed through the \"Group of Nine.\"", "For at least a decade, France has viewed Al Qaeda and related Islamist terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as the most pressing threat to French national security. Over the past year, French officials have also become increasingly concerned by the rise of the Islamic State terrorist organization (known in France as Daech after its Arabic acronym). Successive French governments have aggressively sought to combat Islamist terrorism, both through military operations in West Africa's Sahel region, the Middle East, and Afghanistan and by implementing stringent domestic counterterrorism policies. Despite these efforts, the threat appears to have intensified in recent years. Several deadly attacks on French and European soil and a growing number of French citizens training and fighting with terrorist organizations in the Middle East and North Africa have caused particular concern.\nFrance, which is home to Europe's largest Muslim population (an estimated 5 million-6 million, or about 8% of the total population), is reportedly the source of the largest number of European fighters in Syria and Iraq, most of whom are thought to be fighting with the Islamic State group. French authorities estimate that about 1,400 of the estimated 3,000 Europeans currently fighting with terrorist groups in those countries are French citizens and underscore that this number more than doubled in 2014. The French government has declared that these citizens' return to France and Europe represents \"the biggest threat the country faces in the coming years.\"\nThe killing of 17 people in three related terrorist attacks in Paris in early January considerably heightened French, European, and U.S. concerns about the threat of Islamist terrorism and returning fighters. On January 7, French-born Muslim brothers Chérif and Saïd Kouachi stormed the headquarters of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and fatally shot 11 Hebdo employees and one police officer. In separate incidents on January 8 and 9, a French-Muslim friend of the Kouachi brothers, Amedy Coulibaly, shot and killed a policewoman and four individuals he had taken hostage in a kosher supermarket. All three suspects were killed in shoot-outs with police on January 9. A full investigation into the attacks is ongoing, but media reports indicate that at least one of the Kouachi brothers had spent time in Yemen cultivating relationships with members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Pennisula (AQAP). In a video found after the attacks, Coulibaly declared his allegiance to the Islamic State, though the extent of his contact with the group remains unclear. All three perpetrators had been under state surveillance at various times prior to the attacks, and two of the three had spent time in French prisons.\nThe Paris attacks followed other attacks in France and in Europe that had already raised concern about the threat posed by radicalized French Muslims who have received terrorist training and support abroad. In May 2014, French police arrested a French citizen of Algerian descent, Mehdi Nemmouche, on charges that he killed four people during an attack that month at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium. Nemmouche reportedly spent over a year with Islamist militants in Syria after being radicalized in the French prison system. The Nemmouche arrest came two years after another French citizen of Algerian descent, Mohamed Merah, killed seven people—three soldiers, a rabbi, and three Jewish children—in France's Toulouse region over an eight-day period. Merah also reportedly developed ties to radical Islamists while serving time in prison.\nThe recent attacks and the growing number of combatants training abroad have challenged what has long been considered a highly effective French law enforcement and counterterrorism apparatus. French prosecutors are afforded broad powers to pursue terrorism cases and, over the past decade, have been further emboldened by a series of new anti-terrorism laws. Law enforcement officials also have more authority than most of their European counterparts to monitor and detain terrorism suspects. Nonetheless, the aforementioned attacks have exposed apparent shortcomings.\nFrench authorities have been criticized for an apparent inability to prevent individuals under state surveillance with known links to violent extremists from carrying out killings. The suspects in the Paris, Brussels, and Toulouse attacks had all been previously questioned and monitored by French authorities, but surveillance reportedly was lifted in each case. Some analysts speculate that surveillance on the Kouachi brothers was lifted in 2013 and 2014 as France increasingly shifted attention to citizens fighting with the Islamic State; the brothers were thought to have connections in Yemen and possibly to AQAP, but not the Islamic State. Other observers counter that it may be unrealistic to expect any government to effectively monitor every individual identified as a possible threat, noting, for example, that the Kouachi brothers, \"were two inactive targets who had been quiet for a long time. They were giving nothing away.\"\nOver the past year, and particularly in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the French government has sought to address these and other perceived shortfalls through a series of new counterterrorism measures. The initiatives are focused both on strengthening law enforcement and on preventing radicalization through social and education programs. In late 2014, the government adopted a new anti-terrorism law, which, among other things, broadened the authority to impose travel bans on individuals suspected of seeking terrorist training abroad, imposed strict penalties for inciting or expressing support for terrorism, and authorized the blocking of websites that encourage terrorism.\nThe French government has moved aggressively to use these new authorities since the Paris attacks, including seizing passports of individuals suspected of planning to travel to Syria and arresting individuals for speech deemed supportive of terrorism. In February 2015, the French Interior Ministry announced that it expected to seize close to 50 passports from individuals suspected of planning terrorist-related travel to Iraq and Syria during the first part of the year. In March 2015, French officials announced that they were blocking five websites accused of promoting terrorism, using new authorities that eliminate a previous requirement for a judge to authorize such decisions.\nIn late January 2015, the French government said it would commit €736 million (about $854 million) in new funding over the next three years to new counterterrorism initiatives, including hiring 2,500 new law enforcement personnel, improving information-sharing between intelligence and police officials, streamlining surveillance authorities, and launching new counter-radicalization programs. The new hires are to include 1,100 new positions in the domestic intelligence apparatus and close to 1,000 new positions in the Justice Ministry, including court officials, prison administration, and youth services. In addition, in March 2015, the government announced that it was proposing a new surveillance law to address the perceived shortcomings of a 1991 law enacted before the Internet had become a primary means of communication. The proposed law, expected to be approved by Parliament, would allow authorities to monitor the digital and mobile communications of anyone linked to an investigation of a terrorist suspect. Prior approval of a judge would not be required, and Internet service providers and phone companies would be legally obliged to comply with government requests for data.\nBeyond the domestic sphere, the French government has been a vocal proponent of proposals for an EU-wide Passenger Name Record system and for strengthening cooperation between law enforcement authorities in EU member states. France says that it will implement its own PNR system by the end of 2015, regardless of the outcome of the ongoing discussions on the EU PNR proposal. French officials have also at various times advocated measures to strengthen EU border controls. In addition, France has joined Germany and the UK in calling on U.S.-based technology companies to more aggressively remove content from their servers and websites deemed to promote or incite terrorism.\nA focal point of the French government's new counter-radicalization programs is to be the French prison system. According to some estimates, up to half of France's 68,000 inmates are Muslim. The suspects in the Paris, Brussels, and Toulouse attacks are all thought to have been radicalized while incarcerated. Among other measures, France has pledged to increase the number of Muslim chaplains in its prison system by one-third and to expand an existing program that separates groups of radicalized prisoners from the rest of the prison population in order to prevent recruitment efforts. Muslim advocates have long pointed to the relatively small number of Muslim chaplains in French prisons as one factor that may aid the radicalization process. They say that the French prison system has about 180 Muslim chaplains, compared to 700 Christian ones, with an estimated 80% of Muslim inmates never seeing a chaplain.\nSome analysts point out that while France has developed a far-reaching law enforcement apparatus to counter terrorism, it has had limited success improving the integration of Muslims into French society. Critics of French integration policy contend that to effectively prevent radicalization, the government must do more to reverse the significant socioeconomic disparities between \"native\" French citizens and those of North African and/or Muslim descent. In particular, they question the effectiveness of a long-standing French model of assimilation that prohibits granting special consideration or treatment to different ethnic or religious groups. They argue, for example, that many policies adopted in the name of France's secularist values, including restricting the wearing of head scarves and banning the full face veil, may serve to further alienate Muslims who already feel disenfranchised. Some critics could also argue that new laws against speech deemed sympathetic to terrorists unfairly target Muslims. They point out that in the wake of the Paris attacks, French leaders have vehemently defended the rights of Charlie Hebdo to publish cartoons deemed by many to be offensive and inflammatory, while at the same time aggressively prosecuting other forms of offensive speech.", "Since discovering that three of the September 11 hijackers had lived and plotted in Germany, successive German governments have worked hard to strengthen counterterrorism and anti-radicalization efforts. These efforts have intensified over the past year as officials have become increasingly concerned by the threat posed by German citizens fighting with rebel and terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. As of April 2015, German authorities estimate that about 680 German fighters had traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2011, the majority of whom have now joined the Islamic State group. About one-third of these fighters reportedly have returned to Germany, and 85 have been killed in combat.\nGerman officials express particular concern about the apparently growing numbers of Germans joining extremist Salafist groups in Germany and going on to fight in Syria and Iraq. Between early 2014 and April 2015, estimates of the number of Germans fighting in the region more than doubled, rising from about 270 to 680. German intelligence officials report that fighters often come from Salafist circles that propagate a particularly radical form of Islam aimed at aligning all state and societal structures with the Koran. They estimate that as of April 2015, about 7,300 Germans were members of Salafist groups in Germany, compared to 3,800 in 2011.\nGermans fighting with the Islamic State reportedly have formed their own brigade within the terrorist organization. A significant number of these fighters are thought to have been previously affiliated with a German militant Islamist group named Millatu Ibrahim (Abraham's Religion). Millatu Ibrahim was banned by German authorities in May 2012 for its involvement in riots protesting the publication of caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in media outlets. Analysts believe that one of the group's German co-founders, a former hip-hop artist named Denis Cuspert (stage name Deso Dogg), is an \"integral part of the [Islamic State] propaganda effort,\" including by overseeing the production of a variety of German language material.\nThe German government takes a multifaceted approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism, including law enforcement measures and social and economic policies aimed at preventing radicalization. On the law enforcement side, the government has sought to strengthen existing laws that criminalize travel with intent to train with a terrorist organization, terrorist recruitment, and providing support to terrorist organizations. In December 2014, a German court for the first time sentenced an individual to a jail term for joining a militant group in Syria. Authorities have confiscated the passports of several German citizens suspected of planning \"terrorist travel,\" and have also banned numerous religious organizations suspected of providing support to or recruiting for Islamist terrorists. Nonetheless, some analysts and policymakers have expressed concern about the difficulty of successfully prosecuting suspected terrorists under existing laws. They note, for example, the high burden of proof to establish terrorist intent behind travel to Syria and Iraq, and the difficulty of proving that individuals have been active with terrorist organizations after they return home.\nIn January 2015, Berlin announced proposals to address perceived shortcomings in existing laws against \"terror tourism\" and to grant new authority to collect and save communication data from its citizens. Among other things, the newly proposed laws would allow authorities to confiscate identity cards as well as passports from suspected terrorists—residents can currently travel throughout Europe and to Turkey with identity cards, but without passports. The proposed new surveillance authorities could be particularly controversial given long-standing German concerns about privacy rights. In addition, while many law enforcement officials have welcomed the measures, some emphasize that additional resources, including highly qualified investigators, may be more important. They argue, for example, that they do not have the resources necessary to conduct the level of surveillance necessary to enforce existing laws.\nLaw enforcement efforts have met with some success. Since 9/11, Germany has not experienced a major terrorist attack on the scale of those in France, Spain, or the UK. The first and thus far only deadly Islamist-motivated attack on German soil occurred in 2011, when a German resident from predominantly Muslim Kosovo killed two U.S. airmen and seriously wounded two others in a shooting at the Frankfurt airport. Over the past decade, authorities have broken up several terrorist cells they claim were plotting significant attacks on German soil. In 2010, three German citizens and a Turkish resident in Germany were convicted of plotting what German investigators say could have been one of the deadliest attacks in European postwar history. The group, all members of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), was arrested in 2007 as it prepared to carry out attacks on Ramstein Airbase and other U.S. military and diplomatic installations. In the weeks following the Paris attacks in early 2015, German police raided several properties linked to radical Islamist groups alleged to be planning terrorist attacks in Syria. The raids resulted in at least four arrests, including of two men suspected of having joined the Islamic State after traveling to Syria in 2013.\nThe German government has also devoted significant resources to preventing radicalization, including through efforts to better integrate German Muslims who may feel alienated from broader society. An estimated 4 million Muslims live in Germany, making up roughly 5% of the general population; of which almost two-thirds are thought to have Turkish roots. Although the vast majority of Muslims living in Germany are seen to be relatively moderate in how religion affects their public conduct, support for more extremist views may be on the rise, especially among some younger Muslims. It is thought that some Muslim youth do not identify with Germany and are increasingly motivated by pan-Islamic notions of Muslim humiliation around the world, the plight of the Palestinians, and perceived U.S. subjugation of Arab countries.\nDespite advances in some areas, overall Muslim integration into German society has been minimal. Germans and Muslims often blame each other for this. Many \"native\" Germans see Muslims as refusing to accept German norms and values and as wanting to stay apart from the majority population. German attitudes toward Muslim communities, though rooted in differences in culture and values, also have been exacerbated by persistent social and economic problems facing the country as a whole. Many Muslims view German society as unwilling to fully accept people of different races, regardless of whether they assimilate or not. Some observers say that this reluctance could play into the hands of fundamentalists \"by both defining German-ness in opposition to Islam and deepening the Turkish community's sense of being Muslim.\"\nPublic debate over the role of Muslims in German society has increased over the past year, and especially in the wake of terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen. Tensions have been catalyzed by weekly marches in the eastern city of Dresden organized by a new far-right, anti-Islam organization named PEGIDA (German acronym for Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the West). Between October 2014 and January 2015, the PEGIDA marches steadily grew in size, reaching a high of about 17,000 participants. After drawing sharp condemnation from across the political spectrum and spurring large counter-protests throughout Germany, the PEGIDA marches have since dwindled in size. However, the movement's emergence has exposed doubts about Islam's compatibility with the country's democratic values. German leaders have been particularly challenged to balance their desire to support and promote tolerance of Islam with their condemnation of violent Islamist extremism.", "The International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) estimates that 50 to 100 Spanish citizens have joined jihadist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, however, Moroccan authorities have estimated that at least 1,200 Moroccan nationals with Spanish residency cards have joined the Islamic State group. About 70% of the over 1 million Muslims living in Spain have their origins in Morocco.\nAt least 100 fighters from France and Morocco are thought to have transited through Spain in order to reach Turkey and travel on to Syria. Over the past two years, Spanish police have conducted raids to dismantle jihadist recruiting networks active in Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves located on the coast of Morocco, as well as in Madrid. In December 2014, a joint Spanish-Moroccan operation dismantled a network active in recruiting women to travel and join the Islamic State organization.\nStudies analyzing 20 individuals known to have traveled from Spain to join the conflict as of early 2014 reveal 11 Spanish citizens and nine Moroccan nationals living in Spain, most in their mid-20s or early 30s, and many married with children. The majority of these individuals came from Ceuta. The group included students, taxi drivers, unskilled workers, and unemployed individuals. One individual, Mouhannad Almallah Dabas, a naturalized Spaniard who was born in Syria, was connected to an Al Qaeda cell that operated in Spain from the mid-1990s to 2001 and was convicted in the 2004 Madrid train bombings, although his sentence was later overturned by the country's Supreme Court. Dabas was killed in Homs, Syria, in October 2013 while allegedly fighting for Jabhat al-Nusra. Most of the others had no previously known jihadist background, although several had criminal pasts, including drug charges. Many are thought to have been recruited and radicalized by experienced agents of a Spain-Morocco jihadi network whose Spanish-territory operations were dismantled by authorities between June and September 2013. Several individuals attended Attauba mosque in Ceuta, which has hosted radical imams in the past. At least three members of the group became suicide bombers in Syria.\nSpain has extensive experience in confronting domestic terrorism. The Basque separatist group ETA waged a violent campaign for over 40 years before declaring a permanent ceasefire in 2011. As a result of these experiences, Spain has a considerable body of counterterrorism legislation and entrenched procedures within its existing legal codes. Under the Spanish Penal Code, terrorist offenses are treated as an aggravated form of crime. Observers note, however, that this legislation was built largely around combatting organized groups such as ETA. The 2004 Madrid attacks marked a new type of threat, and Spain has sought to reform its penal code in order to adapt to more loosely organized cells, lone wolf actors, and recruitment or incitement activities. Legal reforms in 2010, for example, criminalized offenses such as recruitment or indoctrination, online incitement of terrorism, providing terrorist financing, and providing terrorism-related training. Additionally, following the Madrid attacks, the Spanish government sharply increased resources for national anti-terrorist agencies and sought to better integrate their work.\nNevertheless, critics have expressed concern that the overall conviction rate for terrorism-related charges in Spain has remained relatively low. One Spanish newspaper reported in January 2015 that out of 571 arrests related to radical Islam since 2004, Spanish courts have convicted fewer than 100 people. Some observers assert that prosecutions have been hindered by strict evidence requirements, high standards of proof for intent and conspiracy, strong safeguards on civil liberties, and accusations of police misconduct. In relation to the foreign fighter issue, the high burden of proof has made it difficult to preemptively charge individuals with terrorism-related crimes before they were able to leave Spain.\nIn September 2014, the Spanish government announced its intention to strengthen counterterrorism laws and police powers in response to the foreign fighter threat. The governing Popular Party (PP) subsequently proposed the addition of new amendments into a broader project to reform the penal code, including making it a criminal offense to receive terrorist training (past reforms criminalized providing training only) or to participate in an armed conflict abroad, and allowing the government to revoke the citizenship of those participating in terrorist activity. Additional proposals would allow for passport seizures, accelerated expulsion orders, reentry bans of identified extremists, and the introduction of streamlined search and capture warrants for police to arrest fighters attempting to travel to conflict zones. The government also indicated planned reforms to the regulation of evidence collection and standards for witness protection, in order to improve the success rate of terrorism-related prosecutions. Spain is working to introduce a national Passenger Name Record system for commercial air travel by the end of 2015.\nThe terrorist attacks in Paris in early 2015 created a heightened sense of urgency for these efforts. In January 2015, the PP and the main opposition Socialist Party (PSOE) jointly re-drafted the proposals as a separate new counterterrorism bill. Rather than advancing the proposals piecemeal in the context of the wider penal code reform, this move combined the measures into a single piece of legislation submitted to the Spanish Parliament for fast-track approval and adopted on March 30, 2015.\nHuman rights and civil liberties advocates have criticized the government's proposals, arguing that they create a vague and overly broad definition of terrorism that could infringe on the freedoms of expression and movement, the right to privacy, and the presumption of innocence. Among other objections, critics assert that the proposals outlaw planning to travel outside the country to train with a militant group, even if no such travel takes place, and make it illegal to express a statement on social media that could be perceived as inciting terrorism, even if not linked to a specific terrorist act.\nIn January 2015, the Spanish government approved a Strategic National Plan to Fight Violent Radicalization, \"a framework plan for the different public authorities to detect and act against potential outbreaks of radicalization, in a timely and coordinated fashion.\" Under the coordination of the Home Affairs Ministry, the plan establishes a new National Group to Combat Violent Radicalization that includes representatives from national government ministries, the intelligence community, provincial and city governments, and nongovernment institutions and associations. The aim is to create \"the necessary structures and work plan to detect and intervene in pockets of potential radicalization ... with the aim of breaking up the chain of transmission of radicalization that makes individuals take the decision to become violent and, in the work-case scenario, become terrorists.\" Additional priorities of the initiative include generating counter-narratives against the spread of radical messages online and combating radicalization in prisons.", "The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and official British government sources estimate that 500 to 600 people have traveled from the UK to fight in Syria and Iraq. Other sources suggest that this figure represents a minimum estimate, with the actual number as high as 1,000 to 2,000. UK authorities have been actively concerned about this trend since 2011, but the issue has gained a higher profile with the appearance of identified or presumed British fighters in several Islamic State propaganda videos since mid-2014. British fighters in Syria have also reportedly carried out suicide bombings, and researchers have confirmed the deaths of 26 individuals who have traveled from the UK to fight. Given the difficulties of monitoring and verification, the actual total could be higher.\nApproximately 2.9 million Muslims live in the United Kingdom. About two-thirds of British Muslims have a South Asian background. Although the majority of Muslims in the UK are not involved in extremist activities, a fringe community exists that advocates radical Islamism and, in some cases, supports violent extremism. The UK government believes that up to 250 individuals who trained or fought in Syria or Iraq have already returned home to the UK. Given the potential for returning extremists to plot attacks on domestic targets, the UK's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre raised the country's terror threat level from \"substantial\" to \"severe\" on August 29, 2014, indicating that authorities consider an attack to be highly likely.\nAccording to the ICSR, the broad profile for many of the British foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is of a male in his 20s, of South Asian ethnic origin, with recent connections to higher education and links to individuals or groups who have international connections. Other analysts assert that while there is no single profile, a high proportion of British foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have criminal pasts, with either a history of petty crime, previous incarceration for extremist Islamist behavior, or are hardened career criminals. Profile analysis of 23 UK fighters known to have been killed indicates that they were all second-generation immigrants from ethnic backgrounds, including Libyan, Palestinian, Eritrean, and Bangladeshi, with an average age of 23. Many had held relatively well-paying jobs and were enrolled in or had completed higher education, although several had significant criminal records and had spent time in prison.\nThe UK's approach to addressing the foreign fighter threat contains three main elements. The first focuses on preventing suspects from traveling to or from the United Kingdom using powers to revoke passports, barring foreign nationals from reentry, and stripping dual nationals or naturalized citizens of their UK citizenship. The government has reportedly revoked the British citizenship of 27 people since 2010, the overwhelming majority due to terrorism-related activities, and has refused or cancelled the passports of 29 individuals planning to engage in terrorist activity abroad. According to Home Secretary Theresa May, as of November 2014, a total of 133 people had been excluded from the UK due to reasons of national security or the \"public good,\" including 84 \"hate preachers.\" The UK is currently the only EU member state that has implemented a national Passenger Name Record system, beginning development under an initiative launched in 2003. Although the system collects advanced passenger information for all commercial flights to the UK originating outside the EU, critics observe that it covers only about two-thirds of total air, rail, and maritime arrivals. Due to restrictions in some EU countries, for example, the system applies to about 70% of intra-EU flights to the UK, and advance data for private airplanes and boats remains difficult to collect.\nThe second element to the UK's approach is managing suspected extremists already in the country. The Home Secretary has the power to impose terrorism prevention and investigation measures (formerly known as \"control orders\"), such as house arrest and restrictions on telephone and Internet use. Backed by an extensive set of counterterrorism legislation, UK security services and police also have a wide range of powers that can be used in efforts to prevent attacks and prosecute those planning them. Home Secretary May indicated in November 2014 that since 2010, 753 people have been arrested in the UK for terrorism-related offenses, 212 have been charged, and 148 successfully prosecuted. There are 138 individuals in the UK serving prison sentences for terrorism-related offenses, and 13 people have been extradited to face terrorism charges abroad.\nThird, the UK government's counterterrorism strategy includes a component called Prevent that seeks to combat the ideology of Islamist extremism, including by banning hate preachers and organizations that incite terrorism; attempting to counter radicalization and extremist recruitment in schools, universities, prisons , and mosques; and working with a network of organizations that offer support to those at risk. These efforts also include combating extremist material on the Internet. A Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit set up in 2010 has taken down over 65,000 unlawful terrorist-related websites, with over 70% of the unit's current caseload reportedly related to the Islamic State organization.\nIn September 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron announced plans to further enhance the government's powers to counter the growing threat posed by foreign fighters. This initiative developed into the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act that was adopted in February 2015. The new act\nBroadens the powers of police and border officials to temporarily confiscate the passports of terrorism suspects for up to 30 days, with judicial review of the decision after two weeks. Currently, the Home Secretary must personally authorize the seizure of a passport. The bill also introduces new Temporary Exclusion Orders banning suspected terrorists with British passports from the country for two years, cancelling their passports, and placing them on \"no fly lists.\" Individuals wishing to return may face prosecution or be forced to complete de-radicalization programs and may face two-year renewable orders restricting their movements, requiring them to check in regularly with the police, and notify authorities of contact with other extremists. Attempting to return in secret is defined as a new criminal offense carrying a five-year sentence. Amends the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, reintroducing the power to relocate suspects within the UK and limit the distance they may travel. The bill increases the standard of proof for imposing a measure from \"reasonable suspicion\" to \"balance of probabilities.\" Amends the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, requiring mobile phone and Internet service providers to retain data allowing relevant authorities to identify the individual or device that was using a particular Internet protocol (IP) address at a given time. Replaces existing \"authority to carry\" provisions for air, maritime, and rail carriers, requiring the advance provision of additional passenger, crew, and service information, including passenger credit card details. Puts the Prevent strategy on a statutory footing. Relevant institutions (e.g., prisons, universities, schools, and mosques) face a new legal duty to report extremism and develop policies to deal with radicals and extremist speakers. Makes it illegal for insurance companies to cover terrorist ransom payments. Creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to assist the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in monitoring the operation and impact of the UK's counterterrorism legislation.\nHuman rights and civil liberties advocates have criticized aspects of the legislation. Some critics maintain that the enhanced powers to seize passports at the border could result in greater ethnic profiling. Others argue that Temporary Exclusion Orders amount to \"dumping\" citizens and \"abdicating ... responsibilities to the international community.\" Critics additionally assert that the reintroduction of relocation powers under Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures are a form of \"internal exile.\"", "The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) estimates that 800 to 1,500 individuals have travelled from Russia to join groups involved in the conflict in Syria and Iraq. The majority of these fighters are thought to come from Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus, regions of Russia that have predominantly Muslim populations. Other sources estimate the number to be much higher, with as many as 2,500 Chechens and other North Caucasians fighting with the Islamic State group or Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq. In recent months, numerous commanders of the proclaimed Caucasus Emirate have reportedly transferred their loyalties to the Islamic State organization. Analysts assert that many Chechen fighters tend to be relatively experienced and combat-ready, based on fighting Russia in a conflict that has been ongoing since the 1990s. Chechen fighters may therefore take on more leadership roles within extremist groups. One of the Islamic State's leading military commanders, for example, is Abu Omar al-Shishani (\"Omar the Chechen\"), who was born in Georgia to an ethnic Georgian Orthodox Christian father and an ethnic Chechen Muslim mother.\nRussian authorities have sought to use tight border controls in Chechnya and the North Caucasus to prevent travel to and from the conflict region. In regions such as Chechnya and Dagestan, there have reportedly been efforts by local authorities and media, as well as at mosques and schools, to discourage young men from travelling to Syria or Iraq to join armed groups. Russia has also used police operations to identify potential extremists and sought to prosecute individuals involved in terrorist activities. Russian legislation makes it a criminal offense to participate in an armed group abroad \"whose aims are contrary to Russian interests\" or to receive training \"with the aim of carrying out terrorist activity.\" Some analysts have pointed out that the recent increase in tensions and mistrust between the United States and Russia over Ukraine has hindered possibilities for intelligence-sharing on the foreign fighter issue.\nThe ICSR estimates that up to 650 individuals have traveled to the conflict from the countries of the Western Balkans (estimates are Albania, 90; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 330; Kosovo, 100 to 150; Macedonia, 12; Serbia, 50 to 70). Studies suggest that over 80% of fighters from the Western Balkans initially joined Jabhat al-Nusra, with a marked shift to the Islamic State group starting in 2013. The number of fighters from the region thought to have been killed in the conflict is approximately 40 to 50, and the number thought to have returned home is approximately 70 to 90. Data patterns for known foreign fighters from the Western Balkans appear to reveal several main clusters, with groups of individuals linked to isolated, radical communities in Bosnia or Serbia or to radical networks based around several informal mosques in Albania.\nAlbania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia all introduced foreign fighter-related changes to their criminal codes in 2014. Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the largest number of fighters from the region, notably closed a legal loophole with passage of a law criminalizing facilitation or participation in foreign fighting. In September 2014, Bosnian authorities reportedly arrested 16 individuals under the new law, which carries a sentence of up to 10 years in prison. Authorities in Serbia, Albania, and Kosovo also made a number of arrests in 2014 linked to foreign fighter facilitation or travel to Syria, with 55 individuals reportedly arrested in Kosovo and five charged in Serbia in October 2014 alone.", "", "The United States has extensive bilateral law enforcement and intelligence relationships with most European countries. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are among the closest U.S. partners in this regard. U.S. police and intelligence services have been assisting their French counterparts with the investigation of the January 2015 attacks, and news reports have shed light on the steady U.S.-French exchange of information on the alleged perpetrators, their travel, and other suspected terrorists and foreign fighters. Since 2001, the United States and the European Union have also greatly expanded their law enforcement cooperation, especially against terrorism. U.S.-EU dialogue on police, judicial, and border control matters has increased substantially, and a number of U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements have been concluded over the years.\nIn addition, U.S. and European policymakers have sought to cooperate on preventing radicalization and countering violent extremism. The United States has partnered with many European countries to share information and \"best practices\" on CVE measures, including social programs, counter-narrative initiatives, and civil society engagement efforts. In 2010, the United States and the EU convened an expert-level dialogue for the first time on preventing violent extremism. European governments and the EU have also worked closely with the United States in the 30-member multilateral Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), founded in 2011. GCTF efforts have included mobilizing CVE resources and expertise, strengthening criminal justice and rule of law capacities, and enhancing international counterterrorism cooperation.\nNevertheless, some challenges remain in promoting closer U.S.-European counterterrorism cooperation. Data privacy has long been a key sticking point. U.S. and European officials also continue to grapple with finding the appropriate balance between strengthening transportation and border security and facilitating legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce. Such issues have come to the forefront of U.S.-European discussions again amid the emerging foreign fighter threat. Some U.S. policymakers, including several Members of Congress, have expressed particular worries about European fighters in Syria and Iraq because the U.S. Visa Waiver Program permits short-term visa-free travel for citizens of most European countries (see \"Issues for Congress\" for more information).", "Recently, U.S. and European counterterrorism cooperation has focused heavily on ways to combat the foreign fighter phenomenon given increasing concerns that both European and American Muslims are being recruited to fight with Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq. In September 2014, the White House noted that U.S. officials from the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security are \"working closely\" with European counterparts on \"a wide range of measures focused on enhancing counter-radicalization, border security, aviation security, and information sharing\" to address potential threats posed by foreign fighters. On January 11, 2015, in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder attended an emergency meeting of European and North American interior ministers to discuss terrorist threats and foreign fighters. High-ranking European officials were also key participants in the February 2015 CVE conference hosted by the United States in Washington, DC.\nGiven the EU's largely open internal borders, U.S. officials have been encouraging the EU to move forward with approving and implementing its own system for collecting airline Passenger Name Record data to help counter the potential threat from returning fighters. U.S. policymakers have also urged the EU to make greater use of the Schengen Information System. U.S. officials and analysts contend that the foreign fighter phenomenon underscores the importance of close bilateral law enforcement ties with European allies and existing U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements. These include the following:\ntwo agreements that allow U.S. law enforcement authorities and Europol to share both strategic information (such as threat tips, crime patterns, and risk assessments) and personal information (names, addresses, phone numbers, and criminal records about suspects in crimes covered by Europol's mandate); the U.S.-EU PNR agreement, which permits airlines flying to and from Europe to share airline passenger data with U.S. authorities; and the U.S.-EU Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) agreement (also known as the U.S.-EU SWIFT accord), which allows U.S. authorities access to financial data held by a Belgium-based consortium of international banks.", "Despite the common commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to bolster efforts against the potential foreign fighter threat, some issues could pose hurdles to greater U.S.-European cooperation. U.S.-European differences on data privacy continue to make information-sharing accords such as SWIFT and PNR controversial in Europe. The EU considers the privacy of personal data a basic right, and EU law prohibits the transfer of such data to countries where legal protections are not deemed \"adequate.\" Many European privacy advocates and some EU policymakers (especially in the European Parliament) have long voiced objections to the SWIFT and PNR agreements due to fears that the United States cannot guarantee a sufficient level of protection for European citizens' personal information.\nBoth the SWIFT and PNR accords will be up for renewal in the near future (SWIFT in mid-2015 and PNR in 2019) and have come under renewed scrutiny following the unauthorized disclosures of classified U.S. surveillance activities since June 2013. Some analysts are concerned that future iterations of the agreements between the United States and the EU may not be able to secure the necessary European Parliament approval. Others suggest that the potential threat posed by returning Islamist fighters may moderate any possible opposition to renewing these accords.\nOther differences in perspective and policy approaches also exist. For example, U.S. authorities have reportedly questioned plans by some European governments to revoke passports of citizens who have gone to fight in Syria or Iraq to prevent them from returning home. Some U.S. officials suggest it may be more useful to question and monitor such returning fighters to enhance intelligence collection, both about domestic terrorist or extremist networks and about the situation on the ground in the conflict zone.\nIn addition, varying U.S. and European views and laws on freedom of speech, including online, could pose difficulties for U.S.-European cooperation in countering radicalization and extremist propaganda. In the past, for example, U.S.-European frictions have surfaced over racist and anti-Semitic material on U.S. websites—which would be illegal if hosted on Internet servers located in European countries such as Germany or France—but which are largely protected in the United States by the right to free speech enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, many European officials have expressed concerns about terrorist and extremist content online, the vast majority of which is hosted on U.S. servers. Following the attacks in Paris in January 2015, France, Germany, and the UK called on Internet and social media companies to begin preemptively removing terrorist content from their sites.\nU.S. technology firms largely oppose European demands for preemptive filtering because they worry about becoming the arbiters of acceptable discussion online; they also question to what extent they must comply with local laws limiting online speech that may not violate U.S. laws. U.S. industry leaders assert that they do remove content that incites terrorism or recruits people to join terrorist organizations, but contend that determining where to draw the line can be a difficult issue (especially with respect to sarcasm or hyperbole), and oppose a broad legal overhaul as unworkable. Furthermore, U.S. technology companies suggest that complying with European calls for preemptive filtering could have negative implications for global Internet freedom, setting a bad precedent with respect to countries such as Turkey, Russia, or China. Meanwhile, some U.S. and European law enforcement officials worry that automatically closing down websites with terrorist content could be counterproductive because such sites often serve as useful intelligence and monitoring tools.", "Several congressional hearings in the 113 th and 114 th Congresses have focused on or addressed the foreign fighter phenomenon, especially as related to Europe.\nSenate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, \"Cybersecurity, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to the Homeland,\" 113 th Congress, 2 nd Session, September 10, 2014; House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, \"One Flight Away: An Examination of the Threat Posed by ISIS Terrorists with Western Passports,\" 113 th Congress, 2 nd Session, September 10, 2014; House Homeland Security Committee, \"Worldwide Threats to the Homeland,\" 113 th Congress, 2 nd Session, September 17, 2014; House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, \"Islamist Foreign Fighters Returning Home and the Threat to Europe,\" 113 th Congress, 2 nd Session, September 19, 2014; House Foreign Affairs Committee, Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, and the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, \"ISIS and the Threat from Foreign Fighters,\" 113 th Congress, 2 nd Session, December 2, 2014; House Homeland Security Committee, \"Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror,\" 114 th Congress, 1 st Session, February 11, 2015; Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, \"Visa Waiver Program: Implications for U.S. National Security,\" 114 th Congress, 1 st Session, March 12, 2015; House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, \"Combating Terrorist Travel: Does the Visa Waiver Program Keep Our Nation Safe?\" 114 th Congress, 1 st Session, March 17, 2015; House Homeland Security Committee, \"A Global Battleground: The Fight Against Islamist Extremism at Home and Abroad,\" 114 th Congress, 1 st Session, March 24, 2015.\nIn many of these hearings, the U.S. Visa Waiver Program figured prominently given that a number of participating countries in Europe have sizeable foreign fighter contingents in Syria and Iraq. As discussed previously, the VWP permits short term visa-free travel (up to 90 days) for business or pleasure to the United States from 38 countries, most of which are in Europe. Congressional concerns about the ability of terrorists to enter the United States under the VWP are not new. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks and the realization that terrorists with European citizenship had traveled to the United States under the VWP (including the \"20 th \" September 11 hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, and airplane \"shoe bomber\" Richard Reid), Congress sought to strengthen the program's security components in legislation, such as the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-173 ) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-53 ).\nAmong other provisions, P.L. 110-53 called on participating VWP countries to meet certain security and passport standards and to sign on to a number of information-sharing agreements. P.L. 110-53 also required visitors entering the United States under the VWP to submit biographical information to U.S. authorities through a new web-based Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) at least two days before traveling. ESTA became operational in 2009. ESTA checks the biographical information submitted against relevant law enforcement and security databases; those individuals not approved under ESTA must obtain a U.S. visa. Prior to ESTA's implementation, the first time an individual traveling to the United States under the VWP was screened was at the port of departure; information submitted for ESTA is largely the same as that required by the previous I-94W form that individuals arriving under the VWP were required to complete en route to the United States.\nAmid growing concerns about terrorist threats emanating from the Syria-Iraq region, including the increasing numbers of foreign fighters, several pieces of legislation on the VWP were introduced in the 113 th Congress. Some proposed measures largely aimed to enhance the security of the VWP further (see H.R. 5470 , introduced September 15, 2014 by Representative Candice Miller, and S. 2869 , introduced September 23, 2014, by Senator Dan Coats). Others would have temporarily suspended the VWP or the participation of certain countries (see H.R. 5434 , introduced September 10, 2014, by Representative Doug Collins; and H.R. 5594 , introduced September 18, 2014, by Representative Tulsi Gabbard).\nAt the start of the 114 th Congress, Representative Candice Miller reintroduced legislation to strengthen the VWP's security elements; it would also specify that the Department of Homeland Security can suspend a country's participation in the VWP should the country fail to provide the United States with pertinent traveler information related to security concerns (see H.R. 158 , the Visa Waiver Program Improvement Act of 2015, introduced January 6, 2015). Similarly, Senator Dan Coats has reintroduced legislation that, among other counterterrorism provisions, aims to improve the VWP's existing security controls (see S. 542 , the Counterterrorism Border Security Enhancement Act, introduced February 24, 2015). Regarding the VWP, S. 542 would expand pre-travel clearance procedures and increase information-sharing requirements for VWP participating countries; S. 542 would also specify that DHS may suspend a country from the VWP for not fully cooperating with such information-sharing requirements.\nThe terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen in early 2015 have prompted even more intense congressional scrutiny of the VWP. While some Members of Congress continue to express reservations about the program on security grounds, many recognize its importance in facilitating international trade and tourism of considerable economic significance for the United States. Others note the resource difficulties that the U.S. Department of State would face if the VWP was terminated. In FY2013, about 20 million people arrived in the United States under the VWP, representing more than one-third of all temporary visitors, and spent almost $80 billion while traveling to and within the United States.\nThe Obama Administration continues to support the VWP as a key facilitator of transatlantic commerce and tourism and rejects calls to suspend it because of the potential foreign fighter threat. U.S. officials point out that ESTA's introduction has greatly strengthened the VWP's security controls over the last few years and that the program's information-sharing provisions with participating countries help to enhance U.S. intelligence about known and suspected terrorists and other criminals. In November 2014, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced that VWP travelers would be required to submit more biographic information through ESTA to help address growing security concerns about foreign fighters. U.S. officials contend that the additional ESTA requirements will enable more accurate and comprehensive screening of VWP visitors, while preserving legitimate trade and travel.\nIn addition to voicing concerns about the VWP, some Members of Congress have questioned whether current European counterterrorism laws are equipped to combat the emerging foreign fighter threat. As discussed earlier, while some European countries already have laws in place that criminalize traveling abroad for terrorist purposes or the facilitation of such travel, others are in the process of considering or enacting such legislation. The EU may also amend its common definition of terrorism to make so-called \"jihadi travel\" and other related foreign fighter activities (such as receiving terrorist training) criminal offenses throughout the EU, both to take into account the requirements of UNSCR 2178 and to avoid prosecution gaps among member states.\nAdministration officials assert that the United States is continuing to encourage all partners, including in Europe, to meet their obligations under UNSCR 2178. The United States would likely welcome an EU decision to update its common terrorism definition. However, many experts note that efforts to criminalize foreign fighter-related offenses could be controversial in some European countries seeking to balance security concerns with integration and rehabilitation imperatives. Meanwhile, reaching agreement at EU level on harmonizing member state laws on \"jihadi travel\" may face hurdles given differences in member states' legal systems, and lag times between when an agreement is reached by EU officials in Brussels and when it is implemented or enforced at the national level.\nIn the wake of the Paris and Copenhagen attacks, several Members of Congress have also noted concerns about the extent and robustness of European information-sharing, both among European countries and with the United States. Many Members of Congress have expressed support for the EU-wide proposal on airline Passenger Name Record data as a way to help improve European capabilities to track potential foreign fighters. Congressional support has been consistently strong for the U.S.-EU PNR accord and the U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement as vital tools in the fight against terrorism.\nU.S. border control measures and visa policy may continue to be salient issues for Congress as the United States seeks to address the potential foreign fighter threat. Congressional decisions related to intelligence-gathering reforms and data privacy and protection issues may have implications for U.S.-European counterterrorism cooperation and the future of U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements in the years ahead. Members of Congress may be able to help shape European views and responses to the foreign fighter phenomenon through ongoing contacts with European lawmakers in national parliaments and in the European Parliament.\nAppendix A. Membership in the European Union, Schengen Area, and the U.S. Visa Waiver Program\nThe following chart details participation of European countries in the 28-member European Union, the Schengen area of free movement, and the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP).\n* Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City are considered de facto members of the Schengen free movement area; they do not have border controls with the Schengen countries that surround them, but they are not official Schengen members because they have not signed the Schengen Agreement.\nAppendix B. Foreign Fighter Recruitment Patterns\nThe dynamics of the Syrian conflict are such that the predominantly Sunni Muslim insurgents' requests for material support often make reference to Islamic religious injunctions to defend co-religionists. Such requests appear to have strong appeal in some Muslim communities around the world. Nevertheless, one also could argue that the power of these requests to convince individuals to become foreign fighters may be relatively limited, given that while foreign fighter flows to Syria have been large relative to similar flows to other conflicts in the past, these flows are relatively small when considered as a proportion of the large global Sunni Muslim population (which may exceed one billion people). Groups or individuals sympathetic to Syrian insurgents also have other means of providing support, including political advocacy and financial donations. Imbalances in the relative flow of fighters to Syria from particular countries or communities may suggest important differences in underlying social and political conditions in those areas or differences in the approaches taken by domestic authorities to prevent foreign fighter recruitment and/or restrict foreign fighter travel.\nIn August 2014, the Islamic State organization issued a lengthy appeal to potential foreign recruits in its English-language web magazine (see Figure B-1 ). The appeal described travel to Iraq and Syria by foreign recruits in support of the Islamic State as analogous to the hijrah , a centerpiece of Islam's foundational story in which the prophet Mohammed and his earliest supporters fled persecution in Mecca for the relative safety of Yathrib (Medina) and later used Yathrib as a base for their subsequent military campaign against their detractors in the Arabian Peninsula. Other Salafist-Jihadist groups have used similar analogies in other contexts as a means of associating their appeals for military and financial support with religious and historical imagery intimately familiar to many Muslims. In the words of the Islamic State's appeal:\nEvery Muslim professional who delayed his jihad in the past …should now make his number one priority to repent and answer the call to hijrah, especially after the establishment of the Khilafah [caliphate, announced by the Islamic State in June 2014]. This Khilafah is more in need than ever before for experts, professionals, and specialists, who can help contribute in strengthening its structure and tending to the needs of their Muslim brothers. … So abandoning hijrah–the path to jihad–is a dangerous matter. In effect, one is thereby deserting jihad and willingly accepting his tragic condition of being a hypocritical spectator.\nThe Islamic State organization also warns prospective recruits of potentially difficult conditions and advises individuals to \"keep in mind that the Khil a fah is a state whose inhabitants and soldiers are human beings. They are not infallible angels. You may see things that need improvement and that are being improved.\" In January 2015, Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani reiterated his call for supporters to join the group's ranks and to carry out attacks in their home countries. In March, the group's English-language magazine featured a lengthy article extolling the virtues of male and female foreign recruits, and provided imagery of a young traveler in a Western airport en route to \"the land of Islam\" (see Figure B-2 )." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title", "", "", "h2_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the stance of U.S. and European leaders regarding terroism?", "Why has this concern been heightened in the past year?", "What characterizes most terrorist suspects in Europe?", "What does US intelligence regarding terrorist fighters?", "What does US intelligence suggest regarding deaths in the Syria-Iraq region?", "What is the relationship between European countries and foreign fighters?", "Why is prosecuting such individuals difficult?", "Why is monitoring such individuals difficult?", "What concerns could slow progress in facing these challenges?" ], "summary": [ "The rising number of U.S. and European citizens traveling to fight with rebel and terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq has emerged as a growing concern for U.S. and European leaders, including Members of Congress.", "Several deadly terrorist attacks in Europe over the past year—including the killing of 17 people in Paris in January 2015—have heightened the perception that these individuals could pose a serious security threat.", "Increasingly, terrorist suspects in Europe appear to have spent time with groups fighting in the Middle East, especially with the Islamic State organization (also known as ISIL or ISIS). Others, like the gunman who murdered two individuals in Copenhagen in February 2015, seem to have been inspired by Islamist extremist propaganda.", "U.S. intelligence suggests that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the Syria-Iraq region, including at least 3,400 Westerners, since 2011. The vast majority of Western fighters are thought to be from Europe, although roughly 150 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria.", "U.S. authorities estimate that a handful of Americans have died in the conflict; they also assert that military operations against the Islamic State group since August 2014 have killed thousands of fighters, including an unknown number of foreigners.", "Nevertheless, European countries and the EU face a range of challenges in stemming the flow of fighters to Syria and Iraq and keeping track of those who go and return.", "Prosecuting such individuals is difficult in many European countries because most existing laws require a high level of proof that a suspect has actually engaged in terrorism abroad or has returned to commit a terrorist act.", "Due to ongoing resource constraints, even those governments with far-reaching legal authority to detain terrorist suspects have found it difficult to identify and monitor a growing number of potential assailants.", "Furthermore, implementation of several EU-wide measures under discussion could be slowed by national sovereignty concerns, long-standing law enforcement barriers to sharing sensitive information, and strong EU data privacy and protection rights." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 5, 5, 5, 5 ] }
CRS_R44495	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction to HUD", "FY2017 Status", "Enactment of Full-Year Appropriations", "Continuing Resolutions", "House Action", "Senate Action", "President's Request", "FY2016", "Discussion of Selected Accounts and Issues", "Assisted Housing Programs", "Section 8 Tenant-Based Rental Assistance", "Renewal Funding", "Administrative Fees", "New Vouchers", "Mobility Demonstration", "Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance", "Renewals and Contract Administrators", "Public Housing", "Operating Fund", "Capital Fund", "Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD)", "Community Development Block Grants", "The Federal Housing Administration (FHA)", "Offsetting Receipts", "Appropriations and Commitment Authority", "Lead Hazard Control", "Policy Directives and Provisions", "Selected General Provisions", "Funding to Implement HUD's Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule", "Housing Assistance for Persons Convicted of Committing Certain Crimes", "Restrictions Related to the Federal Flood Risk Management Standard", "Appendix. The Budget Resolution and Discretionary Spending Caps" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts, typically as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD). HUD's programs are primarily designed to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs.\nThree rental assistance programs—Public Housing, Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance (which funds Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers), and Section 8 project-based rental assistance—account for the majority of the department's funding (more than three-quarters of total HUD appropriations in FY2016). Two flexible block grant programs—HOME and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program—help communities finance a variety of housing and community development activities designed to serve low- and moderate-income families. In addition, in some years Congress appropriates funds to CDBG to assist in disaster recovery. Other more specialized grant programs help communities meet the needs of homeless persons, including those living with HIV/AIDS. HUD's Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures mortgages made by lenders to home buyers with low down payments and to developers of multifamily rental buildings containing relatively affordable units. FHA collects fees from insured borrowers, which are used to sustain the insurance fund. Surplus FHA funds have been used to offset the cost of the HUD budget.\nA Note About the Housing Trust Fund. The Housing Trust Fund (HTF)—a formula grant program administered by HUD—is not funded through the appropriations process; rather, it is funded through contributions from two government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The HTF received its first annual funding in 2016 and is expected to receive funding again in 2017. Since the program is funded outside of the annual appropriations process, it is not reflected in this report.\nTable 1 presents total net enacted appropriations for HUD over the past five years, including emergency appropriations, rescissions, offsetting collections, and receipts. (For more information, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002 , by [author name scrubbed].)", "", "On May 5, 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 was signed into law ( P.L. 115-31 ). Title II of Division K provides full-year FY2017 appropriations for HUD. The law appropriates $48.1 billion for HUD's programs and activities; after accounting for offsets, the net discretionary budget authority provided for the department by the bill totals $38.8 billion. This represents a $1 billion increase in funding over FY2016, which is primarily attributable to funding increases for the tenant-based rental assistance (TBRA) account (+$663 million) and project-based rental assistance (PBRA) account (+$196 million). The increased funding largely maintains current services for the roughly 3 million low-income families who receive housing assistance through the Housing Choice Voucher program and the project-based Section 8 program. The largest relative increase in funding is provided for HUD's lead hazard reduction programs (+32%). The law also included $400 million in disaster assistance provided through the CDBG program.", "None of the FY2017 regular appropriations bills were enacted before the end of FY2016. Instead, Congress approved three continuing resolutions to provide temporary funding. The first CR provided funding for most federal agencies through December 9, 2016 ( P.L. 114-223 ); it also contained the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act for all of FY2017. The second CR, which was enacted before the expiration of the first, provided funding through April 28, 2017 ( P.L. 114-254 ). The third continuing resolution continued the terms of the second CR for one week ( P.L. 115-30 ).\nUnder the terms of the CRs, funding for most programs, projects, and activities—including those administered by HUD—was continued at FY2016 levels, less an across-the-board reduction of 0.496% in the first CR and 0.1901% in the second CR. Additionally, the first two CRs provided appropriations for disaster relief grants through HUD's Community Development Block Grant program: P.L. 114-223 appropriated $500 million in FY2016 funding for grants for areas that experienced presidentially declared disasters that occurred prior to the law's enactment (including flooding in Louisiana); P.L. 114-254 appropriated $1.8 billion in FY2017 funding for areas that experienced presidentially declared disasters that occurred prior to the law's enactment (including flooding in South Carolina).\nFor more information about the two CRs, see CRS Report R44653, Overview of Continuing Appropriations for FY2017 (H.R. 5325) , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44723, Overview of Further Continuing Appropriations for FY2017 (H.R. 2028) , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].", "On May 24, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2017 THUD appropriations bill ( H.R. 5394 ). The bill included $38.7 billion in net discretionary budget authority for HUD. That total reflects approximately $48 billion in new gross budget authority for HUD's programs and activities and more than $9 billion in savings from offsets and receipts. This is about $1 billion more in new gross budget authority, but about $400 million less in net budget authority, than was provided in FY2016 (the difference attributable to an additional $580 million in offsetting receipts in FY2017 relative to FY2016). It included about $500 million less than was included in the Senate-passed bill, and nearly $1 billion less than was requested by the President.", "On May 12, 2016, the full Senate began consideration of FY2017 appropriations for Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies. By custom, appropriations legislation originates in the House of Representatives. Because House action on the FY2017 THUD bill had not yet occurred, the Senate took up H.R. 2577 , which is the House-passed version of the FY2016 THUD bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee substitute amendment ( S.Amdt. 3896 ) to the bill included as Division A the text of the FY2017 THUD appropriations bill as reported by the committee ( S. 2844 ). The substitute amendment also included as Division B the text of the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies bill. It was approved by the full Senate on May 19, 2016.\nEarlier, on April 21, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2017 Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill ( S. 2844 ; S.Rept. 114-243 ). It proposed $48.4 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD's programs and activities, which is a 3% increase from the FY2016 level. After accounting for savings from offsets and rescissions, the bill included $39.2 billion in net discretionary budget authority, which is a 2% increase from the FY2016 level.", "On February 9, 2016, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2017 budget request to Congress. It included $48.9 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD (4% more than FY2016) and $39.6 billion in net discretionary budget authority (3.5% more than FY2016). (For more information, see CRS Report R44380, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): FY2017 Budget Request Overview and Resources , by [author name scrubbed].)", "On December 18, 2015, Congress approved and President Obama signed into law a FY2016 omnibus appropriations law ( P.L. 114-113 ). It included $47 billion in appropriations for HUD; $38.3 billion in net budget authority (excluding $300 million in disaster funding). (For more information, see CRS Report R44059, Department of Housing and Urban Development: FY2016 Appropriations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].)\nTable 2 presents account-level funding information for HUD, comparing FY2016 with the FY2017 President's budget request, congressional action, and final FY2017 amounts. It is followed by a discussion of selected issues and accounts.", "", "More than three-quarters of appropriations for HUD supports three programs: Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance (which funds Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers), Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the Public Housing program. Together, these three programs serve more than 4 million low-income households. The following subsections discuss appropriations for these three programs.", "The tenant-based rental assistance (TBRA) account funds the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program; it is the largest account in HUD's budget. Most of the funding provided to the account each year is for the annual renewal of more than 2 million vouchers that are currently authorized and being used by families to subsidize their housing costs. The account also provides funding for the administrative costs incurred by the local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) that administer the program. The account is funded using both current-year appropriations and advance appropriations provided for use in the following fiscal year.", "Arguably, the most contentious issue in the tenant-based rental assistance account every year is the cost of renewing existing vouchers. All of the roughly 2 million vouchers that are currently authorized and in use are funded annually, so in order for families to continue to receive assistance (i.e., renew their leases at the end of the year), new funding is needed each year. How much it will cost to renew those vouchers is difficult to estimate—since the cost of a voucher is driven by changes in market rents and tenant incomes—and estimates can change from the time the President's budget is released until final appropriations are enacted, as newer data are collected by HUD.\nThe President's budget estimated that the $766 million increase requested would be sufficient to renew all existing vouchers projected to be in use in 2016. The President's estimate assumes $30 million in savings in renewal costs from a policy change related to medical expense deductions that has been proposed in the past several President's budget requests.\nBoth the House committee-passed bill and the Senate bill would have provided less funding for voucher renewals than requested by the President. The House committee-passed bill included $135 million less than the request and the Senate-passed bill proposed $92 million less than the request. As requested, and permitted in FY2016, both bills would have provided the Secretary with the authority to reallocate unused prior-year funding (PHA reserves) to supplement FY2017 allocations.\nS.Rept. 114-243 stated that the amount of funding provided, paired with the reallocation authority, would be sufficient to support all vouchers in use. The press release accompanying House Appropriations Committee-passage of H.R. 5394 also contended that the bill provided sufficient funding to maintain all vouchers in use.\nThe final FY2017 full-year appropriations level for renewals is lower than proposed by the Senate, but higher than proposed by the House committee bill. It includes the requested reallocation authority.", "PHAs are paid a per-unit fee to administer the Housing Choice Voucher program. Thus, the total amount of fees a PHA earns in a year is based on how many vouchers it leases. In recent years, the amount of appropriations provided by Congress has not been sufficient to fully fund all of the fees earned by PHAs under the formula, thus they have received reduced, or prorated, fees.\nThe President's budget requested an increase of $427 million in administrative fee funding relative to FY2016. HUD's Congressional Budget Justifications contended the requested funding level would be sufficient to fund all fees under a new formula HUD is developing based on the findings of a recent administrative fee study, which the department states it hopes to have in place for 2017.\nThe House committee-passed bill included no increase in administrative fee funding; rather, it proposed to fund fees at the FY2016 level. The Senate-passed bill proposed a smaller increase than requested by the President (+$119 million more than FY2016). The final FY2017 appropriations law funds administrative fees at FY2016 levels.", "New vouchers—or \"incremental vouchers\"—are vouchers that are funded by Congress and distributed by HUD to PHAs to serve additional families. In recent years, the primary source of new vouchers has been the Veterans Affairs Supported Housing (VASH) program, which is administered jointly with the Department of Veterans Affairs and provides vouchers paired with supportive services for homeless veterans. In some years, the Family Unification Program (FUP), which provides vouchers for families involved in the child welfare system and youth aging out of foster care, has also received funding for additional vouchers.\nThe President's budget requested $88 million to fund approximately 10,000 new vouchers for families with children who are experiencing homelessness. Additionally, the President's budget requested $7 million to renew tribal VASH vouchers that were funded for the first time in FY2015.\nThe House committee-passed bill included no funding for new incremental vouchers.\nThe Senate-passed bill proposed funding two categories of incremental vouchers: $20 million for FUP vouchers and $57 million for VASH vouchers. The committee report directed that HUD prioritize the awards of the new FUP vouchers to PHAs that will target them to youth. The bill also included provisions designed to improve the program for youth, including a lengthening of the existing 18-month time limit to 36 months (or longer, if the youth is participating in economic self-sufficiency activities) and broadening the age of eligibility up to age 24 (from age 21). (Similar FUP policy changes were proposed in the President's budget request.) Of the funding for VASH vouchers, $7 million was targeted for the renewal of tribal vouchers, as requested by the President.\nThe final FY2017 appropriations law includes funding for the same categories of incremental vouchers proposed by the Senate bill, but at lower levels: $10 million for FUP vouchers and $47 million for VASH vouchers (including renewal of tribal VASH vouchers).", "One of the key features of the Housing Choice Voucher program is portability; families can move wherever they choose and take their voucher with them. Mobility is a term often used to describe portability moves made by families to communities with lower poverty rates and greater access to educational or economic opportunities. While some older research findings about the impact of mobility moves on family outcomes have been mixed, recent findings have shown that certain mobility moves may have meaningful impacts for children's outcomes.\nThe President's budget requested $15 million for a new mobility demonstration to encourage and support mobility moves by families with vouchers. The funds would be awarded to PHAs to provide mobility services to families, including pre- and post-move counseling, and would also fund an impact evaluation.\nThe House committee-passed bill did not include funding for the mobility demonstration; the Senate-passed bill would have provided $11 million to fund it. The final FY2017 appropriations law does not fund the proposal.", "The Section 8 project-based rental assistance (PBRA) account provides funding to administer and renew existing project-based Section 8 rental assistance contracts between HUD and private multifamily property owners. Under those contracts, HUD provides subsidies to the owners to make up the difference between what eligible low-income families pay to live in subsidized units (30% of their incomes) and a previously agreed-upon rent for the unit. No contracts for newly subsidized units have been entered into under this program since the early 1980s. When the program was active, Congress funded the contracts for 20- to 40-year periods, so the monthly payments for owners came from old appropriations. However, once those contracts expire, they require new annual appropriations if they are renewed. Further, some old contracts do not have sufficient funding to finish their existing terms, so new funding is needed to complete the contract (referred to as amendment funding). As more contracts have shifted from long-term appropriations to new appropriations, this account has grown and become the second-largest account in HUD's budget. This account also funds the cost of performance-based contract administrators or PBCAs, entities contracted by HUD to manage the program (generally, state housing finance agencies or public housing authorities).", "The President's budget request included $10.581 billion for the cost of renewing PBRA contracts (including $4 million for technical assistance for tenant organizations) and $235 million for the cost of contract administrators. The President's budget documents acknowledged that the amount requested is less than would be needed to fully fund either activity. In the case of PBRA contract renewals, the budget assumed approximately $240 million in one-time savings from providing funding for less than 12 months for some contract renewals as a part of a transition to calendar year funding. Further, the renewal estimate assumes cost savings from a requested policy change in calculation of medical deductions for elderly and disabled residents. In the case of PBCA funding, the budget assumed the use of $60 million in recaptured funding as well as cost savings from issuing new, cost-saving contracts.\nBoth the Senate-passed bill and the House committee-passed bill proposed $10.901 billion for PBRA contract renewals, which is $85 million more than was requested by the President. Neither bill included the President's proposed change to medical expense deductions; S.Rept. 114-243 stated that the Senate committee increased the funding level above the request because it rejected the policy change. Both bills proposed to fund contract administrators at the requested level.\nThe final FY2017 appropriations law funds PBRA at $10.816 billion, less than requested by the President and included in the Senate and House committee-passed bills. It funds PBCAs at the requested level and permits the use of recaptures and carryover to supplement the appropriated funding level.", "The Public Housing program provides publicly owned and subsidized rental units for very low-income families. Created in 1937, it is the federal government's oldest housing assistance program for poor families, and it is arguably HUD's most well-known assistance program. (For more information, see CRS Report R41654, Introduction to Public Housing , by [author name scrubbed].)\nAlthough there has not been permanent authority to build new Public Housing developments for many years, Congress continues to provide funds to the approximately 3,000 PHAs that own and maintain the existing stock of more than 1 million units. Public Housing receives federal funding under two primary accounts, which, when combined, result in Public Housing being the third-highest funded program in HUD's budget (following the two Section 8 programs). Through the operating fund, HUD provides funding to PHAs to help fill the gap between tenants' rent contributions and the cost of ongoing maintenance, utilities, and administration of public housing properties. Through the capital fund, HUD provides funding to PHAs for capital projects and modernization of their public housing properties. Choice Neighborhoods is an Obama Administration initiative to provide competitive grants to revitalize distressed public and assisted housing properties and their surrounding communities. It is similar to its predecessor program, the HOPE VI program; however, Choice Neighborhoods expands the pool of eligible applicants beyond public housing properties to include other HUD-assisted properties and their communities.", "Operating fund dollars are allocated to PHAs according to a formula that estimates what it should cost PHAs to maintain their public housing properties based on the characteristics of those properties. When the amount of appropriations provided is insufficient to fully fund the amount PHAs qualify for under the formula, their allocation is pro-rated, or reduced proportionally.\nAccording to HUD's Congressional Budget Justifications, the amount requested in the President's Budget for the Operating Fund for FY2017 (a 1.5% increase from FY2016) would be sufficient to fund an estimated 87% of PHAs' formula eligibility.\nThe House committee-passed bill proposed to fund the account level with FY2016, which would likely mean a proration level lower than 87%.\nThe Senate-passed bill proposed to increase funding for the Operating Fund above the President's requested funding level (+2.3%) and the FY2016 funding level (+4%). As a result, under the Senate-approved funding level, the estimated proration level should have been higher than 87%.\nThe final FY2017 appropriation law funds the Operating Fund below the President's request, which will likely mean a lower proration level.", "The President's budget requested $35 million less for the Capital Fund in FY2017 than was provided in FY2016. In terms of formula grants, the reduction is $31 million. The President's budget requested a new set-aside of $5 million for its \"ConnectHome\" initiative, designed to expand broadband access in public housing. As in past years, the President's budget proposed to eliminate funding for the Resident Opportunities and Supportive Services (ROSS) set-aside, which funds service coordinators in public housing.\nThe House committee-passed bill proposed to fund the Capital Fund at the FY2016 level. It included more for set-asides than FY2016, which means slightly less (<1%) would have been available for formula grants. However, the bill would have provided slightly more (also <1%) for formula grants than was requested by the President.\nThe Senate-passed bill proposed a $25 million increase for the Capital Fund relative to FY2016. That amount reflects a decrease of $7 million for formula grants, but it proposed to fund the ROSS set-aside at the FY2016 level. It did not include funding for \"ConnectHome,\" but did include a new set-aside of $25 million for competitive grants for PHAs to evaluate and abate lead-based paint hazards in public housing.\nThe final FY2017 appropriation law includes more for the Capital Fund than was requested by the President or proposed by the House Committee or Senate bills. The increase in funding (+4% over the request) is attributable both to an increase in the amount provided for formula grants, as well as new funding for competitive lead-based paint hazard mitigation grants, as proposed by the Senate.", "The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) is an Obama Administration initiative, first authorized by Congress in FY2012. Under RAD, a limited number of units funded through other HUD-assisted housing programs may convert to either project-based Section 8 rental assistance or Housing Choice Vouchers. These include the Rent Supplement program, Rental Assistance Payments, Public Housing, and Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation program. RAD has never received funding, which means that in order to be eligible, projects must be able to undergo a cost-neutral conversion (i.e., receive no increase in federal subsidy as a result of the conversion).\nThe President's FY2017 budget request included $50 million to fund RAD in order to allow units that cannot undergo a cost-neutral conversion to participate. It also includes proposed program changes to eliminate the cap on the number of units that can convert under RAD and prohibit the rescreening of tenants in public housing units undergoing a RAD conversion. Similar proposals have been included in the past several President's budget requests. Additionally, for the first time in FY2017, the President's budget requests that RAD be expanded to allow for the conversion of units with Project Rental Assistance Contract (PRAC) assistance under the Section 202 Housing for the Elderly program. HUD contends this expanded authority will allow these units to leverage private financing and thus be preserved.\nThe House committee-passed bill included no funding and no expansion for RAD.\nThe Senate-passed bill proposed to expand the RAD demonstration to the Section 202 Housing for the Elderly program, as requested by the President, and includes $4 million to help fund PRAC conversions. The bill did not include additional funding to support other RAD conversions. The Senate-passed bill proposed several additional changes to RAD, including, among others, raising the cap on the number of Public Housing units that can participate from 180,000 to 250,000 and prohibiting rescreening of public housing residents, as proposed in the President's budget.\nThe final FY2017 appropriations law does not include the President's requested expansion of RAD for PRAC units, but does raise the cap on public housing units from 180,000 to 225,000.", "The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, funded in the Community Development Fund account, is the federal government's largest and most widely available source of financial assistance supporting state and local government-directed neighborhood revitalization, housing rehabilitation, and economic development activities. These formula-based grants are allocated to approximately 1,194 entitlement communities (metropolitan cities with populations of 50,000, principal cities of metropolitan areas, and urban counties), the 50 states plus Puerto Rico, and the insular areas of American Samoa, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Grants are used to implement plans intended to address housing, community development, and economic development needs, as determined by local officials.\nFor FY2017, the President's budget requested $2.88 billion for the Community Development Fund, including $2.8 billion for grants under the CDBG program and $80 million for grants for Indian tribes. The requested funding level was $200 million less for CDBG and $20 million more for Indian tribes than was provided in FY2016.\nAs in the past several budget requests, HUD's FY2017 budget documents stated that the agency planned to advance a legislative package of CDBG reforms. Specifically, the Administration's grant reforms, as outlined in HUD's Congressional Budget Justifications, included proposals that would have, if approved,\nreduced the number of small grantees, including removing grandfathering protections for communities that no longer meet the population threshold for entitlement status and establishing a minimum grant amount; reduced the administrative burden on grantees by synchronizing critical program cycles for the submission of plans and reports; helped grantees target funding resources to areas of greatest need; and provided more options for regional coordination, administration, and planning.\nThe Administration also proposed an administrative provision that would have increased (from 10% to 15%) the percentage of CDBG funds allocated to the states of Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona that must be used in colonias ; these are blighted and economically distressed unincorporated areas within 150 miles of the border with Mexico.\nThe House committee-passed bill would have funded CDBG and its related set-asides at FY2016 levels ($3 billion for CDBG grants and $60 million for Indian CDBG grants).\nThe Senate-passed bill would have funded CDBG at $3 billion, which was the same as the program's FY2016 funding level. Also, it would have provided the level of funding ($60 million) for the Indian Community Development Block Grant (ICDBG) program as appropriated for FY2016. However, the bill would have funded ICDBG, along with Native American Housing Block Grants, in a new Indian Block Grant account instead of the CDF account. The bill did not include the colonias set-aside increase that was requested by the President. The bill did include a provision that would have prohibited CDBG grantees from exchanging CDBG funds for other sources of funds. This practice is seen as a means of avoiding CDBG program requirements such as those relating to targeting assistance to low- and moderate-income households, fair housing, environmental review, and fair labor standards.\nThe final appropriations law appropriates $3 billion for distribution to CDBG entitlement communities, states, and insular areas. The law provides an additional $60 million for ICDBG activities. The law does not include a provision requested by the Administration that would have directed the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California to increase the percentage of CDBG targeted to colonias from 10% to 15%. Nor does the law transfer ICDBG funds to a new Indian Block Grant as proposed by the Senate bill. The law includes a Senate provision that prohibits CDBG grantees from transferring or exchanging CDBG funds for other funding sources.", "The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures private mortgage lenders against losses on certain mortgages made to eligible borrowers. If a borrower defaults on the mortgage, FHA repays the lender the remaining amount that the borrower owes. The provision of FHA insurance helps to make mortgage credit more widely available, and at a lower cost, than it might be in the absence of the insurance.\nThe FHA insurance programs are administered primarily through two program accounts in the HUD budget. The Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund) account includes mortgages for single-family home loans made to eligible borrowers. It also includes FHA-insured reverse mortgages, known as Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs). The MMI Fund is the largest of the FHA insurance funds, and when there is public discussion of \"FHA insurance\" or \"FHA loans,\" it is usually related to the MMI Fund and the single-family home loans insured under that fund. (For more information on the features of FHA-insured home mortgages, see CRS Report RS20530, FHA-Insured Home Loans: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed].) The second account, the General Insurance/Special Risk Insurance Fund (GI/SRI Fund), includes mortgages on multifamily buildings and healthcare facilities such as hospitals and nursing homes.", "The costs of federal loan guarantees are reflected in the budget as the net present value of all of the expected future cash flows from the loans that are expected to be insured in a given year. (Cash inflows include fees paid by borrowers to the federal government; cash outflows include claims paid by the federal government when a loan is not repaid by the borrower.) If the estimated cash inflows exceed the estimated cash outflows—that is, if the insured loans are expected to earn more money for the government than they cost—then the program is said to have a negative credit subsidy. A negative credit subsidy results in offsetting receipts, which, in the case of FHA, can offset other costs of the HUD budget.\nHistorically, the MMI Fund has been estimated to have negative credit subsidy. The resulting offsetting receipts are usually the single largest source of offsets in the HUD budget. While the President's budget request estimates the amount of FHA offsetting receipts, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) does its own estimates, and the CBO estimates are the ones that are used by congressional appropriators to determine budget authority.\nFor FY2017, CBO estimates that the MMI Fund's single-family mortgage insurance programs, excluding FHA-insured reverse mortgages, will earn $7.4 billion. This is a slight increase from FY2016, when the MMI Fund's single-family programs were estimated to earn just over $7 billion. In total, FHA programs are estimated to generate nearly $8 billion in offsetting receipts in FY2017, compared to nearly $7.8 billion in FY2016.", "Because the loans insured under the MMI Fund have historically been estimated to have negative credit subsidy, the MMI Fund has never needed an appropriation to cover the costs of loans guaranteed in a given fiscal year. However, FHA does receive appropriations every year for salaries (included in the salaries and expenses account for the overall HUD budget) and administrative contract expenses.\nThe President's budget requested $160 million for FHA's administrative contract expenses, $30 million more than was provided in FY2016. The President's budget proposed paying for this $30 million increase through a fee that would be charged to lenders on FHA-insured mortgages they originate. The House committee-passed bill and the Senate-passed bill both proposed $130 million for administrative contract expenses, the same amount that was provided in FY2016. Neither bill would have provided FHA with the authority to charge lenders a fee to pay for some administrative support expenses, although both the House and Senate committee reports included language indicating support for the goal of improving FHA systems and technology. The Senate committee report language stated that it included resources in the Information Technology account to be used for such purposes. The final FY2017 law does not include the requested fee authority.\nAnnual appropriations acts also authorize FHA to insure up to a certain aggregate dollar volume of loans during the fiscal year. This is referred to as \"commitment authority.\" The President's budget requested the authority to insure up to $400 billion in new mortgages under the MMI Fund and up to $30 billion in new mortgages under the GI/SRI Fund in FY2017, the same amount of commitment authority that was provided in FY2016. The House committee-passed bill and the Senate-passed bill both included the requested commitment authority, and that level was approved in the final FY2017 appropriations law.", "HUD's Office of Lead Hazard Control administers both the Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control Grant program and the Lead Hazard Reduction Demonstration program, designed to reduce the hazards of lead-based paint in homes. It also administers the Healthy Homes Initiative (HHI), which funds grants that can be used to address a broader set of environmental hazards in homes.\nFor FY2017, the President's budget requested $110 million for these programs, the same amount funded in FY2016. Both the House Committee-passed bill and the Senate-passed bill proposed funding increases (to $130 million and $135 million, respectively). The final FY2017 appropriations law funds the account at an even higher level: $145 million.", "The Senate bill and accompanying committee report ( S.Rept. 114-243 ) contained a number of policy changes and directives related to HUD's oversight and enforcement of lead-paint regulations, particularly as they apply to HUD-assisted housing. These included requirements th at HUD align its elevated blood- level standards with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) within a given timeframe , requirements for HUD to establish and implement various enhanced inspection, monitoring , and reporting requirements related to lead -based paint hazards in HUD-assisted housing, increased funding for PHAs to address lead-based paint hazards in public housing, and a requirement that GAO study HUD's oversight of lead-based paint hazards .\nThe final appropriations law and accompanying explanatory statement maintain some, but not all, of the directives from the Senate bill . It requires a GAO report, but with an expanded focus , and it also requires HUD to report on its activities, but does not include the same directives for HUD to enhance its inspection procedures .", "", "The Fair Housing Act requires certain grantees, including communities receiving Community Planning and Development (CPD) formula grants—CDBG, HOME, HOPWA, and ESG funding—as well as the PHAs who administer public housing and the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, to affirmatively further fair housing. While not defined in statute, affirmatively furthering fair housing has been found by courts to mean doing more than simply refraining from discrimination, and working to end discrimination and segregation. (For more information about the obligation to affirmatively further fair housing, see CRS Report R44557, The Fair Housing Act: HUD Oversight, Programs, and Activities , by [author name scrubbed].)\nIn July 2015, HUD issued a final rule that changes the way in which CPD grantees and PHAs (collectively referred to as \"program participants\") comply with the requirement to affirmatively further fair housing. The rule has been controversial. When the proposed rule was published, in June 2013, HUD received more than 1,000 comments. Commenters raised concerns that the requirements intrude on the authority of local jurisdictions and constitute social engineering; raised concerns that compliance will be costly, especially for small jurisdictions and PHAs; asked questions as to whether HUD will continue to allow investment in low-income, segregated areas; and expressed uncertainty about how HUD will enforce the rule.\nDuring the FY2016 appropriations process, the House adopted an amendment to the THUD appropriations bill ( H.Amdt. 399 to H.R. 2577 ) that would have prohibited funds in the bill from being used to enforce the affirmatively furthering fair housing rule. The amendment was not included in the final appropriations act. A similar amendment was proposed to the FY2017 appropriations bill in the Senate. S.Amdt. 3897 would prevent funds from being used to carry out the final rule. The amendment was tabled. Instead, the Senate adopted an amendment, S.Amdt. 3970 , that would prohibit funds in the appropriations bill from being used to \"direct a grantee to undertake specific changes to existing zoning laws\" in carrying out the affirmatively furthering fair housing rule (§240 of the Senate-passed appropriations bill). The provision is included in the final appropriations law. See §243 of P.L. 115-31 .", "Under existing federal law, persons convicted of committing certain crimes are either barred from receiving federal rental housing assistance or local program administrators are given authority to bar such persons from receiving assistance. An amendment accepted during floor consideration of the Senate-passed THUD appropriations bill ( S.Amdt. 3905 ) would have prohibited any funding in the bill from being used to provide housing assistance to persons convicted of a broader set of crimes than are currently subject to restrictions under federal law. Specifically, the amendment would have barred assistance funded under the bill for persons convicted of aggravated sexual abuse, murder, human trafficking, and child pornography (§249 of the Senate-passed bill). This provision is not included in the final FY2017 appropriations law.", "The Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (FFRMS) is the principal mechanism for accomplishing the flood risk management policies established by President Obama in Executive Order (E.O.) 13690. First published in January 2015, the FFRMS aims to improve the resilience of communities and federal assets against the impacts of flooding and the standard is applicable to certain federally funded projects. Section 236 of the House Appropriations Committee-reported FY2017 THUD appropriations bill would have prohibited any funding appropriated under the bill from being used to implement, administer, carry out, or enforce E.O. 13690 until at least 90 days after the Secretary of HUD makes specified reports to the House and Senate appropriations committees regarding the effects of the new FFRMS. This provision is not included in the final FY2017 appropriations law.", "HUD appropriations are included as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD) each year. That bill, like the other 11 annual appropriations bills, is crafted to comply with limits provided in the annual budget resolution, which is, in turn, influenced by the Budget Control Act and its discretionary spending limits. Thus, it is useful to have a basic understanding of these policies and procedures as context when considering the formulation of HUD appropriations levels.\nThe Budget Resolution\nThe annual budget resolution provides a budgetary framework within which Congress considers legislation affecting spending and revenue. It sets forth spending and revenue levels, including spending allocations to House and Senate committees. These levels are enforceable by a point of order. After the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees receive their discretionary spending allocations from the budget resolution (referred to as 302(a) allocations), they divide their allocations among their 12 subcommittees (referred to as the 302(b) allocations). Each subcommittee is responsible for one of the 12 regular appropriations bills. While a budget resolution and subcommittee allocations alone cannot be used to determine how much funding any individual account or program will receive, they do set the parameters within which decisions about funding for individual accounts and programs can be made.\nThe House and the Senate did not adopt a budget resolution for FY2017. In its absence, the Senate Budget Committee chair filed budgetary levels in the Congressional Record that are enforceable in the Senate as if they had been included in a budget resolution for FY2017. Based on these levels, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported their initial 302(b) suballocations on April 18, 2016. They include $56.474 billion for the THUD subcommittee, which is approximately $1 billion less than the comparable FY2016 level ($57.301 billion). In the absence of a budget resolution in the House, the House Appropriations Committee chose to adopt \"interim 302(b) suballocations\" for the appropriations bills as they were marked up in full committee. These interim suballocations are not procedurally enforceable. A suballocation for the THUD subcommittee of $58.190 billion was included in H.Rept. 114-606 .\nThe Budget Control Act and Sequestration\nIn 2011, the Budget Control Act (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ) was enacted, which both increased the debt limit and contained provisions intended to reduce the budget deficit through spending limits and reductions. In part, the BCA was intended to accomplish deficit reduction by imposing statutory limits on discretionary spending each fiscal year from FY2012 through FY2021. The BCA specifies separate limits for defense and nondefense spending; HUD discretionary programs are subject to the nondefense discretionary limits.\nIn addition to the initial spending limits set in the BCA, the law tasked a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to develop a federal deficit reduction plan for Congress and the President to enact by January 15, 2012. When a plan was not enacted, the BCA required that a one-time sequestration of nonexempt discretionary spending occur in FY2013. (Sequestration is a process of automatic, largely across-the-board spending reductions.) In addition, the BCA required that the discretionary spending limits be lowered further for FY2014 through FY2021. Various amendments to the BCA have been enacted that have altered the discretionary spending reductions that were otherwise scheduled to occur under that law. Most recently, the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 had the effect of lessening the BCA reductions for FY2016 and FY2017, by establishing higher levels for those fiscal years' limits than otherwise would have been the case. Under current law, those BCA reductions are to resume for the FY2018 limits.\nIn each fiscal year, if discretionary funding is enacted that exceeds either of the limits (defense or non-defense), then sequestration will be imposed to reduce spending in the applicable category. In terms of mandatory funding, the BCA provided for reductions of nonexempt programs through sequestration each year through FY2021. This has subsequently been amended to occur through FY2024." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 4, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "", "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full", "", "h2_full", "h1_full", "h3_full", "", "h0_title h2_title h3_title", "h0_title h2_title h3_title", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h2_title h3_title", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What was signed into law on May 5, 2017?", "How does this law distribute funding to HUD?", "How does this differ from FY2016's appropriations?", "What is this increase in funding meant to support?", "What did the Senate approve on May 19, 2016?", "How did this bill's gross discretionary appropriations for HUD differ from the FY2016 level?", "How did this bill's net discretionary budget authority differ from the FY2016 level?", "What did the House Appropriations Committee approve on May 24, 2016?", "How did this bill distribute funding to the HUD?", "How did these appropriations differ from the Senate bill's distribution?", "What did congressional action occur in response to?", "What did this budget request include?", "What were the most significant funding increases in this request?" ], "summary": [ "Full-Year Appropriations: On May 5, 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 was signed into law (P.L. 115-31).", "Title II of Division K provides $48.1 billion in gross appropriations for HUD's programs and activities; after accounting for savings from offsets, the net new budget authority for the department totals $38.8 billion.", "The law provides a $1 billion increase in funding for HUD's policies and programs over FY2016, which is primarily attributable to funding increases for the largest accounts in HUD's budget: the tenant-based rental assistance (TBRA) account (+$663 million) and project-based rental assistance (PBRA) account (+$196 million).", "Those increases largely maintain current services for the roughly 3 million low-income families who receive housing assistance through the Housing Choice Voucher program and the project-based Section 8 program. The largest relative increase in funding was provided for HUD's lead hazard reduction programs (+32%).", "On May 19, 2016, the full Senate approved FY2017 appropriations for HUD as a part of a substitute amendment to H.R. 2577 (which incorporated both the committee-reported version of the THUD bill (S. 2844) and the committee-reported version of the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies bill).", "It included $48.4 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD's programs and activities, a 3% increase from the FY2016 level.", "After accounting for savings from offsets and rescissions, the bill included $39.2 billion in net discretionary budget authority, a 2% increase from the FY2016 level.", "On May 24, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2017 THUD appropriations bill (H.R. 5394).", "It included $48 billion in gross discretionary appropriations and $38.7 billion in net discretionary budget authority for HUD, nearly $1 billion less than was requested and about $500 million less than was included in the Senate version.", "Like the Senate bill, H.R. 5394 proposed increases to the TBRA and PBRA accounts, but the increases were smaller than those in the Senate bill or requested by the President.", "Congressional action followed the release of the Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request to Congress on February 9, 2016.", "The request included $48.9 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD (+4% from FY2016) and $39.6 billion in net discretionary budget authority (+3.5% from FY2016).", "The largest funding increases proposed were for the PBRA and TBRA accounts." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 2, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5 ] }
CRS_R44729	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Scope of Congress's Powers Under the Constitution", "Congress's Powers", "Limits on Congress's Powers", "Role of Congress in Interpreting the Constitution", "House Rule XII, Clause 7(c), and Constitutional Authority Statements", "Compliance with the CAS Rule", "Studies of CAS Practices", "Practices with Regard to Specificity", "Practices with Regard to Particular Clauses", "Legal Implications of a CAS", "Debate over the Rule", "Potential Resources and Considerations for Drafting CASs", "Resources on the Constitution That May Be Relevant for CASs", "Additional Considerations in Crafting CASs", "Conclusion" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "On January 5, 2011, the House of Representatives adopted an amendment to House Rule XII to require that Members of the House state the constitutional basis for Congress's power to enact the proposed legislation when introducing a bill or joint resolution. (The amendment does not pertain to concurrent or simple resolutions.) The Constitutional Authority Statement (CAS) rule, found at House Rule XII, clause 7(c), was subsequently adopted in the 113th, 114th, 115th, and 116th Congresses. As the CAS rule begins its ninth year, the requirement continues to be a topic of congressional debate and inquiry, as Members of the House contemplate how to comply with the rule prior to every submission of a bill or joint resolution.\nThis report aims to aid in understanding the CAS requirement. It begins by providing a broad overview of (1) Congress's powers under the Constitution and (2) Congress's role in interpreting this document. The report then specifically addresses House Rule XII, clause 7(c), discussing its key requirements and limits, the legal effect of a CAS, and the debate over the rule's value. The report concludes by discussing trends with regard to the House's recent CAS practices and by providing considerations for congressional personnel drafting CASs. The report contains two tables: Table 1 identifies the constitutional provisions most commonly cited in CASs during the last six months of the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, and Table 2 lists suggested constitutional authorities for various types of legislation.", "Understanding the purpose and logic of the CAS rule first requires an understanding of both the powers provided to the Congress under the Constitution and Congress's role in interpreting the Constitution. The Framers of the Constitution feared tyranny as the result of the \"accumulation of all powers\" of government \"in the same hands\" and, thus, \"sought to guard against it by dispersing federal power to three interdependent branches of Government.\" Reflecting this fear, the federal Constitution divides the government's power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, with the Congress exercising the legislative power, the President exercising the executive power, and the federal courts exercising the judicial power. \"It is a breach of the National fundamental law\" if Congress \"gives up its legislative power\" to one of the other branches or if Congress \"attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power.\"\nWhile only Congress may exercise the legislative power, this power, like those belonging to the other branches of the federal government, is cabined by the terms of the Constitution. Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution vests \"all legislative Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the United States,\" with the phrase \"herein granted\" indicating that the Congress's authority to legislate is \"confined to those powers expressly identified in the document.\" As a result, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article I's Vesting Clause as creating a Congress of specified or \"enumerated powers.\" As the Court noted in United States v. Morrison , \"[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.\"", "Congress's specified powers are primarily, but not exclusively, found in Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution. This section contains 18 clauses, 17 of which enumerate relatively specific powers granted to the Congress. Among the powers enumerated are Congress's powers to\nimpose taxes, and spend the money collected to pay debts and provide for the \"common defence\" and \"general welfare,\" regulate commerce, establish laws respecting naturalization and bankruptcy, regulate currency, establish post offices and roads, promote the \"Progress of Science and useful Arts\" by giving authors and inventors \"exclusive rights\" to their writings and discoveries (i.e., copyright and patent protections), and establish a judicial system.\nIn addition, six of the clauses in Article I, Section 8, defining the substantive legislative jurisdiction of Congress, deal exclusively with wartime and military matters and include Congress's power to declare war and provide for an Army and Navy.\nOutside of Article I, Section 8, the Constitution contains several other provisions providing Congress with a specified power. For example, Article IV of the Constitution empowers Congress to enact laws regulating the validity of state \"public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings\" and rules respecting the territory and property belonging to the United States. And Article V authorizes Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution. Outside of the original constitutional text, many of the amendments to the Constitution explicitly restrict the power of Congress. Several of the Constitution's amendments, however, provide Congress with the power to enact certain legislation. For instance, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, adopted following the Civil War, empower Congress to \"enforce\" the amendments' provisions prohibiting slavery, preventing the deprivations of certain civil rights, and outlawing the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of \"race, color, or previous condition of servitude.\"\nThe final clause of Article I, Section 8, the Necessary and Proper Clause, supplements Congress's enumerated powers, providing the legislative branch the power to adopt measures that assist in the achievement of ends contemplated by other provisions in the Constitution. Specifically, that clause provides Congress with the power to make \"all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.\" The Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause as \"broad,\" in that the clause leaves to \"Congress a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power.\" In so holding, the Court has described the clause as providing the \"broad power to enact laws that are 'convenient, or useful' or 'conducive' to\" a more specific authority's \"beneficial exercise.\" Consistent with this view, the Court has upheld legislation criminalizing perjury and witness tampering as an extension of Congress's power to constitute federal tribunals. Similarly, the Court upheld legislation prohibiting the bribery of officials who receive federal funds, as an extension of Congress's power to \"appropriate federal moneys to promote the general welfare.\" More broadly, the Court has taken the view that other powers, such as the power to conduct oversight, are implied from the general vesting of legislative powers in Congress.\nImportantly, however, the Necessary and Proper Clause is not an independent source of power for Congress that, standing in isolation, permits it to exercise the legislative power. As the Supreme Court has noted, the clause is \"not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the specifically granted 'foregoing' powers of § 8 'and all other Powers vested by this Constitution....'\" Instead, in legislating, Congress \"must rely upon its independent (though quite robust) Article I, § 8, powers\" or in other powers implicitly or explicitly vested elsewhere in the Constitution to Congress. Importantly as well, the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to not only take action to assist in the execution of its own powers under the Constitution, but also to provide support for the execution of \"all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.\" Pursuant to this authority, Congress may permissibly enact legislation to assure the proper exercise of powers given to other branches of the federal government.", "The Constitution imposes two central types of limitations on the powers of Congress. First, the concept of enumerated powers creates what is often referred to as an \"internal limit\" on Congress's powers—that is, Congress's powers are restricted by and to the terms of their express grant. For instance, in United States v. Lopez , the Supreme Court interpreted the Commerce Clause as empowering Congress to regulate \"three broad categories of activities\": (1) \"channels of interstate commerce,\" like roads and canals; (2) \"persons or things in interstate commerce,\" and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Having determined those limits to the clause, the Court held that Congress's power over commerce does not permit it to enact legislation prohibiting the possession of guns near a school (absent a connection to commercial activity) because such legislation does not regulate an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Likewise, the Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause as necessarily requiring a \"congruence and proportionality\" between the injury to be prevented or remedied by congressional legislation and the means that Congress adopted to that end. Applying this standard in City of Boerne v. Flores , the Court held that Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) insofar as that law unduly invaded the sovereign rights of the states. Adopted to protect the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, RFRA, in relevant part, invalidated any state law that imposed a \"substantial burden\" on a religious practice without sufficient justification and narrow tailoring. Describing RFRA's operative standard as imposing a \"stringent test\" that amounted to a \"considerable intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens,\" the Court concluded that there was \"a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved\" by RFRA.\nSecond, beyond the internal limits on Congress's powers, the Constitution also imposes \"external\" constraints on congressional action, or affirmative prohibitions found elsewhere in the text or structure of the document. Article I, Section 9, lists specific constraints on the power of the federal government. Section 9 prohibits Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus in peacetime; passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws; imposing taxes or duties on exports \"from any state\"; and granting titles of nobility. Section 9 also provides that Congress can suspend the writ of habeas corpus only in \"cases of rebellion or invasion\" when \"public safety may require\" such a suspension. Similarly, money can be drawn from the Treasury only upon an appropriation made by law.\nMore broadly, Congress's powers are constrained by three principles undergirding the Constitution: federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. Federalism constraints are grounded in states' status as separate and distinct sovereign entities and seek to preserve states' retained prerogatives under the U.S. constitutional system by enforcing certain limits on the federal government's jurisdiction. For instance, the Supreme Court has identified federalism-based constraints stemming from the Tenth Amendment—the provision of the Bill of Rights that reads, \"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.\" More specifically, the Court has interpreted the Tenth Amendment to prevent the federal government from \"commandeering\" or requiring state executive officers or state legislators to carry out federal directives. Similarly, the Court has held that Congress cannot indirectly commandeer state governments by imposing limits on monetary grants that go so far as to functionally coerce states, leaving them with no choice but to comply with a federal directive.\nSecond, separation of powers constraints are concerned with the proper allocation of authority among the three branches within the federal government. The Constitution assigns each branch of government distinct, but interrelated, roles, and one branch may not aggrandize its power by attempting to exercise powers assigned to another branch. For example, the Appointments Clause of the Constitution gives the President the authority to appoint principal officers of the United States with the Senate's advice and consent. Thus, when Congress purported to reserve to itself the right to appoint certain members of the Federal Election Commission in 1971, the Supreme Court struck down that law as being in violation of the Appointments Clause.\nFinally, constraints based on individual rights serve to prohibit congressional interference with the rights that individuals retain under the Constitution and, in particular, under the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment, for example, prohibits Congress from enacting a law that abridges the freedom of speech. The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that speech restrictions promulgated as a result of the content of the speech are presumptively unconstitutional. In keeping with this presumption, in United States v. Alvarez , the Court struck down a law that made it a crime to falsely claim that one had received military medals or decorations on the grounds that the law risked \"significant First Amendment harm\" by broadly empowering prosecutions of speech based on its content, without any notable limitations.", "Given the powers of Congress and the limits on those powers under the Constitution, the question remains as to which branch of the federal government may interpret the scope of Congress's powers. The question is one that has been debated from the very beginnings of the country. In its 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court held that the logic of having a written Constitution that enumerates the legal limits imposed on the federal government, coupled with the tenure protections provided to the federal judiciary under the Constitution, confirmed the Supreme Court's role in interpreting the Constitution and invalidating acts of other branches of government that contravene this document in the context of a live case or controversy. Pursuant to Marbury ' s famous command, it is \"the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.\"\nWhile Marbury firmly established that the judicial branch has a role in interpreting the Constitution, including the power to strike down laws held to be incompatible with the founding document, it did not, however, expressly state that the judiciary has a final or even exclusive role in defining the basic powers and limits of the federal government. To the contrary, the early history of the United States is replete with examples of all three branches of the federal government playing a role in constitutional interpretation, with Congress and the Executive openly questioning the Supreme Court's pronouncements on constitutional law, such as the Court's rulings on the National Bank or slavery. As these examples show, Marbury was not seen to interfere with the ability of either Congress or the President to interpret the Constitution. Rather, Marbury only asserted the judiciary's power to act as the ultimate expositor of the Constitution in the limited context of cases that were properly before the Court. Instead, Thomas Jefferson's view that \"each of the three departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the Constitution, without any regard to what the others may have decided for themselves under a similar question,\" appears to have prevailed in Congress during the early days of the United States. This is evidenced by the fact that Members of Congress spent \"a considerable amount of time\" \"debating the constitutional limitations on\" legislation during the first 100 years of the nation.\nIn the mid-20 th century, however, the Supreme Court began articulating a theory of judicial supremacy, wherein the Court no longer shared its role in interpreting the Constitution with the other branches of the federal government, but rather characterized its role as being the preeminent arbiter of the Constitution's meaning. For example, in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court read Marbury as \"declaring the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and [this] principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.\" In other words, the Cooper Court concluded that the \"interpretation[s] of the [Constitution] enunciated by this Court ... [are] the supreme law of the land,\" with constitutional interpretations by other actors, including Congress, necessarily lacking the same force. Supporters of the judicial supremacy view assert that it promotes stability and uniformity in constitutional interpretation, as well as preserves constitutional norms from majoritarian pressures. The Court's decision in Cooper , coupled with broader institutional factors that may further constrain Congress's ability to engage in constitutional interpretation, has provided support for the notion of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation within the coordinate branches of government. As a result, while Congress certainly continues to debate about the Constitution during the legislative process, in the modern era, the Court's views on the Constitution appear to have taken on an elevated role vis-á-vis those views of the other branches of government.\nThe theory of judicial supremacy is far from a consensus view, however, and several aspects of the American constitutional system may counsel for a more robust role for Congress in constitutional interpretation. In recent decades, a number of legal scholars and government officials have criticized the judicial supremacy view, instead advancing the view that the Constitution should more regularly be the subject of interpretation by those outside of the judicial branch. This view posits that Congress and others outside of the government possess independent and coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution. Supporters of this view point to the fact that the Constitution requires all Members of Congress to \"be bound by Oath or Affirmation ... to support [the] Constitution ... ,\" a requirement that presumes Senators and Representatives must understand and interpret the Constitution in their work in Congress. Similarly, courts' practice of affording a presumption of constitutionality to laws passed by Congress necessarily assumes that Members of Congress engage in constitutional interpretation during the legislative process. In addition, if Congress opts not to engage in interpreting the Constitution, a vacuum could arise in constitutional dialogue because various judicially crafted doctrines generally serve to keep the courts from making pronouncements on a wide range of constitutional questions. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy observed in his concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, because there are \"numerous instances in which the statements and actions of Government officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention,\" it is \"imperative\" for public officials to \"adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and promise.\" These arguments can be seen as relevant to the current CAS requirement imposed under the House rules insofar as they suggest that Congress should have some role in interpreting the Constitution.", "Originally adopted as an amendment to House Rule XII on January 5, 2011, the CAS rule prohibits Members from introducing a bill or joint resolution without a \"statement citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution.\" The current CAS rule functionally replaced a requirement that existed during the 105th through 111th Congresses, mandating that committee reports for bills reported out of committee \"include a statement citing the specific powers granted to the Congress in the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill or joint resolution.\" A CAS is not part of the text of the legislation; instead, it \"accompanie[s]\" the legislation. The CAS must be \"submitted at the time the bill or joint resolution\" is presented for introduction and referral, that is, when the legislation is dropped in the \"hopper.\" The submitted CAS appears in the Congressional Record and is published electronically on Congress.gov.", "While the rule, on its face, requires Members to provide as \"specific[] as practicable\" \"a statement citing ... the power or powers to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution,\" the CAS rule itself is silent on various issues. For example, the rule does not prescribe any particular format or level of detail for CASs. The House Committee on Rules (Rules Committee) provided guidance soon after the rule was adopted, identifying the following five examples of citations to constitutional authority:\n1. \"The constitutional authority on which this bill rests is the power of Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, as enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the United States Constitution.\" 2. \"This bill is enacted pursuant to Section 2 of Amendment XV of the United States Constitution.\" 3. \"This bill is enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution.\" 4. \"The Congress enacts this bill pursuant to Clause 1 of Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution and Amendment XVI of the United States Constitution.\" 5. \"This bill makes specific changes to existing law in a manner that returns power to the States and to the people, in accordance with Amendment X of the United States Constitution.\"\nThis guidance suggests that compliant CASs should generally discuss the affirmative constitutional authority that empowers Congress to enact particular legislation, but need not discuss any external constraints on Congress's powers to enact the legislation. For example, under this guidance, a CAS for a bill that proposed to ban all interstate shipments of religious pamphlets could be seen as compliant if it cited the Commerce Clause as the source of congressional power, even though the bill may run afoul of the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. Nonetheless, the last example provided by the Rules Committee suggests that a citation to a provision of the Constitution that does not explicitly grant power to the Congress—such as the Tenth Amendment, which preserves the powers of the states —may suffice to comply with the rule. More broadly, the Rules Committee guidance indicates that Members have significant discretion in determining whether particular CASs comply with the rule. The Rules Committee guidance notes that it is ultimately \"the responsibility of the bill sponsor to determine what authorities [he or she] wish[es] to cite and to provide that information to the Legislative Counsel staff.\"\nIn practice, outside commentators have noted that Members have generally complied with House Rule XII, clause 7(c). Such observations may be the result of how the rule is enforced. The Rules Committee has noted, \"The adequacy and accuracy of the citation of constitutional authority is a matter for debate in the committees and in the House.\" This statement suggests that the CAS rule is enforced only insofar as \"the House clerk ... acts to verify that each bill has a justification\" and \"not [in judging] the adequacy of the justification itself.\"", "", "Studies of past practices under House Rule XII, clause 7(c), support the view that Members have considerable leeway and discretion in crafting CASs. Professor Hanah Volokh of Emory University conducted a study of CAS practices early in the 112 th Congress, aggregating more than 1,700 statements submitted during the first four months of 2011. According to Professor Volokh, a \"handful\" of these CASs \"engage[d],\" in her opinion, \"in a thorough and highly detailed explanation of the constitutional ramifications of the proposed legislation\" by discussing the Federalist Papers or Supreme Court doctrine, among other things. The remainder, however, were less specific in their identification of Congress's powers. For example, 8% of the statements reviewed by Professor Volokh generally cited Article I, Section 8–without providing any further specificity as to the particular clauses within that section providing constitutional support for the proposed legislation. A study of the CASs for \"every bill and joint resolution introduced\" from January 5, 2011, to January 5, 2012, of that same Congress reported similar findings. According to the House Republican Study Committee, 15% of submitted CASs relied on Article I, Section 8 alone.\nIn preparing various versions of this report, CRS conducted a similar study of CASs from the 114th and 115th Congresses. First, in 2017, CRS staff examined the 937 statements submitted between July 1, 2016, and January 1, 2017, consisting of 13 joint resolutions and 924 bills. In 2019, CRS staff examined 1,110 statements submitted between July 1, 2018, and January 2, 2019, consisting of 10 joint resolutions and 1,100 bills. Most commonly, in 58% of cases, the CAS cited to a specific clause in Article I, Section 8, such as the Taxing and Spending Clause or the Commerce Clause. Few submitted CASs consisted of more than a bare citation to an affirmative power granted to Congress in the Constitution. For example, four CASs examined from 2016 and six CAS examined from 2018 explicitly discussed Supreme Court case law that purportedly support the bill or joint resolution. Forty-four of the statements from 2016 and thirteen statements from 2018 cited to provisions of the Constitution that constrain rather than empower Congress or one of the other federal branches, such as the restrictions in Article I, Section 9 or the Bill of Rights. Few CASs went beyond the scope of the rule to detail why the constitutional provision cited empowers Congress to enact the proposed legislation.\nIn line with the studies on CASs in the 112 th Congress, CRS found that numerous statements submitted during the sample periods contained general, rather than specific, references to the Constitution. As Table 1 below indicates, the most frequent citation in CASs accompanying recent legislation was a general reference to Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. This occurred in 30% of all CASs during the 2016 sample period and 33% of all CASs during the 2018 sample period, a marked increase from the House Republican Study Committee and Volokh studies of the 112 th Congress. Similarly, the sixth and ninth most frequently cited constitutional provision in submitted statements during the respective sample periods was even broader: a general reference to Article I of the Constitution.", "Beyond CAS practices with regard to specificity, the sample of recently submitted Rule XII statements is also noteworthy in that it highlights the specific clauses of the Constitution that Members have most frequently relied upon in submitted CASs. In particular, numerous recently submitted CASs are notable in that the statements raise certain questions about how a particular clause has been interpreted, both as a matter of historical practice and by the courts, and how that same clause is being cited by the relevant CAS. Among the most prominent examples of CASs that could be seen as adopting an interpretation of the Constitution that potentially diverges from historical understandings or judicial interpretations of a particular clause include statements that cite to the following clauses:\nNecessary and Proper Clause : One of the most frequently cited clauses in recent CASs was the Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows Congress to \"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution\" the powers enumerated in Article I and \"all other Powers vested by [the] Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.\" About a quarter of all CASs in the CRS studies contained a citation to that clause, with 14% of the 2016 CASs and 19% of the 2018 CASs citing the Necessary and Proper Clause as the sole power to enact the underlying legislation. Citations to the Necessary and Proper Clause in isolation could be seen as somewhat anomalous, as that clause has never been viewed by the Court or by the Framers of the Constitution as a general source of power for Congress to do whatever is \"necessary and proper.\" Instead, \"[w]hile the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes congressional action 'incidental to [an enumerated] power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise,'\" it does not provide Congress with \"great substantive and independent power.\" General Welfare Clause: The General Welfare Clause refers to a specific phrase contained within the language in Article I, Section 8, clause 1 empowering Congress to enact certain taxes and spend the money collected from taxation. Specifically, the first clause of Section 8 of Article I affords Congress the power to \"lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... \" In CRS's studies, the Taxing and Spending Clause was the third most frequently cited clause by CASs. Not infrequently, a citation to this clause—commonly described in CASs as the \"General Welfare Clause\"—was used for legislation unrelated to the spending of money by the federal government. Importantly, the phrase \"general Welfare\" does not exist in isolation in the clause, which might otherwise empower Congress to enact laws that broadly promote the general welfare of the nation. Instead, the phrase \"general Welfare\" in Article I, Section 8, clause 1, is tied to the preceding language in the clause regarding the raising of revenue, and thus requires Congress to spend the money it collects from taxation to promote the general welfare. While this power is considerable, it is necessarily tied to spending legislation. Military Regulation Clause: The constitutional provision affording Congress with the power to \"make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces\" is another frequently cited clause in recent CASs. Several of the bills to which such CASs are attached, however, do not purport to regulate the United States' armed forces, but instead prescribe broad regulations for the government as a whole. Such references to the Military Regulation Clause appear to stem from reading the first phrase of the clause—\"make rules for the Government\"—in isolation from the rest of the clause, as an independent power. However, such an understanding of the clause is inconsistent with traditional interpretations of the scope of that clause, which view it as solely related to Congress's power over the military. This interpretation also runs contrary to traditional rules of legal interpretation that counsel for reading phrases in a legal text in their context and not in isolation from the rest of the text. More broadly, interpreting the Military Regulation Clause to allow Congress to direct the actions of the federal government generally in whatever manner Congress wishes would arguably transform the clause from a narrow power, confined to matters related to the armed forces, to an open-ended police power, something otherwise rejected by the Framers of the Constitution. Appropriations Clause: A number of recent CASs cite provisions in Article I, Section 9, including several CASs that cite the Appropriations Clause as the authority for Congress to provide money for a particular project. The Appropriations Clause states, in relevant part, that \"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.\" Like other provisions found in Section 9 of Article I, this clause generally has not been interpreted to grant Congress any affirmative power. Instead, in keeping with other provisions in Section 9, the Appropriations Clause has been seen to function as a restriction on the powers of the federal government. Specifically, the Appropriations Clause ensures that when the federal government spends money, \"the payment of money from the Treasury must be authorized by a statute.\" It thus serves as an affirmative restriction on the power of the Executive and makes Congress's \"power over the purse\" exclusive in nature. As discussed above, Congress's power to spend money derives from the Taxing and Spending Clause. Bill of Rights: While not among the most frequent citations in CASs, occasionally one of the first 10 amendments to the Constitution—the Bill of Rights—has been cited in support of Congress's power to enact legislation. Congress may certainly have an interest in protecting the rights listed in the Bill of Rights, but it should be noted that the first 10 amendments to the Constitution do not themselves empower Congress to take any action, and they instead consist of \"negative rights\" protecting individuals from certain government conduct. The Bill of Rights often prohibits congressional action. As a result, if a sponsor proposes legislation intended to support individual liberties protected by the Constitution, the CAS for such legislation could instead rely on an affirmative power of the Congress, such as the powers provided in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Another alternative would be the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has held allows \"Congress [to] enact so-called prophylactic legislation\" aimed at \"prevent[ing] and deter[ing] unconstitutional conduct.\" Nonetheless, it should be noted that the House Rules Committee has suggested that a citation to a provision of the Constitution that does not explicitly grant power to Congress may suffice to comply with the CAS rule. For example, a Member seeking to rescind or narrow the scope of an existing law could arguably believe it appropriate to identify constitutional principles found in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere that the Member believes are advanced by the proposed legislation.", "CASs have limited legal import, in that the CAS of a bill enacted into law will likely not alter a court's view of the constitutionality of the legislation. At bottom, a CAS is a statement by one Member of Congress (i.e., the sponsor) when a piece of legislation is introduced. It is not formally part of a bill or joint resolution. Therefore, even if the underlying legislation is enacted into law, the CAS would have no formal legal effect because the CAS was not subject to the approval of both houses of Congress, or presented to the President, as is required by Article I, Section 7. Instead, CASs are a type of legislative history material that describes the initial thoughts of a single Member as to Congress's power to enact the bill. In this sense, one might view a CAS as akin to an isolated statement in the Congressional Record or a statement issued by the sponsor of a bill, which courts generally regard as \"weak\" forms of legislative history when considering Congress's intent in passing a law.\nIn practice, in the few court cases that cite to a law's CAS, the underlying statement is mentioned merely in passing and had no apparent effect on the decision, as courts have independently evaluated the constitutionality of the legislation in question notwithstanding the existence of the CAS. This practice is in keeping with broader principles of constitutional law as adopted by the courts. One such principle holds that Congress generally may not independently and without further scrutiny in the context of a case or controversy before a court define its own powers under the Constitution. Another principle holds that an otherwise unconstitutional law will not be found to be permissible by a court merely because Congress believes the provision to be within its powers.", "Given the seeming ease of compliance with House Rule XII, clause 7(c) , and the tendency of some CASs to cite to general or arguably inapplicable provisions of the Constitution, questions might be raised about the desirability of the CAS rule. Critics have argued for its repeal, contending that the rule is symbolic and has little impact on congressional debate or dialogue about Congress's authority under the Constitution. In addition, some have asserted that Congress lacks the institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution, and the CAS rule demonstrates this insofar as there have been few meaningful debates in Congress over the scope of Congress's powers under the rule. Others contend that the administrative costs of complying with the rule outweigh any benefits from the CAS requirement.\nOn the other hand, proponents characterize House Rule XII, clause 7(c), as an extension of the broader debate over Congress's role in interpreting the Constitution, providing a limited means by which Members of Congress may expressly engage in constitutional interpretation. As one commentator notes, \"[f]undamentally, a [CAS] is a congressional interpretation of the Constitution,\" and supporters of the rule see several benefits to having the House of Representatives engage in a limited form of constitutional interpretation through the submission of CASs. According to the rule's proponents, statements submitted under House Rule XII are a \"simple and straightforward self-monitoring mechanism\" to ensure that Congress does not \"usurp\" powers not granted to it in the Constitution. In this sense, according to its proponents, the CAS rule serves to remind Members of the limits on Congress's institutional power.\nAdditionally, supporters of House Rule XII, clause 7(c), argue that the rule enhances constitutional dialogue outside of the judiciary and promotes constitutional literacy within Congress by formally requiring Members to engage in even limited constitutional interpretation when introducing legislation. According to one commentator, the CAS rule could\nprovide a foundation for a new sense within ... [Congress] ... that there is both reason and need for its members to develop deeper and broader understandings of the Constitution and constitutional interpretation—in the direction of Congress becoming ... not only a co-equal branch of the federal government, but a co-equal interpreter of the federal Constitution, if not more.\nProponents of the rule have further contended that the rule could enhance the institutional credibility and reputation of Congress by making clear to constituents that Members \"take seriously the constitutionality of their actions.\" According to one former Member,\nCongress's reputational problems partially relate to a belief that Congress is not really debating or deliberating in good faith but is simply retreating to partisan battle lines. This concern has been exacerbated by Congress abdicating and leaving to the courts its historical responsibility to consider constitutionality on its own. In this respect, the House Rule ... is a foot in the door. Under the House Rule, all members of the House are required, essentially for the first time, to take at least one aspect of their obligation to consider constitutionality more seriously.\nNonetheless, even among proponents of the rule, informal suggestions have been made to improve the constitutional dialogue surrounding CASs. Among the primary changes proposed are the following:\nEnhancing the Content of CASs: Prompted by criticisms about how \"thin many of [the CASs] are,\" some have suggested that the House rules be altered to require more formal and robust debate over the constitutionality of proposed legislation. One proposal called for time to be set aside for formal debate on the House floor about the constitutionality of legislation upon the motion of a single Member. Other proposals focus on changing the content of the CASs themselves by requiring more expansive statements that discuss the relationship between the cited provision of the Constitution and the bill itself. In addition, others have advocated that the CAS rule formally require that the statement discuss \"[w]ith some depth\" any \"precedent germane to the authority to enact the\" legislation. Finally, several commentators have proposed altering the rule so that Members must not only cite to the Constitution's affirmative grants of authority to Congress, but also discuss any potential limitations the Constitution may impose on Congress's power to legislate. Better Enforcing the CAS R ule : Given the large number of CASs that lack specificity or cite seemingly inapplicable clauses of the Constitution, supporters of the rule have argued that Members must be held accountable for ensuring that submitted CASs comply with both the letter and spirit of the requirement. One early version of the current CAS rule proposed in the 111th Congress would have deemed general citations to the \"common defense clause, the general welfare clause, or the necessary and proper clause\" insufficient to satisfy House Rule XII, clause 7(c). In addition, this proposal would have allowed a Member to initiate a point of order challenging the adequacy of a CAS, thereby subjecting the measure to a short debate that would resolve whether the submitted statement complied with House Rule XII. Others have urged that the Clerk of the House or a designee be empowered to \"evaluate the content\" of a submitted statement formally and \"add a note indicating that the Statement submitted does not properly satisfy the Rule's specificity requirement.\" Under this proposal, any bill with such a notation could be \"subject to a special privileged motion by a Member to recommit the bill for failure to follow the Rule.\" Changing Other Procedures Regarding CASs : Currently, the CAS focuses on a single moment: the initial introduction of a bill or joint resolution. Viewing this limitation on the use of a CAS as a shortcoming that prevents more robust constitutional debate, several proponents of the CAS rule have argued that the rule should apply during all stages of the legislative process, including during committee deliberations, so that the constitutionality of a bill or resolution is subject to broader consideration. Relatedly, because the CAS rule only applies at the beginning of the legislative process, the only Member who currently assesses Congress's authority to enact the legislation in question is the Member who introduced the legislation. In order to ensure that Members, who ordinarily must decide how to vote on another Member's bill, consider the constitutional implications of the legislation in question, some have suggested that the House rule \"explicitly acknowledge\" the independent \"obligation\" of Members to be \"mindful of any constitutional objections\" regarding the bill that is the subject of a vote. In what may be the broadest means to allow more Members to weigh in on the constitutional implications of a bill, at least one commentator has suggested (but ultimately rejects) changing the House rule so that the CAS is part of the text of a bill, as opposed to a statement attached to the bill. Such an approach could, at least in theory, formalize and elevate the role of the CAS because when a bill that contains a CAS in its text is put to a vote, multiple Members could potentially voice their agreement or disagreement with the bill's language assessing Congress's power to enact the underlying legislation.\nEach of the proposed modifications to the CAS rule could raise new concerns, however. For example, if House Rule XII were modified to require more robust discussions of the constitutionality of a given piece of legislation throughout the legislative process, such a modification could amplify the criticisms that the CAS rule requires considerable resources to ensure compliance. Moreover, if the rule were modified to require that CASs include additional content, without any changes to its current enforcement regime, the additional requirements could, in the view of at least one commentator, be ignored.", "This section of the report identifies issues that Members and congressional staffers may find useful to consider when assessing whether and how a constitutional provision may provide a source of authority for legislation. First, the section notes available resources that may aid in interpreting the Constitution. Second, the section suggests potential constitutional bases for various types of legislation.", "There are numerous resources that Members and staff could use to learn more about the affirmative powers afforded Congress by the Constitution and the limitations on those powers. The Constitution and its current amendments contain a little more than 7,500 words, and Congress regularly authorizes the printing and distribution of pocket versions of the Constitution for Members and staff. Moreover, a host of primary historical documents from the founding era are available electronically for those interested, including the following:\nFarrand ' s Records : Documentary records from the Constitutional Convention, including the notes gathered by various attendees, complied by historian Max Farrand. The Federalist Papers : A series of newspaper articles written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison urging the ratification of the Constitution. Founder ' s Constitution : A joint venture of the University of Chicago Press and the Liberty Fund, providing various primary sources for each clause of the Constitution. Constitutional Sources Project (ConSource): ConSource provides free access to a \"digital library of historical sources related to the creation, ratification, and amendment of the United States Constitution.\"\nIn addition to these primary sources, Members and staff may wish to consult a number of secondary sources that are publicly available explaining the various clauses of the Constitution, including the following:\nConstitution Annotated ( CONAN ) : The Library of Congress, through the Congressional Research Service, regularly publishes and updates The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation (popularly known as the Constitution Annotated or CONAN). CONAN contains an in-depth, accessible, and objective record of how each provision in the Constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and other entities. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States : Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States is a three-volume treatise written by Associate Justice Joseph Story in 1833. It is widely cited as an authoritative understanding of the Constitution. Interactive Constitution : For an overview of the Constitution, the congressionally chartered National Constitution Center has created the Interactive Constitution wherein \"scholars of different perspectives discuss what they agree upon, and what they disagree about\" with regard to broad concepts in constitutional law. The Heritage Foundation ' s Guide to the Constitution : The Heritage Foundation's Guide to the Constitution provides a clause-by-clause analysis of the Constitution with a series of explanatory essays from a number of legal scholars. The American Constitution Society ' s Keeping Faith With the Constitution : The American Constitution Society's Keeping Faith With the Constitution examines the text and history of the Constitution with a view toward how the Constitution's \"words and principles\" have been interpreted throughout U.S. history.", "To aid drafters of CASs, Table 2 provides a list of suggested citations that could potentially be submitted in a CAS pursuant to House Rule XII, clause 7(c), for various types of commonly introduced legislation.\nBeyond these suggestions for citations to specific provisions of the Constitution, given the broader trends with regard to CAS practices discussed above, it may also be helpful to consider the following questions before submitting a CAS:\nDoes the CAS cite to a specific clause of the Constitution? While several recent CASs have adopted the practice of citing to an entire Article of the Constitution or a section of the Constitution, such as Article I, Section 8, the prevailing customary practice has been to cite to a specific clause of the Constitution. To the extent a Member wishes to cite to a specific clause in a CAS, Table 2 may be a helpful resource to consult. Does the CAS cite only to the Necessary and Proper Clause? While a considerable number of CASs cite exclusively to the Necessary and Proper Clause, such a citation may raise questions with regard to whether the clause is intended to do more than supplement Congress's other enumerated powers under the Constitution. To the extent a Member may wish to cite to Congress's other, more specific enumerated powers for support for a given piece of legislation, Table 2 may be a helpful resource to consult. Does the CAS cite to a clause that affirmatively empowers Congress to take an action? Citations in CASs to clauses in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which contains a list of limitations on the powers of the federal government, or the Bill of Rights, which consists of a number of rights retained vis-á-vis the federal government, may suggest a broader interpretation of such clauses. To the extent a Member prefers to cite to a clause that is more generally recognized to grant an affirmative power to Congress, Article I, Section 8 contains the vast majority of commonly cited clauses that provide Congress the power to legislate with respect to various subjects. Does the CAS cite to a clause that relates to and authorizes the underlying legislation? Perhaps most importantly, a Member may wish cite to a provision of the Constitution whose power, based on either historical understandings or judicial interpretations of a particular clause, has some relationship with the subject matter of the legislation. As discussed earlier in this report, citations to constitutional provisions like the General Welfare Clause and the Military Regulation Clause may be more limited than the language of the Constitution might suggest at first blush. To the extent a Member may want to confirm that a particular CAS citation relates to and authorizes the underlying legislation, attorneys in CRS's American Law Division can provide advice with regard to specific CAS citations.", "A House Rule XII, clause 7(c), statement regarding the constitutionality of legislation is required only when a Member of the House introduces legislation. The CAS, by its nature, is just the starting point for constitutional dialogue respecting a bill or joint resolution. Nothing in the rule prohibits further discussions about the constitutional issues that a piece of legislation may implicate. While the customary practice with regard to CASs, to date, has been to provide a short citation to the provision in the Constitution that affirmatively grants Congress the authority to enact the underlying legislation, it is not unprecedented for Members to cite sources beyond the text of the Constitution, such as Supreme Court case law, primary source materials on the Constitution, or a constitutional law treatise. Other CASs have gone beyond citing to the affirmative powers that the Constitution provides Congress and have discussed potential restraints the Constitution imposes that may prohibit the enactment of the underlying legislation.\nOutside of a CAS, Members can request a formal floor debate respecting the constitutionality of pending legislation, and constitutional debate and dialogue can occur in a host of other contexts, including voting to enact legislation, committee hearings, committee reports, and more \"informal practices, norms, and traditions.\" Also, Members of Congress have a variety of resources available to help inform their participation in constitutional debate, including \"expert witnesses at hearings, their legally trained staff, [and] constitutional experts at the [CRS].\" In particular, CRS's American Law Division regularly provides legal advice to Members and their staff on constitutional questions regarding pending legislation, whether by providing suggestions for a CAS or by formally rendering an opinion on the constitutionality of pending legislation. In this vein, Members and their staff have the capability to meaningfully participate in ongoing debates over the interpretation of the Constitution, beginning with the CAS." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What does understanding the CAS rule require an understanding of?", "How does the Constitution limit the Congress's power?", "What are internal limits?", "What are external limits?", "How did Marbury v. Madison help to solidify the judicial branch's role in interpreting the Constitution?", "How did the Supreme Court's role evolve in the mid-20th century?", "What alternative interpretation of the Supreme Court's role has been promoted recently?", "What evidence have scholars offered up in support of this view?", "What is a CAS?", "How is the submitted CAS published?", "How is the submitted CAS's compliance with the rule enforced?", "How has the CAS rule been criticized?" ], "summary": [ "Understanding the CAS rule first requires an understanding of both the powers provided to the Congress under the Constitution and Congress's role in interpreting the founding document.", "Article I's Vesting Clause creates a Congress of specified or \"enumerated\" powers, and every law Congress enacts must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution. The Constitution creates two central types of limitations on Congress's powers: (1) internal limits and (2) external limits.", "Internal limits are the restrictions inherent in the constitutional grants of power themselves, such as the limits on the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.", "External limits, on the other hand, are the constraints contained in affirmative prohibitions found elsewhere in the text or structure of the document, such as the First Amendment's prohibition on Congress abridging the freedom of speech.", "While the Court's 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison firmly cemented the judicial branch's role in interpreting the Constitution by recognizing the power of the Court to strike down legislation as unconstitutional, the early history of the nation is replete with examples of all three government branches playing a substantial role in constitutional interpretation.", "By the mid-20th century, however, the Supreme Court began articulating a theory of judicial supremacy that became widely accepted, wherein the federal judiciary is the final and exclusive arbiter of the Constitution's meaning.", "Nonetheless, in recent decades, a number of legal scholars and government officials have criticized this theory, instead promoting the view that the political branches of government possess the independent and coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution.", "In support of this view, some point to (1) the Constitution itself requiring all Members of Congress to be bound by an oath to support the Constitution; (2) the presumption of constitutionality that courts afford legislation enacted by Congress; and (3) the wide range of questions the Constitution requires Congress to resolve.", "A CAS is fundamentally a congressional interpretation of the Constitution, in that House Rule XII requires each Member introducing a piece of legislation to attach a statement that cites the power(s) that allows Congress to enact the legislation.", "The submitted CAS appears in the Congressional Record and is published on Congress.gov.", "The House Rules Committee has indicated that Members have significant discretion in determining whether particular CASs comply with the rule. The CAS rule is enforced only insofar as \"the House clerk ... acts to verify that each bill has a justification\" and \"not [in judging] the adequacy of the justification itself.\" The most common means of complying with the rule is to cite to a specific clause in Article I, Section 8, such as the Taxing and Spending Clause.", "The CAS rule has itself been subject to much debate, with proponents arguing that the rule promotes constitutional dialogue in the House, while critics contend that the rule provides minimal benefits and is administratively costly." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, 4, 4, 6, -1, 0, 0, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
GAO_GAO-12-74	{ "title": [ "Background", "Key Initiatives to Improve Federal Agencies’ Management of Used Electronic Products Have Been Launched over the Past 10 Years", "EPA Has Led Initiatives Aimed at Improving the Management of Used Federal Electronics", "GSA Has Issued Personal Property Disposal Guidance and Instituted New Requirements for Electronics Recyclers Listed on GSA’s Contract Schedule", "Executive Orders Issued in 2007 and 2009 Established Goals for Improving the Management of Used Federal Electronics", "The National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship Aims to Improve the Federal Government’s Management of Used Electronics", "The Management of Used Federal Electronics Has Improved and Opportunities Exist for Further Improvements, but Challenges Remain", "FEC Participation Has Grown, and Opportunities Exist to Increase Participation", "The Number of Certified Recyclers Has Grown and Opportunities Exist for Agencies to Increase Their Use", "The Tracking and Reporting of Data on the Disposition of Used Electronics Presents Challenges", "Challenges Remain in Clarifying Agencies’ Responsibility for Used Electronics Sold through Auctions", "Challenges Remain in Defining Key Terms and in Clarifying Differences between the Executive Orders", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "As we have reported previously, EPA estimates that across the federal government 10,000 computers are disposed of each week. Once these used electronics reach the end of their original useful lives, federal agencies have several options for disposing of them. Agencies generally are to donate their used electronics to schools or other nonprofit educational institutions; exchange them with other federal, state, or local agencies; sometimes trade them with vendors to offset the costs of new equipment; sell them—generally through the GSA’s surplus property program, which sells surplus federal government equipment, including used federal electronics, at public auctions; or give them to a recycler.\nFederal agencies, however, are not required to track the ultimate destination of their donated or recycled used electronic products. Instead, agency officials generally consider this to be the recipient organization’s responsibility. Consequently, federal agencies often have little assurance that their used electronics are ultimately disposed of in an environmentally responsible manner. In our prior work, we found that little information exists, for example, on whether obsolete electronic products are reused, stored, or disposed of in landfills. If discarded domestically with common trash, a number of adverse environmental impacts may result, including the potential for harmful substances such as cadmium, lead, and mercury to enter the environment. If donated or recycled, these products may eventually be irresponsibly exported to countries without modern landfills and with waste management systems that are less protective of human health and the environment than those in the United States. For example, in our prior work we found that some U.S. electronics recyclers—including ones that publicly tout their exemplary environmental practices—were apparently willing to circumvent U.S. hazardous waste export laws and export certain regulated used electronic products to developing countries.\nThe federal government’s approach to ensuring environmentally responsible management of used electronics has relied heavily on EPA’s FEC initiative, which, among other things, encourages federal facilities and agencies to manage used electronics in an environmentally safe way. In addition, executive orders were issued to strengthen federal agencies’ overall environmental management practices, including environmentally sound management of federal electronic products. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive (OFEE) each play important roles in providing leadership, oversight, and guidance to assist federal agencies with implementing the requirements of these executive orders. More recently, an interagency task force issued the July 2011 National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship, which is intended to lay the groundwork for enhancing the federal government’s management of used electronics.", "Over the past decade, the executive branch has undertaken several initiatives to improve federal agencies’ management of used electronics. Specifically, (1) EPA has led or coordinated several improvement initiatives and issued guidance aimed at improving the management of used federal electronic products, (2) GSA has issued personal property disposal guidance and instituted new requirements for electronics recyclers it has contracted with to dispose of federal electronic products, (3) the President has issued executive orders that established goals for improving the management of used federal electronics, and (4) an interagency task force issued the July 2011 National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship, which is intended to lay the groundwork for enhancing the federal government’s management of used electronics.", "EPA has led or coordinated several key improvement initiatives to assist agencies with the management of used federal electronics, including the FEC, the Federal Electronics Stewardship Working Group, and the establishment of electronics recycler standards for use in certification programs.\nFederal Electronics Challenge. In 2003, EPA, along with several other agencies, piloted the FEC.that encourages federal facilities and agencies to purchase environmentally friendly electronic products, reduce the impacts of these products during their use, and manage used electronics in an environmentally safe way. To participate, executive branch agencies or The FEC is a voluntary partnership program their facilities must register and sign an agency pledge to become an agency or facility FEC partner, or both. In general, agency partners are responsible for supporting their facilities’ efforts but do not have specific reporting requirements. Facility partners are required to submit a baseline survey of their electronics stewardship activities when they join the program. The survey is to include, among other things, a description of (1) what the entity does with electronic products that are no longer used; (2) which electronics recycling services it uses; and (3) what, if any, measures the entity has taken to ensure that the electronic products were recycled in an environmentally sound manner. Facility partners are also expected to report progress annually, and apply for recognition through FEC awards.\nFEC guidance directs participants to provide recipients of donated electronics with instructions on how to have the electronics recycled responsibly and how to verify that responsible recycling occurs— procedures known as “downstream auditing.” When donating used electronics, FEC instructs agencies and facilities to ensure that recipients contact local or state environmental or solid waste agencies to obtain a database of vendors who recycle used electronics once the equipment is no longer useful to the recipient organization. FEC also recommends that participating agencies and facilities instruct recipients to avoid arrangements with recyclers that are unable or unwilling to share references and cannot explain the final destination of the used electronics they collect. When recycling electronics, participants are to determine how much electronic equipment the recyclers actually recycle compared with the amount they sell to other parties. In addition, FEC instructs participants to physically inspect a potential recycler’s facilities. Used electronics in trash containers, for example, may indicate that the facility is not recycling it, and the presence of shipping containers may indicate that the facility exports it.\nTo assist FEC partners, “FEC champions” are available to help regional federal facilities with their electronics management programs. FEC champions are EPA representatives who are selected based on geographic representation. Champions help federal facilities become FEC facility partners; access resources for managing electronic products, including FEC program information, fact sheets, and limited technical assistance; and receive recognition for improving electronics management programs.\nThe Federal Electronics Stewardship Working Group. This working group coordinates interagency efforts to promote federal electronics stewardship. It also acts as an advisory board for the FEC program. During the working group’s monthly meetings, federal agencies have the opportunity to discuss best practices for implementing the FEC and other electronics stewardship initiatives within their respective agencies. The FEC Program Manager told us the working group meetings serve as a primary mechanism to facilitate communication with agency management regarding the FEC program. Most executive agencies have at least one representative serving with the working group.\nStandards for certification of recyclers. EPA has worked with the recycling industry and other entities to promote partnership programs that address the environmentally sound management of used electronic products. As we reported in July 2010, EPA convened electronics manufacturers, recyclers, and other stakeholders and provided funding to develop Responsible Recycling (R2) practices, so that electronics recyclers could obtain certification to show that they are voluntarily adhering to the adopted set of best practices for environmental protection, worker health and safety, and security practices. Certification for R2 practices became available in late 2009. The R2 practices identify “focus materials” in used electronic products, such as cathode-ray tubes or items containing mercury, that warrant greater care owing to their toxicity and associated risk if managed without the appropriate safeguards. Specifically, the practices require that recyclers and each vendor in the recycling chain (1) export products and components containing certain materials only to countries that can legally accept them, (2) document the legality of such exports, and (3) ensure that the material is being safely handled throughout the recycling chain. R2 practices also establish a “reuse, recover, dispose” hierarchy along the chain of custody for material handling. These practices require recyclers to test electronics diverted for reuse, and confirm that key functions of the unit are working before it may be exported. Without such testing and confirmation, these used electronics must be treated as though they are going to recycling and may not be exported unless the R2 exporting provisions for recycling are satisfied. Recognizing that some clients would not want their used electronics remarketed or reused, R2 practices also require recyclers to have systems in place to ensure that all such electronics processed can be recycled, rather than recovered for reuse.\nEPA encourages electronics recyclers to obtain certification to either R2 practices, or to e-Stewards, a separate voluntary certification program. e- Stewards was initiated by the Basel Action Network in 2008, and the first e-Stewards-certified facilities were announced in early 2010. The length and cost of the e-Stewards certification process depends on a facility’s size and whether it has a documented environmental management system in place.", "The authority for federal agencies to transfer research equipment, including computers, to educational institutions and nonprofit organizations was established in law in 1992. See 15 U.S.C. § 3710(i) (2011).\nThe Computers for Learning program facilitates the transfer of excess federal computer equipment to schools and educational nonprofit organizations. The program implements Executive Order 12999, Educational Technology: Ensuring Opportunity for All Children in the Next Century, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,227 (Apr. 19, 1996). of the property for sale would be greater than the expected sales proceeds.\nMore recently, GSA has instituted new requirements for electronics recyclers listed on the GSA Schedule. In February 2011, GSA began requiring proof of certification under either R2 or e-Stewards for new vendors seeking to provide recycling or disposal services for used electronic products under GSA’s environmental services schedule. According to GSA officials, they also identified 5 vendors, out of the 58 vendors on the schedule at that time, that were performing recycling or disposal services for used electronic products and provided these vendors with modified contract terms—making R2 or e-Stewards certification within 6 months a condition for performing these services under the GSA schedule.", "In January 2007, Executive Order 13423 established goals for federal agencies to improve the management of their used electronic products. Among other things, the executive order required that agency heads (1) establish and implement policies to extend the useful life of agencies’ electronic equipment and (2) ensure the agency uses environmentally sound practices with respect to the disposition of the agency’s electronic equipment that has reached the end of its useful life. Furthermore, the instructions for implementing the executive order, issued on March 28, 2007, called for each agency to develop and submit to OFEE by May 1, 2007, an electronics stewardship plan to implement electronics stewardship practices for all eligible owned or leased electronic products. Among other things, the plans were to address how agencies will ensure that all electronic products no longer needed by an agency are reused, donated, sold, or recycled using environmentally sound management practices at end of life. The implementing instructions called for agencies’ plans to comply with GSA procedures for the transfer, donation, sale, and recycling of electronic products (discussed above), as well as any applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations; and use national standards, best management practices, or a national certification program for electronics recyclers.\nThe implementing instructions for Executive Order 13423 also directed each agency and its facilities to participate in the FEC or to implement an equivalent electronics stewardship program that addresses the purchase, operation and maintenance, and end-of-life management strategies for electronic products consistent with the FEC’s recommended practices and guidelines.\nIn October 2009, Executive Order 13514 built on the previous executive order but included slightly different goals for electronics stewardship. Executive Order 13514 calls for agencies to develop, implement, and annually update strategic sustainability performance plans to specify how they intend to achieve the goals of the order. Agencies were required to submit fiscal year 2010 plans to CEQ and OMB by June 2010. Executive Order 13514, however, did not supersede or revoke the earlier executive order, and that order’s goals and requirements remain in effect.", "In July 2011, an interagency task force,GSA, issued the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship, which describes goals, action items, and projects that are intended to lay the groundwork for enhancing the federal government’s management of used electronic products, among other things. The strategy assigns primary responsibility for overseeing or carrying out most of the projects to either EPA or GSA. Most of the projects are scheduled for completion from summer 2011 through spring 2013. Among other things, the strategy directs GSA to issue co-chaired by CEQ, EPA, and through interagency collaboration and with public input, a comprehensive and governmentwide policy on used federal electronic products that maximizes reuse, clears data and information stored on used equipment, and ensures that all federal electronic products are processed by certified recyclers; and revised reporting guidance to improve federal agencies’ tracking of used federal electronic products throughout their life cycle and to post comprehensive data on Data.gov and other publicly accessible websites.\nThe strategy also recommends that the federal government require and enable recipients of used federal equipment that has been sold, transferred, or donated for reuse to use certified recyclers and follow other environmentally sound practices to the greatest extent possible; and encourage electronics manufacturers to expand their product take- back programs, and use certified recyclers as a minimum standard in those programs by expanding the use of manufacturer take-back agreements in federal electronics purchase, rental, and service contracts.", "According to our review of agency documents and discussions with agency officials, federal agencies have made some progress to improve their management of used electronic products, as measured by greater participation in the FEC and an increase in certified electronics recyclers, but opportunities exist to expand their efforts. In addition, challenges remain that may impede agencies’ progress toward further improving their management of used federal electronics, including in the tracking and reporting of data on the disposition of used federal electronics, in clarifying agencies’ responsibility for used electronics sold through auctions, and in clarifying definitions for key terms and reconciling differences between the executive orders.", "Since we first reported on the FEC in November 2005, participation has grown from 12 agencies and 61 individual facilities to 19 agencies and 253 individual facilities, as of September 2011. However, participation still represents only about one-third of the federal workforce and, in some cases, participation means that an agency has identified its current practices for managing electronic products and set goals to improve them but has not reported on progress toward achieving these goals as required. Specifically, only a little more than half of the agencies and facilities that were registered as FEC partners submitted an annual accomplishment report in 2010 to demonstrate the agency or facility’s progress in electronics stewardship; these reports are a key component of actively participating as a partner. Because FEC participation is voluntary, EPA officials said EPA has no authority to require agencies to report on their progress. As a result, the extent to which agencies that do not report progress are reaching their goals is unknown. However, the FEC program manager told us that with a recent change in policy, FEC facility partners that do not submit their fiscal year 2011 annual reporting form by January 31, 2012, will be considered inactive. An FEC official stated that despite increased efforts to market the program, some agencies find the FEC’s reporting requirements to be time-consuming.\nFor the five agencies we reviewed, participation in FEC varied. Specifically:\nDOD participates in the FEC as an agency partner, but the majority of its installations or facilities do not participate. According to EPA data, 16 of DOD’s approximately 5,000 installations participate in the FEC. DOD officials told us that they are conducting outreach to encourage installations to participate but that some installations may not participate because officials believe that the registration process is too rigorous and burdensome.\nNASA centers are allowed to participate in the FEC, but they are not required to do so because other agency initiatives accomplish the same goals, according to agency officials. Three of NASA’s 10 centers participate in the FEC.\nHUD does not participate in the FEC. We found that agency officials did not understand the FEC participation requirements. HUD’s electronics stewardship plan states that HUD participates in the FEC, but an EPA official, who is responsible for the FEC program, told us that HUD never registered to become a partner—which involves submitting a baseline survey of the agency’s electronics stewardship activities. In our discussions with HUD officials, we found that they were not aware of the FEC registration or reporting requirements and continued to believe that the agency was participating.\nDOE officials promote FEC participation, submit annual accomplishment reports, and actively participate in the FEC awards program. According to agency officials, over a 6-year period, 23 DOE facilities have won FEC awards, with many winning multiple times. All but two DOE facilities participate.\nEducation participates in the FEC as an agency and facility partner.\nHowever, because it centrally manages the purchasing and disposition of electronics, Education submits annual accomplishment reports for the agency as a whole.\nFor those agencies or facilities that actively participate in the FEC, participation can provide federal officials with the information and resources needed to provide greater assurance that their used electronics are disposed of in an environmentally responsible manner, according to EPA documents. For the five agencies we reviewed, officials at agencies or facilities that actively participated in the FEC said that the FEC provided invaluable support. For example, according to DOD officials at one installation, the information sharing that is facilitated through the FEC is one of the biggest benefits of participation—when faced with a problem, the FEC can provide information from other agencies that have faced comparable problems. Similarly, Education officials told us that membership in Federal Electronics Stewardship Working Group was very helpful. In addition, DOE officials said that they have had much success with the FEC program and that the FEC awards program has motivated many DOE facilities to participate in electronics recycling.", "Since the R2 and e-Stewards certification processes were made available in 2009 and 2010, respectively, the number of certified recyclers in the United States has grown greatly. From September 2010 to September 2011, the number of electronics recycling facilities certified to the R2 standard increased from 15 to 122 and the number of facilities certified to the e-Stewards standard grew from 6 to 40. Figure 1 shows the locations of the electronics recycling facilities in the United States that have obtained third-party certification as of September 30, 2011.\nThe increased number of certified recyclers should make it easier for agencies to locate recyclers that will, among other things, ensure that any harmful materials are being safely handled throughout the recycling chain. For the five agencies we reviewed, almost no certified recyclers were used, and in most cases agency officials either misidentified a recycler’s certification status or indicated that they did not know the recycler’s certification status. According to our analysis of the disposition information these agencies provided, of the 25 electronics recycling companies that the five agencies reported using in fiscal year 2010, only one was certified by either R2 or e-Stewards for all locations where the agency used it as of September 30, 2010, and agencies were correct in identifying whether or not their recyclers were certified in only four cases.\nThe confusion regarding electronics recyclers’ certification status could stem in part from the absence of clear guidance. The implementing instructions for Executive Order 13423 direct agencies to use national standards, best management practices, or a national certification program for recyclers. To date, however, none of the oversight agencies—OMB, CEQ, and OFEE—have provided agencies with clear guidance specifying whether R2 or e-Stewards, the two existing certification programs, qualify as “national certification programs for recyclers” under the implementing instructions.\nIn an effort to address this issue, according to the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship, EPA and GSA are to take steps to address the need for well-defined requirements for those certification programs that federal agencies will rely upon. Specifically, EPA, in consultation with GSA and other relevant agencies, is to develop a baseline set of electronics recycling criteria to ensure, among other things, that all downstream handlers of used electronics manage these materials in a way that protects the environment, public health, and worker safety. EPA is also to initiate a study of the current electronics certification programs to evaluate the strength of their audits of downstream facilities. According to the national strategy, as part of its effort to establish a comprehensive and governmentwide policy on used federal electronic products, GSA will consider the baseline set of criteria, the results of the study of current certification programs, and other requirements and considerations in determining which certification programs satisfy the governmentwide requirement to use certified recyclers. Although the strategy calls for GSA to, with public input, issue a revised policy and propose changes to the FMR, it is unclear if GSA is on track to do this by February 2012, given that it has not issued a public draft, nor conducted a public comment or other public input process. Similarly it is unclear when, if, or how GSA’s revised policy component regarding certified recyclers will be incorporated into the FMR. Moreover, it is unclear what mechanism GSA will use to issue the revised policy prior to its inclusion in the FMR, as the policy may not be in conformance with the current FMR. In addition, the national strategy does not specify if or how EPA and GSA will routinely update other federal agencies on the status of their efforts to implement the national strategy’s recommendations.", "Currently, due to challenges associated with the tracking and reporting of used federal electronics, the ultimate disposition of these electronics is unknown—making it difficult to measure the effectiveness of Executive Orders 13423 and 13514, which were aimed at improving the management of used federal electronics and ensuring the proper disposal of electronics that have reached the end of their useful life. The National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship acknowledges the challenges associated with tracking and reporting the disposition of used federal electronics and proposes some solutions for improving the data that agencies report to GSA. Under the national strategy, GSA is to streamline and standardize reporting through the annual Report of Non-Federal Recipientselectronic products leaving federal ownership, and the recipients of these products. It is unclear, however, what electronics the new reporting requirements will cover. The national strategy suggests that the annual Report of Non-Federal Recipients will be expanded to include the reporting of the disposition of electronic products to all recipients. Currently, the report includes only property donated to such nonfederal recipients as schools and state and local governments, and therefore does not include the disposition of significant quantities of electronics. to gather data on the type, quantity, and intended use of If GSA intends to use this report to capture agencies’ data, it is unclear how the report will improve the quality of the limited data GSA currently receives. GSA officials told us that while the agency currently collects disposition data from agencies through its GSAXcess database, GSAXcess is not an accountable property system; therefore, data validation is limited.agencies have not submitted reports to GSA on exchange/sale transactions and property furnished to nonfederal recipients, as currently required, or have not included all of the required information—thus presenting data challenges as GSA seeks to carry out its oversight and management responsibilities.\nAccording to a GSA bulletin, a number of executive The data challenges are further complicated by the fact that individual agency procedures for tracking electronics are not consistent. Agencies typically record the acquisition of electronics as individual units, such as desktop or laptop computers, and continue to track these electronics as individual units while in use at the agency. However, when agencies dispose of these same electronics, they may use a different method for tracking them. For example, rather than tracking the disposition of used electronic products as individual units, agencies may aggregate a number of similar items into a single line item or they may report them by weight. In addition, a single agency may use different metrics for different types of disposition. For example, DLA, a DOD acquisition and disposition agency, tracks electronic products sent to recyclers in pounds and electronic products disposed of through other means—such as donated to schools or transferred to other agencies—by individual unit. Because some electronics are tracked and reported as line items and some are recorded in pounds, it is not possible to compare the extent to which the agency relies on one disposition method over another. For the five agencies we reviewed, data provided to us on the disposition of electronic products were similarly inconsistent, which hampered our efforts to accurately assess the extent to which electronic products procured by these federal agencies were disposed of in an environmentally sound manner.", "GSA’s personal property disposition procedures do not clarify agency responsibilities for tracking or placing contract conditions on the ultimate disposition of used electronics if they are sold through auctions. As we reported in August 2008, some electronics recyclers in the United States—including those that have purchased government electronics sold through auction—appeared willing to export regulated electronics illegally.\nWe identified two auction disposal methods—those used by GSA and by DOD—that could result in used federal electronics being handled in an environmentally risky manner. Specifically, under the GSA auction process, registered participants can bid electronically on items within specific time frames. To participate, potential buyers register with GSA by providing information about themselves, such as name, address, and payment information, before they can bid on items, according to GSA officials. However, GSA officials told us that they do not evaluate the information obtained from buyers to determine whether they are brokers or resellers who might potentially export these used products to other countries where they may not be handled in an environmentally sound or safe manner. Moreover, GSA officials stated that the agency does not have enforcement authority after these items are sold to the general public. They told us that if GSA is made aware of any inappropriate activity or violations of the terms of the sale, it will refer the information to the GSA Inspector General for further investigation. According to agency documentation, GSA’s online auction procedures include standard sales terms and conditions, special security notifications, and export control clauses. However, none of the terms, conditions, or clauses included in GSA’s auction procedures are are aimed at ensuring that (1) electronics containing certain materials exported only to countries that can legally accept them,document the legality of such exports, and (3) the material is being safely handled throughout the recycling chain.\nUnlike GSA, DOD is not directly involved in the auction process but instead sells its used electronics to a private company, which then resells the used electronics through its web-based auction process. According to DOD officials, DOD’s responsibility for tracking its used electronics ends once it passes to the contractor—Government Liquidation. DOD officials said that Government Liquidation has its own terms and conditions that bidders must adhere to once they purchase the used electronics. As with GSA auctions, the terms and conditions included in the Government Liquidation auctions are not aimed at ensuring that used federal electronics are exported only to countries that that can legally accept them. In our review of these auction websites, we found that the overwhelming majority of used electronic products are sold in bulk, which would indicate that they are being sold to brokers or resellers, not individual consumers.\nThe National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship seeks to address the problems associated with used federal electronics sold through auction. According to the strategy, the electronics stewardship policy that GSA is to establish will prohibit the sale of nonfunctional electronics through public auction except to third-party certified recyclers and refurbishers. Functional electronics are to be directed through the existing hierarchy of transfer, donation, and sale. It is unclear, however, how this policy will work in practice. Currently, agencies sell electronics in mixed lots of potentially functional and nonfunctional equipment. For example, officials at one agency said that it was not cost effective to test items to ensure that they are functional; therefore, items are sold through GSA “as is” with no implied warranty. These agency officials said that they combine items in sales lots that will bring the most return to the federal government. In addition, we found that electronics listed on the Government Liquidation and GSA auction websites are frequently marketed as “tested to power-up only,” or with disclaimers such as “condition of the property is not warranted.” Under the national strategy, it is unclear whether electronics characterized in this way would qualify as “functional.” In addition, the national strategy does not provide clear and detailed criteria to assist federal agencies in bundling functional and nonfunctional electronics for sale exclusively to certified recyclers or refurbishers, distinguishing between functional and nonfunctional electronics by conducting specific tests, and labeling electronic products. Moreover, if federal agencies sell used functional electronic products through auctions, neither the agency nor the auction entities are required to impose conditions or to perform due diligence by conducting auditing to determine whether all downstream reusers of such products follow environmentally sound end-of-life practices.\nIn contrast, the European Union has detailed guidance for determining the functionality of electrical and electronic equipment, as part of distinguishing whether the equipment is considered waste in the context of import-export rules. The guidance states that the tests required to determine functionality depend on the type of electronics, but generally, completion of a visual inspection without testing functionality is unlikely to be sufficient for most types of electronics; it also states that a functionality test of the key functions is sufficient. The guidance also identifies defects that materially affect functionality and would therefore cause an item to be considered “waste” if, for example, the equipment did not turn on, perform internal set-up routines, or conduct self-checks. As discussed previously, R2 practices establish a similar “reuse, recover, dispose” hierarchy along the chain of custody for material handling and require recyclers to test electronics diverted for reuse, and confirm that key functions of the unit are working before it may be exported.", "We found that key terms concerning electronics have not been defined and that differences between the executive orders have not been clarified. In particular:\nKey terms not defined. Key terms such as “electronic product” and “environmentally sound practices” are not explicitly defined in the executive orders, the guidance provided to agencies for implementing the executive orders, or the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship. Consequently, each of the agencies we reviewed used its own definition of electronic products to report progress in implementing policies for electronics stewardship. For example, DOE defines electronic products as printers, desktop computers, notebook computers, and monitors; DOD, Education, HUD, and NASA use broader definitions that include servers, routers, and switches; cell phones and musical instruments; and refrigerators. Moreover, without a clear definition of what constitutes an environmentally sound practice, agencies are free to dispose of their used electronics through online auctions or other means that provide little assurance that (1) these electronics are exported only to countries that can legally accept them, (2) recyclers document the legality of such exports, and (3) the material is being safely handled throughout the recycling chain.\nDifferences between the executive orders have not been clarified.\nCEQ has not issued implementing instructions regarding electronics stewardship for Executive Order 13514, which was signed in 2009, and CEQ, OMB, and OFEE have not harmonized the electronics stewardship requirements contained in executive orders 13423 and 13514. For example, under Executive Order 13423, the requirement to use environmentally sound practices applies to electronic equipment that has “reached the end of its useful life,” whereas Executive Order 13514 includes “all agency excess or surplus electronic products,” and the difference between these terms has not been clarified. In addition, the implementing instructions for Executive Order 13423 direct agencies to ensure that contracts for leased electronic equipment incorporate language that requires that at the end of the lease period, the equipment is reused, donated, sold, or recycled using environmentally sound management practices. This directive is not included in Executive Order 13514 nor in the guidance provided to agencies for preparing their strategic sustainability performance plan that is to be used under Executive Order 13514. Officials from these oversight agencies told us that they have informed federal agencies that electronics stewardship plans under Executive Order 13423 can be incorporated by reference into their strategic sustainability performance plans to satisfy certain requirements for Executive Order 13514. Or alternatively, strategic sustainability performance plans may be used in lieu of separate electronics stewardship plans. However, CEQ, OMB, and OFEE have not addressed differences or updated the implementing instructions for Executive Order 13423.", "Federal initiatives to improve the management of agencies’ used electronics—including the FEC, certification for recyclers, personal property disposal guidance, the executive orders, and the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship—have sought to assist federal agencies in the handling of used electronic products. And progress has been made. More agencies and facilities are participating in the FEC, and a growing number of recyclers have received third-party certification. However, opportunities exist to increase the breadth and depth of agencies’ participation in the FEC and to expand the use of certified electronics recyclers.\nFederal agencies also face challenges that may impede their progress toward improving their management of used federal electronics. Specifically, 2 years have elapsed since Executive Order 13514 required CEQ to issue implementing instructions. In the absence of such instructions, agencies do not have definitions for key terms such as “electronic products” and “environmentally sound practices,” and the guidance for implementing the executive orders provides inconsistent information on what procedures an agency should follow when implementing environmentally sound practices. In addition, inconsistencies between Executive Orders 13514 and 13423 have yet to be addressed; without doing so, CEQ lacks assurance that agencies are meeting electronics stewardship requirements of both orders, given that CEQ and OMB permit agencies to comply using either an electronics stewardship plan under Executive Order 13423 or a strategic sustainability performance plan under Executive Order 13514. Furthermore, without consistent tracking and reporting of the disposition of used federal electronics, there is no mechanism to measure the effectiveness of federal policies aimed at ensuring the proper disposal of electronics that have reached the end of their useful life.\nThe recently issued National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship seeks to advance federal agencies’ efforts to manage used electronics. However, it is unclear whether it will fully address challenges that impede environmentally sound management of used federal electronics. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the strategy will be effective without a mechanism for routinely keeping agencies and the public apprised of its progress toward establishing a governmentwide policy on used federal electronics—particularly with respect to use of third-party national certification for electronics recyclers—so that agencies have a clear understanding of their responsibilities and other interested parties are apprised of agencies’ progress toward completing actions identified in the strategy. Currently, the strategy does not state how agencies will be kept informed of implementation efforts. In addition, the strategy lays out an approach for ensuring that federal agencies dispose of nonfunctional electronics in a sound manner, but it does not provide clear and detailed criteria to assist federal agencies in bundling functional and nonfunctional equipment for sale exclusively to certified recyclers and refurbishers and distinguishing between functional and nonfunctional electronics by conducting specific tests and labeling electronic products. Finally, if federal agencies sell used functional electronic products through auctions, neither the agency nor the auction entities are required to perform due diligence by conducting auditing to determine whether all downstream reusers of such products follow environmentally sound end- of-life practices.", "To improve federal electronics stewardship, we are making the following four recommendations.\nTo support federal agencies’ efforts to improve electronics stewardship, we recommend that the Director of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, in collaboration with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration collaborate on developing and issuing implementing instructions for Executive Order 13514 that define key terms such as “electronic products” and “environmentally sound practices;” address inconsistencies between this executive order and Executive Order 13423; and as appropriate, provide clear direction on required agency actions under the national strategy; and require consistent information tracking and reporting on the disposition of used electronics among agencies.\nTo provide transparency on progress toward completing the actions identified in the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship, we recommend that the Director of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the Administrator of EPA, and the Administrator of GSA provide quarterly status updates on a publicly accessible website.\nTo ensure that electronic products procured by federal agencies are appropriately managed, we recommend that GSA include measures in its policy to ensure that all electronics sold through auction are appropriately managed once they reach the end of their useful lives. Such measures could include bundling functional and nonfunctional equipment for sale exclusively to certified recyclers, who would be responsible for determining the best use of the equipment under the “reuse, recover, dispose” hierarchy of management; or if agencies or GSA are to be responsible for screening electronics for auction and distinguishing between functional and nonfunctional equipment, providing clear and detailed criteria for doing so, such as specific testing and labeling; and ensuring that purchasers or recipients of functional electronic products sold through government auctions use certified recyclers or perform due diligence and conduct downstream auditing.", "We provided a draft of this report to OMB, CEQ, GSA, and EPA for review and comment. In addition, we provided DOD, DOE, Education, HUD, and NASA with excerpts of the draft report that pertained to each agency and incorporated technical comments received as appropriate. In written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II, EPA generally concurred with our recommendations. OMB, CEQ, and GSA did not provide written comments to include in our report. Instead, in e-mails received on February 1, January 19, and January 17, 2012, from the agencies’ respective liaisons, OMB, CEQ, and GSA generally concurred with our recommendations. Even with their general concurrences, in some instances, the agencies proposed alternative approaches for executing the recommendations. In the e-mail from its liaison, OMB concurred with the comments in the e-mail from CEQ’s liaison but did not provide additional comments of its own.\nIn response to our recommendation that CEQ, in collaboration with OMB and GSA, issue implementing instructions for Executive Order 13514 that define key terms; require consistent information tracking and reporting; and provide clear direction on required agency actions under the national strategy, CEQ stated that it would reserve its decision regarding our recommendation until after GSA issues its comprehensive governmentwide policy on electronic stewardship. Specifically, CEQ stated that GSA’s policy would address the issues we identified with regard to unclear definitions and inconsistent tracking and reporting of electronics but was silent on how it would provide clear direction on required agency actions under the national strategy. GAO believes it is imperative for CEQ to issue implementing instructions along with GSA’s issuance of its policy. Without such instructions, agencies will lack clarity on required agency actions under the national strategy and whether adhering to the GSA policy is necessary and/or sufficient for implementing the executive order. Moreover, it remains unclear what mechanism GSA will use to issue its revised policy prior to its inclusion in the FMR, to the extent the current FMR does not conform with the new policy. Concerning this issue, GSA stated that it will publish guidance documents concurrent with proposing changes to the FMR. However, as GSA intends to issue guidance documents, which are not legally binding on agencies, as well as regulations, which are, it will be important for CEQ to issue implementing instructions that indicate which actions in the guidance documents, as well as any other actions beyond those in the FMR, are necessary to comply with the executive order.\nIn addition, as we recommended, CEQ, EPA, and GSA agreed that they would update a publicly accessible website on the status of progress toward completing the actions identified in the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship. CEQ stated that progress reporting would be accomplished by GSA and GSA agreed to provide status updates at least quarterly. However, in its written comments, EPA requested that, instead of quarterly status updates, we revise our recommendation to require status updates as significant progress is made or key milestones are met.\nEPA stated that due to the nature of some of the work the agencies have committed to as part of the national strategy, it may not be appropriate to report to the general public on a routine basis. We did not revise the recommendation and are not recommending such disclosure. Instead, we are recommending that the agencies provide a quarterly status update that characterizes the progress made toward achieving each action item or project. For example, one action item in the national strategy directed the Federal Electronics Stewardship Working Group to recommend to CEQ by November 18, 2011, metrics and other reporting tools to measure agencies’ progress in implementing the revised Federal Electronics Stewardship Policy. It would be helpful to have updated information on whether the working group has made its recommendation to CEQ and when CEQ will announce the new metrics and reporting tools. Currently, such information is not publicly available. In fact, as of February 8, 2012, more than 6 months after the policy and benchmarks were issued, no updates have been provided on publicly accessible websites.\nWith regard to our recommendation that GSA include measures in its electronic stewardship policy to ensure that all electronics sold through auction are appropriately managed once they reach the end of their useful lives, in the e-mail received from its liaison, GSA noted that the agency is working toward this goal. Specifically, GSA stated that it is working toward including measures to (1) bundle all equipment for sale to certified recyclers, who then determine proper reuse or recycling, or (2) provide agencies with clear, detailed criteria to distinguish between functional and nonfunctional electronics and ensure that purchasers or recipients of federal electronics use certified recyclers or perform downstream auditing, while also noting that GSA has limited authority to require recipients of used federal electronics to recycle them once ownership has transferred to those recipients.\nAs agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution for 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense, Education, Energy, and Housing and Urban Development; the Administrators of EPA, GSA, and NASA; the Director of OMB; the Chair of the White House CEQ; the Federal Environmental Executive; appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of the report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "The objectives for this report were to examine (1) key initiatives aimed at improving the management of used federal electronics and (2) improvements resulting from these initiatives and challenges that impede progress toward improving the management of used federal electronics, if any.\nTo identify initiatives aimed at improving the management of used federal electronics, we reviewed guidance and other documents describing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiatives related to the Federal Electronics Challenge (FEC), the Federal Electronics Stewardship Working Group, and Responsible Recycling (R2) practices. We analyzed the requirements for electronic products contained in the applicable executive orders and implementing instructions that make up the federal policy framework; the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which governs the process through which the federal government acquires goods and services; the Federal Management Regulation (FMR), which, among other things, regulates the disposal of federal personal property, including electronics; and the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Personal Property Disposal Guide, which serves as an index and quick-reference guide as it relates to personal property management provisions in the FMR; and other relevant electronics stewardship guidance. We also reviewed the July 2011 National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship.\nTo identify improvements resulting from federal initiatives to improve management of used federal electronics and challenges that impede progress, we selected a nonprobability sample of five federal agencies— the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Education (Education), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD); and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—to examine how the federal policy framework is carried out in those agencies. We selected DOD, DOE, and NASA because they each participated to some extent in the FEC program and purchased large amounts of electronic products— ranking first, eighth, and tenth, respectively, in terms of overall federal agency information technology spending in fiscal year 2010. We selected Education because, according to the FEC program manager, the agency actively participates in the FEC and centrally manages its electronics procurement and disposal functions. We selected HUD because the agency was not participating in the FEC. We used FEC participation as a selection criterion because we hoped to include agencies with a range of experience with managing used electronics in an environmentally safe way. Because the selection of agencies was based on a nonprobability sample, the information we obtained is not generalizable to all federal agencies. However, because the nonprobability sample consists of a cross-section of agencies of different sizes and levels of participation in the FEC, the evaluation of these agencies provides relevant examples of different procurement and disposition methods for electronics. For these five agencies we also collected and reviewed fiscal year 2010 strategic sustainability performance plans. We also conducted semistructured interviews with officials from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive (OFEE), and EPA to discuss their respective roles in assessing agency performance and managing the FEC and other federal initiatives for electronics stewardship. In some cases, we followed up the interviews with additional questions, and on two occasions, CEQ provided us with written responses to some of our questions on the roles of OMB, CEQ, and OFEE and other issues on federal electronics stewardship, such as how OMB and CEQ decide on whether an agency’s program is equivalent to the FEC. In addition, at GSA, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials on the agency’s policies and procedures for the transfer, donation, sale, and recycling of electronic products.\nTo determine the extent to which agencies used various disposition methods (i.e., reuse, donation, and sale) we analyzed governmentwide GSA data from GSAXCess, Exchange Sale, and Non-Federal Recipients reports for fiscal year 2010. We designed and implemented a data collection instrument to collect agency-specific disposition data for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 from the five agencies selected for our nonprobability sample. We encountered a number of limitations in obtaining reliable data. For example, GSA officials acknowledged that GSA does not verify the data that it collects from other agencies. The five selected agencies that we collected data from also did not have consistent definitions of electronics and sometimes reported inconsistent information or used inconsistent methods of tracking the disposition of used electronics. For example, DOD tracks some items by weight and other items by line item. We attempted to resolve inconsistencies in the data provided through this effort through follow-up efforts with the five agencies in which we discussed how they attempted to collect the data we requested and related challenges and limitations. Based on these conversations, we determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting on amounts of electronics disposed of by the five agencies and we did not use information collected in the data collection instrument on the extent to which agencies used various disposition methods.\nWe also visited the Kennedy Space Center, in Cape Canaveral, Florida, and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Aviation in Richmond, Virginia, to discuss the procurement and disposition of electronic products. We selected Kennedy Space Center because it is designated as NASA’s Principal Center for Recycling and Sustainable Acquisition. We selected DLA Aviation in Richmond, Virginia, because of its role in disposing of excess property received from the military services through DLA Disposition. We also visited a UNICOR recycling facility located in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, as well as two private electronics recycling facilities located in Tampa, Florida. We selected these facilities because of their role in electronics recycling at federal agencies. At these facilities, we interviewed officials about the procedures involved in recycling used federal electronic products and observed the electronics recycling process to learn how electronics are safely disassembled and, in some cases, processed for reuse.\nTo assess the extent to which the July 2011 National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship addresses any challenges that may impede participation in electronics stewardship initiatives, we examined key provisions of the strategy, such as dividing functional and nonfunctional electronics, and compared these provisions with existing policies for electronics stewardship. In response to our request for information on electronics stewardship, FEC program’s manager, officials within each of the five agencies, and seven champions for the FEC program provided information on the challenges that may affect agency participation in electronics stewardship initiatives. In addition, we interviewed officials with the R2 and e-Stewards recycler certification programs,Electronics TakeBack Coalition, and an electronics recycler to determine the extent to which recyclers in the United States have obtained certification and to discuss their views about the capacity of certified electronics recyclers located in the United States.\nWe conducted this performance audit from October 2010 to January 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Diane LoFaro, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Beardsley; Pamela Davidson; Stephanie Gaines; Deborah Ortega; Ilga Semeiks; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Vasiliki Theodoropoulos contributed to this report.", "Green Information Technology: Agencies Have Taken Steps to Implement Requirements, but Additional Guidance on Measuring Performance Needed. GAO-11-638. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.\nData Center Consolidation: Agencies Need to Complete Inventories and Plans to Achieve Expected Savings. GAO-11-565. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2011.\nElectronic Waste: Considerations for Promoting Environmentally Sound Reuse and Recycling. GAO-10-626. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2010.\nFederal Electronics Management: Federal Agencies Could Improve Participation in EPA’s Initiatives for Environmentally Preferable Electronic Products. GAO-10-196T. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2009.\nElectronic Waste: EPA Needs to Better Control Harmful U.S. Exports through Stronger Enforcement and More Comprehensive Regulation. GAO-08-1044. Washington, D.C.: August 28, 2008.\nElectronic Waste: Strengthening the Role of the Federal Government in Encouraging Recycling and Reuse. GAO-06-47. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2005.\nElectronic Waste: Observations on the Role of the Federal Government in Encouraging Recycling and Reuse. GAO-05-937T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2005." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full h2_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h2_title h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "h0_full h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h2_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the executive branch's stance regarding used electronics?", "What efforts have been made by the EPA to help recycle used federal electronics?", "What efforts have been made by the GSA to help recycle used federal electronics?", "How did the executive branch use executive orders to help recycle used federal electronics?", "How is responsibility for implementing these execute orders distributed?", "How did the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship help distribute responsibility?", "How have federal agencies attempted to improve their management of used electronics?", "What challenges did GAO face while assessing agencies' disposal of used electronics?", "To what extent did GAO face challenges while assessing agencies' monitoring of auctioned electronics?", "What issues might this failure to monitor auctioned electronics cause?", "What other challenges could impede agencies' progress towards improving the management of used electronics?", "How does the EPA's estimate demonstrate the government's failure to recycle used electronics?", "How can federal agencies process used electronics?", "Why is the government's failure to recycle used electronics significant?", "What was GAO asked to examine?", "How did GAO collect data for this analysis?" ], "summary": [ "Over the past decade, the executive branch has taken steps to improve the management of used federal electronics.", "Notably, in 2003, EPA helped to pilot the Federal Electronics Challenge (FEC)—a voluntary partnership program that encourages federal facilities and agencies to purchase environmentally friendly electronic products, reduce the impacts of these products during their use, and manage used electronics in an environmentally safe way. EPA also led an effort and provided initial funding to develop third-party certification so that electronics recyclers could show that they are voluntarily adhering to an adopted set of best practices for environmental protection, worker health and safety, and security practices.", "In 2006, GSA issued its Personal Property Disposal Guide to assist agencies in understanding the hierarchy for disposing of excess personal property, including used electronic products: reutilization, donation, sale, and abandonment or destruction.", "In 2007 and 2009, executive orders were issued that, among other things, established improvement goals and directed agencies to develop and implement improvement plans for the management of used electronics.", "The Office of Management and Budget, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive each play important roles in providing leadership, oversight, and guidance to assist federal agencies with implementing the requirements of these executive orders.", "To lay the groundwork for enhancing the federal government’s management of used electronic products, an interagency task force issued the July 2011 National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship. The strategy, which describes goals, action items, and projects, assigns primary responsibility for overseeing or carrying out most of the projects to either EPA or GSA.", "Federal agencies have made some progress to improve their management of used electronic products, as measured by greater participation in the FEC and an increase in certified electronics recyclers, but opportunities exist to expand their efforts. For instance, agency participation in the FEC represents only about one-third of the federal workforce.", "GAO identified challenges with the tracking and reporting on the disposition of federal electronic equipment. For the five agencies GAO reviewed (Departments of Defense, Energy, Education, and Housing and Urban Development and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration), data provided on the disposition of electronic products were inconsistent, which hampered GAO’s efforts to accurately assess the extent to which electronic products procured by federal agencies are disposed of in an environmentally sound manner.", "Challenges associated with clarifying agencies’ responsibility for used electronics sold through auctions also remain. Currently, neither the agency nor the auction entities are required to determine whether purchasers follow environmentally sound end-of-life practices.", "Not having controls over the ultimate disposition of electronics sold through these auctions creates opportunities for buyers to purchase federal electronics and export them to countries with less stringent environmental and health standards.", "Other challenges that may impede progress toward improving federal agencies’ management of used electronics include defining key terms such as “electronic product” and “environmentally sound practices,” as each agency uses its own definition of electronic products to report progress in implementing policies for electronics stewardship.", "The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that across the federal government 10,000 computers are discarded each week.", "Once these used electronics reach the end of their original useful lives, federal agencies have several options for disposing of them. Agencies generally can donate their reusable electronics to schools; give them to a recycler; exchange them with other federal, state, or local agencies; or sell them through selected public auctions, including auctions sponsored by the General Services Administration (GSA).", "As the world’s largest purchaser of information technology, the U.S. government, through its disposition practices, has substantial leverage to influence domestic recycling and disposal practices.", "GAO was asked to examine (1) key initiatives aimed at improving the management of used federal electronics and (2) improvements resulting from these initiatives and challenges that impede progress, if any.", "To do this, GAO evaluated federal guidance and policy, as well as guidance and initiatives at five selected agencies. GAO selected agencies based on, among other things, the amount of electronics purchased." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, 3, 4, -1, 0, 0, 2, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, 3 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
CRS_R42923	{ "title": [ "", "Synthesis of Key Issues", "Basic Facts and Statistics", "Electric Power Generation in the United States", "Major Electric Power Issues", "Future Technologies for Electricity Production Face Uncertainty", "Recent Events", "Selected Congressional Action from 112th Congress", "Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (S. 2146, Bingaman)", "American Renewable Energy and Efficiency Act (H.R. 5967, Markey)", "CRS Reports", "Additional References", "Adequacy and Reliability of the Grid", "Recent Events", "Selected Congressional Action from 112th Congress", "Cyber Security and American Cyber Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 21, Reid)", "Secure High-Voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act (H.R. 668, Franks)", "CRS Reports", "Additional References", "Environmental Issues", "Recent Events", "Selected Congressional Action from 112th Congress", "Ensuring Affordable Energy Act (H.R. 153, Poe)", "Stop the War on Coal Act of 2012 (H.R. 3409, Johnson)", "CRS Reports", "Additional References" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The electric power industry is in the process of transformation. The electricity infrastructure of the United States is aging, and uncertainty exists around how to modernize the grid, and what technologies and fuels will be used to produce electricity in the future. Unresolved questions of transmission and reliability of the grid are arising from potential cybersecurity threats and continuing interest in harnessing renewable energy and other low carbon sources of electricity. Concerns about reliability and electricity prices are being complicated by new environmental regulations and the rising availability of natural gas for the production of electric power from unconventional resources such as gas shales. Congress will likely be faced with policy issues regarding how the modernization of this vital industry will unfold.", "", "The electrical grid of the United States consists of all the power plants generating electricity, together with the transmission and distribution lines and their associated transformers and substations which bring power to end-use customers. Electric power generation in the United States is currently dominated by the use of combustible fuels, such as the fossil fuels coal and natural gas, or from biomass. These fuels are burned either to produce steam in boilers which is used to turn turbine-generators or burned directly in combustion turbines which turn generators to produce electricity. Nuclear power uses heat from the fission of radioactive elements to produce steam. However, electricity can also be generated directly by wind turbines, solar power, geothermal energy, and hydropower. Generally, electricity must be used as soon as it is produced, because large amounts of electricity cannot be easily stored.\nOriginally, the individual utility company systems were not linked, but with greater electricity demand came the necessity of sharing generation resources. This sharing of generation resources required an interconnection of separate company systems to enable power sales and transfers. These aggregated power systems form three major \"interconnections\"—the Eastern and Western interconnections, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, which includes most of that state. Within these interconnections are reliability regions, and a number of balancing authorities which \"integrate resource plans ahead of time, maintain load-interchange generation balance\" within a balancing authority area, and \"support interconnection frequency in real-time.\" The grid also connects the many publicly and privately owned electric utility and power companies in different states and regions of the United States (and in Canada and Mexico).\nCongress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-617 ), creating a class of non-utility power producers (i.e., qualifying small power and cogeneration facilities) which resulted in the introduction of competition into wholesale power markets (e.g., for the sale of electricity to entities other than the end-user of power). The passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-486 ) served to further promote greater competition in the bulk power markets. As a result, in many parts of the United States, the electric power industry began to transition from highly regulated, local monopoly companies which generated, transmitted, and distributed electricity to end-use customers, to a business in which power generation is competitive while the industry's transmission and distribution functions are still highly regulated.\nIn these regions with restructured electricity industries, competitive markets largely set the price of power. The rates consumers ultimately pay for electricity are based on auctions in regional transmission organization (RTO) or independent system operator (ISO) systems wherein generators competitively bid to provide energy for a particular time period. Rates for wholesale transactions of RTOs and ISOs are under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) regulatory jurisdiction. Wholesale power rate components depend upon the market structure of the RTO or ISO, and generally have cost components for energy, capacity, transmission, ancillary services, operating reserves, and general system costs and regulatory fees. Non-RTO transmission costs and distribution costs are generally added to arrive at the rate end-use customers pay. While FERC is largely responsible for regulation of the electric power transmission system and wholesale power markets, regulation of the distribution function of the electric power business is still largely carried out by state government agencies.\nThe choice of power generation technology in the United States is heavily influenced by the cost of fuel. Historically, the use of fossil fuels has provided some of the lowest prices for generating electricity. Figure 1 shows that, as of 2011, coal accounts for approximately 42% of net generation by the electric power sector, followed by natural gas at 25%, and nuclear power at almost 20%.", "", "Electricity generation is vital to the commerce and daily functioning of the United States. However, the average age of power plants is now over 30 years, and the life expectancy of most power plants is about 40 years. While most of these plants are well-maintained, they are generally not as efficient as newer power plants. As power plants age, they are generally upgraded to continue operations, but the least efficient plants may be retired. Other plants may be shifted from base load operations (in which they essentially operate around the clock) to less demanding intermediate or peaking schedules. The cost of building a power plant is generally recovered over the depreciable life of the asset, such that operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses become the major component of an older power plant's continuing costs. A major component of O&M is the cost of fuel. However, the costs of modernizing older plants to meet new regulatory requirements can be relatively high. When the cost of upgrades to meet new environmental requirements is considered along with (perhaps increasing) O&M expenses, many older power plants become subject to retirement decisions.\nElectric power generation is responsible for 37% of U.S. domestic carbon dioxide emissions (the primary anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG)), and over one-third of all U.S. GHG emissions. Growing concerns over GHG emissions, other environmental costs associated with burning fossil fuels, and existing or anticipated state and federal policies addressing these issues are leading some utilities and energy providers to deploy more renewable energy technologies to meet power demands. As of 2011, hydropower represented 8% of all U.S. electric power industry net generation, with all other renewable energy accounting for a further combined total of 4%.\nRenewable energy has been used since before the Industrial Revolution, but not on the scale of steam power generation. Renewable energy technologies use the power of the sun, wind, water, and heat from the earth, offering the possibility of producing electricity on a large scale without most of the environmental and climate consequences of electric power generation using fossil fuels. Renewable energy sources have the potential to provide inexpensive, almost limitless electricity with minimal adverse environmental impacts. However, some of the technologies used today to generate electricity from renewable energy sources are variable in nature, and produce higher cost power than conventional fossil or nuclear sources of electricity (if environmental externalities are not considered). Practical energy storage technologies can potentially be a game-changer for greater renewable energy deployment. State governments have generally led the way in encouraging deployment of renewable energy technologies, using a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to create a market for renewable energy via mandated requirements. While most RPS goals are expected to be met, about 12 states have existing provisions expiring by 2015, and approximately 14 states and the District of Columbia have existing RPS or related provisions scheduled to expire by 2020.", "Electricity today is widely viewed as a commodity. As a commodity, electricity is primarily bought and sold as both power and energy, with various attributes being traded in electricity markets. Competitive electricity markets have enabled a variety of wholesale electricity products and services to facilitate the sale and transmission of power. These involve both physical transactions (i.e., electricity is generated and sent to or taken off the grid), and financial transactions (i.e., the purchase and sale of electricity). Services have also arisen to provide transaction flexibility, and to manage (or hedge) the risks of various transactions. Some purchasers of electricity as a commodity do so solely for financial reasons. With the California (or Western) energy crisis of 2000 to 2001, the susceptibility of electricity markets to manipulation became evident. Enron and its affiliates were principally found liable for \"engaging in various gaming and market manipulation schemes,\" with an initial decision ordering the disgorgement of $1.6 billion in unjust profits. FERC continues to investigate allegations of energy market manipulation, with nine actions in FY2012 resulting in civil penalties of $148 million assessed, and disgorgement of unjust profits of another $121 million.\nIncreases in the domestic production of natural gas (primarily due to hydraulic fracturing of gas shales) are causing a dramatic change in electric power production decisions. With increasing production of natural gas has come a decline in natural gas prices, and a decline in coal consumption for power generation. In April 2012, for the first time in history, the amount of electricity generation from natural gas equaled that of coal, according to EIA statistics, with each representing about 32% of the market. Many in the energy industry believe that a structural change in the economics of natural gas use has begun.\nWhile coal is projected to retain the largest share of the electricity generation mix through 2035, analyses included in the Annual Energy Outlook 2012 ... anticipate its share declining as more generation comes from natural gas and renewable technologies. Coal's role as the preeminent source of electricity generation in the United States has lessened in recent years, declining from 49% of total electricity generation in 2007 to 42% in 2011.… Projected fuel prices and economic growth are key factors influencing the future electricity generation mix. The price of natural gas, coal's chief competitor, has dropped significantly in recent years due to the increase in domestic production of natural gas.\nThe electric utility industry values diversity in fuel choice options since reliance on one fuel or technology can leave electricity producers vulnerable to price and supply volatility. However, an \"inverse relationship\" is developing for coal vs. natural gas as a power generation choice based on market economics alone, and policies which allow one fuel source to dominate could increase industry vulnerability to volatility. Nevertheless, according to the EIA, coal is expected to be a key part of electricity generation in the United States well past the year 2030. Increased availability of natural gas also raises the prospect of a greater use of distributed generation for power generation.", "", "Would have amended the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to require, beginning in calendar 2015, each electric utility that sold electric energy to electric consumers in a state (other than Alaska or Hawaii) to obtain a percentage of such electric energy from clean energy. This minimum requirement would have risen from 24% in 2015, to a minimum of 84% in 2035 and the years thereafter. The bill directed the Secretary of Energy to (1) establish a federal clean energy credit trading program under which electric utilities may submit clean energy credits to certify their compliance, and (2) issue to each generator of electric energy a quantity of clean energy credits determined in accordance with the bill. Any electric utility that failed to meet the requirements of the bill would have been subject to a civil penalty. The bill would have required the Secretary to establish a state energy efficiency funding program. Introduced March 1, 2012; hearings held by Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.", "Would have amended the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to require the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to promulgate regulations to implement and enforce a federal combined efficiency and renewable electricity standard. Would have required each retail electric supplier to submit to FERC, annually, an amount of federal renewable electricity credits and demonstrated total annual electricity savings for the previous year that, in the aggregate, was equal to the supplier's annual combined target for that year as established by the bill (compliance obligation). The bill would have required FERC, upon a request from a state's governor, to increase, to no more than half, the proportion of the annual combined targets for suppliers located within such state that could be met through submission of electricity savings (as opposed to renewable electricity credits). Would have required a supplier's target to be equal to the product of the supplier's base amount (electricity sold) for the year and a specified annual percentage for that year, which increases from 8% for 2014 to 50% for 2035 through 2040. The bill would have prescribed penalties for noncompliance with, or violations of, this bill. The bill would terminate on December 31, 2041. The bill would have authorized states to set the rates for a sale of electricity by a facility generating electricity from renewable energy sources pursuant to a state-approved production incentive program. Introduced June 19, 2012; Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.", "CRS Report R42756, Energy Policy: 113th Congress Issues , by [author name scrubbed]\nCRS Report R42814, Natural Gas in the U.S. Economy: Opportunities for Growth , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]\nCRS Report R41954, U.S. Renewable Electricity Generation: Resources and Challenges , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]", "Renewable Electricity Futures Study , National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2012, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52409-1.pdf .\nNatural Gas and the Transformation of the U.S. Energy Sector: Electricity , The Joint Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis, November 2012, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/55538.pdf .", "As with electric power plants, electric transmission and distribution system components are also aging, with power transformers averaging over 40 years of age, and 70% of transmission lines being 25 years or older. As components of the system are retired, they are replaced with newer components often linked to communications or automated systems (i.e., the Smart Grid). With changes in federal law encouraging electricity competition and markets, regulatory changes, and the aging of the electric power infrastructure as drivers, the grid is changing from a largely patchwork system built to serve the needs of individual electric utility companies to essentially a national interconnected system capable of accommodating massive transfers of electrical energy between regions of the United States.\nDamage from storms to transmission and distribution systems appears to be increasing. But undergrounding transmission and distribution systems is not always a solution. Underground lines can be more expensive, and take longer to repair. Replacing overhead lines with underground cable is also expensive.\nUpgrading the nation's transmission to accommodate current and future uses and ensuring the functioning and the security of the grid have been paramount concerns for the federal government. The federal government has already tasked the FERC with responsibility for enforcing reliability standards for the bulk electric system, but cybersecurity and physical security of the grid remain key issues. The information technology systems and capabilities of the Smart Grid add to the ability to control power flows and enhance the efficiency of grid operations. But these attributes also potentially increase the susceptibility of the grid to cyber (i.e., computer-related) attack since these two-way information and control capabilities are built around microprocessor devices whose basic functions are controlled by software programming. Safeguarding large transformers and key substations from a potential physical attack by terrorists is a concern. Protection from a major geomagnetic disturbance event caused by solar storms is also a key issue, as prolonged, widespread electricity outages could result.", "High winds, especially when combined with precipitation from seasonal storms, can cause damage to electricity utility systems, resulting in service interruptions to large numbers of electricity customers. Data from various studies lead to cost estimates from storm-related outages to the U.S. economy at between $20 billion and $55 billion annually. Data also suggest the trend of outages from weather-related events is increasing. The recent damage sustained to the electrical grid by Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey, and difficulty in restoring electricity service underscore the age and fragility of the power system, and how electricity service might benefit from hardening and modernization of various power systems.", "", "The bill called for the enactment of bipartisan legislation to secure the United States against cyber attack, enhance American competitiveness, create jobs in the information technology industry, and protect the identities and sensitive information of American citizens and businesses by (1) enhancing the security and resiliency of U.S. government communications and information networks against cyber attack; (2) incentivizing the private sector to quantify, assess, and mitigate cyber risks to networks; (3) promoting investments in the American information technology sector; (4) improving the capability of the government and the private sector to assess cyber risks and prevent, detect, and respond to cyber attacks; (5) preventing and mitigating identity theft; (6) enhancing U.S. diplomatic capacity and international cooperation to respond to emerging cyber threats; (7) protecting and increasing the resiliency of U.S critical infrastructure and assets against cyber attacks. Introduced January 25, 2011; referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.", "Amends the Federal Power Act to authorize FERC, with or without notice, hearing, or report, to order emergency measures to protect the reliability of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure whenever the President issues a written directive or determination identifying an imminent grid security threat. Directs FERC to consult with governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico regarding implementation of emergency measures. Prescribes (1) implementation procedures; and (2) related cost recovery measures affecting owners, operators, or users of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure. Directs FERC to require any owner, user, or operator of the domestic bulk-power system to implement measures to protect the system against specified vulnerabilities. Introduced February 11, 2011; referred to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power.", "CRS Report R42696, Weather-Related Power Outages and Electric System Resiliency , by [author name scrubbed]\nCRS Report R41193, Electricity Transmission Cost Allocation , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]\nCRS Report R40657, The Federal Government's Role in Electric Transmission Facility Siting , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]\nCRS Report R41886, The Smart Grid and Cybersecurity—Regulatory Policy and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]", "Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Electricity Infrastructure , American Society of Civil Engineers, http://www.asce.org/Infrastructure/Failure-to-Act/Electricity/ .\nIntroduction to NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security , The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel, September 2010, http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf .\nThe Future of the Electric Grid , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December 5, 2011, http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/Electric_Grid_Full_Report.pdf .", "Coal has long been the major fossil fuel used to produce electricity. However, burning coal results in environmental consequences, such as nitrogen oxides and sulfur emissions. Today, the burning of coal and other fossil fuels is also largely believed to be contributing to global climate change and its potentially damaging effects. Over the last 40 years, Congress has directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reduce the potential health and environmental impacts of fossil fuel use by limiting emissions or other consequences of combustion processes. These environmental regulatory requirements have been evolving in the last decade due to various challenges to EPA's implementation of federal laws.", "New regulations under development at EPA would impose new requirements on coal-fired power plants. Some of these rules would be implemented at the federal level, while others would be implemented at the state level. They include the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (which replaced the Clean Air Interstate Rule); the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) (also known as the Utility MACT) rule to reduce emissions of mercury, other metallic toxics, acid gases, and organic air toxics; the proposals to regulate coal combustion residues; and the Clean Water Act section 316(b) cooling water intake rule. However, only the Utility MACT rule is currently in effect. EPA also issued standards for greenhouse gas emissions which would require all new power plants to restrict carbon dioxide emissions. EPA has yet to propose rules for GHG emissions from existing power plants, as is required by court order. Much attention has focused recently on the resulting finalization of these regulations, and their potential to contribute to the retirement of mostly small, older coal-burning power plants without modern environmental controls. Due to a general perception in the electric power industry that these new and pending environmental regulations present conflating requirements with unrealistic timeframes for compliance, the regulations have come to be referred to by the industry as the \"train wreck\" scenario due to a perception that a negative impact on reliability could result. Although environmental groups, and some in the electric power industry—mainly those with significant investments in nuclear or natural gas-fired generation—consider the concerns overstated.", "", "Prohibits any funds appropriated or otherwise available for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from being used to implement or enforce (1) a cap-and-trade program; or (2) any statutory or regulatory requirement pertaining to emissions of one or more greenhouse gases from stationary sources that is issued or becomes applicable or effective after January 1, 2011. Defines (1) \"cap-and-trade program\" as any regulatory program established after the date of enactment of the bill that provides for the sale, auction, or other distribution of a limited amount of allowances that permit the emission of one or more greenhouse gases; and (2) \"greenhouse gas\" to include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, or any other designated anthropogenic gas. Introduced February 1, 2011; referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.", "Prohibits the Secretary of the Interior, before December 31, 2013, from issuing or approving any proposed or final regulation under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 that would (1) adversely impact employment in coal mines in the United States; (2) cause a reduction in revenue received by the federal government or any state, tribal, or local government, by reducing through regulation the quantity of coal in the United States that is available for mining; (3) reduce the quantity of coal available for domestic consumption or for export; (4) designate any area as unsuitable for surface coal mining and reclamation operations; or (5) expose the United States to liability for taking the value of privately owned coal through regulation.\nAmong many other actions, the bill amends the Clean Air Act to prohibit the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from promulgating any regulation concerning, taking action relating to, or taking into consideration, the emission of a greenhouse gas (GHG) to address climate change. Excludes GHGs from the definition of \"air pollutant\" for purposes of addressing climate change. Repeals and nullifies a number of federal rules and EPA regulatory actions. Introduced November 14, 2011; referred to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.", "CRS Report R41341, EPA's Proposal to Regulate Coal Combustion Waste Disposal: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]\nCRS Report R41561, EPA Regulations: Too Much, Too Little, or On Track? , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]", "EPA Regulations and Electricity—Better Monitoring by Agencies Could Strengthen Efforts to Address Potential Challenges, United States Government Accountability Office, July 2012, http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592542.pdf .\n2012 State of Reliability, North American Electric Reliability Corporation, May 2012, http://www.nerc.com/files/2012_SOR.pdf .\nPreparing for EPA Regulations: Working to Ensure Reliable and Affordable Environmental Compliance , The Regulatory Assistance Project, July 2012, http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/919 ." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How is coal significant to US energy production?", "How did April 2012 demonstrate a major shift in energy production?", "Why was this shift significant?", "What was responsible for this shift?", "How might this shift affect the US energy production industry?", "What is the federal government's stance regarding electrical power?", "What recent event elevated concern for this issue?", "What other concerns have elevated this issue?" ], "summary": [ "For most of the 20th century, coal has been the dominant fuel used to produce electricity. In 2011, coal was the fuel used for almost 42% of power generation in the United States.", "However, coal use for power generation seems to be on the decline. In April 2012, for the first time in history, the amount of electricity generated from natural gas equaled that of coal (according to Energy Information Administration statistics) with each fuel claiming about 32% of the market.", "The future of coal as a fuel for power generation seems to be in question.", "Two major reasons are generally seen as being responsible: the expectation of a dramatic rise in natural gas supplies, and the impact of environmental regulations on an aging base of coal-fired power plants.", "The electric utility industry values diversity in fuel choice options since reliance on one fuel or technology can leave electricity producers vulnerable to price and supply volatility. However, an \"inverse relationship\" is developing for coal vs. natural gas as a power generation choice based on market economics alone, and policies which allow one fuel source to dominate may come at the detriment of the other.", "Upgrading the nation's transmission system to accommodate current and future uses, and ensuring the reliable functioning and the security of the grid, has been a major concern for the federal government. Federal law has already tasked the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission with responsibility for enforcing reliability standards for the bulk electric system, including cybersecurity, but protection from natural hazards continues as a key issue.", "The recent damage sustained to the electrical grid by Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey and difficulty in restoring electricity service underscore the age and fragility of the power system, and how electricity service might benefit from hardening and modernization of various power systems.", "Growing concerns over greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, other environmental costs associated with burning fossil fuels, and existing or anticipated state and federal policies addressing these issues are leading some utilities and energy providers to deploy more renewable energy technologies to meet power demands, and potentially increasing the need for new transmission lines to incorporate clean energy sources." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, 1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2 ] }
GAO_GAO-13-229	{ "title": [ "Background", "CMS’s Process for Estimating Medicaid Improper Payments under PERM", "Estimate of National Medicaid Improper Payments Did Not Consider Revised Individual State Error Rates", "Design of CMS’s PERM Methodology Meets Established OMB Requirements", "Procedures Used in National Error Rate Calculation Did Not Consider Updates to State- Level Rates", "Deficiencies in CMS’s Guidance and Monitoring Impair Efficient and Effective Medicaid Program Improper Payments Reductions", "Corrective Action Plans Developed and Responsive to Identified PERM Payment Errors", "Nonpayment Errors Not Addressed in All State CAPs", "Requirements for State CAPs Do Not Provide for Considering Costs versus Benefits of Corrective Actions", "State CAPs Do Not Contain All Required Elements", "CMS’s Monitoring of State CAPs Is Limited", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Fee-for-Service, Managed Care, and Eligibility Components of the Medicaid Error Rate Measurement", "FFS and Managed Care Components", "Eligibility Component", "Appendix III: State Error Rates for the Department of Health and Human Services’ Fiscal Year 2011 Reporting of Medicaid Improper Payments", "Appendix IV: Medicaid Outlays and Estimated Improper Payment Error Rates Reported by the Department of Health and Human Services", "Appendix V: Additional Details for Medicaid Error Rates", "Appendix VI: Types of Errors Identified in Payment Error Rate Measurement Reviews", "Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services", "GAO Comments", "Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The purpose of the CMS PERM program is to produce a national-level improper payment error rate for Medicaid. CMS developed PERM in order to comply with the requirements of IPIA, which was amended by IPERA. PERM uses a 17-state, 3-year rotation for measuring Medicaid improper payments. Medicaid improper payments are estimated on a federal fiscal year basis through the PERM process. The estimate measures three component error rates: (1) fee-for-service (FFS), (2) managed care, and (3) eligibility. FFS is a traditional method of paying for medical services under which providers are paid for each service rendered. Each selected FFS claim is subjected to a data processing review. The majority of FFS claims also undergo a medical review. Managed care is a system where the state contracts with health plans to deliver health services through a specified network of doctors and hospitals. Managed care claims are subject only to a data processing review. Eligibility refers to meeting the state’s categorical and financial criteria for receipt of benefits under the Medicaid program. States perform their own eligibility reviews according to state and federal eligibility criteria. See appendix II for additional details on these three components. CMS uses its PERM Manual to provide detailed guidance for implementing CMS regulations on PERM. PERM regulations set forth the methodology for states to estimate Medicaid improper payments and outline the requirements for state CAPs. Figure 1 shows the PERM process for estimating and reducing Medicaid improper payments.\nThrough its use of federal contractors, CMS measures the FFS and managed care components while states perform the eligibility component measurement. CMS contracts with two vendors—a statistical contractor and a review contractor—to conduct the FFS and managed care review components of PERM and calculate error rates. The statistical contractor is responsible for (1) collecting and sampling claims and payment data for review, including performing procedures to ensure that the universe is accurate and complete; (2) reviewing state eligibility sampling plans; and (3) calculating state and national error rates. The review contractor is responsible for conducting data processing and medical reviews after the statistical contractor selects the samples of claims. Beginning with the fiscal year 2011 measurement cycle, state-specific sample sizes are calculated based on the prior measurement cycle’s component-level error rates and precision.\nAll payment error rate calculations for the Medicaid program (the FFS component, managed care component, eligibility component, and overall Medicaid error rate) are based on the ratio of estimated dollars of improper payments to the estimated dollars of total payments. The overall Medicaid error rate represents the combination of FFS, managed care, and eligibility error rates. Individual state error rate components and state overall Medicaid error rates are combined to calculate the national component error rates and national overall Medicaid error rate. PERM accounts for the overlap between claims and eligibility reviews by calculating a small correction factor to ensure that Medicaid eligibility errors do not get “double counted” if the sampled item was also tested in either the FFS or managed care components. National component error rates and the national overall Medicaid program error rate are weighted by state size in terms of outlays, so that a state with a $10 billion Medicaid program “counts” 10 times more toward the national rate than a state with a $1 billion Medicaid program.\nFor fiscal year 2011 reporting—the reporting period covered by our audit—CMS reported an estimated national Medicaid improper payment error rate of 8.1 percent or $21.9 billion ($21,448 million in overpayments and $453 million in underpayments). The weighted national component error rates are as follows: for Medicaid FFS, 2.7 percent; for Medicaid managed care, 0.3 percent; and for Medicaid eligibility, 6.1 percent. See appendix III for the state and national error rates for HHS’s fiscal year 2011 reporting of Medicaid improper payments. See appendix IV for the national Medicaid outlays and the estimated improper payment error rate reported in HHS’s AFRs for fiscal years 2007 to 2011.\nOn February 4, 2009, the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) was enacted. As required under Section 601 of CHIPRA, HHS published a final rule on August 11, 2010, effective September 30, 2010, which requires that PERM eligibility reviews be consistent with the state’s eligibility verification policy rather than reviewing eligibility against a single, federal methodology, which was done in the past. After publication of the final rule, states were allowed to review cases under the new methodology. Figure 2 shows the roll up of the error rate reported for fiscal year 2011.\nIPIA, as amended, requires the heads of federal agencies to report on the actions the agency is taking to reduce improper payments, including a description of the causes of improper payments identified, actions planned or taken to correct those causes, and the planned or actual completion date of the actions taken to address those causes. This law also requires heads of federal agencies to report on a description of the steps the agency has taken to ensure that agency managers, programs, and, where appropriate, states and localities are held accountable through annual appraisal criteria for (1) meeting applicable improper payment reduction targets and (2) establishing and maintaining sufficient internal controls, including an appropriate control environment that effectively prevents improper payments from being made and promptly detects and recovers improper payments that are made. According to OMB’s implementing guidance for IPERA, agencies should utilize the results of their statistical sampling measurements to identify the root causes of improper payments and implement corrective actions to prevent and reduce improper payments associated with these root causes. Agencies should continuously use their improper payment measurement results to identify new and innovative corrective actions to prevent and reduce improper payments. Agencies should also annually review their existing corrective actions to determine if any existing action can be intensified or expanded, resulting in a high-impact, high return on investment in terms of reduced or prevented improper payments.\nWhile CMS has responsibility for interpreting and implementing the federal Medicaid statute and ensuring that federal funds are appropriately spent—including estimating improper payments—the program is administered at the state level with significant state financing. Consequently, CMS relies primarily on states to develop and implement CAPs to address reported PERM errors. Following each measurement cycle, the states included in the measurement are required to complete and submit a CAP based on the errors found during the PERM process. In addition to guidance in the PERM Manual, CMS provides guidance to states on the CAP process upon releasing the PERM error rates and throughout CAP development.", "CMS’s PERM methodology for reporting a national Medicaid program improper payment estimate is statistically sound and meets OMB requirements. However, the process for accumulating the data used in deriving the reported national estimate does not consider the extent of any significant changes in state-level improper payment data that occurred after the initial year-end cutoff for state reporting. The impact of any such significant changes in states’ PERM reviews that were not concluded by the annual measurement cycle cutoff dates could significantly affect the calculation of the rolling 3-year average national Medicaid error rate reported each year.", "The design of CMS’s PERM methodology meets OMB requirements. CMS has documented the steps it took to design the sample and the steps taken to construct the sampling frame for the FFS, managed care, and eligibility review samples in its PERM Manual. The documentation also includes CMS’s process for ensuring that each sampling frame was accurate, timely, and complete. For error rate measurement for the FFS and managed care components, as outlined in the PERM Manual, CMS uses a stratified random sample selected quarterly within each state to provide cases for the data processing and medical review testing. For the eligibility component, as outlined in CMS’s PERM Manual, states use a simple random sample of eligible cases and negative cases, which are drawn each month during the measurement cycle.\nAbsent an alternate methodology specifically approved by OMB, agencies must obtain a statistically valid estimate of the annual amount of improper payments in programs and activities for those programs that are identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. The estimates are to be based on the equivalent of a statistically random sample of sufficient size to yield an estimate with a 90 percent confidence interval of not more than plus or minus 2.5 percentage points around the estimate of the percentage of improper payments. CMS reports national Medicaid error rates at this 90 percent confidence interval to be consistent with OMB’s requirements, but CMS’s procedures provide that the sample size for PERM is to conform to OMB optional guidance for estimating payment errors—specifically, the PERM Manual specifies a target precision of plus or minus 3 percentage points at a 95 percent level of confidence within each state. The PERM Manual provides for the sample size for each state to be based upon the previous payment error rate and the OMB optional standard for the precision and confidence level. To estimate the percentage of dollars paid in error, CMS’s PERM Manual provides for using a ratio estimation methodology to produce the PERM estimate. This means the PERM payment error rate is a ratio of the estimated total dollars paid in error divided by the estimated total payments. The choice of ratio estimation methodology under these circumstances is statistically appropriate.\nThe PERM Manual describes the data collection methods for the medical reviews, data processing reviews, and eligibility determinations. The PERM Manual also describes the statistical ratio estimation methodology to be used to produce the estimated percentage of dollars paid in error. CMS’s PERM Manual also provides for the error rates and summary reports to be provided to each state participating in the measurement cycle. We found that CMS’s PERM Manual is consistent with OMB statistical guidance.", "Although the CMS PERM methodology is statistically sound, CMS did not have procedures for considering the impact of any revisions to state-level error rates in calculating the national error rate after the cutoff date for each of the 3 measurement years. Specifically, the individual state error rates used to calculate the national error rate are not updated to reflect activities occurring after the PERM cycle cutoff. Without a process to consider these more current data on states’ reported improper payment error rates, the reliability of CMS’s reported national estimate may be adversely affected. OMB has identified as a best practice that agencies should establish a policy for handling unscheduled corrections to data, such as including threshold criteria identifying conditions under which data will be corrected and redisseminated.\nAccording to the PERM Manual, a state may request a new error rate calculation from CMS after the cycle cutoff date for informational purposes and for determining sample sizes for the next cycle under certain circumstances. For example, states may request a recalculation when information supporting a claim as correctly paid was submitted to CMS after the cycle cutoff date—but CMS’s review contractor did not have time to complete the review—or when a mistake made by the PERM contractor was identified. This request must be made within 60 business days of the posting date of the state’s program error rate on the CMS review contractor’s website. In such instances, CMS will issue a revised rate to the state. However, each state’s official error rate—used in the calculation of the national Medicaid error rate—will not change as a result of this recalculation. According to CMS, official error rates will be calculated based on information received by the cycle cutoff date. While CMS aims for a cycle cutoff date of July 15—4 months prior to the reporting date—the CMS cycle manager may extend the cycle cutoff date depending on the progress of the PERM reviews. CMS officials acknowledged that historically CMS has had to postpone the cycle cutoff to allow the process to be as complete as possible while still permitting CMS to report an improper payment rate timely in HHS’s AFR. However, after the cutoff date, CMS’s PERM Manual does not allow for any revisions to be factored into a state’s official error rate.\nIn reviewing the results of state PERM reviews, we identified some instances where CMS issued revised state Medicaid error rates. For example, CMS issued a revised rate to one state for its eligibility reviews for the fiscal year 2008 measurement cycle because in January 2010, two months after error rate reporting, CMS and the state discovered that the amount of dollars in error was reported incorrectly by the state. This revised overall state error rate estimate decreased from 20.8 percent to 7.8 percent. In another example for the same fiscal year 2008 measurement cycle, in December 2009, 1 month after error rate reporting, CMS issued a post-cutoff date revised rate to a state for its FFS reviews because CMS received additional documentation from providers after the cycle cutoff date for official error rate calculations. This revised overall state error rate estimate decreased from 6.4 percent to 5.9 percent. These revised percentages were not included in the official error rates used to calculate the national estimate of Medicaid improper payments. While these were both smaller states and the actual impact on the national error rate would be minimal, CMS’s PERM Manual does not provide for CMS to consider the impact and it is possible that these types of changes would have had an impact on the national error rate reported in the subsequent 2 years if the changes were significant and were for states with larger levels of outlays.\nBecause the national error rate is based on 3 years of data and corrections to the 2 years of older data after the cutoff date are not officially recognized by CMS, the entire 3-year cycle could be affected. As a result, the reported estimate of Medicaid improper payments may be adversely affected if needed corrections are significant. This potentially affects CMS’s ability to accurately report on the extent of improper payments, evaluate program performance, and utilize its own resources, as well as state resources, effectively to identify and reduce improper payments.", "CMS and state agencies developed CAPs that were generally responsive to identified payment errors. However, CMS’s PERM Manual does not provide for addressing all nonpayment errors either by identifying specific corrective actions or by analyzing these errors to determine whether actions, if cost effective, are needed. Also, CMS’s PERM Manual does not identify conditions under which corrective action for an error should not be undertaken because the cost of state corrective actions would outweigh the benefit. In addition, not all required elements of the CAPs are being completed by all states and CMS’s written guidance on these required elements is not clear or consistent. Further, CMS’s internal guidance on monitoring state CAPs is not sufficient to help ensure that states’ CAPs contain all of the required elements and that states prevent and reduce improper payments going forward.", "States are responsible for developing, executing, and evaluating CAPs to address specific errors identified during the PERM reviews, and CMS has reported on other initiatives to supplement state corrective actions and help reduce errors. We found that state CAPs were generally responsive to the types of payment errors identified in the PERM reviews.\nThrough PERM, CMS identifies and classifies types of errors and shares this information with each state. States are then to analyze and determine the root causes for their specific improper payments. According to CMS, in addition to the PERM Manual, it provides guidance to state contacts on the CAP process upon providing the PERM error rates and throughout the CAP development.\nAs reported by CMS, and shown in figure 3, overall, the majority of the errors reported in fiscal year 2011 (about 54 percent) for the Medicaid program—based on the fiscal years 2008 to 2010 measurement cycles— were a result of cases reviewed for eligibility, where recipients were either not eligible (25.3 percent) or where their eligibility status could not be determined (28.2 percent). The most common causes of cases in error for the FFS medical review was insufficient documentation (9.2 percent) or no documentation (4.3 percent). Our analysis of error types is shown in appendix VI.\nAs shown in figure 3, almost 42 percent of reported PERM review errors resulted from documentation deficiencies, including either a lack of or insufficient documentation, or because a definitive review decision could not be made because of a lack of or insufficient documentation (undetermined). As these are common types of errors, CMS has reported on certain corrective actions that states have developed to address them. Specifically:\nNo documentation and insufficient documentation. In about 14 percent of all PERM errors, reviewers identified errors because either the provider did not respond to the request for records within the required time frame (no documentation—4.3 percent) or there was not enough documentation to support the service (insufficient documentation—9.2 percent). According to CMS, because much of the error rate in the past was due to missing or insufficient documentation, the majority of states focused on provider education and communication methods to improve the providers’ responsiveness and timeliness.\nUndetermined. In about 28 percent of all PERM errors over the 3-year period, reviewers were unable to determine whether or not a beneficiary was eligible for Medicaid because the case record lacked or contained insufficient documentation. The PERM Manual outlines the due diligence a state must take before citing the case as “undetermined.” According to CMS, specific corrective action strategies implemented by the states to reduce these types of eligibility errors have included leveraging technology and available databases to obtain eligibility verification information without client contact; providing additional caseworker training, particularly in areas determined by the PERM review to be error prone; and providing additional eligibility policy resources through a consolidated manual and web-based training.\nIn addition to the state-specific CAPs that are developed in response to the PERM findings, CMS has reported on other initiatives to lower error rates in HHS’s fiscal year 2011 AFR. For example, to help address the insufficient documentation errors found in medical reviews, CMS reported that it increased its efforts to reach out to providers and to obtain medical records to help resolve this problem. CMS also reported that it gives states more information on the potential impact of these documentation errors and more time for the states to work with providers to resolve them. Table 1 outlines CMS’s reported overall strategies to reduce improper payments and strategies targeted at specific PERM error types.\nAlthough all states developed CAPs that were generally responsive to the payment errors identified through PERM reviews, we were unable to assess the CAPs’ impact on the improper payment error rate because of limited comparative data between PERM measurement cycle years.", "State CAPs did not always address errors identified during PERM reviews that did not have a payment error amount associated with them. Specifically, we identified three types of these nonpayment errors through our analysis of the PERM process that are not consistently addressed in all state CAPs—negative case errors, deficiencies, and technical errors.\nA negative case error occurs when a state incorrectly denies an application or terminates eligibility.\nA deficiency is generally defined as an action or inaction on the part of the state or the provider that could have resulted in a dollar error but did not.\nA technical error is an error where the eligibility caseworker did not act in accordance with state or federal policy, but this did not result in an erroneous eligibility determination or result in a difference between the amount that was paid and the amount that should have been paid.\nCMS’s PERM Manual requires that states test negative cases as part of their eligibility reviews. However, it does not clearly require that states address negative case errors in their CAPs. While a payment error rate is not calculated because there are no payments associated with negative cases, a negative case error rate is calculated to estimate the percentage of the decisions in which eligibility was incorrectly denied or terminated. Our analysis showed that for fiscal year 2011 reporting, approximately 40 percent of the states where negative case errors were identified did not address negative case errors in their CAPs. According to CMS officials, these negative errors should be included in state CAPs.\nWhile deficiencies do not result in a dollar amount in error and therefore had no impact on the payment error rate for fiscal year 2011, they may represent issues that need to be addressed to prevent future payment errors. Although not considered payment errors, some deficiencies were noted during PERM data processing and medical reviews. Examples of deficiencies identified in FFS and managed care reviews include the following:\nA data processing deficiency in which a male was coded as a female in the system but because the service provided could have been appropriate for either sex, it did not result in a dollar difference.\nA medical deficiency wherein although a provider billed for the wrong procedure code, the correct procedure code would have paid the same rate per unit. Therefore, it did not result in a dollar difference but could have under other circumstances.\nOur analysis showed that deficiencies identified in PERM reviews represented approximately 8 percent of the total FFS and managed care errors identified for the fiscal year 2011 reporting, and that approximately 67 percent of these deficiencies were not included or analyzed in state CAPs. In addition, only 10 of the 43 states with deficiencies addressed these deficiencies in their CAPs. While the PERM Manual does not clearly state that CAPs are to address deficiencies, CMS officials told us that states should address deficiencies in their CAPs.\nDuring eligibility reviews, states may identify technical errors. An example of a technical error is a failure to follow state administrative procedures that do not affect eligibility if acceptable documentation is otherwise obtained that supports beneficiary eligibility. According to the PERM Manual, states are not currently required to report these technical errors to CMS and may document technical errors as appropriate during the PERM reviews. Furthermore, the PERM Manual suggests but does not require that states include an analysis of technical errors and related corrective actions in their CAPs.\nAlthough these nonpayment errors did not result in improper payment amounts, they represent internal control deficiencies that could have prevented eligible beneficiaries from receiving Medicaid benefits or may result in improper payments in future years if not addressed. Not clearly requiring states to address nonpayment errors, or to document that sufficient analysis was performed to determine if corrective actions, if cost effective, are needed, may reduce the effectiveness of CAPs for addressing the underlying causes of improper payments. Further, this may inhibit ongoing efforts to prevent and reduce improper payments and to ensure that Medicaid is provided to all eligible beneficiaries.\nOMB’s implementing guidance for IPERA requires agencies to implement corrective actions to prevent and reduce improper payments. In addition, CMS’s PERM regulations and its PERM Manual require each state to complete and submit a CAP based on errors found during the PERM process. However, while specifically allowing states to exclude eligibility technical errors, the PERM Manual does not clearly identify whether the states should consider or include deficiencies or negative case errors in their CAPs. While the PERM Manual does not clearly state that CAPs are to address both deficiencies and negative case errors, CMS officials told us that states should address both of these in their CAPs.", "Although CMS’s PERM Manual requires each state to complete and submit a CAP based on the errors found during the PERM process, this guidance makes no exception for small errors—sometimes caused by rounding—which may result in states incurring costs to implement corrective actions that exceed the benefits of those actions. In its PERM Manual, CMS encourages states to use the most cost-effective corrective actions that can be implemented to best correct and address the root causes of the errors; however, it does not acknowledge that states can address errors by documenting situations where they determined that the costs of implementing the corrective action exceed the benefits.\nOfficials at one state we visited told us that the cost of implementing a system to correct some of its errors that were less than a dollar would outweigh the benefits of this action. A PERM review in this state identified 11 pricing errors resulting from incorrect rounding that netted to $0.53. State officials informed us that they were aware of this rounding issue, as it had been identified in the previous PERM cycle and CMS also identified and reported this type of error for the fiscal year 2011 measurement cycle. According to this state, the original estimate for a system solution to correct these rounding errors was $575,000 to $1,150,000. State officials told us they did not believe that the cost to address this issue was justified as the return on investment for the system solution to correct the condition might never be realized. According to CMS, in e-mail communication with this state, it told state officials that if the state determines that the cost of implementing a corrective action outweighs the benefits then the final decision of implementing the corrective action is the state’s decision. The state continued to pursue corrective actions and was ultimately able to obtain a revised estimate of $115,000 for changes to the system, based on further detailed analysis of the necessary solution. The state now plans to redesign its system in order to avoid these types of PERM errors going forward.\nAccording to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, management should design and implement internal controls—in this case, controls to prevent and reduce improper payments—based on the related costs and benefits. Further, PERM regulations require states to evaluate their corrective action plans by assessing, among other things, the efficiencies that they create. However, the lack of clear written guidance for states on how to address situations where the cost of corrective actions identified by states may outweigh the benefits because of the low dollar amounts associated with these types of errors may result in an unnecessary burden on state resources.", "Although we found that states have generally been engaged in the PERM CAP process and developed CAPs to address improper payment errors, not all required elements of the CAPs are being completed by all states. When developing CAPs, CMS’s PERM regulations require states to perform five key steps to reduce improper payment errors identified through the PERM reviews. For CAPs subsequent to the initial measurement year, CMS’s PERM regulations also require an update on the previous CAP. These requirements are summarized in figure 4.\nNot all required elements of the CAPs—such as the evaluation step or the update on the previous CAP—were consistently reported on by all states.\nFor example, for fiscal year 2011 reporting, 8 of the 51 states did not submit the required evaluation element of the CAP. An additional 9 states submitted the evaluation element for some, but not all PERM components.\nFurthermore, for fiscal year 2011 reporting, only 24 of the 34 states required to submit an update of the previous CAP complied with this requirement. Another 5 states submitted updates for some, but not all, of the PERM components, and of the 29 states that submitted complete or partial updates of their previous CAPs, only 19 submitted them by the due date required by CMS. The other 10 were submitted after CMS followed up with the states.\nCMS officials acknowledged that some state CAPs are missing certain elements, and they are in the process of finalizing specific procedures to outline CMS’s role in reviewing state CAPs and following up with states to obtain any missing elements, as discussed later in this report.\nCMS’s PERM Manual, updated in September 2011, provides guidance for state CAP development, but it does not include specific instructions for completing the evaluation element or on how to report the update on the previous CAP. Furthermore, the CAP template included in the PERM Manual does not include these two required elements. However, on its PERM website, CMS has provided a separate example of a CAP for the states to utilize that includes examples of the evaluation element and a separate report for the update on the previous CAP. Inconsistencies between the PERM Manual—which includes a CAP template—and the example CAP on the PERM website may cause confusion regarding what states are to include in their CAPs. As of August 2012, CMS had updated its PERM Manual and the CAP template to include instructions and a template for reporting on the update of the previous CAP. However, the updated template still did not include the evaluation element, and the separate example of a CAP on the PERM website was not updated to be consistent with the updated PERM Manual guidance and template. Clear, consistent written guidance and instructions on all required elements for CAPs would assist the states in submitting complete CAPs, and increase the likelihood that CMS has the information necessary for analyzing the progress and effectiveness of state CAPs. The lack of clear, consistent guidance in the PERM Manual and the related template on the PERM website on how to develop key elements of the state CAP may have contributed to the missing elements we describe in this report.", "CMS lacked a formal policy describing its role in monitoring state CAPs to ensure that (1) the CAPs contained all of the required elements and completely addressed errors identified in the PERM reviews and (2) states were making progress on implementing corrective actions.\nIn our high-risk series update, we reported that CMS needs to ensure that states develop appropriate corrective action processes to address vulnerabilities to improper Medicaid payments. Our analysis of state CAPs continues to identify issues regarding CMS’s coordination with states in developing and implementing their CAPs. Specifically, during our review and analysis of state CAPs for the fiscal years 2008 to 2010 PERM measurement cycles, we found that CMS had not conducted sufficient oversight to ensure that states submitted complete CAPs, took the five required steps in developing CAPs, and updated the status of previous CAPs.\nAs discussed previously, not all required elements of the CAPs—such as the evaluation step or the update on the previous CAP—were being completed by all states. Once the CAPs are submitted, officials in the seven states we visited noted that there was minimal monitoring of implementation by CMS. For example, officials in one state told us that CMS did not follow-up with the state on the implementation of the corrective actions until the state submitted the CAP related to its next error rate measurement 3 years later. According to CMS officials, they do not track the progress of the states’ implementation of CAPs and are not required to do so. However, CMS officials told us that they review the implementation information that the states provide in their CAPs, specifically in the update of their previous CAPs, and hope to see a reduction in error rates as the CAPs are implemented. Additionally, based on our analysis of state CAPs for fiscal year 2011 reporting, we also noted that approximately 5 percent of all payment errors identified during the PERM reviews were not fully addressed by all states in their CAPs. Improved monitoring by CMS would help ensure that state CAPs contain all of the required elements and are addressing all types of errors identified through the PERM process, and that the actions identified are appropriate to reduce those types of errors going forward.\nThe responsibility for oversight of the states’ development, implementation, and evaluation of their CAPs rests with the Division of Error Rate Measurement (DERM) within CMS’s Office of Financial Management. These efforts include coordinating the CAP process with the states and other agency offices. The Medicaid Integrity Group (MIG) within CMS’s Center for Program Integrity is responsible for reviewing the state CAPs, with assistance from the agency’s regional offices. According to CMS, MIG reviews the state CAPs to (1) ensure the plans address the errors identified during the PERM reviews, (2) provide feedback to the states for improvements, and (3) review the implementation status of the state’s previous CAP.\nOversight through continuous monitoring helps ensure that actions are taken to effectively work toward reducing improper payments. According to OMB’s implementing guidance, agencies must ensure that their managers and accountable officers, program and program officials, and where applicable states and local partners are held accountable for reducing improper payments. Therefore, although the states are responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring their CAPs, CMS should be responsible for monitoring states’ compliance with CMS’s regulations related to the PERM process.\nWe also found that the roles and responsibilities of DERM and MIG are not formally outlined in policies and procedures for the PERM review and corrective action process. CMS officials told us that they are in the process of developing protocols to address the CAP review process. Specifically, CMS officials told us that they have developed a draft policy describing each party’s role in the different stages of the PERM CAP process as well as a review guide to outline CMS’s procedures for coordinating reviews of state CAPs. CMS plans to review state CAPs submitted in February 2013 using this new collaborative process for the first time for the states that are part of the fiscal year 2011 measurement cycle and were reported on in HHS’s fiscal year 2012 AFR. According to CMS officials, they plan to review the CAPs to ensure that all of the attributes outlined in the PERM regulations are addressed and, as needed, notify the states of any missing elements. After reviewing the fiscal year 2011 cycle CAPs, CMS officials told us that they plan to further refine the standard operating procedures and CAP review guide before the documents are finalized. CMS’s draft policy and review guide were not finalized before the completion of our fieldwork, and we did not examine any interim drafts. Thus, we are unable to determine whether the planned revisions to existing procedures will fully address the deficiencies we identified concerning CMS’s monitoring of state CAPs. Monitoring is CMS’s opportunity to ensure that states are appropriately implementing the corrective actions that they have identified to help reduce improper payments. If states are not addressing all applicable issues or are not effectively implementing the actions outlined in their CAPs, future reductions in the Medicaid error rate may be limited. Additional monitoring by CMS would help hold the states accountable for developing, implementing, and evaluating corrective action strategies in support of CMS’s efforts to prevent and reduce Medicaid improper payments.", "The design of CMS’s PERM methodology is statistically sound. However, refining the required PERM process for estimating and reporting national Medicaid improper payments so that the impact of corrections to the data after the cutoff date is considered would help ensure that the reported estimates are reasonably accurate and complete. As CMS reports its estimated Medicaid improper payments based on a rolling 3-year estimate, adjustments made to any of these 3 years can affect yearly reporting and potentially affect the accuracy of the reported national estimate. Given the importance of providing HHS management, OMB, and the Congress with accurate information on the extent of improper payments in federal programs, it is imperative that CMS ensure that its reported estimates of Medicaid improper payments are reliable.\nCorrective actions are critical for preventing and reducing improper payments. While states have developed corrective action plans to address payment errors identified in PERM reviews, not all nonpayment errors were addressed in these plans, which could hinder the prevention of future improper payments. Also, while states are currently required to address all errors, clear written guidance that permits states to document why an action is not being implemented would help ensure the most efficient and effective use of state resources for errors that do not pose a risk of significantly affecting future improper payments. Further, ensuring that states have clear written guidance for developing corrective action plans is key to CMS’s ability to oversee states’ corrective action processes. Strengthening CMS’s required procedures for monitoring the state-level corrective actions is critical to help ensure that states make progress in preventing and reducing improper payments.", "In order to ensure the accuracy of reported improper payment estimates for the Medicaid program, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the CMS Administrator to take the following action:\nUpdate PERM Medicaid improper payment reporting procedures to provide for considering any corrections to state-level improper payment error data subsequent to the cutoff date that would have a significant impact on any of the 3 years used to develop the rolling average for the reported national Medicaid improper payment estimate.\nTo help ensure that corrective action strategies effectively address identified types of improper payments and reduce Medicaid improper payments in a cost-effective manner, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the CMS Administrator to take the following three actions:\nRevise the PERM Manual to provide that states (1) analyze all deficiencies, negative case errors, technical errors, and minimal dollar errors identified in PERM reviews to determine if any corrective actions, if cost effective, are needed to prevent such errors in the future and (2) document the results of their analysis.\nClarify guidance in the PERM Manual, and on the PERM website, on the required elements to be included in a CAP and the specific actions states are to take each measurement cycle to (1) effectively prepare and evaluate their current cycle’s CAPs and (2) provide updates to their previous cycle’s CAPs.\nFinalize draft policies and procedures to clarify specific CMS officials’ roles and responsibilities for monitoring states’ corrective actions to ensure, at a minimum, that (1) the CAPs contain all of the required elements and completely address errors identified in the PERM reviews and (2) states are making progress on implementing corrective actions.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of HHS for comment. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix VII, HHS concurred with the four recommendations in our report. HHS cited a number of actions already taken and other initiatives planned or under way related to our recommendations. For example, with respect to our three recommendations to help ensure that corrective action strategies effectively address identified types of improper payments and reduce Medicaid improper payments in a cost-effective manner, HHS cited CMS’s plans to update its PERM Manual and other relevant documents consistent with our recommended actions to clarify and standardize guidance. HHS also cited action under way to finalize policies and procedures related to monitoring states’ corrective actions.\nHHS also concurred with our recommendation to update procedures for considering the impact of any corrections to state-level improper payment errors on reported national error rates. HHS stated that it will consider revising its procedures in this area. HHS also expressed concern that the draft suggests that past reported national Medicaid error rates were unreliable. We acknowledged in our draft report that the prior year post- cutoff date error rate revisions we reviewed were not sufficient to have had an impact on the national error rate for fiscal year 2011 reporting. Rather, our recommendation is focused on augmenting procedures to help ensure the reliability of future national error rate reporting. HHS also expressed concern about our suggestion that OMB’s Standards and Guidelines for Statistical Surveys should be used to determine how to handle PERM-related data corrections. In our draft report, we characterized this as a best practice. HHS noted, and we agree, that OMB did not include guidance for handling unscheduled corrections to data in its implementing guidance for IPERA. However, taking action, as we recommended, to establish procedures to consider the extent to which any corrections to state-level improper payment data subsequent to the cutoff date would affect the reported national Medicaid improper payment estimate would best ensure the reliability of reported national error rates going forward. HHS also expressed concern about our suggestion that states may request a recalculation of the state-level error rate when records for a medical claim were received prior to the cycle cutoff date but CMS’s review contractor did not have time to complete the review. HHS cited that CMS’s review contractors will complete all reviews for claims where the documentation was received prior to the cycle cutoff date and that states may request a recalculation when information supporting a claim as correctly paid was submitted to CMS after the cycle cutoff date. We agreed with HHS’s point and modified the report accordingly.\nHHS also expressed concern about including the state error rates identified in appendix III of the draft. HHS commented that readers may use the rates to make state-to-state comparisons that are inappropriate because of variations in states' sizes and programs and in states’ implementation and administration of their programs. We acknowledged HHS’s concerns in our draft report by including language in appendix III to caution readers about using these state-level rates to make state-to-state comparisons. However, it is important to present these state-level error rates for transparency regarding the results of state PERM reviews.\nIn addition, HHS provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate and discussed in our additional evaluation in appendix VII.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2623 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII.", "The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) methodology for estimating Medicaid improper payments follows Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and produces reasonable national and state-level estimates and (2) corrective action plans (CAP) have been developed to reduce Medicaid payment error rates and whether these plans addressed the types of payment errors identified.\nTo address these objectives, we reviewed the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA), and related OMB guidance effective for fiscal year 2011. We also reviewed CMS regulations on Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) and CMS’s internal written guidance on PERM. In addition, we reviewed results from state PERM reviews for fiscal years 2006 through 2011, prior GAO and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General reports, and internal control standards. Further, we reviewed improper payment information reported in the Improper Payments Section of HHS’s fiscal year 2011 agency financial report (AFR). We reviewed these documents to understand CMS’s efforts to address IPIA and IPERA requirements and to identify previously reported issues with CMS’s improper payment reporting.\nTo further determine the extent to which CMS’s methodology for estimating Medicaid improper payments follows OMB guidance and produces reasonable national and state-level estimates, we compared the following components of CMS’s methodology for estimating the fiscal year 2011 payment error rate with related OMB guidance: (1) sampling methods, including the sample size, sample selection, sample representation, and precision of the estimates, and (2) statistical methods used to estimate the error rates and precision. As part of this assessment, we did the following:\nConducted interviews with CMS officials and its contractors to clarify our understanding of both the sampling and estimation methodologies.\nReviewed the program manuals for both the payment error and eligibility payment error components of PERM to assess the statistical validity of CMS’s methodology.\nReviewed professional statistical literature to validate the suitability of stratified random sampling and ratio estimation to address the particular characteristics of the payment and eligibility data in the state-administered Medicaid program.\nReviewed state-level payment error rates from the most recent year available to determine whether the sample sizes assigned to states met the precision level for payment error sampling in OMB statistical guidance.\nWe also used the results of these reviews and analyses to identify and assess the reasons for any weaknesses in the estimation methodology and their potential effects on identifying and reporting Medicaid improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2011 and going forward.\nIn addition to reviewing the statistical methodology, we obtained actual payment error data from CMS for the seven states selected for our site visits and independently calculated the payment error rates to confirm the calculations done by CMS using the statistical methodology specified in the program manuals. The basis for our site visit selection is discussed later in this appendix.\nThe scope of our review did not include an assessment of individual states’ processes or payment systems. We assessed the reliability of the claims and error rate data by gaining an understanding of the processes the contractors or states use to perform their reviews, including any use of data sharing to determine eligibility, and their quality controls. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.\nTo further determine the extent to which CAPs have been developed to reduce Medicaid payment error rates and whether these plans addressed the types of errors identified, we did the following:\nReviewed agency policies and procedures related to the development of PERM CAPs and CAPs for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, which are used to address the root causes of improper payments identified from the PERM reviews.\nConducted interviews with officials from CMS related to its oversight role and its own initiatives for reducing Medicaid improper payments.\nReviewed CMS’s error rate reduction plans and initiatives to reduce Medicaid improper payments.\nReviewed the reported causes of improper payments as outlined in HHS’s fiscal year 2011 AFR.\nAssessed CMS’s process for monitoring state corrective actions and its methodology for measuring the effectiveness of corrective actions to reduce improper payments.\nAs part of our review of states’ CAPs, we assessed whether they addressed issues identified in fee-for-service, managed care, and evaluated the effectiveness of implemented corrective actions. eligibility reviews; included the required elements as outlined by CMS; and The scope of our review did not include an assessment of individual states’ implementation of their CAPs.\nIn addition, we conducted site visits at seven state Medicaid offices (California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas). During these site visits, we interviewed state personnel involved in the PERM process to gain an understanding of how states compile the universes of claims and beneficiaries that are sampled for the PERM reviews, how eligibility reviews are conducted, and how the states develop corrective action plans and work with CMS on corrective actions. We selected these states based on criteria such as the states’ federal share of Medicaid payments and errors identified in PERM reviews. The seven states we visited collectively claimed about 37 percent of the total federal share of Medicaid payments made in fiscal year 2010, the most recent data available at the time of our review for site visit selection. We also selected these states to achieve variation in the error rates found during PERM reviews included in the fiscal year 2011 reporting of the Medicaid improper payment estimate. One state had the highest error rate for eligibility reviews as well as the highest combined error rate. This selection also allowed us to focus on certain states with noted vulnerabilities in program integrity efforts, as well as states with possible best practices. Although it does not allow us to generalize findings to all states and thus the program as a whole, we believe these state visits, combined with our analysis of CAPs for all states, enable us to determine if states’ corrective actions are addressing the types of improper payment errors that have been identified.\nWe conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to March 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "The Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) program uses a 17-state, 3-year rotation for measuring Medicaid improper payments. Medicaid improper payments are estimated on a federal fiscal year basis through the PERM process. The estimate measures three component error rates: (1) fee-for-service (FFS), (2) managed care, and (3) eligibility.", "FFS is a traditional method of paying for medical services under which providers are paid for each service rendered. Managed care is a system where the state contracts with health plans to deliver health services through a specified network of doctors and hospitals. The health plan is then responsible for reimbursing providers for specific services delivered.\nStates submit quarterly adjudicated claims data from which a randomly selected sample of FFS and managed care claims are drawn each quarter. Each selected FFS claim is subjected to a data processing review. The majority of FFS claims also undergo a medical review. Managed care claims are subject only to a data processing review.\nA data processing error is a payment error that can be determined from the information available from the claim or from other information available in the state Medicaid system, other related systems, as well as outside sources of provider verification (except medical reviews and eligibility reviews). Data processing errors include, but are not limited to, the following: payment for duplicate items, payment for noncovered services, payment for FFS claims for managed care services, payment for services that should have been paid by a third party but were inappropriately paid by Medicaid, pricing errors, logic edit errors, data entry errors, and managed care payment errors.\nA medical review error is an error that is determined from a review of the medical documentation in conjunction with state and federal medical policies and information presented on the claim. Medical review errors include, but are not limited to, the following: lack of documentation, insufficient documentation, procedure coding errors, diagnosis coding errors, number of unit errors, medically unnecessary services, policy violations, and administrative errors.", "Eligibility refers to meeting the state’s categorical and financial criteria for receipt of benefits under the Medicaid program. States perform their own eligibility reviews according to state and federal eligibility criteria. An eligibility error occurs when a person is not eligible for the program or for a specific service and a payment for the service or a capitation payment covering the date of service has been made. An eligibility error can also occur when a beneficiary has paid the incorrect amount toward an assigned liability amount or cost of institutional care. The results from the eligibility reviews will include eligibility errors based on erroneous decisions as well as payment errors. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) combines the state-reported eligibility component payment error rates to develop a national eligibility error rate for Medicaid. This rate is calculated from the active case payment review findings. For fiscal year 2011 reporting, CMS estimated that the active case error rate was 8.2 percent while the weighted eligibility component error rate was 6.1 percent.\nEligibility reviews are also performed on a sample of negative cases. Negative cases contain information on a beneficiary who applied for benefits and was denied or whose program benefits were terminated based on the state agency’s eligibility determination in the month that eligibility is reviewed. CMS calculates only a case error rate for negative cases, because no payments were made. The negative case error rate estimates the percentage of the decisions in which eligibility was incorrectly denied or terminated. For fiscal year 2011 reporting, CMS estimated that the negative case error rate was 4.9 percent. The results of all PERM reviews, including the negative case reviews, are used to determine future sample sizes.", "According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), states’ Medicaid improper payment error rates identified through the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) program may vary because of multiple factors related to differences in how states implement and administer their programs and should be considered in the context of these differences and operational realities. CMS provides each state its specific error rate and data analysis reports to use to develop corrective actions designed to reduce major error causes and to identify trends in errors or other factors for purposes of reducing improper payments. Also, according to CMS, because of the variation of states’ sizes, overall program variations, and different ways that each state’s rate affects the national rate, CMS does not encourage comparisons based solely on error rates. PERM is designed to produce precise error rates at the national level. Therefore, according to CMS, sample sizes per state are relatively small and the precision of state-specific error rates varies significantly.\nIn addition, during the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 measurement cycles, CMS noted instances where some states’ policies differed from CMS’s policies for determining PERM errors. For example, according to CMS, in the review of some eligibility cases, policy and operational differences among states may have affected the degree to which states and providers could obtain documentation to validate payments and eligibility decisions for PERM purposes. According to CMS, states that have simplified eligibility documentation rules through use of self-declaration and administrative renewal often found it harder to obtain necessary documentation for PERM reviews, which were treated as errors for PERM. In its fiscal year 2011 agency financial report (AFR), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that as required under Section 601 of the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, it published a final rule on August 11, 2010, effective September 30, 2010, which required the eligibility reviews to be consistent with the state’s eligibility verification policy rather than reviewing eligibility against a single, federal methodology, which was done in the past. After publication of the final rule, states were allowed to review cases under the new methodology. HHS also reported that based on current regulations, certain cases from the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 measurement cycles, included in the error rates below, would no longer be considered as errors.\nTable 2 provides a list of state error rates used to determine HHS’s fiscal year 2011 reporting of national Medicaid improper payments.", "Table 3 provides a list of Medicaid outlays and estimated improper payment error rates reported in the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) agency financial reports (AFR).", "Table 4 provides the margins of error at the 90 percent confidence level for error rate data presented in figure 2.", "Table 5 provides a list of error types identified during the fiscal years 2008 to 2010 Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) measurement cycles.", "", "The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HHS) letter dated March 13, 2013. 1. See the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section of this report. 2. We agree with HHS’s comment and modified the report as appropriate. 3. We agree in part with HHS’s comment and incorporated clarifying language to the figure source and Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) process details. Also, we added a figure note to acknowledge that certain year 1 and year 2 activities may be delayed until years 2 and 3, respectively. 4. We clarified the report to acknowledge that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) written guidance does not indicate that states could address an error by stating why an action is not being implemented. This relates to our second recommendation, with which HHS concurred, that such guidance should be formally documented in CMS’s PERM Manual.", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Phillip McIntyre (Assistant Director), Gabrielle Fagan, Kerry Porter, and Carrie Wehrly made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Carl Barden, Sharon Byrd, Francine DelVecchio, Patrick Frey, Wilfred Holloway, Jason Kelly, and Jason Kirwan." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full h2_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "", "", "h1_full", "", "h0_full h2_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What issues did GAO find with CMS's procedures?", "How does this differ from OMB requirements?", "What did CMS develop to mitigate these issues?", "How does the PERM system work?", "What did the PERM calculations reveal?", "Why might these results be inaccurate?", "How could CMS improve the accuracy of these results?", "What is at stake in the accuracy of the results?", "What might the underlying issues result in?", "What is necessary for CMS to analyze the effectiveness of the CAPs?", "How could CMS help ensure that improper payments are reduced?", "What is a major issue with the Medicaid system?", "What were the objectives of this report?", "What data did GAO collect to address these objectives?" ], "summary": [ "The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) methodology for estimating a national improper payment rate for the Medicaid program is statistically sound. However, CMS's procedures did not provide for updating state data used in its methodology to recognize significant corrections or adjustments after the cutoff date.", "The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that federal agencies establish a statistically valid methodology for estimating the annual amount of improper payments in programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments.", "CMS developed the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) program in order to comply with improper payment estimation and reporting requirements for the Medicaid program.", "Under the PERM methodology, CMS places states in one of three cycles, and each year one of the cycles reports new state-level data based on the previous year's samples. CMS then calculates the national Medicaid program improper payment estimate using these new data for one-third of the states and older data for the other two-thirds of the states.", "CMS's estimated national improper payment error rate for fiscal year 2011 for the Medicaid program was 8.1 percent, or $21.9 billion.", "However, CMS's procedures did not provide for considering revisions to state-level Medicaid program error rates used in the CMS methodology for calculating its national Medicaid program error rate. Because corrections to the 2 years of older data after the cutoff date are not officially recognized by CMS, the entire 3-year cycle could be affected.", "OMB has identified as a best practice that agencies should establish a policy for handling unscheduled corrections to data.", "Until CMS establishes procedures for considering changes to initially reported state-level error rates that would be significant to the national error rate, CMS is impaired in its ability to ensure that its reported estimate of the extent of national Medicaid improper payments is reliable.", "Although the nonpayment errors identified in PERM reviews did not result in improper payments, the underlying issues may result in improper payments in future years if not addressed.", "Also, complete information in state CAPs is necessary for CMS to analyze the progress and effectiveness of the CAPs.", "Further, clear accountability for continuous monitoring helps ensure that actions are taken to effectively reduce Medicaid improper payments.", "Medicaid has the second-highest estimated improper payments of any federal program that reported such data for fiscal year 2011. Also, the Congress has raised questions about reporting and corrective actions related to the Medicaid program's improper payments.", "The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) CMS's methodology for estimating Medicaid improper payments follows OMB guidance and produces reasonable national and state-level estimates and (2) corrective action plans have been developed to reduce Medicaid payment error rates and whether these plans address the types of payment errors identified.", "To address these objectives, GAO analyzed CMS's policies and procedures against federal guidance and standards for estimating improper payments and developing related corrective actions to address errors. GAO also reviewed the results of all state-level reviews and conducted site visits at selected states that either received relatively large amounts of Medicaid payments or had varying rates of estimated improper payments, including states with possible best practices. GAO also met with cognizant CMS officials and contractors." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 6, 6, 6, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-14-290	{ "title": [ "Background", "The Corps Has Taken Actions to Address Our 2003 Recommendations but Does Not Collect All of the Recommended Data", "The Corps Collects Recommended Data on Urgent or Emergency Dredging but Does Not Consistently Collect Data on Certain Solicitations", "The Corps Reviewed Data and Procedures for Performing Cost Estimates, but Some Information Remains Outdated", "The Corps Analyzed Options for Operating Its Hopper Dredges in a Report to Congress", "Statutory Restrictions on Corps Hopper Dredges Have Resulted in Additional Costs to the Corps, but Effects on Industry Competition Are Unclear", "Statutory Restrictions Have Resulted in Additional Costs for Corps Hopper Dredging", "Ready Reserve Restrictions Help Ensure the Corps’ Ability to Respond to Critical Dredging Needs", "The Extent to Which Restrictions Have Affected Industry Competition Is Unclear", "The Corps Faces Challenges Regarding the Fiscal Sustainability and the Future Composition of Its Hopper Dredge Fleet", "The Corps Faces Challenges in Ensuring the Fiscal Sustainability of Its Hopper Dredges", "The Corps Faces Challenges in Determining the Future Composition of Its Hopper Dredge Fleet", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency and Third- Party Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: The U.S. Hopper Dredge Fleet", "Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix IV: Comments from the Dredging Contractors of America", "Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "Since 1824, the Corps has been responsible for maintaining a safe, reliable, and economically efficient navigation system in the United States. This system currently comprises more than 12,000 miles of inland and intracoastal waterways and about 180 ports handling at least 250,000 tons of cargo per year. The accumulation of sediment in waterways— known as shoaling—reduces their navigable depth and, without dredging, may result in restrictions on vessels passing through the waterways. These restrictions often apply to the vessels’ draft—the distance between the surface of the water and the bottom of the hull—which determine, in part, the minimum depth of water in which a vessel can safely navigate. Draft restrictions may result in delays and added costs as ships may need to off-load some of their cargo to reduce their draft, wait until high tide or until waterways are dredged, or sail into another port. For example, according to a 2011 Corps study, 1 foot of shoaling in the lower Mississippi River could result in $2.8 billion worth of cargo being disrupted annually. To minimize such risks to navigation, the Corps removed an annual average of about 229 million cubic yards of material from U.S. waterways from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2012, at an average annual cost of about $1.1 billion, according to the Corps. Even with these efforts, draft restrictions have regularly been in place on major waterways throughout the United States in the past several years, according to Corps documents and officials.\nThe Corps contracts with industry to perform most dredging, including work done by hopper dredges. According to the Corps, of the approximately $11 billion it spent for dredging from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2012, about $2.37 billion was for hopper dredging. Of that, industry hopper dredges accounted for about $1.8 billion, and Corps hopper dredges accounted for about $570 million. Corps spending on hopper dredging has more than doubled since fiscal year 2003, while the amount of material removed by hopper dredges has increased only slightly over that period, according to Corps data. Specifically, as shown in figure 2, the Corps spent nearly $170 million for Corps and industry hopper dredges to remove around 66 million cubic yards of material in fiscal year 2003. By fiscal year 2012, Corps spending on Corps and industry hopper dredging had increased to about $370 million, while the amount of material removed increased to nearly 72 million cubic yards. This growth in spending reflects costs for hopper dredging that, according to Corps documents, have increased because of rising costs for fuel and steel, among other factors.\nHopper dredging today is generally performed in three regions of the United States—the East Coast, Gulf Coast, and West Coast—and each region has at least one Corps hopper dredge that typically operates in it: the McFarland on the East Coast, the Wheeler on the Gulf Coast, and the Essayons and Yaquina on the West Coast. On the East and Gulf Coasts, the majority of the hopper dredging workload is carried out by industry dredges, while on the West Coast, Corps dredges remove more than half of the dredged material. Various factors can influence and complicate hopper dredging in each region. For example, on the East Coast, much of the hopper dredging must be performed during certain months of the year because environmental restrictions related to endangered sea turtles and other species prohibit dredging while those species are present. On the West Coast, the Corps must factor in the time and expense of moving industry dredges through the Panama Canal if the only available industry hopper dredges are on the East or Gulf Coasts.\nThe sizes and capabilities of specific hopper dredges—and, therefore, the projects for which they are suited—vary. For instance, shallow ports and harbors cannot be dredged by vessels with deep drafts in many cases. The Corps uses the Yaquina, which is a small dredge with a draft of around 15 feet when its hopper is fully loaded, for dredging small and shallow ports along the California, Oregon, and Washington coasts. In contrast, the Corps uses the Wheeler, which is a large dredge with a draft of nearly 30 feet when its hopper is fully loaded, for deeper navigation channels such as those in the lower Mississippi River. See appendix II for a list of Corps and industry hopper dredges and their characteristics.\nAs noted, several pieces of legislation were enacted that sought to increase the role of industry in hopper dredging by placing restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges. More specifically, in 1978, legislation directed the Corps to contract out much of its hopper dredging work to industry and reduce the Corps’ fleet to the minimum necessary to insure the capability of the federal government and industry together to carry out projects for the improvement of rivers and harbors. The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1993, and subsequent appropriations acts in the early 1990s, required the Corps to offer for competitive bidding at least 7.5 million cubic yards of hopper dredging work previously performed by the federal fleet. The Corps addressed this requirement by reducing the use of each of its four dredges from about 230 workdays per year to about 180 workdays per year. The Water Resources Development Act of 1996 then required the Corps to take the Wheeler out of active status and place it into ready reserve. The Corps implemented this requirement beginning in fiscal year 1998 by generally limiting the Wheeler to working 55 days a year plus any urgent or emergency work. More recently, the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 required that the Corps place the McFarland in ready reserve and limited the use of the vessel to 70 working days per year in the Delaware River and Bay, plus any urgent and emergency work. See table 1 for the statutory restrictions in place on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges and how they have changed since fiscal year 2003.\nThe Corps follows a process—known as the raise the flag procedure—for activating its ready reserve dredges to respond to urgent or emergency dredging needs. The Corps defines an urgent need for dredging as a time-sensitive situation that may require prompt action for providing a safe navigation channel, and an emergency as a situation that would result in an unacceptable hazard to life, a significant loss of property, or an immediate, unforeseen, and significant economic hardship if corrective action is not undertaken within a time period less than the normal contract procurement process. The raise the flag procedure includes a series of steps intended to allow industry the opportunity to respond to urgent or emergency dredging needs before the Corps uses its own dredges. The Corps district office with an urgent or emergency dredging need notifies the Corps division office overseeing it of the dredging need, and district and division staff review ongoing hopper dredging work under existing Corps contracts to see if any industry hopper dredges could be made available. If no industry hopper dredges could be made available, the offices notify Corps headquarters. The Corps’ Director of Civil Works may then decide whether to use one of the Corps’ ready reserve hopper dredges or make additional efforts to procure an industry dredge, such as by releasing a dredge from an existing contract.\nThe Corps contracts for most of the hopper dredging work by soliciting competitive bids from industry. To determine the reasonableness of contractor bids, the Corps develops a government cost estimate for its hopper dredging solicitations. Government cost estimates are developed using information on the costs of owning and operating hopper dredges— including acquisition, fuel, and shipyard costs—along with information on the project for which the dredging is needed—including the amount and type of material to be removed, and the distance from the dredging site to the placement site. In soliciting bids from contractors, the Corps most commonly uses a sealed-bid process, through which it generally awards the contract to the lowest bidder with a bid that is no more than 25 percent above the government cost estimate.receive any bids or if all bids exceed the government cost estimate by more than 25 percent, the Corps may pursue a number of options, including (1) negotiating with bidders to get the bid within an awardable range of the cost estimate; (2) reviewing the cost estimate and revising it based on additional information, as appropriate, or (3) performing the work itself such as through its raise the flag procedure.\nIf the Corps does not The costs to own and operate hopper dredges include costs such as payroll for the crews, fuel, repairs, and depreciation. Hopper dredging requires large capital outlays—a modern hopper dredge comparable in size to the Wheeler, for instance, would cost around $100 million to build, according to Corps and industry estimates—and related costs such as depreciation and replacement of engines or other major equipment can represent a relatively large portion of the dredges’ total costs. The Corps and industry incur much of the costs for their hopper dredges—such as paying a crew and keeping engines and other systems in ready working condition—regardless of how much the dredges are used.\nThe Corps uses two funding sources from its annual civil works appropriation to pay for its hopper dredges. First, for the ready reserve vessels McFarland and Wheeler, funds are provided for each dredge to cover their costs while they are idle in ready reserve. Second, the Corps pays for the use of its dredges with project funds based on a daily rate it establishes for its dredges. According to Corps officials, the Corps sets a daily rate specific to each of its hopper dredges at least annually, based on factors such as the costs of owning and operating the dredge, and the amount of work the dredge is expected to perform. As the Corps uses its hopper dredges for projects, the Corps uses funds allocated for those specific projects to pay its dredges, based on the number of days its dredges work and the dredges’ daily rate.", "", "In response to our 2003 recommendation to obtain and analyze baseline data needed to determine the appropriate use of its hopper dredge fleet, the Corps established a tracking log as part of its raise the flag procedure to maintain and review urgent or emergency work its hopper dredges carry out, but it does not consistently collect certain solicitation information that we recommended. Having a means to track urgent or emergency dredging work helps the Corps ensure it is documenting and evaluating when and under what circumstances it will use its ready reserve dredges. According to Corps officials, the Corps established a tracking log in 2007 to systematically track information on the circumstances when urgent or emergency hopper dredging may be needed, and specifically when Corps’ dredges would be used to meet those needs. Corps district offices that are faced with critical hopper dredging needs submit information on their plans to address the needs to their division and Corps headquarters for review and approval. The Corps’ decision-making process for determining whether to use its ready reserve vessels is also documented via its tracking log. For example, in January 2013, a hopper dredge was needed to perform work along the North Carolina coast because certain areas had become severely shoaled and were impeding safe navigation. One industry bid was received to perform the work, but it exceeded the government cost estimate by more than 25 percent. After determining its cost estimate was reasonable, the Corps negotiated with the industry bidder in an attempt to get the bid within an awardable range of the Corps’ cost estimate, but the parties were unable to come to an agreement. As a result, the Corps initiated its raise the flag procedure because of the urgent nature of the situation. Because no other industry contractors were available immediately to respond, the Corps used the McFarland to perform the dredging and documented its decision-making process in its tracking log.\nWe also recommended that the Corps obtain and analyze other data that could be useful in determining the appropriate use of the Corps’ hopper dredges, including data on solicitations that receive no bids or where all the bids received exceeded the Corps’ cost estimate by more than 25 percent. Corps officials we spoke with said that they are aware when a no-bid or high-bid situation occur, particularly when they use a Corps dredge through their raise the flag procedure because of such a situation. But by tracking and analyzing no-bid and high-bid solicitation data, the Corps may be better positioned to identify gaps in industry’s ability to fulfill certain dredging needs—such as during certain times of the year, in particular geographic areas, or for particular types of projects—and avoid or address any gaps identified. In 2004, the Corps took steps to address our recommendation by modifying data fields in its dredging database, the Corps’ database for maintaining dredging information on each of its dredging projects, to collect data on no-bid and high-bid solicitations. We found, however, that data for these solicitations were not consistently entered into the database across the Corps district offices responsible for entering it. In our review of the Corps’ dredging database, we found that one district office entered data on no-bid and high-bid solicitations. Corps officials from several district offices told us that entering information into the database is tedious and time-consuming. They also indicated that they do not enter information for all data fields because the officials primarily use information from the database for planning and scheduling future dredging work, not for reviewing data on past solicitations or solicitations that did not result in an awarded contract, which would include no-bid and high-bid solicitations.\nCorps headquarters officials we spoke with recognized that tracking and analyzing data on no-bid and high-bid solicitations is important and could serve as a useful decision-making tool in planning future hopper dredging work. However, they have not provided written direction to the district offices to help ensure data on these solicitations are consistently entered into the database. According to officials we spoke with, they have not done so because of other higher-priority action items. The officials added that they have made efforts to ensure district offices consistently enter accurate and complete data into the dredging database, such as emphasizing this activity during periodic meetings with district offices. These outreach efforts have been targeted at entering data into the dredging database as a whole, however, and have not focused specifically on the importance of the data field for tracking no-bid or high- bid solicitations, according to the officials. Federal internal control standards state that management should develop written policies and procedures that staff are to follow as intended. Without complete data on no-bid and high-bid solicitations, the Corps may be missing opportunities to plan future hopper dredging work that identifies and addresses potential gaps in industry’s ability to fulfill certain dredging needs based on this solicitation information.", "In response to our recommendation to assess the data and procedures used to perform the cost estimate used when contracting dredging work to the hopper dredging industry, the Corps took several actions to improve its cost estimates, but some of the information it relies on remains outdated, such as its dredge equipment cost information dating back to the late 1980s. In 2004, and again in 2008, the Corps took actions to evaluate and update certain cost data used in its cost estimates. In 2004, the Corps prepared an internal document that summarized the steps it took to analyze, evaluate, and update certain cost data used in its cost estimates. For example, according to the document, the Corps examined repair and maintenance costs for industry hopper dredges and updated some data for dredge engines. In 2008, the Corps partnered with the Dredging Contractors of America (DCA)—a national association for the dredging industry—to update industry cost data. Corps documentation related to the effort indicated that the Corps learned important information through discussions with industry, and a senior Corps cost-estimating official that we spoke with said that, on the basis of these discussions, the Corps updated the training it provides to Corps staff on preparing hopper dredge cost estimates.\nSome of the data the Corps uses in preparing its hopper dredging cost estimates, however, remain outdated despite the Corps’ attempt to update the information. Specifically, the Corps has not obtained updated technical data on industry hopper dredge equipment or labor rates but instead is relying on outdated information, some of which dates back to the late 1980s. During efforts to update the Corps’ cost-estimating data in 2008, the Corps prepared a survey to collect industry dredge equipment information from the five dredging companies that owned hopper dredges. In cooperation with the Corps, DCA sent the survey to the companies. In the August 2008 letter accompanying the survey, the dredging association stated that “much of the cost basis the Corps uses for industry dredges is old data and limited due to lack of industry input” and noted that the Corps’ ability to obtain the data would be mutually beneficial to the companies and the Corps. Among other things, data the survey sought to collect included costs of dredge acquisition, capital improvements, and certain types of repairs. Efforts to obtain these data were unsuccessful, however, due in part to industry’s concerns about sharing business-sensitive data with the Corps. Industry representatives from one hopper dredging company we spoke with explained that they were concerned that cost data provided to the Corps might become accessible to their competitors and therefore the data were not provided. A senior Corps cost-estimating official we spoke with told us that the Corps limits the release of cost data used in preparing cost estimates within the Corps and that updated industry cost data would assist the Corps in preparing its cost estimates for hopper dredge work. The official also stated that other efforts could be made to obtain updated cost data, including performing a Corps-wide study to evaluate information from each Corps district office with hopper dredging contracts or reviewing contract audits. The Corps, however, has no plans for conducting such a study. In conducting a study, the Corps could assess the most effective and efficient approach for obtaining updated cost data, including examining whether and to what extent it would base its study approach on a review of contracts or contract audits, working directly with industry, or other approaches. Federal internal control standards state the need for federal agencies to establish plans to help ensure goals and objectives A written plan would assist the Corps in obtaining updated can be met.cost data and following sound cost estimating practices, as described in our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide, which is a compilation of cost-estimating best practices drawn from across government and industry. Obtaining reliable and up-to-date data are important for developing sound cost estimates, and the Corps’ cost estimate credibility may suffer if technical data are not updated and maintained, as noted in our cost estimating guide.", "In response to our 2003 recommendation that the Corps prepare a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of existing and proposed restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredge fleet, the Corps prepared an analysis of its fleet for a 2005 report to Congress.its report, the Corps analyzed a number of options for operating its hopper dredges and made a recommendation to Congress for adjusting its fleet based on costs and benefits outlined in its analysis. The Corps recommended an option that it said would, among other things, ensure there was a viable reserve capability ready to respond to unforeseen requirements and ensure the timely accomplishment and reasonable cost for federal projects requiring hopper dredges. Under the option it recommended, the Corps would have (1) increased the Essayons’s dredging by about 35 days, and kept the Yaquina’s dredging days the same; (2) continued to keep the Wheeler in ready reserve; and (3) retired the McFarland. The Water Resources Development Act of 2007 did not specifically address these recommendations, but instead placed the McFarland in ready reserve and removed the then-existing restrictions on the Essayons and Yaquina.", "Since 2003, statutory restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges have resulted in additional costs, but it is unclear whether the restrictions Restrictions have affected competition in the hopper dredging industry.effectively limiting the number of days that Corps dredges can work have resulted in additional costs to the Corps, such as costs to maintain the ready reserve vessels while idle. On the other hand, the restrictions help ensure the Corps’ ability to respond to urgent and emergency dredging needs when industry dredges may be unavailable. The extent to which restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges have affected competition in the dredging industry—as measured by the number of companies with hopper dredges and the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps projects—is unclear, based on our analysis of data on industry bids per Corps solicitation and other factors.", "Since 2003, statutory restrictions on the use of the four Corps’ hopper dredges—in particular, the Wheeler and the McFarland—have resulted in additional costs to the Corps. First, the vessels have needed annual funding to maintain them in ready reserve because, given their limited use, the Corps is unable to recoup their costs with revenues from dredging work. The Corps incurs many of the costs for its hopper dredges—such as paying a crew and keeping engines and other systems in ready working condition—regardless of how much the dredges are used. For instance, placing the McFarland in ready reserve resulted in a substantial decrease in its dredging work (as measured in days worked and amount of material removed) but a relatively small decrease in its operating costs. As shown in table 2, the average annual cubic yards of material removed by the McFarland declined by 60 percent, while its average annual operating costs declined by 16 percent.\nAnnual funding needed to maintain the Wheeler and the McFarland in ready reserve, which is provided through the Corps’ civil works appropriation, has increased since 2003. Specifically, in fiscal year 2003, ready reserve funding for the Wheeler was $7.6 million, and it increased to $13.6 million in fiscal year 2012. In addition, the McFarland has received ready reserve funding of over $11 million each fiscal year since it was placed in ready reserve, resulting in total ready reserve funding for the vessels of over $25 million in fiscal year 2012 (see fig. 3).\nSecond, the ready reserve restrictions have contributed to increases in the daily rate the Corps charges projects for use of the Wheeler’s service, and future increases in the McFarland’s daily rate may also be needed if it experiences unanticipated cost increases. Increases in daily rates may result in either increasing costs, fewer cubic yards of material removed, or both, for the projects that use the Wheeler and McFarland —primarily projects in the Delaware River and the Mississippi River mouth, respectively. Officials from Corps headquarters and district offices responsible for the ready reserve hopper dredges told us they set the dredges’ daily rates in part based on how many days they expect the dredges to work in the coming year and that, in the case of the Wheeler, the limited dredging days since being placed in ready reserve have contributed to higher daily rates. For instance, the Wheeler’s daily rate has increased from $75,000 in fiscal year 2003 to $140,000 in fiscal year 2012, and the Corps expects a rate of $165,000 during fiscal year 2014. Furthermore, although costs for industry hopper dredge work have also increased, officials from a Corps district office that historically used the Wheeler told us that they would now be reluctant to use the vessel instead of an industry hopper dredge because of its high daily rate. In the case of the McFarland, the Corps has increased the vessel’s daily rate from $94,000 in fiscal year 2009 (the last full fiscal year before it was placed in ready reserve) to $100,000 in fiscal year 2012, and officials said they planned to increase and then maintain the daily rate at $110,000 for the next several fiscal years. If there are unanticipated increases in costs for the McFarland, however, such as an unexpected increase in repair costs, Corps officials said they would likely have to increase the vessel’s daily rate to cover such costs. As the officials explained, they set the McFarland’s daily rate with an expectation that the vessel will work 70 days because the ready reserve restrictions do not allow them to increase the number of days the McFarland can work. Therefore, raising the vessel’s daily rate would be the Corps’ primary option to cover an increase in costs.\nOn the West Coast, restrictions on the number of days the Corps’ hopper dredges Essayons and Yaquina could work had led to inefficiencies in completing their work before those restrictions were lifted by the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, according to Corps officials. Before the 2007 act, the Essayons and the Yaquina were restricted to working about 180 workdays annually and, for several years, they reached their operating limits and, therefore, had to return to port before the projects they were working on were finished. The dredges were then sent back to complete the projects once the new fiscal year began, which was in October when weather conditions had begun to deteriorate. As a result, the Corps incurred additional transit and payroll costs while returning to complete the projects. Since the restrictions on these dredges were removed under the 2007 act, Corps officials said they have not had to interrupt ongoing work due to operating limits on the dredges and have had greater flexibility regarding when to perform work.", "The ready reserve restrictions on the Wheeler and McFarland help ensure that they are available to the Corps for responding to urgent and emergency dredging needs, especially in the regions where the dredges are stationed. Demand for hopper dredging often varies substantially from year to year, and month to month, due in part to severe weather events such as hurricanes and floods, other events such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, or environmental restrictions that limit dredging work to certain months of the year. This variability has resulted in periods of high demand during which the Corps has used its ready reserve hopper dredges to respond to urgent or emergency dredging needs when industry hopper dredges were not available. As the Corps noted in its 2005 report to Congress, having the Wheeler in ready reserve is important to ensure that the vessel is available when unforeseen dredging needs occur, while more fully utilizing the Wheeler could limit the Corps’ capability to respond to peak workload demands. Specifically, the Corps has used the Wheeler to respond to urgent or emergency dredging needs 15 times during fiscal years 2003 through 2012. In these cases, according to Corps documents, industry dredges were unavailable to immediately respond to time-sensitive dredging needs at the mouth of the Mississippi River, and the Corps was able to quickly move the Wheeler to the site and conduct the work. Similarly, local pilots and a local port authority we spoke with told us that the McFarland has been critical in addressing dredging needs on the Delaware River and Bay, where the vessel is stationed in ready reserve. Since its placement in ready reserve at the end of 2009, the Corps has used the McFarland to respond to urgent or emergency needs 4 times. Industry representatives from most dredging companies we spoke with agreed that there is a need for Corps hopper dredges, specifically those placed in ready reserve, to respond to urgent or emergency situations when industry hopper dredges are unavailable.", "Since 2003, the extent to which restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges have affected competition in the dredging industry—as measured by the number of companies with hopper dredges and the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps projects—is unclear. A possible benefit of restrictions on the amount of work performed by the Corps’ hopper dredges is that the increased demand for industry hopper dredging services could encourage existing firms to add dredging capacity or new firms to enter the market, which could promote competition, raising the number of bidders and lowering winning bid prices for hopper dredging contracts. In addition, according to dredging industry representatives we spoke with, the more industry dredges can be utilized instead of Corps dredges, the lower the contract prices will be because contractors can spread their costs over more days of operation. However, on the basis of our analysis of (1) the dredging industry, (2) the number of bidders and bid prices for Corps dredging contracts, and (3) other factors that may have affected the level of competition for hopper dredging contracts, it is unclear whether or to what extent the restrictions on the Corps’ hopper dredges may have increased the level of competition in the hopper dredging industry.\nFirst, since 2003, the number of companies with hopper dredges in the United States has not changed, although the number of industry hopper dredges and the total size of these dredges have decreased. Specifically, at the end of 2013, five companies operated one or more hopper dredges. The same number of companies operated hopper dredges in 2003. Of the five companies we reported on in 2003, two sold their hopper dredges and exited the hopper dredging market while two new companies that had not been in the market acquired hopper dredges, and three companies remained the same. Since 2003, the total number of industry vessels decreased from 16 to 13, and the total capacity of these vessels, as measured in cubic yards, decreased by 16 percent. The decrease from 16 to 13 vessels resulted from one company relocating four of its U.S. hopper dredges overseas to perform dredging work primarily in the Middle East,dredge for the U.S. market. In addition, as of January 2014, one company had begun building a new hopper dredge that it expects will be completed in late 2014 or early 2015, and another company announced plans to build a new hopper dredge that it expects will be completed in 2015. If no companies remove existing hopper dredges from the U.S. market, these two dredges, if built as planned, would increase total industry capacity to 13 percent above 2003 levels. According to industry representatives with whom we spoke, dredging companies consider restrictions on the Corps’ hopper dredges in deciding whether to acquire or build a new hopper dredge, but they also consider other factors, such as anticipated funding levels by the Corps, as well as nonfederal work. while another company built a new hopper Second, we did not find evidence of increased competition based on the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps hopper dredging projects since 2003. Economic principles suggest that an increase in the number of competitive bidders in the market should lead to lower prices. The correlation between the number of companies competing for hopper dredging contracts and the winning bid prices for those contracts is As shown in figure 4, in demonstrated by the Corps’ historical data. years where there were more industry bids per Corps solicitation, the average winning industry bid, as a percentage of the Corps’ cost estimate, was generally lower, consistent with economic principles.\nMoreover, available Corps data related to the placement of the McFarland in ready reserve do not show evidence of increased competition in the dredging industry. Specifically, as shown in table 3, after the McFarland was placed in ready reserve, average winning bid prices increased for East Coast maintenance projects (i.e., projects the McFarland might undertake if use of the vessel were not restricted), and the average number of bids for those same projects decreased slightly.\nThird, other factors aside from the ready reserve restrictions may have affected the level of competition in the dredging industry since 2003. Examples of such factors include the following:\nEnvironmental restrictions. Multiple Corps officials and industry representatives told us that environmental restrictions related to endangered sea turtles and other species—which prohibit dredging during the time of year that those species are present—have contributed to fewer bidders for hopper dredging projects, particularly on parts of the East Coast. For instance, because of environmental restrictions, navigation dredging in fiscal year 2014 is limited to December 15, 2013, through March 31, 2014, in much of the Corps’ South Atlantic Division, during which time there are 48 potential Corps dredging projects planned, according to a 2013 Corps planning document. Corps officials attributed the absence of awardable bids for several recent East Coast hopper dredging solicitations to the unavailability of industry hopper dredges when the projects were scheduled to occur—during the period of high demand for hopper dredges caused by environmental restrictions. In addition, they expressed concern that similar shortages of bids could occur in the future.\nCoordination among Corps district offices. Increased coordination in scheduling hopper dredging projects across Corps district offices has helped distribute projects more evenly over time so that more companies had hopper dredges available with which to bid on projects, according to Corps officials. In contrast, when a large number of projects occur at the same time, dredging companies may not have enough dredges available to bid on all projects, thereby reducing the number of bidders for the projects. According to Corps officials we spoke with, increased regional coordination and sharing of up-to-date information on upcoming dredging needs across district offices has helped the Corps to better inform industry of planned work and align the scheduling of projects with the availability of industry dredges. In particular, Corps officials said increased coordination helped the Corps avoid scheduling too many projects simultaneously during a period of increased demand for hopper dredging work following Hurricane Sandy and a Gulf Coast rebuilding effort to protect against the coastal impacts of oil spills.\nDemand for nonfederal hopper dredging work. Corps officials and industry representatives also told us that demand for hopper dredging work from states, private sources, and foreign governments has reduced the number of industry hopper dredges available for Corps projects. For instance, following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, there was an increase in private and state funding for hopper dredge work to construct barrier islands to protect the coastline from the effects of the oil spill. Demand for hopper dredges for this work affected the dredges’ availability for Corps navigation projects, according to Corps documents and officials, and industry representatives. In addition, representatives from one company said that, in part, because of increasing demand for hopper dredges from foreign governments—specifically in the Middle East—the company relocated several hopper dredges overseas, removing them from the U.S. market.\nDifferences in hopper dredge capabilities. Because there are important variations in the size and capabilities of hopper dredges, the requirements of specific dredging projects can result in a limited number of dredges that may be able to effectively compete for a particular dredging project. For instance, the state of California requires hopper dredges to use reduced-emissions engines, in accordance with state air quality regulations. Of the 13 industry hopper dredges, only 3 have such engines, according to a Corps official. Similarly, according to Corps documents, a hopper dredge working at the mouth of the Columbia River in Oregon must be able to dredge against strong currents and endure large waves—capabilities that less than half of the industry fleet possesses, according to a Corps official. Other requirements, such as the depth of the waterway being dredged, or whether the material removed needs to be pumped onto the shore, can also limit which dredges can effectively compete for and carry out the work.", "Key challenges the Corps faces in managing its hopper dredge fleet are (1) ensuring the fiscal sustainability of its hopper dredges and (2) making decisions about the future of its hopper fleet composition, including the utilization of its existing fleet, changes to its existing fleet—including repairs, and the replacement or retirement of any vessels—and the utilization of any new replacement vessels.", "The Corps faces challenges in ensuring the fiscal sustainability of its hopper dredges. In a 2012 study the Corps conducted on the fiscal condition of its hopper dredges, it identified increasing ownership and operating costs for its four hopper dredges, among other things, as a cause for concern and stated that the dredges would become unaffordable unless actions were taken. For instance, the Corps’ study projected that, in fiscal year 2012, the Corps’ total end of fiscal year account balance for its four hopper dredges would exceed their funding levels by over $15 million dollars, and that fiscal problems would continue for the four hopper dredges through fiscal year 2016. The Corps stated in the study that it was concerned that project funding, which the Corps’ hopper dredges depend on to varying degrees, was not increasing and, in some cases, was decreasing.\nThe Corps’ 2012 study identified several actions to take to operate all of its hopper dredges with a positive account balance by the end of fiscal year 2015. For example, based on the study, a corresponding July 2012 implementation memorandum, and our discussions with Corps officials, the Corps increased the daily rates all four of the Corps’ hopper dredges charge to projects that use the dredges, beginning in fiscal year 2012; increased funding in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 budgets for projects that use its hopper dredges to compensate for the vessels’ corresponding increases in daily rates; and formed a team to conduct a hopper dredge operating cost review including, among other things, an evaluation of the affordability of two hopper dredges, the Wheeler and the Yaquina, by June 30, 2014.\nA Corps official told us that the August 2013 grounding accident that the Essayons’ experienced while dredging made the vessel inoperable for about a month while it underwent repairs. In the case of the Wheeler, a Corps official estimated that the delays in replacing the Wheeler’s engines caused the vessel to remain out of operation at least 4 months more than the Corps initially planned. In addition, during this time, a cruise vessel broke free from its moorings during a storm and collided with the Wheeler when it was in the repair yard, which further delayed the Wheeler’s return to work, according to the Corps. deficit by about $2 million, increasing the vessel’s daily rate in fiscal year 2014 and dredging work in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 would give the vessel a positive account balance. Corps officials acknowledged that the Wheeler’s situation was more precarious because it ended fiscal year 2013 with a deficit of over $5 million more than projected in the Corps’ 2012 study, given the engine replacement delay. To get the Wheeler to a positive account balance by the end of fiscal year 2015, Corps officials said that they anticipated increasing the Wheeler’s daily rate and potential dredging activity to more than 70 days under ready reserve in fiscal year 2014. Corps officials said they believe they have some flexibility with the number of days the vessel can dredge since there is not a set amount specified in statute. Corps officials stated they are not planning further actions beyond those identified in the 2012 study at this time, but they acknowledged that additional measures, such as pursuing a permanent increase in the amount of days that the Wheeler may dredge each year under ready reserve, might be warranted if the vessel’s fiscal situation does not improve by the end of fiscal year 2014.", "The Corps also faces challenges in making decisions about the future composition of its hopper dredge fleet. Some of the factors that make it difficult for the Corps to determine what composition of its fleet would best allow it to conduct dredging activities in the manner most economical and advantageous to the United States include the following:\nAging Corps’ fleet. The aging of the Corps’ hopper fleet, contrasted with the millions of dollars the Corps has invested to upgrade the vessels, has made it challenging for the Corps to determine the long- term sustainability of its hopper dredges. Three of the Corps’ four hopper dredges—Essayons, Wheeler, and Yaquina—have been in service for at least 30 years, and the McFarland has been in service over 45 years. According to Corps documentation, the Corps plans a 50-year investment life for its hopper dredges and, based on historical records, major repairs are typically needed when a dredge is about 30 years old. Since 2009, the Corps has invested millions of dollars in replacing and upgrading needed equipment on its four hopper dredges. For example, among other things, the Essayons, Wheeler, and Yaquina all had their engines replaced within the last 5 years allowing them to meet higher air quality emission standards. Similarly, the McFarland’s electrical systems were replaced in fiscal year 2011, which increased the vessel’s efficiency, since many of the systems were original equipment. According to Corps documents and officials, overall, all four hopper dredges are in good operating condition, but given the age of the vessels, the Corps has recognized the need to assess future repair or replacement options for its hopper dredges.\nEffects on industry. Because the Corps relies on both its own dredges and industry dredges to complete hopper dredging work, it needs to factor in both fleets in making future decisions about the composition of its own fleet. As of March 2014, 13 hopper dredges in the U.S. industry fleet had been in service for an average of about 27 years, though information on the extent to which these vessels have been maintained, upgraded, or may be close to going out of service has not been shared by industry with the Corps. During a discussion with industry representatives, however, representatives said that the hopper dredging industry is driven by competition, and they maintain their dredges to be as efficient as possible to improve their competitiveness in the market. Corps officials from several district offices we spoke with said that, because of the increasing use of industry hopper dredges for nonfederal beach nourishment projects, as well as anticipated increases in federal hopper dredging projects, industry’s availability to respond to the nation’s navigation dredging needs may be stretched. These officials said that, as a result, maintaining the Corps’ current fleet composition and perhaps increasing the use of some of the vessels, may be warranted. In contrast, most of the industry representatives we spoke with said they believe that industry has the ability to handle any increases in dredging projects, and the Corps’ fleet should be further restricted or even reduced. These representatives stated that if the Corps increased its hopper dredge capability, then industry’s portion of the overall dredging work would be reduced possibly leading companies to increase prices to cover their operating costs or potentially relocate their hopper dredges overseas.\nFunding uncertainties. Variability regarding federal funding for dredging also poses challenges to the Corps’ plans for its fleet. While funding for hopper dredging has increased since fiscal year 2003 and was about $370 million in fiscal year 2012, Corps officials and stakeholders we spoke with said that, at recent funding levels, there were substantial unmet hopper dredging needs such as providing dredging for small ports and harbors.\nCorps, 2011 Minimum Fleet Capital Investment Report. This study encompassed all 10 dredges in the Corps’ minimum dredge fleet, which includes the 4 hopper dredges reviewed in this report, and 6 other dredges of different types that are generally used for different dredging projects. conducting a life-cycle cost analysis to support funding plans for future dredging needs which would include a cost comparison to either (1) use and then replace the vessels or (2) repair and sustain the vessels.\nThe 2011 study developed options based on three funding scenarios— increased, sustained, or decreased—and, as stated in the study and the Corps’ implementation memorandum, the Corps selected the option associated with sustained funding levels as the best course of action. Should increased funding become available for dredging, a Corps official we spoke with said the Corps may need to adjust its planned course of action. The officials said that the 2011 study could provide the Corps with direction for adjusting its actions. For example, as noted in the study under the increased funding scenario, the Corps could continue with its planned fleet improvements instead of deferring them under the sustained option.", "Hopper dredges play a vital role in keeping the nation’s ports, harbors, and other waterways open for commerce. Over the past several decades, the Corps has increasingly relied on industry to carry out hopper dredging work, but it has also maintained its own minimum fleet of four hopper dredges, in part to ensure its ability to respond to critical dredging needs during periods of high demand. The Corps is faced with the task of balancing the hopper dredging work it contracts out to industry and maintaining the viability of its own fleet. The Corps has recognized the need to make changes to manage its hopper dredge fleet in a fiscally sustainable manner and has taken several actions to do so, including assessing the need to potentially modify the composition of its fleet. Since our 2003 report, the Corps has also made progress in addressing our recommendations to improve the information it maintains to manage its hopper dredging program, including modifying data fields in its dredging database to track solicitations that receive no bids or where all the bids received exceeded the Corps’ cost estimate by more than 25 percent. However, because Corps district offices are not consistently populating the database with these solicitation data, the Corps does not have accurate or complete information that may help it identify potential gaps in industry’s ability to fulfill certain dredging needs, which could inform its plans for future hopper dredging work. Additionally, the Corps made attempts to update the industry cost data it uses to prepare its cost estimates for hopper dredging contracts. Yet, some of the data it relies on remain outdated, and the Corps has no plans to update the information, such as through a Corps-wide study. Until the Corps has a plan for obtaining and then consistently updating reliable cost data, the Corps’ ability to ensure the soundness of its cost estimates may suffer.", "We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps of Engineers to take the following two actions: To ensure the Corps of Engineers has the information it needs to analyze and make informed decisions regarding future hopper dredging work, provide written direction to its district offices on the importance of and need to accurately and consistently populate the data fields in its dredging database that track solicitations that receive no bids or where all the bids received exceeded the Corps’ cost estimate by more than 25 percent.\nTo assist the Corps in preparing sound and credible cost estimates for soliciting bids for hopper dredge work by industry, develop a written plan for conducting a study to obtain and periodically update data on hopper dredging costs for its cost estimates, including reliable data on industry hopper dredge equipment and labor rates.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense and the Dredging Contractors of America (DCA) for review and comment. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix III, the Department of Defense concurred with our recommendations and stated that (1) the Corps will issue a letter to the district offices reinforcing the need to provide accurately and timely information in the Corps’ dredging database, including information for solicitations that receive no bids or where all the bids received exceeded the Corps’ cost estimate by more than 25 percent and (2) the Corps will develop a written plan as resources allow. The Corps also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate.\nDCA provided written comments, which are summarized below and reprinted in appendix IV along with our responses. DCA neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations but disagreed with several statements in our report and raised objections to certain aspects of our scope and methodology. We disagree with DCA’s comments as discussed below. Specifically, in its comments, DCA disagreed with our statement that a direct and valid comparison of work performed by industry to work performed by the Corps is not possible and stated that a third-party consultant performed an analysis of the Corps and industry hopper dredges performing similar work. According to DCA’s comments, the industry hopper dredges can work for significantly less than Corps dredges. As we state in our report, we believe that a number of factors prohibit a direct and valid comparison of the Corps’ and industry’s costs of performing hopper dredge work, including limits to the number of days some Corps’ dredges may operate and differences between dredging projects, such as the type of material dredged. In providing its estimates of cost savings for industry dredging, DCA did not provide information indicating how or whether it took such factors into account or to enable us to evaluate the reasonableness of its estimates.\nDCA also questioned how, if one of the fundamental conclusions of our study is that the Corps has not made sufficient progress to improve the accuracy of its cost estimates, we could use those same government cost estimates to make industry competitiveness inferences. We concluded, however, that it is unclear whether statutory restrictions have affected competition in the hopper dredging industry. In reaching that conclusion, we analyzed a number of factors—including the number of companies with hopper dredges, the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps projects, and other factors such as environmental restrictions, the demand for nonfederal hopper dredging work, and differences in hopper dredge capabilities. We agree that obtaining reliable and up-to-date data are important for developing sound cost estimates, and our report recommends that the Corps develop a written plan for conducting a study to obtain and periodically update data on hopper dredging costs for its cost estimates.\nDCA disagreed with our discussion on the capacity of the industry hopper dredge fleet, stating specifically that one industry dredge, the Long Island, should not have been included in our analysis because it had not been used for maintenance dredging and had not been used on a project for quite a few years. For our report, we did not limit our analysis to particular types of hopper dredging projects, such as maintenance projects, and we compared industry’s total capacity today with what we reported in 2003, which we believe is a valid comparison. Moreover, in its comments on our 2003 report on hopper dredging, DCA included the Long Island in its list of industry dredges to support its point that industry hopper dredging capacity had increased in the decade leading up to 2003. As a result, we continue to believe it was appropriate to include the Long Island as a part of our analysis.\nDCA stated our analysis of how the Corps’ manages its hopper dredges was not comprehensive or objective and questioned why we did not examine options for retiring or further reducing the use of Corps’ dredges. DCA suggested that such an examination should take place and would be in line with the congressional intent of increasing the use of private industry dredges. However, DCA quotes selectively from the main statute that governs the Corps' hopper dredging activities. While those portions of the law read in isolation could suggest that the Corps should take further steps to privatize its hopper dredge work, other provisions of the same law either (1) give the Corps broad discretion to implement its hopper dredge responsibilities or (2) directly restrict the Corps' ability to reduce or eliminate Corps’ dredges. It was not the purpose of our report to examine policy options for carrying out the Corps’ hopper dredge work, including those not presently authorized under statute. We did examine and discuss actions the Corps has taken or plans to take in managing its hopper dredges, which include, among other things, conducting a hopper dredge operating cost review and evaluating retirement or replacement options.\nAs agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.", "This report examines (1) the actions the Corps has taken to address our 2003 recommendations for improving the information needed to manage its hopper dredging program and develop cost estimates for industry contracts; (2) the effects since 2003, if any, of the statutory restrictions placed on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges; and (3) key challenges, if any, the Corps faces in managing its hopper dredge fleet.\nTo conduct our work, we reviewed Pub. L. No. 95-269, which established the Corps’ minimum fleet, the Water Resources Development Acts of 1996 and 2007, and other laws, regulations, and Corps’ policy and guidance governing the Corps’ use of hopper dredges. We interviewed officials from Corps headquarters, division offices, and the 9 Corps district offices with the largest hopper dredging workload during fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2012 (out of a total of 17 district offices that contracted with industry for hopper dredging work during the time period): Galveston, Jacksonville, Mobile, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle. We also visited the Corps’ four hopper dredges and one industry hopper dredge for informational tours of these vessels to gain a better understanding of their physical characteristics and operations. We interviewed representatives from the national association for the dredging industry, the Dredging Contractors of America, and the five dredging companies that own and operate hopper dredges—Cashman Dredging, Dutra Group, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, Manson Construction Co., and Weeks Marine, Inc. We also interviewed other stakeholders involved in hopper dredging, including a national pilots’ association and a national port authority association, and local pilots’ associations and port authorities from the areas where Corps hopper dredges are stationed—New Orleans, LA; Philadelphia, PA; and Portland, OR. We focused our review on the 10-year period between fiscal year 2003—when we conducted our previous review of the Corps’ —and fiscal year 2012—the most recent year for which hopper dredgesCorps information on hopper dredging was readily available. In addition, we focused our review on the four hopper dredges in the Corps’ minimum dredge fleet during the period of our review: the Essayons, McFarland, Wheeler, and Yaquina, and did not include other dredge types.\nU.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Report to Congress: Hopper Dredges (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2005). numbers of bids and bid prices for the contracts. To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed officials from the Corps’ Navigation Data Center who maintain the database, as well as officials from nine Corps district offices who are responsible for entering and updating data on their district offices’ dredging activities. We reviewed documentation related to the database, such as the user’s guide and data dictionary, and electronically tested the data for missing or erroneous values and, in several cases, obtained updated or corrected data from the Corps. We determined the data we used on the type and location of the dredging work, the type of contract, and the number of industry bids and bid prices for sealed-bid solicitations were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also analyzed financial data on the Corps’ hopper dredges, including their operating and ownership costs, and income from ready reserve funding. To assess the reliability of the Corps’ financial data, we interviewed Corps officials who maintain these data, compared the data to other sources of information on the Corps’ hopper dredges, and obtained clarifying information from the Corps for certain items such as ready reserve funding. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We obtained and reviewed information from the five dredging companies that own and operate hopper dredges, including information on their hopper dredges’ capabilities, dredging work they performed, and changes to their hopper dredge fleet since 2003. We did not directly compare work performed by industry hopper dredges with work performed by the Corps’ hopper dredges because, as we first reported in 2003, a direct and valid comparison of the Corps’ and industry’s costs to perform hopper dredge work is not possible due to various factors. of its hopper dredges. In addition to reviewing the 2012 fiscal study, we also obtained and analyzed additional data related to the financial condition of the Corps’ hopper dredges. We also obtained and reviewed the Corps’ 2012 and 2013 implementation memorandums related to both studies and discussed with Corps officials the actions the Corps has taken—and plans to take—related to the memorandums. We examined changes and potential challenges the Corps faces related to managing its hopper dredge fleet, including dredging accidents, repair delays, and potential funding changes. We discussed general Corps fleet management and composition options with industry officials and the other stakeholders we interviewed.\nWe conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to April 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "As of March 2014, 17 hopper dredges were operating in the United States, 13 of which were owned by industry (see table 4). In addition, 2 industry hopper dredges are expected to be added to the U.S. fleet by 2015.", "", "The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Dredging Contractors of America dated March 11, 2014. 1. We believe that various factors prohibit a direct and valid comparison of the Corps’ and industry’s costs to perform hopper dredge work including: (1) design features in the Corps’ vessels in support of national defense missions, which add weight to the vessels and make them less efficient than industry dredges; (2) limits to the number of days some of the Corps’ vessels may operate; and (3) differences between dredging projects—such as type of material dredged, type of work, corresponding risk level, and distance from the dredging operations to the placement site. In providing its estimates of cost savings for industry dredging, DCA provided no information indicating how or whether its third-party consultant took such factors into account. DCA also did not provide enough information on the consultant’s analysis for us to be able to determine how it reached its conclusions that industry dredges can work for less than Corps dredges. Based on our work, we continue to believe, as we state in our report, that since 2003, statutory restrictions on the use of Corps’ hopper dredges have resulted in additional costs to the Corps. 2. DCA referred to three appendixes in their written comments. These appendixes included Excel spreadsheets with various dredging data. We did not reprint these spreadsheets with DCA’s written comments. 3. It was not the purpose of our report to evaluate policy options for carrying out the Corps’ hopper dredge work, including those not presently authorized by law, such as vessel retirements or alternative ready reserve methods. The Corps' authority to retire its hopper dredges or reduce their workload is limited by statute, and DCA did not indicate why it believes retirements would be consistent with existing law. According to statute, the Corps \"may not further reduce the readiness status of any Federal hopper dredge below a ready reserve status except any vessel placed in such status for not less than 5 years that the Secretary determines has not been used sufficiently to justify retaining the vessel in such status.\"The Corps has made no such determination. In addition, the Corps may \"not reduce the availability and utilization of Federal hopper dredge vessels stationed on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts below that which occurred in fiscal year 1996 to meet the navigation dredging needs of the ports on those coasts.\" In the Water Resources and Development Act of 2007, Congress directed the Corps to place the McFarland in ready reserve. But even assuming this provision implicitly repealed the prior statute as applied to the McFarland, the Water Resources and Development Act of 2007 provided that the McFarland must be maintained in a \"ready reserve fully operational condition.\" Similarly, the law requires the Wheeler to be maintained in a \"fully operational condition.\" Furthermore, the law assigns to the Corps the responsibility for carrying out hopper dredge work \"in the manner most economical and advantageous to the United States.\" This language \"evidences congressional intent to confer on the Army Corps wide discretion in matters relating to its dredging activities.” 4. We used only the Dredging Information System data that we determined were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Specifically, as noted in our report, we used data on the type and location of dredging work, the type of contract, and the number of industry bids and bid prices for sealed-bid solicitations. DCA stated that, with the introduction of Multiple Award Task Order Contracting, our analysis of the number of bidders and bid prices may be distorted. As noted in our report, however, we limited our analysis to awarded, sealed-bid solicitations for which the Corps had reliable data on the numbers of bids and bid prices, and we did not include the procurement method mentioned by DCA. Our analysis of the Dredging Information System data indicates that about 76 percent of hopper dredging contracts awarded by the Corps from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2012 (and about 89 percent of hopper dredging contracts awarded in fiscal year 2012 alone) were awarded through the sealed-bid process. 5. In characterizing urgent and emergency work in our report, we relied on the definitions outlined in the Corps’ raise the flag procedure, which we believe was the appropriate way to define and report on how the Corps collects and tracks the urgent or emergency work its hopper dredges carry out. Corps data show that urgent and emergency work have occurred from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2012 as we state in our report. 6. We did not comment on the lack of evidence of increased competition based solely on the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps hopper dredging projects. Rather, we reached our conclusion—that it is unclear whether statutory restrictions have affected competition in the hopper dredging industry— after analyzing a number of factors, including the number of companies with hopper dredges, the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps projects, and other factors such as environmental restrictions, the Corps' efforts to better coordinate dredging activities, demand for nonfederal hopper dredging work, and differences in hopper dredge capabilities. See also comment 4. 7. We did not make industry competitiveness inferences based on the Corps’ cost estimates alone, see comment 6. We agree that obtaining reliable and up-to-date data are important for developing sound cost estimates, and our report recommends that the Corps develop a written plan for conducting a study to obtain and periodically update data on hopper dredging costs for its cost estimates. 8. We included the industry hopper dredge Long Island as available hopper dredge capacity in 2003, based on information provided by the Corps and DCA. In official comments on our 2003 report on hopper dredging, DCA included the Long Island in its list of industry dredges to support the point that industry hopper dredging capacity had increased in the decade leading up to 2003. This dredge was since removed from the U.S. market and, therefore, we factored its removal in our calculation of the change in overall industry capacity since 2003. We included all hopper dredging projects in our analysis and did not limit our analysis to maintenance projects. In addition, we did not examine use, but rather industry capacity. 9. During interviews with the industry representatives who owned the dredges that were removed from the U.S. market, we were told that the dredges were moved overseas, in part, because of increasing demand for hopper dredges by foreign governments, and, that the dredges have performed work overseas, indicating overseas demand. We also recognize a lack of work in the United States may have also been a factor in the relocation of these dredges, and we have added text to our report to note this. 10. We used the Corps’ definition of its minimum hopper dredge fleet in determining the scope of our review. The law establishing the minimum fleet gave the Corps discretion to determine the fleet’s size and composition. In addition, the capacity of the four Corps’ hopper dredges ranges from about 1,050 cubic yards to about 8,300 cubic yards, which is similar to the private industry hopper dredges’ capacity, which ranges from 1,300 cubic yards to 13,500 cubic yards. In contrast, the Murden and Currituck’s total capacity is 512 and 315 cubic yards, respectively, making them significantly smaller dredges than the hopper dredges in the Corps’ and private industry’s fleet. Moreover, the Murden was commissioned into active duty in May 2013, and it was, therefore, not part of the Corps’ fleet during the period of our review, from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2012. 11. The law makes no reference to \"training days\" and does not impose a specific cap on the number of days for which the Wheeler may operate. The Corps has, as a matter of practice, scheduled training work for the Wheeler in order to \"periodically perform routine tests of the equipment of the vessel to ensure the vessel's ability to perform emergency work.” 12. An examination of using industry dredges in a ready reserve mode was beyond the scope of this review. 13. In our report, we make frequent references to the fact that legislation placed the Wheeler and the McFarland in ready reserve, and we provide funding information for the Corps’ dredging program, including the specific funding to support the Wheeler and McFarland in their ready reserve status. We did not identify alternatives for how the Corps might reduce the costs to operate these vessels, but we did examine and discuss actions the Corps has taken or plans to take in managing its hopper fleet, which include, among other things, conducting a hopper dredge operating cost review and evaluating retirement or replacement options. 14. The way that hopper dredges recover their costs is by actively dredging, and, fewer days of work will equate to higher rates when work is performed because of the fewer days available to spread out costs. As noted in our report, daily rates for Corps hopper dredges have increased and may continue to increase due to several factors such as increasing fuel costs and changes in Corps accounting methods, in addition to ready reserve restrictions on two of the dredges. We did not quantify the extent to which individual factors contributed to increases in daily rates, rather we report that restrictions on the number of days ready reserve hopper dredges can work have contributed to increases in their daily rates. We agree that the Essayons, operating on the West Coast with no restrictions, has increased its annual costs and daily rates since becoming unrestricted. However, we found that the increase in the Essayons daily rate from $95,000 in fiscal year 2008—the last year in which it was restricted—to $100,000 in fiscal year 2012 was substantially smaller than that of the Wheeler, with a daily rate increase from $95,000 to $140,000 over the same period. 15. We agree that one basic congressional tenet of the Water Resources Development Act of 1996 was to increase the use of private industry hopper dredges but, as we have noted, the law also directly restricts the Corps' ability to reduce the use of or eliminate Corps’ dredges. See comment 3. We do not agree that collecting more solicitation information would result in enhanced opportunities for the Corps’ hopper dredges to be used more. Rather, we believe that in collecting this solicitation information, the Corps may be able to better plan for future hopper dredging work, whether done by industry dredges or Corps dredges. 16. Based on our review of Corps’ documentation related to the example cited, we found that industry was provided several opportunities to bid on the work. Specifically, after soliciting bids for the work and receiving only one bid, which was more than 25 percent above the government cost estimate, the Corps reviewed its cost estimate, found it to be reasonable, and began negotiations with the company that had submitted the bid. The parties were unable to agree on a price for the work, however, so the Corps then provided a second notification to industry, indicating that there was an urgent need for dredging. According to Corps documentation, no dredging company expressed both the availability and the capability to address the dredging need and, therefore, the Corps used one of its own dredges to complete the work.", "", "", "In addition to the individual listed above, Alyssa M. Hundrup, Assistant Director; Hiwotte Amare; John Delicath; Cindy Gilbert; Miles Ingram; Richard P. Johnson; Delwen Jones; Kirk D. Menard; Samuel Morris; Mehrzad Nadji; Dan Royer; and Tatiana T. Winger made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h3_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h0_title h2_full", "h2_full", "h0_full h2_full", "h3_full", "", "", "h0_full h3_full h4_full", "", "", "h3_full h4_full h1_full", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What actions has the Corps taken to address GAO's 2003 recommendations?", "Why might this data be incomplete?", "How could improving the quality of this data benefit the Corps?", "What data did the Corps assess in response to GAO's recommendation?", "Why might this data be unreliable?", "How could this data be updated?", "How could updating data benefit the Corps?", "How have statutory restrictions on the use of hopper dredges impacted the Corps' budget?", "Why are these restrictions beneficial to the Corps?", "How have these restrictions impacted competition in the dredging industry?", "What data did GAO find to support this?", "What are the key challenges the Corps faces in managing its hopper dredge fleet?", "How did the Corps determine that its hopper dredges were unsustainable?", "What makes it difficult to determine the best fleet composition?", "How could the Corps address these challenges?", "How does the Corps bear responsibility for shipping routes?", "How does the Corps dredge sediment from waterways?", "What did GAO do in 2003?", "What was GAO asked to review?", "What does this report examine?", "How did GAO collect data for this report?" ], "summary": [ "The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has taken actions to address GAO's 2003 recommendations for improving information related to hopper dredging, but some data gaps remain. First, in response to GAO's recommendation to obtain and analyze data needed to determine the appropriate use of its hopper dredge fleet, the Corps established a tracking log to document urgent or emergency work its dredges carry out. The Corps also modified its dredging database to track solicitations for industry contracts that received no bids and bids exceeding the Corps' cost estimate by more than 25 percent, referred to as high bids.", "Corps district offices, however, do not consistently enter data on these solicitations, and Corps headquarters has not provided written direction to the district offices to ensure data are consistently entered.", "Tracking and analyzing no-bid and high-bid solicitation data could enable the Corps to identify and address gaps in industry's ability to fulfill certain dredging needs as the Corps plans its future hopper dredging work.", "Second, in response to GAO's recommendation, the Corps took action to assess the data and procedures it used for developing cost estimates when soliciting industry contracts.", "However, certain industry cost data the Corps relies on remain outdated. For example, some of the data it uses on hopper dredge equipment date back to the late 1980s.", "A senior Corps official stated that a study could be conducted to update the data, but the Corps has no plans to conduct such a study.", "Having a plan for obtaining updated data is important for developing sound cost estimates.", "Statutory restrictions on the use of the Corps' hopper dredges since 2003 have resulted in costs to the Corps, but the effect on competition in the hopper dredging industry is unclear. Restrictions limiting the number of days that Corps dredges can work have resulted in additional costs such as costs to maintain certain Corps dredges while they are idle; the Corps incurs many of the costs for owning and operating its hopper dredges regardless of how much they are used.", "The restrictions, however, help ensure the Corps has the ability to use these dredges to respond to urgent or emergency dredging needs when industry dredges are unavailable.", "It is not clear to what extent restrictions have affected competition in the dredging industry. The number of U.S. companies with hopper dredges has not changed, but the number and size of these dredges have decreased since 2003.", "In addition, GAO did not find evidence of increased competition based on the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps hopper dredging projects since 2003.", "Key challenges facing the Corps in managing its hopper dredge fleet are (1) ensuring the fiscal sustainability of its hopper dredges and (2) determining the fleet's appropriate future composition.", "In 2012, the Corps determined that because of increasing ownership and operating costs, among other things, its hopper dredges would become unaffordable unless actions were taken, including increasing the daily rates charged to projects using the Corps' dredges.", "Factors such as the aging of the Corps' fleet and the effect on industry of possible changes to the Corps' fleet make it difficult for the Corps to determine the best fleet composition.", "In studies it conducted in 2011 and 2012, the Corps identified actions that could help address these challenges, such as reviewing the operating costs of hopper dredges to evaluate the affordability of certain dredges.", "The Corps is responsible for dredging sediment from waterways to maintain shipping routes important for commerce.", "One dredge type, a hopper dredge, performs much of the dredging in ports and harbors, and the Corps uses its own fleet of hopper dredges and contracts with industry to carry out the work.", "In 2003, GAO examined the Corps' hopper dredging program and made recommendations to improve its management.", "GAO was asked to review changes to the program.", "This report examines (1) actions the Corps has taken to address GAO's 2003 recommendations for improving the information needed to manage its hopper dredging program and develop cost estimates for industry contracts; (2) effects since 2003, if any, of the statutory restrictions placed on the use of the Corps' hopper dredges; and (3) key challenges, if any, the Corps faces in managing its hopper dredge fleet.", "GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and policies governing the Corps' use of hopper dredges, and related Corps reports. GAO analyzed dredging contract and financial data for fiscal years 2003-2012, assessed the reliability of these data, and interviewed Corps and dredging stakeholders." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 0, 3, 4, 4, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-12-497	{ "title": [ "Background", "Eligibility Criteria", "Initial Determinations and Continuing Disability Reviews", "Policy Changes to Eligibility Criteria", "Number of Children Applying for and Receiving SSI Benefits Due to Mental Impairments Has Increased", "Examiners Rely on a Combination of Key Information Sources to Determine Medical Eligibility", "When Used in Eligibility Decisions, Medication and Treatment Information Is Frequently a Basis for Denying Benefits", "Examiners Sometimes Lack Complete Information to Inform Their Decision Making and Identify Potential Threats to Program Integrity", "SSA Has Conducted Few Childhood CDRs in Recent Years", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology", "Appendix II: Listings for Mental Disorders for Children under Age 18", "Appendix III: Trends on the Three Most Prevalent Primary Impairments among Children with Mental Impairments in the Supplemental Security Income Program", "Appendix IV: Reported Medication and Psychotropic Drug Use among Children Applying for Supplemental Security Income by Select Impairments, Fiscal Year 2010", "Appendix V: Comments from the Social Security Administration", "Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Since 1974, the SSI program, under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended, has provided benefits to low-income blind and disabled persons—including adults and children,individuals—who meet financial eligibility requirements and the definition of disability. For individuals under age 18, a disability is a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that results in marked and severe functional limitations, and is expected to result in death or which as well as certain aged has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Families of children receiving SSI payments are generally required to use the benefit to meet a child’s needs, including food, clothing, and shelter. The maximum federal benefit payment for a child receiving SSI benefits in 2012 is $698 per month, regardless of the severity of the child’s impairment.monthly federal child payment was $592.\nThe medical evaluation is conducted under applicable legal requirements and SSA policy. severe impairment that does not meet or medically equal any listing, the DDS will then determine whether the impairment results in limitations that functionally equal the listings.", "To aid in evaluating whether a child is medically eligible, DDS offices review various medical and nonmedical information about the child, such as physician notes, psychological tests, school records, and teacher assessments. In certain situations, such as when the evidence is not sufficient to support a decision as to whether a child is disabled, the DDS may purchase a consultative examination to assist in making the decision. If there is evidence that indicates the existence of a mental impairment, the DDS is supposed to make every reasonable effort to ensure that a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist has completed the medical portion of the case review.\nAfter the initial determination has been made and before returning the case file to complete any outstanding nondisability case development, SSA selects a sample of initial determinations for a quality assurance review. If the case is sampled, the reviewing component sends the case to the servicing field office upon completion of its review. If the claimant is determined to be disabled, the field office computes the benefit amount and initiates benefit payment. If the claim is denied, a claimant has 60 days to request that the DDS reconsider its decision. If the claimant is dissatisfied with the reconsideration, he or she may request a hearing before an administrative law judge, whose decision may then be reviewed by SSA’s Appeals Council. When these administrative review options have been exhausted, the claimant may request judicial review by filing an action in a federal district court.\nIf SSA determines that an individual is disabled, the agency is required by law to conduct periodic reviews, known as continuing disability reviews (CDR), to verify the recipient’s continued medical eligibility for receiving benefits in certain circumstances. More specifically, SSA is generally required to perform CDRs (1) during the first year after birth for babies whose low birth weight is a contributing factor to the determination of disability and (2) at least once every 3 years for all other children under age 18 whose conditions are considered likely to improve. DDS offices determine when recipients will be due for CDRs on the basis of their potential for medical improvement, and select and schedule a review date—otherwise known as a “diary date”—for each recipient’s CDR. At the time of these reviews, the child’s representative payee generally must present evidence that the child is and has been receiving medically necessary and available treatment for his or her impairment. SSA is also generally required to redetermine the eligibility of children against the adult criteria for disability after they reach age 18.", "Since SSI’s inception, a number of policy changes have influenced how SSA makes disability decisions and the extent children with mental impairments are eligible to participate in the program. In 1984, Congress mandated the development of new disability standards for individuals with mental impairments and the consideration of the impact of multiple impairments in determining disability, among other things. SSA subsequently expanded the list of mental impairments it considers disabling in 1985 and again in 1990, when SSA added impairments such as ADHD.\nIn 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Sullivan v.\nZebley that SSA’s use of medical listings of impairments for children— without conducting a functional analysis—was incomplete. In response, SSA established “functional equivalence” as a basis for SSI eligibility for children, whereby a child can be found medically eligible for benefits if the child’s impairment limits his or her functional ability to the same degree as described in a listed impairment. In deciding whether an impairment functionally equals the listings, SSA examines how the child functions compared to children of the same age who do not have impairments— rather than basing the decision on the child’s medical diagnosis. The Court’s decision also resulted in the introduction of the individualized functional assessment. This assessment was intended to be comparable to SSA’s method for evaluating adult impairments and to broaden the evaluation of disability in children with physical and mental impairments to include the effects of impairments on a child’s ability to perform age- appropriate activities on a day-to-day basis. Awards to children, especially those with mental impairments, increased dramatically for several years following the Sullivan v. Zebley decision due partly to SSA readjudicating nearly 300,000 determinations made between January 1980 and February 1991 under the revised disability criteria. By 1994, SSA had reprocessed the majority of these cases, and subsequently returned to processing their normal case loads. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) changed the standard for children, and the act was expected to reduce the number of awards. However, awards to children with mental impairments began to increase again shortly after the legislation was enacted (see fig. 1).", "The number of children applying for and receiving SSI benefits due to a mental impairment has increased for more than a decade, and these children comprise a growing majority of all child recipients on the SSI disability rolls. While not all such children who are deemed medically eligible ultimately meet SSI’s financial eligibility requirements, the numbers of children applying for SSI benefits due to a mental impairment increased from 187,052 in fiscal year 2000 to 315,832 in fiscal year 2011 (a 69 percent increase). Despite this increase, SSA data indicated that the agency has denied a majority of these child applicants each year. In fact, for initial determinations in fiscal years 2000 to 2011, the average denial rates for children with physical and mental impairments were about 63 and 54 percent, respectively, and allowance rates have remained relatively stable over time for both groups of children. SSA data also showed that since fiscal year 2000, children with mental impairments represented the majority of all child applications and allowances for SSI benefits (see fig. 2).\nSSA data show that, for those children with mental impairments who apply, the number of children found medically eligible for benefits has increased for almost every mental impairment category—such as speech and language delay and mood disorder—for fiscal years 2000 to 2010, with the exception of intellectual disability. SSA data also show that the three most prevalent primary mental impairments among those children found medically eligible in fiscal year 2011 were for (1) ADHD, (2) speech and language delay, and (3) autism.indicate that applications and allowances for autism saw the largest percentage increases from fiscal years 2000 to 2011 (see fig. 3). (See app. III for trend information related to these three impairments.)", "DDS examiners rely on a combination of key medical and nonmedical information sources—such as medical records, effects of prescribed medications, school records, and teacher and parent assessments—in determining a child’s medical eligibility for benefits. Several DDS officials we interviewed said that when making a determination, they consider the totality of information related to the child’s impairments, rather than one piece of information in isolation. Based on our case file review, we estimate that examiners generally cited four to five information sources as support for their decisions in fiscal year 2010 for the three most prevalent mental impairments. While examiners relied on multiple information sources, we found that the extent they used these sources varied (see fig. 5).\nIn more than 90 percent of the cases we reviewed, the examiner used some form of medical evidence to support the decision, regardless of whether the child’s impairment met, medically equaled, or functionally equaled the listings. SSA generally requires DDS examiners to assist children and their parents or guardians in obtaining medical records in an effort to develop at least a 1-year-long medical history prior to applying for benefits. We estimate that examiners used observations from a treating source, such as a pediatrician or psychologist, about a child’s functioning and testing by a treating source as support for 65 percent and 61 percent of their determinations, respectively, making them among the most commonly cited information sources. According to many of the DDS officials we interviewed, examiners attempt to obtain medical evidence, such as psychological tests, physician’s notes, and mental health records, for children with alleged mental impairments.\nIf such evidence is not available or is inconclusive, DDS examiners may purchase a consultative exam to provide additional medical evidence and help them establish the severity of a child’s impairment. This examination is intended to provide the additional medical evidence, such as results of a physical examination and laboratory findings, needed for a determination. Based on our case file review, we estimate at least one consultative examination was present in 52 percent of the cases. In some cases, DDS offices requested multiple consultative examinations, such as both a psychological and speech and language evaluation to address different aspects of the alleged impairment. Consultative examinations also provide information on the severity of the child’s impairment. For example, one examination provider described a case in which a child with a speech and language delay had receptive and expressive language skills that were nearly 2 years behind his chronological age. We estimated that cases were more likely to be allowed if the consultative exam provider described the child’s impairment as severe. However, many DDS officials told us that such examinations are only a “snap-shot” in time and do not provide a longitudinal view of the child’s functioning. For this reason, some DDS officials said that information from a treating source with a long-standing relationship with the child, such as a physician, is more useful.\nIn addition to medical evidence, SSA uses nonmedical information to evaluate the severity of the child’s impairment and functioning as part of These sources include parents, day care the eligibility determination. providers, teachers, and others knowledgeable about the child’s day-to- day behavior and activities. SSA field office staff may also provide observations about the child, if the child is present for the disability interview. (We estimate about 8 percent of child applicants were present at the field office for the disability interview.)\nSeveral DDS officials told us school records and teacher assessments (standardized questionnaires) are especially critical for determining medical eligibility because these assessments provide information on a child’s functioning over time and are generally more objective than parent assessments. According to some DDS examiners, parents primarily observe their child in an unstructured home environment after the child’s medications have worn off, and may not know what behaviors are developmentally normal, whereas teachers are generally in a position to compare the child to other children and provide neutral observations on how the child relates to peers, responds to medication, and performs in school. We estimate teacher assessments and school testing were used to support 63 and 43 percent of determinations, respectively. We also identified several examples in the case files we reviewed where the teacher’s assessment was used to establish the child’s level of functioning and response to medication. For example:\nTo support an allowance in one autism case, the examiner noted “Per teacher, he is virtually nonverbal. The teacher confirms he is not toilet trained or independent in any area of self care.”\nTo support a denial decision in one ADHD case, the examiner noted that the teacher’s assessment indicated that the child’s medication “has ‘helped tremendously’ with ability to concentrate.” Additionally, according to the teacher the child “has many friends and is very social. She has no problems interacting with others. Claimant has no problems with self care. She participates in the softball and dance team.”\nTo support a denial decision in one autism case, the examiner reported that the “teacher…notes he is more controlled on his meds.”\nAfter the necessary information is collected to make a disability determination, several examiners said that they compare all the information to identify inconsistencies and assign weight to the various sources. For example, some officials told us examiners assess the credibility of parents’ assessments of children’s functioning by comparing it to physicians’ and teachers’ statements. SSA policy notes that an inconsistency does not necessarily mean that a determination cannot be made because often most of the evidence or the most substantial evidence outweighs the inconsistent evidence and additional information would not change the determination or decision. Among the 298 alleged ADHD, speech and language delay, and autism cases we examined, there were 25 in which material inconsistencies could not be resolved between sources, requiring the examiner to assign more or less weight to certain sources. Examiners assigned more weight to teacher assessments or information from school testing in 11 of the 25 cases. Examiners also generally assigned more weight to testing and observations of functioning by a consultative examiner (10 of the 25 cases) or by a treating source (10 of the 25 cases). In contrast, parents’ assessments were given less weight in 14 of the 25 cases, although decisions were made on a case by case basis. In one ADHD case, the child’s mother alleged a developmental delay, but a psychological consultative exam did not find evidence of such a delay. The child’s teacher also stated that the child performed well academically when not under timed conditions. In this case, the examiner gave less weight to the parent’s assessment and denied the claim.", "Despite a media report that prescription medication is considered by some parents as key to obtaining SSI benefits, we found that medication and treatment information is frequently a basis for denying benefits. SSA and DDS officials told us that medication is generally given no more weight than any other medical or nonmedical information in determining a child’s medical eligibility. In addition, several DDS officials told us medication is considered in the context of other sources of information as “just one piece of the puzzle.” Our case file review confirmed that information on medication and treatment was never the sole source of support for an allowance or denial. In fact, we found that applicants were more likely to be denied than allowed when medication was reported (see fig. 6).\nWhen applying for benefits, parents reported that their children were prescribed some form of medication in 58 percent of the cases we reviewed. Of cases where medication was reported as present, 65 percent were denied and 35 percent were allowed. By comparison, 47 percent of cases were denied and 53 percent were allowed when medication was not reported as present. We found that in cases in which psychotropic drug use was reported, applicants were also more likely to be denied. In these cases, 68 percent were denied and 32 percent were allowed. Nevertheless, our case file review suggests examiners did not decide whether to allow or deny a claim based on the absence or presence of medication. Although medication was reported as present in 58 percent of cases, it was only cited as support for a determination in 38 percent of cases.\nBeyond examining cases where parents reported that their children were prescribed medication, we also specifically looked at cases where examiners cited information on medication or treatment as part of the rationale for their determinations. We found examiners generally considered how the child responded to these interventions when making a determination, and in 66 percent of the cases where information on medication or treatment was used to support a determination, the applicant was denied. When examiners cited medication and treatment as a basis for denials, they noted that the child’s functioning improved due to these interventions. For example, in one denied ADHD case, the examiner wrote that the claimant “has responded well to medication and while on medication has no problems functioning, completing work on time and getting along with others.” In one denied speech and language delay case, the examiner noted that the claimant “has been through multiple therapies” and that “hese therapies have been successful.” To the extent that medication improves functioning, DDS officials told us they could potentially find that the child is not disabled under program rules. In contrast, in cases where the child’s functioning was not improved by medication, this information generally helped support an allowance. For example, in one allowed ADHD case, the examiner noted that the child was “ot able to complete work independently despite tx with psych meds and special supervision in a partial inclusion setting.” In another allowed ADHD case, the examiner observed that both the treating source and teacher’s assessment “indicate marked limitations in attention and concentration even with stimulant meds.”\nDespite the examiners’ focus on how medication affects functioning, certain field office and DDS officials acknowledged that they believe some parents are under the impression that medicating their children will improve their likelihood of being found eligible for benefits. For example, in one denied ADHD case the child’s mother did not cooperate with the DDS’s efforts to obtain a consultative exam. The mother argued the DDS should already have enough evidence to support an allowance because the child was taking medication. However, other DDS officials told us some parents may avoid medicating their child prior to a consultative examination so that the child misbehaves and appears more disabled—further reinforcing the importance of multiple tests and observations for determining eligibility.", "Despite the importance of nonmedical information in determining a child’s medical eligibility, examiners sometimes face challenges obtaining complete information. Several DDS offices reported difficulty obtaining school records or teacher assessments, which they partly attributed to school and teacher concerns about the time involved to compile this information, potential liability issues, or confusion about how such information is used in the disability decision-making process. For example, some DDS examiners told us that in certain instances teachers view their completion of the assessment as affirming that a child is disabled and thus endorsing SSA’s decision to award benefits. They do not understand that examiners base their determinations on the totality of evidence or that the assessment could be used to support a denial. In one of the cases we reviewed, a teacher returned a blank teacher assessment with a note stating “we are not allowed to fill these out anymore.”\nOur case file review estimated that teacher assessments were absent for 57 percent of cases for children age 7 or younger—which is unsurprising, given that many of these children may not yet be school age—but such assessments were also absent for 25 percent of cases for children older than age 7. To address this challenge, SSA officials told us that some DDS offices have dedicated staff to conduct outreach to schools in order to emphasize the importance of information from schools as an evidence source. However, they added that these staff have competing priorities, including recruiting consultative exam providers and other medical professionals, which limit the amount of outreach they can perform. In addition to strengthening relationships with school personnel, disability advocates told us that SSA could revise the teacher assessment by using clearer language to make it more inviting to teachers. They also noted that SSA could further emphasize that by completing the assessment, teachers are not endorsing SSA’s ultimate decision as to whether the child is disabled or qualifies for benefits. Because schools and teachers are not required to provide records or teacher assessments, some DDS offices pay a fee for school records, but state laws prevent others from doing so, according to SSA officials. SSA officials did not know the extent to which DDS offices have paid for school records or the amount they had paid.\nSSA officials informed us they have heard reports of some DDS offices facing challenges in obtaining information from schools, but they do not know the degree to which these challenges exist nationwide, nor has SSA conducted an empirical analysis of challenges related to obtaining information from schools. SSA did issue guidance on steps DDS offices can take to mitigate processing delays associated with obtaining school evidence during extended school breaks, such as summer vacation, but the agency has not issued guidance regarding year-round challenges associated with obtaining information from schools. Without further study to determine how widespread these obstacles are, it will remain unclear whether additional guidance is warranted.\nIn addition to the challenges they sometimes face in obtaining information from schools, DDS examiners said that they do not routinely receive information from SSA field offices on multiple siblings receiving SSI benefits within the same household even though they are directed to be alert for such cases. SSA’s policy operations manual states that disabilities may occur in more than one member of a family or household, but notes prior case experience has shown this type of situation is an indicator of possible fraud or abuse, particularly where certain mental impairments are involved. For example, one of SSA’s Cooperative Disability Investigations Units investigated a case in which parents applied for SSI benefits on behalf of their four children, alleging that they all suffered from ADHD and conduct issues.found that the school guidance counselor had never observed them exhibiting symptoms of ADHD despite seeing the four children daily, and that a doctor had rescinded an order authorizing the school to administer ADHD medication to the children. In this instance, SSA subsequently denied the siblings’ applications for SSI benefits. SSA’s policy operations manual directs examiners to refer such cases to SSA’s Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit or Office of the Inspector General for further However, investigators development, if questionable issues cannot be resolved. Based on our interviews, it appears that SSA field offices do not consistently notify DDS examiners when an applicant’s siblings are already receiving SSI benefits, nor are they always made aware of concurrent sibling applications. SSA data indicate that as of January 2012, nearly 64,000 children, or 5 percent of all child recipients, resided in a household where more than 1 child received disability benefits. Without information on such children, DDS examiners may be limited in their ability to identify potential fraud or abuse in the program and elevate these cases to the attention of SSA’s fraud investigations unit.", "SSA has conducted significantly fewer CDRs for children receiving SSI benefits since 2000, even though SSA is generally required to perform CDRs at least every 3 years on child recipients under age 18 whose impairments are likely to improve, as well as certain other individuals (see fig 7). Childhood CDRs overall fell from more than 150,000 in fiscal year 2000 to about 45,000 reviews in fiscal year 2011 (a 70 percent decrease). More specifically, CDRs for children under age 18 with mental impairments declined from more than 84,000 to about 16,000 (an 80 percent decrease). Similarly, SSA has conducted significantly fewer CDRs for adult benefit recipients of either SSI or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).\nFrom fiscal years 2000 to 2011, the number of adult CDRs fell from 584,000 to 179,000.proportion of childhood CDRs conducted has remained much lower than the proportion of adult CDRs conducted. SSA officials attribute the decrease in CDRs overall, including childhood CDRs for those with mental impairments, primarily to resource limitations and a greater emphasis on processing initial claims and reducing the backlog of requests for appeals hearings in recent years. While SSA did increase the number of CDRs it performed after receiving additional funding specifically targeted for CDRs from fiscal years 1996 to 2002, CDRs decreased once the funding expired.", "SSA, Strategic Plan: Security Value for America, Fiscal Years 2013-2016 (Feb. 2012). because DDS offices have not consistently collected secondary impairment data. Without steps to ensure that this information is more reliably recorded, SSA management will not have a complete picture of the characteristics of children with mental impairments receiving benefits or changes in this population over time.\nBecause examiners sometimes lack key information for cases they review, including school records and information on multiple children receiving benefits in the same household, they may face challenges in making eligibility decisions and identifying potential fraud or abuse. Examiners have also increasingly based allowance decisions on a finding of functional equivalence for children with the most prevalent mental impairments, requiring more complex decision making. Yet because some examiners face obstacles in obtaining information from schools— which they consider critical to understanding how a child functions—SSA cannot ensure that examiners have the necessary information to arrive at the most accurate determinations. Additionally, as a key program gatekeeper, DDS examiners are in a unique position to identify program integrity threats related to multiple children receiving SSI benefits within the same household. However, without better information on these types of arrangements they are unable fulfill this role in preventing potential fraud and abuse.\nThe fact that more than 430,000 childhood CDRs are overdue raises concerns about the agency’s ability to manage limited funds in a manner that adequately balances its public service priorities with its stewardship responsibility. When reviews are not conducted as scheduled, some child recipients may receive benefits for which they are no longer eligible, potentially costing taxpayers billions of dollars in overpayments. Furthermore, CDRs provide an important check on program growth by removing ineligible recipients from the rolls, even while new applicants are added. If these reviews are not conducted in sufficient numbers, the agency will continue to struggle to contain growth in benefit payments, placing added burden on already strained federal budgets. Congress appropriated funding for SSA to conduct more CDRs in recent years, and SSA is evaluating how to manage its overall CDR workload. However, because SSA considers SSI childhood CDRs a lower priority than other CDRs, it is unclear whether the agency will use this funding to review children most likely to medically improve—reviews that could yield a high return on investment. If SSA continues to rely heavily on the use of waivers to conduct fewer CDRs than would otherwise be required by law, SSA will potentially forgo future program savings. Furthermore, while we consider SSA’s decision to begin issuing formal waivers in order to clearly comply with the CDR legal requirement to be a good start, that action alone is not sufficient to fully alleviate our concerns with the waiver process. Until the agency formally implements this waiver process, the extent to which SSA is conducting CDRs consistently with its legal requirements will continue to be unclear.", "To strengthen eligibility decisions and improve monitoring of children with mental impairments within the SSI program, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security: 1. Direct the Deputy Commissioners of Retirement and Disability Policy and Operations to take steps to ensure that DDS examiners accurately record information on secondary impairments in order to improve SSA’s understanding of how multiple impairments may influence decisions. 2. Direct the Deputy Commissioner of Operations to identify the extent to which DDS examiners nationwide experience obstacles in obtaining teacher assessments and school records. To the extent these are identified, SSA should clarify the nature of these obstacles and formulate steps to address them. Such steps could include increased DDS outreach to primary and secondary schools, increased SSA coordination with the Department of Education, or additional guidance to DDS offices. 3. Direct the Deputy Commissioner of Operations to ensure that field offices notify their respective DDS offices of those claims in which multiple children within the same household are applying for or receiving SSI benefits so that examiners will be better able to identify potential fraud or abuse in the program and elevate these cases to the attention of SSA’s fraud investigations unit. 4. Direct the Deputy Commissioner of Quality Performance to eliminate the existing CDR backlog of cases for children with impairments who are likely to improve and, on an ongoing basis, conduct CDRs at least every 3 years for all children with impairments who are likely to improve, as resources are made available for these purposes. 5. Direct the Deputy Commissioner of Quality Performance and Deputy Commissioner of Operations to take actions to ensure that SSA’s CDR waiver process is open, transparent, and public. This may include promulgating formal guidance for issuing waivers, and a process for making information about issued waivers available to the public.", "We provided a draft of this report to SSA for review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix V, SSA agreed with 4 of our 5 recommendations and stated that our draft report overall reflected a good understanding of the disability determination process and the SSI childhood disability program. SSA disagreed with our recommendation to eliminate the existing CDR backlog of cases for children with impairments who are likely to improve and conduct CDRs for these children at least every 3 years, as resources are made available for these purposes. SSA agreed conceptually that it should complete more CDRs for SSI children but emphasized that it is constrained by limited funding and staff resources and as a result had to waive many required childhood CDRs in recent years. SSA also argued that performing additional SSI child CDRs would have negative impacts on the SSDI program. We acknowledge the challenge SSA faces as it strives to balance competing workloads. In recognition of the agency’s resource constraints, we noted in our recommendation that additional CDRs for children who are likely to medically improve should be conducted “as resources are made available for these purposes.” We also believe that the increased appropriations for CDRs in recent years provides SSA with added flexibility for balancing these competing workloads. Moreover, it is important to recognize we are not recommending that SSA eliminate its ongoing SSDI CDR efforts. Rather, we believe that more attention is needed for SSI children’s cases to address the existing backlog, especially given the relatively few CDRs conducted in this area in recent years, and the high average cessation rate for these cases. SSA also provided technical comments that we have incorporated, as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Commissioner of Social Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.", "Our review focused on (1) the trends in the rate of children receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits due to mental impairments; (2) the role that medical and nonmedical information, such as medication and school records, play in the initial determination of a child’s medical eligibility; and (3) the steps the Social Security Administration (SSA) has taken to monitor the continued medical eligibility of these children.\nTo examine these issues, we analyzed SSA data on (1) the overall number of initial disability determinations and allowances, (2) annual benefit awards and recipients, (3) the number and types of mental impairments, (4) the number of children receiving SSI benefits residing in households where other children also receive SSI benefits, and (5) the number of continuing disability reviews of children conducted by SSA. In reviewing these data, we acknowledge that the child population in the United States has also grown since 2000 and demographics of this population may have changed since that time. We assessed the reliability of the data presented in this report by performing data testing, reviewing internal controls and related documentation, and interviewing agency officials, and found potential limitations with the extent to which primary and secondary impairment coding within SSA’s 831 Disability file—the file that contains data on disability determinations—may be complete. However, because the 831 Disability file is used by SSA to make, and thus reflect, the decisions made regarding medical determinations, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to describe certain trends among children in the SSI program.\nWe also conducted in-depth interviews with SSA management and line staff at SSA headquarters and within six SSA regions—Atlanta, Georgia; Dallas, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Boston, Massachusetts; and San Francisco, California. Our work included site visits to 9 field offices within these regions, as well as 11 state disability determination services (DDS) offices (state agencies under the direction of SSA that perform medical eligibility determinations and continuing disability reviews of SSI applicants). We performed separate interviews with SSA field office district managers, supervisors, and claims representatives, and with DDS managers, supervisors, examiners, and medical or psychological consultants, when they were available. We selected these sites on the basis of their geographic location, high volume of SSI applications for children with mental impairments, and variety of benefit allowance rates for children with mental impairments. In addition, we interviewed numerous external experts from the medical and disability advocacy communities and reviewed relevant studies to identify factors that may be currently affecting the growth and composition of the childhood disability applicants and recipients, especially for those children with mental impairments. However, the relative effects of any potential factors we identified on the SSI program’s growth are not fully known and were beyond the scope of this report. We also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations.\nWe conducted a case file review to verify information obtained through our interviews with DDS office staff and to better understand the role of secondary impairments in determinations as well as what information examiners use when determining a child’s medical eligibility. We reviewed a probability sample of 298 case files selected from the 184,150 initial determinations decided in fiscal year 2010 for children with alleged attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), speech and language delay, and autistic disorder and other pervasive development disorders (autism). (Through the initial determination process, the DDS assesses whether the child’s impairment can be established through medical evidence—not only by the individual’s statement of symptoms—as well as the severity of the impairment and whether the impairment results in marked and severe functional limitations.) We reviewed electronic case files for children with mental impairments and SSA forms to develop a standardized data collection instrument. We completed a data collection instrument for each initial determination in our sample, and each record was independently reviewed by another staff person for clarity and accuracy. We based our observations of the sources examiners used to support their determinations on examiners’ remarks in the Childhood Disability Evaluation Form (form SSA-538-F6) and the Disability Determination Explanation. Because our purpose was not to assess the appropriateness of examiners’ decisions but to understand what information sources examiners used in explaining the rationale for their decision-making, we did not attempt to adjudicate these cases ourselves. Our observations were limited by the extent to which examiners documented their analysis and rationale on these forms. We found the examiners’ remarks sufficient to characterize which sources were used to support decisions, but examiners provided varying levels of detail in their remarks and we had no basis for judging whether additional sources of information were used to support but were not reported.\nAs with all probability samples, estimates from our case file review are subject to sampling errors. Sampling errors occur because we use a sample to draw conclusions about a larger population. If a different sample had been taken, the results might have been different. To recognize the possibility that other samples might have yielded other results, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval. The 95 percent confidence interval is expected to include the population value for 95 percent of samples of this type. When we make estimates for this population, we are 95 percent confident that the results we obtained are within plus or minus 8 percentage points of what we would have obtained if we had included the entire population within our review, unless otherwise noted. The text of our report provides more specific confidence intervals for various estimates.\nWe selected the sample from within six strata, consisting of allowance and denial decisions and the three most prevalent primary impairments among medical allowances for children with mental impairments—ADHD, speech and language delay, and autism. We sampled approximately the same number of cases from each stratum in order to ensure that the sample sizes were sufficient to produce precise estimates within each combination of impairment and decision. When generalizing to the overall population and to various subpopulations, we weighted each case according to its probability of selection, which varied across strata due to differences in the number of cases in the stratum populations.\nWe conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to June 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "The structure of the mental disorders listings for children under age 18 parallels the structure for the mental disorders listings for adults but is modified to reflect the presentation of mental disorders in children. Under federal regulations, when a child is not performing substantial gainful activity and the impairment is severe, the Social Security Administration (SSA) will examine whether the child’s impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals any of the impairments contained in the listings. The listings further describe the level of severity necessary to meet these requirements. The listings for mental disorders in children are grouped into 11 diagnostic categories: Organic mental disorders. Abnormalities in perception, cognition, affect, or behavior associated with dysfunction of the brain. The history and physical examination or laboratory tests, including psychological or neuropsychological tests, demonstrate or support the presence of an organic factor judged to be etiologically related to the abnormal mental state and associated deficit or loss of specific cognitive abilities, or affective changes, or loss of previously acquired functional abilities.\nSchizophrenic, delusional (paranoid), schizoaffective, and other psychotic disorders. Onset of psychotic features, characterized by a marked disturbance of thinking, feeling, and behavior, with deterioration from a previous level of functioning or failure to achieve the expected level of social functioning.\nMood disorders. Characterized by a disturbance of mood (referring to a prolonged emotion that colors the whole psychic life, generally involving either depression or elation), accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome.\nMental retardation. Characterized by significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning.\nAnxiety disorders. In these disorders, anxiety is either the predominant disturbance or is experienced if the individual attempts to master symptoms; for example, confronting the dreaded object or situation in a phobic disorder, attempting to go to school in a separation anxiety disorder, resisting the obsessions or compulsions in an obsessive compulsive disorder, or confronting strangers or peers in avoidant disorders.\nSomatoform, eating, and tic disorders. Manifested by physical symptoms for which there are no demonstrable organic findings or known physiologic mechanisms; or eating or tic disorders with physical manifestations.\nPersonality disorders. Manifested by pervasive, inflexible, and maladaptive personality traits, which are typical of the child’s long-term functioning and not limited to discrete episodes of illness.\nPsychoactive substance dependence disorders. Manifested by a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiologic symptoms that indicate impaired control of psychoactive substance use with continued use of the substance despite adverse consequences.\nAutistic disorder and other pervasive developmental disorders. Characterized by qualitative deficits in the development of reciprocal social interaction, in the development of verbal and nonverbal communication skills, and in imaginative activity. Often, there is a markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests, which frequently are stereotyped and repetitive.\nAttention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Manifested by developmentally inappropriate degrees of inattention, impulsiveness, and hyperactivity.\nDevelopmental and emotional disorders of newborn and younger infants (birth to attainment of age 1): Developmental or emotional disorders of infancy are evidenced by a deficit or lag in the areas of motor, cognitive/communicative, or social functioning. These disorders may be related either to organic or to functional factors or to a combination of these factors.\nAccording to SSA, these listings are examples of common mental disorders that are severe enough to result in a child being disabled. When a child has a medically determinable impairment that is not listed, an impairment that does not meet the requirements of a listing, or a combination of impairments in which none meets the requirements of a listing, SSA will make a determination whether the child’s impairment or impairments medically or functionally equal the listings. This can be especially important in older infants and toddlers (age 1 to attainment of age 3), who may be too young for identification of a specific diagnosis, yet demonstrate serious functional limitations. Therefore, the determination of equivalency is necessary to the evaluation of any child’s case when the child does not have an impairment that meets a listing.", "Social Security Administration (SSA) data show that the three most prevalent primary mental impairments among those children allowed for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits in fiscal year 2011 were for (1) attention deficit disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), (2) speech and language delay, and (3) autistic disorder and other pervasive development disorders (autism). These data are based on the primary impairment as designated by the disability determination services (DDS) examiner. SSA’s policy operations manual directs DDS examiners to code the primary impairment as the most severe condition that rendered the child disabled. However, SSA officials have acknowledged that primary impairment codes are sometimes missing or inaccurately coded.\nThe following information provides a brief summary of each of these three primary impairments as they compare to the incidence of all mental impairments, as well as in terms of the proportion of applications, allowances, and receipts. Data represented as “applications” reflect SSI benefit claims where a DDS examiner made an initial disability determination decision. Some applications may have been submitted prior to the year when a determination was made. In addition, some applications could have more than one determination if the claim is selected for a quality review or if the disability claim is updated during the same year.\nADHD. From fiscal years 2000 to 2011, applications for this condition as a primary impairment more than doubled, from about 55,204 to 124,217, while allowances have also doubled from 13,857 to 29,872 (see fig. 10). By December 2011, almost 221,000 such children were receiving SSI benefits, and they comprised 26 percent of child recipients with mental impairments on the rolls.\nWhile children with ADHD represent the single largest primary diagnostic group, SSA has denied the majority of ADHD child applicants since fiscal year 2000, because they were not medically eligible. Some DDS examiners we interviewed said that they rarely find a child medically eligible for benefits solely on the basis of a ADHD impairment alone, but more commonly in combination with another impairment, such as oppositional defiant disorder. In our case file review, we found 37 of 50 ADHD allowances had a secondary impairment present, and oppositional defiant disorder was the secondary impairment cited most frequently in the individual cases we reviewed.\nSSA officials suggested that the increase in both applications and allowances for children with ADHD might be attributable to an increase in diagnoses over the last decade, and cited a National Institute of Health survey finding that ADHD diagnoses had increased by 3 percent, on average, from 1996 to 2006 and by 5.5 percent, on average, from 2003 to SSA officials also noted a 2008 medical study reporting that ADHD 2007. is one of the most commonly diagnosed childhood neurobehavioral disorders.that attention deficit disorder and ADHD are among the most common childhood disorders in the United States.\nIn addition, the National Institute of Mental Health has stated Speech and language delays. Since fiscal year 2000, both applications and allowances for children with speech and language delays have increased overall, but the proportion of applicants found medically eligible has ranged from 54 to 61 percent during this period. From fiscal year 2000 to 2011, applications for this impairment more than doubled, from 21,615 to 51,740 while the number of children allowed increased from 11,565 to 29,309 (see fig. 11).\nSome DDS officials we interviewed attributed the increased number of children applying for and receiving SSI benefits to speech and language delay to increased school testing and screening program services offered under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The U.S. Department of Education noted in their latest annual report that teachers indicated that 89 percent of the children aged 3 through 5 years served under IDEA received speech or language therapy in the 2003 to 2004 school year, and 86 percent received it in the 2004 to 2005 school year, making it the most common service in both years.that speech and language impairments were one of the most common disability categories among students aged 6 through 21 years served under IDEA, Part B, in the fall of 2006. Of these more than 6 million students aged 6 through 21 years, about 1.2 million, or 19.1 percent, received services due to a speech and language impairment.\nIn addition, they noted Some speech and language experts from across the United States told us that they were surprised by the increased number of children receiving SSI benefits, but acknowledged that the definitions of disability for IDEA and the SSI program are different. They added that in some instances speech and language disorder may be a provisional diagnosis for very young children when it may be difficult to pinpoint a specific impairment or impairments, which they believed could be contributing to program growth. SSA officials told us that further study was needed to better understand increases of this impairment. As of February 2012, SSA was considering whether to propose new rules for evaluating language and speech and disorders.\nAutism. From fiscal year 2000 to 2011, autism applications increased by almost 400 percent from 5,430 to 26,739, and allowances increased similarly from 5,050 to 22,931 (see fig.12). As of December 2011, about 107,000 (12 percent) children with mental impairments were receiving SSI benefits due to autistic disorders. From fiscal year 2000 to 2011, DDS examiners found from 86 to 94 percent of those children applying for SSI on the basis of autism medically eligible for benefits.\nSSA officials primarily attribute the increase in the number of autism applications and allowances over the years to greater incidences of autism among children and explained that some children who may have previously been diagnosed as intellectually disabled are instead being diagnosed as autistic. In fact, the number of children applying for and receiving SSI benefits due to “intellectual disability” or “mental retardation” has significantly declined since fiscal year 2000. Children receiving benefits due to an intellectual disability comprised 51 percent of all mental claims in fiscal year 2000 and 15 percent in fiscal year 2011. According to one study SSA cited, the prevalence of autism in children has increased by 2.5 percent, from 0.6 per 1,000 live births in 1994 to 3.1 per 1,000 live births in 2003, while during the same period, the prevalence of mental retardation and learning disabilities declined by 2.8 and 8.3 per 1,000, respectively. In addition, the Centers for Disease Controls and Prevention estimated in March 2012 that on average 1 in 88 children in the United States has an autism spectrum disorder, but the extent to which this reflects increases in awareness and access to services or actual increases in the prevalence of autism symptoms is not known.\nOn the basis of our case file review, we also identified some characteristics of children for whom SSA made an initial determination in fiscal year 2010 for ADHD, speech and language delay, and autism. For example, as shown in figure 13, more than 60 percent of these children had ADHD.\nThe age at which SSA determined whether a child was medically eligible for benefits varied by impairment (see fig. 14). Children with ADHD who applied for benefits were older, on average, than applicants with autism or speech and language delay.\nBased on our case file review, we estimate that 72 percent of these children were male, although gender composition also varied by impairment (see fig. 15). As discussed in appendix I of this report, we reviewed case files from a stratified probability sample of determinations made in fiscal year 2010.", "In our review of a generalizable probability sample of 298 initial determinations performed in fiscal year 2010 for children with alleged attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), speech and language delay, and autistic disorder and other pervasive development disorders (autism), we found parents reported that their children were prescribed some form of medication in 58 percent of these cases. More specifically, parents reported that their children were prescribed psychotropic drugs in 47 percent of these cases (see table 1). Children with ADHD accounted for the vast majority of those reportedly using medication or psychotropic drugs—79 percent and 90 percent, respectively (see table 2). The most commonly reported psychotropic drugs were Concerta, Ritalin, and Adderall, which are prescribed to treat ADHD, as well as Risperdal, which is an antipsychotic. Of children reportedly prescribed psychotropic drugs, the majority reported using one psychotropic drug.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Jeremy Cox (Assistant Director), James Bennett, Alexander Galuten, Jason Holsclaw, Kristen Jones, Sheila McCoy, Luann Moy, Ernest Powell, Jeff Tessin, and Paul Wright made key contributions to this report and the related e-supplement." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "h0_full h2_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h0_full h1_full", "h3_full", "h3_full", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How has the number of SSI child applicants and recipients with mental impairments changed over the last decade?", "What factors have contributed to this shift?", "What were the most prevalent impairments among eligible children?", "How are secondary impairments considered in SSI applicants?", "Why is it difficult to track how the presence of impairments may affect SSI decisions?", "What do DDS examiners rely on when determining a child's medical eligibility for SSI?", "According to GAO's analysis, what role does medication and treatment information play in DDS examiners' decisions?", "What issues hinder DDS examiners' decision making?", "How does this hinder DDS examiners' decision making?", "What does SSA's SSI program provide to eligible low-income individuals?", "How does the SSI program support disabled children?", "What was GAO asked to assess?", "What does GAO recommend to the SSA?", "How did SSA respond to GAO's recommendations?", "How did AGO acknowledge SSA's response?" ], "summary": [ "The number of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) child applicants and recipients with mental impairments has increased substantially for more than a decade, even though the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied, on average, 54 percent of such claims from fiscal years 2000 to 2011.", "Factors such as the rising number of children in poverty and increasing diagnosis of certain mental impairments have likely contributed to this growth.", "In fiscal year 2011, the most prevalent primary mental impairments among children found medically eligible were (1) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, (2) speech and language delay, and (3) autism, with autism claims growing most rapidly since fiscal year 2000.", "State disability determination services (DDS) examiners also consider the impact of additional, or “secondary,” impairments when making a decision, and when present, these impairments were used to support 55 percent of those cases GAO reviewed that were allowed in fiscal year 2010.", "However, SSA has not consistently collected those impairment data, limiting its understanding of how all impairments may affect decisions.", "DDS examiners generally rely on a combination of key medical and nonmedical information—such as medical records and teacher assessments—to determine a child’s medical eligibility for SSI. In its case file review, GAO found that examiners usually cited four to five information sources as the basis for their decision, and that being on medication was never the sole source of support for decisions.", "Moreover, examiners cited medication and treatment information, such as reports of improved functioning, as a basis for denying benefits in more than half of cases that GAO reviewed, despite a perception among some parents that medicating their child would result in an award of benefits.", "Examiners also reported they sometimes lacked complete information to inform their decision making. For example, several DDS offices reported obstacles to obtaining information from schools, which they believe to be critical in understanding how a child functions. Examiners also do not routinely receive information from SSA field offices on multiple children who receive benefits in the same household, which SSA’s fraud investigations unit has noted as an indicator of possible fraud or abuse.", "Without such information, examiners may be limited in their ability to identify threats to program integrity.", "SSA’s SSI program provides cash benefits to eligible low-income individuals with disabilities, including children.", "In 2011, SSA paid more than $9 billion to about 1.3 million disabled children, the majority of whom received benefits due to a mental impairment.", "GAO was asked to assess (1) trends in the rate of children receiving SSI benefits due to mental impairments over the past decade; (2) the role that medical and nonmedical information, such as medication and school records, play in the initial determination of a child’s eligibility; and (3) steps SSA has taken to monitor the continued medical eligibility of these children.", "GAO recommends that SSA take steps to ensure needed information, such as secondary impairment data and school records, is consistently collected; make its CDR waiver process more transparent; and conduct additional childhood CDRs.", "SSA agreed with four recommendations and disagreed with one that the agency conduct additional childhood CDRs, citing resource constraints.", "The GAO recommendation acknowledges resource constraints, as discussed more fully within the report." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, -1, -1, 0, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 5, 5, 5 ] }
CRS_R44924	{ "title": [ "", "General Questions", "What Is Deferred Maintenance?", "How Big Is NPS's Maintenance Backlog?", "Has the Maintenance Backlog Been Increasing or Decreasing?", "What Factors Contribute to Growth or Reduction of the Backlog?", "How Does NPS's Backlog Compare with Those of Other Land Management Agencies?", "Which States Have the Largest NPS Maintenance Backlog?", "Which Park Units Have the Largest Maintenance Backlog?", "Funding Questions", "How Much Has NPS Spent in Recent Years to Address the Maintenance Backlog?", "What Are the Funding Sources for NPS to Address the Maintenance Backlog?", "Have Additional Types of Funding Been Proposed to Address the Backlog?", "Management Questions", "How Does NPS Prioritize Its Deferred Maintenance Needs?", "What Types of Challenges May Exist in Managing the Maintenance Backlog?", "Role of Congress", "How Has Congress Addressed NPS's Maintenance Backlog?", "How Did the National Parks Centennial Act of 2016 Address Deferred Maintenance?", "What Legislation Has Been Proposed in the 115th Congress to Address NPS Deferred Maintenance?" ], "paragraphs": [ "T he National Park Service's (NPS's) backlog of deferred maintenance (DM)—maintenance that was not done as scheduled or as needed—is an issue of ongoing interest to Congress. The agency estimated its DM needs for FY2016 at $11.332 billion. Although other federal land management agencies also have DM backlogs, NPS's backlog is the largest. Because unmet maintenance needs may damage park resources, compromise visitors' experiences in the parks, and jeopardize safety, NPS DM has been a topic of concern for Congress and for nonfederal stakeholders. Potential issues for Congress include, among others, how to weigh NPS maintenance needs against other financial demands within and outside the agency, how to ensure that NPS is managing its maintenance activities efficiently and successfully, and how to balance the maintenance of existing parks with the establishment of new park units. This report addresses frequently asked questions about NPS DM. The discussion is organized under the headings of general questions, funding-related questions, management-related questions, and questions on Congress's role in addressing the backlog.", "", "The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board defines deferred maintenance and repairs (DM&R) as \"maintenance and repairs that were not performed when they should have been or were scheduled to be and which are put off or delayed for a future period.\" NPS uses similar language to define deferred maintenance . Although NPS uses the term DM rather than DM&R, its estimates also include repair needs. Following NPS's usage, this report uses the term DM to refer to NPS's deferred maintenance and repair needs. Members of Congress and other stakeholders also often refer to DM as the maintenance backlog .\nAs suggested by the above definition, DM does not include all maintenance, only maintenance that was not accomplished when scheduled or needed and was put off to a future time. Another type of maintenance is cyclic maintenance —that is, maintenance performed at regular intervals to prevent asset deterioration, such as to replace a roof or upgrade an electrical system at a scheduled or needed time. Although NPS considers cyclic maintenance separately from DM, NPS has emphasized the importance of cyclic maintenance for controlling DM costs. Cyclic maintenance, the agency has stated, \"prevent[s] the creation of DM and enabl[es] repairs to fulfill their full life expectancy.\" NPS also performs routine, day-to-day maintenance as part of its facility operations activities. Such activities include, for example, mowing and weeding of landscapes and trails, weatherizing a building prior to a winter closure, and removing litter.", "NPS estimated its total DM for FY2016 at $11.332 billion. This amount is nearly evenly split between transportation-related DM in the \"Paved Roads and Structures\" category and mostly non-transportation-related DM for all other facilities (see Table 1 ). The Paved Roads and Structures category includes paved roadways, bridges, tunnels, and paved parking areas. The other facilities are in eight categories: Buildings, Housing, Campgrounds, Trails, Water Systems, Wastewater Systems, Unpaved Roads, and All Other.\nNPS also estimates annually a subset of DM that includes its highest-priority non-transportation-related facilities. For FY2016, DM for this subset of key facilities was estimated at $2.271 billion.", "NPS's estimated maintenance backlog increased for most of the past decade before dropping in FY2016. Over the decade as a whole (FY2007-FY2016), Figure 1 and Table 2 show a growth in NPS DM of $1.718 billion in nominal dollars and $0.021 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars.", "Multiple factors may contribute to growth or reduction in the NPS maintenance backlog, and stakeholders may disagree as to their respective importance. One key driver of growth in NPS maintenance needs has been the increasing age of agency infrastructure. Many agency assets—such as visitor centers, roads, utility systems, and other assets—were constructed by the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930s or as part of the agency's Mission 66 infrastructure initiative in the 1950s and 1960s. As these structures have reached or exceeded the end of their anticipated life spans, unfunded costs of repair or replacement have contributed to the DM backlog. Further, agency officials point out, as time goes by and needed repairs are not made, the rate at which such assets deteriorate is accelerated and can result in \"a spiraling burden.\"\nAnother key factor is the amount of funding available to the agency to address DM. The sources and amounts of NPS funding for DM are discussed in greater detail below, in the section on \" Funding Questions .\" NPS does not aggregate the amounts it receives and uses each year to address deferred maintenance, but agency officials have stated repeatedly that available funding has been inadequate to meet DM needs. In recent years, Congress has increased NPS appropriations to address DM, in conjunction with the agency's 2016 centennial anniversary. NPS has stated that these funding increases, although helping the agency with some of its most urgent needs, have been insufficient to address the total problem. Some observers have advocated further increases in agency funding as a way to address DM, whereas others have recommended reorienting existing funding to prioritize maintenance over other purposes. The Administration's budget request for FY2018 would reduce some NPS funding for DM while increasing other NPS DM-oriented funding.\nAnother subject of attention is the extent to which acquisition of new properties may add to the maintenance burden. Stakeholders disagree about the role played by new assets acquired by NPS, through the creation of new parks or the expansion of existing parks, in DM growth over the past decade. To the extent that newly acquired lands contain assets with maintenance and repair needs that are not met, these additional assets would increase NPS DM. According to the agency, new additions with infrastructure in need of maintenance and repair have been relatively rare in recent years, and most of the acquired lands have been unimproved or have contained assets in good condition. In past years, NPS also has stated that some acquisitions of \"inholdings\" within existing parks have even facilitated maintenance and repair efforts by providing needed access for maintenance activities. Others have contended that even if new acquisitions do not immediately contribute to the backlog, they likely will do so over time, and that further expansion of the National Park System is inadvisable until the maintenance needs of existing properties have been addressed. For example, the Administration's FY2018 budget proposes to eliminate funding for NPS federal land acquisition projects in order to \"focus fiscal resources toward managing lands already owned by the federal government.\"\nSome observers also have expressed concerns that growth in NPS DM may be at least partially due to inefficiencies in the agency's asset management strategies and/or the implementation of these strategies. The section of this report on \" Management Questions \" gives further details on NPS's management of its DM backlog. NPS has taken a number of steps over the decade to improve its asset management systems and strategies. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended further improvements.\nFrom year to year, the completion of individual projects, changes in construction and repair costs, and similar factors play a role in the growth or reduction of NPS DM. For instance, with respect to the reduction in NPS DM for FY2016, the agency stated:\nThe database used to track DM and other facility asset information changes daily as data is entered, updated, closed out, and corrected in the system. The \"snapshot\" of the data taken at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 is exactly that … a view of the NPS data as of Sep 30, 2016. Many factors contributed to this almost $600 million decrease, including data cleanup, completion of several large projects, revisions to several large project work orders, and savings from decreases in construction costs.\nStill another issue is that the methods used by NPS and the Department of the Interior (DOI) to estimate DM have varied over time and for different types of maintenance reports. For example, the estimates in Figure 1 and Table 2 , above, draw on two different types of DM reports. For FY2006-FY2013, the estimates are calculated from DM ranges that NPS provided to DOI for annual departmental financial reports. Starting in FY2014, NPS began to publish separate estimates of agency DM on its website, which include some assets—such as buildings that NPS maintains but does not own—that are not included in the DOI departmental estimates. Additionally, during the earlier FY2006-FY2013 period, DOI changed its methods for calculating its estimated DM ranges, and NPS was in the process of completing its database of reported assets. What portion of the overall change in NPS DM over the decade may be attributable to changes in methodology or data completeness, rather than to other factors, is unclear.", "Although all four major federal land management agencies—NPS, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the Forest Service (FS)—have DM backlogs, NPS's backlog is the largest. For FY2016, NPS reported DM of more than $11 billion, whereas FS reported DM of roughly half that amount (about $5.5 billion), and FWS and BLM both reported DM of less than $2 billion. DM for the four agencies is discussed further in CRS Report R43997, Deferred Maintenance of Federal Land Management Agencies: FY2007-FY2016 Estimates and Issues .", "NPS reports DM by state and territory in its report titled NPS Deferred Maintenance by State and Park . The 20 states with the highest NPS DM estimates are shown in Table 3 .\nThe states with the highest DM are not necessarily those with the most park acreage. For example, Alaska contains almost two-thirds of the total acreage in the National Park System but accounts for less than 1% of the agency's DM backlog. Instead, the amount, type, and condition of infrastructure in a state's national park units are the primary determinants of DM for each state. For example, transportation assets are a major component of NPS DM, and states with NPS national parkways—the George Washington Memorial Parkway (mainly in Virginia and Washington, DC), the Natchez Trace Parkway (mainly in Mississippi and Tennessee), the Blue Ridge Parkway (North Carolina and Virginia), and the John D. Rockefeller Jr. Memorial Parkway (Wyoming)—are all among the 20 states with the highest DM.", "Table 4 shows the 20 individual park units with the highest maintenance backlogs.\nVarious factors may contribute to the relatively high DM estimates for these park units as compared to others. For example, many of them are older units whose infrastructure was largely built in the mid-20 th century. Some sites, such as Gateway National Recreation Area and Golden Gate National Recreation Area, are located in or near urban areas and may contain more buildings, roads, and other built assets than more remotely located parks. Three of the 10 units with the highest estimated DM are national parkways, consistent with the high proportion of NPS's overall DM backlog that is related to road needs.", "", "It is not possible to determine the total amount of funding allocated each year to address NPS's DM backlog, because NPS does not aggregate these amounts in its budget reporting. Funding to address DM comes from a variety of NPS budget sources, and each of these budget sources also funds activities other than DM. NPS does not report how much of each funding stream was used for DM in any given year.\nAlthough it is not possible to determine amounts allocated to NPS deferred maintenance, GAO estimated amounts allocated for all NPS maintenance (including DM, cyclic maintenance, and day-to-day maintenance activities) for FY2006-FY2015. GAO estimated that, over that decade, NPS's annual spending for all types of maintenance averaged $1.182 billion per year. GAO did not determine what portion of this funding went specifically to DM. NPS has testified that annual funding of roughly $700 million per year, targeted specifically to DM, would be required simply to hold the maintenance backlog steady without further growth.", "NPS has used discretionary appropriations, allocations from the Department of Transportation, park entrance fees, donations, and other funding sources to address the maintenance backlog. Most of the funding for DM comes from discretionary appropriations, primarily under two budget activities, titled \"Repair and Rehabilitation\" and \"Line-Item Construction.\"\nThe Repair and Rehabilitation (R&R) budget subactivity, within the NPS's Operation of the National Park System (ONPS) budget account, focuses on large-scale, nonrecurring repair needs, and repairs for assets where scheduled maintenance is no longer sufficient to improve the condition of the facility. R&R funds are used for projects with projected costs of less than $1 million each. NPS estimated that, over the past five years, a range from 49% to 83% of R&R funds have been specifically targeted to projects on the DM backlog, as opposed to projects associated with other types of maintenance. The Administration's FY2018 budget would fund the R&R subactivity at $99.3 million, a decrease of $25.2 million from FY2017 appropriations provided in P.L. 115-31 . The Line- Item Construction budget activity, within the NPS's Construction account, provides funding for the construction, major rehabilitation, and replacement of existing facilities needed to accomplish approved management objectives for each park. This funding is used for projects expected to cost $1 million or more. NPS prioritizes projects for funding on the basis of their contribution to parks' financial sustainability, health and safety, resource protection, and visitor services, as well as on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. NPS estimated that, over the past five years, a range from 59% to 87% of Line-Item Construction funds have been used specifically to reduce the DM backlog. The Administration's FY2018 budget would fund the Line-Item Construction activity at $137.0 million, an increase of $5.0 million over FY2017 appropriations provided in P.L. 115-31 . Portions of other NPS discretionary budget activities and accounts also are used for DM. These include various budget activities within the ONPS and Construction accounts, as well as NPS's Centennial Challenge account. The Centennial Challenge account provides federal funds to match outside donations for \"signature\" NPS parks and programs. The funding is used to enhance visitor services, reduce DM, and improve natural and cultural resource protection. The Administration's FY2018 budget justification requests $15.0 million for the Centennial Challenge program, a decrease of $5.0 million from the amount provided for FY2017 in P.L. 115-31 .\nBeyond NPS discretionary appropriations, a number of other, nondiscretionary agency revenue streams also are used partially or mainly to address DM.\nNPS receives an annual allocation from the Highway Trust Fund to address transportation needs, including transportation-related DM. Funds are provided to NPS (and other federal land management agencies) by the Federal Highway Administration, primarily under the Federal Lands Transportation Program. In recent years, these allocations have funded approximately two-thirds of NPS's transportation-related maintenance spending. For FY2018, NPS's allocation from the Federal Lands Transportation Program is $284.0 million, an increase of $8.0 million from the FY2017 allocation. Through related federal highway programs, NPS could potentially receive additional funding. Park entrance and recreation fees collected under the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (16 U.S.C. §§6801-6814) may be used for DM, among other purposes. The fees, most of which are retained at the collecting parks, may be used for a variety of purposes benefiting visitors, including facility maintenance and repair, interpretation and visitor services, law enforcement, and others. NPS estimates entrance and recreation fee collections of $256.9 million for FY2017 and $259.5 million for FY2018. NPS collects concessions franchise fees from park concessioners who provide services such as lodging and dining at park units. The fees, collected under the National Park Service Concessions Management Improvement Act of 1998 (54 U.S.C. §§101911 et seq.), are available for use without further appropriation and are mainly retained at the collecting parks. They may be used to reduce DM, among other purposes, with priority given to concessions-related DM. NPS estimates concessions franchise fee collections of $127.8 million for FY2017 and $131.3 million for FY2018. The National Park Service Centennial Act ( P.L. 114-289 ) established the NPS Centennial Challenge Fund . In addition to discretionary appropriations (discussed above), the fund is authorized to receive, as offsetting collections, certain amounts from the sales of entrance passes to seniors. NPS estimates that the senior pass sales will provide an additional $15.0 million for the account for FY2018 on top of discretionary appropriations. The funding may be used for a variety of projects but must prioritize DM, improvements to visitor services facilities, and trail maintenance. Federal funds must be matched by nonfederal donations on at least a 50:50 basis. The Centennial Act also established the NPS Second Century Endowment and directed that it receive, as offsetting collections, revenues from senior pass sales totaling $10 million annually. The endowment also is authorized to receive gifts, devises, and bequests from donors. The funds may be used for projects approved by the Secretary of the Interior that further the purposes of NPS, including projects on the maintenance backlog. More broadly, other types of d onations to NPS may be used for projects that reduce DM, among a variety of other purposes. NPS estimated that, through all of these programs combined, the agency would receive donations of $75.0 million in FY2017 and $71.0 million in FY2018 (in addition to the revenues generated from the sales of the senior passes). Under the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-40 ), NPS will receive $20 million in FY2018 from proceeds from the sale of federal helium, to be used for DM projects requiring a minimum 50% match from a nonfederal funding source. Other NPS mandatory appropriations also have been partially used for DM. These include monies collected under the Park Building Lease and Maintenance Fund, transportation fees collected under the Transportation Systems Fund, and rents and payroll deductions for the use and occupancy of government quarters, among others. NPS estimated varying amounts for these mandatory appropriations for FY2017 and FY2018.", "Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders have proposed sources of additional funding to address NPS's DM needs. Legislative proposals in the 115 th Congress are discussed in the \" Role of Congress \" section, below. Among other sources, stakeholders have proposed to increase NPS DM funding with resources from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, offshore oil and gas revenues that currently go to the General Treasury, income tax overpayments and contributions, motorfuel taxes, and coin and postage stamp sales. By contrast, others have suggested that NPS DM could be reduced without additional funding—for example, by improving the agency's capital investment strategies, increasing the role of nonfederal partners in park management, or disposing of assets.", "", "NPS uses computerized maintenance management systems to prioritize its DM projects. Agency staff at each park perform condition assessments that document the condition of park assets according to specified maintenance standards. The information is collected in a software system through which the agency assigns to each asset a facility condition index (FCI) rating—a ratio representing the cost of DM for the asset divided by the asset's replacement value. (A lower FCI rating indicates a better condition.) The agency also assigns an asset priority index (API) rating that assesses the importance of the asset in relation to the park mission. Projects are prioritized based on their FCI and API ratings, as well as on other criteria related to financial sustainability, resource protection, visitor use, and health and safety. The agency's scoring system aligns with criteria identified in its Capital Investment Strategy.", "In addition to the funding challenges discussed earlier, NPS faces other issues in managing the maintenance backlog. In December 2016, GAO reported on NPS management of maintenance activities, and identified both successes and challenges. In terms of challenges, GAO reported that competing duties often make it difficult for park staff to perform facility condition assessments in a timely manner, that the remote location of some assets contributes to this difficulty, that the agency's focus on high-priority assets likely may lead to continued deterioration of lower-priority assets, and that NPS lacks a process for verifying that its Capital Investment Strategy is producing the intended outcomes. GAO also reported on successes in NPS asset management—for example, that the agency's assessment tools are consistent with federally prescribed standards and that it is working with partners and volunteers to address maintenance needs.\nAn additional challenge, identified in NPS budget documents, relates to the disposal of unneeded assets to reduce the agency's maintenance burden. Part of NPS's asset management includes identifying assets that may be candidates for disposal. For example, some assets may have high FCI ratings, indicating expensive maintenance needs, along with low API ratings, indicating that they are not of high importance to the NPS mission. NPS may favor destroying or disposing of such assets, but the agency has stated that the cost of removing the assets often precludes the use of this option. GAO also identified that legal requirements—such as the requirement in the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act ( P.L. 100-77 , as amended) that federal buildings slated for disposal must be assessed for their potential to provide homeless assistance before being disposed of by other means—create additional obstacles for NPS disposal of unneeded properties.", "", "Congress has addressed NPS's maintenance backlog through oversight, funding, and legislation. For example, in the 115 th Congress, both the House and the Senate have held oversight hearings to investigate options for addressing NPS DM. Annual appropriations for NPS are discussed in CRS Report R42757, National Park Service: FY2017 Appropriations and Ten-Year Trends . Several recent laws and proposals outside of annual appropriations, including the National Parks Centennial Act of 2016 and bills introduced in the 115 th Congress, are discussed under the following questions.", "The National Parks Centennial Act ( P.L. 114-289 ), enacted in December 2016, contained a variety of provisions aimed at addressing the NPS maintenance backlog as well as meeting other park goals. The law created two funds that may be used to reduce DM—the National Park Centennial Challenge Fund and the Second Century Endowment for the National Park Service. Both funds receive federal monies from the sale of senior recreation passes, as well as donations. DM projects are a prioritized use of the Centennial Challenge Fund and are among the potential uses of endowment funds. The law also made changes to extend eligibility for the Public Land Corps and increase the authorization of appropriations for the Volunteers in the Parks program. Participants in these programs perform a variety of duties that help address DM, among other activities. In addition, the law authorized appropriations of $5.0 million annually for FY2017-FY2023 for the National Park Foundation to match nonfederal contributions. Contributions to the foundation are used for a variety of NPS projects and programs, including projects on the maintenance backlog.", "Bills in the 115 th Congress related to NPS deferred maintenance include the following.\nH.R. 1577 , the National Park Service Transparency and Accountability Act, would require the Secretary of the Interior to submit to Congress a report evaluating the NPS's Capital Investment Strategy and its results, including a determination of whether the strategy is achieving its intended outcomes and any recommendations for changes. H.R. 2584 / S. 751 , the National Park Service Legacy Act of 2017, would establish a National Park Service Legacy Restoration Fund with funding from mineral revenues. Annual amounts deposited into the fund would begin at $50.0 million for FY2018-FY2020 and would rise gradually to $500.0 million for FY2027-FY2047. The funds would be available to NPS for expenditure without further appropriation. They would be used for \"high-priority deferred maintenance needs of the Service,\" with 20% of the funding going to transportation-related maintenance and the remaining 80% going to repair and rehabilitation of non-transportation-related assets. Projects with a nonfederal cost share would receive special treatment in priority rankings. The funding could not be used for land acquisition, and it could not supplant discretionary funding for NPS facility operations and maintenance. H.R. 2863 , the Land and National Park Deferred Maintenance (LAND) Act, would establish a National Park Service Maintenance and Revitalization Conservation Fund. The fund would receive $450.0 million each year from mineral revenues, of which $375.0 million would go to NPS, with $25.0 million going to each of three other agencies: FWS, BLM, and FS. The monies would be available for expenditure without further appropriation and would be used for \"high priority deferred maintenance needs that support critical infrastructure and visitor services.\" Funds could not be used for land acquisition. S. 1460 , Section 5101, would establish a National Park Service Maintenance and Revitalization Conservation Fund as part of a broader energy-modernization bill. Although the fund would have the same name as in H.R. 2863 , the Senate version would provide for deposits to the fund of $150.0 million per year from offshore revenues collected under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1338 et seq.). The funds would be available for expenditure only when appropriated by Congress. The monies would be used for \"high-priority deferred maintenance needs of the Service that support critical infrastructure and visitor services\" and could not be used for land acquisition." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full", "", "h0_full h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h3_title", "", "", "h3_full", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is deferred maintenance?", "What is the scale of NPS's maintenance backlog?", "In what sector is the bulk of the backlog?", "How does NPS's backlog compare to that of other federal agencies?", "How did NPS's backlog change between 2007 and 2016?", "What might have caused these changes?", "How does the maintenance backlog vary among the states and territories?", "How does NPS decide which deferred maintenance projects to prioritize?", "To what extent has NPS implemented improvements to its asset management systems and strategies?", "What have members of Congress and stakeholders proposed to address NPS's deferred maintenance needs?", "What sources do the bills propose for such funding?", "What other sources have been proposed?" ], "summary": [ "This report addresses frequently asked questions about the National Park Service's (NPS's) backlog of deferred maintenance—maintenance that was not performed as scheduled or as needed and was put off to a future time.", "NPS's deferred maintenance, also known as the maintenance backlog, was estimated for FY2016 at $11.332 billion.", "More than half of the NPS backlog is in transportation-related assets.", "Other federal land management agencies also have maintenance backlogs, but NPS's is the largest and has drawn the most congressional attention.", "During the past decade (FY2007-FY2016), NPS's maintenance backlog grew steadily before decreasing in FY2016. Overall, the deferred maintenance estimate grew by an estimated $1.718 billion in nominal dollars and $0.021 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars over the decade.", "Many factors might contribute to growth or reduction in deferred maintenance, including the aging of NPS assets, the availability of funding for NPS maintenance activities, acquisitions of new assets, agency management of the backlog, completion of individual projects, changes in construction and related costs, and changes in measurement and reporting methodologies.", "The backlog is distributed unevenly among states and territories, with California, the District of Columbia, and New York having the largest amounts of deferred maintenance. The amounts also vary among individual park units.", "NPS prioritizes its deferred maintenance projects based on the condition of assets and their importance to the parks' mission, as well as other criteria related to financial sustainability, resource protection, visitor use, and health and safety.", "NPS has taken a number of steps over the decade to improve its asset management systems and strategies. Some observers, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO), have recommended further improvements.", "Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders have proposed new sources of funding to address NPS's deferred maintenance needs.", "Bills in the 115th Congress to increase NPS funding for deferred maintenance—including H.R. 2584, H.R. 2863, S. 751, and S. 1460—would draw from mineral revenues currently going to the Treasury.", "Other proposed funding sources have included monies from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, income tax overpayments and contributions, new motorfuel taxes, and coin and postage stamp sales." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-17-364	{ "title": [ "Background", "Available Data Indicate Vacancies across NWS Operational Units Have Increased Since Fiscal Year 2010", "Officials Reported NWS Operational Units Took Steps to Address the Impact of Vacancies but at Times Were Unable to Complete Key Tasks", "NWS Operational Unit Managers and Staff Reported Taking Steps to Help Ensure Forecasts and Warnings Were Issued in Light of Vacancies", "Managers and Staff Performed Additional Tasks", "Managers and Staff Adjusted Their Work Schedules", "Managers and Staff Modified Their Leave Schedules", "Managers Requested Additional Temporary Staff from Other Operational Units", "Management and Staff Cited an Inability at Times to Perform Key Tasks, As Well As Increased Stress and Fatigue", "NOAA’s WFMO Makes Limited Information Available to NWS Operational Unit Managers on the Status of Hiring Requests", "NOAA’s WFMO and NWS Have Taken Some Actions to Help Address the Hiring Backlog but Have Not Evaluated These Actions", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: National Weather Service Operational Units, by Operational Unit Category and Location", "Appendix III: Information on Vacancies by National Weather Service Region", "Appendix IV: Information on Vacancies in National Weather Service Weather Forecast Offices", "Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Commerce", "Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "NWS is the nation’s official and authoritative source for watches and warnings during severe weather and is responsible for providing weather and climate data and issuing forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property and enhancement of the national economy. Through its operational units nationwide, NWS issues many types of forecasts and warnings including weather, river, flood, and aviation. It issues approximately 1.5 million forecasts and 50,000 warnings annually. NWS also supports the national infrastructure that collects and processes worldwide weather data and climate observations from the air, land, and sea. This infrastructure includes technologies such as Doppler weather radar; satellites operated by NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service; marine data buoys; surface observing systems; and instruments for monitoring space weather. Across this infrastructure, NWS collects billions of weather and climate observations annually, which are fed into its supercomputer forecasting models. In fiscal year 2016, NWS had 4,218 employees, of whom 3,629 were in operational units, and NOAA’s budget for NWS was approximately $1.1 billion, according to NWS documentation.\nNWS headquarters, led by the Director of NWS, is responsible for overall agency management, including overseeing operations and conducting budgetary formulation, analysis, and reporting. NWS’s Chief Operating Officer, based out of NWS’s headquarters, oversees six regional offices— referred to as regional headquarters—and the director’s office of the National Centers. NWS’s regional headquarters and the director’s office of the National Centers, in turn, oversee various local operational units. Together, these units constitute six categories of operational units, with a total of 168 individual operational units as follows.\nRegional headquarters. Six regional headquarters are led by regional directors who provide administrative and operational support, including managing the regions’ budgets and hiring efforts, to the following offices and centers:\nWeather forecast offices. One hundred and twenty-two offices operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to monitor local weather and issue local forecasts and warnings.\nWeather service offices. Fifteen offices, mostly located in Alaska, operate on various schedules to collect weather observations that assist with the development of local, national, and global forecasts and warnings.\nRiver forecast centers. Thirteen centers operate 16 hours a day, 7 days a week, to monitor major river systems and aquifers to produce river and flood forecasts and coordinate warnings with local weather forecast offices. These centers increase their service hours as needed when flooding is predicted or is occurring.\nTsunami warning centers. Two centers generally operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to monitor seismic and sea level activity and issue tsunami forecasts and warnings for the United States and its territories.\nNational Centers and the director’s office. The director’s office of the National Centers oversees nine National Centers and provides them administrative and operational support, including managing their hiring efforts. The National Centers generate products and services to support other NWS operational units, as well as private sector partners, other governmental agencies, and the public. Most centers operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and some issue forecasts and warnings related to a particular area of focus (e.g., the National Hurricane Center issues forecasts and warnings for hurricanes and other tropical weather). The nine centers are the: (1) Aviation Weather Center, (2) Climate Prediction Center, (3) Environmental Modeling Center, (4) National Centers for Environmental Prediction Central Operations, (5) National Hurricane Center, (6) Ocean Prediction Center, (7) Space Weather Prediction Center, (8) Storm Prediction Center, and (9) Weather Prediction Center.\nFigure 1 shows the location of NWS’s six regions and 168 operational units. (App. II provides information on NWS’s 168 operational units by operational unit category and location.)\nThe structure of NWS’s operational units is principally based on NWS’s efforts to modernize the agency during the 1990s. During the modernization effort, NWS established a standardized staffing model in its operational units to provide more uniform services. The staffing structure across NWS operational units is generally based on “fair weather” forecasting needs, meaning that additional staff and overtime may be called for to help with issuing weather forecasts and warnings during severe weather and emergency events. See figure 2 for examples of forecasting workstations at NWS operational units.\nAs noted above, NWS receives support for certain administrative functions from NOAA’s WFMO, including workforce planning; hiring; and processing personnel actions such as promotions. WFMO also works with NOAA’s Office of Security—which is staffed and directed by the Department of Commerce’s Office of Security—to ensure security checks and background investigations are conducted as part of the hiring process, as necessary.\nBeginning in 2013, a series of events led to a hiring backlog at NWS. Specifically, in response to the 2013 federal budget sequestration, NOAA implemented an agency-wide hiring freeze. Because WFMO generally could not hire or replace departing employees during the freeze, the number of vacancies at NWS increased. According to WFMO officials, when the hiring freeze was lifted in 2014, demand for hiring across NOAA was high. Simultaneously, WFMO had experienced a high level of attrition during the freeze—in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, approximately 50 percent of WFMO staff handling hiring left the agency, according to a WFMO official—and therefore, WFMO could not keep pace with the hiring demand when the freeze was lifted. In fiscal year 2016, attrition at NWS outpaced WFMO’s hiring abilities. Over the course of the fiscal year, 191 staff left NWS, and WFMO hired 157 external candidates, according to WFMO data. Therefore, NWS’s hiring backlog increased. According to NWS documents and officials, NWS had resources to fill vacant operational unit positions, but it was unable to do so because of limited hiring resources at WFMO. According to NOAA budget officials, an administrative spending cap has limited WFMO’s ability to increase its hiring activities to address the hiring demand. In particular, since fiscal year 2005, NOAA has been subject to an administrative spending cap in its annual appropriation that places restrictions on the dollar amount the agency can spend for administrative support, including the amount it can spend on hiring actions.\nAdditionally, in 2016, WFMO began planning changes to the hiring- related functions it provides to NWS. Specifically, NOAA began transitioning toward using a newly established Commerce-wide Enterprise Services Organization (ESO)—a shared services model—to process actions related to human capital, including hiring requests for NWS and NOAA’s other agencies. A NOAA official said that ESO is intended to improve operational efficiencies by increasing automation levels, streamlining business processes, and improving customer service. When ESO is fully established, WFMO officials said they anticipate that WFMO will provide business advisors to NWS to continue to provide workforce planning assistance, counseling on human capital issues, and other hiring-related assistance.", "Available NWS data show that vacancies at operational units increased from fiscal years 2010 through 2016. Specifically, we determined that across NWS’s 168 operational units, vacancies increased from about 5 percent (211 positions) at the end of fiscal year 2010, to about 11 percent (455 positions) at the end of fiscal year 2016. These vacancy rates are based on data from NWS’s organizational table, a database that tracks information on the number, type, and location of positions across the agency, including whether each position is filled.\nHowever, these vacancy rates do not factor in the agency’s available resources, according to NOAA and NWS officials. The officials explained that from fiscal years 2010 through 2016, NWS did not have resources to support all of the positions included in its organizational table. For example, in fiscal year 2016, an NWS official said that the organizational table contained approximately 185 more positions than the agency had resources to support.\nTo address this issue, NWS developed additional vacancy data that factored in its available resources. Based on these data, the vacancy rate across operational units was approximately 0.6 percent in fiscal year 2010 and increased to about 7 percent in fiscal year 2016. NWS developed these data by proportionally distributing unfilled positions from the organizational table across the operational units to show the number of positions the agency had resources to fill at an agencywide level. However, while useful in providing an estimate of agencywide vacancies, these data do not reflect how individual NWS operational units have managed their staffing levels and vacancies. Instead of identifying specific positions on its organizational table to leave unfilled to ensure staffing levels did not exceed available agency resources, NWS established a “targeted vacancy rate” practice in 2014. Under this practice, the six NWS regional headquarters directors and the director of the National Centers are to hold approximately 5 percent of the positions on the organizational table vacant across their operational units. NWS headquarters officials said that the regional headquarters directors and the director of the National Centers are responsible for implementing this practice and have discretion to allocate resources according to their needs to achieve the agency’s mission goals. Most directors said that they have not had to manage to the targeted vacancy rate, however, because existing vacancies have kept staffing levels below what NWS resources can support.\nFor vacancy rates at the operational unit level, we examined data from NWS’s organizational table and determined that vacancies have varied across NWS operational units, by category of operational unit, and by region. For example, at the close of fiscal year 2016, the vacancy rate across operational units was about 11 percent. However, almost half of the units (75 of 168) had a higher vacancy rate, and more than 10 percent (21 of 168) had a vacancy rate higher than 20 percent at the close of fiscal year 2016. Similarly, we found a wide range of vacancy rates by operational unit category (see table 1 for a breakdown of vacancy rates by operational unit category for the last pay period of fiscal years 2014 through 2016). Regional vacancy rates also varied. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2016, the Central Region had the lowest vacancy rate of 8 percent, while the Alaska Region had the highest vacancy rate of 19 percent (see app. III for additional data on vacancy rates by region).\nWe also determined that across NWS’s 122 weather forecast offices— which comprised approximately 75 percent of NWS’s operational unit staff at the end of fiscal year 2016—vacancies varied by position. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2016, the number of vacant meteorologist positions—including entry-level, general, and lead meteorologists—had increased by 57 percent (from 98 to 154 vacant positions) from fiscal year 2014. Over the same period, the number of vacant management positions—including the meteorologist-in-charge, warning coordination meteorologist, science and operations officer, and electronics systems analyst—decreased by 29 percent (from 42 to 30 vacant positions). For more information on vacancy rates in weather forecast offices by position, see app. IV.", "Officials we interviewed in NWS regional headquarters, the National Centers, and operational units reported taking steps to address the impact of vacancies and help ensure forecasts and warnings were issued but said they were at times unable to complete key tasks and were experiencing stress and fatigue from their efforts to cover for vacancies. For example, operational unit managers reported that they have needed to perform additional tasks, such as working forecasting shifts, and have modified leave schedules to cover forecasting shifts in their units. However, taking these steps, according to managers and staff, at times led to their inability to complete other key tasks, such as providing severe weather information support to state and local emergency managers.", "Most NWS officials we interviewed indicated that vacancies in operational units remained unfilled for extended periods, stretching from several months to a few years. For example, one operational unit manager said that over the course of 6 years (2011 to 2016), her unit had 16 vacancies. The vacancies remained unfilled for an average of 11 months, and 2 of the vacancies took over 2 years to fill, according to documentation provided by the manager. Another operational unit manager said that since 2014, 3 of the unit’s positions were vacant between 8 and 20 months.\nOperational unit managers and staff across the units we interviewed reported having taken several steps to address the impact of vacancies and to help ensure forecasts and warnings were issued.", "Managers and staff in operational units with vacancies often performed additional tasks to help ensure forecasts and warnings were issued, according to officials we interviewed in five NWS regional headquarters, the National Centers, and six of eight operational units. For example, managers we interviewed in five of the eight operational units with vacancies that we visited said that they worked forecasting shifts to cover for vacancies. Typically, in a fully staffed operational unit, managers are expected to spend from 10 to 25 percent of their time working forecasting shifts. In one weather forecast office we visited, however, three managers said they worked forecasting shifts above the expected percentage in 2016. For example, the warning coordination meteorologist estimated working around 70 percent of his time on forecasting shifts for about 6 months to cover for vacancies. Similarly, another operational unit we visited had a vacant administrative assistant position for over a year since February 2016. In this instance, the warning coordination meteorologist and the science and operations officer told us that, in addition to their managerial duties, they shared the administrative assistant’s responsibilities, while also working forecasting shifts to cover for other vacancies in the unit.\nOperational unit managers and staff were sometimes temporarily promoted to positions of greater responsibility when those positions were vacant, according to officials we interviewed in five NWS regional headquarters and managers in five operational units. For example, they said that a general meteorologist may be temporarily promoted to a lead meteorologist position, allowing that meteorologist to act as a supervisor to other meteorologists. According to data from NOAA’s WFMO, NWS operational units made 333 temporary promotions in fiscal year 2016. Officials in one NWS regional headquarters said that making temporary promotions generally does not increase the number of staff available to work forecasting shifts, but rather temporarily shifts a vacancy from one position in the unit to another. In addition, managers and staff are limited by regulations to being temporarily promoted for 120 days in a 12-month period, resulting in managers sometimes promoting several different staff to cover for one vacant position over the course of the vacancy, according to officials in another NWS regional headquarters.", "Managers and staff in operational units with vacancies adjusted their work schedules to cover for vacancies and help ensure forecasts and warnings were issued, according to officials in all six NWS regional headquarters, the National Centers, and seven of the eight operational units we visited. For example, managers in five operational units said that managers and staff worked overtime to cover forecasting shifts and ensure forecasts and warnings were issued. Typically, NWS uses overtime to increase the number of staff covering forecasting shifts during severe weather. However, when operational units have had vacancies, managers and staff have also worked overtime to cover forecasting shifts during fair weather and additional forecasting shifts during severe weather, according to NWS headquarters officials. Several staff in one operational unit said they frequently worked 15 to 20 consecutive days without a day off to cover for multiple vacancies. In another operational unit, in light of vacancies, three to five employees consistently worked about 100 hours per pay period during fiscal years 2015 and 2016 to ensure forecasts and warnings were issued, according to data provided by the regional director overseeing the unit.\nManagers in three operational units we visited said that, because of vacancies, they had reduced the number of staff scheduled for forecasting shifts. For example, a manager in one operational unit with a hydrologist vacancy said he reduced the number of hydrologist shifts during the day from three to two to allow staff to take annual leave during the summer. Another operational unit manager said that because his office was short-staffed, on fair weather days he reduced the number of meteorologists scheduled from two to one, and then scheduled another employee, such as an entry-level meteorologist or a hydrometeorological technician, to ensure that at least two employees were staffed to a forecasting shift. Officials in one NWS regional headquarters said that reducing the number of staff on a forecasting shift during fair weather can be risky because severe weather can occur quickly without sufficient time for the operational unit manager to call in additional staff.", "Operational unit managers and staff modified their leave schedules to cover for vacancies and ensure staff were available to issue forecasts and warnings, according to officials in four NWS regional headquarters, the National Centers, and seven operational units we visited. For instance, managers in five operational units said they had denied or cancelled their own or others’ planned annual leave because of vacancies in the office. One operational unit manager indicated he cancelled annual leave as a last resort after taking other actions, such as requiring other staff to work overtime, and another manager said she altered her leave plans to allow operational unit staff to take annual leave. Staff in four operational units said that on some occasions they were not able to use annual or sick leave because they worked forecasting shifts to cover for vacancies instead. For example, staff in one operational unit we visited said that no one in the unit was granted annual leave at the end of 2015 to ensure that forecasting shifts would be covered. Staff in two other operational units said that employees were choosing not to take annual or sick leave because they did not want to leave their units short-staffed. Because staff had been unable to use their annual leave, officials in the National Centers and one NWS regional headquarters said some operational unit staff may end up losing some of their annual leave at the end of the year.", "Managers in four of eight operational units we visited said they had requested additional staff from other operational units through temporary duty assignments to ensure that forecasting shifts were staffed. For example, staff from one operational unit we visited said they had at least one meteorologist at the unit on temporary duty, working forecasting shifts for a 7-month period from 2015 to 2016, to cover for vacant meteorologist positions in the office. To obtain assistance, operational unit managers are to make requests to their respective NWS regional headquarters. Officials in all six NWS regional headquarters said that some operational units they oversee have requested additional staff to cover forecasting shifts, but their ability to accommodate those requests has been limited by funding and the availability of staff. One regional headquarters official said that to accommodate requests for additional staff to cover forecasting shifts, the region performed fewer outreach activities because those activities are funded by the same account as temporary duty assignments.", "Because operational unit managers and staff were doing work to cover for vacancies, they were unable at times to perform other key tasks, according to officials across the NWS units we interviewed. Examples include the following:\nDelivering impact-based decision support services. Managers we interviewed in six of eight operational units with vacancies said that because their units were short-staffed, they had been unable to provide some impact-based decision support services to core partners, such as local and state emergency managers. For example, managers in one operational unit said that given the vacancies in their office, they had been unable to provide in-person forecasting support to local emergency managers or to produce common impact-based decision support service products, such as informational webinars that provide more detailed information on the potential impacts of approaching severe weather. NWS officials said that providing this type of information is important for helping their core partners make decisions—such as the timing and locations for potential evacuations in advance of oncoming storms—that may affect their ability to save lives and property.\nObtaining training related to weather forecasting. Managers in six operational units we visited said that with ongoing vacancies in their operational units, staff were not able to complete critical training related to weather forecasting. This was in part, because managers had reduced or eliminated the number of supernumerary shifts afforded to staff—administrative shifts used by staff to, among other things, complete training. For example, staff in one operational unit said that they had gone from approximately 15 supernumerary shifts per year when they were fully staffed to 4 shifts per year, because of vacancies. According to staff in four operational units we visited, they were able to complete some, but not all, of their training during forecasting shifts on days with fair weather. Staff in an operational unit that has severe tropical weather said they had been unable to complete tropical weather training in advance of the upcoming hurricane season. Staff said that tropical weather training, though not required, is critical for honing meteorologists’ skills for correctly predicting tropical storms and hurricane-related weather. Officials in two NWS regional headquarters said they were concerned about the long-term effects of vacancies on the staffs’ forecasting skills.\nPerforming management and administrative activities. Operational unit managers were unable to perform certain management or administrative tasks, or were delayed in doing so, because they were covering for vacancies, according to officials in four NWS regional headquarters and the National Centers. For example, officials in one NWS regional headquarters said they have delayed conducting a number of administrative tasks, including processing the region’s budget, procurement, travel authorizations, and permanent change of station vouchers, because staff were completing the work of multiple vacant administrative positions. Officials expressed concern about these delays, because they can make monitoring the region’s finances difficult. Staff in one operational unit said because their managers were working forecasting shifts and performing other work to cover for vacancies, they were unable to review or approve projects that the staff developed as part of their focal duties. Focal duties, which are outside of meteorologists’ regular forecasting tasks, help incorporate new science, technology, and techniques into the unit’s operations.\nCarrying out community outreach and education. Managers we interviewed in five of eight operational units said their staff had been unable to participate in community outreach and education events because of vacancies in their units. For example, one operational unit manager said that his office had curtailed community outreach and education efforts to have staff cover forecasting shifts left open by vacancies. He said the office had stopped taking applicants for their StormReady and TsunamiReady programs—programs to help communities develop skills to save lives and property when severe weather occurs—because the staff who would normally be working with new participants had instead been working forecasting shifts.\nLaunching weather balloons. Managers in two operational units said that their staff missed weather balloon launches because of vacancies in their units. For example, managers in one operational unit said during the summer of 2015, on multiple occasions staff were unavailable to launch weather balloons twice a day to collect upper air observations, as instructed by an NWS directive. Staff were unavailable in these instances because they were taking steps to address work resulting from vacancies, such as covering forecasting shifts to monitor the development of severe weather in the area, according to the operational unit manager. When weather balloons are not launched, critical observations from the upper air atmosphere are not collected and entered into the computer models that produce forecasts and warnings.\nEvery day, tw ice a day, NWS staff across the United States launch instruments—know n as radiosondes—with weather balloons to capture observations from the upper atmosphere. According to NWS documents, conducting upper air observations is important for producing w eather forecasts and w arnings as it is the primary method of capturing information on temperature, humidity, and other conditions in the upper atmosphere. NWS launches about 70,000 radiosondes a year from 92 NWS locations, tw ice a day, almost simultaneously at 00:00 and 12:00 Coordinated Universal Time. The data collected by the radiosondes are fed into the computer models used for producing the agency’s w eather forecasts and w arnings. In fiscal year 2017, NWS began testing and evaluating w ays to automate the w eather balloon launch process, which could eliminate the need for staff to manually launch the balloons, according to NWS headquarters officials.\nMaintaining equipment. One operational unit manager we interviewed said that as of fiscal year 2016 the unit had been unable to replace damaged precipitation gauges with new equipment because one electronic technician position has been vacant. According to the manager, precipitation gauges are important because they provide official recordings of rainfall that are used to calibrate radar precipitation estimates and track rainfall to assess the need for flood and flash flood warnings (see fig. 3).\nIn addition, officials we interviewed in most NWS regional headquarters, the National Centers, and four operational units indicated that operational unit managers and staff experienced stress, fatigue, and reduced morale resulting from their efforts to cover for vacancies. For example, officials in two regional headquarters said that managers and staff in operational units with vacancies had continued to meet their critical mission of issuing forecasts and warnings in large part because of their dedication and commitment to the NWS mission. But the long-term result has been that employees are fatigued and morale is low, according to the officials. An official in another NWS regional headquarters said that staff are getting worn down covering extra forecasting shifts because of vacancies in operational units that, in some instances, have lasted for a few years. One operational unit manager we interviewed said staff in his unit were demoralized because they had continued to cover the workload for multiple vacancies. Additionally, staff we interviewed at two operational units said that because positions remain vacant for extended periods, staff are concerned that the agency may be intentionally leaving vacant positions open to downsize the number of staff across operational units. These staff said this perception has negatively affected their morale. NWS headquarters officials acknowledged that vacancies had created challenges and stress for operational unit managers and staff.", "WFMO makes available limited information on the status of hiring requests as the requests move through the phases of the hiring process. Through interviews and supporting documentation, we identified the following three phases of the NWS hiring process: (1) a regional headquarters or the director’s office of the National Centers enters a hiring request into WFMO’s data system; (2) a job announcement is developed and posted, applicants are interviewed, and a candidate is selected; and (3) the selected candidate enters on duty at NWS (see fig. 4).\nOperational unit managers we interviewed said that information on the status of their hiring requests was critical to their ability to allocate resources and manage work schedules. It is also particularly important in light of the length of the hiring process, which, according to some operational unit managers, has sometimes taken as long as 2 years. WFMO data for fiscal year 2016 show that the time it took to fill hiring requests once they were selected for processing averaged 232 days (around 8 months) and ranged from 64 to 467 days.\nOn the basis of our interviews with NOAA’s WFMO and NWS headquarters and operational units, we determined that limited information on the status of hiring requests is available. For example, during phase 1 of the hiring process—from when a regional headquarters or the director’s office of the National Centers enters a hiring request into WFMO’s data system to when the request is selected for processing— information on the status of the hiring request is not made available to operational unit managers. After NWS headquarters’ approval, hiring requests are entered into the data system where they are then generally selected for processing in the order they are received. However, WFMO does not make available information to operational unit managers on when a request is likely to be selected for processing. The WFMO director said that the data system is unsophisticated and was not designed for reporting the length of time that hiring requests remain in the system or how many are likely to be processed before a specific request is selected for processing.\nFor phases 2 and 3 of the hiring process—from when the hiring request is selected for processing by WFMO to the time the newly hired staff enters on duty at NWS—the data system tracks and makes accessible to operational unit managers some information on the status of their hiring requests. Specifically, operational unit managers can log into the data system and view the status of their individual hiring requests once they have been selected for processing. For example, a manager can access the data system to see when a job opening was announced and the date when the announcement will close. However, WFMO officials acknowledged that some data fields in the system, such as job announcement open and close dates, have not consistently been updated in real time. According to the WFMO director, this occurs, in part, because contractors—who are largely responsible for making these updates—use a different system that is not integrated with the data system, and updating the WFMO’s system requires additional steps that contractors do not always take when they have heavy workloads and time constraints.\nAdditionally, information related to the security check process, which occurs at the end of phase 3, is not available in the data system because the system is not set up to track the steps involved in the security check. The NOAA Office of Security is responsible for processing security checks, and its data system is not integrated with WFMO’s data system. Officials we interviewed from the six regional headquarters and the National Centers, as well as several operational unit managers, characterized the security check part of the hiring process as lengthy, opaque, and difficult to track. For example, officials from one regional headquarters said they contacted WFMO to see where their candidate was in the security check process and were referred to the NOAA Office of Security, which told them that the security check had been completed weeks earlier. These regional headquarters officials cited this experience as an example of communication challenges arising between two organizational departments whose systems are not integrated. Similarly, some NWS operational unit managers said they were unable to obtain information about where their candidate was in the security check process from either the NOAA Office of Security or WFMO. The NOAA Office of Security director said he is aware of confusion about the security check process and, as a result, started providing NOAA-wide informational briefings in June 2016, with the goal of increasing transparency about his office’s functions and interaction with WFMO.\nOfficials we interviewed from most regional headquarters and several operational unit managers said it is often difficult to obtain information on hiring requests from WFMO staff. In particular, several operational unit managers said that they have been unable to obtain updates through telephone or e-mail communications with WFMO staff, and several officials described WFMO and the hiring process as a “black hole” for information. According to a WFMO policy document, human capital specialists should respond to telephone calls and e-mails as part of their regular duties. However, the WFMO director added that since sequestration, WFMO has been understaffed, and the human capital specialists have been unable to fully manage their workload, including returning telephone calls and e-mails to respond to requests for information. Most operational unit managers we interviewed said it is difficult to allocate resources and develop work schedules without information about the status of their hiring requests, which would help them estimate how long the hiring process may take and, therefore, when they might expect new staff to enter on duty.\nAccording to federal standards for internal control, management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. For example, management communicates quality information down and across reporting lines to enable personnel to perform key roles. This could include communicating information to operational unit managers on the status of their hiring requests throughout the hiring process, which could help managers effectively plan and distribute their unit’s workload.\nThe WFMO director acknowledged the difficulty operational unit managers have had in obtaining complete and timely information, and said that as part of the broader Commerce-wide effort to transition to ESO for processing hiring requests, WFMO is providing support in the development of a new Commerce-wide data system. In developing the system, officials said they are exploring ways to enhance information available to managers. For example, WFMO officials said that a new system could automatically update certain milestones as they occur, which would enhance the timeliness and quality of information available to operational unit managers. The WFMO director said the Department of Commerce plans to develop the new system, potentially in 2017, but the design and capabilities have yet to be finalized. In the interim, without access to complete and real-time information on the status of their requests throughout the three phases of the hiring process, NWS operational unit managers are limited in their ability to plan for and distribute their unit’s workload in the most efficient and effective manner.", "NWS has faced challenges in supporting its goal of sustaining a highly skilled workforce in part because of its hiring backlog, according to NWS headquarters officials we interviewed. To help address the hiring backlog, NOAA’s WFMO and NWS are taking several actions, including the following.\nEmploying contractors to process hiring actions. Beginning in June 2014, WFMO started using contractors to process the majority of NWS’s hiring requests. It did so because WFMO staff were unable to meet the demand for processing hiring requests as a result of a number of resource-related factors, including being short-staffed, according to WFMO officials. However, the contractors have been unable to fully meet NWS’s demand. For example, the primary contractor generally processed about 50 hiring-related actions per month for NWS and another NOAA agency, representing a fraction of NWS hiring requests in the system, according to WFMO officials. Additionally, the officials said that though WFMO has begun transitioning toward using the Commerce-wide ESO for hiring, it has faced challenges with the transition because of funding limitations. WFMO’s director said that until funding becomes available and ESO is fully established, WFMO will continue using contractors to help process hiring requests for NWS. NWS officials expressed concern that once the transition to ESO is complete, the move away from contractors who are focused on NWS and another NOAA agency toward one serving all Department of Commerce agencies may increase NWS’s hiring backlog, as more NOAA agencies will be vying for the same services from a single contractor.\nCombining multiple hiring requests into a single job announcement. In March 2015, NWS began identifying hiring requests for similar positions and requesting that WFMO process those requests in bundles instead of individually, as had been past practice. For example, in July 2016, NWS combined hiring requests for 30 entry-level meteorologist positions at 24 locations into a single job announcement. While the announcement was open, six more hiring requests were approved, and NWS was then able to fill 36 positions from the combined announcement. Combining job announcements for similar positions is intended to accelerate and streamline hiring, according to NWS officials.\nDeveloping an inventory of lead meteorologist candidates. In June 2015, NWS issued a lead meteorologist job announcement—a position NWS typically fills by hiring internal general meteorologists— to develop an inventory of qualified candidates. The job announcement was open for 1 year, and applicants could identify specific operational units they wanted to be considered for, even if those units did not have a vacancy at that time. Once an operational unit had a vacancy that was approved to fill, the manager could request a list of qualified and interested candidates from the inventory to interview and potentially hire. Previously, vacant lead meteorologist positions were advertised through individual job announcements, each of which required a unique job announcement and subsequent hiring action. NWS officials said they plan to continue using this inventory approach to fill lead meteorologist positions by posting one announcement biannually or annually to maintain a current inventory of qualified candidates. By developing this inventory through one announcement, NWS officials said the process of identifying qualified candidates is more efficient, and operational units may be able to fill vacant positions more quickly.\nLimiting entry-level job announcements to external candidates.\nIn July 2016, NWS changed the way it announced its entry-level meteorologist positions—the positions with the highest vacancy rate across weather forecast offices at the time—so that these positions would be available exclusively to candidates outside the agency. NWS officials said they made this change because previously NWS often hired internal candidates to fill open entry-level meteorologist positions, which filled a vacancy in one location but created a vacancy in another. According to our analysis of WFMO data, during fiscal years 2010 through 2016, over half of all NWS hiring actions were for internal candidates. Of these, about two-thirds were for promotions, and about one-third were for lateral reassignments, which typically involve staff keeping the same position but moving to a different operational unit—such as current entry-level meteorologists accepting a position in a new unit (see fig. 5 for an annual breakdown of NWS hiring actions). Additionally, according to NWS data, 42 percent of the agency’s workforce will be eligible to retire by 2020. Therefore, NWS officials said they recognized the need to bring in new employees to the agency. They also noted that limiting entry-level hiring to external candidates is intended to help increase the overall number of employees, reduce the number of vacancies, and reduce the number of hiring actions to be processed by WFMO.\nExploring a change in the entry-level meteorologist promotion process. NWS is exploring changing its promotion process so that entry-level meteorologists will be able to progress to general meteorologists based on merit promotion criteria. The current process requires entry-level meteorologists to apply through a competitive announcement, which requires WFMO to post a job announcement and complete the associated hiring action. The change under consideration would allow entry-level meteorologists to accept a promotion while staying in their current operational unit, rather than requiring them to change units to obtain a promotion—which occurs if no openings are available in their unit. According to our analysis of NWS data, 35 percent of the agency’s hiring actions from fiscal year 2010 through 2016 were for promotions. NWS officials we interviewed said that the change under consideration may help reduce the human capital workload and, in turn, help reduce the hiring backlog. NOAA officials indicated that they plan to begin implementing this change late in fiscal year 2018 for meteorologist positions in weather forecast offices and some National Centers.\nNWS headquarters officials stated that reducing the hiring backlog is a high priority but that they have not evaluated the extent to which their hiring actions have helped reduce the hiring backlog or helped to achieve their goal of sustaining a highly skilled workforce. Under federal standards for internal control, management should design control activities, such as comparing actual performance with planned or expected results and analyzing significant differences, to achieve objectives. NWS officials said they believe the hiring actions to date have helped allow the agency to streamline hiring but said they have not evaluated the actions. However, the officials added that they intend to develop a strategic human capital plan with WFMO’s assistance that may, in part, provide a framework for integrating and evaluating the effectiveness of the various hiring actions. The officials said they do not have a time frame for developing such a plan because WFMO staff will be unavailable until the transition to using ESO is complete, and they are uncertain when that will happen. In the interim, by evaluating whether its actions are reducing the hiring backlog or achieving the goal of sustaining a highly skilled workforce, NWS would have better assurance that its actions were achieving expected results and could better determine where to devote resources.", "In light of vacancies that have increased since fiscal year 2010, NWS operational managers and staff have taken several steps to help ensure forecasts and warnings are issued. However, in taking these steps, managers and staff have faced challenges, including an inability at times to complete key tasks, and have experienced stress, fatigue, and reduced morale. WFMO and NWS officials recognize the need to fill vacant positions across NWS operational units, but the hiring process has been lengthy and WFMO makes limited information available to managers on the status of requests. This has limited managers’ ability to effectively plan and distribute workloads. WFMO officials agree that it is important to provide complete and timely information to managers, and said that, as WFMO moves to using a new Commerce-wide data system, they may be able to enhance the information that is made available to operational unit managers during the hiring process. In the interim, without access to complete and real-time information on the status of their requests throughout the three phases of the hiring process, NWS operational unit managers are limited in their ability to plan for and distribute their units’ workload in the most efficient and effective manner.\nAdditionally, WFMO and NWS are taking several actions intended to streamline hiring, but NWS has not evaluated the success of these actions in reducing the hiring backlog or achieving the goal of sustaining a highly skilled workforce. NWS intends to develop a strategic human capital plan that may, in part, provide a framework for integrating and evaluating the effectiveness of the various hiring actions, but officials do not have a time frame for its development. In the interim, by evaluating whether its actions are reducing the hiring backlog or achieving the goal of sustaining a highly skilled workforce, NWS would have better assurance that its actions were achieving expected results and could better determine where to devote resources.", "We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce take the following two actions: To enhance information available to operational unit managers, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the director of NOAA’s WFMO to ensure that complete information on hiring requests is routinely communicated to NWS managers throughout the three phases of the hiring process, such as by supporting the development of improved tracking and reporting capabilities in the planned new Commerce-wide data system.\nTo help ensure NWS’s hiring actions are achieving expected results, we recommend the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Assistant Administrator for Weather Services to evaluate the extent to which NWS’s actions are reducing the hiring backlog and achieving the goal of sustaining a highly skilled workforce; for example, NWS could evaluate these actions as part of the development of its strategic human capital plan.", "We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce transmitted written comments from NOAA, which are reproduced in appendix V. NOAA agreed with our recommendations, and stated that the report provides a factual account of the status of NWS hiring, efforts NWS and WFMO have taken to expedite hiring, the resources challenges NWS and WFMO have faced, and the impact that understaffing has had on the NWS’s ability to carry out its mission. NOAA agreed with our two recommendations to communicate complete information on hiring requests and evaluate the extent to which NWS’s actions are reducing the hiring backlog; regarding the first, NOAA stated that WFMO will work with ESO to continue to develop the requirements and tools needed to track human capital service delivery. NOAA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.", "Our objectives were to examine (1) information available on vacancies at National Weather Service (NWS) operational units for fiscal years 2010 through 2016; (2) steps, if any, NWS operational unit management and staff have taken to address the impact of vacancies at their units; (3) the extent to which National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Workforce Management Office (WFMO) makes information available to operational unit managers on the status of hiring requests; and (4) the extent to which NOAA’s WFMO and NWS are taking actions to address the hiring backlog at operational units.\nTo conduct our work, we reviewed relevant laws and NOAA, WFMO, and NWS policies, directives, and other documents. We also reviewed congressionally requested studies, including studies by the National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Public Administration. To define NWS operational units for the purposes of this report, we developed criteria based on our review of documents and interviews with knowledgeable NWS officials. We defined NWS operational units as all units in any category of units (e.g. weather forecast offices) in which at least one of the units met at least two of the following three criteria: (1) issues forecasts, (2) issues warnings, and (3) has personnel that are essential emergency employees. We analyzed a list of NWS essential emergency employees by operational unit, and cross-referenced this list with information on which units issue forecasts or warnings to determine which units met our criteria. As long as one of the operational units in a particular unit category met our criteria, we included all of the units in the category in our analysis. On the basis of these criteria, we identified six categories of operational units and a total of 168 individual operational units (see table 2). Appendix II provides a complete list of the operational units included in our scope.\nTo examine the information available on vacancies at NWS operational units for fiscal years 2010 through 2016, we obtained data for the end of those fiscal years from the agency’s organizational table, a database that tracks information on the number, type, and location of positions across the agency, including whether each position is filled. We calculated the number of vacancies—which we define as unfilled positions—and vacancy rates by dividing the number of unfilled positions by the total number of positions for each fiscal year, operational unit category, and position type. To assess the reliability of NWS’s organizational table data, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed knowledgeable NWS and NOAA officials about how data are entered and maintained. We also conducted a review of the organizational table data for obvious errors and completeness. On the basis of this review, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting available information on the number of vacancies across NWS operational units.\nWe also reviewed data NWS provided that adjusted information from the organizational table to factor in the level of positions the agency indicated it had resources to support. NWS developed these data because, according to NWS officials, the organizational table does not reflect resources the agency had available to fill many of the vacancies. However, the additional data the agency prepared did not identify which positions listed on the organizational table it did not have resources to fill. Rather, NWS developed these data by proportionally distributing vacancies across the operational units to show the number of positions the agency had resources to fill, according to NOAA and NWS officials. At an agencywide level (across all operational units collectively), these data were helpful to see the vacancy levels NWS estimated having, based on its resource levels. However, we determined that the additional data did not provide an accurate reflection of vacancies for a particular unit or position type and did not reflect how NWS has been managing its staffing levels or vacancies. In particular, the regional headquarters and director’s office of the National Centers have discretion to allocate resources according to their needs, including identifying which positions to leave vacant to ensure they do not exceed available resources, according to NWS headquarters officials. They do not, according to officials at regional headquarters and the director’s office of the National Centers, spread vacancies proportionally across their operational units. Given these limitations, we report data directly from the organizational table as described above.\nTo examine any steps NWS operational unit management and staff have taken to address the impact of vacancies at their units, we conducted interviews and obtained documentation when available from officials from the six NWS regional headquarters and nine National Centers and the director’s office. In addition, we visited a nongeneralizable sample of nine operational units across the United States that were selected to represent a range in (1) the number of vacancies in the unit; (2) the types of weather typical for the unit’s area of coverage, as demonstrated by types of forecasts produced; (3) the size of the population of the warning area covered by the unit; (4) the region in which the unit is located; and (5) the category of operational unit. Table 3 shows the operational units we selected and visited during our review. During our site visits we conducted separate interviews with management and staff and analyzed available documentation to corroborate steps they described having taken to address the impact of vacancies. The results from our interviews and site visits cannot be generalized to those operational units and employees we did not interview but rather provide illustrative examples of steps being taken to address vacancies.\nWe analyzed the information we obtained from our interviews and site visits to identify themes and develop a summary of the types of impacts from vacancies and any steps management and staff have taken to address vacancies.\nWe also collected and analyzed data on the number of temporary promotions for fiscal years 2010 through 2016 from NOAA’s WFMO to obtain additional context, as temporary promotions were commonly cited as an action taken to address vacancies in operational units we visited. To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed knowledgeable NWS and NOAA officials and reviewed relevant documentation. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.\nTo examine the extent to which NOAA’s WFMO makes information available to operational unit managers on the status of hiring requests and the extent to which NOAA’s WFMO and NWS have taken actions to address the hiring backlog at operational units, we examined documentation regarding the process for hiring at NWS operational units, as well as any actions NWS and WFMO have taken to address the hiring backlog. We analyzed available data on NWS and WFMO attrition, the number and types of hiring actions completed by WFMO and its contractors for NWS, and data on the amount of time it took to complete NWS hiring actions for fiscal years 2010 through 2016. According to a WFMO official, these data were not available at the operational unit level; therefore, we analyzed them for all NWS employees. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed knowledgeable NWS and NOAA officials, and reviewed the data for obvious errors and completeness. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the number and types of hiring actions and the amount of time the hiring actions took from fiscal years 2010 through 2016.\nWe interviewed NWS and WFMO officials regarding ongoing and planned actions to address the hiring backlog. We also interviewed officials from NOAA’s Office of Security, which is directed by the Department of Commerce’s Office of Security, regarding the process for completing security checks and background investigations as well as to determine the information available to operational unit managers during the security check step of the hiring process. In addition, we interviewed officials from the NOAA Budget Office and the Enterprise Services Organization about NOAA’s transition to a shared services model. Finally, we compared activities related to information WFMO makes available to operational unit managers, as well as information on actions NWS and WFMO have taken to address the hiring backlog, with federal standards for internal control.\nWe conducted this performance audit from November 2015 to May 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "The National Weather Service’s (NWS) 122 weather forecast offices comprise the majority of the 168 operational units (73 percent) included in our review. At the end of fiscal year 2016, 2,720 of NWS’s 3,629 operational unit employees (75 percent) worked in weather forecast offices. Table 6 provides vacancy rates by the positions in weather forecast offices for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, based on data from NWS’s organizational table, which is a database that tracks information on the number, type, and location of positions across the agency, including whether each position is filled. Table 7 provides a brief summary of the roles and responsibilities for positions in weather forecast offices.", "", "", "Anne-Marie Fennell, (202) 512-3841 or [email protected].", "In addition to the individual named above, Alyssa M. Hundrup (Assistant Director), Amy R. Bowser, John W. Delicath, Tanya Doriss, Cindy K. Gilbert, Amanda K. Goolden, Steven Gregory Lozano, Ryan B. Millendez, Colleen M. Phillips, and Sara A. Sullivan made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h2_full", "h3_full", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "h0_full h3_full h2_full h4_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How has the number of vacancies in the NWS changed since fiscal year 2010?", "How did NWS officials respond to this situation?", "What did these data reveal?", "How has NWS taken steps to address the impact of unfilled vacancies?", "How have these steps affected other aspects of the workplace?", "What access do NWS managers to hiring requests?", "Why would managers need access to this information?", "How does this compare to federal standards?", "What is WFMO doing to improve reporting capabilities?", "What is the interim risk of this situation?", "How has NOAA begun addressing the hiring backlog?", "What impact have these actions had?", "What steps does NWS intend to take in the future to continue addressing the hiring backlog?", "How will better evaluation help NWS reduce the hiring backlog?", "What did GAO examine in this report?", "What information did GAO analyze?" ], "summary": [ "Available data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS) indicate that the number of vacancies across its operational units has increased since fiscal year 2010. Specifically, agency data show that vacancies—unfilled positions at a point in time—increased from about 5 percent of the total number of positions at the end of fiscal year 2010 to about 11 percent in 2016.", "NWS officials reported that they did not have the resources to fill all of these vacancies and therefore developed additional data that factored in available resources.", "Based on these data, the vacancy rate across operational units was approximately 0.6 percent in fiscal year 2010 and increased to about 7 percent in fiscal year 2016.", "NWS operational unit managers and staff GAO interviewed said they had taken several steps to address the impact of vacancies that remained unfilled for months, and in some cases, more than a year. These steps included managers and staff performing additional tasks to ensure forecasts and warnings were issued, staff adjusting their work and leave schedules, and managers requesting temporary staff from other units.", "However, taking these steps, according to managers and staff, at times led to their inability to complete other key tasks, such as providing severe weather information support to state and local emergency managers.", "NOAA's Workforce Management Office (WFMO) makes limited information available to NWS managers on the status of their hiring requests. GAO found that complete information was often not available to managers, such as when the processing of a new hiring request was scheduled to begin.", "NWS managers said such information was critical for allocating resources and managing work, particularly in light of the length of the NWS hiring process. For example, agency data show that filling hiring requests selected for processing ranged from 64 to 467 days in fiscal year 2016.", "This is not consistent with federal internal control standards that call for management to communicate necessary quality information to achieve an entity's objectives.", "A WFMO official said the agency is working with the Department of Commerce to develop a new department-wide data system, potentially in 2017 that could provide improved tracking and reporting capabilities, but the design of the new system has not been finalized.", "In the interim, without complete information on the status of their requests, NWS operational unit managers are limited in their ability to plan for and distribute their unit's workload in the most efficient and effective manner.", "NOAA's WFMO and NWS have taken some actions to help address NWS's hiring backlog. For example, NWS has combined job announcements for similar positions into one announcement.", "NWS officials said they believe such actions have allowed them to streamline hiring, but they have not evaluated the extent to which their actions have achieved expected results, consistent with federal internal control standards.", "NWS intends to develop a strategic human capital plan, which officials said could provide a framework for evaluating its hiring actions, but does not have a time frame for its development.", "In the interim, by evaluating whether its actions are reducing the hiring backlog, NWS would have better assurance that its actions were achieving expected results, and the agency could better determine where to devote resources.", "GAO was asked to review vacancies and hiring at NWS operational units. This report examines (1) information available on vacancies at NWS operational units for fiscal years 2010 through 2016, (2) any steps NWS operational unit management and staff have taken to address the impact of vacancies at their units, (3) the extent to which NOAA's WFMO makes information available to managers on the status of hiring requests, and (4) the extent to which NOAA's WFMO and NWS are taking actions to address the hiring backlog at operational units.", "GAO analyzed available vacancy data for fiscal years 2010 through 2016 and assessed the data's reliability; examined relevant documentation and interviewed NOAA, WFMO, and NWS officials; and visited a nongeneralizable sample of nine units selected to reflect geographic diversity and varying vacancy levels." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 3, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_RL33785	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Who Are Homeless and Runaway Youth?", "Defining the Population", "Demographics", "Annual Point-in-Time (PIT) Counts", "Voices of Youth Count", "Other Research", "Factors Influencing Homelessness and Leaving Home", "Challenges Associated with Running Away and Homelessness", "Evolution of Federal Policy", "U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness: Opening Doors", "Focus on Youth Homelessness", "Runaway and Homeless Youth Program", "Basic Center Program", "Overview", "Funding Allocation", "Rural Homeless Youth Demonstration", "Transitional Living Program", "Overview", "Maternity Group Homes", "Funding Allocation", "Outcomes of Youth in the TLP", "Special Populations and Rural Homeless Youth Demonstration", "Street Outreach Program", "Overview", "Funding Allocation", "Data Collection Project", "Training and Technical Assistance: RHYTTAC", "National Communication System: National Runaway Safeline", "Oversight", "Educational Assistance", "Elementary and Secondary Education", "Higher Education", "Chafee Foster Care Independence Program88", "Discretionary Grants for Family Violence Prevention" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Running away from home is not a recent phenomenon. Folkloric heroes Huckleberry Finn and Davy Crockett fled their abusive fathers to find adventure and employment. Although some youth today also leave home due to abuse and neglect, they often endure far more negative outcomes than their romanticized counterparts from an earlier era. Without adequate and safe shelter, runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to engaging in high-risk behaviors and further victimization. Youth who live away from home for extended periods may become removed from school and systems of support. Runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to multiple problems while they are away from a permanent home, including untreated mental health disorders, drug use, and sexual exploitation. They also report other challenges including poor health and the lack of basic provisions.\nCongress began to hear concerns about the vulnerabilities of the runaway population in the 1970s due to increased awareness about these youth and the establishment of runaway shelters to assist them in returning home. Congress and the President went on to enact the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ( P.L. 93-415 ) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. Since that time, the law has been updated to authorize services to provide support for runaway and homeless youth outside of the juvenile justice, mental health, and child welfare systems. The Runaway Youth Act—now known as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act—authorized federal funding to be provided through annual appropriations for three programs that assist runaway and homeless youth: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). Together, the programs make up the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF).\nBasic Center Program: Provides funding to community-based organizations for crisis intervention, temporary shelter, counseling, family unification, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families. In some cases, BCP-funded programs may serve older youth. Over 31,000 youth participated in FY2016, the most recent year for which data are available. Transitional Living Program: Supports community-based organizations that provide homeless youth ages 16 through 22 with stable, safe, longer-term residential services up to 18 months (or longer under certain circumstances), including counseling in basic life skills, building interpersonal skills, educational advancement, job attainment skills, and physical and mental health care. Over 6,000 youth participated in FY2016. Street Outreach Program: Provides funding to community-based organizations for street-based outreach and education, including treatment, counseling, provision of information, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and trafficking. SOP grantees made contact with more than 36,000 youth in FY2016.\nThis report begins with an overview of the runaway and homeless youth population. It then describes the challenges in defining and counting this population, as well as the factors that influence homelessness and leaving home. The report also provides background on federal efforts to support runaway and homeless youth, including the evolution of federal policies to respond to these youth, with a focus on the period from the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 to the present time. The report then describes the administration and funding of the Basic Center, Transitional Living, and Street Outreach programs that were created from authorizations in the act. The appendixes include funding information for the BCP program and discuss other federal programs that may be used to assist runaway and homeless youth.", "", "There is no single federal definition of the terms \"homeless youth\" or \"runaway youth.\" However, HHS relies on definitions from the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act in administering the Runaway and Homeless Youth program: The act includes the following definitions:\n\"Homeless youth,\" for purposes of the BCP, includes individuals under age 18 (or some older age if permitted by state or local law) for whom it is not possible to live in a safe environment with a relative and who lack safe alternative living arrangements. \"Homeless youth,\" for purposes of the TLP, includes individuals ages 16 through 22 for whom it is not possible to live in a safe environment with a relative and who lack safe alternative living arrangements. Youth older than age 22 may participate if they entered the program before age 22 and meet other requirements. \"Runaway youth\" includes individuals under age 18 who absent themselves from their home or legal residence at least overnight without the permission of their parents or legal guardians.\nSeparately, the McKinney-Vento Act authorizes several federal programs for homeless individuals that are administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The definition of \"homeless individual\" in McKinney-Vento refers to \"unaccompanied youth,\" which applies to selected homelessness programs. HUD's related regulation defines an \"unaccompanied youth\" as someone under age 25 who meets the definition of \"homeless\" in the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act or other specified federal laws. The regulation also provides additional criteria, including that they have lived independently without permanent housing for at least 60 days.\nThe research literature discusses definitions of runaway and homeless youth. While studies have often categorized young people based on their status as runaways , homeless, or street youth , a 2011 report suggests that overlap exists between these categories. The authors of the study note that these \"typologies,\" or classifications, are too narrowly defined by the youth's housing status and reasons for homelessness, among other factors. The authors explain that typologies based on mental health status or age cohort are promising, but they suggest further research in this area to ensure that the typologies are accurate.", "The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility. These youth often eschew the shelter system for locations or areas that are not easily accessible to shelter workers and others who count the homeless and runaways. Youth who come into contact with census takers may also be reluctant to report that they have left home or are homeless. Determining the number of homeless and runaway youth is further complicated by the lack of a standardized methodology for counting the population and inconsistent definitions of what it means to be homeless or a runaway.\nDifferences in methodology for collecting data on homeless populations may also influence how the characteristics of the runaway and homeless youth population are reported. Some studies have relied on point prevalence estimates that report whether youth have experienced homelessness at a given point in time, such as on a particular day. According to researchers that study the characteristics of runaway and homeless youth, these studies appear to be biased toward describing individuals who experience longer periods of homelessness.", "HUD requires communities receiving certain HUD funding to conduct annual point-in-time (PIT) counts of people experiencing homelessness, including homeless youth. The PIT counts include people living in emergency shelter, transitional housing, and on the street or other places not meant for human habitation. It does not include people who are temporarily living with family or friends. In the 2018 PIT count, communities identified 36,361 unaccompanied youth under age 25 (versus 40,799 in 2017) and another 8,724 under age 25 who were homeless parents (versus 9,434 in 2017). While PIT counts do not provide a confident estimate of youth experiencing homelessness across the country, they provide some information to communities about the potential scope of youth homelessness.", "The Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act ( P.L. 110-378 ), which renewed authorization of appropriations for the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program through FY2013, also authorized funding for HHS to conduct periodic studies of the incidence and prevalence of youth who have run away or are homeless. Separately, the accompanying conference report to the FY2016 appropriations law ( P.L. 114-113 ) directed HUD to use $2 million to conduct a national incidence and prevalence study of homeless youth as authorized under the Runaway and Homeless Youth program. HUD provided these funds to Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago to carry out the study. The study, known as Voices of Youth Count , used a nationally representative phone survey to derive national estimates and conducted brief surveys of youth and in-depth interviews of youth who had experiences of homelessness. The phone survey involved interviews with adults whose households had youth and young adults ages 13 to 25 and with adults ages 18 to 25. Voices of Youth Count estimated that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 had experienced homelessness within a one-year period, meaning they were sleeping in places not meant for human habitation, staying in shelters, or temporarily staying with others while lacking a safe and stable alternative living arrangement. This differs from the PIT counts because it includes individuals who are staying with others. The study also found that youth homelessness affected youth in rural and urban areas at similar levels.", "A 2010 study on the lifetime prevalence of running away used longitudinal survey data of young people who were 12 to 18 years old when they were first interviewed about whether they had run away—defined as staying away at least one night without their parents' prior knowledge or permission—along with other behaviors. In subsequent years, youth who were under age 17 at their previous interview were asked if they had run away since their last interview. Youth who had ever run away were asked how many times they had done so and the age at which they first did. The study found that 19% of those who ran away did so before turning 18; females were more likely than males to run away; and among white, black, and Hispanic youth, black youth have the highest rate of ever running away. Youth who ran away reported that they did so about three times on average; however, about half of runaways had only run away once. Approximately half of the youth had run away before age 14.\nA subset of runaway youth is those in foster care. In FY2017, over 500 children in the United States had run away from their foster care home or other placement. While this represents less than 1% of all children in foster care, running away is more prevalent among older youth in care. A study of over 50,000 youth ages 13 through 17 in 21 states indicated that 17% ran away at least once during their first time in foster care. The study found that female, black, and Hispanic youth were more likely to run away than male and white youth in care. The study further found that youth were more likely to run away from congregate care (i.e., group care) settings compared to other settings, such as living with a relative or in a foster family home. Youth were also more likely to run away from care if they lived in the most socioeconomically disadvantaged counties or lived in a state that lacked a process to screen youth on the risk of running away. States report on the characteristics and experiences of certain current and former foster youth through the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). Among other information, states must report data on cohorts of foster youth beginning when they are age 17, and later at ages 19 and 21. Among youth surveyed in FY2015 at age 21, about 43% reported having experienced homelessness.", "Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. According to the research literature, a youth's poor family dynamics, sexual activity, sexual orientation, pregnancy, school problems, and alcohol and drug use are strong predictors of family discord. One-third of callers who used the National Runaway Safeline in 2017—a crisis call center funded under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program for youth and their relatives involved in runaway incidents—gave family dynamics (not defined) as the reason for their call.\nFurther, a longitudinal survey of middle school and high school youth examined the effects of family instability (e.g., child maltreatment, lack of parental warmth, and parent rejection) and other factors on the likelihood of running away from home approximately two to six years after youth were initially surveyed. Researchers found that youth with family instability were more likely to run away. Family instability also influenced problem behaviors, such as illicit drug use, which, in turn, were associated with running away. Researchers further determined that certain other effects (e.g., school engagement, neighborhood cohesiveness, physical victimization, and friends' support) were not strong predicators of whether youth in the sample ran away. In a study of youth who ran away from foster care between 1993 and 2003, the youth cited three primary reasons why they ran from foster care: to connect with their biological families, express their autonomy and find normalcy, and maintain relationships with nonfamily members. The Voices of Youth Count study found that certain youth ages 18 to 25 were at heightened risk of experiencing homelessness. This included youth with less than a high school diploma or GED; who were Hispanic or black; who were parenting and unmarried; or identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or questioning (LGBTQ). Gay and lesbian youth appear to be at greater risk for homelessness and are overrepresented in the homeless population, due often to experiencing negative reactions from their parents when they come out about their sexuality. The Voices of Youth Count study found that LGBTQ young adults ages 18 to 25 had more than twice the risk of being homeless than their heterosexual peers. LGBTQ youth made up about 20% of young adults who reported homelessness. In addition, a study involving LGBTQ young adults in seven cities found that the most common reason youth became homeless was due to being kicked out or asked to leave the home of a parent, relative, foster home, or group home.\nUnder an HHS grant, Youth with Child Welfare Involvement at Risk of Homelessness , the 18 grantees (state, local, and tribal child welfare agencies or community-based organizations) evaluated multiple risk factors for homelessness among child welfare-involved populations: which include those who have had numerous foster care placements, run away from foster care, been placed in a group home, had a history of mental health or behavioral health diagnoses, had juvenile justice involvement, had a history of substance abuse, been emancipated from foster care, and been parenting or fathered a child.", "Runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to multiple problems while they are away from a permanent home, including untreated mental health disorders, drug use, and sexual exploitation. Studies of homeless youth indicate that they are more likely to experience mental health and substance abuse disorders than their counterparts in the general population. A literature review of studies on psychiatric disorders among homeless youth found high prevalence of conduct disorders, major depression, psychosis, and other disorders. A study of participants in the Street Outreach Program found that about 6 out of 10 reported symptoms associated with depression and almost three-fourths reported that they had experienced major trauma, such as physical or sexual abuse or witnessing or being a victim of violence. Substance abuse is more prevalent among youth who live on the street, compared to homeless youth who are in shelters. Still, both groups of youth use alcohol or drugs at higher rates than their peers who live in family households, even after researchers control for demographic differences.\nWhile away from a permanent home, runaway and homeless youth are also vulnerable to sexual exploitation; sex and labor trafficking; and other victimization such as being beaten up, robbed, or otherwise assaulted. Some youth resort to illegal activity including stealing, exchanging sex for food or a place to stay, and selling drugs for survival. Runaway and homeless youth report other challenges including poor health and a lack of basic provisions.", "Prior to the enactment of the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 (Title III, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, P.L. 93-415 ), federal policy provided limited services to runaway and homeless youth. If they received any services, most of these youth were served through the local child welfare agency, juvenile justice court system, or both. The 1970s marked a shift to a more rehabilitative model for assisting youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses such as running away. During this period, Congress focused increasing attention on runaways and other vulnerable youth due, in part, to emerging sociological models to explain why youth engaged in deviant behavior. The first runaway shelters were created in the late 1960s and 1970s to assist them in returning home. The landmark Runaway Youth Act of 1974 decriminalized runaway youth and authorized funding for programs to provide shelter, counseling, and other services. Since the law's enactment, Congress and the President have expanded the services available to both runaway youth and homeless youth under what is now referred to as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program. In more recent years, other federal entities have been involved in responding to the challenges facing runaway and homeless youth. These efforts are coordinated through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). Figure 1 traces the evolution of federal policy in this area.", "The Runaway and Homeless Youth Program is a major part of recent federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness. The USICH, established under the 1987 Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, is made up of several federal agencies, including HHS and HUD. The HEARTH Act, enacted in 2009 as part of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act ( P.L. 111-22 ), charged USICH with developing a National Strategic Plan to End Homelessness. In June 2010, USICH released this plan, entitled Opening Doors . The plan set out goals for ending homelessness, including (1) ending chronic homelessness by 2015; (2) preventing and ending homelessness among veterans by 2015; (3) preventing and ending homelessness for families, youth, and children by 2020; and (4) setting a path to ending all types of homelessness.", "In 2012, USICH amended Opening Doors to specifically address strategies for improving the educational outcomes for children and youth and assisting unaccompanied homeless youth. USICH outlined its intention to improve outcomes for youth in four areas: stable housing, permanent connections, education or employment options, and socio-emotional well-being.\nIn 2013, a USICH working group developed a guiding document for ending youth homelessness by 2020. Known as the Framework to End Youth Homelessness , the document outlines a data strategy to collect better data on the number and characteristics of youth experiencing homelessness. This data strategy includes coordinating the former data collection system for the Runaway and Homeless Youth program—referred to as RHYMIS—with HUD's Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS). RHYMIS was a data system administered by HHS for previous RHYP grantees to upload demographic and other data for the youth they served. HMIS is a locally administered data system used to record and analyze client, service, and housing data for individuals and families who are homeless or at risk of homelessness in a given community. As of FY2015, RHYP grantees stopped reporting to RHYMIS and instead report to HMIS. Grantees reported to RHYMIS on the basic demographics of the youth, the services they received, and the status of the youth upon exiting the programs. RHY grantees are now required to report this same (and new information) to HMIS. According to HHS, some grantees have had have encountered inaccurate software programming for their data standards or have had issues with successfully extracting their data to submit to HHS.\nThe data strategy outlined in the framework also involves, if funding is available, designing and implementing a national study to estimate the number, needs, and characteristics of youth experiencing homelessness. This is consistent with the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act's directive for HHS to conduct a study of youth homelessness. As noted, this study— Voices of Youth Count —received funding from FY2016 HUD appropriations. In addition, HHS has supported other research on homeless youth, including factors associated with prolonged homelessness and risk factors for homelessness among children and youth with involvement in child welfare. In 2018, the USICH issued a brief that outlines continued gaps in data on the homeless youth population, citing the need for greater understanding about the causes of youth homelessness and how youth enter and exit homelessness. Separately, the framework also outlined a strategy to strengthen and coordinate the capacity of federal, state, and local systems to work toward ending youth homelessness. USICH has provided guidance to communities, including by establishing community-level criteria for ending homelessness and accompanying benchmarks to assess whether they have achieved an end to youth homelessness. Still, the 2018 USICH brief called for greater evidence regarding the impact of housing and service interventions in helping youth exit homelessness.", "As mentioned, the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program is administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) within HHS's Administration for Children and Families (ACF). The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act includes three authorizations of appropriations.\nThe authorization of appropriations for the Basic Center Program and Transitional Living program is $127.4 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020. Under the law, 90% of the federal funds appropriated under the two programs must be used for the BCP and TLP (together, the programs and their related activities are known as the Consolidated Runaway and Homeless Youth program). Of this amount, 45% is reserved for the BCP and no more than 55% is reserved for the TLP. The remaining share of consolidated funding is allocated for (1) a national communication system to facilitate communication between service providers, runaway youth, and their families (National Safeline); (2) training and technical support for grantees; (3) evaluations of the programs; (4) federal coordination efforts on matters relating to the health, education, employment, and housing of these youth; and (5) studies of runaway and homeless youth. The authorization of appropriations for the Street Outreach program is $25 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020. Although the SOP is a separately funded component, SOP services are coordinated with those provided under the BCP and TLP. The authorization of appropriations for the periodic estimate of incidence and prevalence of youth homelessness is such sums as may be necessary for FY2019 and FY2020. Funding has not been provided by HHS under this authority, and as noted, funds appropriated to HUD for this purpose have been used to support Voices of Youth Count.\nTable 1 shows funding levels for the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program from FY2006 through FY2019. Over this period, funding has increased notably for the program three times, most recently from FY2017 to FY2018. Congress has provided some guidance on how the additional funds are to be spent. In the conference report to accompany the FY2019 consolidated appropriations act, Congress stated that the increase should be provided to current TLP grantees whose awards end on March 31, 2019. The funding is to be used to continue services until new awards are made to those grantees, or for those grantees that did not receive a new grant, to provide services until the end of FY2019. Funding may then be used for additional new awards.", "", "The Basic Center Program is intended to provide short-term shelter and services for youth and their families at centers operated by BCP grantees, which are public and private community-based organizations. Youth eligible to receive BCP services include those youth who are at risk of running away or becoming homeless (and may live at home with their parents), or have already left home, either voluntarily or involuntarily. To stay at the shelter, youth must be under age 18, or an older age if the BCP center is located in a state or locality that permits this higher age. Some centers may serve homeless youth through street-based services, home-based services, and drug abuse education and prevention services. Grantees seek to connect youth with their families, whenever possible, or to locate appropriate alternative placements. They also provide individual or group and family counseling, health care, education, and employment assistance.\nAs specified in the law, BCP grantees or centers are intended to provide services as an alternative to involving runaway and homeless youth in the law enforcement, juvenile justice, child welfare, and mental health systems. Youth may stay in a center continuously up to 21 days. In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available). These centers, which can shelter as many as 20 youth, are generally supposed to be located in areas that are frequented or easily reached by runaway and homeless youth.\nBCP grantees must make efforts to contact the parents and relatives of runaway and homeless youth. Grantees are also required to establish relationships with law enforcement, health and mental health care, social service, welfare, and school district systems to coordinate services. Grantees maintain confidential statistical records of youth, including youth who are not referred to out-of-home shelter services. Further, grantees are required to submit an annual report to HHS detailing the program activities and the number of youth participating in such activities, as well as information about the operation of the centers.", "BCP grants are allocated directly to grantees for a three-year period. Funding is generally distributed to entities based on the proportion of the nation's youth under age 18 in the jurisdiction where the entities are located. The 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico each receive a minimum allotment of $200,000. Separately, the territories (currently, this includes American Samoa and Guam) each receive a minimum of $70,000. The amount of funding for each state or territory can further depend on whether grant applicants in that jurisdiction applied for funding, and if so, whether the applicant fulfilled the requirements in the authorizing law and grant application. For example, the authorizing law directs HHS to give priority to applicants who have demonstrated experience in providing services to runaway and homeless youth. HHS is to re-allot any funds designated for grantees in one state to grantees in other states that will not be obligated before the end of a fiscal year. See Table A-1 for the amount of funding allocated for each state in FY2017 and FY2018. The costs of the BCP are shared by the federal government (90%) and grantees (10%).", "In FY2008, HHS began funding a three-year Rural Host Homes Demonstration Project , which was initiated to expand BCP shelter and support services to runaway and homeless youth who live in rural areas not served by shelter facilities. The project supported grantees that provided youth with shelter (via host home families who were recruited, screened, and trained) and preventive services, including transportation, counseling, educational assistance, and aftercare planning, among others. Over the course of the three years, the project served 781 youth, 411 of whom received shelter and 370 of whom received preventive services without shelter.", "", "Recognizing the difficulty that youth face in becoming self-sufficient adults, the Transitional Living Program provides longer-term shelter and assistance for youth ages 16 through 22 (or older if the youth entered the TLP prior to reaching age 22) who may leave their biological homes due to family conflict, or have left and are not expected to return home. Pregnant and/or parenting youth are eligible for TLP services. In FY2017, the TLP provided services to 3,517 youth. In FY2018, the program funded 229 organizations.\nEach TLP grantee may shelter up to 20 youth at various sites, such as host family homes, supervised apartments owned by a social service agency, scattered-site apartments, or single-occupancy apartments rented directly with the assistance of the grantee. Youth may remain at TLP sites for up to 540 days (18 months), or longer for youth under age 18. Youth ages 16 through 22 may remain in the program for a continuous period of 635 days (approximately 21 months) under \"exceptional circumstances.\" This term means circumstances in which a youth would benefit to an unusual extent from additional time in the program. A youth in a TLP who has not reached age 18 on the last day of the 635-day period may, in exceptional circumstances and if otherwise qualified for the program, remain in the program until his or her 18 th birthday.\nYouth receive several types of services at TLP-funded programs:\nbasic life-skills training, including consumer education and instruction in budgeting and the use of credit; parenting support and child care (as appropriate); building interpersonal skills; educational opportunities, such as GED courses and postsecondary training; assistance in job preparation and attainment; and mental and physical health care services.\nTLP grantees are required to develop a written plan designed to help youth transition to living independently or another appropriate living arrangement, and they are to refer youth to other systems that can help to meet their educational, health care, and social service needs. The grantees must also submit an annual report to HHS that includes information regarding the activities carried out with funds and the number and characteristics of the homeless youth.", "As part of the FY2002 budget request, the George W. Bush Administration proposed a $33 million initiative to fund maternity group homes—or centers that provide shelter to pregnant and parenting teens who are vulnerable to abuse and neglect—as a component of the TLP. Although the TLP authorized services for pregnant and parenting teens prior to FY2002, the Bush Administration sought funds specifically to serve this population. Increased funds were ultimately provided to enable these youth to access TLP services. The 2003 amendments to the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act ( P.L. 108-96 ) provided explicit authority to use TLP funds for this purpose. Since FY2004, funding for adult-supervised transitional living arrangements that serve pregnant or parenting women ages 16 to 21 and their children has been awarded to organizations that receive TLP grants. These organizations provide youth with parenting skills, including child development education, family budgeting, health and nutrition, and other skills to promote family well-being.", "TLP grants are distributed competitively by HHS to community-based public and private organizations throughout the country for a five-year period. Grantees must provide at least 10% of the total cost of the program.", "HHS is carrying out a study to learn more about the long-term outcomes of 1,250 youth who have used TLP services. The study seeks to describe the outcomes and to isolate and describe promising practices and other factors that may contribute to their successes or challenges. Of particular interest for the study is how services are delivered, the demographics of youth, and their socio-emotional wellness and life experiences. It involves both a process evaluation and impact evaluation, with youth randomly assigned to the treatment (i.e., participation in the TLP) and control groups. The study seeks to address the following questions: (1) How do TLP programs operate, what types of program models are used to deliver services, and what services are delivered to homeless youth? (2) What are the long-term housing outcomes and protective factors for youth who participate in the TLP program immediately, six months, 12 months, and 18 months after exiting the program? (3) What interventions can be attributed to any positive outcomes experienced by youth who participate in the TLP? According to HHS, the pilot study revealed challenges \"in collecting data from a large enough sample size of youth to detect any effects so that conclusions could be drawn about the impact of homeless youth served by TLPs.\" HHS is not certain how it will move forward with the study.", "In FY2016, HHS began the Transitional Living Program Special Population Demonstration project. The project funded nine grantees over a two-year period that tested approaches for serving populations that need additional support: LGBTQ runaway and homeless youth ages 16 to 21; and young adults who have left foster care because of emancipation. Grantees were expected to provide strategies that help youth build protective factors, such as connections with schools, employment, and appropriate family members and other caring adults. According to HHS, a process evaluation will assess how grantees are implementing the demonstration project.\nHHS separately funded a project from FY2012 through FY2014 to build the capacity of TLPs in serving LGBTQ youth. Known as the 3/40 Blueprint: Creating the Blueprint to Reduce LGBTQ Youth Homelessness , the purpose of the grant was develop information about serving the LGBTQ youth population experiencing homelessness, such as through efforts to identify innovative intervention strategies, determine culturally appropriate screening and assessment tools, and better understand the needs of LGBTQ youth served by RHY providers. The website developed by the grantee, the University of Illinois at Chicago, identifies promising practices that serve LGBTQ youth who are experiencing homelessness and publishes information about their challenges.\nIn FY2009, HHS began the Support Systems for Rural Homeless Youth Demonstration Project . Six states received grants to support TLPs in rural communities in serving young adults who have few or no connections to a supportive family structure or community resources. The five-year project sought to provide services across three main areas:\nsurvival support, which includes housing, health care (including mental health), and substance abuse treatment and prevention; community, which includes community service, youth and adult partnerships, mentoring, and peer support groups; and education and employment, which includes high school or GED completion, postsecondary education, and job training and employment.\nThe six states—Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont—each received annual grants of $200,000. According to HHS, all of the sites engaged youth in positive youth development activities that included safe places for youth to go. In addition, they raised awareness about homelessness in rural areas and addressed some of the unique needs around employment, housing, and transportation. However, the sites also confirmed that there is a general lack of available housing for homeless youth and that transportation was the most critical impediment to serving these youth.", "", "The Street Outreach Program provides runaway and homeless youth living on the streets or in areas that increase their risk of using drugs or being subjected to sexual abuse, prostitution, sexual exploitation, and trafficking are eligible to receive services. The program's goal is to assist youth in transitioning to safe and appropriate living arrangements. SOP services include the following:\ntreatment and counseling; crisis intervention; drug abuse and exploitation prevention and education activities; survival aid; street-based education and outreach; information and referrals; and follow-up support.", "Grants are awarded for a three-year period, and grantees must provide 10% of the funds to cover the cost of the program. In FY2018, 96 grantees were funded. In FY2017 grantees made contact with 24,366 youth.", "The Family and Youth Services Bureau initiated the Street Outreach Program Data Collection Project in 2012 to learn more about the lives and needs of homeless and runaway youth served by SOP grantees. The purpose of the project was to design services to better meet the needs of these youth. FYSB collected information through focus groups and computer-assisted personal interviews with 656 youth (ages 14 to 21 years) served by grantees in 11 cities. The project found that participants were homeless on average for nearly two years and had challenges with substance abuse, mental health, and exposure to trauma. Youth most identified that they were in need of job training or help finding a job, transportation assistance, and clothing. The top barriers to obtaining shelter were shelters being full, not knowing where to go for shelter, and lacking transportation to get to a shelter. The study researchers concluded that more emergency shelters could help prevent youth from sleeping on the street. Further, they noted that youth on the streets need more intensive case management (e.g., careful assessment and treatment planning, linkages to community resources, etc.) and more intensive interventions.", "HHS funds the Runaway and Homeless Youth Training and Technical Assistance Center (RHYTTAC) to provide technical assistance to RHYP grantees. HHS awarded a five-year cooperative agreement, from September 30, 2017, through September 29, 2020, to National Safe Place to operate RHYTTAC. National Safe Place is a national youth outreach program that aims to educate young people about the dangers of running away or trying to resolve difficult, threatening situations on their own. RHYTTAC is designed to provide training and conference services to RHYP grantees that enhance and promote continuous quality improvement to services provided by RHYP grantees. Further, RHYTTAC offers resources and information through its website, tip sheets, a quarterly newsletter, toolkits, sample policies and procedures, and other resources. RHYTTAC also provides assistance to individual grantees in response to their questions or concerns, as well as concerns raised by HHS as part of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program Monitoring System (see subsequent section).", "A portion of the funds for the BCP, TLP, and related activities are allocated for a national communications system known as the National Runaway Safeline (\"Safeline\"). The Safeline is intended to help homeless and runaway youth (or youth who are contemplating running away) through counseling, referrals, and communicating with their families. Beginning with FY1974 and every year after, the Safeline, which until 2013 was called the National Runaway Switchboard, has been funded through the Basic Center Program grant or the Consolidated Runaway and Homeless Youth Program grant. The Safeline is located in Chicago and operates each day to provide services to youth and their families across the country. Services include (1) a channel through which runaway and homeless youth or their parents may leave messages; (2) 24-hour referrals to community resources, including shelter, community food banks, legal assistance, and social services agencies; and (3) crisis intervention counseling to youth. In calendar year 2017, the Safeline handled nearly 30,000 contacts with youth (via phone, computer, emails, and postings), of which nearly three-quarters were from youth and 9% were from parents; the other callers were relatives, friends, and others. Other services are also provided through the Safeline. Since 1995, the \"Home Free\" family reunification program has provided bus tickets for youth ages 12 to 21 to return home or to an alternative placement near their home through Home Free.", "HHS evaluates each RHYP grantee through the Runaway and Homeless Youth Monitoring System. Staff from regional ACF offices and other grant recipients (known as peer reviewers) inspect the program site, conduct interviews, review case files and other agency documents, and conduct entry and exit conferences. The monitoring team then prepares a written report that identifies the strengths of the program and areas that require corrective action.\nThe Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 required that within one year of its enactment (October 8, 2009), HHS was to issue rules that specified performance standards for public and nonprofit entities that receive BCP, TLP, and SOP grants. On April 14, 2014, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the new performance standards and other requirements for the Runaway and Homeless youth program grantees. On December 20, 2016, HHS implemented a final rule that was similar to the provisions in the NPRM. These standards are used to monitor individual grantee performance.\nThe Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and the House Committee on Education and Labor have exercised jurisdiction over the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program. HHS must submit reports biennially to the committees on the status, activities, and accomplishments of program grant recipients and evaluations of the programs performed by HHS. The most recent report was submitted in January 2018, and covered FY2014 and FY2015.\nThe 2003 reauthorization law ( P.L. 108-96 ) of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act required that HHS, in consultation with the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, submit a report to Congress on the promising strategies to end youth homelessness within two years of the reauthorization, in October 2005. The report was submitted to Congress in June 2007.\nAs mentioned above, the 2008 reauthorization law ( P.L. 110-378 ) required HHS, as of FY2010, to periodically submit to Congress an incidence and prevalence study of runaway and homeless youth ages 13 to 26, as well as the characteristics of a representative sample of these youth. As discussed, Congress appropriated funding to HUD for this purpose and the study, known as Voices of Youth Count , includes multiple publications about its findings. The 2008 law also directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate the process by which organizations apply for BCP, TLP, and SOP, including HHS's response to these applicants. GAO submitted a report to Congress in May 2010 on its findings. GAO found weaknesses in several of the procedures for reviewing grants, such as that peer reviewers for the grant did not always have expertise in runaway and homeless youth issues and feedback on grants was not provided in a permanent record. In addition, GAO found that HHS delayed telling successful grantees that the grant had been awarded to them. HHS has implemented the recommendations made in the report.\nAppendix A. Basic Center Program (BCP) Funding\nAppendix B. Additional Federal Support for Runaway and Homeless Youth\nSince the creation of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program, other federal initiatives have also established services for such youth.\nYouth Homelessness Demonstration Program (YHDP): The omnibus appropriations laws for FY2016 through FY2018 enabled HUD to set aside up to $33 million (FY2016), $43 million (FY2017), and $80 million (FY2018) from the Homeless Assistance Grants account to implement projects that demonstrate how a \"comprehensive approach\" can \"dramatically reduce\" homelessness for youth through age 24. The appropriations laws each fiscal year direct this funding to up to 10 communities with the FY2016 funding; up to 11 communities with the FY2017 funding, including at least five rural communities; and up to 25 communities with the FY2018 funding, including at least eight rural communities. HUD has allocated $33 million to 10 communities for FY2016 and $43 million for FY2017. In addition, HUD is taking steps to evaluate the YHDP grantee communities in developing and carrying out a coordinated community approach to preventing and ending youth homelessness. 100-Day Challenges to End Youth Homelessness : Since 2016, cities have partnered with public and private entities to accelerate efforts to prevent and end youth homelessness. A Way Home America and Rapid Results Institute, organizations that focus on pressing social problems, have provided support to the organizations. HHS provided training and technical assistance through RHYTTAC to the first three cities involved in the challenge: Los Angeles, CA; Cleveland, OH; and Austin, TX. In general, participating communities have housed homeless youth and have identified new housing options for this population. Youth with Child Welfare Involvement At-Risk of Homelessness (YAHR): HHS has funded grants to build evidence on what works to prevent homelessness among youth and young adults who have child welfare involvement. HHS awarded funds to 18 grantees for a two-year planning period (2013-2015). Six of the grantees received additional funding to refine and test their service models during a second phase (2015-2018). A subset of those grantees will then be selected to conduct a rigorous evaluation of their impact on homelessness.", "", "In school year 2016-2017, more than 1.3 million children and youth were homeless. Of these students, over 118,000 were homeless youth unaccompanied by their families. The Department of Education administers the Education for Homeless Children and Youth program, which was established under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 ( P.L. 100-77 ), as amended. This program assists state education agencies (SEAs) to ensure that all homeless children and youth have equal access to the same, appropriate education, including public preschool education, that is provided to other children and youth. Grants made by SEAs to local education agencies (LEAs) under this program must be used to facilitate the enrollment, attendance, and success in school of homeless children and youth. Program funds may be appropriated for activities such as tutoring, supplemental instruction, and referral services for homeless children and youth, as well as providing them with medical, dental, mental, and other health services. McKinney-Vento liaisons for homeless children and youth in each LEA is responsible for coordinating activities for these youth with other entities and agencies, including local Basic Center and Transitional Living Program grantees. States that receive McKinney-Vento funds are prohibited from segregating homeless students from non-homeless students, except for short periods of time for health and safety emergencies or to provide temporary, special, supplemental services. FY2019 funding for the program is $93.5 million.", "According to a 2017 survey of 43,000 college students at selected colleges and universities, 9% of those attending four-year universities and 12% of those attending community college had been homeless in the last year. In addition, 37% of university students and 46% of community college students were housing insecure in the past year, meaning that they had difficulty paying rent or lived with others beyond the expected capacity of the housing, among other scenarios.\nThe Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes financial aid and support programs that target homeless students and other vulnerable populations. For purposes of applying for federal financial aid, a student's expected family contribution (EFC) is the amount that can be expected to be contributed by a student and the student's family toward his or her cost of education. Certain groups of students are considered \"independent,\" meaning that only the income and assets of the student (and not their parents or guardians) are counted. Individuals under age 24 who have been verified during the school year as either (1) unaccompanied and homeless or (2) unaccompanied, self-supporting, and risk of homelessness. This verification can come from a McKinney-Vento liaison for homeless children and youth in the local education agency; the director (or designee) of a program funded under the Runaway and Homeless Youth program; the director (or designee) of an emergency shelter or transitional housing program funded by HUD; or a financial aid administrator.\nSeparately, HEA provides that homeless children and youth are eligible for what are collectively called the federal TRIO programs. This includes the following TRIO programs: Talent Search, Upward Bound, Student Support Services, and Educational Opportunity Centers. The TRIO programs are designed to identify potential postsecondary students from disadvantaged backgrounds, prepare these students for higher education, provide certain support services to them while they are in college, and train individuals who provide these services. HEA directs the Department of Education (ED), which administers the programs, to (as appropriate) require applicants seeking TRIO funds to identify and make services available, including mentoring, tutoring, and other services, to these youth. TRIO funds are awarded by ED on a competitive basis. In addition, HEA authorizes services for homeless youth through TRIO Student Support Services—a program intended to improve the retention and graduation rates of disadvantaged college students—that include temporary housing during breaks in the academic year. In FY2019, TRIO appropriations are $1.1 billion.\nSeparately, HEA allows additional uses of funds through the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) to establish demonstration projects that provide comprehensive support services for students who are or were homeless at age 13 or older. FIPSE is a grant program that seeks to support the implementation of innovative educational reform ideas and evaluate how well they work. As specified in the law, the projects can provide housing to the youth when housing at an educational institution is closed or unavailable to other students. FY2019 appropriations for FIPSE are $5 million.", "Recently emancipated foster youth are vulnerable to becoming homeless. In FY2017, nearly 20,000 youth \"aged out\" of foster care. The Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP), created under the Chafee Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 ( P.L. 106-169 ), provides states with funding to support children and youth ages 14 to 21 who are in foster care and former foster youth ages 18 to 21 (and up to age 23 in states that extend foster care to age 21). States are authorized to receive funds based on their share of the total number of children in foster care nationwide. However, the law's \"hold harmless\" clause precludes any state from receiving less than the amount of funds it received in FY1998 or $500,000, whichever is greater. The program specifies funding for transitional living services, and as much as 30% of the funds may be dedicated to room and board. The program is funded through mandatory spending, and as such $140 million ($143 million as of FY2020) is provided for the program each year through the annual appropriations process.", "The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA), Title III of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 ( P.L. 98-457 ), authorized funds for Family Violence Prevention and Service grants that work to prevent family violence, improve service delivery to address family violence, and increase knowledge and understanding of family violence. From FY2007 to FY2009, one of these projects focused on runaway and homeless youth in dating violence situations through HHS's Domestic Violence/Runaway and Homeless Youth Collaboration on the Prevention of Adolescent Dating Violence initiative. The initiative was created because many runaway and homeless youth come from homes where domestic violence occurs and may be at risk of abusing their partners or becoming victims of abuse. The initiative funded eight states and community-based organizations to address the issue of teen dating violence among runaway and homeless youth. The grants funded activities such as curriculum on dating violence, small groups for teens, and a sexual assault/dating violence reduction program. The initiative resulted in an online toolkit for advocates in the runaway and homeless youth and domestic and sexual assault fields to help programs better address relationship violence with runaway and homeless youth." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_title", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_title h2_title h1_full", "h0_title h2_full", "h0_full h2_full", "h2_title h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What factors contribute to youth homelessness?", "Why is it difficult to know the precise number of homeless and runaway youth?", "What actions are HUD taking to better determine the number of homeless and runaway youth?", "What has HUD discovered about homeless youth?", "How were the needs of runaway and homeless youth handled through the 1960s?", "What changed about how the needs of runaway and homeless youth were handled starting in the 1970s?", "What characterizes the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 ?", "How was the act most recently authorized?", "What is the status of the Act's funding?", "What is the USICH?", "What is the USICH's Opening Doors plan?", "How does Voices of Youth Count aid this task?", "What other federal programs help homeless youth?" ], "summary": [ "Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. A youth's sexual orientation, sexual activity, school problems, and substance abuse are associated with family discord.", "The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility and overlap among the populations.", "The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is supporting data collection efforts, known as Voices of Youth Count, to better determine the number of homeless youth.", "The 2017 study found that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 experienced homelessness within a 12-month period because they were sleeping in places not meant for habitation, in shelters, or with others while lacking alternative living arrangements.", "From the early 20th century through the 1960s, the needs of runaway and homeless youth were handled locally through the child welfare agency, juvenile justice courts, or both.", "The 1970s marked a shift toward federal oversight of programs that help youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses (i.e., a noncriminal act that is considered a violation of the law because of the youth's age).", "The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 was enacted as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. The act was amended over time to include homeless youth. It authorizes funding for services carried out under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).", "The program was most recently authorized through FY2020 by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385). This law did not make other changes to the RHYP statute.", "Funding is discretionary, meaning provided through the appropriations process. FY2019 appropriations are $127.4 million.", "The RHYP is a part of larger federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). The USICH is a coordinating body made up of multiple federal agencies committed to addressing homelessness.", "The USICH's Opening Doors plan to end homelessness includes strategies for ending youth homelessness by 2020, including through collecting better data and supporting evidence-based practices to improve youth outcomes.", "Voices of Youth Count is continuing to report on characteristics of homeless youth.", "In addition to the RHYP, there are other federal supports to address youth homelessness. HUD's Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program is funding a range of housing options for youth, in selected urban and rural communities. Other federal programs have enabled homeless youth to access services, including those related to education and family violence." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, 2, -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, 0, 1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-17-80	{ "title": [ "Background", "DOD Guidance for Establishing and Closing Commissaries", "Our Prior Work on Defense Commissaries", "DOD’s Annual Appropriation", "Private Business Concepts at the Commissaries", "DeCA Lacks Reasonable Assurance That It Has Maintained Its Desired Savings Rate", "DeCA’s Savings Calculation Methodology Uses Weighted Averages of Product Prices", "DeCA’s Savings Calculation Methodology Has Several Weaknesses", "DeCA Employs a Business Model That Departs from Practices Generally Employed by Commercial Grocery Stores", "DeCA Uses a Statutorily Required Pricing Method That Differs from the Method Generally Used by Commercial Grocery Stores", "DOD Pricing Method Leads to Mostly Uniform Prices, Whereas Private Sector Prices Are Sensitive to Local Market Costs", "DeCA Tracks Products Sold but Does Not Manage Products in a Manner Consistent with Practices Generally Employed in Commercial Grocery Stores", "DeCA Lacks Reasonable Assurance That Certain of Its Business Processes Are Cost Effective", "DeCA Has Not Compared Costs and Benefits of Using In- House Staff or Contractors for Shelf Stocking and Custodial Services", "DeCA Lacks Reasonable Assurance That It Is Using the Most Cost-Effective Product Distribution System", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "By law, DOD’s primary consideration for establishing and closing commissaries is the needs of the members of the armed forces on active duty and their dependents. DOD Instruction 1330.17 outlines requirements for establishing and closing commissaries. Under the instruction, DOD can establish commissaries only where (1) the location has a military mission and a minimum active-duty population of at least 500 active, reserve, or National Guard personnel and (2) the location is part of DOD’s real property inventory. For commissaries in locations that DOD considers to be remote and isolated, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness and Force Management) may grant an exception from the requirement to have a minimum active-duty population of 500 personnel. DOD Instruction 1015.10, which defines remote and isolated, lists factors to establish and maintain a location’s remote and isolated status, which must be documented and updated if circumstances change substantially. According to DeCA, as of April 2016, there were 29 commissaries that are located in remote and isolated areas. DOD’s instruction also provides specific requirements for closing commissaries, including if the location (1) no longer is managed as part of DOD’s real property inventory, such as if the site is closed under a Base Realignment and Closure round recommendation and (2) no longer has a military mission or an active-duty population—specifically if there are not at least 100 active, reserve, or National Guard personnel on active duty permanently assigned to the installation or location.", "We have previously reported on DOD’s commissary operations as well as other privatization efforts within the department. For example, in November 2016, we reported that DOD’s budget neutrality report for the commissaries and exchanges did not include any assumptions, methodology, or specific time frames related to cost savings initiatives totaling $2 billion in reductions over a 5-year period from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2021. We also found that DOD’s report did not define specific metrics for benchmarks for customer satisfaction, quality of products, and patron savings. We recommended that DOD provide information to Congress to support the department’s conclusion about budget neutrality, develop a plan for achieving alternative reductions to appropriations, and identify specific metrics for customer satisfaction, quality of products, and patron savings. DOD concurred with our recommendations.\nIn April 2011, we reported that some of the general and economic criteria in DOD’s instruction were not clear on when to establish or continue a commissary versus when to discontinue commissary operations at Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine. For example, DOD’s instruction stated that the primary consideration in assessing the need for a commissary and selecting the location of the store—including whether to operate commissaries on closed installations—is the effect on active-duty personnel and their dependents. However, the instruction did not specify how this effect should be measured and used as decision criteria. Additionally, at the time of our review, the instruction stated that “as a general rule, commissary operations are discontinued when an installation is completely closed and no active-duty or reserve component personnel remain on the installation.” However, we found that it was unclear what conditions would warrant an exception to the general rule and how the general rule relates to the other criteria for closing a commissary. As a result, we recommended that DOD revise and clarify its guidance. DOD concurred with and implemented our recommendation.\nIn July 2010, we reported that the Army experienced challenges with its efforts to privatize its lodging facilities. Specifically, the Army pursued privatization to obtain private-sector financing in order to address poor conditions of its facilities. We made recommendations related to the Army needing to assess the costs and benefits of future privatization efforts and to the need for DOD to incorporate lessons learned in future privatization efforts within the department. DOD concurred and implemented our recommendations.", "DeCA is required by law to use appropriated funds to cover commissary operating costs, which subsidizes the price of groceries and household goods for patrons shopping at commissaries. In fiscal year 2015, DeCA received $1.3 billion in appropriations. DeCA also is governed by regulations that may limit its ability to control costs and allocate funds in the same way as commercial grocery stores, which do not operate under such regulatory requirements. For example, under law, DeCA employees are subject to civil service rules, including the General Schedule pay scales and Office of Personnel Management regulations on personnel policies such as hiring, pay, and retention, but that are not sensitive to local market conditions such as local labor costs as would be true for a commercial grocery store. Figure 1 shows how DeCA allocated $1.3 billion in appropriated funds by labor and non-labor operating costs in fiscal year 2015.", "When DOD established DeCA in 1991, it consolidated the management of separate grocery stores run by the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. According to DeCA officials, the consolidation helped reduce costs by combining buying power and sharing overhead. In recent years, several studies reviewed the potential impact of employing business concepts normally used in commercial grocery stores, such as variable pricing and improvements in product management, in commissary operations. For example, in 2015 the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (Military Commission) and Boston Consulting Group both recommended ways to reduce annual appropriated funds of commissaries by implementing private business concepts. Specifically, the Military Commission recommended several operational efficiencies, including consolidating commissaries with exchanges, which are retail stores not funded with appropriations and comprise a mix of department stores; convenience stores; and fast food outlets, among others, and are managed by each of the military services. The Boston Consulting Group made recommendations related to employing variable pricing and to product management.", "DOD has a methodology to calculate the patron savings rate at commissaries, but lacks reasonable assurance that it is maintaining its desired savings rate for patrons because of weaknesses in this methodology. DeCA’s Board of Directors annually recommends the patron savings rate that is to be the price differential commissary patrons are to obtain by shopping in commissaries rather than at commercial grocery stores. Based on past calculations of the savings rate, the Board recommended a desired average savings rate of 30 percent for fiscal year 2015. DeCA’s methodology for calculating savings uses weighted averages of product prices. However, aspects of DeCA’s methodology are not consistent with leading practices for cost estimating and sampling. As a result of these weaknesses, DeCA lacks reasonable assurance that the desired 30 percent rate recommended by the Board reflects the actual experience of commissary patrons.", "DeCA uses weighted averages of product prices to calculate the savings rate, and DeCA’s methodology differs for commissaries in the continental United States and for those in Hawaii, Alaska, and overseas. For commissaries in the continental United States, DeCA divides products into seven categories ranging from fresh meat and produce to nonfood items with universal product codes (i.e., bar codes). For products with bar codes, DeCA compares commissary and commercial prices for over 38,000 items. Specifically, it compares prices on commissary items during the first 6 months of the calendar year with average national product prices provided by a leading survey. For products lacking a bar code, DeCA conducts physical audits at local commercial grocery stores with similar products for a selected sample of 30 commissaries. For the meat and produce samples, DeCA collects price data annually in August and September. The seven categories’ prices are weighted using a consumer expenditure survey published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.\nFor commissaries in Alaska, Hawaii, and overseas, DeCA calculates the weighted average of savings for a selected sample of commissaries based on savings by total sales in each geographic region. DeCA physically collects prices for about 200 items across the same seven product categories from a sample of commissaries in Alaska and Hawaii. At other overseas commissaries, DeCA conducts more limited sampling from 13 commissaries. As shown in table 1, DeCA’s calculation of the savings rate varies by geographic region.", "When compared with leading practices for cost estimating and sampling, DeCA’s savings calculation methodology has several weaknesses that could lead to an inaccurate calculation of the actual savings rate that commissary patrons experience. According to leading practices and federal standards for internal control, management should have relevant and reliable information to run its operations and the data should be reasonably free of error and bias and represent what they were purported to represent. However, our analysis showed that DeCA’s methodology for determining the savings rate is not fully consistent with leading practices in five areas. As a result, DeCA lacks reasonable assurance that patrons are receiving the full desired value of the nonpay cash benefit represented by the 30 percent savings rate approved by the Board of Directors.\nSeasonal sales prices: DeCA’s methodology does not account for seasonal differences in prices. DeCA collects its product price samples during the first 6 months of the calendar year for categories, such as dairy, grocery food, frozen, and health and beauty products in the continental United States, which is not representative of the whole year and omits potentially reduced prices commercial grocery stores may offer during the winter holidays. DeCA officials acknowledged that they do not account for winter holiday season price fluctuation, but stated that 6 months is a sufficient period of time for the sample. However, according to nonprobability sampling standards published by the American Association for Public Opinion Research, this type of omission creates a coverage error by underrepresenting part of the sample and generates potential bias. By limiting data collection to the first 6 months of the year, DeCA lacks reasonable assurance that its methodology results in an accurate comparison between commissary and commercial prices over the full year.\nSampling overseas commissaries: While DeCA employs a methodology for randomly selecting 30 commissaries in the continental United States in its savings market basket analysis, the agency lacks a similar methodology for selecting overseas commissaries. Specifically, DeCA officials stated that they ask regional directors to select the overseas commissaries to be included in the sample. However, according to the report on nonprobability sampling by the American Association for Public Opinion Research, a nonrandom sampling method should be based on procedures to provide estimates and some measure of their reliability to help avoid potential sources of bias. Examples of bias include sampling based on convenience or a sample that is small and unrepresentative of the total populations. By giving regional directors the discretion to select overseas commissaries, DeCA is not using a random sampling method and the results of its savings analysis may be subject to potential sources of bias and may not be representative.\nGeographic price differentiation: DeCA’s methodology does not account for differences in prices based on geographic location. As discussed earlier, DeCA uses the Nielsen survey that aggregates prices nationwide to compare with commissary prices. DeCA does not compare its prices with prices charged by local competitors near its commissaries. In contrast, commercial grocery stores generally compare their prices with prices charged by competitors in the same market since they are subject to comparable local costs of business operations. Examples of comparable local costs include the costs of labor and any applicable property or other taxation. Prices at commercial grocery stores generally reflect local market conditions, leading to higher retail prices in higher cost areas and lower prices in lower cost areas. Conversely, the commissaries are somewhat insulated from local market conditions since commissaries pay their employees according to the federal pay system, which is not tied directly to the local labor market; operate from government-owned military bases that are not subject to property taxes; and have an annual appropriation to subsidize operations. Because DeCA’s methodology does not differentiate from high to low cost areas, the patron savings rate is potentially inaccurate across different regions. For example, the savings rate is likely to be lower in areas with a low cost of operations and higher in areas with a high cost of operations. In July 2016, DeCA officials stated that they are considering revising the savings methodology to include more comparisons with local commercial grocery stores.\nPrivate labels: DeCA’s methodology does not account for lower priced private labels. DeCA compares prices and savings only across major name brands and grocery products that are sold by commissaries and commercial grocery stores and excludes private- label items. However, patrons at commercial stores typically shop for a mix of private-label and name-brand products, so DeCA’s exclusion of private labels likely leads to an overstatement of the savings rate. DeCA officials told us that they are working with the Boston Consulting Group to conduct a pilot program to implement private labeling at a select sample of commissaries for a limited time period. The sample of commissaries and time period had not been determined at the time of our review. According to DeCA officials, the pilot would help DeCA to more accurately compare the cost of shopping at commissaries with commercial grocery stores.\nWeighted averages for quantities of items sold: DeCA does not use weighted averages to account for variance in the quantities of different products sold at its commissaries. As discussed earlier, DeCA uses a weighted average to calculate savings at some locations based on market shares from sales in the previous fiscal year. However, DeCA does not use a weighted average when comparing product prices with those of commercial grocery stores. Instead, DeCA aggregates the prices of all commissary items within a category (e.g., meat or produce) rather than using a weighted average that takes into account differences in quantities sold across products. For example, when DeCA calculates the average savings rate within the meat category, the agency assumes the same quantities are sold for all meat products, for example, for T-bone steaks and for ground beef. This methodology assumes that patrons buy the same quantities of differently priced products, an approach that is inconsistent with leading practices. Because DeCA’s methodology does not account for the variances in the quantities of different products sold within a category, it can result in an inaccurate calculation of the patron savings rate.\nThe 2015 Boston Consulting Group study also noted weaknesses in DeCA’s savings rate methodology. For example, the study estimated that the savings rate between commissary and commercial grocery store prices is lower than 30 percent and ranges from 5 to 25 percent depending upon the location of the commissary because higher cost of living areas enjoy greater savings than lower cost of living areas. DeCA officials told us they have used the same savings rate methodology since it was introduced in 2008 and acknowledged they have not validated it for accuracy and consistency.\nDeCA officials stated that they have contracted with the Boston Consulting Group to assist in addressing a statutorily authorized pilot program for the commissary system to achieve budget neutrality (i.e., not continuing to rely on appropriations). The effort includes revising its methodology to verify that the approved savings rate is being achieved. Once the savings rate is verified, it will be used as a baseline to assess pilot programs that would include variable pricing and private label brands. At the time of this review, DeCA officials could not provide evidence to support how the revised savings methodology would address all the limitations we identified, including those related to seasonal bias, sampling methodology for overseas commissaries, and geographic differentiation. DeCA officials stated that the agency plans to assess and revise the savings methodology, which may include addressing some limitations such as weighted average calculations. As DeCA takes steps to revise its methodology, an opportunity exists to address the weaknesses we and others have identified. Doing so would provide greater assurance that patrons are experiencing the desired 30 percent savings rate using their commissary shopping privileges.", "DeCA’s business model for defense commissaries departs from practices generally employed by commercial grocery stores. First, DeCA uses a statutorily required pricing method that differs from the pricing method generally employed by commercial grocery stores. Second, while DeCA tracks products sold in its stores, the agency does not adopt leading practices such as using product demand to determine which products it should stock, potentially limiting the stocking and sales of popular items. Third, DeCA lacks reasonable assurance that certain of its business processes are cost effective.", "DeCA’s commissaries are subject to statutory requirements to implement a pricing method that leads to generally uniform prices for the same product at different locations. By comparison, commercial grocery stores’ prices are sensitive to local market operating costs as noted above and include a markup on the price of products to cover operating costs and generate a profit. To address the statutory requirement that DOD plan for the budget neutrality of commissaries, DeCA is considering changes in its pricing method that could enable defense commissaries to incorporate business concepts commonly used by commercial grocery stores.", "By law, DeCA is required to implement a uniform pricing method across its commissaries. Under this method, DeCA prices products so that sales of products recoup only the actual product cost from the supplier; the cost of transportation to the place of sale; and the actual or estimated cost of the loss of inventory, plus a 5-percent surcharge. The surcharge can be used to fund specific types of activities, such as commissary construction, equipment, repair, software acquisition, and facilities maintenance. As a result, DeCA officials stated that because their pricing model excludes some costs, such as salaries, benefits, rent, and a profit margin, commissaries provide patron savings when compared with shopping at commercial grocery stores.\nBy contrast, pricing at commercial grocery stores is sensitive to the cost of business operations, competition in their specific market, and the need to generate a profit. They typically establish prices that account for the full cost of grocery products plus the needed markup for profit. According to private sector guidelines, standard industry practices for pricing include costs, such as salaries and benefits for employees, rent, marketing, and other administrative support costs. However, by law, DeCA cannot include costs such as salaries, employee benefits, and utilities in its retail product prices, and DeCA instead pays these costs using its annual appropriation. Also, according to DeCA officials, unlike commercial grocery stores, DeCA does not pay rent for the use of commissary buildings because DOD owns the facilities, although the agency pays for store construction and maintenance with funds from the 5 percent surcharge. Figure 2 shows DeCA’s pricing practices as compared with those of commercial grocery stores.\nDeCA’s uniform pricing method results in some differences with commercial grocery stores in how prices are set. Commercial grocery stores use a variable pricing method by which they charge different prices for the same product in different locations, even within the same chain of stores. (Variable pricing is discussed further in the next section of this report). Conversely, DeCA’s mandate to charge uniform prices means that prices are generally the same for the same item regardless of local market business conditions, cost of operations, or the presence of competition from commercial grocery stores, so commissary prices are not sensitive to these factors. Moreover, the annual appropriation covers the cost of operations, which serves as a subsidy, as previously noted. DeCA officials told us that the current system results in DeCA using high sales volumes and surcharge revenue collected at some commissaries to offset lower sales at other commissaries—often those at smaller commissaries or those located in remote locations, many of which might be unprofitable if they were commercial grocery stores. For example, DeCA pools the surcharge revenue collectively across all commissaries to help pay for commissary construction and maintenance, among other things.\nThe uniform pricing method also likely leads to differences in the actual savings rate commissary patrons experience due to commercial grocery stores’ sensitivity to local market business operations costs but from which the commissaries are somewhat shielded. Specifically, while commissaries share the same prices for the same products regardless of the market, commercial grocery stores generally price products to recoup the lower or higher operating costs in a given market and maintain a profit margin. Thus, DeCA’s uniform pricing method likely results in patrons in lower cost-of-living areas receiving a lower-than-average savings rate since competing private retail stores can price products lower based on the lower local operating costs but the commissary’s product price is static and not sensitive to local market operating costs. By comparison, commissary patrons in higher cost-of-living areas (e.g., Hawaii) are likely to experience a relatively greater savings rate since competing commercial grocery stores must price their products higher to recoup the higher operating costs but, as in the previous example, the commissary’s price is uniform and static.\nA comparison of the uniform pricing method and commercial grocery store practices reveals another key difference between the commissaries and commercial stores. Commercial grocery store operators are likely to eventually close an unprofitable store when profit and loss—affected by prices—are the key considerations. Conversely, because the commissary business model has a separate funding source (the annual appropriation) that is not linked to sales and prices, DeCA may keep stores open even if the cost of operations exceeds sales revenue. For example, a commissary at Camp Kure, Japan, sold goods totaling $56,655 in fiscal year 2015 but had operating costs totaling $71,931, which represents nearly 127 percent of total sales—figures that would be considered unprofitable for a commercial grocery store. Senior DeCA officials acknowledged that remote and overseas commissaries are unlikely to be profitable under the commercial grocery store business model. On the other hand, some commissaries do generate sales in an amount greater than their operating costs. For example, the commissary at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, sold goods totaling $93.3 million in fiscal year 2015 and had operating costs of $10.2 million. Figures 3 and 4 shows a comparison of sales and operating costs, which are subsidized through appropriations, for commissaries with the highest and lowest sales.\nSpecifically, DeCA plans to pilot changes to the uniform pricing method in response to a statutory provision. DeCA is working with the Boston Consulting Group to address a provision directing DOD to report on its plan to achieve budget neutrality for the commissaries and the exchanges, and authorizing pilot programs, including the use of variable pricing, among other things. As noted above, variable pricing is a common practice used by commercial grocery stores. It allows them to price some goods below cost, which generates a loss on that product but increases customer traffic to the store and potentially higher sales of other products. According to recent studies contracted by DOD, variable pricing could allow DeCA to price goods and compete more directly with private grocery stores nearby, which could increase commissary revenues. For example, the 2015 Boston Consulting Group study found that variable pricing would allow DeCA to correct for imbalances under uniform pricing that lead to some patrons in low cost-of-living areas receiving a lower than average savings benefit. The study concluded that variable pricing would allow DeCA to provide a more consistent level of savings across regions and categories. This approach would help ensure a more uniform distribution of the desired savings rate among commissary patrons regardless of location. At the time of our review, DeCA officials could not confirm the time frames regarding when the pilot will be implemented.", "DeCA tracks the sale of products at all commissaries but does not assess the contribution of the sale of each product to a given store’s total sales in determining which products to sell. In 2015, DeCA launched a system for scanning patron identity cards, which officials said has helped DeCA track shopping behavior at the commissaries. DeCA officials stated that they are also taking steps to analyze consumer shopping behavior to understand general trends at commissaries. For example, DeCA plans to better understand consumer preferences by age, income, job position, and a variety of other demographics, to better target products that are sold at commissaries. Senior DeCA officials further stated that the agency conducted reviews of products on a regular basis to understand which products are top sellers and which are not performing well. DeCA officials explained how they use these product reviews to help assess customer demand and interest for new products. However, officials said that they do not consider the contribution of each product to a store’s total sales in determining which products to sell. Similarly, according to the 2015 Boston Consulting Group study, DeCA could improve its management of products based on a deep understanding of consumer preferences, shopping behavior, and product category management.\nAccording to DeCA officials, because commissaries are focused on providing a benefit rather than on maximizing profitability or sales like commercial grocery stores, commissaries do not have clear goals or objectives related to customer demand. For example, commissaries do not always adjust products that commissaries carry based on customer demand. Conversely, according to studies of commercial grocery store practices and National Grocers Association officials, efficient product management includes focusing on the contribution of products to the store’s sales and providing products driven by customer demand so that stores are selling what their customers want to buy. In addition, according to commercial grocery store officials, the retail industry typically determines how many different brands of the same item (such as brands of ketchup or tuna) and how many different size containers of each brand that is most cost effective to stock. They generally include avoiding offering too many similar brands and sizes of similar products; instead, they typically limit the number of similar products offered to increase efficiency and sales margins.\nCommissaries, on the other hand, may stock too many different brands and sizes of the same product, according to the Boston Consulting Group’s 2015 study. This practice, known as “product proliferation” in the retail industry, can tie up funds in inventory without generating revenue, particularly for those brands or sizes that do not sell well at a given commissary. During site visits to 12 commissaries, we found some evidence of product proliferation. For example, we found five brands of mayonnaise with 36 different sizes and flavors at one commissary. By comparison, a nearby commercial grocery store had just three different brands of mayonnaise and 18 different sizes and flavors.\nDeCA officials said that they would like to be more efficient and improve product management based on store sales and customer demand, but DeCA does not have a plan with time frames and could not provide additional information about how it would achieve this goal. According to federal standards for internal control, management should design control activities to achieve objectives, and management should formulate plans to achieve its objectives and have oversight of control activities depending on the level of precision needed so that the entity meets its objectives. Further, according to leading practices in project management, the establishment of clear, achievable objectives, goals, and time frames can help ensure successful project completion. Without a plan that clarifies the objectives, goals, and time frames DeCA will take to improve management of products based on store sales or customer demand as generally employed in commercial grocery stores, DeCA risks managing products inefficiently and missing opportunities to generate greater revenue streams and possibly cut costs.", "DeCA lacks reasonable assurance that its business processes for stocking shelves, providing custodial services, and distributing products to its stores are cost effective. The agency has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis to review operational costs related to decision making on using in-house commissary staff for stocking and custodial services versus contractors. Similarly, the agency has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis to understand the costs associated with different distribution options across all commissaries. Employing cost-effective business processes is important to DeCA’s ability to reduce its reliance on the annual appropriation while maintaining the desired patron savings rate.", "DeCA uses in-house staff to stock shelves and provide custodial services at some of its commissaries and contracts out for these services at other commissaries, but the agency could not provide a cost-benefit analysis to determine which approach results in lower operating costs. According to a recent study and private retailers with whom we spoke, most commercial grocery stores use in-house stocking because it allows for more flexibility and control over the management of inventory and staffing, which can lead to lower operating costs. We analyzed DeCA data for fiscal year 2015 and found that 154 commissaries had used service contracts for stocking and custodial services totaling $137 million, about $900,000 per commissary per year. During the same year, 81 commissaries used in- house staff for stocking and custodial services, and DeCA estimated the cost for in-house DeCA staff for these commissaries at about $39 million, about $500,000 per commissary per year. Thus, at the time of our review, in-house stocking and custodial services cost on average about $400,000 less. For example, based on our analysis of 49 small commissaries, 23 of the 49 stores had service contracts totaling $7.5 million, or just over $327,000 per commissary per year. By comparison, the remaining 26 stores used in-house stocking totaling $6.6 million, or almost $255,000 per commissary per year, a difference of almost $72,000 on average. We provided this analysis to DeCA and they acknowledged that contracting for stocking and custodial services cost more on average. Table 2 and figure 5 show the total and average costs of in-house stocking and custodial services compared with service contracts at commissaries of various sizes.\nFederal standards for internal control and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance state that management is responsible for establishing and maintaining internal control to achieve the objectives of effective and efficient operations. Further, these federal government guidelines also state that management should establish and monitor activities to evaluate costs associated with contracts. OMB guidance also promotes efficient resource allocation through well-informed decision making and provides guidance for a federal agency to perform sound cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. These analyses should include elements such as comprehensive estimates of the expected benefits and costs of the program and alternative means of achieving objectives.\nHowever, DeCA is continuing to implement service contracts for many of its stocking and custodial services without conducting cost-benefit analysis to determine whether this approach will reduce operating costs when compared with using in-house staff. Although DeCA conducted cost comparisons for two commissaries, DeCA has not performed cost comparisons or cost-benefit analysis for the remaining 238 commissaries. According to DeCA officials, the cost comparisons for the two commissaries were conducted because the service contractor had defaulted, and the cost comparison found that in-house stocking was more cost effective. According to some DeCA officials, there are several reasons for using in-house stocking at a commissary, such as the lack of availability of a contractor, the location and size of commissaries, as well as staff experience, but the agency did not identify savings as a reason for using in-house stocking.\nAccording to DeCA officials, cost-benefit analyses were not completed for all commissaries because it was not a requirement when DeCA was established in 1991. Further, officials stated that DeCA continued to use contracts inherited from the prior commissary system. Although DeCA’s acquisition regulations require DeCA to review its service contracts annually to ensure contract performance, it has not compared the use of service contracts with the use of in-house DeCA staff for stocking and custodial services and instead continues to renew the contracts. Without conducting a cost-benefit analysis to guide decisions about using in- house or contractor staff for stocking and custodial services at its commissaries, DeCA is not positioned to determine whether it is using its resources efficiently and effectively and is reducing operational costs.", "DeCA has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis to fully understand the costs associated with different product distribution options across all commissaries and to use in selecting the most cost-effective option available for each commissary. After it was established in 1991, DeCA consolidated its logistics supply chains and transportation operations decisions at its headquarters based in Fort Lee, Virginia. Generally, DeCA headquarters decided to rely on product manufacturers to transport products to commissaries. The product manufacturers decide how to transport their products to DeCA commissaries, and they either deliver the products themselves or hire a third-party broker to arrange for deliveries. According to DeCA officials, although DeCA headquarters makes contracting decisions, local commissary officials have some discretion to consult with manufacturers on product distribution options. For example, some commissaries have distribution capabilities and, instead of direct delivery from the manufacturer, the products are delivered to a DeCA central distribution center. If products are delivered to a central distribution center, DeCA uses its own trucks to deliver products to commissaries. Figure 6 shows the different distribution options for delivering products to commissaries.\nAlthough contracting decisions for commissary products are made at DeCA headquarters, some local commissary officials stated that they have been able to negotiate directly with manufacturers and achieve some cost savings in the quantities purchased and directly delivered. For example, according to DeCA officials, some commissaries can reduce the price of products by leveraging high-selling nonperishable items (e.g., water and energy drinks) and achieving economies of scale by buying large amounts of such items directly from a manufacturer rather than receiving those items in smaller quantities from third-party brokers. Specifically, DeCA officials stated that commissaries could negotiate with manufacturers by leveraging the volume of a truckload of specific products, thereby reducing the wholesale price of that product—a savings that would be reflected in a lower retail price for patrons. According to some DeCA officials, in addition to larger stores receiving truckloads of items, a truckload of products can also be split among several smaller stores located close to each other. Based on an example from a senior DeCA official from a large commissary, we found that if the commissary is able to accept a truckload of bottled water on a weekly basis there is a potential of $552,500 annual savings on the cost of such water, compared with relying on a third-party distributor to provide individual pallets of water in separate deliveries. Although there could be potential cost savings, DeCA has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis to understand product distribution options and potential cost savings.\nAnother product distribution option that could provide cost savings is to use a central distribution center or larger commissary. Specifically, some commissaries use a central distribution center or larger commissary to receive products from manufacturers and then distribute products directly to or between commissaries, rather than receiving direct delivery from a manufacturer to a commissary. Specifically, DeCA currently operates five product-delivery vehicles located at larger commissaries that support one or two smaller commissaries that are unable to receive large truckloads of products. The total cost for five vehicles is approximately $64,000 to operate annually, not including driver salaries. DeCA uses these vehicles to leverage storage space and reduce costs for other smaller commissaries located nearby. In addition to providing manufacturer products to the smaller commissaries, DeCA could use its trucks to provide meat to smaller commissaries. According to a senior DeCA official, a smaller commissary may not need staff to operate certain in- store departments such as a meat department if a nearby larger commissary can deliver meat products on a regular basis using DeCA’s truck. Further, according to DeCA officials, some other commissaries also have the potential to leverage their size and location to provide meat for commissaries located nearby, which would eliminate the need for a meat department at each of the smaller, co-located commissaries. Based on the example from a DeCA commissary official, we found that five commissaries in a regional zone could source their meat from a central commissary, and DeCA could potentially avoid the cost of 50 full-time equivalent salaries to operate a meat department in those five commissaries. Based on this example, we estimate that the potential cost avoidance at five commissaries is about $2 million annually.\nAccording to federal government guidelines, management should establish and monitor activities to evaluate the costs associated with contracts. Furthermore, federal guidelines promote efficient resource allocation through well-informed decision making and provide guidance for a federal agency to perform sound cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. These analyses should include elements such as comprehensive estimates of the expected benefits and costs of the program and alternative means of achieving objectives.\nHowever, DeCA has not conducted cost-benefit analysis to fully understand the costs associated with different distribution options across all commissaries. According to DeCA officials, DeCA did not conduct such cost-benefit analysis because it was not required by DOD or Congress. Further, DeCA officials stated that DeCA was accustomed to using the existing distribution network established when DeCA was created in 1991. Without a cost-benefit analysis, however, DeCA lacks a data-driven rationale for choosing product distribution options that could be more efficient and beneficial for commissary operations and patrons.", "Although DeCA is implementing or considering business process improvements at defense commissaries, the agency continues to use certain business processes that are not consistent with those generally employed by commercial grocery stores. First, DeCA states it is achieving its desired 30 percent savings rate for commissary patrons; however, DeCA’s methodology for calculating this rate has certain limitations. By relying on a process that does not include a random sampling method and does not account for seasonal or geographic differences in price, among other limitations, DeCA cannot be assured that the commissary system is delivering the desired savings rate to all commissary patrons. Second, DeCA collects information to help manage the products sold at commissaries, but there are weaknesses to this approach that can limit DeCA’s ability to operate efficiently. In particular, DeCA has not focused on improving the management of products based on consumer demand and consequently may be missing potential opportunities to improve sales, leverage efficiencies, and achieve savings in commissary operations. Third, DeCA has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis for its service contracts for stocking and custodial services and for distributing products to commissaries. For example, DeCA uses service contracts for stocking at most commissaries, even though in-house stocking has been shown to be less costly. Without analyzing the costs and benefits of its stocking, custodial, and distribution processes, the agency lacks reasonable assurance that it is identifying potential operational efficiencies and costs savings.\nAs a result of using certain business processes that depart from those used by commercial grocery stores, DeCA is missing opportunities to reduce its operating costs and potentially to reduce its reliance on the annual appropriation while providing the patron savings rate that constitutes the noncash benefit provided by the commissary system. Moreover, should the Congress wish to privatize in whole or in part the defense commissary system, the continued reliance on business processes not used by commercial grocery stores can make the commissaries less attractive to potential private-sector businesses that might be interested in operating the defense commissaries.", "To provide greater assurance that defense commissaries are achieving the desired savings rate for patrons, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief Executive Officer of DeCA, as DeCA revises its methodology for calculating the savings rate, to address the limitations that we identified, including those related to seasonal differences in prices, the sampling methodology for overseas commissaries, geographic differentiation, and the calculation of the weighted average.\nTo improve operational efficiencies and reduce costs related to product management and services that support commissary operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief Executive Officer of DeCA to take the following two actions:\nDevelop a plan with objectives, goals, and time frames on how it will improve efficiency in product management, such as offering products based on store sales or customer demand.\nConduct comprehensive cost-benefit analyses to guide decisions on implementing the most cost-effective option as stocking and custodial services contracts are renewed, and on choosing product distribution options.", "In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. DOD’s comments are summarized below and reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments on the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nDOD concurred with our recommendation to address the limitations that we identified as DeCA revises its methodology for calculating the savings rate, including those related to seasonal differences in prices, the sampling methodology for overseas commissaries, geographic differentiation, and the calculation of the weighted average. In its comments, DOD noted that it has established a new baseline for patron savings as well as a revised methodology that compares regional savings levels with prices at commercial grocery stores near commissaries. This action could meet the intent of our recommendation if it helps address the limitations we identified in our report.\nDOD also concurred with our second recommendation to develop a plan with objectives, goals and timeframes on how to improve efficiency in product management. DOD stated that it plans to implement two variable pricing programs and private labeling, which would help improve category management by using private sector practices to improve product offerings and reduce costs. DOD also stated that it plans to implement any changes to product offerings beginning in April 2017. For example, DOD identified 10 commissaries to participate in an effort to improve patrons' overall shopping experience by gradually ensuring a more consistent savings level across categories of products throughout a store through correcting the prices on key items where patrons experience lower than expected savings. Additionally, DOD stated that plans to introduce private labeled products to create incremental cost efficiencies with the goal of offsetting DECA’s reliance on appropriated funding.\nFinally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to conduct comprehensive cost-benefit analyses to guide decisions on implementing the most cost-effective option as stocking and custodial services contracts are renewed, and on choosing product distribution options. The department stated that authorizing legislation would be required to implement this recommendation. Specifically, DOD pointed to requirements in the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act that DOD acquire certain services from nonprofit agencies that serve the blind and the disabled and provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation that require DOD to set aside procurements exclusively for various categories of small business concerns under specified circumstances. Finally, DOD cited Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 and the Service Contract Labor Standards as presenting additional impediments to implementing our recommendation. With respect to product distribution options, DOD stated that it does not believe there is a demonstrable need to conduct a cost- benefit analysis. DOD stated that DeCA purchases items either delivered to commissary’s back door or to the commissary shelf, which includes transportation costs, and is authorized to use appropriated funds for transportation costs within and outside the United States.\nWe recognize that DOD operates in an environment that requires strict adherence to various mandates, both statutory and regulatory. While DOD has cited a number of laws and regulations that apply once it has made a decision to contract out for the performance of a function, the Department did not cite a specific provision that would prevent it from conducting a cost-benefit analysis to make an informed decision whether to contract for services or to perform them in-house. For example, although the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires the use of set asides for specified socioeconomic categories of contractors, DOD has not identified any provision in the regulation that would prevent it from analyzing the costs of using one or more of these contractors to perform a function compared to the cost of performing the function using in-house resources. With respect to product distribution options, we found in our report that DeCA could potentially achieve a total of $2 million annually in cost avoidances for its product distribution costs at five commissaries. In its comments, DOD does not provide any rationale for why it should not pursue such cost avoidances for its product distribution. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation is valid and that DOD should use a data-driven approach and conduct a cost-benefit analysis to fully understand the costs associated with stocking and custodial services contracts and its different distribution options. Given the constrained budget environment, we believe DOD needs to explore all available opportunities to achieve efficiencies.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chief Executive Officer of the Defense Commissary Agency; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-4523 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "To address both objectives of this report, we conducted site visits to a nongeneralizable sample of 12 commissaries to identify information on commissary operations at the local level. We selected these commissaries based on location, sales, operating costs, and representation of all military services. The 12 commissaries we visited were located at Fort Belvoir, Naval Air Station Oceana, Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, and Fort Lee, Virginia; Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania; Schofield Barracks, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, and Kaneohe Bay Marine Corps Base, Hawaii; and Naval Base San Diego, Naval Air Facility El Centro, and Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California. In each commissary, we analyzed product prices and savings and how products were managed, sold, and stocked. In each commissary, we met with local commissary staff to discuss our observations, the costs and benefits associated with contracting for services compared with using in-house staff for stocking and custodial services, and the product distribution options used at the commissary. Although the site visits constitute a nongeneralizable sample, they helped augment information we obtained from Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) headquarters and other sources.\nTo evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has assurance it is maintaining the savings rate for patrons that represents the nonpay cash benefit, we reviewed DeCA’s current savings methodology that calculates the savings rate that patrons realize by using commissaries instead of private retailers from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, the latter being the most recent available fiscal year for which data were available at the time of our review. We compared DeCA’s savings methodology with relevant leading practices for cost estimating and sampling, such as sampling standards established by the American Association for Public Opinion Research Report Task Force on Non- Probability Sampling, and with federal standards for internal control, which states that management should have relevant and reliable information to run an agency’s operations and the data should be reasonably free of error and bias and represent what they were purported to represent. We also compared DeCA’s methodology with private sector practices identified in recent studies, specifically the private sector’s local pricing strategies, which consider competition from local retail grocery stores in setting prices rather than nationwide prices and include private- label items. We interviewed DeCA officials responsible for collecting, tracking, and analyzing sales, prices, costs, and savings information at DOD commissaries to corroborate our understanding of DeCA’s methodology for calculating DeCA’s patron savings rate.\nTo identify differences in business practices between commissary operations and commercial grocery store practices, we reviewed (1) DOD’s pricing method, (2) management of products, and (3) cost-benefit analyses of service contracts and transportation distribution costs. First, to describe DOD’s current pricing method and any planned changes to the method, we reviewed DeCA’s pricing method as required by statute, and compared DeCA’s pricing method with methods used in the private sector. We identified private sector practices by reviewing studies and leading practices that describe operational efficiencies achieved in the private sector through practices such as private labeling and variable pricing. We also interviewed private sector grocers and retailer associations to identify private sector practices for operating retail grocery stores. We also reviewed DeCA’s plans to change its current pricing method and how that plan compares with private sector practices.\nSecond, to evaluate the extent to which DOD efficiently manages products sold at the commissaries, we compared DOD objectives and guidance to maintain an efficient system of commissaries with practices generally employed in the private sector. We also reviewed DeCA’s management of the inventory of products and compared this management with pertinent studies and leading practices that analyze private sector grocery retail practices based on operational efficiencies related to the management of products and customer demand. We also compared DeCA’s implementation of a new system for category management with federal standards for internal control, which states that management should design control activities and formulate plans to achieve objectives and respond to risk, and management should have oversight of control activities depending on the level of precision needed so that the entity meets its objectives. We also interviewed DeCA officials responsible for managing products sold in commissaries, including those officials at the 12 commissaries we visited, to assess product management practices.\nGAO-14-704G. commissary we visited did not have a service contract, and stocking was performed in-house by DeCA commissary staff. For product distribution costs, we reviewed costs associated with DeCA owned or leased vehicles and DeCA warehouses both domestically and overseas, as well as other options for product distribution. We compared DeCA’s practices, guidance, and policies, for deciding to contract for services with federal government guidelines in the Office of Management and Budget’s Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, federal standards for internal control, and the Office of Management and Budget’s Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control. We interviewed DeCA headquarters officials and officials at local commissaries responsible for contracting to understand the agency’s contracting practices and policies and to assess the implementation of contracts at the local level.\nWe assessed the reliability of the data provided by DeCA by (1) reviewing related documentation, such as recent studies and (2) interviewing DeCA officials who were knowledgeable about the data. We asked the officials questions intended to assess the reliability of the data. On the basis of procedures performed, we have concluded that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting on data related to savings, sales and salaries used for contracting and custodial services.\nWe conducted this performance audit from September 2015 to March 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this report were Gina Hoffman (Assistant Director), Pedro Almoguera, Bonita Anderson, James Ashley, Pat Bohan, Tim DiNapoli, Timothy Guinane, Amie Lesser, Alice Paszel, Terry Richardson, Sabrina Streagle, Elizabeth Wood, Bill Woods, and Yee Wong." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_title", "", "h2_full", "", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h1_title", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h0_full h3_full", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "To what extent does DOD know that it is maintaining the desired savings rate for commissary patrons?", "What weanesses exist in DeCA's methodology for calculating the annual savings rate?", "What issues may these weaknesses cause?", "What is DeCA doing to address these issues?", "What characterizes DeCA's tracking of sales?", "What is the status of DeCA's effort to improve their product management system?", "To what extent has DeCA conducted cost-benefit analyses for staff and product distribution?", "Why would it benefit DeCA to conduct such analyses?", "What does this report concern?", "What data did GAO analyze in this report?", "What other information did GAO consult?", "What recommendations does GAO make?", "How did DOD respond to these recommendation?", "What is GAO's ongoing stance?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Defense (DOD) lacks reasonable assurance that it is maintaining its desired savings rate for commissary patrons. The Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), which manages the commissaries, has a methodology for calculating the annual savings rate that patrons realize by shopping at commissaries rather than commercial grocery stores. In fiscal year 2015, the most recent data available at the time of our review, DeCA's Board of Directors approved a desired average savings rate of 30 percent based on savings calculated for prior years using the methodology. However, GAO found weaknesses in this methodology.", "For example, the methodology does not use a random sample of overseas commissaries or account for seasonal and geographic variations in item prices.", "Because of these weaknesses, DOD's methodology can potentially result in an inaccurate calculation of the actual savings rate that commissary patrons experience.", "DeCA officials stated that the agency plans to revise the savings methodology to address the limitations GAO identified. Because this effort is underway, it is too early to know whether the revisions will address the limitations GAO identified.", "First, DeCA tracks the sale of products at all commissaries but does not assess the contribution of the sale of each product to a given store's total sales in determining which products to sell. According to DeCA officials, because commissaries are focused on providing a benefit rather than on maximizing profits like commercial grocery stores, commissaries do not always adjust products they carry based on customer demand.", "DeCA officials said that they would like to be more efficient, but have not developed a plan with achievable objectives, goals, and time frames regarding how to improve product management based on sales and customer demand. Without improving the management of products based on sales and customer demand as is done in commercial grocery stores, DeCA may be missing opportunities to increase sales, leverage efficiencies, and achieve savings in commissary operations.", "Second, DeCA has not conducted cost-benefit analyses for costs associated with (1) the use of stocking and custodial service contracts as compared with the use of in-house staff and (2) product distribution options across all commissaries. For example, DeCA uses services contracts at most commissaries, totaling about $137 million in fiscal year 2015, even though our analysis suggests that using in-house personnel for stocking may be more cost effective. Commercial grocery stores are generally sensitive to the cost of business operations, competition in their market, and the need to generate a profit. In addition, different product distribution options could result in significant savings impacting the price a commissary patron pays for a product.", "According to DeCA officials, DOD does not require cost-benefit analyses to compare alternative options for service contracts or for the distribution of products to commissaries. However, without conducting such analyses to guide its decision making on these business processes, DeCA is not positioned to determine whether it is using its resources most efficiently.", "Senate Report 114-49 included a provision for GAO to review aspects of commissary operations. This report (1) determines the extent to which DOD has assurance it is maintaining its desired savings rate for patrons and (2) identifies differences in business practices between commissary operations and commercial grocery store practices.", "GAO analyzed data on savings, sales, and costs.", "GAO also reviewed leading practices relevant for commissary operations; assessed the costs for service contracts and product distribution options; and conducted site visits to a nongeneralizable sample of 12 commissaries based on, among other things, location and sales.", "GAO is making three recommendations, including that DOD address limitations identified in its savings rate methodology; develop a plan with objectives, goals, and time frames to improve efficiency in product management; and conduct comprehensive cost-benefit analyses for service contracts and distribution options.", "DOD concurred with GAO's first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third recommendation.", "GAO continues to believe the cost-benefit analysis recommendation is valid." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5, 5 ] }
GAO_GAO-16-548	{ "title": [ "Background", "SGEs Serve Temporarily and Have Fewer Ethics Restrictions Than Other Employees", "Roles of OGE, OPM, and Agency Offices in SGE Oversight, Designation, and Hiring", "Agencies’ Use of SGEs Not Serving on Federal Boards Is Limited", "Four of Five Selected Agencies Had Reliable Data on SGEs Not Serving on Federal Boards While HHS Had Challenges Reporting Reliable Data", "OGE Data Reflected Agency Reporting", "Weak Coordination and Misunderstandings Can Contribute to Challenges in Identifying SGEs for Reporting Purposes", "Selected Agencies Appointed SGEs Primarily Using Expert and Consultant Hiring Authority and Utilized Them in Specialized Areas", "Most Selected Agencies Use the Expert and Consultant Hiring Authority and Have Guidance or Require Documentation for the Designation Process", "SGEs Work in Highly Specialized Areas and Supervisors Generally Track Days", "OGE Reviews Have Found No Issues for SGEs Not Serving on Federal Boards", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Legislative History of the Special Government Employee Designation", "Appendix III: Ethics Provisions Applicable to Non-Special Government Employees Compared to Special Government Employees Not Serving on Federal Advisory Committees or Other Boards", "Appendix IV: Government-wide and Agency- Specific Hiring Authorities Used to On-Board Special Government Employees by Selected Agencies", "Appendix V: Use Of Special Government Employees At Chief Financial Officer Act Agencies And The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2012-2013", "Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services", "Appendix VII: Comments from the Office of Government Ethics", "Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "A SGE is an employee expected to perform temporary duties for no more than 130 days during a 1-year period. An individual hired under a temporary appointment can be designated a SGE where the employing agency makes a good-faith estimate that the individual is not expected to serve more than 130 days in the succeeding 1-year period. Under the executive branch’s longstanding interpretation, while SGEs are expected to serve no more than 130 days in a 1-year period, if an individual was designated a SGE but unexpectedly exceeds the 130 days of service, that person is still considered a SGE for the current year. However, OGE advises that if the SGE is to serve beyond the 1-year period, the agency will need to make a new estimate for the following year, and the prior year’s experience will have a bearing on whether the agency reasonably can conclude that the employee is likely to serve no more than 130 days in the next year (see appendix II for a legislative history of the establishment of the SGE status).\nSGEs are covered by most ethics rules, but the application of some of those rules to SGEs is less restrictive than for other employees and permits them to engage in more outside activities (see appendix III for a comparative overview of select ethics rules for SGEs and other employees). Employees of the executive branch are covered under numerous prohibitions and requirements set forth under statute (criminal and noncriminal), executive order, and regulation. The criminal statutes establishing the foundation for acceptable conduct while serving the public include the bribery and illegal gratuities prohibitions (18 U.S.C. § 201) and the criminal conflict of interest prohibitions (principally 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205, 207, 208, and 209).\nSGEs are covered by most, but not all, of these criminal statutes and in some instances are afforded distinct treatment from other employees. Like other employees, SGEs are subject to prohibitions on bribery and illegal gratuities, and prohibited from participating in matters that directly affect their own financial interests (or the financial interests of individuals or entities attributed to the employee). SGEs are generally not afforded special treatment under the various post-employment bans on the activities of former employees. However, SGEs are subject to substantially narrower restrictions than other employees on their outside representational activities (including the receipt of compensation related to such activities).\nAs illustrated in figure 1 below, SGEs are not covered under the ban on outside supplementation of government salaries. More specifically, a regular employee cannot receive compensation from anyone (other than the government) for performing government service. SGEs are subject to the standards of conduct regulations, which implement the principles of ethical conduct established under Executive Order No. 12674, and prohibits SGEs from, among other things, receiving compensation for teaching, speaking, and writing that is undertaken as part of the employee’s official duties. While the treatment of SGEs is generally the same as for other employees under these standards of conduct, there are exceptions.\nApart from the government-wide ethics requirements, some agencies have developed supplemental agency-specific ethics requirements covering their employees, including SGEs. Four of the five selected agencies for this review have supplemental regulations covering ethics restrictions. For example, NRC has a list of prohibited securities that certain covered employees, including SGEs, cannot own, including stock, bonds, or other security interests in certain companies.", "OGE provides overall leadership and oversight of the executive branch ethics program designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest with all employees, including SGEs. OGE established the standards of conduct regulations—covering issues such as gifts, conflicting financial interests, impartiality, seeking employment, misuse of position, and outside activities—which address not only actual conflicts of interest but also activities that give rise to the appearance of such conflicts. In addition, OGE issued regulations addressing the management of agency ethics programs, including procedures related to reviewing public and confidential financial disclosure. It also provides ethics training to agency officials.\nOGE officials said there is no standardized way for agencies to approach the SGE designation process. However, OGE stated that pursuant to the executive branch’s longstanding interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 202, a proper designation requires a prospective good faith determination at the time of an appointment that the individual is not expected to perform services for more than 130 days of the succeeding 1-year period. OGE believes that a prospective determination is important so that employees are on notice with respect to the ethics laws and rules that will apply to them.\nTo help carry out its oversight role, OGE collects data on agency ethics programs. Executive branch agencies are required to submit an annual report to OGE concerning certain aspects of their ethics programs. OGE provides an annual questionnaire to each executive branch agency to assist agencies in fulfilling this requirement. The annual questionnaire covers a range of issues, including the agency’s ethics program structure and staffing, as well as ethics education and training policies. According to agency officials, OGE also uses the annual questionnaire to gain knowledge about individual programs as well the overall program and to make informed decisions about agency resource allocations and priorities.\nOPM provides guidance to agencies on government-wide hiring authorities to ensure that agencies properly utilize these authorities, such as the expert and consultant appointment authority, which may be used to on-board employees ultimately categorized as SGEs (see appendix IV for examples of government-wide hiring authorities used by selected agencies to hire SGEs). OPM requires all federal agencies to identify that an employee is a SGE on the government records documenting an individual’s personnel action—Standard Form 50. Agencies also can identify an employee as a SGE by using a specific remark code—E21 on the personnel action form. OPM collects data on federal employees, including SGEs, from agencies that submit personnel data through the Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) Statistical Data Mart.\nSome, but not all, of the information on the personnel action form is collected in OPM’s EHRI. The use of the specific remarks code for SGE is not mandatory for agencies.\nAt individual agencies, multiple offices may play a role in on-boarding and designating SGEs. Those offices may include the hiring or appointing office, the human capital office, the ethics office, and the office of general counsel. Generally, the hiring office takes the lead role in identifying the skill set and length of service needs. The agency’s human capital office advises on the appropriate use of hiring authorities, processes the personnel action to on-board the SGE, and enters the personnel action information into the personnel database. Agencies are required to identify the SGE designation on the personnel action Standard Form 50. The agency’s ethics office is responsible for training employees, including SGEs, on their ethics requirements so that they are able to identify potential problems and seek the advice and counsel of ethics officials, when appropriate. Ethics offices may also provide technical assistance to the hiring office by advising on how to make a good faith service days estimate for the purposes of making a SGE designation, and evaluating whether the individual has potential conflicts of interest. At agencies where the ethics functions are not within the general counsel’s office, then the agency’s general counsel’s office may also have a role in helping to ensure that ethics statutes and regulations are applied appropriately to a SGE.", "OGE data show SGEs not serving on federal boards make up a small portion of total SGEs in the executive branch. According to OGE data, federal agencies reported 40,424 total SGEs in the executive branch as of December 31, 2014. As of that date, about 3 percent of those SGEs (1,138 of 40,424) were not serving on federal boards and employed as experts or consultants. At the end of 2013, that figure was about 1 percent (515 of 41,335). Over a 10-year period (from 2005 to 2014), we found that agencies generally reported more limited use in 2014 than in 2005, and used an annual average of approximately 2,000 SGEs not serving on federal boards, with a peak of about 3,100 in 2009 and a low of about 500 in 2013.\nAs shown in figure 2, OGE data show the numbers of SGEs not serving on federal boards in the executive branch varied over the 10-year period. According to OGE, agencies’ use of SGEs not serving on federal boards varies depending on their need for particular expertise at any given time.\nAs shown in figure 3, most SGEs not serving on federal boards were employed at the 24 CFO Act agencies and the CFPB—about 94 percent (484 of 515) at the end of 2013 and about 99 percent (1,276 of 1,288) at the end of 2012. In 2012 and 2013, the selected agencies comprised 63 percent (805 of 1,288) and 29 percent (149 of 515) of SGEs in the executive branch, respectively (see appendix V for a complete breakout of SGEs not serving on federal boards at each of the 24 CFO Act agencies and CFPB).\nSince 2012, OGE officials reported the agency has taken a number of steps to improve individual agency’s reporting on SGEs. For example, in 2014, OGE began posting agencies’ responses, unedited, and some of the results from its annual questionnaire on its website. OGE officials believe publicizing agency responses will increase reporting accountability. Also, in 2014, OGE officials convened focus groups with executive branch ethics officials to identify any challenges with understanding ethics reporting requirements, including for SGEs, in the annual questionnaire. In 2015, OGE officials added a skip-ahead feature to its annual questionnaire to help streamline agencies’ responses. This feature helps to prevent agencies from responding to questions that are not germane to their agency. OGE also directed executive branch agencies to centralize their annual reporting strategy by requiring that all submissions be sent to OGE directly from the CFO Act department, rather than from component agencies. Through these and other efforts, OGE officials said their goals are to expand the reach of ethics guidance for federal employees, and to increase both the consistency and the accuracy of ethics training across the executive branch. Officials at all five of the selected agencies we spoke with told us that OGE’s oversight and guidance was effective, and that they felt comfortable contacting OGE if they had a SGE or ethics-related question.", "", "Agencies are responsible for identifying SGEs and reporting these data to OGE (through its annual questionnaire) and OPM (through information on personnel actions in EHRI).\nGenerally, OGE’s data reflected what agencies reported on SGEs not serving on federal boards. As part of our assessment of the reliability of OGE data on these SGEs not serving on federal boards, we compared OGE data with data from the selected agencies for 2012 and 2013—the most recent data available. In 2012, we found that the five selected agencies had data that closely matched OGE data. In 2013, we found data for three of the five selected agencies closely matched (see figure 4). We attribute most of the difference between OGE and NSF data in 2013 to differences in the reporting time frame (fiscal year versus calendar year). At HHS, we found a significant difference between OGE data and agency data. HHS told us it had 609 SGEs not serving on federal boards in 2013, but reported 4 to OGE. When we asked about the discrepancy, HHS said 609 was correct, but could not explain the discrepancy.\nOGE has a process for reviewing agency submissions, but it does not verify the data for every agency. During the review of the responses to its Annual Agency Ethics Program Questionnaire, OGE officials follow up with agencies for an explanation in instances where agencies reported data that represented a 20 percent increase or decrease compared to the prior year’s submission. OGE officials conducted follow-up efforts with agencies when a submission showed a difference between the number of employees required to receive ethics training and the number of employees that received training, or the number of financial disclosure reports filed. OGE also conducts spot checks of some of the agencies’ responses to determine the level of variance from year to year, according to agency officials.\nBased on our assessment, OPM does not have complete data on SGEs not serving on federal boards in its EHRI database. We compared OPM data on individual SGEs with agency data for 2005 to 2014. Our comparison of selected agency data to OPM’s EHRI database revealed close matches in two of the five selected agencies. NSF and DOJ data mostly matched OPM’s EHRI database over the 10-year period of fiscal years 2005 to 2014. We experienced some challenges in attempting to match OPM’s data on individual SGEs for the other three selected agencies (State, HHS, and NRC). For example, HHS officials provided inaccurate dates for when SGEs were hired. We found the OPM data had incomplete information on individual SGEs for the 10-year period. OPM officials said it is very difficult to reliably identify a complete list of SGEs in their database since agencies do not consistently identify SGEs in personnel data collected by OPM in the EHRI database. According to OPM, there is no policy or legal requirement for the agency to capture SGE data in its EHRI database.", "Four of the five selected agencies had data reliable enough for the purposes of reporting annual totals. Still, three of the selected agencies in our review—HHS, State, and NRC—encountered challenges in identifying SGEs not serving on federal boards due to weak coordination and misunderstandings about SGE designations. At HHS, we found that staff in the agency’s human capital office did not coordinate with its ethics office before providing the agency’s SGE totals, which contributed to challenges in identifying and reporting on their SGEs.\nAfter submitting an initial list of SGEs, State and NRC required additional meetings to clarify our request for their SGE totals. At State, human resources and ethics officials disagreed about which individuals should be identified as SGEs not serving on federal boards for SGEs hired prior to 2008. Both agencies ultimately provided corrected data.\nAll the selected agencies generally had a designation and on-boarding process that involved some degree of coordination between a hiring office, a human capital office, and an ethics or general counsel office (or both) before on-boarding a SGE. Some of the selected agencies operate in a more structured and formal way than others. State recently instituted a formal coordination process and, in April 2014, issued written guidance and procedures on the process, including explicit instructions for coordinating among the hiring office, the human capital office, and the ethics office.\nConversely, HHS had a less structured coordination process for identifying SGEs not serving on federal boards. HHS experienced difficulty identifying employees categorized as SGEs not serving on federal boards, in part, because the departmental human capital office is not consistently coordinating with human capital offices in its components or with the Office of the General Counsel, Ethics Division to ensure that SGEs not serving on federal boards are appropriately identified. In addition, HHS’s human capital officials misunderstood the SGE designation and, at times during our audit, could not distinguish between SGEs not serving on federal boards and SGEs who serve on federal advisory boards, committees, or commissions. For example, the HHS human capital office provided data that showed 500 to 600 SGEs not serving on federal boards at one of its components, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), every year between fiscal years 2005 and 2014.\nHowever, FDA human capital officials disagreed and said they were only aware of one SGE not serving on federal boards at FDA for that period. A FDA human capital official told us that most of the SGEs at FDA are serving on advisory boards or are committee members. The FDA human capital official said it generally only has a few experts or consultants, and those individuals may be hired on indefinite appointments or not to exceed 5-year appointments.\nWhen asked about the reason for the discrepancy, HHS provided no explanation. According to the HHS Office of General Counsel Ethics staff, the office relies on data provided by components and staff offices, and takes no additional steps to verify data for the annual OGE ethics survey.\nIn Internal Control Standards for the Federal Government, we have previously reported that information should be recorded and communicated in a form that enables entities to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. HHS’s Human Resource Manual instructions on the appointment of experts and consultants contains guidance on identification of expert and consultants, for instance, but no guidance on appropriately identifying an expert or consultant as a SGE not serving on federal boards. Additionally, the instructions do not include any mention of the circumstances under which experts and consultants may be considered a SGE or when coordination among the hiring, human capital, or ethics offices is appropriate. Without clarifying guidance on identifying SGEs not serving on federal boards, HHS cannot be assured that the agency is reporting reliable data to OGE and OPM.\nWe did not review whether these issues are occurring at other executive branch agencies. However, issues such as these reduce the reliability of the government’s data on SGEs. By strengthening data, agencies will be better positioned to identify SGEs not serving on federal boards, perform the appropriate ethics review for their SGEs not serving on federal boards, and provide the appropriate ethics training. Moreover, accurate and complete data are important to allow OGE and Congress to provide informed oversight of agencies using SGEs not serving on federal boards.", "", "Three of the five selected agencies hired most of their SGEs not serving on federal boards under the government-wide expert and consultant hiring authority, 5 U.S.C. § 3109. Section 3109 permits agencies to appoint experts or consultants without regard to the competitive service hiring rules. Additional government-wide temporary hiring authorities were used, but to a lesser degree. State officials, for example, said the agency also uses government-wide temporary hiring authorities under which retired former Foreign Service or civil service retirees, among others, would be eligible for noncompetitive appointment for on-boarding SGEs. Two of the five agencies, NSF and NRC, more often used their own agency-specific hiring authorities when on-boarding SGEs. NSF officials use an agency-specific hiring authority under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, as amended, to on-board most of their SGEs. Similarly, NRC officials said they primarily use their hiring authority under section 161d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to hire SGEs (see appendix IV for more information on hiring authorities used by the selected agencies, including government-wide and agency-specific authorities).\nFour of the five selected agencies had written policies specifically for SGEs or experts and consultants, while one—DOJ—did not. As mentioned earlier, in 2014, State issued written guidance and procedures on the on-boarding and designation process for SGEs not serving on boards. The written guidance included critical questions for managers to consider when determining SGE status, the primary hiring authorities to use, roles and responsibilities for the appropriate offices, and instructions for documenting appointments. The guidance is explicit about preparing the personnel action and including the use of the appropriate OPM remark code indicating the individual is a SGE. For example, the contents of State’s SGE on-boarding package include electronically completed OGE 278 or OGE 450 in the agency’s Financial Disclosure Management system; conflict of interest clearance request checklist from State’s Legal Office of Ethics and Financial Disclosure; individual’s position description; hiring manager’s certification that it is not anticipated that the employee’s duties will require more than 130 days of service; individual’s acknowledgement of ethics guidance review by signing and dating the last page of the seven page document on Government Ethics Guidance; individual’s resume; and in certain cases, a signed Ethics Agreement, if required by State’s Legal Office of Ethics and Financial Disclosure.\nSpecifically, State’s human capital staff circulates a SGE ethics clearance and request package to the hiring bureau’s human capital as well as to the ethics office, housed in State’s office of general counsel. HHS, NSF, and NRC had written guidance on human capital policies and procedures for experts and consultants that agency officials said was applicable to SGEs not serving on federal boards. DOJ’s Departmental Ethics office had no written guidance on human resources policies specifically for SGEs not serving on federal boards.\nThree of the five selected agencies (NRC, NSF, and State) required documentation for the SGE on-boarding. For example, at NRC, the hiring office must submit a justification for on-boarding an expert/consultant that is a SGE not serving on federal boards. The justification required an explanation of why the expertise is needed, what projects the expert will work on, and why the expertise is not already available in house. NRC also has a checklist for the steps that should be followed by the appropriate offices that play a role in on-boarding a SGE. Conversely, NSF has requirements for documenting expert/consultants in its internal guidance, but nothing specific for SGEs is required on the personnel manual.\nIn addition to SGEs that are individuals hired from outside (including those reemployed retired federal employees who are SGEs), three of our selected agencies identified examples of an employee who became a SGE after a conversion (or change) in the individual’s appointment. Selected agencies said such conversions are infrequent. Generally, a conversion is a change of appointment (under either the same or a different appointment authority) in the same agency without a break in service. Conversions are appointment actions taken according to the rules related to the appointment into which the conversion results. Appointment rules would prescribe, among other things, the process required for making the appointment, eligibility, and qualification requirements. For example, a conversion action into an expert position under section 3109 would have to comply with the requirements under that authority, including that the expert position requires the services of a specialist with skills superior to those of others in the same activity, and that the individual to be appointed is regarded as an authority or practitioner of unusual competence and skill in a professional, scientific, technical, or other activity. These conversions included:\nDOJ officials reported that a senior noncareer employee, who wished to return to academia, resigned and the following day was appointed to an intermittent consultant position. The consultant appointment was not to exceed 5 months and therefore since the employee would be in a temporary appointment that would not exceed 130 days, the employee was a SGE. Agency officials explained that the conversion was justified because there were a number of pending matters for which the office had a continuing need for the employee’s expertise, which they viewed as essential for program stability.\nNRC officials reported two instances when regular employees became SGEs through conversion actions. In both instances, retired NRC employees had been reemployed as regular (non-SGE) employees. Subsequently, both employees’ appointments were converted to consultant appointments (in conformance with NRC’s guidance on consultants), resulting in the employees becoming SGEs. NRC said the conversions resulted from changes to the work assignments and responsibilities of both individuals.\nState officials reported that a senior presidential appointee, who intended to retire, was appointed to an expert/consultant position, resulting in the employee becoming a SGE. The department justified the appointment because the employee had deep expertise on foreign policy issues (he had served in the Foreign Service for decades) and the appointment would enable the department to call upon him from time to time to provide expert advice to the foreign affairs community.", "The selected agencies used SGEs not serving on federal boards for their expertise in a variety of policy areas: science, health care, foreign affairs, legal, and inspections, as shown in figure 5.\nOfficials from the selected agencies said SGEs not serving on federal boards are typically used for short-term needs and often in response to unforeseen events such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, a resignation, or an increase of work on issues requiring specific scientific expertise. Some SGEs were hired to fill administrative positions, as well; for example, NRC hired a budget specialist and NSF employed a SGE with expertise in organizational equal employment issues.\nSelected agency officials told us that their SGEs provide services in a variety of ways, including the following:\nAt NSF, SGEs provided scientific expertise on specific initiatives, conducting evaluations and advising on NSF programs, including international programs, and providing oversight of cross-directorate programs. NSF SGEs may also advise and assist in the development of short- and long-range plans, and assist in establishing goals and objectives for research programs.\nAt DOJ, SGEs served on the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund initiative. For example, DOJ SGEs included the Special Master who presided over the Compensation Fund proceedings and staff who supported the Special Master. Other SGEs at DOJ provided quick turnaround assistance to the agency in preparing for congressional testimonies or other very narrowly tailored needs.\nAt HHS, SGEs often served as intermittent employees who worked for the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). For example, many NDMS SGEs provided support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency after a disaster. HHS also used SGEs not serving on a federal board to 1) advise and consult on acquiring materials for its medical library to administer health coaching programs, 2) develop and implement a health coaching program, and 3) advise on a strategy to achieve accreditation for one of its operating divisions.\nAt NRC, SGEs often served in areas such as engineering, scientific, and other technical (professional) occupational series. NRC SGEs roles and responsibilities included providing services related to security administration, human factors, budget analysis, technical writing and editing, and visual information.\nAt State, SGEs most often served as Foreign Affairs officers, senior advisors, management analysts, and physical scientists. For example, State officials highlighted initiatives and issues that require quick action in hiring appropriate experts, such as a public outreach position for the Arab community.\nOfficials from four of the selected agencies told us that supervisors are generally responsible for tracking whether the SGE stays within the 130- day service estimate. DOJ officials permit their SGEs to track their own days of service. State officials reported that they have examples of SGEs exceeding the 130-days in 1 year and human resources reevaluating their status for the next year. NSF has built a feature into its personnel system that alerts the supervisor and human resources office when a SGE is approaching the end of expected days of service for the agency.", "OGE reviews of executive branch agencies’ ethics programs have found few issues specific to SGEs and none for SGEs not serving on federal boards. We issued two SGE-related reports since 2004 where we discuss guidance and policies available to agencies and potential conflicts of interest of individuals who serve on advisory committees and boards. Our analysis of 23 OGE reviews conducted at the CFO Act and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for fiscal years 2005 to 2014 showed no issues specific to SGEs not serving on federal boards. According to OGE and officials at our selected agencies, at the time of our review, there were no outstanding OGE recommendations at the five agencies.\nOGE primarily conducts two types of ethics program reviews: plenary reviews and inspections. During a plenary review, OGE generally examines all elements of an agency’s ethics program, including its structure and general administration; public and confidential financial disclosure process; ethics training, advice, and counseling program; enforcement of ethics-related statutes and regulations, including supplemental standards of conduct regulations; and administration of its ethics program as it applies specifically to advisory committees and SGEs.\nAs part of the plenary reviews, OGE evaluates whether an agency made an affirmative determination as to whether or not a member of an advisory committee is a SGE rather than a representative. OGE officials said this helps ensure that those advisory committee members who will be expected to provide advice to the government (rather than on behalf of a group or industry the member represents) are designated as SGEs and therefore appropriately covered by ethics and conflicts of interest provisions. In 2015, OGE’s Program Review Branch examined all ethics program review reports issued from January 1, 2009, through September 30, 2015, to determine how they addressed issues involving SGEs. The examination covered 238 review reports and identified model practices related to SGEs and recommendations, and suggestions regarding management of SGEs during the specified period.\nAccording to OGE officials, the majority of the recommendations OGE makes about SGEs following plenary reviews are focused on the determinations agencies made between designating an advisory committee member as a representative or as a SGE. According to OGE officials, an agency that fails to properly designate a member of an advisory committee as a SGE, but rather designates the member as a representative, poses a risk to the government because that member is not subject to ethics and conflicts of interest provisions (including agency reviews for conflicts of interest). Based on its reviews and the results from its annual questionnaire, OGE officials said they believe agencies are more routinely properly designating advisory committee members as SGEs in recent years.\nAccording to OGE, its inspections are a streamlined version of the plenary review process. Inspections focus on the core elements of an agency’s ethics program, which include overall program administration, public and confidential financial disclosure systems, ethics training, and ethics advice and counseling. Inspections do not focus specifically on advisory committees or SGEs. However, if a concern specific to SGEs was to be identified during the inspection, the issue would be addressed and noted in the inspection report. Alternatively, according to OGE’s procedures, if the issue was of sufficient magnitude, OGE would initiate a more comprehensive plenary review of the agency’s ethics program.\nOGE is responsible for ordering action it deems necessary to correct deficiencies in agency ethics programs. If OGE orders corrective action and the agency does not comply, OGE may notify the President and Congress. Additionally, OGE is responsible for ordering action it deems necessary with respect to individual employees and, to do so, is authorized (among other things) to recommend that an agency investigate possible violations of any rule, regulation, or Executive order relating to conflicts of interest or standards of conduct. OGE officials said that agency Inspectors General are better positioned to investigate potential ethics or conflicts of interest violations by individual employees. OGE does not review or intervene in ongoing agency investigations; however, it may provide the agency with technical assistance if requested.", "Given the enormous complexity involved in delivering the wide array of services the federal government provides to U.S. citizens daily, agencies need the ability to obtain temporary outside skills, opinions, and expertise for improvement of government services and operations. The SGE category helps to ensure that the government can satisfy recruitment needs while ensuring integrity of government service. While agencies are overwhelmingly using SGEs for federal advisory committees and boards, a very small number of SGEs not serving on federal boards is filling a niche for short-term, unique, or unforeseen situations requiring specific skillsets.\nAgencies are responsible for reporting on SGEs not serving on federal boards to OGE and OPM requires agencies to identify SGEs on an individual’s personnel action. However, agencies may have reporting challenges as a result of weak internal coordination among offices with a role in designating and identifying SGEs not serving on boards and misunderstandings about which individuals are in this category. Although OGE has taken recent steps to improve agencies’ reporting, the reliability of agencies’ data is dependent on how well they coordinate internally and how well agencies understand the SGE designation. Given the misunderstanding about SGEs that we found at selected agencies, additional research may be needed to determine whether other agencies are experiencing challenges similar to those we identified at selected agencies. Stronger internal coordination among offices that maintain SGE data would strengthen the SGE data that agencies report to OGE and OPM. In particular, unless HHS takes steps to reconcile differences between data held by components and its headquarters, and reconcile differences in data held by its ethics office with data held by its human capital office, the agency cannot be assured of the reliability of its data on SGEs not serving on federal boards. By strengthening data, agencies will be better positioned to report reliable data on SGEs not serving on federal boards to OGE and OPM. Moreover, OGE and Congress may provide better oversight of agencies using SGEs not serving on federal boards.", "To help ensure HHS has reliable data on SGEs not serving on federal boards, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS take steps to improve the reliability of data on SGEs not serving on boards. For example, the agency could reconcile human capital data with general counsel and ethics office data, or issue clarifying guidance to human capital staff on appropriately identifying SGEs in human capital databases.\nTo help ensure that agencies report consistent and reliable data, the Director of OGE should determine (e.g., through a survey of Designated Agency Ethics Officials and/or by analyzing agency data) whether other executive branch agencies are experiencing data challenges similar to HHS, State, and NRC. If they are, the Director should take steps to help the agencies strengthen their data.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Directors of OGE, OPM, and NRC; the Secretaries of HHS and State; the Senior Staff Associate of NSF; and the Assistant Attorney General for Administration at DOJ for review and comment. OGE and HHS provided us with written comments (reproduced in appendixes VI and VII). In its written comments, HHS concurred with our recommendations. In OGE’s written comments, it partially concurred with our recommendation to determine whether other executive branch agencies are experiencing data challenges similar to HHS, State, and NRC. OGE said it concurs with the emphasis on ensuring that agencies report consistent and reliable data and that it will survey ethics officials or otherwise analyze agency data as recommended. However, OGE stated it has no authority to direct human resources offices to collect or share data or to otherwise coordinate with agency ethics offices. We maintain that OGE has the inherent authority to require agencies to ensure that their reported information is reliable. We did not suggest that OGE direct agency human resources officials to take specific steps regarding SGE data. Rather, we believe that through collaborative actions between agency ethics and human resources officials, agencies can ensure reported information on SGE is reliable.\nAlthough none of the other agencies provided comments on the report’s findings, conclusions, or recommendations, all of the agencies provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.\nAs agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, as well as to the appropriate congressional committees and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report please contact me at (202) 512-6806 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII.", "The objectives of this engagement were to review agencies’ use and oversight of the special government employee (SGE) designation in the federal workforce for SGEs not serving on federal boards at the 24 agencies covered under the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, as amended, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). This report (1) describes what is known about the total number of SGEs not serving on federal boards in the executive branch as well as at CFO Act agencies and CFPB; (2) assesses the extent to which the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and selected agencies identify and report data on SGEs not serving on federal boards; (3) assesses how selected agencies appoint, utilize, and oversee SGEs not serving on federal boards, and describes the relevant hiring authorities and ethics requirements; and (4) examines how, if at all, OGE oversees and ensures compliance with ethics requirements for SGEs, including the proper identification of individuals as SGEs, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 202(a).\nTo address these objectives, we reviewed the federal statutes, regulations, and agency guidance that address ethics requirements for federal executive branch employees, including the proper designation of SGEs and statutes and regulations related to hiring authorities that agencies use to on-board SGEs, and we interviewed agency officials responsible for ensuring compliance with ethics and hiring requirements for SGEs.\nWe selected five agencies—the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Justice (Justice), Department of State (State), National Science Foundation (NSF), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) —to provide case illustrations of agencies’ use of SGEs not serving on federal boards. We selected the agencies based on the following factors: (1) number of SGEs, (2) ratio of non-Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) SGEs compared to the agency’s 2-year on-board average of all employees over the period of fiscal years 2014 to 2015, (3) agency size, (4) OGE ethics program review results, and (5) agency responses to OGE on the amount of time the agency indicated it spends overseeing SGEs.\nTo describe what is known about the total number of SGEs not serving on federal boards in executive branch agencies, as well as at CFO Act agencies and CFPB, we examined agency use of SGEs reported by OGE for calendar years 2005 through 2014. Each executive branch agency is required to submit an annual report to OGE on the agency’s ethics program including, among other things, data on agency use of SGEs. To assist agencies in fulfilling this requirement, OGE provides an annual questionnaire to each executive branch agency that covers the preceding year. OGE’s data represent a point in time assessment—the last day of the calendar year—and may not include individuals who were employed during the year but were not employed on the last day of the calendar year. We also reviewed documentation and interviewed OGE officials about recent steps the agency took to improve OGE’s reporting on SGEs.\nTo assess the extent to which OGE, OPM, and selected agencies identify, collect, and report data on SGEs not serving on federal boards, we analyzed OGE’s, OPM’s, and selected agencies’ data related to the number of SGEs not serving on federal boards at CFO Act agencies and CFPB for fiscal years 2005 through 2014. We assessed the reliability of OGE’s, OPM’s, and selected agencies’ data on SGEs not serving on federal boards. We compared OGE’s data on the total number of SGEs not serving on federal boards with selected agencies’ data for the most recent years available—2012 and 2013. We also compared data on individual SGEs not serving on federal boards from the five selected agencies with records for SGEs for these agencies in OPM’s Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) system using the effective date of the SGE appointment and other variables, such as grade, step, and gender, which is a method we have used in previous reports. Generally, we found OGE’s and four of the selected agencies’ data sufficiently reliable (State, NSF, NRC, and DOJ) to report annual totals of SGEs not serving on federal boards. We also found that one of the selected agencies, HHS, provided unreliable effective dates for SGEs not serving on federal boards. Specifically, the SGE on-board dates provided by HHS were invalid when compared to effective dates of personnel actions in EHRI, which are reliable for this field. For two agencies, we found several instances of misidentified SGEs not serving on federal boards, and after discussion with the agencies, they provided corrected data. We found that OPM data did not have complete information that would allow us to identify SGEs not serving on federal boards.\nTo assess how selected agencies appoint, utilize, and oversee SGEs, we examined agency documentation and interviewed agency officials on the (1) process for designating and hiring SGEs not serving on federal boards, (2) hiring authorities used, (3) types of roles and responsibilities SGEs performed, and (4) agency tracking of whether SGEs stay within the 130-day service estimate. We examined internal coordination on SGEs not serving on federal boards among hiring, ethics, and general counsel offices by interviewing agency officials at the department level and component/sub-agency level, reviewing agency documentation, and comparing human resource data maintained by department level human resource offices with data maintained at the component or sub-agency level on SGEs not serving on federal boards.\nTo examine how, if at all, OGE oversees and ensures compliance with ethics requirements for SGEs, we examined statutes and regulations covering OGE’s role and responsibilities. We examined 23 OGE reviews of agency level ethics programs at 24 CFO Act agencies and the CFPB for fiscal years 2005 to 2014 to determine whether OGE identified issues relating to SGEs not serving on federal boards and whether OGE had any related open recommendations. Since the Department of Defense did not have a review during that period, we included reviews conducted at component agencies (Army, Navy, and Air Force). We also examined agency documentation such as the Summary Report: Special Government Employees, October 2015, and interviewed officials on OGE’s roles, responsibilities, and compliance activities.\nWe conducted this performance audit from April 2015 to July 2016, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "Congress created the special government employee (SGE) category in 1962 when revising the criminal laws relating to bribery, graft, and conflict of interest prohibitions. With regard to conflict of interest prohibitions, the 1962 law was intended, in part, to establish more appropriate prohibitions for a category of employees consisting of consultants and other temporary employees to facilitate the government’s recruitment of such persons from outside the government.\nThe 1962 act was the culmination of years of study by groups inside and outside of government concerning how best to assure high ethical standards in the conduct of the federal government. Their work revealed, in part, that the existing conflict of interest laws had an unnecessarily harsh impact on temporary employees and made it harder for agencies to obtain temporary service of persons with specialized knowledge and skills, advisers who provide essential counsel, and highly skilled technicians. During congressional testimony, examples were provided concerning the impact the existing conflict of interest laws had on agency recruitment. For example, an attorney declined a position on an advisory committee concerning the civil service system because he was concerned that to serve he would have to resign from his firm, which represented individuals in their dealings with federal agencies (such as the Internal Revenue Service). In another example, an individual who had served full time in the Department of State but left was asked to return as a part-time consultant to leverage the considerable knowledge he had acquired while employed with the department overseas. He declined because the application of the law would have exposed him to criminal liability.\nPrior to the act, most of the existing laws originated in the 19th Century, at a time when persons outside the government rarely served as consultants or advisers. Therefore, the laws were aimed at the activities of regular full-time employees, rather than at a consultant or other temporary employee whose main work was performed outside the government. While Congress had recognized the adverse impact these laws had on temporary employees and granted specific statutory exemptions from time to time, this approach created an inconsistent range of exemptions. To address this issue, Congress created a uniform means of imposing special rules on all temporary employees expected to serve within specified time limits. In doing so, Congress aimed to balance efforts to ensure integrity of government service with recruitment needs.", "A special government employee (SGE) is an employee of the federal government and therefore generally subject to ethics rules applicable to employees. SGEs must be distinguished from individuals that work for the federal government as independent contractors (rather than employees), who would not be covered by federal employee ethics rules. While some ethics rules apply differently to SGEs (or in fewer instances, do not apply at all), most ethics provisions apply to SGEs.\nThe following is an overview of selected government-wide ethics provisions for executive branch employees and how they apply to SGEs that are not serving on Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committees. Under the heading “Non-SGEs” is a general description of each provision. Under the heading “SGEs (Non-FACA)” is a general description of modifications to SGE coverage (if any). This is not a comprehensive listing of ethics provisions. Moreover, we have excluded differences in coverage which are exclusively applicable to SGEs serving on FACA committees as these SGEs are outside the scope of this report.", "Agencies in our review used a number of government-wide and agency- specific hiring authorities to on-board SGEs. The selected agencies frequently designated as SGEs individuals who had been appointed to serve as experts or consultants (under 5 U.S.C. § 3109, or a similar agency-specific authority). Under the government-wide authority 5 U.S.C. § 3109, agencies may appoint experts and consultants, as needed, for temporary or intermittent work when authorized by an appropriation or other statute. Tables 2 and 3 show government-wide and agency-specific hiring authorities that our selected agencies reported using when hiring SGEs.", "", "", "", "", "Yvonne D. Jones, (202) 512-6806 or [email protected].", "In addition to the individual name above, Signora J. May, Assistant Director; Anthony Patterson, Analyst-in-Charge; Jessica Lewis, Sara Daleski, Karin Fangman, Amanda Miller, Susan Sato, and Robert Gebhart made major contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "To what extent do SGEs serve on federal boards?", "How has this situation developed from 2005 to 2014?", "How are SGEs not serving on federal boards typically appointed?", "How are SGE's days of service tracked?" ], "summary": [ "As of December 2014, approximately 3 percent of SGEs (1,138 of 40,424) were working as experts or consultants and not serving on federal boards, according to the Office of Government Ethics (OGE).", "Federal agencies made limited use of special government employees (SGE) not serving on federal boards. Over a 10-year period (2005 to 2014), GAO found that agencies used an annual average of approximately 2,000 SGEs, with a peak of about 3,100 in 2009 and a low of about 500 in 2013.", "Three of the five selected agencies primarily used expert and consultant hiring authorities to appoint SGEs not serving on federal boards. The other two agencies generally used their agency-specific authorities. The agencies used these employees in specialized areas (see figure).", "Four of five agencies said supervisors are generally responsible for tracking SGEs' days of service. One agency permits SGEs to track their own days." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 5, 5 ] }
CRS_R44808	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Federal Assistance Available to Individuals and Families", "The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)", "Availability of Flood Insurance Through the NFIP", "The Coastal Barrier Resources System and Flood Insurance", "Primary Flood Insurance Through the NFIP", "Preferred Risk Policies", "Standard Flood Insurance Policies", "NFIP Coverage Limits: Single Family Dwellings", "NFIP Coverage Limits: Other Residential Buildings and Condominiums", "NFIP Claims", "Advance Payments from the NFIP", "FEMA Assistance to Individuals and Families", "Individuals and Households Program", "Other Needs Assistance", "Group Flood Insurance", "Other Individual Assistance", "Transitional Shelter Assistance", "Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power Program", "The Coastal Barrier Resources System and Housing Assistance", "SBA Disaster Loan Program", "SBA Personal Property Loans", "SBA Flood Insurance Requirements", "Assistance Which May Be Available to Individuals and Families After a Flood", "HUD Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program", "Examples of CDBG-DR Assistance After Major Floods", "Summary and Considerations for Congress", "Communities Which Do Not Participate in the NFIP", "Unequal Amount of Assistance Available Through Flood Insurance and Disaster Assistance", "Availability of Alternative Funding", "Considerations for NFIP Reauthorization", "Resources for Further Information" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "After a flood event, people are often uncertain about what types of federal assistance they are eligible for, and if their eligibility for federal disaster assistance is linked in any way to whether or not they have flood insurance. Because much of the other disaster assistance that is available to individuals comes from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), there may be confusion between possible claims provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP, which is also managed by FEMA) and other disaster assistance programs. This report provides an overview of the assistance available to individuals and households following a flood and provides links to more comprehensive guidance on both flood insurance and disaster assistance. The NFIP is described in detail in CRS Report R44593, Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) .\nThe National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the main program intended to provide federal assistance to homeowners and renters recovering from flood losses. The NFIP was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA, 42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.). The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. As of May 2018, the NFIP had over 5 million flood insurance policies providing over $1.28 trillion in coverage. Nationally, as of July 2018, about 22,322 communities in 56 states and jurisdictions participated in the NFIP. According to FEMA, the program saves the nation an estimated $1.87 billion annually in flood losses avoided because of the NFIP's building and floodplain management regulations.\nIn addition to NFIP claims payments to policyholders, homeowners and renters may also access a number of other federal programs aimed at mitigating the impact on individuals and households. As described below, Congress established certain limits on the availability of federal disaster assistance dependent on whether individuals had flood insurance, as set out by the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 (FDPA, P.L. 93-234 , 87 Stat 985). In addition to requiring property owners with federally backed mortgages to have flood insurance, the FDPA restricts access to federal financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes for use in any area that has been identified as having special flood hazards (i.e., what is known as a Special Flood Hazard Area, or SFHA), and in which the sale of flood insurance has been made available under the NFIP, unless covered by flood insurance (i.e., the community participates in the NFIP). The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-288 , as amended, Stafford Act) also sets restrictions to flood disaster assistance, stating that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no federal disaster relief assistance made available in a flood disaster area may be used to make a payment (including any loan assistance payment) to a person for repair, replacement, or flood disaster assistance that was conditional on the person first having obtained flood insurance under applicable federal law and subsequently having failed to obtain and maintain flood insurance as required under applicable federal law on such property.", "", "", "A core design feature of the NFIP is that communities are not required to participate in the program by any law or regulation. Rather, communities in the United States voluntarily participate in the NFIP generally as a means of securing access to the primary flood insurance offered by the NFIP. Essentially, the NFIP is structured so that the availability of primary flood insurance through the NFIP is tied to the adoption and enforcement of floodplain management standards by participating communities. FEMA is only allowed to provide flood insurance to \"those States or areas (or subdivisions thereof)\" where \"adequate land use and control measures\" have been adopted that \"are consistent with the comprehensive criteria for land management and use developed\" by the NFIP. Thus, communities that participate in the NFIP, and therefore whose residents may access the NFIP's primary flood insurance, also must adopt, through local or state laws, minimum floodplain management standards that are described in FEMA regulations. Communities are required to adopt these minimum floodplain management standards in order to participate in the NFIP. FEMA has set forth the minimum standards it requires for participation in the NFIP in federal regulations. Though the standards appear in federal regulations, the standards only have the force of law because they are adopted and enforced by a state or local government.\nA community that has been found failing to enforce the floodplain management standards may be placed on probation and ultimately suspended from the NFIP. However, a community cannot be removed from the NFIP because of increased or excess flood insurance claims and losses. Rather, probation and suspension only occur if the community fails to uphold its obligations related to floodplain management. Communities that have been suspended or those communities that do not participate in the NFIP can face significant consequences. Most importantly, residents of these communities are not able to purchase primary flood insurance through the NFIP, which may result in significant uninsured property risk in that community. In addition, if a community does not participate in, or has been suspended from, the NFIP but has been previously mapped by FEMA for flood hazards, it is difficult for the community and policyholders to access some other forms of federal assistance for areas in the floodplain.\nFor example, by law, no federal assistance may be provided for acquisition or construction purposes in an area that has been identified as having special flood hazards unless the property is covered by flood insurance. Likewise, as federally backed mortgages require flood insurance for properties in the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), these property owners would be required to obtain such insurance in the private market. A community is allowed to leave the NFIP at its will, but the potential consequences of that decision are similar to those if the community has been suspended.", "In some other special cases NFIP flood insurance may not be available; for example, no new NFIP flood insurance coverage may be provided for new construction or structures with substantial improvements which are located on any coastal barrier within the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS). The CBRS contains two types of units: System units and Otherwise Protected Areas (OPAs). System units are generally comprised of private lands that were relatively undeveloped at the time of their designation within the CBRS. The boundaries of system units are generally intended to follow geomorphic, development, or cultural features. OPAs are generally comprised of lands held by a qualified organization primarily for wildlife refuge, sanctuary, recreational, or natural resource conservation purposes. The boundaries of OPAs are generally intended to coincide with the boundaries of conservation or recreation areas such as state parks and national wildlife refuges.", "FEMA develops, in coordination with participating communities, flood maps called Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) that depict the community's floodplain and flood risk. A key aspect of this flood mapping is the identification of the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA). The SFHA is intended to distinguish the flood risk zones that have a chance of flooding during a \"1 in 100 year flood\" or greater frequency. This means that properties have a risk of 1% or greater of flooding every year if located in a SFHA. In a community that participates or has participated in the NFIP, owners of properties in the mapped SFHA are required to purchase flood insurance as a condition of receiving a federally backed mortgage. By law and regulation, federal agencies, federally regulated lending institutions, and government-sponsored enterprises must require these property owners to purchase flood insurance as a condition of any mortgage that these entities make, guarantee, or purchase. Property owners falling under this mandate may purchase flood insurance through the NFIP or through a private company, so long as the private flood insurance \"provides flood insurance coverage which is at least as broad as the coverage\" of the NFIP, among other conditions. Not all mortgages in the SFHA are affected by this mandatory purchase requirement. For example, a personal mortgage loan between two private parties (such as between family members), or a mortgage issued by a private mortgage company that is not then sold on the secondary market to a bank or entity like Fannie Mae, may not require flood insurance. Even if they are not technically required to mandate flood insurance by federal law, the issuing party may still require it as a means of financially securing the property.", "Flood insurance is optional for properties outside the SFHA regardless of whether they have a federally backed mortgage. However, as there is still a risk of flooding outside the SFHA, residents of NFIP participating communities with property located outside the SFHA may voluntarily purchase a lower-cost Preferred Risk Policy (PRP). Rates for PRPs are lower than for properties in SFHAs in accordance with their lower risk profile; however, unlike properties in the SFHA, an individual may be denied a PRP if there is significant loss history for the property. FEMA encourages the purchase of PRPs both to reduce the financial flood risk of a broader group of individuals, and to expand the number of NFIP policyholders, thus improving the fiscal soundness of the NFIP portfolio.", "FEMA has considerable discretion under the law to craft the details of the flood insurance policies it sells through the NFIP. Currently, there are three policies that the NFIP uses to sell primary flood insurance—the Dwelling, the General Property, and the Residential Condominium Building Association policy (RCBAP) forms. Collectively, these Standard Flood Insurance Policies (SFIPs) appear in regulations, and coverage qualifications are generally equivalent. Within the SFIPs sold by the NFIP, there are numerous policy exclusions that are often not understood by policyholders. For example, SFIPs have limited coverage of basements or crawlspaces. Because SFIP coverage limits are often less than the value of a structure or the value of the property's contents, policyholders can obtain excess flood insurance to cover losses beyond the coverage limit. However, such excess coverage is not sold by the NFIP, and can only be purchased through the private insurance market.", "The maximum coverage limits available from the NFIP are determined by occupancy type and location in or out of a SFHA (see Table 1 ). The NFIP defines three main occupancy types: Single Family Dwelling, Other Residential Building, and Business Building. The distinction between residential and nonresidential is determined by the percentage of the floor space which is devoted to commercial uses.\nPolicyholders are able to elect coverage for both their building property and separate coverage for contents. Renters may obtain a contents-only coverage. The maximum coverage with either a SFIP or a PRP for single-family dwellings (which also includes single-family residential units within a 2-4 family building) is $100,000 for contents and up to $250,000 for buildings coverage.", "For Other Residential Buildings which are not covered by a Residential Condominium Building Association Policy (RCBAP), the maximum available coverage limit is $250,000 for building coverage and $100,000 for contents coverage. These limits apply to all single condominium units and all other buildings not in a condominium form of ownership, including cooperatives, timeshares, apartment buildings, dormitories, and assisted-living facilities. The Other Residential Building category also includes hotels, motels, tourist homes, and rooming houses which have more than four units where the normal guest occupancy is six months or more. An individual dwelling unit in a condominium not covered by the RCBAP may be separately insured under the Dwelling form, in the name of the unit owner, up to the limits of insurance coverage for a single-family dwelling (up to $100,000 for contents, up to $250,000 for building elements). A residential condominium association may purchase insurance coverage under the RCBAP on behalf of the association and the unit owners to cover the building and, if desired, coverage of commonly owned contents. In this case, the maximum limit for the building is the replacement cost, or the total number of units multiplied by $250,000, whichever is less.", "While FEMA provides the overarching management and oversight of the NFIP, the bulk of the day-to-day operation of the NFIP, including claims made after a flood, is handled by private companies. This arrangement between the NFIP and private industry is authorized by statute and guided by regulation. There are two different arrangements that FEMA has established with private industry. The first is the Direct Servicing Agent (DSA), which operates as a private contractor on behalf of FEMA for individuals seeking to purchase flood insurance policies directly from the NFIP. The second arrangement is called the Write-Your-Own (WYO) Program, where private insurance companies are paid to directly write and service the policies themselves. With either the DSA or WYO Program, the NFIP retains the actual financial risk of paying claims for the policy (i.e., underwrites the policy), and the policy terms and premiums are the same.\nFollowing a flood, NFIP policyholders are advised to contact their agent or insurance company to file a claim. This is either one of the WYO companies or the DSA, who will provide an adjuster to assist the policyholder to make a claim. The adjuster will normally take measurements and photographs to assess the damage, provide an estimate of the covered flood damage, and provide a proof of loss form for the policyholder to sign. The estimate, proof of loss form, and other supporting documentation provide the Proof of Loss, which is required before the claim can be paid. The complete Proof of Loss, signed and sworn to by the policyholder, along with documentation to support the amount requested initially and any requests for additional payment, must be sent to the DSA or WYO company within 60 days after the date of loss or within the extension. In severe events, FEMA may authorize an extension of the 60-day period to send the proof of loss to the NFIP adjuster. For example, following both the Louisiana floods in August 2016 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012, FEMA authorized multiple extensions which ultimately gave policyholders 330 days to submit their proof of loss after the Louisiana floods and a full two years to submit their proofs of loss after Sandy. So far, policyholders have been given one year from the date of loss to file claims for Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Irma, and Hurricane Maria.", "In some circumstances, FEMA has authorized a conditional waiver to allow insurers (either WYO companies or the NFIP Direct Servicing Agent) to make advance payments to policyholders. These advance payments have been made in two ways.\n(1) Pre-inspection: Once a policyholder provides notice of loss, an insurer may offer an advance payment for building and/or personal property damages up to a total of $5000 after confirming coverage and validating that the insured property has flooded. The insurer may offer a total advance payment of up to $20,000 if the policyholder provides photographs depicting flood damage to the covered property and either documentation such as receipts verifying out-of-pocket expenses related to the repair or replacement of covered property, or a contractor's itemized damage estimate.\n(2) Payment for Significant Damage: If the insurer receives a general contractor's estimate of necessary repairs to the insured property and a flood insurance inspector retained by the insurer has inspected the insured property, an advance payment may be authorized, not to exceed 50% of the general contractor's estimate of necessary repairs. In both cases, the advance payment cannot be used for Additional Living Expenses, and after the claim is settled, the insurer will reduce the final payment by the amount of the advance. If the loss is determined not to be a covered loss, or if the advance payment exceeds the amount of the actual covered loss, the insured will be required to repay the advanced payment (or portion thereof).", "When the President declares a major disaster under the Stafford Act, the President's action contains a designation for the types of assistance FEMA will provide for victims of that disaster. Individual Assistance (IA) may be provided for certain declared disaster areas, but not others. IA provides help to individuals and families and can include several programs, depending on whether the governor of the affected state or the tribal leader has requested that specific help.", "The principal IA program to offer assistance to individuals and families is the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). The IHP has two broad categories that assist families and individuals who have been impacted by disaster damage: housing assistance and other needs assistance. The total of all assistance to one household cannot exceed $34,000. Each household is considered a single applicant regardless of the number of household members. In all instances, this help is intended to supplement, but not substitute for, existing insurance coverage. If applicants have insurance, any assistance provided by FEMA for losses covered by insurance should be considered an advance and must be repaid to FEMA upon receipt of an insurance payment settlement.\nUnder IHP, housing costs can be assumed by the federal government for up to 18 months. Unlike other Stafford Act programs, housing is not cost shared with the state, but is all federal assistance. The types of housing assistance include monetary assistance, direct assistance, repairs, and replacement. Monetary Assistance is provided to individuals and families to address the costs to rent temporary housing while repairs are being made to their predisaster primary residence or while they transition to permanent housing. The amount of rental assistance available is calibrated to include housing and utility costs in the affected area. Direct Assistance provides temporary housing units to disaster survivors that are purchased or leased by the federal government. The IHP cost per household limit does not apply to Direct Assistance. The use of Direct Assistance, such as mobile homes and trailers, is rare and is generally considered a last resort to be employed only when other housing options are not available in the immediate disaster area.\nThe great majority of disaster housing help comes in the form of temporary rental assistance and repairs to a home which is not insured in order to make it habitable. This repair assistance does not include new utilities or improvements to the home, but does make the home conform to current, applicable building codes in the affected area. The goal is to repair the home to a safe and sanitary living or functioning condition. FEMA will not pay to return a home to its condition before the disaster. The IHP can also make a contribution through Replacement Assistance toward the replacement of an uninsured or underinsured owner-occupied residence that was damaged in a disaster event. However, the $34,000 limit means that it is unlikely that IHP awards will pay for the full replacement of a residence. IHP recipients whose homes are located in a Special Flood Hazard Area and are in a community participating in the NFIP and who receive assistance for repair, replacement, permanent housing construction, and/or personal property as a result of a flood-related disaster must obtain and maintain flood insurance as a condition of accepting disaster assistance.", "Funding for individuals and families is also available through the Other Needs Assistance (ONA) program. Unlike housing, ONA is cost shared with the state government on a 75% federal, 25% state basis. The ONA program is intended to address specific needs created by the disaster's impact. Assistance under ONA can include clothing, furniture, funeral expenses, child care, emergency medical and/or dental help, and a range of other needs. Flood insurance may be required on insurable items (personal property) if they are to be located in a SFHA.", "One unique form of assistance that is eligible for ONA funding is the Group Flood Insurance Policy (GFIP) offered by FEMA to IHP recipients after major flood disasters. The GFIP is a temporary mechanism for recipients of IHP funds—generally low-income persons—to acquire flood insurance following a flood loss. This assistance allows households time to recover from the disaster and be in a better position to buy flood insurance after the expiration of the GFIP. The premium for the GFIP is a flat fee of $600 per insured household, which is paid from ONA funds. A special deductible of $200 (applicable separately to any buildings loss and any contents loss) applies to insured flood damage losses sustained by the insured property in the course of any subsequent flooding event during the term of the GFIP. The policy covers the maximum amount of IHP awards (currently $34,000) and begins 60 days after the date of the applicable disaster declaration. The term of the policy is 36 months and is nonrenewable. FEMA is to provide a certificate of coverage to each household and contact the household 60 days before the policy is due to expire. The expiration notification from FEMA is designed, in part, to encourage policyholders to contact a local insurance agent or producer or a private insurance company selling NFIP policies under the WYO program, and advise them as to the amount of coverage the policyholder must maintain in order not to jeopardize their eligibility for future disaster assistance.", "Other programs which may be available to individuals and families from FEMA include Crisis Counseling for disaster victims, Disaster Legal Assistance, and Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA). The latter is available if there is a significant number unemployed due to the disaster who do not qualify for the regular state unemployment program. DUA is federally funded through FEMA but is administered by the Department of Labor and State Unemployment Compensation agencies. These programs do not require flood insurance.", "FEMA also uses Public Assistance grants to provide short-term shelter for disaster survivors who are unable to return to their homes. For instance, Transitional Shelter Assistance (TSA) provides short-term sheltering assistance to disaster survivors who have a continuing need for shelter after congregate shelters have closed. The TSA initiative is intended to provide short-term lodging for eligible disaster survivors whose communities are either uninhabitable or inaccessible due to disaster-related damages. FEMA considers applicants' eligibility for TSA as part of the IHP application process. TSA is authorized by the Stafford Act and is subject to Public Assistance regulations on state cost share. However, TSA is administered through FEMA's Individual Assistance program, which is better prepared to collect information on individuals than Public Assistance. For those who are eligible for TSA support, FEMA has the authority to fund the use of hotels or motels as transitional shelters, through direct payment to the participating hotels or motels.", "In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, FEMA designed the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) Pilot Program to work with state, local, and tribal governments to carry out certain essential measures to help restore power, heat, and hot water to residential properties, allowing residents to remain in or return to their homes while permanent repairs were completed. The STEP program home repairs were not accomplished under the authority of the IHP program, but instead were funded under Section 403 of the Stafford Act, which covers essential assistance; in other words, the grants were provided to eligible Public Assistance Grant Program applicants, who in turn used the funding for essential repairs to private residences. The STEP program was intended to reduce the demand for other FEMA-provided shelter, such as congregate shelters or TSA. STEP consisted of three elements: residential electrical meter repairs, shelter essential measures, and rapid temporary exterior repairs. FEMA delivered the STEP program through direct federal assistance; reimbursement of applicants who perform, or contract for the performance of, authorized emergency protective measures; or a combination of the two. Individual residential property owners were not eligible to apply directly to STEP. Eligible costs under the STEP pilot program were limited to $10,000 per residential unit, including equipment, materials, labor, and any associated inspection fees that were necessary to accomplish work that was eligible under STEP. STEP assistance was made available to residents in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.\nThe STEP pilot program shared some commonality with IHP, as it provided basic repairs to disaster-affected residences. However, STEP was intended only to make homes habitable for the short term and did not provide any assistance beyond basic repairs to homes, whereas IHP provides financial assistance for home repair or replacement, rental expenses, damaged personal property, and other needs. In New York City, the New York City Rapid Repair Program augmented STEP to allow for repairs to multifamily dwellings and more permanent repairs needed to meet building codes. As STEP funding was not provided to individuals, support from STEP did not affect the determination of any IA grant from FEMA. Households which benefitted from STEP support were not required to have or purchase flood insurance.\nFEMA instituted a similar program to STEP, called Shelter at Home, to address housing needs following the floods in Louisiana in August 2016 (FEMA-4277-DR-LA). Eligible costs under the Shelter at Home program were limited to single-family owner-occupied properties for repairs up to a maximum value of $15,000. As with the STEP program, Shelter at Home assistance did not affect the determination of any IA grant from FEMA and there was no flood insurance requirement for recipients of Shelter at Home assistance.\nSTEP programs were instituted in Texas following Hurricane Harvey (FEMA-4332-DR-TX), in Florida following Hurricane Irma (FEMA-4337-DR-FL), in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Irma (FEMA-4336-DR-PR) and Hurricane Maria (FEMA-4339-DR-PR), and in the U.S. Virgin Islands following Hurricane Irma (FEMA-4335-DR-VI) and Hurricane Maria (FEMA-4340-DR-VI). All of these STEP programs were available only for disaster-damaged single-family owner-occupied primary residential properties, including duplexes and townhomes. The Texas program is known as Partial Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering (PREPS). All of the STEP programs for the 2017 hurricanes capped the cost of repairs at $20,000. As with previous STEP programs, STEP assistance for the 2017 hurricanes did not affect a FEMA IHP applicant's eligibility for repair, replacement, or permanent or semipermanent housing construction assistance, if approved, under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, and there was no flood insurance requirement for recipients other than providing documentation of flood insurance or certification of no flood insurance.", "The Coastal Barrier Resources Act ( P.L. 97-348 , as amended through P.L. 106-390 ) restricts housing assistance provided under Section 408 of the Stafford Act. Housing assistance, including repair, replacement, and semipermanent or permanent construction, is not authorized to those who live in the Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS) or in an Otherwise Protected Area (OPA). However, essential assistance under Section 403 of the Stafford Act is allowed in the CBRS and in OPAs. In addition, although FEMA discourages some types of sheltering in CBRA or OPA areas, none of the STEP policies exclude implementation of STEP in CBRAs/OPAs. STEP is funded as an emergency protective measure under Section 403 and is, therefore, exempt from most of the CBRA/OPA restrictions.", "The Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program provides direct loans to businesses, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters to repair or replace property damaged or destroyed in a federally declared disaster. SBA Disaster Loans include Home and Personal Property Disaster Loans, Business Physical Disaster Loans, and Economic Injury Disaster Loans. About 83% of direct disaster loans are awarded to individuals and households rather than small businesses. The program generally offers disaster loans at a fixed rate that have loan maturities of up to 30 years. The SBA Disaster Loan Program can be put into effect by five types of declarations: two types of Presidential Declarations as authorized by the Stafford Act, and three types of SBA declarations. The type of declaration determines what types of loans are made available, but has no bearing on the loan terms or loan caps.", "A Personal Property Loan provides a creditworthy homeowner or renter in a declared disaster area with up to $40,000 to repair or replace personal property owned by the survivor, while Real Property Loans provide creditworthy homeowners with up to $200,000 to repair or restore the homeowners' primary residence to its predisaster condition. Only uninsured or otherwise uncompensated disaster losses are eligible. The amount that SBA will lend depends on the cost of repairing or replacing the home and/or personal property (minus insurance settlements or grant assistance). The loans may not be used to upgrade a home or build additions to a home unless the upgrade or addition is required by city or county building codes. However, a homeowner can borrow additional funds beyond the cost of repair to cover the costs of mitigation intended to protect their property against future damage; however, mitigation funds may not exceed 20% of the disaster damage, as verified by SBA, to a maximum of $200,000 for home loans.\nDisaster loans may be used in conjunction with other types of assistance, including insurance, but only to the extent that there is no duplication of benefit. The Stafford Act requires federal agencies providing disaster assistance to ensure that businesses and individuals do not receive disaster assistance for losses for which they have already been compensated. SBA regulations prohibit applicants from receiving a home disaster loan if their damaged property can be repaired or replaced with the proceeds of insurance, gifts, or other compensation. These amounts must either be deducted from the amount of the claimed losses or, if received after SBA has approved and disbursed a loan, as principal payments on their loans.", "Recipients of SBA loans must carry flood insurance for the life of the loan. Because the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, among other things, made flood insurance requirements directly applicable to agencies that provide government loans, such as the SBA, such agencies cannot subsidize, insure, or guarantee any loan if the property securing the loan is in a SFHA of a community not participating in the NFIP. In addition, the SBA will deem an applicant ineligible for a home disaster loan if the SBA determines that the applicant assumed the risk by not maintaining flood insurance as required by an earlier SBA disaster loan when the current loss is also due to flood. SBA loans are not available for properties in the Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS) or in an Otherwise Protected Area (OPA).", "In addition to NFIP and other federal assistance that may be automatically triggered with a disaster declaration, individuals may also access federal assistance that is not automatically triggered by such declarations. In some instances that are perceived as catastrophic events, Congress has provided additional resources to states and local governments through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program (CDBG-DR). The CDBG-DR program is not automatically triggered by a disaster. Instead, Congress has occasionally addressed unmet disaster needs by providing supplemental disaster-related appropriations for the CDBG-DR program. Consequently, CDBG-DR is not provided for all major disasters declared under the Stafford Act, but only provided at the discretion of Congress.", "The CDBG-DR program is designed to help communities and neighborhoods that otherwise might not recover after a disaster due to limited resources. Eligible grantees include states, units of local government, Indian tribes, and other areas designated by the President as disaster areas. Generally, CDBG-DR grantees must use at least 70% of the funds for activities that principally benefit low- and moderate-income (LMI) persons or areas. Due to the block grant nature of the program, local and state officials exercise a great deal of discretion in determining which combination of eligible activities to employ. This allows communities to use CDBG-DR funds to meet disaster-related needs, including short-term disaster relief, mitigation activities, and long-term recovery activities. Communities and states are also free to amend and revise their annual CDBG plans in response to flood in order to address imminent threats to the health and safety of residents. Communities, at the discretion of Congress, may be reimbursed by CDBG-DR funds for use of their regular CDBG allocation. This results from explicit language included in some appropriations bills.\nHUD does not provide CDBG-DR funding directly to individuals; however, individuals and families may benefit from a number of the eligible activities for which CDBG-DR funds can be used. Examples of these activities include buyouts of damaged properties in a floodplain and relocating residents to safer areas, relocation payments for people and businesses displaced by a disaster, rehabilitation of homes and buildings damaged by the disaster, and homeownership activities such as down payment assistance, interest rate subsidies, and loan guarantees for disaster victims.", "Some of the biggest flood-related CDBG-DR grants have been made available in the aftermath of hurricanes. For example, following the 2005 hurricane season (particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), Congress provided $19.7 billion in CDBG-DR funding to five states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas). Louisiana and Mississippi were the two states hardest hit by the 2005 hurricanes and received $13.4 billion and $5.5 billion, respectively. Both states devoted the majority of the CDBG-DR funding to housing recovery, with particular support for homeowners. Louisiana state officials used $3 billion of CDBG-DR funding for the Road Home program. This program defined a homeowner's potential grant amount as the estimated cost to repair or rebuild the home, minus any insurance payments and FEMA assistance for structural repairs, up to a maximum of $150,000. This potential amount was then reduced by 30% for homeowners who did not carry insurance (homeowners insurance and also flood insurance if the property was in a SFHA and the community participated in the NFIP). The state also reduced the award to remove Duplication of Benefits and unpaid taxes owed to the state. Homeowners could choose to repair their property or to relocate (with only 60% of the potential grant amount available if they chose to relocate out of Louisiana). Mississippi established a similar program called the Mississippi Homeowner Grant Program. The maximum assistance in the Mississippi program considered the applicant's income relative to the area median income, and whether or not the property was located in a SFHA. Assistance in Mississippi was also conditional on homeowners' willingness to attach covenants to the property that created commitments to maintain flood insurance, rebuild and repair in accordance with applicable building codes and local ordinances, and elevate the property in accordance with the most recent FEMA guidelines.\nAfter Hurricane Sandy, which made landfall in October 2012, $16 billion ($15.8 billion after the sequester) was awarded in CDBG-DR funding to New York City and the states of Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. This funding has been used in a variety of ways which provide funding directly to individuals and families, including housing rehabilitation and replacement, resilient rebuilding (for example, elevation of a property), property acquisition, and coastal resiliency measures. The State of New Jersey used CDBG-DR funding after Hurricane Sandy to make grants of up to $10,000 through its Homeowner Resettlement Program which homeowners could use toward addressing anything that would provide an incentive to remain in their community. One of the eligible expenses for which this money could be used was to pay flood insurance premiums. The Resettlement Program was only available to homeowners in the nine most impacted counties whose property was their primary residence which they owned and occupied at the time of the storm, and whose residence sustained a FEMA-verified loss of $8,000 or greater or more than one foot of flooding on the first floor. Before the funds were released, the homeowner was required to sign a promissory note to reside in the county for three years; otherwise, they would have to repay the funds to the state. Initially 60% of the funds were reserved for LMI families in accordance with HUD income guidelines. The disbursement of the funds was evaluated in the order in which the requests were received.\nFollowing the 2017 Hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and Maria), there were three relevant acts containing CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations. Texas was allocated $57.8 million for damages associated with Hurricane Harvey. The first supplemental allocated an additional $5.024 billion to Texas, $616 million to Florida, $1.507 billion to Puerto Rico, and $243 million to the U.S. Virgin Islands. In the second supplemental, Congress did not provide HUD with any CDBG-DR funding, although it did make some modifications to eligibility, to include tribes, and set expenditure deadlines. In the third supplemental, HUD was allocated $28 billion in CDBG-DR funding. Congress required that these funds be used for two purposes:\n1. Up to $16 billion to address remaining unmet needs from major disasters in 2017, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria as well as California wildfires and subsequent mudslides. Congress specified that at least $11 million of this be targeted to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with $2 billion to repair and upgrade the electrical grid in these jurisdictions. 2. At least $12 billion to support mitigation activities among CDBG-DR grantees that experienced presidentially declared disasters from 2015 through 2017. After addressing remaining 2017 unmet needs, HUD was able to make an additional $3.9 billion available for mitigation, bringing the amount available for mitigation to nearly $16 billion for recent CDBG-DR grantees.\nCDBG-DR funding from the third supplemental for the 2017 hurricanes, including mitigation funding, allocated $18.4 billion to Puerto Rico, $4.7 billion to Texas, $1.21 billion to the U.S. Virgin Islands, and $707.3 million to Florida.", "", "Congress may consider whether they agree that individual households should be disadvantaged by a decision made by their community, over which an individual is likely to have very little control. Individuals who live in a community which has not joined, withdraws from, or which has been suspended from the NFIP, are not allowed to buy or renew NFIP flood insurance and are barred from applying for SBA loans. These households may wish to buy NFIP flood insurance but are not allowed to do so, because of their community's NFIP status (or nonstatus).\nTable 1 provides summary information on available federal assistance from an NFIP insurance policy, FEMA Individuals and Households Program, and SBA disaster loans. This information is provided dependent on the status of the individual's property in the Special Flood Hazard Area, the community's participation in the NFIP, and whether that individual has the required insurance coverage.", "There is often a perception that flood victims get large amounts of disaster aid and that this may act as a moral hazard which discourages people from purchasing flood insurance and/or adopting risk reduction measures. In fact, the amount of FEMA Individual Assistance after a flood is relatively limited; many of the headline reports of federal aid refer to public assistance or assistance which is not available to all individuals. Flood insurance may be preferable for governments, since policyholders cover a portion of the costs through premium payments. Flood insurance may also be better for individuals, as uninsured households fare less well than those with insurance. Generally, residents must live in a federally declared disaster area to be eligible to receive disaster assistance or disaster loans; in contrast, NFIP policyholders may claim for damages from any flood, regardless of whether the flood was a declared disaster under federal law. Although the maximum coverage available under the NFIP may not be sufficient to cover all flood-related losses, an individual or family will generally be able to get more from NFIP insurance than from disaster assistance. For example, homeowners are able to get up to $350,000 for buildings and contents together and renters are able to get up to $100,000, compared to a maximum of $34,000 per household from FEMA disaster assistance. In addition, most disaster victims do not receive the maximum amount available under FEMA disaster assistance. For example, after the South Carolina floods in October 2015, although less than 5% of households in the counties receiving IHP had NFIP flood insurance, the average IHP payment was about $3,200. In contrast, the average NFIP claim for the South Carolina floods was $34,934. Neither flood insurance payments nor Individual Assistance payments need to be paid back; however, the amount available through IA will be reduced by the amount of NFIP proceeds received for the same damages. In addition, a household without flood insurance will only be able to get IA under a limited set of circumstances. An individual or household may be able to borrow up to $240,000 through a combination of SBA Personal Property and Real Property Loans; however, these loans must be paid back with interest. In order to receive SBA loans, recipients must carry flood insurance for the life of the loan. The amount of this assistance is subject to Duplication of Benefits and sequence protocols.\nThe nexus between flood insurance and disaster assistance reveals conflicting aims: the desire to encourage individuals and households to purchase flood insurance versus the humanitarian objective of providing assistance following a disaster so that people do not suffer unnecessarily. This is fundamentally a moral hazard question. A fully individualistic approach to flood risk would advocate that individuals and households should purchase adequate flood insurance to protect themselves against a major flood disaster. A more egalitarian approach could take the view that individuals do not necessarily have a free choice on whether or not they purchase flood insurance (for example, residents of a community which does not participate in the NFIP) and that some individuals and households may not be able to afford sufficient coverage. In this case, the policy question is whether or not the federal government should step in after a disaster even if the victims do not have flood insurance. Congress may allow these conflicting policies to continue and to retain the current difference between the amounts available from flood insurance and disaster assistance, or may consider proposals that would alter the balance between assistance and insurance.", "A significant amount of money is available to individuals and households through funding sources which are not available in all disasters, particularly through CDBG-DR. For example, homeowners in Louisiana and Mississippi could get grants of up to $150,000 after the 2005 hurricane season, as could homeowners in New Jersey after Hurricane Sandy. Rather than being funded through the annual appropriations process, statutory authority for CDBG-DR funding is provided via supplemental appropriations which are awarded by Congress only in extraordinary circumstances that have resulted in significant unmet needs for long-term recovery. Because Congress has so far opted to use special appropriations to deliver CDBG-DR funds rather than establishing a permanent CDBG disaster recovery program, HUD cannot create permanent regulations and guidance of how states should implement CDBG-DR grants. This may lead to delay and/or confusion in implementation, and may also subject program design decisions to local politics. Unless the individual state required homeowners to purchase flood insurance, the recipients of CDBG-DR grants are exempt from the requirement to purchase flood insurance. Given the unequal use of CDBG-DR, there may be an issue of equity in disaster housing assistance, where some disaster events receive an expanded form of federal assistance to meet housing needs in the form of CDBG, which can create different tiers of disaster housing assistance for declared disasters.", "NFIP's authorization will expire on November 30, 2018. The availability of NFIP insurance has impacts on other programs operated by FEMA and other agencies such as SBA and HUD. Separately from, or in conjunction with, NFIP reauthorization, the impacts on other programs may be useful to consider. In particular, Congress may consider revising the requirements associated with the Flood Disaster Protection Act and flood insurance.", "Other sources of disaster assistance are described in detail in the following CRS reports; however, this is not a comprehensive list of available disaster assistance following a flood, but rather a sampling of the most commonly used programs.\nCRS Report R44593, Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to Major Disasters and Emergencies CRS Report R44619, FEMA Disaster Housing: The Individuals and Households Program—Implementation and Potential Issues for Congress CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress CRS Report RL31734, Federal Disaster Assistance Response and Recovery Programs: Brief Summaries CRS Report RL33330, Community Development Block Grant Funds in Disaster Relief and Recovery CRS Report R45084, 2017 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: Overview" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h0_title", "", "", "", "h0_title", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_title", "", "", "", "h1_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the National Flood Insurance Program?", "What kind of coverage does NFIP provide for homes and buildings?", "What otehr programs might homeowners and renters utilize?", "What is the purpose of the Individuals and Households Program?", "What impact might there be on other programs if NFIP is allowed to lapse?", "To what extent should Congress consider other related programs?" ], "summary": [ "The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the main program intended to provide federal assistance to homeowners and renters recovering from flood losses.", "The maximum coverage for one- to four-family homes is $100,000 for contents and $250,000 for buildings coverage.", "In addition to NFIP claims payments to policyholders, homeowners and renters may also access a number of other federal programs aimed at mitigating the impact on individuals and households.", "The principal FEMA program to offer assistance to individuals and families is the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). The total of all IHP assistance to one household cannot exceed $34,000. IHP recipients whose homes are located in a Special Flood Hazard Area, are in a community participating in the NFIP, and who receive assistance for repair, replacement, permanent housing construction, and/or personal property as a result of a flood-related disaster must obtain and maintain flood insurance as a condition of accepting disaster assistance.", "The NFIP's authorization expires on November 30, 2018. If the NFIP is not reauthorized and is allowed to lapse, the authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire. If the NFIP were to lapse, the unavailability of NFIP insurance could have an impact on other programs such as IHP, SBA disaster loans, and CDBG-DR.", "Separately from or in conjunction with NFIP reauthorization, the impacts on such other programs may be useful to consider. In particular, Congress may consider revising the requirements for flood insurance in the Flood Disaster Protection Act." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-15-437	{ "title": [ "Background", "Overview of FEMA’s Workforce", "FEMA Is Taking Steps to Address Long- standing Human Capital Management Challenges, but Success Hinges on the Effective Completion and Integration of These Efforts", "FEMA’s Workforce Planning Efforts", "FEMA Employee Credentialing System", "FEMA’s Employee Morale", "Success Hinges on the Effective Completion and Integration of Various Human Capital Management Efforts", "FEMA Faces Staffing Challenges with New Disaster Workforces and Does Not Collect All Information Necessary to Evaluate Program Costs and Performance", "Retention and Recruitment Challenges Limit FEMA’s Ability to Meet Staffing Goals in Its New Disaster Workforce Programs", "FEMA Corps Retention", "FEMA Corps Background Investigations", "Surge Capacity Force Recruitment", "FEMA Does Not Collect Complete Cost Information on New Disaster Workforce Programs", "FEMA Corps Management and Background Investigation Costs", "Surge Capacity Force Costs to DHS", "FEMA Does Not Measure or Collect Full Performance Data Needed to Assess the Effectiveness of New Disaster Workforce Programs", "FEMA Does Not Have Complete Measures or Reliable Performance Data", "Performance Assessment of FEMA Corps Teams", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Organization Chart", "Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "In 2001, we first identified strategic human capital management in the federal government as a high-risk area because of the significant challenges federal government agencies faced including acquiring and developing staff whose size, skills, and deployment met agency needs. In our February 2013 update, we reported that effective strategic workforce planning is essential for ensuring that agencies have the talent, skill, and experience mix they need to cost-effectively execute their mission and program goals.\nIn our past reviews of these issues at FEMA, we have reported that FEMA should strengthen the strategic management of its workforce, including improvements in gathering workforce data, identifying staffing gaps, and developing plans with goals and measures to fill those gaps. we reported that FEMA lacked a strategic For example, in 2007, workforce plan and recommended that, in responding to strategic workforce planning requirements in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act), FEMA apply the key principles of strategic workforce planning, such as assessing the number of employees and critical skills that FEMA needs. Although FEMA subsequently issued a strategic workforce plan for 2008-2012, that plan did not include performance metrics or identify possible workforce gaps, In 2011, overlaps, or inconsistencies, as discussed later in this report.we again reported the need for and recommended that FEMA develop a workforce plan. Most recently, in 2012, we recommended that FEMA establish goals, performance measures, and systematic processes for collecting and analyzing workforce data. FEMA has not yet fully addressed many of our past human capital–related recommendations, as we discuss later in the report.", "FEMA’s workforce consists of a combination of employees hired under as well as individuals from two workforce Title 5, and the Stafford Act,components who are not FEMA employees but are deployed to augment FEMA’s workforce for disaster response: the DHS Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps.\nTitle 5 employees: These permanent and temporary employees make up FEMA’s day-to-day workforce and are responsible for administering the agency’s ongoing program activities in headquarters and regional offices. During disasters, these employees can be deployed as needed.\nStafford Act employees: These employees must provide support to disaster-related activities and augment FEMA’s disaster workforce at facilities, regional offices, and headquarters. Stafford Act employees include Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees and reservists (formerly disaster assistance employees). COREs are temporary employees with 2- to 4-year appointments and can be deployed to fulfill any role specifically related to the incident for which they are hired and qualified during disaster assistance response and recovery efforts. Reservists work on an intermittent basis and are deployed as needed to fulfill incident management roles within their cadre function.\nSurge Capacity Force: The purpose of the Surge Capacity Force is to augment FEMA’s disaster workforce in a catastrophic disaster. The Surge Capacity Force consists of volunteers who are employees of DHS components, such as the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Secret Service. DHS issued the Surge Capacity Force Concept of Operations in 2010 and first deployed Surge Capacity Force volunteers to assist in response and recovery efforts during Hurricane Sandy which made landfall in October 2012— approximately 1,100 Surge Capacity Force volunteers from seven DHS components deployed to New York in November and December 2012 to provide aid to survivors, information about disaster assistance, and logistics support. Currently only DHS employees can volunteer to join the Surge Capacity Force, although the Post- Katrina Act authorizes FEMA to include employees of other federal agencies. FEMA manages and coordinates the Surge Capacity Force program. The other DHS components provide management support for the Surge Capacity Force program.\nFEMA Corps: FEMA Corps is a national service program managed by AmeriCorps NCCC whose members work under the supervision of FEMA staff. FEMA staffs are responsible for developing projects for FEMA Corps members and providing technical supervision at project sites. Specifically, FEMA Corps members are young adults—ages 18 to 24—who are recruited to serve in the FEMA Corps program as members of the AmeriCorps NCCC Program. They serve for 10 months under a service agreement providing national community service for FEMA disaster management operations. The goals of the program are to (1) strengthen the nation’s disaster response capability, (2) achieve significant cost savings to the taxpayer, (3) create pathways to work for young people, (4) promote an ethic of national service, and (5) modernize government operations to improve performance. FEMA, in conjunction with the NCCC, established the FEMA Corps in 2012, and its first major deployment to assist in disaster response and recovery efforts was during Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. Figure 1 shows an image of a FEMA Corps member participating in recent FEMA disaster recovery efforts.\nDuring fiscal years 2008 through 2014, the number of individuals that could be deployed as part of FEMA’s disaster response workforce increased from 16,928 personnel in 2008 to 18,449 personnel in 2014— reflecting the incorporation of the two new non-FEMA components, the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. Analysis of its mission and personnel, changes in policies, technology advances, and workforce data are some of the factors FEMA officials use to determine the agency’s composition and staffing levels and the number of individuals needed for the new components of its disaster response workforce. Figure 2 shows FEMA’s combined workforce composition and staffing levels for fiscal years 2008 through 2014.\nSeveral program offices within FEMA play a role in the agency’s workforce planning. At FEMA headquarters, OCCHCO (within the Mission Support Bureau) is responsible for providing leadership and direction to all stakeholders, including FEMA headquarters and regional offices, on human capital programs, products, and services. OCCHCO is also responsible for implementing policies and programs to recruit, hire, train, and retain FEMA’s workforce including guidance and oversight related to morale issues. Within the Office of Response and Recovery, the Incident Workforce Management Division is responsible for the deployment of personnel, the management of the surge capacity forces, disaster response cadre management, and the implementation of FQS. See appendix II for FEMA’s organizational chart, as of January 2015.", "In recent years, we and others have identified long-standing human capital management challenges at FEMA and made a number of recommendations to strengthen the agency’s efforts. FEMA has taken or is planning various actions to address a number of these issues, as outlined below. However, since many of these efforts are ongoing and not yet completed, it is not clear whether they will be effective or the extent to which they will address our prior recommendations and the challenges that we and others have identified.", "Workforce planning has been a long-standing challenge for FEMA, as we have previously reported. In 2007, we reported that FEMA lacked a strategic workforce plan and recommended that FEMA, in responding to strategic workforce planning requirements in the Post-Katrina Act, apply the key principles of strategic workforce planning, such as assessing the number of employees and critical skills that FEMA needs. We also recommended that FEMA define what resources are needed to achieve its disaster relief mission, and collect sufficient data in a way that enables managers to monitor progress and support resource priorities, among other things. In 2008, FEMA implemented our recommendations by issuing a Strategic Human Capital Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2012.\nHowever, that plan did not include performance metrics or identify possible workforce gaps, which are leading practices for strategic workforce planning that we have identified. An OCCHCO official said that staff turnover and other emerging management issues prevented FEMA from subsequently identifying workforce gaps, and developing staffing goals and related metrics. In 2011, we again recommended that FEMA develop a comprehensive workforce plan that meets Post-Katrina Act requirements to identify agency staffing needs and skills requirements.to conduct a baseline assessment of its workforce to inform the agency’s future workforce planning efforts, including the development of a strategic workforce plan for fiscal years 2012 to 2016. However, FEMA did not develop a plan and our recommendation remains unaddressed.\nIn 2012, FEMA said the agency had acquired a contractor In 2012, we also recommended that FEMA identify long-term quantifiable mission-critical goals, establish a time frame for completing the development of quantifiable performance measures, establish lines of authority for agency-wide workforce planning efforts, and develop systematic processes to collect and analyze workforce data. FEMA officials said that the new strategic workforce plan they were developing to cover fiscal years 2012 to 2016 would help address these recommendations. However, FEMA did not issue a new strategic workforce plan. In 2015, FEMA officials identified two ongoing efforts that they believe will address these previously identified challenges and our recommendations—the development of a new incident workforce planning model and a new strategic workforce plan.described in more detail below.\nNew incident workforce planning model—In September 2014, FEMA entered into a contract to develop a new incident workforce planning model to determine the optimal mix of workforce components to include in FEMA’s disaster workforce. a new incident workforce planning model was needed to address changes since the existing workforce model was developed. These changes include current disaster workforce data such as deployment rates of reservists and FEMA’s new disaster workforce components as well as changes in policies, technological advances, and progress in FQS, and the impact of national mitigation efforts. FEMA’s Office of Response and Recovery officials said that the new incident workforce planning model will provide a comprehensive analysis of the workforce FEMA needs to conduct its response, recovery, and mitigation missions including, for example, the required number of reservists, Surge Capacity Force volunteers, COREs, and FEMA Corps members. They said they intend to review and reevaluate the incident workforce model approximately every 3 years to ensure that the workforce is capable of carrying out FEMA’s mission. According to FEMA officials, results of the analyses from the new model were imminent; however, the results were not available at the time we concluded our review in June 2015.\nAccording to FEMA officials, the incident workforce planning model also provides a comprehensive view of staffing requirements based on historical trends of workload by incident type and will be used to determine staffing needs for incidents.\nOCCHCO officials, its forthcoming Human Capital Strategic Plan (HCSP) will address all of the unaddressed workforce-related recommendations from our 2011 and 2012 reports. FEMA’s OCCHCO officials said they planned to issue the plan in September 2015. In the past, we have found that organizations in both the public and private sectors use strategic workforce planning to help ensure they have the capacity to meet both current and future mission requirements. Preparing a strategic workforce plan encourages agency managers and stakeholders to systematically consider what is to be done, what skills will be needed, and how to gauge progress and results. Until FEMA completes its new incident workforce planning model and its strategic workforce plan, we cannot assess their effectiveness or determine whether they will help to address the long- standing workforce challenges we and others have identified.", "Employee credentialing has also been a long-standing challenge for FEMA, as we and others have previously reported. Employee credentialing involves assigning members of FEMA’s workforce with qualification levels and areas of expertise which they can use to assist state and local stakeholders during a disaster. In response to Post- Katrina Act requirements, FEMA launched an agency-wide credentialing effort in June 2008 that officials renamed FQS in 2010. The Incident Workforce Management Division assumed responsibility for the system in June 2011, and FEMA implemented FQS in 2012.use the system to assign and track the various qualifications and expertise of members of FEMA’s workforce.\nIn the five focus groups we conducted from July 2014 through November 2014, participants cited concerns about FEMA’s implementation and management of FQS. Participants said that FEMA officials ignored FQS qualifications and titles when assigning tasks during Hurricane Sandy, issues that were also identified in FEMA’s after-action report on its response to the storm. They said that as a result, some of the managers and participants were deployed without the skills or expertise needed to effectively function in their assigned duties and contribute to disaster response and recovery efforts. Additionally, some participants stated that during Hurricane Sandy, staff did not know their FQS titles or had the wrong FQS title and that they observed that other employees were overqualified or underqualified, based on their training and experience, for the cadre position and qualification level to which they were assigned. FEMA officials noted that, at the time these issues occurred, FQS had been implemented on an agency-wide basis for less than a month and that difficulties in using the newly designed system in the operational environment after Hurricane Sandy were understandable. Nonetheless, employees in our focus groups said these issues have also negatively affected employees’ morale, another long-standing challenge for FEMA, as discussed below.\nThe DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) has also identified various problems in FEMA’s efforts to implement a credentialing system before, during, and after the response to Hurricane Sandy. For example, before Hurricane Sandy, the OIG identified problems in developing an information technology system for implementing FQS in 2012.assessing the agency’s response to Hurricane Sandy, the OIG reported on issues related to misclassified personnel and difficulties in finding In qualified personnel. The DHS OIG has also identified issues with FEMA implementations of FQS in subsequent disasters, noting that FEMA’s reliance on FQS to obtain enough appropriately skilled staff continued to be an ongoing and systemic problem. As a result, the DHS OIG told us it has an ongoing review of FEMA’s implementation of FQS and plans to issue a report later this year.\nFEMA’s strategic plan for 2014-2018 establishes a performance goal to increase the operational readiness and deployability rating of the agency’s workforce to 80 percent or greater by the end of 2018. To achieve this goal, FEMA will need to, among other things, effectively implement its FQS program, to appropriately size, train, and organize its disaster workforce to conduct effective and efficient operations. FEMA’s Incident Workforce Management Division officials said they had established a working group in December 2014 to address issues affecting the effectiveness of the FQS to complement other efforts they had initiated to improve FQS implementation. For example, they established a FEMA Incident Workforce Academy to streamline and standardize training to better ensure that all workforce members received the appropriate training prior to deployment. Resolving the long-standing issues with FEMA credentialing efforts will better position FEMA to implement its national credentialing system. However, because FEMA’s efforts related to improving FQS are ongoing, it is too soon to determine whether they will address challenges experienced.", "Since DHS began operations, in 2003, employee morale has been a long- standing workforce management issue for the department as well as for FEMA. In September 2012, we reported that DHS employees had lower than average morale compared with that of the rest of the federal government, but morale varied across DHS components. FEMA has had consistently lower than average employee morale scores on the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) annual federal employee survey since the agency was transferred to DHS in 2003. In addition, the Partnership for Public Service reported in 2014 that FEMA’s ranking on the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government had declined since 2010, and FEMA ranked 281 out of 315 agency subcomponents in Best Places to Work in the Federal Government in fiscal year 2014.\nParticipants in our focus groups cited a number of concerns contributing to continuing morale issues including FQS credentialing issues and changes to FEMA’s management of the reservist workforce. Specifically, in each of our five focus groups, participants expressed dissatisfaction with the agency’s implementation of FQS and its long-term negative impact on employee morale. Regarding changes to FEMA’s management of the reservist workforce, focus group participants in each of the three regions stated that there were negative impacts on morale when FEMA moved management and oversight responsibilities for the reservist program from FEMA’s 10 regional offices to FEMA headquarters in 2012 because the change eliminated long-standing positive relationships between the reservists and regional staff. FEMA officials said that they made the change in management of the reservist workforce because the prior, decentralized system managed by the regions was dysfunctional, inconsistent, inefficient, and lacked standardization and strategic oversight.\nFEMA’s OCCHCO officials said they have taken a number of steps to address low employee morale. Among other things, they said they provide program officials with a planning tool (the Employee Viewpoint Survey Team Action Planning worksheet) to assist the agency’s managers and supervisors in improving employee morale and increasing satisfaction within their work units. They also said that they established a working group in December 2014 to identify solutions for improving employee morale. Officials said they planned to issue a report sometime in 2015. Given that the working groups, as well as the other initiatives officials described, are ongoing, it is too early to assess whether they will be effective in addressing FEMA’s long-standing morale problems.", "Given the ongoing nature of FEMA’s efforts to address workforce management challenges highlighted above, FEMA’s progress in resolving these challenges hinges on the extent to which officials are able to effectively coordinate and integrate various human capital efforts into a strategic human capital management approach. We have previously reported our concerns regarding the lack of coordination and collaboration among FEMA offices and organizations. For example, we reported in June 2011 that FEMA has much work ahead of it to ensure effective collaboration between program and support offices. In April 2012, we reported that FEMA’s efforts related to workforce planning have been independently conducted by various offices across the agency, concluding that having integrated workforce planning and training could help FEMA ensure that it has the properly sized and skilled workforce to effectively carry out its mission.\nFEMA’s OCCHCO officials told us that the multiple stakeholders responsible for these various human capital efforts have coordinated through an agency executive steering committee to ensure they will be integrated into their broader strategic workforce plan. However, the effectiveness of these coordination efforts remains to be seen. For example, the statement of work for the contractor whom FEMA acquired to support its human capital planning efforts does not specify that FEMA’s ongoing workforce-related initiatives and activities are expected to be integrated into the proposed strategic workforce plan, nor does it indicate how OCCHCO plans to analyze future staffing needs for FEMA’s day-to- day, or steady-state operations. Such an analysis would help FEMA’s agency-wide workforce planning but will not be included in the Incident Workforce Management Division’s new incident workforce planning model. In an August 2012 report commissioned by OCCHCO, the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute found that the existing force planning model considered the FEMA workforce from a response- only perspective and did not consider the workforce requirements to fill any steady-state activities. could provide valuable insights into FEMA’s workforce strategy. According to FEMA officials, they plan to address the issue of steady- state operations for future workforce planning through its executive steering committee to integrate it into the ongoing human capital planning efforts. Given that FEMA’s efforts are ongoing, it is too early to assess their effectiveness in addressing long-standing workforce-related challenges over the long term.\nHomeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, Informing FEMA’s Future Workforce Strategy: FEMA Strategic Workforce Initiative Phase II Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2012).", "", "", "FEMA Corps program attrition has varied from 23 to 28 percent in each recruitment class, or “cohort.” As shown in figure 3, although the FEMA Corps program did not meet its target of less than 25 percent attrition in each of the first four FEMA cohorts of FEMA Corps members, the program met its target for the most recent cohort. According to FEMA officials, the responsibility for retaining FEMA Corps members is shared jointly by FEMA and NCCC. FEMA is primarily responsible for determining the suitability of FEMA Corps members to gain access to FEMA’s facilities and networks. Keeping FEMA Corps members in the program is important because of the costs associated with recruiting, training, and equipping them for deployment, as well as the need for FEMA Corps members to support FEMA’s response, recovery, and preparedness missions.\nTwo of my four deployments did not have enough work for my team. We were often given busy work that had little to no impact on the substantive work at the project sites. Understandably, some of this may have had to do with the unusually light storm season this year. Nevertheless, it left the team (and many of the other Corps members I spoke with) feeling like the FEMA Corps program oversold itself to its applicants. regarding the type of service activities they would be involved in and said the work seemed meaningless or was unfulfilling. For example, some said they would have preferred to provide direct service to disaster areas instead of doing behind-the-scenes administrative and support work in office settings.\nDuring our FEMA Corps focus groups, participants also reported feeling underutilized or having little or no meaningful work during some of their service projects.\nFEMA and NCCC officials said the survey results and our focus group discussions reflected challenges during the initial implementation of the program and the relatively limited number of disasters that occurred in 2013 and 2014. In August 2014, FEMA and NCCC reduced the enrollment number of FEMA Corps members from 1,600 to 1,000 per year to reflect the low number of disasters and resulting challenges with providing enough substantive work for FEMA Corps members. FEMA officials cited this change as an example of the steps they have taken with NCCC to adjust the program to address FEMA Corps members’ satisfaction with the program. They also said they are taking steps to set accurate expectations in advertising, target recruitment efforts, as well as piloting different types of teams to provide members with additional service project opportunities.", "According to FEMA and NCCC officials, failing background investigations is another reason that FEMA Corps members leave before the end of the program. Members failing background investigations also contributed to the program not meeting its retention target. As shown in figure 4, the FEMA Corps security vetting process has three parts. First, applicants who have been selected to join the FEMA Corps undergo initial background screening by both FEMA and NCCC before they arrive on campus. Members who pass these screenings receive FEMA badges and equipment. Second, before deploying to the field, FEMA Corps members are required to complete all necessary information for an OPM Third, while FEMA Corps “public trust” background investigation.members are deployed to the field, OPM conducts the background investigation of members.\nAccording to FEMA officials, FEMA allows members whose background investigations are still pending to have access to FEMA’s facilities and information networks as well as, depending on their project, survivors’ sensitive personal information, such as Social Security numbers. According to FEMA security officials, such security risks are mitigated because all members have undergone preliminary background screening by both FEMA and NCCC. FEMA officials also stated that any members who are found during background investigations to present serious risks are immediately removed from FEMA until the member mitigates the adverse information, if he or she is able to do so.\nAccording to NCCC officials, if FEMA Corps members fail the background investigation and are terminated from the program, members may not receive some or all of the Segal AmeriCorps Education Award, which is a key incentive for completing the program. However, these officials stated that these members may be able to transfer to the traditional AmeriCorps NCCC program, if positions are available. During FEMA Corps focus groups, participants commented on the disruption to teams when members are terminated from the program.\nDuring a focus group with all four of FEMA’s liaisons to the five NCCC regional campuses, liaisons stated that the cost and duration of the security process pose a significant threat to the program’s ability to retain FEMA Corps members.\nFEMA officials stated it would be desirable to require members to submit this information earlier, such as during the selection phase, which would allow FEMA to begin processing background investigations up to 4 months earlier than the officials currently do.such changes to the security vetting process would be possible if they were implemented in a phased pilot approach and the program accepted or mitigated potential risks, such as higher costs for background investigations for applicants who are not selected and member recruitment challenges. FEMA and NCCC officials said they have had discussions about modifying the security vetting process to minimize the disruptions resulting from failed background checks and FEMA is considering piloting changes to have team leaders complete background investigations earlier in the process. According to NCCC officials, by making it possible for incoming FEMA Corps members to complete the information needed for the background investigation before members arrive on campus, OPM could arrange for investigators to conduct background investigation interviews of members while they are on campus rather than after they have been deployed.", "FEMA has not met its goals for recruiting volunteers for the Surge Capacity Force. FEMA has a goal of staffing the Surge Capacity Force with 15,400 volunteers. As shown in figure 5, according to FEMA officials, in January 2015, the Surge Capacity Force had 4,033 volunteers, and, as of March 2015, one of the eight participating DHS components met the enrollment target of 7 percent of the eligible workforce.\nDuring focus groups with all eight DHS component program coordinators, participants identified challenges related to FEMA’s management of the program. The groups agreed in general that DHS components will not be able to meet recruitment goals without additional resources, guidance, marketing, and senior DHS and FEMA leadership engagement to help recruit and manage additional Surge Capacity Force volunteers. All the coordinators reported that their position was a collateral duty.\nAccording to the Surge Capacity Force Concept of Operations, a baseline level of staffing for the Surge Capacity Force to respond to program requirements is 15,400 personnel. However, FEMA officials said they do not have a strategy or plan for how they plan to increase the number of volunteers because they believe this is the responsibility of the other DHS components. However, an August 2012 Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute report, commissioned by FEMA to support the agency’s workforce planning efforts, reported that “many federal agencies have their own protocols that must be followed in the event of a national-level disaster, and other agency staff may not be available for deployment. Careful advanced planning with partner agencies may ensure that staff is available for the surge capacity.” In addition, the report said, “it would be helpful to identify where surge employees will come from and what their level of availability will be. . . . . Understanding the availability rate of surge employees could ensure that FEMA has a sufficient surge force when needed.” While FEMA officials said that they could fill the volunteer shortfall by having DHS components designate their employees to be part of the Surge Capacity Force, they said this would not take place until needed during a disaster. As a result, employees specifically designated for a disaster may not be ready to deploy within 48 hours of no-notice activation, as required by program guidance, because they may not have been trained on their agency’s travel procedures or possess a valid government travel credit card. Because FEMA can increase the number of potentially available Surge Capacity Force volunteers before a disaster strikes, FEMA’s reliance on the designation option increases the risk that FEMA may not have a sufficient Surge Capacity Force when needed during a disaster.\nOur work on leading strategic workforce planning practices calls for agency leaders to develop workforce plans, implement recruitment and retention strategies, and measure their effects. These leading practices on collaboration state that agencies should identify and address needs by leveraging resources, agree on roles and responsibilities, establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, and reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports.\nGiven that the deployment of FEMA’s disaster workforce to Hurricane Sandy nearly exhausted the number of available personnel, the lack of a recruitment plan or strategy for how to increase Surge Capacity Force staffing to reach targets may limit the capacity of FEMA’s disaster workforces to support response efforts in the event of a disaster. Because the Surge Capacity Force has a key role in augmenting FEMA’s workforce in catastrophic disasters, having such a plan or strategy to strengthen recruitment efforts would help ensure that FEMA has the information it needs to identify the availability of Surge Capacity Force volunteers needed to fully support its efforts.", "", "FEMA does not collect or consider data on all of the costs associated with implementing the FEMA Corps program, although the low per capita cost of employing FEMA Corps members was a primary justification for establishing the program. FEMA has estimated that it will cost about $100 million to implement the FEMA Corps program over 5 years, from 2012 through 2017, and the final cost depends on factors such as member enrollment, attrition, and housing costs, among others. While this cost estimate accounts for NCCC’s costs of recruiting, selecting, and deploying FEMA Corps members, FEMA officials said they do not collect or account for data on all of FEMA’s costs of implementing the program or its costs for conducting background investigations of program participants.\nFirst, FEMA does not collect data on the salaries and expenses of the staff in FEMA’s 10 regions who are responsible for developing requests for FEMA Corps teams, providing on-the-job training to the teams, and supervising teams on a day-to-day basis. According to the FEMA Corps Branch Chief in February 2015, on average, about 10 FEMA Corps teams per month were operating in each of FEMA’s 10 regions in 2014. FEMA Corps project sponsors in 1 FEMA region we visited reported that each of its teams working out of the regional office has one or more regional office staff supervisors.\nIn addition, although FEMA collects data on the costs of background investigations for FEMA Corps members, it does not collect data on the costs of staff to process them, and does not include either of these costs in the per capita cost of employing FEMA Corps members. These costs may be substantial as, according to FEMA officials, the program has had between 756 and 1,045 new FEMA Corps members each year, and a background investigation must be conducted on the new members. According to FEMA officials, depending on the projects to which members are assigned, the cost of these background investigations can range from about $1,000 per member for the moderate-risk background investigation to more than $3,600 per member for the full background investigation. These costs could increase the per capita cost of members by up to 10 percent. According to FEMA officials, from October 2013 through April 2015, FEMA conducted background investigations for 1,507 FEMA Corps members at a cost of about $2.2 million. According to FEMA officials, it has reduced the number of FEMA Corps members subject to the full background investigation for fiscal year 2015 after researching job functions to which members were generally assigned. However, as the program provides additional opportunities for members to engage in projects, such as information technology projects, which require the more expensive full background investigation, the cost of these background investigations is likely to increase in the future.\nAccording to Office of Management and Budget guidance, in order to promote efficient resource allocation through well-informed decision making, agencies should identify comprehensive estimates of the expected benefits and costs in analyses used to support decisions to expand programs. These analyses should also consider alternative means of achieving program objectives by examining different program scales and different methods of provision. In addition, the best practices we have identified on program cost estimating and assessment state that reliable cost information is required to know whether government programs are achieving their goals and what the costs are.\nFEMA officials said they consider their own management costs and the background investigation costs for FEMA Corps members to be part of their regular operating costs and therefore do not have a system in place to estimate or capture these costs for any management analysis. They said it was not feasible to determine the exact proportion of costs for staff and other expenses that are attributable to the FEMA Corps program because of the wide range and variance in staff and other resources used to support the program in FEMA headquarters and regional offices. However, by estimating the number of staff used to manage FEMA Corps teams in the field and the proportion of their time spent on FEMA Corps oversight and management, FEMA could use assumptions regarding the proportion of costs for staff and other expenses and validate them with relevant stakeholders. Further, the full costs of background investigations are directly attributable to the FEMA Corps program. Complete cost information on the FEMA Corps program would inform FEMA’s decision making on allocation of its disaster workforce resources and help program officials determine the extent to which the program is achieving the significant cost savings that was a primary goal and justification for establishing the program.", "When estimating total costs of managing and implementing the Surge Capacity Force, FEMA does not collect or consider data on all of the costs associated with implementing the Surge Capacity Force. While FEMA collects information on its own costs of managing the program, officials said they do not collect data on the costs incurred by DHS components in managing the program and deploying staff during disasters or annual deployment mobilization exercises. For example, when reporting its costs for managing the Surge Capacity Force program in 2014—about $1.2 million—FEMA included salaries of FEMA Surge Capacity Force program management staff and program support staff, as well as printing costs and reimbursable expenses to DHS components for travel, lodging, per diem, and any overtime during an annual mobilization exercise. In addition, according to FEMA human capital officials, when collecting information on the costs of managing and deploying the Surge Capacity Force during Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts, the costs collected included reimbursable expenses incurred by these employees for travel, per diem, lodging, and any overtime expenses. According to FEMA’s Incident Workforce Management Division officials, the total reimbursement cost for Surge Capacity Force volunteers during Hurricane Sandy was about $14.2 million.\nHowever, FEMA does not collect or consider data on other costs to DHS components, related to the Surge Capacity Force, that are not reimbursed by FEMA. These costs include the salaries and benefits of volunteers when deployed for disasters or annual mobilization exercises, the costs of coordinators in each DHS component to recruit and manage volunteers, or any overtime paid to other employees to backfill positions vacant when volunteers are deployed for disasters or exercises. For example, seven DHS components deployed employees for up to 45 days during Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts. These components paid the salaries and benefits of these employees during their deployment. According to FEMA officials, the costs to DHS components of deploying employees to disasters as part of the Surge Capacity Force vary. For example, the salary associated with deploying a highly-graded technical or professional employee could be twice as much as deploying an employee working in another sector within DHS.\nDuring focus groups, Surge Capacity Force program coordinators at DHS components said that staffing costs are a consideration when DHS components determine which categories of their employees are eligible to volunteer for the Surge Capacity Force and when supervisors in DHS components approve their direct reports to volunteer and deploy as part of the Surge Capacity Force. However, FEMA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer officials stated they do not consider the costs to DHS components in supporting the program because FEMA is not responsible for reimbursing DHS components for these costs. We requested information from the DHS Office of the Chief Financial Officer to determine whether DHS collected any information on the department- wide costs associated with implementing the program and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer official referred us back to FEMA as the department’s lead agency for managing the program. The costs to DHS components when deploying their employees for Surge Capacity Force may not be a direct cost to FEMA, but they are costs attributable to the government’s overall management and implementation of the Surge Capacity Force as a program. For example, the costs of deploying volunteer DHS employees include the opportunity cost of time that deployed employees could otherwise spend carrying out their routine duties.\nAs discussed previously, according to Office of Management and Budget guidance, agencies should identify comprehensive estimates of the expected benefits and costs in analyses used to support decisions to expand programs. In addition, the best practices we have identified on program cost estimating and assessment state that reliable cost information is required to know whether government programs are achieving their goals and what the costs are.\nThe FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force have the potential to help FEMA achieve its mission at a lower cost, but tracking and reporting the full costs of deploying and managing these disaster workforce components would help FEMA better assess actual cost savings resulting from the programs and determine the most cost-effective size and mix of FEMA’s disaster workforce and its deployment to disasters. Complete cost information on the Surge Capacity Force would also help FEMA determine whether the total number and the mix of Surge Capacity Force volunteers who participated in the program and deployed during Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts was cost-effective. Additionally, more comprehensive and accurate cost information on both workforce components could help inform ongoing discussions regarding FEMA’s efforts—in the case of the Surge Capacity Force—to expand the program outside of DHS to other federal agencies, and FEMA’s decision—in the case of FEMA Corps—whether to renew or modify the interagency agreement it has with NCCC to administer the FEMA Corps program, which expires in February 2017.", "", "FEMA does not have complete measures to assess its progress in meeting program goals—for example, the goal of having FEMA Corps graduates gain employment in emergency management careers, such as with FEMA. FEMA also does not have a measure to assess the FEMA Corps program’s primary goal of enhancing FEMA’s disaster response efforts, or the Surge Capacity Force’s goal of deploying a sufficient number of qualified personnel to disasters. For example, FEMA officials said they do not report on the number of FEMA Corps teams that are assigned to service projects specific to a declared disaster compared with the number of teams assigned to non-disaster-specific service projects. For the Surge Capacity Force, FEMA does not report the numbers of volunteers needed and available during a disaster to highlight any potential gaps in the ability of the Surge Capacity Force to meet its program goals.\nAdditionally, FEMA does not collect complete and reliable data necessary for FEMA to assess FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force program performance. For example, although the FEMA Corps program has a retention goal of 75 percent, NCCC officials, who are responsible for tracking these data, were unable to determine the number of FEMA Corps members who left the program because of failed background investigations because these data are not systematically collected. Further, FEMA and NCCC officials provided us different numbers of members who left because of failed background investigations, and were unable to account for differences between the sets of data. As described earlier, to measure whether members experienced personal growth and development during their terms of service, NCCC conducts member exit surveys, but these surveys do not include responses from FEMA Corps members who did not graduate from the program (about 23 to 28 percent of 2,710 total program participants). In addition, the 2013 NCCC survey of FEMA Corps project sponsors to assess whether FEMA Corps teams helped meet their needs had a response rate of 34 percent, which is far below the 80 percent standard response rate for surveys as outlined by FEMA’s performance data on the Office of Management and Budget.the Surge Capacity Force program also were not complete or reliable. FEMA officials said they did not collect data on the number of volunteers deployed for Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts who left their deployments early. While FEMA conducted a postdeployment survey of Surge Capacity Force volunteers who deployed for Hurricane Sandy response and recovery efforts for the program’s after-action report, the resulting data are not generalizable because the survey had a response rate of 13 percent. According to FEMA officials, for those staff who did respond, FEMA did not collect data on the reasons why 23 percent of these survey respondents indicated they would not deploy with the Surge Capacity Force for a future event.\nAccording to the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for Program Management, agencies should develop meaningful measures to monitor program performance and to track the accomplishment of the program’s goals and objectives. Additionally, The Standard for Program Management states that in monitoring programs, agencies should collect, measure, and disseminate performance information and analyze program trends, so that program managers can determine the program’s state and trends, and point to areas in need of adjustment. Regarding the Surge Capacity Force postdeployment surveys, according to Office of Management and Budget guidance, agencies must design surveys to achieve the highest practical rates of response, and nonresponse bias analyses must be conducted when response rates or other factors suggest there is a potential for bias to occur.\nFEMA officials said they had not yet established comprehensive performance measures or collected reliable performance data for the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs because they are new programs that are still being developed. However, the FEMA Corps program was announced in March 2012, more than 3 years ago, and DHS established the Surge Capacity Force program in April 2010, more than 5 years ago. In addition, although FEMA and NCCC identified some FEMA Corps program performance measures in August 2014, during our review, as of February 2015, the FEMA Corps Branch Chief is considering potential new measures for FEMA. Developing performance measures that reflect all program goals would help FEMA assess the overall effectiveness of the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs and hold program officials accountable for meeting all program goals and ensuring the appropriate use of its resources. With regard to collecting complete and reliable performance data, FEMA’s managers of the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs agreed that such data collection is essential for proper program management and stated that they may take steps to gather such information in the future, but did not have specific plans to do so. Without collecting complete and reliable data to help assess the performance of the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs, FEMA lacks assurance that its workforce components are meeting desired objectives and goals.", "FEMA does not have a system in place to assess FEMA Corps teams’ performance in contributing to FEMA’s disaster response, recovery, and preparedness missions. FEMA staff request FEMA Corps teams by submitting service project requests to NCCC identifying the tasks and goals associated with the disaster deployment or project. Service projects may include Stafford Act–related disaster response or recovery activities, as well as preparedness activities and include activities such as registering survivors in the field on tablet computers, answering phones at national call centers, and performing data entry and general administrative duties. Once a team’s project is completed, FEMA Corps team leaders complete project completion reports that describe the tasks and accomplishments.\nHowever, FEMA does not have a system in place to compare the service project requests and the corresponding project completion reports to assess whether the goals of the requests were met. We reviewed service project requests and project completion reports from 2012 through 2014 that FEMA and NCCC provided and determined that they were completed with varying amounts of detail and project identification information, such as project or disaster declaration codes, which made it unfeasible to match corresponding requests and completion reports for comparison. FEMA and NCCC officials agreed that the limitations in the way the data were documented and collected made comparison of the records very difficult. During our review, FEMA and NCCC issued program guidance in August 2014 that called for both agencies to collaborate on the development of a standard system to share information. In April 2015, FEMA and NCCC officials said they were manually matching corresponding records and they intended to complete this effort in May 2015. In addition, as a longer-term project, FEMA and NCCC officials said they were developing an automated system that would enable NCCC and FEMA to more easily evaluate project completion reports against the objectives in the service project requests. Officials said they intended to complete this automated system in 2016. However, when we requested the project plans for these efforts, NCCC and FEMA officials could not provide any documentation, such as meeting minutes, agendas, budgets, or documentation of expected time frames, related to either their reconciliation efforts or the development of the automated information technology system.\nFEMA Corps program guidance establishes that the success of the program will be measured by the completion of meaningful and measurable service projects during FEMA deployments. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government suggests that information should be recorded and communicated to management and others within the entity who need it, and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. Such internal control responsibilities include routine evaluations of program and employee performance through FEMA Corps service projects. Further, according to best practices for project management, the development of a project management plan—which defines how the project is executed, monitored, and controlled—is a key element of project management. Best practices also call for the development of milestone dates, among other factors, in carrying out a project successfully.\nGiven the importance of evaluating FEMA Corps teams’ performance in meeting the needs of service project requests, developing a plan, with milestones, to create an automated information technology system or process to efficiently compare project completion reports against their initial service project requests would better position FEMA Corps managers to carry out such performance evaluations. Being able to conduct these performance evaluations would also better enable FEMA to identify any necessary changes to the program to maximize the utility of FEMA Corps teams and the FEMA Corps program as a component of its disaster workforce.", "Since 2007, we have highlighted the need for FEMA to develop a strategic workforce plan that encompasses goals, performance metrics, and other key aspects of workforce management. According to FEMA’s OCCHCO officials, the agency has various efforts ongoing to address long-standing workforce management challenges and open recommendations, including its incident workforce planning model and its HCSP. However, the success of these efforts will hinge on FEMA’s ability to successfully coordinate them and to integrate various other workforce- related efforts involving FEMA’s employee credentialing system and employee morale into a broader strategy on workforce management. Regarding FEMA’s newest disaster workforce components—developing a plan or strategy to improve recruitment efforts for the Surge Capacity Force could help FEMA identify the availability of resources that could help it reach its staffing goals for the program and respond effectively to disasters. Further, collecting and accounting for total costs associated with managing both the FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force programs will better position DHS to compare the benefits of the programs against the level of resources invested in these programs. FEMA also does not have the performance measures, data, and system to adequately assess the programs’ progress and ensure they are meeting stated program goals. Establishing performance measures for all stated program goals and collecting complete and reliable data—such as the number of members who leave the program because of failed background investigations, and working with NCCC to develop a plan, with milestones, to create an automated system by which FEMA Corps managers can assess FEMA Corps project completion reports against the initial service project requests—are actions that will better position FEMA managers to evaluate the program.", "To better enable DHS to meet its Surge Capacity Force staffing goals and improve its capacity for disaster response, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to develop a plan or strategy for improving recruitment efforts.\nTo better position DHS to evaluate the effective use of its resources and to ensure that DHS is aware of the total costs of administering and managing the FEMA Corps, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to collect and account for all costs associated with this new workforce, including the costs of background checks and staff time spent managing FEMA Corps teams.\nTo better position DHS to evaluate the effective use of its resources and to ensure that DHS is aware of the total costs of administering and managing the Surge Capacity Force, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to collect and account for all costs associated with this new workforce, including the costs of employee salaries and benefits of Surge Capacity Force volunteers when deployed.\nTo better enable FEMA to track and evaluate the performance of the FEMA Corps program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to establish performance measures for all program goals, such as the rates of employment among program graduates in the emergency management field, and the rates of deployment of FEMA Corps members during disaster response; collect complete and reliable program performance data, such as tracking the number of FEMA Corps members who leave the program early for failing background investigations, and obtaining survey responses from as many participants of the FEMA Corps as possible, including those who have left the program or not graduated; and develop, in conjunction with NCCC, a plan, with milestones, to create an automated system or process by which managers can assess project completion reports against service project requests.\nTo better enable FEMA to track and evaluate the performance of the Surge Capacity Force program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to: establish performance measures for all program goals, such as the rates of deployment of Surge Capacity Force members during disaster response; and collect complete and reliable program performance data, such as obtaining survey responses from as many participants of the Surge Capacity Force as possible.", "We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FEMA for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to address them. FEMA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWith regard to our first recommendation, for FEMA to develop a plan or strategy for improving recruitment efforts, DHS stated that by using staffing requirements developed during the Force Structure review, the Surge Capacity Force program will work with the DHS components to establish recruiting priorities and metrics for Tier 3 volunteers in order to In coordination with the DHS components, improve recruitment efforts.DHS will also develop a communication strategy to ensure the dissemination of information to DHS employees outlining the benefits of volunteering in the Surge Capacity Force program. DHS estimated that all of these efforts would be completed on or before March 31, 2016. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.\nWith regard to our second and third recommendations, for FEMA to collect and account for all costs associated with the new workforce components, DHS stated that the department will work with FEMA’s Office of the Chief Security Officer and Surge Capacity Force program, respectively, to identify all costs associated with managing its two new disaster response workforce components—FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force. For example, regarding FEMA Corps, DHS stated that it will identify the costs related to processing security background checks. For the Surge Capacity Force program, DHS stated that the program will request and compile salary and benefit information of Surge Capacity Force volunteers from the various DHS components. DHS estimated that all of the efforts would be completed on or before April 30, 2016. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendations.\nWith regard to our fourth recommendation, for FEMA to track and evaluate the performance of the FEMA Corps program, DHS stated that the FEMA Corps program will work with NCCC to develop mechanisms to better track and evaluate the performance of the program. For example, the FEMA Corps will work with NCCC to develop an exit survey for all FEMA Corps members, including those that leave the program early and will monitor results for continuous improvement. The estimated completion date for all of the efforts is December 31, 2016. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.\nWith regard to our fifth recommendation to track and evaluate the performance of the Surge Capacity Force program, DHS stated that the program will develop an exit survey for all Surge Capacity Force volunteers and request the support of all DHS components in gathering responses and establish a performance target for availability of Surge Capacity Force volunteers to deploy if activated. DHS estimated that all of the efforts would be completed on or before July 31, 2016. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.", "The objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken steps to address long-standing challenges in managing its workforce, and (2) these challenges affected FEMA’s deployment and management of its new disaster workforce components—the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps.\nTo address the first objective, we identified FEMA’s long-standing challenges in managing its workforce by reviewing GAO’s prior work on FEMA and FEMA’s after-action reports on its response to Hurricane Sandy. To assess the extent to which FEMA has taken steps to address these challenges, we reviewed documentation that describes FEMA’s workforce planning and management efforts, such as the FEMA Strategic Plan 2014-2018, the statement of work for the contract for FEMA’s updated strategic workforce management plan (expected to be finalized in September 2015), and the statement of work for FEMA’s contract for its new incident workforce planning model—expected imminently, pending final approval. We interviewed officials from the Office of the Chief Component Human Capital Officer (OCCHCO), the Incident Workforce Management Office, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, and the Office of Policy and Program Analysis to discuss FEMA’s progress in addressing GAO’s open recommendations and implementing the initiatives identified in FEMA’s Strategic Human Capital Plan, 2008-2012. We also discussed the extent to which these initiatives and GAO’s leading practices in human capital planning will be included in the updated strategic workforce management plan and integrated into FEMA’s workforce planning efforts. To assess FEMA’s implementation of the FEMA Qualification System (FQS), we interviewed officials from FEMA’s Incident Workforce Management Division. We also reviewed FEMA’s Hurricane Sandy After-Action Report to identify the agency’s progress and challenges faced with FQS during response and recovery efforts for Hurricane Sandy. To help assess the extent to which FEMA is experiencing employee morale issues, we reviewed findings of the Partnership for Public Service, which ranked the best places to work in the federal government for fiscal years 2010 through 2014—the 5 most recent years for which data were available. We also interviewed OCCHCO officials to obtain information on the agency’s progress and challenges with addressing employee morale issues.\nAs shown in table 1, to obtain the views of FEMA’s disaster workforce on FEMA’s challenges in managing its workforce, we conducted 23 focus group sessions with a total of 136 participants from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA, and the AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC).\nTo obtain regional perspectives on FEMA’s disaster workforce on FEMA’s workforce planning and management efforts, we conducted focus groups with Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (CORE) and Permanent Full-Time (PFT) employees at 3 of FEMA’s 10 regions (Regions II, IV, and VI). We selected the 3 regions based on factors including geographic dispersion and regions that typically respond to different types of disasters. These sessions involved small-group discussions designed to gain more in-depth information about issues COREs and PFTs face. Discussions were guided by a moderator who used a list of discussion topics to encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences as COREs or PFTs. Specifically, discussion topics included experiences while being deployed to Hurricane Sandy or other disasters, job differences during deployments and steady-state conditions, likelihood of deployments, whether every employee is an emergency manager, FQS implementation, force structure, training, policies and procedures, communication, perspectives of other employee groups, employee morale, and changes at FEMA; however, not all topics were discussed in each group. Each focus group involved four to eight COREs or PFTs. There were two types of focus groups based on whether employees were deployed to Hurricane Sandy response efforts. The participants were chosen from a random sample of the entire universe of eligible participants at each region. We excluded supervisors from selection to allow participants to speak freely. Selected individuals who were not available for the focus groups were replaced with randomly selected alternates, to the extent possible. We completed written summaries of each focus group, and used qualitative analysis software to categorize responses and identify common themes across the focus groups, using appropriate checks to ensure accuracy. The results of these focus groups are not generalizable. However, the views we obtained from them provided us with valuable examples of CORE and PFT experiences.\nTo address the second objective, we selected the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs for review because these new disaster workforces were deployed for the first time during Hurricane Sandy, the nation’s most recent catastrophic disaster. We also selected these workforces for review because they are jointly managed by agencies outside of FEMA and they consist of non-FEMA employees who are funded by the Disaster Relief Fund. To examine the retention and recruitment challenges of these programs, we reviewed program documentation, such as the Surge Capacity Force Concept of Operations, and NCCC surveys of FEMA Corps member graduating classes. We also interviewed officials with FEMA, NCCC, DHS headquarters, and DHS components about program staffing challenges. We reviewed FEMA Corps program data on the number of FEMA Corps members who left the program because of failed background investigations from September 2012 through March 2015, but we determined that these data were not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We compared the information we gathered against our leading practices on collaboration and strategic workforce planning. To examine the extent to which these programs collect complete cost information, we reviewed program documentation, such as the FEMA Corps Business Case, and interviewed officials with FEMA, NCCC, DHS headquarters, and DHS components responsible for implementing and supporting the Surge Capacity Force and FEMA Corps programs. We compared the information we gathered against Office of Management and Budget guidance on cost-benefit analyses and our best practices on program cost estimating and assessment.of these workforces, we reviewed program documentation, such as the FEMA Corps Implementation Plan, and Surge Capacity Force postdeployment surveys. We also interviewed officials with FEMA, NCCC, DHS headquarters, and DHS components about performance management for both programs. We intended to review FEMA Corps service project requests and corresponding project completion reports from September 2014 through November 2014, but as we discuss in the report, the records could not be reliably compared. As a result, we could not report on the number of service projects completed by FEMA Corps teams or the extent to which the goals of service projects have been accomplished by FEMA Corps teams. We visited two FEMA regions and one FEMA region via teleconference to interview FEMA officials responsible for requesting and managing FEMA Corps teams in the field To examine the performance and, as discussed later, to conduct focus groups of FEMA Corps team leaders and members. We compared the information we gathered against standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, program management best practices, program guidance, and Office of Management and Budget guidance on surveys.\nTo obtain perspectives on FEMA’s management of its new disaster workforces—FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force—we conducted focus groups with all four of FEMA’s liaisons to the five NCCC regional campuses and all eight DHS component Surge Capacity Force coordinators. These sessions involved small-group discussions designed to gain more in-depth information about recruitment and retention issues in the FEMA Corps and Surge Capacity Force programs. Discussions were guided by a moderator who used a list of discussion topics to encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences. Specifically, discussion topics included implementation, management, deployment, recruitment, and retention issues; however, not all topics were discussed in each group. We completed written summaries of each focus group, and used qualitative analysis software to categorize responses and identify common themes across the focus groups, using appropriate checks to ensure accuracy. The results of these focus groups of all four FEMA’s liaisons to the five NCCC regional campuses and all eight DHS component Surge Capacity Force coordinators represent the entire populations.\nIn addition, to obtain perspectives of participants in the FEMA Corps program, we conducted focus groups with FEMA Corps team leaders and members at FEMA Regions II, IV, and VI. These sessions involved small- group discussions designed to gain more in-depth information about participant experiences in the FEMA Corps program. Discussions were guided by a moderator who used a list of discussion topics to encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences. Specifically, discussion topics included implementation, management, deployment, recruitment, and retention issues; however, not all topics were discussed in each group. Both focus groups with FEMA Corps team leaders involved three team leaders each. Each focus group with FEMA Corps members involved eight members from two or more teams in a region. The participants were chosen from a random sample of the entire universe of eligible participants at each region. We completed written summaries of each focus group, and used qualitative analysis software to categorize responses and identify common themes across the focus groups, using appropriate checks to ensure accuracy. The results of these focus groups are not generalizable. However, the views we obtained from them provided us with valuable examples of experiences of participants in the FEMA Corps program.\nWe conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to June 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact above, Christopher A. Keisling (Assistant Director); Frederick Lyles, Jr. (Analyst-in-Charge); Carla N. Argueta; Chuck Bausell; Billy Commons, III; Eric Hauswirth; Susan Hsu; Tracey King; Marc N. Meyer; Luis E. Rodriguez; Cynthia Saunders; and Michelle Su all made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_title", "h2_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_title", "", "", "h1_full", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "h1_full", "", "h0_full h3_full h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What characterizes FEMA's attempt to improve its workforce management?", "What other challenges has GAO identified in FEMA's workplace?", "What has GAO recommended FEMA do to address workplace issues?", "How has FEMA responded to these recommendations?", "What challenges does FEMA face with regards to the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps?", "How would developing a volunteer increase plan benefit FEMA?", "To what extent does FEMA collect cost information?", "Why would it be in FEMA's best interest to collect such information?", "What accounts for FEMA's failure to collect performance data?", "Why would it benefit FEMA to collect performance data?", "How has FEMA's total workforce changes from 2005 to 2014?", "What kinds of employees does FEMA use?", "What new components did FEMA introduce in 2012?", "What issues arose for FEMA during Hurricane Sandy?", "What was GAO asked to examine about FEMA?", "What does GAO's report address about FEMA?", "What types of documents did GAO review for their report?", "What interview data did GAO collect?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is taking steps to address various long-standing workforce management challenges identified by GAO. Since 2007, GAO has found that FEMA faced challenges in completing and integrating its strategic workforce planning efforts.", "GAO has also identified other workforce challenges at FEMA, including low employee morale.", "As a result, GAO recommended that FEMA develop a plan that identifies workforce gaps and includes performance metrics for monitoring progress.", "FEMA has not yet resolved these challenges and fully addressed GAO's workforce-related recommendations but, according to agency officials, plans to do so through several efforts:", "FEMA faces challenges in implementing and managing its two new workforce components: the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps. For example, as of January 2015, the Surge Capacity Force was at 26 percent of its staffing target of 15,400 personnel, and FEMA does not have a plan for how it will increase the number of volunteers to meet its goals.", "Developing such a plan would help ensure that the Surge Capacity Force has a sufficient number of personnel available to support FEMA's efforts.", "Further, GAO found that FEMA does not collect full cost information, including the costs of FEMA Corps background investigations and the salaries and benefits of Surge Capacity Force volunteers who are paid by DHS components while they are deployed.", "Collecting this information would help provide a more accurate accounting of the cost of conducting both programs.", "Further, FEMA does not assess all aspects of program performance because it does not have performance measures that correspond to all program goals. The agency also does not collect reliable performance data, or have an automated system for comparing performance against FEMA Corps project goals.", "Doing so would better enable FEMA to assess whether it is meeting its program goals.", "FEMA's total workforce increased by about 144 percent—7,558 to 18,449 employees—from fiscal year 2005 to September 2014.", "FEMA historically has relied on both permanent and temporary disaster-related employees to respond to presidentially declared disasters.", "In 2012, FEMA deployed two new components to its disaster response workforce—the DHS Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps.", "However, an after-action report from Hurricane Sandy indicated that FEMA exhausted its staff resources during its response and that FEMA faced additional challenges related to its disaster response workforce.", "GAO was asked to examine FEMA's efforts to manage its current and future workforce needs.", "This report addresses (1) FEMA's actions to address long-standing workforce challenges, and (2) the challenges that have affected FEMA's new disaster workforce components.", "GAO reviewed after-action reports, strategic plans, and program documentation for FEMA Corps and the Surge Capacity Force.", "GAO also interviewed agency officials and conducted 23 nongeneralizable focus groups with members of FEMA's workforce who provided important insights." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 4, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_R42636	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "The Human Capital Approach", "The Jobs Analysis Approach", "Methodological Considerations", "Summaries of Recent Studies", "The Congressional Budget Office", "Methodology", "Findings", "The President's Pay Agent", "Methodology", "Findings", "Other Studies", "The Heritage Foundation", "The American Enterprise Institute", "The Cato Institute", "Overall Considerations" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "In recent years, there has been significant congressional interest in compensation of the federal workforce. The increased interest has been driven at least in part by the federal fiscal situation and in part by the state of the economy since the recession began in 2007. Issues related to the compensation of federal employees often center on the pay differential between federal workers and their private sector counterparts. For years, the annual President's Pay Agent (PPA) study, which is covered in greater detail later in this report, has shown a large wage penalty for federal workers compared to private sector workers in similar occupations. A spate of recent studies, which use a different analytical approach and data sources, has partially contradicted the findings of the PPA study by concluding that at least some federal workers enjoy a wage premium over comparable private sector workers. These studies and accompanying reporting on the comparison of compensation of federal workers to private sector workers provide an indication of the disparate findings, which makes it difficult to determine how compensation of federal employees actually compares to that of workers in the private sector. This report attempts to clarify why the recent studies have arrived at different conclusions and examines limitations of the approaches employed in the different studies.\nBased on the review of studies considered in this report, it appears there is no single study that addresses the question of compensation comparability using a widely agreed-upon methodology. That is not to say individual studies are not methodologically sound (some are), but rather that the questions asked and the assumptions made are not necessarily the same across studies, which at times arrive at vastly different conclusions. Any modeling of the relationship between the compensation of federal and private sector workers involves making assumptions, which in turn influence the results. Some assumptions are conceptual (e.g., should \"job security\" count as a \"benefit?\"), while others are empirical (e.g., what is the most appropriate model specification for the underlying data structure?). Finally, there are data limitations that prevent, or at least seriously curtail, researchers from specifying models as fully as possible. For example, there is not a dataset available at this time that allows an analyst to combine detailed characteristics of individual workers and detailed characteristics of jobs performed in the federal and private sectors.\nThere have been several attempts in recent years to address the issue of compensation between the federal workforce and the private-sector workforce. In evaluating claims about federal pay, there appear to be two basic approaches to comparing compensation in the federal and private-sector workforces—the human capital approach and the jobs analysis approach. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive but may be difficult to combine given data limitations. In addition, the two approaches could even produce opposite results. Each approach is outlined below, followed by an examination of a few recent studies comparing federal and private sector compensation. The studies reviewed were chosen because they are official government studies (President's Pay Agent, Congressional Budget Office) or have received significant attention in policy debates.", "The \"human capital\" approach attempts to account for (control) as many observable characteristics of individual workers as possible that are known to affect individual compensation. When workers with similar observable characteristics are compared, some of the residual differences in an outcome (e.g., earnings) may be attributed to that individual's sector of work and some of the differences may be unexplained, in part because certain individual characteristics cannot be quantified and modeled. Literature on human capital and wages has shown that various forms of human capital, such as educational attainment, job tenure, and credentialing, are positively associated with earnings. Other things being equal, higher levels of certain human capital are associated with higher individual earnings. Other individual characteristics, such as age, sex, and race, tend to affect earnings as well. Human capital approaches do not necessarily justify the impact of some characteristics on earnings but merely incorporate as many explanatory variables in a model as necessary to isolate the effect of the variable of interest, which is sector of employment in the case of federal compensation studies.\nStudies using a human capital model typically try to capture as many characteristics of individuals as possible to explain earnings. Because of the need to build models based on individual characteristics, data sources for human capital models are typically household surveys, such as the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS), which provides extensive self-reported demographic and economic data.\nThe Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study reviewed in this report, as well as studies from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation (Heritage), use the human capital approach to compare compensation of workers in the federal and private sectors.", "The \"jobs analysis\" approach focuses on comparing the compensation for similar jobs, based on the actual duties and responsibilities of jobs in different sectors. In this approach, an attempt is made to match comparable jobs in different sectors rather than comparable workers in those sectors. The pay differential is then typically attributed to the pay structures in the different sectors, with the assumption that pay should be equal for equal work, regardless of individual worker traits.\nComparing occupation to occupation is an important control in studies of wage differentials. Ideally, a comparison would match federal jobs with jobs in the private sector having identical tasks, responsibilities, skill requirements, and levels of complexity. In practice, this level of job matching may be difficult to achieve, in large part because of data limitations. Available data often make it difficult to look beyond broad occupational categories. This can be a serious limitation, particularly when it comes to trying to gauge actual responsibilities and actual job tasks. Using broad occupational categories, such as \"manager,\" for instance, may conceal a great degree of difference in job function. For example, a manager of a small retail store and a manager of a federal department with complex multibillion dollar programs might both have the occupational title of \"manager\" but have very different job functions, knowledge, and responsibilities. Even within a sector, similar differences may exist. In the private sector, the manager of an independent store has vastly different duties and complexities than a manager of a manufacturing plant, for example. In addition, there may be some occupations in the federal government that do not have any (or any obvious) counterparts in the private sector, such as jobs in the intelligence community.\nThe President's Pay Agent (PPA) uses the jobs analysis approach in its annual study of pay differentials between federal and private sector workers. Despite the limitations of job matching spelled out above, the PPA arguably goes furthest in the studies under review in measuring actual tasks and responsibilities.", "Ideally, a compensation comparison study would control for every other factor but the one of interest so that any difference in compensation between two workers may be attributed entirely to the sector in which the workers were employed (federal or private). Given real world data limitations, it is not possible to construct a perfectly controlled study, but it is possible for many demographic controls to match individuals across sectors closely. In other words, there is always some degree of omitted variable bias in studies of this sort, such that not all characteristics (of individuals or jobs) may be measured. For example, it is possible to compare two single white males of the same age with bachelor's degrees working in the same city—one in the federal government and one in the private sector. Data limitations, however, may not allow researchers to compare those same individuals in terms of job tenure (consecutive uninterrupted years in same occupation), motivation, intelligence, aptitude, or other possible explanatory factors. In other words, not all of the observed pay differences are due to premia or penalties from working in a particular sector but might also be attributed to variables not included in the models that researchers construct. Omitted variable bias affects both human capital and jobs analysis studies.\nIn addition to problems associated with omitted variables, even the observable characteristics of individuals or jobs may create error in the models as a result of inexact measurement. Even in relatively straightforward characteristics, such as industry classification, there may be some uncertainty in the data. There is evidence that some private-sector employees might misclassify themselves as federal employees in the March CPS. For example, a federal contractor who is employed by a private-sector firm might classify his sector of work as the federal government. This sort of measurement error also influences any study that compares two groups of workers (e.g., gender, race). As with omitted variable bias, measurement error may affect both human capital and jobs analysis studies.", "The discussion above shows what the components of a study attempting to isolate the compensation effect of working for the federal government might include. If every factor that affected compensation could be measured and observed, then the premium or penalty of working in the federal government could be quantified. In reality, of course, it is not possible to observe, let alone measure, every factor affecting individual compensation.\nThe differences between the human capital studies (CBO, American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation) and the jobs analysis study (PPA) make it difficult to compare easily across studies. Table 1 below, however, shows the main features of the five studies summarized in this report. Greater detail is provided below on the CBO and PPA studies.\nAs noted previously, to isolate the effect of sector—federal or private—on compensation, many other factors that influence compensation need to be considered (i.e., controlled for). The data in Table 2 show the different control variables in the compensation studies.\nTable 2 indicates the differences, and thus a large part of the reason for discrepant findings, between the human capital studies and the jobs analysis study. The human capital studies control, to varying degrees, for educational attainment, certain demographic characteristics, firm size, residency, and occupation. Importantly, however, data limitations do not allow a great degree of precision in controlling for occupation or job responsibilities in the human capital studies (see elaboration on this in \" The Congressional Budget Office \" review below). On the other hand, the PPA study, while not controlling for characteristics of individual workers, focuses in much greater detail than the human capital studies on the content of jobs.\nThe list of control variables in Table 2 shows the numerous options that researchers have in designing a study to compare compensation across sectors and that different studies control to varying degrees for different variables. Controlling for educational attainment and experience are particularly important, given their impact on earnings. As CBO notes in its study, educational attainment \"plays a particularly large role\" in explaining compensation differences and the compensation differentials vary greatly by individuals' education levels. Workers with higher levels of education tend to earn more (both in the federal and private sectors) and federal workers have more educational attainment, on average, than private sector workers. Similarly, controlling for occupation and firm size are important in making comparisons between the federal and private sector workforce. There are many occupations in the federal government that have no, or limited, counterparts in the private sector, thus making it important to consider the types of jobs that workers in each sector are actually performing. Similarly, the federal government is not like most private sector firms—it is a large \"employer.\" Nearly all federal workers are employed at entities with at least 1,000 employees, while only about 40% of private sector workers are employed in firms of that size. Because employees of large firms tend to earn more than workers at small firms, firm size is an important control variable.", "The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in its analysis of the compensation of federal and private-sector employees, focuses on the question of how the federal government's compensation costs would differ \"if the average cost of employing federal workers was the same as that of employing workers in the private sector with certain similar observable characteristics.\" To answer this question, CBO uses the so-called \"human capital\" approach to comparing wages and benefits. Unlike the other human capital studies reviewed in this report, CBO does not report pay differentials as \"premia\" or \"penalties,\" as they note that the \"data do not allow CBO to gauge the degree to which each of those factors affects differences in average wages between the sectors.\" Thus, consistent with CBO's interpretation, its findings are reported as differentials and not as premia.", "As discussed previously, the human capital approach uses an array of control variables to try to match individuals across different sectors in order to isolate any sector-specific effect of compensation. In the CBO study, controls are used for educational attainment, race, sex, age, marital status, immigration status, citizenship status, firm size, occupation, and geographic location. The controls are used so that the compensation of individuals with similar observable characteristics can be compared in the federal and private sectors. To the extent that all other factors are held constant (e.g., workers of the same age, experience, education, job type, etc.), the difference in compensation between the federal worker and private sector worker may be attributed to that sector, plus any error in the model.\nDemographic and wage data in the CBO study are from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The wage variable is calculated as an average hourly wage and includes salaries, tips, overtime pay, commissions, and bonuses. Data on benefits are imputed for each individual in the CPS sample based on the National Compensation Survey (NCS) and the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF). Benefits calculated in the study include the value of paid leave, retirement income (defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans), health insurance benefits, and legally required benefits (e.g., Social Security). As CBO notes, estimating benefits across sectors is much more difficult, and results in greater uncertainty, than estimating wage differences due to the different data sets and stronger assumptions required to estimate benefits.\nOne of the more difficult factors to control for in the human capital models is the type of work two similar individuals are performing. Again, for example, if the data allowed a comparison between two single white males of the same age with bachelor's degrees working in the same city and performing the same job (i.e., the values of variables other than sector of employment being equal), then any compensation differential would be more likely attributable to the sector in which the individuals worked.\nGiven the data source used in the CBO and other human capital studies, the CPS, it is not possible to compare narrowly delineated occupational groups. The CBO study uses 24 occupational categories at the two-digit level to control for type of work, which is likely as refined as possible given sample size concerns. Nonetheless, the level of aggregation for two-digit occupation codes conceals a diversity of occupations within those aggregated categories. For example, the occupation group \"protective service occupations\" includes lifeguards, private detectives, criminal investigators, and managers of police and detectives, among others. Likewise, the occupation group \"transportation and material moving occupations\" includes aircraft pilots, bus drivers, parking lot attendants, ship loaders, taxi drivers, and ship engineers, among others. Thus, it is possible that two individuals (one in the federal sector and one in the private sector) with similar demographic and educational characteristics who worked in the same broad occupational category might have widely divergent compensation, primarily due to the different sectors in which the individuals worked. However, it could also be due, to varying degrees, to different tasks, responsibilities, and complexities of the jobs within the broader occupational groupings. While controlling for education may partially offset the comparisons of workers within broad occupational categories (e.g., the educational and demographic profiles likely differ for aircraft pilots and parking lot attendants), there may still be some differences in compensation between similar federal and private sector workers that are concealed by the broad occupational comparisons. For example, the demographic and educational profile of workers in \"protective service occupations\" might be similar for several individuals, but the individual job tasks (e.g., border patrol agents versus security guards in residential shopping areas), might drive very different compensation levels.\nAs such, CBO reports wage and benefit differences by five categories of educational attainment—high school or less, some college, bachelor's degree, master's degree, and professional or doctorate degree. This differentiation is important for explaining the compositional effects in the two workforces, which are not captured by analyses reporting aggregate differences or single differentials.", "Table 3 presents the major findings of the CBO study. As the data show, the pay and benefit differential between federal and private sector workers varies by the educational attainment of the individual worker. Specifically, the CBO study finds a positive wage differential for federal workers with less than a bachelor's degree and a negative wage differential for workers with more than a bachelor's degree. For benefits, as with wages, the differential between federal and private sector workers varies by educational attainment, with a positive benefit differential for federal workers with a master's degree or less. When combining wages and benefits for total compensation, the largest differential for federal workers occurs for those with some college education or less (32% and 36%, respectively), while for workers with a professional degree or doctorate, there is a compensation differential of -18% compared to similarly educated private sector workers. For example, federal employees with a professional or doctorate degree earn an average of $73.20 per hour in wages and benefits, while private sector workers with a professional or doctorate degree earn an average of $89.60 per hour in wages and benefits. Thus, on average a federal employee with a professional or doctorate degree (and with other similar characteristics) makes $16.40 per hour, or 18%, less than a private sector employee with similar education and characteristics.", "In the 1980s, there were concerns about the ability of the federal government to recruit and retain talented, high-skilled individuals. As a result, in-depth research around 1990 showed a pay gap between federal workers and comparable private sector workers and significant variation in the local cost of living that was not accounted for in the General Schedule. That research in part led to the passage of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990 ( P.L. 101-509 ), which laid out a schedule to close the gap between federal and private sector pay over a number of years. The President's Pay Agent is mandated to (and still does) produce annually a single percentage expressing the difference in the average rate of pay for all General Schedule (GS) employees to the average non-federal rate of pay. Pay adjustments were supposed to be made through annual and locality pay changes according to the size of the pay discrepancies.\nThe process for federal pay adjustment under FEPCA was put into place by Congress according to specific processes and formulas mandated by Congress. FEPCA has never been implemented as originally enacted. The annual pay adjustment was not made in 1994; in 1995, 1996, 1998, and 2010, reduced amounts of the annual adjustments were provided. For 1995 through 2010, reduced amounts of the locality payments were provided. In addition, there were no pay adjustments for 2011 and 2012. Although the annual adjustment and the locality payment are sometimes referred to as cost-of-living adjustments, neither is based on measures of the cost of living.", "As noted previously, the PPA conducts an annual study based on an analysis of comparable jobs rather than on human capital. The PPA does not control for the characteristics of individuals but rather attempts to control for the characteristics of jobs . The PPA uses data from the National Compensation Survey (NCS) and the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to compare pay between General Schedule (GS) workers and non-federal workers for the same level of work within each of the locality pay areas. The scheduled rates of basic pay of workers at each grade in the GS system are compared to the base earnings of full-time non-federal workers performing jobs with similar characteristics. Unlike the other studies reviewed in this report, the PPA is the only study that provides a time series, rather than a single point-in-time estimate, because it is replicated every year.\nThe methodology of the PPA is somewhat complex, given the scope of the study. The study employs an extensive crosswalk to match federal GS jobs with non-federal jobs in multiple localities. In addition, the PPA study uses sophisticated methods of weighting in order to account for the actual presence and allocation of federal work in the economy and uses modeling to provide data in cases in which there are not sufficient job matches from the actual NCS surveys. The core comparison method, however, is about matching job content in the federal and private sector workforce. Specifically, the PPA studies use \"grade leveling\" to assign federal grade equivalents to non-federal jobs. This leveling provides the means of comparison between sectors.\nThe PPA grade leveling system is based on the General Schedule's Primary Standard for the Factor Evaluation System (FES), which consists of nine factors that guide position classification standards. The FES and the PPA use a variety of factors to classify positions by the content and responsibilities of the job, rather than characteristics of individuals holding those positions. The PPA consolidates the nine FES factors into four factors in constructing grade leveling:\nKnowledge. This factor uses the FES Factor \"Knowledge Required by Position.\" Job Controls and Complexity. This factor combines four FES Factors—\"Supervisory Controls,\" \"Guidelines,\" \"Complexity,\" and \"Scope and Effect.\" Contacts. This factor combines two FES Factors—\"Personal Contacts\" and \"Purpose of Contacts.\" Physical Environment. This factor combines two FES Factors—\"Physical Demands\" and \"Work Environment.\"\nThe PPA study, like the FES, assigns point values to each job based on factors. These point values are then converted to grade levels. Each factor provides a maximum number of points to the total, thus the calculation of a position's point total is weighted depending on how many points are available from each factor. The vast majority of the weight in assigning grades to jobs comes from the first two factors—\"Knowledge\" and \"Job Controls and Complexity.\"\nOnce jobs are grade leveled, across the federal and non-federal sectors, average salaries are computed for each grade-equivalent position by locality (e.g., the average salary of a GS-13 federal employee in Los Angeles is compared to the average salary of a non-federal worker in Los Angeles with a job equivalent to a GS-13). Then the salary differential is calculated for each grade in each locality. Finally, a single percentage expressing the GS rate of pay to the non-federal rate of pay is calculated.\nAs with the human capital studies, the President's Pay Agent study (a \"jobs analysis\" approach) is subject to omitted variable bias and measurement error. In the case of the PPA, there are numerous judgments that must be made in the process of matching federal jobs to private sector jobs. The PPA does not simply match job titles but also attempts to measure and compare job content and responsibilities, both of which could be sources for measurement error. There is at least some evidence, for example, that the federal government hires workers with less education and tenure than workers in the private sector in the same level of occupational responsibility. In turn, one source of measurement error in a jobs analysis study such as the PPA is that less experienced, less skilled federal workers are compared with more experienced, more skilled workers in the private sector, which makes the pay gap seem a function of sector rather than the underlying worker characteristics. In addition, matching a federal job to the private sector for which there is no obvious counterpart requires judgment that could lead to additional measurement error.", "The 2011 PPA study (which shows adjustments that would be required for calendar year 2013) reports a pay disparity of -26.3%. That is, across all occupations and localities, on average federal workers earned 26.3% less than non-federal workers performing similar work. This disparity ranged across the 34 localities, from -17.3% (Houston) to -36.9% (Washington, DC). The disparity in the \"Rest of U.S.\" (i.e., all areas outside of the localities included in the PPA study) was -19%. While the other studies reviewed in this report attempt to calculate the value of benefits in comparing compensation, the PPA study does not calculate the value of benefits because it is not mandated by FEPCA to do so.", "The CBO and PPA studies represent two approaches to comparing pay in the federal and non-federal sectors—the human capital approach and the jobs analysis approach. Three additional studies are briefly summarized in this section. Two of the studies take the human capital approach to comparing compensation and the third does not control for worker or job characteristics.", "Prior to the release of the CBO study, the Heritage Foundation released a report comparing compensation of federal workers with non-federal workers. The Heritage study, like the CBO study, controls for several observable worker characteristics related to human capital in order to compare the pay and benefits of individuals in the two sectors.\nThe main findings of the Heritage study are in Table 4 . The study uses a series of regression equations to estimate the premium that federal workers receive in different forms of compensation—pay, health insurance, retirement benefits—compared to workers in the non-federal sector. When using the most detailed controls, the author of the Heritage study reports a wage premium of 19% and a total compensation premium of 31% for federal workers compared to non-federal workers.\nThere are at least two major methodological issues in the Heritage study that limit the strength of its findings.\nFirst, because the distribution of earnings in the federal and private sectors differ greatly (i.e., earnings dispersion in the federal sector is more compressed than in the private sector), certain statistical techniques are more appropriate than others for estimating compensation equations on the two samples (federal and private). The Heritage study used log-linearized models to compare the average wages in the federal and private sectors. Using such models, however, can lead to inaccurate estimates of average wages due to certain characteristics of the wage data, such as skewness and heteroscedasticity. In essence, the analytical technique used in the Heritage study generates much larger wage differential estimates than the technique used in the CBO study, which corrects for the different properties of wage distributions in the federal and private sectors.\nSecond, the Heritage study excludes workers earning wages below $5 per hour and above $60 per hour. The exclusion of individuals earning more than $60 per hour is likely to affect the results of the study more so than the exclusion of lower-wage workers. By excluding workers earning more than $60 an hour, the pay of higher earners in the private sector is artificially compressed (i.e., it would suppress the mean earnings of private sector workers by truncating the distribution of earners) and appears more in line with federal pay than the actual distribution of earnings.", "As with the CBO and Heritage Foundation studies, the American Enterprise Institute adopted a human capital approach in comparing compensation of federal workers with non-federal workers.\nThe main findings of the AEI study are in Table 5 . As does the Heritage study, the AEI study uses a series of regression equations to estimate the premium that federal workers receive in different forms of compensation—pay, health insurance, retirement benefits—compared to workers in the non-federal sector. When using the most detailed controls, the authors report an overall wage premium of 14% and a total compensation premium of 61% for federal workers vis-a-vis non-federal workers. This total compensation premium includes a benefits premium of 63% and a job security premium of 17%. Only wage premia are calculated by the education level of the individual worker. The declining wage premium as educational attainment increases is consistent with the findings of the CBO study, the only other study to examine wage premia by educational attainment.\nThe AEI study, unlike the Heritage study, did not take the additional step of excluding observations with hourly earnings greater than $60; AEI's use of censored earnings (i.e., imputed value for earnings over $200,000) from the CPS, however, can affect the estimates because of the imputation method. Additionally, the AEI study uses only 10 occupational categories as controls, which is fewer than the CBO and Heritage studies and leaves wider occupational variation within groups. Finally, the AEI's estimate of a \"job security\" premium (i.e., the estimated value of lower likelihood of involuntary separation for federal workers compared to private sector workers) has been criticized by observers for not being consistent with the observable (or lack of observable) security premia in other sectors.", "Unlike the other studies reviewed in this report, the Cato Institute compared the compensation of federal workers with non-federal workers using no control variables. The Cato study found that\nfederal civilian workers earned an average annual wage of $83,679 in 2010, compared to an average annual wage for private sector workers of $51,986; federal civilian workers had average annual total compensation of $126,141 in 2010 compared to average annual total compensation of $62,757 for private sector workers; and federal workers have greater job security than private sector workers.\nBecause it does not include controls either for worker or job characteristics, the Cato study provides little useable information on compensation differentials between similarly situated workers in the federal and private sectors. The more detailed studies from CBO, Heritage, and PPA have shown that the distribution of human capital (i.e., education and experience) differs across the two sectors and that the private sector contains many jobs (e.g., lower-wage service jobs) that are not present in the federal sector. A study at the level of aggregation of Cato's essentially compares two different sets of workers and jobs, which makes its conclusions less informative.", "Comparative compensation studies pose a range of challenges and choices. As the review in this report has shown, there are multiple choices that researchers face even within the context of the two main frameworks of comparison—human capital models and jobs analysis models. For example, researchers may choose to include or exclude control variables, such as educational attainment or experience. In general, in a well-specified model, the more the researcher can (or chooses to) control for, the more the model might isolate the effect of employment sector on compensation. In addition to choices about modeling, data limitations play a role in determining the robustness of comparisons. For example, the human capital models rely on some version of the Current Population Survey, which by design does not allow detailed comparisons of actual job responsibilities and characteristics. On the other hand, the extensive occupational crosswalks used in the PPA do not, by design, include demographic characteristics of the individuals filling those jobs.\nNo two studies reviewed are perfectly comparable, making it difficult to neatly summarize the findings across studies. Of the five studies under review, one reports an overall average wage penalty for federal workers (PPA), one reports neither an overall average wage premium nor a penalty for federal workers (CBO), and three (Heritage, AEI, and Cato) find overall average wage premia for federal workers compared to private sector workers. Only two of the studies—CBO and AEI—report earnings differentials by level of educational attainment, however. While the AEI report shows a clear wage premium across levels of educational attainment, the more methodologically rigorous CBO study finds a more nuanced outcome. That is, federal workers with less than a bachelor's degree have on average a wage premium compared to private sector counterparts, while federal workers with post-graduate educational attainment experience a wage penalty relative to private sector counterparts.\nSummarizing benefit differentials is more difficult than summarizing wage differentials because of the way different studies measure benefits and the assumptions required to make estimates. Unlike estimating wages, estimating benefits often requires integrating multiple data sources and making choices about what constitutes a \"benefit.\" Despite the greater uncertainty associated with estimating benefits, the largest differentials occur in this component of compensation. Of the three studies that attempt to estimate benefit differentials, all three find benefit premia for federal workers compared to private sector workers. As with wage differentials, the CBO study finds a declining benefit premium as educational attainment rises. That is, the benefit premium declines from 72% for federal workers with a high school degree or less to 2% for federal workers with a professional degree or doctorate. The CBO study finds an average benefit differential of 48% for federal workers compared to private sector workers. The Heritage and AEI studies do not report benefit premium by level of educational attainment, but both report a benefit premium for federal workers (these two studies include different components in estimating \"benefits,\" making a straightforward comparison difficult).\nResults from these studies provide useful information. It is hoped that a review of their approaches is helpful in explaining and facilitating evaluation of competing findings related to the compensation of the federal workforce. A few closing thoughts based upon this review are presented below:\nArguably, there is no \"average\" employee in the federal or private sector. The range of worker and job characteristics is sufficiently broad across sectors that claims about \"average\" workers generally conceal much of the variation driving differences in compensation. For purposes of policy, the most informative studies show variation in compensation differentials by some control variables, particularly by some measure of human capital (e.g., education) or detailed occupation. Benefit comparisons are more difficult to model than wage comparisons. While estimates of wages are relatively straightforward (and available from the CPS and other data sources), data on benefits are less available and require assumptions on the part of researchers. For example, placing an average value on employer-subsidized health insurance requires assumptions about the coverage of the insurance, which may not be readily available. Likewise, placing a value on \"job security\" requires difficult-to-quantify assumptions about preferences of individual workers (e.g., risk aversion, job commitment). Benefit differentials tend to be the largest component of compensation differentials that are identified across the reviewed studies, and they are more difficult to interpret because they are measured in less precise ways than wages. The existence of a wage gap does not necessarily indicate a premium or penalty that is attributable to an observed and measureable characteristic, such as sector of employment. Rather, there are unobservable characteristics that can legitimately influence wages and that may drive differences between workers in different sectors. In the literature on the pay gap between men and women, for example, researchers have encountered difficulty measuring potential explanatory factors such as discrimination, level of investment in careers, and preferences for certain types of work. In all of the reviewed studies, findings are presented as federal compensation compared to private sector compensation, with the implicit or explicit assumption that federal pay should match private sector pay. The assumption that private sector pay is \"correct\" because it is determined by \"market forces\" is a conceptual assumption rather than an empirical reality. Benchmark comparisons are useful but the assumption underlying these studies is that compensation in the federal sector is either too high or too low compared to this benchmark. An alternative assumption, which is generally not present in the studies, might be that private sector pay may need to be altered to be in line with federal compensation in some instances. In fields such as finance and law, where private sector compensation can vastly exceed public sector compensation, the private sector benchmark may not consistently be the \"right\" figure in those areas. Additionally, there may be some types of work, involving specialized technical knowledge, where consistency of service and longer tenures are valued and perhaps worthy of a premium. Some federal occupations have no clear private benchmark. This reality makes it unclear what the finding of a compensation premium or penalty for such occupations compared to the private sector means. Similarly, in some occupational areas (e.g., intelligence, regulatory), the federal government is the major employer and must attract workers in a competitive environment; in these occupational areas, a private benchmark may not be informative. Across the board adjustments to compensation of federal employees may have unintended consequences. Findings in the CBO study, in particular, demonstrate the wide compensation differentials that exist across human capital characteristics. Adjustments that are made uniformly may narrow differences between some federal and private sector workers but widen differences for other workers. This could have the possible effect, for example, of making it more difficult to attract higher-skilled workers into the federal government if an across-the-board compensation adjustment caused higher-skilled, higher-paid workers to lose ground relative to their private sector counterparts." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h2_title", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_title", "", "h2_full", "", "h2_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is Congress' stance toward the federal civilian workforce?", "Why has interest from Congress increased?", "What does the issue of compensation of federal employees focus on?", "What is the history of the pay gap?", "What contradictions to these results have been found?", "How can compensation be assessed in federal pay?", "What is the human capital approach?", "What is the job analysis approach?", "What does this report cover?", "What materials were used to create the report?", "In what way do the studies provide insight to the federal workforce?", "What was found in \"human capital\" studies?", "How does the use of the \"average\" workers affect the analysis?", "What characterize the best studies for policy purposes?" ], "summary": [ "Recently there has been significant congressional interest in compensation of the federal civilian workforce.", "The increased interest has been driven at least in part by budgetary pressure and in part by the state of the economy since the recession began in 2007.", "Issues related to the compensation of federal employees often center on the pay differential between federal workers and their private sector counterparts.", "For several years, the annual President's Pay Agent (PPA) study has shown a large wage penalty for federal workers compared to private sector workers in similar occupations.", "A few recent studies, however, which use a different analytical approach and data sources, have partially contradicted the findings of the PPA study by concluding that at least some federal workers enjoy a wage premium over comparable private sector workers. These disparate findings make it difficult to determine how compensation of federal employees compares to workers in the private sector.", "In evaluating claims about federal pay, there appear to be two basic approaches to comparing compensation in the federal and private-sector workforces—the human capital approach and the jobs analysis approach. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive but may be difficult to combine given data limitations.", "The human capital approach attempts to account for as many observable characteristics of individual workers as possible (e.g., education, experience) that are known to affect individual compensation.", "The jobs analysis approach, on the other hand, focuses on matching comparable jobs in different sectors rather than workers with similar demographic characteristics in those sectors.", "Each approach is outlined in this report, followed by an examination of a few recent studies comparing federal and private sector compensation.", "The studies reviewed were chosen because they are official government studies (President's Pay Agent, Congressional Budget Office) or have received significant attention in policy debates.", "Results from these studies, which at times arrive at vastly different conclusions, provide some useful information about evaluating competing claims related to the compensation of the federal workforce.", "In general, the more methodologically rigorous \"human capital\" studies show a pay premium for federal workers with lower levels of educational attainment and a pay penalty for federal workers with higher levels of educational attainment.", "The range of worker and job characteristics is sufficiently broad across sectors that claims about \"average\" workers conceal much of the variation driving differences in compensation.", "For purposes of policy, the most informative studies show variation in compensation differentials by some control variables." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 2, 3, -1, 0, 0, -1, 3, -1, 0, 0, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
GAO_GAO-12-700	{ "title": [ "Background", "SCRA Eligibility, Violations, and Compliance", "SCRA Requirements Limit Eligibility for Mortgage Protections", "Thousands of Mortgage- Related SCRA Violations Have Been Identified to Date", "Mortgage Servicers and Others Cited Challenges to Complying with SCRA", "Federal Regulators’ Oversight of SCRA Compliance Has Been Limited", "Prudential Regulators Examine for SCRA Compliance Based on Risk Factors", "Oversight of SCRA Compliance Varied by Institution, Year, and Regulator", "Examiners Generally Used Limited Loan Testing", "Coordination of SCRA Oversight Lacking", "Challenges in Ensuring Servicemembers’ Awareness of SCRA Protections", "DOD and DHS Education Efforts", "Other SCRA Outreach Efforts", "Servicemembers Face Challenges Asserting Their SCRA Protections, Raising Questions about Training Effectiveness", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "SCRA Compliance", "SCRA Compliance Oversight", "Servicemember Education and Awareness", "Appendix II: Oversight of Mortgage Servicers’ Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Compliance", "Federal Reserve and OCC Enforcement Actions", "DOJ Enforcement Actions", "National Mortgage Settlement", "Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security", "Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix V: Comments from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Appendix VI: Comments from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", "Appendix VII: Comments from the Federal Housing Finance Agency", "Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban Development", "Appendix IX: Comments from the National Credit Union Administration", "Appendix X: Comments from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency", "Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs", "Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "Congress passed the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act in 1940 to provide servicemembers protections to help them meet the unique circumstances they face when serving their country. In response to the increased use of Reserve and National Guard military units in the Global War on Terrorism, Congress enacted SCRA in December 2003 as a modernized version of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. In addition to providing protections related to residential mortgages, the act covers other types of loans, such as credit card and automobile and a variety of other issues, such as rental agreements, eviction, installment contracts, civil judicial and administrative proceedings, motor vehicle leases, life insurance, health insurance, and income tax payments.\nSCRA provides the following mortgage-related protections to servicemembers: Interest Rate Cap. Servicemembers who obtain mortgages prior to serving on active duty status are eligible to have their interest rate capped at 6 percent for the duration of their active duty status and for 12 months after returning from active duty service. Interest above 6 percent is to be forgiven by the servicer. Servicemembers are required to inform their servicer of their active duty status in order to avail themselves of this provision.\nForeclosure Proceedings. A servicer cannot sell, foreclose, or seize the property of a servicemember for breach of a pre-service obligation unless a court order is issued prior to the foreclosure on the property. This protection is effective until 9 months after the term of active duty service ends. If the servicer files an action in court to enforce the terms of the mortgage, the court may stay any proceedings or adjust the obligation to preserve the interests of the parties.\nMortgage prepayment penalties. A court may decide that servicemembers who have mortgages that impose penalties for paying off the balance early are not subject to these penalties if the servicemember incurs such fees due to military service and the ability of the servicemember to pay the fees is materially affected by military service. change-of-station order to relocate to another area may receive a court order that waives the penalty for selling his or her home and paying off the mortgage early.\nFor example, a servicemember who receives a permanent\nAdverse credit reporting protections. A servicer may not report adverse credit information to a credit reporting agency solely because a servicemember exercises his or her SCRA rights, including a request to have his or her mortgage interest rate and fees be capped at 6 percent.\n50 U.S.C. app. §523(b).\nIn addition to SCRA, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 includes a requirement applicable to institutions that service mortgages. This act requires that all mortgage servicers that service home loans provide notification of the availability of homeownership counseling offered by the lender to eligible homeowners who fail to pay any amount by the due date. In 2006, changes were made to the homeownership counseling notice requirement. Mortgage servicers are required to alert borrowers of SCRA protections if they are in default on their mortgage, and the notice instructs borrowers to notify their servicer if they believe they are eligible for SCRA protections. Servicers must provide the notification within 45 days from the date a payment was missed by a borrower. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) developed and disseminated the format for this notice.\nSCRA provides protections to active duty servicemembers in all five of the military services—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—as well as members of each of these services’ reserve These components include the Army Reserve, Navy component. Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard.\nIn 2010, active duty servicemembers comprised 63 percent of the military’s force, and the reserve components represented the remaining 37 percent of the military force. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the military population and shows that the Army constitutes the greatest percentage of both active duty servicemembers and the reserve forces.\nWhile the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve are federal entities, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard (known collectively as the National Guard) have both federal and state missions. Members of the National Guard who are eligible for SCRA protections are those who have been called into federal active duty service. In addition, members of the National Guard recalled for state duty are also eligible for SCRA protections under certain circumstances.\nThe responsibility of extending mortgage-related SCRA protections to eligible servicemembers often falls to mortgage servicers. While some institutions that originate home mortgage loans hold the loans as assets on their balance sheets, institutions generally sell them to other financial institutions or the enterprises—Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. The enterprises purchase mortgages from primary mortgage lenders. They hold some of the mortgages they purchase in their portfolios, but they package the majority into mortgage-backed securities and sell them to investors in the secondary mortgage market. The enterprises guarantee these investors the timely payment of principal and interest. If a mortgage originator sells its loans to either an investor or to an institution that securitizes them, another financial institution or other entity is appointed as the mortgage servicer to manage payment collections and other activities associated with these loans. Mortgage servicers, which can be large mortgage finance companies, commercial banks, or small specialty companies unaffiliated with a larger financial institution, earn a fee for duties they perform, such as sending borrowers monthly account statements, answering customer-service inquiries, collecting monthly mortgage payments, maintaining escrow accounts for property taxes and hazard insurance, and forwarding proper payments to the mortgage owners. Other mortgage lenders that hold the mortgages they originate may service the loans internally or outsource this function.\nIn the event that a borrower becomes delinquent on loan payments, the mortgage servicer must decide whether to pursue a home retention workout or foreclosure alternative, such as a short sale, or proceed with foreclosure. If the mortgage servicer determines that foreclosure is the most appropriate option, it follows one of two foreclosure methods, depending on state law. In a judicial foreclosure, a judge presides over the process in a court proceeding. Mortgage servicers initiate a formal foreclosure action by filing a lawsuit with a court. A nonjudicial foreclosure process takes place outside the courtroom and is typically conducted by a trustee named in the deed-of-trust document that accompanied the mortgage. Trustees, and sometimes mortgage servicers, generally send a notice of default to the borrower and publish a notice of sale in area newspapers or legal publications.\nPrudential regulators—FDIC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, and OCC—have the authority to conduct reviews of any aspect of banks’ activities, including compliance with applicable consumer protection laws, such as SCRA. OCC charters and supervises national banks and federal thrifts. The Federal Reserve supervises state-chartered banks that opt to be members of the Federal Reserve System, bank holding companies, thrift holding companies, and the nondepository institution subsidiaries of those institutions. FDIC supervises FDIC-insured state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, as well as federally insured state savings banks and thrifts. NCUA charters and supervises federally chartered credit unions and insures savings in federal and most state- chartered credit unions. OCC regulates the vast majority of mortgage servicing in the United States. For example, OCC-regulated servicers accounted for close to 80 percent of the unpaid principal balance on serviced mortgages in the third quarter of 2011. The prudential regulators conduct risk-based examinations of the institutions they oversee on a routine basis. Because examinations are risk-based and there are a number of consumer compliance laws for which examiners assess compliance during an examination, SCRA compliance is not assessed during every examination.\nThe Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act) established CFPB and provided it with the authority to regulate mortgage servicers with respect to federal consumer financial law. Consumer financial protection functions from seven existing federal agencies were transferred to the new agency. For mortgage servicers that are depository institutions with more than $10 billion in assets or their affiliates, CFPB will have exclusive supervisory authority and primary enforcement authority to ensure compliance with federal consumer financial law. Additionally, if a mortgage servicer is a nondepository institution, CFPB will have both supervisory and enforcement authority to ensure compliance with federal consumer financial law. Finally, CFPB will have rulemaking authority with respect to mortgage servicers, including authority that transfers from other federal agencies such as the Federal Reserve and the Federal Trade Commission. SCRA, however, was not one of the enumerated laws for which oversight transferred to CFPB. The prudential regulators remain responsible for overseeing compliance with the law for any of the entities they supervise that are servicing mortgages.\nOther federal agencies are involved in the mortgage market by operating mortgage programs aimed at expanding homeownership for populations who may encounter difficulties in obtaining mortgages. For example, FHA has played a large role in assisting minority, lower-income, and first-time homebuyers in obtaining mortgages. FHA’s program insures private lenders against losses from borrower defaults on mortgages that meet FHA criteria for properties with one to four housing units. As of September 2011, almost 3,700 lending institutions were approved to participate in FHA’s mortgage insurance programs for single-family homes. FHA also offers special protections for servicemembers who have FHA-insured loans. For example, FHA-approved lenders are authorized to postpone principal payments and foreclosure proceedings for servicemembers on active duty who have FHA-insured mortgages.\nVA is also active in the mortgage market through its Home Loan Guaranty program, which provides lenders a guaranty on a portion of mortgage loans for eligible veterans, active duty servicemembers, surviving spouses, and members of the reserve components in recognition of their service. According to VA, the program operates by substituting the federal government’s guaranty for a down payment that might otherwise be required. VA guarantees a portion of the mortgage loan in the event that borrowers default, providing lenders with substantial financial protections against some of the losses that may be associated with extending such mortgage loans. In 2011, VA guaranteed over 350,000 loans to veteran borrowers.\nThe Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and gave it responsibility for, among other things, the supervision and regulation of the housing-related enterprises: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 12 federal home loan banks.each of the regulated entities operates in a safe and sound manner, including maintenance of adequate capital and internal controls, and carries out its housing and community development finance mission. FHFA has no direct authority over mortgage servicers, but does have authority to ensure that the housing enterprises are being run safely and soundly, as well as the power to impose operational, managerial, and internal control standards on the companies.", "", "The total number of servicemembers eligible for the mortgage protections provided by SCRA is not known, but the size of this population is likely limited because the act provides protections only to servicemembers who meet certain eligibility requirements. The maximum number of servicemembers potentially eligible for mortgage protections under SCRA at any one time includes those servicemembers on active duty service and those who have recently left it. According to DOD, between 2007 and 2010 about 2 million servicemembers, including those activated from the reserve components, were on active duty.servicemembers who may actually qualify for the SCRA mortgage protections is a smaller portion of this population because some of the act’s protections only extend to servicemembers who obtained their mortgages prior to entering active duty service or servicemembers whose military service materially affects their ability to pay their mortgage. However, representatives from all the mortgage servicers with whom we spoke stated that they do not assess whether a servicemember’s ability to pay has been materially affected by their active duty status and that they provide eligible servicemembers SCRA protections regardless of whether their ability to pay is materially affected or not.\nHowever, the number of According to DOD officials, representatives from industry trade groups, SCRA experts, and military service organizations, the servicemembers most likely to be eligible for SCRA mortgage protections are members of the reserve components. These servicemembers are more likely to have had mortgages prior to entering active duty service and some may potentially experience a decline in their incomes as they leave their civilian employment and begin receiving their military pay. We have previously reported, however that servicemembers belonging to the reserve components on average earn more income while activated. According to DOD officials, the number of servicemembers activated from the reserve components from 2007 through 2010 was approximately 576,500.\nThe maximum number of servicemembers who are eligible for SCRA mortgage protections is also a smaller portion of the total military population because many do not own homes for which they have taken out mortgage loans. According to the Census Bureau, the U.S. homeownership rate was about 67 percent in 2010. However, research shows that servicemembers are generally less likely to own their own homes. surveys—surveys that DOD sends annually to active duty servicemembers and members of the reserve components to evaluate various programs and policies and their impact on servicemembers—only 34 percent of active duty servicemembers and 55 percent of reserve component servicemembers reported that they owned or made mortgage payments on a home in the previous 12 months. However, even those military families who have mortgages may not be eligible for SCRA protections. First, some SCRA mortgage protections only apply to servicemembers who took out their mortgage before being placed on active duty. Also, given that mortgage interest rates have been at historic lows in recent years, servicemembers who took out mortgage loans during this period before being placed on active duty may be likely to have loans with rates lower than the SCRA-mandated level of 6 percent.\nCensus computes the homeownership rate by dividing the number of owner-occupied housing units by the number of occupied housing units or households.", "Although the total number of SCRA violations is not known, thousands of SCRA violations have been identified from a number of sources. First, DOJ—which is responsible for enforcing SCRA—settled investigations in 2011 with two mortgage servicers and identified 165 instances of active duty servicemembers who had their homes foreclosed upon without the mortgage servicer seeking the proper court order as required by the act. Second, in July 2011, as part of its investigation into SCRA violations, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform sent letters to 10 large mortgage servicers requesting them to identify the total number of improper foreclosures and interest-rate and fee violations they had committed. In their responses, 6 mortgage servicers reported having conducted a total of at least 148 improper foreclosures against servicemembers and failing to reduce interest rates or fees on the mortgages for over 14,000 servicemembers since 2005. Third, as the result of a class-action lawsuit filed by several servicemembers, as of January 2012, Chase Home Finance, LLC had issued refunds to approximately 13,500 borrowers for interest and fees charged in excess of SCRA protections since 2005. Many of the mortgage servicers involved in these investigations are among the largest in the industry and service millions of loans. Table 1 summarizes the various SCRA violations identified by these sources to date.\nThrough their compliance examinations, prudential regulators identified 251 instances of SCRA compliance problems at depository institutions between 2007 and 2011. FDIC identified the vast majority—230—of these issues, with Federal Reserve staff identifying 16, OCC staff identifying 4, and NCUA staff identifying 1 instance. However, these SCRA compliance issues may not specifically concern mortgages—for example, they may have involved non-mortgage-loan products, such as credit card loans.\nA more complete picture of the extent of SCRA violations may result from three large-scale federal agency reviews that are ongoing. Recent enforcement actions taken by DOJ, Federal Reserve, and OCC require mortgage servicers to conduct historical reviews of their mortgage loan files to determine if servicemembers who were eligible for the SCRA mortgage protections received them, among other things. If violations are identified, the mortgage servicers are required to provide compensation to the servicemembers. Appendix II contains a detailed explanation of these reviews.\nIn the wake of identified SCRA violations, some mortgage servicers have implemented procedures to enhance their compliance with SCRA. Some large mortgage servicers have instituted several military status checks during the foreclosure process. For example, one large mortgage servicer now requires its foreclosure counsel to check a customer’s military status prior to the initiation of foreclosure proceedings, 1 week prior to a foreclosure sale, and 1 day prior to the scheduled sale date. Some mortgage servicers have also created dedicated customer service support for military servicemembers, including telephone hotlines and websites. For example, representatives from one mortgage servicer told us that they had developed a dedicated team that is staffed with former servicemembers to assist customers with SCRA requests. These customer-support representatives also receive training on military financial issues and serve as the points of contact for any problems with delinquency, remediation, and foreclosure.\nFinally, as a result of identified violations and SCRA investigations, some servicemembers will be receiving SCRA protections that go beyond those stated in the act. For example, three mortgage servicers that responded to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform letters noted that they have reduced the interest rate they charge on servicemembers’ mortgages to 4 percent—which is below the 6 percent required in SCRA. Additionally, the National Mortgage Settlement between the federal government, 49 state attorneys general, and five large mortgage servicers that occurred in February 2012 requires the five mortgage servicers to implement new mortgage servicing standards. These new standards expand protections to certain servicemember customers of these five mortgage servicers beyond those provided in SCRA. For example, the new standards extend foreclosure protections to any servicemember— regardless of whether their mortgage was obtained prior to active duty status—who is receiving Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay or is serving at a location more than 750 miles away from their home. This means that any servicemember meeting these conditions and living in a nonjudicial state who obtained a mortgage after obtaining active duty status could not be foreclosed upon without a court order. More information on the National Mortgage Settlement is contained in appendix II.", "Representatives from some mortgage servicers and industry associations cited challenges that make complying with SCRA difficult. First, mortgage servicers may not know at the time a mortgage is originated whether a borrower will be eligible for SCRA protections in the future. For example, a borrower would become eligible for SCRA mortgage protections after obtaining his or her mortgage by joining the active duty military or being called into active duty service while serving as a member of the reserve components. Therefore, mortgage servicers may not be able to flag loans at origination that could potentially become eligible for SCRA protections at a later date. Second, representatives from some mortgage servicers and industry associations also noted that military orders, which servicemembers must provide to their mortgage servicers in order to receive the SCRA interest rate protection, can be difficult to interpret. In particular, a representative from one mortgage servicer noted that the orders do not always clearly specify the start and end dates of active duty service and that the format and content of these orders can vary considerably across services, which may lead to mistakes by mortgage servicer personnel responsible for determining eligibility. Further, a DOD official explained that in some instances, military orders may not be available in a timely manner. For example, he stated that members of the reserve components may be alerted that their unit is being mobilized on a certain date; however, the servicemembers may not get the actual military orders until weeks later. This delay could lead to problems for both a servicemember and a mortgage servicer. For example, if a servicemember has been deployed, he or she may encounter difficulties sending orders to his or her mortgage servicer. Without the orders, a mortgage servicer may encounter difficulties verifying the servicemember’s active duty start date in order to appropriately adjust their payment amounts.\nOne of the primary tools mortgage servicers use to comply with SCRA is a website operated by DOD’s Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) that allows mortgage servicers and others to query DMDC’s database to determine the active duty status of a servicemember. DMDC collects, archives, and maintains DOD personnel data. Representatives from mortgage servicers indicated that they use this website to confirm if a borrower is an active duty servicemember and may be eligible for SCRA protections and that they rely on the site to confirm if a servicemember is on active duty status prior to conducting a foreclosure. Representatives from one mortgage servicer also noted that they use the website to confirm the period of time that borrowers are eligible for the SCRA interest rate protections. The website is an important compliance tool because servicemembers are eligible for the foreclosure protections even if they do not notify their mortgage servicers that they are serving on active duty.\nHowever, many representatives from mortgage servicers and industry associations with whom we spoke cited challenges with the usability of the website. Moreover, confusion appears to exist in the mortgage servicing industry about the availability of information in the database. For example, prior to April 2012, the website only allowed mortgage servicers to inquire about borrowers’ active duty status one individual at a time. The inability to test large numbers of borrowers simultaneously—known as batch testing—made confirming borrowers’ SCRA eligibility difficult given the large volumes of mortgages that some institutions service. Representatives from some mortgage servicers also indicated that sometimes the personnel information available from DMDC is not complete or accurate and that the database may produce a false-negative result. That is, it will indicate that servicemembers were not on active duty status when in fact they were. DMDC officials explained that information contained in the database depends on information provided to DMDC by the various services. Therefore, if a service has not reported a servicemember to DMDC as being on active duty status, the database will report that the servicemember is not on active duty. Additionally, representatives from mortgage servicers told us that they believe some servicemembers are not listed in the database. For example, one explained that, in some instances they have received orders from servicemembers, but when they query the database to confirm the active duty status, the servicemembers are not listed as on active duty. Other mortgage servicer representatives believed that some servicemembers may not be listed in the database for national security reasons, such as those serving in the Special Forces. However, DMDC officials told us that active duty status is updated for all servicemembers, including those on special operations.\nTo help address these challenges, DOD is working with the mortgage servicing industry and industry associations to improve both the usability of the website and the readability of military orders. First, to aid mortgage servicers’ ability to query the database, DMDC has developed and implemented a way for mortgage servicers and others to conduct batch queries of the database from the website for up to 250,000 servicemembers at a time.to develop the capability of the database to query historical information and also to distinguish between those active duty periods for servicemembers in the National Guard that provide SCRA protections and those that do not.\nDOD officials also noted that they are trying Second, DOD has collaborated with the financial industry through the Financial Services Roundtable’s Housing Policy Council—a consortium of financial institutions that provide mortgage credit—to develop an alternative military order form that servicemembers can attach to or provide in lieu of their military orders when requesting relief under SCRA from their mortgage servicers. This form is intended to be easier for mortgage servicers to interpret as it is shorter and more standardized than official orders, which can vary by service. According to DOD officials, this alternative form was approved by DOD in December 2011 and has been distributed to the military services as well as to financial institutions and is being used by servicemembers.", "", "Prudential regulators—FDIC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, and OCC—are responsible for supervising depository institutions’ compliance with various federal consumer laws including SCRA. Consumer compliance examinations are one of the primary tools regulators use to assess this compliance. Prudential regulators all use a risk-based approach to consumer compliance examinations to determine which areas to target, with areas of higher risk receiving greater focus during examinations. For example, according to the FDIC consumer compliance examination manual, riskier areas may include ones that involve regulatory changes or complex products. Regulatory officials also told us that because of this risk-based approach, SCRA may not be included or fully addressed within the scope of an examination. For example, officials from one regulator told us that when deciding to include SCRA in an examination they may consider, among other things, consumer complaints, internal audit results of the institution’s compliance management system, and problems raised in the media. Regulators also use the risk-based approach to determine the specific examination procedures they use to assess compliance. Areas of higher risk would be subject to more extensive review procedures, while areas of lower risk would receive less extensive review. For example, according to OCC’s examination manual, areas of greater risk may involve more extensive testing of loan transactions for compliance.\nIn 2009, the regulators developed interagency examination procedures related to SCRA through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), including a specific checklist that examiners can use in their examinations. The interagency SCRA procedures and checklist indicate that examiners should determine whether depository institutions applied and properly calculated interest-rate reductions, whether any foreclosures were conducted without a court order, and whether any servicemember requests for SCRA protection were inappropriately reported as adverse information to a credit reporting agency. Additionally, the interagency procedures suggest, among other things, that examiners (1) consider reviewing SCRA policies, procedures, and account documentation when assessing the adequacy of the institution’s internal controls and (2) review whether the depository institution’s compliance reviews and audit materials include transaction testing of samples covering relevant product types. The checklist contains a series of questions related to different sections of SCRA, including the ones that apply to residential mortgages.\nIn addition to routine risk-based consumer compliance examinations, prudential regulators conduct targeted reviews of areas of high concern.\nFor example, FDIC, Federal Reserve, and OCC conducted an interagency review of the foreclosure policies and practices of 14 mortgage servicers in late 2010, in response to the large number of foreclosures since 2007 and continued weaknesses in the mortgage market. The examiners evaluated the adequacy of each mortgage servicer’s operating procedures and controls and preparation of foreclosure documentation, among other things. Although the interagency review was not intended to directly assess SCRA compliance, during the course of this effort, two mortgage servicers nonetheless identified SCRA compliance problems. Additionally, in June 2011, OCC issued guidance to all of its regulated institutions that required them to conduct self-assessments of their foreclosure management practices. OCC examiners will review the self-assessments in the subsequent examination of the institutions.", "The extent to which SCRA was reviewed varied by the size of the depository institution, the year in which the examination took place, and the regulator that conducted the examination from 2007 through 2011. Based on our review, we estimate that from 2007 through 2011, prudential regulators reviewed SCRA compliance in at least one examination for 48 percent of all the institutions they oversaw that serviced mortgages. This estimate includes documentation of an SCRA review for any type of loan product (e.g., residential mortgage, credit card, automobile, and other types of products). Some of the reasons bank examiners cited for including SCRA in the scope of an examination included the need to follow up on previous violations and deficiencies, changes in regulatory requirements, and identification of SCRA loans being serviced. To determine the extent to which SCRA compliance was included in examinations of depository institutions and the procedures examiners used to assess SCRA compliance, we reviewed workpapers for examinations conducted by FDIC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, and OCC. We reviewed the workpapers for examinations from 2007 to 2011 for a sample of 152 institutions that service mortgages they hold in their loan portfolios or service mortgages for other institutions. The 152 institutions represented a stratified random sample of institutions based on size and regulator examined from 2007 through 2011. Because officials from some regulators told us that they may not conduct an examination for every institution every 12 months, and because SCRA might not be covered in each risk-based examination, we looked at examinations spanning a 5- year period.\nBased on our sample, we found that prudential regulators included a review of SCRA compliance in at least one examination for a greater percentage of large institutions than all other institutions. In this report, the 40 large institutions are comprised of the 10 largest mortgage servicers regulated by each of the four prudential regulators. Specifically, we found that about 70 percent of these large institutions were reviewed for SCRA compliance at least once from 2007 through 2011 compared with an estimated 48 percent of all other institutions for the same period. Officials from one regulator indicated that one reason for this difference might be that the larger institutions conducted more mortgage lending than smaller institutions; therefore, examiners may be more likely to review SCRA compliance at larger institutions.\nWe reviewed examinations for all 40 of the large institutions, and therefore the percentage presented is the percentage of these 40 large institutions, and is not an estimate. For our estimates of the remaining institutions, we are 95 percent confident that the actual population of these institutions that were examined for SCRA is between 45 percent and 52 percent. occurred in an estimated 26 percent of all institutions, compared with 2007 when about 4 percent of all institutions were reviewed for SCRA. Figure 2 shows the distribution in the percentage of institutions examined for SCRA compliance for each year from 2007 through 2011. Some of the regulatory officials told us that reasons for the differences by year may include the adoption of SCRA interagency examination procedures in 2009 and increased attention to the impacts of the financial crisis on servicemembers in recent years.\nWe also found that among just the 40 large institutions, a greater percentage had an SCRA compliance review in 2010 and 2011 compared with earlier years: in 2010 and also in 2011, about 40 percent of the institutions had an SCRA review, about 13 percent of these institutions were reviewed for SCRA about 23 percent of these institutions were reviewed for SCRA compliance in 2008, and in 2007, 10 percent were reviewed for SCRA compliance.\nOur analysis also revealed differences by regulator in the extent to which SCRA was reviewed for compliance. Figure 3 shows that both FDIC and Federal Reserve reviewed a significantly higher percentage of institutions for SCRA compliance compared with NCUA and OCC. It also shows that OCC reviewed a greater percentage of institutions than NCUA. NCUA officials explained that the agency does not have a separate consumer compliance examination function and that consumer compliance is part of its overall evaluation of the safety and soundness of institutions. The officials said that given the recent economic crisis, the agency has placed more focus on the safety and soundness of credit unions than on compliance with consumer regulations. They said that this is part of the reason the percentage of credit unions that received an SCRA compliance review is so low. However, our prior work has found that mortgage servicing problems, including inadequate controls over foreclosure processes, have led to risks to the safety and soundness of depository institutions.\nFor the estimated 52 percent of institutions that were not examined for SCRA compliance from 2007 through 2011, examiners did not document their reasons for excluding SCRA for at least 95 percent of these institutions. In our review, we found four examinations for which examiners had documented in the workpapers a reason for not including SCRA compliance. For three of these examinations, the reason cited was that examiners had recently examined for SCRA compliance and found no violations, deficiencies, or other concerns. The fourth examination reviewed the depository institutions’ progress in addressing consumer compliance issues identified in the previous examination and because SCRA compliance was not one of the issues of concern identified in the previous examination, it was excluded from the examination we reviewed.\nRegulatory officials offered a few reasons to explain why an examiner may not include SCRA compliance in an examination. For example, officials from one regulator said that some depository institutions might not serve large military populations. Therefore, examiners might not consider compliance with SCRA mortgage protections a substantial risk to these institutions. Additionally, officials from one prudential regulator indicated that examiners may choose to exclude SCRA compliance from an examination if the institution had received few complaints concerning SCRA-related issues. The regulators indicated that they had received very few SCRA complaints related to residential mortgages between 2007 and 2011 compared with the number of consumer complaints they received overall during this period.", "As part of our review of examination workpapers for the 152 institutions in our sample, we collected information on the procedures examiners used to assess compliance with SCRA if an examination reviewed residential mortgage loans or if the workpapers did not specify the loan product being addressed. We included examinations in which the loan product was not specified to help ensure that we reviewed any examination procedures that may have addressed residential mortgages. Our review found a total of 83 institutions for which examiners either reviewed SCRA compliance for residential mortgage loans or did not specify the loan product being reviewed. The figures presented for this analysis are not generalizable to the population of institutions that service mortgages. After reviewing examination guidance and auditing standards, we grouped examiners’ documented examination procedures into three categories based on our professional judgment as to the extent that each type of procedure would provide assurance that financial institutions were complying with SCRA: Interviews with depository institution personnel. This category includes activities in which examiners interviewed staff at the depository institution for information on, among other things, their compliance management systems and whether the institution services loans to servicemembers eligible for SCRA protections.\nAssessments of depository institutions’ compliance management systems. This category includes instances in which examiners documented that they reviewed the quality of depository institutions’ compliance management systems, such as reviewing institutions’ SCRA policies and procedures, internal controls, and training programs.\nTesting loan files for SCRA compliance. This category includes activities such as testing a limited number of loan files the institution identified as SCRA-eligible or conducting more comprehensive testing, such as reviewing a statistical sample of loan files.\nOf these categories, the first category—interviews with depository institution personnel—provides the least assurance of SCRA compliance because the examiner would be relying primarily on assertions provided by institution personnel rather than an independent assessment or verification of these assertions. The second category—assessments of institutions’ compliance management systems—provides greater assurance of SCRA compliance because these procedures require examiners to independently assess the quality of the depository institutions’ procedures and internal controls. The final category—testing of loan files—provides even greater assurance of SCRA compliance because examiners can independently verify whether the institution’s personnel provided all necessary SCRA protections.\nAlthough in many examinations examiners documented that they used an assortment of examination procedures from different categories to assess compliance with SCRA, we categorized each of the 83 institutions whose SCRA compliance was assessed during the 5-year period of our review by the highest assurance level of the examination procedures that were used in any of the examinations done of that institution from 2007 through 2011. Based on this analysis, we found that only about half of these institutions had any testing conducted during this 5-year period. Specifically, of these 83 institutions, we found that\n6 institutions had examinations during this period that relied on interviews of depository institution staff to assess SCRA compliance as their highest category of examination procedure,\n36 institutions had examinations in which the highest category of examination procedure used to assess SCRA compliance was to review the institution’s compliance management system, and\n41 institutions had examinations that involved testing of loan files as the highest category of examination procedure—the examination procedure category that provides a greater level of assurance for SCRA compliance than the previous two categories.\nHowever, at the 41 institutions at which examiners tested loan files, we found that the type of testing conducted was limited. Examiners can choose from different types of testing methods that provide differing levels of assurance that an institution is complying with SCRA. For example, within the testing category, testing a limited sample of loan files that depository institutions identified as SCRA-eligible provides less assurance of compliance because it relies on assertions by depository institutions of SCRA eligibility, whereas testing a statistical sample of loans provides greater assurance because it allows examiners to independently select files for testing, and the results would be representative of the institution’s compliance. In the examinations we reviewed, the examiners mostly tested a limited sample of loans that the depository institution had identified as SCRA-eligible and, therefore, provided less assurance that the institution was complying with SCRA. We found no instances between 2007 and 2011 in which examiners tested a statistical sample of either loans in foreclosure or mortgage loan files in general, which would have provided the greatest assurance of an institution’s SCRA compliance. By testing only foreclosure files or mortgage loan files that the depository institution had identified as SCRA- eligible, examiners cannot fully determine if the institution has appropriately identified all eligible servicemembers. By expanding the scope of testing to include a larger sample of foreclosure and mortgage loan files, beyond just those files that the depository institution had identified as SCRA-eligible, examiners could better ensure that institutions are appropriately identifying eligible servicemembers and providing them all of the protections to which they are entitled. To minimize the burden on institutions and examiners, such reviews could be conducted as part of samples of loans drawn for examining compliance with other regulatory requirements.", "In addition to the prudential regulators, other federal agencies conduct oversight of SCRA compliance. SCRA authorizes DOJ to commence a civil action against any person who engages in a pattern or practice of violating the act or if a violation of the act raises an issue of significant public importance. DOJ staff indicated that they consider military attorneys to be the most likely staff to help ensure that a servicemember is afforded their SCRA protections. For cases in which a military attorney is unable to obtain voluntary compliance from a mortgage servicer or other person or entity doing business with a servicemember, DOJ has a system in place to receive referrals for these cases and to open investigations. DOJ officials told us and military attorneys confirmed that, in most cases, military attorneys are able to resolve SCRA matters without referring them to DOJ. DOJ also receives referrals for SCRA investigations from private attorneys and individual servicemembers and their families. When DOJ receives an SCRA referral, officials investigate the matter and determine if a full investigation should be opened.Investigations can result in DOJ filing a civil action against the party in court for alleged SCRA violations, or a resolution with the party may be reached without filing the case in court.\nDOJ filed a total of five cases in court from 2007 through 2011 for SCRA violations. Two of these cases—BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP and Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc.—involved SCRA violations regarding servicemembers’ mortgages. In May 2011, DOJ took enforcement actions against both mortgage servicers for wrongfully foreclosing upon active duty servicemembers without obtaining court orders. DOJ alleged that both mortgage servicers did not consistently check the military status of borrowers on whom they foreclosed, resulting in 165 improper foreclosures between 2006 and December 2010 (as listed previously in table 1). In its enforcement actions, DOJ required each of these mortgage servicers to pay damages to servicemembers and conduct a variety of remedial actions. For example, BAC Home Loans Servicing agreed to pay at least $20 million to resolve the lawsuit, and Saxon Mortgage Services agreed to pay at least $2.35 million. The mortgage servicers were also required to, among other things, (1) implement revised SCRA policies and procedures for using the DMDC website, (2) implement a foreclosure monitoring program, (3) provide SCRA compliance training to all applicable employees, and (4) conduct reviews to identify additional servicemembers who may have had their SCRA rights violated and compensate them. Appendix II discusses these reviews in more detail. In addition to the 5 SCRA cases DOJ filed in court, DOJ opened 45 additional SCRA investigations from referrals it received between 2007 and 2011, 9 of which involved servicemembers’ mortgages. One of these referrals involved a servicemember’s request to waive the prepayment penalty on her mortgage when she received a permanent change-of-station order and sold her home to move closer to the new base. DOJ was able to reach a resolution with the mortgage servicer without trying the case in court. Another investigation involved allegations of a mortgage servicer charging interest in excess of the SCRA maximum of 6 percent. DOJ officials stated that this investigation was resolved in favor of the servicemember. Finally, in February 2012, DOJ settled with five of the nation’s largest mortgage servicers for a variety of improper mortgage servicing procedures, including allegations of SCRA violations. More information on the National Mortgage Settlement is contained in appendix II.\nOther federal agencies that operate mortgage programs also oversee certain aspects of SCRA compliance. For example, to participate in FHA’s mortgage programs, mortgage servicers must comply with the agency’s program requirements, which include complying with all applicable laws and regulations, including SCRA. FHA officials explained that they use a risk-based approach to monitor the institutions that service the loans the agency insures. Officials told us that from 2007 through 2011, FHA conducted about 200 mortgage servicer monitoring reviews. They explained that each review consists of a sample of the mortgage servicer’s loan files and FHA staff use a checklist to help ensure that the mortgage servicer is in compliance with a variety of servicing requirements for each loan in the sample. One of the requirements reviewed for each loan is the distribution of the HUD counseling notice that includes information on SCRA eligibility to borrowers who are at least 45 days delinquent. Agency officials explained that a more thorough review of SCRA compliance is conducted if a mortgage servicer has identified that the borrower is an active duty servicemember. For loans that a mortgage servicer has marked with a code to indicate that the borrower is an active duty servicemember, FHA staff conduct additional steps to better ensure that the mortgage servicer has provided the servicemember appropriate SCRA protections, as well as additional protections that FHA provides to active duty servicemembers who have FHA-insured loans. These steps include ensuring that the interest rate has been appropriately adjusted and that foreclosure was postponed. FHA officials stated that they rely on mortgage servicers to appropriately identify active duty servicemembers. Although they may review SCRA compliance on specific loans, FHA officials told us that their reviews are not intended to assess the adequacy of the mortgage servicers’ SCRA compliance policies and procedures or to determine whether these policies are functioning for all of a servicer’s activities. As a result of FHA’s servicer monitoring reviews, some SCRA compliance problems have been identified. For example, FHA officials told us that between 2007 and 2011 the agency found two instances of SCRA noncompliance during its mortgage servicer monitoring reviews. One of these instances involved a mortgage servicer failing to send the HUD counseling notice that includes information on SCRA eligibility to borrowers delinquent 45 or more days, and the other violation involved a mortgage servicer failing to verify a borrower’s active duty status prior to foreclosure.\nAlthough VA interacts with mortgage servicers as part of its Home Loan Guaranty Program, VA officials explained that the program currently does not conduct in-depth reviews of mortgage servicers’ policies and procedures and loan files to review overall compliance with SCRA mortgage protections. The officials explained that they are in the process of finalizing a program that will conduct on-site audits of mortgage servicers’ functions and that they expect the program to be implemented in late 2012. VA officials explained that this program will include reviews of servicers’ loan files and policies and procedures for monitoring and identifying SCRA-eligible borrowers to determine servicers’ overall compliance with SCRA mortgage protections. Officials explained that in the wake of recently identified SCRA violations, they conducted a review of all VA loan files that were in foreclosure from October 2009 to January 2011 to determine if any of the borrowers were possibly eligible for SCRA mortgage protections. The officials said that they identified approximately 30,000 borrowers in foreclosure during that period and that they conducted an in-depth review of 47 loans that were potentially eligible for SCRA mortgage protections. VA determined that none of these borrowers were improperly foreclosed upon. They have recently expanded this review to include a longer time period, but as of June 2012, they had not completed the review to determine if any borrowers were improperly foreclosed upon.\nVA officials explained that they do conduct reviews of the adequacy of servicing being conducted by servicers. These reviews—Adequacy of Servicing reviews—are conducted on all loans over 120 days delinquent to determine if servicers have provided adequate servicing to borrowers, but according to VA officials, they are intended to explore loss mitigation options and not to examine for SCRA compliance. The officials explained that during these reviews, VA reviews mortgage servicers’ notes on the account to determine if they have provided adequate servicing to the borrower. Specifically, they check to see if the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, if a reason for default has been determined, if loss mitigation options have been considered, and why any loss mitigation options that were considered were not completed. Officials explained that if the mortgage servicer has taken the appropriate steps, VA would determine that the servicing provided was adequate. If VA determines that the servicing being provided was not adequate, or if the servicer was unable to contact the borrower, it conducts supplemental servicing on the loan and works with the borrower directly to explore loss mitigation options. According to VA officials, they may learn during these reviews that the loan involves an active duty servicemember. However, the Adequacy of Servicing reviews currently do not evaluate the extent to which servicers have assessed whether borrowers are eligible for SCRA mortgage protections. They also explained that while their procedures for conducting these reviews do not address reviewing for compliance with SCRA mortgage protections, VA loan technicians encourage borrowers to review their SCRA mortgage protections with military attorneys. Additionally, VA officials explained that they do not have a mechanism for tracking if these reviews have identified SCRA-eligible borrowers. As part of VA’s mission to serve servicemembers, VA officials told us that they try to ensure that servicemembers have received every opportunity to keep their homes and avoid foreclosure. VA officials explained that they rely on federal regulators to investigate and enforce statutory requirements, such as SCRA. However, given that VA staff also oversee servicers’ activities, they do have the opportunity to review servicers’ efforts to determine SCRA eligibility, such as by making an inquiry with the servicer of the loan or consulting DOD records to determine if the borrower is an active duty servicemember. Without such a review, the extent to which the agency is ensuring servicemembers are receiving all protections to which they are entitled is not clear.\nThe enterprises—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—also conduct SCRA compliance monitoring at the mortgage servicers that service loans on their behalf. This monitoring focuses on enforcing contractual requirements between the enterprises and mortgage servicers to ensure that mortgage servicers are following the servicing guidelines issued by the enterprises. The servicing guidelines outline mortgage servicers’ compliance obligations for several different laws and regulations, including SCRA. The SCRA components of the guidelines include information for mortgage servicers on, among other things, how SCRA relief is initiated and how interest rates are reduced, as well as foreclosure proceedings and credit reporting. Enterprise officials explained that SCRA compliance is not included in each review conducted. If it is included, Fannie Mae officials explained that examiners seek to understand how a mortgage servicer checks for SCRA compliance and conducts testing of the servicers accounting methods for SCRA compliance. For example, if a servicemember has an interest rate that is greater than 6 percent, examiners test to ensure that interest rate and payment amounts have been properly reduced. Freddie Mac officials told us they assess the mortgage servicer’s understanding of SCRA and the procedures in place to ensure compliance. The enterprises’ SCRA compliance monitoring efforts have identified some instances of noncompliance. For example, Fannie Mae identified 13 instances of noncompliance with its SCRA guidelines between 2007 and 2011, and Freddie Mac has identified 2 instances. These instances of noncompliance involved issues such as mortgage servicers not having comprehensive SCRA compliance policies and procedures and mortgage servicers not properly verifying the active duty status of servicemembers. Officials from FHFA—the enterprises’ regulator—stated that its supervisory focus for SCRA compliance is to confirm that the enterprises are taking steps to ensure that the mortgage servicers with which they have contracts comply with the contracts’ requirements which include compliance with applicable laws.\nAlthough the prudential regulators, FHA, VA, and FHFA all have a role in helping ensure that mortgage servicers provide appropriate SCRA protections to eligible servicemembers, currently none of these entities share information related to SCRA compliance with one another. While the extent of oversight conducted by these entities varies, they do review for some of the same SCRA provisions, such as those related to interest rate reductions and foreclosures. Furthermore, some of the mortgage servicers that participate in FHA’s and VA’s loan programs and service loans on behalf of the enterprises are also subject to oversight by one of the prudential regulators, which review for SCRA compliance during their examinations. Although these agencies obtain SCRA-related information about many of the same institutions, FHA, VA, and FHFA officials stated that they have not coordinated with the prudential regulators on SCRA compliance issues. Further, FHFA officials stated that while they participate in some forums with the prudential regulators to coordinate on various issues, they were not aware of any coordination related to SCRA compliance.\nGAO, Financial Market Regulation: Agencies Engaged in Consolidated Supervision Can Strengthen Performance Measurement and Collaboration, GAO-07-154 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007). information about their fair lending oversight programs. For example, the agencies established the Interagency Fair Lending Task Force to develop a coordinated approach to address discrimination in lending and adopted a policy statement on how the various agencies were to conduct oversight and enforce the fair lending laws. At that time, federal officials said that coordinating on fair lending issues allows the agencies to exchange information on a range of common issues, informally discuss fair lending policy, and confer about current trends or challenges in fair lending oversight and enforcement. FHFA officials explained that the agency has existing memorandums of understanding with prudential regulators and HUD that establish the protocols they use to discuss trends, risks, and other emerging issues on a variety of topics with these other agencies, but that SCRA has not been a topic during these discussions. FHFA does not currently have a memorandum of understanding with VA to share information, but the officials explained that they have worked with the agency in the past on issues such as appraisals and that they have done so through letter arrangements that allow them to share information. These existing arrangements could provide a mechanism for SCRA information to be shared between FHFA and the prudential regulators, FHA, and VA. However, currently no such sharing arrangements exist between the prudential regulators, FHA, and VA. Although FHA, VA, and the enterprises that FHFA oversees have identified limited instances of SCRA violations in recent years, the sharing of information related to SCRA trends, emerging risks, or types of weaknesses found in mortgage servicers’ policies among all agencies that play a role in SCRA compliance oversight could increase awareness of potential problems and improve their ability to identify SCRA violations.", "", "Under SCRA, DOD services’ Secretaries and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the primary responsibility for ensuring that servicemembers receive information on their SCRA rights and protections. Servicemembers are informed of their SCRA rights in a variety of ways. For example, briefings are provided on military bases and during deployment activities; legal assistance attorneys provide counseling; and a number of outreach media, such as publications and websites, are aimed at informing servicemembers of their SCRA rights. According to DOD officials, the legal assistance attorneys are primarily responsible for leading the military’s SCRA education efforts. Each of the military services, including the Coast Guard under DHS, operates a number of legal assistance offices throughout the country. Legal assistance offices are operated by military and civilian legal assistance attorneys who are responsible for providing support to servicemembers on a variety of legal issues, including family law and estate planning. As part of their responsibilities, they inform servicemembers about their rights and benefits under SCRA.\nLegal assistance attorneys provide SCRA support to servicemembers using various methods. We spoke with legal assistance attorneys at six military installations across the five services. They told us that they provide servicemembers with information on SCRA during routine briefings on military installations, in handouts, and during one-on-one sessions with individual servicemembers. Two legal assistance attorneys told us that they alert installation staff, including unit commanders, to direct servicemembers to their legal assistance offices if they have a problem. Legal assistance attorneys also told us that they will contact depository institutions on behalf of servicemembers to help them receive their SCRA protections. Some legal assistance attorneys also told us that they provide templates of letters for servicemembers to send to their mortgage servicer to request a reduction in their mortgage interest rate. Additionally, legal assistance attorneys told us that they will refer servicemembers to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Military Pro Bono Project if they are unable to resolve an SCRA matter for a servicemember. ABA’s program connects active duty servicemembers to pro bono attorneys who assist them with civil legal problems.\nSCRA requires that servicemembers be informed of the rights and protections available under SCRA upon entry into the military, during initial orientation training, and, in the cases of members of the reserve components, when called to active duty for a period of more than 1 Predeployment briefings generally occur at the military installation year. that deploys the servicemember and, in addition to SCRA, cover a range of other legal and financial issues, such as the preparation of wills and powers of attorney. According to DOD officials, members of the reserve components may receive this briefing numerous times at their home station prior to deployment. Servicemembers are also provided with an additional opportunity to learn about their rights under SCRA upon returning from deployment. According to DOD officials, because some SCRA protections extend for a 9- or 12-month period beyond servicemembers’ active duty service, obtaining information at the end of deployment is critical for those servicemembers who will no longer be on active duty and will lose access to military-provided legal assistance. As a result, the Army reserve component—which includes the Army Reserve and Army National Guard and is the largest portion of the reserve components—requires that members receive standardized post- deployment training on SCRA.\nDOD and DHS use a number of other methods to deliver SCRA information to servicemembers, including military training courses, publications, websites, and other family support services. For example, DHS officials told us that all Coast Guard members are informed of their SCRA rights during basic training. Some others may receive additional SCRA training during their initial officer training at the Coast Guard Academy or other advanced classes. DOD also publishes general articles in newsletters and installation publications explaining servicemembers’ SCRA rights and more specific articles on the relationship between mortgage difficulties and SCRA. Additionally, several military websites contain information on SCRA, including websites for individual services and military installations and sites such as Military OneSource—a DOD online resource that is staffed with counselors who offer assistance to servicemembers on a variety of topics, including financial counseling. DOD also provides financial management and family support services through the family readiness centers located at military installations. These centers provide general financial management counseling on topics such as reducing debt and saving for college to servicemembers’ families during periods of deployment and also share information on SCRA and refer family members to the legal assistance office if they have an SCRA issue.", "Other federal agencies also provide SCRA outreach and support to servicemembers and financial institutions in a variety of ways, including oral briefings, written notifications, and websites. For example, VA officials told us that some servicemembers who leave active duty service participate in a multiday briefing conducted in partnership with VA, DOD, and the Department of Labor. This briefing discusses reentering civilian life, SCRA protections, and veterans’ benefits. Additionally, both VA and FHA provide SCRA-related outreach to the institutions that participate in their mortgage programs. For example, VA periodically sends written notifications to all of its loan servicers reminding them of their compliance responsibilities and alerts them to changes in the act when they occur. FHA also provides information to its mortgage servicers on SCRA. Its website contains a list of questions and answers for mortgage servicers on SCRA, servicemembers’ eligibility criteria, and FHA policies with respect to servicing FHA-insured mortgages in compliance with SCRA.\nThe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has an Office of Servicemember Affairs that also plays a role in providing SCRA outreach to servicemembers and mortgage servicers responsible for complying with the act. As of May 30, 2012, CFPB officials had conducted 37 visits to military installations and National Guard units and met with legal assistance attorneys to discuss consumer protection issues servicemembers have been facing, including SCRA. CFPB also sent letters to 25 large mortgage servicers in 2011 alerting them of servicemembers’ rights under SCRA and their responsibilities to comply with the act. The letters specifically urged mortgage servicers to educate their employees about SCRA and review their loan files to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally, CFPB has held meetings in which representatives from DOD and DHS and other federal agencies, financial institutions, and trade associations discussed issues related to SCRA compliance. CFPB officials also held a forum in which financial institutions discussed activities—some that go beyond those required by SCRA— they were undertaking to assist servicemembers’ with their mortgages. In July 2011, CFPB and the Judge Advocate Generals of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard developed a joint statement of principles to provide stronger protections for servicemembers in connection with consumer financial products and services. Finally, through its consumer response function, CFPB also works directly with servicemembers by collecting consumer complaints against depository institutions and coordinating those complaints with servicemembers’ depository institutions and if necessary, the appropriate legal assistance offices.\nFinally, military servicemember groups also assist servicemembers with SCRA issues. Organizations such as the National Military Family Association, the Military Officers Association of America, the Reserve Officers Association, and others provide information on SCRA to their members in a variety of ways. A representative from one military servicemember group explained that its website—which contains background information on SCRA and legal reviews of specific SCRA provisions—is the group’s primary means of providing information to servicemembers and the public on SCRA issues. Other representatives with whom we spoke said that they provide information to their members when changes to SCRA have occurred. For example, one military servicemember group highlights applicable legislative changes in weekly electronic notifications to its members.", "DOD officials, legal assistance attorneys, and representatives of military servicemember groups with whom we spoke noted a number of challenges with ensuring that servicemembers are aware of their SCRA protections. One main challenge cited was servicemembers’ retention of the SCRA information they receive from DOD and DHS. Attorneys at each of the six legal assistance offices told us that servicemembers are not aware of the full extent of their SCRA rights. In addition, several military servicemember group representatives, a National Guard Bureau official, and an SCRA expert told us that despite available information on SCRA, servicemembers are not adequately prepared to invoke their rights when needed.\nAccording to DOD officials, the bulk of the SCRA education provided to servicemembers occurs at military installations that focus on regular active duty servicemembers. However, members of the reserve components—those most likely to qualify for SCRA’s mortgage protections—may not be located at military installations and, therefore, have less access to these services and trainings. One DOD official told us that members of the reserve components may receive SCRA briefings at their home station. However, legal assistance attorneys at five of the six legal assistance offices with whom we spoke told us that members of the reserve components have limited access to legal assistance offices on military installations when they are not on active duty. Having this limited access to legal assistance could affect reserve components members’ ability to avail themselves of their SCRA protections when needed. Additionally, some members of the reserve components face geographic challenges with accessing legal assistance offices due to their distance from military installations. About half of the military installations in the United States are located in just 10 states, while members of the reserve components live throughout the country. For example, the Chief Legal Assistant for the Ninth Coast Guard District explained that the legal assistance office for that district is located in Cleveland, Ohio, but the office provides legal services to the entire Great Lakes Region.\nAnother challenge in ensuring that servicemembers are aware of their SCRA protections when needed is the effectiveness of the educational briefings provided by DOD and DHS. As discussed above, SCRA requires that servicemembers receive SCRA training upon entry into the military, during initial orientation training, and, for members of the reserve components, when called to active duty for a period of more than 1 year. However, legal assistance attorneys who conduct this training and military servicemember groups explained that its effectiveness is diminished because of the volume of information presented, the timing of the training, and the availability of legal assistance resources. For example, four military officials told us that during predeployment activities and annual National Guard weekend training activities, servicemembers attend multiple, back-to-back briefings, which cover a variety of legal and financial issues that are focused on a number of important topics, such as family law and estate planning. One military attorney referred to these briefings as “baptism by a fire hose” when trying to illustrate the volume of information provided to servicemembers at these critical times. Further, military attorneys with whom we spoke told us that the amount of time legal assistance attorneys are able to spend with servicemembers during pre- and postdeployment activities is limited due to the volume of servicemembers deploying and returning from deployment. For example, one military attorney told us that legal assistance attorneys might assist 250 deploying servicemembers with their legal affairs prior to deployment and that during deployment there is limited time available to provide legal assistance. Another legal assistance attorney stated that it would be beneficial for members of the reserve components to have more time to access military legal assistance resources when they return from deployment because of concerns that they do not retain the information they receive during postdeployment briefings. One legal assistance attorney that assists members of the reserves specifically explained that when he provides SCRA-related briefings to deployed servicemembers who should have received SCRA briefings prior to deployment; many seem like they are hearing the information for the first time. He suggested that servicemembers’ retention of information could be improved if deploying servicemembers receive more comprehensive briefings with smaller groups of servicemembers. Additionally, a National Guard Bureau official told us that predeployment briefings contain too much information for servicemembers to absorb, including the relatively small portions of the briefings that include information on SCRA. These methods of providing SCRA information to servicemembers raise concerns about their ability to retain the information they receive during these trainings.\nWithout adequate awareness, servicemembers may not take full advantage of their protections under SCRA. As discussed above, the methods of SCRA training and outreach provided by DOD and DHS to regular active duty servicemembers and members of the reserve components may not be adequate to ensure that these servicemembers are aware of and benefiting from the full protections provided by the act.\nIn 2008, DOD asked in its annual Status of Forces Surveys if active duty servicemembers and members of the reserve components had received SCRA trainings. Forty-seven percent of members of the reserve components—including those who had been activated in 2008—reported in the survey that they had received SCRA training and only 35 percent of regular active duty servicemembers reported that they had received training. While these numbers may not reflect the number of servicemembers who received SCRA training, they do provide an indication as to the number of servicemembers who recalled receiving such training. DOD also surveys servicemembers on a variety of issues related to their benefits; however, according to DOD officials who conduct these surveys, servicemembers have not been surveyed on the effectiveness of DOD’s SCRA educational efforts. DHS officials also told us they have not evaluated the effectiveness of their SCRA education methods to members of the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve. In addition to surveying servicemembers on the effectiveness of SCRA- related education methods, DOD and DHS could use other techniques to assess the effectiveness of their education efforts. For example, servicemembers could be tested after a period of time to determine how much information they retained from the SCRA component of their predeployment briefings. Additionally, focus groups could be held with servicemembers to review the understandability of written materials provided on SCRA. Without understanding the extent to which existing SCRA educational efforts are effective, DOD and DHS are not able to determine if their methods are adequate to ensure that servicemembers avail themselves of the benefits to which they are entitled.", "Ensuring that mortgage servicers fully comply with SCRA can protect servicemembers from undue financial harm. Our analysis of risk-based compliance examinations conducted by the four prudential regulators estimated that about half of all the depository institutions that serviced mortgages were reviewed for SCRA compliance from 2007 through 2011. However, during these examinations, examiners only conducted testing of loan files at 41 of the 83 institutions for which we reviewed the procedures used by examiners over the 5-year period to verify that mortgage servicers’ SCRA compliance processes and controls were functioning properly. For these 41 institutions, examiners did not use the testing procedures most likely to detect instances of noncompliance. Examination guidance and auditing standards suggest that testing is a part of effective monitoring. Furthermore, additional testing of loan files using methods that provide greater assurance of compliance is warranted given that thousands of violations at some large mortgage servicers have been documented through federal agencies’ targeted reviews and mortgage servicers’ own internal reviews, but not through the prudential regulators’ routine compliance examinations. Without additional testing of foreclosure files and, as appropriate, other mortgage loan files not identified by the depository institution as SCRA-eligible, and without employing testing methods that provide greater assurance of compliance, prudential regulators may not be able to determine whether these institutions are extending protections to all eligible servicemembers.\nAlthough not a direct regulator of financial institutions that service mortgages, VA does interact with mortgage servicers as part of its Home Loan Guaranty program and therefore has an interest in ensuring that these institutions are complying with SCRA. However, the current level of monitoring that VA conducts of mortgage servicers that participate in its program provides little assurance that eligible servicemembers with VA- guaranteed loans are receiving their full SCRA mortgage protections. By not routinely reviewing mortgage servicers’ overall compliance with SCRA mortgage protections, the agency cannot be assured that mortgage servicers participating in its program have policies and procedures that function properly to provide these protections. The agency’s development of a new program to conduct on-site audits of mortgage servicers’ overall operations provides a good opportunity for the agency to expand its efforts related to SCRA compliance. Further, if VA determines that servicers’ loss mitigation efforts have either not been successful or adequate during its Adequacy of Servicing reviews, it provides supplemental servicing on loans. During its Adequacy of Servicing reviews and while conducting supplemental servicing, VA would have the opportunity to take steps to determine if servicers assessed whether borrowers were eligible for SCRA protections. Because the agency’s entire mission is dedicated to benefiting individuals who have served the country through military service, expanding its procedures to review for SCRA compliance at mortgage servicers that participate in its mortgage program could help the agency achieve its mission and better ensure that servicemembers are receiving all benefits to which they are entitled.\nBecause multiple federal agencies’ play a role in ensuring that mortgage servicers provide SCRA protections to eligible servicemembers, sharing information on SCRA compliance could benefit these agencies’ respective SCRA oversight efforts. Most agencies responsible for SCRA oversight conduct risk-based reviews and therefore do not always include SCRA compliance in their reviews. Sharing information on SCRA compliance issues could alert agencies to potential problems and improve agencies’ ability to identify SCRA violations. We have previously found that collaboration among supervisory agencies can lead to more effective supervision and that such collaboration does occur for certain consumer compliance laws. However, no such sharing of information related to SCRA compliance information currently takes place routinely between the prudential regulators, FHA, VA, and FHFA. Further, because these entities monitor SCRA compliance at many of the same institutions, the sharing of information could help them to more quickly identify compliance problems that may adversely affect servicemembers. Many of these agencies already have existing mechanisms for sharing information that could be used or expanded to periodically share information on SCRA compliance.\nThe Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Homeland Security are responsible for educating servicemembers on their SCRA rights. DOD and DHS provide this information through a variety of methods throughout servicemembers’ military careers. However, servicemembers may often be unaware of their SCRA rights for a variety of reasons, such as the volume and variety of information they must retain from educational briefings. Members of the reserve components in particular face unique challenges that can affect whether they learn of and are able to obtain assistance with SCRA protections because they have more limited access to military legal assistance locations and to SCRA-related training opportunities. Additionally, the recently created CFPB’s Office of Servicemember Affairs has been working with DOD and DHS to identify opportunities to increase servicemembers’ awareness of SCRA protections and its results could provide useful information to assist in this effort. While DOD has surveyed servicemembers on whether they had received SCRA training, neither DOD nor DHS has assessed the effectiveness of their educational methods to determine if better ways exist to ensure that servicemembers retain the information they receive on SCRA and can recall it when they need it. Without such an assessment, such as by using focus groups of servicemembers or testing to reinforce retention of SCRA information, DOD and DHS may not be able to ensure they are reaching servicemembers in the most effective manner.", "To better ensure SCRA compliance oversight, we recommend that the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration take steps to increase the frequency with which examiners (1) conduct testing of foreclosure files and as applicable, other mortgage loan files; and (2) employ testing methods that provide greater assurance that mortgage servicers are complying with SCRA.\nTo help ensure that VA assists servicemembers with remaining in their homes and avoiding foreclosure, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that a review for SCRA compliance is included in the department’s new mortgage servicer monitoring program and that additional steps to assess SCRA compliance are taken by VA staff during its Adequacy of Servicing reviews and while conducting supplemental servicing.\nAdditionally, to increase agencies’ awareness of potential problems with SCRA compliance, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration, the Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should explore options to use existing mechanisms or develop new ones to share information related to SCRA compliance oversight.\nFinally, the Secretary of Defense—through the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy—and the Secretary of Homeland Security should assess the effectiveness of their efforts to educate servicemembers on SCRA to determine better ways for making servicemembers aware of their SCRA rights and benefits, including improving the ways in which members of the reserve components obtain such information.", "We requested comments on a draft of this report from CFPB, DHS, DOJ, DOD, FDIC, Federal Reserve, FHFA, HUD, NCUA, OCC, and VA. We received formal written comments from DHS, DOD, FDIC, Federal Reserve, FHFA, HUD, NCUA, OCC, and VA; these are presented in appendixes III through XI, respectively. We also received technical comments from CFPB, DOJ, DOD, FDIC, Federal Reserve, FHFA, OCC, and VA, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nFederal Reserve, NCUA, and OCC agreed to take actions in response to our recommendations that they increase the frequency with which their examiners conduct testing of mortgage and foreclosure files and employ testing methods that will provide greater assurance of mortgage servicers’ compliance with SCRA.\nThe Federal Reserve’s Director of the Division of Consumer and Community Affairs noted that Federal Reserve examiners apply interagency examination procedures to test the sufficiency of a depository institution’s program for ensuring its employees provide appropriate protections to active duty servicemembers, and that it will work with the other federal financial regulators to consider appropriate ways to update the interagency SCRA examination procedures. The Director’s letter notes that Federal Reserve considers interviews with bank staff and reviews institutions’ compliance management systems to be types of examiner testing. Although our report acknowledges that such steps can provide useful information regarding an institution’s SCRA compliance, we recommended that the regulators provide greater assurance of SCRA compliance by increasing the frequency of loan file testing.\nNCUA’s Executive Director agreed that additional testing of loan files would provide greater assurance of SCRA compliance. His letter also notes that NCUA has made recent changes to its examination process to raise the importance of consumer protection issues, noting that beginning with its 2011 examinations, staff separate from safety and soundness examiners review the lending practices of federal credit unions to ensure compliance with SCRA. Further, NCUA noted that it has also incorporated reviews for SCRA compliance into its analysis and investigations of complaints.\nThe Comptroller of the Currency noted that OCC will update its examination guidelines to ensure that a review of SCRA compliance is conducted during each supervisory cycle for its regulated institutions, and that such reviews will include the testing of loan files selected using an appropriate methodology to assess compliance with SCRA.\nFDIC’s Director of their Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection did not comment on our recommendation but agreed that testing a representative sample of loans for compliance with SCRA is an effective tool to assess compliance with SCRA for large mortgage servicers. However, his letter also noted that having examiners interview bank employees also serves as an effective tool for assessing compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations, and that such interviews are often used to verify that the depository institution is conducting sufficient employee training and is enforcing its policies and procedures. We agree that conducting interviews of depository institution personnel can be a useful procedure to examine for SCRA compliance, but supplementing such actions with increased testing of loan files provides an even greater level of assurance that an institution is complying with SCRA.\nVA concurred with our recommendation that they ensure that a review for SCRA compliance is included in its new mortgage servicer monitoring program and also indicated their staff would be taking additional steps to assess SCRA compliance during Adequacy of Servicing reviews and while conducting supplemental servicing. In a written response, VA’s Chief of Staff noted several activities the agency conducts to help ensure that veterans are aware of their SCRA protections. He stated that VA will revalidate and, as necessary, revise its focus and procedures to ensure veteran borrowers are receiving all SCRA protections to which they are entitled. Additionally, he noted that VA will include in its mortgage servicer monitoring program a review to ensure that servicers’ appropriately afford SCRA-eligible borrowers their mortgage protections as part of their loss mitigation efforts. Finally, he said that VA will incorporate additional steps into its Adequacy of Servicing reviews to assess whether the servicer appropriately provided SCRA mortgage protections to eligible borrowers.\nFederal Reserve, FHFA, HUD, NCUA, OCC, and VA agreed with our recommendation that the federal agencies involved in overseeing mortgage servicers’ SCRA compliance should explore using existing mechanisms or developing new ones to share information related to SCRA compliance oversight.\nFederal Reserve Division of Consumer and Community Affairs Director noted that additional interagency collaboration related to SCRA compliance trends and emerging risks may be appropriate and useful in improving supervisory practices related to SCRA compliance, and she agreed to explore other opportunities to share information related to SCRA compliance with other federal agencies. She stated that their staff are currently planning an interagency servicemember financial protection webinar for financial industry participants that is to include panelists from the federal supervisory agencies, as well as representatives from other agencies with SCRA oversight responsibility.\nFHFA’s Deputy Director for the Division of Enterprise Regulation also agreed that increased information sharing among supervisors of mortgage lending industry participants could assist in identifying potential compliance problems and in some cases could improve the identification of SCRA violations. He noted that FHFA’s supervision function will consider whether the agency’s existing memorandums of understanding are sufficient or should be expanded to cover more types of information or more agencies to broaden information sharing on issues of supervisory concern, including SCRA compliance. He also noted that the supervision function would consider whether compliance oversight would be improved by developing processes for more frequent routine communications with supervisors of other market participants subject to mortgage lending compliance requirements.\nHUD’s Acting Assistant Secretary for Housing-Federal Housing Commissioner agreed that HUD should participate in agencies’ discussions to explore options to share information related to SCRA compliance, noting that HUD’s should be a participatory role rather than a leadership one because it does not have responsibility for overseeing SCRA. Her letter also notes they believe that the scope of such collaboration should be broadened beyond just SCRA compliance to include all agencies’ mutual interests in single family housing issues, which we agree could be useful.\nThe NCUA Executive Director’s letter notes that NCUA will use its participation in FFIEC and other interagency working groups to share information regarding the supervision of financial institutions and compliance concerns, and that it currently shares information with CFPB regarding consumer compliance oversight and is working with federal financial regulators to develop tools to facilitate information sharing.\nThe Comptroller of the Currency stated in his response that OCC will continue to be an active member of the FFIEC Task Force on Consumer Compliance, which is an interagency organization that works collectively to develop examiner guidance and examination procedures and to discuss emerging risks or trends regarding new products and services. He also noted that OCC, the other prudential regulators, and CFPB have signed a memorandum of understanding on supervisory coordination that outlines the coordination of examinations and the sharing of compliance oversight information, including information on SCRA.\nVA’s Chief of Staff noted that VA will collaborate with the agencies involved in SCRA compliance oversight to share information related to SCRA compliance.\nFDIC did not comment on this recommendation.\nDHS concurred and DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that they assess the effectiveness of their efforts to educate servicemembers on SCRA to determine better ways for making servicemembers aware of their SCRA rights and benefits, including improving the ways in which members of the reserve components obtain such information. DHS’s Director of Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office noted that the Coast Guard strives to keep all its members fully aware of SCRA benefits and rights and that it will explore measures to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in the future. DOD’s Office of Legal Policy Director stated that the education and protection of servicemembers is DOD’s highest priority and that it continuously evaluates the effectiveness of training to servicemembers on their protections under SCRA and that it will continue to do so bearing our recommendation in mind. His letter also notes that DOD recently testified before Congress on efforts to conduct a survey on financial issues affecting servicemembers which will further inform DOD’s efforts.\nWe are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the U.S. Attorney General. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8678 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix XII.", "Our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) eligibility, the number of violations that have occurred, and practices financial institutions use to comply with SCRA; (2) what oversight financial regulators and other federal agencies have taken to help ensure depository institutions’ compliance with the act; and (3) actions the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and others have taken to ensure that servicemembers and others are informed of protections provided under the act. With the exception of our regulatory compliance review, the scope of our review includes only SCRA protections related to servicemembers’ residential mortgages.", "To describe what is known about the practices depository institutions use to comply with SCRA, we interviewed representatives from a non- generalizable sample of four large mortgage servicers and one national consumer credit reporting agency about their SCRA compliance practices and challenges and reviewed relevant policies and procedures. We selected 4 mortgage servicers that were among the 10 largest based on data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) on the unpaid principal balance of residential mortgages institutions own and service, plus mortgage loans they service on behalf of other institutions, and mortgage servicers that had participated in either the prudential regulators’ interagency review of foreclosure policies and practices or the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s investigation. We interviewed representatives of financial industry trade associations, including those that represent the mortgage industry, depository institutions with a large military customer base, and the credit reporting industry. We also interviewed officials from DOD’s Defense Manpower Data Center, which operates the website that depository institutions and others use to verify the active duty status of servicemembers. To determine what is known about SCRA violations that have occurred we reviewed letters from 10 large mortgage servicers written in response to a House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform investigation on mortgage servicers’ SCRA compliance history and practices. We also reviewed data on SCRA violations found during bank and credit union examinations conducted from 2007 through 2011 by the prudential regulators—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). We also reviewed available information from legal actions taken by the Department of Justice (DOJ) against two mortgage servicers for SCRA violations and a class action settlement against a large mortgage servicer for SCRA violations. Finally, we reviewed DOJ, Federal Reserve, and OCC enforcement actions against mortgage servicers for, among other things, foreclosure documentation problems that require the mortgage servicers to conduct reviews, which are currently ongoing, to determine historical SCRA violations.", "To assess the oversight prudential regulators have taken to help ensure depository institutions’ compliance with SCRA, we reviewed their examination policies and procedures and interviewed agency officials about their oversight activities related to SCRA. We also reviewed interagency examination procedures and checklists the regulators developed in 2009 to aid their oversight of SCRA. To assess the extent to which prudential regulators examined for SCRA, we selected a stratified random sample of 160 institutions from the population of all depository institutions that serviced mortgages as of November 2011 for institutions regulated by FDIC, Federal Reserve, and OCC, and September 2011 for institutions regulated by NCUA. We developed a certainty stratum composed of the 10 largest institutions regulated by each of the four prudential regulators—FDIC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, and OCC—for a total of 40 institutions. The remaining 120 institutions comprised an additional four strata of institutions of varying sizes—one stratum per prudential regulator. We used the Call Reports to identify mortgage servicers based on data the institutions reported on the unpaid principal balance of residential mortgages they own and service, plus mortgage loans they service on behalf of other institutions. We selected credit unions that service mortgage loans using data from the SNL Financial Database on the unpaid principal balance of real estate loans owned and serviced, plus those serviced on behalf of other institutions. We confirmed our use of the relevant mortgage variables with the SNL Financial Database with NCUA. We excluded any depository institutions that did not service mortgages. We then used these data to select a stratified random sample from the population of depository institutions that service mortgages. While we initially selected a sample of 160 institutions (40 for each regulator), we excluded 8 of the selected institutions from our analysis. Three institutions regulated by the Federal Reserve were excluded because they were recently chartered and therefore had not had an examination. We also excluded five credit unions because they were state-chartered, meaning that state supervisory authorities and not NCUA served as the primary regulator for these institutions. Table 2 provides more detail on the population, sample, and sample disposition by stratum.\nTo determine the extent to which prudential regulators included SCRA compliance within the scope of their examinations, we requested SCRA- related examination workpapers, as well as documents examiners prepare to determine the scope of their examinations for all consumer compliance examinations the prudential regulators conducted from 2007 through 2011. We reviewed examinations conducted over a 5-year period because regulatory officials told us that they may not conduct an examination for a particular institution every 12 months, and because SCRA might not be covered in each risk-based examination. We relied on the examination documentation provided to us by the prudential regulators to represent the full universe of examinations that were conducted for each institution in our sample between 2007 and 2011. We did not independently verify that the examination documentation they provided to us represented the full universe of examinations they conducted over this period. We reviewed the documents we received and developed a data collection instrument (DCI) to capture the information we found in the examination documentation in a consistent manner. We determined that a depository institution had received an SCRA compliance review if examination workpapers revealed an SCRA compliance review for any type of loan product covered by the act (for example, residential mortgages, automobile loans, or credit cards loans). We aggregated this examination-level data to the institution level and used the data to produce estimates of the percentage of all institutions for which the prudential regulators included an SCRA compliance review within an examination at least once during the 5-year period. Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample of institutions is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (for example, plus or minus 10 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. For estimates used in this report, we report the 95 percent confidence intervals along with the estimates themselves. We also report percentages based on the 10 largest institutions per regulator. Since these percentages are based on the total population of such institutions, they have no sampling error and consequently confidence intervals are not reported for these percentages.\nWe reviewed examination workpapers and used our DCI to document the procedures examiners indicated they used to assess SCRA compliance. We only noted the examination procedures for SCRA compliance reviews that involved residential mortgage loans or did not specify the type of loan product covered. Eighty-three institutions in our sample met these criteria. SCRA examination procedures for exams that solely focused on other loan products, such as credit cards and automobile loans, were outside the scope of our review. We then grouped the data we collected on examination procedures into four categories:\nRequests for information from depository institutions. This includes activities such as requests for institutions’ internal audit results, policies and procedures, SCRA complaints, and lists of SCRA loans.\nInterviews with depository institution personnel. This includes activities in which examiners interviewed staff at the depository institution for information on, among other things, their compliance management systems and whether the institution services SCRA loans.\nAssessments of depository institutions’ compliance management systems. This category includes instances in which examiners documented that they reviewed the quality of depository institutions’ compliance management systems, such as reviewing institutions’ SCRA policies and procedures, internal controls, and training programs.\nTesting loan files for SCRA compliance. This category includes activities such as testing a limited or statistical sampling of loans the institution identified as SCRA-eligible or conducting more comprehensive testing, such as reviewing a statistical sample of loan files.\nTable 3 provides additional detail on the individual examination activities that comprise each of these categories.\nWe reviewed prudential regulators’ examination guidance and government auditing standards, which note that various activities can provide increasing levels of assurance that reviewed entities are following their stated policies and procedures and that internal controls are functioning. Based on this review, we grouped examiners’ documented examination procedures into four categories based on our professional judgment as to the extent to which the examination activities involved verification of assertions made by the depository institution regarding compliance with SCRA. For example, based on our categories, category 1—requests for information from depository institutions—provides the least assurance of SCRA compliance because it does not involve an assessment of compliance, but rather the collection of information. Category 2—interviews with depository institution personnel—also provides less assurance because it relies primarily on assertions provided by the institution. Whereas category 4—testing of loan files—provides the greatest assurance of SCRA compliance within our categories because testing loan files allows examiners to independently verify whether an institution’s compliance procedures are functioning properly and whether SCRA protections are being appropriately extended to eligible borrowers. Examination guidance from three of the four prudential regulators cite the testing of individual loan transactions as the most extensive level of review for assurance that a depository institution is complying with laws and regulations. They also indicate that testing a larger sample of loans, including a statistical sample, provides a fuller assessment of compliance than testing a limited sample. We placed institutions in each of the four categories based on the highest level of examination activity conducted from 2007 through 2011. The figures presented for this analysis are not generalizable to the population of institutions that service mortgages.\nTo describe the SCRA compliance oversight activities of other federal agencies, we reviewed DOJ’s policies and procedures for receiving SCRA referrals and investigating SCRA cases and interviewed agency officials. We also reviewed DOJ enforcement actions and investigations that DOJ was able to resolve without filing a court case related to servicemembers’ mortgages from 2007 through 2011. We also reviewed the SCRA compliance monitoring activities and policies and procedures of other federal agencies that play a role in the mortgage market. These agencies include the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and VA. We also reviewed the SCRA compliance monitoring efforts of two government-sponsored enterprises—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We reviewed the guidance these agencies and enterprises provide to mortgage servicers participating in their programs and interviewed agency officials.", "To determine what actions DOD, DHS, VA, and others have taken to ensure servicemembers are informed of their SCRA rights, we reviewed the act to determine what it requires agencies to do and interviewed two SCRA experts. To describe what actions individual agencies were taking to inform servicemembers of their rights, we reviewed DOD and DHS policies and procedures and SCRA training materials and publications, and interviewed representatives from these agencies, including officials from DOD’s Office of Legal Policy, DHS, and the National Guard Bureau. We also reviewed DOD’s Status of Forces surveys to active duty servicemembers and members of the reserve components to determine efforts DOD has taken to assess the effectiveness of its methods of educating servicemembers about SCRA benefits. We selected six military installation legal assistance offices (one for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard and two for the Air Force) based on a geographic distribution of states with high numbers of foreclosures and large active duty and reservist populations and interviewed legal assistance attorneys who work in these offices to learn how the attorneys teach servicemembers about their SCRA protections and discuss the challenges servicemembers face asserting those protections. The six installations were: Fort Drum, New York; Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas; Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas; Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California; Coast Guard 9th District Command Center, Ohio; and Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. We reviewed examples of SCRA training and outreach that these offices develop and distribute to servicemembers. To learn about the specific challenges that members of the reserve components face, we also spoke with legal assistance attorneys from the Naval Reserves and the Ohio National Guard who were recommended to us by legal assistance attorneys with whom we spoke.\nTo determine what actions other agencies, including VA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and FHA were taking to inform servicemembers and others of SCRA protections, we reviewed notifications they provide to mortgage servicers on SCRA compliance and interviewed officials at these agencies. We also interviewed representatives from the American Bar Association’s Legal Assistance for Military Personnel program to learn how they coordinate with legal assistance attorneys and assist servicemembers with SCRA issues. Finally, we interviewed representatives from seven military servicemember groups whose memberships represent a broad population of servicemembers and their families. These groups included the Reserve Officers Association, National Military Family Association, Military Officers Association of America, Air Force Sergeants Association, National Guard Association of the United States, Naval Enlisted Reserve Association, and Retired Enlisted Association.\nWe conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to July 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "As of June 2012, three federal agency reviews were under way to determine if servicemembers who were eligible for SCRA mortgage- related protections received them. A total of 14 mortgage servicers are involved in these reviews as a result of recent enforcement actions taken by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). While each review is separate, some overlap exists in the institutions and timeframes being reviewed. However, officials from DOJ told us they are coordinating the reviews to eliminate unnecessary duplication and overlap at institutions. DOJ also completed one review of a mortgage servicer—Saxon Mortgage Services—in May 2012.", "In response to deficiencies in the foreclosure process that various mortgage servicers publicly announced beginning in September 2010, OCC and the Federal Reserve conducted a coordinated (interagency) on- site review of 14 mortgage servicers to evaluate the adequacy of controls over their foreclosure processes and their policies and procedures for compliance with applicable federal and state laws. This review identified various weaknesses and deficiencies in these mortgage servicers’ foreclosure operations, including violations of SCRA. As a result of these reviews, OCC and the Federal Reserve issued consent orders to the 14 mortgage servicers and their affiliates in April 2011, requiring these institutions to make various corrective actions. One of these actions required each of the mortgage servicers to retain a third-party consultant to conduct independent reviews of foreclosure actions that were initiated, pending, or completed on primary residences from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, to identify borrowers who suffered financial injury as a result of errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies in foreclosure actions, and to remediate those borrowers, as appropriate. As part of these independent reviews, the consultants are required to review 100 percent of the foreclosure actions during 2009 and 2010 that involved servicemembers who may have been protected under SCRA.\nBecause examiners reviewed a relatively small number of foreclosure files during the original interagency review, the reviews required by the consent orders are intended to be more comprehensive. The consent orders require the third-party consultants to develop detailed sampling methodologies for identifying foreclosure actions to include in the review. These methodologies are subject to OCC’s and the Federal Reserve’s approval. OCC officials told us that, in conjunction with DOD and DOJ, they have worked with the third-party consultants to develop a process to access the Department of Defense’s Defense Manpower Data Center’s database with custom queries in order for the third-party consultants to accurately identify the pool of potential SCRA-eligible borrowers. To supplement the independent reviews, the regulators also required mortgage servicers and consultants to establish an outreach process for borrowers, including servicemembers, who believe they were financially harmed by improper foreclosure practices to request a review of their foreclosure case. These requests for review must be submitted to the mortgage servicers by September 30, 2012. According to officials from OCC and the Federal Reserve, as of May 2012, preliminary results from this review on instances of SCRA noncompliance were not available.", "On May 26, 2011, DOJ settled two cases against Saxon Mortgage Services and BAC Home Loans Servicing for allegations of violations of SCRA’s foreclosure provision.cases dictated that damages be paid to affected servicemembers and remedial actions be taken by the mortgage servicers. BAC Home Loans Servicing agreed to pay at least $20 million to resolve the lawsuit, and Saxon Mortgage Services agreed to pay at least $2.35 million. The consent orders also required the mortgage servicers to, among other things, (1) implement revised SCRA policies and procedures specifically about querying the Department of Defense’s Defense Manpower Data Center database that contains information on servicemembers’ active duty status, (2) implement a foreclosure monitoring program, (3) provide SCRA compliance training to all applicable employees, and (4) conduct reviews to identify additional servicemembers who may have had their SCRA rights violated and compensate them. The reviews required by the consent orders included the following: The consent orders for each of these\nSaxon Mortgage Services was required to review all nonjudicial foreclosures conducted from January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2010, to determine compliance with SCRA. This review was completed in May 2012 and a total of 22 servicemembers were identified as having been improperly foreclosed upon.\nBAC Home Loans Servicing is required to conduct reviews for both the foreclosure and interest-rate provisions of SCRA. Specifically, BAC Home Loans Servicing is to review all nonjudicial foreclosures it conducted from January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2010, for SCRA compliance. For the interest-rate review, the consent order required BAC Home Loans Servicing to retain an independent accounting firm to review a statistically valid sample of home mortgage files from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2010, and issue a report on whether the mortgage servicer appropriately applied interest rates and fees to servicemembers’ mortgages as required by SCRA.\nDOJ officials told us that, as of June 2012, the BAC Home Loans Servicing review is ongoing.", "In February 2012, DOJ and 49 state attorneys general settled with five of the largest national mortgage servicers for a variety of improper mortgage servicing procedures, including allegations of SCRA violations. The $25 billion settlement was one of the largest financial recoveries obtained by the attorneys general in history and contains a number of provisions related to SCRA designed to protect servicemembers’ rights and to provide them additional benefits. To resolve allegations of liability that have not previously been settled, five mortgage servicers—Ally Financial Inc., Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo & Company—agreed to conduct a full review, overseen by DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, to determine whether any servicemembers were foreclosed on in violation of SCRA since January 1, 2006. Additionally, four of the mortgage servicers— Ally Financial Inc., Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., and Wells Fargo & Company—agreed to conduct a thorough review of mortgage loans to determine whether any servicemember, since January 1, 2008, was charged interest in excess of 6 percent after submitting a valid request to lower the interest rate. The agreement also specifies compensation above the $25 billion settlement amount for any SCRA foreclosure or interest-rate violations. Compliance with the SCRA provisions of the settlement will be overseen by DOJ’s Civil Rights Division. Table 4 summarizes these three reviews.", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the individual named above, Cody Goebel, Assistant Director; Meghana Acharya; Rachel Batkins; Rudy Chatlos; Christine Houle; John McGrail; Mark Ramage; and Jennifer Schwartz made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "h2_title", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "h0_title h3_title", "", "h0_full h3_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full h3_full", "h0_title h2_full", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What oversight of SCRA has there been?", "What has been reviewed for SCRA compliance?", "What were limited institutes tested additionally for?", "To what extent was the examination of loans sufficient?", "What does the lack of oversight mean for SCRA practices?", "What other parties are involved in SCRA compliance oversight?", "How has the Department of Justice considered SCRA violations?", "How do other federal agencies handle SCRA compliance information?", "How could these agencies improve their oversight?", "How are servicemembers informed of their SCRA rights?", "How is this information distributed?", "What concern is there about the distribution of SCRA information?", "How effective is DOD and DHS's assement of their SCRA education methods?", "What does this lack of assessment mean?", "What is the purpose of the SCRA?", "Why is SCRA being reviewed?", "What is the GAO covering in their review?", "What information did the GAO collect for this report?", "How should regulators improve their SCRA practices?", "How should DOD and DHS improve their SCRA practices?", "How did the agencies respond to these GAO recommendations?" ], "summary": [ "Federal regulators’ oversight of SCRA compliance has been limited.", "GAO estimates that from 2007 through 2011 prudential depository institution regulators—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, National Credit Union Administration, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—reviewed 48 percent of all banks and credit unions for SCRA compliance.", "Of these institutions that were reviewed for SCRA compliance, only about half received examinations that involved testing of compliance by reviewing loan files.", "Further, GAO found that examiners had only reviewed loans identified by the institution as involving servicemembers and had not independently selected a statistical sample of loan files, which would have provided greater assurance of SCRA compliance.", "Without more testing, which examination and auditing guidance suggest provides increased verification, regulators are less likely to detect SCRA violations.", "Various other federal agencies are involved in SCRA compliance oversight.", "The Department of Justice has explicit SCRA enforcement authority and since 2007 has brought three cases against mortgage servicers for violations.", "The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Federal Housing Administration, and Federal Housing Finance Agency—which regulates the government-sponsored enterprises—all obtain information about SCRA compliance at the servicers that participate in the mortgage programs they administer or regulate, but the agencies and the prudential regulators do not share such information among themselves.", "Collaboration among these agencies could lead to more effective supervision and improve their awareness of potential problems with SCRA compliance. Further, VA oversight of mortgage servicers does not specifically review for SCRA compliance. By increasing its SCRA compliance monitoring efforts, VA could better ensure that servicemembers with VA loans are better protected.", "SCRA requires that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—which oversees the Coast Guard—inform servicemembers of their SCRA rights.", "The military services provide this information in various forms, such as briefings and websites.", "However, some military officials said that servicemembers—particularly members of the National Guard and reserve—often receive SCRA information as part of briefings with numerous other topics prior to deployment and do not always retain the necessary awareness when they need it later.", "DOD and DHS do not assess the effectiveness of their SCRA education methods, such as by using focus groups of servicemembers or testing to reinforce retention of SCRA information.", "Without such assessment, they may not be able to ensure that they are informing servicemembers of their rights in the most effective manner.", "SCRA protects servicemembers whose active duty military service prevents them from meeting financial obligations, by allowing interest rates on certain debts to be reduced and requiring a court order before certain foreclosures on their homes can occur.", "With foreclosures rising, reports surfaced of instances in which financial institutions failed to comply with SCRA.", "GAO examined the (1) eligibility for SCRA protections and extent of SCRA mortgage-related violations by depository institutions, (2) SCRA compliance oversight by prudential regulators and other federal agencies, and (3) the military services’ efforts to educate servicemembers on SCRA.", "GAO collected data on populations eligible for SCRA from DOD and SCRA violations from banking and law enforcement agencies and reviewed a stratified random sample of prudential regulators’ examinations of banks and credit unions. GAO also interviewed regulators, law enforcement and military officials, and military service organizations.", "Prudential regulators should conduct more extensive loan file testing for SCRA compliance. Regulators and other agencies that oversee mortgage activities should also explore opportunities for information sharing on SCRA compliance oversight, and VA should expand its SCRA compliance monitoring efforts.", "Finally, DOD and DHS should assess the effectiveness of their efforts to provide SCRA information to servicemembers.", "The agencies generally agreed and noted actions responsive to GAO’s recommendations." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1, 5, 5, 5, -1, 0, -1, -1, 3, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 4 ] }
CRS_R44946	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Congressional Actions", "Key Positions", "Special Envoys", "Special Representatives", "Coordinators", "Advisors", "Ambassadors-at-Large", "Miscellaneous Positions", "Compensation", "Issues for Congress", "Potential Advantages", "Potential Disadvantages", "Congressional Outlook" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "President George Washington set the precedent for making special, temporary diplomatic appointments in 1789 when he named Gouverneur Morris as a private agent to establish normal diplomatic relations with British officials. From that point on, the number of these temporary special representatives expanded and contracted, depending on each Administration's governing style and the issues at the time. As the United States became more deeply involved in world affairs, and as Presidents became more directly involved in international relations, the number of special appointments grew, particularly in the 20 th and 21 st centuries.\nIn the 115 th Congress, the authority of the President and the Secretary of State to make or change temporary, special appointments of special envoys, representatives, coordinators, advisors, and related positions has emerged as an ongoing issue of interest. Congressional concern and scrutiny regarding these special appointments has occurred during previous Administrations, including those of Presidents William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.\nCritics of these special positions sometimes view them as a way to circumvent the Senate's constitutional prerogative to provide its advice and consent required for long-term positions at the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), perhaps because the nominee or the position is controversial. Furthermore, such critics contend that these positions may (1) create tension or cause disputes over funding and resources with the regional and functional bureaus that would otherwise be tasked with addressing the issue at hand, (2) confuse foreign government officials regarding the importance of the issues on which the positions focus compared with other Administration policy priorities, and (3) make it harder for foreign officials to identify the correct point person representing the U.S. government on select topics. In contrast, proponents often view special appointments as a temporary, flexible tool that administrations can leverage quickly to draw attention and direct resources to a particular issue. Some proponents assert that if special envoy positions are folded into larger parts of the department, they may be overlooked and, as a result, the issues under the relevant envoy's purview may not receive the necessary attention.\nOn August 28, 2017, Secretary Tillerson transmitted a letter to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that unveiled the department's plans to address special envoys. According to Department of State comments to the press, of the 66 positions outlined, 30 will be retained, 21 will be integrated into regional and functional bureaus, 9 will be eliminated, and 5 will be folded into existing positions. In addition, one position will be transferred to USAID.\nIn his letter, Secretary Tillerson made note of concerns that special envoys can \"circumvent the regional and functional bureaus that make up the core of the State Department.\" He asserted that his planned changes would empower regional and functional bureaus, create a more efficient State Department, and improve the department's ability to achieve critical foreign policy goals that are currently the responsibility of special envoys. The Administration proposed one of the following policy options for each special envoy position (see tables below to review specific proposals for each position):\nretain and expand the position; retain the position, with no changes; retain the position and staff, but realign them under a more appropriate bureau or office; retain the position and staff, dual-hat the position with an existing position, and keep its staff and functions aligned under its existing bureau or office; retain the position and staff, dual-hat the position with an existing position, and realign the position, staff, and functions under a more appropriate bureau or office; transfer the functions and staff of the position to USAID; remove the title of the position, but keep its staff and functions aligned under its existing bureau or office; remove the title of the position and realign staff and functions under a more appropriate bureau or office; or remove or retire the position.", "While it is not unusual for Congress to express concern regarding the department's use of these temporary positions in the foreign policy arena, the 115 th Congress is particularly interested because of the Trump Administration's announced goals to reorganize the executive branch, including the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. On June 13 and 14, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held budget hearings with Secretary of State Tillerson that indicated congressional interest in special envoy use. On July 17, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing with Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan on the State Department FY2018 Reauthorization and Reorganization Plan. Extensive discussion focused on special envoys, representatives, coordinators, negotiators, and advisors (hereinafter referred to as special envoys or special appointments). Congressional interest in this issue has surfaced at additional hearings in the 115 th Congress.\nIn July 2017, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed S. 1631 , the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2018. If enacted into law, this bill would limit the use of temporary foreign affairs appointments and require most appointees to be confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Title III, Section 301, of S. 1631 would require that\nthe Secretary of State provide a report, not later than 30 days after enactment of the bill, comprising recommendations regarding whether to maintain each existing \"Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor\" that is not expressly authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress; no later than 90 days after the issuance of the aforementioned report, the Secretary of State present any \"Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor\" that the department intends to retain but is not expressly authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the advice and consent of the Senate; the Secretary can establish or maintain \"Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor\" positions provided that the appointment is established for a specified term and presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the advice and consent of the Senate within 90 days of the appointment; the Secretary of State may maintain or establish temporary \"Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, or Special Advisor\" positions for a limited period of no longer than 180 days without the advice and consent of the Senate as long as the Secretary notifies the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at least 15 days prior to the appointment and certifies that the position is not expected to demand the exercise of significant authority pursuant to U.S. law (the Secretary may renew any position established under these authorities provided that the Secretary complies with these notification requirements); beginning not later than 120 days following enactment, no funds may be obligated or expended for any \"Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor\" positions exercising significant authority pursuant to U.S. law that is not being served by an individual who has been presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for advice and consent of the Senate; in addition, funds may not be obligated or expended for any staff or resources related to such positions until the appointed individual has been presented; beginning not later than 120 days following enactment, no funds may be obligated or expended for temporary positions (those lasting for a duration of no longer than 180 days) or any related staff and resources unless the Secretary of State has complied with the notification process; no \"Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor\" authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress shall be appointed absent the advice and consent of the Senate (with the exception of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues); the congressional authorization for the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma shall be repealed.\nSeparate provisions of S. 1631 provide congressional authorization for the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues position and, separately, give the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom the authority to supervise any special envoy, representative, or office, including the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, with responsibility for protecting international religious freedom, protecting religious minorities, or advising the Secretary of State on matters relating to religion.\nIn September 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations passed S. 1780 , the \"Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018.\" If enacted, none of the funds appropriated in the bill or in any prior law could be used to downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate to another United States Government agency several offices and positions, including\nthe Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; the Office of the Special Coordinator for Global Criminal Justice Issues; the Coordinator for Cyber Issues; the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South Central Asia; the Coordinator for Sanctions Policy; the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues; the Office of Global Women's Issues; the Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons; and the Special Advisor for International Disability Rights.\nThe committee report accompanying the bill noted that, \" the August 28, 2017, notification on special envoys and representatives raises further questions on the integrity of the [reorganization of the Department of State] process, as the Committee notes that any proposal for significant personnel changes should be a component of the [broader] reorganization or redesign.\"\nIn addition, the 114 th Congress passed the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017 ( P.L. 114-323 ), which required the Secretary of State to submit a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs comprising a \"tabulation of the current names, ranks, positions, and responsibilities of all special envoy, representative, advisor, and coordinator positions at the Department, with a separate accounting of all such positions at the level of Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) or above.\" In addition, for each position so identified, the department was required to provide information including the date on which each position was created, the mechanism by which each position was created, the current department official to which each position reports, and the total number of staff assigned to support each position. The Department of State provided this report to the committees in April 2017.", "Temporary positions are often created in response to congressional or public demands for increased Department of State attention to a specific global issue, event, or crisis. These positions may be created to circumvent the advice and consent role of the Senate, among other reasons, although Congress has established some of these positions in statute. The following tables identify key positions, including\nspecial envoy, representative, coordinator, advisor, ambassador-at-large, and similar positions that the State Department identified in an April 2017 report transmitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; additional positions that CRS identified; descriptions for each position; and the Trump Administration's proposed plan for each position as described in Secretary Tillerson's August 28, 2017, letter.", "The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) defines a special envoy as \"one designated for a particular purpose, such as the conduct of special negotiations and attendance at coronations, inaugurations, and other state ceremonies of special importance.\" The designation is temporary. While U.S. law does not include a blanket requirement that the Senate provide advice and consent for the appointment of special envoys, it does require advice and consent for select special envoys. The department's two \"special envoy and coordinator\" positions, the Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center and the Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, are at least in part authorized by statute.\nIn addition, the Department of State has established two existing special presidential envoys, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs. The responsibilities of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs are provided through Executive Order 13698 and Presidential Policy Directive 30. According to the Department of State, the role of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS is to help coordinate all aspects of U.S. policy related to destroying ISIS. This position was established pursuant to Department of State general authorities. Both special presidential envoys are housed within the Office of the Secretary and report to the Secretary of State. See Table 1 for the status of special envoys, special envoy and coordinators, special presidential envoys, and U.S. special envoys.", "The roles, responsibilities, and protocol rankings of several special representative positions in the Department of State are addressed in U.S. law. For example, 22 U.S.C. §2567 authorizes the President to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, \"special representatives of the President for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament matters.\" This law further stipulates that \"each Presidential Special Representative shall hold the rank of ambassador.\" The Foreign Affairs Manual provides information regarding the roles and responsibilities of select special representatives not mandated by statute. See Table 2 for the status of special representatives and U.S. special representatives.", "Neither U.S. law nor the Foreign Affairs Manual offers a basic definition or generic overview of the roles, responsibilities, and protocol for the ranking of coordinators, lead coordinators, senior coordinators, special coordinators, or U.S. coordinators (hereinafter, coordinators) in the Department of State. However, the duties of the congressionally authorized coordinator positions are provided in statute. When not detailed in the FAM, descriptions of the coordinator positions that are not congressionally authorized are sometimes available on the Department of State's website. See Table 3 for the status of coordinators.", "U.S. law does not define the general roles, responsibilities, and protocol ranking of senior advisors and special advisors in the Department of State. The Foreign Affairs Manual makes note of the general responsibilities of special advisors assigned to the department's regional bureaus, dividing them into the categories of labor advisors, economic advisors, political-military advisors, regional planning advisors, and United Nations advisors. The FAM adds that \"some bureaus combine a number of these advisors into one office unit under a director\" and includes information about the responsibilities of public affairs advisors assigned to both regional and functional bureaus. However, these broader guidelines do not appear to apply generally to those advisors placed outside of regional bureaus. Senior advisors and special advisors in functional bureaus tend to have significant influence over a narrow functional area, while senior advisors and special advisors in regional bureaus support a broader scope of bureau activities with less leadership responsibility. This distinction may explain why the senior advisors and special advisors identified by the department and listed below are located outside regional bureaus. Position descriptions for some department advisors are available on the department's website. See Table 4 for the status of senior advisors and special advisors.", "Ambassadors-at-large are \"appointed by the President and serve anywhere in the world to help with emergent problems, to conduct special or intensive negotiations, or serve in other capacities, as requested by the Secretary or the President.\" As required by 22 U.S.C. §3942(a)(1), the appointment of Ambassadors-at-large is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Ambassadors-at-large generally rank immediately below assistant secretaries of state in terms of protocol. They are perceived within the department as managers of crucial yet narrow subject matters, while assistant secretaries have much broader responsibilities. While the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Coordinator of U.S. Government Activities to Combat Global HIV/AIDS, the Special Representative for Global Health Diplomacy, and the Special Coordinator for Global Criminal Justice Issues do not have the position title of \"ambassador-at-large,\" the department currently provides these positions that rank. See Table 5 for the status of ambassadors-at-large.", "In addition to the position groups noted above, several uniquely titled positions exist within the Department of State identified by both the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and the department as related to special envoys, representatives, coordinators, and related positions. Many of these positions are authorized by statute, and their authorities can be found therein. Nevertheless, no statutory authorization exists for the lone \"lead coordinator\" position, the \"Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation\" post. The position is noted in the Foreign Affairs Manual only as being housed within the Office of the Secretary. A description of the position is available in remarks made by then-Secretary Kerry in September 2015. Similarly, no statutory authorization exists for the lone \"senior official\" position, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Official. The position title reflects the institutional infrastructure of APEC, wherein each member state designates a \"senior official\" who, according to APEC, participates in guiding the organization's working level activities and projects under the direction of APEC Ministers. The duties of the Senior Official for APEC are defined in the FAM. Descriptions for other positions listed below can be found on the department's website. See Table 6 for the status of miscellaneous positions.", "Special envoys and related position officeholders are appointed to government service through various avenues, as reflected by the diverse means of pay through which officeholders are compensated. According to the Department of State, these include the Senior Executive Service (SES) pay rates, the Executive Schedule (EX) and the General Schedule (GS) pay rates, and, separately, rates of pay for those appointed as Experts (ED), Consultants (EF), and in senior-level positions (SL). These means of pay, which are authorized by statute, are applied not only to personnel within the Department of State, but also to those elsewhere in the federal government. Special envoys who serve as ambassadors-at-large, assistant secretaries and under secretaries are required by statute to be compensated through the Executive Schedule. According to information transmitted by the Department of State, officeholders compensated through these means are both career FSOs and noncareer officials.\nOther officeholders are compensated through the Senior Foreign Service (SFS) and Foreign Service (FS) pay rates, whereas others are compensated through statutory guidelines proscribing salaries to chiefs of mission. These means of compensation are authorized pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-465 , as amended; hereinafter, the Foreign Service Act). The Foreign Service Act authorizes the Secretary of State to make \"limited appointments\" to the Senior Foreign Service of individuals who are not career FSOs under certain conditions. Therefore, special envoys and related officeholders compensated under SFS and FS pay rates are both career FSOs and noncareer members of the Senior Foreign Service.", "Many in the foreign affairs community and in Congress have differing views of the advantages and disadvantages of special appointments. In the 1990s, for example, many believed that the Clinton Administration had overused special appointments (for those not established by statute). Early in George W. Bush's terms of office, his Administration announced, in contrast to the previous Administration, that it would avoid the use of special appointments. However, by the end of the Bush Administration, the number of special appointments had matched those under the Clinton Administration.\nAnother factor in appointing special envoys is the sense of urgency regarding a given issue, as determined by Members of Congress and interest groups that may be pressing their representatives and the Administration to elevate their concerns—either through Congress or via the Administration. According to one study, \"in nearly every case we examined over several Administrations, the impetus to appoint a [special envoy/special representative] was a combination of congressional pressure and the Administration's readiness to give the matter higher-level attention.\"\nIn the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 17, 2017, Chairman Corker stated, \"Special Envoys do more harm than good.... I think that they hurt the culture of our professional Foreign Service officers candidly because I think they see them in many cases as a work around.... I hope that we'll do away with all of them that are unnecessary. And I think most of them are unnecessary.\" Following issuance of the Trump Administration's plans regarding special envoys on August 28, 2017, Senator Corker reiterated his concern regarding the accumulation of special envoys at the department. He added that the authorization bill the committee passed in July \"recognizes that urgent developments may require the creation of a special envoy\" and that he looked forward to examining the proposed changes in detail.\nAt the same hearing, Ranking Member Benjamin Cardin said that \"we have too many special envoys. On the other hand, there are areas that I want to have special attention, where I don't think you get it unless there's a point person within the State Department to deal with it.... \" Following the publication of Secretary Tillerson's letter outlining the department's plans with regard to special envoys, Senator Cardin commented, \"I agree with Secretary Tillerson that there is room for examining the use of our Special Envoys ... while I support creating a more efficient and effective Department, we must be sure that the Administration is not eliminating Envoys who are critical to our ability to advance our interests and our values.\" There are numerous arguments for and against the use of special envoys—both in general and with regard to specific policy issues. Which positions are necessary or unnecessary may differ from one Member of Congress to another or from one Administration to another.", "Proponents of special envoys espouse several perceived benefits of such positions, including the notions that such positions\nare short-term and flexible and can activate U.S. response more easily than having to go through regular channels; are a quick tool that the Department of State can use when a crisis erupts; indicate high-level Administration interest in a particular issue; help an ambassador or an assistant secretary who does not have the time or resources to deal with a specific issue within a country; can coordinate a wider range of aspects that go beyond the country or region under the purview of an ambassador or assistant secretary; can represent directly the views of the President or Secretary of State and, thus, give the U.S. representative greater status (than an assistant secretary, for example) and access to higher level foreign government officials; are generally less expensive than a full-time permanent government employee, whose position may be difficult to eliminate at the end of an Administration; could engage, in certain cases, with enemies or others that regular diplomats would or could not; and address issues that Congress or interest groups are calling attention toward.", "Critics argue that special envoys, especially if overused, can create concerns. Some concerns are that special appointments\ncould undermine the ambassador in the country, the assistant secretary of state, or cause confusion among foreign government officials and even within the department itself as to who is the point person on certain issues; may create tension between themselves and the ambassador or the assistant secretary by assuming a large share of scarce resources dedicated to a particular issue or taking on a special role and leaving the routine work to the career employees; have a lack of accountability to Congress and the American public, as they frequently work directly for the President or Secretary of State; have, in the past, hired large numbers of staff, while not being able to take advantage of qualified Foreign Service Officers because of timing and a perception among Foreign Service Officers that serving under special envoys does little to advance their careers; could undermine the consistency of the Administration's policy and/or could distort the importance of the issue, as compared with other ongoing foreign policy issues; in some cases are appointed from outside the foreign policy arena and are unable to operate effectively due to a lack knowledge of key policy players in Washington and the means through which the department's bureaucracy operates; tend to remain in place at the department long after the issues for which they were created to address are resolved; and if eliminated after they are created, could signal unintentionally to the rest of the world that the United States is downplaying or ignoring the issue area for which the special representative was responsible.", "Congress has addressed issues arising from the use of special appointments by requiring the Department of State to report to Congress on the existing use of these positions, holding hearings, and including language in legislation (currently in the Senate) that would require many appointments to be made with the advice and consent of the Senate.\nOther options might include limiting the scope of individuals eligible to serve as special envoys through several related means, including\nproscribing limitations on the volume of appropriated funds that can be expended for the compensation of special envoys and related officials; exemptions could be carved out for the remuneration of special pay differentials and death gratuities as needed; and requiring individuals who serve in these positions to be career members of the Senior Foreign Service or the Foreign Service appointed pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §3492(a)(1), which requires career members of the Senior Foreign Service and Foreign Service Officers to be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate; exemptions could be carved out for members of the Senior Executive Service, detailees from other federal agencies, or others as needed.\nCongressional perspectives on these issues over the 115 th Congress may evolve as the Secretary of State and the Trump Administration as a whole continue to pursue and implement specific aspects of State Department and executive branch reorganization." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_full h3_full h2_full h1_full", "h0_full h3_full h1_title", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "h3_title", "", "", "h3_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What interest is there on the special envoys, representatives, and coordinator positions?", "How has the use of special representatives changed since its origination?", "Why are these representatives difficult to track?", "What is Congress' involvement in the use of temporary positions?", "Why might the use of special envoys come into question at the current moment?", "What plans does the Trump Administration have for special envoy positions?", "What additional action may need to be taken for the changes?", "What other party has taken action to address special envoys?", "How were special envoys addressed in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations?", "What bill was created?", "How were special envoys addressed in the Senate Committee on Appropriations?", "How is the input from Congress on special envoys regarded?", "What background does this report include?", "What does it identify specifically about special envoys?", "What arguments does this report follow?", "What is the scope of this report?", "How will this report be updated?" ], "summary": [ "The 115th Congress has expressed interest in monitoring the use of special envoys, representatives, and coordinator positions by the Department of State, as well as any changes to their status.", "Special, temporary diplomatic appointments originated during the presidency of George Washington, and the number of special representatives has expanded and contracted since then.", "Tabulating the precise number of these positions is difficult, however, because some special positions have fallen into disuse over time and were never officially eliminated.", "It is not unusual for Congress to express concern or assert legislative prerogatives regarding the department's use of temporary positions in the foreign policy arena.", "These positions may come under particular scrutiny in the 115th Congress in light of the Trump Administration's ongoing effort to reorganize the executive branch, including the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.", "On August 28, 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson transmitted a letter detailing the Trump Administration's proposed plans to expand, consolidate, or eliminate several temporary special envoy positions, while keeping others in place without any changes.", "For those positions that are authorized in statute, congressional action may be required for the Administration to move forward with its proposed changes.", "The 115th Congress has also taken action to address the issue of special envoys.", "For example, on July 17, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing with Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan in which the use of such positions was discussed extensively.", "Later in July, the committee passed an authorization bill (S. 1631) that, if enacted, would include new limitations pertaining to the use of special envoys, such as provisions subjecting the appointment of individuals to such positions to the advice and consent of the Senate.", "Furthermore, the Senate Committee on Appropriations passed a State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill (S. 1780) that would prohibit the use of funds to downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate (to another federal agency) select special envoys or their offices.", "Some Members of Congress perceive congressional input regarding the use of special envoys as both important in its own right and a crucial component of the broader need for Congress to assert its prerogatives as the Trump Administration continues to reorganize the executive branch and the Department of State.", "This report provides background on the use of special envoys, representatives, and coordinators (primarily within the foreign affairs arena; for the most part, interagency positions are not included).", "It identifies various temporary positions, their purpose, and existing authorities.", "The report presents commonly articulated arguments for and against the use of these positions and issues for Congress going forward.", "The scope of this report is limited to the special envoy and related positions identified by the Department of State in a 2017 report to Congress and additional selected positions identified by CRS.", "This report may be updated to reflect congressional action." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, 1, 2, -1, 0, 1, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6 ] }
CRS_RL34240	{ "title": [ "", "Overview", "Political Upheaval in 2007", "Judicial Crisis", "President Musharraf's Reelection", "Musharraf-Bhutto Engagement", "Benazir Bhutto's Return", "State of Emergency Imposed, Then Lifted", "Benazir Bhutto Assassinated", "Implications for Pakistani Democratization", "Credible Elections Following Crises?", "Election Calendar", "Implications for Pakistani Security and Stability", "Succession Issues", "Nuclear Security75", "Implications for Pakistan-U.S. Relations", "Policy Discussion", "U.S. Assistance" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The year 2007 has seen Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minster and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October. Bhutto's killing in an apparent gun and bomb attack (the circumstances remain controversial) has been called a national tragedy for Pakistan and does immense damage to already troubled efforts to democratize the country. Bhutto was \"chairperson for life\" of what arguably is Pakistan's most popular party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which won the most total votes in the 2002 national election. The assassination came just 12 days after Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had lifted a 6-week-old emergency order. The PPP named her young son, Bilawal, and her husband, Asif Zardari, to succeed her as party leaders. Bhutto's long-time party deputy, Makhdoom Amin Fahim, is expected to be the put forward as the PPP's prime ministerial candidate.\nOn November 3, 2007, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf issued a Proclamation of Emergency suspending the country's Constitution. The proclamation justified the suspension as necessary due to the country's rapidly deteriorating security circumstances (\"an unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan\") and to the allegedly negative role being played by the country's judiciary, which was claimed to be \"working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and extremism thereby weakening the Government and the nation's resolve and diluting the efficacy of its actions to control this menace.\" According to the proclamation, the situation required \"emergent and extraordinary measures.\"\nA Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) was issued by Musharraf (in his role as army chief) on the same day pursuant to the emergency proclamation. The PCO requires, inter alia , that the country's judiciary take a new oath of office, and it bars the judiciary from making any orders against the PCO or from taking any action against the President, the Prime Minister, or anyone acting under their authority. It also suspends a number of \"Fundamental Rights\" listed in Chapter One of the Pakistani Constitution. These include freedom from unlawful arrest and detention, and freedoms of movement, assembly, association, and speech. Seven Supreme Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and scores of High Court judges refused to take a new oath of office under the PCO and were summarily dismissed.\nTop U.S. officials repeatedly have urged President Musharraf to make more energetic efforts to restore civilian government and rule of law in Islamabad by respecting the independence of the country's judiciary and by holding free and fair parliamentary elections in early 2008. These admonitions continued following Bhutto's demise. Despite seemingly undemocratic developments in Islamabad, the United States has since 2001 provided billions of dollars in foreign assistance to Pakistan. Developments in Pakistan in 2007 have led many Washington-based critics—both governmental and independent—to more forcefully question the Bush Administration's largely uncritical support for President Musharraf.\nNews of the November emergency decree and PCO elicited immediate criticism from Washington: According to the State Department, Musharraf's move \"was a setback\":\n[W]e had hoped to see this transition unfold differently.... It is our fervent hope that [scheduled] elections will be free, fair, transparent, and credible. We are working closely with Pakistani officials and U.S., Pakistani and international civil society organizations to ensure that these elections are as transparent as possible.\nSecretary of State Condoleezza Rice said she had \"communicated very clearly to the Pakistanis that the holding of free and fair elections is an absolute necessity\" and later said U.S. aid to Pakistan would come under review. The Pentagon announced a postponement of scheduled high-level bilateral defense consultations. In his first public comments on the issue, President George W. Bush said the United States expects elections in Pakistan as soon as possible and that Musharraf should resign his military post. President Bush later telephoned Musharraf for a \"very frank discussion\" on the strong U.S. belief that the Pakistani leader should resign from the military and hold elections. Islamabad characterized President Bush as showing understanding of the \"difficult circumstances\" being faced by Musharraf and of the Pakistani leader's commitment to \"full democracy and civilian rule.\"\nSeveral bills condemning the emergency declaration were introduced in Congress ( S.Res. 372 , H.Res. 810 , and H.Res. 823 ), but none has moved out of committee to date. On November 17, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte met with President Musharraf in Islamabad, reportedly delivering a \"strong message\" on the need to heed U.S. advice or face a possible reduction in military assistance. Islamabad rejected U.S. calls to end the emergency and dismissed the Deputy Secretary's admonitions as \"nothing new.\" The Under Secretary also met with Musharraf ally and National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz and Vice Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, and spoke by phone with Benazir Bhutto.\nMusharraf's \"second coup\" appeared to many observers to be a desperate power grab by a badly discredited military ruler. While Musharraf insisted the emergency decree was meant to deal with the country's security crisis and spreading Islamist militancy, most analysts believe it was a preemptive assault on the country's judiciary in light of signs that the Supreme Court was set to invalidate Musharraf's October 6, 2007, reelection as president. One international human rights group issued a report making this argument and criticizing the U.S. and other Western governments for \"propping up\" Musharraf with military and financial assistance.\nThere are fears that the move further destabilized Pakistan and emboldened Islamist militants, while further alienating Pakistani civil society. It also brought a surge in unwanted attention to the Pakistani military's failure to defeat the country's militant extremist elements, as well as to its major and hugely profitable role in the country's economy. The security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and materials becomes an especially crucial issue during a period of political instability in Islamabad. Moreover, Pakistan's Western allies find themselves in the awkward position of supporting an increasingly unpopular Musharraf who has twice used force to obtain or maintain power.\nThe Islamabad government's harsh crackdown on political opposition apparently spurred former Prime Minister and opposition leader Benazir Bhutto to end what had been ongoing negotiations toward a power-sharing arrangement with Musharraf. Musharraf, for his part, called Bhutto \"too confrontational\" and himself ruled out further power-sharing negotiations. The U.S. government had supported a Musharraf-Bhutto accommodation as being in the best interests of both Pakistan and the United States. Bhutto's catastrophic removal from Pakistan's political equation thus dealt a serious blow to U.S. policies aimed at bringing greater stability to that country.", "Pakistan in 2007 suffered from considerable political uncertainty as the tenuous governance structure put in place by President Musharraf came under strain. Among ordinary Pakistanis, criticism of the military—typically among the most respected institutions in the country—and its role in governance has become much more common, especially as the army has proven unable to ensure security and stability in both major cities and in the western provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier. Many among the Pakistani public appear increasingly put off by a seemingly arbitrary electoral process that preserves the power of a corrupt elite that demonstrates little meaningful concern with the problems of ordinary citizens. Moreover, there has been an accompanying and widespread dismay among Pakistanis at the appearance of unabashed U.S. interference in their political system, interference that from their perspective serves only to perpetuate the corruption.", "A judicial crisis began with President Musharraf's summary March 2007 dismissal of the country's Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, on charges of nepotism and misconduct. Analysts widely believe the action was an attempt by Musharraf to remove a potential impediment to his continued roles as president and army chief, given Chaudhry's rulings that exhibited independence and went contrary to government expectations. The move triggered immediate outrage among Pakistani lawyers; ensuing street protests by opposition activists grew in scale. By providing a platform upon which anti-Musharraf sentiments could coalesce, the imbroglio morphed into a full-fledged political crisis.\nThe deposed Chief Justice became an overnight political celebrity. In May, tens of thousands of supporters lined the streets as Chaudhry drove from Islamabad to Lahore to address the High Court there. Chaudhry later flew to Karachi but was blocked from leaving the city's airport, reportedly by activists of the regional, government-allied Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) party. Ensuing street battles between MQM cadres and opposition activists left at least 40 people dead on May 12, most of them PPP members. Reports had local police and security forces standing by without intervening while the MQM attacked anti-Musharraf protesters, leading many observers to charge the government with complicity in the bloody rioting. In July, in what was widely seen as a major political defeat for Musharraf, the Supreme Court unanimously cleared Chaudhry of any wrongdoing and reinstated him to office. When, in August, Musharraf reportedly came close to declaring a state of emergency, Secretary of State Rice placed a late-night telephone call to Islamabad, by some accounts in a successful effort to dissuade him.\nAugust brought further indications that the Supreme Court would not be subservient to military rule and could derail President Musharraf's political plans. Most significantly, the court ruled that former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could return to Pakistan after seven years in exile. When Sharif attempted to return on September 10, the government immediately arrested him on corruption charges and deported him. (On October 24, Pakistan's Chief Justice stated that Sharif still has an \"inalienable right\" to return to Pakistan, and he accused then-Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz of violating a Supreme Court order by arranging for Sharif's most recent deportation.) In September, the Islamabad government arrested hundreds of opposition political leaders and activists, many of them deputies of Nawaz Sharif, including some sitting members of Parliament. A statement from the U.S. Embassy called the development \"extremely disturbing and confusing,\" and Secretary Rice called the arrests \"troubling.\" At year's end, Pakistan's judicial crisis was far from fully resolved.\nChanges made by Musharraf under the emergency remain controversial, perhaps most especially the questionable dismissal of many Supreme Court justices, some of whom remain under house arrest in 2008. Aitzaz Ahsan, the lawyer who lead the successful effort to have former Chief Justice Chaudhry reseated earlier in 2007, has been at the forefront of the current effort to have the Supreme Court reconstituted by Musharraf restored to its pre-November status. In early December, he proposed requiring all parliamentary candidates to sign an oath pledging to restore the judiciary, but this tack was rejected by Bhutto and other opposition leaders as unrealistic. Ahsan himself accused the U.S. government of not seeming to care about Musharraf's crackdown on the Supreme Court and making no mention of the issue in various agency briefings.", "President Musharraf won provisional reelection on October 6, 2007, capturing 98% of the votes cast by Pakistan's 1,170-member Electoral College. About 57% of the total possible vote from the membership of all national and provincial legislatures went to Musharraf; two-fifths of the body had either abstained (members of the Bhutto-led PPP) or resigned in protest (mostly members of the Islamist party coalition). Musharraf vowed to resign his military commission following reelection, even knowing he would become even more politically vulnerable as a civilian president. Controversy had arisen over Musharraf's intention to seek reelection by the current assemblies, as well as his candidacy while still serving as army chief (2002 and 2005 Supreme Court rulings allowed for his dual-role until November 15). Opposition parties called such moves unconstitutional and they petitioned the Supreme Court to block this course.\nOn October 5, the court ruled the election could take place as scheduled but that official results would be withheld until after the court rules on such legal challenges. While few observers predicted the court would void the result, Musharraf was to some degree left in political limbo—he was not expected to doff his army uniform until his reelection was confirmed. Some analysts feared that a state of emergency would be declared were the court to rule against Musharraf. U.S. and other Western officials, including Secretary Rice, urged Musharraf to refrain from any such move. On November 19, the new Supreme Court (as reconstituted under the PCO) struck down legal challenges to the validity of the reelection, thus paving the way for Musharraf's retirement from the army and swearing in for a second term, which took place on November 29.", "President Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 had negotiations on a power-sharing arrangement that could facilitate Musharraf's continued national political role while also allowing Bhutto to return to Pakistan from self-imposed exile, potentially to serve as prime minister for a third time. The Bush Administration reportedly encouraged such an arrangement as the best means of both sustaining Musharraf's role and of strengthening moderate political forces in Islamabad. Pakistan's deputy information minister reportedly claimed that the United States essentially forced a reluctant Islamabad to allow Bhutto's return from exile. Some analysts took a cynical view of Bhutto's motives in the negotiations, believing her central goal was personal power and removal of standing corruption cases against her. Bhutto insisted that she engaged Musharraf so as to facilitate \"an effective and peaceful transition to democracy.\"\nOn October 4, President Musharraf and Bhutto agreed to an accord that could have paved the way for a power-sharing deal. The National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) provides amnesty for all politicians who served in Pakistan between 1988 and 1999, thus essentially clearing Bhutto of pending and potential corruption charges. Officials said the amnesty would not apply to former Prime Minister Sharif. In return, Bhutto reportedly agreed (tacitly) to accept Musharraf's reelection plans. (The incumbent ruling party's chief, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, was later quoted as saying the NRO was part of \"a deliberate strategy to prevent the opposition from uniting and she [Bhutto] fell for it.\") The Supreme Court subsequently put a spanner in Bhutto's scheme by ruling on October 12 that it would hear challenges to the NRO, thus threatening a Musharraf-Bhutto deal by potentially reinstating corruption charges against the former prime minister. Many Pakistanis were unhappy with news of the potential deal, viewing it as a politically unprincipled arrangement between two opportunistic figures. Following the imposition of emergency, Bhutto stated that she would not meet or negotiate with Musharraf, effectively ending prospects for a deal.\nWhen asked whether the United States still favored a Musharraf-Bhutto power-sharing agreement in the wake of the emergency decree and deteriorating relations between the president and former prime minister, U.S. officials only reiterate a belief that Pakistan's moderate forces should work together to bring constitutional, democratic rule. Yet reports continued to suggest that Washington pushed for such an accommodation even after Bhutto's apparently full embrace of the opposition.", "On October 18, Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan after more than eight years of self-imposed exile and was welcomed in Karachi by hundreds of thousands of jubilant supporters. She proceeded to vigorously re-entered Pakistan's political stage with a major and polarizing effect; even segments of her own powerful Sindh-based clan were bitterly opposed to her reentry. While Bhutto continued to enjoy significant public support in the country, especially in rural Sindh, there were signs that many PPP members were ambivalent about her return and worried that her credibility as an opponent of military rule has been damaged through deal-making with Musharraf. Only hours after Bhutto's arrival in Karachi, two blasts near her motorcade—likely perpetrated by at least one suicide attacker—left some 145 people dead, but Bhutto was unharmed. To date, police have made no breakthroughs in the case, but there are signs (along with widely-held suspicions) that the perpetrators are linked to Al Qaeda and other Islamist extremists in Pakistan. Without offering evidence, Bhutto herself implicated elements of Pakistan's own security apparatus in the attack. (Following Bhutto's December assassination, a letter was released in which she requested that President Musharraf be held ultimately responsible for her potential violent death; see below).", "As Islamist-related militancy surged and political uncertainty continued unabated in Pakistan in October 2007, observers grew increasingly concerned that President Musharraf would impose martial law through an emergency proclamation. When asked about the possibility on November 1, Secretary Rice said it was \"quite obvious that the United States would not be supportive of extra-constitutional means,\" and she reiterated Washington's view that Pakistan \"needs to prepare for and hold free and fair elections\" as planned. The next day, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Adm. William Fallon, met with Musharraf in Islamabad and warned against declaring a state of emergency that would \"put the [Pakistan-U.S.] relationship at risk.\" One report claimed that during this time U.S. diplomats received forewarning from Pakistani officials that an emergency declaration was imminent. According to this report, the reaction of the U.S. diplomats was muted, which some senior Pakistanis took as a sign that they could proceed. However, a U.S. official denied that any \"green light\" was given.\nPresident Musharraf announced his decision to declare a state of emergency in a late-night televised address to the Pakistani people on November 3. In that speech, Musharraf argued that the country was under existential threat from terrorism and extremism, and that his government and its law enforcement agencies were stricken by paralysis due especially to Supreme Court interference. He also held certain elements in the Pakistani media responsible for deteriorating conditions. Calling his emergency proclamation necessary in the interests of the state, he compared his actions to those of Abraham Lincoln's \"sweeping violations of constitutional limits\" as an effort to preserve the union, and he pleaded with Pakistan's \"friends in the United States\" to give the country more time to establish democratic rule.\nThe emergency declaration led to an immediate and harsh crackdown on Pakistan's independent media outlets. Numerous private television and radio stations were blacked out in the wake of Musharraf's announcement and a new government order banned any media reports that \"defame or bring ridicule\" to the government or military. Violations of the order can bring a one-year prison sentence or a five million rupee ($82,000) fine. For many days after the emergency decree, independent domestic news stations, as well as international outlets such as the BBC and CNN, remained off the air in Pakistan. Indications are that the Musharraf government has continued to clamp down on the country's media.\nMoreover, several thousand opposition figures, human rights activists, and lawyers were rounded up and detained in the days following the emergency proclamation. On the Monday after Musharraf's weekend speech, thousands of lawyers protested in several Pakistani cities and were met with police beatings and mass arrests. Chief Justice Chaudhry, who was among seven Supreme Court judges dismissed by the Musharraf government, publicly urged the country's lawyers to continue their protests. The U.S. government expressed \"grave concern\" at the crackdown, calling such \"extreme and unreasonable measures\" contradictory to the goal of a fully democratic Pakistan. Musharraf later had Pakistan's 1952 Army Act amended to allow for military trials of civilians, chilling human rights groups and potentially providing a retroactive sanctioning of \"disappearances\" traced to the country's security services and criticized by the Supreme Court.\nAs noted above, the United States called the emergency declaration a serious setback to Pakistan's democratization process. Many other world governments, including that of key Pakistani benefactor Britain, echoed U.S. criticisms. Pakistani neighbor and rival India, wary of becoming involved in Pakistan's domestic problems, issued a notably restrained expression of \"regret\" for \"the difficult times that Pakistan is passing through.\" In response to what it called \"unwarranted criticism and excessive reactions\" from abroad, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry asked that the international community \"show understanding of this difficult decision\" and reiterated that the government and President Musharraf are \"committed to full civilian democratic rule and holding of elections.\"\nA November session of the 53-member Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) issued a condemnation of the abrogation of the Pakistani Constitution and threatened Pakistan with suspension from the Commonwealth unless Musharraf repeals the emergency provisions, retires from the army, releases all political detainees, and removes curbs on media freedom by November 22. Islamabad expressed \"deep disappointment and regret\" at the CMAG statement, saying it reflected \"ignorance to the ground realities.\" On November 22, the CMAG made good on its suspension threat pending restoration of democracy and rule of law there. Islamabad expressed \"deep regrets\" at the \"unreasonable and unjustified\" decision, saying it \"does not take into account the objective conditions prevailing in Pakistan.\"\nInternational human rights groups were vociferous in their criticisms: New York-based Human Rights Watch decried the \"coup against Pakistan's civil society\" and demanded that Pakistan immediately return to constitutional rule and end its crackdown on the judiciary, media, human rights activists, and political opponents. London-based Amnesty International warned that the \"wholesale abrogation of fundamental human rights protections\" represented a \"blatant breach of international law\" and it also demanded the restoration of human rights and justice. The Pakistani public appeared overwhelmingly opposed to Musharraf's coup, but street protests were relatively modest in scale (due in part to police crackdowns and blockades). The Pakistani media were largely unanimous in their criticism of what was widely seen to be a bald-faced attempt by Musharraf to maintain his own power in the face of increasing pressures. Many leading U.S. press outlets urged the Bush Administration to end its reliance on Musharraf, seeing him as an obstacle both to more effective counterterrorism efforts and to democratization.\nOn December 15, President Musharraf lifted the state of emergency in what he claimed was a \"complete restoration of the constitution.\" In a speech to the Pakistani nation, he again asserted that the emergency was declared as a last resort—\"against my own will\"—in order to defeat a \"conspiracy\" to \"derail the democratic process.\" Musharraf also took credit for laying \"the foundation of real democracy.\" Skeptics saw little evidence that the lifting of the emergency would lead to meaningful change, given what they see as repressive media curbs and a stacked judiciary. One senior Pakistani analyst called Musharraf's move a \"public relations exercise.\" Human Rights Watch echoed the sentiments of many in calling the \"restoration of the constitution\" a \"sham\" that would do little to restore genuine rule of law unless \"arbitrary\" laws and amendments made after November 3 were withdrawn. On the day before his action, Musharraf, acting under the PCO, issued several decrees and made amendments the Pakistani Constitution, some of which would ensure that his actions under emergency rule would not be challenged by any court.", "On December 27, 2007, former Prime Minister and key opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in a gun and suicide bomb attack following a political rally in the city of Rawalpindi. President Bush and the State Department offered deep sympathy and sincere condolences, strongly condemning the \"cowardly\" attack. The killing elicited widespread condemnation from around the world. The next day, Bhutto's body was interred in her ancestral village in Sindh as the Pakistani government ordered a nearly total shutdown of services in anticipation of spreading violence. Serious rioting occurred in the Sindhi capital of Karachi, as well as at numerous other sites.\nThe circumstances of Bhutto's death remain controversial. Early reports about the cause were conflicting: a government official claimed that neither bullets nor shrapnel caused her death and that she was killed after her head hit a latch on the vehicle's sunroof. A more senior official later withdrew the claim, but the government has continued to maintain that gunshots played no role. Emergency room doctors who tried to revive Bhutto may have been pressured to conform to the government's accounts and later sought to distance themselves from such accounts, calling for an autopsy. Video and photographs of the event appear to show a gunman firing three shots at Bhutto from close range, closely followed by an explosion which left more than 20 bystanders dead. In a blow to subsequent investigations, city fire trucks used high-pressure hoses to clear the crime scene of debris, likely destroying what could be vital forensic evidence.\nMany observers have criticized the Musharraf government for providing insufficient security for Bhutto. Questions about how she was killed become more relevant in this context, as death from gunshots fired at close range would be more damning of existing security than would a suicide bombing, which is more difficult to defend against. With Pakistanis widely skeptical of their government's capacity and intention in launching a probe—and many holding the government directly or indirectly responsible for Bhutto's death—demands soon came for an international investigation into the assassination. As articulated by one Pakistani daily, \"Only an inquiry by a credible, neutral panel of international experts would hold any weight with people.\" Some called for a U.N. probe modeled on that which investigated the 2005 assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister; Bhutto's widower supported the course. The Islamabad government denied any need for U.N. involvement, a sentiment echoed by Washington. Under international diplomatic pressure, Musharraf on December 30 agreed to consider foreign assistance in the investigation and three days later announced that a team from Britain's Scotland Yard would take a role in the investigation. The U.S. government welcomed Musharraf's decision as positive step and stands ready to provide its own assistance should Pakistan request it.\nPakistani government officials quickly blamed pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda-linked militant Baitullah Mehsud for Bhutto's killing, claiming they had intercepted a telephone conversation in which Mehsud took credit for the act. Through a spokesman, Mehsud has denied any involvement in the killing. A Taliban spokesman suggested that the attack was a \"well-planned conspiracy\" carried out by Pakistani government agents. The U.S. government has not taken a position on the identity of Bhutto's killers, with some officials saying Islamabad was too abrupt in blaming Mehsud. At least one former U.S. counterterrorism official is convinced that Al Qaeda or one of its Pakistan-based allies was behind the assassination.\nU.S. agencies reportedly had provided Bhutto with \"nonactionable\" intelligence about potential threats to her safety, but Musharraf rebuffed Washington's requests that her security be bolstered. U.S. officials apparently recommended several reputable Pakistani contractors to provide protection, however these were not employed due to Bhutto family fears they might be infiltrated by extremists.\nAlong with Al Qaeda itself, a number of religious extremist groups indigenous to Pakistan are seen to have had a motive for assassinating Bhutto and the means to do so. These include banned terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, as well as Sunni extremists in Lashkar-e-Jhangvi or Sipah-e-Sahaba (Bhutto had Shiite ancestry). Conspiracy theories became rampant in Pakistan, with many versions implicating government agencies as complicit.", "By imposing what was in essence martial law President Musharraf did harm to the cause of Pakistani democratization. In late November, the newly reconstituted Supreme Court struck down challenges to the validity of Musharraf's October 2007 reelection, clearing the way for Musharraf to resign his military commission, which he did on November 28. The next day he was sworn in as a civilian for a second five-year presidential term. Secretary Rice called Musharraf's resignation \"a good first step,\" but added her view that \"the most stabilizing thing [for Pakistan] will be to have of free and fair elections.\"\nIn November, Musharraf specified that elections would come by early January, but he declined to set a date for ending the emergency (other government officials had suggested the emergency would be lifted by early December). Bhutto responded by ending negotiations with Musharraf and promising to go ahead with a November 13 \"long march\" protest from Lahore to Islamabad. As the date approached, authorities again placed her under house arrest with a seven-day detention order, and some 600 police surrounded the Lahore home of her host. In a powerful indicator of a major policy change, Bhutto declared, \"It's over for Musharraf,\" and she issued her most stringent public demand to date: that Musharraf resign both his military commission and presidency. She called on the international community to stop backing the \"dictator\" and subsequently reached out to other opposition leaders, including former Prime Minister Sharif—who quickly welcomed her shift away from Musharraf—and even Qazi Hussain Ahmed, chief of the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami party. Musharraf, for his part, called Bhutto \"too confrontational\" and ruled out further power-sharing negotiations with her.\nIn Bhutto's view, the ruling, Musharraf-allied PML-Q party saw its fortunes rapidly declining and expected to lose badly in any free election. Thus, she asserted, its leaders chose to collude with allies in the intelligence agencies to have the polls postponed (she called Musharraf's electoral plans \"a farce\"). As Musharraf's political clout wanes, the PML-Q party faces more daunting odds in convincing a skeptical electorate that it deserves another five years in power. Former Prime Minister Sharif has been even more explicit in his criticisms of Musharraf, calling him a \"one-man calamity\" who has single-handedly brought ruin to Pakistan through efforts to retain personal power. Sharif calls for restored democracy and urges the U.S. government to support the Pakistani nation rather than a single individual.\nBenazir Bhutto's assassination dramatically altered Pakistan's political field. As per Bhutto's will, and in what one Pakistani daily called \"the unfortunate reality of South Asia's dynastic politics,\" the PPP on December 30 named her young son, Bilawal, and her husband, Asif Zardari, to succeed her as party leaders. Until Bilawal completes studies at Oxford, Zardari will run the party. Zardari is a controversial figure in Pakistan: he has spent years in prison (without conviction) on charges ranging from corruption to complicity in murder. His rise to leadership of Pakistan's largest opposition party could present difficulties for U.S. policy makers. Bhutto's long-time party deputy and recent National Assembly member Makhdoom Amin Fahim is expected to be put forward as the PPP's prime ministerial candidate. Fahim, who comes from a feudal Sindh background similar to that of Bhutto, led the party competently in her absence, but does not possess national standing and support anything close to that enjoyed by Bhutto herself. Moreover, with Bhutto's demise, Nawaz Sharif has been able to step up as the most visible opposition figure with national credentials. A conservative with long-held ties to Pakistan's Islamist political parties, Sharif is a bitter enemy of Musharraf and is viewed with considerable skepticism by many in Washington, where there are concerns that a resurgence of his party to national power could bring a diminishment of Pakistan's anti-extremism policies and be contrary to U.S. interests.", "Two major political crises—a November emergency declaration and suspension of the Constitution followed by the December assassination of the leading prime ministerial candidate—led to obvious questions about the credibility of elections held in their immediate wake. Even before the emergency proclamation, some observers saw signs that the government did not intend to conduct credible elections, most prominently controversy surrounding the possible disenfranchisement of scores of millions of Pakistanis from voter rolls and the apparent absence of an effective and neutral Election Commission.\nIn November, President Musharraf reportedly told a meeting of PML-Q parliamentarians that elections would not be held under U.S. dictation, and he repeatedly refused to give a firm date for ending what was in essence martial law. Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with the Pakistani President days later, delivering a message that emergency rule was \"not compatible\" with free and fair elections. Musharraf reportedly replied by saying the emergency would be lifted only after Pakistan's security situation was sufficiently improved.\nSecretary Rice opined that it would be \"very difficult\" to have free and fair elections in Pakistan under a state of emergency. Upon his swearing-in to a second presidential term, Musharraf suggested that the emergency order would be lifted in early December, about one month before scheduled polls. When asked about the possibilities for conducting credible elections only weeks after restoration of the country's Constitution, a State Department spokesman said he would \"leave that to the experts,\" but he went on to suggest that—with a \"concerted and dedicated effort\"—it would be possible. A White House spokeswoman answered by saying, \"We are not going to judge the date of lifting the emergency order.\"\nIndependent analyses were less circumspect. For example, a Pakistani legislative watchdog organization called it \"obvious\" that free and fair elections were not possible in the given setting. A report by a Brussels-based nongovernmental organization concluded that Musharraf has sought to smother Pakistan's nascent moves toward civilian rule and that no \"proper\" elections could be held under the circumstances. It called on the international community to recognize Musharraf's negative role and to respond with graduated aid sanctions that would target the military without reducing its counterterrorism capabilities, while at the same time expanding development aid. Especially worrisome for skeptics is Musharraf's demolition of the country's judiciary: deposed Chief Justice Chaudhry remains under house arrest, as does many of the approximately 100 high court judges who refused to take a new oath of office under the PCO.\nThere have been numerous reports of government efforts to \"pre-rig\" the polls. Those who see a \"stacked judiciary, cowed media, and toothless election commission\" have been pessimistic about the chances for a credible process. Bhutto herself reportedly was set to give visiting U.S. Members of Congress a 160-page report detailing the Election Commission's and major intelligence agency's alleged plans to illicitly manipulate the outcome.", "Pakistan's National Assembly ended its five-year term on November 15. This was the first time in the country's history that the body had completed a full term without interruption. With Shaukat Aziz's term also ending, President Musharraf appointed his political ally and current Chairman of the Senate, Mohammadmian Soomro, to serve as caretaker Prime Minister during the election period. Soomro, who also is the constitutional successor to the Pakistani presidency should the office become vacant, is a former banker from an influential Sindhi family. Many analysts view the caretaker cabinet as being stacked with partisan Musharraf supporters and so further damaging to hopes for credible elections. Musharraf repeatedly has promised that the elections will be open and transparent, and he avers that opposition parties make unsubstantiated claims of rigging to justify their own anticipated losses.\nOn November 20, Pakistan's Chief Election Commissioner announced that national polls would be held on January 8, 2007. About 13,500 candidates representing 49 parties filed papers to vie for Pakistan's National Assembly seats and provincial assembly constituencies. Among them were three serious contenders for the premiership: former two-time Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, and recent Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi. Elahi, a cousin of the ruling PML-Q's chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, is viewed as a close ally of Musharraf's who would likely bolster the president's continued influence. Sharif's electoral plans met a major obstacle when, on December 3, his nomination papers were rejected, making him ineligible to compete in the elections because of criminal convictions related to his 1999 ouster from power (his brother Shabaz, a former Punjab Chief Minister and political heavyweight in his own right, saw his own nomination papers rejected days earlier, apparently due to pending criminal charges against him).\nMeanwhile, the Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition has over time become weakened by the increasingly divergent approaches taken by its two main figures—Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed, a vehement critic of the military-led government, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan chief Fazl ur-Rehman, who largely has accommodated the Musharraf regime. With its two major constituents holding directly opposing views on the wisdom of participating in upcoming elections, the MMA has all but formally split, diminishing its prospects for holding power in Pakistan's two western provincial assemblies.\nOpposition parties were placed in the difficult position of choosing whether to participate in elections that were perceived as manipulated by the incumbent government or to boycott the process in protest. Sharif, along with Qazi Hussain's Jamaat-e-Islami party (a member of the Islamist MMA coalition), was for a time clear in his intention to keep his party out of the planned elections he calls a \"farce,\" but Bhutto was less direct about her own intentions. This left the opposition divided until Bhutto announced her intention to participate, which spurred Sharif to reverse course. On December 9, Sharif announced that his party would participate in elections after he failed to convince Bhutto to join a boycott. Bhutto welcomed the decision. Some analysts insisted that an election boycott would only serve the interests of the ruling PML-Q, and they urged full poll participation while stressing the need to minimize any rigging or manipulation of the process.\nUpon Bhutto's assassination, a nationwide debate was launched over the issue of postponing the election date. Both Zardari, the new PPP leader, and Sharif demanded that the election be held as scheduled. The Bush Administration appeared to support their demands. Zardari's calculation likely was rooted in expectations of a significant sympathy vote for the PPP. The ruling PML-Q appeared to seek (and later welcome) a decision to postpone the polls. Sharif, for his part, has maintained a hardline stand against Musharraf's continued rule, demanding that a broad-based national unity government be put in place.\nWhile conceding that the Pakistanis must determine whether or not to make changes to the election schedule, a State Department spokesman offered that the best way to honor Bhutto's memory was for the democratic process to continue, and he opined that polls should \"by all means\" go ahead as scheduled \"if an election can be held safely and smoothly on January 8.\" When asked about the issue, Secretary Rice said \"it's just very important that the democratic process go forward.\" Some analysts believe the U.S. government's apparent push for January elections may have been part of an eagerness to \"graft legitimacy\" onto Musharraf by anointing a successor to Bhutto. In fact, Bhutto's death appears to leave the United States even more dependent on an increasingly embattled Musharraf as the only major pro-U.S. leader in Pakistan.\nThe Election Commission's January 2 decision to delay the polls until February 18 was met with vocal denouncement by the main opposition parties, who accuse the government of fearing a substantive loss. The State Department welcomed the setting of a firm date and urged Pakistani officials to use the interim period to ensure that an independent media is able to operate and that all restrictions on political parties are lifted. Even nongovernmental American commentators had urged a delay, arguing that Musharraf can maintain his status only by allowing for a genuine national reconciliation involving all major political parties, and that this can come about only after \"a pause and then a bold regrouping.\" Musharraf defended the postponement as necessary given the scale of destruction in Sindh. It is as yet unclear if opposition parties will organize large-scale street protests against the decision.", "Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post-2001 period and became especially prevalent in 2007. In the months since an early July commando raid on a radical Islamabad mosque, religious militants have perpetrated more than three dozen suicide bomb attacks—most of them against security personnel—taking more than 700 lives, and \"neo-Taliban\" militants have controlled western regions such as Waziristan and Swat, where government troops have engaged costly and, in the former case, losing battles. Despite recent apparent successes in Swat, Pakistan was plagued by at least ten suicide bombings in December alone.\nDespite Musharraf's ostensible motives, the imposition of a state of emergency further inflamed anti-Musharraf sentiment among the Pakistani public and aggravated already considerable civil-military tensions. Moreover, by redirecting resources toward subduing Pakistani civil society, the move may even have hindered the military's ability to combat religious extremists, who many argue are strengthened by authoritarian rule that weakens the country's moderate political forces. On the other hand, it is possible that Musharraf and the new army chief, Gen. Kiyani, are dividing their responsibilities so that the former will retain political management of the country while the latter oversees the military's counterinsurgency efforts. This might serve to make more effective Pakistan's anti-extremism efforts over time (in both their political and their militarized aspects).\nAn International Crisis Group report on \"Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan\" warned that,\nMartial law will only bring more violence and instability to Pakistan. The imprisonment of secular leaders of civil society boosts jihadi groups. The targeting of moderate political parties empowers the Islamists. Censorship of the media makes the mosque more potent as a means of communication. The destruction of the institutions of the rule of law opens the door wider to extremism.\nIndeed, Musharraf's imposition of emergency did not lead to any immediately noticeable improvement in his government's battle with the militants as Pakistan troops continued to appear on the defensive in provincial conflict regions. By one account, Islamist militants in the Swat Valley more than doubled the territory under their control in the weeks after November 3. By early December, however, following the apparent launch of major Pakistan army offensives in the region, most militant elements in the Swat were reported to be in retreat. On December 15, the Pakistani government claimed victory there, saying fighters loyal to the radical Islamist Mullah Fazlullah had been routed and driven into the hills.\nMany Western diplomats, including those from the United States, have expressed dismay with President Musharraf's November fixation on the Pakistani judiciary and on his arrest of civil society elements considered unthreatening to state security. Musharraf has to many observers appeared more interested in battling his domestic political adversaries than in taking on the country's religious militants. When asked about this apparent contradiction, a White House spokeswoman said, \"We do not believe that any extra-constitutional means were necessary in order to help prevent terrorism in the region.\"\nBhutto's killing at year's end led to country-wide rioting. Some 60 people were killed and the caretaker government called the damage from ensuing violence \"colossal,\" saying \"manufacturing, revenue, exports have all suffered badly.\" Whether deserving or not, Musharraf himself took the brunt of the blame for ensuing instability. The developments fueled already considerable concerns that, in focusing on civil strife in the cities, Pakistan's security apparatus would be distracted from what the United States considers to be crucial counterterrorism operations in Pakistan's western regions near Afghanistan.\nPakistan's neighbor and long-time rival India has watched Pakistan's turmoil with great interest, but little public comment. A destabilized Pakistan represents a major security concern for New Delhi, but at the same time history shows that as Pakistan's internal difficulties grow, Pakistani interference in Indian affairs tends to decrease.\nPakistan's political crises also have harmed what had been a generally strong national economy. The country's main stock market lost nearly 5% of its value when trading opened on November 5—the market's worst-ever one-day decline—and the country's attractiveness for foreign investors almost certainly has suffered with December's instability. Following Bhutto's killing, the market again fell by nearly 5%, even as it finished the year up by 40%.", "In the days after the emergency proclamation, rumors abounded in Pakistan that President Musharraf had himself been placed under house arrest. However, the only figures who could potentially unseat Musharraf—intelligence chiefs and corps commanders—all were handpicked by Musharraf on the assumption that they would remain loyal to him (the new Army Chief, Gen. Kiyani, is widely seen to be a moderate, professional, and pro-Western soldier). While Pakistan's influential army corps commanders appear to have fully endorsed the imposition of emergency, they may be much less approving of a power-sharing arrangement that would include Bhutto. Given its collective interest in maintaining a unified chain of command, however, most analysts see the army's top leadership staying united and thus maintaining a relative degree of order in the country. The probability of Musharraf being removed from office by force is therefore considered to be quite low. Should a major outpouring of public protest occur, however, it is possible that Musharraf's powerful military subordinates could seek his resignation in the national interest.", "Among the most urgent concerns of U.S. officials during Pakistan's political crisis has been the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and materials, which could be degraded as instability persists. While the danger of Islamist extremist gaining possession of a nuclear explosive device is considered remote, the risk of rogue scientists or security officials seeking to sell nuclear materials and/or technology is seen to be higher in a setting of deteriorating security conditions. Pentagon officials backpedaled from early expressions of concern, saying they believe Pakistan's arsenal was \"under the appropriate control.\" According to the New York Times , the United States has spent nearly $100 million since 2001 on a classified program to help secure Pakistan's strategic weapons. Islamabad emphatically rejects suggestions that the country's nuclear arsenal is anything but fully secure, and called the Times story \"distorted and exaggerated.\" Most analysts appear to have concluded that the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and facilities are much improved in recent years. More worrisome, many claim, is the possibility that Pakistan's nuclear know-how or technologies could remain prone to leakage. Even India's national security advisor—a figure not expected to downplay the dangers—has stated an opinion that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is \"largely safe.\"", "", "The ability of the United States to effectively exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan is demonstrably low at present. President Musharraf's emergency decree and its attendant developments, along with widespread violence and the assassination of Bhutto, have led to widespread concerns that the Bush Administration's Pakistan policy—and perhaps its broader anti-extremism effort—had become fragile and ineffective. The Bush Administration generally has not ranked democracy at the top of its list of priorities with Pakistan: at a December 2007 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Pakistan, one senior analyst offered that, \"Overall U.S. policy toward Pakistan until very recently gave no serious attention to encouraging democracy in Pakistan.\"\nOn November 9, five U.S. Senators—including the Majority Leader and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—signed a letter to President Bush which said Musharraf's assumption of emergency rule raised \"very troubling questions\" not only about the Administration's Pakistan policy, but also about its overall national security strategy. The Senators called for a broad review of Washington's Pakistan policy, including adjustments to aid programs and new steps to enhance security along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and to defeat Al Qaeda. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), Senator Joe Biden, warned President Musharraf in December \"there will be consequences\" if upcoming elections are not fair and open, saying U.S. aid levels could be decreased. Following Bhutto's death, the Speaker of the House, Representative Nancy Pelosi, said Washington should address \"troubling questions\" about the probe into Bhutto's murder and consider withholding further foreign assistance to Pakistan unless Islamabad allowed international investigators to participate.\nAn array of former U.S. government officials has insisted that military dictatorship in Pakistan is not in the U.S. interest and called on President Bush to use actions as well as words to push President Musharraf back on the democratic path. In a December 10 opinion article, Benazir Bhutto argued that all the countries of the world had a direct interest in Pakistani democratization, reiterating her long-held view that dictatorship had fueled extremism in her country and that credible elections there were a necessary condition for the reduction of religion militancy. As for U.S. policy, she opined that, \"At the very least, America can and should prod Musharraf to give Pakistanis an independent election commission, a neutral caretaker administration, and an end to blatant vote manipulation.\"\nIn December there was a sense among some in the U.S. government that Pakistan was getting back to a democratic path, especially after the mid-month lifting of the emergency. However, Bush Administration patience with Musharraf may be wearing thin; there are signs that it may be making firmer contingency plans in case Musharraf does not long survive in power. Still, and despite a sense among many independent analysts that continued U.S. support for Musharraf is detrimental to overall U.S.-Pakistan relations and to U.S. interests in the region, there is to date little outward sign that the Bush Administration is preparing to withdraw its support for his continued rule. In an interview weeks after the \"second coup,\" President Bush offered strong support for Musharraf, saying he \"hasn't crossed the line\" and \"truly is somebody who believes in democracy.\" Some independent analysts, along with SFRC Chairman Senator Biden, expressed incredulity at President Bush's continuing personal investment with the Pakistani leader.\nIn reaction to the emergency proclamation in Islamabad, Bush Administration officials said they would review relevant U.S. law on aid to Pakistan. However, Pakistan has been under democracy-related U.S. aid sanctions for more than eight years. Musharraf's extra-constitutional 1999 seizure of power triggered automatic penalties under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act, which bans non-humanitarian U.S. assistance \"to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.\" Assistance may be resumed to such government if the President certifies to Congress that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office.\nPost-September 2001 circumstances saw Congress take action on such restrictions. P.L. 107-57 (October 2001) waived coup-related sanctions on Pakistan through FY2002 and granted presidential authority to waive them through FY2003. Subsequent Congresses provided further annual waiver authority. In issuing the waiver, the President must certify for Congress that it \"would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan\" and \"is important to United States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism.\" President Bush has exercised this waiver authority five times, most recently in July 2007.\nDuring a November House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Pakistan, Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte said the Bush Administration \"strongly disagreed\" with the emergency imposition in Islamabad, but he also called President Musharraf \"an indispensable ally in the global war on terrorism\" who has overseen major accomplishments in the battle against Islamist extremism and who has helped to make Pakistan a more moderate and prosperous country. The Deputy Secretary warned that cuts to U.S. aid programs for Pakistan \"would send a negative signal\" and that \"Pakistan's future is too vital to our interests and our national security to ignore or to downgrade.\" Several Members in attendance called for suspending some forms of aid to Pakistan until anti-democratic developments there are reversed.\nIn discussing the potential implications of new governance issues in Pakistan, Administration officials have emphasized the importance of not allowing Islamabad's continuing cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts to be undermined. Thus, the Administration likely will continue to see the demands of what it terms the \"War on Terror\" as trumping concerns about Pakistan's system of governance, as it has appeared to do since 2001. Many observers viewed President Bush's initial and overall reaction to the emergency decree and ensuing crackdown as somewhat subdued. Some see developments in Pakistan and the Administration's allegedly tepid response as evidence that President Bush's so-called Freedom Agenda is applied selectively and without principle. This perception may contribute to increased anti-American sentiments in Pakistan.\nForeign Policy magazine offered a November 2007 exchange between two senior Pakistan experts which captures the main arguments of those who believe the United States must continue to support Musharraf's flawed leadership in Islamabad so as to maintain \"continuity in the face of political instability\" there, and those who believe Musharraf has become a liability whose rejection by the United States would signal to the Pakistani military that it must \"start negotiating with the country's political parties and civil society instead of dictating to them.\" Many commentators continue to view Musharraf himself as the primary obstacle to both Pakistani democratization and to more effective Pakistani counterterrorism efforts. Some insist that Musharraf's resignation from the presidency is a necessary step toward democratization and national reconciliation.", "While President Bush has the authority to immediately halt all or some U.S. assistance to Pakistan, there are no signs that he intends to do so. In reviewing U.S. aid programs, Administration officials could place holds on certain items, such as F-16 combat aircraft being purchased by Pakistan as a Foreign Military Sale. Acute and historic Pakistani sensitivities to such U.S. policy choices—combined with repeatedly voiced concerns that Pakistan's full cooperation in counterterrorism efforts must continue—have most analysts doubting the Administration would halt delivery of defense supplies to Pakistan, in particular those useful for counterinsurgency. Congress already has placed legal conditions on future U.S. military aid to Pakistan. Pending legislation would provide for further conditionality. President Musharraf himself reached out to U.S. congressional leaders in November, telephoning the Chairs of the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees in an apparent effort to discourage any new restrictions being placed on U.S. aid. Many analysts, including those making policy for the Bush Administration, assert that conditioning U.S. aid to Pakistan has a past record of failure and likely would be counterproductive by reinforcing Pakistani perceptions of the United States as a fickle and unreliable partner.\nMore than $26 million in U.S. aid to Pakistan has been devoted to bilateral and multilateral democracy-related programs there, including the provision of 430,000 transparent ballot boxes purchased in tandem with the Japanese government, as well as part of an effort to computerize the country's voter rolls. Washington also plans to sponsor election observation programs in support of upcoming parliamentary elections. U.S. officials repeatedly have emphasized that the United States is neutral with regard to the outcome of Pakistan's national elections.\nNumerous commentators on U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan—along with some in Congress—have recommended making adjustments to the proportion of funds devoted to military versus economic aid and/or to the objectives of such programs. For most of the post-2001 period, funds have been split roughly evenly between economic and security-related aid programs, with the great bulk of the former going to a general economic (budget) support fund and most of the latter financing \"big ticket\" defense articles such as maritime patrol aircraft, self-propelled howitzers, and upgrades for F-16 combat aircraft. Only about one-tenth of the more than $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs. The Bush Administration and/or Congress may find it useful to better target U.S. assistance programs in such a way that they more effectively benefit the country's citizens. Numerous analysts call for improving America's image in Pakistan by making U.S. aid more visible to ordinary Pakistanis." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_title h1_title", "", "h0_full", "h1_full", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "h1_full", "", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "How did President Musharraf justify his \"second coup\"?", "How does the US view Pakistan?", "How was Pakistan pressured after the coup?", "How did Musharraf respond to such pressure?", "What did Musharraf do about political activists and court judges?", "What occurred prior to the emergency declaration?", "How did the US view this arrangement?", "How did Bhutto's removal impact the US?", "How did this change US interaction with Pakistan?", "What bills were introduced?", "What is division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act?", "What report relates to this one?", "How will this report change in the future?" ], "summary": [ "President Musharraf sought to justify his \"second coup\" as being necessary to save Pakistan from Islamist extremism and from a political paralysis he blamed largely on the country's Supreme Court.", "The United States, which had exerted diplomatic pressure on Musharraf to refrain from imposing a state of emergency, views Pakistan as a vital ally in global and regional counterterrorism efforts, and it has provided considerable foreign assistance to Pakistan since 2001, in part with the goal of facilitating a transition to democracy in Islamabad.", "Washington and other world capitals pressured Musharraf to return Pakistan to its pre-November 3 political circumstances, relinquish his status as army chief, and hold free and fair elections in January 2008.", "Musharraf vowed to hold such elections (which, following the Bhutto assassination, were rescheduled for February 18) and he finally resigned his military commission in late November.", "While thousands of previously detained political activists have been released, most of the approximately 100 high court judges who refused to take a new oath of office remain under house arrest.", "In the months preceding the emergency declaration, Bhutto had engaged negotiations toward a power-sharing arrangement with Musharraf.", "The U.S. government supported such accommodation as being in the best interests of both Pakistan and the United States.", "Bhutto's catastrophic removal from Pakistan's political equation thus dealt a serious blow to U.S. interests.", "In light of this and other developments that constitute major setbacks for U.S. policy toward Pakistan, U.S. officials are reevaluating their approach, and many in Congress have called for cutting or halting certain types of U.S. assistance to Pakistan.", "Several bills condemning the emergency declaration were introduced in Congress (S.Res. 372, H.Res. 810, and H.Res. 823), but none has moved out of committee to date.", "Division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764) places conditions on a portion of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and includes a call for \"implementing democratic reforms\" there.", "See also CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations.", "This report will be updated." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, -1, 2, 2, -1, 0, -1, 2, 3, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R45192	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Background", "Recent Developments", "Arctic National Wildlife Refuge", "FWS Rule on Nonfederal Oil and Gas Management", "Nonfederal Oil and Gas Operations in the National Wildlife Refuge System", "Number and Location of Nonfederal Oil and Gas Operations", "Compatibility of Nonfederal Oil and Gas Activities", "Federal Oil and Gas Operations in the National Wildlife Refuge System", "Number and Location of Federal Operations", "Compatibility of Federal Oil and Gas Activities", "Oil and Gas Activities in Alaska in the National Wildlife Refuge System", "Number and Location of Oil and Gas Operations in Alaska Refuges", "Compatibility of Oil and Gas Activities in Alaska", "Potential Issues for Congress" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The development of oil and natural gas resources in the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) has been the subject of administrative rulemaking and the focus of debate in Congress. The NWRS is a network of lan ds and waters administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI). The NWRS contains 566 national wildlife refuges, 36 wetland management districts composed of waterfowl production areas (WPAs), and 3 WPAs that lay outside of wetland management districts. Issues pertaining to oil and gas wells in the NWRS include private property rights, economic and energy security benefits of oil and gas development, and the potential for adverse effects of oil and gas development on NWRS lands and wildlife. Some see these activities as contrary to the mission of the NWRS as stated in the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, as amended (NWRSAA; 16 U.S.C. §668dd), whereas others think that oil and gas activities can be managed so as to avoid undue harm to wildlife or that U.S. energy needs outweigh conservation concerns. Both the executive branch and Congress have addressed oil and gas activity in the NWRS through\ndebating the compatibility of oil and gas activities with the purposes of the NWRS; examining the potential economic and energy security benefits of developing oil and gas resources in the NWRS, predominantly in Alaska; and promulgating regulations for oil and gas activities in the NWRS to ensure access to nonfederal mineral rights while attempting to minimize impacts on natural resources, including lands, waters, and wildlife.\nFWS states that it aims to balance the rights of mineral resource owners and lessees in the NWRS with the system's conservation mission. In 2016, FWS promulgated a final rule, titled \"Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights,\" to update regulations for nonfederal oil and gas activities on NWRS land. The 115 th Congress also has considered the regulation of nonfederal oil and gas activities in the NWRS and has enacted legislation to establish a federal oil and gas program in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska.", "Wells associated with oil and gas activities are present in about 18% of NWRS units. Most oil and gas operations on refuge lands involve nonfederal resources. These activities most often occur when rights to the surface and subsurface estates have been severed and FWS has acquired only the surface rights for addition to the NWRS, but valid existing rights to the mineral estate remain in nonfederal ownership. FWS regulation of these nonfederal activities is based on statutory authorities reflected in a 2016 agency final rule and in sections of the FWS Service Manual .\nLeasing and development of federally owned resources within the NWRS typically is prohibited. However, in certain cases, such as where the federal leases predate the establishment or expansion of the refuge, there may be federal leases and development on refuge lands. The administration of federal oil and gas resources in the NWRS is delegated to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), in the DOI, under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. §§181 et seq.). BLM administers federal oil and gas leasing under regulations at Title 43, Part 3100, of the Code of Federal Regulations . The regulations require BLM to obtain FWS concurrence as to the time, place, and nature of oil and gas operations, \"in order to give complete protection to wildlife populations and wildlife habitat on the areas leased.\"\nOil and gas activities in Alaskan NWRS units, like those in other states, are administered by FWS for nonfederal operations and by BLM for federal operations. However, Alaskan activities are managed pursuant to Alaska-specific law as well as the general statutory and regulatory framework described above. Relevant Alaska laws include the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA; P.L. 96-487 ) and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA; 43 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq.), among others.\nThis report contains sections on recent developments related to oil and gas wells in the NWRS, nonfederal wells in NWRS units outside of Alaska, federal wells in NWRS units outside of Alaska, nonfederal and federal wells in Alaskan NWRS units, and issues for Congress in considering oil and gas activities in the NWRS. In the sections on federal and nonfederal wells, the report presents information on the\nnumber and location of oil and gas wells; compatibility of oil and gas activities with NWRS purposes; and regulatory mechanisms for the administration of oil and gas activities.", "", "On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law P.L. 115-97 , which provides for the creation of an oil and gas program in a portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR, or the refuge) in northeastern Alaska. The law's enactment came after a decades-long debate over whether to allow oil and gas development in ANWR. P.L. 115-97 establishes an oil and gas program for the refuge's Coastal Plain, with at least two oil and gas lease sales (of no fewer than 400,000 acres each) required in the next 10 years, and contains provisions for the distribution of revenues and royalties. P.L. 115-97 limits surface development to 2,000 acres for production and support facilities, which need not be concentrated in a single area. Development proponents contend that the oil and gas program will generate economic activity, contribute to U.S. energy security, and result in royalty revenues for both the federal government and the state of Alaska; opponents contend that the region's reserves are not necessary for energy independence and that development will detrimentally impact the refuge's unique biological resources.\nP.L. 115-97 requires the first ANWR lease sale within four years of the law's enactment—by December 2021. Activities preparatory to the lease sale include identifying lands to be leased, conducting sale-specific environmental reviews, issuing notices of sales, and other \"prelease\" activities. Activities also could include new geological and geophysical surveys to determine the extent and location of hydrocarbon resources.", "Regulations at Title 50, Part 29, Subparts C and D of the Code of Federal Regulations govern nonfederal oil and gas operations that occur within the NWRS outside of Alaska. In November 2016, FWS promulgated a final rule, \"Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights,\" which amended these regulations with regard to the management of nonfederal oil and gas wells in the NWRS. According to FWS, the changes, which went into effect on December 14, 2016, aimed to increase the consistency of FWS regulations with state and federal law and with best management practices. The rule is discussed further below under \" Nonfederal Oil and Gas Operations .\"\nThe rule has been the subject of both congressional attention and administrative action in the 115 th Congress. H.J.Res. 45 , introduced on January 30, 2017, would have disapproved the FWS final rule under the Congressional Review Act (CRA; 5 U.S.C. §§801-808) and prevented FWS from enacting a substantially similar rule in the future. No further actions were taken on H.J.Res. 45 , and the deadline to vote using fast-track procedures in the Senate pursuant to the CRA has elapsed. Some proponents of the CRA action to overturn the FWS rule stated that this action was necessary because FWS had overstepped its authority in promulgating the rule. They also stated that this rule would increase costs for oil and gas operators developing nonfederal resources in the NWRS. Some opponents of the CRA action contended that the final rule is a much-needed update to the previous management rule, which was more than 50 years old when the new rule was promulgated, and that the final rule establishes appropriate responsibilities for operators.\nThe Administration also has been active on NWRS oil and gas operations. On March 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13783, which required a review of several oil- and gas-related rules, including the FWS 2016 rule. E.O. 13783 established that \"it is in the national interest to promote clean and safe development of our Nation's vast energy resources, while at the same time avoiding regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy production, constrain economic growth, and prevent job creation.\"\nE.O. 13783 instructed the Secretary of the Interior to review and \"if appropriate ... suspend, revise, or rescind the guidance\" of the specified rules, including the FWS nonfederal oil and gas rule, to be consistent with the statement of national interest. When DOI published its final report on E.O. 13783, FWS was still in the process of reviewing the final rule.", "The FWS \"Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights\" rule revised requirements applicable to nonfederal oil and gas activities that occur in the NWRS outside of Alaska. This rule replaced prior regulations governing these activities, which, according to FWS, had \"remained unchanged for more than 50 years and provide[d] only vague guidance to staff and operators.\" FWS said the 2016 final rule aimed to update the agency's management practices and improve the compatibility of nonfederal oil and gas activities with the mission of the NWRS. The rule provides an explicit process for refuge staff to follow to minimize the impact of oil and gas activities on refuge resources to the extent practicable. The process includes permitting requirements, operating standards, requirements for financial bonding, and penalty provisions.\nThe rule also requires operators to meet performance-based standards, including standards for surface use and site management, specific resource protections, spill prevention and response, waste management, and reclamation. FWS claims that the performance-based standards, rather than prescriptive regulations, are intended to provide operators with flexibility in meeting the requirements of the permit while ensuring that NWRS resources are protected. These standards also address resource protection needs in different environments by allowing resource managers and operators to identify the most appropriate management practices for a given situation.\nFWS also outlines its minerals management policy in the FWS Service Manual . Specifically, Section 1.7(B) of the manual states that owners of nonfederal mineral rights within NWRS units outside of Alaska can transfer or develop these rights but must do so using the \"technologically feasible, least damaging methods.\"", "Prior to the issuance of the 2016 final rule, FWS published an environmental impact statement (EIS) in August 2016. As part of the EIS, FWS collected information on nonfederal oil and gas activities in the NWRS. Data on nonfederal oil and gas activities presented in this report are from the EIS unless otherwise noted.\nWithin the NWRS, the EIS reported that 107 of the total 605 units, or approximately 18%, contain nonfederally administered wells (including oil, gas, and \"other\" well types; see Table 1 ). These units include 104 national wildlife refuges and 3 wetland management districts ( Figure 1 ). Forty-five NWRS units were reported to have active wells, including 44 with oil and gas wells and 11 with other well types (some units had both oil and gas wells and other well types). In total, FWS recorded 5,002 nonfederal wells in the NWRS, including 2,201 gas wells, 971 oil wells, 59 oil and gas wells, and 1,771 other wells. \"Other\" wells include injection wells for enhanced oil recovery, saltwater or wastewater disposal wells, coal-bed methane wells, observation wells, stratigraphic wells, dry wells, and water wells. Of the 5,002 wells, 2,196 (44%) are inactive and 1,665 (33%) are active; the remaining wells have another classification.\nFor a complete list of NWRS units with nonfederal wells, see Table A-1 .", "Balancing mineral owners' right to develop their oil and gas resources with FWS's mission to conserve and protect NWRS resources can be complex and can raise questions of compatible use. The NWRS's mission is provided in the NWRSAA, as amended by the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-57 ). The NWRSAA states that \"the mission of the System is to administer a national network of lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans.\"\nUnder the NWRSAA, the Secretary of the Interior is to identify and permit only activities that are deemed compatible with the NWRS's mission and to deny activities that are not compatible. Specifically, the law directs the Secretary to facilitate compatible wildlife-dependent recreation opportunities, including hunting, fishing, and hiking. By providing for compatible uses only, the NWRSAA prioritizes the NWRS's primary mission—conservation; management; and restoration of fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats. However, there are limited exceptions to the compatibility requirement; these exceptions provide for certain activities without requiring compatibility determinations.\nOne such exception is for the development of nonfederal oil and gas rights. FWS's Final Compatibility Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 outlines circumstances in which the compatibility determination process is not required. Exemptions are provided for refuge management activities, military overflights, certain actions taken by other federal agencies with primary jurisdiction over a unit or area within a unit, emergencies, and \"other\" circumstances, including reserved oil and gas rights. The notice on the policy states, \"B. Other exceptions. (1) There are other circumstances under which the compatibility requirements may not be applicable. The most common exceptions involve property rights that are not vested in the Federal Government, such as reserved rights to explore and develop minerals or oil and gas beneath a refuge.\"\nAlthough these activities are not subject to a compatibility determination, the notice goes on to state, \"In the case of reserved rights, the Refuge Manager should work with the owner of the property interest to develop stipulations in a special use permit or other agreement to alleviate or minimize adverse impacts to the refuge.\"\nQuestions have been raised about FWS's general authority to regulate nonfederal oil and gas resources within the NWRS. In response to questions raised in public comments during development of the 2016 rule, FWS cited its statutory authority to regulate nonfederal oil and gas resources within the NWRS through the NWRSAA. FWS relies on this same authority in requiring permits for oil and gas operations within the NWRS. The agency states that the development of oil and gas resources within the NWRS has the potential to \"adversely impact [other] refuge resources.\"", "Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, BLM manages oil and gas leasing on federal lands, including in the NWRS. BLM regulations provide that any drilling in national wildlife refuges may take place only \"with the consent and approval of the Secretary [of the Interior] with the concurrence of the Fish and Wildlife Service as to the time, place and nature of such operations in order to give complete protection to wildlife populations and wildlife habitat on the areas leased.\"\nFWS policy concerning federal oil and gas leasing within the NWRS is summarized in the agency's Mineral P olicy Service Manual . The manual states that, with limited exceptions, extracting or developing leasable federal minerals is not allowed on NWRS lands. The exception to this prohibition is for limited circumstances where oil and gas development adjacent to an NWRS unit results in the drainage of federal oil and gas resources. In cases where the federal leases predate the establishment or expansion of the refuge, valid existing leases and wells may continue to operate.", "BLM reports that it administers 328 federal wells in 11 NWRS units outside of Alaska and 1 unit in Alaska. (The total of 12 units includes 10 national wildlife refuges and 2 wetland management districts. See \" Oil and Gas Activities in Alaska in the National Wildlife Refuge System \" for more information on activities in Alaska.) Of the 11 units outside of Alaska, the majority also have nonfederal oil and gas wells. However, two national wildlife refuges and one wetland management district that contain federal wells do not have nonfederal wells. The total includes 35 producing oil wells, 65 producing gas wells, and 194 nonproducing wells of various types. In addition, 34 wells are in stages of the approval process within these units. The wells are located in seven states within the southeast (Louisiana), mountain (Montana, Utah, and North Dakota), southwest (New Mexico and Oklahoma), and midwest (Indiana) regions. See Table B-1 for a complete list of federal oil and gas activity within the NWRS.", "Because new development of federal oil and gas resources on refuge lands typically is prohibited, in undertaking such evaluations, it is unclear whether the FWS \"concurrence\" required in BLM's oil and gas leasing regulations would involve an FWS compatibility determination. As discussed above, FWS's compatibility policy describes some situations in which a compatibility determination is not required. Among other situations, exceptions may apply \"where primary jurisdiction of refuge lands falls to an agency other than [FWS].\" It is unclear whether this exception would apply in the case of federal subsurface resources, which are administered by BLM.", "National wildlife refuges in Alaska are governed by the provisions of ANILCA and other Alaska-specific laws, as well as by general authorities for the NWRS. ANILCA provides FWS with statutory authority to ensure that operators accessing nonfederal mineral rights within NWRS in Alaska work with FWS to help avoid operational impacts and ensure reclamation standards. As noted, the regulations promulgated in the FWS nonfederal oil and gas rule of November 2016 do not apply to refuges in Alaska. Although Alaska is exempted from regulations within the rule, the rule states\nOperations on refuges in Alaska are exempt from these regulations. However, the performance-based standards of this rule may be used, as appropriate, as guidance in determining how an operator would meet the various requirements of ANILCA and ANCSA [Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq.] to protect refuge resources and uses.", "With respect to nonfederal oil and gas operations in Alaska refuges, FWS identified four NWRS units in Alaska with nonfederal wells (see Table 1 and Table A-1 ). Nonfederal subsurface ownership in Alaska may arise from situations in which FWS acquired split-estate lands without subsurface rights or from situations in which subsurface rights were legislatively conveyed under ANCSA.\nIn total, FWS identified 199 nonfederal Alaska wells, including gas, oil, oil and gas, and other well types. Of the 199 wells, 191 are contained within a single unit, Kenai National Wildlife Refuge, and the remaining 8 (all noted as \"other\" for their type) are distributed across the remaining three refuges. Only Kenai National Wildlife Refuge contains both active and inactive wells; all wells in Alaska Peninsula, Becharof, and Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuges are inactive.\nWith respect to federal oil and gas operations in Alaska refuges, BLM identified 92 wells, all within the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge. Of this total, 30 wells are producing oil, 12 wells are producing gas, and 49 are nonproducing wells of various types. One additional well is in the drilling stage. As discussed above (see \" Arctic National Wildlife Refuge \"), P.L. 115-97 requires the development of a federal oil and gas program within the ANWR.\nSee Table B-1 for a complete list of federal wells in Alaska.", "Section 304 of ANILCA states: \"Each refuge shall be administered by the Secretary [of the Interior], subject to valid existing rights, in accordance with the laws governing the administration of units of the National Wildlife Refuge System, and this Act.\" The section additionally states that the Secretary must determine whether proposed refuge uses (including certain oil and gas activities discussed in ANILCA) are compatible with refuge purposes before permitting those uses. FWS states in its Service Manual that the agency \"may alter the compatibility process, in some cases, for Alaska refuges,\" including for reviewing oil and gas leasing on non-North Slope refuges. Also, BLM regulations at 43 C.F.R. 3101.5-3 state with regard to Alaska wildlife areas that \"no lands within a refuge in Alaska open to leasing shall be available until the Fish and Wildlife Service has first completed compatability [ sic ] determinations.\"\nSection 1008 of ANILCA outlines a requirement for the Secretary of the Interior to establish an oil and gas leasing program for certain non-North Slope federal lands in Alaska. The section provides that the Secretary shall not identify lands for oil and gas development where this activity would be in violation of applicable law or, in the case of NWRS lands, would be incompatible with the purpose for which the units were established. Section 1009 requires that, upon receipt of an application for an oil and gas lease, the Secretary must render a decision, accompanied by a statement explaining the decision and whether oil and gas activities would be compatible with the purpose of the NWRS unit, within six months or within three months after publication of a final environmental impact statement if the Secretary determines one is required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347).\nIn debating oil and gas development in the ANWR, Congress has considered the compatibility of oil and gas activities with refuge purposes. P.L. 115-97 , which established an oil and gas program for ANWR's Coastal Plain, amended ANILCA to include a new refuge purpose: \"to provide for an oil and gas program on the Coastal Plain.\" Including oil and gas as a refuge purpose appears likely to facilitate a compatibility decision for an oil and gas program. FWS would prepare a compatibility determination as part of BLM's development of the oil and gas program, which has not yet occurred.", "The 115 th Congress has considered several issues relating to oil and gas activities in the NWRS. Issues of interest have included the general compatibility of oil and gas activity with NWRS purposes and oil and gas development in ANWR specifically. (See \" Recent Developments \" section for more information.)\nH.J.Res. 45 was introduced, under the authorities provided by the Congressional Review Act (CRA), to disapprove the 2016 final rule pertaining to nonfederal oil and gas activities within the NWRS outside of Alaska. Although the window for considering H.J.Res. 45 under the expedited procedures associated with the CRA has elapsed, Congress may consider the issues raised in this legislation. For example, Congress may be interested in issues pertaining to permitting fees, the role of state regulators, and how to balance or prioritize facilitation of activities with concerns about wildlife and resource protection.\nSeparately in the 115 th Congress, P.L. 115-97 addressed the long-standing issue of energy development in ANWR by establishing an oil and gas program for the Coastal Plain within the refuge. H.R. 49 and S. 49 , introduced prior to the passage of P.L. 115-97 , proposed oil and gas leasing programs for the Coastal Plain that contained similar but not identical provisions to the enacted law. Also introduced in the 115 th Congress, H.R. 1889 and S. 820 would designate the Coastal Plain as wilderness under the Wilderness Act, which generally would prohibit commercial activities, including energy development.\nCongress may remain interested in key aspects of the ANWR debate that have been raised in P.L. 115-97 and previously. These could include issues related to limits on the footprint of development, other environmental protections, compliance with NEPA, FWS and BLM management roles, judicial review of legal challenges, and treatment of special areas within the Coastal Plain, among other matters. For more information on these issues, see CRS Report RL33872, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): An Overview . P.L. 115-97 addressed some of these issues and not others, possibly owing in part to limitations imposed by the budget reconciliation process on the matters that can be considered germane. Congress could choose to address these issues through future oversight or legislation.\nAppendix A. Nonfederal Oil and Gas Activities Within the National Wildlife Refuge System\nAppendix B. Federal Oil and Gas Wells Within the National Wildlife Refuge System" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h0_full h4_full", "h0_full h3_full h2_full h1_full", "h1_title h4_title", "h4_full", "h1_full", "h0_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "", "h2_full h1_full", "h2_full", "", "h3_title", "h3_full", "", "h4_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What wells exist in the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS)?", "How are the NWRS administered?", "What types are the NWRS wells?", "What negative opinions exist on NWRS wells?", "What is the opposing view to these concerns?", "How is the harm of oil and gas development being minimized?", "How does nonfederal well activity occur?", "How is the nonfederal well regulated?", "What nonfederal wells exist?", "How are nonfederal wells administered?", "How is is federal oil and gas treated within the NWRS?", "What is the exception to this rule?", "What units of federal wells are producing?", "How does the BLM regulate the FWS in well activity?", "How do Alaskan wells compare to other sites in the United States? \\", "What additional requirements does Alaska have?", "What wells does the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge contain?", "Where else do wells exist in Alaska?", "How has Congress considered oil and gas activities in the NWRS?", "What issue regarding Alaska has been regarded?", "How has this been allowed so far?", "How might this program be continued?", "How has FWS's 2016 nonfederal oil and gas rule been addressed?" ], "summary": [ "Oil- and gas-related wells are documented in 110 (approximately 18%) of the 605 units of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS).", "The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI), administers the NWRS, which includes primarily national wildlife refuges, along with wetland management districts and waterfowl production areas.", "The wells in the NWRS most commonly involve nonfederal oil and gas resources but sometimes encompass federal resources.", "Oil and gas development in the NWRS has the potential to adversely impact wildlife and/or the environment, and some see it as contrary to the mission and purposes for which the NWRS was established.", "Others think that some levels of oil and gas activity may take place in refuges without harming the system's central mission of wildlife conservation and that such activity could benefit the U.S. economy and provide greater energy security.", "FWS, which administers nonfederal mineral activities on refuge lands, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which administers federal mineral activities on refuge lands, have developed regulations that seek to minimize the adverse impacts of oil and gas development in the NWRS, among other purposes.", "Nonfederal oil and gas activities in refuges most often occur where FWS has acquired surface rights to refuge lands without acquiring mineral rights.", "In these cases, the entity (such as an individual, corporation, or tribe) that retains a valid existing right to the mineral estate has the right to develop the oil and gas resources pursuant to regulations established by FWS.", "According to FWS data, there are 107 NWRS units with nonfederal wells, and 45 of these units have active wells.", "Nonfederal oil and gas activities in the NWRS outside of Alaska are governed by a final rule promulgated by FWS on November 2016, \"Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights.\"", "In contrast to these nonfederal activities, leasing and development of federal oil and gas resources within the NWRS generally is prohibited.", "The primary exception is when federal oil and gas leases predate the establishment or expansion of an NWRS unit, in which case the lease can be allowed to continue.", "According to BLM records, outside of Alaska, there are 11 NWRS units with federal oil and gas wells, all of which have at least 1 producing well.", "BLM regulations require FWS concurrence as to the time, place, and nature of oil and gas activities in refuges, in order to maximize protection for wildlife populations and habitat.", "For both federal and nonfederal wells in the NWRS, regulation within Alaska is different from that in the rest of the United States.", "In addition to general FWS and BLM regulations, these units also are subject to requirements of Alaska-specific laws, including the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA; P.L. 96-487).", "Within Alaska, Kenai National Wildlife Refuge has both federal and nonfederal oil and gas wells.", "Three other Alaskan units have nonfederal wells.", "Congress has debated both the extent of oil and gas activities in the NWRS and the compatibility of these activities with the NWRS's mission and purposes.", "One issue that has been debated for many years is whether to allow energy development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in northeastern Alaska.", "P.L. 115-97, enacted in December 2017, established a federal oil and gas program for a portion of the refuge.", "Congress may continue to pursue oversight or legislation related to the implementation of this program, including issues related to limits on the footprint of development, compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347), or judicial review of legal challenges, among other matters.", "Congress also has addressed FWS's 2016 nonfederal oil and gas rule through both oversight and legislation, and it may continue to consider aspects of these regulations as well as the appropriate role for FWS in overseeing nonfederal oil and gas wells in the NWRS." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, -1, -1, 3, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, 1, 2, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-16-136	{ "title": [ "Background", "GSA Data on Selected Leased Vehicles Are Generally Reliable", "GSA’s Efforts Support the Reliability of Selected Drive-thru Data", "Reasonableness of Selected Drive-thru Data", "Indications of Accuracy in Selected Drive-thru Data", "GSA Takes Steps to Ensure the Reasonableness of FAST Vehicle Data", "GSA’s Role Focuses on Providing Guidance and Advice to Agencies on Identifying and Reducing Underutilized Vehicles", "Some Agencies’ Processes Do Not Always Facilitate the Identification and Removal of Underutilized Leased Vehicles, Which May Hinder Cost Savings", "Agencies Use a Variety of Utilization Criteria, and Two Agencies That Could Not Determine if Some Vehicles Met These Criteria in Fiscal Year 2014 Have Taken Steps to Address the Issues", "Four Agencies in Our Review Could Not Determine If They Justified Some Vehicles, but Two Have Plans to Address the Identified Issues", "Three Agencies in Our Review Kept Vehicles They Identified as Unjustified", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: NASA Utilization Criteria by Vehicle Type and Center in Fiscal Year 2014", "Appendix III: Comments from the General Services Administration", "Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix V: Comments from the Department of the Interior", "Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs", "Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "Agencies use vehicles in many ways, as vehicles support agency efforts to achieve various mission needs. These needs can be diverse, as demonstrated by the vehicle uses of the five agencies we selected for review: ferrying clients, conveying repair equipment, hauling explosive materials, and transporting employees, among others (see table 1.)\nAgencies may own or lease the vehicles in their fleets and are responsible for managing their vehicles’ utilization in a manner that allows them to fulfill their missions and meet various federal requirements. For example, agencies determine the number and type of vehicles they need to own or lease and when a vehicle is no longer needed to achieve the agency’s mission. Statutes, executive orders, and policy initiatives direct federal agencies to, among other things, collect and analyze data on costs and eliminate non-essential vehicles from their fleets. For example, every year agencies provide an update on their progress in achieving the inventory goals determined by their Vehicle Allocation Methodology (VAM), such as the type and number of vehicles in their fleets. These updates are reviewed by GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (OGP), which provides feedback on agencies’ submissions.\nFederal provisions on vehicle justifications and determining what makes a vehicle “utilized” are detailed in the Federal Property Management Regulations (FPMR). Specifically, the FPMR provide how agencies can define utilization criteria for the vehicles that they use. According to GSA’s OGP, the only requirement in the utilization portion of the regulations is for agencies to justify every full-time vehicle in their respective fleets, though the regulations do not specify how these justifications should be conducted. The FPMR recommend—but do not require—that the annual mileage minimum for passenger vehicles be 12,000 miles, and 10,000 miles for light trucks. However, according to GSA officials, mileage is not the only appropriate indicator of utilization for some vehicles’ missions. For example, GSA officials stated that it would be inappropriate to set a mileage expectation for an emergency responder vehicle or a vehicle that supports national security requirements because those vehicles are only needed in specific circumstances and may not accrue many miles. Thus, the FPMR state that the aforementioned mileage guidelines “may be employed by an agency… other utilization factors, such as days used, agency mission, and the relative costs of alternatives to a full time vehicle assignment, may be considered as justification where miles traveled guidelines are not met.” Therefore, according to GSA officials, agencies are allowed to define their own utilization criteria, which may include adopting the miles-traveled guidelines from the FPMR, using mileage minimums above or below the FPMR, or employing other metrics.\nAccording to GSA officials, agencies may choose to define their selected utilization criteria in their internal policies, and vehicles meeting those criteria would be considered justified under the regulations. However, if a vehicle does not meet the utilization criteria specifically described in agency policy, the FPMR permit agencies to individually justify a vehicle using criteria the agency finds appropriate for that specific vehicle. The regulations do not specify the frequency with which the justifications (either as determined by agency policy or individually determined) must be conducted, updated, or reviewed. Agencies decide what vehicles are needed to help the agency meet their mission at any given point in time. While GSA provides guidance, the ultimate decision-making power lies with the agency leasing the vehicle.\nFederal agencies can use GSA Fleet to acquire leased vehicles. According to GSA, under this arrangement an agency informs GSA Fleet what kind of vehicle is necessary for its mission. GSA Fleet fulfills the agency’s request by either purchasing a new vehicle (owned by GSA but leased to the agency), or providing a vehicle from GSA’s existing inventory (owned by GSA and previously leased to another agency). GSA Fleet’s primary mission is to provide the “best value” to its customers and the American people. GSA Fleet’s leasing rates are designed to recover all costs of its leasing program, but the exact cost of a lease depends on the type of vehicle and the number of miles traveled during the lease period, among other factors. For example, a conventionally fueled subcompact sedan has a 2015 fixed rate of $153 per month and mileage rate of $0.13 per mile traveled. GSA Fleet’s fixed rate is designed to cover fixed costs such as GSA Fleet staff and vehicle depreciation, whereas the mileage rate is designed to cover variable costs such as fuel and maintenance. Agencies are responsible for any costs associated with damage or excessive wear and tear over the course of the lease— typically 3-7 years for a passenger vehicle. We previously reported that, according to GSA officials and fleet managers from military and civilian fleets, GSA Fleet’s vehicle lease rates are typically lower than the commercial sector and provide a more economical choice for federal agencies.\nGSA Fleet collects data on leased vehicles to assist with billing as well as help agencies manage their leased-vehicle fleets. GSA Fleet’s Fleet Management System (FMS) contains most of this data. The portal used by agencies to access the data in GSA’s FMS is called Drive-thru. Drive- thru offers a suite of applications, including tools to analyze crash data and report mileage. As Drive-thru is the primary portal through which customers can access GSA’s leasing data, some customers refer to the underlying database as Drive-thru as well. While Drive-thru is the name of the exterior-facing access portal rather than the database itself, we will refer to the database as Drive-thru for the purposes of this report to reflect the language commonly used by GSA’s leasing customers.\nDrive-thru stores hundreds of data elements on each vehicle, including manufacturer-provided information such as make, model, and fuel efficiency; agency-reported data such as monthly mileage; and data obtained through fleet cards (charge cards) such as quantity and type of fuel purchased. Agencies can import information from Drive-thru into their own internal fleet management systems and, according to multiple agency officials, generally rely on GSA Fleet to ensure Drive-thru’s accuracy, as identifying and correcting erroneous data can be time consuming and difficult. However, agencies can change the data they receive from Drive-thru after data enter an agency’s internal fleet management system but before they are externally reported.\nGSA’s OGP co-manages and co-funds a web-based reporting tool—the Federal Automotive Statistical Tool (FAST)—with the Department of Energy (DOE). FAST gathers data from federal agencies about their owned and leased vehicles to satisfy a variety of federal-reporting requirements, including the annual Federal Fleet Report. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), it is the leasing agencies, not GSA or DOE, which are responsible for the accuracy of the data agencies report to FAST. As a result, while GSA’s OGP helps compile the information from FAST that populates the Federal Fleet Report, the accuracy of the Federal Fleet Report is dependent on the accuracy of the data that agencies report to FAST.\nThe Federal Fleet Report provides an overview of federal motor vehicle data, such as number of vehicles and related costs. A comparison of the reports from fiscal years 2012 through 2014 shows that the overall quantity of leased vehicles varies slightly from year to year, but the costs have consistently decreased. For example, in fiscal year 2013, federal agencies leased 183,989 vehicles at a cost of approximately $1.06 billion. In fiscal year 2014, federal agencies leased slightly more vehicles— 186,214—but the costs dropped to $1.03 billion, as shown in table 2. GSA officials explained that the cost reduction is attributable in part to agencies’ decisions to lease smaller, less expensive vehicles.\nAlthough GSA collects and reports information on leased vehicles, GSA does not have responsibility for tracking how agencies use vehicles or identifying underutilized vehicles. Nevertheless, some of the services that GSA Fleet provides are related to utilization. For example, to help streamline customers’ vehicle leasing experiences, in 2014 GSA employed approximately 330 liaisons called Fleet Service Representatives (FSR). FSRs are expected to answer local customers’ questions about vehicle acquisition, provide assistance when vehicles need services, and help customers understand the various leasing terms and products offered by GSA Fleet. According to GSA Fleet, FSRs should discuss utilization with leasing customers at least annually as part of other business discussions.", "We found the data we reviewed in Drive-thru to be generally reliable as GSA has taken steps to ensure that the data are reasonable, although a few data elements have indications that those data could be more accurate. While GSA is not responsible for the accuracy of data in FAST, it has taken appropriate steps to ensure the data are reasonable.", "GSA is responsible for ensuring that the information that it is providing to customers in Drive-thru is reliable (i.e., both reasonable and accurate). It is important that data in Drive-thru are reliable because reports that are generated via Drive-thru represent a service that GSA is directly providing to customers to help them manage their fleets. Agencies also use Drive- thru when fulfilling federal fleet reporting requirements. For example, agencies can download a report about their leased vehicles from Drive- thru. The report then can be directly uploaded into FAST to meet annual reporting requirements on the leased fleet’s size and costs. Incorrect data in Drive-thru can therefore hinder agencies’ abilities to manage their leased fleets or could compromise the integrity of federal reports.", "A basic test of reliability is whether the data are reasonable. Using the guidance provided in three key sources, we developed an analytical framework for measuring the “reasonableness” of data, as there is currently no universally accepted standard for such a measurement. Each of these key sources discusses three topics, which we use as our standard for reasonableness of data: (1) electronic safeguards, such as error messages for out-of-range or inconsistent entries; (2) a review of data samples to ensure that key fields are non-duplicative and sensible; and (3) clear guidance to ensure consistent user interpretation of data entry rules.\nBased on the data we reviewed, we found that GSA has taken appropriate steps to ensure the selected Drive-thru data are reasonable. Specifically, GSA uses electronic safeguards when data are entered into Drive-thru. For example, error messages appear if a user enters an odometer reading such as 12345, 99999, 00000, 654321 or a reading that differs 9,999 or more miles from the previous month’s entry. Similarly, GSA uses a validation program to catch vehicle identification number (VIN) entry errors. VIN barcodes are scanned into GSA’s system unless they must be manually entered due to barcode damage. For both scans and manual entries, software validates that the entered VIN meets the check digit calculation.\nIn addition, GSA verifies some data during reconciliations and other post- entry checks. For example, customer mileage entries are routinely monitored by GSA’s Loss Prevention Team (LPT) for abnormal inputs. If entries for a specific vehicle are consistently nonsensical, the LPT reviews the activity for signs of fraud and, if likely fraudulent, forwards to the appropriate Inspector General’s office for investigation. For entries that are consistently nonsensical but are not likely fraudulent, the LPT notifies the designated FSR for follow-up with the customer. The FSR is then tasked with emphasizing to the customer the importance of entering valid odometer readings in the future.\nLastly, GSA reported that it provides guidance on how to enter vehicle- related information into Drive-thru to the people who are responsible for entering different types of data. Generally, information about the vehicle itself is the responsibility of GSA or its agents (such as contractors— known as “marshallers”—who enter manufacturer-provided data at the time GSA receives the vehicle). GSA provides a handbook to marshallers that explains how the marshallers should use the software that collects information and transmits it to GSA’s system. Similarly, GSA provides a Drive-thru guide to customers that explains how customers should enter certain types of information into Drive-thru; however, GSA does not provide instructions regarding how customers should inform GSA if their contact information will change. The lack of such guidance may have been a contributing factor in the inaccuracies we found in the customer contact data, as discussed in the next section on indications of accuracy in Drive-thru data; however, according to GSA officials, planned changes to GSA’s customer ID protocols will remove the need for such guidance in the future.", "A second test of data reliability is accuracy; however, we tested for indications of accuracy in the data, as verifying the data accuracy itself would have required extensive examination of individual vehicles, which was beyond the scope of this review. We performed tests on a selection of nearly two dozen Drive-thru data elements from May 2015 for selected vehicles and determined that there are numerous indications of accuracy associated with the data we reviewed. For example:\nAlmost 100 percent of 9 vehicle inventory fields, including make, manufacturer name, fuel type, VIN, and model year, have no missing data. One vehicle was missing the manufacturer name.\nThree entries indicated the presence of a luxury manufacturer entry (all for Audi), an error rate of less than one hundredth of one percent. .07 percent of records for sedan fuel tank sizes exceeded 20 gallons. Although sedan fuel tank sizes vary and can change from year to year, few midsize sedans have 20 gallon tanks. Therefore, fuel tanks larger than 20 gallons might indicate a data error.\nDespite the overall indications that the selected Drive-thru data are accurate, there are three areas where we found indications that the data may be less accurate than the other information we studied: fuel type coding, odometer entries, and customer contact data. According to federal internal controls standards, data collection applications—including electronic safeguards such as logic and edit checks—should ensure that all inputs are correct in order to facilitate accountability and effective stewardship of government resources.\nFirst, we found that while most fuel-type-coding data appear to be accurate, gas stations coded pumps incorrectly in at least some cases from January through April 2015, and possibly in as high as 46 percent of cases. For example, drivers of vehicles with E-85 fuel types were reported to have purchased compressed natural gas or biodiesel. We were not able to determine the precise number of instances where fuel had been miscoded; however, because some vehicles use more than one type of fuel—for example, “flex fuel” vehicles can operate on either regular gasoline or an alternative fuel known as E-85, which is a blend of gasoline and ethanol. Given the data available, we were not able to determine which fuel the user actually selected and were thus unable to determine which purchases were coded incorrectly by the gas station. The high end of the error range (46 percent) would mean that each uncertainty was resolved as a fuel-pump-coding error by the gas station, an error that GSA officials said was extremely improbable. These officials noted that they believed the actual error rate was substantially lower. However, GSA officials agreed that pump miscodings compromise data accuracy and noted that GSA has worked with fueling station owners and relevant associations to reduce fuel pump miscodings. However, GSA officials stated their ability to affect change is highly limited, as the miscodings occur at the point of sale and there is no incentive for the fueling stations to correct the miscodings.\nIn addition to fuel type miscodings, we found that 3 percent of monthly odometer entries in May 2015 were lower than the previous month’s odometer reading. An odometer reading that decreases from one month to the next indicates that there was an error at some point in time—either the previous month’s entry was too high, or the current month’s entry is too low. Monthly odometer readings are supplied by agencies as part of the billing process, and odometer errors result in temporary billing errors as agencies pay additional fees based on mileage. GSA officials stated that they cannot be certain of a vehicle’s odometer reading until the vehicle is returned to them at the end of the leasing period and that they typically depend on the leasing agency to correctly report the odometer readings. According to GSA officials, as part of the monthly odometer- data collection process GSA’s system warns users that they may have entered incorrect data if the reported odometer reading is 9,999 miles greater than or less than the previous month’s odometer reading. Users would then be able to correct the data before submitting it to GSA.\nGSA officials stated that they chose the 9,999 mile warning point because they did not want the system to generate cautionary messages to customers when there was a valid reason for the mileage difference. The officials explained that there are legitimate reasons why the previous month’s odometer reading might be higher than the current month’s reading. For example, if the agency relied on GSA to estimate mileage in the previous month and the estimate was too high, the agency’s correction in the current month could result in a lower odometer reading. GSA officials said that they did not want the system to incorrectly flag these instances, and that they have no plans to evaluate the current safeguard. However, using such a large mileage difference to trigger a warning means that GSA may be unlikely to catch the majority of errors. We found 52 cases where the mileage difference was 9,999 miles or greater, but more than 4,800 cases where the previous month’s odometer reading exceeded the current month’s reading. We also found that the average monthly odometer difference for our selected vehicle data is 564 miles per month, with 95 percent of vehicles driving less than 2,482 miles per month, as shown in table 3.\nAlthough the resulting billing errors can be resolved the following month and the overall error rate is low, resolutions take time and resources for both GSA and the customer. Evaluating the current warning and adjusting it accordingly could help improve the accuracy of the data and therefore help reduce these costs, and GSA officials stated that changing the existing safeguard would not be costly. Further, GSA’s edit check for odometer readings is not consistent with federal internal control standards that call for agencies to pursue data accuracy when possible and cost- effective.\nLastly, we found that customer contact data, such as the name and e-mail of the individual whom GSA should contact for vehicle-related services, is not always correct. As mentioned previously, GSA’s customer-leasing guide does not provide guidance regarding how customers should proceed if the vehicle’s point of contact will change. In addition, according to GSA officials, the customer ID number—which is how customers sign in to Drive-thru—is associated with the customer’s fleet, not the customer points of contact themselves. As a result, customer contact data are updated manually by FSRs after FSRs detect a problem, such as a returned e-mail after the previous point of contact leaves the agency. Several FSRs stated that the manual updates are time-consuming. Moreover, one FSR we interviewed stated that the current process relies on the initiative of FSRs to ensure accuracy. Without accurate customer contact data, it is more difficult for FSRs to communicate with agencies about vehicles, including whether certain vehicles are still needed. Two FSRs stated that turnover in customer agency fleet management is high. Such turnover exacerbates the difficulty associated with maintaining the accuracy of these data. According to GSA officials, planned changes to Drive-thru in 2016 will resolve this issue, as customer IDs will no longer be assigned to a fleet. Rather, each customer will have that individual’s own individual user account, profile, and password. In addition, the customer ID will be the individual customer’s e-mail address instead of a number, a step that GSA officials anticipate will resolve the difficulties associated with updating the user contact information.", "GSA is not responsible for the accuracy of data reported to FAST, a data collection system that GSA co-manages with DOE. Rather, OMB’s Circular A-11 provides that agencies are responsible for reviewing and correcting fleet data prior to submitting them through FAST. However, GSA’s OGP has a role in ensuring the reasonableness of FAST data as a partner in the FAST management team. In this role, GSA focuses on data relevant to fleet management, such as overall inventory, cost, and utilization metrics. We found that GSA’s OGP has taken appropriate steps to ensure the fleet management data reported to FAST are reasonable. Specifically, (1) GSA is aware of the electronic safeguards built into FAST for fleet management data; (2) GSA examines some of the data after it is submitted by agencies and flags entries for correction; and (3) GSA provides guidance to agencies on how to properly enter information into FAST.\nAccording to GSA, it shares responsibility with DOE for implementing and managing electronic safeguards for FAST. GSA and DOE collaborate to implement logic checks, which both parties use to determine the reasonableness of the data. We also found that GSA has a process for reviewing data after they are entered by an agency. If, for example, a significant increase in a specific type of fuel use is not matched by a similar increase in inventory, mileage, or cost, then GSA flags the data for verification with the agency. While it is not known how often GSA finds entries that it recommends for agency review, GSA reported that during both the 2013 and 2014 FAST reporting cycles, a few agencies experienced difficulties that required GSA to help resolve data issues (for example, re-opening FAST after the close of the data call). Lastly, we found that GSA provides guidance to agencies on how to properly enter information into FAST in a variety of formats, including (1) written instructions to users, (2) written instructions to administrators, (3) presentations at quarterly meetings, (4) one-on-one sessions with individual agencies upon request, (5) online demonstrations, and (5) official guidance in the form of Federal Management Regulation (FMR) bulletins.", "GSA has a limited role in identifying and reducing underutilized leased vehicles, as agencies are responsible for managing their vehicle fleets. GSA is not responsible for monitoring agencies’ vehicle utilization policies. Rather, according to GSA officials, GSA focuses on providing guidance and advice to federal agencies on utilization by (1) developing written guidance and reviewing agencies’ Vehicle Allocation Methodology (VAM) update submissions and (2) holding conversations with federal agencies’ fleet managers about vehicle utilization at least annually.\nGSA’s OGP provides written guidance in the form of bulletins to federal agencies to implement legislation, executive orders, and other directives, but agencies are not legally required to follow this guidance. For example, in May 2011, a Presidential Memo (implementing a 2009 Executive Order) required GSA to develop and distribute VAM guidance to federal agencies for determining their optimum fleet inventory. In response, GSA provided such guidance to agencies in August 2011. Specifically, the guidance directed agencies to survey the utilization of vehicles each year, but agencies were not required to follow the guidance and some agencies chose to continue using their existing processes even though those processes differed from the GSA guidance. For example, some agencies’ fleet managers (including those from NASA, according to NASA officials, and those from the U.S. Navy, according to GSA officials) believed that the processes they already had in place fulfilled the intention of the guidance. In addition to providing written guidance, GSA has voluntarily reviewed utilization information covered in agencies’ VAM update submissions and has sometimes made broad recommendations to agencies based on those reviews. For example, in the 2014 VAM review, GSA recommended that all executive federal agencies establish and document specific vehicle utilization criteria for motor vehicle justification, that the criteria be reviewed at least annually, and that action be taken when underutilized vehicles are identified.\nGSA officials told us that another aspect of the agency’s role in identifying and reducing underutilized leased vehicles is to provide advice to federal agencies’ fleet managers at least annually through conversations about utilization. According to GSA officials, this advisory role is intended to help the federal government save money by providing agencies with support needed to make wise business decisions. In addition, GSA officials explained that during conversations with fleet managers, FSRs might discuss the agency’s overall fleet size, vehicle replacement options, or may suggest that a larger vehicle is no longer needed when a smaller one will suffice. For example, one NASA fleet manager told us that his FSR coordinated the exchange of two larger vehicles in his fleet for two smaller vehicles for the purposes of downsizing and reducing fuel consumption.\nTo improve our understanding of these utilization conversations and to examine their usefulness, we sent a non-generalizable survey to 68 fleet managers for our five selected federal fleets. While the responses are not representative of either the experiences among our five selected agencies or the federal fleet as a whole, they do provide insight into activities that are otherwise undocumented. Fifty one fleet managers responded, with the majority of them (41) reporting either having decision- making authority or collaborating with their supervisor to make decisions about vehicle acquisition and disposal. Of the 41 respondents with a role in the vehicle’s acquisition and disposal decision-making process, 27 responded that their FSR has communicated with them about leased- vehicle utilization based on mileage. The majority of those decision- makers—25 of the 27—said that these communications were moderately to extremely useful in helping them to manage their leased-vehicle utilization based on mileage. However, 18 of the 51 overall respondents (including 14 of the 41 respondents with an acquisition and disposal decision-making role) said that they had never discussed utilization based on mileage with their FSR.\nGSA’s management told us that it believes these conversations are occurring, but may not include the word “utilization,” a situation that could explain, in part, why some of our survey respondents reported never having discussed utilization with their FSR. According to GSA officials, the expectation is inherent to the role of the FSR and is made clear to them through training. However, we found indications that not all FSRs are discussing utilization with agency fleet managers. GSA’s management does not have a mechanism to help ensure that these conversations are occurring as expected. As a result, GSA may not be able to identify opportunities for FSRs to better assist agencies in identifying and managing their underutilized leased vehicles. Establishing such a mechanism would be consistent with federal internal control standards, which state that agencies should have reasonable assurance that employees are carrying out their duties and that feedback is provided in the event that expectations are not met.\nWhile GSA generally focuses on providing guidance and advice, it has regulatory authority to repossess federal agencies’ leased vehicles in some instances, including cases where agencies cannot produce justification for the vehicle. Specifically, the FPMR state that if GSA requests justification for a vehicle, agencies must provide it. If the agency does not provide justification for that leased vehicle, GSA may withdraw the vehicle from further agency use. GSA officials told us that it does not exercise this authority because it would be a significant cost and time burden for GSA to review these justifications.", "Some of the agencies we reviewed could not determine if vehicles met utilization criteria, could not provide justifications for vehicles, or kept vehicles that had been determined were not needed. In total, we identified shortcomings in agency processes that affected leased vehicles with an annual cost of approximately $8.7 million.", "While the FPMR provide general mileage guidelines that can be used as criteria for vehicle utilization—12,000 miles per year for passenger vehicles and 10,000 miles per year for light trucks—it also authorizes agencies to develop their own criteria to determine vehicle utilization where miles-traveled guidelines are not appropriate. GSA officials stated most vehicles will not meet these guidelines and that agencies are expected to adopt criteria that reflect the vehicles’ mission. The agencies in our review used a wide variety of utilization criteria, as shown in table 4.\nOne of the five agencies—BIA—uses the FPMR mileage guidelines as its criteria. Three other agencies—Air Force, NPS, and VHA—use the FPMR mileage guidelines for some (but not all) vehicles. NASA does not use the FPMR guidelines as criteria; NASA uses miles-traveled criteria that are lower than the FPMR guidelines. Analyzing the appropriateness of each utilization criteria was beyond the scope of this report. According to GSA officials, all utilization criteria—including mileage criteria below FPMR guidelines—are allowed under the FPMR. While three of our five selected agencies use mileage criteria below FPMR guidelines for at least some vehicles, they are not the only agencies doing so. For example, in fiscal year 2013, the Inspector General (IG) for the Department of Energy (DOE) found one DOE facility used 2,460 miles per year, an average of 205 miles per month, as its utilization criteria.\nAgencies provided a variety of explanations for the utilization criteria they selected:\nAir Force officials stated their vehicles serve very diverse mission needs. In order to ensure they have the right vehicle for each mission need, they developed a software algorithm with over 2,600 criteria that are not all utilization-based. Some criteria include the cost of alternatives and the criticality of a vehicle’s contribution to the mission.\nAccording to BIA officials, the FPMR’s miles-traveled guidelines are appropriate utilization criteria for their fleet because their vehicles typically travel long distances across remote areas to meet their mission.\nNPS officials stated they used the FPMR’s miles-traveled guidelines as criteria for leased vehicles because the criteria provide the right metrics to meet department needs.\nVHA uses the FPMR’s miles-traveled guidelines as well as other miles-traveled metrics and days per month as utilization criteria, which an official said reflects the agency mission of delivering health care. Vehicles only need to meet one criterion to be considered utilized.\nNASA uses miles-traveled utilization criteria that are lower than the FPMR miles-traveled guidelines. NASA policy requires each NASA center to set utilization criteria at 25 percent of the average miles traveled for each vehicle type at their center (see app. II for a list of NASA utilization measurements by center). NASA officials stated they believe this approach is an acceptable business practice, which the agency has used for more than 20 years.\nWe found 71 percent of the vehicles we selected from the five agencies met these agency-defined criteria, as shown in table 4.\nFor two agencies—NASA and VHA—we found that the agencies’ processes for managing utilization data did not always facilitate the identification of underutilized leased vehicles, although both agencies have taken steps to rectify the identified issues. Specifically, we found:\nNASA did not apply its utilization criteria to 41 vehicles at its Armstrong Flight Research Center because, according to NASA officials, the center’s transportation officer retired in 2013 and the replacement did not apply utilization criteria in fiscal year 2014. Without utilization criteria, the center could not determine which vehicles from this center were utilized in fiscal year 2014. The agency paid approximately $137,000 for these vehicles in fiscal year 2014. According to NASA officials, the center’s transportation officer conducted a utilization analysis for these vehicles in fiscal year 2015 and the center will continue to follow NASA policy in the future.\nVHA did not safeguard vehicle utilization data at one VHA medical center, as a new employee deleted vehicle utilization data from 2008- 2014. This prevented the agency from presently determining whether 343 vehicles had met the utilization criteria in fiscal year 2014. The agency paid more than $1.1 million to GSA in fiscal year 2014 for these vehicles. A VHA official said the agency was previously unaware vehicle utilization data from that medical center had been deleted from the Fleet Management Information System (FMIS) and have counseled the employee responsible regarding the error to ensure that the data are retained in the future.", "If vehicles do not meet utilization criteria defined in agency policy, the FPMR provides that agencies must justify vehicles in another manner. The FPMR do not specify how agencies should conduct these justifications or how the justifications should be documented. While the FPMR state that agencies may be required to provide written justification, the regulations do not require agencies to clearly document the justifications before a request to provide such documentation is made. Federal internal control standards state that all transactions and significant events need to be clearly documented and that the documentation should be readily available for examination.\nFour of the five agencies in our review could not readily provide justifications for vehicles that had not met utilization criteria defined in agency policy. Cumulatively, these agencies spent approximately $5.8 million in fiscal year 2014 on vehicles where individual justifications could not be located in a timely manner, as shown in table 5 below. Without readily available documentation, the agencies could not determine whether they had justified these vehicles, and whether any of these vehicles should be eliminated from agency fleets.\nAir Force officials could not readily provide the justifications for 413 vehicles that did not meet the utilization criteria in its software algorithm. The agency paid $1.5 million to GSA in fiscal year 2014 for these vehicles. According to officials, vehicles that do not meet the utilization criteria in the Air Force’s algorithm are subject to the agency’s justification process, the results of which are stored in the agency FMIS. However, we found that the Air Force’s FMIS does not include information on all agency vehicles. Agency officials said justifications for these 413 vehicles are not stored in the Air Force’s FMIS and would be difficult to locate because these vehicles are used by the Air National Guard, which has its own justification process. However, Air Force is administratively responsible for these vehicles, according to agency officials.\nBIA officials could not readily provide the justifications for 282 vehicles that did not meet utilization criteria. The agency paid $1.2 million to GSA in fiscal year 2014 for these vehicles. According to these officials, justifications are documented via e-mail, and it would be very challenging to search e-mail for these records as there was no universal format. Moreover, BIA officials said some of the justifications were reviewed by a fleet manager who left the agency, and they were unsure how to retrieve records from that individual’s e-mail account. Interior officials stated they will replace BIA’s e-mail process with a standardized form accessible through Interior’s FMIS in fiscal year 2016.\nNASA was able to provide the justifications for all of its vehicles where it applied utilization criteria and the criteria were not met. NASA policy requires NASA centers to use Vehicle Utilization Review Boards (VURB) to approve or deny justifications for vehicles that do not meet utilization criteria. All vehicles that are reviewed by VURBs have an individual justification form, and all VURBs submit a summary document of their reviews to headquarters officials.\nNPS officials could not readily provide justifications for 645 vehicles because those justifications were not stored within the agency’s FMIS. The agency paid $2.5 million to GSA in fiscal year 2014 for these vehicles. While NPS designed its justification forms to be stored within Interior’s FMIS, we found none of these forms had been uploaded to the system. In order for NPS officials to determine which of its vehicles had been justified, they would need to locate these 645 forms, which officials said were stored in field offices. Interior officials told us they were unsure why some of NPS’ forms were not stored in the agency’s FMIS but they plan to upload the forms to the system.\nVHA was unable to locate justifications for 181 vehicles for which it had data indicating that the vehicle had not met VHA’s utilization criteria. The agency paid $0.6 million to GSA in fiscal year 2014 for these vehicles. According to VHA officials, justifications are stored with local fleet managers and are not readily accessible to headquarters officials. Agency officials said that the justification system was developed to assist local fleet managers and that previously, it was not necessary for headquarters to access these records.\nThe finding that four of the selected agencies’ processes did not allow them to consistently determine which of their vehicles are justified is consistent with the findings of other agencies that have examined their vehicle fleets. For example, in 2014 the Inspector General (IG) for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported that DHS could not determine whether or not certain vehicles that did not meet the agency’s utilization criteria were justified. The IG estimated DHS’s cost to operate these vehicles in fiscal year 2012 was between $35.3 and $48.6 million. As a result of our review, two of the selected agencies—BIA and NPS— have plans to modify their systems accordingly to provide accessible justification documentation. Without readily available justification documentation, agencies are limited in their ability to exercise oversight over vehicle retention decisions, including how many vehicles—if any— should be eliminated.\nFurther, the FPMR do not specifically require that agencies document all of their justifications in writing or store the justifications in a readily accessible location. Federal internal control standards on record keeping and management call for the accurate and timely recording of transactions, such as justification decisions and call for the documentation to be readily available for examination. We found that without such readily available documentation, four of the five selected agencies in our review could not determine whether they had justified some of their vehicles and whether any of those vehicles should be eliminated from agency fleets. According to GSA officials, the agency has not reviewed the FPMR to determine if the regulations should be amended to be more specific about vehicle justification documentation, and they have no plans to do so. As a result, GSA may be missing an opportunity to help ensure that agencies are appropriately justifying all vehicles in their fleet and determining if their leased-vehicle fleets contain vehicles that should be eliminated.", "In addition to the vehicles where agencies could not locate justifications in a timely manner, three agencies kept vehicles that did not pass their justification process. The FPMR do not require agencies to take any action for unjustified vehicles, which are vehicles that neither meet the agency’s utilization criteria nor pass the justification process. However, federal internal control standards call for agencies to be accountable for stewardship of government resources. All five selected agencies have established approaches to address unjustified vehicles, which can include placing them into a shared pool, transferring them to a new mission, rotating them with higher-mileage vehicles, or eliminating them from their fleet. All five selected agencies took actions to reduce vehicles that did not meet utilization criteria or pass the justification process; yet three agencies cumulatively retained over 500 such vehicles, paying GSA $1.7 million for these vehicles in fiscal year 2014. See table 6.\nSpecifically, we found that:\nNPS retained 109 vehicles that did not meet agency-defined utilization criteria and did not pass the agency’s justification process. The agency paid GSA $0.4 million in fiscal year 2014 for these vehicles.\nVHA retained 393 vehicles that did not meet agency-defined utilization criteria and did not pass the agency’s justification process. The agency paid $1.3 million to GSA in fiscal year 2014 for these vehicles. VHA policy does not require justification for all vehicles that do not meet utilization criteria. As a result, these 393 vehicles were never subject to a justification process even though they did not meet utilization criteria. VA officials said that returning vehicles to GSA would not lead to cost savings because GSA will continue to charge the agency for the vehicle until a new lessee is found. GSA officials said that only in cases where a large number of vehicles are prematurely returned at once does GSA continue to charge the leasing agency for the vehicles. VA officials stated that they do not believe that this policy is applied consistently.\nNASA retained one vehicle that did not meet agency-defined utilization criteria in fiscal year 2014 and did not pass the agency’s justification process. NASA officials explained that the vehicle was incrementally removed from service in fiscal year 2015 to ensure that mission requirements would not be negatively impacted. NASA has since returned its unjustified vehicle to GSA.\nWhile these findings are not generalizable, they are consistent with several findings from agency inspectors general that have reported agencies keeping vehicles even though they did not meet agency’s utilization criteria or pass the agency’s justification process. For example, in 2013 the DOE IG found one DOE component retained 234 vehicles— 21 percent of the component’s fleet—even though the vehicles did not meet utilization criteria and users had not submitted justification for their retention. Similarly, in 2015 the DHS IG found that the Federal Protective Service had not properly justified administrative vehicles and spare law enforcement vehicles in its fleet, valued at more than $1 million fiscal year 2014.\nInternal controls call for agencies to be accountable stewards of government resources. However, agency processes do not always require that every vehicle undergo a justification review or that vehicles are removed if they do not pass a justification review. Agency processes that do not facilitate the removal of underutilized vehicles hinder agencies’ abilities to maintain efficient vehicle fleets. Without processes to ensure that underutilized vehicles are consistently removed, agencies may be foregoing opportunities to reduce the costs associated with their fleets. The cost savings achieved by eliminating unjustified vehicles may be less than the cost paid to GSA because agencies may need to spend resources on alternative means to accomplish the work performed by these vehicles. For example, while an agency would save the monthly cost of leasing an eliminated vehicle, another vehicle in the agency’s fleet may need to travel more miles if it performs functions previously performed by the eliminated vehicle. This may increase leasing costs for the remaining vehicle. Nonetheless, by not taking corrective action, agencies could be spending millions of dollars on vehicles that may not be needed.", "Given the approximately $1 billion dollars that are spent annually on leased federal vehicles and the government-wide emphasis on good fleet management, it is critical for agencies to have reliable data and sound management practices. While GSA has taken a number of positive steps to assist agencies in managing their fleets, there are more actions it can take. For example, GSA’s current 9,999 odometer reading warning allows for large odometer discrepancies before warning users of a potential error, leading to potentially inaccurate odometer readings that can result in potentially inaccurate billing and additional staff time for subsequent correction. Evaluating the current warning and adjusting it accordingly could help improve data accuracy and therefore help reduce these costs.\nAdditionally, while customers report that utilization-related conversations with FSRs are helpful, GSA does not have a mechanism to know the extent to which these conversations are taking place as expected. As a result, GSA may be missing a potential opportunity to help agencies ensure that their leased fleet is the optimum size.\nFurthermore, while the FPMR provide some guidance to federal agencies on how to justify vehicle utilization, they do not require agencies to have clearly-documented justifications available for examination or to have any mechanism for ensuring that these justifications take place. We found shortcomings for almost all of the agencies in our review in these areas. Additionally, findings from Inspectors General have identified similar concerns at other agencies, indicating that a lack of readily available justifications may extend beyond the agencies covered under this review. GSA has not examined these regulations. As a result, GSA may be missing an opportunity to help ensure that agencies are appropriately justifying all vehicles in their fleet and determining if their leased vehicle fleet contains vehicles that should be eliminated.\nIn the absence of an FPMR requirement, federal internal control standards can help agencies use their authority to be responsible stewards of government resources. However, because some agencies’ processes do not consistently facilitate the identification of underutilized vehicles, these agencies may not know which vehicles should be eliminated. Specifically, without readily accessible written justification, agencies are limited in their ability to exercise oversight over key vehicle retention decisions for vehicles that cost millions of dollars annually. Additionally, some agencies have not eliminated or reassigned vehicles that did not meet utilization criteria or pass a justification review. By not taking corrective action, agencies could be spending millions of dollars on vehicles that may not be needed.", "To help improve the accuracy of Drive-thru data to allow agencies to better manage their leased-vehicle fleet data, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA evaluate the 9,999-mile/month electronic safeguard for Drive-thru odometer readings to determine if a lower threshold could improve the accuracy of customer data and adjust this safeguard accordingly.\nTo provide better assurance that Fleet Service Representatives (FSR) are having conversations with leasing customers about utilization in accordance with GSA expectations, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA develop a mechanism to help ensure that these conversations occur.\nTo help strengthen the leased-vehicle justification processes across federal agencies, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA examine the FPMR to determine if these regulations should be amended to require that vehicle justifications are clearly documented and readily available, and adjust them accordingly.\nTo improve the justification process, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to modify the current process to ensure that each leased vehicle in the agency’s fleet meets the agency’s utilization criteria or has readily available justification documentation.\nTo improve their justification process, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs should direct the Under Secretary for Health to modify the current process to ensure that each leased vehicle in the agency’s fleet meets the agency’s utilization criteria or has readily available justification documentation.\nTo facilitate the elimination of unnecessary vehicles, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of the Interior should direct the NPS Director to take corrective action to address each leased vehicle that has not met the agency’s utilization criteria or passed the justification process. This corrective action could include (1) reassigning vehicles within the agency to ensure they are utilized or (2) returning vehicles to GSA.\nTo facilitate the elimination of unnecessary vehicles, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs should direct the Under Secretary for Health to take corrective action to address each leased vehicle that has not met the agency’s utilization criteria or passed the justification process. This corrective action could include (1) reassigning vehicles within the agency to ensure they are utilized or (2) returning vehicles to GSA.", "We provided a draft of this report to GSA; to the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Veterans Affairs; and to NASA for review and comment. GSA and the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Veterans Affairs provided written comments in which they concurred with our recommendations. These comments are reproduced in appendixes III-VI. NASA provided no comments.\nIn written comments, GSA stated that it agreed with the three recommendations directed to it and is developing a comprehensive plan to address them.\nIn written comments, the Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation directed to it and stated that it would publish a policy memorandum in the second quarter of fiscal year 2016 that will direct DOD fleet managers to ensure that each leased vehicle in the agency’s fleet meets agency utilization criteria or has readily-available justification documentation. If implemented as planned, this action should meet the intent of the recommendation.\nIn written comments, Interior concurred with the recommendation for NPS to take corrective action to address each leased vehicle that has not met the agency’s utilization criteria or successfully passed the utilization justification process and specified the actions that NPS, as well as BIA, are implementing or planning to enhance their leased-vehicle programs. For example, Interior stated that NPS is implementing actions to ensure vehicle justifications reside in the Department’s Financial and Business Management System and plans to review the current guidelines to establish reliable and consistent utilization metrics. In addition, Interior stated that NPS plans to develop processes to ensure justifications are on file and rotate underutilized vehicles to locations to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its fleet. If implemented as planned, these actions should meet the intent of the recommendation. Interior also stated that BIA is establishing an electronic document repository to ensure accessibility of fleet management documents, transitioning to standard fleet-utilization forms, and conducting a leased-vehicle miles-driven utilization analysis to determine an annual mileage minimum requirement.\nIn written comments, VA concurred with the two recommendations directed to it and specified the actions it has taken or plans to take to address them. Related to the recommendation to modify their current process to ensure that each leased vehicle in the agency’s fleet meets the agency’s utilization criteria or has readily-available justification documentation, VA stated in its letter that VHA agrees that GSA-leased vehicles should either be used frequently enough to achieve the agency’s utilization criteria or have readily-available justification documentation. VA stated that, subsequent to our review, VHA’s fleet program took action to ensure local fleet management programs correct deficient documentation on vehicles identified in our review that did not meet the agency’s utilization criteria. Specifically, VA stated that VHA’s fleet program requested Veterans Integrated Service Networks to solicit local fleets to justify any vehicles that had insufficient justifying documentation during our review. In addition, to help ensure that local fleet management programs are complying with current documentation requirements and to improve oversight of the programs, VA stated that the Office of Capital Asset Management Engineering and Support would issue written reminders to local fleet programs and monitor and audit utilization reports. VA included a target completion date of January 2017. If implemented as planned, these actions should meet the intent of the recommendation.\nRelated to the recommendation to take corrective action to address each leased vehicle that has not met the agency’s utilization criteria or passed the justification process, VA concurred and stated that this corrective action could include reassigning vehicles within the agency to ensure they are utilized or returning the vehicles to GSA. VA stated that VHA would take corrective action and included a target completion date of January 2017. If implemented as planned, these actions should meet the intent of the recommendation.\nWhile VA agreed with our recommendations to address underutilized vehicles, it disagreed with our conclusion that 14 percent of VHA’s leased fleet is “unneeded, costing taxpayers an unnecessary $3 million.” Based on our analysis of VA data, our report found that VHA paid $3 million in fiscal year 2014 for leased vehicles that did not meet utilization criteria and did not have readily available justifications. These vehicles accounted for 14 percent of the selected vehicles in VHA’s leased fleet. We did not state that these vehicles were unneeded. We did state, however, that without justifications or corrective actions, agencies could be spending money on vehicles that may not be needed.\nAs discussed above, VA described actions taken subsequent to our review to address some of the issues we identified, and also reported in its written comments that the most recent data show that less than 1 percent of VHA’s total current leased vehicle fleet may not be fully utilized. This number reflects two differences from our calculation. First, in general comments on the draft report, VA stated that there are now 381 vehicles for which it cannot determine if the vehicle met utilization criteria, if the vehicle had a justification, or if VA is aware that the vehicle did not meet utilization criteria or have a justification. Based on our analysis, we found 917 such vehicles among VHA’s selected leased vehicle fleet in fiscal year 2014, a difference of 536 vehicles. As described in the report, we analyzed fiscal year 2014 data for five selected agencies because it was the latest completed fiscal year at the time of our review. We agree that the actions taken subsequent to our review, as well as VHA’s planned actions, should address the issues we identified and should meet the intent of the recommendations. However, we have not reviewed the documentation nor verified the data on which VA’s new percentage is based. Second, VA’s new percent is the percentage of all of VHA’s leased vehicle fleet, not the percentage of selected leased vehicles that were part of our review. For the five agencies in our review, all of our percentages were calculated as a percentage of the number of leased vehicles that were selected for review, not of the agency’s entire leased vehicle fleet. As discussed in more detail in the report, we did this to consistently exclude vehicles such as tactical or law-enforcement vehicles. Thus, we continue to believe that our conclusion is valid.\nGSA, Interior, and VA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Administrators of GSA and NASA, and the Secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Veterans Affairs. In addition, this report will be available for no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.", "We conducted a review of the utilization of GSA’s leased vehicles. This report assesses: (1) the extent to which GSA data on leased vehicles are reliable, (2) GSA’s role in identifying and reducing underutilized leased vehicles, and (3) the extent to which the assessment processes used by selected federal agencies facilitate the identification and removal of underutilized leased vehicles, and any cost savings that could be achieved by reducing any underutilized vehicles.\nTo determine the extent to which GSA’s data for leased vehicles are reliable, we examined the reasonableness of data contained in GSA’s internal fleet management database (Drive-thru) and the Federal Automotive Statistical Tool (FAST), a web-based reporting tool co- sponsored by GSA and the Department of Energy. For the purposes of this review, reliability is defined by two key components: reasonableness and indications of accuracy. We also tested a selection of Drive-thru data (reflecting approximately 162,000 vehicles) for indications of accuracy.\nGSA is responsible for the reasonableness of data in Drive-thru and FAST. We used three key sources to develop a standard for reasonableness, as there is currently no single federal criterion for a measurement of reasonableness. The three key sources included (1) prior GAO work that provided guidance on how to assess the reliability of data; (2) OMB’s Circular A-123, which defines management’s responsibility for internal controls in the federal government; and (3) GAO’s Green Book, which provides standards for internal control in the federal government. The key practices surrounding the standard of measurement that we developed for reasonableness are: electronic safeguards, such as error messages for out of range entries or inconsistent entries; the extent to which GSA reviews data samples to ensure that key data fields are non-duplicative and sensible; and the clarity of the guidance that GSA provided to ensure consistent user interpretation of data entry rules.\nAs agencies are responsible for the accuracy of data in FAST, not GSA, we only examined Drive-thru for indications of accuracy. We focused on approximately two dozen data elements contained in the Fuel Use Report and the Inventory Report as these related most to costs associated with utilization and federal fleet reporting. To this end, we requested data from GSA for all GSA-leased vehicles that were continuously leased by the same agency from January 1, 2015, through May 21, 2015. We requested continually leased vehicles because we anticipated making month-to-month data comparisons. However, this historical comparison was not feasible as GSA does not store some historical data in its Fleet Management Information System database, which provides information to Drive-thru. Therefore, the inventory data pulled from GSA’s database were a “snapshot” of the federal fleet as of May 21, 2015, although the fuel data reflected the months of January-April 2015. Once the data were obtained, we conducted a variety of logic checks to locate any anomalies that might provide insight into the extent which GSA ensures the accuracy of Drive-thru data. For example, one of the logic checks we performed on these data included counting vehicles and determining whether at least one purchased fuel type over a 4-month time period failed to match the vehicle’s fuel type (accounting for vehicles that could potentially use more than one fuel type). This logic check was performed to determine how often, if at all, fuel was erroneously coded at the fuel pump.\nFor objectives 2 and 3, we judgmentally selected five federal vehicle fleets from five federal agencies, including the U.S. Air Force (Air Force); U.S. Department of the Interior’s National Park Service and Bureau of Indian Affairs; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs’ Veterans Health Administration. We made our selection based on the following criteria: (1) varying fleet sizes, but none smaller than 1,000 vehicles; (2) a combination of military and civilian fleets; (3) a combination of fleets with mileage-based utilization levels above and below federal mileage-based utilization guidelines; (4) fleets that had not been audited by an organization other than GAO within the last 3 years; and (5) other considerations such as use of telematics and adoption of utilization criteria other than the mileage guidelines in GSA regulations. We selected these fleets, which according to GSA in 2014 ranged in size from 1,574 to 13,954 vehicles to broadly discuss the experiences and practices across a section of the federal fleet. These results are not generalizable to their overarching agencies or other federal agencies.\nTo determine what GSA’s role is in identifying and reducing underutilized leased vehicles, we reviewed and analyzed relevant federal laws, regulations, executive orders, and GSA guidance to federal agencies for preparing VAM submissions. We described GSA’s role based on the responsibilities delineated in those documents. We also interviewed GSA officials, including Fleet Service Representatives (FSR) to better understand the role they play when working with federal agency fleet managers to identify underutilized leased vehicles. To corroborate information that GSA officials told us about FSRs speaking with their agency fleet managers at least once a year to assist in identifying underutilized leased vehicles and to determine any value that fleet managers assign to these conversations, we administered a non- generalizable, mixed-method questionnaire to 68 federal agency fleet managers. To ensure that our questions were meaningful and that we received accurate survey data, we pre-tested our survey with four representatives from four of our selected agencies. Using GSA’s Drive- thru data, we selected fleet managers for our five selected federal agencies who were responsible for at least 20 GSA leased vehicles. Through interviews with agency officials and FSRs, we learned that the contact information in Drive-thru was not sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Specifically, two of four FSRs that we spoke with and officials from two selected agencies reported that Drive-thru does not contain reliable contact information for individuals who would have conversations with FSRs. These officials reported that some of the contacts in Drive-thru were actually end-users, such as contractors. In other cases, the contact information was outdated. To address this, we requested that the selected federal agencies provide us with lists of current fleet managers within their agencies, and we matched those names to the list of fleet managers from the Drive-thru data. Agencies that were unable to provide independent lists of fleet managers verified which individuals from the Drive-thru data were in the fleet manager’s role at their agency and would be the appropriate individuals with whom to discuss utilization. This matching and verification process brought the survey selection pool to 114 fleet managers, yielding a reasonable number of contacts for BIA, NASA, and NPS—given their respective fleet sizes. However, our matching and verification process resulted in four fleet managers for Air Force and 80 for VHA. Since other fleet managers on Air Force’s list of current fleet managers met our survey pool parameters, we took a random sample of 16 fleet managers to add to the four we identified during the matching and verification process. Also, to avoid over- representing VHA, we randomly chose one fleet manager from 19 Veterans Affairs’ regions. We sent the survey to a total of 69 fleet managers as follows:\n12 at BIA;\n12 at NPS;\n6 at NASA;\n20 at Air Force ; and\n19 at VHA.\nHowever, during the survey period, Air Force informed us that one of the selected fleet managers’ roles no longer included responsibilities for GSA-leased vehicles. Therefore, the total number of selected fleet managers in the survey pool totaled 68. Fifty one of the 68 fleet managers completed our survey, yielding a 75 percent response rate. As noted in our report, findings from this survey effort are not generalizable.\nTo determine the extent to which the assessment processes used by selected federal agencies facilitate the identification and removal of underutilized leased vehicles, we reviewed and analyzed: pertinent federal laws and regulations; GSA guidance that described the VAM process; and internal policies and procedures that the selected federal agencies use to identify underutilized vehicles in five fleets, such as fleet handbooks; and interviewed officials from GSA and the five federal agencies about the agencies’ responsibilities in identifying underutilized leased vehicles. We then compared these processes to federal internal control standards related to record keeping and management as well as stewardship of government resources, as described in the 1999 Green Book.\nTo calculate the costs of the vehicles involved in these processes, we conducted a multi-step analytical process. First, we asked GSA to provide data on passenger vehicles and light trucks that were continuously leased from GSA during fiscal year 2014 (i.e., from October 1, 2013-September 30 2014, inclusive) for the five selected federal fleets. Table 7 shows how we defined passenger vehicles and light trucks for the purposes of this review.\nWe focused on vehicles that GSA leased on a continuous basis (i.e., to a single agency) for at least fiscal year 2014 so that the agencies were fully accountable for the selected vehicles’ mileage over the entire fiscal year 2014 time period. We scoped our work to include light trucks and passenger vehicles because they comprise the majority of GSA’s continuously leased fleet at 65 percent and 27 percent, respectively. We also asked GSA to exclude tactical, law-enforcement and emergency- responder vehicles from the selected vehicle population, as well as vehicles located outside of the continental U.S. We made these exclusions because, according to GSA officials, some agencies did not want law enforcement data, for example, released outside of GSA because it could be considered sensitive. In addition, we needed to develop a manageable, selected population given the time resources needed to investigate each vehicle.\nAfter receiving the data from GSA, we conducted various analytical tests to develop a dataset that was free from detectable errors. For example, we examined data on current and previous monthly odometer readings. We then determined which vehicles in the dataset had a current monthly odometer reading that was lower than the previous month’s odometer reading. This allowed us to determine which vehicles likely had errors associated with their end-of-fiscal year mileage—allowing us to remove them from the population of analysis. We also analyzed over 15,500 fiscal year 2014 vehicle records from the five agencies that we reviewed. In total, selected vehicles from these agencies accounted for about 8 percent of the federally leased fleet, although the findings associated with this selection are not generalizable.\nNext, we determined which selected passenger vehicles and light trucks at each agency did not meet the miles-traveled guidelines in the Federal Property Management Regulations in fiscal year 2014 (12,000 miles and 10,000 miles, respectively). We then sent a list of the selected vehicles that had not met the miles-traveled guidelines to each agency and requested that they group the vehicles into one of the categories described below and depicted in figure 1:\nGroup 2: No longer leased by the agency as of May 21, 2015;\nGroup 4: Met a mileage-based utilization criteria defined by the\nGroup 5: Met a non-mileage-based utilization criteria defined by the\nGroup 6: Had a written justification in lieu of meeting the utilization criteria that the agency defined;\nGroup 8: Was repurposed, given additional tasks, or reassigned within the agency during fiscal year 2015; and\nGroup 9: Was retained beyond May 21, 2015, despite not meeting agency-defined utilization criteria, possessing a written justification for retention, or being given other tasks.\nWe also asked agencies to identify vehicles that they could not categorize and reasons why—such as vehicles’ lacking readily auditable documentation, including information on whether the vehicle met the agency-defined utilization criteria in fiscal year 2014 (Group 3) and written justification for retaining vehicles that did not meet the agency-defined utilization criteria (Group 7). As these two groups—and vehicles in Group 9—stem from insufficient agency processes to identify and remove leased vehicles, we focused on determining the costs associated with the vehicles in these groups.\nAgencies were responsible for categorizing each of the vehicles that GAO provided to them. We provided the agencies with each vehicle’s license plate number, VIN number, make, model, and other identifying information to assist in this process. We did not verify whether agencies categorized vehicles correctly, as some of the information necessary for these categorizations was contained within agency systems and records (for example, if the vehicle met an agency-defined criteria or if the vehicle was repurposed). However, to evaluate the overall reliability of agencies’ vehicle justification, we selected a small sample of vehicles from each agency and then requested written justifications from each of those agencies that reported that they had written justifications for vehicles. We removed vehicles from the selected population if agencies reported that the vehicle should have been excluded from the review (for example, vehicles that agencies reported were law enforcement vehicles but not labeled as such in GSA’s system). We also removed vehicles if the VIN number that the agency provided did not match the VIN from the original information that GSA provided and vehicles that agencies categorized in more than one group, among other data-cleaning efforts.\nWe determined the cost paid to GSA for each vehicle in each of the 9 groups using data from GSA. For each vehicle, we summed the following: the vehicle’s fiscal year 2014 mileage rate multiplied by the total number of miles the vehicle traveled in fiscal year 2014; per-mile costs for additional equipment multiplied by the total number of miles the vehicle traveled in fiscal year2014; the fixed monthly mileage rate for additional equipment multiplied by 12 (for the 12 months of the fiscal year); and any flat monthly rate charges multiplied by 12 (for the 12 months of the fiscal year).\nThese costs represent the amount an agency paid to GSA for each vehicle in fiscal year 2014. However, these costs do not include other costs incurred by the leasing agency, such as the salaries of their fleet managers or the costs to garage the vehicles. Also, we did not have information on the opportunity costs of alternatives to replacing these leased vehicles. For example, if a vehicle is removed from an agency’s fleet and another vehicle is used more frequently as a result, the agency would still pay for miles traveled or trips made by the other mode of transportation. Therefore, the costs associated with the groups are annual costs paid to GSA, and an undetermined percentage of these costs would reflect actual cost savings if vehicles were removed.\nWe conducted this performance audit from February 2015 to January 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "According to NASA policy, each NASA center should conduct an annual review of fleet utilization during the third quarter of each fiscal year. The review first identifies vehicles that fail to meet the minimum utilization goals, also called the “utilization target point.” The target point is calculated by multiplying the average usage by 25 percent (0.25) for each vehicle type, such as sedans/station wagons, ambulances, intercity busses, and trucks with a gross vehicle weight of less than 12,500 pounds. In fiscal year 2014, sedans and trucks less than 12,500 pounds were required to meet the mileage target points shown in table 9 at their respective centers: According to NASA policy, individual vehicles within each vehicle type whose range falls below the utilization target point will be added to the “utilization target list”. Programs, missions or departments with vehicles on the target list are required to submit a new justification form for each individual vehicle on the list for center review and retention approval. These justifications are then evaluated during the annual review process, with possible outcomes including reassignment within the center, exchanging the vehicle for a different type of vehicle that better suits the mission, or returning the vehicle to GSA.", "", "", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, John W. Shumann (Assistant Director), Melissa Bodeau, Jennifer Clayborne, Monika Jansen, Davis Judson, Terence Lam, Malika Rice, Jerome Sandau, Alison Snyder, Michelle Weathers, Crystal Wesco, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full h3_full", "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h2_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h0_full h2_full", "", "h0_full", "h2_full", "h3_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What assistance does the GSA provide to agencies?", "How is this assistances distributed?", "What does GSA expect from FSR communication?", "What did GAO find regarding this expectation?", "To what extent does GSA enforce this expectation?", "What characterized the vehicle utilization processes of the selected agencies?", "What specific issues did selected agencies have?", "What were the financial implications of these issues?", "To what extent did NASA and VHA apply their utilization criteria?", "What action has been taken to address this issue?", "What justifications for leased vehicles were missing from agencies?", "How have BIA and NPS responded to this problem?", "What is the financial implication of NPS and VHA's actions?", "What was the GAO asked to review?", "What does this report cover?", "What records did the GAO select to analyze?", "What else from these agencies did the GAO review?", "How generalizable are GAO's findings?" ], "summary": [ "The General Services Administration (GSA) provides guidance to agencies to assist them in reducing underutilized leased vehicles.", "This guidance can be written (such as bulletins) or advice from GSA's fleet service representatives (FSR) to agency fleet managers.", "FSRs assist agencies with leasing issues, and GSA expects its FSRs to communicate with fleet managers about vehicle utilization at least annually.", "However, 18 of 51 fleet managers GAO surveyed reported that they had never spoken to their FSR about vehicle utilization.", "GSA has no mechanism to ensure these discussions occur and therefore may miss opportunities to help agencies identify underutilized vehicles.", "While the selected agencies—the Air Force, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Park Service (NPS) and the Veterans Health Administration (VHA)—took steps to manage vehicle utilization, their processes did not always facilitate the identification and removal of underutilized vehicles.", "Certain selected agencies (1) could not determine if all vehicles were utilized, (2) could not locate justifications for vehicles that did not meet utilization criteria, or (3) kept vehicles that did not undergo or pass a justification review.", "These agencies paid GSA about $8.7 million in fiscal year 2014 for leased vehicles that were retained but did not meet utilization criteria and did not have readily available justifications (see table).", "Of the selected agencies, NASA and VHA did not apply their utilization criteria to nearly 400 vehicles, representing about $1.2 million paid to GSA in fiscal year 2014.", "However, these agencies have taken steps to rectify the issue.", "The Air Force, BIA, NPS, and VHA could not readily locate justifications for over 1,500 leased vehicles that did not meet utilization criteria, representing about $5.8 million.", "BIA and NPS are planning action to ensure justifications are readily available in the future.", "As of May 2015, NPS and VHA had retained more than 500 vehicles—costing $1.7 million in fiscal year 2014—that were not subjected to or did not pass agency justification processes. While costs paid to GSA may not equal cost savings associated with eliminating vehicles, without justifications and corrective actions, agencies could be spending millions of dollars on vehicles that may not be needed.", "GAO was asked to examine federal processes for assessing the utilization of leased vehicles.", "This report addresses, among other objectives, (1) GSA's role in identifying and reducing underutilized leased vehicles and (2) the extent to which the processes used by selected federal agencies facilitate the identification and removal of underutilized leased vehicles, and any cost savings that could be achieved by reducing underutilized vehicles.", "GAO selected five agencies using factors such as fleet size, and analyzed over 15,500 fiscal-year 2014 vehicle records.", "At the five agencies, GAO surveyed fleet managers with at least 20 leased vehicles; reviewed fleet policies and guidance; and interviewed federal officials.", "These findings are not generalizable to all agencies or fleet managers." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, -1, -1, -1, 2, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-18-190	{ "title": [ "Background", "F-22 Unit Size and Organizational Structure Constrain Aircraft Availability and Have Not Been Reviewed by the Air Force since 2010", "Sustainment Issues Limit F-22 Aircraft Availability", "Small F-22 Squadrons and Wings Exacerbate Aircraft Availability Challenges", "Partial Unit Deployments Hinder the F-22 Squadrons’ Abilities to Maximize the Aircraft Available for Operations", "Organizing for New Operational Concepts Poses Additional Aircraft Availability Challenges", "The Air Force Has Not Comprehensively Assessed F-22 Organizational Structure since 2010", "Air Force Utilization of F-22s Reduces Pilot High-End Air Superiority Training Opportunities", "F-22 Pilots Are Not Meeting Minimum Training Requirements Necessary for Their Air Superiority Missions", "F-22 Pilots Benefit from Exercises, but Exercise Quality and Quantity Can Detract from Training Needs", "Adversary Air Demands for F-22s Detract from the Ability of Pilots to Meet Training Requirements", "Current Operations Reduce F-22 Pilot High- End Air Superiority Training Opportunities", "Use of F-22s for Alert Missions Diminishes Pilots’ Ability to Train for High-End Air Superiority Missions", "Operational Deployments Diminish F-22 Pilots’ Ability to Train for High-End Air Superiority Missions", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: F-22 Maintenance and Supply Challenges Limit Aircraft Availability", "Maintenance of the F-22’s Unique Low Observable Coating Reduces Aircraft Availability", "The F-22’s Small Fleet Size Exacerbates Spare Part Supply Challenges", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "DOD guidance states that the Air Force and other services are responsible for providing trained and ready forces to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the combatant commands. The Air Force is specifically responsible for gaining and maintaining air superiority. The Air Force Strategic Master Plan states that the Air Force must focus clearly on the capabilities that will allow freedom of maneuver and decisive action in highly contested spaces, including high-end air capabilities. Fifth generation fighter capabilities and ready and trained Airmen who are properly equipped for their missions are central components of the Air Force’s ability to provide air superiority in contested environments.\nThe F-22 is the Air Force’s fifth generation, air superiority fighter that incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and engines capable of sustained supersonic flight. The F-22 is optimized for air-to-air combat, able to carry up to eight air-to- air missiles, and equipped with a 20-millimeter cannon. After development began, the Air Force also added air-to-ground capabilities to the F-22. Air Force officials emphasized the synergistic benefits of the F-22 to the joint force. Specifically, the F-22’s individual capabilities, like its stealth and sensors, help it to coordinate and improve the performance of other aircraft during operations, including fourth generation fighters. The Air Force views the F-22 and the F-35—its other fifth generation fighter—as complementary platforms with some overlapping capabilities. For example, the F-22 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-air missions and the F-35 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-ground missions. The Air Force announced in its fiscal year 2018 budget request that it now intends to retain the F-22 until 2060. It has also begun an effort to define and develop the next generation of air superiority capabilities that it plans to field in 2030 and beyond. Figure 1 shows a picture of an F-22.\nThe F-22 and the F-15C are the two operational fighters in the Air Force’s Air Superiority Core Function. The Air Force assigns two primary (air-to- air focused) missions and one secondary (air-to-ground focused) mission to the F-22. These missions are described in table 1. The Air Force requires its pilots to be proficient in their primary missions and familiar with their secondary missions.\nThe size of the current F-22 fleet is smaller than the Air Force originally planned. The Air Force F-22 acquisition program began in 1991 with an intended development period of 12 years and a planned quantity of 648 aircraft. The Air Force had intended to station 40 percent of the operational fleet outside of the United States. However, schedule delays, cost increases, and changes to threats, missions, and requirements led DOD to reduce the number of F-22s it eventually purchased. The Air Force identified a requirement for 381 F-22s in 2002, but ended aircraft production in 2012 with approximately half of that number. As of May 2018, the Air Force had a total of 186 F-22s, as shown in figure 2. The total aircraft inventory includes primary mission aircraft in each community—those authorized to perform combat—as well as aircraft that are designated for other purposes.\nThe operational portion of the F-22 fleet is organized into 6 operational squadrons at four locations. According to Air Force officials, the small number of F-22s provides a less than ideal fifth generation fighter capacity until F-35 numbers grow. However, in a June 2017 report to Congress, the Air Force stated that it would not make economic or operational sense to reopen the F-22 production line, and reported that it would cost approximately $50 billion to procure an additional 194 F-22s. The Air Force is continuing to fund programs to modernize the F-22 and make reliability improvements.\nFigure 3 shows the basing locations of the F-22 fleet, and the numbers of aircraft at each base.", "The size and structure of F-22 units diminishes the Air Force’s ability to maximize the number of F-22s available for operations and have not been reviewed since 2010. The F-22 has sustainment issues due to the fleet’s maintenance and supply challenges. These challenges have affected aircraft availability rates, which have remained below Air Force standards. The small size of F-22 squadrons and wings has contributed to low aircraft availability rates. Further, the Air Force practice of deploying a small portion of a squadron makes it difficult for F-22 squadrons, as currently organized, to make aircraft available for their missions at home station. The Air Force would also face difficulties generating aircraft to support DOD’s concepts for using distributed operations in high threat environments with its current F-22 squadron organization. Although in 2016 it assessed its future air superiority capability needs, the Air Force has not comprehensively assessed whether the current F-22 organizational structure is optimized to support combatant commander needs.", "The F-22 has sustainment issues due to the fleet’s maintenance and supply challenges that have affected aircraft availability rates. In fiscal year 2016, this resulted in the fleet having an average of 80 F-22s available for operations, as shown in figure 4. According to the Air Force, from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, the F-22 fleet availability rate was below the Air Force’s annual F-22 availability standard by 4 to 19 percent.\nFirst, the F-22 has some unique maintenance challenges, which have affected aircraft availability rates. The maintenance demands of the F- 22’s Low Observable (LO) coating, a critical component of its stealth characteristic, reduces aircraft availability. Without the LO maintenance issues, availability would have been significantly closer to meeting the annual availability standard, according to the Air Force officials. Fourth generation fighters do not have to contend with this maintenance issue. The F-22’s LO coating is actually a series of coatings that require diligent and time-consuming application and curing, which results in extended periods of time when the aircraft are not available, according to Air Force officials. The F-22’s LO coating is also beginning to reach the end of its service live, requiring maintenance actions that further reduce aircraft availability. The Air Force has begun to address these maintenance issues by using a more durable coating and standing up additional repair facilities.\nSecond, the F-22 faces a number of supply challenges that have contributed to reduced and unpredictable aircraft availability. Officials from all four operational locations expressed concerns over low supply levels and difficulties with obtaining needed parts. The F-22 fleet’s small size and resulting low demand for parts contributes to this problem. Obtaining missing parts can be a time-consuming and costly process because some original manufacturers no longer make the parts or are completely out of business, according to Air Force officials. When this is the case, the Air Force may need to find the original aircraft and parts design plans, and obtain a new contractor to produce a small number of parts. Officials at one operational location said a simple wiring harness required a 30-week lead time.\nAppendix I contains additional information on F-22 maintenance and supply issues.", "With 18 to 21 primary mission aircraft per F-22 squadron, and 1 or 2 F-22 squadrons per wing, the Air Force has been unable to gain the maintenance and supply efficiencies associated with its larger traditional squadrons and wings, and this has contributed to low aircraft availability rates. According to service officials, the Air Force has traditionally structured its fighter wings to have 3 squadrons with 24 primary mission aircraft per squadron to optimize maintenance efficiency and combat power. The Air Force is planning to organize its active duty F-35 fleet into traditional sized squadrons with 2 or 3 squadrons per wing. A RAND study also concluded that larger squadrons and multiple squadrons per wing create efficiencies. Larger squadrons and wings create efficiencies because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Having a multi-squadron wing is also beneficial when one squadron deploys a portion of its aircraft, pilots, and maintenance personnel and leaves another portion of the squadron at the squadron’s home station. In these cases, collocated squadron(s) can help backfill shortfalls for the portion of the squadron that remained at home station.\nThe Air Force recognizes that smaller F-22 operational squadrons and wings face sustainment challenges due to their size. Facing cuts in the total number of aircraft purchased, the Air Force decided in 2006 to organize its F-22s into 7 operational squadrons, each with 18 primary mission aircraft. However, in 2010, the Air Force found that this plan was unsustainable because operational squadrons were not able to produce adequate sorties. The Air Force then decided to eliminate 1 squadron and used some of the aircraft from that squadron to increase the number of primary mission aircraft to 21 in its 5 remaining active duty squadrons. The Air Force left its one F-22 National Guard squadron with only 18 primary mission aircraft. The Air Force’s intent with this restructuring was to increase fleet sustainability while retaining enough squadrons for force projection needs.\nF-22 aircraft availability metrics have fluctuated, but have generally been better for operational locations with more aircraft per squadron and more squadrons per wing. For example, table 2 shows that the operational locations in Alaska and Virginia—locations with 2 operational squadrons—have higher aircraft availability rates than the locations with only 1 operational squadron. Although Air Force maintenance data shows that the Florida operational squadron had a lower availability rate than the locations with 2 operational squadrons in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016, Air Force officials noted that this squadron should be able to leverage the maintenance benefits of having the F-22 training squadron on base. However, a major maintenance backlog for the training squadron currently limits that benefit, according to the officials.\nThe F-22 units in Alaska and Virginia are also generally able to produce more sorties per month. Further, F-22 squadron officials in Hawaii stated that increasing their squadron—the smallest in the fleet—by 4 additional aircraft would allow the squadron to generate 32 percent more sorties. Air Force officials cautioned that there are many factors that influence maintenance metrics for the F-22, including the age of the aircraft, climate and leadership. However, they agreed that larger squadrons and wings increase maintenance performance.", "Further, the Air Force practice of deploying a small portion of a squadron forward makes it difficult for F-22 squadrons as currently organized to make aircraft available for their missions at home station, according to officials from all four operational locations. The Air Force organizes its F- 22 squadrons and other fighter squadrons based on a model where a squadron deploys to a single forward location, according to Air Force officials. In order to facilitate deployments, the Air Force has for approximately the last two decades organized squadrons into smaller deployable pieces called Unit Type Codes (UTCs). However, the UTCs are not the same size. For example, one of the F-22’s UTCs is designed to have only 6 of a squadron’s 21 aircraft but contains almost 50 percent of the squadron’s equipment, approximately 40 percent of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and 60 percent of its operational personnel. This organizational approach therefore creates a disproportionate split among UTCs in terms of equipment and personnel, making it more difficult for the underserved portions of the squadron to maintain readiness or generate sorties.\nFurthermore, different UTCs will not only have unequal amounts of equipment and personnel, but will also tend to unevenly apportion their best aircraft, more experienced personnel, and critical parts, according to Air Force officials. The officials noted that during “split operations,” the portion of the squadron remaining at home struggles to keep aircraft available for missions. According to Air Force officials, traditional fighter squadrons have larger UTCs, which provides a better balance in equipment and personnel that lessens the strain of split operations.", "With its current F-22 squadron organization, the Air Force would also face difficulties generating aircraft to support DOD’s concepts for using distributed operations in high threat environments. According to DOD, potential adversaries are increasingly capable of challenging U.S. access to operational areas by, for example, developing cruise and ballistic missiles that are able to reach U.S. forward air bases. In its Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan, the Air Force states that the ability to deploy and operate forces in non-permissive environments is essential to air superiority. One approach for doing this is to use distributed bases. Instead of operating from well-developed and vulnerable forward air bases, squadrons would break up into smaller units and operate independently from multiple locations, moving around so as to complicate enemy targeting. The Air Force is drafting an adaptive basing concept and implementation plan to help guide its efforts in this area.\nSustaining and maintaining multiple independent deployable units so that they have operational aircraft available for the combatant commander is not possible with the current F-22 squadron structure and would require significant investment, according to Air Force officials. F-22 squadrons have made a number of short exercise deployments, with small numbers of aircraft to provide forward presence and examine the units’ abilities to conduct distributed operations. These deployments showed that rapidly deploying small numbers of F-22s for short durations is possible. The deployments also identified a number of challenges the Air Force needs to address if it implements a distributed operations concept, including maintenance, logistics, spare parts, and tanker support challenges, according to after-action reports and service officials. Furthermore, according to the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, distributed operations requires a dynamic logistics system that is more responsive, agile, and flexible than DOD is used to employing. Air Force officials told us that the Air Force is early in the process of examining the implications of distributed operations and has not determined the extent to which F-22 squadron organization should be adjusted to support distributed operations.", "While the Air Force reviews F-22 operations and sustainment needs as part of the annual programming and budgeting process within DOD, the Air Force has not comprehensively assessed whether the current F-22 organizational structure is the optimal structure to support combatant commander needs since 2010, according to Air Force officials. As previously discussed, the Air Force found in 2010 that operational squadrons were not able to produce adequate sorties and so eliminated 1 squadron and used some of the aircraft from that squadron to increase the number of primary mission aircraft in its 5 remaining active duty squadrons DOD’s Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, states that risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control hazards arising from operational factors and make decisions that balance risk and cost with mission benefits. It assists organizations and individuals in making informed decisions to reduce or offset risk, thereby increasing operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success. Furthermore, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should periodically evaluate the organizational structure so that it meets the entity’s objectives and has adapted to any new objectives for the entity. Furthermore, management should periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objectives or addressing related risks.\nHowever, the Air Force has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of the F-22 organizational structure since 2010, according to Air Force officials. As previously discussed, while the larger squadrons and wings created after the 2010 restructuring have generally had higher availability rates than smaller ones, fleet aircraft availability rates remain below the Air Force standard for what is needed. Further, the F-22’s role has also evolved since 2010. For example, F-22s have begun participating in combat operations in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, potential adversaries are increasingly able to challenge U.S. air superiority, according to the Air Force. In 2016, the Air Force examined its future air superiority capability needs in its Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan, but that review did not include an assessment of organizational structure, according to officials involved with the review. Such an assessment could consider a number of alternatives, such as consolidating the F-22 fleet into larger squadrons and/or wings to improve aircraft availability or revising the design of the deployable units in squadrons to better support current deployment practices and future operational concepts, as well as any risks associated with those alternatives. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and assesses alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, the Air Force may be forgoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet to support current and future combatant commander high-end air superiority needs.", "The Air Force’s utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited its pilots’ opportunities to train for their high-end air superiority missions, and contributed to F-22 pilots not meeting their training requirements. F-22 pilots need extensive training in order to be prepared to execute their high-end air superiority missions. However, Air Force utilization of F-22 units for exercises, the low supply of adversary air training capabilities, and the use of F-22s to meet combatant commander needs, including the alert mission, affects the ability of pilots to meet those requirements.", "F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. F-22 pilots need extensive training for F-22 units to fulfill their air superiority role. Air Force guidance notes that a key to maintaining air superiority is trained and ready Airmen that must possess a well-honed combat edge so that they are ready to prevail even against the most advanced opponents. The Air Force strategy also notes that the training of Airmen must be relevant and responsive if they are to maintain superior agility in the future. Through its Ready Aircrew Program, the Air Force establishes annual continuation training requirements for F-22 pilots. These requirements focus on the training needed to accomplish the core missions of F-22 units. They define the minimum required mix of annual sorties, simulator missions, and training events aircrews must accomplish to sustain combat mission readiness. Air Force officials emphasized that the requirements outlined in the Ready Aircrew Program are minimums and noted that some pilots may need additional sorties to achieve proficiency.\nIn 2016, GAO reported that combat fighter squadrons were unable to meet annual training requirements across the full range of core missions. Further, an Air Force analysis conducted in 2016 determined that, based on current aircraft availability rates, pilots in an F-22 squadron with 21 primary mission aircraft need 270 days of home station training each year to meet their minimum annual continuation training requirements. However, F-22 pilots are generally not meeting those minimums, according to the officials, and F-22 operational squadrons have reported numerous shortfalls. For example, one squadron identified training shortfalls in its primary missions for four consecutive years in its annual training reports. Another squadron identified training shortfalls in one of its primary missions, offensive counter-air, in three of the last four annual training reports.", "Although participation in exercises is an important component of F-22 pilot training, multiple exercises can interrupt pilot training cycles and restrictions in some exercises can detract from F-22 pilot training for the high threat environment. Exercises provide pilots an opportunity to train in a more realistic setting. At the same time, frequent participation in exercises can take time away from the home station training that is required to maintain combat mission readiness for high-end air superiority missions. Although high demand for exercise participation is causing stress across the Air Force, the problem is particularly acute for F-22 pilots, according to a 2016 Air Force analysis. While F-22 pilots require 270 days at home each year, they are getting only 191 days on average, according to the analysis. Pilots from other fighter aircraft, such as the F- 16 and F-15E, are also experiencing home station training shortfalls, but not as great as those faced by F-22 pilots, according to the analysis.\nFurthermore, F-22 units are often directed to participate in exercises as part of Air Force efforts to build relationships with partners. However, due to security concerns regarding exposing the F-22’s unique capabilities, F- 22 pilots may be restricted from flying the aircraft the way they would in combat, according to Air Force officials. As a result, the value of the training is reduced and these types of exercises can result in the F-22 pilots developing bad habits that must be corrected in future training, according to Air Force officials.\nThe Air Force recognizes that exercise demands on F-22 units and other fighter units make it difficult for pilots to complete their required training. Based on its analysis, the Air Force is planning to increase the time pilots have available to conduct home station training, including by establishing a goal of no more than 1 day on travel for every 5 days at home station. As a result, the Air Force will be reducing total exercise participation and thereby increasing the number of days F-22 pilots are at home station in fiscal year 2018 by 8 days. However, the Air Force projects that F-22 pilots in fiscal year 2018 will still fall 71 days short of the 270 days they need to meet their yearly training requirement, based on current aircraft availability rates. Without exploring further reductions in exercise events that do not contribute to high-end air superiority training, at current aircraft availability rates F-22 pilots may not be fully prepared to effectively support combatant commander needs against the most advanced threats.", "F-22 pilot training requires flying against aircraft playing the role of adversaries, but high demand and low supply of adversary air resources have resulted in training shortfalls. Due to the F-22’s unique air superiority role and high-end capabilities, the Air Force expects F-22 pilots to face and defeat numerically superior adversaries. This results in an annual demand of between 145 and 171 adversary air sorties for every operational F-22 pilot. The adversary air demand for fourth generation fighters is much lower. For example, continuation training for the Air Force’s other air superiority fighter—the F-15C—results in an annual demand of between 45 and 73 adversary air sorties. To support F-22 training requirements, the Air Force has provided two of the four operational locations (Virginia and Florida) with a squadron of T-38s to provide dedicated adversary air support for use in training. In Alaska, an adversary air squadron is located at a nearby base that is able to provide some support for F-22 training, according to officials. The F-22s in Hawaii have no adversary air support on base or nearby. Figure 5 shows F-22 operational locations and their adversary air support.\nAll F-22 operational locations report that insufficient adversary air caused pilots to have shortfalls in their training. For example, the operational F-22 squadron in Florida, which shares an adversary air squadron with a collocated F-22 training unit, reported that F-22 pilot training deficiencies in fiscal year 2016 were caused in part by limited adversary air support. Specifically, adversary air shortfalls negatively impacted the training of 83 percent of the squadron’s pilots for the offensive counter-air mission and 54 percent of the pilots for the defensive counter-air mission. Operational squadrons at other locations reported similar negative effects on training caused in part by the limited adversary air.\nMoreover, the limited supply of dedicated adversary aircraft means that often F-22 pilots must fly their aircraft in an adversary aircraft role to support the training of the squadron’s other F-22 pilots. For example, according to a 2017 Air Force memo, 55 percent of all sorties generated by F-22s based in Hawaii were dedicated to adversary air. The F-22 squadron in Hawaii reported that this practice negatively affected the combat readiness of all of the squadron’s pilots. The Air Force categorizes adversary air sorties as useful only for maintaining basic flying proficiency. Officials from the Virginia unit explained that F-22 pilots flying adversary air do not fly like they would during combat missions and so these sorties are wasteful, having no or negative training value. An official representing the Hawaii unit indicated that the high percentage of sorties dedicated to adversary air leads to wasteful training and declines in readiness against potential threats. Air Force officials expect competing demands for limited adversary air to grow as the Air Force stands up more F-35 squadrons.\nThe Air Force recognizes and is attempting to mitigate adversary air shortfalls. For example, the Air Force has hired contractors to address Air Force adversary air shortfalls at exercises, as we previously reported. In addition, the Air Force has outlined a plan to provide additional adversary air support for its fighter units, including contract adversary air support for the F-22 training squadron in Florida and the operational squadrons at two of the four operational locations (Virginia and Hawaii) in the 2019 timeframe. However, the Air Force must first complete additional analysis and finalize funding before additional adversary support is provided to these locations, according to an August 2017 Air Force briefing on the plan. Until the Air Force explores additional alternatives for increasing external adversary air training support at all of the operational locations, F-22 pilots will likely continue to face training shortfalls and use limited sorties on flying adversary air themselves. Furthermore, this may result in the F-22 squadrons not being fully prepared to execute the high-end air superiority missions.", "The Air Force is providing F-22s in support of current combatant commander needs, including alert missions and operational deployments, but the alert mission and these operational deployments take time away from air superiority training. Although these missions are important, they take no or limited advantage of the unique capabilities provided by the F- 22, as figure 6 illustrates. Classified details regarding the current and projected operational requirements for the F-22 are included in the classified version of this report.\nDOD has an established risk-informed process to distribute the service’s operational forces to the combatant commanders. Air Force officials told us that combatant commanders can request a general fighter capability or a very specific capability that only an F-22 can provide. Air Force officials also said the Air Force does not set aside F-22 units for only the most advanced threat missions, and it does not set aside any other fighter units for unique missions. The Air Force provides F-22 units to the combatant commands when those units address the combatant commander’s capability requirement and are available, according to service officials.", "F-22 support for ongoing air sovereignty alert missions further reduces F- 22 pilots’ abilities to train for the high-end air superiority mission. The alert mission supports homeland defense, DOD’s top priority. This mission requires certain air bases have fully fueled, fully armed jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. Two F-22 operational locations have full time alert mission responsibilities (Alaska and Hawaii) and one location (Virginia) performs alert missions on an as- needed basis. According to Air Force officials, the alert mission does not require the high-end capabilities provided by the F-22 and currently F- 15C and F-16 squadrons are filling alert mission requirements in other parts of the United States. F-35s could also conduct this mission if they were assigned it, according to Air Force officials. The Air Force plans to start fielding 2 F-35 squadrons in Alaska beginning in 2020. However, there are currently no plans to use F-35s for the alert mission, according to U.S. Northern Command. With no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently based in Hawaii and Alaska, the alert mission falls to the F-22 units.\nDedicating F-22s to the alert mission reduces the ability of F-22 pilots to train for their primary missions. Operational squadrons in Alaska and Hawaii have F-22 pilots sitting alert in order to address the 24-hour per day alert commitment. During this time they are not able to train for their high-end air superiority missions. Further, the squadrons must dedicate a number of mission-capable aircraft to this mission, which is more challenging for squadrons with a smaller number of aircraft. Squadron officials from one location estimated that they could generate hundreds of additional training sorties on an annual basis if they could use the aircraft that are currently dedicated to the alert mission.", "The Air Force also deploys F-22s outside of the United States to address combatant commander requirements and these deployments also reduce the time available for F-22 pilots to conduct home station training for their high-end air superiority missions. Since 2007, the Air Force has deployed F-22s to a number of combatant commands to address a variety of needs, including providing assurance to friends and allies and deterring potential adversaries. F-22s deployed to U.S. Central Command have also been supporting ongoing operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.\nF-22 pilots can gain valuable experience from deployments but their ability to train for the high-end air superiority mission can suffer. For example, F-22 involvement in current combat operations against ISIS provides pilots with experience deploying for combat, integrating with coalition forces, and conducting air-to-ground attack operations, according to Air Force officials. Although its high-end capabilities provide some benefits in current operations against ISIS, F-22s have primarily been used for close air support (CAS) missions in operations against ISIS, according to Air Force officials. However, CAS is not a primary or secondary mission for the F-22. As such, F-22 pilot air superiority skills degrade while on deployment because they are conducting CAS missions and not able to train for their air superiority missions, according to Air Force officials.", "The F-22’s current availability and pilot training challenges will likely become more significant as fourth generation fighters become less survivable and the Air Force’s reliance on its small fleet of F-22s to execute the air superiority mission grows. Limitations on F-22 availability are due in part to maintenance challenges inherent to the F-22, including maintaining its LO coating. It is also due in part to Air Force decisions to organize the F-22 fleet into small wings and squadrons, resulting in lost efficiencies that come with larger organizations. Further, F-22 squadrons, designed to operate from one location, face challenges generating available aircraft when they are split, as current Air Force practices and future concepts require. The Air Force also requires well-trained pilots in order to take full advantage of the F-22’s high-end capabilities. However, F-22 pilots’ ability to train for its air superiority missions and meet associated training requirements is constrained by factors including adversary air limitations and participation in exercises with limited training value. Operational use of the F-22 for missions that have no or limited need for the F-22’s unique capabilities, such as the alert mission, further limit the ability of pilots to prepare for the high-end air superiority challenges the nation increasingly faces.\nOne option for addressing these challenges would be to purchase more F-22s. However, the Air Force’s determination that it does not make economic or operational sense to restart F-22 production means that the Air Force has to find other ways to improve its F-22 fleet’s ability to address high-end air superiority challenges. Air Force efforts to improve F-22 capabilities and maintainability and wider efforts to address high exercise demand and adversary air shortfalls are examples of positive steps the service is taking. The Air Force has also shown a prior willingness to consolidate its F-22 fleet. Further, the Air Force outlined its commitment to addressing high-end air superiority challenges in its Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan. This effort, along with the planned fielding of a large number of F-35s provides the Air Force with the opportunity to more comprehensively review and, if necessary, transform how it should best organize, posture, train, and utilize its fifth generation assets, including the F-22. However, unless the Air Force takes steps to assess and make necessary adjustments to the current organization and use of its F-22s, F-22 units are likely to continue to experience aircraft availability and pilot training rates that are below what they could be. As a result, the Air Force may be incurring increased risks in future operations in high threat areas.", "We are making the following two recommendations to the Air Force: The Secretary of the Air Force should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and assesses alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons. The assessment could at a minimum assess the following two alternatives: consolidating the fleet into larger squadrons and/or wings in order to improve aircraft availability, and revising the design of the deployable units in squadrons to better support current deployment practices and future operational concepts. (Recommendation 1)\nThe Secretary of the Air Force should identify and assess actions to increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for the high-end air superiority missions. This effort could consider alternatives such as: reducing exercise events that do not contribute to F-22 pilot high-end air superiority training, increasing external adversary air support so all F-22 pilots can use their available limited sorties to conduct high-end air superiority training rather than having a significant portion of the F-22 pilots providing training support, and finding alternatives to using F-22 units for alert missions, and other missions that do not require the jet’s unique capabilities or prepare F-22 pilots for their primary missions. (Recommendation 2)", "We provided a draft of the classified version of the report to DOD for review and comment. That draft contained the same recommendations as this unclassified version. In written comments (reproduced in appendix II), DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted planned actions to address each recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee and the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretary of the Air Force, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "Maintenance demands of the F-22’s unique Low Observable (LO) coating, along with supply challenges exacerbated by the fleet’s small size, limit the number of aircraft available for missions. In part because of these challenges, the Air Force had an average of 80 F-22s available for operations during fiscal year 2016.", "Maintenance demands of the F-22’s unique LO coating, a critical component that gives the F-22 its stealth characteristics, reduces aircraft availability. Without the LO maintenance issues, availability would have been significantly closer to meeting the annual availability standard, according to Air Force officials. Fourth generation fighters, lacking a full LO coating, do not have to contend with this maintenance issue. The LO coating is actually a series of coatings that require diligent and time- consuming application and curing, resulting in extended periods of time during which aircraft are not available, according to Air Force officials. Further, the LO coating for each F-22 requires regular and thorough inspection to ensure that any damaged or degraded areas are identified and repaired. If damage to the LO coating exceeds a threshold, the F-22 is considered not capable of conducting its mission. An Air Force report summarizing fiscal year 2016 maintenance issues reported that LO maintenance was the primary reason F-22s were not considered mission capable due to maintenance.\nMaintaining the integrity of the LO coating complicates other F-22 maintenance actions because the LO coating must be removed and then restored. According to Air Force officials, removing and replacing a part on an F-22 and a fourth generation fighter, like an F-15C, could take a similar amount of time. However, the F-22 would require additional time at the beginning and end of the maintenance action to gain access to the part through the LO coating and then restore the integrity of the coating, significantly increasing the time aircraft would be unavailable due to maintenance. The Air Force is taking steps to reduce the impact of LO maintenance by, for example, creating panels that can be removed without requiring a full recoating procedure and by developing a more durable coating. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that the LO coating for its other fifth generation fighter—the F-35—uses different materials and processes and should be easier to maintain than the F-22’s LO.\nThe F-22’s LO coating is also beginning to reach the end of its service life, requiring maintenance actions that further reduce aircraft availability. According to Air Force officials, the LO coating has an 8-to-10 year life span, but environmental factors such as high temperatures, humidity, and salinity can reduce that span by 2 to 3 years. Further, the Air Force does not house its F-22s in climate-controlled hangars at 3 of the 4 operational locations (Florida, Hawaii, and Virginia), thus exposing them to these LO- degrading environmental factors. The Air Force has taken action to address maintenance challenges by using a more durable coating and standing up additional repair facilities. The Air Force also plans to use more durable materials to make long-term corrective repairs beginning in calendar year 2019, but this will constitute a costly long-term effort, according to the Air Force.", "As a result of the F-22 fleet’s small size and resulting low demand for parts, the F-22 faces a number of supply challenges that have contributed to reduced and unpredictable aircraft availability. Officials from all four operational locations identified low supply levels and difficulty obtaining needed parts as a concern. Obtaining parts can be a time-consuming and costly process because some original manufacturers no longer make the parts or are completely out of business, according to Air Force officials. When this is the case, the Air Force may need to find the original aircraft and parts design plans, and obtain a new contractor to produce a small number of parts. Officials at one operational location said a simple wiring harness required a 30-week lead time. Air Force maintenance statistics for fiscal year 2016 show that 14 percent of the F-22 fleet was not mission capable, and therefore not available, due to supply issues. According to Air Force officials, the F-22 fleet’s small size and resulting low demand for parts makes this problem more acute.\nF-22 squadrons face an unenviable choice when necessary parts are not available, according to Air Force officials: they can make the aircraft unavailable until the spare part arrives and can be installed or they can take the part from another aircraft that may be broken for a different reason. The second option, called cannibalization, is an inefficient way to conduct maintenance because it doubles the work. A good part needs to be removed from one aircraft and put into another. Once the replacement part arrives, it needs to be installed on the cannibalized aircraft. There is also a chance that the cannibalized part could get damaged in the process or just not work. Further, cannibalization could result in additional LO repairs on the donor aircraft. An Air Force report summarizing fiscal year 2016 maintenance issues reported that F-22 cannibalization rates have grown by 6 percent between fiscal years 2012 and 2016.\nThe F-22’s small fleet size also exacerbates supply challenges it is facing with its engines, potentially falling below minimum spare part requirements for multiple calendar years. Further, an increase in flying hours in 2014 resulted in engines requiring overhauls sooner than previously anticipated. It is taking time for the engine maintenance contractor to build up enough capacity to deal with this increased demand. The officials said that the F-22’s small fleet size contributed to this problem because, as was the case with other parts issues, low early demand meant that many of the vendors that built parts for those engines no longer build the parts or are not in business. Additionally, it takes time to find vendors and skilled people to build those parts again. The Air Force is implementing a mitigation plan that includes increasing production, overflying the standard engine maintenance interval, and borrowing engines from aircraft in long-term maintenance. According to Air Force officials, this kind of engine issue is not unique to the F-22. They noted that there was a time when B-1s, another small fleet, had a major engine shortfall that resulted in aircraft parked without engines in them. An Air Force forecast shows that mitigation efforts will avoid that problem, barring unanticipated increases in demand or maintenance problems.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact name above, Michael Ferren, Assistant Director; Vincent Buquicchio; Nicolaas Cornelisse, Analyst-in-Charge; Patricia Donahue; Amie Lesser; Tamiya Lunsford; Matthew Jacobs; Travis Masters; Richard Powelson; Walter Vance; and Nicole Volchko made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full h2_full", "h0_title h2_title h3_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h2_full", "h0_full h3_full", "h3_full h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "h2_full h1_full", "", "h3_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "To what extent has the Air Force optmized its F-22 fleet?", "Why is availability limited?", "What is one example of this constraint?", "What else causes maintenance availability challenges?", "Why would larger units be better for maintenance availability?", "What locations have F-22 squadrons operated from?", "How does this cause issues?", "How has the Air Force previously assessed the F-22 fleet?", "What are the consequences of htis lack of assessment?", "How has Air Force use of the F-22 fleet shaped training opportunities?", "What are the problems with such a program?", "What is a specific example of such problems?", "What is another exxample of these problems?", "What are the consequences of Air Force's lack of evaluation?", "What was the F-22 designed as?", "What abilities do the F-22s provide to the Air Force?", "How is the Air Force attempting to redirect their focus?", "How does the introduction of the F-35 impact F-22 use?", "What has the Senate provisioned GAO to review?", "What does this report cover?", "What information did the GAO review for this report?", "How does this report differ from other versions?" ], "summary": [ "The Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft.", "Availability is constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization.", "For example, stealth is a central feature of the F-22 and, according to Air Force officials, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the aircraft is time consuming and significantly reduces the time F-22s are available for missions.", "Maintenance availability challenges are exacerbated by the Air Force's decision to organize the F-22 fleet into small units—18 or 21 primary mission aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons per wing.", "Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing with 24 aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel, according to service officials.", "Moreover, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to operate from a single location.", "However, it generally deploys only a part of a squadron, and the remaining part struggles to keep aircraft available for missions at home.", "The Air Force has not reassessed the structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010.", "Without conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify and assess F-22 organization, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat environments.", "The Air Force's utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year.", "However, F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilization of F-22s for exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22's unique capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials.", "For example, F-22 units are often directed to participate in partnership building exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security concerns about exposing the F-22's unique capabilities.", "The Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—a mission that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but there are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently based at the F-22 locations in Alaska and Hawaii, so the alert mission falls to the F-22 units. Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission cannot be used for any other purposes, including training. This limits opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority skills.", "Without examining and implementing options to improve F-22 pilot training opportunities, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve its capability to address the high-end air superiority challenges it expects to face.", "The F-22 was designed and fielded as the Air Force's premier air-to-air fighter.", "The small fleet of 186 F-22s is central to the Air Force's ability to accomplish its air superiority mission in high threat areas.", "While the Air Force has focused on other missions over the last 15 years of conflict, it is now trying to refocus on overcoming advanced threats, even as it continues to support ongoing operations.", "Though the recent introduction of the F-35 gives the Air Force another advanced fighter, the F-35 is primarily designed for the air-to-ground missions and so is intended to complement but not replace the F-22.", "Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons.", "This report examines the extent to which the Air Force's (1) organization of its F-22 fleet maximizes availability of aircraft and (2) utilization of its F-22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training.", "GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, analyzed maintenance data and training information for the F-22, evaluated the use of F-22s during deployments, and interviewed agency officials.", "This is a public version of a classified report issued in April 2018. Information DOD deemed classified or sensitive has been omitted." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1, 5, -1, 7, -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, 1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-14-769	{ "title": [ "Background", "State’s Overseas Real Property Inventory Has Increased, but Data Do not Allow for Comparisons across Years", "State Officials Said That They Consider Many Factors in Managing Their Overseas Real Property, but Data and Documentation Are Limited", "State Considers Various Factors in Identifying Unneeded Property, but Faces Challenges in Disposing of Properties", "State Uses Data on Property Disposal Costs in Managing Real Property, but Data May Be Incomplete", "State Is Attempting to Reduce Its Reliance on Leased Space and Related Costs but Faces Challenges", "State Was Unable to Provide All Documentation on Real Property Transactions", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State", "Appendix III: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contacts", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "State has authority to acquire, manage, and dispose of real property abroad. Specifically, the Foreign Buildings Act (Act) of 1926, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of State to acquire by purchase, construction, exchange, or lease sites and buildings in foreign cities for use by diplomatic and consular establishments of the United States. The Act allows State to alter, repair, furnish, and dispose of these properties, and to provide residential and office space and necessary related facilities to federal agencies abroad. It also authorizes the Secretary to apply disposal proceeds toward real property needs or to deposit proceeds into the Foreign Service Buildings Fund and use the proceeds for authorized purposes.\nOBO manages State’s real property abroad to support U.S. government presence at embassies and consulates, which are also known as missions or posts. This office is responsible for managing U.S. government-owned and government-leased real property, which includes land, structures, and buildings such as embassies, warehouses, offices, and residences. OBO coordinates directly with officials at posts tasked with managing the post’s real property. Posts are responsible for implementing OBO policies related to the management, acquisition, disposal, and reporting of real property, outlined in State’s FAM. Table 1 below provides an overview of OBO’s and the posts’ roles and responsibilities for real property management.\nIn 2004, the administration added managing federal real property to the President’s Management Agenda and the President issued an executive order directing executive agencies to submit real property information annually for inclusion in a single, comprehensive database, which is now known as the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) that provides an annual report on the government’s real property holdings.\nState is currently undertaking a multiyear, multibillion-dollar capital- security construction program to replace 214 of its facilities abroad due to security concerns. State is taking these steps due to continuing threats and incidences such as the terrorist bombings in 1998 of embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, that killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000 others. The program incorporates the requirements of the Secure Embassy Counterterrorism Act of 1999 and instructs State to replace facilities at vulnerable posts and to require that all new diplomatic facilities be sufficiently sized to ensure that all U.S. government personnel at the post work onsite. Construction projects are prioritized by State’s annual risk matrix that ranks facilities based on their vulnerability across a wide range of security threats. In 2004, to aid in the construction of new embassies, a related program, the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) program was authorized, which required agencies with personnel overseas to provide funding for the construction of new, secure, and safe diplomatic facilities for U.S. government personnel overseas. State expects funding of $2.2 billion per year over a 5 year period through fiscal year 2018 to carry out new construction projects.", "Our analysis of State’s real property portfolio indicated that the overall inventory has increased. State reported its leased properties, which make up approximately 75 percent of the inventory, increased from approximately 12,000 to 14,000 between 2008 and 2013. However, comparing the total number of owned properties between years can be misleading because State’s method of counting these properties has been evolving over the past several years. OBO officials explained that in response to changes in OMB’s and FRPP’s reporting guidance, they have made efforts to count properties more precisely. For example, OBO has focused on separately capturing structural assets previously recorded as part of another building asset, such as perimeter walls, guard booths, and other ancillary structures. As a result of this effort, State recorded approximately 650 additional structural assets in its fiscal year 2012 FRPP report and approximately 900 more structures the following year in its fiscal year 2013 FRPP report, according to OBO officials. Additionally, OBO officials told us that former Department of Defense (DOD) properties in Iraq and Afghanistan were transferred to State; the largest of these transfers occurred in 2012 when State assumed responsibility from DOD for approximately 400 properties in Iraq. State reported additional changes in its real property portfolio, which are described below.\nAcquisitions: State reported spending more than $600 million to acquire nearly 300 properties from fiscal year 2008 through 2013 (see fig.1). State uses two sources of funding to acquire real property. It acquires land for building new embassy compounds (NEC) with funding from the CSCS program. It acquires residences, offices, and other functional facilities with proceeds from the disposal of unneeded property. In fiscal years 2008 through 2013, State reported spending approximately $400 million of these disposal proceeds to acquire approximately 230 properties.\nDisposals: From fiscal years 2008 through 2013, State reported selling approximately 170 properties. In doing so, it received approximately $695 million in proceeds (see fig.1). According to State, property vacated when personnel move into newly constructed facilities is the largest source of property that can be disposed of. When State completes construction of a NEC, personnel previously working in different facilities at multiple locations are then collocated into the same NEC, a move that provides State an opportunity to dispose of its former facilities. Further information on State’s acquisitions and disposals from fiscal year 2008 through 2013, can be found in figures 1 and 2 below.\nLeases: The majority of State’s leased properties are residences. State reported spending approximately $500 million on leases in 2013 and projects a potential increase to approximately $550 million by 2016 as growing populations in urban centers around the world push rental costs higher and the U.S. government’s overseas presence increases.\nOBO provides guidance to posts for disposing of unneeded properties as the post prepares to move into a NEC. In Belgrade, OBO is working with the post to sell an old embassy that is no longer needed following the completion of Belgrade’s NEC. Post officials told us that relocating to the NEC in April 2013 allowed them to market their old embassy and terminate multiple leases. In London, State sold its existing embassy building in August 2013 to fund the construction of a NEC. State is leasing the existing building until construction of the NEC is completed, which is expected in 2017.\nNEC construction has also provided State the opportunity to sell residential properties that are not located near the new embassies under construction. For example, according to post officials in London, transitioning to the NEC in London allowed State to make cost effective changes in its residential property portfolio by selling valuable older properties near the current embassy and purchasing newer lower cost residences near the NEC.\nState reports these types of real property transactions to Congress quarterly. Also, as required, State submits annual reports to Congress listing surplus overseas properties that have been identified for sale. For example, our analysis found that State listed 39 properties that it identified for disposal in its fiscal year 2013 annual report to Congress. Some properties identified as unneeded in State’s fiscal year 2013 FRPP report were not included in the 2013 annual report to Congress, such as a former embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan; land in New Delhi, India, and Manila, Philippines; and various properties in Beijing, China. According to OBO officials, the annual reports to Congress do not include unneeded properties they expect to retain or have determined they cannot sell for various reasons, such as host government restrictions related to diplomatic or political differences. For example, according to a State IG report, after State refused to pay what it considered an illegal tax to support the Brazilian social security system in 1996, the government of Brazil blocked the disposal of all U.S. diplomatic properties in the country. OBO officials told us that they do not report unneeded properties that cannot be sold because the Congressional reporting requirement is to list surplus properties that have been identified for sale.", "State’s officials said that they consider many factors in managing their real property portfolio, specifically in terms of identifying and disposing of unneeded property, as well as in purchasing and leasing property. The officials also described challenges associated with each of those aspects of managing the real property portfolio. State collects data on costs associated with properties identified for disposal to track costs, but we found that posts did not use the required code to track these costs consistently. As a result, this raises questions about the extent to which posts worldwide are using the code as State intends, and the extent to which State is receiving accurate and comprehensive cost information about its properties. We requested to review 202 files from fiscal year 2008 through 2013 on acquisitions, disposals, and leases, but were only provided 90 files since, according to State officials, the files were not centrally located and too time consuming to find and provide within the time frame of our review. State was able to provide most of the “core” documents agreed to, although some of the documentation was missing for the 90 files provided. For example, State provided all 36 of the requested lease files, but some documentation that FAM and OMB directs State to retain, and that State agreed to provide, was missing for 30 of the 36 lease files provided.", "OBO officials told us that they work with posts to identify and dispose of unneeded properties primarily using factors outlined in FAM, along with other strategies. FAM lists 18 factors that OBO and posts might consider when identifying and disposing of property (see table 2), such as whether (1) the property has excessive operating costs, (2) State used the property only irregularly, or (3) the property is uneconomical to retain. Officials at two of the four posts we visited told us that they were aware of and use the guidelines to identify unneeded property. Officials at a third post that owned property was unaware of the guidelines, but told us they used excessive maintenance costs to identify properties for disposal. Excessive maintenance cost is one of the 18 listed factors in FAM. OBO also uses other strategies to help identify unneeded property, such as: (1) reviewing the Department’s internal property database to identify properties newly classified by posts as unneeded, (2) monitoring new construction to identify property vacated as personnel move to new facilities, (3) reviewing reports of State’s (IG) for recommendations on disposals, and (4) evaluating changing political conditions and evolving post conditions to help right-size a post’s real estate portfolio.\nOnce posts identify and OBO approves a property as unneeded, OBO takes the lead in disposing of the property. For example, OBO sold residences in London in fiscal year 2012 and an embassy in fiscal year 2013 (see fig.3), and the Department received approximately $497 million in proceeds that State is using to design and build the new London embassy and to obtain replacement residences closer to the new embassy (see fig.4). OBO also sold a residence in Helsinki in fiscal year 2011 and received approximately $657,000 that was deposited back into its asset management account for other real property needs worldwide.\nOBO officials acknowledged challenges with disposing of unneeded properties. These challenges included: the condition and location of facilities, changing missions in countries, and diplomatic reasons or political situations that require State to retain property previously marked as unneeded. For example, unneeded residential units can be in poor condition, which makes selling them challenging. Also, officials told us that the State’s primary mission of diplomacy overrides property disposal. In countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and India, policy changes with the diplomatic mission have led to retaining property previously marked as unneeded. For example, in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, a new consulate was built; however, State retained property to accommodate and expand their mission.\nOfficials at the posts we visited also described some past and recurring challenges to disposing of unneeded real property: Officials at the Helsinki and Sarajevo posts told us that differing opinions between OBO and posts about whether to dispose or retain unneeded property presented challenges. For example, officials in Helsinki told us they wanted to dispose of two unneeded residential properties in 2014 because of excessive maintenance costs and a longer commuting time due to the need to take mass transit because parking space was eliminated at the renovated embassy (see fig. 5). However, OBO officials told the post to retain and assign staff to the two properties for an additional 3 years. OBO believed that marketing the two properties, located next to two additional unneeded properties they had been attempting to sell since 2011, would possibly depress the disposal price if all the properties were marketed at the same time. However, post officials believe it will cost the post and State more in maintenance costs to bring the properties to a state of good repair, and believe selling the properties now would be more financially beneficial than retaining the properties for an additional 3 years as the costs to maintain the property would outweigh the potential for increased proceeds.\nOBO officials told us that they conduct an internal review to determine the financial benefit of whether to retain or sell properties in these situations as the agency attempts to maximize the disposal value of property. Officials at the Sarajevo post told us that they have had ongoing discussions with OBO about retaining their old embassy and converting it to a new Ambassador’s residence. Post officials told us that OBO originally wanted the post to dispose of its interest in the embassy—which State has been leasing for only $1 per year since 1994 with the option to continue the lease at this rate for 150 years. OBO officials told us that, at this below-market lease rate of $1 per year, they anticipated that the disposal of this leasehold interest could generate proceeds for State. However, OBO and post officials told us that the host government denied the Department’s request to transfer the lease to a third party. Given the Department’s inability to transfer or sell its interest in the property, OBO and the post reached an agreement to retain the embassy and convert it into an Ambassador’s residence. When the conversion is complete the post will terminate the lease for its current Ambassador’s residence, which has an annual lease cost of $144,000.\nOfficials at the Helsinki and Belgrade posts told us that OBO’s process for appraising and marketing properties for sale was a challenge in disposing properties in a timely manner. Specifically, the post officials thought OBO’s real estate firm’s appraisals were too high and made the properties unsellable. OBO acknowledged that ensuring an accurate appraisal price presents challenges and therefore, it also reviews appraisals internally. Also, post officials in Helsinki and Belgrade told us that the global real estate firms OBO hired to market their properties did not have local offices, and thus may have not fully understood the local real estate market. For example, Belgrade post officials told us that an affiliate office in Hungary was marketing their old embassy, and that a Hungarian phone number was the primary number used to market the property, which they believe made selling the property more challenging (see fig. 6). OBO officials told us that they believe the global firms they contract with are more experienced than many local firms.\nOfficials at the Belgrade post told us about zoning challenges with the host government that have delayed the disposal of their old embassy. They told us OBO notified the post that it would sell the old embassy once the new embassy had been built. However, post officials told us they have had to resolve zoning issues with the host government before the embassy could be sold. OBO officials told us that the old embassy was zoned for diplomatic use and that the process to change the zoning to mixed-use is under way. OBO and post officials have worked with the host government, and post officials believe the decision to zone the property for commercial and residential use will increase the disposal price of the property.", "OBO collects data on costs associated with unneeded properties identified for disposal to track costs associated with properties before their disposal, but the data do not specify costs associated with individual properties. Once OBO approves a property as unneeded, each post should charge a specific internal accounting code designated for property acquisition and disposal costs. OBO officials told us that each post is required to charge costs for property to this code so OBO can track the costs to maintain the property before the property is disposed by State. For example, these types of costs would include utilities, legal fees, and security services. Posts charged approximately $11.1 million to this code from fiscal year 2008 through 2013, according to the data provided by OBO.\nWe found that the four posts we visited did not use this code consistently. State’s Foreign Affairs Handbook instructs posts to use the code to record costs related to the disposal of unneeded real property, but does not describe in detail the types of costs that can be charged to this account. Specifically, the Foreign Affairs Handbook includes the following information on this accounting code: “7541 Real Estate-Program Costs: Costs in support of the acquisition and disposal of State real property.” OBO officials told us costs for unneeded properties that should be charged to this code include disposal costs for government-owned buildings, such as guard, maintenance, utility, and other building operating costs of vacant/unneeded property until sold. Although State relies on this account to monitor costs associated with disposal of unneeded properties, on our site visits we found that officials at one post did not know they could use this account for costs related to properties identified for disposal, such as utility bills and condominium fees while marketing the property. This post charged these costs to its routine maintenance account not intended for unneeded properties. Post officials thought the code for unneeded properties was used to process the disposal, and not for ongoing costs related to the property while the property was being marketed for disposal. Officials at the other two posts we visited that had unneeded property for disposal used the code to charge all of their related costs while they marketed the property for disposal. We found posts in other countries with unneeded properties identified for disposal in fiscal year 2013 had not charged expenses to this account during that fiscal year such as posts in Jamaica, Ukraine, Tunisia, and Namibia.\nOMB’s capital-planning guidance states that reliable data are critical to managing assets effectively. According to this guidance, only valid, complete, relevant, reliable, and timely data can help the agency make informed decisions regarding the allocation of resources. Additionally, government-wide internal control standards state that pertinent financial and operating information should be recorded and communicated to management and others within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. State will be unable to capture and maintain complete and accurate information on the operating costs for properties identified for disposal if posts do not consistently charge costs related to these properties to the designated account. This raises questions about the extent to which posts worldwide are using the code as State intends and the extent to which State is receiving accurate and comprehensive cost information about its properties. For example, State may not have the information it needs to make a decision to accept or decline an offer for a property when attempting to maximize revenue for a property disposal. In addition, posts may not have sufficient funding for routine property maintenance because they are using their designated routine maintenance funds on unneeded properties, which could reduce the amount of funding they have available for maintenance of other properties. This could impact the upkeep of posts’ current real-property portfolio and increase the amount for deferred maintenance. We have previously reported that deferring maintenance and repair can reduce the overall life of federal facilities, lead to higher cost in the long term, and pose risks to safety and agencies’ missions.", "OBO officials said that they would like to reduce the number of leased properties in State’s portfolio and increase federally owned property. OBO officials told us that owning more housing will save on aspects of lease costs, such as exchange-rate fluctuations, rapid inflation, and rising property rents. The officials added that currently 15 percent of State’s residential properties are federally owned, but officials would like to eventually increase this number to 40 percent. They told us that based on the average cost of a property’s acquisition, along with expected reinvestment of disposal proceeds on a yearly basis; it will take about 50 years to reach this ownership target. Officials believe it is not cost effective or feasible to own 100 percent of properties due to the inability to own properties in some countries, high maintenance costs of owning properties in some countries, and the lack of flexibility in dealing with staffing changes. OBO officials told us that they consider the unique facts and circumstances of each country when deciding whether to lease or acquire properties. We have previously reported on the federal government’s over-reliance on leasing, which could be more expensive in the long term than the cost to acquire property.\nState relies on its Opportunity Purchase Program to fund real property acquisitions, and to reduce its need to lease space. The Opportunity Purchase Program reinvests proceeds from property disposals to acquire real properties other than new embassy construction. According to OBO officials, the program allows State to acquire properties in order to avoid costs because State officials conduct a lease-versus-purchase analysis to measure savings from owning rather than leasing over an expected time frame they plan to retain a property. OBO officials told us that over the last several years the program has generated investment returns from its acquisitions that typically range from 7 percent to 10 percent. As funding from disposals becomes available, OBO reviews attractive purchasing markets and security needs at the approximately 275 posts and narrows down purchasing opportunities to 12 to 15 posts. OBO officials told us they notify the post that they have been selected for the program, and the post provides acquisition opportunities for OBO to review. OBO officials told us that disposals are unpredictable to forecast on an annual basis, making planning and funding for these acquisitions difficult. The Belgrade post is an example of where State has employed the Opportunity Purchase Program. State acquired four residential units in Belgrade for approximately $2.1 million in fiscal year 2013 (see fig. 7). According to OBO, from fiscal year 2006 through 2013, the Opportunity Purchase Program has produced approximately $16 million annually in lease cost avoidance and will provide another projected $6 million in lease cost avoidance once all pending acquisitions are completed.\nPost and OBO officials we interviewed echoed similar views on the preference of owning versus leasing based on the real estate market in each post’s location. Post and OBO officials told us that the conditions of a specific location, such as the local real estate market and the mission of the post influence the decision to own or lease. For example, post officials in Helsinki told us that properties are costly to acquire and expensive to maintain in the area. They said leasing is a better option because it provides flexibility when staffing changes occur, and the property owners in the area are reliable and responsive. Post officials in Sarajevo told us that because of the instability of the real estate market and possible future changes in embassy staffing, it is more practical to lease residential housing. On the other hand, post officials in Belgrade told us that they would like to own more residential units because of the difficulty in finding quality housing to lease. OBO officials told us they prefer a mix of owned and leased housing to provide a stable housing pool, manage rental costs, and provide flexibility as mission requirements change, and officials seek to acquire housing in markets where they can acquire quality housing and where it is cost effective to own rather than lease.\nIn addition to acquisitions, OBO and post officials described several steps they have taken to reduce costs associated with leasing:\nOBO reviews its highest cost expiring leases annually to determine if State is obtaining a market rate for these properties and if leases should be renewed or replaced. Officials told us that this review includes 100 of the most costly leases worldwide and is used to assist posts that take the lead in monitoring and securing lease renewals. OBO officials told us that in fiscal year 2014 after this review, they determined that 30 percent of leases were prospects for exploring whether rents can be reduced. Under FAM, appraisals or other documentation such as a market study or a design review for the acquisition and renewal of major leases are used for each transaction. OBO meets this guidance by providing fair-market rental estimates, market studies, surveys, and legal direction for posts.\nOBO is attempting to maximize the cost effectiveness of its leased portfolio. OBO officials told us they implemented a rental benchmark program in 2007 to help ensure the U.S. government pays the prevailing market rate, and does not overpay for leased housing. Officials told us that 25 posts were involved with the program when it began in 2007 and that it covered 171 posts in 2013. OBO works with posts and contracts with real estate experts to provide rental ceilings for leased residential properties at each post. OBO uses these ceilings to set a cap on the amount a post can spend on leased residential property, and if a post exceeds that cap, OBO must approve a waiver. OBO officials told us that they conduct a quarterly review of the posts to see that they are in compliance and that the program incentivizes posts to stay within their rental ceilings to secure cost-effective leases. Belgrade post officials spoke highly of the program as it has reduced the post’s administrative burden in seeking waivers, by providing a more realistic ceiling, which has allowed the post to secure housing in a timelier manner. Also, OBO officials told us that the program has resulted in savings by slowing down the growth of leasing costs.\nPost and OBO officials told us that they proactively renegotiate leases to reduce costs. Officials at all four posts we visited told us that their locally employed staff had established strong working relationships with property owners from years of real estate experience. Post officials told us that the locally employed staff were instrumental in negotiating reduced lease costs. For example, one post official told us that the post secured office space for 30 percent below market value, and officials from another post told us that they were in the process of securing a new leased warehouse space that would save $50,000 to $80,000 per year due to the expertise of the local staff working at the post. In addition, posts and OBO have successfully renegotiated leases since fiscal year 2011 in St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; La Paz, Bolivia; Budapest, Hungary; and Tokyo, Japan that have produced approximately $3.5 million in savings. Also, OBO officials told us that in their estimation, the lease waiver program avoided $43 million in lease costs by working with overseas posts to locate less costly property, renegotiating lease terms, and by rejecting approval of proposed rent increases or higher cost replacement properties.", "OBO could not provide us all the real property files we requested for acquisitions and disposals between fiscal year 2008 through 2013, except for the files pertaining to leases. Specifically, we requested 202 files which included property disposals, acquisitions, and leases, but OBO stated it was only able to provide 90 of the files because these files were not centrally located and too time consuming to find and provide within the timeframe of our review. OBO agreed to provide us “core” documents for acquisition and disposal files; however some of the documentation was missing in the files we reviewed. In addition, although OBO was able to provide all the lease files requested we found the lease files to be incomplete based on FAM and OMB guidance (see Table 3). Without the missing files and documentation, it is unclear how efficiently and effectively State is managing its overseas real property.\nAcquisitions and Disposals: Under FAM, OBO and posts should create and preserve records containing adequate and proper documentation of the decisions, procedures, and transactions or operations of the Department and posts. Further, Standards for Internal Control in the federal government states that an agency should establish control activities to ensure that the agency completely and accurately records all transactions. These standards explain that control activities include activities such as the creation and maintenance of related records that provide evidence of execution of these activities as well as appropriate documentation. OBO told us that they were unable to provide all of the information for acquisitions and disposals as requested because files were not centrally located, maintained by different groups within State, and too time consuming to find and provide within the time frame of our review. Thus, OBO officials agreed to provide what they considered “core” documents, which were a subset of the documentation we requested based on our analysis of FAM and OMB guidance. State was able to provide most of the “core” documents agreed to, although some of the documentation was missing. For example, we found instances of acquisition files missing deeds and disposal files missing deposit slips, which were both core documents State agreed to provide. Furthermore, since we received only core documents, we could not determine whether the work to meet additional FAM and OMB guidance was conducted and the records were missing, or if this work was not conducted at all. Without this information, it is unclear whether State is consistently following its internal FAM and external OMB guidance, and how State officials made real property decisions. These findings are similar to those of State’s IG which found significant vulnerabilities due to inadequate file documentation that could potentially expose the Department to substantial financial losses.\nLeases: State was able to provide all 36 of the requested lease files, but some documentation listed in FAM and OMB guidance was not in 30 of the 36 of the files we reviewed. For example, State guidance directs OBO to complete documentation for leases such as: a lease agreement and documentation of OBO’s approval. Additionally, OMB directs executive branch agencies, such as State, to conduct a lease-versus-purchase analysis when deciding to lease or acquire properties to ensure all leases are justified as preferable to direct U.S. government purchase and ownership.All 36 files contained a lease agreement. However, only 6 of the 36 files contained all of the information that FAM directs State to retain and that State agreed to provide. These findings are similar to those of State’s IG which found that the Department’s process to monitor lease information provided by posts was not always effective. The IG found numerous recorded lease terms that did not agree with supporting documentation. We found that 30 of 36 files lacked either documentation of OBO’s approval or a lease-versus-purchase analysis, or both. OBO officials told us they do not conduct a lease versus purchase analysis when purchasing is not an option, such as in cases where there is a lack of sufficient funding or the property is in a country that does not allow non-domestic ownership. According to OBO, 6 of the 36 leases in our review were for space in a country that did not allow non- domestic ownership; however, the files did not include documentation that this was the case. We have previously found that without a lease-versus- purchase analysis, decision makers lack financial information on the long- term decisions to lease rather than own. Also, we have previously found that when this analysis has been conducted in the federal government that such analysis has identified savings from owning versus leasing.", "State manages a multibillion dollar portfolio of buildings, land, and structures at approximately 275 posts throughout the world and has $7.5 billion in projects currently under design and construction. The Department has taken a number of measures to improve management of these properties. These measures include actively identifying unneeded properties, providing posts with rental cost parameters, and other cost- saving initiatives. Despite these steps in managing the real property portfolio, State cannot identify the cost associated with properties identified for disposal, which may compromise State’s ability to make fully informed decisions because of unclear guidance. Furthermore, State could not provide some key documents we requested for our review pertaining to acquisitions, disposals, and leases of its properties worldwide. As a result, the Department may not be able to ensure that it is making cost-effective decisions about properties. Improvements in these areas will become more important as State constructs additional NECs and disposes properties no longer needed when personnel relocate to new facilities.", "To improve State’s management of real property overseas and enhance State’s accountability and ability to track real-property management decisions, the Secretary of State should take the following four actions: 1. Clarify accounting-code guidance to the posts for tracking expenses related to disposal of unneeded properties. 2. Take steps to ensure that documents related to real property acquisitions are prepared and retained in accordance with FAM and OMB guidance. 3. Take steps to ensure that documents related to real property disposals are prepared and retained in accordance with FAM and OMB guidance. 4. Take steps to ensure that documents related to real property leases are prepared and retained in accordance with FAM and OMB guidance.", "We provided a draft of this product to the Department of State (State) for review and comment. In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, State concurred with the report’s recommendations. State provided technical clarifications that were incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact either of us at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] or (202)-512-8980 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "To determine what is known about the Department of State’s (State) real property inventory, we reviewed State’s Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) data for fiscal years 2008 through 2013—the time period of our review. Additionally, we reviewed State’s real property reports to Congress and compared these with State’s annual FRPP reports to the General Services Administration. We determined that FRPP data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting approximate numbers of properties in State’s portfolio by interviewing knowledgeable Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) and post officials about data quality assurance procedures and reviewing related documentation, including previous GAO and State Inspector General (IG) reports, data dictionaries and user manuals, and data verification practices. We also reviewed State’s internal report on costs associated with properties identified for disposal to determine costs for unneeded properties that State is selling. To evaluate the reliability of State’s real property database we interviewed OBO and post officials and locally employed staff responsible for entering real property data at the four posts we visited. We also examined OBO’s policies and processes for entering information into its real property database and issues affecting quality control over this information. Although we identified data reliability issues for some facilities in State’s real property database, as those issues generally involved the classification or description of facilities, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to describe the approximate number of U.S. properties overseas.\nTo determine what factors State considers in managing its real property portfolio and the extent to which it documents its decision-making process, we reviewed sections of the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) applicable to property management overseas and documents prepared by State officials in response to our questions. We reviewed State’s data on costs associated with unneeded properties identified for disposal for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. We found the data had limitations, which we discuss in the report. We reviewed documentation that State provided for its real property disposals, acquisitions, and leases from fiscal years 2008 through 2013. We requested files on all 94 property disposals and 72 property acquisitions reported during this period. State provided 20 of the 94 disposal files we requested and 34 of the 72 acquisition files, which included all of the 2013 files. We also requested, and were provided with, all 36 major leases with $500,000 or more in annual rent, as defined in the FAM, that were active from fiscal years 2008 through 2013 and still were listed as active in FRPP at the end of fiscal year 2013. To evaluate the completeness of these files we compared State’s documentation of real property disposals, acquisitions, and leases to the documentation directives listed in FAM and relevant Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars. We also obtained information on how State reinvested revenue generated from property disposals between fiscal years 2008 through 2013. While our review of these disposals, acquisitions, and leases provides key insights and illustrates recent products of State’s real property policies and guidance, the results of our review should not be used to make generalizations about all State disposals, acquisitions, and leases.\nWe interviewed State Department officials at OBO and at four selected posts (Belgrade, Serbia; Helsinki, Finland; London, United Kingdom; and Sarajevo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina) to gather information on unneeded properties, disposals, acquisitions, and leases. We selected these posts because they had (1) ongoing or recently completed embassy construction or renovation projects without disposing of properties, (2) properties reported as identified for disposal for multiple years without being disposed of, and (3) a mix of owned and leased properties. We based our site visit selection on these factors in order to observe posts with (1) higher numbers of property disposals than other posts due to recently completed or ongoing construction of new embassies, (2) persistent challenges in selling unneeded properties, and (3) experience managing both owned and leased properties. The results of the case studies provide insight into State’s management and decision-making practices but cannot be generalized for the purposes of this review.\nWe conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to September 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contacts named above, Amelia Shachoy and Hynek Kalkus, Assistant Directors; Joshua Akery, George Depaoli, Colin Fallon, Hannah Laufe, Grace Lui, Josh Ormond, Nitin Rao, Kelly Rubin, Ozzy Trevino, and Crystal Wesco made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "h0_full", "h2_title h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "", "h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What did GAO's analysis of the Department of State's inventory of overseas real property demonstrate?", "What was the scale of this increase?", "What caveats exist about this trend?", "Why has the Department of State's method of counting changed?", "What did GAO find regarding State's management of real property?", "How does state deal with uneeded propoerties?", "What are some of the factors influenced by FAM guidance?", "How does State collect data on unneeded properties?", "What issues did GAO find with State's reliance on an accounting code?", "Why is the accounting code not used consistently?", "What are the implications of the fact that the code is not used correctly?", "What issues may be caused for State if their data is not accurate?", "To what extent was GAO provided with the requested documents?", "What issue arose from this interaction?", "What are the effects of missing files and documentation?", "How did GAO investigate the State's documentation of their management of real property?", "What other data did GAO collect?", "To what extent is this study generalizable?" ], "summary": [ "GAO's analysis of the overseas real property portfolio of the Department of State (State) indicates that the overall inventory has increased in recent years.", "State reported that its leased properties, which make up about 75 percent of its inventory, increased from approximately 12,000 to 14,000 between 2008 and 2013.", "State's numbers of federally owned properties increased, but comparing the total number of owned properties from year to year can be misleading because State's method of counting these properties has been evolving over the past several years.", "Specifically, according to State officials, they have been revising their method for counting properties to produce more precise counts and to meet reporting guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), among others. For example, State began counting separately structural assets previously included as part of another building's assets, such as guard booths or perimeter walls, and consequently reported approximately 650 additional structural assets in fiscal year 2012 than in 2011, and approximately 900 more structures in 2013.", "State officials told GAO that they consider many factors in managing real property; however, GAO found State's available data and documentation on management decisions were limited.", "State officials said that they work with overseas posts to identify and dispose of unneeded properties, primarily using factors in State's Foreign Affairs Manual ( FAM ) guidance.", "Such factors include identifying properties deemed obsolete or with excessive maintenance costs.", "State collects data on costs associated with unneeded properties identified for disposal, relying on posts to charge all such costs to a specific accounting code.", "The four posts GAO visited did not use this code consistently. For example, officials at one post charged some disposal costs to a routine maintenance account. Officials at the other posts with properties for sale used the code to charge all related disposal costs. GAO also found that other posts with unneeded properties identified for disposal in fiscal year 2013 had not charged expenses to this account.", "The guidance provided in the FAM for using this code does not detail the types of costs that can be charged.", "This omission raises questions about the extent to which posts use the code as State intends and the extent to which State receives accurate and comprehensive cost information about its unneeded properties.", "State, without accurate data on unneeded property, may not have the information it needs to make a decision about property offers when attempting to maximize revenue for property sales. Also, posts may not have sufficient funding for routine property maintenance if they use funds designated for this type of maintenance on unneeded property.", "GAO requested to review 202 files between fiscal year 2008 through 2013 on acquisitions (72), disposals (94), and leases (36), but was provided 90, as State told GAO that these files were not centrally located and too time consuming to find and provide during the time frame of our review.", "State provided most of what it considers “core” documents for the acquisition and disposal files, but these documents do not constitute all of the documentation listed in the FAM and OMB guidance. In addition, although State provided all 36 of the requested lease files, some documentation that State agreed to provide was missing for 30 of the 36 files.", "Without the missing files and documentation, it is unclear how efficiently and effectively State is managing its overseas real property.", "GAO requested 202 files for all acquisitions, disposals, and major leases pertaining to State's management of its real property abroad for the period from 2008-2013.", "In addition, GAO interviewed State officials in headquarters and at four posts abroad, selected because they had (1) ongoing or recently completed embassy construction or renovation projects without property disposals, (2) properties reported as identified for disposal for multiple years without being disposed, and (3) both owned and leased properties.", "The results of the four case studies cannot be generalized for the purpose of this review." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 1, 1, 3, 4, 4, 4, -1, 8, 8, -1, 0, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R43473	{ "title": [ "", "Background", "Political and Economic Conditions", "Populism and Democracy in Bolivia", "Drug Policy", "Economy is Expanding, but Social Challenges Remain", "October 2014 Presidential and Legislative Elections", "U.S. Relations", "U.S. Foreign Aid", "Counternarcotics", "Trade", "Outlook" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Bolivia is a country rich in cultural diversity and natural resources, whose political and economic development have been stymied by chronic instability, poverty, corruption, and deep ethnic and regional cleavages. In 1825, Bolivia won its independence from Spain, but then experienced frequent military coups and counter-coups until democratic civilian rule was established in 1982. As a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) with Chile, Bolivia lost part of its territory along the Pacific coast and has no sovereign access to the ocean, a source of lingering resentment among Bolivians. Bolivia does have preferential rights of access to the Chilean ports of Antofagasta and Arica and the Peruvian port of Ilo. As a result of the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-1935), Bolivia lost access to the Atlantic Ocean by way of the Paraguay River and significant territory. Bolivia possesses the second-largest natural gas reserves in Latin America after Venezuela and significant mineral deposits, yet at least 42% of Bolivians live in poverty (down from 64% in 2005). Some sources point to a higher figure, nearing 60%. Bolivia has been deemed as having an \"acute\" level of vulnerability to natural disasters; recent flooding has disproportionately affected poor communities in rural areas.\nBolivia's population of 10.5 million people is among the most ethnically diverse in South America. Quechua and Aymara are the two predominant indigenous groups, together comprising some 55% of the population. Despite the National Revolution of 1952, in which the Bolivian indigenous peoples benefitted from land reform and expanded suffrage, indigenous groups have historically been under-represented in the Bolivian political system and disproportionately affected by poverty and inequality. In the 1980s, indigenous-based political parties and movements emerged in Bolivia, and by 2006 some 17% of members of the Bolivian Congress self-identified as indigenous. Since the mid-2000s, indigenous representatives have used the legislature as a forum to advocate for indigenous rights, equitable economic development, and the preservation of indigenous land and culture. Nevertheless, indigenous communities continue to engage in large-scale protests to ensure that their interests are met.\nBolivia has been a major producer of coca leaf, the main ingredient in the production of cocaine. Although coca leaf is legal in the country for traditional uses and is grown legally in some parts of the country, its cultivation for illegal purposes increased in the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 2000s, cultivation levels had decreased to half of the levels of the 1990s as a result of aggressive, U.S.-backed policies to eradicate illicit production. These policies, and the way in which they were implemented, caused social unrest and economic hardship in the two main coca-growing regions. Opposition to forced eradication policies led to the rise of coca growers' trade unions and an associated political party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS).", "Since taking power in January 2006, Evo Morales and his leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party have presided over a period of relative political stability and economic expansion. After being governed by six different presidents between 2001 and 2005, Bolivians have repeatedly gone to the polls to reaffirm their support for Morales and the MAS; the party now has majorities in both chambers of the legislature. President Morales has expanded state control over the economy by renegotiating contracts with some companies to increase the taxes and royalties they pay, and by expropriating other companies. These policies have angered foreign investors, but have brought the government substantial revenue. President Morales has used that influx of revenue to expand social programs and provide cash transfers to the elderly, families with children, and pregnant women. Buoyed by record prices for its gas and mineral exports, economic growth in Bolivia has averaged 4.5% per year during the Morales Administration, according to the World Bank.", "Under Evo Morales, democracy in Bolivia has in some ways become more representative and participatory, but less accountable and transparent. The participation of women in all branches of the federal government increased after a law mandating gender parity in the selection process for government jobs took effect; however, women remain under-represented in mayoral posts. Indigenous participation in the executive branch, legislature (where seven seats are set aside for representatives from indigenous districts), and courts has increased since Morales took office. The 2009 constitution guarantees the autonomy of subnational entities (departments, indigenous communities, municipalities, and sub-departmental regions), providing more opportunities for direct political participation, but challenges remain in implementing those provisions. According to the United Nations (U.N.), additional progress needs to be made in order to protect indigenous communities' rights, particularly their right to be consulted prior to infrastructure or mining projects being carried out on their lands.\nIn dealing with the opposition, President Morales and his government have periodically used anti-democratic methods to consolidate power and quell dissent. In December 2007, for example, Morales' supporters in the Constituent Assembly passed a draft constitution (which prioritized indigenous rights and agrarian reform) during a series of sessions that many opposition delegates were not permitted to attend. Opposition governors and other political leaders have also been sidelined by sometimes controversial charges of corruption and other malfeasance. The corruption, inefficiency, and politicization in Bolivia's criminal justice system have been identified as barriers to democratic development in the country. Restrictions on freedom of the press, including retaliatory actions against media outlets that do not report positively about government actions, as well as periodic attacks against journalists critical of the government, have been reported. With Bolivia's traditional political parties in disarray, opposition to Morales has generally been divided between those in the wealthy eastern provinces (led by Governor Rubén Costas of Santa Cruz) who oppose his state-led, pro-indigenous policies, and those who originated from within his own base, some of whom favor more radical policies than he does.\nDespite opposition from conservative sectors during his first term and protests by unions and indigenous groups during his second term, Morales has remained popular in Bolivia, particularly among the poor and indigenous (who were arguably neglected by previous governments). President Morales received the support of 67% of Bolivian voters in a national recall referendum held in August 2008, 61% support for the new constitution he backed in 2009, and 64% support for his re-election that year. Support for President Morales remains higher in the poorer western highlands (where Quechua and Aymara indigenous groups predominate) than in the wealthier eastern lowlands, sometimes called the Media Luna (Half Moon) states of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija (see Figure 1 ).", "The coca leaf has been used for thousands of years by indigenous communities in the Andean region for spiritual and medical purposes, and its use is considered an important indigenous cultural right. In 2013, the United Nations accepted Bolivia's petition for recognition that it allows coca cultivation for licit uses within its borders. The coca leaf is also a primary component of cocaine, an illicit narcotic. Unlike past Bolivian governments, which sought to criminalize coca production, President Morales and the MAS developed a \"coca yes, cocaine no\" policy for Bolivia that permits each family to produce one cato (1,600 square meters) of coca to be used for traditional uses, but any coca grown beyond that is subject to eradication. The policy seeks to (1) recognize the positive attributes of the coca leaf; (2) commercialize coca for licit uses; (3) continue \"rationalization\" of coca (voluntary eradication) in the Chapare and extend it to other regions; and, (4) increase interdiction of cocaine and other illicit drugs at all stages of production.\nProponents of the \"coca yes, cocaine no\" policy argue that it is a culturally sensitive approach to coca eradication that is widely accepted in Bolivia. They assert that Morales' experience as a coca grower has enabled him to negotiate agreements with producers in regions where prior governments were unable to limit coca cultivation. Critics of Morales' coca policy argue that it is based on the false premises that traditional demand for coca exceeds the current legal threshold of 12,000 hectares, and that there are viable markets outside Bolivia for licit coca-based products. A 2013 study funded by the European Union reportedly found that Bolivia needs some 14,700 hectares to meet traditional demands for coca, but produces more than 25,000 hectares. According to U.S. estimates, coca cultivation in Bolivia declined by 4,000 hectares between 2009 and 2012. In 2012, estimated coca cultivation in Peru was twice that of Bolivia and estimated coca cultivation in Colombia was three times that of Bolivia.", "The way that Bolivia is perceived by international investors contrasts markedly with the way its macroeconomic and fiscal policies have been evaluated by economists from the leading multilateral development institutions. Bolivia ranks 167 th out of 189 countries evaluated in the World Bank's 2013 Ease of Doing Business report and third from the bottom (behind Haiti and Venezuela) among Latin American and Caribbean countries. Summing up several other investment climate rankings, the State Department maintains that Bolivia receives a \"low ranking\" due, in part, to its official corruption, social unrest, expropriations of private companies, and questionable commitment to international dispute settlement. Nevertheless, the World Bank has praised Bolivia's economy, which is driven by state-centered policies and fueled by commodity exports, for its positive macroeconomic results, declining public debt, and increasing international reserves. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has found that solid economic performance, prudent fiscal policy, and \"active social policies since the mid-2000s have helped Bolivia to nearly triple income per capita and reduce poverty.\"\nDespite its recent economic expansion, Bolivia remains among the poorest countries in South America and one of the most unequal countries in the Western Hemisphere. Bolivia ranked 108 th out of 187 countries in the U.N. Development Program's 2012 human development index. Bolivia has one of the lowest life expectancies in the region (67), as well as some of the highest maternal and child mortality rates. These indicators are much worse in indigenous and rural communities, due to a continued lack of access to sanitation and health services. Progress has been made in some critical areas, however. For example, according to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), access to treated drinking water stood at 50% in rural areas as recently as 2007. In 2012, 79% of the population had access to clean water.", "Like other populist leaders in Latin America, Evo Morales is seeking to extend his time in office rather than entrusting his legacy to a successor such as, for example, Vice President Alvaro García Linera. Morales backtracked on an earlier pledge not to run for a third term after a controversial Constitutional Court decision in May 2013 cleared him to compete in the October 2014 presidential elections. Although the 2009 constitution established a two-term limit for Bolivian presidents, the Constitutional Court ruled that President Morales is exempted from that limit due to the fact that he is technically serving his first term under the new constitution.\nPolls predict that President Morales will be easily re-elected. In a poll from mid-February 2014, Morales had 46% of the vote. His closest rivals were Samuel Medina, a cement magnate, with 13.4% support, and Governor Rubén Costas, with 9% support. Some analysts doubt that any opposition candidate from the Media Luna stands a chance at defeating President Morales. For instance, none of the opposition candidates have thus far been able to capitalize on popular protests that forced the Morales Administration to back away from pushing the Congress to enact a new mining code.\nBolivia is also scheduled to convene legislative elections in October 2014. There are 60 Senate seats and 130 Chamber of Deputies seats up for election. Some predict the opposition could prevent the MAS from winning a majority in the Senate, where each province holds four seats.", "From the late 1980s through the mid-2000s, U.S. relations with Bolivia centered largely on controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, much of which was usually shipped to Colombia to be processed into cocaine. In support of Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts, the United States provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance, and forgave all of Bolivia's debt for development assistance projects and most of the debt for food assistance. Bolivia, like Peru, had been viewed by many as a counternarcotics success story, with joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and some effective alternative development programs. Others, however, view the forced eradication policies that U.S. antidrug efforts emphasized as a social and political disaster that fueled popular discontent, worsened Bolivia's chronic instability, and contributed to human rights violations.\nPrior to the December 2005 elections, most analysts predicted that a Morales victory would complicate U.S. relations with Bolivia. After the election, U.S. State Department officials congratulated Evo Morales but noted that \"the quality of the relationship between the United States and Bolivia will depend on what kind of policies they [Morales and the MAS government] pursue.\" Despite an initial openness to dialogue, U.S.-Bolivian relations became tense soon after President Morales took office. U.S. officials expressed concerns about the Morales government's commitment to combating illegal drugs, its ties with Venezuela and Cuba, and its nationalization of Bolivia's hydrocarbons industry. Tensions in U.S.-Bolivian relations flared during the fall of 2007 as Bolivian authorities (including President Morales) complained that some U.S. assistance was going to support opposition groups seeking to undermine the MAS government. In 2008, U.S.-Bolivian relations deteriorated from what analysts described as \"tenuous\" at best in the summer, to extremely tense by the fall.\nU.S.-Bolivian relations hit their lowest point in modern times in September 2008, when President Morales accused the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia of supporting opposition forces and expelled him from the country. The U.S. government responded by expelling Bolivia's Ambassador to the United States. On September 16, 2008, President Bush designated Bolivia as a country that had failed to live up to its obligations under international narcotics agreements. That decision was closely followed by the suspension of Bolivia's trade preferences under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) for a lack of counternarcotics cooperation. On November 1, 2008, Bolivian President Morales announced an indefinite suspension of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Bolivia after accusing some DEA agents of espionage. The Peace Corps also suspended operations in Bolivia that fall due to \"growing instability\" in the country and has since closed the program. It is unlikely that the agency would resume operations until and unless the U.S. government has more of a diplomatic presence in the country.\nPeriodic efforts to repair relations in subsequent years have failed for different reasons. After two years of high-level negotiations, on November 7, 2011, the U.S. and Bolivian governments signed a Framework Agreement to guide relations that said both governments looked forward to the \"early return of ambassadors to both Washington and La Paz.\" However, after the United States requested Bolivian approval of a nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador in La Paz (through the diplomatic procedure known as agrément ) in November 2012, the Bolivian government leaked the name of the U.S. nominee to the press. President Morales then said in February 2013 that he no longer had an interest in exchanging Ambassadors.\nTwo events that occurred in 2013 resulted in the end of most, if not all, U.S. foreign aid to Bolivia. In May 2013, President Morales asked the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to end its operations in Bolivia after 52 years in the country. He claimed that USAID had funded opposition forces that had sought to undermine his government, charges that USAID vigorously denied. As USAID began shutting down its operations, the State Department decided to close its International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs office in Bolivia in December 2013 due to a lack of adequate cooperation from Bolivian authorities.\nAnother source of tension in the relationship has been the case of New York flooring contractor Jacob Ostreicher, who launched a rice farm in Bolivia in 2008. The Bolivian government arrested Mr. Ostreicher on suspicion of money laundering in June 2011, imprisoned him for 18 months in what was termed pre-trial detention, and then placed him under house arrest even though he was never formally charged with a crime. Several Bolivian officials in the Interior Ministry and Attorney General's Office reportedly were jailed for allegedly attempting to extort Ostreicher in exchange for his release. Corruption and inefficiency in Bolivia's judicial system has been identified as a serious human rights problem in the country. Congress held multiple hearings pushing for Mr. Ostreicher to be freed; he eventually escaped house arrest and returned to the United States in December 2013. The Bolivian government considered Mr. Ostreicher a fugitive. As the United States criticized Bolivia's handling of the Ostreicher case, Bolivia protested the U.S. government's 2012 denial of its request for former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, currently living in the United States, to be extradited to Bolivia to stand trial for civilian deaths that occurred when he ordered government security forces to respond to violent civilian protests in the fall of 2003.", "When Evo Morales took office, Bolivia was among the top recipients of U.S. aid in Latin America. However, assistance levels have been declining since FY2007. Bolivia received $122.1 million in U.S. assistance in FY2007, including $66 million in counternarcotics assistance for robust interdiction and alternative development programs. Other goals of U.S. assistance in Bolivia included promoting economic opportunities, particularly for indigenous groups; combating malaria and other illnesses while also strengthening and decentralizing healthcare provision; and providing support for justice reform and for regional and municipal governments. Since many of the regional governments were controlled by opposition parties, President Morales came to oppose USAID's regional and municipal government strengthening programs.\nAs a result of President Morales' decisions to expel the U.S. Ambassador, DEA, and USAID, U.S. assistance to Bolivia fell from $99.7 million in FY2008 to $5.2 million in FY2013 and to zero in FY2014. The FY2015 budget request does not include any funding for Bolivia. Although other donors, such as the European Union (EU), support development assistance, health, and alternative development programs in Bolivia, they have not traditionally provided the same types of surveillance and interdiction programs that the U.S. government supported through the State Department and DEA. The EU has recently begun to fund interdiction with the construction of a base in Yapacani, Santa Cruz, for Bolivian antidrug forces, as well as a program to improve Bolivian border controls.", "On September 13, 2013, President Obama identified Bolivia as a major drug producing country that had \"failed demonstrably\" to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements for the sixth consecutive year. The U.S. determination was made despite the fact that Bolivia reported eradicating over 10,000 hectares of coca in 2012 and that official U.S. estimates for coca cultivation and potential cocaine production in Bolivia showed decreases of 2% and 18%, respectively, for 2012 as compared to 2011.\nArguments used to justify the determination include Bolivia's reservation to the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (allowed by the U.N. in January 2013 but opposed by the United States) recognizing coca leaf chewing as legal in the country, Bolivia's failure to prevent coca produced for licit uses from being diverted into illicit markets, and its inability to convict individuals accused of drug trafficking. The U.S. determination was vigorously rejected by the Bolivian government.", "Bolivia is not a major U.S. trade partner; two-way trade totaled just over $2 billion in 2013. Bolivia's largest export by far is natural gas, with the bulk of that destined for neighboring Brazil and Argentina. Bolivian exports to the United States in 2013 consisted mainly of precious metals and stones followed by tin and related products. Although the United States is not Bolivia's primary export market, it does rank just behind Brazil and ahead of China as a source for Bolivian imports. In 2013, top Bolivian imports from the United States included heavy machinery, electronics, and vehicles.\nFrom 1991 through 2008, Bolivia received U.S. trade preferences under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; Title II of P.L. 102-182 ). The purpose of ATPA was to promote economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from dependence on illicit drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. ATPA encouraged some limited textile and jewelry production in Bolivia. As previously stated, Bolivia's ATPA benefits were suspended in 2008 due to its lack of counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. The effects of that suspension on the Bolivian economy as a whole have been small because exports under ATPA accounted for a small percentage of Bolivia's GDP. A majority of Bolivia's textile exports are now destined for Venezuela.", "Economists predict that Bolivia is likely to enjoy steady economic growth averaging roughly 4% in the coming years (2015-2018). Even if prices or demand for its commodity exports were to fall, neither of which is likely, Bolivia's significant reserves should cushion its economy from economic shocks. Economic growth and improving social indicators should enable President Morales and the MAS to continue dominating the Bolivian political system for the foreseeable future, despite periodic protests from disgruntled interest groups.\nWith presidential elections expected to be held in October, the Morales government is unlikely to make overtures to improve relations with the United States. At the same time, none of the issues that usually draw U.S. interest to particular Latin American countries—proximity, counternarcotics concerns, or trade—are particularly salient with Bolivia. Bolivia is a landlocked country in South America that supplies only 1% of U.S. cocaine and whose primary trade partner is Brazil. And, although Bolivia is a member of the nine-member Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA), it does not possess the same ambitions to serve as a regional counterweight to the United States as Venezuela.\nNevertheless, there is always a chance that President Morales could change his mind regarding a desire to improve relations with the United States and eventually exchange Ambassadors. He reportedly expressed a willingness to do so within an environment of \"mutual respect\" during a meeting with a recent U.S. Senate delegation to Bolivia. It remains to be seen what type of conditions either government might place on efforts to improve relations." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "h1_full", "h0_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "How has Bolivia's political and economic situation changed in the last decade?", "How have Morales and his party changed the orientation of Bolivia?", "What effect does coca growing have on Bolivia?", "What is the nature of U.S. interest in Bolivia?", "How has Bolivia enacted counternarcotics efforts?", "What support did the U.S. provide?", "How has President Morales' policies affected foreign relations?", "How have US relations been strained with Bolivia?", "How have US and Bolivia's relationship changed due to the strain?", "What legal changes have been made to the US-Bolivia relationship?" ], "summary": [ "In the last decade, Bolivia has transformed from a country plagued by political volatility and economic instability that was closely aligned with the United States to a relatively stable country with a growing economy that now has strained relations with the U.S. government. Since 2006, Bolivia has enjoyed a period of relative political stability and steady economic growth during the two presidential terms of populist President Evo Morales, the country's first indigenous leader and head of the country's coca growers' union.", "Buoyed by a booming natural gas industry, Morales and his party, the leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, have decriminalized coca cultivation, increased state control over the economy, expanded social programs, and enacted a new constitution favoring the rights of indigenous peoples.", "Located in the Andean region of South America, Bolivia, like Peru and Colombia, has been a major producer of coca leaf, the main ingredient in the production of cocaine.", "U.S. interest in Bolivia has traditionally centered on counternarcotics, trade, and development matters.", "From the late 1980s through the mid-2000s, successive Bolivian governments, with financial and technical assistance from the United States, tried various strategies to combat illicit coca production, including forced eradication.", "In support of Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance, and has forgiven all of Bolivia's debt for development assistance projects and most of the debt for food assistance. From 1991 through November 2008, Bolivia also received U.S. trade preferences in exchange for its counternarcotics cooperation under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; Title II of P.L. 102-182). Bolivia also received U.S. development, democracy, and health assistance provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1961 through 2013.", "Although President Morales' policies have proven popular with his supporters, they have worried foreign investors and strained U.S. relations, particularly in the realm of drug control.", "With an antagonistic foreign policy closely aligned with that of Venezuela, Bolivian-U.S. relations have been more tense during the Morales Administrations than they have been in decades.", "Despite significant strains in the bilateral relationship, the two countries have not formally severed diplomatic or consular relations, even though they have not exchanged Ambassadors since President Morales expelled the U.S. Ambassador in the fall of 2008.", "Due to actions taken by the Morales government (including the 2013 expulsion of USAID from the country) and a lack of counterdrug cooperation with the United States, Bolivia has lost U.S. trade preferences and no longer receives U.S. foreign aid." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
GAO_GAO-19-414	{ "title": [ "Background", "Government Procurement Markets and the Procurement Opportunities That Parties to the GPA and FTAs Have Reported Opening to Foreign Firms", "Two Types of Data Sources Used to Estimate Foreign Sourcing in Government Procurement", "Data from Government Procurement Databases on Contracts Awarded by Central Governments", "The USG Likely Procured More Than Twice as Much from the Other Six Main Parties to the GPA and NAFTA as Vice Versa, but Exact Comparisons Are Not Possible", "USG Contracts Valued at About $5 Billion Went to Firms Located in the Six Main Parties, out of About $12 Billion Awarded to All Foreign-Located Firms", "USG Awarded Less by Contract Value to U.S.- based Subsidiaries of Foreign-Owned Firms Than to Foreign-Owned, Foreign-Located Firms, Which Mainly Support DOD Operations Abroad", "Central Governments of the Other Six Main Parties Awarded Almost $2 Billion to U.S.-Located Firms or for U.S.-Made Products out of About $6.5 Billion in Foreign-Awarded Contracts", "While Available Contract Data Enable Broad Cross- Country Comparisons of Foreign Sourcing by Central Governments, They Allow Limited Assessment of Economic Implications", "Select Data Elements Available in Government Procurement Databases Allow for Broad Cross-Country Comparisons, but Not Precise Estimates", "Available Procurement Contract Data Allow Limited Assessment of the Economic Implications of Foreign Sourcing", "Foreign Sourcing Is a Minor Share of Government Procurement, and Our Analysis Did Not Find a Consistent Relationship with Coverage under the GPA and NAFTA", "Foreign Source Procurement by Central Governments Estimated from Country Databases Varied in Value from 2 to 19 Percent of Overall Central Government Procurement", "Foreign Source Procurement Estimated by an Alternative Method Shows Import Percentages by All Levels of Government Range from 7 to 18 Percent of All Government Purchases", "Available Contract Data Indicate Foreign Sourcing Is Not Always Greater for Contracts Covered by the GPA and NAFTA Than for Other Contracts", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology", "Analysis of Data on Contracts Awarded from Government Procurement Databases", "Analysis of Trade Data Linked to Data on the Goods and Services Purchased by the Public Sector", "Appendix II: Characteristics of Central Government Procurement Databases", "Appendix III: Additional Results Related to Foreign Sourcing by the U.S. Federal Government", "Appendix IV: Methodology for Addressing Missing Contract Award Values in the Tenders Electronic Daily Database", "European Union", "Norway", "Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "U.S. international trade agreements that cover USG procurement include the GPA and bilateral and regional FTAs. The revised GPA has 20 parties (including the EU) covering 48 WTO member countries (including the 28 EU member countries). Another 33 WTO members are observers; of these, 10 are in the process of acceding to the agreement. In addition to the GPA, the United States has 14 FTAs with 20 countries, four of which (Canada, Israel, Singapore, and South Korea) are also parties to the GPA. Almost all of the FTAs to which the United States is a party include provisions covering government procurement.\nThe GPA aims to mutually open government procurement markets for goods, services, and construction services among its parties, according to the WTO. Under the GPA, foreign suppliers are able to compete alongside with U.S. suppliers for USG contracts covered by the agreement, and U.S. suppliers are able to compete for covered foreign government contracts in accordance with the framework established by the GPA. According to the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), to implement U.S. obligations under the international agreements that cover government procurement, the United States—generally (and not always) — waives preferential purchasing requirements for goods and suppliers from other countries that are parties to the agreements in covered procurements over a certain threshold. For example, USTR has waived the Buy American Act and other preferential provisions for eligible products in acquisitions covered by various trade agreements. However, Commerce officials noted that small business set-aside requirements are not waived nor are the provisions of the Berry Amendment.", "As part of our body of work on international government procurement, we have previously reported the following:\nThe U.S. and EU government procurement markets are comparable in size, and each is larger than those of all other GPA and U.S. FTA partner countries combined. Some other parties to the agreements also have large government procurement markets, including Japan, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, and Norway.\nThe government procurement chapters of the GPA and selected U.S.\nFTAs that we reviewed generally have similarities in text and commitments, possibly because key parties negotiated multiple agreements concurrently. However, the revised GPA generally provides more comprehensive market access than the selected FTAs we reviewed.\nThe United States reported opening more procurement opportunities covered by the GPA to foreign firms than had other parties to the agreement. Data for 2010 showed that the United States reported $837 billion in GPA covered procurement. This amount is about twice as large as the approximately $381 billion reported by the next five largest GPA parties combined—the EU, Japan, South Korea, Norway, and Canada—even though total U.S. procurement is less than that of the other five parties combined.\nPreviously, we reported on the opportunities available to U.S. and foreign firms seeking to compete for covered government procurement contracts in the countries that are parties to the agreements. In the current report, we analyze the value and number of actual contract awards, reported in procurement databases, including contracts covered under the GPA and NAFTA and those not covered. Covered contracts can be awarded to domestic firms, to firms from countries that are parties to the GPA and U.S. FTAs, or to other non-U.S. firms. Additionally, the Buy American Act does not apply to products that are purchased for use outside the United States, nor to the acquisition of services. Therefore, such contracts can be awarded without the application of Buy American Act domestic preference conditions to bids from any firm, including firms from non-GPA and non-FTA countries.", "To estimate foreign source procurement, we looked for information about where the goods and services that governments purchase are produced and the characteristics of the firms supplying those goods and services. We identified two types of primary data sources that could be analyzed to estimate foreign sourcing in government procurement: (1) government procurement databases to estimate direct cross-border central government procurement and (2) input-output tables merged with international trade data to estimate total procurement by all levels of government and the portion comprising imported goods and services.", "Government procurement databases collect information on contracts awarded by government entities to firms supplying goods and services. Except for Japan, all the countries in our analysis maintain online government procurement databases that can serve as a primary data source to generate statistics on their foreign source central government procurement. The USG and the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA use these databases to report to the WTO their required procurement statistics under the GPA. While Japan does not have a government procurement database, Japan’s central government collects procurement data from various ministry sources and reports the aggregated data to the WTO. As table 1 shows, the U.S. Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) provides more data fields that can be used as proxies for measuring foreign source procurement than the non-U.S. databases provide. FPDS-NG contains data on four potential proxy measures of foreign sourcing—firm location, firm ownership, product and service origin, and place of performance. The database for the EU and Norway and the databases for Canada and Mexico all contain contract award data related to firm location. South Korea’s database and Japan’s WTO submission on its 2013 procurement contain data on source country of goods and services. Therefore, two data fields, one reflecting firm location and the other reflecting country of product and service origin, appear to provide reasonable proxy measures of foreign source procurement, although neither is available across all data sources. (For more information on the characteristics of each government procurement database, see app. II.)\nInformation about how much goods and services a country imports provides the basis for another approach to estimating what portion of all government procurement in that country is imported. The WIOD provides such information, giving us a second type of data and an alternative analytical approach for estimating foreign source government procurement. The WIOD links data on an economy’s supply chain interdependencies to data on its import and export flows, thus providing a proxy estimate of the share of imports in procurement by all levels of government. We based our method for analyzing linked input-output tables on an approach used by the European Commission which examines import penetration of government procurement within Europe.\nUnlike the contract data we analyzed from government procurement databases, the WIOD data capture procurement by all levels of government. However, the input-output tables are organized by industry, which requires a decision as to which industries make up the government sector in any given country’s economy. Some industries, like “public administration”, can safely be assumed to be part of the governmental sector in every country. Other industries, like education or health care, vary across countries in the degree to which they are part of the government sector, if at all.\nWhile this analytical method based on input-output tables can provide broad estimates of how much governments are purchasing imported goods and services, it relies on some important assumptions that may affect the reliability of the results. For example, it assumes that the goods and services purchased by all levels of government are imported to the same extent as they are when purchased by other industries in the same country. This assumption, known as the “proportionality assumption”, recognizes that results from this method may overestimate the share of imports in government procurement to the extent that the analysis does not capture attempts by the government sector to limit foreign sourcing in its procurement. On the other hand, other aspects of this method may underestimate the share of imports in government procurement. For example, the input-output data include intermediate inputs but do not include purchases for investment, such as some government assets because, according to the authors of the European Commission study, input-output tables do not have the data to distinguish between investments by the private and public sectors. Thus, the input-output data could exclude investment made through construction services like those purchased to build highways, schools, or other assets that have long-term use, services that are included in covered procurement under both the GPA and NAFTA.", "The value of U.S. government (USG) contracts awarded to firms located in the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA likely exceeds twice the estimated value of contracts from those parties to U.S. firms, but exact comparisons are not possible. The USG awarded contracts valued at about $12 billion to foreign-located firms in fiscal year 2015, of which less than half went to firms located in the other six main parties. Conversely, the government procurement data we analyzed indicated the central governments of these parties awarded almost $7 billion to foreign sources, of which less than a third were awarded to firms located in the United States or for goods or services from the United States. Over three- quarters of these U.S.-sourced contracts were awarded by Canada and Mexico. Only the USG’s procurement database contains data on firm ownership. Analyzing these data, we found that the USG awarded more, by reported contract value, to foreign-owned firms located abroad, than it awarded to U.S.-based subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms. This was mostly U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) contracts in support of the U.S. military presence in those countries. Overall, while available contract data enable broad cross-country comparisons, these data allow only limited insight into the effects on the U.S. economy of foreign sourcing of USG procurement. This is principally because the contract data do not capture the economic roles of firms awarded contracts and thus do not allow for a definitive assessment of the economic implications of foreign sourcing, as we discuss later in this report.", "In 2015 the USG awarded about 511,000 contracts valued at about $290.9 billion. Out of this total, about 47,000 contracts valued at about $12.1 billion were awarded to firms located outside the United States (as shown in the data by firm location). Similarly, the USG awarded about 50,000 contracts valued at about $16.5 billion for foreign goods and services (as shown by country of product and service origin). See table 2.\nOf the USG foreign source procurement awarded to firms in the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA, firms located in the EU received more than half in terms of contract value and slightly less than half by number. In 2015 the USG awarded about 10,000 contracts valued at about $5.3 billion to firms located in the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA (see table 2 above). This $5.3 billion is about 40 percent of the total value of USG contracts awarded to foreign-located firms. Firms located in the EU received almost 5,000 USG contracts valued at $2.8 billion. Firms located in Japan, South Korea, and Canada were awarded most of the remaining aggregate USG contract value ($1.1, $0.8, and $0.6 billion, respectively) and number of contracts (about 1,500, 600, and 2,900, respectively) awarded to firms in the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA. Firms located in Mexico and Norway received less than 1 percent of the aggregate USG contract value and number of contracts awarded to firms in the other six main parties.\nHowever, as table 2 also shows, the majority of foreign-sourced USG procurement, in terms of both value and number of contracts, went to firms located in countries that are not among the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA. Germany, Japan, and South Korea are among the top five countries whose firms received the most USG contract value in fiscal year 2015. However, countries in the Middle East, including Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, were also among the countries whose firms were main recipients of USG procurement in terms of aggregate contract value (see app. III for additional information on USG foreign source procurement by country).\nFinally, table 2 shows that FPDS-NG data are similar when we use, instead of firm location, the alternative measure of foreign sourcing based on country of product and service origin. For example, the aggregate value of contracts awarded by the USG for goods and services originating in countries of the other six main parties was about 43 percent of the overall value of USG foreign source procurement—the same proportion we found when using firm location as proxy measure of foreign sourcing. In addition, as with the results based on firm location, most of the USG’s foreign source procurement as measured by country of product and service origin went to countries outside the other six main parties to international procurement agreements.", "Foreign-located firms can be either foreign-owned or U.S.-owned, just as U.S.-located firms can be either foreign-owned or U.S.-owned. Among the government procurement databases we used, only the FPDS-NG includes data on firm ownership. Some research on foreign sourcing in government procurement differentiates between direct and indirect cross- border procurement based on knowledge about both the location and ownership of the successful bidder: In direct cross-border procurement, the successful bidder is both foreign-owned and foreign-located.\nIn indirect cross-border procurement, the successful bidder is a U.S.- based domestic subsidiary of a foreign-owned firm.\nAccording to a recent EU Commission study, between 2009 and 2015, the EU’s indirect cross-border government procurement was more than 5 times greater in terms of both value and number of contract awards than its direct cross-border government procurement. The study notes that indirect cross-border procurement is often high when direct cross-border procurement is low and suggests that may reflect actual or perceived barriers to cross-border bidding, which lead firms to rely on their locally based subsidiaries for cross-border sales. The study reported that indirect cross-border government procurement (foreign-owned, domestically located vendor) accounted for 21.9 percent of the number and 20.4 percent of the value of certain contract awards in the EU’s 28 countries, while direct cross-border government procurement (foreign-owned, foreign-located vendor) accounted for 1.7 percent of the number of contracts and 3 percent of contract value.\nIn contrast to the findings of that EU Commission study, our analysis of FPDS-NG data shows that indirect cross-border procurement by the USG was smaller in terms of total award value and number of contracts than direct cross-border procurement. This indicates that foreign firms selling to the USG generally do not establish a local presence in the United States. Specifically, foreign-owned firms located in the United States (indirect cross-border procurement) received contracts valued at about $3.6 billion, or less than 1 percent of the value of all USG contracts. By contrast, firms that were both foreign-owned and foreign-located (direct cross-border procurement) received contracts valued at about $11.8 billion, or about 4 percent of the value of all USG contracts ($290.9 billion). Therefore, USG direct cross-border procurement was about three times greater than indirect cross border procurement for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2015.\nA possible explanation for this finding could be that foreign-owned and foreign-located firms are awarded more USG contracts in terms of value and number than U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms because those contracts are covered by international procurement agreements. Foreign- owned and foreign-located firms are awarded more USG contracts because they may bid for large-value GPA covered USG contracts at a higher rate than their U.S.-located counterparts, or they may generally be more competitive for such contracts. However, for contracts not covered under the GPA and NAFTA, the relative difference between the two groups of foreign-owned firms becomes smaller in terms of aggregate contract value. Therefore, the difference between direct and indirect cross-border procurement is likely not due to agreement coverage as one might expect. To better understand why the USG’s direct cross-border procurement was larger than its indirect cross-border procurement, we further analyzed the FPDS-NG data on firm location, firm ownership, and place of performance—where the services were performed or where the goods were produced.\nBased on firm location, as stated earlier, foreign-located firms were awarded about $12.1 billion in USG contracts. Measured by aggregate contract value, almost all of the USG contracts awarded to those firms were performed abroad (i.e., outside the United States)—$11.9 out of $12.1 billion or 98 percent. USG contracts performed abroad are commonly awarded to U.S.-located as well as to foreign-located firms. In 2015, the USG awarded contracts performed abroad valued at about $23.3 billion, of which about half was awarded to U.S.-located firms.\nIn particular, as figure 1 suggests, while U.S.-located firms received contracts performed abroad valued at $11.4 billion, foreign-located firms were awarded USG contracts valued at $11.9 billion. Almost all of those USG contracts—$11.7 out of $11.9 billion or 98 percent—were awarded to firms that were foreign-owned as well as foreign-located (i.e., direct cross-border government procurement). The vast majority of the value of these USG contracts to foreign-owned, foreign-located firms was for DOD contracts performed abroad. In particular, DOD awarded about 84 percent of the value of USG contracts—$9.8 billion out of $11.7 billion— that were performed abroad and awarded to foreign-owned, foreign-located firms. The vast majority of those contracts ($7.5 billion or 77 percent) were covered under the GPA and NAFTA. (See app. III for a breakdown by agency of all USG contracts performed abroad and awarded in fiscal year 2015 to foreign-owned, foreign-located firms.)\nForeign-owned firms located in six countries received the majority (57 percent) of DOD’s $9.8 billion in aggregate award value of contracts performed abroad. Specifically, firms located in three countries in the Middle East—Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates— together received 28 percent of that award value; firms in Japan and South Korea together received 18 percent; and firms in Germany received 11 percent. About a quarter of DOD’s $9.8 billion in aggregate award value were for purchases of fuel, oil, lubricant, and wax. About 9 percent were for education and training services, and about 7 to 8 percent each were for construction of buildings and housekeeping services. For example, fuel was the main product procured by DOD in United Arab Emirates, while in Saudi Arabia most DOD procurement was for education and training services. (See app. III for a breakdown of DOD contracts performed abroad and awarded to foreign-owned and foreign- located firms, by country.)", "Our analysis of available procurement contract data from 2015 shows that the central governments of the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA, apart from the USG, awarded contracts valued at about $170.5 billion. About 4,000 out of a total of 245,000 of these contracts with an estimated total value of about $6.5 billion were awarded to foreign sources, that is, to foreign-located firms or for imported products and services. Some of these contracts awarded by the other six main parties were covered by the GPA and NAFTA, while others were not.\nFurthermore, the central governments of the other six main parties awarded about 2,000 U.S.-sourced contracts worth about $1.8 billion (see fig. 2). U.S.-sourced contracts are contracts awarded to U.S.-located firms or for products made in the United States. Canada and Mexico awarded most of the U.S.-sourced contracts. Specifically, central government contracts awarded to U.S.-located firms by Canada and Mexico accounted for almost 80 percent of the value and number of all U.S.-sourced contracts.\nOver 60 percent of the value and number of U.S.-sourced contracts awarded by the central governments of the other six main parties were for the procurement of goods. In particular, Canada awarded more than 20 times more in contract value to purchase goods than it did to purchase services from U.S.-located firms. However, for contracts covered under trade agreements, the other six main parties collectively awarded more U.S.-sourced contracts for services than for goods; these contracts were awarded primarily by the EU and Mexico. U.S.-located firms were awarded virtually no construction services contracts. This result is consistent with our findings for procurement flows among all countries among the other six main parties to GPA and NAFTA and may be explained by the proxy measure used—firm location, which accounts only for direct cross-border procurement. For example, the EU commission paper cited previously finds that for construction works the share of direct cross-border procurement in the total value of awards was 1.7 percent compared with 12.3 percent for indirect cross-border procurement.", "", "The data available from the government procurement databases we analyzed provide relevant and useful information for assessing foreign sourcing in government procurement, but these data do not allow for precise cross-country comparisons based on the GPA provisions on rules of origin. Data and reporting on country of origin for goods and services is limited for a number of reasons. Most of the databases we analyzed contain fields on contract award value and type of contract, as well as fields on firm location or country of product or service origin—proxy measures of foreign sourcing that, as we have found, allow for broad cross-country comparisons. However, precise estimates from the available data are not possible because no single internationally accepted definition exists to distinguish procured goods and services that are “foreign” from those that are “domestic” and the information in government procurement databases is not uniform. There is no agreed- upon definition of the country of origin for goods and services for statistical reporting purposes in the GPA even though a similar term— country of production—is used in the 1994 GPA’s general principles on nondiscrimination. Instead, the GPA generally expresses that a party shall apply the rules of origin that it applies in the normal course of trade when determining the country of origin for goods and services in covered procurement.\nAnother factor that limits cross-country comparisons of country of origin data by parties to the GPA is the recent revision to the GPA itself, which no longer requires the parties to provide country of origin statistics, as we previously reported. According to the 1994 GPA, parties were to provide statistics on the country of origin for products and services purchased by its entities, to the extent that such information is available. However, the revised GPA, which went into effect in 2014, does not require parties to report available information on the country of origin of purchased products or services. While all the GPA members included in our scope reported the amount of covered procurement to the WTO, only Japan (until 2013) reported statistics on the “nationality of the winning tenderer”. The WTO Committee on Government Procurement’s Work Programme on the Collection and Reporting of Statistical Data is currently examining the issues surrounding how countries define country of origin for the procurement of goods and services.\nFinally, while the United States collects a variety of relevant data on foreign sourcing, those data have certain limitations for cross-country comparisons since the data are collected for different purposes. While U.S. agencies collect country data on successful bidders and the country of origin of goods and services in response to the Buy American Act and report these in FPDS-NG, the agencies do not collect data on country of origin determinations in response to relevant provisions of the GPA or NAFTA. For example, the U.S. Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR), in implementing statutes including the Buy American Act, applies different tests to determine the country of origin of an end product and defines end products to include “domestic”, “foreign”, or “U.S.-made”. The test to determine country of origin for an end product under the Buy American Act is different from the test to determine country of origin in the procurement of an end product under trade agreements.\nAccording to the FAR, for manufactured products, the Buy American Act uses a two-part test to define a domestic end product: (1) the article must be manufactured in the United States, and (2) the cost of domestic components must exceed 50 percent of the cost of all the components. According to the FAR, for procurement under trade agreements, the test to determine “country of origin” is “substantial transformation”, (i.e., transforming an article into a new and different article of commerce, with a name, character, or use distinct from the original article). The substantial transformation test can also be used to determine whether a product is a U.S.-made end product. The FAR also defines a foreign end product as an end product other than a domestic end product. Therefore, under the FAR, contracting officers use different tests and different descriptors to designate country of origin. Since corresponding data fields for these descriptors are not available in FPDS-NG, the data do not allow for exact cross-country comparisons of foreign sourcing under the GPA and NAFTA.", "In all countries included in this report, available contract data do not allow for a definitive assessment of the economic implications of foreign sourcing in government procurement, such as impacts on wages and profits. As figure 3 shows, using the United States for illustrative purposes, foreign versus domestic sourcing in government procurement could be viewed in four different ways —firm location, firm ownership, product and service origin, and place of contract performance. For example, FPDS-NG data shows that a task order under a DOD contract for facilities support performed in Iraq reports the United Arab Emirates as the country of product and service origin for safety and rescue equipment, while also reporting the firm location and ownership as the United States. FPDS-NG data showed that another task order under the same contract, for housekeeping services, reports the place of performance as Kuwait but reports the United States as the country of product and service origin, the firm location, and the country of firm ownership. As another example from FPDS-NG data, a contract awarded by the U.S. Agency for International Development for internet services performed in Malawi and awarded to a foreign-owned business reports the United States as the country of service origin but the United Kingdom as the firm location. Each of the various different ways relevant to the sourcing of USG contracts can be viewed on a continuum based on the extent of foreign involvement associated with the production and service delivery processes.\nCountry of firm location. As found in the procurement databases, suppliers can be located, for example, domestically in the United States or abroad. However, the economic effects related to the country of firm location depend on what is produced in the country relative to what is produced elsewhere. For example, the supplier may be an end product manufacturer doing less skill-intensive assembly and packaging, a high technology and skill-intensive manufacturing firm that substantially transforms a product that is subsequently used as an input in the production process, or a broker providing unskilled labor for product distribution. In each of these examples, the country of firm location could experience different economic effects from the awarded contract.\nCountry of firm ownership. Suppliers could be domestically or foreign owned, and who owns the firm determines who accrues the firm’s profits. However, determining ownership is challenging because a supplier awarded a contract may have various ownership structures. For example, the supplier may be a sole proprietor or a corporation with shareholdings, subsidiaries, ultimate owners, or may be a participant in a corporate group. The supplier may have established a presence in the United States through a foreign-owned subsidiary or may participate in a partnership such as a joint venture with a U.S. firm.\nCountry of product or service origin. Goods and services purchased under government procurement contracts may be domestically produced or imported. In this case, the effects can be analyzed in the same way as trade flows in general. However, the country of product or service origin is more challenging to determine for government procurement contracts compared with general trade in goods and services, since government contracts typically cover more than one good or service. Therefore, the country of origin for certain goods included in a contract may be different from the country of origin for other goods under the same contract.\nCountry of contract performance. USG contracts can be executed within the United States or outside the United States. For example, the country of contract performance may determine where the service is delivered as opposed to the location or ownership of the firm that delivers the service. The place of performance may lead to benefits and costs accruing to the location where the contract is performed. For example, if a service is delivered or the products are produced outside the United States, the contract likely employs local labor and therefore benefits the local labor market.\nBecause available data in government procurement databases do not specify the supplier firm’s economic role, the economic effects of the awarded contract remain uncertain. The potential effects of the awarded contract on other firms, workers, the government, or consumers in the domestic and foreign economies may vary depending on the supplier firm’s economic role.", "We estimate that foreign sourcing is generally a small share of government procurement for the United States and the other six parties to the GPA and NAFTA. Foreign sourcing by the USG and the other parties’ central governments, estimated by government procurement databases, varied in value from about 2 to 19 percent of overall central government procurement. Foreign sourcing by all levels of government, estimated by data on trade and public sector purchases by the United States and the other six main parties, shows that government imports ranged from about 7 to 18 percent of the goods and services purchased by these countries’ governments. In addition, our analysis of central government contract data found that foreign sourcing is sometimes but not always greater, in terms of value and number of contracts, for contracts covered by procurement agreements than for contracts not covered by those agreements.", "Our analysis of available data on firm location from government procurement databases shows that foreign sourcing in 2015 ranged in value from 2 to 19 percent of overall central government procurement (see fig. 4). The central governments of the EU, Mexico, and the United States awarded less than 5 percent of the aggregate value of their procurement contracts to foreign-located firms. The proportions for Canada and Norway were about 11 and 19 percent, respectively. Both Canada and Norway can be characterized as small, open economies bordering much larger, open trading partners, which may contribute to their relatively larger shares of foreign sourcing in central government procurement. Canada’s central government awarded about 10 percent of the value of all its contracts to firms located in the United States. Similarly, Norway’s central government awarded about 19 percent of the value of all its contracts to firms located in the EU.\nOur analysis of available data on country of product and service origin shows that Japan procured less from foreign sources (2 percent) than both the United States (6 percent) and South Korea (3 percent). See figure 5.\nWe obtained similar results in terms of number of foreign-sourced contracts. Less than 5 percent of the number of central government contracts was sourced from abroad in the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Mexico. For the United States, Norway, and Canada, the numbers of foreign-sourced contracts based on firm location comprise higher percentages (9, 8, and 13 percent, respectively). Canada’s central government awarded about 9 percent of the total number of contracts it awarded to firms located in the United States. Similarly, Norway’s central government awarded about 7 percent of the total number of contracts it awarded to firms located in the EU.\nExcept for the United States, most of the central governments of the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA awarded few construction services contracts to foreign-located firms. One possible explanation is that, given the higher dollar value threshold of contracts in this sector, foreign-owned firms may have a greater incentive to establish a local presence through subsidiaries in the host countries. The data in the non- U.S. databases do not provide enough information to explore that hypothesis. However, FPDS-NG data show that construction services contracts are the main contract type awarded to foreign-located firms by the USG, which awarded about 3,090 construction services contracts worth $1.8 billion (or about 20 percent and 8 percent of all construction services contracts, respectively) to foreign-located firms. Less than 1 percent of these contracts’ award value was for contracts performed in the United States and over 70 percent of these contracts’ award value was for contracts covered by the GPA and NAFTA.\nIn addition, the USG awarded a roughly equal share (about 4 percent of all contracts in terms of value) of goods and services contracts to the other six parties to the GPA and NAFTA. Canada, on the other hand, awarded a relatively large percentage of the value of all goods contracts (30 percent) to firms located abroad.", "We also assessed the degree of foreign sourcing in terms of government import percentages to identify patterns in government procurement that may differ from those based on the location of the supplier and origin of goods and services. Using linked input-output tables and an alternative analytical approach, we were able to broadly estimate the domestic and foreign sources of inputs to the government sector for the United States and the six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA. This alternative approach to estimating foreign source government procurement is based on macroeconomic data on trade flows of goods and services between countries and the types of goods and services purchased by the public sector. Unlike the approach above based on government procurement contract data, this approach allows us to calculate broad estimates of domestic and foreign sourcing in procurement by all levels of government—central, state, and local.\nTable 3 shows our broad estimates based on a narrow definition of the government sector, which includes only “public administration”. In the table, the columns are the purchasing countries or the EU. The rows indicate where the goods or services are being purchased from. As the table shows, for all the countries and the EU, foreign sourcing generally accounts for a small portion of all governmental purchases. For example:\nOut of the estimated $1.2 trillion that the central, state, and local governments in the United States purchased, $100 billion was imported from outside the United States—a total foreign source percentage of about 9 percent, including $26 billion (2 percent) from the EU.\nOut of the $460 billion that the EU governments at every level purchased, $36 billion was imported from outside the EU—a total foreign source percentage of about 8 percent, including $10 billion (2 percent) from the United States.\nOut of the $178 billion that governments in Japan purchased, $12 billion was imported from outside Japan—a total foreign source percentage of about 7 percent.\nIn general, the smaller economies in terms of government purchases— Canada, South Korea, Mexico, and Norway—imported a relatively larger percentage of such purchases than the United States, EU, and Japan. Specifically, Canada, South Korea, and Norway imported about 9 to 13 percent of their governments’ purchases. Mexico imported a notably large share of about 18 percent. Of the estimated $24 billion in purchases by Mexico’s government sector, about 6 percent was from the United States and about 3 percent from the EU. This inverse relationship between the size of an economy and the relative percentage import share of government purchases has been noted by others that have used the input-output methodology.\nBasing estimates of foreign source government procurement on the narrow definition of the government sector may not be as appropriate in countries where the government plays a large role in various additional sectors. Figure 6 shows the size of the government sector under the narrow definition as well as two broader definitions which add additional industries. The “typical definition” as defined in the EU study also includes the education and health care sectors. The “broad definition” also includes a portion of the energy and the telecommunications sectors. The relative sizes of the parties change under the different definitions, as shown in the figure. For example, while the EU government sector is less than half the size of the U.S. government sector under the narrow definition ($460 billion for the EU compared with $1,159 billion for the United States), under the broad definition they are comparable in size ($2.4 trillion for the EU and $2.6 trillion for the United States).\nFigure 7 shows the estimated percentages of each country’s and the EU’s government sector purchases that are imported under the narrow, typical, and broad definitions as described above. Under all three definitions, the United States and EU have some of the smallest percentages of imported government purchases, between 8 and 10 percent. Mexico has one of the largest percentages, between 17 and 22 percent. Canada and Norway are in the middle, from about 12 to 16 percent. For South Korea and Japan, the estimated percentages of government sector purchases that are imported increased under the broad definition—from 7 percent to 17 percent for Japan, and from 9 percent to 22 percent for South Korea.", "Our analysis of 2015 data from central government procurement databases finds evidence that foreign sourcing was sometimes, but not always, greater for contracts covered by the GPA and NAFTA than for contracts not covered by those agreements. Given the goals promoted by the GPA and NAFTA, one might expect that procurement covered by such agreements would likely result in a higher number or larger aggregate value of contracts awarded to foreign-located firms or for the purchase of foreign goods and services. For the United States and two of the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA—Mexico and South Korea—the results bore out that expectation: for all three, more central government foreign sourcing in terms of contract value occurred when procurement was covered by the agreements. However, our analysis also shows that for two other parties, Canada and Norway, the opposite was true; for the remaining two parties, the EU and Japan, we found little difference or could not calculate an estimate. Our previous work showed that only about a third of the estimated average annual government procurement at all levels of government from 2008 through 2012 was covered by the GPA and NAFTA ($1.5 out of $4.4 trillion).\nThe available data from the government procurement databases that we analyzed show that the USG and the central governments of Mexico and South Korea awarded at least twice as much to foreign sources for contracts covered by international agreements—ranging from 2 to 6 percent of the value of covered contracts compared with less than 1 to 2 percent for non-covered contracts (see table 4). In particular, for contracts awarded by the USG, foreign-located firms received more than twice the value of covered compared with non-covered contracts—about $8.8 billion compared to $3.4 billion, respectively. Results for the USG are similar when looking at the amount of foreign source procurement based on product and service origin. Conversely, U.S.-located firms were awarded a higher aggregate value of non-covered contracts from the USG, compared with covered contracts. (See table 4.)\nFor Canada and Norway, more central government foreign sourcing in terms of contract value occurred when procurement was not covered by trade agreements than when it was. For covered contracts, Canada’s central government awarded 1 percent of the value of all contracts to foreign-located firms compared with 10 percent of the value for non- covered contracts. Similarly, Norway awarded foreign-located firms more than 5 times more in non-covered than covered contracts as measured by aggregate contract value.\nFor the EU and Japan, data on the value of foreign sourced contracts and their agreement coverage are either not available or incomplete. The available EU data have a significant number of foreign unclassified contracts and do not include contracts below the GPA threshold values, which limits the reliability of any comparison for covered versus non- covered contracts. In addition, Japan’s 2015 GPA submission of 2013 procurement data did not report on the amount of foreign source procurement broken out by covered and non-covered contracts, because, according to Japanese officials, this is not a GPA statistical reporting requirement. Therefore, we could not calculate a similar comparison of the value of covered versus non-covered procurement for Japan.\nFinally, with regard to the number of contracts awarded, our analysis of available data from country databases does not show a consistent relationship with international procurement agreement covered awards to foreign-located firms or for foreign-sourced goods or services. In South Korea and the United States, the number of contracts not covered by trade agreements and awarded for foreign sourced products was greater compared with covered contracts. Conversely, in Canada, EU, Mexico, and Norway, the number and share of contracts covered by trade agreements and awarded to foreign-located firms was greater compared with non-covered contracts. In percentage terms, foreign-located firms received the same share (9 percent) of covered and non-covered contracts awarded by the USG.", "We provided a draft of this product to USTR, Commerce, OMB, and GSA for comment. Commerce provided technical comments on this report, which we incorporated, as appropriate. USTR, OMB, and GSA did not comment on our draft report.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8612 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.", "This report examines the extent of foreign sourcing in government procurement by the United States and the other six main parties to selected international procurement agreements. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), the other main parties, besides the United States, are the European Union (EU), Japan, Canada, South Korea, and Norway. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the other main parties are Mexico and Canada. The report (1) provides alternative broad estimates of foreign sourcing by the U.S. government (USG) and the central governments of the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA, and (2) assesses foreign sourcing as a share of estimated central government procurement and of estimated procurement by all levels of government, and the extent to which central government contracts that are covered under the GPA and NAFTA are foreign-sourced.\nWe analyzed data from two types of sources: (1) government procurement databases in Canada, the EU, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, and the United States, for 2015, and (2) 2014 trade data merged with data on the types of goods and services purchased by the public sector. Since Japan does not have a national procurement database, data for Japan were based on its WTO GPA submission for 2013, which is the last submission that contains information on its foreign sourcing in government procurement. We also interviewed cognizant government officials in Washington, D.C.; Ottawa, Canada; Mexico City, Mexico; Seoul, South Korea; and Tokyo, Japan, and reviewed available research literature to identify potential methods, sources, and data limitations. We also interviewed government officials at the EU mission in Washington, D.C. and exchanged information with officials knowledgeable of the EU government procurement database.", "We collected and analyzed data from the following five databases: for the United States, the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG); for the EU and Norway, Tenders Electronic Daily (TED); for Canada, Contract History; for Mexico, the Government of Mexico e-Procurement System CompraNet; and for South Korea, the South Korea ON-line E-Procurement System (KONEPS).\nSeveral of these government procurement databases included data on procurement at all levels of government—national, state, and local— while others did not. Therefore, we limited our analysis to data on central government procurement. For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of each database, see appendix II.\nTo identify data fields that could be reasonably compared across databases, we followed a number of methodological steps: First, we looked for fields that capture the total award value of the contract at the time of award (2015); the type of contract in terms of goods, services, and construction services; the contract award date; the contract duration; and the type of tendering procedure. We took into account the following considerations:\nUnits of analysis. We established appropriate units of analysis across databases. Several databases contained a number of fields that were potentially relevant to our work. Specifically, in FPDS-NG the unit of analysis is the contract award. The database contains data at the contract action level (contracts, task orders, and their modifications). We used contract awards for the number of reported contracts, but for certain data on indefinite delivery vehicles (IDVs) such as government-wide acquisition contracts, indefinite delivery contracts, and blanket purchase agreements, we relied on data for task orders awarded in fiscal years 2015 through July 2018 (see discussion of contract valuation and multiple-year, multiple-award contracts below) because they contained information on place of performance, country of product and service origin, and place of manufacture, which were the relevant fields for foreign sourcing. The TED database contains information on contract notices, contract award notices, and contract awards above certain thresholds set by relevant EU legislation. While the EU and Norway use contract award notices to estimate the value of covered procurement in their GPA statistical notifications, we used contract awards because they allowed us to estimate actual foreign sourcing. The databases for Canada, Mexico, and South Korea contain a contract identifier, which is the sole and unique unit of analysis that is available.\nContract valuation. We established comparable fields across databases that represented the estimated maximum total value of a procurement awarded in 2015 over its entire duration. For FPDS-NG, we developed a methodology that is consistent with the methodology laid out in the revised GPA and avoids the inconsistencies of the revised U.S. methodology, which we previously reported. In particular, in October 2015, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) notified the WTO that the United States had revised its methodology for preparing GPA statistical reports on U.S. federal procurement. To more precisely reflect the value of the federal procurement market at the time of each report, the revised methodology presented the total amounts obligated under GPA covered contracts over a 6-year period—that is, the year the contract was awarded plus 5 years after the award. As we previously reported, the revised methodology has both advantages and disadvantages. It improves the accuracy of reporting but introduces a 6-year delay, whereas the revised GPA requires reporting within 2 years of the end of the reporting period. In addition, the revised valuation methodology is not consistent with the one used by other countries and creates an internal inconsistency: In measuring actual obligations for procurement contracts rather than the value at the time of award, the revised U.S. methodology is inconsistent with the methodology used by other large GPA members, such as the EU, Norway, Canada, and Mexico, which report contract values at the time of award rather than actual obligations or expenditures.\nThe United States continues to report the number of covered contracts to the WTO based on their award value, which leads to an inconsistency between the reported numbers and values of reported U.S. government procurement contracts. The contracts comprising the reported value of covered procurement are determined at a later time under the revised methodology and can result in a different set of contracts being used to determine the reported value.\nOur current methodology uses base and all options value for all contracts awarded in fiscal year 2015 unless the contract was an IDV. For IDVs we used the base and all options value of task orders awarded in fiscal years 2015 through July 2018 under those IDVs to avoid overestimating the total value. We used the aggregate base and all options value for task orders under those contracts because the alternative—using the base and all options value on the base IDVs—is inflated due to problematic data entries for multiple awards. As a result, our methodology produces an estimate that is consistent with methods used by other parties, internally consistent, and in accordance with the methodology for valuation in the revised GPA. As we noted earlier, the result is close to the obligations value currently reported in the Trade Agreements Report used by USTR to report to the WTO.\nIn TED, we used the contact award value field, because it captures the appropriate measure and according to EU documentation was corrected for errors in the data. For the EU and Norway, we found that for above-threshold procurement approximately 15 percent and 12 percent of the contract award values were missing, respectively. We took additional steps to address these missing values to generate estimates of the total contract award values. Specifically, we implemented a Predictive Mean Matching (PMM) multiple imputation methodology for the EU and used post-stratification estimation techniques for Norway. (See app. IV for more details on both methods.) However, we excluded the value of below-threshold procurement for the EU and Norway because it is reported on voluntary basis and suffers from missing and implausible values. In particular, for the EU, about 42 percent of the contract award values below threshold are missing and another 10 percent are below €1,000. For Norway, 80 percent of the contract award values below threshold are missing. Nevertheless, as a robustness check of the results from our analysis, we applied our imputation methodology discussed in appendix IV to the entire TED dataset and found that once those values are estimated, the amount of procurement awarded by the EU to U.S.- located firms increases by less than 10 percent. However, we do not consider the estimate sufficiently reliable to be included in our aggregate analysis.\nIn Contract History, we used the contract value field because, according to Canadian officials, it includes the original total value of the contract at the time of the award. In addition, those officials noted that this field was used by Canada in its reporting of covered procurement for its WTO statistical notifications. In CompraNet, we used the contract amount field since, according to Mexican officials, this field reflects the total value of the contract award. In KONEPS, we used the total awarded value field, since it was the only field available for our analysis and contained the value awarded for a given year (see adjustments we made for multiple-year contracts below).\nCurrency denomination. We converted contract values reported in different currencies in the databases into dollars using the period average exchange rate for 2015 as provided by the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.\nContract modifications or amendments. Since we defined the value of the award at the time of award, we selected contracts awarded in 2015 and excluded any subsequent modifications or amendments in all the databases.\nContract types. We used the product and service classifications that each database used to group contracts by type. Different databases used different classification schemes, and we did not independently reclassify any contracts to a uniform classification system, since such a system does not exist and a concordance among all schemes is not possible. In FPDS-NG, we used the U.S. product and service codes to classify federal government contracts in product groups and categorized reported procurement as either goods, services, or construction services. In TED, we used the type of contract field, which categorized reported procurement as supplies, services, and works based on the EU common procurement vocabulary in TED. In Contract History, we used the grouping of goods, services, and construction, which Canadian officials provided to us based on the global shipment identification number codes and description in the database. In CompraNet, we used the type of contract field, which indicates if the contract is for goods, services, or public works. In KONEPS, the data on foreign procurement included goods only, and no classification scheme was available for foreign procurement contracts.\nMultiple-year, multiple-award contracts. Some countries’ procurement practices include contracts awarded for multiple years, and we accounted for the valuation of those contracts by estimating their total cumulative value over multiple years at the time of award in 2015. In FPDS-NG, we accounted for the value of multiple-award contracts by using the base and all options value of task orders awarded in fiscal years 2015 through 2018 for IDVs initially awarded in fiscal year 2015. In TED, available documents noted that member states can use alternative multiple-year tools such as framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems for a certain time period or for repeat purchases, respectively. While the indicator field for these data in TED was not sufficiently populated for further analysis of those types of contracts, the contract valuation field we used had already accounted for the total value of the contract, and thus no further adjustment was warranted. Officials in Canada provided data on multiple-year contracts, including call-ups and standing offers. However, since the contract value field we used accounted for the total value of the contract, no further adjustment was needed. For Mexico, CompraNet contains information on framework agreements and multiple-year contracts, but since the contract value field indicated the total value of the contract award, no adjustment was needed. South Korea also uses multiple-year contracts, and we made several adjustments to estimate South Korea’s total value of 2015 awards. We identified multiple-year contracts in KONEPS in 2015; based on solicitation numbers, we then removed the value of contracts originally awarded in prior years, while adding the value of multiple year contracts with solicitations in 2015 and awards in 2016 and 2017.\nType of tendering procedure. In all databases we included in our analysis contracts under open and limited tendering procedures.\nSecond, we identified data fields among the five databases that could potentially be used as proxy measures of foreign sourcing in government procurement: contractor data related to firm location contractor data related to firm ownership data on country of product and service origin However, we did not identify a data field common to all five databases that could be used as a proxy measure of foreign sourcing. FPDS-NG contained data on all four measures listed above. TED, CompraNet, and Contract History contained contractor data related to firm location. KONEPS and Japan’s WTO submission on its 2013 procurement contained data on country of product and service origin. Therefore, two data fields—firm location and country of product and service origin—were available in two groups of countries as reasonable proxy measures of foreign source procurement.\nFinally, we analyzed the contract data from the government procurement databases by GPA coverage. Some databases contain a field for GPA coverage, the data for which we deemed to be reliable for our purposes; for the databases that did not, we developed a proxy measure for GPA coverage. FPDS-NG contains a field on trade agreement coverage, but we found it to be unreliable as reported in previous work; therefore, we constructed a method to identify GPA covered procurement using an approach that USTR confirmed is consistent with the steps applied by the USG in developing its GPA statistical notifications. TED contains an identifier for GPA covered procurement, and we used this field to estimate GPA covered procurement for Norway and the EU after taking steps to address missing values for this identifier using other information in the dataset. Contract History contains a field that lists all internal and international agreements applicable to a contract in Canada. Therefore, covered procurement includes all contracts covered under the GPA, NAFTA, and other Canadian international procurement agreements. For Mexico, CompraNet contains a data field on type of procedure, which indicates the eligible firms that can bid on a contract. The data in this field indicate that the contract is (1) open to national firms only; or (2) international procurement under trade agreements, that is, open to both national (Mexican) firms and foreign firms from FTA partner countries; or (3) international procurement open to national firms, foreign firms from FTA partners, and all other foreign bidders. We treated international procurement in CompraNet as a proxy for GPA covered procurement. We grouped all contracts awarded in 2015 into two categories: non-covered procurement, which includes contracts open to national firms only, and covered procurement, which includes contracts open to foreign bidders (i.e. all contracts in categories 2 and 3 described above). KONEPS does not have a data field that specifically identifies covered procurement. Therefore, we defined a proxy for covered procurement as procurement above the revised GPA thresholds by covered entities. However, we were unable to make an adjustment for goods and services excluded from the agreement, since KONEPS does not classify foreign procurement by product service codes.\nTo analyze the extent to which central government contracts that are covered under the GPA and NAFTA are foreign-sourced, we compared the proportion of foreign-sourced award values for contracts covered under the GPA and NAFTA to the same proportion of foreign-sourced contracts, which are not covered by those agreements. Our analysis describing the relationships between trade agreement coverage and procurement award values did not account for additional factors and was limited due to the data available. As we previously reported, the countries within our scope represent over 90 percent of the GPA countries’ total government procurement. Moreover, we previously performed consistency checks across time periods for these countries and determined that covered procurement out of total central government procurement appeared relatively stable over time. However, a more robust test of the relationship between foreign sourcing and selected international agreement coverage would use a larger cross-section of data over time and control for factors such as types of goods and services procured, size of the economy, type of tendering procedure, and other specific details of each agreement, among others.\nTo determine whether the procurement contract data from the five databases were reliable for our purposes, we identified in relevant countries the appropriate data sources used to prepare the countries’ and the EU’s submissions of statistical notifications to WTO and other government procurement reports. To ensure consistency between our methods for estimating foreign sourcing with the methods used by the countries and the EU in their estimates of covered procurement for their GPA statistical notifications, we discussed with government officials in Canada, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea their process and data used to create their statistical notifications and other WTO reports, and we took steps to replicate existing report totals of EU covered procurement. We performed a sensitivity check for the U.S. data in FPDS-NG, where more than one relevant data field was available, to determine whether the definitional differences in the data fields were likely to materially affect our results about foreign sourcing. The results were similar across all six fields that could be used as alternative proxy measures of foreign source procurement in FPDS-NG data (see app. III, tables 11 and 12).\nIn addition, we conducted electronic tests of all five procurement databases to identify whether the data were complete and internally consistent. We determined that the country procurement databases were sufficiently complete and internally consistent after taking the additional steps for the EU and Norway as described earlier, related to missing contract award values (see app. IV). We also shared our analyses of the data with cognizant officials from the corresponding countries who were willing to verify our methodology and replicate our analysis. Procurement and trade officials and researchers in Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Japan answered our questions relevant to data quality including data collection, cross checks of data entries, access controls, internal reviews, primary users, completeness and updates to the data, missing values, reporting mistakes, electronic safeguards and procedures for follow-up if errors are found. In Canada and Mexico officials replicated and confirmed our methodology and results. Results for South Korea and Japan were consistent with alternative available official publications.\nThe various limitations in the procurement contract data that we identified and addressed, to the extent possible, affected our ability to obtain precise estimates of foreign sourcing in government procurement, but they were not an impediment to using the data for broad comparisons of orders of magnitude. Such comparisons include the amount of foreign sourcing, measured using firm location and country of product and service origin, by the USG and central governments of the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA. The data also allowed broad comparisons of bilateral procurement flows among the parties, as well as comparisons by type of contract and agreement coverage, as available, for the seven parties to the GPA and NAFTA within our scope.", "To obtain information on the aggregate levels and percentages of procurement by all levels of government that are imported, we relied on input-output tables from the World Input Output Database (WIOD) for 2014. The input-output tables have an industry by industry format, with each country’s industries listed separately. The data in each table are derived from publically available data from both national statistics agencies and international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. We relied on the WIOD to ensure that the combined data from different countries was collected to be consistent. These data do not allow for distinctions between different levels of government.\nTo assess the reliability of estimates based on the WIOD data, we first reviewed available documentation for the database. In cases where we had questions, we received written responses from WIOD officials. In addition, we compared estimates based on the WIOD to estimates based on other databases and found similar results. In general, we found that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.\nTo estimate the level and percent of procurement from the database, we took the following steps. First, we identified the industries associated with the governmental sector. Then, for that industry (or combination of industries), we obtained both the total level of purchases (or inputs), and the inputs that came from within that country, or other countries of interest. To obtain an estimate for the EU, we combined the purchases over the 28 member countries then in the EU. In general, we followed a procedure outlined in a 2017 paper produced by the European Commission. In this paper, the authors describe how input-output tables can be used to measure cross-border penetration in public sector procurement.\nAn essential step in our method is defining which industries make up the government sector. Moreover, because the composition of the government sector and the patterns of government purchases vary by country, different measures of the government sector are more appropriate for different countries—since what goods and services the government provides or performs affects what it procures from the private sector. For example, for the EU, the government funds the majority of services in the area of public administration, defense, social security, education, and health care. In contrast, the USG funds a smaller share of health care services.\nWe followed the model laid out in the European Commission paper and defined the government sector in three ways: 1. Narrowly Defined – (O84) Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 2. Typically Defined – (O84) Public administration and defense; compulsory social security (Q) Human health and social work activities 3. Broadly Defined – (O84) Public administration and defense; compulsory social security (Q) Human health and social work activities (D35) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (E36) Water collection, treatment and supply (E37-E39) Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery; remediation activities and other waste management services (1/3) * (H49) Land transport and transport via pipelines (1/2) * (H53) Postal and courier activities (1/2) * (J61) Telecommunications However, our procedure deviated from the European Commission report with regard to an additional category of expenditure in the report, final consumption by government. As in our prior reports, we did not include this category. This category includes both spending on social benefits, health care, and education as well as spending on collective items such as defense. We did not include this category in prior reports partly due to data reliability concerns about consistency in measurement of spending on social benefits across countries. However, if we had included it, that would have caused our estimates of import penetration to be smaller, because the WIOD tables do not include any cross-border expenditures for this category. For example, the percentage for the United States would have changed from about 8 percent to about 4 percent.\nTo construct consistent data from different countries over time, certain assumptions were made by the WIOD. An assumption that has important implications for our analysis is known as a “proportionality assumption,” which is typical in the construction of input-output tables. This assumption requires that the percentage of a product that is imported is constant across all industries. In the example provided by the WIOD: “If 20 percent of Czech absorption of electronics is sourced from Germany, then 20 percent of any Czech final or intermediate use of electronics is assumed to originate from Germany.” The WIOD has attempted to improve on the proportionality assumption by making it at a more disaggregated level, but according to the WIOD, the proportionality assumption remains a limitation of the data set and consequently of our analysis. Importantly for our analysis, the proportionality assumption implies that the results we obtained from this method may not capture attempts by the government sector to award a larger share of its procurement to domestic firms relative to other industries.\nAnother important limitation for our analysis is the scope of the industry data reported by the WIOD. Specifically, the input-output data include intermediate inputs but exclude purchases by government for investment. Such purchases could include some government assets that would be considered procurement covered by the GPA and NAFTA. For example, the input-output data could exclude construction services like those government purchases to build highways or schools that have long-term use, which are procurements potentially covered by the GPA and NAFTA.\nFinally, while we followed a method described above that has been used to study procurement, there are alternative methods that could have also been used based on input-output data. For example, according to industry officials at the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the “Trade in Value Added” methodology is such a method, and such data are maintained by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.\nWe conducted this performance audit from March 2017 to May 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.\nThose standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "The following appendix contains descriptive comparative information about the five databases included in our review: for the United States, the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG); for the EU and Norway, Tenders Electronic Daily (TED); for South Korea, the South Korea ON-line E-Procurement System (KONEPS); for Mexico, the Government of Mexico e-Procurement System CompraNet; and for Canada, Contract History.\nFor each database, we provide its formal name and function, contract and/or agency coverage, and data field(s) related to firm location, firm ownership, source country of goods or services, location of contract execution, contract valuation, trade agreement coverage, and type of contract in terms of goods, services or construction services.", "The following appendix provides supplemental information from our analysis of foreign sourcing by the United States in fiscal year 2015 based on data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). FPDS-NG contains data on four potential proxy measures of foreign sourcing—firm location, firm ownership, product and service origin, and place of performance. The database contains six fields that correspond to these four proxy measures. See tables 11 and 12. For cross-country comparisons, we use two of the six measures—vendor country code (13QQ) and country of product and service origin (9E). We disaggregate the data by country and list the top 20 countries, which are recipients of USG contracts based on firm location. See tables 13 and 14. Since about 10 percent of USG contracts are performed outside the United States, we also provide a breakdown of those contracts that are awarded to foreign-owned and –located firms by agency. See table 15. Finally, since most of these contracts by contract value are awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD), we also provide a country breakdown of DOD contracts performed outside the United States and awarded to foreign-owned and –located firms. See table 16.", "", "To report on European Union (EU) procurement data in the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) database for 2015, we took steps to address missing contract award values, which amounted to approximately 15.2 percent of the 38,233 in-scope contract award values. To address these missing contract award values, we implemented a multiple imputation methodology that imputes a range of values for each missing contract award value and allows for estimation of additional uncertainty induced by the imputation methodology. After determining that the data were likely to be conditionally missing at random, we used predictive mean matching (PMM) to address missing values as described below. We determined that using PMM was appropriate because it can provide more robust results when the relevant variable is not normally distributed; PMM, as a form of multiple imputation, allows us to assess the variability introduced through the process of addressing missing data; and PMM, when properly specified, does not distort averages or variance in the underlying data.\nAs we discuss below, the method for addressing missing values used by the EU has none of these features.\nIn PMM, a regression model is first fit to complete cases in the dataset to predict values for the variable of interest for the entire dataset (i.e., including complete and incomplete cases). These predicted values are used to identify complete observations (“donors”) that are close (a “match”) to a given observation that is missing a value for the variable of interest. The PMM model draws matches using the posterior predicted distribution of the regression model. When PMM is used in conjunction with multiple imputations, this process is repeated multiple (m) times for each missing value. As a result, each of m imputations may match to a different donor. The donor’s observed value for this variable is donated to fill the blank data cell—not the predicted value used to match to this donor. The strength of the predictive model used to identify these matches will affect variation in the set of m imputed values because a better predictive model will identify donors that have observed values more consistently close to their predicted values.\nIn order to specify our PMM model, we first explicitly tested the Ordinary Least Squares regression model used to match donors as part of the process discussed above. We performed standard regression diagnostics, including an examination of the included variables and residuals to avoid overfitting. We found that our model was able to explain 86 percent of variation in contract award values and appeared to have well-behaved (homoscedastic) residuals.\nWe drew m=30 imputed values for each missing observation using the PMM process described above, which allowed us to generate estimates of the total contract value amounts and measure the uncertainty induced in those estimates by the imputation methodology. We used these measures of uncertainty to construct 95 percent confidence intervals and express these values as a percentage relative to the estimate itself. To assess the quality and reliability of the multiple imputations that followed from this predictive model, we performed four main sensitivity checks, which are included in tables 17 and 18. 1. We examined the proportion imputed for each subset of the data that we planned to report. The column headed “Percent imputed contract awards” shows the proportion of the count of contracts in a given data subset that were imputed using the methodology described above. We looked to avoid any individual subset being substantially greater than the overall average of 15 percent imputed. In practice, we individually checked any subset exceeding 30 percent imputed. 2. We evaluated the level of uncertainty induced by the imputation methodology across important subgroups of the data. The column headed “95 percent confidence interval +/-” indicates the percent of the “Contract award value estimate” that, when added and subtracted to this estimate, forms the 95 percent confidence interval. The level of uncertainty expressed in the relative confidence interval results from between-imputation variance, which could indicate extreme or inconsistent matches. We looked for confidence intervals that were, in our judgment, narrow as a proportion of point estimates. In practice, nearly all of the subgroups we are choosing to report have confidence intervals smaller than plus or minus 3.5 percent of point estimates. 3. We evaluated the percent of imputed values across important subgroups of the data. “Percent of imputed value duplicates” is a diagnostic column to test for sparseness of imputation matches among the 30 imputed values for each imputed contract award. We determined the number of duplicate imputation draws among the 30 imputed values for each observation, which could indicate sparseness in the number of suitable matches or overfitting of the model. We intended to inspect any finding with more than about 5 out of 30 (17 percent) duplicated imputation draws; in practice, however, this threshold was not reached for any subsets of the data that we have chosen to report. 4. We compared estimates resulting from our imputation methodology to published EU reports across important subgroups of the data. “Alternative estimate (EU’s missing value methodology)” shows the results of replicating a methodology for correcting missing data described in EU documents and used for some EU reports. The EU methodology is based primarily on the average value of contracts that are present in the dataset. This provides a general point of comparison, allowing us to determine which subsets of the data are likely to be responsible for estimation differences with prior EU publications. This comparison methodology therefore provides a benchmark but not a diagnostic for the imputation models. There are several important differences between our imputation methodology and the EU’s methodology. a. Calculation of confidence intervals: The EU’s methodology results in the same value substituted for every contract award of a given type (construction goods, and services). As such, it is not possible to estimate confidence intervals for a given observation or group of observations using this methodology. In contrast, the multiple imputation models include estimates of uncertainty. b. Distortion of subgroup averages: The EU’s methodology is not sensitive to differences in group averages apart from contract type. As a result, it may distort subgroup averages. For example, if hypothetical Country A has services contracts that average $100 but the overall average for services contracts is $1,000, substituting the overall average into missing values for Country A as the EU methodology would have the effect of significantly distorting Country A’s characteristics. In contrast, the imputation models we used are designed to be sensitive to all significant reported differences in contract awards because we included all reported variables in our imputation models.", "To report on Norway procurement data in the TED database for 2015, we needed to take steps to address missing contract award values (153 of 1,319 missing, or about 11.5 percent). The scale of the missing values is thus smaller than for the EU data, while the dataset as a whole is too small, in our judgment, to support correction through an imputation model. Our statistical tests found no evidence that contract award values were conditionally missing at random. Thus, we assume that the data are missing completely at random and corrected the missing data using post- stratification estimation techniques. To do so, we treated the database of contract awards as the full population of such contract awards, which provides the full joint distribution of contract attributes. We treated the complete observations (88.5 percent of the total) as our sample of this population. Post-stratification adjusts the sampling weights for this sample so that the joint distribution of post-stratifying variables, which we selected based on our reporting needs, matches the known population joint distribution.\nBased on the resulting confidence intervals, we determined that the post- stratification sampling results in data are sufficiently reliable for subsets defined by foreign status and contract type (see table 20) or by foreign status and GPA coverage (see table 21).", "", "Kimberly Gianopoulos, (202) 512-8612 or [email protected].", "In addition to the contact named above, Adam R. Cowles (Assistant Director), Marisela Perez (Analyst-in-Charge), Gergana T. Danailova- Trainor, Ben Bolitzer, Andrew Kurtzman, and Julia Kennon made major contributions to this report. James Ashley, Peter Choi, David Dayton, Christopher Keblitis, Grace P. Lui, John Yee, and Timothy Young provided technical assistance." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_title", "", "h2_full", "", "h0_full", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "h1_full", "", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What contracts has the US government granted to foreign-located firms?", "What have government databases said about these contracts?", "How did GAO resolve this discrepancy?", "What did GAO find about the types of firms awarded?", "What are the limitations of the contract data?", "What was found about foreign sourcing by the GPA and NAFTA parties?", "How does foreign sourcing by central governments measure in th US?", "What was the extent of government imports?", "How does central government foreign sourcing compare between the US and other countries?", "What is the global scale of government procurement?", "What outstanding questions exist about foreign procurement?", "What was GAO asked to review?", "On what did the review focus?", "What does GAO's report accomplish?", "How did the GAO source its comparable data on foreign sourcing?", "How was data for Japan accessed?", "How did the GAO find additional information?" ], "summary": [ "The U.S. government awarded contracts valued at about $12 billion to foreign-located firms, of which about $5 billion went to firms with reported locations in the other six main parties to the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (see figure).", "Conversely, government procurement databases indicated the central governments of these parties awarded an estimated $7 billion to foreign sources, out of which about $2 billion was U.S.-sourced. Canada and Mexico awarded most of the U.S.-sourced contracts.", "GAO was able to determine that the U.S. government awarded more, by contract value, to foreign-owned firms located abroad than to foreign-owned, U.S.-located firms.", "Moreover, more than 80 percent of U.S. government contracts awarded to foreign-owned firms located abroad were Department of Defense contracts performed abroad.", "Overall, while available contract data enable broad cross-country comparisons, they do not necessarily show where the goods are produced, where the services are delivered, or where the profits go, among other economic effects.", "Foreign sourcing by the seven GPA and NAFTA parties within the scope of the study, using two alternative methods, is less than 20 percent of overall central government procurement.", "Foreign sourcing by central governments, estimated from government procurement databases of the United States and the other six main parties, varied in value by party from about 2 to 19 percent of overall central government procurement.", "Foreign sourcing by all levels of government, estimated from data on trade and public sector purchases, showed that the governments' imports likely ranged from about 7 to 18 percent of the goods and services the governments purchased.", "In addition, contract data show that U.S., South Korean, and Mexican central government foreign sourcing was greater in value under contracts covered by GPA and NAFTA than under noncovered contracts, but the opposite was true for Canada and Norway. For the European Union and Japan, GAO found little difference or could not calculate an estimate.", "Globally, government procurement constitutes about a $4 trillion market for international trade.", "However, little is known about foreign sourcing in government procurement—how much governments procure from foreign-located suppliers or how much they acquire in foreign-made goods.", "GAO was asked to review the extent of foreign sourcing in government procurement across countries.", "GAO focused on the United States and the other six main parties to the GPA and NAFTA, selected international agreements that open procurement markets on a reciprocal basis.", "This report, the fourth of a related series, (1) provides broad estimates of foreign sourcing by the U.S. government and central governments of the other six main parties, and (2) assesses foreign sourcing as a share of estimated central government procurement and of estimated procurement by all levels of government, and the extent to which central government contracts that are covered under selected international procurement agreements are foreign-sourced.", "GAO analyzed the most recent comparable data available from two sources: (1) government procurement databases used in Canada, the European Union, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, and the United States, for 2015, and (2) 2014 trade data merged with data on the types of goods and services purchased by the public sector.", "Since Japan does not have a government procurement database, data for Japan were based on its 2015 GPA submission of 2013 data.", "GAO also interviewed cognizant government officials in Washington, D.C.; Ottawa, Canada; Mexico City, Mexico; Seoul, South Korea; and Tokyo, Japan." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_RL33370	{ "title": [ "", "Andean Counterdrug Initiative", "FY2007 Funding Request", "Related Funding Programs", "Foreign Military Financing (FMF)", "International Military Education and Training (IMET)", "Defense Department Counternarcotics Account", "U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance by Country", "Colombia7", "Peru", "Bolivia8", "Ecuador9", "Brazil10", "Venezuela11", "Panama12", "Congressional Conditions on Assistance", "Expanded Authority", "Personnel Caps", "Helicopters", "Reports", "Colombian Human Rights", "Aerial Fumigation", "Prohibition on Participation in Combat Operations", "Bolivian Human Rights", "Demobilization of Illegally Armed Groups in Colombia", "Major Legislative Activity in the 109th Congress, Second Session, and 110th Congress, First Session", "FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations", "House Action", "Senate Action", "FY2006 Supplemental Appropriations13", "FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act", "Major Legislative Activity in the 109th Congress, First Session", "FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations", "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2006 and FY2007", "National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006", "Appendix. Map" ], "paragraphs": [ "In 2006 and early 2007, Congress considered a number of issues relating to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the U.S. assistance program to help Colombia and its neighbors address drug trafficking and economic development issues. These issues included ongoing concerns with the effectiveness of the program, funding levels, human rights, and the future of the program. The region has been viewed as particularly important because it produces virtually all of the world's cocaine and increasing amounts of high quality heroin. It is estimated that 90% of the cocaine coming to the United States originates in, or passes through, Colombia. Moreover, the stability of Colombia and the region is threatened by Colombia's longstanding leftist guerrilla insurgency and rightist paramilitary groups, which are believed to be largely funded by their participation in illegal narcotics production and trafficking.\nThe Andean Counterdrug Initiative is the primary U.S. program that supports Plan Colombia, a six year plan developed in 1999 by President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) of Colombia, and continued by current President Alvaro Uribe. The six-year plan has ostensibly ended, although the same level and types of activities are continuing. The Colombian government has reportedly developed a follow-on plan, Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP), that would include support for the demobilization of rightist paramilitary groups.\nAlthough ACI is the primary program, it is not the only one supporting counternarcotics and economic development in the Andean region. Countries in the region also receive Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The Department of Defense supports drug interdiction operations from its own counternarcotics account. In addition, the United States provides economic development aid from Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), and Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts. These programs are not considered part of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, although they support many programs which are tangentially related, such as poverty reduction and infrastructure improvements.", "The Andean Counterdrug Initiative was designed to provide assistance to seven countries in the broadly defined Andean region: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The region is important to U.S. drug policy because it includes three major drug producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all the world's cocaine and significant quantities of high quality heroin destined for the United States are produced. U.S. objectives for the ACI program are to eliminate the cultivation and production of cocaine and opium, build law enforcement infrastructure, arrest and prosecute traffickers, and seize their assets.\nThe region also includes two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador), members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which supply significant quantities of oil to the United States. For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), the Andes mountain range that runs through South America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration, even though the countries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration pact.\nU.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, when Congress passed legislation providing $1.3 billion in interdiction and development assistance ( P.L. 106-246 ) for Colombia and six regional neighbors. Funding for ACI from FY2000 through FY2007 totals about $5.7 billion. ACI is managed by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Some ACI funds are transferred to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for alternative development programs.\nACI funds are divided between programs that support eradication or interdiction efforts and those focused on alternative crop development and democratic institution building. On the interdiction side, programs train and support national police and military forces, provide communications and intelligence systems, support the maintenance and operations of host country aerial eradication aircraft, and improve infrastructure related to counternarcotics activities. On the alternative development side, funds support development programs in coca growing areas, including infrastructure development, and marketing and technical support for alternative crops. They also support programs assisting internally displaced persons, promoting the rule of law, and expanding judicial capabilities.\nACI also funds the Air Bridge Denial Program that is currently operational in Colombia, and temporarily suspended in Peru, after an accidental shooting down of a civilian aircraft carrying U.S. missionaries in 2001. After the incident, in which two Americans died, the program in both countries was suspended until enhanced safeguards were developed. The program in Colombia resumed in August 2003. The program supports an aircraft fleet, pilot training, and logistical and intelligence support. The program tracks aircraft suspected of being involved in drug trafficking, and forces them to land for inspection. If an aircraft is repeatedly unresponsive, it may be shot down, at the direction of the commander of the Colombian Air Force. The resumption of a program in Peru is still pending the development of safety enhancements.", "The Administration requested a total of $721.5 million for FY2007 for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, a slight reduction from FY2006. Included as part of the request was $65.7 million for a Critical Flight Safety (CFS) Program, a multi-year effort to upgrade and refurbish State Department aircraft used for eradication and interdiction missions. FY2006 was the first year for which funds were requested for this function. Congress appropriated $30 million instead of the requested $40 million. In previous years, the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) Program was a separate line item in the request and appropriation. This year, funding for the program is included in the allocation for Colombia. In the two previous fiscal years, Congress cut funding for ABD from its request of $21 million, providing $11 million in FY2005 and $13.8 million in FY2006.\nFrom year to year, the ACI allocation for Colombia has remained relatively stable, and the FY2007 request was level with previous years. For FY2007, the Administration proposed to fund the Air Bridge Denial from the Colombia allocation, since the program is only operational there. The State Department maintained that this will not result in less funding for other Colombia programs, as previous costs related to critical flight safety were proposed to be funded in the CFS program.", "Additional funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, both managed by the State Department. Recipients are subject to an aid cutoff if they have not signed so-called Article 98 agreements with the United States. Such agreements, referring to Article 98 of the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, prevent the International Criminal Court from proceeding with a request for the surrender of U.S. personnel present in the country. These agreements are required under the American Services Members Protection Act of 2002, that was incorporated as Title II of H.R. 4775 , the FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. 107-206 ). The President may waive the law if it is in the national interest. Colombia, the major recipient of military assistance in Latin America, has signed an agreement. Others, such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, have not signed an agreement, or have not ratified such an agreement, and could see their assistance withheld. Counternarcotics funds are not affected. In addition to State Department programs, the Defense Department has a counternarcotics account for worldwide programs involving interdiction, training, equipment, and intelligence sharing. In the Western Hemisphere, these programs are managed by the U.S. Army Southern Command.", "Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides funding grants to foreign nations to purchase U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. The program's objectives are to assist key allies to improve their defense capabilities, to strengthen military relationships between the United States and FMF recipients, and to promote the professionalism of military forces in friendly countries. FMF is provided to Colombia and the Andean region to support the efforts of those nations to establish and strengthen national authority in remote areas that have been used by leftist guerrilla organizations, rightist paramilitaries, and narcotics traffickers. A portion of FMF funding in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 went for infrastructure protection of oil pipelines in Colombia.\nThe FY2006 estimate for the Andean region is $90.1 million, with $89.1 million for Colombia. The FY2007 request was $90.85 million for the region, with Colombia proposed to receive $90 million, mainly to support Colombia's efforts to establish and strengthen national authority over remote areas that are used by terrorists and that support narcotics trafficking. For FY2007, Congress provided $86.35 million, with funds for Colombia trimmed to $85.5 million. Funds are to be used to provide interdiction boats, additional combat aircraft, training and infrastructure improvements, and maintenance and operation of the Colombian military's helicopter program. Funds are also to be used to support Colombia's interdiction capabilities, intelligence sharing, and communications.", "The IMET program provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. Its objectives are to improve defense capabilities, develop professional and personal relationships between U.S. and foreign militaries, and influence these forces in support of democratic governance. Training focuses on the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control, civil-military relations, military justice systems, military doctrine, strategic planning, and operational procedures. IMET funding for the Andean region was estimated at $3.4 million in FY2006 out of a total of $13.4 million for all of Latin America. The request for FY2007 for the Andean countries was $2.56 million out of a hemisphere-wide total $12.6 million. The request for Colombia was $1.68 million and would focus on civil-military issues for junior and mid-grade military officers, with an emphasis on human rights. Congress provided $2.46 million in IMET for the Andean nations, with Colombia to receive $1.61 million.", "The Department of Defense has authority for counternarcotics detection and monitoring under Sections 124, 1004, and 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act. DOD requests a lump sum for counternarcotics programs worldwide and does not request amounts by country. The allocation for FY2005 DOD counternarcotics funding for Latin America was $366.9 million, of which up to $200 million was for Colombia.\nFor FY2006, DOD requested a total of $896 million globally for counternarcotics programs, of which it estimated spending $368 million in Latin America. Of this amount, $122 million would be in direct support of Colombia. Activities include detection and monitoring operations to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies interdict drug trafficking. In the Andean region, support is provided in the form of training, equipment, and intelligence sharing activities. Requested levels for FY2007 were reportedly in the same range as FY2006.", "", "Colombia receives the single largest portion of ACI funds. For FY2007, the Administration requested $465 million, of which $313.9 million would be for interdiction and eradication efforts, $125 million for alternative development and institution building programs, and $26.2 million for rule of law programs. Interdiction funds would support the Colombian military's aviation program and drug units with training, logistics support, operating expenses, equipment, and to upgrade forward operating locations. Assistance would also be used to support Colombian National Police aviation, eradication and interdiction programs with equipment, logistical support, training, new base construction, communications and information links. Alternative development programs would support the introduction of new licit crops, the development of agribusiness and forestry activities, and the development of local and international markets for new products. Rule of law assistance would help promote democracy through judicial reform, support for vulnerable groups, and training and technical assistance for advisors in rule of law areas.\nFor FY2007, Congress provided the Administration's request of $465 million. It is not clear at this time how the funds will be allocated among alternative development and interdiction activities. In the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Congress provided a total of $469.5 million for Colombia, divided among $310.9 million for interdiction, $131.2 million for alternative development, and $27.4 million for rule of law programs. The amount for alternative development represents a $6.5 million increase from FY2005 levels. Colombia also receives small amounts of Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR), that in FY2007, would be used to address arms trafficking across Colombian borders.\nColombia's spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by three parallel mountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation and processing, and contributes to the government's difficulty in exerting control throughout the nation. The country is known for a long tradition of democracy, but also for continuing violence, including a guerrilla insurgency dating back to the 1960s, and persistent drug trafficking activity. Recent administrations have had to deal with a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist paramilitaries (or \"self-defense\" forces), and independent drug trafficking cartels. The two main leftist guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The rightist paramilitaries are coordinated by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). All three groups participate in drug production and trafficking, regularly kidnap individuals for ransom, and have been accused of gross human rights abuses. The three have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the United States. The AUC and Colombian military have been accused of collaborating in fighting the FARC and ELN.", "Peru is the second largest recipient of ACI funding with $98.5 million requested for FY2007. This represented a reduction from $106.9 million in FY2006. For FY2007, Congress provided $103.17 million for Peru. The request proposed splitting ACI funds, with $56 million for interdiction and $42.5 million for alternative development and institution building. Interdiction funds would focus on improving Peruvian airlift operations, determining the extent of coca cultivation in the country, and demand reduction and money laundering programs. Alternative development funds would address roads, bridges, schools and health care access, land reform, and agri-business.\nPeru shares its northern border with Colombia, and is the second largest cocaine producer in the world. It exports high purity cocaine and cocaine base to markets in South America, Mexico, Europe, and the United States. Nevertheless, Peru has been viewed as a success story in counternarcotics efforts because joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication efforts, and alternative development programs have significantly reduced coca production. Counternarcotics policy in Peru has faced growing resistance from indigenous communities that view coca leaf cultivation as a cultural right and source of income. A 2004 Peruvian study found that approximately two million people use coca leaf either habitually or occasionally, and another two million use it for tea, or for traditional or ceremonial purposes. Some regions have attempted to de-criminalize coca growing, a move that the government has resisted.", "For FY2007, the Administration proposed spending, and Congress approved, $66 million in Bolivia, a reduction from $79.2 million in FY2006. The requested amount would be divided between $35.0 million for interdiction and $31.0 million for alternative development and institution building. Interdiction funds would be used to identify and eradicate illegal crops, and to disrupt trafficking operations. Alternative development would continue support for the production of licit crops, and establish integrated justice centers in conflictive regions.\nLandlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but Bolivia's significant gains in reducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in controlling production in Colombia. For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to Colombia to be processed into cocaine. The United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistance. There has been growing public opposition in Bolivia to counternarcotics policy that has served to fuel to popular discontent and political instability. Some critics believe that U.S. policy supporting forced drug crop eradication contributed to electoral support for left-of-center opposition political figures, such as Evo Morales, who won the presidency in 2005.", "Ecuador is the fourth largest recipient of ACI funds. For FY2007, the Administration requested, and Congress approved, $17.3 million, a reduction from nearly $20 million in FY2006. Funds would be divided between $8.9 million for interdiction and $8.4 million for alternative development and institution building. The objective of assistance to Ecuador is to stop or prevent any spillover of drug trafficking and guerrilla activities from Colombia, and to stop the transit of drugs destined for the United States.\nOn Colombia's southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia's neighbors to the influx of drugs and guerrillas, being situated adjacent to areas in southern Colombia that are guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas. As a major transit country for cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru, Ecuador cooperates extensively with the United States in counternarcotics efforts. Nonetheless, the State Department reports that weak public institutions, the uneven implementation of new criminal proceedings, and widespread corruption limit the country's ability to counter drug trafficking. In November 1999, the United States signed a 10-year agreement with Ecuador for a forward operating location (FOL) in Manta, on the Pacific Coast, for U.S. aerial counterdrug detection and monitoring operations.", "Congress approved the FY2007 ACI request for Brazil totaling $4 million mainly for interdiction and law enforcement activities. Brazil's isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms Colombia's southeastern border. Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, but is a conduit for the transit of coca paste and cocaine from Colombia to Europe and the United States. It is also becoming a final destination, with marked increases in crack cocaine and heroin abuse.\nBrazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territory in the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign intervention. In an effort to exercise control over this vast territory, Brazil has constructed a $1.4 billion sensor and radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System (SIVAM from its acronym in Portuguese), offering to share data from this system with neighbors and the United States. It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers and policemen, with air force and navy support. In 2000, it launched COBRA, an inter-agency border security program to deal with spillover drug crime from Colombia. In 2003, Brazil expanded COBRA-like programs to its northern borders with Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. The programs focus on controlling land and air entry into Brazil and are headquartered at Tabatinga.", "The Administration proposed spending, and Congress approved, $1 million in FY2007 counternarcotics assistance to Venezuela largely for interdiction and law enforcement purposes, a reduction from $2.2 million in FY2006. Because of Venezuela's extensive 1,370-mile border with Colombia, it is a major transit route for cocaine and heroin destined for the United States. Despite political tensions in U.S.-Venezuelan relations, there has been continuing cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).\nOn September 15, 2005, President Bush designated Venezuela, pursuant to international drug control certification procedures set forth in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 ( P.L. 107-228 ), as one of two countries that had failed demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements. At the same time, the President waived economic sanctions that would have curtailed U.S. assistance for democracy programs in Venezuela, and ACI funding will not be affected. The justification noted that despite Venezuela's increase in drug seizures over the past four years, Venezuela has not addressed the increasing use of Venezuelan territory to transport drugs to the United States. The action was taken in the aftermath of Venezuela's August 2005 decision to suspend its cooperation with the DEA.", "For FY2007, the Administration requested, and Congress approved, $4 million for counternarcotics programs to assist Panama. Because of its geographic location bordering Colombia at the crossroads of North and South America, its largely unguarded coastline, and its well-developed transportation, banking, trade and financial sectors, Panama is a major transit route for illicit drugs and an attractive site for money laundering. Drug traffickers use fishing vessels, cargo ships, small aircraft, and speed boats to move illicit drugs—primarily cocaine, but also heroin and Ecstasy—through Panama.\nAccording to the Department of State, security in Panama's Darien region bordering Colombia has improved in recent years, although the smuggling of weapons and drugs across the border continues. According to the Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Panama's cooperation with the United States on counternarcotics efforts is excellent, although the country's difficult fiscal situation has impeded Panama's law enforcement ability. For this reason, the Department of State maintains that U.S. assistance is critical in ensuring effective Panamanian law enforcement.", "Since first approving expanded assistance to Colombia for counternarcotics programs in 2000, Congress has included a number of conditions on U.S. assistance in both authorization and appropriations legislation. The most recently enacted funding legislation is the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, as included in the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution ( H.J.Res. 20 , P.L. 110-5 ). The FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 5122 , P.L. 109-364 ) also included provisions relating to Colombia. The FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1815 , P.L. 109-163 ) authorized funding for Department of Defense drug interdiction activities.", "Both the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and the FY2007 National Defense Authorization, maintain language, first approved by Congress in 2002, authorizing support for a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations. Appropriations report language notes that counternarcotics, alternative development, and judicial reform should remain the principal focus of U.S. policy in Colombia. This authority shall cease if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not vigorously attempting to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.", "The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act changed existing law with regard to the cap on the number of U.S. military and civilian contractors that can be deployed in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. The cap on military personnel was raised from 400 to 800, and for civilian contractors, from 400 to 600. The number of deployed personnel changes as programs begin, expand, or finish. The personnel caps do not apply to foreign national contract employees, or to personnel stationed at the U.S. embassy.", "The FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act maintains current law requiring that if any helicopter procured with ACI funds is used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defense group or illegal security cooperative, the helicopter shall be immediately returned to the United States.", "The FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act requires a report from the Secretary of State prior to the obligation of funds on the proposed programs, projects, and activities funded by ACI on a country-by-country basis.", "The FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act allows the obligation of 75% of assistance to the Colombian Armed Forces without a determination and certification from the Secretary of State regarding respect for human rights and severing ties with paramilitary groups. The remaining 25% can be released in two installments of 12.5% each. The first installment can be made provided that the Secretary of State certifies that\nthe Commander General of the Colombian Armed Forces is suspending members who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; the Colombian government is vigorously investigating and prosecuting members of the military who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations, and promptly punishing those found guilty; the Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress in cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in such cases; the Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress in severing links to paramilitary organizations; the Colombian government is dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial networks by arresting commanders and financial backers; and the Colombian government is taking effective steps to ensure that land and property rights of indigenous communities are not being violated by the Colombian Armed Forces.\nThe last installment can be made after July 31, 2007, if the Secretary of State certifies that the Colombian Armed Forces are continuing to meet the above conditions and are conducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. The law also requires that not later than 60 days after enactment, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with internationally recognized human rights organizations regarding progress in meeting these conditions.\nThe law denies visas to anyone who the Secretary of State determines has willfully provided any support to leftist guerrilla organizations or rightist paramilitaries, or has participated in the commission of gross violations of human rights in Colombia. The provision may be waived if the Secretary of State determines and certifies, on a case-by-case basis, that the issuance of a visa is necessary to support the peace process in Colombia, or for urgent humanitarian purposes.\nIn addition to these provisions that are specific to Colombia, the law includes a provision from previous legislation, often called the Leahy amendment, that denies funds to any unit of a security force for which the Secretary of State has credible evidence of gross human rights violations. The Secretary may continue funding if he determines and reports to Congress that the foreign government is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of these security forces to justice.", "The FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act required that not more than 20% of funds used for the procurement of chemicals for aerial coca and poppy fumigation be made available unless the Secretary of State certifies that 1) the herbicide mixture is in accordance with EPA label requirements for comparable use in the United States and any additional controls recommended by the EPA; and 2) the herbicide mixture does not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment, including endemic species. Further, the Secretary of State must certify that complaints of harm to health or licit crops caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation is being paid for meritorious claims. These funds may not be made available unless programs are being implemented by USAID, the Colombian government, or other organizations to provide alternative sources of income in areas where security permits for small-acreage growers whose illicit crops are targeted for fumigation. Such programs are to include consultation with local communities. For FY2007, the Senate bill maintained the provision, whereas the House version was silent.", "The FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act continues the prohibition on U.S. military personnel or U.S. civilian contractors participating in any combat operations in Colombia. This provision has been included in appropriation legislation since the original Plan Colombia law approved by Congress in 2000.", "The FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act required the Secretary of State to certify that the Bolivian military was respecting human rights, and that civilian judicial authorities were investigating and prosecuting, with the military's cooperation, military personnel who have been implicated in gross violations of human rights. Such a certification was to be issued before any ACI funds were made available to the Bolivian military. House and Senate versions of the FY2007 bill contained differing report language relating to human rights (House) and seizure of natural gas fields (Senate).", "The FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act makes funds available to assist in the demobilization and disarmament of former members of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), if the Secretary of State certifies that:\nassistance will be provided only for individuals who have verifiably renounced and terminated any affiliation or involvement with FTOs, and are meeting all the requirements of the Colombia Demobilization program; the Colombian government is fully cooperating with the United States in extraditing FTO leaders and members who have been indicted in the United States for murder, kidnaping, narcotics trafficking, and other violations of U.S. law; the Colombian government is implementing a concrete and workable framework for dismantling the organizational structures of FTOs; and funds will not be used to make cash payments to individuals, and funds will only be available for any of the following activities: verification, reintegration (including training and education), vetting, recovery of assets for reparations for victims, and investigations and prosecutions.", "", "The Andean Counterdrug Initiative, as well as FMF and IMET, are funded in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriation bill. The 109 th Congress did not complete work on a number of appropriation bills, including Foreign Operations. Three continuing resolutions were passed to maintain funding into 2007 when the 110 th Congress finished all held-over spending bills. The final bill, the FY2007 Continuing Resolution ( H.J.Res. 20 / P.L. 109-289 , as amended by P.L. 110-5 ) was passed on February 15, 2007. Funding for ACI in FY2007 was set at $721.5 million, an amount equal to the President's request. Many of the changes proposed by Congress (see House and Senate action below) were not maintained in the final version of the continuing resolution because many programs, including conditions and limitations, were retained from the FY2006 spending bill.", "On May 25, 2006, the House Appropriations Committee marked up the FY2007 spending bill. The bill made significant changes to the way foreign aid to Colombia is provided, but largely approved the Administration's request with regard to funding levels. The most significant change was to provide some funding for Colombia from traditional aid accounts rather than the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and to create a new account—the Trade Capacity Enhancement Fund—to which some ACI funds would be transferred.\nThe bill provided a total of $545.2 million for Colombia, an increase of $80.4 million over the FY2006 level. Instead of funding alternative development and institution building from the ACI account, the bill provided $135 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for alternative development, a $10 million increase from the request. In addition, the bill provided $26.2 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for rule of law programs, equal to the request, that were previously provided from the ACI account. Funding for drug interdiction programs at $313.9 million, equal to the request, was maintained in the ACI account. The provision of some funds from non-ACI accounts was characterized as beginning the process of treating Colombia as a strategic partner. The Subcommittee also included $70.2 million for the Critical Flight Safety Program, earmarked for operations in Colombia. This was $4.5 million above the request.\nThe bill increased funding for Peru by $10.5 million over the request, providing $46 million for alternative development and $63 million for interdiction programs. These funds remain in the ACI account. The bill cut ACI funding for Bolivia by $15 million from the request, all of it in interdiction programs. Funding for alternative development was set at $31 million, and $20 million for interdiction. The cut was made in response to reports that Bolivia's commitment to fighting drugs was lessening. ACI funding for Brazil ($4 million), Ecuador ($17.3 million), and Panama ($4 million) was equal to the request. The $1 million requested for Venezuela was not provided.\nThe Subcommittee created a new account—the Trade Capacity Enhancement Fund—and a new position at USAID to oversee and coordinate trade assistance programs. While the total amount provided was $522 million, the bill transferred $62.5 million of ACI funds to the new account for use in ACI countries. The Subcommittee's report noted that this is the amount of ACI funds that would have been committed to trade promotion activities.", "The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the Foreign Operations bill on June 29, and did not make as many changes to the ACI program as the House. The Senate bill provided $699.4 million for ACI, a decrease of $22 million. A portion of the decrease ($9.8 million) was transferred to a Democracy Fund for similar types of programs as that provided by ACI. The remaining decrease was from interdiction activities and the Critical Flight Safety Program, which was cut by $12.3 million. Both the House and Senate bills maintained reporting requirements from previous appropriations bills.", "The Administration did not request additional counternarcotics funds for the Andean region in the supplemental. However, an amendment on the House floor ( H.R. 4939 ) added $26.3 million for drug interdiction aircraft in Colombia. Sponsored by Representative Burton, the funds would be used to purchase three new DC-3 fixed-wing aircraft for the Colombian Navy. The bill passed the House on March 17 and the Senate on May 4. It was signed into law on June 15 ( P.L. 109-234 ).", "Congress included a number of provisions in the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 5122 , P.L. 109-364 signed into law on October 17, 2006) relating to DOD's role in counter-narcotics and Colombia. The bill re-authorized previous law authorizing the Defense Department to provide support for counterdrug activities of other government agencies (Sec. 1004) and to support counterdrug activities of some foreign governments (Sec. 1033). The legislation also authorized a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia.", "", "On June 28, 2005, the House passed H.R. 3057 ( H.Rept. 109-152 ) fully funding the ACI at $734.5 million. The Senate passed H.R. 3057 on July 20, 2005 ( S.Rept. 109-96 ) also fully funding the ACI. Both House and Senate versions included conditions on assistance, similar to current law, regarding human rights, expanded authority for a unified campaign, a prohibition on combat, and the use of U.S.-provided helicopters.\nThe House passed the conference report ( H.Rept. 109-265 ) on November 4, 2005, and the Senate followed suit on November 10. The President signed it into law on November 14, 2005 ( P.L. 109-102 ). The final agreement fully funded the ACI at $734.5 million, but provided a different mix on how that money should be spent than did either the House or Senate bills.\nThe conference report made ACI funds available until September 30, 2008. It adopted language with regard to demobilization, and appropriated $20 million to assist Colombia with the demobilization of rightist paramilitary groups. The conference report removed a Senate provision requiring the Secretary of State to consult with the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia before making a certification that Colombia is meeting human rights conditions. Instead, the conference report stated the expectation that the Secretary will consider the opinion of the High Commissioner and the Committees on Appropriations prior to making the certification. It also increased funding for alternative development and rule of law programs in Colombia from $149.76 million, as provided by the Senate, to $158.6 million.", "The House International Relations Committee reported H.R. 2601 , the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, with a provision making U.S. assistance to Colombia contingent on a certification from the Secretary of State that Colombia has a workable framework in place for the demobilization and dismantling of former combatants, and that Colombia is cooperating with the United States on extradition requests. The bill also calls for a report from the Secretary of State that details tax code enforcement in Colombia. In floor action, the House approved a Burton amendment to authorize the transfer of two tactical, unpressurized marine patrol aircraft for use by the Colombian Navy for interdiction purposes. The bill passed the House on July 20, 2005.\nThe Senate had under consideration its version of the foreign relations authorization bill, S. 600 . The bill authorizes funding for ACI and includes a number of conditions on assistance consistent with current law. The bill authorized a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities; maintains the existing cap on military and civilian personnel allowed to be stationed in Colombia; prohibits U.S. military and civilian personnel from participating in combat operations; and maintains reporting requirements relating to human rights and the conduct of U.S. operations.", "Both the House and Senate approved the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1815 ) on December 19, 2005, which was signed by the President on January 6, 2006 ( P.L. 109-163 ). The law authorized $901.7 million for DOD-wide global drug interdiction activities. Unlike the FY2005 authorization, it did not include provisions relating to Colombia or the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.", "" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "", "h0_full h1_full", "", "", "h1_full", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_full h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How did the US decide to provide counterdrug assistance to the Andean region?", "From other aid do Andean countries benefit?", "What is Congress' current stance regarding the drug trade?", "What is the center of the global cocaine trade?", "How has the US been involved in the fight against drug trafficking in the Andean region?", "What funding resources does the US provide?", "What is Defense's involvement?", "How has Congress allowed the counternarcotics funds to be used?", "Why has Congress. expanded its military reach in Colombia?" ], "summary": [ "In February 2007, the 110th Congress finished consideration of FY2007 foreign operations appropriations legislation, held over from 2006, that provided foreign assistance to the Andean region.", "In addition to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), Andean countries benefit from Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, and other types of economic aid.", "Congress continued to express concern with the volume of drugs readily available in the United States and elsewhere in the world.", "The three largest producers of cocaine are Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Ninety percent of the cocaine in the United States originates in, or passes through, Colombia.", "The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to help Colombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of Plan Colombia in 1999.", "From FY2000 through FY2007, the United States provided a total of about $5.7 billion for the region in ACI funds. The United States also provides funding for Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), and Economic Support Funds (ESF) to some countries in the region.", "The Defense Department maintains a central counternarcotics account that funds activities in Latin America.", "Since 2002, Congress has granted expanded authority to use counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in Colombia.", "Three illegally armed groups in Colombia that participate in drug production and trafficking have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department. In 2004, Congress also increased the level of U.S. military and civilian contractor personnel allowed to be deployed in Colombia, in response to an Administration request." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_R42826	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "The FAR and What It Covers", "What Is the Federal Acquisition Regulation?", "Where Can I Find the FAR?", "What Agencies Are Subject to the FAR?", "What Purchases Are Subject to the FAR?", "What Transactions Fall Outside the FAR's Coverage?", "What Does the FAR Cover?", "Parts 1 to 51", "Parts 52 and 53", "Guiding Principles for the Federal Acquisition System", "Promulgation of the FAR", "How Did the FAR Originate?", "How Is the FAR Amended?", "Who Typically Promulgates Regulations Amending the FAR?", "What Roles Do OFPP and OMB Play in Revising and Implementing the FAR?", "How Long Does It Take to Amend the FAR?", "Relationship Between the FAR and Other Authorities Governing Procurement", "What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Procurement or Other Statutes?", "What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Agency FAR Supplements?", "What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Other Regulations (i.e., Non-FAR Supplements)?", "Does the FAR Include All the Government's Procurement Policies?", "The FAR, Congress, and Judicial and Other Tribunals", "What Can Congress Do to Prompt Amendment of the FAR?", "What Can Congress Do If It Disapproves of a Potential Amendment to the FAR?", "How Much Deference Do Courts and Other Tribunals Give to FAR Provisions?", "The FAR and Federal Contracts", "What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and a Federal Contract?", "Do Amendments to the FAR Apply to Pre-Existing Contracts?", "What Happens If Required Contract Clauses Are Not Included in a Particular Contract?", "Other Topics", "May Agencies Deviate from the FAR?", "May an Acquisition Team Use a Policy or Procedure That Is Not Addressed by the FAR?", "Can a Third Party Enforce the Terms of the FAR Against a Government Contractor?", "Could an Agency or Transaction Not Subject to the FAR Be Subject to Requirements Like Those in the FAR?" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The federal government is the largest buyer of goods and services in the world, and executive branch agencies—particularly the Department of Defense—make most of these purchases. Many (although not all) acquisitions by executive branch agencies are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which can make the FAR a topic of interest to Members and committees of Congress and their staff. In particular, Members, committees, and staff may find themselves\nconsidering or drafting legislation that would prompt amendment of the FAR to save money, promote transparency, or further other public policies; conducting oversight of executive agencies' performance in procuring goods and services, including their compliance with the FAR; and responding to questions from constituents regarding executive branch procurement activities.\nIn addition, in 2012, the Defense Business Board recommended \"zero-bas[ing]\" the entire acquisition system, apparently including the FAR, to \"restor[e] the management of the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes back to the state envisioned by the Packard Commission.\" The Packard Commission is the name commonly given to President Reagan's 1986 Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense. The commission is generally credited with seeking to \"link and streamline\" the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes, thereby \"reducing complexities, regulations, and processes, and enhancing accountability as well as recruiting experienced personnel with strong management credentials.\"\nThis report provides answers to 25 frequently asked questions regarding the FAR. These questions and their answers are organized into six broad categories, including (1) what the FAR is and what it covers; (2) promulgation of the FAR; (3) the relationship between the FAR and other authorities governing federal procurement (e.g., statutes, agency FAR supplements, other regulations, policies); (4) the FAR in relation to Congress and judicial and other tribunals; (5) the relationship between the FAR and federal procurement contracts; and (6) other topics.", "This section includes questions and answers that broadly address what the FAR is and what it covers, including where the text of the FAR can be found; what agencies are subject to the FAR; what purchases are subject to the FAR; and what transactions fall outside the FAR's coverage.", "The FAR is a regulation, codified in Parts 1 through 53 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). As is discussed in more detail below (see \" What Does the FAR Cover? \"), each part of the FAR, such as Part 37—Service Contracting, is divided into subparts (e.g., Subpart 37.1, Service Contracts—General). Subparts are divided into sections (FAR 37.113, Severance payments to foreign nationals), which may be divided into subsections (Section 37.113-2, Solicitation provision and contract clause). The FAR also contains standard solicitation provisions and contract clauses (Part 52) and forms (Part 53).\nThe various agency FAR supplements, codified in Chapters 2 through 63 of Title 48, and the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), codified in Chapter 99 of Title 48, are not part of the FAR, although they can play a significant role in the acquisition process. \" What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Agency FAR Supplements? ,\" below, discusses in more detail the relationship between the FAR and agency FAR supplements, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).", "The FAR is available in print from the Government Printing Office as part of the Code of Federal Regulations , or from private publishers. However, it is arguably most conveniently accessed online, where it is available in either PDF or HTML format, at https://www.acquisition.gov/?q=browsefar , or as Title 48 of the C.F.R. at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/ , or at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionCfr.action?collectionCode=CFR .", "The FAR applies to certain purchases, discussed below (see \" What Purchases Are Subject to the FAR? \"), by executive branch agencies, which the FAR defines to mean\nexecutive department[s], ... military department[s], or any independent establishment[s] within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 101, 102, and 104(1), respectively, and any wholly owned Government corporation within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 9101.\nHowever, although the FAR applies to executive branch agencies, it does not necessarily apply to all executive branch agencies, or to all organizational components of a particular executive branch agency. Exceptions include, for example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which Congress has authorized to establish its own acquisition system, and the U.S. Mint.\nThe FAR does not apply to legislative branch agencies or judicial branch agencies, although agencies in the other branches of government (or otherwise not subject to the FAR) may adopt the FAR as a matter of policy, or promulgate or otherwise be subject to requirements like those in the FAR. For example, the Library of Congress, a legislative branch agency, has stated that it is Library policy to follow the FAR, unless it is determined that a deviation would \"be in the best interest of the Library.\" See also \" Could an Agency or Transaction Not Subject to the FAR Be Subject to Requirements Like Those in the FAR? ,\" below.\nThe FAR does not directly regulate federal contractors or would-be federal contractors, although such vendors are affected by the application of the FAR's definitions, policies, procedures, and requirements by contracting officers. For example, the FAR provides policies and procedures related to types of contracts, subcontracting, contract termination, and payments to contractors. See also \" What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and a Federal Contract? \" and \" What Happens If Required Contract Clauses Are Not Included in a Particular Contract? ,\" below.", "As noted previously (see \" What Agencies Are Subject to the FAR? \"), executive branch agencies are generally subject to the FAR when making certain purchases. Namely, the FAR applies to \"acquisitions\" of \"supplies\" (or goods) and \"services\" with appropriated funds by most (although not all) executive branch agencies. Each of these terms—acquisitions, appropriated funds, supplies, and services—has a specific meaning for purposes of the FAR, which can influence whether the FAR is applicable to particular transactions.\nFor purposes of the FAR, \"acquisition\" means:\nthe acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract.\nAppropriated funds are \"funds paid out of the United States Treasury\" that are charged \"to an appropriation provided by or derived from an act of Congress.\" An appropriation is \"[a]uthority given to federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments from Treasury for specified purposes.\"\n\"Supplies\" means:\nall property except land or interest in land. It includes (but is not limited to) public works, buildings, and facilities; ships, floating equipment, and vessels of every character, type, and description, together with parts and accessories; aircraft and aircraft parts, accessories, and equipment; machine tools; and the alteration or installation of any of the foregoing.\nOther examples of supplies include office furniture, cameras and audio-visual equipment, information technology and communications equipment, cleaning products and tools, uniforms, and musical instruments.\nGenerally, \"services\" refers to tasks performed by a contractor. More specifically, a \"service contract\" means \"a contract that directly engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.\" The FAR identifies the following as examples of areas in which service contracts may be found:\n(1) [m]aintenance, overhaul, repair, servicing, rehabilitation, salvage, modernization, or modification of supplies, systems, or equipment. (2) [r]outine recurring maintenance of real property. (3) [h]ousekeeping and base services. (4) [a]dvisory and assistance services. (5) [o]peration of Government-owned equipment, real property, and systems. (6) [c]ommunications services. (7) [a]rchitect-[e]ngineering …. (8) [t]ransportation and related services …. (9) [r]esearch and development.", "Certain transactions, by their nature, are not subject to the FAR. Notable examples of such transactions are\nany agency contract or agreement that is not a procurement contract (i.e., not a contract that uses appropriated funds to acquire property or services for the direct use of the United States), including \"other transactions\" (i.e., non-procurement contracts that authorized agencies may use for research and/or development of prototypes); grants and cooperative agreements; contracts with third parties entered into by persons using federal funds from a grant, cooperative agreement, or other federal financial assistance; purchases or leases of real property; and transactions where Congress has authorized a government entity to acquire goods or services \"notwithstanding any other provision of law.\"\nSubcontracts under federal contracts (i.e., contracts with third parties entered into by federal contractors) are also not subject to the FAR. In some cases, the FAR requires agencies to include terms in their prime contracts obligating their contractors to \"flow down\" certain requirements to subcontractors, so that subcontractors may be subject to certain requirements like those in the FAR as terms of their contracts. However, not all requirements flow down, and certain FAR provisions that pertain primarily to the conduct of procurements by executive branch agencies are inapplicable to subcontractors. For example, although federal agencies are generally required to provide for \"full and open competition\" in the selection of contractors, agency contractors are generally not required to provide for \"full and open competition\" in the selection of subcontractors.", "The various parts of the FAR contain somewhat different types of information, as illustrated below. In particular, Parts 1 through 51 establish policies, requirements, exceptions, practices, and procedures to guide members of the acquisition workforce in performing their responsibilities, while Parts 52 and 53 provide standard solicitation and contract clauses and forms. In addition, while much of the FAR is arguably process oriented (e.g., specifying how agencies may obtain full and open competition), the opening sections of the FAR articulate \"guiding principles\" for the federal acquisition system that arguably inform all other sections of the FAR and federal procurement generally (e.g., satisfying the customer, minimizing administrative operating costs).", "Contracting officers and other members of the acquisition workforce rely on the FAR for guidance on a wide range of topics, including acquisition planning, publicizing contract actions, required sources of supplies and services, and types of contracts. Additionally, the FAR provides definitions of words and terms used in government procurement.\nDepending upon the topic, the FAR may provide contracting officers with the government's basic policy, any requirements that agencies must meet, and any exceptions to these requirements. For example, Subpart 6.1 of the FAR articulates that, as a matter of policy, \"contracting officers shall promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government contracts,\" and identifies acceptable procedures for full and open competition (e.g., sealed bidding, competitive proposals). Subpart 6.3, in turn, identifies the circumstances in which other than full and open competition is permitted (e.g., only one responsible source, urgent and compelling circumstances). It also specifies the procedures and requirements for using other than full and open competition (e.g., contracting officers are generally required to justify their decision to use other than full and open competition, and obtain approval from a higher-ranking agency official).\nIn other cases, the FAR articulates general standards that agencies are to consider in making certain determinations, or the grounds upon which agencies may take certain actions. Thus, Part 9 of the FAR—which addresses \"contractor qualifications\"—specifies the \"general standards\" that contracting officers must consider when determining whether prospective contractors are responsible. It similarly describes the grounds upon which agency suspension and debarment officials may exclude persons from federal contracting for a temporary or fixed period. Other provisions of Part 9 describe how contracting officers may (or, in some cases, must) obtain information for use in making determinations regarding contractor qualifications (e.g., preaward surveys, the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System [FAPIIS], and the System for Award Management [SAM]).\nYet other provisions articulate the responsibilities of various agency personnel in administering the contract. Contract administration may include a variety of tasks and responsibilities depending on, for example, the type of contract and the goods or services acquired. Part 42 of the FAR provides guidance for contracting officers and other members of the acquisition team regarding audits, postaward orientations for contractors, production surveillance and reporting, and collection of contractor performance information, among other things. Additionally, a detailed list of 71 specific contract administration functions may be found in Section 42.302(a), which is to be used by the contract administration officer (CAO).", "Parts 52 and 53 differ from the other parts of the FAR in that they provide agencies with standard provisions and clauses to be included, or incorporated by reference, in the solicitation or contract, as well as forms for use during the acquisition process. Part 52 contains solicitation provisions and contract clauses prescribed elsewhere in the FAR. Each provision and clause has its own unique identification number. For example, the following provision is included in solicitations that involve an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 standard competition:\n(a) This solicitation is part of a standard competition under Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76 (Revised), Performance of Commercial Activities, dated May 29, 2003 (hereafter \"the Circular\"), to determine whether to accomplish the specified work under contract or by Government performance.\n(b) The Government will evaluate private sector offers, the agency tender, and public reimbursable tenders, as provided in this solicitation and the Circular.\n(c) A performance decision resulting from this standard competition will be publicly announced in accordance with the Circular. If the performance decision favors a private sector offeror, a contract will be awarded. If the performance decision favors an agency or a public reimbursable tender, the Contracting Officer shall establish, respectively, either a Most Efficient Organization letter of obligation or a fee-for-service agreement, as those terms are defined in the Circular.\n(d) As provided in the Circular, directly interested parties may file contests, which are governed by the procedures in Federal Acquisition Regulation 33.103. Until resolution of any contest, or the expiration of the time for filing a contest, only legal agents for directly interested parties shall have access to the certified standard competition form, the agency tender, and public reimbursable tenders.\nPart 53 contains standard, optional, and agency-prescribed acquisition forms, such as Standard Form 30, \"Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract\"; Optional Form 17, \"Offer Label\"; and DOD Form DD 254, \"Contract Security Classification Specification.\"", "In addition to providing procedures and requirements that, collectively, make up the procurement process, discussed above, the FAR also articulates guiding principles for the federal acquisition system (which includes performance standards), and describes the federal acquisition team and its roles and responsibilities. According to the FAR, the overarching vision of the acquisition system \"is to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public's trust and fulfilling public policy objectives.\" In brief, the four performance standards are:\n(a) [s]atisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service ...;\n(b) [m]inimize administrative operating costs;\n(c) [c]onduct business with integrity, fairness, and openness; and\n(d) [f]ulfill public policy objectives.\nAgency personnel—including \"representatives of the technical, supply, and procurement communities\" and \"the customers they serve\"—and contractors make up the acquisition team. Government members of the team \"must be empowered to make acquisition decisions within their areas of responsibility … [possess] the authority to make decisions … and be prepared to perform the functions and duties assigned.\" The contractor is also encouraged to be prepared for performance of the contract.", "The questions and answers in this section address the promulgation of the FAR, including the origins of the FAR; the process by which the FAR is amended; who typically promulgates regulations amending the FAR; the roles of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in revising and implementing the FAR; and how long it generally takes to amend the FAR.", "Prior to the establishment of the FAR system and the initial publication of the FAR, two primary procurement regulations existed: the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR) and the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR). Generally, the FPR applied to civilian agencies and the DAR applied to the Department of Defense (DOD) and its components, although the then-Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and Bonneville Power Administration, among others, each had \"semiautonomous procurement regulations.\" The proliferation of agency procurement regulations was such that, in its 1972 report, the Commission on Government Procurement stated that it had found \"a burdensome mass and maze of procurement and procurement-related regulations\" within the federal government, and \"no effective overall system for coordinating, controlling, and standardizing regulations.\"\nThe commission's report provided an impetus for bringing order to the \"mass and maze\" of procurement regulations. Notably, Congress enacted the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1979 ( P.L. 96-83 ), which amended the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act ( P.L. 93-400 ) to authorize the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to \"issue policy directives … for the purpose of promoting the development and implementation of the uniform procurement system.\" Subsequently, OFPP released Policy Letter 80-5. This document effectively established the \"Federal Acquisition Regulation System\" and stated that the system would include, among other things, \"[a] single Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), to be issued jointly by the General Services Administration, the Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, pursuant to their respective authorities\" under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, the Armed Services Procurement Act, and the National Aeronautics and Space Act.\nThe FAR was published initially on September 19, 1983, and took effect on October 1, 1984. It has been periodically amended since then, as discussed below (see \" Who Typically Promulgates Regulations Amending the FAR? \" and \" How Is the FAR Amended? \").", "The FAR was initially promulgated—and has subsequently been amended—using the same rulemaking procedures used in promulgating other regulations. In short, the Department of Defense (DOD), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), acting on behalf of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council), or the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), as discussed below (see \" Who Typically Promulgates Regulations Amending the FAR? \"), issue proposed and final rules amending the FAR under the \"notice-and-comment\" procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA established four basic requirements agencies must follow when issuing rules using notice-and-comment, or informal, rulemaking. These four steps are\n1. the publication of a proposed rule in the Federal Register ; 2. the opportunity for interested persons to submit comments on the proposed rule; 3. publication of a final rule that includes a \"concise general statement\" of the \"basis and purpose\" of the rule; and 4. a 30-day waiting period after the final rule is published in the Federal Register before the rule can take effect.\nIf necessary, agencies can invoke a \"good cause\" exception to some of these requirements. One particular application of the \"good cause\" exception is the use of interim final rulemaking. If an agency finds that notice and comment would be \"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest,\" the agency may issue a rule without prior notice and comment and instead take post-promulgation comments. The agency may choose to revise the rule in light of the post-promulgation comments it receives.\nIn addition to the APA, there are a number of executive orders and other statutes that may be applicable to the rulemaking process (for example, Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Unfunded Mandates Act, and the Congressional Review Act all have additional requirements agencies must follow when promulgating rules).", "The Federal Register notices proposing or announcing amendments to the FAR are jointly issued by the Department of Defense (DOD), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). These three agencies issue the Federal Register notices, in part, because federal statutes and regulations task the heads of these agencies with \"jointly issu[ing] and maintain[ing] … a single Government-wide procurement regulation, to be known as the Federal Acquisition Regulation.\" However, the amendments proposed and announced by DOD, GSA, and NASA have been arrived at by means of and with the concurrence of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council). This council—which consists of the Administrator of OFPP, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, and the Administrator of General Services, or their designees (see \" What Roles Do OFPP and OMB Play in Revising and Implementing the FAR? \") —is also tasked by statute with certain responsibilities as to the FAR. Specifically, the council is to \"assist in the direction and coordination of Government-wide procurement policy and Government-wide procurement regulatory activities in the Federal Government,\" as well as \"manage, coordinate, control, and monitor the maintenance of, issuance of, and changes in, the Federal Acquisition Regulation.\"\nIn practice, the FAR Council operates by referring potential changes to the FAR to one or more standing \"FAR teams,\" each of which is responsible for maintaining specific parts of the FAR. Each team is created by the FAR Council, and is composed of representatives from military and civilian agencies and advisory representatives from OFPP. The FAR teams are directed by the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council (CAAC) and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council (DAR Council), and their activities are coordinated to ensure agreement and cooperation between civilian and defense acquisition personnel. The relevant FAR team drafts and submits potential FAR amendments to the CAAC and the DAR Council for review. After the councils have reviewed a potential FAR amendment, they submit it to OFPP and OIRA for additional review. These are then sent to the FAR signatories within GSA, DOD, and NASA for approval before being published as proposed, interim final, or final rules in the Federal Register .\nThe Administrator of OFPP is also authorized to amend the FAR on his or her own if he or she determines that GSA, DOD, and NASA \"are unable to agree on or fail to issue Government-wide regulations.\" In practice, the Administrator of OFPP appears to have seldom exercised this authority after the initial promulgation of the FAR. However, the Administrator has periodically issued policy letters and notices pertaining to federal procurement, as discussed below (see \" Does the FAR Include All the Government's Procurement Policies? \").\nCongress does not itself amend the FAR, although it could enact legislation that could prompt the executive branch to amend the FAR. See \" What Can Congress Do to Prompt Amendment of the FAR? ,\" below.", "The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) provides overall direction for the government-wide procurement policies, regulations, procedures, and forms for executive agency acquisitions that make up the FAR. The Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy is responsible for directing the development of the procurement policies that are implemented, in part, by the FAR. The Administrator also establishes procedures to ensure that executive agencies are complying with the FAR.\nIn addition, the Administrator serves as the chair of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council), which \"assist[s] in the direction and coordination of Government-wide procurement policy and Government-wide procurement regulatory activities.\" The Secretary of Defense, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) are the other members of the FAR Council. In the event that these three members are unable to reach agreement regarding revisions to the FAR, the Administrator of OFPP has the authority to prescribe certain revisions without their concurrence, as discussed above (see \" Who Typically Promulgates Regulations Amending the FAR? \").\nThe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides oversight and review of proposed changes and amendments to the FAR. These responsibilities are largely carried out by OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Rules amending the FAR are subject to the same rulemaking requirements that are applicable to executive agencies, which typically include review by OIRA. Both OFPP and OIRA review proposed changes to the FAR to ensure that they are consistent with the law and policies of the Administration.\nThe Administrator of OFPP, in concurrence with the Director of OMB, may also deny or rescind any government-wide regulation or final rule of any executive agency relating to procurement if the Administrator determines that the regulation or rule is inconsistent with the policies, regulations, or procedures issued pursuant to the FAR.", "Depending upon how the regulation is promulgated (see \" How Is the FAR Amended? \"), the number of comments received upon a proposed change, and other factors, the process of amending the FAR can take anywhere from months to years (and, in some cases, a change is proposed, but not finalized). The FAR amendment could potentially take longer than any period prescribed in statute for the amendment, where amendment is required by statute. However, rules generally have the force of law even if they are enacted after any statutory deadline for their promulgation. Moreover, while agencies could potentially be compelled to take action in certain circumstances if they have \"unreasonably delayed,\" they have seldom, if ever, been compelled to issue procurement regulations. This is, in part, because congressional indications of how quickly an agency should proceed are only one factor in determining whether a delay in rulemaking is unreasonable and agency action should be compelled. Other factors include (1) whether a danger to human health is implicated by the delay; (2) the agency's competing priorities; (3) the interests prejudiced by the delay; and (4) whether the agency has treated the present party disparately from others. Certain of these factors (e.g., danger to human health, disparate treatment) would seldom be implicated in a procurement context.", "This section addresses the relationship between the FAR and other authorities governing federal procurement, including statutes, agency FAR supplements, other regulations, and executive branch policies and guidance.", "In addition to the FAR, there are a number of statutes that, directly or indirectly, address the acquisition of goods and services by executive branch agencies. The primary statutes governing federal procurement are the codifications in Titles 10 and 41 of the United States Code of the Armed Services Procurement Act and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, which, respectively, govern the procurements of defense and civilian agencies. However, a number of other statutes also apply, including the Anti-Kickback Act; Brooks Act of 1972, as amended; Buy American Act; Buy Indian Act; Contract Disputes Act; Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act; Davis-Bacon Act; Defense Production Act; Economy Act; Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act; Miller Act; Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act; Prompt Payment Act; Service Contract Act; Small Business Act; Trade Agreements Act; Truth in Negotiations Act; and Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act. In addition, there are a number of provisions within other statutes (e.g., national defense authorizations acts, appropriations acts) that address procurement.\nThe FAR implements many such statutory provisions, although, in some cases, other agency regulations may also implement particular statutory provisions (e.g., the Small Business Act), and the FAR must \"conform\" to the non-procurement regulations of other agencies (see below \" What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Other Regulations (i.e., Non-FAR Supplements)? \"). However, there are some procurement-related provisions in statute—especially in permanent provisions of appropriations laws —that are not reflected in the FAR or the agency FAR supplements discussed below (see \" What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Agency FAR Supplements? \"). These include, for example, statutory grounds for debarment, authorization to enter noncompetitive contracts related to hazardous fuels reduction activities, and certain restrictions upon the purchase of incandescent lamps.\nOn the other hand, because certain statutes grant the executive branch broad discretion to regulate federal contracting, there are provisions in the FAR that do not have a direct counterpart in federal statute. Examples include the grounds for administrative debarment and suspension, the requirement that contractors disclose \"credible evidence\" of certain offenses to federal officials, and the procedures surrounding the government's termination of contracts for convenience or default. Often the FAR provisions without direct statutory counterparts have developed in response to executive orders; judicial or other decisions; or policy recommendations.", "The FAR expressly authorizes agency heads to issue agency-specific procurement regulations that implement or supplement the FAR. These agency-specific regulations are codified in Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations , immediately following the FAR. A well-known example is the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which is found in chapter 2 of Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations .\nThere is a common misperception that agency FAR supplements differ significantly from the FAR and essentially create agency-unique procurement structures. This is generally not the case, particularly when a statute does not impose or authorize unique procurement requirements for an agency. Rather, absent agency-specific statutory requirements, agency-specific regulations may only be issued when necessary to implement FAR policies and procedures, or to supplement the FAR to meet the agency's specific needs. Further, the regulations may not conflict or be inconsistent with the FAR, except as required by law or if the agency has used an authorized deviation (see \" May Agencies Deviate from the FAR? \").\nThe FAR contains requirements that agencies must follow when promulgating agency-specific regulations. They include providing notice and comment in the Federal Register when required (e.g., if the regulations have a significant cost or administrative impact on contractors or offerors). Additionally, agencies must comply with such federal laws as the Paperwork Reduction Act and Regulatory Flexibility Act. See \" How Is the FAR Amended? ,\" above.", "Although the FAR and any agency FAR supplements, discussed above (see \" What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Agency FAR Supplements? \"), are intended to guide executive agencies in acquiring goods and services, they may not be the only regulations to address particular procurement-related topics. For example, regulations promulgated by the Department of Energy codified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations discuss the award and administration of energy savings performance contracts by federal agencies. These long-term contracts—which provide for the contractor to incur the costs of implementing energy savings measures in exchange for a share of any energy savings directly resulting from the measures—are also discussed in certain agency FAR supplements. However, Title 10 expressly provides that:\n[t]he provisions of this subpart are controlling with regard to energy savings performance contracts notwithstanding any conflicting provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and related Federal agency regulations.\nOther agency regulations directly or indirectly pertaining to federal procurement include those in Titles 13, 28, 29, and 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations , which, respectively, discuss contracting with small businesses; Federal Prison Industries/UNICOR; the Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Acts, and certain other labor provisions; and AbilityOne and contractors' anti-discrimination and affirmative action obligations.\nDepending upon the requirements of the underlying statute and, particularly, whom this statute charges with its implementation, the FAR provisions may need to \"conform\" to the provisions of another agency's regulations, or the FAR and any agency regulations may be issued with the \"concurrence\" of all agencies involved.", "Various procurement policies, requirements, and guidance are issued by OFPP or OMB as circulars, guides, memoranda, and policy letters. Some of these documents supplement material found in the FAR, while others cover subjects or issues not found in the FAR. For example, Policy Letter 11-01, \"Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions,\" addresses a topic also addressed in the FAR. Policy Letter 11-01 provides specific guidance regarding how agencies are to manage the performance of inherently governmental and other functions, while Subpart 7.5 of the FAR lists examples of functions that are considered to be inherently governmental, or that \"may approach being in that category because of the nature of the function, the manner in which the contractor performs the contract, or the manner in which the Government administers contractor performance.\" In contrast, other procurement topics are addressed by OFPP memoranda, but not covered in the FAR. Examples include Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act inventories, service contract inventories, and the quality of federal procurement data.", "This section includes questions and answers that address what Congress can do to prompt amendment of the FAR; what Congress can do if it disapproves of a potential amendment to the FAR; and the deference given to FAR provisions by judicial and other tribunals.", "As noted previously (see \" Who Typically Promulgates Regulations Amending the FAR? \"), Congress does not itself amend the FAR. However, Congress may prompt the executive branch to amend the FAR by doing one of two things. In some cases, Congress effectively prompts amendment of the FAR by enacting or amending a law implemented, in part, through the FAR. This law need not mention the FAR, or amendment of the FAR, for an amendment to ensue. In other cases, Congress explicitly directs that the FAR be amended. Sometimes, Congress also specifies that the FAR Council should make this amendment, or the time frame within which the amendment should be made (although not all FAR amendments required by Congress are made within the prescribed time frame, as discussed above, \" How Long Does It Take to Amend the FAR? \"). The first approach appears to be more common in situations where procurement or other statutes directly address the topic of the legislation, while the second approach tends to be used in situations where the FAR addresses topics not directly addressed in statute (see \" What Is the Relationship Between the FAR and Procurement or Other Statutes? \").\nHowever, as discussed previously (see \" Who Typically Promulgates Regulations Amending the FAR? \"), the FAR Council and OFPP may also amend the FAR without the enactment of procurement-related legislation or a congressional directive to do so. Some FAR amendments are initiated by the FAR Council, in particular, in response to policy concerns or litigation. In other cases, the FAR Council amends the FAR in response to an executive order directing the amendment of the FAR, or otherwise addressing procurement matters. Thus, committees and Members of Congress could also encourage the FAR Council or OFPP to use its authority to amend the FAR, or encourage the President to issue an executive order, provided that the proposed changes are within their authority.", "In certain circumstances, Congress may have concerns about a proposed or final amendment to the FAR, particularly one which may have resulted from executive branch action without express statutory authorization. Members of Congress may make such concerns known to the executive branch informally (e.g., via letters), or through the exercise of oversight, in the hope of prompting the abandonment or modification of the provisions in question. In some cases, however, Congress may also enact legislation that effectively or expressly forecloses certain amendments to the FAR. For example, Congress could enact legislation whose requirements would be inconsistent with certain potential amendments to the FAR, as happened in 2008, when Congress required that contracts for commercial items or performed overseas be subject to any \"mandatory disclosure rule\" promulgated by the FAR Council. Congress could also enact legislation that bars agencies from imposing certain requirements on contractors, or from using appropriated funds to implement specific rules, regulations, or executive orders pertaining to contract-related matters.\nIn addition, the Congressional Review Act (CRA) (5 U.S.C. §§801-808) provides Congress with the opportunity to overturn a final rule, including a rule that would amend the FAR, through the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. If passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, a joint resolution of disapproval results in the rule having no \"force or effect.\" Enacted in March 1996 as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) ( P.L. 104-121 ), the CRA contains expedited procedures for congressional consideration of such joint resolutions of disapproval.", "Like other regulations, FAR provisions represent agencies' constructions of the statutes which they implement. As such, judicial and other tribunals generally review the provisions of the FAR in light of Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council in determining whether these interpretations are entitled to deference (commonly known as \"Chevron deference\"). In Chevron , the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for review of an agency's construction of a statute which it administers: (1) Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue, and (2) If not, is the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute consistent with the purposes of the statute? \"[I]f the statute speaks clearly 'to the precise question at issue,'\" the tribunal \"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,\" regardless of what the agency regulation provides. However, where \"the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,\" the tribunal \"must sustain the [a]gency's interpretation if it is 'based on a permissible construction' of the Act.\"\nOver the years, certain FAR provisions have been upheld under Chevron on the grounds that Congress has not spoken directly to the precise question at issue, and the agency's interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the purposes of the underlying statute. However, other provisions have been found either to be contrary to the intent of Congress, as \"unambiguously expressed\" in statute; or to be based on an impermissible construction of the underlying statute. These provisions tend to be amended to conform to the underlying statute (although in some cases, the underlying statute has been amended to support a long-standing agency interpretation).\nIn contrast, individual agency interpretations of the FAR, issued in guidance or other documents, are not entitled to Chevron deference, although they may receive a lesser degree of deference. The extent of such deference is generally \"understood to vary with circumstances,\" such as \"the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and … the persuasiveness of the agency's position,\" as well as the \"writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertise, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other source of weight.\"", "This section includes questions and answers addressing the relationship between the FAR and a federal contract; whether FAR amendments apply to pre-existing contracts; and what happens if a contract clause which is required by the FAR is not included in a particular contract.", "The FAR applies only to federal agencies, while the contract applies to both the agency and the contractor. Thus, it is the provisions in the contract, not those in the FAR, that bind the contractor, although contract terms required by the FAR may be read into contracts which lack them in certain circumstances (see \" What Happens If Required Contract Clauses Are Not Included in a Particular Contract? \").\nWhile the FAR contains many standard terms and clauses, the details and specifics are left to the individual contract. For this reason, the drafting that occurs for each contract can be highly important. The interaction between the FAR and the contract is exemplified by the treatment of economic price adjustments. An economic price adjustment provides for the upward or downward revision of prices in a contract if certain conditions occur. The FAR provides that there are three general types of economic price adjustments: those based on established prices; those based on actual costs of labor or material; and those based on cost indexes of labor or material. When one of these price adjustments is to be used, the contract will then be drafted to address the specifics, such as identifying the events that will trigger the price adjustment, identifying the applicable indexes or established prices, and establishing the base levels.\nImportantly, while courts and other tribunals will generally interpret a statute or regulation, such as the FAR, by looking to its plain meaning, and not the drafters' intent, the intent of the parties to a contract could be found to prevail over its plain text in certain cases (e.g., other provisions of the contract evidence that the contract's language on a particular issue does not reflect their intentions). In addition, the enforcement of specific provisions of a contract could potentially be waived—or relinquished—by a party to the contract.", "Amendments to the FAR generally apply only to contracts entered into on or after the date of the amendment, not to pre-existing contracts (i.e., contracts whose terms have already been agreed upon). The FAR itself characterizes this as a \"convention.\" However, this convention is intended to shield the government from liability for breach of contract, which it could potentially incur were it to unilaterally amend the terms of an existing contract. Moreover, when the FAR change is prompted by a statute, this convention also reflects the fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that laws will not be given retroactive effect unless there is clear congressional intent to the contrary. A procurement-related statute could potentially be found to have retroactive effect if it purported to alter the parties' obligations under a contract whose terms had been agreed upon prior to the statute's enactment.", "Because the standard contract clauses are designed, in part, to protect the government's interests in the performance of the contract, the FAR generally requires that some variant of these clauses be either included or incorporated by reference in agency contracts. However, agencies have sometimes awarded contracts that lack a required clause, prompting questions about whether the requirements governed by that clause apply.\nIn certain circumstances, the courts and boards of contract appeals will \"read\" required clauses into contracts which lack them, treating the clause as a term of the contract despite its absence. The currently prevailing grounds for \"reading in\" clauses is that articulated by the former Court of Claims (here acting as a predecessor to the current U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States , wherein the court found that certain required contract terms allowing the government to terminate contracts for its convenience were to be read into contracts which lacked them because (1) the terms represented a \"deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy,\" and (2) federal regulations can \"fairly be read\" as permitting the clause to be read into the contract since they require agencies to incorporate the clause. Other required FAR clauses that have been read into government contracts under the \" Christian doctrine\" have included those allowing the government to terminate contracts for default; addressing protests after award; and governing contractors' use of government property. However, courts have declined to read in other clauses, often when the contractor (as opposed to the government) seeks to rely upon the missing, but required, clause. In other cases, courts have relied upon other grounds to read certain terms into government contracts, such as the theory that the government has an \"inherent right\" to terminate contracts for its convenience.", "This section addresses agency deviations from the FAR; the ability of third parties to enforce the terms of the FAR against a government contractor; the use of procurement techniques not expressly mentioned in the FAR; and whether agencies or transactions not subject to the FAR could be subject to requirements like those in the FAR.", "Agencies are authorized to deviate from the FAR under certain circumstances. A deviation involves agency noncompliance with a mandatory procurement regulation (e.g., using a solicitation provision or contract clause that is inconsistent with the FAR), in the absence of a statute expressly requiring or authorizing such noncompliance. Only those deviations authorized by the FAR are permitted. Contracting officers must use the Authorized Deviations in Provisions clause and the Authorized Deviations in Clauses clause to notify offerors and contractors when a solicitation or contract contains a deviation.\nDeviations may be granted (as discussed below) when necessary to meet the agency's specific needs and requirements, so long as not precluded by law, executive order, or regulation. The FAR recognizes two types of deviations: individual and class. Individual deviations affect only individual contract actions. They may generally be authorized by the agency head, with the contracting officer required to document the justification and agency approval in the contract file. Class deviations affect multiple contract actions. For civilian agencies (other than NASA), deviations may generally be authorized by agency heads or their designees after consultation with the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council (CAAC). Additionally, a copy of each class deviation must be provided to the FAR Secretariat. For DOD, the FAR provides that class deviations will be done in accordance with DFARS, which generally grants the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy the authority to issue them. If any agency requires a permanent class deviation, then it should propose a FAR revision when appropriate.\nAn example of a recent notable class deviation was the one that DOD issued regarding the System for Award Management (SAM) shortly after this database came into use. In anticipation of SAM's completion, the FAR and DFARS were amended to require contractors to use the database to meet initial registration and annual certification requirements. However, once SAM began to be used, people reported \"performance issues ... [that] affected the timely processing of awards.\" These issues prompted DOD to issue a class deviation permitting contractors to use alternative measures to meet their registration and certification requirements until the problems with SAM were resolved. DOD rescinded this deviation once SAM's \"performance issues ... [had] been corrected.\"", "The FAR authorizes acquisition team members to use any \"specific strategy, policy, or procedure\" not addressed by the FAR so long as the strategy, policy, or procedure is in the best interests of the government, and is not prohibited by statute, regulation, executive order, or case law. This means that agencies are not necessarily limited to the strategies or procedures expressly mentioned in the FAR, but rather may exercise some discretion in structuring procurements to meet agency circumstances and needs. For example, although the FAR nowhere mentions the use of reverse auctions, agencies' use of reverse auctions in source selection has been upheld on the grounds that \"a procurement procedure is permissible where not specifically prohibited.\"", "The ability of third parties to enforce the requirements of the FAR—or the terms of a government contract—against a contractor is generally limited, particularly if the third party is not a subcontractor under the federal contract. In some cases, persons harmed by the actions (or inaction) of a government contractor have alleged that the harm would not have occurred had the contractor complied with the requirements of the FAR (as incorporated in the contract, or otherwise), or that they should be entitled to recover for this harm because of the provisions of the FAR. For example, the plaintiffs in one case seeking to hold a federal contractor liable for the death of a third party, Baragona v. Kuwait & Gulf Link Transportation Company , alleged that they were \"third party beneficiaries\" of a FAR provision requiring government contractors to obtain insurance against certain liability claims by third parties, and that this clause \"effectively waive[d] a [foreign] contractor's ability to assert a personal jurisdiction defense.\" However, such allegations generally fail, as they did in Baragona , because plaintiffs who are not parties to a contract are generally seen to lack standing to enforce the contract's terms.", "Agencies and/or transactions that are not themselves subject to the FAR could potentially be subject to requirements like those in the FAR for several reasons. In some cases, the FAR implements, in part, a more broadly applicable statute, and the requirements of this underlying statute could be found to pertain to agencies and/or transactions that are not themselves subject to the FAR. For example, in a 2012 decision, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses must be accorded a price evaluation preference when the General Services Administration (GSA) acquires certain leasehold interests in real property even though such acquisitions are not subject to the FAR (see \" What Purchases Are Subject to the FAR? \"). GAO reached this conclusion because the Small Business Act, which governs price evaluation and other preferences for HUBZone small businesses, \"does not limit the type of contract to which it applies\" (unlike the FAR, which applies only to procurement contracts). Because the Small Business Act \"broadly applies to all federal contracts that involve full and open competition,\" and a lease of real property is a contract, GAO rejected GSA's assertion that price evaluation preferences for HUBZone small businesses are required only in procurements of goods and services (i.e., procurements subject to the FAR).\nIn other cases, statutes impose requirements like those implemented, in part, by the FAR on entities or transactions that are not subject to the FAR. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, for example, imposed \"Buy American\" requirements upon certain grant recipients, and \"Davis Bacon\" requirements upon certain loan recipients, who would not have been subject to these requirements pursuant to the FAR or the statutes that the FAR, in part, implements. In yet other cases, an agency adopts regulations or guidance with provisions modeled on or akin to those in the FAR, as noted previously (see \" What Agencies Are Subject to the FAR? \"). For example, GSA has adopted certain FAR provisions \"as a matter of policy\" in its regulations regarding leases of real property. Similarly, the procurement guidelines of the U.S. Postal Service include a \"Suspensions and Delay\" clause like that in the FAR, while the Senate Procurement Regulations include provisions on the ratification of unauthorized commitments like those in the FAR." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "h1_full", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "h2_title", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "h2_full", "", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "", "h0_title h2_title", "h2_full", "h0_full", "", "h2_title h3_title", "h3_full", "h2_full", "", "h3_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the scale of the federal government's purchasing power?", "To what are these acquisitions subject?", "What specifically might Members and committees of Congress consider?", "What is the FAR?", "With what might the FAR provide contracting officers?", "What else does the FAR stipulate?", "Why does FAR exist?", "How has FAR changed since it took effect?", "How are revisions made?", "How are amendments applied to FAR contracts?", "How much authority does FAR have over good and service acquisitions?", "What other entities govern good and service acquisitions?", "Why are these other authorities useful?", "What binds the acquisitions contract?" ], "summary": [ "The federal government is the largest buyer of goods and services in the world, and executive branch agencies—particularly the Department of Defense—make most of these purchases.", "Many (although not all) acquisitions by executive branch agencies are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which can make the FAR a topic of interest to Members and committees of Congress and their staff.", "In particular, Members, committees, and staff may find themselves (1) considering or drafting legislation that would amend the FAR to save money, promote transparency, or further other public policies; (2) conducting oversight of executive agencies' performance in procuring goods and services; and (3) responding to questions from constituents regarding executive branch procurement activities. In addition, certain commentators have recently suggested that some or all FAR provisions should be withdrawn.", "The FAR is a regulation, codified in Parts 1 through 53 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which generally governs acquisitions of goods and services by executive branch agencies. It addresses various aspects of the acquisition process, from acquisition planning to contract formation, to contract management.", "Depending upon the topic, the FAR may provide contracting officers with (1) the government's basic policy (e.g., small businesses are to be given the \"maximum practicable opportunity\" to participate in acquisitions); (2) any requirements agencies must meet (e.g., obtain full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures); (3) any exceptions to the requirements (e.g., when and how agencies may waive a contractor's exclusion); and (4) any required or optional clauses to be included, or incorporated by reference, in the solicitation or contract (e.g., termination for convenience).", "The FAR also articulates the guiding principles for the federal acquisition system, which include satisfying the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered goods and services; minimizing operating costs; conducting business with integrity, fairness, and openness; and fulfilling public policy objectives. In addition, the FAR identifies members and roles of the \"acquisition team.\"", "The FAR is the result of a 1979 statute directing the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to \"issue polic[ies] … for the purpose of promoting the development and implementation of [a] uniform procurement system.\" Partly in response to this directive, the FAR was issued in 1983, and took effect in 1984.", "It has been revised frequently since then, in response to legislation, executive orders, litigation, and policy considerations.", "These revisions are generally made by the Administrator of General Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, acting on behalf of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council. However, the Administrator of OFPP also has the authority to amend the FAR in certain circumstances.", "FAR amendments generally apply only to contracts awarded after the effective date of the amendment.", "While the FAR contains the principal rules of the federal acquisition system, it is not the only authority governing acquisitions of goods and services by executive branch agencies.", "Statutes, agency FAR supplements, other agency regulations, and guidance documents may also apply.", "In some cases, these sources cover topics not covered in the FAR, and sometimes the FAR addresses topics not expressly addressed in statute or elsewhere.", "In addition, it is the contract (not the FAR) that binds the contractor, although judicial and other tribunals may read terms required by the FAR into contracts which lack them." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, 0, 1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3 ] }
GAO_GAO-15-9	{ "title": [ "Background", "Most Selected Agencies Reported Lower Rates of Official Time Use but the Potential for Underreporting Exists", "Usage Rates Are Trending Lower but Total Hours Used Overall Increased between Fiscal Years 2006 and 2013", "Agencies Reported Relatively Small Numbers of Employees Charged Official Time in Fiscal Year 2013", "Use of an Alternative Methodology Could Improve Future Official Time Cost Estimates", "OPM’s Cost Estimate Does Not Align with Best Practices", "Cross-Checking OPM’s Cost Estimate Can Yield a More Reliable Estimate", "OPM’s Cost Estimate Lacked Documentation", "Little Agency Data Exist on Non-payroll Costs", "While OPM Reports on Its Own Initiative, It May Be Missing an Opportunity to Improve Official Time Reporting", "Agencies’ Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) Most Often Specify Reasonable Time as Approach to Manage Official Time, and Primary Oversight is Generally Left to Immediate Supervisors", "Reasonable Time Approach Most Often Used to Manage Official Time", "Agencies Reported Immediate Supervisors Generally Have Lead in Monitoring Official Time, and Most Took Additional Steps", "Agency Management and Union Officials Cited Similar Benefits on Official Time", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Official Time Hours and Rates Reported by 10 Selected Agencies for Fiscal Years 2006 Through 2013", "Appendix III: OPM Reporting on Official Time, Fiscal Years 2002 - 2012", "Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management", "Appendix V: Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The Statute provides a legal basis for the current federal labor and management relations program and establishes two sources of official time. Official time for, both, collective bargaining and Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA)-related activities, such as negotiations, attendance at impasse proceedings, and participation in proceedings before the FLRA, is provided as a statutory right. Official time for other purposes must be negotiated between the agency and the union in an agreed-upon amount deemed reasonable, necessary, and in the public interest. However, activities that relate to internal union business, such as the solicitation of members or the election of union officials, must be performed when in a non-duty status; that is, not on official time.\nIn a 1979 report, we recommended that OPM (1) clarify its recordkeeping requirements then in effect for capturing time spent on representational activities, and (2) direct agencies to comply with those requirements. Following our report, in 1981, OPM issued Federal Personnel Manual Letter 711-161. The letter stated that, no later than January 1, 1982, federal agencies activate a recordkeeping system to capture official time charges to representational activities. But the letter did not require agencies to report the yearly time charges to OPM, as we had recommended. As a result, OPM never consolidated the amount of time charged government-wide to union activities and has no information on agencies’ compliance with the recordkeeping requirement. When the Federal Personnel Manual was abolished in 1994, all recordkeeping requirements regarding time spent on union activities were rescinded.\nIn a 1997 report accompanying an appropriations bill, the House Appropriations Committee requested that OPM provide a one-time report on the total hours of official time spent on representational activities, number of employees who used official time, and related costs (salary, office space, equipment, and telephone) covering the first 6 months of calendar year 1998. In response, OPM reported that a total of 23,965 federal employees used approximately 2.2 million hours during the 6- month sample period. OPM estimated the cost of this time at about $48 million. OPM also reported that 946 of these employees (or 4 percent) worked 100 percent of the time in a representational capacity. OPM has prepared reports on official time usage since fiscal year 2002 and most recently for the period covering fiscal year 2012.", "", "Seven of 10 selected agencies reported lower official time rates in fiscal year 2013 compared to fiscal year 2006, as shown in table 2 below. Official time rates indicate the number of official time hours expended per BU employee and allow for meaningful comparison of official time usage over time. For seven agencies, declines in official time charges per BU employee ranged from about 30 minutes or less at several agencies to 2- 1/2 fewer hours per BU employee at one agency. The remaining three agencies—including DHS, DOT, and SSA—reported increased official time rates. An analysis of the average annual rate of official time use was somewhat higher but showed a similar pattern for the same seven agencies with annual declines and three agencies with annual increases.\nOverall, the total number of official time hours charged as reported by the 10 selected agencies was higher in fiscal year 2013 when compared to fiscal year 2006, as shown in table 3 below. In fiscal year 2013, the 10 selected agencies in our review reported that BU employees charged a total of 2,485,717 hours to official time, an increase of 25 percent compared to the 1,991,089 hours these agencies reported for fiscal year 2006. We found that half of the agencies reported using more official time hours in fiscal year 2013 than in fiscal year 2006 (see figure 1 for the interactive graphic, which represents each individual agency’s official time rate and hours reported for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2013).\nOPM and agencies attributed changes in usage to several reasons. According to OPM, factors that have contributed to the changes in official time use in previous years include: an emphasis by agencies on accurately documenting official time changes in the number of BU employees; changes in the amount of mid-term and term collective bargaining; variation in the use of labor-management forums; and hours.\nA number of agencies cited similar factors. For example, RRB attributed changes in usage to the age of its CBA with the American Federation of Government Employees labor union, which is almost 30 years old. Thus, the agency has not had any nationwide negotiations during the time period which might have required a large number of official time hours. NSF reported a lower number of charged official time hours in mid-term negotiations (284 to 110), dispute resolution (203 to 93), and general labor-management relations (978 to 691). NSF officials informed us that their official time tally of hours was incomplete for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 because the agency transitioned to a different time and attendance system, which we will explain more fully later in this report.\nOther agencies cited factors such as increases in the amount of negotiations or general labor-management relations areas impacting changes in use of official time. For example, DOT officials pointed out that the increase in official time charges per BU employee was spent improving labor management relations and internal business processes, and not litigating disputes. They noted that the agency’s spike in official time rate between fiscal years 2006 and 2007 may be related to possible underreporting in fiscal year 2006. This made a subsequent return to better accuracy appear to be a sharp increase in fiscal year 2007. Most of DOT’s increased reporting of official time was also in the general labor- management relations category. The agency reported 66,736 hours in fiscal year 2006 compared to 230,080 hours reported in that category for fiscal year 2013. According to DOT, the agency’s increase since fiscal year 2006 in the use of official time in the general labor-management relations category resulted in turn from increased collaboration between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its unions, primarily the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). NATCA is FAA’s largest BU and accounts for the majority of official time used by FAA’s union representatives. In 2009, FAA and NATCA renegotiated their 2006 CBA.\nDHS, with the highest percentage increase of official time hours charged, also had the biggest percentage increase of BU employees. DHS reported its largest increases in official time hours in the general labor- management relations category, from 25,785 hours in fiscal year 2006 to 185,509 hours in fiscal year 2013, and also in the mid-term negotiations category, from 3,416 to 11,045. According to DHS, several factors contributed to the agency’s increased use of official time hours during the period. For the first time, the recognition of a BU within the Transportation Security Administration increased the overall DHS number of BU employees by more than 40,000 from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012. In addition, DHS officials said that the establishment of labor- management forums contributed to official time usage fluctuations during the period. Agency officials explained that as more forums were established and became more active, the hours expended grew. DHS also cited budget reductions, sequestration, and furloughs as factors that led to increases in the general labor-management relations hours reported, as briefings and meetings with the unions were necessary to keep them informed of how DHS components would address shortfalls, avoid or mitigate planned furloughs, and contingency plans for the potential lapse of future appropriations. In addition, DHS explained that there was also a corresponding increase in mid-term bargaining hours reported as unions exercised their right to negotiate based on the notices they received regarding these matters.\nAgency officials told us of instances where agencies may have underreported the number of official time hours. Several agencies explained particular internal circumstances that impacted agencies’ ability to accurately record the number of official time hours charged. For example, NSF officials told us that the agency transferred its official time reporting to a different time and attendance system during the middle of fiscal year 2012. Because of the transition, it did not capture all official time charges for parts of fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013. NSF does not have a mechanism to retroactively collect incomplete official time data for these years. A Commerce official told us that one of its components does not report official time using the same transactional codes as other components use. As a result, the component had more than 24,000 hours of official time for fiscal year 2013 that was not accounted for in EHRI. According to the official, Commerce is negotiating a change in the CBAs with the three affected unions to report official time using the same transactional codes that the other components use. In addition, a recent GAO report found that official time activities at VA were recorded as administrative leave because the agency’s current time and attendance system does not have a code to capture official time separately. VA officials told us that the agency is implementing a new time and attendance system, the Veterans Affairs Time and Attendance System (VATAS), which will capture official time usage. According to a VA official, the agency has not collected official time data through VATAS because of system issues they are addressing. The officials said VA does not have a time frame for when VATAS will be in use department-wide.\nIn addition, we found that some agencies, such as DHS, SSA, and Commerce, vary in how they report hours charged to labor management forum meetings conducted under Executive Order 13522. Executive Order 13522 was designed to establish a cooperative and productive form of labor-management relations but does not specify how agencies should treat labor management forum meetings for time and attendance purposes. Some agencies consider this time as official time and others as duty time. For example, DHS reported that it advises its components that time used in relationship to these meetings is to be included as official time under the general labor management category. On the other hand, we were told by an SSA official that SSA considers time spent on labor management forum meetings as duty time. Commerce reported that time spent at labor management forum meetings, depending on the particular agency component, is sometimes charged to official time and other times charged as regular duty time.", "In total for fiscal year 2013, the 10 selected agencies reported that less than 2 percent of BU employees from the 10 agencies charged official time hours. As shown in table 4, the percentage of BU employees who charged official time at the ten agencies ranged from less than 0.01 percent at VA to 7.5 percent at DOT.\nAs shown in table 5 below, 8 of our 10 selected agencies reported that a small number of employees charged 100 percent of their duty time to official time in fiscal year 2013. We found that each of these eight agencies have CBAs in place that authorize certain union officials to charge 100 percent of their time to official time. VA, the largest of our 10 selected agencies with about 265,000 BU employees spread among 18 unions and approximately 200 facilities, reported the highest number of employees, 259, that charged 100 percent of their time to official time in fiscal year 2013. Treasury and DHS were next with 44 and 43 of their respective 2,046 and 2,960 total official time users charging 100 percent official time. NSF and SSA reported no employees charged 100 percent of their duty time to official time in fiscal year 2013.", "", "OPM did not implement key practices needed to develop a reliable cost estimate of official time. Specifically, OPM’s cost estimate is not reliable because it lacks assurance of its accuracy and also lacks adequate documentation.\nOPM could have greater assurance of the accuracy of its cost estimate if it cross-checked its results using an alternative methodology to determine whether the results are similar. Since OPM had not published a cost estimate for fiscal year 2013, we replicated OPM’s methodology for fiscal year 2012 and applied the methodology to fiscal year 2013 EHRI salary data to facilitate a comparison of cost estimates for fiscal year 2013. Basing estimates on an assessment of most likely costs enhances accuracy. Best practices for high-quality cost estimates incorporate cross- checking with an alternative methodology to see if the results are similar. If the results are not similar, the methodologies should be reconciled. As described below, our comparison of the cost estimates generated by the two methodologies revealed different results.", "OPM has historically estimated annual official time costs by using a simple computation—multiplying each agency’s average salary (as reported in EHRI) for BU employees covered by official time activities by the agency’s total reported official time hours. We computed our own cost estimate for the 6 of our 10 selected agencies who report data through EHRI using an alternative methodology that used actual salary data of BU employees who charged official time and multiplied this amount by the We agency total reported official time hours used for each employee.found that our cost estimate for the 6 agencies yielded an estimate that was about $5 million more than the estimate using OPM’s methodology ($61 million versus $56 million, or a difference of about 9 percent). Further, cost estimates using GAO’s methodology at 4 of the 6 agencies were higher by 15 percent or more than the estimates using OPM’s methodology (see table 6). As a result, OPM’s cost estimate for government-wide use of official time could be higher or lower if this methodology were applied to all reporting agencies rather than the 6 agencies used here.\nOPM officials said reporting on official time is not a priority at this time and they have used the same methodology for preparing its estimate since fiscal year 2002. According to these officials, the publication of reports on official time is impacted by available resources, such as staff time, and the consideration of other mission priorities. OPM told us it produces the official time reports as a resource to help inform agencies, unions, and the public on the granting and use of official time. DOL and SSA officials reported that OPM’s reports were useful because they provide a perspective on agency usage levels. One agency said it uses the reports to support negotiations with unions. Other agencies may benefit similarly from OPM reporting on official time. In addition, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) has previously referenced OPM reports in a recent case.\nUse of other methodologies by OPM may result in more representative estimates of actual costs and OPM may be able to provide better information to help Congress oversee the use of official time and help agencies manage this activity.", "OPM’s cost estimate for official time lacked adequate documentation because OPM could not initially provide a reasonable amount of documentation on its methodology for producing the cost estimate so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with the program could quickly replicate the process and produce the same results. A credible cost estimate is supported by detailed documentation that describes how it was derived. The methodology used to derive cost estimates should be thoroughly documented so that results are replicable. We requested documentation but the agency was unable to produce it. For example, we submitted several requests to OPM to understand significant assumptions about the cost estimate. However, OPM was unable to provide documentation that guides its estimation process. Accordingly, we developed a summary of our understanding of OPM’s steps for producing the estimate based on discussions and e-mails between us and OPM. For example, after several inquiries about its methodology, OPM provided information about filters it applies for computing the number of BU employees when finalizing the number used to compute salary costs. The filters OPM uses could impact the average salary and total count of BU employees which are key factors in computing agency total salary costs. We recognize that the methodology OPM uses can be considered a relatively straightforward and reasonable labor equation. However, that is all the more reason that OPM should be able to have its methodology readily available so an independent analyst could quickly recreate its results.", "Four of our 10 selected agencies reported that they collected data on non-payroll costs such as travel, office space, telephone service, or related costs. Among these four agencies, the type of data collected varied by agency. The other six agencies said they did not collect or track data on non-payroll costs. SSA is required to report on non-payroll costs Each year since related to official time to its appropriations committee.1998, SSA has reported official time costs (hours, dollar value of payroll costs, travel and per diem, office space, telephones and supplies, associated interest, and arbitration expenses) to the House Appropriations Committee. For fiscal year 2013, SSA reported that its unions’ representational activity costs were $14.6 million, of which $12.6 million were for salary and benefits, $700,000 for travel and per diem, $1.1 million for office space, telephones, and supplies, and the remainder split among interest and arbitration expenses.\nDOL reported that it tracks non-payroll costs for its unions; however, the specific types of costs tracked vary by union. For example, DOL reported office annual rent ($54,000) costs for one union and reported travel ($268,000) and communication ($6,000) costs for another union for fiscal year 2013. Another agency, Treasury, reported that IRS, the agency’s largest bureau with approximately 100,000 employees, has different needs and practices than some of Treasury’s smaller bureaus and finds it useful to track administrative costs attributable to official time—union office space and travel cost—to support agency proposals when negotiating with the union, and for responding to outside inquiries. HHS reported it has systems enabling it to track travel costs related to official time. Further, the organizational units within HHS maintain records and can generate reports for costs such as office space rentals and services such as computers, telephones, and copiers.", "According to OPM, the agency issues reports on agency use of official time on its own initiative to assist agencies with ensuring accountability in labor-management relations. Specifically, in a memorandum to agency and department heads on June 17, 2002, OPM requested each agency to report by the end of each fiscal year on the number of hours of official time used by employees to perform representational activities. The first agency submissions were due to OPM by October 31, 2002, covering fiscal year 2002. Since fiscal year 2004, OPM has asked agencies to report official time hours used in the four predefined categories of term negotiating, mid-term negotiating, dispute resolution, and general labor In addition, fiscal year 2009 was the first time management relations.\nOPM relied upon agency official time usage data extracted from EHRI. OPM officials told us that they expected to publish reports for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 by the end of fiscal year 2014 to the extent that data is available and validated by agencies during this time period. Subsequently, however, OPM informed us that fiscal year 2013 data has not been available and validated for all agencies, and that, accordingly, OPM released a report for fiscal year 2012 on October 3, 2014.\nEHRI collects data from the various payroll providers on official time used in the agencies serviced by the payroll providers. However, according to OPM, some agencies have not transitioned to reporting official time via the categories included in electronic payroll systems and must still provide the official time data to OPM manually. Four of our 10 selected agencies provided fiscal year 2011 official time data to OPM manually— VA, DOL, HHS, and SSA.\nOPM produces reports on government-wide use despite having no reporting requirement for official time. OPM prepares for reporting on official time data by asking agencies to verify data that the agencies have previously provided to OPM through the EHRI database. Between fiscal years 2009 and 2012, OPM relied on data extracted from EHRI to prepare its annual reports on official time, but took an additional step in the process by asking agencies to verify the data reported through EHRI. As mentioned earlier, EHRI collects agency data on official time from the various payroll providers. Agencies transmit payroll data that include information on official time hours to payroll providers based upon agencies’ time and attendance data. According to OPM officials, the verification is a time and labor intensive process.\nOPM asks agencies to verify information such as number of hours used in each of the four categories of official time use and total hours. Agencies may confirm OPM’s numbers or make changes based on the agencies’ data. When there are differences, OPM relies on the data verified and provided by the agencies to prepare its report. OPM does not follow up with individual agencies who submitted revised usage data to (1) determine the source of the differences, or (2) identify steps for improvements to future reporting through EHRI.\nAs shown in table 7, we found differences between OPM’s EHRI data and agency data reported to us on total official time hours charged in fiscal year 2013 for the 6 of our 10 selected agencies that report through EHRI. As mentioned earlier, 4 of our 10 agencies provide official time data to OPM manually—VA, DOL, HHS, and SSA.\nInternal control standards dictate that management obtains relevant data from reliable internal and external sources on a timely basis. Federal financial accounting standards stress that reliable information on the costs of federal programs or activities is crucial for effective management of government operations. The standards explain Congress needs cost information to evaluate program performance, to make program authorization decisions, and to compare alternative courses of action. Moreover, OPM’s guidelines instruct the agency on the importance of pursuing high-quality data and reliable information on program costs. Specifically, according to OPM’s Information Quality Guidelines, the agency is to maximize the quality of the information it disseminates.\nAccording to OPM officials, OPM does not know if agencies’ reported official time hours are accurate. The officials told us generally, at least half of the about 50 agencies that report official time data through EHRI revise their official time hours through the report validation process. However, OPM does not know why agencies submit such changes and does not request explanatory information. Several of our selected agencies that report through EHRI provided reasons why there may be differences. For example, DOT officials explained that DOT collects the official time data by pay period using pay codes entered by the employee on their timecard and reflects amendments to previous pay periods. They explained that because the pay periods do not begin and end on the first and last day of the fiscal year, the numbers provided may not match the numbers provided by OPM and that unless the timeframe between the collection by OPM and DOT are exact, there is a potential for differences. Commerce told us that the amount of official time reported by EHRI is not as accurate as what they report because EHRI includes official time that should not be reported (e.g., official time for employees not covered by title 5 U.S.C., specifically, foreign service employees).\nTo date, OPM has not sought to determine reasons for discrepancies between EHRI and agency reported data. By not following up with agencies on data differences, OPM may be missing an opportunity to improve data quality on agency reporting through EHRI and enable a less labor intensive and more efficient process.", "CBAs contain provisions by which agencies manage official time. Typically, an agreement outlines the approach, types of activities that are allowed and not allowed, and internal controls, such as the supervisory approval process and practices for verifying authorized employees who perform representational duties.\nSince agencies and unions can negotiate at the department, component, bureau, operating administration, facility, or local level, there can be variations in how official time is managed within an agency. For example, within VA there are 18 unions with 18 CBAs representing about 265,000 BU employees. VA has several components that encompass more than 200 facilities. On the other hand, NSF has one union with one CBA representing more than 900 BU employees that are located at a single facility.\nOur review of 173 CBAs from the 10 agencies found that agencies manage official time using three different approaches or a combination of two or more approaches. These include:\nBank of hours: Specified number of hours or a limit (i.e., not-to- exceed) on the number of hours authorized for representational activities;\nDesignated positions: Specified percentage or number of hours authorized for a designated position, such as the President, Vice- President, Secretary, or Treasurer, and is typically characterized as a percentage of an employee’s total time, such as 50 or 100; and\nReasonable time: No specified number or percentage of hours for representational activities (i.e., an agreement may state that a reasonable amount of time will be granted to a union representative to accomplish representational duties).\nOfficial time for certain representational activities is provided as a statutory right. Therefore, if a BU has exhausted its allotted bank of hours of official time for representational activities before the calendar or fiscal year ends, it may negotiate additional time with the agency, or otherwise receive additional time, as appropriate. DHS officials told us that if their unions used up their allotted bank of hours, additional time would be granted for union representatives to attend FLRA-mandated hearings. In addition, one of DOT’s CBAs includes language that additional time may be requested and approved on a case-by-case basis.", "A majority of CBAs at 8 of the 10 agencies contained provisions directing agencies to use the “reasonable time” approach—one that is not defined in terms of specific hours—to manage official time for representational duties. As shown in table 8, 141 of 173 CBAs, or 82 percent, we reviewed Of the 141 contained provisions for using the reasonable time approach.CBAs that specified the reasonable time approach, 64 used reasonable time exclusively while the remaining 77 used it in combination with another approach, such as a bank of hours, designated positions, or both.\nFor example, Commerce, DHS, DOL, DOT, HHS, Treasury, and VA have CBAs that contained all three approaches to manage official time. Some of them included reasonable time for union representatives to conduct representational activities, designated percentages or hours of official time for union officers, and a separate bank of hours for travel or training activities.\nThe second most frequently used approach to manage official time was through a bank of hours. Our review found that 93 of 173 CBAs, or 54 percent, in nine agencies contained a provision for using a bank of hours to conduct representational activities. Of the 93 CBAs that utilized a bank of hours, 16 specified using a bank of hours exclusively while 77 created a bank of hours in combination with other approaches. Depending on the size of the agency and BU, the number of hours allotted to the bank can vary. For instance, a smaller agency, NSF, included a provision for a bank of 1,040 hours per year. Larger agencies have a wide range of hours allotted to the bank. For instance, one of DHS’s CBAs included a provision for a bank of 30,000 hours per fiscal year, while one of SSA’s CBAs allotted a bank of 250,000 hours per fiscal year for all representational activities.\nThe least often used approach by agencies involved designated positions with authorized percentages or hours of official time. Of the 49 CBAs that contained a provision for designated positions, 1 CBA at Treasury specified using the designated positions approach exclusively and 48 CBAs at eight other agencies used it in combination with other approaches. We found 27 CBAs at nine agencies that provided for at least one union official to charge up to 100 percent of their duty hours to official time. These agencies include: Commerce, DHS, DOL, DOT, HHS, RRB, SSA, Treasury, and VA.", "All agencies we reviewed reported that immediate supervisors generally have the primary responsibility of approving official time requests and monitoring use when they sign off on their designated employee’s timecards. For example, DOL and HHS require immediate supervisors to monitor and verify official time use for employees under their supervision and also submit official time hours to their human resources office periodically, which are then compiled for OPM’s Official Time Reports. One of DHS’s components, the United States Coast Guard, provides labor-management relations program guidance and training to educate immediate supervisors on official time procedures, rights, and responsibilities to ensure that the provisions for official time are administered appropriately as specified in relevant CBAs. NSF also provides training sessions and best practice discussions with all supervisors responsible for approving official time.\nIn addition to the supervisory process, some of the agencies’ labor relations offices have a responsibility to monitor official time. For example, the labor relations office at DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration receives official time requests and also monitors and verifies official time usage. Similarly, DOT’s Federal Transit Administration requires union representatives to seek approval from immediate supervisors and the labor relations officer to use official time. NSF’s Labor Relations Officer monitors official time usage quarterly to determine whether it is being used within the confines of the CBA.\nEight of 10 agencies reported taking additional steps to monitor official time. Similar to agency approaches for managing official time, agency internal controls practices for monitoring official time varied at the eight agencies because they are negotiated at the exclusive level of recognition, such as components, bureaus, operating administrations, and facilities. As shown in table 9, agency practices may include: (1) comparing authorized versus actual individuals charging official time; (2) comparing requests for official time versus actual official time used; (3) verifying that actual official time use does not exceed authorized amounts through internal reports used by agency management to monitor usage; and (4) verifying accuracy of official time usage by sharing internal reports with authorized individuals, such as union representatives. DHS and VA reported that they do not use any additional practices besides the monitoring performed by the immediate supervisor.\nOf the four practices, agencies we reviewed most often used the list of authorized union representatives to compare it against those who charged official time. For example, DOT, HHS, NSF, and Treasury reported that they provide a list of authorized official time users to supervisors who are responsible for ensuring that their employees are authorized to charge official time prior to approving timesheets. SSA’s internal official time tracking system has built-in capabilities that would only allow authorized union representatives to request official time and enter the actual amount used. Commerce partially addressed this practice because only some of its bureaus reported that they used the list to cross-verify. For example, Census reported that officials pull reports each pay period to verify whether an employee should have charged the official time category while the National Institute of Science and Technology’s Labor Relations Manager spot checks time and attendance records of union representatives, using the most recent list of authorized employees on file with the agency.\nInternal reports used to verify that authorized individuals did not exceed their authorized amounts were the second most-often-used practice reported by agencies to monitor official time use. For example, NSF used internal reports to ensure that the total amount of official time hours was appropriately credited towards the bank as outlined in its CBA. SSA used internal reports generated from its official time tracking system, which was programmed to ensure that the time requested by union representatives and approved by immediate supervisors matches the actual time used. In addition, the system does not allow users to exceed their authorized amounts of official time as negotiated in the CBAs. Commerce and DOT used this practice as well but not all of their bureaus or operating administrations reported that they used internal reports for cross- verification. For example, one of Commerce’s bureaus, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, reported that it periodically runs internal reports on usage and tracks overall use through the official time categories. Unions that have an allotted bank of hours typically authorize who can use official time and the amount. According to DOT, only one of its operating administrations reported using internal reports to verify that authorized individuals did not exceed their authorized amounts because official time is drawn from a bank of hours. DOT reported that internal reports were unnecessary for other operating administrations that use the reasonable time approach. Regardless of the approaches used, having internal reports would enable agencies to gauge overall usage, ensure that individuals did not exceed what they were authorized to use, and provide reasonable assurance that use of official time is as intended.\nOPM is a member of a forum of agencies that exchange information on issues related to labor management relations. According to OPM officials, the Employee Labor Relations (ELR) network is an informal group of agency headquarters labor and employee relations practitioners who have ongoing communication through face-to-face meetings and e-mail distribution. OPM said it uses the ELR network to share information on policies, significant third-party decisions, and best practices. According to one agency official, the ELR network plans to discuss official time reporting as an agenda item. This council could be an avenue for OPM to work with agencies on reporting issues for agency use of official time. While informal, the ELR network presents an opportunity for OPM to share information on monitoring and reporting practices for agency use of official time.\nInternal control guidance prescribes management to perform ongoing monitoring through regular management and supervisory activities, comparisons, and reconciliations. Monitoring is essential for assessing the extent of performance over time. OPM officials have stated that matters relating to official time use are governed by the law and negotiated between agencies and unions. Consistent with the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, OPM has no statutory or regulatory role for monitoring or enforcing agencies’ use of official time.Consequently, OPM officials said they do not share information on monitoring practices.\nBy not sharing monitoring practices among agencies, OPM may be missing an opportunity to help agencies strengthen their internal controls for monitoring the use of official time and increase transparency and accountability.", "While we described earlier in this report costs associated with official time, agency management and union officials also cited what they considered to be some benefits of official time. Specifically, agency management and union officials at three selected agencies—SSA, Treasury, and VA—told us about several benefits related to official time, such as (1) improving labor-management relations, and (2) reducing agency costs. Similar benefits were also cited in our September 1997 report, which surveyed 30 federal agencies on how resources were used for employee union activities. First, according to both management and union officials, official time has helped improve labor-management relations between management and unions because they work jointly to develop solutions or improvements to address workplace challenges. For example, some of the Treasury union officials we met with said that management involved their unions early on in the process when making suggestions to streamline or fine tune workplace processes, such as installing a new performance management system and updating existing procedures. In addition, they also told us that official time has helped to create an environment where the workforce can be more engaged and have their voices heard. Treasury officials told us that official time improves the agency’s efficiency and accomplishment of the mission because union officials communicate goals to the organization. SSA management officials told us that allowing official time provides a stable work environment for SSA employees while SSA union officials said that official time has played a critical role in improving SSA as a workplace. For example, they explained that SSA unions were able to negotiate “flexi-place” arrangements with agency management using official time to allow employees to work from home. VA union officials told us that official time has allowed them to help agency management establish workforce policies related to telework.\nSecond, according to both management and union officials, the use of official time by union representatives to address issues, such as potential unfair labor practices, equal employment opportunity complaints, and grievances with employees, has led to agency cost savings. For example, management and union officials at Treasury and VA told us that having official time has resulted in fewer unfair labor practices and grievances filed by employees because they are usually resolved at the lowest level of management. Specifically, VA union officials told us that a VA union conducted a study of its 22 local chapters and found reductions in grievances and unfair labor practices because of official time. In addition, VA management officials said that having on-site union representation and support helps lessen and resolve disputes more quickly, thereby assisting the department in moving forward with its mission. Similarly, SSA union officials also said that official time has helped to resolve employee issues before escalating to formal grievances or equal employment opportunity complaints.", "The use of official time is granted in statute as being in the public interest and established in practice by federal agencies. OPM has produced reports on agencies’ use of official time and estimated government-wide costs on its own initiative for most years since 2002 while emphasizing that agency labor and management are both accountable for ensuring official time is used appropriately. There has been longstanding congressional interest in official time usage as well as some concern about the amount, type, accuracy, and timeliness of information available to help ensure an appropriate level of congressional oversight. The scope and level of official time use reinforces the need for oversight and accountability with more than 1.2 million BU employees eligible to use official time and over 3.4 million hours charged for representational activities in fiscal year 2012, the latest year for which OPM has reported this information.\nWithin this overall context, it is important that sufficient controls, processes, and guidance are in place for reporting and monitoring to provide reasonable assurance that official time is used as intended; is consistent with the statute and applicable agency policies and procedures; enables congressional oversight; informs management and labor decision making; and provides public transparency.\nOPM has historically estimated official time costs using a methodology that uses the average salary of all employees in a BU. An alternative methodology using actual salary data of BU employees who charged official time would yield a different estimate than OPM’s methodology. The use of alternative cost estimation methodologies may result in a more representative estimate of actual costs. Since OPM recognizes weaknesses in data collected through its EHRI database, OPM must expend additional resources to validate official time data. OPM reports that on any given year, about half of about 50 agencies reporting change their submissions during the validation process. OPM’s attempt to improve the reliability of official time data by having agencies validate their data is noteworthy but labor intensive and time consuming. By not following up with agencies on data differences, OPM may be missing an opportunity to improve data quality on agency reporting through EHRI and enable a less labor intensive and more efficient process. In addition, Congress may not have the most accurate information on the use of official time at agencies to support its oversight activities.\nSince agencies are most often managing the use of official time using an approach that has no specified number of hours, they could be at a greater risk for abuse. The risk may increase within agencies with multiple collective bargaining agreements at the department, component and operating administration levels that have differences in how official time is managed. Hence, agencies may need to implement additional actions to monitor the use of official time to help mitigate the risk of abuse. Agencies that use a reasonable time approach and rely exclusively on immediate supervisors for monitoring could benefit from the experience of other agencies that use a number of techniques to monitor the use of official time. By not considering whether it would be useful for agencies to share information on monitoring practices, OPM may be missing an opportunity to assist agencies in strengthening internal controls and increasing transparency and accountability.", "To help ensure that OPM and agencies collect, track, and report reliable data on the use of official time, we recommend that the Director of OPM take the following three actions:\nConsider other approaches to developing its cost estimate.\nWork with agencies to identify opportunities to increase efficiency of data collection and reporting through EHRI.\nConsider whether it would be useful to share agencies’ practices on monitoring use of official time through existing forums such as the ELR network.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Director of OPM for review and comment. OPM commented on our three recommendations and partially concurred on all three. OPM also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. OPM’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV. We also provided an abridged draft laying out key facts and information to the 10 selected agencies we reviewed and incorporated comments where appropriate.\nOPM partially concurred with our first recommendation that the agency should consider other approaches to developing its cost estimate. OPM agreed to consider other approaches to developing its cost estimates in addition to considering whether to continue using its current methodology. OPM stated that its cost estimates have been based on (1) official time and average salary data provided to OPM through EHRI; (2) official time data manually provided directly to OPM by certain agencies; and (3) official time data manually updated by a number of agencies. OPM said that the approach we used in the report linking official time hours taken by specific individuals to those individuals’ actual salaries is not always possible using EHRI in all instances and is a labor intensive, and thus more costly process to undertake for the entire executive branch. The methodology we used was intended as an example of an alternative method for producing a cost estimate.\nOPM reported to us on October 15, 2014, that 52 of the 62 agencies that reported fiscal year 2012 official time data to OPM did so using EHRI, thus OPM would be able to link official time hours used by specific individuals to the actual salaries for the overwhelming majority of reporting agencies. Although our approach may be slightly more labor intensive, it provides greater assurance that the cost reported is more representative of actual cost and, ultimately, more useful for oversight purposes.\nOPM partially concurred with our second recommendation that the agency should work with other agencies to identify opportunities to increase the efficiency of data collection and reporting through EHRI. OPM stated that it will work with agencies to identify opportunities which they may wish to consider in order to increase the efficiency of data collection and reporting of official time through EHRI. However, OPM stated that it has no authority to direct agency actions regarding official time, including how official time data is collected and reported. It added that any opportunities to increase efficiency of data collection and reporting of official time are ultimately dependent upon individual agency determinations subject to local collective bargaining obligations.\nWe agree that agencies are ultimately responsible for making changes to their data collection but OPM plays an important role via its reporting of official time. By following up with agencies that report discrepancies during the verification process, OPM could determine whether there are less resource-intensive alternatives for agencies to pursue that would yield more accurate data. We continue to believe that by following up with agencies on data differences, OPM has an opportunity to help improve the data quality on agency reporting through EHRI.\nOPM partially concurred with our third recommendation that the agency consider whether it would be useful to share agencies’ practices on monitoring use of official time through existing forums such as the ELR network. OPM stated that it will consider whether it would be useful to share agencies’ practices on monitoring use of official time through existing forums such as the ELR network, but ultimately, implementation of any identified practices is subject to each agency’s policies and their collective bargaining obligations. We continue to believe that OPM has an opportunity to strengthen its assistance to agencies by sharing techniques and approaches on monitoring official time in a collaborative manner through its membership in the ELR network.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Director of OPM and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-6722 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.", "The objectives of this engagement were to review the use of official time by federal agencies and the federal rules relating to the use of official time by federal employees. Specifically, this report (1) describes the extent to which 10 selected agencies reported using official time; (2) assesses the extent to which OPM’s cost estimate for official time aligns with leading cost estimation practices; (3) examines OPM reporting on official time; and (4) determines the extent to which selected agencies vary in their approach for managing official time and related internal control practices, and describes reported benefits. We included available information on both costs and benefits to be consistent with standard economic principles for evaluating federal programs and generally accepted government auditing standards. For purposes of this review, “use of official time” will constitute time charged to an official time and attendance code.\nTo address these objectives, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 10 of 61 agencies that reported official time data covering fiscal year 2011 to OPM. We selected the 10 agencies using the following factors: (1) the number of bargaining unit (BU) employees, (2) agency size, (3) rate of official time use, (4) the number of BUs and unions represented at the agency, and (5) the amount of reported agency salary costs associated with official time (see table 10 for agencies and data on selected criteria). In fiscal year 2011, the 10 agencies accounted for approximately 47 percent of BU employees.\nTo describe the extent to which the 10 selected agencies reported using official time, we used OPM’s published reports on official time that included official time data for each of the 10 selected agencies and covered fiscal years 2002 through 2011. We provided a structured document request to the 10 selected agencies to collect official time usage data for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. We reviewed relevant agency documentation, interviewed agency officials charged with administering agency official time processes, and reviewed documentation to better understand the data systems each agency used to collect and report such data, as well as the quality of data entered into their systems. Specifically, we examined the data provided for obvious errors and inconsistencies and we also queried each of the 10 agencies to better understand the data systems each agency used to collect and report official time usage data, as well as to the quality of data entered into their systems. We determined that agency official time usage data for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the report.\nTo further support our analysis, we used OPM’s Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) Statistical Data Mart, which contains information on personnel actions and payroll data for most federal civilian employees, including employees of our 10 selected agencies. We assessed the reliability of EHRI data through electronic testing to identify missing data, out-of-range values, and logical inconsistencies. We also reviewed our prior work assessing the reliability of these data and interviewed OPM officials knowledgeable about the data to discuss the data’s accuracy and steps OPM takes to ensure reliability. On the basis of this assessment, we believe the EHRI data we used are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report.\nWe began our analyses with fiscal year 2006 because that is the first year in which OPM consistently reported all data elements for each of our 10 selected agencies.because it was the most recent, complete fiscal year of data available during our review.\nWe selected fiscal year 2013 as the endpoint To assess whether OPM’s cost estimate for agency use of official time aligned with leading cost estimation practices, we compared OPM’s method and approach for preparing its estimate with GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. For this guide, GAO cost experts assessed measures consistently applied by cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry, and considered best practices for the development of reliable cost estimates.\nWe assessed whether OPM’s estimate met the four desired characteristics for sound cost estimating, which include: well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. We performed a limited analysis of the cost estimating practices used by OPM against the characteristics. The cost estimating best practices criteria will be limited because OPM did not develop a life-cycle cost estimate. OPM collects statistics on agency use of official time, including hours per year and estimated costs of prior years, and applies a straightforward labor equation. To calculate the total cost, OPM uses an equation that is wage rate (plus a fringe rate) multiplied by hours used. For the wage rate, OPM uses an agency average of salaries for all employees who belong to a BU.\nAs a part of our assessment of the reliability of OPM’s cost estimate, we cross-checked OPM’s methodology with an alternative methodology. Using fiscal year 2013 salary data from EHRI, we developed a methodology that uses an alternative wage rate—salaries of employees who charged official time. To calculate the total cost, we calculated hourly costs plus fringe rate for individuals who charged greater than zero hours of official time in any category. Our approach included using the same filters and merges as OPM used, according to its responses to our queries. We conducted interviews with knowledgeable OPM officials and provided OPM with a description of our analysis to ensure our assumptions were consistent with their approach.\nTo examine the extent of OPM reporting on the use of official time, we used OPM’s published reports that included government-wide official time data from federal agencies between fiscal years 2002 through 2011. We reviewed relevant agency documentation, interviewed agency officials responsible for producing government-wide reports on official time, and reviewed documentation to better understand OPM’s role in collecting and reporting on use of official time.\nTo determine the extent to which selected agencies varied in their approach for managing official time and related internal controls practices, we reviewed active collective bargaining agreements (CBA) and related agency documentation provided by the 10 selected agencies in response to a structured document request. We identified 173 active CBAs in the 10 selected agencies representing the universe for this review. We also reviewed agency documentation and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable on internal control practices used to monitor use of official time. We do not generalize the results of our analysis to agencies outside of this review.\nWe performed a content analysis of 173 CBAs covering active BUs at the 10 selected agencies to create a unique database of official time provisions. To ensure that we received the appropriate CBAs for all active BUs, we cross-verified them using information, such as bargaining unit status (BUS) codes, from OPM’s FLIS and a list of active BUs provided by OPM. We also followed up with all of our selected agencies to verify that we correctly matched their CBAs to active BUs using the BUS codes. In addition, to ensure consistency and accuracy of our analysis of various agency approaches, analysts independently analyzed CBAs and then compared their results through a double blind review for all 173 CBAs. In cases where there were discrepancies, analysts reconciled their differences for a final determination of an agency’s approach used to manage official time.\nTo describe reported benefits of official time, we interviewed agency management and union officials from 3 of our 10 selected agencies, including SSA, Treasury, and VA, to obtain their viewpoints.agencies reflected a large proportion of BU employees and also utilized different approaches for capturing and reporting official time. Because they are not tangible, we could not independently verify benefits cited by agency management and union officials.\nWe conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to October 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "OPM reported an overall decrease in government-wide official time hours between fiscal years 2002 and 2012 with a slight rise between fiscal years 2006 and 2012 (see figure 12). According to OPM, official time costs in fiscal year 2012 represented less than 0.1 percent of the civilian personnel budget for federal civil service BU employees.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Signora J. May (Assistant Director), Leslie Ashton, Lee Clark, Clifton G. Douglas Jr., Sara Daleski, Barbara Lancaster, Jason Lee, Andrea Levine, Robert Robinson, Susan Sato, Cynthia Saunders, Rebecca Shea, and Stewart Small made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h3_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "h1_title h4_title", "", "h4_full h1_full", "", "", "h4_full h2_full", "", "", "", "", "h2_full", "", "", "h3_full h4_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What are official time hours?", "What did GAO find regarding the the change of official time hours?", "How did some company official time rates decline?", "To what extent did some official time rates increase?", "Why did the number of hours change?", "To what extent did some agencies report no changes?", "How does OPM estimate annual official time costs?", "How did GAO calculate their own estimated annual official time costs?", "What did GAO do with their estimation method?", "What did the GAO's estimate yield in comparison to that of OPM?", "How would the GAO's estimate method change the cost estimate?", "Why has OPM defended their usage of their own estimate method?", "How might other estimates from OPM's estimate change the estimate of actual cost?", "What does OPM report on?", "How does OPM verify their data?", "What data revisions usually take place?", "What risks does OPM assume in not following up on data differences?", "What is official time?", "How are employees on official time payed?", "What was OPM's estimate of official time hours?", "What was GAO asked to examine regarding OPM?", "What does this report examine in regards to OPM?", "How did GAO obtain information for the report?", "On what agencies did GAO focus?", "Why were these agencies chosen?" ], "summary": [ "Official time rates indicate the number of official time hours expended per bargaining unit (BU) employee and allow for meaningful comparisons over time.", "The ten agencies GAO reviewed reported using 2.5 million official time hours in fiscal year 2013 compared to about 2 million hours in fiscal year 2006.", "Although the total number of hours charged increased by 25 percent, 7 of the 10 selected agencies reported lower official time rates in fiscal year 2013 as compared to fiscal year 2006. Declines in official time rates per BU employee ranged from about 30 minutes or less at several agencies to 2-1/2 fewer hours per BU employee at one agency.", "Three agencies reported increased official time rates over the same period.", "The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) attributed changes in the number of hours, in part, to changes in the number of BU employees and the amount of collective bargaining negotiations.", "In total for fiscal year 2013, the 10 selected agencies reported that less than 2 percent of employees charged official time. During the same year, eight of the 10 agencies reported having employees who charged 100 percent of their duty time to official time; a total of 386 employees combined. Two agencies reported having no employees who charged 100 percent official time in fiscal year 2013.", "OPM has historically estimated annual official time costs by using a simple computation—multiplying each agency's average salary as reported in its Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) database for BU employees covered by official time activities by the agency's total reported official time hours.", "GAO computed its own cost estimate using an alternative methodology that used actual salary data of BU employees who in fact charged official time and multiplied this amount by the agency total reported official time hours used for each individual.", "GAO computed a cost estimate for the 6 of our 10 selected agencies that report through EHRI.", "GAO found that its cost estimate for these 6 agencies yielded an estimate that was about $5 million more than the estimate using OPM's methodology ($61 million versus $56 million, or a difference of about 9 percent). Further, cost estimates using GAO's methodology at 4 of the 6 agencies were higher by 15 percent or more than the estimates using OPM's methodology.", "A government-wide cost estimate could be higher or lower if this methodology was applied to all agencies.", "OPM said reporting on official time is not a priority at this time and they have used the same methodology for preparing its cost estimate since fiscal year 2002.", "Use of other methodologies may result in a more representative estimate of actual cost.", "OPM issues reports on official time to assist agencies with ensuring accountability in labor-management relations. It reports on official time usage government-wide.", "OPM asks agencies to verify data that OPM obtains through its EHRI database. While OPM reports the corrected data, it does not follow-up with agencies to determine the source of data differences. Its guidelines state the importance of pursuing high quality data, reliable data on program costs.", "According to OPM, at least half of the about 50 agencies that report official time data through EHRI report differences with the EHRI data and provide revised official time data to OPM.", "By not following up with agencies on data differences, OPM may be missing an opportunity to improve data quality on agency reporting through EHRI and enable a less labor intensive and more efficient process.", "Official time is time spent by federal employees performing certain union representational activities, such as negotiations and handling grievances.", "Employees on official time are treated as if they are in a duty status and are paid accordingly.", "OPM's estimated total payroll costs, salary and benefits, for fiscal year 2012 official time hours was over $156 million and covered more than 1.2 million employees.", "GAO was asked to review federal rules relating to the use of official time.", "This report (1) describes the extent of official time use by 10 selected agencies; (2) assesses OPM's cost estimate for official time; and (3) examines OPM's reporting on official time.", "GAO obtained usage data from agencies and OPM's annual reports.", "For this study, GAO selected 10 agencies (National Science Foundation, Railroad Retirement Board, Social Security Administration, and the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Labor, Treasury, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs) representing 47 percent of BU employees covered by OPM's report.", "GAO's selection was based on factors such as agency size, number of BU employees, and official time rate." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1, 1, 2, 1, -1, 5, -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, 0, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-15-325	{ "title": [ "Background", "Coast Guard Acquisition Strategy for Fixed-Wing Assets", "Significant Work Remains to Field 14 Fully Capable C-27Js", "DHS and Coast Guard Are Establishing a Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft Program to Oversee the C-27J Transfer and Modification Process", "The Coast Guard Has Transferred Two C-27Js and Is Taking Steps to Achieve Major Milestones", "Induct the Aircraft", "Establish Operational Units", "Add Surveillance and Advanced Communication Capabilities", "The Coast Guard Must Address Risks Related to Spare Parts, Technical Data, and Understanding the Condition of the Aircraft", "Purchasing Spare Parts", "Accessing Technical Data", "Understanding the Condition of the Aircraft", "Current Fixed-Wing Fleet Plan Achieves Savings but Does Not Meet Flying Hour Needs, and Revised Analysis Is Years Away", "Current Fleet Plan Should Save Money but Does Not Meet Flight Hour Goal", "Coast Guard Also Faces Shortage in Surveillance Capability", "Current Fleet Plan Will Cost More per Flight Hour", "New Fleet Mix Study Ongoing but Results Are Years Away", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "The history of the C-27J is complex and involves several government agencies and private contractors. To meet the Army’s combat zone airlift supply mission, in 2007 a joint Army and Air Force program office awarded a contract for C-27Js to a company called Global Military Aircraft Systems—a partnership between L-3 Communications and the manufacturer, an Italian company called Alenia Aermacchi (a Finmeccanica company). L-3 Communications, the lead partner, installed U.S. military-specific equipment on the aircraft manufactured by Alenia Aermacchi. In addition, a separate division of L-3 Communications provided full logistics support to the Army and Air Force under the Global Military Aircraft Systems contract. The Air Force and Army began purchasing these aircraft without fully developing a logistics plan that established how to fully support the aircraft. Five years later, in 2012, the Air Force canceled the program, citing budget constraints and its determination that Air Force C-130s could provide nearly all of the Army’s desired capability. The Air Force had not finished its logistics plan at the time.\nWhen the program was canceled in 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) had purchased 21 C-27Js—13 by the Army and 8 by the Air Force. By mid-2013, the 13 aircraft that the Air Force fielded were sent to AMARG (colloquially referred to as the “boneyard”) for preservation and 8 aircraft were still in production. The Air Force announced that these 21 aircraft would be made available to U.S. government agencies. In May 2012, the Coast Guard conducted a business case, which estimated that receiving the 21 C-27J aircraft would save it $826 million, in fiscal year 2012 dollars, without changing planned performance targets. In August 2013, after USASOC also expressed interest in the aircraft, the Coast Guard wrote a letter to Congress using its prior analysis to estimate that receiving 14 C-27Js, instead of all 21 aircraft, would still save $799 million ($837 million in fiscal year 2015 dollars) over 30 years. Figure 1 illustrates the major events in the history of the C-27J.\nIn fall 2013, DOD transferred 7 C-27J aircraft to USASOC; 3 that had since completed production and 4 aircraft still in production. Then, in December 2013, as a part of the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed DOD to transfer the remaining 14 C- 27J aircraft to the Secretary of Homeland Security. These aircraft—13 from AMARG storage and 1 aircraft still owned by L-3 Communications— have been or will be transferred to the Coast Guard. Congress also required Homeland Security to transfer 7 HC-130Hs to the Air Force after certain modifications; the Air Force was required to transfer these aircraft to the Secretary of Agriculture for use by the U.S. Forest Service. These HC-130H aircraft are to be supplied by the Coast Guard. Figure 2 illustrates the transfer of aircraft among these agencies.\nThe Coast Guard’s fixed-wing aviation fleet comprises several assets with different capabilities. Table 1 illustrates the capability differences between the Coast Guard’s long-range (HC-130H and HC-130J) and medium- range (HC-144 and C-27J) airframes in terms of payload, range, endurance, and speed. For each asset, table 1 also includes the number of annual planned flight hours, the designed service life, and cost per flight hour.\nThe HC-144 and C-27J have a lower cost per flight hour than the HC-130. Each aircraft is planned to have the same surveillance and communication capabilities, and, according to program officials, the extent to which the endurance, speed, range, and other attributes increase performance largely depends upon the mission the aircraft is performing. For example, all of these aircraft can conduct maritime security and search and rescue missions in accordance with Coast Guard needs; however, the HC-130J, with greater payload and endurance, is better suited for responding to humanitarian disasters or mass casualty incidents either domestically or overseas. The C-27J is larger than the HC-144, but generally fits between the HC-144 and the HC-130J in terms of the capability of the airframe.", "In 2005, the Coast Guard developed a mission needs statement that factored in new requirements for its fixed-wing assets following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In particular, this document emphasized the importance of persistent surveillance in accomplishing Coast Guard missions—generated by flying more hours with surveillance- capable aircraft. Based on this analysis, the Coast Guard determined that it needed 52,400 fixed wing flight hours per year to meet its missions while moving toward a presence-based approach to enforcement, rather than its conventional response-based approach. For example, according to the mission needs statement, this presence-based approach will lead to operations that detect and interdict threats as far from the United States as possible. In 2007, based on the 2005 mission needs statement, the Coast Guard published a baseline for all of its major acquisition programs, which became a single program of record. The fixed-wing portion of this program of record included 22 HC-130Js and 36 HC-144s, which were planned to meet the annual goal of 52,400 flight hours. The receipt of 14 C-27Js represents a significant change, in terms of fleet composition, to the Coast Guard’s 2007 program of record.", "As of January 2015, the Coast Guard has transferred 2 of 14 C-27Js to its aircraft maintenance facility, after returning them to flyable status, and is in the process of developing a detailed plan for fielding all 14 aircraft by 2022. The Coast Guard, based on DHS direction, has restructured its HC-144 acquisition program to also encompass the transfer of the C- 27Js. This combined acquisition, termed the Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft program, is considered a new, major program within DHS. The C- 27J transfer process is not simple, as significant work remains to achieve three major milestones before the aircraft are fully operational: (1) induct the aircraft (prepare for use), (2) establish operational units (bases), and (3) add surveillance and advanced communication capabilities. In addition, complicating these efforts are areas of risk that need to be addressed before the Coast Guard can field fully operational C-27Js. These three risk areas are: (1) purchasing spare parts, (2) accessing technical data, and (3) understanding the condition of the aircraft. Figure 4 illustrates the milestones and risk areas the Coast Guard must address before it can field a fully capable aircraft.\nThe Coast Guard’s 2012 business case estimated that it would cost about $600 million in acquisition costs to transform the 14 C-27Js into fully functioning Coast Guard assets, which includes purchasing sets of initial spare parts (estimated at $150 million), flight trainers/maintenance equipment/engineering costs (estimated at $150 million), and installing surveillance capabilities (estimated at $300 million). However, these costs are notional since the Coast Guard is in the process of developing a cost, schedule, and performance baseline for the aircraft as part of its Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft program. These costs are based on the Coast Guard’s experience with other fixed-wing aircraft and do not account for risks specific to the C-27J. The Coast Guard has awarded or plans to award several contracts to assist with these steps, in some cases partnering with USASOC. Coast Guard project officials recognize each of these risk areas and are confident they can work through them given the Coast Guard’s experience with foreign manufactured aircraft, such as the HC-144.", "DHS oversees Coast Guard major acquisitions and in October 2014 issued an acquisition decision memorandum that outlined how the C-27J would be incorporated into the DHS acquisition review process. In this regard, DHS directed the Coast Guard to restructure its HC-144 program to accommodate the addition of the 14 C-27J aircraft. These aircraft, together, are now termed the Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft program, which is a major DHS acquisition program. DHS directed the Coast Guard to pursue the Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft program in two phases.\nThe first phase is the acquisition of the HC-144, which is currently paused following the purchase of 18 out of 36 planned aircraft. The Coast Guard previously estimated that it would complete the purchase of 36 missionized HC-144s by 2025. DHS has instructed the Coast Guard to develop a plan to close out this phase.\nThe second phase focuses on the acquisition of the C-27J aircraft and has two segments.\nSegment one is the induction and employment of the unmodified C-27J aircraft that can perform missions, but without surveillance capabilities.\nSegment two is modification of the 14 aircraft, which principally involves the addition of the surveillance and advanced communication capabilities and operationally testing the asset. The Coast Guard was directed to develop all acquisition documents for the second segment of the C-27J acquisition, including a life-cycle cost estimate and acquisition program baseline. DHS further directed the Coast Guard to operationally test a prototype of the C-27J with the new surveillance capabilities before it modifies all 14 aircraft. estimate, and logistics plan for the first segment of the C-27J phase of this program. 2. Include the funding requirements for the C-27J in the Coast Guard’s forthcoming 5-year funding plan (fiscal years 2016 to fiscal years 2020). 3. Submit a detailed schedule that includes C-27J engineering and testing activities. 4. Present operational test strategies to DHS’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for the HC-144 and the C-27J. 5. Provide a revised execution plan including a summary of funds obligated and a spend plan for the fiscal year 2014 and 2015 C-27J funding. 6. Provide a business case analysis comparing Coast Guard operational and depot maintenance to contracted maintenance for the C-27J. 7. Provide a report on the process of adding a mission system to the C- 27J.\nDHS also provided the Coast Guard with the authority to continue to incorporate the C-27J aircraft into its fleet while it develops these areas of knowledge and provides these action items to DHS.", "Three major milestones need to be accomplished before the Coast Guard can field fully capable C-27Js: 1. Induct the aircraft—The Coast Guard plans to continue removing the aircraft from storage, establish a maintenance regimen, recondition the aircraft, and develop manuals and user guides, among other tasks. Currently, the Coast Guard is assessing the first two planes and establishing the key steps necessary to finish inducting these aircraft. 2. Establish operational units—The Coast Guard plans to establish the first C-27J operational unit (base) in California in fiscal year 2016 and a second unit at an as-yet undetermined location in fiscal year 2018. Training aircrew, among other key tasks, are completed as a part of this milestone. 3. Add surveillance and advanced communication capabilities—The Coast Guard plans to convert the C-27J from a cargo aircraft to a multi-mission aircraft with both cargo and surveillance capabilities to fully meet Coast Guard mission requirements.", "The Coast Guard is in the process of developing a baseline induction process for the C-27J; however, Coast Guard program officials stated that until they understand the condition of each aircraft, they cannot estimate how long it will take to induct each plane. The first part of induction entails removing the aircraft from the AMARG storage facility, which involves taking off a protective compound, conducting system checks and basic maintenance, and successfully completing a flight test—among other steps. Figure 5 shows one of the Coast Guard’s C-27Js in preserved status at AMARG.\nOnce the first part of the induction process is complete, the aircraft is flown to the Coast Guard’s aviation maintenance center, called the Aviation Logistics Center, where the Coast Guard has established a project office responsible for completing the induction process and fielding the C-27Js. Currently, this project office is assessing the first two planes and establishing the key steps necessary to fully induct the aircraft, such as incorporating the aircraft into the Coast Guard maintenance system, building up the Coast Guard’s knowledge of the aircraft by conducting training and test flights, repairing physical damage (if any), replacing missing parts, and creating Coast Guard operational and maintenance documents and procedures. When completing these steps, complications can arise. For example, program officials stated that the C-27J uses a liquid oxygen based aircrew breathing system similar to the HC-130J. All other Coast Guard fixed wing aircraft use oxygen in gas form; thus, the Coast Guard has to write new policies and train users on how to work with this material on the C-27J.\nThe Coast Guard expects it will take about 9 months to induct the first two aircraft and, therefore, plans to have them ready for operations by fiscal year 2016. According to Coast Guard officials, the amount of time required to induct subsequent C-27J aircraft should decrease after the Coast Guard develops logistics, maintenance, and training systems with the first two aircraft. In addition, in February 2015, the Coast Guard signed a sole-source contract with Alenia Aermacchi for on-the-ground troubleshooting support, which should also help to speed up the induction process. Further, because a significant part of the induction process involves integrating the C-27J into the Coast Guard’s maintenance system, the time needed to induct future planes should also decrease as maintenance and training procedures, among others, are developed and documented. Thus far, to augment and develop its in-house maintenance capabilities, the Coast Guard spent $3.2 million for 1 year of contractor logistics support under a pre-existing USASOC contract with Lockheed Martin set to expire in August 2015. The Coast Guard has decided to exercise an option for this contract for an additional year while it builds the capacity necessary to maintain the plane using Coast Guard personnel and procedures.", "The Coast Guard plans to establish the first C-27J operational unit in fiscal year 2016 in California with four fully inducted C-27Js; a second undetermined location (likely on the east coast) is tentatively scheduled to begin initial operations in fiscal year 2018. Coast Guard officials added that plans for additional bases, if necessary, are not yet finalized. According to Coast Guard aviation program managers, the C-27J fleet will be based where it is most needed to help the Coast Guard fulfill its drug and migrant interdiction, disaster response, and search and rescue missions, among the Coast Guard’s other missions.\nTo establish the first base, pilots, aircrew, and aircraft maintenance personnel all need training to effectively and safely operate and maintain the C-27J. The Coast Guard plans to train an initial cadre of approximately 20 pilots and 80 aircrew and maintenance personnel to stand-up the base in California. In addition, the Coast Guard plans to build a $12 million maintenance training facility for the HC-144 and the C- 27J. In May 2014, the Coast Guard signed a $434,000 sole-source contract with Alenia Aermacchi to train two Coast Guard pilots and two aircrew members in Pisa, Italy. These personnel completed training in September 2014. In addition, the Coast Guard is in the process of contracting for the use of a C-27J flight simulator.", "To meet its requirements, the Coast Guard has to convert the C-27J from a cargo aircraft to a multi-mission aircraft with both cargo and surveillance capabilities—a $300 million effort, according to initial Coast Guard estimates. These capabilities are enabled by a mission system that primarily consists of a surface-search radar, electro-optical infrared camera, and advanced communication capabilities to process and distribute data gathered by these sensors. The process of adding a mission system is called missionization. The Coast Guard plans to use a mission system known as Minotaur—already in use by the Navy for aviation surveillance activities—for all of its medium and long range surveillance aircraft, including the C-27J. United States Customs and Border Protection also uses this system for its surveillance aircraft, potentially increasing the communication and data sharing across DHS.\nThe Coast Guard is in the early stages of replacing obsolete and poorly performing mission systems on its existing fixed-wing fleet of HC-130Js and HC-144s with the Minotaur system. In November 2014, the Coast Guard completed a preliminary design review for the HC-130J system and plans to begin installation of a prototype mission system this summer. Prototyping and testing a system for the HC-144 is dependent on the schedule for the HC-130J, but is currently planned to be completed in fiscal year 2016. The C-27J will be the last to have the mission system incorporated. To begin this effort, the Coast Guard entered into a $1 million agreement with the Navy’s Naval Air Warfare Center in November 2014 to evaluate mission system options on the C-27J. The Coast Guard tentatively estimates that it will have a C-27J mission system prototype by fiscal year 2017 and, following testing, plans to install and integrate this equipment on additional aircraft beginning in fiscal year 2018. Notionally, all 14 C-27Js are to have mission systems incorporated by fiscal year 2022.", "The successful and cost effective fielding of the C-27J is contingent on the Coast Guard’s ability to address three risk areas, related to the following:\nPurchasing spare parts—The Coast Guard had to develop its own list of spare parts for the aircraft, as existing lists are not available. Further, the Air Force and USASOC have had difficulties obtaining some spare parts.\nAccessing technical data—The Coast Guard does not have full access to the technical data for the C-27J, which are required to maintain the aircraft over the long term and make modifications to the aircraft’s structure—for example, to install sensors.\nUnderstanding the condition of the aircraft—The condition of each of the Coast Guard’s C-27Js is not fully known; for example, the Coast Guard found an undocumented dent on one aircraft taken out of AMARG and its 14th plane—still owned by L-3 Communications— was not properly preserved.\nWe have identified these three areas as risks because they represent knowledge gaps for the Coast Guard and will likely require the largest amount of resources during the process of fielding 14 fully capable aircraft. For example, accessing technical data is key to installing surveillance capabilities—an effort planned to cost $300 million. In addition, these are areas in which the Air Force and USASOC have experienced difficulties while operating the C-27J. In combination, these risk areas could inhibit the number of hours per year that the C-27J will be fully capable of accomplishing its missions and add additional costs to these efforts.\nTo mitigate some of these risks, the Coast Guard is formulating a partnership with USASOC to collaboratively maintain the C-27Js owned by both services. For example, USASOC purchased technical manuals, which it is sharing with the Coast Guard, while the Coast Guard is contracting for a field service representative to work with both fleets. In addition, the Coast Guard began participating in a user group with the other countries that operate the C-27J, including Italy and Greece, though this user-base is limited since only 76 C-27s have been sold by Alenia Aermacchi (including the 21 C-27Js that belong to the United States government). In general, Coast Guard officials have characterized these risks as “good problems to have” because they are receiving 14 aircraft without reimbursement and they see the C-27J as a valuable addition to the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet.", "Spare parts are essential to keeping aircraft operational, but USASOC and the Air Force have experienced a number of setbacks related to acquiring necessary parts, particularly from Alenia Aermacchi. While the Air Force was operating the C-27J, it encountered issues keeping its fleet in operable condition due to difficulties with obtaining spare parts. For example, at the time the Air Force canceled the C-27J program, 11 of 14 planes were missing parts. Further, to support the deployment of two C- 27Js to Afghanistan in July 2011, the Air Force built a large pool of spare parts by purchasing $65 million worth of spares from L-3 Communications. Due to delivery delays from Alenia Aermacchi, parts were taken from a C-27J that was still in production at L-3 Communications. Using these parts, the C-27Js were in operable condition 83 percent of the time from July 2011 to June 2012. However, creating such a large and expensive pool of spares, relative to the number of aircraft, is not a sustainable approach that the Coast Guard can apply to maintaining its planes. Further, the Air Force did not obtain access to key data such as spare parts demand information and ordering history and, therefore, could not provide these data to the Coast Guard.\nSince it began operating C-27Js in fall 2013, USASOC has made some progress purchasing spare parts, though purchasing directly from Alenia Aermacchi continues to present significant challenges, due to parts pricing and delivery delays. Air Force and L-3 Communications officials estimate that Alenia Aermacchi controlled up to 90 percent of the spare parts for the C-27J. Through the efforts of its own logistics support contractor, however, as of November 2014, USASOC has had to order only 24 percent of the parts it needs directly from Alenia Aermacchi, with the remainder coming directly from the original parts manufacturers or U.S. government-approved suppliers. However, the 24 percent of parts that USASOC ordered from Alenia Aermacchi comprised 40 percent of USASOC’s total spending on spare parts; thus, Alenia Aermacchi remains a significant stakeholder. Further, USASOC has had issues with pricing and delayed deliveries. Alenia Aermacchi has increased the price of parts on two USASOC purchases; for example, USASOC purchased a refueling valve that previously cost $10,998, but it now must pay $15,121 for the part—a 37 percent increase. In addition, USASOC officials have been frustrated by the length of time Alenia Aermacchi has taken to provide parts. For example, as of November 2014, USASOC had received 70 percent of the parts ordered from non-Alenia Aermacchi suppliers but only 3 percent of the parts ordered from Alenia Aermacchi. While Alenia Aermacchi officials recognize that there have been issues with spare parts in the past, they told us that the company has recently changed its logistics model and has the capability to fully support the Coast Guard’s C-27Js. Further, according to USASOC contracting officials, difficulties with Italian export controls have slowed the spare parts and parts repair processes. Alenia Aermacchi is in the process of applying for Italian export control licenses for USASOC and the Coast Guard. Once approved, these licenses will reduce delays attributable solely to export issues—usually around 30 to 90 days—according to Alenia Aermacchi officials.\nThe Coast Guard has already encountered some challenges with purchasing spare parts. For example, when removing aircraft from AMARG it is standard procedure to replace the aircraft’s filters. In doing so, the Coast Guard was able to purchase only half of the filters through U.S. government approved suppliers. The remaining filters had to be purchased directly from Alenia Aermacchi because they were unavailable from other sources. To mitigate export control delays, Coast Guard officials said they used Alenia Aermacchi filters from USASOC’s warehouse and paid for replacements to USASOC’s inventory.\nDeveloping an initial set of spares for the C-27J, estimated to cost $8 million per aircraft, is another significant area of risk. The Coast Guard received data from other countries’ air forces that fly the C-27J and, using these data, have developed its own initial list of spares. The Coast Guard must now find suppliers for these parts and then determine what portion of these parts are economical to keep on-hand in the Coast Guard’s supply chain. Further, according to Coast Guard project officials, significant learning will occur as the Coast Guard inducts the C-27J and generates its own data, as it starts flying the aircraft, on the failure rate of the aircraft’s parts. These data will allow the Coast Guard to fine tune the list of spare parts before the aircraft are fielded.\nLastly, the Coast Guard plans to fly its aircraft at a more aggressive operating pace—up to 1,000 hours per year compared to about 500 hours per year for the Air Force and USASOC—and in a maritime environment, which is generally more demanding on assets due to increased corrosion from the saltwater environment. Thus, its spare parts needs are likely to be much higher than USASOC and the Air Force.", "The Coast Guard does not yet have sufficient access to technical data to fully support, maintain, and operate the C-27J. Alenia Aermacchi is the sole owner of the full technical data associated with the C-27J aircraft. Coast Guard project officials said they have approached the company about acquiring a technical data licensing agreement. The Coast Guard plans to meet immediate technical data requirements by utilizing resources under the Alenia Aermacchi field service representative contract. The Coast Guard continues to explore various options for accessing this key information. These options can vary depending upon the three basic types of technical data for aircraft: 1. Flight and maintenance manuals–These manuals provide all of the information required to safely and effectively fly and maintain the aircraft—including detailed guidance on maintenance and flight procedures—and function as the foundational documents necessary for properly operating the aircraft. In 2014, the Air Force supplied the Coast Guard with two sets of flight and maintenance manuals. The first set, produced by L-3 Communications, translated the Alenia Aermacchi manuals into Air Force-specific language and also covered the modifications made to the plane by L-3 Communications. These manuals were updated through March 2013 but never fully completed. The second set, produced by Alenia Aermacchi, pertained only to the aircraft in its originally manufactured condition prior to modifications. This set continued to be updated by Alenia Aermacchi until the Air Force transferred them to the Coast Guard in February 2014. USASOC has since purchased flight and maintenance manuals from Alenia Aermacchi, according to Coast Guard project officials, and provided the Coast Guard access to them. The Coast Guard is in the process of contracting for Coast Guard-specific instructions based on these manuals for how to conduct basic aircraft maintenance. 2. Depot level maintenance data–During periodic depot level maintenance, the Coast Guard conducts major airframe inspections and completes required repairs, which allows the service to accomplish its missions with fewer resources over the long run. These depot maintenance periods typically include removing large portions of the aircraft to address core corrosion and rebuild key parts, including engine work. At the time the Air Force canceled its C-27J program, it was in the process of pursuing the data required for depot maintenance from L-3 Communications, the lead contractor. However, since Alenia Aermacchi owned the data, this process would have been complex and, according to Air Force officials, was unsuccessfully resolved. The extent to which the Coast Guard can develop depot level maintenance procedures and conduct its own engineering activities on the C-27J with only the basic flight and maintenance manuals is unknown at present. The Coast Guard has significant experience conducting depot maintenance on aviation assets, which, according to project office officials, increases its ability to overcome knowledge gaps associated with the lack of technical data. 3. Design and manufacturing data–These data contain information such as the expected fatigue life—how long components last—of pieces of the airframe and information required to manufacture key parts. Access to design and manufacturing data is needed when modifications are required to the aircraft, such as to add capability, and manufacturing data are useful for competitively purchasing parts or determining the cause of parts failures. Alenia Aermacchi has sole ownership and access to these data. According to project officials, the Coast Guard could purchase access to these data from Alenia Aermacchi, either on an as-needed basis or in bulk. Alternatively, Coast Guard officials added that they can learn about the aircraft through testing, reverse engineering, and/or experimentation. Coast Guard project officials stated that these options would require significant resources, and that they will likely use a combination of these approaches.\nWithout access to technical data for the C-27J, the Coast Guard faces risks related to controlling costs and maintenance issues and installing surveillance capabilities. Technical data can enable the government to complete maintenance work in-house, as well as to competitively award acquisition and sustainment contracts. In July 2010, we reported that for service contracts pertaining to DOD weapons programs, the lack of access to proprietary technical data and a heavy reliance on specific contractors for expertise limits or precludes the possibility of competition. Further, in May 2011, we reported that access to technical data is needed to help control costs and maintain flexibility in the acquisition and sustainment of DOD weapon systems. In addition, the lack of technical data could ground the aircraft for longer periods than necessary. For example, Air Force program officials told us about a severe 2012 mishap with one of its C-27Js that grounded its fleet for several months while Alenia Aermacchi investigated the incident. As Alenia Aermacchi had sole access to the technical data, the Air Force was reliant on it to conduct the investigation. After several months, Alenia Aermacchi determined that the issue was the result of improper manufacturing of an aircraft component at one of its suppliers’ facilities. The Air Force then had to wait approximately 10 months while the parts were re-made by the supplier and sent to the Air Force. Alenia Aermacchi officials have expressed interest in serving as the sole maintenance provider for the Coast Guard and USASOC’s aircraft as it does for many of its international customers. Alenia Aermacchi officials note that they are also accustomed to supporting agencies doing their own maintenance by providing field service representatives, engineering support, and technical publications.\nThe process of installing surveillance capabilities on the C-27J will be shaped by the extent to which the Coast Guard can access design and manufacturing data for the C-27J. The first step in this process is purchasing the main sensor systems, a surface search radar and electro- optical infrared camera, and installing them on the aircraft. However, this task is risky and could reduce capability if the Coast Guard does not gain access to the C-27J’s technical data. For example, on the HC-130J, the Coast Guard mounts the surface-search radar on the aircraft’s fuselage. However, such modification to an aircraft requires technical data to determine the impact on its structural integrity. Without access to the necessary data, the Coast Guard would be reliant on Alenia Aermacchi to perform the engineering required to mount the radar. However, the Coast Guard is looking into alternatives that would require access to fewer data. According to Coast Guard and USASOC officials, two possibilities for the C-27J that would require a limited amount of technical data include (1) mounting the electro-optical infrared camera on one of the aircraft’s doors and (2) modifying the surface-search radar to fit on the nose of the aircraft—replacing the existing weather radar, which may no longer be necessary because the new radar would also perform weather-related tasks. While possible, such an approach could require performance trade- offs—such as limiting the coverage of the radar and the camera.", "An additional risk for the Coast Guard is addressing the physical condition of the 14 aircraft. USASOC has experienced a number of premature failures and unexpected maintenance with its C-27Js that could also be an issue for the Coast Guard. So far, during the 700 hours flown by the 6 operational USASOC aircraft between January 2014 and November 2014, they have had the following problems:\nFuel leaks were found in the wings of the aircraft, which are designed to hold fuel similar to many commercial aircraft. The seams and joints of three of USASOC’s seven aircraft were poorly sealed upon delivery of the aircraft, requiring significant repairs.\nThe landing gear on one aircraft extended during landing without pilot instruction due to a landing gear component deficiency, which is a safety issue and grounded the aircraft.\nWheel assemblies on multiple aircraft were improperly constructed.\nA cracked bracket required an aircraft to be grounded for 58 days.\nA crack was discovered in a structural piece surrounding the left wheel on four aircraft.\nProblems were found with four different types of valves, including fuel and de-icing valves on multiple aircraft.\nOxygen system leaks due to manufacturing errors on multiple aircraft.\nSome of these issues are related to major manufacturing problems and are consistent with findings of the Defense Contract Management Agency, which oversaw the C-27J manufacturing process on behalf of the Air Force. For example, in March 2013, the Defense Contract Management Agency issued a request for L-3 Communications, as the lead U.S. partner, to correct poor practices at Alenia Aermacchi that would seriously compromise the reliability and safety of the C-27J if not corrected. This corrective action request has been closed, but the extent to which these problems extend through the Coast Guard’s 14 C-27Js, built prior to these changes, is unknown.\nWhile USASOC experienced the problems noted above on brand new aircraft, the Coast Guard is receiving aircraft that the Air Force previously used. When removing the first two planes from storage at AMARG, the Coast Guard discovered numerous, though relatively minor, issues that delayed delivery of the planes to the Coast Guard’s Aviation Logistics Center by a few weeks. For example, the Coast Guard discovered a dent on the underside of one C-27J that was not properly documented and also found some corrosion, particularly with bolts on the wings of the aircraft, which it replaced on both aircraft. Coast Guard officials stated that the manufacturer may have installed the wrong bolts on the aircraft. Coast Guard and Air Force officials determined that the first two aircraft that they removed from AMARG are likely in the best condition. Two of the most heavily used aircraft destined for the Coast Guard supported the contingency operation in Afghanistan for 11 months. The Coast Guard will continue to assess the condition of the other 11 planes as they are removed from storage, which officials have identified as an area of concern.\nApart from the 13 aircraft that have been stored at the AMARG, the 14th plane destined for the Coast Guard is also missing parts and has been stored outdoors since 2011 without being preserved by L-3 Communications (which still owns the aircraft). L-3 Communications officials told us that they did not properly maintain the aircraft’s engines and propellers because parts required to run the engines, necessary for proper maintenance, were used for other C-27Js and not replaced in a timely manner. However, L-3 Communications, at its expense, recently sent the engines and propellers to be serviced by the original manufacturer and these items are now properly stored. In October 2014, we observed the aircraft at L-3 Communications’ facility in Waco, Texas. The aircraft’s engines and propellers were not installed but were stored in a nearby hangar consistent with original equipment manufacturer direction, according to L-3 officials. However, the cockpit was missing several components related to communications and operations functions, and the body of the aircraft showed some corrosion—particularly under each wing. L-3 Communications is now in the process of replacing 11 key missing parts taken from the aircraft to support the Afghanistan deployment and other C-27Js. At the time of our visit, L-3 Communications officials were optimistic that the aircraft would be delivered to the Coast Guard in working condition by February 2015, pending the delivery of the missing parts. However, as of March 2015, Alenia Aermacchi had yet to deliver these parts to L-3 Communications. L-3 Communications is now planning to deliver the aircraft to the U.S. Government in June 2015, pending the delivery of parts expected by late March 2015. Given that the airplane was not stored in accordance with Air Force procedures and has been used for spare parts, there will likely be some maintenance issues that L-3 Communications will have to address before it can deliver the aircraft to the U.S. Government.", "The C-27J will improve the affordability of the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet, but the current fleet of aircraft that the Coast Guard is pursuing is not optimal in terms of cost and flight hour capability. We estimate that the Coast Guard’s current plan should save $795 million over the next 30 years, compared to the 2013 estimate of $837 million. However, the source of these savings has shifted. A significant portion of the savings now results from a drop in the number of flight hours the fleet will achieve due to reducing the planned quantity of aircraft. For example, the 2013 plan achieves the Coast Guard’s stated goal of 52,400 flight hours per year, while the current plan achieves 43,200 flight hours per year—an 18 percent reduction. This reflects a shift from a fleet of 58 planes primarily composed of less-expensive HC-144s, to a fleet of 54 planes composed of a higher number of larger and more expensive HC-130Js. Operating more HC-130Js results in more expensive flight hours per year. The Coast Guard is in the process of examining, in several stages, its mission needs, including whether the current flight hour goal is still sound. But the results will not be used to inform budgets prior to fiscal year 2019. In the meantime, DHS and the Coast Guard have paused the HC-144 acquisition program, but historically the Coast Guard has received C-130J aircraft without budgeting for them. The Coast Guard already owns 20 aircraft that are not yet operational, including 14 C-27Js and 6 HC-130Js, and are planned to be outfitted with surveillance capabilities in the coming years. If the Coast Guard continues to receive additional aircraft before the results of the study are known, options for optimizing its fleet mix may be limited.", "To determine the potential impact of the C-27J on the cost and fight hour capability of the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet, we compared three scenarios: the 2007 program of record (without the C-27J), to which we applied updated assumptions and the data in the Coast Guard’s business case, the Coast Guard’s C-27J business case as presented to Congress in 2013, and the Coast Guard’s current plan, to which we applied updated assumptions and the data in the Coast Guard’s business case.\nTable 2 shows the total planned number of aircraft in each fleet we compared, the total cost to fly the aircraft for the next 30 years, total flight hours over the next 30 years, and the total estimated savings of each fleet compared to the program of record.\nWe found that the Coast Guard’s current plan should save $795 million over the next 30 years compared to the program of record fleet. While the amount of savings is similar to the $837 million estimated by the Coast Guard in 2013, the source of these savings has shifted, as shown in figure 6. The Coast Guard’s savings in the initial plan were largely due to acquisition cost savings. However, in the current plan, the savings are now largely due to operating expenses based on the Coast Guard’s planned reduction in flight hours.\nIn its August 2013 letter to Congress, the Coast Guard stated that receiving 14 C-27Js would save money without reducing planned flight hours below its goal of 52,400 hours per year, set forth in the Coast Guard’s 2005 mission needs statement. To do this, the Coast Guard planned to replace three HC-130Js with three C-27Js, gaining 600 flight hours per year at a lower cost per flight hour, and to decommission its HC-130Hs sooner than originally planned. However, the Coast Guard has since changed its planned fleet composition, and is now on a path to replace 14 HC-144s with 14 C-27Js and buy all 22 of the HC-130Js as planned in the program of record. This change results in 9,200 fewer flight hours per year (an 18 percent reduction) once the currently planned fleet is fully operational. Also contributing to this reduction of flight hours is the current plan to purchase 4 fewer medium range aircraft (HC-144s and C- 27Js) and reduce the HC-144 flight hours from 1,200 to 1,000 hours per year—due primarily to the high cost of maintaining the aircraft while flying at the higher pace.\nTable 3 shows: (1) the aircraft that comprise each fleet plan, (2) the planned annual flight hours once each fleet is built, and (3) the difference in flight hours, if any, based on the planned flight hours per year. We calculated this difference using the Coast Guard’s goal of 52,400 annual flight hours as a baseline. The table also includes the actual quantity and flight hour performance of the fleet, as of 2014, as a basis for comparison.\nIn all, the Coast Guard’s current plan is still an improvement over the flight hours recorded in fiscal year 2014, when the Coast Guard flew 38 percent fewer hours compared to its stated needs. As reflected in the table, however, the current plan also would result in a flight hour shortfall compared to the program of record.", "In addition to the reduction in its planned flight hours, the Coast Guard also has a shortage in its capability to meet its surveillance needs. To fully meet its needs, the Coast Guard must fly 52,400 hours per year with assets capable of conducting surveillance missions with advanced communication capabilities, such as sharing data. The Coast Guard’s 2005 mission needs statement directed the Coast Guard’s fixed wing fleet to be comprised of assets with improved surveillance capabilities, which would allow the Coast Guard to become more proactive through increased presence and surveillance rather than responding to events as they occur.\nThe Coast Guard has not been able to build up its flight hours as quickly as planned in 2007. The Coast Guard planned for the HC-144 and HC- 130J, the two fixed wing assets in the program of record fleet planned to be outfitted with improved surveillance capabilities, to conduct surveillance consistent with the surveillance goal. The C-27J, once missionized, is also planned to have improved surveillance capabilities. However, in 2014, the 16 HC-144s and the 5 HC-130Js that are currently missionized and operational flew only 16,381 hours, about 31 percent of the overall need. The remaining flight hours in 2014 were flown by HC- 130Hs and other legacy aircraft that do not have surveillance capabilities consistent with the Coast Guard’s needs. The result, in fiscal year 2014, was a 69 percent difference in these capabilities compared to the Coast Guard’s 2005 mission needs statement.\nFurther, the surveillance shortage in today’s fixed wing fleet is likely larger than 69 percent because the mission systems on the HC-144 and HC- 130J are not yet fully effective. For example, the Navy had to use non- Coast Guard software to assess the capabilities of the HC-130J’s radar after determining that the software the Coast Guard uses does not work well with the aircraft’s sensors. Moreover, we found in June 2014 that the HC-144 did not meet key performance parameters related to surveillance during operational testing. Replacement of the current mission system, already underway, is planned to address the majority of deficiencies. Once missionized, the HC-144, C-27J and HC-130J will reduce the current surveillance shortage since these aircraft will comprise increasingly larger proportions of the fleet over the next decade.", "While the fixed-wing fleet that the Coast Guard is currently pursuing should save $795 million over 30 years, it will have a higher average cost per hour of flight. The Coast Guard’s long-term approach, as reflected in the current plan, is to replace HC-144s with C-27Js that cost approximately $1,000 more per flight hour. This is a shift from the plan as presented to Congress in 2013, which proposed replacing some of the more expensive to operate HC-130Js with C-27Js. Both plans propose replacing the HC-130H as soon as possible compared to the program of record, which will improve the overall cost per hour of flight.\nAs table 4 illustrates, the current proposed mix of aircraft will cost $11,059 per hour of flight, which is greater than the program of record and the fleet described to Congress in 2013. While the Coast Guard’s current plan preserves much of the anticipated savings from receiving the 14 C-27Js and increases the number of flight hours compared to the fleet the Coast Guard is operating today, it results in fewer flight hours for the dollar.", "The Coast Guard is currently conducting a fleet-wide analysis, including surface, aviation, and information technology, intended to be a fundamental reassessment of the capabilities and mix of assets the Coast Guard needs to fulfill its missions. The Coast Guard is undertaking this effort consistent with direction from Congress. The Howard Goble Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 directed the Commandant of the Coast Guard to submit an integrated major acquisition mission needs statement that, among other things, identifies current and projected capability gaps using mission hour targets. This mission needs statement is to be completed concurrent with the President’s fiscal year 2019 budget submission to Congress. Specifically, the Coast Guard plans first to rewrite its mission needs statement and concept of operations by 2016. Then, it will use a complex model to develop the full fleet mix study, which will include a re-assessment of the fixed-wing flying hour goals. Based on this, the Coast Guard plans to recommend a set of assets that best meets these needs in terms of capability and cost. The Coast Guard plans to complete the full study in time to inform the fiscal year 2019 budget, though specific dates for these events have not been set forth.\nThe Coast Guard and DHS have undertaken several studies, starting in 2008, to reassess the mix of assets the Coast Guard needs. However, in 2011, we reported that it was unclear how DHS and the Coast Guard would reconcile and use these multiple studies to make trade-off decisions or changes to the program of record. To date, the Coast Guard has made no changes to its program of record based on these analyses.\nThe upcoming mission needs statement and subsequent fleet mix analysis will be important to inform decisions about the mix of fixed wing assets the Coast Guard needs and can afford. For example, our calculations and the Coast Guard’s 2012 business case demonstrate that replacing HC-130Js with medium-range aircraft (such as the HC-144 and C-27J) adds flight hours and reduces costs. Specifically, the savings the Coast Guard presented to Congress in its 2013 letter were predicated on replacing three HC-130Js with three C-27Js. According to the Coast Guard, this action would add 600 flight hours per year and save $322 million over the next 30 years. Further, the Coast Guard’s analysis showed that replacing nine HC-130Js would add 1,800 flight hours per year and save nearly $1 billion. According to Coast Guard officials, the fleet mix analysis will examine these cost savings while also accounting for the level of performance provided by the HC-130J compared to the other fixed-wing assets. Because the results of the fleet mix study will not be available for several years, decisions that are made in the interim will not be informed by the Coast Guard’s analysis. To illustrate, if this fleet mix analysis were to establish needed flight hours at a lower number than the current 52,400 goal, the Coast Guard could end up with excess capacity. Further, if the analysis were to demonstrate that the optimal fleet mix is comprised of more medium-range aircraft and fewer long- range aircraft, then the Coast Guard is currently on a path to end up with a more expensive fleet than necessary and it would be too late to opt for a fleet with a greater number of flight hours for the dollar.\nCoast Guard budget and programming officials recognize the aviation fleet may change based on the flight hour goals in the new mission needs statement and the overall fleet mix analysis. They therefore have not included any additional fixed-wing asset purchases in the Coast Guard’s five-year budget plan. For example, DHS and the Coast Guard have formally paused the HC-144 acquisition program at 18 aircraft for the time being. In addition, the Coast Guard already owns 20 aircraft, received since fiscal year 2009, comprised of 14 C-27Js and 6 HC-130Js that are not yet fully operational. These aircraft are planned to be outfitted with surveillance capabilities in the coming years. In total, since 2000, the Coast Guard has received 12 HC-130Js, currently valued at approximately $100 million each, without including them in its budget requests. The Coast Guard’s Major Systems Acquisition Manual provides that the Coast Guard must manage its portfolio of assets to ensure that public resources are wisely invested and that capital programming is an integrated process of a component’s portfolio of capital assets to achieve its strategic goals and objectives for the lowest life cycle cost and least risk. Continuing to receive these aircraft in the coming years, while the Coast Guard revisits its fixed-wing mission needs, will diminish the Coast Guard’s flexibility to optimize its fleet. Further, the Coast Guard may end up with aircraft it ultimately does not need.", "The Coast Guard is in the process of revisiting its fixed-wing fleet needs while also addressing several unknowns regarding its newest asset, the C-27J. While the transfer of the C-27Js to the Coast Guard may save acquisition funds, the Coast Guard is still a long way from being able to operate these aircraft efficiently and effectively. Overcoming the issues we have highlighted is feasible. But it will take time and resources to ensure that the C-27J will be able to function as a Coast Guard medium- range surveillance asset, particularly in terms of adding surveillance capabilities and achieving 1,000 flight hours per year.\nIf the Coast Guard uses the C-27J to replace some HC-144s, as is the current plan, the Coast Guard will fall short of its flight hour goals over the next 30 years, but if the C-27J replaces some HC-130Js, the Coast Guard can achieve more flight hours at a lower cost. The Coast Guard has an opportunity to address these issues now, within the context of its ongoing effort to assess its overall fleet of fixed wing assets. For example, the fleet mix analysis will aid the Coast Guard in determining the right mix of assets between the HC-130J—which the Coast Guard views as a highly capable aircraft—or the greater number of lower cost flight hours provided by the HC-144 or similar aircraft. However, the study results are years away. In the meantime, although the Coast Guard has exercised prudence in pausing the HC-144 program, it may continue to receive HC- 130Js before it knows that it needs these aircraft and before it has determined the capabilities of its C-27J fleet. As a result, if the Coast Guard continues to receive HC-130Js while it revisits its needs, the capability and cost of the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet runs the risk of being dictated by the assets the Coast Guard already owns rather than what it needs. Until the fleet mix study is concluded, the Coast Guard does not know the quantities of each aircraft that optimally balance the capability and presence of its fixed-wing fleet. Because the Coast Guard already has HC-130J aircraft in the pipeline awaiting the addition of surveillance capabilities and sensors, any impact of halting the provision of these aircraft in the interim, prior to completion of the fleet mix study, would be mitigated.", "We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Commandant of the Coast Guard inform Congress of the time frames and key milestones for completing the fleet mix study, including the specific date when the Coast Guard will publish its revised annual flight hour needs and when it plans to inform Congress of the corresponding changes to the composition of its fixed-wing fleet to meet these needs.\nWe also recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard advise Congress to modify the provision of any additional HC-130Js, as appropriate, pending the findings of the fleet mix study.", "We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and formal comment. In its comments, DHS concurred with our first recommendation but did not concur with our second recommendation. DHS’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II. We also provided a full draft of this report to DOD and draft sections of this report to Alenia Aermacchi and L-3 Communications, which provided us with technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.\nIn its letter, DHS stated that it disagreed with our analysis of cost and flight hours because it contains updated assumptions that are not carried through the entire report. During our review, the Coast Guard agreed that changing these assumptions would provide a more accurate understanding of the Coast Guard’s current fixed-wing fleet costs and flight hours. DHS and Coast Guard officials stated that they are not planning to conduct an analysis of the Coast Guard’s current fixed-wing aircraft plan. To assess this plan accurately, as discussed in the objectives, scope, and methodology of this report, we changed two key assumptions from the Coast Guard’s 2013 letter to Congress. First, the HC-144 is now planned to fly only 1,000 hours per year compared to the original plan of 1,200 hours per year. Second, the original analysis assumed all of the Coast Guard’s aircraft have a 30-year service life. In reality, each aircraft type is projected to have a different service life: 40 years for the HC-144; 30 years for the HC-130J; and 25 years for the C- 27J. We applied these assumptions to all of our calculations and then compared our results with what the Coast Guard presented to Congress to determine what, if any, differences exist. We believe this analysis is necessary to understand changes the Coast Guard has made and how they compare to the total savings presented to Congress.\nRegarding the first recommendation, on informing Congress of the time frames and milestones for completing the fleet mix study, DHS concurred with our recommendation but did not provide specific time lines for meeting this recommendation. Based upon a project schedule we received in fall 2014, DHS is currently working toward completing its full fleet mix analysis effort, including providing a revised statement of annual flight hour needs. The Coast Guard plans to complete its initial mission needs statement and concept of operations by 2016, but these documents will not identify the exact mix of assets the Coast Guard needs to meet its missions. Once these documents are complete, the Coast Guard will conduct further analysis to produce the fleet mix study. Based on the study, the Coast Guard plans to recommend a fleet of assets that best meets its needs and, according to officials, will take fiscal constraints into account. The time line for this second effort is unclear but officials told us that they plan for it to inform the fiscal year 2019 budget. We believe it is crucial for Congress and other stakeholders to understand when this information will be available so that key decisions can be made with accurate and up-to-date data. Further, Congress needs to know that the mix of the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet assets will likely change based upon the results of this study.\nDHS did not agree with our second recommendation, that the Commandant of the Coast Guard advise Congress to modify the provision of any additional HC-130Js pending the results of the fleet mix study. DHS stated that it would be inappropriate for the Coast Guard to provide additional guidance, beyond the President’s budget, to the United States Congress on how to appropriate funds. The context for our recommendation reflects the fact that Congress uses many information sources to make decisions on how to appropriate funds that are not included in the President’s budget, such as information provided through agency briefings and reports, input from congressional agencies, and other sources. The Coast Guard has initiated an assessment that it states will provide a definitive flight hour goal for its fixed-wing assets—and subsequently the number and type of aircraft to meet this need. Without knowing the outcome of that assessment, Congress risks providing aircraft that may be in excess of the Coast Guard’s needs and that could result in an additional $1 billion in costs to the Coast Guard. In the meantime, as several C-130Js are already in the pipeline and 14 C-27Js have recently been received, the Coast Guard has prudently decided to pause the HC-144 program while it reassesses its needs. If receiving more C-130Js could complicate or even obviate the fleet mix analysis, now is the time to so advise Congress.\nDHS and the Coast Guard also provided technical comments that we incorporated into the report as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Secretary of the Department of Defense. In addition, the report is available on our website at http://www.gao.gov.\nAs agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to your offices. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the status of the transfer of the C-27Js from the Air Force to the Coast Guard, including cost and schedule estimates, plans for testing, and establishing a maintenance program—as well as any obstacles the Coast Guard faces to field the transferred aircraft, and (2) to what extent the acquisition will affect the overall cost and performance of the Coast Guard’s fixed wing aviation fleet.\nTo determine the status of the transfer of the C-27Js from the Air Force to the Coast Guard, including cost and schedule estimates, plans for testing, and establishing a maintenance program—as well as any obstacles the Coast Guard faces to field the aircraft, we examined the Coast Guard’s C- 27J Implementation Plan as well as other key acquisition documents, including life cycle cost estimates, acquisition program baselines, and logistics studies. To develop a list of major steps in the transfer process, we analyzed the Coast Guard’s initial C-27J Implementation Plan and compared the steps in this plan to the Coast Guard’s Major Systems Acquisition Manual as well as the most recent C-27J Acquisition Decision Memorandum to identify what needed to be done and when. To gain a better sense of the history of the aircraft and its past performance and issues, we reviewed program documents on costs, and maintenance history from both the Air Force and Army. We spoke to members of the Air Force’s C-27J program office to identify how much knowledge the Air Force gained through its acquisition process and gain an understanding of the successes and challenges that they were having. We also reviewed interagency contracting agreements the Coast Guard has with the Army and Navy as well as C-27J contract documents. We interviewed Coast Guard officials from the requirements and acquisitions directorates to identify challenges for the transfer and sustainment of the aircraft, as well as officials from the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Project regarding the acquisition and implementation of the mission system.\nWe developed a list of risk areas based on Coast Guard documentation and what is needed to develop sufficient knowledge about the program. We interviewed U.S. Naval Air Systems Command officials on airworthiness standards as well as the mission system in development by the Navy. We visited the Air Force 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG), located on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, to view the 13 C-27Js in storage and interview Air Force officials in charge of the C-27Js on site, as well as collect flight and maintenance logs regarding past C-27J operation. We met with U.S. Army Special Operations Command officials at Fort Bragg, interviewed contracted logistics support for the C-27J, and toured the parts warehouse and viewed some of the C-27Js on site. We also interviewed program office officials and contractor representatives from the Coast Guard’s C-27J Asset Project Office to gain a better sense of operational challenges and how they are being addressed and toured their respective facilities to discuss issues related to the fielding of the aircraft. We visited L-3 Communications in Waco, Texas to discuss the progress of the 14th plane, view the plane in its current condition, and interview Defense Contract Management Agency officials.\nTo assess the costs of operating and fully equipping the C-27J for Coast Guard missions compared to the program of record, we used the Coast Guard’s May 2012 business case for information regarding all of the costs associated with acquiring and operating this asset for the next 30 years— 2013 through 2042. This estimate, derived in May 2012 by the Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, used the costs for the HC-144 and the HC-130J to estimate the costs of the C-27J using the relative weights of each aircraft. We also used the same perspective as this analysis, in that we looked at the costs to the Coast Guard over the next 30 years given the options for fleet composition. We assumed—similar to the 2012 business case—that the Coast Guard has to purchase the remaining HC-130Js with acquisition funds even though these aircraft have been added by Congress to the Coast Guard’s budget in prior years.\nWe changed three assumptions underlying the analysis to better reflect the Coast Guard’s actual data: 1. Flight Hours: The business case assumed that the C-27J and HC- 144 would fly 1,200 hours per year but the Coast Guard plans to fly each aircraft for 1,000 hours per year. Our analysis used the 1,000 hour number because it is the actual planned amount. 2. Designed Service Life: The Coast Guard’s business case assumed that all three of its fixed-wing assets have the same designed service life. However, the HC-144 has a 40-year designed service life, the C- 27J has a 25-year designed service life, and the HC-130J is designed for a 30-year life. While the Coast Guard maybe able to extend the service life of the C-27J, it could also do so for the HC-144 and HC- 130J. We accounted for this by dividing each asset’s full acquisition cost by the designed service life and multiplying by the 30-year span of the analysis. 3. Spare Parts: The Coast Guard is not going to receive $42 million in spare parts from the Air Force, which was factored into the original business case but not our analysis.\nWe also used the business case to generate purchase and employment schedules for each fixed-wing aircraft for the next 30 years. To assess the Coast Guard’s current plan, we received the planned flight hours for the next 10 years from the Coast Guard’s planning directorate and, similar to the business case, extrapolated these numbers over the next 30 years.\nTo convert all information into fiscal year 2015 dollars, we used the deflators for procurement, fuel, operations and maintenance, and military pay as appropriate from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense’s National Budget Estimates for FY 2015, known as the green book.\nThe efficiency of each planned fleet was derived by taking the total acquisition and operating costs of each planned fleet and dividing this number by the total planned flight hours.\nLastly, we met with Coast Guard officials who put together the Coast Guard’s estimate and assessed the estimate from the Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center. In addition, we met with Coast Guard officials who are working on the Coast Guard’s Fleet Mix Analysis who provided schedules and briefings to us describing this ongoing assessment.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact above, Katherine Trimble, Assistant Director; Laurier R. Fish; Marie Ahearn; Peter W. Anderson; Ozzy Trevino; and Melissa Wohlgemuth all made key contributions to this report. Jonathan Mulcare also made contributions to this report.", "Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls. GAO-14-450. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014.\nCoast Guard: Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-12-918. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2012.\nObservations on the Coast Guard’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s Fleet Studies. GAO-12-751R. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2012.\nCoast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains Unachievable. GAO-11-743. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.\nCoast Guard: Deepwater Requirements, Quantities, and Cost Require Revalidation to Reflect Knowledge Gained. GAO-10-790. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2010." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "h0_full", "h2_full h3_title h1_full", "h1_full", "h2_full", "h1_full", "h3_full h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What are the Coast Guards plans regarding its C-27s?", "What funding is needed to operate these aircrafts?", "What issues exist in the preparation of the aircrafts?", "How is the Coast Guard responding to these risks?", "What is the current outlook for the C-27J fleet?", "How did the Coast Guard make their case for the C-27Js?", "To what extent have they made good on this promise?", "What data did GAO use in this assessment?", "What is the status of the Coast Guard's mission analysis?", "What is the status of the aircraft fleet?", "What is the likely effect of these acquisitions?", "What is the Air Force doing to the 14C-27s?", "For what are the aircrafts being used?", "How does the Coast Guard establish its aircraft needs?", "What is the importance of the Coast Guard's aircraft?", "How should the DHS and Coast Guard address Congress on Coast Guard fleet?", "How did the DHS respond to this recommendation?", "What might happen if the Coast Guard accepts additional HC-130Js?" ], "summary": [ "As of January 2015, the Coast Guard had transferred 2 of the 14 C-27J aircraft it is receiving from the Air Force to its aircraft maintenance facility, with plans to field 14 fully operational C-27Js by 2022.", "According to initial Coast Guard estimates, while the aircraft come at no cost, the Coast Guard needs about $600 million to fully operationalize them.", "This process is complex and significant work and risk remain. For example, the Coast Guard must establish its needs and purchase a set of spare parts for each aircraft, but faces hurdles due to potential pricing issues and delivery delays from the manufacturer. Also, the Coast Guard does not have access to the manufacturer's technical data that are required for modifications to the aircraft's structure to, for example, incorporate radar.", "These and other risks may inhibit the Coast Guard's ability to operate the aircraft as planned. However, the Coast Guard is working to mitigate these risks.", "The C-27J will improve the affordability of the Coast Guard's fixed-wing fleet, but the fleet as currently planned may not be optimal in terms of cost and flight hour capability.", "The Coast Guard submitted a business case to Congress in 2013 that determined the C-27J would save $837 million over 30 years, compared to the program of record, without reducing fleet performance.", "GAO estimates that the fleet the Coast Guard is currently pursuing achieves nearly all of these savings. However, the source of these savings has shifted. A significant portion of the savings now results from an 18 percent drop in flight hours due to a change in the mix of aircraft the Coast Guard intends to pursue.", "GAO used updated information in conducting its analysis, such as the expected service life of each aircraft type.", "Consistent with congressional direction, the Coast Guard is conducting a multi-phased analysis of its mission needs—including its flight hour goals and fleet of fixed-wing assets—but will not present the full results prior to its 2019 budget request.", "In the meantime, the Coast Guard has prudently paused its existing HC-144 acquisition program. However, since 2000, the Coast Guard has received 12 HC-130Js without budgeting for them and it may continue to receive these aircraft while it studies its fixed-wing fleet needs.", "If the Coast Guard continues to receive these aircraft in the near term, the capability and cost of the Coast Guard's fixed-wing fleet runs the risk of being dictated by the assets the Coast Guard already owns rather than what it determines it needs.", "The Air Force is transferring 14 C-27J aircraft to the Coast Guard.", "Once modified into surveillance aircraft, the C-27Js will be a part of the Coast Guard's fixed-wing aircraft fleet.", "In 2007, the Coast Guard established a baseline of aircraft quantities and costs known as the program of record. This baseline established the cost and quantity of aircraft necessary to achieve its goal of 52,400 flight hours per year.", "The Coast Guard's aircraft, including the HC-144 and HC-130J/H, are integral to its missions, such as counterdrug and search and rescue.", "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast Guard should advise Congress of the time frames for the Coast Guard's fleet analysis and to modify the provision of additional HC-130Js, as appropriate, in the interim.", "DHS agreed with the first recommendation, but did not agree with the second recommendation.", "If the Coast Guard accepts additional HC-130Js before completing the fleet mix study, the aircraft may be in excess of the Coast Guard's need." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 1, 2, -1, -1, 5, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 5, 5 ] }
GAO_GAO-15-388T	{ "title": [ "DHS Has Made Progress in Strengthening Its Management Functions, but Considerable Work Remains", "DHS Progress in Meeting Criteria for Removal from the High-Risk List", "DHS Progress in Achieving Key High-Risk Actions and Outcomes", "Key Themes Continue to Impact DHS’s Progress in Implementing Its Mission Functions", "GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "DHS’s efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions have resulted in progress addressing our criteria for removal from the high-risk list. In particular, in our 2015 high-risk update report, which we released earlier this month, we found that DHS has met two criteria and partially met the remaining three criteria, as shown in table 1.\nLeadership commitment (met). In our 2015 report, we found that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Under Secretary for Management at DHS, and other senior officials have continued to demonstrate commitment and top leadership support for addressing the department’s management challenges. We also found that they have taken actions to institutionalize this commitment to help ensure the long-term success of the department’s efforts. For example, in April 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum entitled Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort, committing to, among other things, improving DHS’s planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes through strengthened departmental structures and increased capability. Senior DHS officials, including the Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Management, have also routinely met with us over the past 6 years to discuss the department’s plans and progress in addressing this high-risk area. During this time, we provided specific feedback on the department’s efforts. We concluded that it will be important for DHS to maintain its current level of top leadership support and commitment to ensure continued progress in successfully executing its corrective actions through completion.\nCorrective action plan (met). We found that DHS has established a plan for addressing this high-risk area. Specifically, in a September 2010 letter to DHS, we identified and DHS agreed to achieve 31 actions and outcomes that are critical to addressing the challenges within the department’s management areas and in integrating those functions across the department. In March 2014, we updated the actions and outcomes in collaboration with DHS to reduce overlap and ensure their continued relevance and appropriateness. These updates resulted in a reduction from 31 to 30 total actions and outcomes. Toward achieving the actions and outcomes, DHS issued its initial Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management in January 2011 and has since provided updates to its strategy in seven later versions, most recently in October 2014. The integrated strategy includes key management initiatives and related corrective actions plans for addressing DHS’s management challenges and the actions and outcomes we identified. For example, the October 2014 strategy update includes an initiative focused on financial systems improvement and modernization and an initiative focused on IT human capital management. These initiatives support various actions and outcomes, such as modernizing the U.S. Coast Guard’s financial management system and implementing an IT human capital strategic plan, respectively. We concluded in our 2015 report that DHS’s strategy and approach to continuously refining actionable steps to implementing the outcomes, if implemented effectively and sustained, should provide a path for DHS to be removed from our high-risk list.\nCapacity (partially met). In October 2014, DHS identified that it had resources needed to implement 7 of the 11 initiatives the department had under way to achieve the actions and outcomes, but did not identify sufficient resources for the 4 remaining initiatives. In addition, our prior work has identified specific capacity gaps that could undermine achievement of management outcomes. For example, in April 2014, we reported that DHS needed to increase its cost-estimating capacity and that the department had not approved baselines for 21 of 46 major acquisition programs. These baselines—which establish cost, schedule, and capability parameters—are necessary to accurately assess program performance. Thus, in our 2015 report, we concluded that DHS needs to continue to identify resources for the remaining initiatives; work to mitigate shortfalls and prioritize initiatives, as needed; and communicate to senior leadership critical resource gaps.\nFramework to monitor progress (partially met). In our 2015 report we found that DHS established a framework for monitoring its progress in implementing the integrated strategy it identified for addressing the 30 actions and outcomes. In the June 2012 update to the Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, DHS included, for the first time, performance measures to track its progress in implementing all of its key management initiatives. DHS continued to include performance measures in its October 2014 update. However, we also found that the department can strengthen this framework for monitoring a certain area. In particular, according to DHS officials, as of November 2014, they were establishing a monitoring program that will include assessing whether financial management systems modernization projects for key components that DHS plans to complete in 2019 are following industry best practices and meet users’ needs. Effective implementation of these modernization projects is important because, until they are complete, the department’s current systems will not effectively support financial management operations. As we concluded in our 2015 report, moving forward, DHS will need to closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse adjustments, as needed.\nDemonstrated, sustained progress (partially met). We found in our 2015 report that DHS has made important progress in strengthening its management functions, but needs to demonstrate sustainable, measurable progress in addressing key challenges that remain within and across these functions. In particular, we found that DHS has implemented a number of actions demonstrating the department’s progress in strengthening its management functions. For example, DHS has strengthened its enterprise architecture program (or blueprint) to guide and constrain IT acquisitions and obtained a clean opinion on its financial statements for 2 consecutive years, fiscal years 2013 and 2014. However, we also found that DHS continues to face significant management challenges that hinder the department’s ability to accomplish its missions. For example, DHS does not have the acquisition management tools in place to consistently demonstrate whether its major acquisition programs are on track to achieve their cost, schedule, and capability goals. In addition, DHS does not have modernized financial management systems. This affects its ability to have ready access to reliable information for informed decision making. As we concluded in our 2015 report, addressing these and other management challenges will be a significant undertaking that will likely require several years, but will be critical for the department to mitigate the risks that management weaknesses pose to mission accomplishment.", "Key to addressing the department’s management challenges is DHS demonstrating the ability to achieve sustained progress across the 30 actions and outcomes we identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. In our 2015 report, we found that DHS has fully implemented 9 of these actions and outcomes, with additional work remaining to fully address the remaining 21. Achieving sustained progress across the actions and outcomes, in turn, requires leadership commitment, effective corrective action planning, adequate capacity (that is, the people and other resources), and monitoring the effectiveness and sustainability of supporting initiatives. The 30 key actions and outcomes include, among others, validating required acquisition documents in accordance with a department-approved, knowledge-based acquisition process, and sustaining clean audit opinions for at least 2 consecutive years on department-wide financial statements and internal controls.\nWe further found that DHS has made important progress across all of its management functions and significant progress in the area of management integration. In particular, DHS has made important progress in several areas to fully address 9 actions and outcomes, 5 of which it has sustained as fully implemented for at least 2 years. For instance, DHS fully met 1 outcome for the first time by obtaining a clean opinion on its financial statements for 2 consecutive years and fully met another outcome by establishing sufficient component-level acquisition capability. It also sustained full implementation of another outcome by continuing to use performance measures to assess progress made in achieving department-wide management integration. DHS has also mostly addressed an additional 5 actions and outcomes, meaning that a small amount of work remains to fully address them.\nWe also found that considerable work remains, however, in several areas for DHS to fully achieve the remaining actions and outcomes and thereby strengthen its management functions. Specifically, DHS has partially addressed 12 and initiated 4 of the actions and outcomes. As previously mentioned, addressing some of these actions and outcomes, such as modernizing the department’s financial management systems and improving employee morale, are significant undertakings that will likely require multiyear efforts. Table 2 summarizes DHS’s progress in addressing the 30 actions and outcomes and is followed by selected examples.\nAcquisition management. In our 2015 report, we found that DHS has fully addressed 1 of the 5 acquisition management outcomes, partially addressed 3 outcomes, and initiated actions to address the remaining outcome. For example, DHS has recently taken a number of actions to fully address establishing effective component-level acquisition capability. These actions include initiating (1) monthly Component Acquisition Executive staff forums in March 2014 to provide guidance and share best practices and (2) assessments of component policies and processes for managing acquisitions. DHS has also initiated efforts to validate required acquisition documents in accordance with a knowledge-based acquisition process, but this remains a major challenge for the department. A knowledge-based approach provides developers with information needed to make sound investment decisions, and it would help DHS address significant challenges we have identified across its acquisition programs. DHS’s acquisition policy largely reflects key acquisition management practices, but the department has not implemented it consistently For example, in March 2014, we found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not fully followed DHS policy regarding testing for the integrated fixed towers being deployed on the Arizona border. As a result, DHS does not have complete information on how the towers will operate once they are fully deployed.\nIn addition, in our 2015 report we found that DHS continues to assess and address whether appropriate numbers of trained acquisition personnel are in place at the department and component levels, an outcome it has partially addressed. Further, while DHS has initiated efforts to demonstrate that major acquisition programs are on track to achieve their cost, schedule, and capability goals, DHS officials have acknowledged it will be years before this outcome has been fully addressed. Much of the necessary program information is not yet consistently available or up to date.\nIT management. In our 2015 report, we found that DHS has fully addressed 2 of the 6 IT management outcomes, mostly addressed another 3, and partially addressed the remaining 1. For example, DHS has finalized a directive to establish its tiered governance and portfolio management structure for overseeing and managing its IT investments, and annually reviews each of its portfolios and the associated investments to determine the most efficient allocation of resources within each of the portfolios. DHS has also implemented its IT Strategic Human Capital Plan at the enterprise level. This includes developing an IT specialist leadership competency gap workforce analysis and a DHS IT career path pilot. However, as DHS has not yet determined the extent to which the component chief information officers have implemented the enterprise human capital plan’s objectives and goals, DHS’s capacity to achieve this outcome is unclear. Additionally, we found that DHS continues to take steps to enhance its information security program. However, while the department obtained a clean opinion on its financial statements, in November 2014, the department’s financial statement auditor reported that continued flaws in security controls such as those for access controls, configuration management, and segregation of duties Thus, were a material weakness for fiscal year 2014 financial reporting.the department needs to remediate the material weakness in information security controls reported by its financial statement auditor.\nFinancial management. In our 2015 report, we found that DHS has fully addressed 2 financial management outcomes, partially addressed 3, and initiated 3.financial statements for 2 consecutive years, fiscal years 2013 and 2014, fully addressing 2 outcomes. As of November 2014, DHS was working Most notably, DHS received a clean audit opinion on its toward addressing a third outcome—establishing effective internal control over financial reporting. We reported in September 2013 that DHS needs to eliminate all material weaknesses at the department level, including weaknesses related to financial management systems, before its financial auditor can affirm that controls are effective. However, as we reported in our 2015 report, DHS has yet to identify and commit the resources needed for remediating the remaining material weaknesses. As we reported in September 2013, according to DHS’s auditors, the existence of these material weaknesses limits DHS’s ability to process, store, and report financial data in a manner that ensures accuracy, confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data without substantial manual intervention. This, in turn, increases the risk that human error may cause material misstatements in the financial statements.\nWe also found in our 2015 report that DHS needs to modernize key components’ financial management systems and comply with financial management system requirements. The components’ financial management system modernization efforts are at various stages due, in part, to a bid protest and the need to resolve critical stability issues with a legacy financial system before moving forward with system modernization efforts. For fiscal year 2014, auditors reported that persistent and pervasive financial system functionality conditions exist at multiple components and that DHS continues to rely on compensating controls and complex manual work-arounds due to serious legacy financial system issues. We concluded that without sound controls and systems, DHS faces long-term challenges in obtaining and sustaining a clean audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting, and ensuring its financial management systems generate reliable, useful, and timely information for day-to-day decision making.\nHuman capital management. In our 2015 report, we found that DHS has fully addressed 1 human capital management outcome, mostly addressed 2, and partially addressed the remaining 4. For example, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed a human capital strategic plan in 2011 that DHS has since made sustained progress in implementing, fully addressing this outcome. We also found that DHS has actions under way to identify current and future human capital needs. However, DHS has considerable work ahead to improve employee morale. For example, the Office of Personnel Management’s 2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey data showed that DHS’s scores continued to decrease in all four dimensions of the survey’s index for human capital accountability and assessment—job satisfaction, talent management, leadership and knowledge management, and results-oriented performance culture. DHS has taken steps to identify where it has the most significant employee satisfaction problems and developed plans to address those problems. In September 2012, we recommended, among other things, that DHS In improve its root-cause analysis efforts related to these plans.December 2014, DHS reported actions under way to address our recommendations but had not fully implemented them. Given the sustained decrease in DHS employee morale indicated by Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey data, as we concluded in our 2015 report, it is particularly important that DHS implement these recommendations and thereby help identify appropriate actions to take to improve morale within its components and department-wide.\nGAO, DHS Training: Improved Documentation, Resource Tracking, and Performance Measurement Could Strengthen Efforts, GAO-14-688 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2014). found that while component officials generally identified the Leader Development Framework as beneficial, DHS management could benefit from improved information for identifying the need for and making program improvements. In support of the Leader Development Framework, we recommended, among other things, that DHS clearly identify Leader Development Program goals and ensure program performance measures reflect key attributes. DHS agreed and implemented this recommendation in December 2014. However, to fully achieve this outcome, DHS also needs to develop and make sustained progress in implementing a formal training strategy, as well as issue department-wide policies on training and development, among other things.\nManagement integration. In our 2015 report, we found that DHS has sustained its progress in fully addressing 3 of 4 outcomes we identified and agreed they are key to the department’s management integration efforts. For example, in January 2011, DHS issued an initial action plan to guide its management integration efforts—the Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management. Since then, DHS has generally made improvements to the strategy with each update based on feedback we provided. DHS has also shown important progress in addressing the last and most significant management integration outcome—to implement actions and outcomes in each management area to develop consistent or consolidated processes and systems within and across its management functional areas—but we found that considerable work remains. For example, the Secretary’s April 2014 Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort memorandum highlighted a number of initiatives designed to allow the department to operate in a more integrated fashion, such as the Integrated Investment Life Cycle Management initiative, to manage investments across the department’s components and management functions. DHS completed its pilot for a portion of this initiative in March 2014 and, according to DHS’s Executive Director for Management Integration, has begun expanding its application to new portfolios, such as border security and information sharing, among others. However, given that these main management integration initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and contingent upon DHS following through with its plans, it is too early to assess their impact. To achieve this outcome, we concluded that DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress integrating its management functions within and across the department and its components.\nIn our 2015 report, we further concluded that in the coming years, DHS needs to continue implementing its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management and show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its key management initiatives and corrective actions and achieving outcomes. In doing so, it will be important for DHS to maintain its current level of top leadership support and sustained commitment to ensure continued progress in executing its corrective actions through completion; continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk area and periodically report its progress to us and Congress; identify and work to mitigate any resource gaps, and prioritize initiatives as needed to ensure it can implement and sustain its corrective actions; closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse adjustments as needed; and make continued progress in achieving the 21 actions and outcomes it has not fully addressed and demonstrate that systems, personnel, and policies are in place to ensure that progress can be sustained over time.\nWe will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts in this high-risk area to determine if the actions and outcomes are achieved and sustained over the long term.", "In September 2011, we reported that our work had identified three key themes that had impacted DHS’s progress in implementing its mission functions since it began operations: (1) executing and integrating its management functions for results, (2) leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise, and (3) strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts. As previously discussed, DHS has made important progress with respect to the first theme by strengthening and integrating its management functions, but considerable work remains. Our recent work indicates that DHS has similarly made progress related to the other two themes of leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise and strategically managing risk and assessing homeland security efforts, but that these two themes continue to impact the department’s progress in implementing its mission functions.\nLeading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise. As we reported in September 2011, while DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the homeland, it has significant leadership and coordination responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security enterprise. To satisfy these responsibilities, it is critically important that DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective partnerships with its stakeholders while at the same time addressing DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. Before DHS began operations, we reported that to secure the nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships among components and also with a range of other entities, including federal agencies, state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and international partners. DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts. For example, in June 2014, we reported on DHS efforts to enhance border security by using collaborative mechanisms such as the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats to coordinate border security efforts. Specifically, we reported that DHS and CBP had coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, through the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, interagency partners—including CBP, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and the Bureau of Land Management, among others—worked jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity.\nHowever, our recent work has also identified opportunities for DHS to improve its partnerships. For example, with respect to DHS’s efforts to enhance border security using collaborative mechanisms, in June 2014, we found that DHS had established performance measures and reporting processes for the mechanisms, but opportunities existed to strengthen the mechanisms. For instance, we found that establishing written agreements with its federal, state, local, and tribal partners could help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack of common objectives, and recommended that DHS establish such agreements. DHS concurred and stated that it planned to develop memoranda of understanding to better facilitate its partnerships. Further, in November 2014, we reported on DHS’s processing of Freedom of Information Act requests. We found, among other things, that DHS lacked an important mechanism for effectively facilitating public interaction with the department on the handling of Freedom of Information Act requests because the department did not have an updated regulation reflecting changes in how it processes these requests. We recommended that DHS finalize and issue an updated DHS Freedom of Information Act regulation. DHS concurred and reported planned actions to implement this recommendation by April 2015.\nGAO-11-881. to critical infrastructure security and resilience. Our recent work has further found that DHS offices and components have continued to engage in risk management activities. For example, in September 2014, we reported that during fiscal years 2011 to 2013, DHS offices and components conducted or required thousands of vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure. These assessments can identify factors that render an asset or facility susceptible to threats and hazards. However, we also found that DHS is not well positioned to integrate relevant assessments to, among other things, support nationwide comparative risk assessments, because the assessment tools and methods used vary in length, detail, and areas assessed. In addition, our recent work has identified opportunities for components to better strategically manage risks in various programs. For example, in September 2014, we reported that CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities—including nuclear and radiological testing—covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013. We found that DHS had established a policy that requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions, but that CBP testing did not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP had not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. We recommended that—to help ensure that resources for covert operations provide reasonable assurance that efforts to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border are working as intended and appropriately targeted—DHS conduct or use a risk assessment to inform the department’s priorities for covert operations. DHS concurred and reported that it plans to implement this recommendation in July 2015.\nIn September 2011, we reported that limited strategic and program planning, as well as assessment and evaluation to inform approaches and investment decisions, had contributed to DHS programs not meeting strategic needs or doing so effectively and efficiently. Our recent work has indicated that strategic and program planning challenges continue to affect implementation of some DHS programs. For example, in September 2014, we reported on DHS headquarters consolidation efforts and their management by DHS and the General Services Administration (GSA). We found that DHS and GSA’s planning for the consolidation did not fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices intended to help agencies effectively plan and procure assets. DHS and GSA officials reported that they had taken some initial actions that may facilitate consolidation planning in a manner consistent with leading practices, but consolidation plans, which were finalized between 2006 and 2009, had not been updated to reflect these changes. According to DHS and GSA officials, the funding gap between what was requested and what was received from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 was over $1.6 billion. According to these officials, this gap had escalated estimated costs by over $1 billion—from $3.3 billion to $4.5 billion—and delayed scheduled completion by over 10 years, from an original completion date of 2015 to the current estimate of 2026. However, DHS and GSA had not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives to help them adapt consolidation plans to changing conditions and address funding issues as reflected in leading practices. We recommended that DHS and GSA work jointly to assess these needs. DHS and GSA concurred, and DHS reported in February 2015 that the agencies had drafted an enhanced consolidation plan. We will assess this plan when it and any additional supporting analyses are made available to us.\nWe also recently found that DHS had taken preliminary steps to begin to understand the cyber risk to building and access controls systems in federal facilities, but that significant work remained, such as developing a strategy to guide these efforts. In particular, in December 2014, we found that DHS lacked a strategy that (1) defines the problem, (2) identifies roles and responsibilities, (3) analyzes the resources needed, and (4) identifies a methodology for assessing cyber risk to building and access controls systems in federal facilities.a strategy that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of key components within DHS had contributed to a lack of action within the department. For example, we found that no one within DHS was assessing or addressing cyber risk to building and access control systems particularly at the nearly 9,000 federal facilities protected by the Federal Protective Service as of October 2014. We recommended that DHS, in consultation with GSA, develop and implement a strategy to address cyber risk to building and access control systems. DHS concurred and identified steps it plans to take to develop a strategy by May 2015.\nWe concluded that the absence of Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.", "For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Joseph P. Cruz (Assistant Director), Michael LaForge, Thomas Lombardi, Emily Kuhn, Taylor Matheson, Shannin O’Neill, and Katherine Trimble. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in each product.", "DHS Training: Improved Documentation, Resource Tracking, and Performance Measurement Could Strengthen Efforts. GAO-14-688. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2014.\nDepartment of Homeland Security: Progress Made; Significant Work Remains in Addressing High-Risk Areas. GAO-14-532T. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2014.\nHomeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage Its Portfolio to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with Congress. GAO-14-332. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2014.\nDepartment of Homeland Security: DHS’s Efforts to Improve Employee Morale and Fill Senior Leadership Vacancies. GAO-14-228T. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2013.\nDHS Financial Management: Continued Effort Needed to Address Internal Control and System Challenges. GAO-14-106T. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2013.\nInformation Technology: Additional OMB and Agency Actions Are Needed to Achieve Portfolio Savings. GAO-14-65. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2013.\nDHS Financial Management: Additional Efforts Needed to Resolve Deficiencies in Internal Controls and Financial Management Systems. GAO-13-561. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2013.\nDHS Recruiting and Hiring: DHS Is Generally Filling Mission-Critical Positions, but Could Better Track Costs of Coordinated Recruiting Efforts. GAO-13-742. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2013.\nInformation Technology: Additional Executive Review Sessions Needed to Address Troubled Projects. GAO-13-524. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2013.\nThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_full", "h1_full", "", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What must the DHS demonstrate to address management challenges?", "To what extent has DHS addressed these actions?", "What was found about the implementation of the 9 actions the DHS addressed fully?", "What actions have been mostly addressed?", "What of the DHS's addressing of the remaining actions?", "What process should DHS take in addressing these actions?", "On what kinds of government operations has GAO reported?", "Why was DHS designated as high risk?", "How has DHS progressed since being designated as high risk?", "How have DHS's changes altered GAO's work?", "On what does this statement report?", "On what is it based?" ], "summary": [ "Key to addressing the department's management challenges is DHS demonstrating the ability to achieve sustained progress across 30 actions and outcomes that GAO identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area.", "GAO found in its 2015 high-risk update report that DHS fully addressed 9 of these actions and outcomes, while work remains to fully address the remaining 21.", "Of the 9 actions and outcomes that DHS has addressed, 5 have been sustained as fully implemented for at least 2 years. For example, DHS fully met 1 outcome for the first time by obtaining a clean opinion on its financial statements for 2 consecutive years.", "DHS has also mostly addressed an additional 5 actions and outcomes, meaning that a small amount of work remains to fully address them.", "However, DHS has partially addressed 12 and initiated 4 of the remaining actions and outcomes. For example, DHS does not have modernized financial management systems, a fact that affects its ability to have ready access to reliable information for informed decision making.", "Addressing some of these actions and outcomes, such as modernizing the department's financial management systems and improving employee morale, are significant undertakings that will likely require multiyear efforts. In GAO's 2015 high-risk update report, GAO concluded that in the coming years, DHS needs to continue to show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its key management initiatives and achieving the remaining 21 actions and outcomes.", "GAO has regularly reported on government operations identified as high risk because of their increased vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.", "In 2003, GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies into one department, and failure to address associated risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security.", "While challenges remain for DHS across its range of missions, it has made considerable progress.", "As a result, in its 2013 high-risk update, GAO narrowed the scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening and integrating DHS management functions (human capital, acquisition, financial, and information technology).", "As requested, this statement discusses, among other things, DHS's progress and actions remaining in strengthening and integrating its management functions.", "This statement is based on GAO's 2015 high-risk update and reports and testimonies from September 2011 through February 2015. Among other things, GAO analyzed DHS strategies and interviewed DHS officials." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 4, -1, -1, 1, 2, -1, 4 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-15-449	{ "title": [ "Background", "Behavioral Health Treatment", "Medicaid", "Medicaid and Other Funding Sources for Public Behavioral Health Programs", "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act", "State Behavioral Health Agencies", "An Estimated 3 Million Low-Income Uninsured Adults Had a Behavioral Health Condition, with Half Living in States that Have Not Expanded Medicaid", "Selected Non- Expansion States Offered Treatment Options for Uninsured Adults, but Primarily Provided Treatment to Those with the Most Serious Behavioral Health Needs", "States Offered a Variety of Behavioral Health Treatments for Uninsured Adults", "States Set Priorities to Focus Care on Those with the Most Serious Behavioral Health Needs and Used Waiting Lists for the Remaining Individuals", "Selected Expansion States Generally Managed Behavioral Health Separately from Other Benefits, Reporting Increased Treatment Availability, but Some Continuing Access Concerns", "Selected States Generally Managed Behavioral Health Coverage for Newly Eligible Enrollees Separately from Other Benefits", "Selected States Provided Comparable Behavioral Health Benefits for Newly Eligible and Existing Medicaid Enrollees", "Selected Expansion States Reported Increased Availability of Behavioral Health Treatment, but Cited Some Ongoing Access Concerns", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Estimated Number and Percentage of Low-Income, Uninsured Adults with Behavioral Health Conditions", "State expanded Medicaid as of", "Total", "Total", "Appendix II: State-Reported Information on Effects of Medicaid Expansion on State Behavioral Health Agency Budgets", "Connecticut", "Kentucky", "Maryland", "Michigan", "Nevada", "West Virginia", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Access to behavioral health treatment—services and prescription drugs to address behavioral health conditions—is important because of the harmful consequences of untreated conditions, which may result in worsening health, increased medical costs, negative effects on employment and workplace performance, strain on personal and social relationships, and possible incarceration. Behavioral health treatment can help individuals reduce their symptoms and improve their ability to function. However, research suggests that a substantial number of individuals with behavioral health conditions may not receive any treatment or less than the recommended treatment, even among those with serious conditions. For example, in 2013, SAMHSA estimated that there were 3.9 million adults aged 18 or older with a serious mental illness who perceived an unmet need for mental health care within the last 12 months. This number includes an estimated 1.3 million adults with a serious mental illness who did not receive any mental health services. One potential barrier to accessing treatment is shortages of qualified behavioral health professionals, particularly in rural areas. SAMHSA noted that more than three-quarters of counties in the United States have a serious shortage of mental health professionals.\nBehavioral health treatment includes an array of options ranging from less to more intensive, and may include prevention services, screening and assessment, outpatient treatment, inpatient treatment, and emergency services for mental health and substance use conditions. Prescription drugs may also be included as part of treatment for either substance use or mental health conditions. See table 1 for information on select behavioral health treatments.\nIn addition to these treatments, other supportive services exist for behavioral health conditions that are designed to help individuals manage mental health or substance use conditions and maximize their potential to live independently in the community. These supportive services are multidimensional—intended to address not only health conditions, but also employment, housing, and other issues. For example, they include recovery housing—supervised, short-term housing for individuals with substance use conditions or co-occurring mental and substance use conditions that can be used after inpatient or residential treatment.", "The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—and states jointly administer the Medicaid program, which finances health care, including behavioral health care, for low-income individuals and families. States have flexibility within broad federal parameters for designing and implementing their Medicaid programs. States may use Medicaid waivers—which allow states to set aside certain, otherwise applicable federal Medicaid requirements—to provide health care, including behavioral health treatment, to individuals who would not otherwise be eligible for those benefits under the state’s Medicaid program. For example, states may use waiver programs to target residents in a geographic region or to target individuals with particular needs, such as those with serious mental illness. States may also choose different delivery systems to provide benefits including behavioral health treatment to Medicaid enrollees, such as FFS or managed care. Some states with managed care delivery systems may elect to “carve out” behavioral health benefits, i.e., contract for them separately from physical health care benefits. For example, some states contract with limited benefit plans, which are managed care arrangements designed to provide a narrowly defined set of services. Similarly, states with FFS delivery systems may choose to contract with separate companies to administer behavioral health benefits than those administering physical health care benefits.Our previous work has noted that while using a separate plan to provide mental health services may control costs, it can also increase the risk that treatment for physical and mental health conditions will not be coordinated.", "A variety of sources provide funding for behavioral health treatment in public programs. Medicaid is the largest source of funding for behavioral health treatment, with spending projected to be about $60 billion in 2014. Another significant source of revenue for state BHAs is state general revenues. In contrast to Medicaid, for which payment of benefits to eligible persons is required by law, state general funding for the treatment of uninsured and underinsured residents is discretionary. The extent to which state-funded treatment is provided may depend on the availability of funding. States may also use SAMHSA mental health and substance use block grants to design and support a variety of treatments for individuals with behavioral health conditions. See figure 1 for information on sources of state BHA revenues for mental health in 2013. (Similar figures for substance use were not available.)", "The number of states that have expanded Medicaid includes the District of Columbia, which we refer to as a state of for the purposes of this report.", "State BHAs are the agencies responsible for planning and operating state behavioral health systems, and they play a significant role in administering, funding, and providing behavioral health treatment. State BHAs manage behavioral-health-related federal grants and may work with other state agencies—such as state Medicaid agencies—to identify and treat mental health and substance use conditions. State BHAs may contract directly with providers to deliver behavioral health treatments or may contract with county or city governments, which are then responsible for the delivery of treatments within their local areas. State BHAs may also play a role in providing Medicaid enrollees with wraparound services—that is, services that state Medicaid programs do not cover, but that may aid in recovery, such as supportive housing.", "Nationwide, estimates using data from 2008 to 2013 indicated that of 17.8 million low-income, uninsured adults, approximately 3 million (17 percent) had a behavioral health condition prior to the Medicaid expansion in 2014. Specifically, about 1 million low-income, uninsured adults (5.8 percent) were estimated to have a serious mental illness, while nearly 2.3 million low-income, uninsured adults (12.8 percent) were estimated to have a substance use condition. Underlying these national estimates was considerable variation at the state level. In particular, the percentage of low-income, uninsured adults with a behavioral health condition ranged from 6.9 percent to 27.5 percent. Similarly, the percentage of low-income uninsured adults with serious mental illness ranged from 1.3 percent to 13 percent, while the percentage with a substance use condition ranged from 5.9 percent to 23.5 percent. See figure 3 for the states with the highest and lowest estimated percentages of low-income, uninsured adults with a serious mental illness or substance use condition. See appendix I for state-by-state estimates.\nOf the 3 million low-income, uninsured adults estimated to have a behavioral health condition, nearly half—approximately 1.4 million people, or about 49 percent—lived in the 22 states that had not expanded Medicaid as of February 2015, compared with the approximately 1.5 million people in the remaining 29 states that had expanded Medicaid. The estimated prevalence of behavioral health conditions overall among low-income, uninsured adults was about 17 percent, on average, in both expansion and non-expansion states.", "State BHAs in the non-expansion states we examined offered a variety of behavioral health treatments for low-income, uninsured adults. These states identified priority populations to focus care on adults with the most serious conditions and used waiting lists for those with more modest behavioral health needs.", "The non-expansion states we examined—Missouri, Montana, Texas, and Wisconsin—offered a range of behavioral health treatments— inpatient and outpatient services and prescription drugs—for low-income, uninsured adults. These states used community mental health centers, state institutions, and contracts with providers to deliver treatments, and used a variety of sources, such as state general funds, federal block grants, and Medicaid to fund them. For mental health and substance use conditions, outpatient services that these states offered included evaluation and assessment, visits with medical providers, and individual, family, and group counseling. Treatments also included emergency care, and in most of these states, partial hospitalizations and inpatient psychiatric care for mental health conditions. For substance use conditions, these states also offered detoxification and residential treatment. These states generally made prescription drugs available to uninsured adults as part of the treatment for behavioral health conditions.\nFor example, Missouri, Texas, and Wisconsin included medication- assisted treatment for substance use conditions, and all four of the selected non-expansion states offered prescription drugs for mental health conditions. In addition to treatment, the non-expansion states also offered some supportive services, such as peer support or housing services, for uninsured adults.\nFor two of the states we examined—Wisconsin and Texas—the availability of specific services for behavioral health may vary throughout the state. In particular, the responsibility for administering and providing treatment was divided between the state BHA and local entities, which receive both state and local funding to provide behavioral health treatment. funding for behavioral health, which they can use to fund services of their choosing. The Wisconsin BHA identified a core list of 30 services for behavioral health that it promotes and encourages counties to provide, but the official noted that it may be difficult for a single county to provide all of the services on the list. For example, the Wisconsin BHA reported that about a quarter of counties provided medication-assisted treatment for individuals with substance use conditions in 2013. As another example, Texas offers opportunities for local mental health authorities to compete for funding for specific types of services, such as housing.\nLocal entities are counties for Wisconsin and local mental health authorities in Texas. In contrast, the state BHA is solely responsible for administering behavioral health treatment in Missouri and Montana. coverage. In addition, Wisconsin obtained a Medicaid waiver effective January 2014 that made certain childless adults up to 100 percent of the FPL eligible for Medicaid, which gave them access to Medicaid-covered services and prescription drugs, including behavioral health treatments.\nOfficials from the non-expansion states we examined noted initiatives relevant to low-income, uninsured adults, such as improving crisis response and coordinating care for individuals involved with law enforcement.\nTexas officials noted that 24 of the 33 local mental health authorities have a facility-based crisis option to treat individuals experiencing a crisis and that they would like to provide the remaining local mental health authorities with similar facilities, which are intended to avoid inpatient care.\nIn Wisconsin, behavioral health treatment includes mobile crisis services to respond to individuals in the community experiencing a crisis. A Wisconsin official told us that there were legislative efforts underway to expand these services, particularly in rural areas.\nMissouri has hired community mental health liaisons to facilitate access to behavioral health services for individuals who are in frequent contact with law enforcement.", "The selected non-expansion states established priority populations for providing behavioral health treatment to those with the most severe behavioral health needs. For the states we examined, priority populations for mental health treatment included individuals with serious mental illness and those presenting in crisis. Similarly, all the non-expansion states we examined identified priority populations for receiving treatment for substance use conditions. Specifically, pregnant women and individuals abusing drugs intravenously were among the priority groups that the states identified to receive treatment.\nAs part of setting priorities for those with the most serious behavioral health needs, the non-expansion states included specific eligibility requirements based on diagnosis or impairment, in addition to financial status, for behavioral health treatment for the uninsured.\nIn Montana, individuals aged 18 to 64 diagnosed with a severe, disabling mental illness, and incomes up to 150 percent of the FPL may qualify for the state-funded Mental Health Services Plan. Montana officials told us that their Mental Health Services Plan does not provide treatment to individuals with more moderate behavioral health needs, but that these individuals may get some treatment through community-based “drop-in” centers.\nIn Texas, local mental health authorities are required to provide services to adults with diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or clinically severe depression, and may, to the extent feasible, provide services to adults experiencing significant functional impairment due to other diagnoses. Individuals who are not members of the identified priority groups are generally not eligible to receive treatment.\nThree of the states we examined maintained waiting lists for individuals with more modest needs for behavioral health treatment.\nTexas officials said that they triage individuals eligible for behavioral health treatment, and those with less urgent needs may have to wait. In some cases, individuals may receive a lower level of care than recommended while waiting for treatment due to resource limitations. For example, an individual might receive medication-related services and crisis services as needed, but not recommended rehabilitation services. Texas officials told us that there were over 5,000 individuals waiting for behavioral health treatment as of February 2013, although they were able to move most individuals off waiting lists when they received additional state funding for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. They described this additional funding as “historic,” and they reduced the number of individuals waiting to fewer than 300 as of May 2014. In addition to reducing the waiting list, Texas moved 1,435 adults from lower levels of care to more appropriate levels in 2014.\nA Wisconsin official told us if county agencies run out of funding, they are permitted to establish waiting lists or may only serve clients with Medicaid coverage. The official said there were 1,656 individuals waiting for substance use treatment and 242 individuals waiting for a specific mental health service in 2013, prior to Wisconsin extending Medicaid coverage to certain low-income adults through a Medicaid waiver.all services if they run out of funding, but must always provide emergency care.\nThe official said that county agencies do not have to provide\nMissouri officials said there were 3,723 individuals on the waiting list for substance use treatment as of January 2015.\nMissouri state BHA officials noted that Missouri does not maintain a waiting list for mental health services.", "Selected states generally managed behavioral health benefits for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees separately from physical benefits through carve-outs or separate contracts. Health plans for these enrollees were generally aligned with Medicaid state plans, resulting in comparable behavioral health benefits for newly eligible and existing Medicaid enrollees. According to state officials, expanding Medicaid has increased the availability of behavioral health treatment, although some access concerns continue.", "The expansion states we examined generally managed behavioral health benefits separately from other benefits through carve-outs or separate contracts. Four of the six states included in our study—Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, and West Virginia—explicitly carved out or contracted for the administration of behavioral health services or prescription drugs separately from other services and drugs. For example, in Maryland, specialty mental health services have been carved out of its contracts with managed care organizations (MCO) since 1997 and are paid for on an FFS basis. Michigan carved behavioral health services out of its MCO contracts and moved them to a limited benefit plan in 1998. Connecticut, which has an FFS delivery system for newly eligible enrollees, contracted with a behavioral health benefits manager to administer behavioral health services. The other two states contracted with MCOs to provide both physical and behavioral health coverage, but several of these MCOs chose to subcontract with behavioral health benefits managers. See table 2 for information on the expansion states’ coverage designs for behavioral health services and prescription drugs.\nState officials cited various reasons for separately managing behavioral health benefits, including concerns about access, ensuring appropriate expertise, and state law.\nMaryland officials told us they chose to carve out mental health services and pay for them on an FFS basis through a behavioral health benefits manager due to concerns about beneficiary access under managed care, particularly for more intensive services generally not covered by commercial insurance plans. Maryland also separately carved out mental health prescription drugs on an FFS basis, which officials said was so that the state could align policies for these drugs with the behavioral health benefits manager administering the mental health services carve-out.\nIn Kentucky, three of the five Medicaid MCOs subcontracted behavioral health benefits to a behavioral health benefits manager. Kentucky officials told us that one of the MCOs decided to subcontract these benefits due to a lack of expertise in managing behavioral health prescription drugs.\nMichigan and Connecticut officials told us that state laws prohibit their Medicaid programs from using certain utilization management techniques for some types of behavioral health prescription drugs. Michigan officials told us that given the lack of utilization management tools available, they decided to pay for behavioral health prescription drugs on an FFS basis rather than to include these drugs in the state’s limited benefit plan contracts.\nProviders have raised concerns about managing behavioral health benefits separately from medical benefits, and some states reported making efforts to make sure care is coordinated. Behavioral health physician groups we spoke with told us that paying for physical and behavioral health care separately makes it difficult to assess the total cost of care for individuals with behavioral health conditions, and does not provide adequate incentives to make investments in one type of care that may reduce costs for another type of care. For example, provider groups said that lack of investment in substance use services could lead to additional costs for emergency medical care. In addition, one physician group raised concerns about managing behavioral health services separately from prescription drugs because of the potential for conflicting utilization management policies to create barriers to care. For example, a pharmacy benefits manager may require outpatient counseling as a condition for receiving medication-assisted treatment for substance use, but such counseling may not be covered by the managed care company that authorizes behavioral health services. The four states we spoke with that explicitly manage behavioral health care separately—Connecticut, Michigan, Maryland, and West Virginia—noted that they were engaged in care coordination efforts.\nConnecticut officials said that although they have multiple contracts for benefits administration, all claims are processed through a single vendor and the state uses these data to help identify individuals in need of care management.\nMichigan officials said that the state has implemented claims sharing between the MCOs managing physical health care and the limited benefit plans that manage behavioral health benefits. Michigan is currently working on a demonstration program with CMS that would allow for real-time sharing of clinical information for individuals dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid.\nMaryland included financial incentives related to physical health, such as the number of patients who have an annual primary care visit, in the contract with its behavioral health benefits manager.\nWest Virginia officials said that they were working on creating a comprehensive managed care plan for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees that would offer both physical and behavioral benefits, including prescription drugs, under the same plan in order to better coordinate care.\nIn addition, Michigan, Maryland, and West Virginia have established Medicaid health homes to coordinate care for individuals with chronic As of January 2015, conditions, including behavioral health conditions.Connecticut was in the process of developing Medicaid health homes for individuals with behavioral health conditions.", "Five of the six expansion states included in our study chose to align their alternative benefit plans with their Medicaid state plans—providing at least the same benefits for newly eligible enrollees as existing enrollees received under the state plan—and some states made alignment-related coverage changes.\nConnecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and Nevada aligned their alternative benefit plans with their Medicaid state plans, which required these states to add to their alternative benefit plans any state plan benefits that were not already included. For example, Michigan officials said they added additional recovery-oriented substance use services, such as peer support services, to the alternative benefit plan to match existing state plan benefits.\nAlthough not required, states may also choose to add benefits to their Medicaid state plans to match their alternative benefit plans. As part of the alignment process, Kentucky chose to extend substance use treatment—previously limited to children under 21 and pregnant and postpartum women—to all Medicaid enrollees under its state plan to match the substance use coverage in its alternative benefit plan.\nWest Virginia did not align its alternative benefit plan with its Medicaid state plan, but there were no differences in coverage for behavioral health services and associated prescription drugs.", "Officials we interviewed from the six expansion states generally reported that Medicaid expansion had resulted in greater availability of behavioral health treatment, and changes were greater in states without previous coverage options for low-income adults. Kentucky, Nevada, and West Virginia did not have any coverage available for low-income childless adults prior to expansion and primarily relied on their states’ BHAs to provide behavioral health treatment for the uninsured.\nKentucky officials reported a substantial increase in the availability of behavioral health treatment for individuals when they enrolled in Medicaid, as individuals were no longer limited to what state-funded community mental health centers could provide, and could access additional services, such as peer support services.\nNevada officials stated that while the state BHA and the state’s Medicaid program provide the same array of behavioral health treatments, some uninsured individuals experienced long delays in receiving care prior to enrolling in Medicaid coverage under the expansion.\nWest Virginia officials cited the increased availability of prescription drugs. West Virginia’s BHA did not pay for prescription drugs for uninsured individuals except in limited circumstances, whereas newly eligible Medicaid enrollees gained access to the full array of covered drugs under the state’s Medicaid program.\nIn contrast, Connecticut, Maryland, and Michigan all had limited coverage available for certain low-income adults prior to expanding Medicaid that paid for some behavioral health services and prescription drugs. For example, Maryland’s Primary Adult Care program paid for outpatient mental health and substance use services and prescription drugs for adults up to 116 percent of the FPL. Officials from these three states reported that while the availability of treatment increased when individuals enrolled in Medicaid, the changes were small; for example, officials from two states reported that Medicaid beneficiaries had a greater choice of providers.experienced larger changes; for example, Michigan officials reported that enrollment in Medicaid had resulted in improved access to substance use services, including access to case management, which officials said could help individuals live more successfully in the community.\nIndividuals not enrolled in these coverage programs Officials from the expansion states in our study did report some access concerns for new Medicaid enrollees due to behavioral health professional shortages, which they attempted to address in a variety of ways. Officials from all six states cited behavioral health workforce shortages as a challenge to providing behavioral health treatment for low- income adults in their states. The state officials specifically highlighted shortages of Medicaid-participating psychiatrists and psychiatric drug prescribers.\nNevada officials reported conducting a secret shopper study of psychiatrists in the state’s Medicaid program in 2014 that found only 22 percent of Medicaid-enrolled psychiatrists were accepting new Medicaid patients.\nMaryland and Connecticut officials reported difficulties providing Medicaid enrollees with access to certain prescription drugs used for medication-assisted treatment for substance use conditions due to a lack of physicians willing to prescribe these drugs for Medicaid enrollees.\nStates reported taking several steps to address workforce shortages, such as providing reimbursement for telehealth services, expanding the types of providers who can receive reimbursement for providing services in Medicaid, and using peers and other non-licensed providers to deliver some services under the supervision of licensed providers. Michigan chose to address behavioral health needs of its new Medicaid enrollees by leveraging its primary care workforce. The state used a health assessment tool as part of the enrollment process for its alternative benefit plan that included questions about potential behavioral health conditions. Health assessment information was conveyed to each enrollee’s primary care provider, who could then address any behavioral health needs or refer for specialty care if needed.\nState officials reported additional concerns regarding access to behavioral health treatment due to expansion-related budget reductions for state BHAs, which fund treatment for uninsured individuals, as well as non-Medicaid covered treatments for Medicaid enrollees. Officials from four of the six expansion states we spoke with—Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, and Nevada—reported that their state’s BHA budget had been reduced based on the expectation that uninsured individuals would enroll in Medicaid. For example, Michigan officials reported that the state reduced its state general fund contribution for its BHA by about 10 percent ($116 million) from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2015, and Nevada reported a $33 million reduction to its BHA budget over fiscal years 2014 and 2015 related to the expansion. Some state officials raised concerns about having enough state BHA funding for individuals who would remain uninsured or underinsured following expansion, including individuals who are eligible but do not enroll or re-enroll in Medicaid, immigrants, and certain individuals under 65 who are enrolled in Medicare because of a disability. Officials from two states also expressed concerns about the adequacy of funding for wraparound services—services that are not covered by their states’ Medicaid programs, such as supportive housing—for Medicaid enrollees. Officials from the four states that reported BHA budget reductions noted that there were subsequent adjustments to their budgets to lessen the impact of the reductions based on these concerns. For example, Michigan’s BHA received an additional $25 million for fiscal year 2015 to address behavioral health needs in certain populations that remain ineligible for Medicaid. (See appendix II for more information on expansion-related changes in state BHA budgets.) Despite concerns about budget reductions, officials from two states noted that when additional Medicaid funds from the expansion were considered as part of the behavioral health budget, much more funding was available overall.\nOther continuing access problems mentioned by state officials related to inpatient behavioral health treatment.\nNevada officials said that lack of psychiatric inpatient capacity has led to patients who were considered a risk to themselves or others being kept in emergency rooms for up to several days before they could secure a bed in a psychiatric hospital. Officials said that an average of 90 to 110 patients per day, predominately Medicaid enrollees, were waiting in emergency rooms. Nevada has made efforts to address the problem, for example, by sending teams of psychiatrists to emergency rooms to assess psychiatric patients to determine whether they could be discharged and treated on an outpatient basis. However, officials noted that discharging such patients carries risks and has led to poor outcomes in the past.\nKentucky officials said that they were working to expand capacity for residential treatment programs for substance use. Officials said that given Medicaid’s exclusion of payment for treatment for adults at “institutions for mental disease” with 16 or more beds, they were encouraging providers to design any new residential substance use programs to be under that limit. However, they noted that doing so can prevent providers from taking advantage of economies of scale and may make it more difficult to operate some residential treatment programs shown to be effective for substance use conditions. Officials said that the state was working to develop alternatives to inpatient care for Medicaid enrollees, such as transitional housing combined with an intensive outpatient program.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for review. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nAs arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after its issuance date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff members have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.", "Estimated number of low-income, uninsured adults Percent (standard error) Number Total 20.3 (2.6) 68,495 337,414 24.9 (4.6) 20.9 (2.7) 19.4 (2.2) 12.5 (1.2) 12.0 (2.0) 13.0 (3.6) 15.7 (1.2) 12.2 (1.8) 21.1 (4.5) 23.7 (3.6) 16.5 (1.4) 27.5 (3.1) 19.2 (3.1) 15.9 (3.3) 15.8 (2.3) 20.3 (2.4) 19.9 (3.8) 21.2 (1.6) 19.5 (4.4) 16.4 (1.7) 17.2 (2.4) 21.0 (3.2) 20.6 (3.3) 21.5 (3.3) 20.4 (4.2) 6.9 (2.3) 13.2 (2.5)", "Estimated number of low-income, uninsured adults Percent (standard error) Number Total 12.6 (1.6) 85,555 679,004 14.4 (2.1) 27.5 (4.1) 27.4 (2.1) 18.1 (2.7) 20.7 (3.3) 18.9 (2.0) 24.9 (4.0) 22.3 (2.7) 17.5 (3.4) 22.0 (2.5) 13.7 (1.0) 16.6 (3.2) 23.4 (4.6) 23.4 (3.8) 18.1 (2.3) 21.4 (3.8) 19.6 (3.4)", "16.7 (0.4) 16.9 (0.5) 16.6 (0.5)\nState expanded Medicaid as of February 2015 error) 9.8 (2.3) error) 11.7 (1.9)\nPercent (standard error) 1.2 (0.5)\n3,251 10.1 (3.5)\n21.9 (4.5)\n6.3 (1.7)\n17.0 (2.3)\n2.4 (1.1)\n9.8 (1.8)\n13.1 (1.9)\n3.5 (1.4)\n4.0 (0.6)\n9.7 (1.0)\n1.2 (0.3)\n2.8 (1.0)\n9.7 (1.9)\n0.5 (0.3)\n7.4 (2.8)\n7.2 (2.4)\n6.0 (0.8)\n11.9 (1.1)\n2.2 (0.5)\n3.6 (1.2)\n9.4 (1.8)\n0.8 (0.5)\n6.4 (2.1)\n18.1 (4.3)\n3.3 (1.7)\n11,231 11.3 (2.1)\n15.8 (3.3)\n3.4 (1.4)\n3.9 (0.7)\n13.9 (1.3)\n1.3 (0.3)\n50,730 13.0 (2.7)\n19.9 (2.8)\n5.4 (1.5)\n6.4 (2.3)\n13.4 (2.5)\n0.7 (0.3)\n3.3 (1.3)\n12.8 (2.8)\n0.2 (0.2)\n6.1 (1.5)\n13.4 (2.0)\n3.7 (1.2)\n6.2 (1.5)\n16.3 (2.2)\n2.2 (0.9)\n8.8 (3.0) 6.1 (2.9)\n16.0 (3.6)\n4.9 (2.2) 1.6 (1.2)\n16.0 (1.3)\n2.0 (0.5)\n11.7 (2.6)\n2.1 (1.0)\n7.3 (1.0) 7.2 (1.5)\n11.1 (1.6)\n1.9 (0.7)\n6.1 (1.6)\n12.9 (2.2)\n1.8 (0.7)\n6.5 (1.9)\n16.3 (2.9)\n1.9 (0.8)\n5.5 (1.6)\n15.8 (3.2)\n0.6 (0.3)\nState expanded Medicaid as of February 2015 error) 6.9 (2.8) error) 16.1 (2.8)\nPercent (standard error) 1.5 (0.6)\n5.2 (1.8)\n17.9 (4.0)\n2.7 (1.5)\n1.3 (0.8)\n5.9 (2.1)\n0.4 (0.3)\n6.1 (1.7)\n10.7 (2.1)\n3.6 (1.2)\n3.1 (0.9)\n10.4 (1.5)\n0.9 (0.4)\n3.1 (1.1)\n13.1 (1.9)\n1.8 (0.6)\n2,688 10.5 (3.1)\n19.7 (3.8)\n57,470 11.1 (1.5)\n20.5 (1.7)\n4.2 (0.9)\n7.5 (1.7)\n12.4 (2.2)\n1.7 (0.8)\n6.8 (1.9)\n15.9 (2.9)\n2.0 (0.9)\n6.2 (1.3)\n15.4 (1.9)\n2.7 (0.9)\n6.9 (2.5)\n23.5 (3.8)\n5.5 (2.3)\n33,594 10.4 (2.4)\n16.0 (2.5)\n4.1 (2.0)\n5.6 (1.9)\n14.5 (3.1)\n2.6 (1.3)\n8.5 (1.8)\n15.9 (2.5)\n2.4 (1.0)\n4.2 (0.6)\n10.5 (0.8)\n1.0 (0.3)\n7.4 (2.0)\n10.6 (2.3)\n1.4 (0.7)\n1,041 10.2 (3.2)\n15.7 (3.9)\n2.5 (1.2)\n7.3 (2.4)\n16.9 (4.2)\n0.8 (0.4)\n36,787 10.1 (3.0)\n18.0 (3.2)\n4.7 (1.8)\n9.1 (2.1)\n12.7 (1.9)\n3.6 (1.4)\n22,092 11.3 (3.8)\n15.4 (3.7)\n7.9 (2.4)\n12.4 (2.3)\n0.7 (0.3)", "17,750,507 1,029,529 523,286 9,022,176 506,243 8,728,331 5.8 (0.2) 2,272,065 5.8 (0.3) 1,190,927 5.8 (0.3) 1,082,313 12.8 (0.3) 13.2 (0.5) 12.4 (0.5)\n1.9 (0.1) 2.0 (0.2) 1.7 (0.2)\nNot reported because percentage was estimated with low precision. However, totals include data for states that are not reported in this table. For the purposes of this report, we refer to the District of Columbia as a state. Totals include data for states that are not reported in this table. Numbers of low-income uninsured adults in expansion and non-expansion states with a given type of behavioral health condition may not sum to the total because the percentages used to calculate these numbers were rounded.", "", "Connecticut officials reported that the budget for its state behavioral health agency (BHA) was reduced in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. However, amid concerns about the effects on providers, the BHA absorbed some of these reductions.", "In fiscal year 2014, the BHA’s budget was reduced by $15.2 million, but the agency absorbed this reduction rather than decreasing the amount of grant funding for providers for the treatment of uninsured and underinsured individuals. In fiscal year 2015, there was a $25.5 million reduction in the BHA’s budget. The BHA used a one-time $10 million appropriation from the Connecticut legislature plus other sources to limit the reduction in grant funding for providers to $5.4 million. Kentucky officials reported that the BHA’s budget was reduced by $9 million in fiscal year 2014. However, one-time funds allowed the BHA to avoid reducing funding for its contracts with community mental health centers. In fiscal year 2015, there was a $21 million decrease in the BHA’s budget, which was taken from contracts with community mental health centers.", "Maryland officials reported that the state has not reduced state general fund support for its BHA due to the expansion of Medicaid.", "Michigan officials reported that the state reduced the budget for its state BHA due to the Medicaid expansion, but then added some funds based on concerns about certain populations that remain ineligible for Medicaid.\nMichigan officials reported that state general revenue contributions to its BHA were reduced by $116 million from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2015 (from $1.153 billion in fiscal year 2013 to $1.037 billion for fiscal year 2015).\nMichigan officials reported that their legislature had appropriated an additional $25 million for fiscal year 2015 to address the needs of individuals ineligible for Medicaid, such as individuals younger than 64 enrolled in Medicare based on a disability and commercially insured children.", "Nevada officials reported that the state reduced the budget for its BHA, but used one-time funds to ease the transition from state funding to Medicaid reimbursement for substance use providers in fiscal year 2014.\nNevada officials reported a reduction of $33 million in the BHA’s budget in fiscal years 2014 and 2015.\nNevada officials said one-time funds totaling about $690,000 were used in fiscal year 2014 for substance use service providers to maintain services during the transition from state funding to Medicaid reimbursement.", "West Virginia officials reported that its charity care fund, which reimburses its network of comprehensive community behavioral health centers for the care of the uninsured, was funded at about $15.4 million per year in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015.\nOfficials said that the governor’s fiscal year 2016 budget had recommended a $3 million reduction in the charity care fund due to Medicaid expansion.", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, William Black, Assistant Director; Manuel Buentello; Hannah Locke; Drew Long; Hannah Marston Minter; and Emily Wilson made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "h0_full h1_title", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How were behavioral health and physical health benefits managed differently within states that expanded Medicaid?", "What did officials say Medicaid enrollment?", "What concerns remain regarding the expansion of Medicaid within these states?", "What did GAO obtain from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration?", "How did GAO select the states for study?", "From these states, what did GAO review?", "How did the Department of Health and Human Services help GAO with the report?" ], "summary": [ "Six selected states that expanded Medicaid generally managed behavioral health and physical health benefits separately for newly eligible enrollees, and state officials reported increased availability of behavioral health treatment, although some access concerns continue. Four of the six selected states explicitly chose separate contractual arrangements for behavioral health and physical benefits.", "Officials from all six selected states said that enrollment in Medicaid increased the availability of behavioral health treatment for newly eligible enrollees.", "Officials also reported some ongoing access concerns, such as workforce shortages.", "GAO obtained estimates of low-income adults who may have a behavioral health condition from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.", "GAO also selected four non-expansion and six expansion states based on, among other criteria, geographic region and adult Medicaid enrollment.", "GAO reviewed documents from all selected states, and interviewed state Medicaid and BHA officials to understand how uninsured and Medicaid-enrolled adults receive behavioral health treatment.", "The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 1, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 6, 6, 6, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R45392	{ "title": [ "", "Why This Issue Is Important to Congress", "An Overview of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI)", "Definitions", "Autonomy", "Robot", "Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS)", "Artificial Intelligence (AI)", "Machine Learning", "Automated Weapon System (AWS)", "RAS and AI in Society12", "The Rationale for RAS and AI Adoption by U.S. Ground Forces", "Changing Geostrategic Environment", "Military Implications of RAS and AI Advances in Industry", "Workforce Implications", "Overwhelming Data and Required Speed of Action", "RAS and AI Implications for U.S. Ground Forces33", "Improved Performance/Reduced Risk to Soldiers and Marines", "New Force Designs", "Better Institutional Support to Combat Forces", "Potential New Operational Concepts", "New Models for Recruiting and Retaining Soldiers and Marines?", "A Need for Systems and Tactics to Defend Against RAS and AI Use?", "Selected Non-U.S. Military RAS and AI Efforts", "Russia", "China", "South Korea", "United Kingdom", "Governing Policies and Managing Organizations", "DOD Governing Policies", "DOD and Service Managing Organizations", "Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC)", "Army", "Army Artificial Intelligence Task Force73", "Marine Corps75", "Army and Marine Corps RAS and AI Strategies", "The Army's RAS and AI Strategy", "The Army's RAS Priorities", "Near-Term RAS Priorities (2017-2020)", "Mid-Term RAS Priorities (2021-2030)", "Far-Term Priorities (2031-2040)", "The Marines' RAS and AI Strategy", "The Marines' Robotic and Autonomy Priorities", "Near-Term Robotics and Autonomy Priorities (2018-2022)", "Mid-Term Robotics and Autonomy Priorities (2023-2027)", "Far-Term Robotics and Autonomy Priorities (2028-2032)", "Selected Army and Marine Corps RAS and AI Efforts", "The Challenge of Autonomous Ground Navigation", "Squad Multi-Purpose Equipment Transport (SMET)", "Leader-Follower Technology for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWVs)", "Army's Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) and Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV)", "M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and Predictive AI", "Marine Corps Robotic Vehicle (Modular) (RV (M))103", "Marine Corps Fully Autonomous First Wave Concept", "RAS and AI in Military Units: Personnel Considerations", "Unit Manning Changes", "Recruiting and Retention of Those with Advanced Technical Skills", "Training", "Career Paths", "Legal and Ethical Considerations of RAS and AI", "The Law of Armed Conflict", "Distinction", "Proportionality", "Permissible Weapons", "Ethical Arguments", "Organized Groups Concerned with Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)", "Google Employee Opposition to DOD's Project Maven160", "Campaign to Stop Killer Robots", "The United Nations (U.N.)", "European Parliament (EP)170", "DOD's View of Opposition to LAWS", "DOD and LAWS Policy and Challenges", "Potential Considerations for Congress", "Assessment of Foreign Military RAS and AI Efforts and Potential Impact on U.S. Ground Forces", "Should the United States Develop Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems for Ground Forces?", "How Will U.S. Ground Forces Counter Foreign RAS and AI Capabilities?", "How Should DOD and the Services Engage with the Private Sector?", "What Are Potential Personnel-Related Concerns Associated with RAS and AI?", "Unit Manning Changes", "Recruiting and Retention of Those with Advanced Technical Skills", "Training", "Career Paths", "What Role Should Congress Play in the Legal and Ethical Debate on LAWS?", "What Role Should the United States Play in Potential Efforts to Regulate LAWS?" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The nexus of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to change the nature of warfare. RAS offers the possibility of a wide range of platforms—not just weapon systems—that can perform \"dull, dangerous, and dirty\" tasks—potentially reducing the risks to soldiers and Marines. Regarding AI, one report suggests\nOne of the promises of AI in the military that seems to guarantee its adoption is its broad applicability. AI can be used to increase effectiveness and efficiency for more than just combat operations. AI can improve supply lines, enhance the training of new soldiers, and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence gathering and processing. But their effectiveness in combat operations seems especially promising. AI is not a wholly revolutionary idea to be applied to the military domain, and it is merely the next logical step in the digitization and mechanization of the modern battlefield.\nAs a stated imperative in the National Defense Strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services are pursuing RAS and AI for a wide variety of applications. Aside from the programmatic and budgetary considerations for Congress, another key aspect of these technologies that may merit consideration by Congress is articulated in the following passage from a U.S. Air Force document:\nAuthorizing a machine to make lethal combat decisions is contingent on political and military leaders resolving legal and ethical questions. These include the appropriateness of machines having this ability, under what circumstances should it be employed, where responsibility for mistakes lies, and what limitations should be placed on the autonomy of such systems.... Ethical discussions and policy decisions must take place in the near term in order to guide the development of future [unmanned aircraft systems] capabilities, rather than allowing the development to take its own path apart from this critical guidance.\nApart from the U.S. military's pursuit of RAS and AI, there has been a proliferation of RAS and AI internationally, ranging from foreign militaries, to violent nonstate groups to criminal organizations. These technologies have already been used to a limited degree against U.S. military forces. How the United States will address further foreign advances in these realms may be of interest to Congress.", "", "There are a variety of definitions for the following terms and, for the purposes of this report, the following definitions will be used:", "The level of independence that humans grant a system to execute a given task. It is the condition or quality of being self-governing to achieve an assigned task based on the system's own situational awareness (integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing), planning, and decisionmaking. Autonomy refers to a spectrum of automation in which independent decisionmaking can be tailored for a specific mission, level of risk, and degree of human-machine teaming.", "A powered machine capable of executing a set of actions by direct human control, computer control, or both. It is composed minimally of a platform, software, and a power source.", "RAS is an accepted term in academia and the science and technology (S&T) community and highlights the physical (robotic) and cognitive (autonomous) aspects of these systems. For the purposes of this concept, RAS is a framework to describe systems with a robotic element, an autonomous element, or more commonly, both.", "The capability of a computer system to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence such as visual perception, speech recognition, and decisionmaking.\nIn the 115 th Congress, multiple bills included definitions for AI and incorporated an often-cited classification scheme that categorizes AI systems as designed to think rationally, act rationally, think like humans, or act like humans. These classifications were broadly incorporated into the first definition of AI in statute, included in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( P.L. 115-232 ), which states that the term AI includes\n(1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.\n(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action.\n(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and neural networks.\n(4) A set of techniques, including machine learning that is designed to approximate a cognitive task.\n(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision-making, and acting.\nWhile not specified in these definitions, a distinction between narrow and general AI is important when discussing the current and future abilities of AI systems. The term \"narrow AI\" describes technologies tailored to particular, narrowly defined tasks; the AI systems in use today fall within this category. While narrow AI systems can exceed human capabilities in their specific task set, they cannot understand context or apply what the systems have learned to related tasks. In contrast, \"general AI\" refers to systems that demonstrate intelligent behavior across a range of cognitive tasks, which is unlikely to occur for decades or longer, according to most analysts.", "Machine learning is an application of AI that provides systems the ability to automatically learn and improve from experience without being explicitly programmed. It focuses on the development of computer programs that can access data and use it to learn for themselves. The process of learning begins with observations or data, such as examples, direct experience, or instruction, in order to look for patterns in data and make better decisions in the future based on the examples that are provided by humans. The primary aim is to allow the computers to learn automatically without human intervention or assistance and adjust actions accordingly.", "A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation.", "Much has been written about how RAS and AI have affected society and, in particular, the workplace. A comprehensive 2017 study by the International Bar Association's (IBA) Global Employment Institute offers some interesting insights on both society and the workplace:\nModern information technologies and the advent of machines powered by artificial intelligence (AI) have already strongly influenced the world of work in the 21 st century. Computers, algorithms and software simplify everyday tasks, and it is impossible to imagine how most of our life could be managed without them. However, is it also impossible to imagine how most process steps could be managed without human force? The information economy characterized by exponential growth replaces the mass production industry based on economy of scales.\nWhen we transfer the experience of the past to the future, disturbing questions arise: what will the future world of work look like and how long will it take to get there? Will the future world of work be a world where humans spend less time earning their livelihood? Alternatively, are mass unemployment, mass poverty and social distortions also a possible scenario for the new world, a world where robots, intelligent systems and algorithms play an increasingly central role? What is the future role of a legal framework that is mainly based on a 20 th century industry setting? What is already clear and certain is that new technical developments will have a fundamental impact on the global labor market within the next few years, not just on industrial jobs but on the core of human tasks in the service sector that are considered 'untouchable.' Economic structures, working relationships, job profiles and well-established working time and remuneration models will undergo major changes.\nIn addition to companies, employees and societies, education systems and legislators are also facing the task of meeting the new challenges resulting from constantly advancing technology. Legislators are already lagging behind and the gap between reality and legal framework is growing.\nThe study further suggests that because of RAS and AI, society has entered a \"Fourth Industrial Revolution,\" described as\n[t]he technical integration of cyber physical systems (CPS) into production and logistics and the use of the 'internet of things'(connection between everyday objects) and services in (industrial) processes—including the consequences for a new creation of value, business models as well as downstream services and work organization. CPS refers to the network connections between humans, machines, products, objects and ICT (information and communication technology) systems. Within the next five years, it is expected that over 50 billion connected machines will exist throughout the world. The introduction of AI in the service sector distinguishes the fourth industrial revolution from the third.\nThe analysis also provides examples of Fourth Industrial Revolution robotics and artificial intelligence:\nWell-known examples from the field of robotics and AI are the so-called 'smart factories', driverless cars, delivery drones or 3D printers, which, based on an individual template, can produce highly complex things without changes in the production process or human action in any form being necessary.\nWell-known service models are, for example, networking platforms like Facebook or Amazon Mechanical Turk, the economy-on-demand providers Uber and Airbnb, or sharing services, such as car sharing, Spotify and Netflix. Studies show that merely due to sharing services the turnover of the sector will grow twentyfold within the next ten years.\nIf, as some suggest, society is in a \"Fourth Industrial Revolution\" what are the implications for the U.S. military as a whole and, in particular, U.S. ground forces, namely the Army and Marine Corps?", "The U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, in describing DOD's strategic approach, states\nThe Department will invest broadly in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages.\nIn this regard, the Army and Marines are directed to pursue RAS and AI in support of the National Defense Strategy, but there are also more practical reasons why the Army and Marines might emphasize the development of RAS and AI. Some of these reasons include the following:", "Since 2001, the U.S. military—the Army and Marine Corps in particular—has focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, with modernization for traditional ground combat receiving less emphasis. The 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America changed the military's focus from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, noting\nThe central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.\nThis change of strategic focus toward great power competition has prompted a renewed emphasis on preparing for conventional ground combat both in training and modernization, which may be contributing to a greater focus by the Army on RAS and AI. The Army's June 2018 Vision statement notes\nThis modernization includes experimenting with and developing autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and robotics to make our Soldiers more effective and our units less logistically dependent.\nRevisionist powers and smaller states are also modernizing and seeking these technologies as well. One defense expert suggests\nThe robotics revolution isn't American-made. It isn't even American-led. Countries around the world are pushing the envelope in autonomy, many further and faster than the United States. Conversations in U.S. research labs and the Pentagon's E-ring are only one factor influencing the future of autonomous weapons. Other nations get a vote too. What they do will influence how the technology develops, proliferates, and how other nations—including the United States—react.\nAs Secretary of the Army Mark Esper reportedly noted, \"Whoever gets to robotics and AI first, it'll be a game changer on the battlefield.\" In this regard, the stage appears set for nations to aggressively pursue RAS and AI over the near- and long-term to achieve a battlefield advantage.", "RAS and AI have been described as changing the very nature of work and workforce design, with some experts predicting an acceleration of this trend over the next two decades. RAS and AI advances in the private sector in areas such as transportation, logistics, manufacturing, health care, and engineering could be readily adapted by the military and ground forces. A potential added incentive is the adoption of these technologies would likely face little international opposition, as these types of technologies do not readily fall into the category of autonomous weapons.", "Regarding the civilian labor market, researchers from industry, government, and academia have conducted numerous studies and surveys attempting to predict the impact of AI and automation on the U.S. and international workforce. While the reports vary in the many ways—including the populations studied, the timeframe for projected impacts, predicted numbers of jobs lost or gained, and whether the study looks at whole jobs or skills/tasks—there are some overarching takeaways. First, impacts are very difficult to predict, even for experts working in AI and automation. For example, in a 2014 survey of expert \"technology builders and analysts\" by Pew Research Center, 48% of respondents predicted that AI and robots would displace more jobs than they created by 2025, while the remaining 52% predicted that more jobs would be created than displaced. Second, the range of methodologies used in such workforce reports makes comparing studies challenging, thereby adding to the difficulty in projecting workforce impacts. Third, the studies raise additional questions that may have implications for both civilian and military workers. These include, but are not limited to, the following:\nWill AI and RAS displace certain skills/tasks or entire jobs, and what types of roles will the new technologies fill? If certain skills/tasks are automated, employees might have opportunities to upgrade the skills of their employers. If entire jobs are eliminated, employers could be reluctant to maintain the size of their workforce and pay for employee re-skilling while also investing in AI and RAS technologies. How will the pace of innovation and adoption of new technologies affect the workforce and corresponding labor policies? Some experts argue that AI and RAS technologies are developing much more rapidly than disruptive technologies of prior years (which have largely involved physical systems such as automated teller machines at banks) and a subsequent long time lag between innovation and full adoption. While there have been concerns about automation and new technologies displacing middle class workers for the past two centuries, the ability to implement AI systems and software on existing physical hardware could facilitate rapid adoption and allow for more disruptive changes to the labor market than have been seen historically. Further, RAS and AI technologies together can replace both physical and cognitive labor. Some analysts have raised concerns that wide spread adoption of AI and RAS systems might cause shifts in the workforce that outpace changes to labor policies. Are there a sufficient number of AI and RAS experts in the workforce to implement the technologies across the public and private sectors? A number of studies have noted that there is far more demand than supply of such experts. What are the roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors in meeting the demand?\nThese civilian workforce issues could have implications for military organizations. As RAS and AI have changed the global civilian labor market, some believe they will eventually affect military personnel management models. They contend that\nnew technologies will permit the automation of many tasks currently performed by soldiers. As automation and AI allow civilian business leaders to place humans in different kinds of work, so too will military personnel planners be forced to think anew about the recruiting and employment opportunities of a new global workforce approach. It is likely to drive the creation of new military personnel models and in turn the designing of new ground force structures. This, along with the disruptive technologies of robotics, AI, and human augmentation could enable new operating concepts.\nFewer soldiers and Marines could have a direct impact on the size and allocation of the defense budget, not just in military compensation, but also in military logistics, construction, and health care, for example.", "Advances in technology, sensors, computers, and networked communications have served to cut through a large portion of the \"fog of war\" that military planners and commanders have to contend with by providing a vast array and amount of data, including real-time data. One study observes:\nThe number of images and signal intercepts are well beyond the capacity of the existing analyst community, so there are huge backlogs for translators and image interpreters, and much of the collected data are never reviewed.\nThe dilemma facing human analysts is further characterized:\nToday's analysts also face a wide variety of data streaming in from different platforms and sensors—data they must integrate (or fuse) to ensure accurate, comprehensive situational awareness. Their workstations comprise multiple screens, each showing different streams of data and each loaded with different suites of tools. In many cases, the applications, databases, and operating systems underlying these tools are produced by different vendors and are not interoperable. Sailors told us they are overwhelmed as they struggle to master the functions provided by each tool in the suite at their workstations. Another challenge is the existence of multiple and often mutually exclusive security domains (different classification levels).\nAutomated systems and AI can be of significant value in assisting military analysts, planners, and commanders in processing and synthesizing large and diverse data sets.\nThe availability of significant quantities and types of data and the required speed of action often required to address time-sensitive military threats presents a challenge for military decisionmakers:\nProcessing speed and communication capabilities also increasingly tilt the equation against human decision makers, both generally and especially in military situations. Humans now process at about one-millionth the speed of machines. Machines are becoming faster. Humans aren't. When instant response is imperative, even our Defense Department's proponents of humans in the loop concede that their desired human control cannot be achieved. It can be anticipated that this exception will allow the rule as the range of tasks that can be accomplished by machines grows, machine speeds increase (both in calculation and in kinetic operations), and autonomous operations proliferate. As two observers conclude, \"military superpowers in the next century will have superior autonomous capabilities, or they will not be superpowers.\"\nAutomated systems and AI can also be of great value in dealing with military situations where a \"manual\" or human-in-the-loop response is insufficient, such as dealing with \"swarms\" of unmanned ground or aerial vehicles or an inbound hypersonic weapon.", "Although the future is unpredictable, it is a reasonable assumption that selected RAS and AI advances in the private sector such as logistics, data analysis, and education and training will be adopted by militaries to enhance their institutional and operational effectiveness. Some of the potential implications of RAS and AI for U.S. ground forces include the following:", "RAS and AI have the potential to improve both the individual performance of troops as well as the performance of virtually every type of unit. RAS has applicability in lightening soldiers' and Marines' individual combat loads, improving situational awareness at the squad and platoon levels, and serving as \"teammates\" rather than simply tools. AI can be employed as a planning and decision support tool and could be a central component in automated weapon systems (AWS), which can provide protection from incoming aircraft, missiles, rockets, artillery and mortar shells, and other threats.\nSome believe RAS and AI also show great promise in reducing physical risks to soldiers and Marines. RAS and AI can be used in such missions as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), route clearance, obstacle breaching, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance—all considered extremely high-risk operations—in a manner that significantly limits troop exposure to these hazards. As previously noted, RAS and AI are expected to play a greater role in force protection, particularly from the risk of aircraft, missile, rocket, and artillery and mortar attack.", "One report suggests that\na highly capable and sustainable land combat battlegroup in 2030 may consist of as few as 250–300 human soldiers and several thousand robotic systems of various sizes and functions. By the same token, many functions of artillery and combat engineer units, currently undertaken by humans, might be better done by robots in human-robot teams. This has the potential to reduce the size of these types of units by hundreds of combat arms personnel. This approach could free up personnel for redeployment into areas where the art of war demands leadership and creativity-enabling intelligence functions; training and education; planning; and, most importantly, command and leadership.\nIn some cases, RAS- and AI-inspired force redesigns could not only be revolutionary but controversial as well. The Army, for example, plans to replace the current M-2 Bradley-series infantry fighting vehicle with an Optionally-Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), which can also be operated remotely instead of by a crew. Remotely transporting an infantry unit in an OMFV could give rise to concerns that should the remote control capability fail or be disrupted, the vehicle's occupants would be unduly vulnerable to enemy fire.", "From an institutional perspective, RAS and AI have a wide range of applicability in training and educating troops and leaders which, in addition to improved efficiency, could result in both cost savings as well freeing up personnel previously dedicated to these tasks for other assignments. From an institutional support perspective, RAS and AI developed for private sector use can most likely be readily adapted for military use. Military warehouse and depot functions are likely prime candidates for RAS and AI applications, potentially increasing efficiency, reducing costs, and freeing up personnel for other endeavors. Efforts are also underway for the partial automation of both ground and air logistics so that unmanned systems can be used to deliver supplies and evacuate casualties. Another potential application being explored by the Army is using AI to predict when vehicle parts might breakdown and prevent equipment failures before they happen. RAS and AI also have potential applications in treatment of wounded soldiers in combat zones and in rear areas as well.", "RAS and AI offer the possibility of new operational concepts for ground forces. One potential concept would be to \"saturate an operational area with small autonomous systems that force an adversary to move, be detected, and be targeted by friendly forces.\" Another possible operational concept to mitigate the effects of enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities during forced entry operations (such as an airborne assault or amphibious landing) could be to employ autonomous air, ground, and naval systems to attack A2/AD systems prior to the introduction of U.S. ground forces. As a corollary to such potential new RAS/AI-enhanced offensive operational concepts, U.S. policymakers and defense officials may also explore what sort of defensive countermeasures and systems might be required should potential U.S. adversaries employ RAS and AI in a similar manner against U.S. and allied forces. As one study suggests, \"some of the major platforms and strategies upon which current military forces rely might be rendered obsolete, or at least highly vulnerable\" if RAS and AI are employed in combat.", "How soldiers and Marines are recruited, trained and educated, and retained is likely to change as RAS and AI become a more prevalent part of the military. One study notes that\nas robots replace humans in many \"dirty, dull, and dangerous\" functions, it is possible that many lower ranking soldiers may be displaced. This will necessitate a change to the traditional career pyramids, where the mass of the Army is found in the lowest ranks.\nSuch a fundamentally different force could have profound impacts on the institutional Army and Marine Corps and could put both services in even greater competition with the private sector for highly skilled and educated recruits. It could also result in fewer opportunities in the U.S. military for those with limited education or those lacking technical skills. The Army cautions, however, that the displacement of lower-ranking soldiers is a \"hypothesis\" and that many of these soldiers would not be replaced but instead fill new positions to support RAS and AI.", "While it remains to be seen to what extent the Army and Marines adopt RAS and AI for battlefield use, it is reasonable to assume potential adversaries might seek to pursue these capabilities, possibly even to a greater extent than the United States. For example, while the United States may choose not to pursue autonomous weapons based on moral, ethical, and legal considerations, other nations might not feel so obligated and aggressively develop these capabilities for possible use against U.S. forces. In this and other cases, the Army and Marines could be required to develop new systems, tactics, operational concepts, and possibly even units to counter the threat posed by enemy RAS and AI.", "Other nations have military RAS and AI aspirations. Recognizing the importance of these technologies, in 2017 the Chinese government reportedly stated its goal of being the world's premier artificial intelligence innovation center by 2030, with Russian President Vladimir Putin stating, \"Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere [AI] will become ruler of the world.\" One analyst notes\nArmed robots are also proliferating on the ground and at sea. South Korea has deployed a robot sentry gun to its border with North Korea. Israel has sent an armed robotic ground vehicle, the Guardium, on patrol near the Gaza border. Russia is building an array of ground combat robots and has plans for a robot tank. Even the Shiite militias in Iraq have gotten in on the game, fielding an armed ground robot in 2015.\nThese technologies are not the exclusive purview of nations or paramilitary groups. One report notes in 2017 a criminal group used a swarm of small unmanned aerial vehicles against a FBI hostage rescue team's observation post in an attempt to force them from their hidden position.\nThe following sections provide a brief illustrative description of selected non-U.S. RAS and AI efforts. For the selected countries, the efforts discussed are only examples and might not constitute that nation's entire military RAS/AI program.", "One study notes, \"The Russian Military Industrial Committee has approved a plan that would have 30 percent of Russian combat power consist of entirely remotely controlled and autonomous robotic platforms by 2030.\" At a 2016 military technology forum, Russia reportedly unveiled the Vikhr (Whirlwind) unmanned ground combat vehicle (UCGV) ( Figure 1 ) based on its BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).\nThe Vikhr is reportedly armed with a stabilized 30mm Shipunov 2A72 automatic cannon, a coaxial 7.62mm Kalashnikov PKT/PKTM machine gun, and six ready-to-launch 9M133M Kornet-M (AT-14 Spriggan) anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The Vikhr can be reconfigured to accommodate a variety of weapons. The 2A72 main gun can be replaced by a single or twin-barrel 23mm 2A14 anti-aircraft cannon, 12.7mm NSVT or Kord heavy machine gun, or a 30mm Gsh-6-30K six-barrel naval automatic cannon. The Vikhr can also accommodate surface-to-air missiles of Igla (SA-18 Grouse) or 9K333 Verba man-portable air defense systems, as well as Shmel-M reactive flame throwers. Foreign artillery systems can also be integrated onto the Vikhr. The Vikhr can also be equipped with four mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to provide a surveillance capability. The Vikhr is said to be remotely controlled up to a distance of 10 kilometers.\nRussia has also developed the Uran-9 a smaller robotic tank ( Figure 2 ) with a 30mm Shipunov 2A72 automatic cannon, four ready-to-launch 9M120-1 Ataka (Spiral-2) ATGMs, four Igla-V surface-to-air missiles, and a 7.62mm Kalashnikov PKT/PKTM machine gun. The Uran-9 can also mount a Shmel-M reactive flame thrower. The Uran-9 can be remotely controlled up to a distance of 3 kilometers. Russia reported in 2018 that it had tested the Uran-9 in Syria in \"near combat conditions\" to conduct mine clearing and force protection operations.\nReportedly, the Russian Ministry of Defense is urgently pursuing AI along with the Ministry of Education and Science. While it may not currently possess the relevant high-technology culture and funds, Russia is undertaking efforts to organize its academic, scientific, and commercial communities to develop Russian AI and to compete globally.", "One report discusses China's AI aspirations:\nPeople's Liberation Army PLA thinkers expect AI to reshape the character of war itself, from today's \"informatized\" ways of warfare into \"intelligentized\" warfare, in which AI is critical. According to Lt. Gen. Liu Guozhi, who leads the Central Military Commission's (CMC) Science and Technology Commission, AI could accelerate military transformation, reshaping military units' programming, operational styles, equipment systems, and models of combat power generation, ultimately leading to a profound military revolution.\nHe warns, \"facing disruptive technology, [we] must ... seize the opportunity to change paradigms. If you don't disrupt, you'll be disrupted!\" So the PLA is pursuing intelligent and autonomous unmanned systems; AI-enabled data fusion, information processing, and intelligence analysis; war-gaming, simulation, and training; defense, offense, and command in information warfare; and intelligent support to command decision-making, among other applications. In particular, the CMC Joint Staff Department has called for the PLA to leverage the \"tremendous potential\" of AI in planning, decision support, and operational command.\nAnother report suggests China has already developed a range of unmanned aerial, underwater, surface, and ground platforms and is working on cutting-edge unmanned systems, including those with stealth, swarming, and hypersonic capabilities. China believes these modern unmanned systems could be used to introduce a persistent presence in disputed waters or territories. These reports suggest China has wide-ranging military applications for RAS and AI in mind, which could present a multifaceted challenge to the U.S. military.\nPentagon officials have reportedly noted that China has made it a national goal to acquire foreign technology—through both licit and illicit means—to advance its military technologies, including AI and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology. Army officials note this presents a number of challenges and limitations when working with U.S. academic institutions to develop RAS and AI, as many of these institutions have significant numbers of foreign nationals enrolled in science and engineering programs.", "The South Koreans have developed the Samsung SGR-A1 robot sentry to defend South Korea against North Korean border intrusion. In 2007, it was revealed the SGR-A1 had a fully autonomous mode, and a number of press sources began referring to it as a fully autonomous weapons system, which resulted in a great deal of negative press, although Samsung and South Korean officials noted that a human was required to engage targets. Reportedly, the SGR-A1s, which cost $200,000 apiece, are remotely operated sentries that mount either a 5.5mm machine gun or a 40mm automatic grenade launcher, which work in conjunction with cameras and radar systems that can detect intruders with heat and motion sensors and can challenge them through audio or video communications. The SGR-A1 is deployed throughout the 160-mile Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ).", "The Brimstone missile developed for the Royal Air Force is an aircraft-launched, fire-and-forget missile designed to destroy ground vehicles or small boats ( Figure 3 ). Brimstone has two modes of operation, one that involves a human \"painting\" a target with a laser and the other \"fire and forget\" mode where the missile's software seeks a predesignated target type within an established kill box. Brimstone has reportedly been used against Islamic State targets in Syria. Saudi Arabia has acquired the Brimstone missile as well. While the United States has a similar system—the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)—Brimstone is an example of an exportable, semi-autonomous weapon system (which could be converted to an autonomous weapon system by adding a loiter capability and switching it to a single fire-and-forget mode) against which U.S. ground forces will likely need to develop countermeasures.", "Army and Marine RAS and AI efforts are governed by various policies and managed by a number of different organizations. The following sections provide an overview of selected authorities and managing organizations.", "Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Unmanned Systems Integrat ed Roadmap 2017-2042, June 2018\nOSD's Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap is to\nprovide overarching strategic guidance that will align the Services' unmanned systems goals and efforts with the DOD strategic vision. This strategic guidance will focus on reducing duplicative efforts, enabling collaboration, identifying challenges, and outlining major areas where DOD and industry may collaborate to further expand the potential of unmanned systems. As DOD has embraced the use of unmanned systems across nearly every operating environment, this strategy will allow DOD to capitalize on the technology advancements and paradigm shift that unmanned systems provide.\nThe overarching themes of OSD's Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap include\ninteroperability, autonomy, secure network, and human-machine collaboration.\nIn addition to autonomous systems, it also addresses cyber operations, information assurance, the electromagnetic spectrum, and electronic warfare.\nJoint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (JCRAS), October 16, 2016\nDOD's 2016 JCRAS stipulates that by 2035, the Joint Force will employ integrated human-RAS teams in diverse combinations to expand the Joint Force commander's options. Noting that \"war will remain a human endeavor with humans retaining responsibility and accountability for military actions\" the JCRAS establishes the following future precepts:\nemployment of human-RAS teams, leveraging autonomy as a key enabler, and integrating RAS capabilities to develop innovative concepts of operations.\nDepartment of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.09, Change 1, May 8, 2017, Autonomy in Weapons Systems establishes\nDOD policy assigns responsibilities for the development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned platforms and establishes guidelines designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements.\nThe directive also stipulates that \"autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force,\" precluding the development of fully autonomous weapons systems. This reluctance to pursue fully autonomous weapons systems was further emphasized during 2017 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, when then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva stated, \"I am an advocate for keeping the restriction, because we take our values to war.... I do not think it is reasonable for us to put robots in charge of whether or not we take a human life.\"\nIn a similar manner, the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy lays out DOD's strategic approach to effectively integrate AI into the Department and maintain military advantage.", "", "In June 2018, DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) to accelerate the delivery of AI-enabled capabilities to the Joint Force and synchronize DOD AI activities. Reportedly, DOD hopes to attract \"world-class\" AI talent to the new organization. A decision where to locate the JAIC is pending.", "The Army has a variety of organizations involved in its RAS and AI efforts. In managing these efforts, there are three major organizations involved. At the Army level, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology (ASA [ALT]) Program Director for Robotics is responsible for RAS. In terms of major command-level management, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager for RAS exercises management of Army ground and air RAS efforts, as well as overall RAS integration. In July 2018, the Army stood up Army Futures Command (AFC), intended to establish unity of command and effort that consolidates the Army's modernization process under one roof. It is not yet established how AFC will manage the Army's RAS and AI efforts, but it is expected that AFC will have a major role in managing these efforts.", "On October 2, 2018, the Army announced the creation of the Army Artificial Intelligence Task Force in Support of the Department of Defense Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (A-AI TF). The Army's intent is to \"establish a scalable A-AI TF under U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC) consisting of hand-selected Army personnel with specific skill sets to lead Army AI efforts and support DOD projects, principally based at Carnegie Mellon University.\" The A-AI TF will work with Carnegie Mellon's National Robotics Engineering Center in Pittsburg, PA, and the Army expects to achieve an initial operating capability at Carnegie Mellon University in early November 2018.", "In a similar manner, a number of organizations are involved in Marine RAS and AI efforts. The Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration Command (CDIC) is responsible for developing RAS and AI concepts of operation and employment. Next, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is responsible for scientific and technological (S&T) development of RAS and AI. Finally, the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) is responsible for the acquisition of RAS and AI technologies/systems.", "", "In March 2017, the Army published its Robotics and Autonomous Systems Strategy. The Army describes its RAS objectives as follows:\n1. Increase situational awareness. Complex terrain and enemy countermeasures limit soldiers' abilities to see and fight at the battalion level and below. Advancements in RAS allow for persistent surveillance and reconnaissance over wide areas, often going where manned systems cannot, thereby increasing standoff distances, survivability and reaction time for commanders.\n2. Lighten the s oldiers' physical and cognitive workloads. Excessive equipment requirements reduce stamina and endurance. Autonomous systems lighten equipment loads and increase soldier speed, mobility, stamina and effectiveness. Vast amounts of information overload leaders' ability to make decisions. RAS facilitate mission command by collecting, organizing, and prioritizing data to facilitate decision-making as well as improving tactical mobility while reducing cyber, electronic, and physical signatures.\n3. Sustain the force with increased distribution, throughput, and efficiency. Logistics distribution is resource intensive. Soldiers and teams become vulnerable at the end of extended supply lines. Air and ground unmanned systems and autonomy-based capabilities enhance logistics at every stage of supply movement to the most forward tactical resupply points. RAS move materiel to the most urgent points of need and provide options for Army logistics distribution to the warfighter.\n4. Facilitate movement and maneuver. Joint combined arms maneuver in the 21 st century requires ready ground combat forces capable of outmaneuvering adversaries physically and cognitively in all domains. Through credible forward presence and resilient battle formations, future ground forces integrate and synchronize joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities to create temporary windows of superiority across multiple domains; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; and achieve military objectives. Investments in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities allows future enemies to engage Army forces earlier and at greater distances. In addition, adversaries will look to emplace obstacles to threaten movement and maneuver across extended avenues of advance. As a counter, Army forces employ RAS to extend the depth of the area of operations and to provide responses to enemy action. RAS expand the time and space at which Army forces can operate and improve the ability to overcome obstacles.\n5. Protect the force. The congested and contested future operational environment (OE) increases soldiers' exposure to hazardous situations. RAS technologies will enhance soldiers' survivability by providing greater standoff distance from enemy formations, rockets, artillery, and mortars as well as placing less soldiers at risk during convoy operations.\nWhile the Army does not have specific strategic objectives for AI like it does RAS, the Army's RAS Strategy does suggest a future role for AI:\nArtificial intelligence (AI) is the capability of computer systems to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence such as perception, conversation, and decision-making. Advances in AI are making it possible to cede to machines many tasks long regarded as impossible for machines to perform. AI will play a key role in RAS development as reasoning and learning in computers evolves. AI will improve the ability for RAS to operate independently in tasks such as off-road driving and analyzing and managing mass amounts of data for simplified human decision-making. Increasingly, AI will account for operational factors such as mission parameters, rules of engagement, and detailed terrain analysis. As human-machine collaboration matures, AI will contribute to faster and improved decision-making in five areas: identifying strategic indications and warnings; advancing narratives and countering adversarial propaganda; supporting operational/campaign-level decision-making; enabling leaders to employ \"mixed\" manned/unmanned formations; and enhancing the conduct of specific defensive missions in which functions of speed, amount of information, and synchronization might overwhelm human decision making.", "Within the context of the Army's RAS Strategy, Army leadership has established near-, mid-, and far-term RAS priorities.", "Near-term priorities are partially funded in current budgets and consist of the following:\nincrease situational awareness for dismounted forces at lower echelons; lighten the physical load for dismounted forces; improve sustainment with automated ground resupply; facilitate movement with improved route clearance; and protect the force with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) RAS platform and payload improvements.", "Mid-term priorities have research and procurement funding lines submitted for the budget under consideration and consist of the following:\nincrease situational awareness with advanced, smaller RAS and swarming; lighten the load with exoskeleton capabilities; improve sustainment with fully automated convoy operations; and improve maneuver with unmanned combat vehicles and advanced payloads.", "Far-term priorities have limited research and development funding programmed in the budget and consist of the following:\nincrease situational awareness with persistent reconnaissance from swarming systems; improve sustainment with autonomous aerial cargo delivery; and facilitate maneuver with advancements to unmanned combat vehicles.", "The Marines' RAS and AI Strategy is articulated in the Marine Corps Robotic and Autonomy Strategy (MCRAS). The MCRAS's stated objectives are to\nincrease situational awareness; lighten the Marines' cognitive and physical burden; improve sustainment; facilitate movement and maneuver; and protect the force.\nAs part of the Marines' AI strategy, they hope to speed up and improve decisionmaking in the following areas:\nidentifying strategic indications and warnings; advancing narratives and countering adversarial propaganda; supporting operational/campaign-level decisionmaking; enabling leaders to employ manned-unmanned formations; and enhancing mission execution through big data analysis.", "In a manner similar to the Army's, the Marines have established near-, mid-, and far-term priorities.", "Increase situational awareness. Lighten the Marine burden. Improve sustainment. Facilitate movement. Protect the force.", "Increase situational awareness with advanced, smaller and swarming RAS. Lighten the load with exoskeleton capabilities. Improve sustainment with fully automated convoy operations. Improve maneuver with unmanned combat vehicles and advanced payloads.", "Enable manned and unmanned teaming (MUM-T). Scalable sensors, scalable teaming to support MUM-T. Advancements in machine learning.", "", "Developing autonomous robotic ground systems that can successfully navigate tactically cross-country is a significant challenge that will need to be overcome before these systems can be employed effectively on the battlefield. One researcher describes the challenge of autonomous ground navigation as well as a brief history of driverless car development as follows:\nAutonomous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) navigation, for example, is relatively straightforward, since the world model according to which it operates consists simply of maps that indicate preferred routes, height obstacles and no-fly zones. Radars augment this model in real time by indicating which altitudes are clear of obstacles. Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates convey to the UAV where it needs to go, with the overarching goal of the GPS coordinate plan being not to take the aircraft into a no-fly zone or cause it to collide with an obstacle.\nIn comparison, navigation for driverless cars is much more difficult. Cars not only need similar mapping abilities, but they must also understand where all nearby vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists are, and where all these are going in the next few seconds. Driverless cars (and some drones) do this through a combination of sensors like LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), traditional radars, and stereoscopic computer vision. Thus the world model of a driverless car is much more advanced than that of a typical UAV, reflecting the complexity of the operating environment. A driverless car computer is required to track all the dynamics of all nearby vehicles and obstacles, constantly compute all possible points of intersection, and then estimate how it thinks traffic is going to behave in order to make a decision to act.\nDriverless car development originated with a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) program in 2004. When the program ended in 2007, driverless cars could move only slowly through closed courses, and not without accidents. A decade later, industry is on the verge of commercializing driverless cars around the world. This rapid progress is a result of the significant industry-sponsored Research and Development (R&D) investment, as well as competition for the multi-billion-dollar automotive consumer market. Meanwhile—and paradoxically, given the origins of the technology—there has been very little progress in military autonomous vehicle development.\nOvercoming the challenges of tactical cross-country autonomous navigation (e.g., avoiding obstacles such as barbed wire, minefields, and antitank ditches) and using terrain to shield military vehicles from detection and engagement by direct-fire weapons remains, for the foreseeable future, a crucial developmental challenge for both U.S. and foreign ground forces.\nThe following sections provide a brief description of selected unclassified Army and Marine Corps RAS and AI efforts.", "The SMET is an unmanned robotic vehicle intended to provide logistical support to squads in Army Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) and Marine Infantry Battalions. The SMET will be designed to operate in unmanned and optionally manned modes and will be required to carry up to 1,000 lb., operate over 60 miles in 72 hours, and generate 3 kW stationary and 1 kW moving to enable equipment and charge batteries. The target cost for the SMET is no more than $100,000 per system. The SMET is largely a commercial off-the-shelf effort, as a number of vendors had previously developed prototypes for past Army robotic initiatives.\nConceptually, the SMET is intended to carry troops, food and water, ammunition, supplies, and other weapons such as mortars and anti-armor weapons. The SMET is also to be expandable and could conduct route clearance and breaching operations by the addition of special mission modules. Theoretically, the SMET could also be configured to conduct reconnaissance and serve as a semi- or fully autonomous weapon system when armed.\nIn December 2017, the Army selected four vendors—Team Polaris (Applied Research Associates, Polaris Defense, and Neya Systems), General Dynamics Land Systems, HDT Global, and Howe and Howe Technologies—to conduct a six-month operational technology demonstration in FY2019. Sixty-four SMETs (16 from each vendor) are to be made available to the 1 st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10 th Mountain Division, Ft. Drum, NY, and the 2 nd BCT, 101 st Airborne Division, Ft. Campbell, KY, for evaluation in November 2018. Army plans call for SMET to transition to a Program of Record by first quarter FY2020, after which the Army would transition into Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of the SMET. By the second or third quarter of FY2021, the first Army units will begin to receive the SMETs. Depending on budgets, the Army could eventually procure as many as 5,723 SMETs.", "The Army's Leader-Follower Technology for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWVs) effort revolves around a suite of sensors and vehicle upgrades intended to provide TWVs the capability of linking three unmanned vehicles to a single manned vehicle during the conduct of logistics road convoy operations. This effort is intended to reduce the number of soldiers required to operate a convoy, thereby reducing the number of exposed soldiers to risk of injury from attack.\nThe Army's Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) of Warren, MI, is reportedly working with several industry partners on the effort. Robotic Research LLC, of Gaithersburg, MD, is providing the autonomy kit for the vehicles, and Oshkosh Defense of Oshkosh, WI, is building the kits that allow the trucks to be remotely operated. Lockheed Martin of Bethesda, MD, is the integrated systems developer, and DCS Corporation of Alexandria, VA, is creating the graphic user interface allowing the soldier in the lead vehicle to control the follower trucks.\nPlans call for a year-long operational technical demonstration in late FY2019 involving deploying 60 systems to two Palletized Load System (PLS) Truck Companies. If successful, the Army plans to enter Low-Rate Initial Production in FY2021 and Full-Rate Production in FY2023, with production completed by FY2027.", "The Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) is intended to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, which has been in service since 1981. As part of this effort, the Army plans for the NGCV to have the capability to be \"optionally manned\"—meaning that soldiers will be onboard the NGCV most of the time, but the vehicle will have the ability to conduct limited operations without them. As part of this effort, the Army also plans to develop Robotic Combat Vehicles to serve as \"wingmen\" for the NGCV. The Army's long-term vision is for RCVs to act as \"scouts and escorts\" for manned NGCVs, with soldiers controlling the RCVs from stations in the NGCV. At present, it takes one soldier to direct a single ground robotic vehicle by remotely controlling every movement and action. The Army hopes to improve AI to the extent that a single soldier can control \"a squadron of robots.\"\nThe Army plans to develop an initial set of six experimental NGCV prototypes—two manned NGCVs and four RCVs—for delivery by the end of FY2019. In FY2020, the Army plans for hands-on soldier testing with the final effort—testing a company-sized element (14 RCVs)—from FY2023 to FY2024.", "In June 2018, the Army reportedly awarded a $1 million yearlong contract to Uptake Technologies, an industrial AI company based in Chicago, IL, to build AI software for the M-2 Bradley intended to \"predict component failures, decrease the frequency of unscheduled maintenance, and improve the productivity of repair operations.\" The basic concept is to install sensors inside the Bradley's engine and other components to record information such as temperature and revolutions per minute (RPM) and transmit it to the Uptake software, where machine learning would look for patterns in data that match known engine failures in similar vehicles. Reportedly, Uptake will install its software on 32 M-2 Bradleys at Ft. Hood, TX, not only to predict when future repairs might be needed but also to optimize the timing of general maintenance. In addition, if the software performs as envisioned, it could also \"prevent the Army from doing unnecessary preventative maintenance work, saving time and money.\" If successful, Army officials reportedly could expand this effort to the entire Bradley fleet as well as other combat vehicle fleets. Officials are cautious, noting that these industrial machine-learning technologies have not yet been fully tested on military vehicles.", "The Marine RV (M) is a custom-built, multimission-tracked platform that incorporates AI but also fulfils the need for man-in-the-loop capabilities. It is intended to accommodate a wide variety of mission modules, ranging from route clearance and breaching; logistics; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA); casualty evacuation; and direct- and indirect-fire weapons.", "As part of efforts to develop innovative concepts of operation, the Marines are exploring a Fully Autonomous First Wave Concept whereby robotic and autonomous aerial, amphibious, and ground platforms would be employed as the first wave of an amphibious assault to address enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. As part of the Marines' Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO), implementation of Fully Autonomous First Wave could result in the need for fewer Marines to participate in high-risk amphibious assault operations, as well as a reduction in the logistical footprint needed to support Marine amphibious operations.", "A fully manned, capable and well-trained workforce is a key component of military readiness. The integration of RAS and AI into military units raises a number of personnel-related issues that may be of interest to Congress.", "The introduction of RAS and AI will almost certainly lead to significant changes in how units are organized, equipped, and manned. Sometimes this is conceptualized as a need for reduced manpower, as RAS and AI are used to replace personnel and reduce unit manning. For example, the use of leader-follower technology could lead to the ability to provide logistical support to the deployed units with fewer truck drivers. However, from another perspective, manpower savings in one area may be offset by manpower increases in another. Some observers note that the increased use of unmanned aircraft have increased manning requirements rather than reducing them:\nYet the military's growing body of experience shows that autonomous systems don't actually solve any given problem, but merely change its nature. It's called the autonomy paradox: The very systems designed to reduce the need for human operators require more manpower to support them.\nConsider unmanned aircraft—which carry cameras aloft without a crew, yet require multiple shifts of operators, maintainers and intelligence analysts on the ground to extract useful data—and it becomes clear that many researchers and policymakers have been asking the wrong question. It is not \"what can robots do without us?\" but \"what can robots do with us?\"\nAnother consideration revolves around assessments of risks associated with potential failure of RAS and AI systems. National security leaders may want to retain manpower to provide certain capabilities in the event RAS and AI systems are degraded or inadequate for a given mission or requirement.", "The introduction of RAS and AI brings with it a greater need for military personnel with advanced technical knowledge. The military has extensive experience bringing new members into the armed forces (recruiting) and convincing those members to stay in the armed forces after their initial term of service has ended (retention). However, for the great majority of individuals currently brought into the armed forces, the highest degree they have is a high school diploma, in the case of enlisted personnel, or a bachelor's degree, in the case of officers.\nAs the military integrates RAS and AI into its formations, the need to recruit and retain those with advanced technical training will increase. At least some military personnel will need to have a sophisticated understanding of RAS and AI to assist with the design, acquisition, programming, testing, and quality control of such systems. A more sizable population will need to have fairly extensive knowledge of particular systems to effectively use and maintain them. Recruiting and retaining the types of individuals needed to perform these roles may be challenging. They will likely need to have high cognitive ability and years of advanced technical training, in addition to meeting the physical and behavioral standards for joining the armed forces. In addition, the military will likely face intense competition from the private sector for the individuals who do meet all of these requirements.", "As RAS and AI become integrated into military formations, the need to train servicemembers on how to use and maintain such systems will increase. While the scope of training required will vary depending on the types of systems introduced and the work roles of individuals, the time and expenses required to develop appropriate training curricula and to train individuals will likely be significant. Such training will not be a one-time event, but will need to be ongoing to accommodate the fielding of new systems and upgrades to older systems. At present, the armed forces provide most military skill training through an extensive network of military schools and training sites. However, this might not be the optimal way to develop and maintain proficiency in RAS and AI systems, particularly for those whose work roles require current, high-level knowledge.", "Most individuals who join the armed forces come in at the lowest enlisted or officer grade (rank) and are gradually promoted to higher grades over the course of their military career. These career paths are well defined, and a close connection is typically maintained between one's grade and technical skill, professional military knowledge, leadership experience, authority, status, and compensation. For most military personnel, the career path takes an individual from a focused specialist in a given skill set to a leader of increasingly larger organizations, which themselves are increasingly complex in terms of personnel, systems, and capabilities. Various levels of professional military education, as well as broadening assignments, are designed to facilitate this development.\nHowever, maintaining the desired supply of individuals with expertise in RAS and AI may require a different career path model—for example, higher entry level grades or a technical career track that requires fewer assignments to leadership positions. In addition, in light of rapid technological change, maintaining expertise in RAS and AI might be enhanced by periodic assignments outside of the military—for example, in the private sector or academia. One career path model that has been cited as potentially applicable to those with advanced technical training is the one which exists in the military medical community. In this model, officers are routinely brought in at a higher grade based primarily on their medical skills, with less emphasis placed on developing professional military skills and large scale organizational leadership. However, it is not yet clear that this model would be ideal for RAS and AI experts.", "The legal and ethical debate over the development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems largely concerns technology that does not currently exist—mobile robotic weapons systems capable of selecting and attacking targets without human intervention. While some argue that such weapons can and should be developed and fielded if they meet the requirements of the international law of armed conflict (LOAC, also known as international humanitarian law, or IHL) for lawful weapons —described more fully below—others view the lack of human participation in the decision to take a human life to make such systems inherently unlawful or unethical.\nOpponents of fully autonomous weapons systems urge the adoption of an international treaty banning such weapons or at least providing a legal framework to ensure that such weapons are subject to meaningful human control. Others advocate a moratorium on developing such weapons until advances in technology enable the weapons to comply with LOAC. Proponents of autonomous weapons systems argue that the possibility that such systems may enhance compliance with LOAC could make their use more ethical than fighting wars without them. They recommend rigorous testing and review of proposed weapons under the existing Article 36 legal review process. \"Article 36 Review\" refers to the obligation of states to evaluate new or modified weapons to ensure they do not violate LOAC. The obligation stems from Article 36 of Additional Protocol I (API).", "Two well-established general principles governing armed attacks during armed conflict are distinction and proportionality. Distinction refers to distinguishing between combatants and military targets on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on the other. Proportionality refers to the balance between the military advantages expected to be gained from an attack versus the probable extent of collateral civilian harm. Some observers note the difficulty posed by reducing these principles to a digital format such that autonomous weapons systems will be capable of obeying them.\nA corollary to these basic principles is individual and group accountability for failure to adhere to them. Some commentators have raised the concern that robots are not amenable to deterrence or punishment, and wonder who will be held responsible for any noncompliant behavior.", "As far as objects are concerned, lawful targeting requires the ability to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects. The API defines military objectives as objects that by \"nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.\" Objects not meeting those criteria are civilian objects. The nature of an object may change, making constant reassessment necessary. An object ordinarily used for civilian purposes may not be targeted unless the adversary is using it for military purposes such that it meets the criteria above, with any doubt to be resolved in favor of its treatment as a civilian object. Moreover, the API prohibits targeting facilities or other objects that are necessary for the survival of the civilian population or that would be likely to cause environmental harm if subjected to an armed attack.\nThere are also rules applicable to targeting individuals. Under the API and customary international law, only combatants are lawful targets, and even they are protected if they become wounded or surrender. The API bars targeting civilians unless, and for so long as, they participate directly in hostilities. The API also protects certain military personnel, such as medics and clergy.", "Like the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality has as its central aim the protection of civilians during armed conflict. It requires balancing the expected military advantage that an armed attack may obtain against the potential harm to civilians and civilian objects. Whether a given attack is proportionate is a judgment made at the initiation of the attack, which is subject to fluid conditions on the battlefield. There is disagreement among practitioners and academics as to how these dissimilar components—concrete military advantage versus incidental deaths of civilians and damage to property—might effectively be evaluated to determine what civilian harm is excessive. No clear formula exists. Some doubt that it will ever be possible to create an algorithm capable of making an adequate proportionality assessment.", "A central premise of the law of armed conflict is that the permissible means and methods of warfare are \"not unlimited.\" Specifically, the API prohibits employing weapons and methods of warfare that are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or that are intended or may be expected to cause widespread long-term and severe damage to the environment. Specific types of weapons that these treaties ban include chemical and biological weapons. These treaties also forbid weapons that are indiscriminate in their effect, that is, those that are not able to be used in accordance with the principle of distinction.\nConsequently, API Article 36 requires that parties test new weapons to ensure compliance with the law of war:\nIn the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.\nThe proper test, then, is whether, in some or all circumstances, an autonomous weapons system is indiscriminate by nature or is of such a nature as to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or is likely to cause widespread long-term and severe damage to the environment. In other words, an autonomous weapons system, like all other weapon systems, must be able to distinguish targets appropriately and to ensure that the attack is proportionate to the expected military advantage. Some argue that the fact that the weapon system operates autonomously does not per se govern whether it can meet these criteria. As the argument goes, as long as the autonomous system can be programmed with sufficiently reliable targeting information to ensure that it can be fired at a lawful target, the autonomous weapon system can survive an Article 36 review. On the other hand, some scientists have warned that robotic systems capable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants or making proportionality judgments are not likely in the short term. The ban on weapons that cause superfluous or unnecessary damage or suffering likewise arguably can be met by, among other things, ensuring the payload is not a prohibited type, such as biological or chemical in nature.\nAs mentioned above, the Department of Defense has a directive on the development of autonomous weapons systems. It states that \"[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.\" The directive requires the evaluation and testing process to ensure that autonomous weapons systems\n(a) Function as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries.\n(b) Complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before continuing the engagement.\n(c) Are sufficiently robust to minimize failures that could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized parties.\nThe directive emphasizes the need for an effective human-machine interface, requiring that autonomous weapons systems\n(a) Be readily understandable to trained operators.\n(b) Provide traceable feedback on system status.\n(c) Provide clear procedures for trained operators to activate and deactivate system functions.\nWhether these efforts will assuage critics may turn on the \"appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force\" that the Department of Defense adopts.", "Some opponents of developing fully autonomous weapons systems have raised a variety of concerns that do not necessarily implicate humanitarian law, but rather, concern whether the availability of such systems could make armed conflict more prevalent. According to this view, national leaders may be more likely to involve their nations in hostilities when the risk to human soldiers is minimized. A counter argument is that most new weapons are developed in order, at least in part, to minimize risk to troops and have been subject to the same criticism. Another argument for such systems is that robots are unlikely to replace soldiers on the battlefield entirely,\nalthough they may reduce the numbers of soldiers some envision that robotic systems are likely to enhance the capabilities of soldiers as a force multiplier.\nOpponents also argue that human compassion and other emotions are necessary to ethical war-fighting. Human empathy, some argue, helps soldiers to evaluate the intent of potential human targets to determine whether they actually pose a threat; machines, they argue, may possibly never be programmable to emulate compassion or empathy effectively. On the other side, proponents of such systems argue that human emotions—fear, anger, and the instinct for self-preservation—may lead to adverse consequences on the battlefield. Robots, they posit, may not be subject to human errors or unlawful behavior induced by human emotions.\nOne other argument skeptics of automated weapon systems make is that the phenomenon of \"automation bias,\" in which humans trust computer interpretations rather than their own senses and instincts regarding their environment, may nullify meaningful human control over such systems. A variation of this concern is that relying on robots will make killing too remote for soldiers, dehumanizing the endeavor by making it seem more like participating in a video game.", "Notable futurists, such as Elon Musk and the late Steven Hawking, have warned that AI has the potential to be far more dangerous than nuclear weapons and could be \"the worst event in the history of our civilization.\" While of note perhaps more important is a growing level of organized groups concerned with LAWS. The following are examples of organized groups concerned with lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS).", "In April 2017, DOD established the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team to oversee Project Maven, a project to use AI to autonomously extract objects of interest from moving or still UAV imagery. Project Maven would develop computer vision algorithms, trained using AI techniques such as machine learning, to better identify targets. Tools built through Project Maven would be used to complement the labor-intensive process of humans analyzing drone video, a practice that delays providing results to warfighters for targeting purposes. It was suggested that such AI-enhanced tools could allow human analysts to process up to two to three times as much data within the same time period, providing more time-sensitive targeting data and, according to DOD, a reduction of collateral damage and civilian casualties.\nGoogle is one of a number of companies involved in Project Maven. In March 2018, Google's role in Project Maven came to light and a number of Google employees reportedly expressed concern \"that the company would offer resources to the military for surveillance technology involved in drone operations\" while \"others argued that the project raised important ethical questions about the development and use of machine learning.\" Reportedly about a dozen Google employees resigned in protest and about 4,000 employees signed a petition demanding \"a clear policy stating that neither Google nor its contractors will ever build warfare technology.\" Reportedly Google will not renew its contract with DOD for Project Maven when the current contract expires in 2019.", "The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is a nonprofit umbrella organization that advocates for a ban on LAWS. Their belief is autonomous weapon systems are immoral and lack the decisionmaking capability of humans and, therefore, should be banned. They advocate for the preemptive ban on LAWS, arguing that \"the introduction of such weapons would violate international humanitarian law and risk devastating consequences to civilian populations.\" The campaign to Stop Killer Robots is said to be emulating the past success of a nongovernment organization (NGO) movement in the late 1990s—the International Campaign to Ban Landmine (ICBL). The ICBL successfully lobbied for the negotiation of an international ban on landmines—the Ottawa Convention—and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Some note the similarities between autonomous weapon systems, landmines, and cluster munitions movements and suggest the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and its proven NGO strategy raises some interesting possibilities.", "The parties to the United Nation's Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) has met on a variety of occasions—most recently from August 27 to August 31, 2018—to discuss lethal autonomous weapons. In November 2017 in Geneva, Switzerland, the U.N. Group of CCW Government Experts (GCE) reportedly affirmed that \"international humanitarian law continues to apply fully to all weapon systems, including the potential development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems.\" More happened at the GCE meeting, however. Their goal was to set the stage for negotiating an annex to the CCW, but they were not successful. The Russians, for example, strongly opposed any restrictions. There was, however, general agreement that meaningful human control over autonomous weapons systems is required. Accordingly, meaningful human control over LAWS can be exercised in five instances:\nhumans defining LAWS targets; humans not activating LAWS until it is clearly understood what the weapon will target; humans confirming targets selected by LAWS; humans confirming LAWS decision to engage targets—effectively \"pulling the trigger\"; and humans deactivating a LAWS that is malfunctioning.", "On September 12, 2018, Members of the European Parliament overwhelming passed a nonbinding resolution urging Member States and the European Council to work toward an international ban on weapon systems that lack meaningful human control over the critical function of selecting and engaging targets. It was also noted that France and Germany are not working toward and do not support the strict and total prohibition of autonomous weapons.", "Regarding opposition to LAWS, DOD notes the current challenge:\nA lack of trust by the Warfighters, and the wider public, is a major roadblock in DOD's continued development and use of autonomous unmanned systems. This lack of trust is highlighted by international efforts at the United Nations (U.N.) to consider policies that would prohibit the deployment of autonomous systems with lethal capabilities. Additionally, there are technological shortcomings in the current abilities of AI regarding ethical thinking that may limit the public's trust of autonomous unmanned systems developed for military capabilities.\nSituational ethical reasoning is currently not coherently implementable by AI in the range of scenarios that military forces may encounter. Given this limitation, it is paramount to ensure that human authority, accountability, and the ability to maintain command and control (C2) are preserved as increasing numbers of unmanned systems become more widely deployed.", "As part of the discussion of the ethics and legality of LAWS that will have a direct impact on whether or not the Army and Marines develop LAWS for battlefield use, DOD notes\nIn considering the specific use of weaponized systems, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, signed in November 2012, established policies and assigned responsibilities to shape the development and use of autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned platforms. It mandates that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force. DoDD 3000.09 also requires that persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable ROE. DoDD 3000.09 underwent a mandatory periodical update with administrative changes (Change 1, May 8, 2017), but a more substantive update was expected to be completed in late 2017. That substantive update, when released, is expected to involve clarifications of definitions and processes rather than a shift in the overall thrust of the policy.\nDOD does not currently have an autonomous weapon system that can search for, identify, track, select, and engage targets independent of a human operator's input. These tasks currently rely heavily on a human operator using remote operation, also referred to as \"tele-operation.\" In the future, weaponization will be a crucial capability in mission sets where the unmanned system is directly supporting forces engaging in hazardous tasks.\nIn the realms of public and international diplomacy, concerned states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and experts in AI have urged an immediate and intensive effort to formulate and secure an international treaty restricting the development, deployment, and use of weapon systems that can autonomously locate, select, and attack human targets. In response to similar expressions of concern from some High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the UN Office in Geneva hosted informal experts' meetings on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in 2014, 2015, and 2016. The CCW established a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) which met to discuss LAWS in a more formalized setting in 2017. A second meeting is foreseen for 27 to 31 August 2018. If such restrictions on autonomous weapon systems were to come into existence, and if the U.S. were to follow it, the ban would severely limit the ability to develop and use lethal autonomous weapon systems.\nIn view of this policy position and, in consideration to the challenges posed by a possible treaty regulating AI, this suggests future DOD development of LAWS is possible, given favorable advances in AI technology and an absence of international restrictions.\nEven under the current DOD directive to have humans in the loop for LAWS, some analysts have called for caution, as people might give too much deference to technology. For example, one analyst points to the 1988 case of the USS Vincennes guided missile cruiser mistakenly shooting down an Iranian passenger jet. The analyst notes that while there were indicators that it was a civilian aircraft, and final authorization for firing lay with the crew, no one was willing to challenge the computer.", "Congress has an active and ongoing interest in RAS and AI. In its September 2018 report titled \"Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence and its Growing Impact on U.S. Policy,\" the House Subcommittee on Information Technology notes\nThe loss of American leadership in AI could also pose a risk to ensuring any potential use of AI in weapons systems by nation-states comports with international humanitarian laws. In general, authoritarian regimes like Russia and China have not been focused on the ethical implications of AI in warfare, and will likely not have guidelines against more bellicose uses of AI, such as in autonomous weapons systems.\nAs Congress continues policy debates on RAS and AI, potential considerations could include, but are not limited to, the following:", "As the United States pursues military RAS and AI applications and systems, an examination of foreign military RAS and AI efforts and their potential impact on U.S. ground forces could be of benefit to policymakers. One report notes\nThe emphasis on armed robots underscores the difference between U.S. concepts of operations, in which unmanned ground systems largely support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and augment warfighters' capabilities, while the Russian military contemplates small to large unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) doing the actual fighting in the near future alongside or ahead of the human fighting force.\nIt has been suggested that military RAS and AI have the potential to change the very nature of war. At the strategic level, this could affect how the U.S. organizes ground forces, how it fights, and what types of major weapon systems it will need. At the operational and tactical levels, enemy RAS and AI capabilities could dictate specific weapon systems design, the development of new types of units to address enemy RAS and AI, and how brigade to squad level units conduct tactical operations.\nWhile the DOD and the Services emphasizes the development of RAS and AI for the U.S. military, it might be considered prudent to have a full understanding of foreign military RAS and AI efforts to help guide U.S. efforts and possibly preclude strategic or tactical RAS and AI \"surprises\" posed by foreign militaries or nonstate groups.", "Regarding fully autonomous weapon systems, one report notes\nSome of the most prominent leaders in these fields are publicly warning about the dangers in an unconstrained environment. Military operations enabled by these technologies, and especially by artificial intelligence, may unfold so quickly that effective responses require taking humans out of the decision cycle. Letting intelligent machines make traditionally human decisions about killing other humans is fraught with moral peril, but may become necessary to survive on the future battlefield, let alone to win. Adversaries will race to employ these capabilities and the powerful operational advantages they may confer.\nWhile DOD continues to eschew fully automated ground combat systems, there is a possibility that other nations could aggressively pursue fully autonomous weapons systems to achieve a battlefield advantage. This raises a question: are other nation's efforts to develop LAWS sufficient justification for the United States to do the same? The evolution of other weapons, such as hypersonic weapons, could also result in U.S. development of fully autonomous weapon systems from a purely defensive perspective. Despite DOD's insistence that a \"man in the loop\" capability will always be part of RAS systems, it is possible if not likely, that the U.S. military could feel compelled to develop ground fully autonomous weapon systems in response to comparable enemy ground systems or other advanced threat systems that make any sort of \"man in the loop\" role impractical.", "While U.S. development of RAS and AI for use by ground forces is articulated in a variety of strategies and directives, it can be argued that equally and, possibly, more important is the development of technologies, systems, formations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures designed to counter foreign use of RAS and AI against U.S. ground forces. Such a \"defensive\" approach to RAS and AI could prove to be particularly prudent, as it is possible other nations may introduce RAS and AI systems into ground combat before the United States, thereby necessitating an effective means of countering their use. Furthermore, foreign RAS and AI advances not directly related to weapons such as AI-enhanced military decisionmaking and intelligence or RAS-enabled logistics could have an indirect impact on U.S. ground forces and may be taken into consideration when developing U.S. counter RAS and AI capabilities.", "Many cutting-edge innovations in AI and RAS are occurring in the private sector, and these innovations could be adapted for use by U.S. ground forces. However, engaging with the private sector raises policy considerations for the Army and Marine Corps, as well as DOD more broadly. For example, if policymakers seek to assist the military in making use of emerging technologies such as AI and RAS, they might consider expanding support for entities such as the Defense Innovative Unit. If the Administration or Congress seeks to have more in-house expertise in AI and RAS, they might also consider supporting the development of service incentives or recruitment models to attract additional experts, either on a permanent or temporary basis.\nThere are other potential considerations which might merit further examination. As previously noted, there are a number of security challenges associated with DOD and the Services engaging with academic institutions and the private sector in regards to foreign national students and employees who might pose a security risk. Another consideration is how academia and private industry view the morality of military RAS and AI use. As technologies in these areas advance, some academic and private sector institutions might choose to \"opt out\" of working with DOD on technologies which they might view as counter to their values—much as Google reportedly is doing with DOD's Project Maven. If this becomes a pervasive practice, DOD efforts to develop RAS and AI technologies could be significantly hindered. Some experts have argued that a productive relationship could be encouraged by DOD approaching AI development and use with a focus on ethics and safety. The memorandum establishing the JAIC includes these principles, which must be considered within the Center's overarching goal of accelerating the delivery of AI-enabled capabilities.", "Aside from equipping the Services, personnel-related issues may be a major congressional concern as the Services incorporate various levels of RAS and AI into the force both in the near and far term. As such, Congress might choose to examine a number of topics in the following areas:", "Questions Congress may consider include the following:\nWhere will RAS and AI be integrated into the military most rapidly? Which occupational specialties will be less needed due to replacement by RAS and AI? Which occupational specialties will be in greater demand as RAS and AI are integrated into the force? What degree of \"human backup\" is desired in the event RAS and AI systems do not perform as required?", "Questions Congress may consider include the following:\nWhich particular skills do the military services require to support the integration of RAS and AI systems? What fields of academic study and work history are most essential to target for recruiting and retention? The armed forces have any array of special and incentive pay authorities that allow them to increase compensation for targeted skill sets and assignments. Are these authorities sufficient? Are the Services using them effectively? What nonmonetary incentives are most attractive to individuals with those skills? Do the armed forces have the authority to offer those incentives? How valuable are those skills to private-sector employers? How competitive are the armed forces in competing for this type of labor? Should certain eligibility criteria for joining the armed forces be modified to make military service a more viable option for those with the necessary skills? To what extent can other federal civilians and contractors with advanced technical skills be substituted for military personnel with those skills?", "Some considerations for training servicemembers on RAS and AI include the following:\nHow much training will the armed forces have to provide to their work force can effectively employ RAS and AI systems? When and where will this training occur, and at what cost? How quickly will the armed forces be able to adapt their training programs to account for technical advances in RAS and AI, and new concepts of operations? What role might private-sector training or training with industry play, particularly for those whose work roles require the most sophisticated knowledge of RAS and AI?", "Some considerations for developing a career path model for RAS and AI experts include the following:\nWhat assignments will be most critical to the professional development of RAS and AI experts and their ability to contribute to operational missions? Might private-sector or academic assignments be part of the career path? Will specialists in RAS and AI be expected to lead units and, if so, of what size and complexity? Does a technical track make sense? How much professional military knowledge will RAS and AI specialists need to possess to effectively integrate into military organizations? How much knowledge of warfighting functions will they need to advise commanders on how best to employ RAS and AI and how to synchronize them with other systems for maximum effect?", "Legal and ethical considerations associated with the possible development and adoption of fully autonomous lethal weapon systems are both considerable and complicated. As RAS and AI technology development advances in both the commercial and military sectors, a point will likely be reached where U.S. policymakers will be faced with the decision—can the United States (legally) and should the United States (ethically) develop LAWS? The Administration will likely have its own views on the legality and morality of LAWS, as will Congress. As previously noted\nAuthorizing a machine to make lethal combat decisions is contingent on political and military leaders resolving legal and ethical questions. These include the appropriateness of machines having this ability, under what circumstances should it be employed, where responsibility for mistakes lies, and what limitations should be placed on the autonomy of such systems.... Ethical discussions and policy decisions must take place in the near term in order to guide the development of future [unmanned aircraft systems] capabilities, rather than allowing the development to take its own path apart from this critical guidance.\nIn view of this, there appears to be an opportunity for Congress to examine these issues and perhaps define its role in the overall U.S. governmental debate on LAWS. These debates and resulting policy decisions and guidance could prove beneficial to DOD as a whole—and the Army and Marines in particular—as they develop RAS and AI systems and capabilities for use on the battlefield.", "Given current deliberations on LAWS and ongoing discussions in the U.N., it is conceivable that at some point in the future, formal international efforts could be undertaken to regulate LAWS development and use. As DOD has previously noted\nIf such restrictions on autonomous weapon systems were to come into existence, and if the U.S. were to follow it, the ban would severely limit the ability to develop and use lethal autonomous weapon systems.\nSuch restrictions could limit other nations as well. Should deliberate formal efforts to regulate LAWS emerge in the coming years, the United States has the option of playing an active role, a passive role, or no formal role whatsoever. Because of the potential national security implications of a potential LAWS ban, as well as its impact on Army and Marine RAS and AI developmental efforts, policymakers both in the Administration and Congress might examine and decide what the appropriate level of U.S. involvement should be in such an international regulatory process." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 3, 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_title h1_title", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What implications does the adoption of RAS and AI by U.S. ground forces carry?", "How are the Army and Marines incorporating RAS and AI into their plans?", "What are some ways in which RAS and AI are anticipated to be incorporated within military operations?", "To what extent is it expected that stakeholders will raise concerns about their use?", "What is the main ethical question currently debated about RAS and AI?" ], "summary": [ "The adoption of RAS and AI by U.S. ground forces carries with it a number of possible implications, including potentially improved performance and reduced risk to soldiers and Marines; potential new force designs; better institutional support to combat forces; potential new operational concepts; and possible new models for recruiting and retaining soldiers and Marines.", "The Army and Marines have developed and are executing RAS and AI strategies that articulate near-, mid-, and long-term priorities. Both services have a number of RAS and AI efforts underway and are cooperating in a number of areas.", "RAS and AI are anticipated to be incorporated into a variety of military applications, ranging from logistics and maintenance, personnel management, intelligence, and planning to name but a few.", "In this regard, most consider it unlikely that appreciable legal and ethical objections to their use by the military will be raised.", "The most provocative question concerning the military application of RAS and AI being actively debated by academics, legal scholars, policymakers, and military officials is that of \"killer robots\" (i.e., should autonomous robotic weapon systems be permitted to take human life?)." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 3, 3, 3 ] }
CRS_RL34670	{ "title": [ "", "Workers' Compensation in the United States", "Federal Workers' Compensation", "The Defense Base Act", "DBA Benefits Paid", "Contractor Injuries and Deaths Covered by the DBA", "Contractor Deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan", "H.R. 5136, Proposed Legislation to Deny Award Fees to Contractors due to Negligent Contractor Behavior", "Legislative History", "Basic Provisions of the Defense Base Act", "DBA Eligibility", "DBA Insurance", "Insurance Through Private Carriers", "Self-Insurance", "DBA Waivers", "DBA Benefits for Foreign Nationals", "DBA Administration", "Dispute Resolution", "War Hazards Compensation Act", "Selection of Defense Base Act Providers", "Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development", "Department of Defense", "DOD Insured Activities", "U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Pilot Program", "Costs to the Federal Government", "DBA Premiums Under Single Insurer Programs", "Comparison of DBA Insurance Premiums Paid by DOD and USACE", "DBA Costs Associated with the Department of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Contract", "U.S. Army Audit Agency Report on DBA Insurance under LOGCAP", "Defense Contract Audit Agency Audit of DBA Insurance Under LOGCAP", "Options for Congress", "P.L. 110-417, the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, as an Outline for Possible DBA Reform", "Single-Source Contract for DBA Insurance", "Experience Rating for DBA Insurance", "Federal Self-Insurance", "DOD Analysis of DBA Reform Options", "Improvements to the Current Open-Market DBA System", "Appendix. List of Acronyms" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "More than 131 million private and public sector employees in the United States are covered by some form of workers' compensation. Although the details of the various state and federal workers' compensation systems differ, all workers' compensation systems in the United States provide for limited wage replacement and full medical benefits for workers who are injured or become ill as a result of their work and survivors benefits to the families of workers who die on the job. In most cases, workers' compensation is mandated by state law and administered by state agencies. However, for some classes of workers, including overseas federal contractors, workers' compensation is mandated by federal law and provided or administered by the federal government. Table 1 provides summary data on workers' compensation in the United States.\nThe workers' compensation system is a no-fault system that pays workers for injuries or illnesses related to employment without considering the culpability of any one party. In exchange for this no-fault protection and the guarantee of benefits in the event of an employment-related injury, illness, or death, workers give up their rights to bring actions against employers in the civil court system and give up their rights to seek damages for injuries and illnesses, including pain and suffering, outside of those provided by the workers' compensation laws. With limited exceptions, injuries, illnesses, or deaths that are the result of accidents or incidents that occur in the workplace or that are the result of activities related to employment are covered by workers' compensation.\nState and federal laws differ on how private employers may meet their responsibilities to insure against the economic losses to employees from workplace injuries and illnesses. In nearly every state and federal system, firms can self-insure or purchase workers' compensation insurance from private providers or, in some states, from state funds.", "Workers' compensation policy is largely determined by the individual states. Each state and the District of Columbia, with the exception of Texas, has its own basic workers' compensation policy that mandates that private-sector employers and state and local government agencies insure against the financial damages caused by employment-related injuries and illnesses and provide no-fault cash and medical benefits to employees who are injured, killed, or become sick on the job.\nThe federal government has only a limited role in the workers' compensation system and administers workers' compensation programs for federal employees and several limited classes of private-sector workers, including overseas federal contractors. In 2007, state workers' compensation programs paid $52.1 billion, or 94%, of the $55.4 billion in total cash and medical benefits paid by the workers' compensation system; federal workers' compensation programs paid $3.3 billion, or 6%, of total workers' compensation benefits.\nWith limited exceptions, the federal government has traditionally left workers' compensation law and policy to the states. However, the federal government has intervened in workers' compensation policy in three cases. First, the federal government administers a workers' compensation program for most federal employees under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). Second, the federal government administers workers' compensation programs for the longshore and harbor and railroad industries because of the interstate nature of those industries. The Defense Base Act (DBA), created in 1941, extended the federal workers' compensation program for longshore and harbor workers, initially to persons working on American military bases abroad and then to most federal contractors working outside of the United States. Third, the federal government administers limited workers' compensation systems for coal miners with black lung disease and energy workers with cancer and other diseases caused by exposure to radiation and other toxic substances because state workers' compensation systems have proven unable to provide adequate coverage for these conditions.", "The DBA requires that many federal government contractors and subcontractors provide workers' compensation insurance for their employees who work outside of the United States. Under the provisions of the DBA, overseas federal military and public works contractors are subject to the same workers' compensation rules, including the same insurance requirements and same schedules of benefits for affected workers, as maritime firms covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). DBA insurance is provided by private companies or through self-insurance and the DBA program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL). Like all workers' compensation systems, the DBA provides no-fault coverage and is an exclusive remedy to injured workers. Injured workers and the survivors of workers killed on the job are entitled to benefits for employment-related injuries, illnesses, and deaths regardless of fault and are not permitted to sue their employers or the federal government for any types of damages caused by employment-related incidents.", "Prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, DBA benefits were paid to several hundred claimants per year. OIF was accompanied by an increase in the number of DBA cases and the total amount spent on DBA claims. As shown in Table 2 , the DBA caseload increased more than six-fold between 2004 and 2007, with 2007 having the largest caseload of the entire OIF period. The average amount of compensation and medical benefits paid per claim in 2007, however, was at the lowest level since 2003. The number of DBA payments dropped in 2008, but the average benefits per case rose to the 2006 level. DOL reports that the increase in cases in 2007 was due, in part, to greater compliance efforts that resulted in firms reporting a greater number of claims that involved only minor medical care and no lost work time. Table 2 provides an overview of DBA claims paid between 1997 and 2008.", "Between September 2001 and the end of December 2009, the DBA has processed 55,988 cases of covered injuries or deaths. Of these, 27,820 or 49.7% involved no lost work time on the part of the employee. During this period, the DBA has processed 1,987 cases involving the death of a covered employee. Just over 40% of all injury and death cases covered by the DBA during this period involved employees working for Service Employers International Inc., an indirect subsidiary of KBR, a military and public works contractor. Service Employers International Inc. was the employer of record for 22,921 total cases including 107 death cases between September 2001 and the end of December 2009. Table 3 provides summary data on DBA cases during this period.", "Between September 2001 and the end of December 2009, there were 1,987 contractor deaths covered by the DBA. Of these, 1,459 or 73.4% occurred in Iraq and 289 or 14.5% occurred in Afghanistan. Of the 289 deaths in Afghanistan, 100 occurred during the final six months of 2009. Contractor operations in Iraq and Afghanistan account for 87.9% of all covered contractor deaths during this period. During this same period, there were 4,248 American military deaths in Iraq and 848 American military deaths in Afghanistan. Table 4 provides a comparison of contractor and military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan.", "Congress has expressed concern over negligent contractor behavior that may jeopardize the health and safety of both contractors and government personnel. Accordingly, H.R. 5136 , the proposed NDAA for FY2011, includes a provision that requires the Secretary of Defense to report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, by September 1, 2011, on incidents where contractors have earned reduced award fees or been denied award fees because of incidents where the contractor jeopardized the health or safety of government personnel. P.L. 111-84 , the NDAA for FY2010, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to reduce or deny award fees due to such incidents, as defined in Section 823.", "The Defense Base Act, P.L. 77-208, was enacted in 1941 and extended workers' compensation coverage under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) to persons working on American military bases that were either acquired by the United States from foreign countries or that were located outside of the continental United States. Coverage was extended to public works contractors working outside of the United States in 1942 with the enactment of the War Hazards Compensation Act, P.L. 77-784, which also established the War Hazards Compensation Act (WHCA) program. The most significant amendments to the DBA were enacted in 1958 and extended coverage to non-citizens, to persons working on projects funded under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, and to persons working to provide morale and welfare services, such as through the United Service Organizations (USO) to the armed forces. These amendments also further defined the types of work covered under the DBA to include service contracts.\nIn 2006, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to examine ways it could improve its DBA procedures and Section 843 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (NDAA) requires DOD to change the way its contractors provide DBA coverage for their workers and to prepare a report to Congress on a new DOD acquisition strategy for DBA insurance.", "The DBA extends the provisions of the LHWCA to federal contractors working outside of the United States. The LHWCA is a federal law that requires that private-sector firms provide workers' compensation coverage for their employees engaged in longshore, harbor, or other maritime occupations. Workers' compensation insurance under the LHWCA can be provided either by a private carrier approved by the DOL or through a self-insurance system.\nInjured workers covered by the LHWCA and DBA are entitled to full medical benefits to treat their injuries provided by a physician of their choice. Injured workers are also entitled to cash disability benefits to replace a portion of their lost wages. The basic weekly LHWCA and DBA disability benefit is equal to two-thirds of a worker's pre-disability weekly wage. Under the LHWCA and DBA, benefits for total disability are capped at 200% of the national average weekly wage; benefits for partial disability are capped on the basis of a schedule of impairments. Benefits are also paid to survivors of covered workers killed on the job.", "Section 1 of the DBA applies the basic workers' compensation protections and benefits of the LHWCA to the following four categories of private-sector employees working as federal contractors:\nemployees who work on U.S. military, air or naval bases outside of the United States, including bases located in U.S. territories; employees who work on public works projects outside of the United States under contract to any federal agency; employees who work outside of the United States on projects funded by the federal government under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 that provide for the sale of military equipment or services to American allies; or employees who work for American firms providing morale, welfare, or similar services to the armed forces outside of the United States.\nWork performed under a grant from the federal government is not covered by the DBA.", "The DBA is a privatized workers' compensation insurance program. Benefits are not paid by the federal government but rather are the responsibility of a covered worker's employer. Employers subject to the DBA can purchase insurance from a private provider approved by the DOL or, with the permission of DOL, self-insure. Firms that fail to provide compensation for their injured employees covered by the DBA can be subject to criminal prosecution and the firm and its officers can be subject to civil suits brought by the injured workers.", "Contractors covered by the DBA may purchase workers' compensation insurance from private carriers approved by the DOL. Currently, the major providers of DBA insurance coverage are ACE-USA, American International Group (AIG), and CNA. Of the 55,988 new DBA cases created between September 2001 and the end of December 2009, 54,449, or 97.3% were insured by one of these three companies or their subsidiaries. The largest single insurer of DBA cases during this period was the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, an AIG company that insured 43,901 DBA cases. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of all DBA cases from September 2001 to the end of December 2009 by insurer.", "Insurance prices can be quite variable, moving between \"hard market\" periods with higher premiums and difficulties for consumers finding insurance and \"soft market\" periods with low premiums and relatively easy availability. Particularly when faced with high premiums, some insurance consumers choose not to purchase insurance from an insurance company but instead choose to \"self-insure.\" Self-insurance is a very broad term, possibly covering any situation in which an entity chooses to retain a risk rather than purchasing insurance. Self-insurers can cover a spectrum from (1) entities who essentially ignore a risk and take few, if any, steps to financially prepare for a loss; to (2) entities who consider and evaluate risks, while perhaps setting up some sort of savings or reserve accounts to pay for future losses; to (3) entities who set up a legally licensed insurance company, known generally as a captive insurer, to whom actuarially determined premiums are paid but ownership of the insurer is retained by the insured, so both profits and risks are also retained by the insured.\nBecause the DBA mandates workers' compensation insurance for federal contractors overseas, the first self-insurance option, essentially ignoring the risk, is generally not an option. Under the DBA, however, employers do have the option to self-insure if they meet certain financial criteria and are approved to do so by DOL. Under the federal regulations, self-insurers are not required to go so far as to set up captive insurers in order to self-insure. Nearly 170 employers are listed by DOL as authorized self-insurers. Firms may also self-insure under most state workers' compensation laws, and according to the Self-Insurance Institute of America, more than 6,000 corporations and their subsidiaries self-insure their workers' compensation risks. Many self-insurers still purchase some form of insurance, typically a \"catastrophic\" policy that would take effect if extraordinarily high losses occurred, and federal rules actually require such a policy. Many self-insurers also hire third-party administrators, who undertake much of the administrative burden of dealing with claims but without assuming any of the financial risk.\nChoosing to self-insure is a decision taken on a wide variety of business grounds. In general, those self-insuring are seeking to reduce insurance costs and ensure the availability of insurance. Self-insurance can reduce costs through three primary mechanisms. First, any profits that would have flowed to the insurer could be captured by the self-insurer; second, the self-insurer may be able to save on administrative costs, either by undertaking the administration in-house or finding a more efficient third-party administrator; and third, if the self-insurer is a relatively low-risk, its costs would be lower if it were not pooled with other, higher risk parties.", "The Secretary of Labor may, at the request of a federal agency, grant a waiver that exempts a firm from the DBA if the firm can demonstrate that an alternative workers' compensation system that provides benefits in the case of disability or death is in place to cover the firm's employees. DBA waivers do not apply to American citizens or nationals or to persons hired within the United States.", "The DBA covers all eligible federal contractors, including non-U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. Foreign nationals receive the same DBA benefits as U.S. citizens or nationals with two exceptions. First, benefits for the survivors of a foreign national who was not a resident of the United States or Canada are only available to the worker's surviving spouse and children or, if there is no spouse or children, the worker's surviving father or mother, provided that the worker supported the father or mother for at least one year before the worker's death. The eligibility for survivors benefits for foreign nationals is more limited than that for American citizens and nationals. Survivors benefits in the case of the death of an American citizen or national can be paid to the worker's spouse, children, siblings, parents, grandparents, or grandchildren.\nSecond, permanent disability benefits or survivors benefits payable for foreign nationals who are not residents of the United States or Canada may be commuted from installment payments to a single lump-sum payment equal to one-half of the present value of the future compensation. The decision to commute benefit payments for foreign nationals is made by the Secretary of Labor and can be requested by the insurance carrier responsible for paying benefits.", "The DBA is administered by the DOL, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation (DLHWC). DBA claims are processed through one of five LHWCA regional offices, with all claims originating in Iraq and Afghanistan processed through the New York office.", "An applicant dissatisfied with the decision made on his or her DBA claim may request a hearing before a DOL Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The decision of a DOL ALJ can be appealed to the DOL Benefits Review Board, and the decisions of this board may be appealed to the U.S. District Court. In addition to this formal process for adjudicating claims, the DOL has an informal dispute resolution process that seeks to bring the worker and his or her insurer or employer together either over the telephone or in an informal conference to resolve the dispute before an ALJ hearing is required. DOL reports that 8.2% of all DBA cases originating in Iraq or Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005 involved claims disputes.", "The War Hazards Compensation Act (WHCA) supplements the DBA by providing a form of reinsurance for injuries and deaths to contractors directly related to military conflict. If an employee's injury or death is caused by a war hazard, the workers' compensation benefits are provided not by the insurer or employer but by the federal government. Under the provisions of the WHCA, an injury or death is considered to have been caused by a war hazard if it occurred during\na war in which the United States is engaged; an armed conflict in which the United States is engaged, whether or not war has been formally declared; or during a war or armed conflict between military forces of any origin in a country in which a covered employee is working;\nand if the injury or death was caused by\nthe discharge of any weapon by a hostile force or in combating an attack; the action of a hostile force or person, including an insurrection or rebellion against the United States; the discharge of any munitions intended for use against a hostile force; the collision of vessels in convoy, or the operation of vessels or aircraft without running lights or other aids to navigation; the operation of vessels or aircraft in a hostile zone or engaged in war activities.\nGenerally, an insurance carrier or self-insured employer will first pay DBA benefits to an injured worker or his or her survivors and then seek reimbursement from DOL under the WHCA. Insurers and employers may be reimbursed for benefits paid and itemized and non-itemized administrative costs associated with the claim. Non-itemized administrative costs are capped by regulation at 15% of the total value of the benefits due on a claim. A claim is not reimbursed under the WHCA if the insurance carrier charged an additional premium, referred to as premium loading, to cover the specific war hazard that caused the injury or death.\nWHCA benefits are paid out of the Employees' Compensation Fund, which also pays workers' compensation benefits for federal employees under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). The WHCA is administered by the DOL OWCP Division of Federal Employees' Compensation (DFEC), and the DFEC makes determinations on whether claims should be paid under the WHCA. While the costs associated with FECA benefits paid out of the Employees' Compensation Fund are charged back to the injured workers' host agencies, WHCA costs paid out of the Employees' Compensation Fund are not charged back to the contracting agency.\nWHCA claims make up a relatively small percentage of the total DBA claims that originate in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between September 2001 and June 2009, over 37,000 DBA claims had been filed for cases originating in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, since 2003 when combat operations in Iraq began and June 2009, 823 WHCA claims had been filed, 781 for cases from Iraq and 42 for cases from Afghanistan. Thus, even in two military operations in which the United States is fighting insurgent enemy forces without clearly established front lines and in which contractors are playing significant roles, WHCA claims make up just over 2% of all DBA claims filed. Among the WHCA cases that have been paid since 2003, a total of $12.1 million has gone for compensation and benefits, whereas $19.7 million has gone to reimburse insurers for itemized and non-itemized expenses associated with these claims.", "Although many federal agencies have had or currently have overseas contracts subject to the DBA, the Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the major DBA contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. These agencies take different approaches to contracting for insurance services under the DBA. DOS and USAID have awarded competitive contracts through the use of blanket contracts, with fixed rates, to a single provider for each agency. In contrast, under the DOD approach private contractors negotiate individually with private insurers. Over time, evidence has shown that rates for DBA insurance charged to DOD have been significantly higher than DBA insurance rates for DOS and USAID.", "Before 1990, DOS required contractors to obtain DBA insurance independently, resulting in a variety of rates on the basis of company size, claims history, and work site. This arrangement proved particularly onerous for small businesses with limited overseas experience. Such companies found it difficult to obtain insurance, and when insurance was possible, they paid significantly higher premiums. However, a DOS Inspector General (IG) found that costs could be reduced through the use of a blanket contract to a single provider. In 1991, DOS competitively awarded a multi-year contract to CIGNA Property and Casualty Insurance Company. As a result, in 2000 DOS conducted a competition for a follow-on, multi-year contract. Four companies competed: CIGNA, AIU, Ace International, and CNA. CNA was competitively awarded the DOS contract in 2001 and has held the contract since that time. DOS issued a formal notice in April 2008 of its intent to solicit bids for a permanent contract for DBA insurance. In the most recent competitions for DBA insurance contracts, both the DOS and USAID received only single bids from CNA's Continental Casualty Company.", "DOD, with the exception of contracts issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-IA), permits its overseas contractors to purchase DBA insurance from any insurance company approved by DOL. Currently, DOD contractors pay over 76% of their DBA insurance premiums to AIG. CNA's Continental Casualty Company, through its single provider contract for USACE and JCC-IA claims receives nearly 14% of DOD insurance premiums while ACE USA receives over 6% of DOD premiums.", "Contracts issued by the Department of the Army are responsible for 69% of DOD's DBA insurance premiums. The Department of the Navy contracts account for 23% of premiums while the Department of the Air Force contracts are responsible for 5% of premiums.\nActivities in Iraq and Afghanistan account for 88% of DOD's DBA insurance premiums. A total of 61% of DOD's premiums are paid to insure activities under the Department of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract with KBR and KBR contracts account for the largest share of DOD premiums. Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide break-downs of DOD DBA insurance premiums by primary program and contractor.", "Shortly after the 2005 GAO report, DOD began working closely with the USACE to conduct a competition to award a contract for a pilot DBA project based on the DBA programs already in place at DOS and USAID. CNA was the only company to submit a proposal and was awarded the contract. The contract was awarded in November 2005 and coverage began in December 2005 with coverage extending through March 2008. DOD's report to Congress discussed the early results under the USACE pilot program. After the first six months of the pilot program, USACE reported that estimated savings to the federal government on DBA insurance costs already had exceeded more than $19 million. On the basis of these results, the pilot program was extended through September 2008.\nA new contract for DBA insurance coverage of USACE contracts was awarded to the sole bidder, CNA's Continental Casualty Company, in October 2008. This new USACE contract also covers DOD contracts issued by the JCC-IA.\nAt the May 15, 2008, hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on the DBA, Richard Ginman of the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, projected that continued success with the USACE pilot program would, in all likelihood, make it a permanent DOD program stating:\nAlthough the contract for the pilot program is continuing, the USACE in February 2008 decided to make the program permanent. A goal of the pilot program was to provide data to build and present to our office and the Army, a formal business case to determine if the pilot should be expanded Army or DoD-wide. To help USACE develop such a case, the Army Audit Agency recently agreed to the Army's request (through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Policy and Procurement) to review the results of the two-year pilot program to determine if it warranted permanent placement at the USACE and warrant further extension in the Army. Once Army Audit's review is complete, USACE will develop the business case and we will review the results to determine the Department's next steps.", "Although the DBA requires that federal contractors working overseas either purchase workers' compensation insurance for their employees or self-insure, the costs of this insurance is usually passed along to the federal government as a cost item in the contract. If the agency is purchasing services under a cost-plus contract, the contractor receives a set percentage of the total cost of all items, including DBA insurance, billed to the federal government. In cost-plus contracts, the contractor's fees rise with contract costs. There is no financial incentive for the contractor to limit the government's costs.", "It is possible to compare the costs of DBA insurance purchased through the USACE pilot program with the costs of DBA insurance paid by DOS and USAID contractors as all three agencies use single insurer programs. In the competitions for their most recent DBA contracts, each of the three agencies received only one bid, from CNA's Continental Casualty Company. Currently, USAID contractors pay the lowest DBA insurance premiums for services, construction, and security. The highest premiums are paid by all agencies for aviation-related activities. Table 5 , below, provides current DBA insurance premiums for contractors in the USACE pilot program, DOS, and USAID.", "The competitive market for DBA insurance for non-USACE DOD contracts results in lower premiums than are paid by USACE under its single insurer system. For all types of contracts in all global locations, the weighted average premium for competitive market DOD contracts is currently $5.30 per $100 in covered payroll, versus $8.32 for single insurer system USACE contracts. Figure 4 compares the weighted average premiums under the DOD competitive market and USACE single insurer systems. DOD competitive market contracts have a wider variance than those under the USACE system, with the cheapest DOD premium at $0.09 per $100 as opposed to $3.50 under the USACE system and the most expensive DOD premium at $40, double the highest USACE premium of $20.\nPremiums under both systems are higher in Iraq and Afghanistan than in other locations. The weighted average DOD premium in Iraq and Afghanistan is $5.64 per $100, while the USACE premium is $8.64. In areas other then Iraq and Afghanistan, average premiums are lower and DOD's competitive market premiums remain less expensive then those paid under the USACE single insurer system.", "The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) was established by the Department of the Army on December 6, 1985, with the publication of Army Regulation 700-137. LOGCAP is an initiative to manage the use of civilian contractors who perform services in support of DOD missions during times of war and other military mobilizations. LOGCAP contracts are intended to augment combat support and combat service support to military forces.\nAlthough the LOGCAP program began in 1985, the program has been the subject of intense scrutiny since the start of OIF. The LOGCAP troop support contract in Iraq has been the subject of several congressional hearings. The contract is the largest single contract for combat operations in Iraq to date. Policymakers continue to express concern over the reported lack of oversight of LOGCAP contracts in Iraq for several reasons, including the expense and difficulty of managing large-scale logistical support contracts; allegations and reported instances of contract waste, fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement; and questions regarding DOD's ability and capacity to manage such contracts. Congressional concerns over the DBA insurance program have been driven, in part, by the lack of transparency and oversight of the overall costs incurred under the LOGCAP program.\nRecent assessments from the GAO, DOD's IG, and the SIGIR reveal a lack of federal oversight, management, and accountability for funds spent for Iraq contracting. An audit conducted by the DOD IG revealed that the federal government failed to substantiate the disbursement of at least $7.8 billion of $8.2 billion spent for goods and services in Iraq. In a May 22, 2008, congressional hearing before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, DOD officials revealed estimates that the Army disbursed $1.4 billion in commercial payments that lacked the minimum supporting justification and documentation for a valid payment, such as certified vouchers and invoices. In one reported instance, a $320 million payment in cash was made without justification beyond a signature.", "In early 2007, an audit of the DBA program was initiated by the U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA) due to several factors, including the growing complexity of the DBA program, rising program costs, wide fluctuations in insurance rates, and the federal government's efforts to reduce and avoid future program costs. In September 2007, the USAAA released its audit report.\nArmy auditors found that KBR, the LOGCAP contractor, paid approximately $284.3 million in DBA premiums during the period from FY2003 through FY2005. These premiums rose steadily each fiscal year from approximately $4.7 million in FY2003 to approximately $164.7 million in FY2005. As a result of these premiums, the auditors concluded that DBA insurance represented a \"significant and recently increasing cost element\" of the overall LOGCAP contract.\nUSAAA found that whereas total LOGCAP DBA costs rose between FY2003 and FY2005, DBA premiums for Iraq and Kuwait as a percentage of total payroll increased from FY2003 to FY2004 and then declined in FY2005 and FY2006. The audit also found that these rate fluctuations appeared inconsistent with the risks associated with providing DBA insurance for this contract. In addition, the audit found that the LOGCAP contractor reported accident rates that were lower than the U.S. private industry average yet it was paying higher than industry-average worker's compensation premiums.\nTable 6 provides the LOGCAP DBA premiums for Iraq and Kuwait for the period between FY2002 and FY2006.\nArmy auditors found that the Department of the Army paid \"substantially\" more in DBA premiums than was expected to be paid out in DBA claims. The auditors found that while $284.3 million in DBA premiums were paid under the LOGCAP contract between FY2003 and FY2005, just under 26% of these premiums went to pay the $73.1 million in DBA claims and potential future claims arising from cases during this period. Table 7 provides data on LOGCAP DBA premiums and potential claims for the period between FY2003 and FY2005.\nOne explanation offered by the USAAA for what it deemed as these \"excessive\" premiums was the practice of basing DBA premiums on total payroll costs, including costs such as overtime pay and hazard pay while basing DBA benefit amounts, usually two-thirds of pre-injury wages, only on base pay.\nAuditors found that between January 1, 2003, and September 30, 2005, KBR paid $23.1 million in premiums on the special incentive payments made to its employees for the hazard pay component of its payroll. In addition, DBA benefits, but not the wages used to calculate DBA premiums, are capped, and thus a portion of the total premium is paid on salary above the cap that will not be replaced by DBA disability benefits. Because of this, KBR is essentially paying insurance on payroll that does not need to be insured because it can not, by law, be replaced under the provisions of the DBA.", "The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audited the costs billed to the DOD by KBR for DBA insurance under LOGCAP in 2003. The results of this audit were reported to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan at the Commission's May 4, 2009, hearing. At this hearing, DCAA Director April G. Stephenson testified that the DCAA could find no evidence that KBR attempted to use a competitive bidding process to secure DBA insurance or ensure that the rates it paid were competitive. Because of this lack of evidence, DCAA reported that it was unable to determine the reasonableness of the DBA rates paid by KBR in 2003 or subsequent years. In addition the DCAA audit found that KBR was not verifying the actual labor costs of its subcontractors and thus was paying DBA premiums on estimated rather then actual labor costs.\nAs a result of its audit of KBR's DBA insurance under LOGCAP in 2003, the DCAA recommended to the Department of the Army that, unless KBR can provide some evidence that its purchase of DBA insurance was competitive, that the Department of the Army determine if KBR should be required to reimburse the federal government for some of the DBA insurance costs it billed under LOGCAP in 2003. In addition, DCAA reported that it is currently determining whether or not KBR's use of estimated rather then actual subcontract labor costs makes a reduction in the amount billed by KBR for DBA insurance for its subcontractors necessary.", "Current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought increased congressional attention to several issues surrounding the DBA. Concerns have been raised over the following issues:\nthe overall cost and variability of DBA premiums paid; the basis for DBA premiums; the costs of the program to the federal government; the manner in which contractors select their DBA providers; and the coordination of the DBA with the WHCA.\nIn 2006, Congress enacted language in the Defense Authorization Act that required the DOD to review its DBA procedures and to work with the DOS and USAID to find ways to more effectively provide DBA insurance to overseas military contractors. On May 15, 2008, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held a hearing on DBA issues that focused on DBA costs involved in the LOGCAP contract as well as the possibility of the DOD adopting a single-source model for DBA insurance similar to what is currently used by DOS, USAID, and USACE as part of its pilot program.", "Section 843 of the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act requires DOD to adopt a department-wide DBA insurance provision that will minimize costs, ensure that premium prices are tied to expected claims, minimize risk to DOD, and provide for a competitive DBA marketplace. Although this legislation does not require DOD to adopt any specific DBA strategy, an earlier version of the bill ( H.R. 5658 ) provision passed by the House provided an outline of several policy options that DOD was required to consider when formulating its overall DBA strategy.\nIn H.R. 5658 , the House-passed version of the bill, Section 850 contains policy options that fall into three broad categories of DBA reform that are similar to those mentioned in reviews of the DBA performed by the GAO, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the USAAA, and the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. The three categories of policy options are\nusing a single contracted source, or a limited set of contracted sources, for all DOD DBA contracts, similar to the model used by DOS, USAID, and the USACE pilot program; using a rating system to set premiums based on past claims incurred, similar to the experience rating systems used in many private insurance lines; and having the federal government self-insure for all DBA costs similar to what is currently done with the workers' compensation for injuries and death related to war hazards under the WHCA and workers' compensation for federal employees under the FECA program.", "Currently, DOS, USAID, and USACE use single-source contracts to provide DBA insurance for their contractors. Under this model, all agency contractors purchase DBA insurance from a single source selected through a competitive bidding process. This process allows a single insurer to pool the risks of multiple contractors and contracting activities with the goal of using this pooled risk to reduce the premiums paid by all contractors.\nBecause of the different nature of the contracts issued by DOS, USAID, USACE, and DOD, it is difficult to compare premiums to determine if DOD would experience cost savings from a single-source contract for DBA insurance. Currently, across all geographic areas and activities, DOD pays lower average premiums then does USACE. However, the highest premiums paid by DOD are double those paid under USACE's single-source contract. In addition, both DOS and USAID have lower negotiated premium rates under their single-source contracts than USACE does under its contract.\nA report issued by the Majority Staff of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee found that underwriting gains were significantly higher for major DBA contracts independently negotiated than for the single-source contracts used by DOS and USAID. CBO estimates that adopting a single-source model for all DOD DBA insurance would result in savings of $33 million in the first year and a 10-year cost savings of $362 million.\nAlthough there are indications that adoption by DOD of a single-source model for DBA insurance could result in cost savings, the size and complexity of the DOD and its contracts may result in difficulties in that agency adopting the system used by the smaller DOS and USAID. It is not known if a single insurer would be willing or able to take on all of the DOD's DBA business. USAAA reports that only one insurance carrier bid to provide coverage under the LOGCAP contract, and an earlier effort by DOD to find a single carrier for all DBA contracts in Iraq resulted in no carriers placing bids. Similarly, a DOD survey of the four largest DBA insurers found that all opposed a single source contract system and none would bid for such a contract if it were offered by DOD. This problem is not unique to DOD as in their most recent contract solicitations, DOS, USAID, and USACE each only received a single bidder for their DBA insurance.\nUSACE reports that even with a single source for all DBA insurance under its pilot program, the agency is still required to provide administrative support and bear administrative costs. The CBO concurs with this assessment and notes that although it estimates overall cost savings if DOD were to adopt a single-source model for DBA insurance, these cost estimates do not take into account the costs to DOD involved in setting up and administering the system and that these costs \"could greatly diminish savings.\"", "In its audit of DBA insurance for the LOGCAP contract, USAAA concluded that the premiums being paid by KBR did not reflect either the expected claims to be paid or the risks involved in the covered activities, especially given KBR's relatively low accident rates. USAAA also found that LOGCAP DBA rates were subject to large annual fluctuations and were a major component of the overall cost of the LOGCAP contract. The use of experience ratings, in which current premiums are based on past claim rates, could bring DBA premiums more into line with the risks faced by DBA contractors.\nExperience rating is common in the insurance industry and is a feature of many workers' compensation systems governed by state laws. Under an experience rating system, a base premium can be increased if a customer has a history of claims that indicate a greater risk to the insurer or be lowered if the claims history indicates a reduced insurance risk. The proprietary nature of individual insurance arrangements between contractors and carriers and that neither DOL nor any of the contracting agencies has any authority to regulate DBA claims makes it difficult assess what factors are currently used to set current DBA premiums.\nThere may be difficulties in using experience ratings to determine DBA premiums. The fluctuations in the price of premiums charged under the LOGCAP program may indicate difficulties in accurately estimating insurance risk in a war zone. One such difficulty involves the determination of whether a claim should be paid under the DBA or the WHCA. For example, USAAA reports that KBR's insurance broker was concerned with the probability of increased DBA claims due to a plane crash and the current DOS insurance contract allows for higher premiums for security contracts that involve aviation. However, under some circumstances a plane crash would be covered not by the insurer under the DBA but rather by the federal government under the WHCA. In addition, in response to USAAA's audit of the DBA insurance under the LOGCAP contract, the U.S. Army Sustainment Command stated that it \"may prove difficult to find insurance carriers who use retrospective rating plans in determining DBA insurance premiums for countries where war risk hazards have been recognized by the DOS.\"", "The DBA is a privatized workers' compensation system in which individual contractors either purchase insurance from private carriers or self-insure. However, because the terms of many federal contracts allow the contractors to bill the federal government for the cost of DBA insurance, DBA insurance costs are often ultimately paid by the federal government. One option for DBA insurance reform would be to eliminate the private nature of DBA insurance and have the federal government act as the sole DBA insurer and pay 100% of all DBA administrative and claim costs. Having the federal government self-insure for DBA insurance would be similar to the way workers' compensation insurance is handled for injuries and deaths caused by war hazards under the WHCA and for federal employees under the FECA program.\nUnder a federal self-insurance system, benefits would likely be paid from a trust fund in a manner similar to the way that FECA and WHCA benefits are paid from the federal Employees Compensation Fund. The federal government could administer the program itself or hire a third-party administrator.\nThere are several potential advantages to having the federal government self-insure for DBA hazards. First, rather than paying insurance premiums, the federal government would only be responsible for paying the actual cost of claims and administration. Given that claims make up just over 25% of total costs paid for DBA insurance under the LOGCAP contract, the federal government could potentially see cost savings through self-insurance. In addition, issues involving premium loading and the charging of DBA insurance premiums on non-covered components of payroll such as hazard pay would be eliminated if the federal government self-insured.\nSecond, the use of the federal government as self-insurer would eliminate the need to distinguish between DBA and WHCA claims, because every claim would be paid by the federal government. There is evidence that the current process, in which the federal government identifies WHCA claims after they have been paid as DBA claims and then reimburses insurers for claim and administrative costs, results in the federal government paying significant amounts that do not go directly to claimants. Over the past six years under the WHCA, the federal government has paid more in reimbursements to insurers for expenses ($19.7 million) than it has paid in compensation to claimants ($12.1 million).\nThere is also evidence, including testimony provided by DBA and WHCA claimants at a 2009 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing, that in some cases, claimants with injuries that clearly fall under the statutory requirements of the WHCA must first navigate procedural and other requirements of their contractors' DBA insurers before their cases are eventually transferred to DOL. In some cases, DBA insurers controvert claims or oppose specific benefits for claims that are likely to end up at the DOL under the WHCA. Under the current system, insurers have the right and responsibility to investigate all claims and controvert or oppose claims and benefits they feel are not their responsibility or that fall outside of the DBA. However, this can cause delays for claimants, including claimants with clear WHCA cases that will eventually be paid by the DOL.\nHaving the federal government self-insure for DBA hazards would change the historic private nature of the DBA program and place the program at odds with the privatized LHWCA program. In addition, federal self-insurance for DBA claims would go against current trends in state workers' compensation programs. Exclusive state funds, in which the state pays all workers' compensation claims, are being replaced either by state funds that compete on the open market with private carriers, or by systems in which all workers' compensation insurance is provided privately.\nThe DOD, in its 2009 report to Congress on DBA insurance alternatives, stated that a self-insurance system, in which none of the costs of employee-injuries or deaths would be paid by the employer, could result in moral hazard. Contracting firms with no financial stake in the health and safety of their employees may take additional risks or compromise procedures without any fear of ultimately having to pay, through higher insurance premiums, for the negative consequences of these actions.", "In September 2009, in response to Section 843 of the NDAA, the DOD reported to Congress the results of its review of various possible acquisition strategies for providing DBA insurance to its contractors. This report used information from industry sources and data from existing DOD DBA activities to evaluate the following four DBA reform alternatives:\nAlternative A: Improvements to the existing open market DBA system; Alternative B: A single-source contract for all DOD DBA coverage; Alternative C: Limiting DBA insurance to a small number of pre-selected providers; and Alternative D: Federal self-insurance with third-party administration.\nThese four alternatives were evaluated against the following six criteria, based, in part, on criteria provided by Congress in Section 843 of the NDAA.\n1. Minimize overhead costs associated with obtaining DBA insurance; 2. Minimize the costs of coverage consistent with realistic assumptions regarding the likelihood of incurred claims by contractors; 3. Provide for a correlation of premiums paid in relation to claims incurred that is modeled on the best practices in government and industry for similar kinds of insurance; 4. Provide for a low level of risk to the DOD; 5. Provide for a competitive marketplace for insurance required by the DBA to the maximum extent practicable; and 6. Consider implementation issues.\nThe DOD's analysis of the four alternatives evaluated against the six criteria resulted in the highest rankings for Alternative A: improvements to the existing open-market DBA system; and Alternative D: federal self-insurance with third-party administration. Specifically, improving the existing open-market system was predicted to best minimize overhead and coverage costs; provide the best correlation of premiums paid to claims incurred; and provided the lowest risk to DOD. Federal self-insurance with third-party administration was predicted to best provided for a competitive marketplace and be the easiest to implement.\nAlthough the DOD's analysis of four major policy alternatives is comprehensive, there are limitations to its utility as a guide for Congress in making changes to the overall DBA system. The DOD report only focuses on DOD contractors and while these make up the bulk of DBA-covered firms, other contracting agencies, such as DOS and USAID may have different experiences and issues than DOD and DOD's recommended policy changes may not be as successful if applied across the entire federal government.\nTwo of the six criteria used to evaluate the four alternatives also serve to limit the utility of the DOD analysis. Congress required DOD to consider the how each alternative provided for a competitive DBA marketplace. This requirement may have biased the study against policy options, such as self-insurance or single or limited-source contracts for DBA insurance which, by definition, do not support a competitive marketplace but which may still be viable policy options for Congress to consider.\nIn its analysis, DOD added an additional criteria based on the ease of policy implementation. Evaluations of alternatives against this criterion were based, in part, on how quickly policy changes could be made and whether or not federal laws or regulations would need to be changed. it is understandable that DOD would consider this criterion necessary, given the time and cooperation within the executive branch and with the Congress that regulatory and statutory changes would require. However, when looking at alternatives for making changes to the national DBA program, Congress may not want to limit itself to alternatives that provide for easy implementation.", "The DOD report identified making improvements to the existing open-market DBA system as one of the preferred alternatives. Specifically, the DOD report suggests four improvements to the current DBA insurance system. First, all approved DBA carriers should have access to comprehensive data on losses and costs. In its discussions with industry representatives, the DOD found that some carriers felt that they were at a competitive disadvantage without this data as more than 75% of the DOD DBA market is covered by a single carrier, AIG. In addition, unlike in conventional workers' compensation insurance, there is no national clearinghouse, such as the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), for loss and cost data.\nSecond, the DOL should be given the authority to establish a program of assigned risk pools for the DBA program and require that large insurers provide coverage to pool members. An assigned risk pool would assure that small contractors, those that are high-insurance risks, or contractors otherwise unable to secure DBA insurance would be covered at reasonable rates and that all major DBA insurance carriers would share the risks of providing insurance to these contractors.\nThe DOD also recommends requiring that insurance carriers separate out the pricing of DBA insurance from other types of insurance, such as accidental death and dismemberment and ransom insurance. In addition, the DOD recommends establishing a single DOD contact for issues relating to country-waivers under the DBA program.", "" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 4 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "", "", "h1_title", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full h2_full h1_title", "h2_full h1_title", "", "", "h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h1_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why accounts for Congress's interest in the the DBA program?", "What have the DOS and USAID seen since adopting single-source models for their DBA insurance?", "How does the USACE differ from the rest of the DOD regarding its contracting?", "How does the NDAA for FY2009 change the DOD's procedures?", "How does the DOD hope to meet criteria recommended by Congress?", "What else did the report determine?", "What weakness does the report have?", "What information does this report provide?", "What relevant criticisms are included in the report?", "How does the report conclude?", "What is included in the Appendix of the report?" ], "summary": [ "Congress has become increasingly concerned with the costs involved in the DBA program because the federal government usually reimburses its contractors for their DBA premiums.", "The Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have seen some cost savings since adopting single-source models for their DBA insurance in which contractors for each agency are required to purchase insurance from a single company selected by the agency.", "The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently testing such a model for its DBA system. For the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD), however, including the Army's large Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, individual contractors are free to select their own DBA insurers and negotiate their own rates, and one contractor, KBR, has been criticized by DOD auditors for failing to demonstrate that it sought to control DBA premium costs when selecting an insurer.", "The NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417) includes a provision that requires DOD to change the way its contractors provide DBA coverage for their workers.", "In a report issued pursuant to this legislation, DOD concluded that making improvements to the current open-market DBA insurance system would best meet the criteria for reform recommended by Congress and the agency.", "The report also found advantages that could result from having the federal government self-insure, with third-party administration, for DBA costs.", "However, there may be limitations to the utility of the report as a guide for Congress in making overall changes to the DBA program.", "This report provides an overview of the DBA and the systems used to provide DBA insurance at DOS, USAID, DOD, and USACE.", "Also included are criticisms of the current DOD DBA policy raised by GAO and Army auditors as well as responses to those criticisms by DOD and USACE.", "The report concludes with a discussion of several DBA reform options suggested by the House of Representatives in recent legislation and analyzed by DOD.", "A list of acronyms used in this report is provided in the Appendix." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1, 0, -1, 2, -1, 0, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-13-498	{ "title": [ "Background", "Federal Elder Justice Program Structure", "Elder Justice Funding", "Federal Elder Justice Programs Are Fragmented but Minimally Overlapping, Reducing the Risk for Duplication", "Federal Elder Justice Programs Are Administered by Multiple Agencies", "Overlap and Duplication are Minimal in Federal Elder Justice Effort", "Federal Coordination of Elder Justice Activities Is in Development, but Monitoring Is Limited", "Federal Coordination of Elder Justice Activities Is in Development", "Federal Programs Did Not Track Elder Justice Outcomes in 2011", "Challenges Persist in Serving Older Adults and Stakeholders Identified a Need for Additional Training and Awareness", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology for Surveying Federal Elder Justice Program Managers", "Identification of Federal Elder Justice Programs", "Survey of Federal Elder Justice Program Managers", "Appendix II: Federal Elder Justice Programs", "Department/ agency HHS/ACL", "Department/ agency HHS/NIH", "Department/ agency HHS/ACL", "Department/ agency HHS/ACL", "Department/ agency HHS/ACL", "Department/ agency HHS/ACL", "Department/ agency HHS/CMS", "Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments:", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "Elder justice can be defined as efforts to prevent, identify, and respond to elder abuse. The following are examples of the types of objectives federal elder justice programs may include:\nPreventing and identifying elder abuse, such as conducting outreach and public education and investigating allegations of elder abuse.\nResponding to elder abuse, such as providing counseling, prosecuting elder abuse cases, advocating on behalf of nursing home residents, and offering legal assistance.\nProviding training and technical assistance related to elder abuse for individuals and agencies.\nConducting research related to elder abuse issues, such as the development of information and data systems and identifying the incidence.", "Federal elder justice programs are administered and funded through a complex intergovernmental structure. The Older Americans Act of 1965 (OAA) established the Administration on Aging (AoA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as the chief federal advocate for older Americans5 and assigned responsibility for elder abuse prevention to the AoA. In April 2012, HHS established the Administration for Community Living (ACL), which brought together the AoA, the Office on Disability and the Administration on Developmental Disabilities to better align the federal programs that address the community living service and support needs of both the aging and disability populations, among other things.\n42 U.S.C. § 3012(a)(1).\nElder justice programs funded by HHS are implemented through the aging services network.6 Authorized by the OAA, the aging services network was developed to help people age 60 and over maintain maximum independence in their homes and communities and to promote a continuum of care for vulnerable older adults. The aging services network is now made up of 56 state aging agencies, 629 area agencies on aging (AAAs), and almost 20,000 service provider organizations, many of which rely on volunteers, that deliver services to older adults.7 Further, the OAA authorizes grants administered by the AoA, within ACL, to fund initiatives for those 60 years of age and older throughout the aging services network, including social services such as home-delivered meals, legal assistance, employment programs, research and community development projects, and training for professionals in the field of aging.8 Elder justice programs supported by the Department of Justice (Justice) also are delivered through the aging services network as well as through other state agencies, local social service and government agencies, and tribal government agencies.\nThe OAA uses the term “aging network” (42 U.S.C. § 3002(5)) but we found the more descriptive term “aging services network” in widespread use.\nArea agencies on aging are sub-state organizations that can encompass one or more local governmental jurisdictions, such as cities and counties. 42 U.S.C. § 3024. 42 U.S.C. § 3025(a)(2)(A). regional planning and development agencies.10 The rest are located in colleges, community action agencies and other organizations.\nNational Health Policy Forum Background Paper No. 83: The Aging Services Network: Serving a Vulnerable and Growing Elderly Population in Tough Economic Times, December 13, 2011. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397k-3.\nPub. L. No.111-148, tit. VI, subtit. H, §§ 6701-6703, 124 Stat. 119, 782-804 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397j-1397m-5).\nPub. L. No. 109-432, § 405, 120 Stat. 2922, 3053.\nPub. L. No. 106-386, sec.1209(a), § 40802, 114 Stat. 1464, 1508 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14041a).\nPub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-1955.\nPub. L. No. 109-162, § 205, 119 Stat. 2960, 3002 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14041a).\nViolence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54.\nSee appendix II, table 9. financial abuse is explicitly included in the mission of the CFPB’s recently established Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans.19 Figure 1 shows the federal, state, regional and local service agencies that support and deliver elder justice efforts.\n12 U.S.C. § 5493(g)(3).\nMultiservice organizations are organizations that deliver more than one type of public benefit program, such as congregate meals, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program cards, and legal assistance. State attorneys general may also play a consumer protection role. Justice also plays a consumer protection role. Social service agencies include domestic violence and sexual assault victim services providers.", "HHS and Justice fund elder justice programs through formula grants and discretionary grants to agencies as well as tribal and non-profit organizations in each state. For programs that deliver funds through grants, the state agencies submit applications or agree to meet certain requirements with information provided by regional or local agencies, which may provide the services themselves or contract with independent providers to deliver the services. Some HHS and Justice programs are funded through discretionary grants, which may be awarded directly to any eligible applicant that meets eligibility criteria. Eligible applicants for HHS and Justice elder justice discretionary grant programs may include area agencies on aging, multi-service organizations, district attorneys’ offices, legal assistance groups and postsecondary institutions. Figure 2 illustrates the flow of funding for elder justice programs from HHS and Justice to several types of grant recipients.", "", "In fiscal year 2011, HHS and Justice administered 12 programs that directed federal funds toward elder justice programs. Seven of these programs directed all funds toward elder justice in fiscal year 2011; the other five directed some of their funds toward elder justice but supported activities for other purposes, as well. Table 1 lists the 12 programs that directed funds toward elder justice. The fiscal year 2011 obligations reported in table 1 include federal funds only.\nBecause more than one agency is involved in this same broad area of national interest, and the agencies have just begun to coordinate their activities, these programs are fragmented. However, the administration has begun to take steps to enhance coordination which, as we previously reported, can help address some of the problems that arise from a fragmented array of programs supporting the same national interest.21 In addition, we identified 34 other federal programs that supported elder justice indirectly—by providing federal funds for elder justice as an allowable activity(see fig. 3). Because elder justice was an allowable activity in these 34 programs, grant recipients determined whether elder justice activities would be conducted in a given fiscal year.22 As a result, federal program managers could not tell us which elder justice activities to compare for that year, to determine if overlap or duplication occurred, for those 34 grant programs.\nGAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices that Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005), and GAO-12-342SP.\nSee appendix II for more information on 34 programs.", "The 12 programs supported elder justice activities through a variety of federal funding mechanisms. Ten of the programs supported the federal elder justice effort through grants to a variety of grantees such as states, localities, universities, and other grantees, while the remaining two programs—HHS’ Interpersonal Violence within Families and Among Acquaintances Prevention program and Justice’s Elder Justice and Nursing Home Initiative—did not award grants but administered contracts and interagency agreements. Because few of these programs provided formula grants to all states and most dispersed discretionary grants to limited number of recipients of several types, there is minimal overlap in this area.\nSpecifically, 3 of the 10 grant programs provided a guaranteed base of funding through formula grants to all states; however, each of these programs awarded grants to state agencies for different purposes and the state agency recipients of the HHS grants differed from the recipients of the Justice grant.23 One HHS program awarded formula grants to state aging agencies to fund elder justice prevention and awareness activities and the other program funded assistance to residents of long term care facilities. The Justice program awarded formula grants to state criminal justice agencies to fund elder justice activities as well as other law enforcement and prosecution strategies. Moreover, 7 of the 10 elder justice grant programs required recipients to compete for funding by awarding discretionary grants to a limited number of grant recipients. Three of these discretionary grants provided funding to direct service providers, such as local organizations serving domestic and sexual assault victims, local governments, or courts. The remaining four discretionary grants provided funding to a nonprofit organization and a limited number of postsecondary institutions to operate resource centers for state and local governments or to conduct research related to elder mistreatment.\nFederal elder justice programs also provided support for a variety of types of victims and potential victims of elder abuse. Nine of the 12 programs provided services to victims and potential victims of elder abuse: 5 provided assistance to all types of victims and 4 focused on key subgroups of victims, further reducing the potential for overlap. For example, 1 of the 4 programs served older female victims, another targeted victims in long-term care facilities, and still another served victims in tribal communities. Table 2 displays the types of victims targeted by the federal elder justice programs we identified.\nThe three formula grant programs were HHS’ Prevention of Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation program (42 U.S.C. § 3058), HHS’ Long-Term Care (LTC) Ombudsman Program (42 U.S.C. § 3058g), and Justice’s Services, Training, Officer, and Prosecutors (STOP) Violence Against Women Formula Grant Program (42 U.S.C. § 3796gg-1).\nThese programs did not directly serve victims or potential victims directly, rather they engaged in research on elder abuse in general.\nMoreover, a variety of service providers—organizations that deliver services at the state and local level—were supported by the 12 elder justice programs. In 2011, 8 programs targeted specific subgroups of service providers while 4 programs did not target subgroups of service providers. Even some of the 4 programs that provided support to all types of service providers specialized to some degree. For example, one program supported outreach focused on tribal elders while another focused on elder mistreatment research (see table 3).\nIn addition to serving a range of elder abuse victims and service providers, the 12 programs we identified varied with respect to the activities they supported, with minimal overlap in some activities (see table 4). For example, 4 programs provided victim assistance services. Two programs provided support for conducting investigations of complaints concerning different members of the older adult community, including residents of long-term care facilities and female victims in the community.\nThree broad categories of activity—education, outreach, and information dissemination; training and technical assistance to service providers; and promoting state and local coordination—were supported by most of the 12 programs we identified. While some of these activities—education and outreach training for service providers, and state and local coordination— appear to overlap, these activities were not necessarily providing similar services to similar populations. For example, one program supported public education and outreach to potential victims to promote financial literacy among older adults and prevent financial exploitation. Another program trained law enforcement officers to recognize and investigate instances of abuse and trained staff in victim services organizations and governmental agencies to understand the role each plays in addressing elder abuse in the community. A third program promoted local coordination among human services organizations, law enforcement, and community development programs just within tribal communities. Further, some of the grant programs identify several allowable activities grantees may conduct using program funds, only a few of which may be elder justice-related, but do not require grantees to conduct all of them. In one case, the sponsoring agency does not track which elder justice projects are funded. For example, in describing the department’s grant administration practices for the STOP Violence program, a Justice official explained that state agencies maintain records of the elder justice projects they fund but Justice does not. Thus, the number of grantees that conduct elder justice activities is not known by Justice.\nWhen considering, collectively, the variation in the types of funding mechanisms and grant recipients, the elder abuse victims and service providers targeted by the grants, and the types of activities conducted, we found overlap across the 12 programs was minimal. In addition, the potentially overlapping activities have been cited as being in need of greater federal emphasis, as we will discuss later in this report. For example, public awareness and training for professionals working with elder abuse victims were two of the areas identified by some of the state and local officials we interviewed as those in which increased federal support would be beneficial. Also, previously discussed, we have recommended that coordination among state and local organizations has helped mitigate the effects of increasingly limited resources.\nMoreover, the key differences noted above, in conjunction with low levels of funding, reduce the risk that two or more area agencies on aging or local service providers would be providing the same services to the same beneficiaries—that is, that they are providing duplicative services. With respect to low funding levels, by the time federal elder justice funds are obligated to grantees nationwide, the amount of funds available to any individual service provider is likely to be low. State officials in all three states we visited said that HHS is the primary federal funding source for their elder justice activities. Under two HHS programs, the Prevention of Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation program and the Long-Term Care (LTC) Ombudsman Program, the federal government distributes funds to state aging agencies, which then allocate funds to area agencies on aging or local service providers. For example, in fiscal year 2011, of the $5,033,000 total obligations for the Prevention of Elder Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation program, which directs all funds toward elder justice, HHS provided $197,380 to Illinois’ state aging agency. The allocation to one of the state’s 13 area agencies on aging was $14,488, which it then distributed to numerous other local service providers working directly with older adults, such as county human service agencies. In Virginia, HHS provided $118,040 to the state aging agency from the Prevention of Elder Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation program fiscal year 2011 obligations. According to officials at one of Virginia’s 25 area agencies on aging, the allocation to that agency was $3,027 for that fiscal year.", "", "GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices that Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).\nGAO-06-15. identified practices that can enhance coordination efforts, such as defining and articulating a common federal outcome or purpose agencies are seeking to achieve, consistent with their respective goals and missions. Developing a common federal outcome establishes a rationale for agencies to collaborate that helps overcome significant differences in agencies’ missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business that may lead them to work at cross purposes.\nHHS and Justice are involved in developing efforts to coordinate their elder justice activities. Most recently, the Elder Justice Coordinating Council (Council) was established under the Elder Justice Act of 2009 (EJA) to address cross-agency coordination of activities relating to elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation.26 According to the EJA, the Council should include members representing HHS, Justice, and other federal entities with responsibilities or programs related to elder abuse. The Council held an inaugural meeting in October 2012, where it identified four issue areas for action—financial exploitation, public policy and awareness, enhancing response, and advancing research—and collected white papers from issue area experts. The white papers included recommendations for improving and advancing the field of elder justice. The Council is required to make recommendations to the Secretary of HHS for the coordination of elder justice activities by relevant federal agencies and report to Congress on accomplishments, challenges, and recommendations for legislative action every 2 years.\nThe Council met again in May 2013 to consider next steps. The Elder Justice Interagency Working Group (Working Group), an informal group designed to bring together federal officials responsible for carrying out elder justice activities, presented recommendations distilled from the white papers. The working group’s recommendations included such actions as launching an elder justice web site, developing elder justice forensic centers, a national APS data system, a national public awareness campaign, and strategies for combating financial exploitation in collaboration with industry.\n42 U.S.C. § 1397k.\nThe EJA also established an Advisory Board on Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation (Advisory Board), which has a mission, distinct from the Council, of developing innovative approaches to improving the quality of long-term care, including preventing abuse, neglect, and exploitation.28 The Advisory Board is tasked with creating short- and long-term strategic plans for the development of the elder justice field and making recommendations to the Council. Unlike the Council, which is comprised of federal agency officials who administer elder justice programs, the Advisory Board will be made up of appointed members from the general public with experience and expertise in elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation prevention, detection, treatment, intervention, and prosecution. Progress so far has included a solicitation for nominations for members, issued by HHS on July14, 2010.29 In addition, HHS and Justice officials from 10 of the 12 elder justice programs we identified said they were involved in informal or ad hoc coordination efforts with other federal programs. For example, officials representing 8 programs reported participating in joint program planning and implementation, such as assisting in the review of grant solicitations, collecting and sharing materials to support elder mistreatment prosecutions, and supporting training initiatives. Other coordination efforts program officials reported include participating in joint information sessions—such as elder abuse awareness events—jointly funding a training initiative, and sharing data and information about trends, prevention efforts, and responses to abuse, with other agencies or programs.", "While federal agencies have taken steps to better coordinate their efforts, less progress has been made in articulating and tracking common goals for federal elder justice activities. Program officials reported that 4 of the 12 federal programs we identified tracked elder justice outcomes in 2011 and one had conducted a program evaluation to determine effectiveness.\n42 U.S.C.§1397k-1.\nEstablishment of the Advisory Board on Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation,75 Fed. Reg. 40,838 (July 14, 2010).\n1993 (GPRA)30—as recently enhanced by the GPRA Modernization Act of 201031—can also serve as leading practices for planning at lower organizational levels, such as individual programs or initiatives.32 GPRA provides federal agencies with a way to focus on results and improve agency performance by, among other things, developing strategic plans. Examples of strategic plan components include a mission statement; general goals and objectives, including outcome-oriented goals; and a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved.\nWhile HHS and Justice, the two agencies that oversee the 12 federal elder justice programs we identified, each have defined broad strategic goals and objectives at the department level that may impact elder justice (see table 5), and ACL has identified a strategic goal related to its elder justice responsibilities, the departments have not formally defined common goals for addressing concerns of elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation.\nPub. L. No. 103-62, § 4(b), 107 Stat. 285, 287 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(1)).\nPub. L. No. 111-352, § 3, 124 Stat. 3866, 3867-68 (2011) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(1)).\nGAO, Veteran-Owned Small Businesses: Planning and Data System for VA’s Verification Program Need Improvement, GAO-13-95 (Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2013).\nStrategic goal 3: Advance the health, safety, and well-being of the American people.\nObjective 3.C: Improve the accessibility and quality of supportive services for people with disabilities and older adults.\nAdministration for Community Living strategic goal 4: Ensure the rights of older people and prevent their abuse, neglect, and exploitation.\nStrategic goal 2: Prevent crime, protect the rights of the American people, and enforce federal law.\nObjective 2.2: Prevent and intervene in crimes against vulnerable populations; uphold the rights of, and improve services to, America's crime victims.\nObjective 3.1: Promote and strengthen relationships and strategies for the administration of justice with state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement.\nJustice’s fiscal year 2012 performance and accountability report also cites priority goals, intended to represent critical elements of the agency’s strategic plan, which includes a priority goal to protect those most in need of help, such as vulnerable populations including the elderly.\nAmong the 12 federal programs, we determined that 4 tracked outcomes for potential victims of elder justice in 2011.\nHHS’s LTC Ombudsman Program reported the number of complaints made by residents in long-term care facilities, which include those related to elder abuse, neglect, or exploitation, that were resolved to the satisfaction of the resident.\nHHS’s NIA Developmental Research on Elder Mistreatment program tracked the number of scientific publications resulting from NIA funding as a measure of the program’s performance in meeting its intended purpose of supporting research on elder mistreatment.\nJustice’s Tribal Elder Outreach Program33 monitored outcomes related to service delivery for individual grant recipients, though these data were not aggregated for the full program. Outcomes individual grantees reported included the number of tribal victims served as a result of outreach efforts, according to Justice officials. Justice’s Abuse in Later Life Program monitored outcomes at the grantee level. Outcomes the program tracked included the number of professionals trained to respond to domestic violence and sexual assault as well as the number of individuals receiving services.\nFor three of the eight programs that did not track elder justice outcomes in 2011, officials said they plan to do so in the future. For example, officials from two of the programs that directed all funds toward elder justice said they plan to develop and monitor outcomes. For example, HHS’s National APS Resource Center has identified program outputs, that will inform the development of outcome measures, such as a literature review of evidence-based APS programs and a related webinar, which will aim to improve the knowledge-base of participants. Similarly, the National Center on Elder Abuse,35 also funded by HHS, has identified outcomes such as elder abuse awareness and the extent to which research findings are integrated into training and practice.\nSimilarly, formal evaluation of federal elder justice programs is limited. As we have previously reported, researchers designing formal evaluations for other programs, including one welfare program, have found that they had to fit the evaluation design to available time and resources, even when an evaluation is planned for the state rather than the federal level.36 For example, in some cases, conducting an evaluation for an entire state may be determined to be so expensive that data collection has to be limited to a portion of the state. Thus, individual program efforts may not always be feasible within the resources of many elder justice programs. Nevertheless, one program, HHS’ NIA research program, held a conference to evaluate the progress of research supported by grants 42 U.S.C. § 10603(c)(1).\n42 U.S.C. § 3012(d).\nGAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-208G (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2012); and Welfare Reform: Data Available to Assess TANF’s Progress, GAO-01-298 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001). awarded to research elder justice issues in 2010. Three of the 11 remaining programs also indicated they plan to conduct evaluations in the future once more work has been completed or if funding becomes available. Officials from the other 8 programs reported they have not recently conducted nor do they plan to conduct a formal evaluation that includes an assessment of elder justice activities. Program officials cited several factors that limit their ability to formally evaluate their programs, including variability of program activities and scope year by year, insufficient data due to a short period of implementation for newer programs, and limited resources, including funding devoted to and expertise in program evaluation.\nGiven the costs associated with evaluating individual programs, developing common objectives and outcomes for HHS and Justice elder justice programs could be a first step in assessing the federal effort. As noted, coordination of these programs is just under way and HHS and Justice have not developed common objectives for the elder justice effort nor have they defined a set of common outcomes, which are necessary precursors to future performance measures, that could be used to evaluate the federal effort as a whole. Without progress on these fronts, the federal government cannot assess the effectiveness of its effort nor the efficient use of resources devoted to elder justice activities.", "Officials from the state aging agencies, area agencies on aging, and service providers we interviewed identified the increased demand for services in a constrained fiscal environment as a major challenge in meeting the needs of the growing older adult population. State aging agency, area agency on aging, and service provider officials also cited the need for greater awareness of elder abuse, by both the public and individuals who interact with older adults, to help prevent elder abuse or recognize its symptoms. Further, officials in all of the state aging agencies we contacted told us that elder abuse cases are increasing, especially financial exploitation cases. For example, one state official we spoke with said that, as they gave greater emphasis to such cases, they found that elder justice cases involving financial exploitation, in particular, take longer to investigate, use financial records that are difficult to obtain, and are often harder to prove than physical or emotional abuse.\nElder justice activities are a small but important component of the broad range of services area agencies on aging (AAA) provided in the states we visited. Among these elder justice services were basic legal services to older adults, such as assisting with setting up wills, power of attorney, or advance directives, which can help deter financial exploitation. AAAs we visited also coordinated a number of other types of elder justice services. For example, an Arizona AAA administers a program funded through a Justice Victims of Crime Act grant to provide emergency housing for abused older adults. The same AAA uses HHS Title VII of the OAA funding for a Boys and Girls Club program to teach young people about respecting older adults. In Illinois, a Justice STOP grant helped create the Elder Law and Miscellaneous Remedies Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County which handles elder abuse cases and other instances where the victim is an older adult.\nOfficials representing all of the nine AAAs and nine of the local providers we interviewed also helped raise awareness of elder abuse through education and training programs both for the public in general and for those members of the community who regularly interact directly with older adults. For example, in Virginia, a local service provider received a Justice grant to train criminal justice professional service providers, victims, witnesses, and anyone likely to come in contact with elders. Such individuals may not be aware of the different ways abuse can present itself in the older adult population, and other AAA officials said that education and training for these direct service providers could help them identify it and respond appropriately. The Virginia provider saw its program as helpful in determining how to address an abused older adult’s problems. In our view, in the absence of this awareness, incidents of elder abuse may go unreported or unaddressed.\nFor the most part, APS agencies in Arizona and Virginia worked with AAAs to identify and respond to incidents of elder abuse. Although the administrative structure of the AAAs and APS agencies can vary from state to state, the basic AAA services can help bolster an older adult’s independence after an elder abuse incident. Depending on the division of responsibility for elder justice services in the state, AAAs may refer reports of elder abuse to the state’s APS program in their area. For example, in Arizona and Virginia, the AAAs turn any allegations of elder abuse over to the state APS program upon learning about it. However, in Illinois, the state contracts with service providers to conduct the entire investigation and disposition of the elder abuse cases. Once an investigation has been conducted and service needs identified, AAAs may be involved in connecting elder abuse victims to services.\nDespite their efforts to raise awareness of elder abuse in their communities, officials at five AAAs and four local service providers told us that more public awareness and training was needed. Moreover, officials from state aging agencies in two of the three states we visited said that the federal government should further emphasize the need for training law enforcement officers and other officials in identifying elder abuse for when they come in contact with older adults in need. An AAA official in one of these states said that training resources should also be directed to healthcare officials, because they are in a position to identify signs of elder abuse.\nIn prior work on elder financial exploitation, experts and federal, state, and local officials focusing on this form of elder abuse told us that older adults need more information about what constitutes financial exploitation to know how to avoid it. That prior study found that each of the seven federal agencies reviewed independently produces and disseminates public information on elder financial exploitation that is tailored to its own mission, and worked together at times to increase public awareness. For example, each year, the FTC and the Postal Inspection Service collaborate on community presentations during National Consumer Protection Week. However, although the Older Americans Act calls for a coordinated federal elder justice system, which includes educating the public, the seven agencies reviewed in that prior study did not undertake these activities as part of a broader coordinated approach.37 In other work on public program effectiveness, we have concluded that agencies can use limited funding more efficiently by coordinating their activities and can strengthen their collaboration by establishing joint strategies.38 Of the nine AAA officials we spoke with for this review, five said that there is a need for a strategic, national public awareness campaign on elder justice, not limited to financial exploitation. Officials at three of these AAAs suggested that the federal government sponsor a national campaign to raise awareness that would include broadly dispersed public education announcements on the prevalence and types of elder abuse and helpful resources for those in need. The campaign would help service providers and care givers who interact with older adults or observe their behavior recognize the signs of elder abuse and report it.\nGAO, Elder Justice: National Strategy Needed to Effectively Combat Financial Exploitation, GAO-13-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2012).\nGAO-06-15.\nDuring its meeting in May 2013 to consider next steps, the Elder Justice Coordinating Council moved closer to developing a coordinated federal effort to prevent and respond to elder abuse. One of the actions recommended by the Council’s Federal Interagency Working Group was the development of a national public awareness campaign. However, the Council is currently considering this recommendation and has not yet taken a final decision. Our work for this study indicates that until a broad- based public awareness campaign is established, many incidents of elder abuse may be unreported or unaddressed.", "Growth in the percentage of the United States population over 60 years of age and in reports of elder abuse may outstrip the public resources allocated to serve the elderly. In addition, given the range of elder justice activities and individuals served under federal programs, coordination is key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources. Further, while federal agencies have taken some initial steps toward coordinating their elder justice activities, such as forming the Elder Justice Coordinating Council, their efforts to develop a coordinated response to elder abuse would be further supported by an assessment of the effectiveness of federal elder justice programs. Until common objectives and outcomes for federal elder justice programs are defined, agencies may be working at cross purposes. In addition, with the continuing growth in the older adult population, the absence of sufficient public awareness and education about elder abuse and the resources available to address it may slow the progress of elder justice efforts at all levels of government.", "1. To provide the basis for greater consistency across states in assessing elder justice service delivery, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS, as chairman of the Elder Justice Coordinating Council, direct the Council to make it a priority to identify common objectives for the federal elder justice effort and define common outcomes. 2. To help protect older adults from all forms of abuse, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General collaborate in developing a national campaign to raise awareness of the occurrence of elder abuse and provide information on how to obtain services.", "We provided a draft of this report to HHS and Justice, the two federal agencies that administer the 12 elder justice programs that we reviewed. HHS provided general comments that are reproduced in appendix III.\nBoth departments provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nHHS concurred with our recommendations and agreed that federal coordination is key to ensuring the use of limited resources. Concerning the first recommendation, HHS identified the formation of the Elder Justice Coordinating Council as an effort to develop common objectives and plans for action to address elder justice issues. Further, HHS said that each of nine proposals for action that the Council now is considering has specified outcomes and that steps and strategies are being developed to implement the proposals. We agree that the Council’s activity is indicative of progress toward a coordinated federal elder justice effort and development of common objectives. We encourage the Council to think broadly in developing common objectives and outcomes that will encompass the elder justice programs of all federal agencies represented on the Council, both now and in the future. HHS said that our recommendations correctly point out a need for greater public awareness and, with regard to the second recommendation, that one of the proposals for Council action is development of a broad-based public awareness campaign.\nHHS also asked us to consider that improved public surveillance could help better describe the extent and patterns of abuse among older adults. In our previous report on elder abuse, we noted that, although the CDC considers elder abuse a growing public health problem, there is no ongoing surveillance of its extent similar to periodic national incidence studies of child abuse and neglect. Without periodically measuring the extent of elder abuse nationwide, it will be difficult to develop an effective national policy for its prevention as required under the OAA. In that report, we suggest that Congress consider mandating the Secretary of HHS to conduct, in coordination with the Attorney General, a periodic national study of the extent of elder abuse over time.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of the Departments of Health and Human Services and Justice, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.", "This appendix discusses the methodology for surveying federal elder justice program managers to gather information for examining the potential for fragmentation, overlap, and duplication among federal elder justice programs.\nUsing lists of existing federal programs, we identified programs government-wide that funded elder justice activities, based on program selection criteria discussed below. We confirmed the list through contact with federal agency officials. We surveyed the federal officials who manage the federal elder justice programs on our list, and analyzed the programs’ similarities and differences with regard to key elements, including objectives, activities, funding mechanisms and recipients, target populations, outcome measures and fiscal year 2011 obligations.", "For the purposes of this study, we defined elder justice as efforts to prevent, identify, and respond to elder abuse. To identify federal programs that provided funding for elder justice activities in fiscal year 2011, we developed an initial list of programs that met our definition of elder justice and one of three selection criteria, as shown in figure 4.\nThe list was based on the findings of three prior inventory efforts completed by GAO and the Congressional Research Service in 2011, as well as searches of the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and agency websites. To confirm the programs on our list, we contacted agency officials who managed the programs during our entrance conferences for additional program information. We also asked agency officials to add any programs that we had overlooked in developing the list. We then reassessed the list to determine how well the programs met the elder justice definition and program selection criteria.", "To determine how federal programs that target elder justice compare with respect to key elements, we developed a web-based survey to collect descriptive information about programs from agency officials. Because program obligations during fiscal year 2011 was one of the data elements we needed to collect, the survey was designed to collect information from programs that either have elder justice as a primary objective or one of multiple objectives.\nTo develop the survey questions, we reviewed prior GAO reports on elder justice, on serving the aging population, and on identifying duplication and overlap in federal programs administered by multiple agencies. The survey, modeled after GAO surveys regarding potential overlap and duplication, collected information on key program elements pertaining to overlap and duplication, including objectives, activities, target populations, outcome measures, and obligations during fiscal year 2011. The survey was administered between July and September 2012. To maximize response, we sent periodic follow-up emails to all agency officials that had not responded to the survey by our deadline.\nThe practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce several types of errors, commonly referred to as non-sampling errors. For example, differences in how a particular question is interpreted, the sources of information available to respondents, or the types of people who do not respond can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We included steps in the survey design, data collection, and data analysis to minimize such non-sampling errors. In designing the survey, we took steps to clarify the survey questions to ensure that questions would be correctly interpreted by respondents. For example, during its development, we pretested our Web-based survey with five selected programs administered by HHS, Justice, and the SEC. We conducted these pretests to ensure that the respondents understood the questions and could provide the answers to them and the questions could be completed in a reasonable amount of time. Following each pretest, the survey underwent additional, mostly minor, revisions, based on feedback from pretest participants. An additional source of non-sampling error can be errors in computer processing of the data and statistical analysis. All computer programs relied on for analysis of this survey data were independently verified by a second analyst for accuracy.\nThe survey response rate was 100 percent. In addition to collecting program information, the survey allowed us to confirm, exclude, and add programs based on consultations with agency officials. As a result of our analysis of the survey data, including follow-up contact with the agency officials who managed them, we identified 12 programs that met one of the first two selection criteria and funded elder justice activities in fiscal year 2011. We analyzed whether similarities and differences in the 12 programs with respect to key program elements, such as sponsoring agency, objectives, activities, target populations and grant recipients, indicated potential overlap or duplication, and whether program officials could identify program outcomes.\nTo augment the survey data, we collected additional information on program activities and target groups for individual activities. We reviewed program descriptions published on agency websites, in grant solicitations, and in budget justifications; and reviewed publicly available lists of grant recipients and award amounts. We then grouped activity descriptions by type of activity and specific group or subpopulation that directly benefited from the activity. For example, we determined whether education and outreach efforts were directed at the general public or a specific subpopulation of victims of elder abuse, such as those in tribal communities. We confirmed these classifications with the relevant program officials and added or corrected information as necessary.", "Services to End Violence Against and Abuse of Women Later in Life Program agency staff, and victim assistants to address elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation, including domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking, in their communities.\nDevelop or enhance a coordinated community response to elder abuse.\nProvide or enhance services for victims who are 50 years of age or older.\nConduct cross-training for victim service organizations, governmental agencies; criminal justice professionals; and nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations serving victims of elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation, including sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking, in their communities.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nDevelop multidisciplinary partnerships that include law enforcement, prosecutors, domestic violence victim services programs or nonprofits, and programs or nonprofits that serve older victims.\nTraining for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and individuals that serve older victims and work in victims services programs.\nCross training for victim services organizations, governmental agencies, courts, law enforcement agencies, and organizations working with older victims.\nOutreach and service delivery to older victims.", "Fiscal year 2011 obligations $5,033,000 for the prevention, detection, assessment, and treatment of, intervention in, investigation of, and response to elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation, including financial exploitation.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nTraining law enforcement officers, health care providers, and other professionals on how to recognize and respond to elder abuse.\nSupport outreach and education campaigns to increase public awareness of elder abuse and prevention, including financial exploitation.\nSupport efforts of state and local elder abuse prevention coalitions and multidisciplinary teams of agencies and organizations that work with victims.\nPromote the development of information and data systems, including elder abuse reporting systems, to quantify the extent of elder abuse in each state and analyze information to identify unmet service and need.\nProvide technical assistance to programs that provide services for victims of elder abuse and their families.\nObjectives:\nDevelop comprehensive outreach strategies and foster improved culturally appropriate crime victim assistance services to address elder abuse.\nAugment ongoing crime victim assistance service strategies and provide special focus on elders including enhanced collaboration and coordination among victim assistance and human services, courts and law enforcement, and community development and youth outreach and mentoring programs.\nLink the issue of elder abuse in tribal communities with traditional cultural norms of respect and reverence for tribal elders.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nConduct outreach through awareness posters, service brochures, editorials and newspaper articles, radio and television ads, videos, and fact sheets.\nSupport curriculum development, training, community teaching, and awareness efforts.\nPromote community-based and culturally specific crime victim assistance services and develop and distribute related protocols and toolkits.", "Fiscal year 2011 obligations $1,134,000 o Epidemiological study of the relationship of self-neglect and important health outcomes in a biracial population of older adults. o Study of relevant health issues, including elder mistreatment, in older Chinese adults. o Development of a mentoring program for aspiring researchers on aging topics. o Study to determine the extent and outcomes of resident-to- resident elder mistreatment in long-term care facilities. o Studies of the social and neural bases for older adults’ vulnerability to financial exploitation.\nObjective:\nProvide information, materials, and support to enhance state and local efforts to prevent and address elder mistreatment.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nDisseminate information about elder abuse prevention, including promising practices and interventions, and provide resources to professionals and the public.\nProvide technical assistance, training, and consultation, to state agencies and community-based organizations.\nAdvise on program and policy development.\nObjective:\nSupport and coordinate Justice's activities in combating elder abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation, especially as they impact beneficiaries of Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care programs.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nProsecute failure of care, health care fraud, and consumer fraud cases and enforce civil rights.\nPromote state and local coordination through state working groups.\nProvide training for U.S. Attorney’s offices and Medicaid Fraud Control Units on investigating and developing failure of care cases.\nProvide training for nurses, prosecutors, judges, and participants of legal aid clinics on fraud and abuse cases.", "Fiscal year 2011 obligations 200,000 programs across the country, with a primary focus on the older population, by providing APS systems, agencies, and professionals with relevant information and support.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nIdentify evidence-based practices for APS programs and interventions and promote the evaluation of unevaluated practices that have the potential to advance and strengthen the efficiency, effectiveness, and relevance of APS work.\nCompile and synthesize research that informs APS programming and interventions.\nProvide specific and targeted technical assistance to state and local APS programs to facilitate the implementation of best practices and research findings.\nACL is broadly responsible for federal efforts related to elder abuse and prevention services. In addition to administering individual programs, ACL is responsible for facilitating the development, implementation, and improvement of a coordinated, multidisciplinary elder justice system; providing federal leadership to support state efforts to carry out elder justice programs; establishing an information clearinghouse; and promoting collaborative efforts for the development and implementation of elder justice programs. 42 U.S.C. § 3011(a).\nObjective(s) and examples of elder justice activities Objectives:\nSupport communities in their efforts to develop and strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women, including older women.\nDevelop and strengthen victim services in cases involving violent crimes against women, including older women.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nProvide training for law enforcement officers, judges, other court personnel, prosecutors, and domestic violence victim service providers to more effectively identify and respond to violent crimes against women.\nDevelop and implement more effective police, court, and prosecution policies and protocols regarding violent crimes against women.\nDevelop data collection and communication systems linking police, prosecutors, and courts to identify and track arrests and violations.\nSupport statewide multidisciplinary efforts to coordinate the response of state law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, victim services agencies, and other state agencies.\nProvide training for sexual assault forensic medical examiners in collecting evidence.\nStrengthen programs that address violence against older women and women with disabilities, including investigating and prosecuting instances of violence and targeting outreach, counseling, and other victim assistance services.\nObjective(s) and examples of elder justice activities Objectives:\nEncourage state, local, and tribal governments and courts to treat domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking, including instances of violence against older individuals, as serious violations of criminal law.\nInterpersonal Violence within Families and Among Acquaintances Prevention improve safety, access to services, and confidentiality for victims and families. Objective:\nPrevent interpersonal violence – including domestic violence, sexual assault, spousal and partner abuse, and elder abuse, woman battering, and acquaintance rape – within families and among acquaintances.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nDevelop uniform definitions and recommend data elements for public health surveillance of elder abuse and neglect.\nProvide information and education to the public on interpersonal violence to increase awareness of related public health consequences.\nProvide training to health care providers to identify potential victims of interpersonal violence and refer individuals to entities that provide supportive services.\nObjectives:\nAdvocate for residents of nursing homes, board and care homes, assisted living facilities, and similar adult care facilities and improve residents’ care and quality of life.\nResolve problems of individual residents. Examples of elder justice activities:\nInvestigate and resolve complaints made by residents of facilities.\nProvide training to state and local ombudsmen.\nProvide consultations to LTC facility managers and staff.", "LTC ombudsman programs to enable them to effectively respond to residents’ complaints and represent their interests on an individual and systemic level.\nStrengthen the LTC Ombudsman program by developing innovative, effective approaches for states to provide services to LTC facility residents.\nExamples of elder justice activities:\nProvide technical assistance to state and local ombudsmen.\nProvide consultation, information, and referral for ombudsmen, residents, and families.\nProvide training and resources for state and local ombudsman programs.\nPromote public awareness on the role of ombudsmen.\nIdentify research needs and promote research related to ombudsman programs and services.\nPromote cooperation between ombudsman programs and advocacy groups.\nObjective(s) Educate consumers and businesses about their rights and responsibilities, including providing consumers with tools needed to make informed decisions and businesses with tools needed to comply with law.\nEnforce consumer protection laws in federal court or administrative litigation, especially in cases alleging deceptive practices; coordinate joint law enforcement actions with state and federal partners, including criminal law enforcement; enforce injunctions and administrative orders obtained in consumer protection cases; and develop, review, and enforce consumer protection rules.\nExamples of activities related to elder justice Provides free information to consumers of all ages. The FTC identifies older adults as a target population for many of its consumer education efforts, including how to recognize and report identity theft and scams/frauds related to health care and financial exploitation. The Bureau of Consumer Protection has investigated frauds affecting seniors, and misrepresentations aimed at the “oldest old” and their caretakers, including misrepresentations of services provided when referring seniors to long-term care facilities.\nCollect consumer complaint data and share information to enable state and local law enforcement to become more effective.\nCollects and stores information on consumer complaints, including financial exploitation incidents such as investment fraud and identify theft. Complaints may include those reported by older individuals, though the FTC does not require complaints to include the age of the victim.\nProvide assistance to states, U.S. territories, and tribal governments, to provide services and activities to reduce poverty.\nGrants support activities that address nutrition, health, and emergency services, among others, for low- income individuals including the elderly.\nReduce or eliminate dependency; achieve or maintain self-sufficiency for families; help prevent neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children and adults; prevent or reduce inappropriate institutional care; and secure admission or referral for institutional care when other forms of care are not appropriate.\nGrants may be used to support activities aimed at preventing neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children or adults, among others.", "Objective(s) Provide formula grants to states to support services that enable seniors to remain in their homes for as long as possible.\nExamples of activities related to elder justice Services may include case management and legal services, among others. Each state may allocate funds to area agencies on aging, which have the flexibility to use the funds to provide the services that best meet the needs of seniors in their service areas. In providing community services, providers could observe and report on potential elder abuse activity.\nPromote and enhance state leadership in securing and maintaining legal rights of older individuals and state capacity to: coordinate the provision of legal assistance, provide technical assistance and training; promote financial management services for older individuals, assist older individuals in understanding their rights, and improve the quality and quantity of legal services provided to older adults.\nThe legal assistance developer can play a key role in designing and implementing the elder rights provisions of state plans to ensure older persons have access to their benefits and rights.\nProvide assistance for older individuals in accessing long-term care options and other community-based services; protect older individuals against direct challenges to their independence, choice, and financial security.\nServices are specifically targeted to older individuals with economic or social needs. Services may include assistance to ensure elder rights protections regarding transfers from LTC facilities to home and community- based care and assistance for individuals who have experienced elder abuse, including consumer fraud and financial exploitation.\nProvide funding to strengthen states’ legal services networks, including the development and implementation of integrating low-cost service mechanisms.\nGrants support legal education and assistance services and may include projects that address elder financial exploitation. The program also promotes linkages with service providers in area aging agencies, Aging and Disability Resource Centers, state long-term care ombudsmen, and APS.\nProvide grants to states to assist family and informal caregivers to care for loved ones at home for as long as possible.\nServices include dissemination of information about services and other assistance including counseling and training.", "Objective(s) Support the aging and legal networks to enhance the quality, cost effectiveness, and accessibility of legal assistance and elder rights programs; and support demonstration projects to expand or improve the delivery of legal assistance and elder rights protections to older individuals with social or economic needs.\nExamples of activities related to elder justice Supported activities include case consultation for legal professionals regarding legal problems impacting older individuals, training for aging and legal services professionals on a range of legal and elder rights issues, technical assistance to professionals that provide legal assistance to older individuals, and information dissemination regarding legal and elder rights issues.\nNutrition Services (Congregate Nutrition Services, Home-Delivered Nutrition Services and Nutrition Services Incentive Program)\nReduce hunger and food insecurity, promote socialization of older individuals, and promote the health and well-being of older individuals and delay health conditions through access to nutrition and other disease prevention and health promotion services.\nGrants to states support nutrition services including meals and nutrition education. In providing or delivering meals, service providers could observe and report on potential elder abuse activity.\nPromote the financial security of older individuals and enhance their choice and independence by empowering them to make decisions with respect to pensions and savings plans.\nProjects include assisting seniors with the administrative appeals process, locating pension plans “lost” as a result of mergers and acquisitions, and other assistance in negotiating with former employers for due compensation.\nProvide culturally competent health care, community-based long-term care, and related services; serve as focal points for developing and sharing technical information and expertise for organizations, communities, educational institutions, and professionals working with older Native Americans.\nCenter activities have included assisting in developing community- based solutions to improve the quality of life and delivery of support services to the Native elderly population and providing a forum for discussions about elder abuse to help communities develop plans to reduce and control occurrences.\nEmpower seniors to protect themselves from the economic and health-related consequences of Medicare and Medicaid fraud, error, and abuse through increased awareness and understanding of health care programs.\nActivities include training Medicare beneficiaries, retired professionals, and other senior citizens on how to recognize and report instances or patterns of health care fraud and abuse and complaint resolution for beneficiaries.\nIdentify efficient, effective, and economical procedures for LTC facilities and providers to conduct background checks on a statewide basis on all prospective direct patient access employees.\nStates conduct background checks to help meet regulations prohibiting LTC facilities and providers from employing individuals found guilty of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of patient funds.", "Objective(s) Receive complaints, grievances, and requests for information from, and provide assistance to, Medicare beneficiaries.\nExamples of activities related to elder justice The ombudsman may receive inquiries or complaints that mention elder abuse and refer complainants to the appropriate agency or organization to address their concerns.\nDetermine whether service providers and suppliers meet applicable requirements for participation in Medicare and/or Medicaid programs, and are incompliance with Medicaid and Medicare conditions of participation and coverage.\nFederal and state surveyors conduct health and safety inspections in a variety of settings, including nursing homes, home health agencies, and hospitals, to determine compliance with CMS regulations including those that address abuse and neglect of beneficiaries.\nTrain and educate individuals in providing geriatric care for the elderly.\nActivities include training, development of curricula related to the treatment of health problems of the elderly, continuing education, and establishment of traineeships for advanced education students.\nSupport the career development of physicians, nurses, social workers, psychologists, dentists, pharmacists, and health professionals as academic geriatric specialist by requiring them to provide training in clinical geriatrics, including the training of interdisciplinary teams of health professionals.\nFaculty teaches and develops skills in interdisciplinary education geriatrics.\nEstablish or operate Geriatric Education Centers to provide interdisciplinary training of health professional faculty, students, and practitioners in the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease, disability, and other health problems of the elderly.\nProject activities include training and continuing education of health professionals in geriatrics and developing curricula related to the treatment of health problems of the elderly.\nProvide support, including fellowships, for geriatric training projects to train physicians, dentists and behavioral or mental health professionals who plan to teach geriatric medicine, geriatric dentistry, or geriatric behavioral or mental health.\nPhysicians participate in service rotations that include day and home care programs, extended care facilities, and community care programs.\nProvide eligible homeowners with education and information about the unique features of a reverse mortgage and other alternatives to a reverse mortgage that homeowners may consider given their financial situation.\nHUD offers counseling to elderly clients who may be at risk of delinquency in paying mortgages and may be at risk of becoming victims of financial exploitation.\nObjective(s) Extend the length and improve the quality of independent living and prevent premature and inappropriate institutionalization of elderly and disabled non-elderly residents of federally-assisted multifamily housing.\nExamples of activities related to elder justice Service coordinators assess resident needs; identify and link residents to appropriate services in the community, and monitor the delivery of services. Service coordinators may also educate residents about other services and help them build informal support networks.\nLink public housing residents with supportive services, resident empowerment activities, and assistance in becoming economically self-sufficient. For elderly or disabled residents specifically, the objective is to help improve living conditions and enable residents to age-in-place.\nService coordinators assess the needs of residents and coordinate available resources, including supportive services for elderly residents.\nAddress the most serious tribal law enforcement needs; increase the capacity of tribal law enforcement agencies to prevent, solve, and control crime for safer communities; implement or enhance community policing strategies; and engage in strategic planning for law enforcement.\nGrants support law enforcement training, including community policing and computer and crime reporting training.\nEncourage and support research, development, and evaluation to further understanding of the causes and correlates of crime and violence, methods of crime prevention and control, and criminal justice system responses to crime and violence; and contribute to the improvement of the criminal justice system and its responses to crime, violence, and delinquency.\nProjects include research related to elder mistreatment as it relates to the objectives of the program, such as identifying the causes and means of preventing crime.\nEnhance the systemic response to crimes of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking committed against American Indian and Alaska Native women and girls.\nVictim services provided under the program, including emergency shelter services, crisis intervention, and information and referrals, may be provided to older individuals who are victims.\nProvide investor protection through the prosecution of violations of federal of securities laws.\nProsecuted cases may include those involving older adults as victims. In some instances, the elderly were specifically targeted.\nProvide information to investors about protecting their finances, funds and investments, and ways regulators can support their efforts.\nWhile most outreach activities are targeted at all investors, there are several activities, throughout the country, that are specifically focused on senior investors, such as Senior Summits, Senior Days and Senior Expos.\nObjective(s) Engage in outreach activities on an ad hoc basis.\nExamples of activities related to elder justice Past activities have included SEC’s Senior Summits which help older investors make difficult decisions about their finances and learn new ways to protect their assets as they age.\nFoster compliance with securities laws, detect violations, and correct compliance problems by conducting examinations of registered entities, broker-dealers, and investment advisers and companies, among others.\nExaminations may identify unsuitable transactions for senior investors.\nProvide investors with information needed to evaluate current and potential investments, make informed decisions, and avoid fraudulent schemes. In addition, provide agency staff with critical insight about emerging trends and factors shaping investor decision-making.\nOIEA may target certain outreach efforts to specific groups, such as seniors, members of the military, and teachers. Outreach includes providing resources to help individuals become better-educated investors, including understanding how to avoid fraud. For example, OIEA continues to support the Outsmarting Investment Fraud Campaign, designed to educate seniors about identifying potential investment fraud.\nCommunicate money laundering or terrorist financing risks to the financial industry and facilitate the reporting of valuable information to law enforcement.\nFinCEN issued an advisory to financial institutions in 2011 that provided potential indicators of elder financial exploitation.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact listed above, individuals making key contributions to this report, in all aspects of the work, were Bill Keller, Sara Edmondson, Brenna Guarneros, and Rosemary Torres Lerma. Also contributing to the report were James Bennett, Holly Dye, Melissa Jaynes, Jill Lacey, Grant Mallie, Amanda Miller, Andrew Nelson, Heddi Nieuwsma, and Craig Winslow.", "Elder Justice, National Strategy Needed to Effectively Combat Elder Financial Exploitation. GAO-13-110. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2012.\nElder Justice: Stronger Federal Leadership Could Enhance National Response to Elder Abuse. GAO-11-208. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2011.\nOlder Americans Act: More Should Be Done to Measure the Extent of Unmet Need for Services. GAO-11-237. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2011." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full", "", "", "h0_title h3_title", "h0_full h3_full", "h0_full", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "h3_full h2_full", "h1_full", "", "", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h3_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What did the departments of HHS and Justice administer in 2011?", "What characterized the separate administration of these programs?", "How did the funding among the programs differ?", "How were judges and court personnel included in some of the programs?", "What did support among elder justice programs look like?", "How do the differences across programs affect the risk of overlap among them?", "Why is coordination important to elder justice work?", "What would help federal coordination efforts?", ":How has a lack of tracking program outcomes hindered efforts to stop elder abuse?", "What is a major challenge in meeting the needs of the elder population?", "How can existing programs better prevent elder abuse?", "To what extent is public awareness necessary for this issue?", "As such, what is the Elder Justice Coordinating Council considering?", "What are the current challenges facing the elder justic movement?", "What was GAO asked to do as a result of these concerns?", "What three main points does GAO cover in their report?", "In writing this report, what sort of information did GAO gather?", "How did GAO select the states they reviewed?" ], "summary": [ "In fiscal year 2011, two agencies--the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Justice (Justice) --separately administered 12 fragmented but minimally overlapping programs that directed funds toward elder justice, with low risk of duplication.", "Specifically, because more than one federal agency administers these programs, GAO found that these grant programs are fragmented. Further, GAO found that overlap across the 12 programs was minimal because the programs varied with respect to (1) funding mechanisms and recipients, (2) elder abuse victims targeted, (3) service providers, and (4) activities conducted.", "For example, a few of these programs provided formula grants to all states and most dispersed discretionary grants to a limited number of recipients. Programs that supported victims of elder abuse generally assisted all types of victims, but some also focused on certain subgroups, such as older women.", "Some programs that assisted service providers also targeted specific subgroups, such as judges and court personnel.", "In addition, elder justice programs supported a wide range of activities. For example, one HHS program provided public education to help identify and prevent elder abuse, while a Justice program trained law enforcement officers to investigate instances of elder abuse.", "Considering the variation across funding mechanisms and recipients, the elder abuse victims and service providers targeted by the grants, and the types of activities conducted, overlap across the 12 programs is minimal and the risk of duplication--when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries--is low.", "We have previously reported that coordination is key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources to address issues that cut across more than one agency.", "While federal coordination is in development--for example, HHS, Justice, and other agencies recently formed the Elder Justice Coordinating Council--federal agencies have yet to articulate common objectives and outcomes as precursors to future measures for elder justice programs, which would provide a rationale for coordination.", "Further, few federal programs tracked elder justice outcomes in 2011 or conducted program evaluations to assess effectiveness, making it difficult to determine what impact, if any, many programs have on victims of elder abuse.", "Officials representing state aging agencies, area agencies on aging and service providers in the three states GAO visited identified the increased demand for elder justice services in a constrained fiscal environment as a major challenge in meeting the needs of the growing older adult population.", "Officials also cited the need for greater awareness of elder abuse by the public and training of direct service providers who interact with older adults on a regular basis, to help prevent elder abuse or recognize its symptoms.", "Five of the nine regional agency officials GAO spoke with said elder justice issues need to be elevated to national attention for the general public by a national public awareness campaign.", "The Elder Justice Coordinating Council is considering a recommendation to sponsor a national campaign but has not yet done so.", "As the percentage of older adults in the population increases, the number of older adults at risk of abuse also is growing. At the same time, constraints on public funds may limit assistance to the growing population of older adults in need.", "GAO was asked to review elder justice program issues.", "This report addresses: (1) the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication across the federal grant programs that support elder justice; (2) the extent to which federal programs coordinate their efforts and monitor elder justice outcomes; and (3) how state aging agencies, area agencies on aging, and service providers deliver federal elder justice services and what challenges, if any, they face in doing so.", "GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, identified federal elder justice programs, surveyed federal officials about program elements, reviewed program documentation, and visited agencies responsible for elder justice in Illinois, Virginia and Arizona.", "GAO selected states based on the percentage of the elderly in the state population, geographic dispersion, and percentage of the state's Older American Act funds devoted to elder care." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 1, 1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-17-127	{ "title": [ "Background", "Processing Payroll from Time and Attendance Systems", "Internal Controls and Data Reliability", "OPM Has Not Made EHRI Payroll Data Widely Available Even Though They Have Potential to Support OPM’s Strategic and Open Data Goals", "Unlike Other, Related Databases, OPM Has Not Made the EHRI Payroll Data Widely Available", "EHRI Payroll Data Have Potential to Support Research and Analysis in Areas Related to OPM’s Strategic and Open Data Goals", "EHRI Payroll Data Have the Potential to Support Governmentwide Accountability", "EHRI Payroll Data Have the Potential to Support Human Resource Analytics and Decision Making", "Weaknesses in Internal Controls Complicate OPM’s Ability to Leverage EHRI Payroll Data in Support of Its Mission", "Internal Control Weaknesses Increase the Risk of EHRI Payroll Data Reliability Issues", "Control Activities: Controls on User Access", "Control Activities: Appropriate Documentation of Transactions and Internal Controls", "Monitoring: Ongoing Monitoring During Normal Operations", "Data Reliability Issues Limit OPM’s Ability to Fully Leverage EHRI Payroll Data in Support of Its Mission", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Selected Data Reliability Testing Results", "Appendix II: Standards and Methods for Data Reliability Assessment", "Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgements" ], "paragraphs": [ "The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is tasked with providing human resources, leadership, and support to federal agencies to manage their human capital functions. For OPM to effectively perform this role, executive branch agencies are required to report information on their civilian employees to OPM and ensure that workforce data meet certain standards developed by OPM. OPM has developed these data to carry out its strategic goal of serving as a thought leader in data-driven human resource management and policy decision-making. The Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) system is OPM’s primary repository for human capital data to support these efforts.\nOPM developed EHRI to (1) provide for comprehensive knowledge management and workforce analysis, forecasting, and reporting to further strategic management of human capital across the executive branch; (2) facilitate the electronic exchange of standardized human resources data within and across agencies and systems and the associated benefits and cost savings; and (3) provide unification and consistency in human capital data across the executive branch. In addition, OPM’s updated system and integrated data were expected to accrue savings to the federal government, reduce redundancy among agency systems, streamline the various processes involved in tracking and managing federal employment, and facilitate human capital management activities by providing storage, access, and exchange of standard electronic information through a data repository of standardized core human capital data for most executive branch employees.\nWhile the personnel database predated the EHRI Data Warehouse, the payroll database was newly developed for OPM’s e-payroll initiative to consolidate agency payroll processes. The payroll database contains individual payroll records for approximately 2.0 million federal employees and is the primary governmentwide source for payroll information on federal employees. The records consist of data elements such as an EHRI ID for linking files, agency time charge categories, and pay rates.\nThe consolidation of agency payroll processes—known as the e-payroll project—provided the opportunity for OPM to begin collecting standardized governmentwide payroll data. As part of the e-payroll initiative, OPM consolidated the operations of 22 federal payroll system providers for the 116 executive branch agencies into four primary providers—General Services Administration’s (GSA) National Payroll Center (NPC), the Department of Defense’s Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), Department of Interior’s Interior Business Center (IBC), and Department of Agriculture’s National Finance Center (NFC). Consolidation was undertaken to simplify and standardize federal payroll policies and procedures, and better integrate payroll with other human capital and finance functions.", "Most federal agencies rely on one of the four payroll service centers, DFAS, IBC, NPC, or NFC, to process employee pay. Payroll service centers receive employees’ bi-weekly time sheets which come from a variety of time and attendance (TA) systems from the agencies they service. Generally, TA systems allow employees to specify time spent on different work and leave categories, such as the number of regular or overtime hours worked or the number of annual leave or sick leave hours taken in a given pay period (PP). However, the level of detail regarding the exact nature of the work or leave time varies depending on agency policies and systems for recording employee work time. While the service centers have consolidated payroll reporting, there are still variations among the centers and the TA systems agencies use to submit employee time sheets. Some systems are maintained by the service center and employees from various agencies access those systems to record their hours. For example, GSA has only one TA system that agencies use to record work and leave hours. Other systems are maintained by the agency and may reflect specific TA accounting needs of the agency. For example, NFC processes time sheets from several different TA systems, some of which are agency specific, and DFAS processes payroll for the Department of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and others through systems including the Business Management Redesign (e-Biz) TA system and the Automated Time, Attendance, and Production System (ATAAPS) (see figure 1).\nIn light of the significant variation in TA systems and service centers involved in processing TA information into payroll records, OPM established core standards for consistency in reporting and recording certain types of work and leave hours. These standards apply at the agency level as well as the service center level. Some of these standards are based on official leave authorized in statute. For example, federal employees are authorized to be absent from duty without a loss in pay or charge to leave for legal holidays and for activities such as jury duty, attendance at a military funeral, bone-marrow or organ donation, and certain union activities. Other standards are based on OPM guidance for excused absences due to inclement weather or blood donation, among others, charged as administrative leave. Agencies follow common recording practices for annual leave and sick leave. These core standards at the agency level are an important part of the process for reporting to OPM because they allow the service centers to collapse certain fields in a consistent way. While agencies may have specific time codes and time keeping practices to meet their needs, core standards for service center reporting dictate how these codes should be collapsed for reporting to OPM. For example, agencies may have detailed categories for various types of administrative leave, but segments of those charge codes apply generally to the category of administrative leave, enabling service centers to aggregate these data from TA systems.", "OPM relies on agencies and service centers to ensure that the data they submit are timely, accurate, complete, and compiled in accordance with OPM standards. However, federal internal control standards specify that even when external parties, such as service centers in this case, perform operational processes for an agency, management—in this case OPM— retains responsibility for the performance of responsibilities assigned to those organizations. Consequently, OPM management is responsible for understanding the controls each service center has designed, implemented, and operates for payroll processing and how the service centers’ internal control systems impact OPM’s internal controls for the payroll data. Underlying requirements for data standards and data quality efforts are the standards for internal control which apply to all executive branch government functions. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , effective internal control systems have certain attributes, including reliable internal and external sources that provide data that are reasonably free from error and bias and faithfully represent what they purport to represent. Another attribute involves management evaluating both internal and external sources of data for reliability, and obtaining data on a timely basis so that they can be used for effective monitoring.", "Use of the EHRI payroll database has been limited because OPM has not made it widely available. This is in contrast to other, related OPM datasets, such as the EHRI personnel database, which OPM has prepared for use and made publicly available through multiple mechanisms including FedScope, an online tool for data analytics. Because the EHRI payroll database has potential to be used for accountability, research, and data-driven human resource management and policy decision making, making it available would support OPM’s strategic and open data goals.", "The EHRI payroll data have rarely been used since the database became operational in 2009. We identified four instances where the data have been used, primarily by OPM or by GAO to respond to Congressional requests for information. Specifically, (1) OPM used EHRI payroll data to calculate rough estimates of official time—paid time that employees spend on union-related activities—for its 2009 to 2012 reports to Congress; (2) we made similar use of EHRI payroll data to estimate use of official time in selected federal agencies in a 2014 report, which revealed limitations in OPM’s method of estimating the governmentwide costs of official time; (3) we used EHRI payroll data in a 2014 review that found inconsistencies in how agencies recorded and reported the use of administrative leave; and (4) we used EHRI payroll data in 2016 to report on the use of administrative leave at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this final case, our use of EHRI data enabled a more detailed examination of DHS’s use of administrative leave and helped verify the reliability of the information obtained from DHS.\nAside from these four instances, the data remain largely unused because OPM does not make the data available to the larger research community or to federal agencies. This is in contrast to other OPM data, such as the EHRI personnel data, which has been widely used since OPM made it available. OPM has taken specific steps to make these other human resources-related data available, but has not taken any of these steps for the EHRI payroll database. For example, OPM has made the EHRI personnel database available by (1) cleaning it and preparing it for statistical analysis; (2) integrating it with other data in a repository known as the EHRI Statistical Data Mart; (3) making deidentified data—that is, data without personally identifiable information—accessible through FedScope, an online data analytics tool that draws on data in the Statistical Data Mart; (4) listing data that are available (either by download or by request) on the OPM website and on Data.gov; and (5) sharing requested data with other parties, such as think tanks and academic researchers.\nData in the EHRI Statistical Data Mart are also processed and repackaged to make them more available and usable. Specifically, data received by OPM from agencies and stored in the EHRI Data Warehouse are further processed and cleaned and placed into a format better suited for analysis. This process involves additional corrections and generates additional data elements likely to be useful for statistical analysis. These processed and prepared data are then submitted to the EHRI Statistical Data Mart, which forms the basis for FedScope. Both the FedScope analytics tool and the downloadable datasets are accompanied by documentation that clarifies the meanings of the data elements and limitations associated with the data.\nOPM also makes other EHRI data available through its website and Data.gov. Established in 2009, Data.gov is administered by the General Services Administration (GSA) as a public portal for government data in accordance with the government-wide open data policy. It includes information about and links to datasets from executive branch agencies. As of September 2016, users are able to find references to the EHRI personnel and retirement data on Data.gov. From Data.gov, users can follow links to the personnel data in FedScope and request access to the retirement data. OPM also offers a suite of analytic tools for agencies to perform workforce analyses and forecasting on the data in the EHRI Data Warehouse.\nUnlike the EHRI personnel and retirement data, the EHRI payroll data have not been made available in any of these ways. The documentation that accompanies the EHRI Statistical Data Mart specifically notes the absence of payroll data as a limitation, warning users that the data elements related to pay reflect only annualized rates of pay, and that employees’ actual pay may be lower or higher due to such factors as overtime or leave without pay, which would be addressed if the payroll data were integrated into the Statistical Data Mart. The four databases within the EHRI Data Warehouse were designed with linking identifiers to enable such integration. Even though this capability exists, for the past seven years, the payroll database has not been linked with other EHRI databases, is not incorporated into the Statistical Data Mart, and has been left largely unchecked and unused. Until the payroll data are made available, such as by incorporating them into the Statistical Data Mart and linking them to the other EHRI databases as designed, OPM will not be able to crosscheck data across the databases for accuracy, and the data will not benefit from the processing and preparation for statistical analysis that is performed for data in the Statistical Data Mart.\nBecause reliability issues are often identified during use of the data, greater use of the EHRI payroll data by other parties would also have the benefit of helping to improve and establish the data’s reliability. As noted in GAO’s Assessing the Reliability of Computer-Processed Data, past users can be valuable sources of information about the completeness, accuracy, limitations, and usability of a dataset. For example, our prior reports that utilized the EHRI payroll data uncovered reliability issues, and OPM itself discovered a reliability issue when it attempted to use the data to analyze the use of sick leave (an issue we describe later in this report).", "The EHRI payroll data have potential to be used for research and analysis on topics related to OPM’s strategic and open data goals. In particular, EHRI payroll data include detailed information on pay, incentives, leave, work activities, telework, and other aspects of the federal workforce that could support OPM’s strategic and open data goals for data-driven research in areas such as audits and human resource analytics and decision making, according to our review of literature and interviews with OPM officials. OPM’s strategic goals call for the agency to develop and provide access to data systems that support human resources–related research and analytics both within and outside of OPM. As part of its strategic goal to serve as the thought leader in research and data-driven human resource management and policy decision making, OPM’s strategies include (1) developing data systems to support such analysis and (2) fostering partnerships with work groups, agencies, universities, and industry to access and analyze data. As part of its strategic goal to manage information technology systems efficiently and effectively, OPM’s strategies include providing greater access to human resources data and enabling data analytics to inform policy and decisions. In addition, OPM has open data goals that involve making data available and usable, in part to help ensure governmentwide accountability. In particular, OPM’s flagship enterprise information management initiative, a part of its most recent Open Government Plan, includes (1) ensuring that data are easily retrievable and highly usable for analytics and decision making, (2) promoting a culture of collaboration and partnerships with external stakeholders, and (3) releasing data to foster a broader conversation with the public by allowing third parties to conduct their own analyses and even create their own applications using OPM data.", "The utility of the EHRI payroll data for governmentwide accountability is demonstrated in audits that have been conducted using agency-specific data. For example, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) used agency payroll data to conduct an audit of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), DOD’s payroll provider. Specifically, by using agency payroll data, the DOD IG was able to identify improper payments to federal civilian employees. Improper payments occur when funds go to the wrong recipient, the recipient receives an incorrect amount of funds, or the recipient uses the funds in an improper manner. DFAS determined that payments were being made to accounts with invalid social security numbers, to employees under the legal employment age, and to multiple employees into the same bank account. These improper payments amounted to more than $15 million over a six-year period. We identified similar audits for improper payments conducted by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Social Security Administration Office of Inspector General (SSA IG).\nAgency-specific payroll data have also supported audits of the use of retention incentives. For example, in 2011, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General examined retention incentives paid to VA employees in fiscal year 2010. Using agency payroll data, it found that officials responsible for reviewing and approving retention incentives did not adequately justify and document awards in accordance with VA policy. Also, VA officials did not always terminate retention incentives at the end of set payment periods. As a result of their review, the VA Inspector General questioned the appropriateness of nearly 80 percent of incentives it reviewed. These incentives totaled about $1.06 million in FY 2010.\nAgency-specific payroll data have also been used to audit agencies’ reports on the amounts they have withheld or deducted from employees’ pay for retirement, health benefits, and life insurance. For example, the DOD IG, in collaboration with OPM, has checked payroll data against Official Personnel Files to assess whether withholdings from pay appear reasonable for employees in multiple departments whose pay is processed through DFAS. The Department of Agriculture IG has done a similar audit for employees in multiple departments whose pay is processed through the National Finance Center (NFC). Identifying payroll fraud, monitoring retention incentives, and assuring accuracy of withholdings are issues that can affect all agencies. The EHRI payroll database contains data elements necessary for conducting such audits, with the advantage that it includes data for all executive branch agencies, thus enabling governmentwide reviews.", "Our review of the literature and interviews with OPM officials suggest that key elements in the EHRI payroll data have the potential to be used to understand a variety of human capital outcomes in the federal government. We identified studies that could have benefitted from the availability of the EHRI payroll data to examine (1) the relationship between demographic characteristics and pay disparities and costs of compensation; (2) the use of flexibilities, such as telework, on employee retention and motivation; and (3) the use of various types of leave. Because the EHRI payroll data were unavailable, the studies we identified tended to make use of data that were less precise, less directly relevant, or less comprehensive than the EHRI payroll data. These studies illustrate some of types of research that could be done more precisely or more comprehensively if EHRI payroll data were made available.\nAccording to our review of the literature, EHRI payroll data could also inform studies of disparities in pay among demographic groups in the federal workforce and enable more precise analysis of the costs of federal compensation. For example, a 2015 article in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory compared long-term professional mobility between federal employees who received veterans’ preferences and those who did not. To measure mobility, the study relied on employees’ General Schedule (GS) grade levels from OPM’s Personnel data system. A 2012 study in the Internal Review on Public and Non- Profit Marketing examined the relationship between performance-based pay initiatives and discrimination complaints in selected federal agencies using agency data related to equal employment opportunity records. A 2009 study in the American Review of Public Administration examined potential drivers of the narrowing pay gap between men and women in the federal government, including changes in seniority, differences in fields of study, and women’s migration into traditionally male fields. To measure the pay gap, these researchers relied on data on employees’ self-reported annual salary.\nAlthough these studies of disparities provide insight into the impact of human capital decisions concerning hiring and pay, they had to rely upon GS grade levels, administrative data, or average annual salary levels to assess outcomes. Each of these measures has limitations that could have been addressed if EHRI payroll data had been available. This is because the EHRI payroll data were designed to provide standardized, governmentwide information by pay period regarding actual pay, incentive pay, telework and leave hours, and numerous other data elements related to federal work activities and compensation. The data used in the three studies, however, did not provide precise measures of compensation because pay ranges overlap grade levels in the GS system and individuals with different grades can receive similar pay rates. In addition, approximately 30 percent of federal employees are not covered by the GS system and would be excluded from such assessments by default. Available measures of annualized salary used in these studies are also imprecise. An employee’s actual earnings may include other forms of pay (for example, overtime or shift differentials) not included in adjusted basic pay, or may be less than the annualized rate because of the employee’s work schedule (for example, less than full time non-seasonal) or individual circumstances (for example, leave without pay). Also, incorporating administrative records of pay into analyses can be challenging because methods of collecting and reporting otherwise similar payroll information varies significantly across federal agencies. In contrast, if EHRI payroll data had been available for these studies, they could have addressed some of these limitations because the data are designed to reflect actual pay, including any special pay, overtime pay, or other incentives and awards an individual might receive each pay period. They are also centralized and designed to be consistent across agencies.\nStudies of the impact of workforce flexibilities, such as telework, on employee retention and motivation also demonstrate potential uses of the EHRI payroll database. A 2010 article in Public Manager described how agencies, such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have used telework to improve retention of employees with critical skills. Similarly, a 2013 study published in the American Review of Public Administration found that federal employees who engaged in frequent or infrequent telework were no more likely than their counterparts who do not telework to express an intention to leave, while a 2012 study in the same journal concluded that employees at the Department of Health and Human Services who telework were not significantly more motivated than those who choose not to telework. Instead of using time spent teleworking drawn from time and attendance records, both of these studies relied on data from the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, in which federal employees self-report whether they engage in telework “frequently” or “infrequently.” These studies would have benefitted from EHRI payroll data, which include telework fields that, if reliable, could yield more precise findings by allowing researchers to use the actual number of hours or days employees teleworked per pay period, rather than employees’ generalized descriptions of their telework frequency.\nThe telework fields in the EHRI payroll data could also help OPM to meet statutory requirements to monitor and report on governmentwide use of telework, and OPM has recently issued a memo to agencies indicating that it will start using the payroll data to do so. In our 2012 report on OPM’s ability to meet this requirement, we found that estimates of telework among federal employees were limited to data calls to agencies because some agencies did not track telework in their time and attendance systems. In that report, we concluded that the accuracy of telework participation and frequency data for some agencies was questionable. The EHRI payroll reporting requirements now include data elements for continuous and episodic telework. The availability and use of these data elements for analysis would allow for more accurate and efficient assessments to meet statutory reporting requirements, and would be of use to policymakers.\nOur review of literature also indicates that the EHRI payroll data are potentially useful for analyzing the use of leave. OPM officials told us that they would use the data to analyze use of sick leave and annual leave across the federal government if they had sufficient resources. In the past, officials conducted such analyses by requesting data on an ad hoc basis from agencies, but, according to OPM officials, that process was too resource-intensive to continue. Our review of recent studies suggests that researchers share OPM’s interest in these topics. For example, a 2015 study in the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine used time and attendance records from an unidentified federal agency to examine sick leave use among different demographic groups. Using survey data, another study examined the impact of different office designs on sick leave use among Swedish workers, finding that open office plans were associated with significantly higher reported rates of sick leave use. However, research on trends in leave use and impacts of certain policies on leave use across the federal government has been limited in the past by a lack of comprehensive and standardized leave use data, which could be addressed if EHRI payroll data were made available to agencies and researchers.\nCollectively, these studies demonstrate the value of fields within the EHRI payroll database—such as pay, telework, leave, and other compensation data—in assessing human capital outcomes. However, in all of the studies we identified, researchers relied on proxy, annualized, or self- reported measures, as opposed to actual measures of pay, telework, leave, and other key variables. Further, researchers typically relied upon data covering a limited number of federal agencies or employees. Compared to the EHRI payroll data, these sources do not provide governmentwide data or the same level of precision or detail for assessing policy outcomes among federal employees, which can affect the results of analysis. Studies relying on annualized salary may over or understate actual compensation given the timing of personnel actions, such as hires, separations, promotions, and leave, which can affect the actual amount of pay employees receive in a year. Studies relying on information about a small subset of the federal workforce may not provide reliable insights about overall federal human capital trends or policy effects. We and others have noted the importance of appropriate methods and data in comparing benefits and wages among federal employees and their private-sector counterparts.\nOther data sources that have been used instead of the EHRI payroll data—such as OPM’s EHRI personnel database and the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS)—also have limitations that could be addressed if the payroll data were made available. For example, the EHRI personnel database does not contain information on the amounts of time spent on sick leave, annual leave, administrative leave, official time activities, and telework, among other variables relevant to compensation and time use studies. OPM’s FEVS—a governmentwide database of federal employee perceptions on their agency’s policies and practices— contains data elements related to pay, but limitations on the reliability of these data elements have been identified.\nIn addition to the specific studies we reviewed in detail, we identified hundreds of articles on topics that correspond to EHRI payroll data fields. For example, we identified 276 articles with the phrases “administrative leave,” “annual leave,” “court leave,” “family leave,” “medical leave,” “military leave,” or “unpaid leave” in their titles that have been published in peer-reviewed journals since 2009, when OPM launched EHRI. In addition, we identified 37 peer-reviewed studies with the term “telework” in their titles and six with the phrase “performance- based pay” in their titles. Although an in-depth assessment would be necessary to determine the reliability of individual fields for any of the specific purposes noted above, our basic reliability testing suggests that several key fields in the EHRI payroll data are reasonably complete and contain data within expected ranges—and therefore would have potential to support research on these topics if the EHRI payroll data were made available. (See appendix I for more detailed results of our electronic tests of EHRI payroll data reliability.) As long as the EHRI payroll data remain unavailable, federal pay and work-related research will be limited and OPM will continue to miss opportunities to support its strategic and open data goals.", "OPM has designed and implemented some control activities to ensure the reliability of EHRI payroll data, but weaknesses in these controls limit OPM’s ability to fully leverage these data in support of its mission. As described earlier, we assessed OPM’s internal controls on the payroll data against two of the five elements of the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government: control activities and monitoring. Control activities are the actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve its objectives, including appropriate documentation of internal controls. Control activities help agencies ensure the reliability of data within information systems, such as the EHRI payroll system. Monitoring is necessary to promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews so that corrective actions necessary to achieve objectives are taken in a timely manner. A deficiency exists when the design, implementation, or operation of a control does not allow management or personnel to achieve control objectives or address related risks.", "While OPM internal controls provide some assurance of the reliability of EHRI payroll data, weaknesses in the design or implementation of certain control activities and monitoring controls for the EHRI payroll database increase the risk of reliability issues that may limit OPM’s ability to fully leverage the data in support of its mission. Specifically, (1) weaknesses in control activities have resulted in limited quality checks and acceptance of unreliable data into the EHRI payroll database; and (2) weaknesses in monitoring activities have resulted in failure to address these reliability issues and increased risk that these issues may compound over time. Table 1 lists these control components and related activities, along with an assessment of whether they provide reasonable assurance of OPM’s ability to achieve its objectives in these areas.\nOPM guidance includes requirements for automated controls in support of data quality, such as defining data parameters and tolerances, identifying data errors, checking for completeness, and taking corrective actions when necessary. According to EHRI documentation and OPM officials, automated edit checks are performed by the data system software to check the validity of individual data elements, the proper relationship of values among associated data elements, and data format specifications. The rules check the value and format of fields, including record identifying fields, such as birthdate and agency, as well as non-record identifying fields, such as hours of leave. Specifically, they check to make sure that fields are formatted as numbers, dates, or text, depending on the designed content of the field, and that all values in a field fall within a defined range of possible values. Further, OPM applies three relational edits to ensure (1) that actions taken to add an employee to the system are not associated with an employee already in the system, (2) that actions taken to correct a record are associated with an existing record, and (3) that actions taken to delete a record are associated with an existing record. See table 2 for a description of the fields that are checked, the rule that is applied, and the action taken if the rule identifies an error.\nData that fail OPM’s automated checks are considered errors, and the edit rules for the EHRI payroll system specify that data with error rates greater than 3 percent will not be accepted. However, according to OPM officials, the payroll data enters the EHRI Data Warehouse with very few other edits. OPM officials noted that they intend to define additional edits that could be applied to the payroll data during the data loading process. Federal standards for internal control state that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. However, due to the limited nature of these edits EHRI payroll data have a higher risk of data reliability issues that may limit OPM’s ability to fully leverage the data in support of its mission. For example, the results of our electronic testing of data from 2010-2015 found fields with missing data, logical errors, and out-of-range values. (For selected results of electronic testing of the data, see appendix I.)\nOPM’s automated rules also require the system to check the number of records for each agency every pay period, and are designed to reject submissions and generate an automated report for the service centers when the number of records has changed by more than 5 percent. While the reports are generated, OPM officials told us that resource constraints preclude them from having the same level of controls in place for the payroll data as they do for other EHRI data, including lack of capacity to follow up on missing payroll submissions. Federal standards for internal control state that management should evaluate information processing objectives to meet the defined information requirements, such as for completeness and accuracy. However, the EHRI payroll system accepted multiple submissions of data that should have been rejected by this rule. Specifically, our testing of the data found that, for nine separate pay periods in fiscal year 2014, payroll data records for agencies contained less than 1 percent of the affected agency’s total civilian workforce. In all, 17 of the 24 CFO Act agencies were affected by this problem at least once in fiscal year 2014 (see table 3). Without these data, government- wide analytics that cover any of these impacted dates will be similarly limited and incomplete.\nAlthough these submissions should have been flagged and rejected by OPM’s edit check for having a greater than 5 percent change in the number of records from one pay period to the next, OPM was unaware of the missing data until we identified the problem. This was due, in part, to inadequate monitoring controls, which are described in more detail below. In addition, while OPM designed these control activities to meet requirements for completeness and accuracy, the controls have not always met their objective and therefore do not provide sufficient assurance that completeness requirements will be achieved. Failing to evaluate information processing objectives to see if they meet the defined information requirements for completeness increases the risk that some EHRI payroll data will be unreliable.", "OPM has established roles and responsibilities for users and other controls safeguarding accountability for data quality and security, and maintains information on data access and use activity. As designed, these user controls are intended to provide reasonable assurance that control objectives will be achieved if OPM monitors them. According to OPM officials, EHRI payroll database users must complete an application to gain access and service provider points of contact are given access credentials once access forms are submitted and approved. Applications of users requiring administrative privileges on information system accounts receive additional scrutiny. In addition, OPM documentation establishes processes for updating the list of authorized users when accounts are created, deactivated, or deleted—for example, specifying that account passwords are to expire after 60 days and that accounts that are inactive for 60 days are to be deactivated.\nOPM has also designed controls to capture and save some metadata tied to data loading and data provider submissions and user access. Automated processes capture metadata on user access and those logs are stored in system audit tables which are archived on a monthly basis and retained indefinitely, according to OPM officials. Logs detailing access for the three most recent months are available online. Within the data warehouse program where payroll data reside, applications have auditing functionality for user activity which captures what the user did as well as what was accessed. Web application activity is also tracked, and logs are retained indefinitely. Reports issued to providers can be reconstituted in real time and this information can be used for investigation. However, OPM officials told us they have not used this information for such investigations or reviews. As a result of this incomplete implementation of access controls, OPM does not know whether these controls are working appropriately.", "The two primary sources of documentation that guide submissions of EHRI payroll data into the system—the Guide to Human Resources Reporting (GHRR), and the Guide to Data Standards Part B (GDS)—are not up-to-date and do not provide sufficient assurance that control objectives will be achieved. OPM relies on the service centers and agencies to assure the accuracy of payroll data submissions, as outlined in these documents. For example, the GHRR outlines each data element, its required format, and whether it must be included in the database. The GDS outlines the required format for submissions to EHRI, including the file content, notification of transmission to OPM, file naming conventions, and transmission frequency. The GDS also acknowledges that the edits outlined for service centers and agencies in that document constitute the minimum required level of quality control and encourages agencies to supplement them based on the specifics of their internal programs and operations. The GHRR was last updated July 2013 to reflect the inclusion of telework variables, but the GDS has not been updated since March 2012. Given the changes to the system and the control weaknesses noted above, OPM officials noted that all payroll data standards will have to be reworked to ensure they are robust for data collection and programming by the payroll providers. OPM officials did note their intention to update these guides to align with system, regulatory, and other changes, but did not have a detailed plan or timeframe for doing so. Federal standards for internal control state that management should document internal controls to ensure that all transactions, documentation, and records are properly managed and maintained. OPM cannot ensure that the data quality control changes made to the system are fully implemented without updating its guidance documents. Out-of-date documentation does not provide sufficient assurance that control objectives will be achieved. Until OPM updates this documentation, it faces increased risk that data submissions will not be consistent with current requirements and recent changes to the system, which could affect the reliability of data submissions.", "As described above, the EHRI payroll system is designed to reject data and produce data quality reports when data error rates exceed 3 percent or when the number of records at an agency changes by more than 5 percent from one pay period to the next. According to OPM officials, biweekly EHRI data quality control reports and error files are made available to payroll providers on the EHRI portal. This quality control reporting is kept in the EHRI Data Warehouse indefinitely and the quality control reports issued to providers can be reconstructed. The GHRR directs payroll providers to monitor these reports for deviations from previous norms and analyze them to identify potential issues in systems that gather and send EHRI data from the agency to OPM. OPM officials told us that they do not monitor these reports to identify and resolve problems, and resource constraints prevent the agency from following up with the payroll providers. While inconsistent implementation of control activities allowed incomplete data to be accepted by the EHRI system, this limitation in monitoring controls led these incomplete submissions to remain undetected and unaddressed by OPM. In addition, without timely review and correction of problems identified in these reports, OPM risks errors compounding with each biweekly data submission, as the error tolerance checks involve comparison of each new submission to the most recent submission, which itself may have been incomplete. Further, without timely identification and correction of such problems, missing data may not be recoverable. For example, in response to the missing data issue noted above, OPM contacted the relevant service centers to locate the missing files. However, service centers only retain data for 18 months from the original date of submission. If the controls were working as designed, the service center would have been required to provide a corrected submission before the end of this retention period, and OPM would have reasonable assurance that the data for these pay periods were complete. Because of the delay in identifying this error, when OPM finally did request the data from the service centers, corrected data submissions were expected to require a significant amount of work because the retention period had passed. OPM was unable to provide the data within the time frames of this engagement and it is unclear whether OPM will be able to retrieve the missing data from the relevant service centers. Federal standards for internal control state that management should establish monitoring activities for the internal control system and evaluate the results, and should remediate identified internal control deficiencies on a timely basis. Without appropriate efforts to review and respond to system generated reports, OPM does not have sufficient assurance that the control objective will be achieved and the risk of submissions of inaccurate or incomplete data is increased.", "While OPM’s internal controls provide some assurance of the reliability of some of the EHRI payroll data, the weaknesses in control activities (controls for completeness, accuracy, and validity of information processing and appropriate documentation) and monitoring controls (ongoing during normal operations) may increase the risk for data reliability issues to arise and persist in the EHRI payroll data. We have also identified several data reliability issues through electronic testing of EHRI payroll data, in past GAO work, and through interviews with OPM officials. Collectively, these issues present challenges for fully leveraging the EHRI data, and may limit OPM’s ability to utilize the data for some analyses in support of its mission and strategic goals.\nWe found a variety of potential data reliability issues from our electronic testing of EHRI payroll data, as illustrated in appendix I. In some cases, these issues indicate the potential for reliability issues that may limit OPM’s ability to fully leverage the data in support of its mission. For example, we found that the EHRI payroll data includes records for six entities that should not be in the system due to exemptions from OPM reporting requirements, as shown in table 4. When using EHRI payroll data, the unintentional inclusion of these entities could impact some analyses and limit OPM’s ability to draw valid conclusions from the data.\nWe also found a small number of instances of social security numbers being assigned to multiple EHRI records, as shown in table 5 below.\nWhen using EHRI Payroll data, this could indicate that some individuals appear in the data more than once, potentially impacting some analyses and limiting OPM’s ability to draw valid conclusions from the data.\nIn a 2014 report, we found that weakness in OPM’s documentation for transactions and internal controls led to inconsistent reporting of administrative leave data and inclusion of some excepted agencies’ data in payroll feeds. Specifically, in our report of agencies’ use of administrative leave we found differences between agencies’ leave recording practices and what OPM officials consider paid administrative leave. In response, OPM issued guidance to agencies to review how they record administrative leave and clarify that administrative leave should not be routinely used for an extended time. This guidance can help agencies and payroll providers to provide more consistent data on administrative leave, and improve the usefulness of EHRI payroll data for related analyses.\nOPM officials also told us about data reliability issues beyond those identified in this review. For example, OPM officials told us that, in 2015, they discovered a problem related to data on sick leave. Specifically, due to a programming error, the data received from payroll providers that sum the number of sick leave hours an employee used in a year was populating an unrelated field in the EHRI payroll database. As a result, according to OPM officials, the amount of sick leave an employee used in any given year was not accurate. One of these officials told us that this problem may also apply to other variables. This suggests that OPM’s edit checks, which were designed to maintain a minimum level of quality control, may not sufficiently reduce the risk of these types of errors.\nOPM officials told us they had plans to update EHRI security protocols, payroll documentation, testing for reliability issues, and data standards, but OPM has not documented these plans or created a schedule to implement them. For example, OPM officials told us that they planned to update their documentation beginning in FY 2016, working collaboratively with OPM’s program policy office, federal agencies, and shared service centers, and other stakeholders. Although the EHRI payroll data was not a part of the 2015 OPM data breach, agency officials told us that the agency is evaluating its current security posture and making necessary changes to protect the privacy and integrity of all the data they manage. According to OPM officials, these plans include preparing to deploy a new secure portal to applications and tools; improving use of encryption; masking and redaction when appropriate and prudent; consolidating data from multiple data sets into more secure databases; utilizing better and more secure user management tools and audit trail logging; and providing new forms of user authentication, among other potential security and access measures.\nOPM officials also said they are planning to correct the issue they had identified with the sick leave variable and that they were in the process of testing other variables to see if they had the same problem. However, OPM officials told us that these actions would require resources and reprioritization of the existing workload, and that a project plan and timeframes had not yet been developed. Further, OPM officials noted that the agency has a critical leadership role in addressing the complete data life cycle, and that agencies and service centers also play a critical role in assuring data quality. Accordingly, OPM officials said they were seeking a comprehensive solution that includes agency and service center actions to ensure accurate data are submitted to EHRI.\nAs yet, OPM has not linked EHRI payroll correction activities back to specific agency objectives or created a schedule for implementing these changes. GAO’s schedule assessment guide notes that a well-planned schedule is a fundamental management tool that can help government agencies gauge progress, identify and resolve potential problems, and determine the amount and timing of resource needs. Without a well- planned schedule—developed in consideration of how it will contribute to OPM’s objectives and risks—OPM may not be able to appropriately prioritize and execute the necessary changes.", "Although use of EHRI payroll data has been limited to date, it carries significant potential to support governmentwide accountability and human resource analytics and decision making. In our review of peer-reviewed journals we identified hundreds of articles on topics that correspond to EHRI payroll data fields. Unfortunately, however, EHRI payroll data will continue to be underutilized until—consistent with its own strategic and open data goals—OPM makes the data available to potential users, as it does other databases within the EHRI system. While data collection and storage is not without cost, EHRI’s centralized, standardized, and comprehensive features offer the promise of efficient, cost effective, and more precise analytics. In preparing the data to make them available, OPM will need to take steps to process and clean them as it does for the EHRI personnel data. This is the first step toward improved reliability. Our basic reliability testing suggests that several key fields in the EHRI payroll data are reasonably complete and contain data within expected ranges— and therefore could have potential to support research on these topics.\nHowever, while some fields in the current EHRI payroll data may be sufficiently reliable for certain types of audits and workforce analytics, other fields suffer from reliability issues that limit the range of purposes for which the data can be used. This is because OPM has not designed sufficient control activities to assure data quality, has not evaluated or consistently implemented the control activities it has designed, and has not updated key documentation to support quality submissions of data. Compounding these problems is OPM’s failure to monitor ongoing operations, for example, by reviewing system generated reports. Without timely identification and correction, data quality problems will continue undetected and remain uncorrected. While OPM officials noted their intention to address these shortcomings, they do not have plans with specific actions and time frames for doing so. Without a schedule specifying when these planned changes will be made, OPM officials will be unable to gauge progress, identify and resolve potential problems, or determine the amount and timing of resource needs related to the desired changes. As a result, OPM faces an increased risk of implementing ineffective or contradictory changes, and of facing delays in completing these activities. Until relevant changes are made, existing problems can continue to compound as data for 2 million federal civilian employees are received biweekly. Without available and reliable payroll data, OPM and others must continue to rely on data that are more costly, imprecise, or limited in scope—missing opportunities to leverage centralized, standardized data that is essential for accountability and well-informed management and policy decisions.", "GAO is making five recommendations to the Director of OPM.\nGAO recommends that the Director of OPM take the following action to support its strategic and open data goals: Improve the availability of the EHRI payroll data—for example, by preparing the data for analytics, making them available through online tools such as FedScope, and including them among the EHRI data sources on the OPM website and Data.gov.\nGAO recommends that the Director of OPM take the following two actions to improve internal controls for data quality:\nUpdate EHRI payroll database documentation to be consistent with current field definitions and requirements, including the Guide to Human Resources Reporting and the Guide to Data Standards, Part B; and\nConsistently monitor system-generated error and edit check reports and ensure that timely action is taken to address identified issues.\nGAO recommends that the Director of OPM take the following two actions to integrate the payroll data into the larger suite of EHRI databases:\nDevelop a schedule for executing these plans; and\nEvaluate existing internal control activities and develop new control activities for EHRI payroll data, such as implementing transactional edit checks that leverage the information in the other EHRI datasets.", "We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Director of OPM. OPM agreed with our recommendations. In its comments (reproduced in appendix III), OPM noted that a lasting and effective solution for enhancing the quality of payroll data requires consistent data quality not just in the “last mile” after delivery to the EHRI system, but also at the origination of the data. OPM also noted that implementation of these recommendations will require collaboration between various stakeholders and appropriate resources. We agree. As we note in the report, while payroll processing is more consolidated than in the past, agencies still use a variety of time and attendance (TA) systems, which can vary in the level of detail with which work or leave time is recorded depending on agency policies and systems. In addition, there are variations in the systems and processes of the payroll providers. These variations across agencies and across payroll providers underscore the importance of updated documentation for reporting and consistent monitoring of error reports. In addition, through its leadership role in the OPM-managed Human Resources Line of Business, OPM can consider action for ensuring data quality—for example, by including data quality indicators among its performance measures for the payroll providers. OPM also provided technical comments which we incorporated, as appropriate.\nWe will send copies to the appropriate congressional addressees and the Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, as well as to other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2700 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. The names of GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.", "This Appendix presents selected results from our electronic testing of the EHRI payroll data. The results are grouped into three categories: (1) tests for missing data, (2) tests for logical errors, and (3) tests for potentially invalid values. 1. Missing Data Tests Incomplete data can limit both the ability to conduct desired analyses and the usefulness of any analysis conducted. For example, if a large amount of data is missing, as was the case with data missing for entire agencies for some pay periods, it may not be possible to complete analysis of that agency for the missing periods. If a smaller proportion of data is missing, analysis may still be possible. However, any analysis completed using these data will be limited in its accuracy and validity, which may increase the risk of drawing inappropriate or invalid conclusions.\nBecause the EHRI payroll data have been identified as potentially useful for government-wide studies of telework behavior, we tested for missing data in telework-related fields. As shown in table 6, we found data in these fields to be missing entirely in 2011 and largely incomplete in 2012, years for which reporting on this variable was not required by OPM. The percentage missing is based on the number of records without values out of all records within a fiscal year. As a result, estimates of governmentwide telework participation, as shown in table 7, are likely to be inaccurate for these years. 2. Logical Error Tests Logical testing can reveal data reliability issues among and within individual records. For example, logical testing can assess whether there are duplicates among records in the data system. Our electronic testing assessed whether there were duplicate records in the EHRI payroll data. We also looked for records with multiple payments, either from the same agency or from different agencies, in a single pay period—a form of duplication that could also indicate problems with data reliability. As shown in tables 8, 9, 10, and 11, we found no instances of a complete duplicate records, few instances of EHRI IDs associated with more than one social security number, and that generally less than 1 percent of records were associated with multiple payments in a single pay period.\nLogical testing can also uncover data reliability issues within individual records. As shown in table 12, we found a number of variables with questionable values, given the values of other variables for the same record. For example, we found instances where the amount of annual leave used was greater than the amount available, and other instances where the data indicate an agency contribution to Federal Employee Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) for an employee who has not made a contribution. In both cases, this should not be possible under typical circumstances, and may indicate a data reliability issue. 3. Outlier and Out of Range Tests Tests for invalid formats and values can reveal obvious errors about data. For example, as shown in table 13, we tested the format of the social security numbers (SSN) in EHRI, which should all be nine digit numbers, and found some cases where these numbers were not properly formatted, indicating a potential data reliability issue that could prevent analysis of individuals when attempting to match SSNs.\nWe also tested the values of fields in the EHRI payroll data to determine whether any records were outside of the expected ranges. As shown in table 14, we found several variables where the minimum value was below the expected possible floor or the maximum value was above the expected ceiling. For example we found a maximum value for Student Loan Repayments of $100,000, which is well above the expected ceiling for such payments. We also found that the lowest minimum value for total salary in a pay period was negative $99,140, while all salary values should generally be positive for normal records (non “correction” records).", "Data reliability assessments—a process consistent with internal control standards—gather and evaluate the information needed to determine whether data can be used to answer specific research questions. In this context, reliability means that data are reasonably complete and accurate to answer the intended questions that OPM, agencies, policy organizations, and academics might have about the federal workforce. Reliability assessments are specific to the context of the particular characteristics of the research project and the risk associated with the possibility of using insufficiently reliable data. Errors are considered acceptable if the associated risk has been assessed and a conclusion reached that the errors are not substantial enough to cause a reasonable person, aware of the errors, to doubt a finding, conclusion, or recommendation based on the data. To determine whether data are sufficiently reliable for a specific research purpose, one must consider the expected importance of the data in the final report; corroborating evidence; level of risk of using the data; and the results of assessment work conducted to date.\nCompleteness, accuracy, and validity are all components of reliability.\nCompleteness refers to the extent to which relevant records are present and the fields in each record are populated appropriately. For example, are the payroll records for all on-board employees at an agency recorded for every pay period within the calendar year?\nAccuracy refers to the extent to which recorded data reflect the actual underlying information. For example, do the recorded hours of annual leave in an employee’s payroll record accurately reflect the number of annual leave hours they reported in their time and attendance form?\nValidity, for the purposes of this report, refers to whether the data actually represent what is being measured. For example, if we are measuring the extent of overtime in the federal government and we use a field that records a certain type of administratively uncontrollable overtime, does that represent the extent of overtime use or might there be other ways overtime is recorded?\nData reliability assessments as a process include (1) reviewing existing information about the data and conducting interviews with officials from the entity or entities that collect the data, (2) reviewing selected system controls, and (3) performing tests on the data, such as advanced electronic analysis and tracing to and from source documents.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made important contributions to this report: Sidney Schwartz, Director; Rebecca Shea, Assistant Director; Russ Burnett; Steven Putansu; David Blanding, Hiwotte Amare; Joanna Berry; Amy Bowser; Tim Carr; Melinda Cordero; Sara Daleski; Lorraine Ettaro; Dani Greene; Donna Miller; Laura Pacheco; and Jeffrey Schmerling." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "h0_title h2_title", "h0_full h2_full", "h0_full h2_full", "", "h0_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What characterizes the relationship between EHRI payroll data and OPM?", "Why is this the case?", "What is the purpose of EHRI payroll data?", "What is the goal of this centralized and standardized source of pay?", "What is the consequence of limitations on data availability?", "Why does the OPM's internal controls for the EHRI payroll data need to be addressed?", "What did GAO's assessment find regarding the internal controls for the data?", "Specifically, what weaknesses did GAO find?", "Why is it necessary for OPM to address these weaknesses?", "What is the task of OPM?", "How does OPM use EHRI?", "What information do payroll data provide?", "How is this data used?", "On what does the usability of this data depend?" ], "summary": [ "The Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) payroll data are not fully supporting the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) strategic and open data goals.", "This is because OPM has not taken the steps necessary to make the data widely available for use by other agencies and researchers.", "EHRI payroll data are intended to provide a centralized, standardized, and comprehensive source of pay and leave related data across the federal government.", "In this capacity, these data have the potential to provide a more efficient, cost effective, and precise data source for federal agencies and researchers who wish to assess human resources and policy decision making across the federal government.", "Because these data are not widely available, federal agencies and researchers must rely on other proxy sources for payroll data, which are more limited in the scope of analysis they can provide or the level of detail needed for data-driven human capital studies.", "Although some elements of the data are sufficiently reliable for general use, weaknesses in OPM's internal controls for the EHRI payroll data will need to be addressed to enhance the reliability of other data elements.", "As shown in the table below, GAO's assessment of key internal control activities that are critical to ensuring the reliability of the EHRI payroll data found a number of areas where there is insufficient assurance that the control objective will be achieved.", "These weaknesses increase the risk of data errors, incomplete data fields, and ineffective monitoring of the EHRI payroll data.", "Unless OPM takes steps to correct these internal control weaknesses, it will be unable to fully leverage these data to meet its mission and allow others to make full use of these data for their research needs.", "OPM is tasked with supporting federal agencies' human capital management activities, which includes ensuring that agencies have the data needed to make staffing and resource decisions to support their missions.", "The EHRI system is OPM's primary data warehouse to support these efforts. The payroll database—one of the four databases in the EHRI system—became operational in 2009.", "Payroll data provide information on federal employees' pay and benefits and how they allocate their time, as reflected in hours charged to work activities and use of leave.", "EHRI data are essential to governmentwide human resource management and evaluation of federal employment policies, practices, and costs.", "The ability to capitalize on this information is dependent, in part, on the reliability of the collected data." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, -1, 1, 2, -1, 0, -1, 2, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
CRS_R41415	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Background", "The Basic Structure and Operation of Peer-To-Peer File Sharing Networks", "Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Cases", "Case Law Surrounding Statutory Damages for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing of Copyrighted Works", "Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset", "Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum", "Reactions and Implications" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Many users of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks have been subjected to copyright infringement lawsuits regarding the unauthorized uploading and downloading of copyrighted material. The vast majority of these lawsuits have settled, with the file sharer agreeing to pay compensation to the copyright holders. Several of the cases have resulted in default judgments against the defendants or summary judgment motions in favor of the plaintiffs. However, a few of these cases have gone to trial, and two cases in particular resulted in substantial jury awards to the plaintiffs. Those jury awards, based on the Copyright Act's statutory damages provision, were later reduced by federal judges who found the awards to be grossly excessive and unjust, and even a violation of the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause. This report provides an overview of this type of copyright infringement, explains the Copyright Act's statutory damages provision, and reviews the recent P2P file sharing litigation.", "Copyright is a federal grant of legal protection for certain works of creative expression, including books, movies, photographs, and music. A copyright holder possesses several exclusive legal entitlements under the Copyright Act, including the right to control reproduction and distribution of the protected material. Unauthorized use of a copyrighted work by a third party in a manner that implicates one of the copyright holder's exclusive rights constitutes infringement. The copyright holder may file a lawsuit against an alleged infringer for a violation of any of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright. The Copyright Act provides several civil remedies to the copyright holder that is harmed by infringement, including the possibility of obtaining injunctive relief, actual damages suffered by the copyright owner due to the infringement, statutory damages, and costs and attorney fees.", "File sharing software programs that create P2P network connections between computers enable the transmission of data and communications over the Internet. A variety of P2P programs are typically available for free download from the distributors' websites. After installing a P2P program (called a \"client application\") onto the computer, the user runs the application to connect to the computers of other users of that particular P2P software who are currently \"on-line.\" The client application allows users to \"share\" files located on their computer hard-drives. Once users make files available for sharing with each other, anyone who uses the same company's software to connect to the respective P2P network may locate and download desired files easily and at no cost. For example, a user of the LimeWire software can directly access files saved on another LimeWire user's computer hard-drive. Or a user can search for a particular file name, such as an MP3 song title, across all users' computers connected to the LimeWire network, and then download a copy of that file onto his or her computer.\nWhile P2P file sharing technology could be used for legitimate purposes, the overwhelming majority of files available for sharing on peer-to-peer networks are copyrighted works —digital files that are electronic copies of copyrighted sound recordings, television shows, and motion pictures. Uploading and downloading of these copyrighted works without the authorization of the copyright holders using P2P file sharing technology is a violation of the copyright holders' exclusive rights to control the reproduction and distribution of their works.", "The Copyright Act imposes a remedy of actual damages \"as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement.\" The copyright holder may also elect to obtain statutory damages prior to final judgment in the case, rather than actual damages. These statutory damages do not require proof of actual damages and create a range of $750 to $30,000 per infringed work upon a finding of copyright infringement, as the court considers just. If the infringement is found to be willful, the Copyright Act permits \"enhanced\" statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work.\nThe remedy of statutory damages for copyright infringement was adopted by the First Congress in the Copyright Act of 1790; with subsequent revisions of the Copyright Act, Congress retained the statutory damages provision and increased the authorized amounts. According to the Supreme Court, statutory damages \"give the owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits.\" In addition to this compensatory purpose, statutory damages also serve to punish the infringer and deter others from infringement. The most recent increase in the statutory damages amount range occurred when Congress passed the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999. According to the legislative history of this statute, Congress deemed the increase necessary because,\nBy the turn of the century the Internet is projected to have more than 200 million users, and the development of new technology will create additional incentive for copyright thieves to steal protected works.... Many computer users are either ignorant that copyright laws apply to Internet activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for their conduct. Also, many infringers do not consider the current copyright infringement penalties a real threat and continue infringing, even after a copyright owner puts them on notice that their actions constitute infringement and that they should stop the activity or face legal action. In light of this disturbing trend, it is manifest that Congress respond appropriately with updated penalties to dissuade such conduct.…\nCourts and juries must be able to render awards that deter others from infringing intellectual property rights. It is important that the cost of infringement substantially exceed the costs of compliance, so that persons who use or distribute intellectual property have a strong incentive to abide by the copyright laws.\nDefendants in cases involving a jury's award of particularly large statutory damages have challenged the award as unconstitutional, arguing that a statutory award that far exceeds the harm suffered by the plaintiff constitutes a deprivation of due process. Historically, judicial review of statutory damages has been assessed under the standard the Supreme Court outlined in a 1919 decision, St. Louis, I.M. & S. Railway Co. v. Williams . This standard is quite deferential and overrules an award within a statutory range only when it is \"so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.\" Elements the court considers are whether Congress has given \"due regard for the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence to [the law].\" In Williams, the plaintiffs had sued a railroad that charged them 66 cents more than the statutorily prescribed fare. The state law under which the plaintiffs brought suit allowed a statutory damages award of between $50 to $300 for each overcharge. Each plaintiff was awarded statutory damages of $75, for a violation that resulted in actual damages of only 66 cents—approximately 114 times greater than the damages each plaintiff had incurred. The Supreme Court found that the awarded damages did not violate due process and upheld the constitutionality of the court's award.", "In 2009 and 2010, federal juries in Minnesota and Massachusetts returned particularly large verdicts on non-commercial entities undertaking peer-to-peer file sharing of copyrighted sound recordings based upon the statutory damages range for copyright infringement. However, the judges in these cases subsequently decreased the awards based on common law doctrines and also the U.S. Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. These large damages awards by the juries, and their reduction by the judges, have been the subject of much debate among commentators and also the courts. These cases will be discussed below.", "In Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset , the defendant Thomas-Rasset had used the popular peer-to-peer file sharing program Kazaa to download at least 24 copyrighted sound recordings to her computer and then had made those digitized music files available for \"sharing\" (downloading) to other Kazaa users. The jury found her guilty of willful copyright infringement and awarded to the plaintiff (recording companies that owned or controlled exclusive rights to copyrights in the sound recordings) $1.92 million in statutory damages ($80,000 per infringed song). Thomas-Rasset appealed the jury's damages award, arguing that it was either (1) violative of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) excessive and shocking, resulting in the necessity of remittitur to the minimum statutory damages amount of $750 per copyright infringement; or (3) excessive and shocking, resulting in the necessity of a new trial.\nThe United States filed a memorandum in the case in defense of the constitutionality of the Copyright Act's statutory damages provision. First, the United States argued that the court should decide the propriety of the verdict based upon non-constitutional grounds before relying upon the Due Process Clause, unless the constitutional question \"is necessary to decide a case before it.\" These non-constitutional grounds, according to the government, include the admission of further evidence or the common law doctrine of remittitur. Furthermore, even if the Due Process Clause must be relied upon, according to the government, the proper standard for evaluating the statutory damages range, and the jury's award, was the Williams test described above, and not the Supreme Court's more recent punitive damages jurisprudence (as the defendant had argued). Punitive damages and statutory damages, according to the government, were distinct because punitive damages are awarded to punish a wrongdoer, while statutory damages \"exist in large part to compensate victims of wrongdoing in areas where actual damages are difficult to calculate or prove.\" As a result, through a \"carefully crafted statute,\" and based upon the distinct policy rationale surrounding statutory damages, the government argued that the due process concerns surrounding punitive damages (namely, fair notice and unconstrained discretion ) were not implicated for copyright infringement because the damages provision put individuals on notice of a specific range of damages to which they may be subject. The government also argued that the punitive damages \"guidepost\" analysis provided by the Supreme Court in the BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore case was ill-fitted to the context of statutory damages for copyright infringement—the ratio for discerning punitive versus actual damages would be difficult to discern because statutory damages \"are in fact, a substitute or proxy for actual damages … in which actual damages are hard quantify.\"\nInstead, the government argued that the Copyright Act's statutory damages range satisfies the Williams test because it\nestablished a regime to protect intellectual property that dates back to before the beginning of the Republic. The current damages range provides compensation for copyright owners because … there exist situations in which actual damages are hard to quantify. Furthermore … Congress took into account the need to deter the millions of users of new media from infringing copyrights in an environment where many violators believe that they will go unnoticed.\nAs such, the government maintained that the court should defer to Congress's reasoned judgment.\nThe court reduced the jury's award considerably, from $1.92 million down to $54,000, noting that the award of $54,000 was still \"significant and harsh\" but is \"no longer monstrous and shocking.\" In making this decision, the court avoided the constitutional question and instead employed the common law doctrine of remittitur. Remittitur is ordered when a \"verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. A verdict is not considered excessive unless there is plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking result.\" This doctrine can be employed based upon the trial court's own reading of all the evidence presented. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it lacked the power to remit an award of statutory damages because of the plaintiff's right under the U.S. Constitution's Seventh Amendment to a jury trial regarding statutory damages. According to the court, the Seventh Amendment merely requires that if remittitur is ordered, the plaintiffs be given \"the option of choosing to reject the remittitur and exercise their right to a new jury trial solely on the issue of damages.\" The court found that statutory damages for copyright infringement serve both \"deterrent and compensatory components.\" As such, while the plaintiff did not need to prove actual damages for an award of statutory damages, \"statutory damages should bear some relation to the actual damages suffered.\" The court found factual support for an infliction of actual damages as well as evidence of willfulness and the need for deterrence; however, it maintained that \"these facts simply cannot justify a $2 million verdict in this case.\" Critical to the court's analysis was the fact that Thomas-Rasset was not a business acting for profit but an individual consumer acting illegally \"seeking free access to music for her own use.\"\nAs a result, according to the court, the need for deterrence through a large damages award was not as essential because of the lack of profits accruing to the defendant. Her infringing conduct was \"for the sole purpose of obtaining free music.\" The court also found that the damages award was excessive in relation to the justified expenditures the plaintiffs must undertake in pursuing infringers. As a result, employing the maximum recovery rule to preserve the jury's wide discretion, or reducing the damages to the \"maximum amount the jury could properly have awarded,\" the court chose to award three times the statutory minimum per infringement ($750), or $2,250 per infringement. While such an award formula is not in the express provisions of the Copyright Act, the court reached this \"most reasoned solution\" through a process of analogy to other statutes that make available treble damages from the statutory minimum upon willful violation, including the Patent Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The court rejected the defendant's request for an imposition of the statutory minimum of $750 per infringement. This was due to the defendant's far-reaching damage to the recording industry through distribution, as well as her willful behavior of denying responsibility and lying on the witness stand. The $750 minimum, according to the court, was set as a floor, \"even without a finding of willfulness,\" resulting in the need for additional deterrence against deliberate online piracy.\nThe plaintiffs were given seven days from the date of the court's order reducing the damages to decide whether to accept the remittitur or to request a new trial on the issue of damages. The plaintiffs rejected the remittitur on the grounds that it \"could be read to set a new standard for statutory damages, essentially capping those damages at three times the minimum statutory amount of $750 ... for any noncommercial individuals who illegally download and upload music.\" This, according to the plaintiffs, removes discretion from the jury to award a higher amount in appropriate circumstances. The plaintiffs argued that the Copyright Act did not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial infringers, and that it was within the province of Congress, not the courts, to fashion a limit on damages for a particular type of infringer or type of infringement. Congress, according to the plaintiffs, directly addressed this issue, and the court's remittitur \"ignores the harm caused by [non-commercial] infringers,\" because they can cause as much damage as commercial infringers through the multiplier effect of decentralized peer-to-peer services. The plaintiffs also argued that the remittitur award did not take into account the particular facts of Thomas-Rasset's case. According to the plaintiffs, the court had improperly relied on statutory authority outside of the Copyright Act to craft a \"three times the minimum statutory damages\" provision applicable to the case, in a manner that Congress did not authorize.\nAfter a new trial on the issue of damages was held, the jury awarded $1.5 million in statutory damages ($62,500 per song) to the record labels on November 3, 2010. On December 6, the defendant filed a motion asking the court to reduce the statutory damages to zero, arguing that the award violates the Due Process Clause \"because it bears no reasonable relationship to the actual damages that the defendant caused.\" She claimed that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of any identifiable harm specifically caused by her file sharing; therefore, in her view, \"even an award of the minimum statutory damages permitted by the Copyright Act would be unconstitutional.\" The district court has not yet ruled on this motion as of the date of this report.", "In 2007, several record companies sued Joel Tenenbaum, a student at Boston University, seeking more than $1 million in statutory damages for his use of peer-to-peer file sharing resulting in the downloading and distribution of 30 songs. Tenenbaum was found guilty of willful copyright infringement, and the jury awarded $675,000 in statutory damages. Tenenbaum appealed this award, arguing that the damages award was unconstitutionally excessive under the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. He also argued that the award was grossly excessive and should be lowered under the common law doctrine of remittitur.\nLike in the Thomas-Rasset case, the United States again intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statutory damages provision. The government stated almost verbatim its arguments from Thomas-Rasset . The United States did, however, add to its argument in stating that the broad societal undertaking of peer-to-peer file sharing, resulting in copyright infringement, \"demonstrated the necessity of providing strong deterrence towards others who think their actions go undetected.\" The defendant, according to the government, exemplified this concern in continuing to download and share copyrighted music for at least three years, despite his knowledge that the activity was illegal. The government noted that the \"Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that Congress may adjust the amount of statutory damages to the public wrong rather than the public injury.\"\nThe court, however, agreed with the defendant. The court maintained that it was impossible to avoid the constitutional question because remittitur required the plaintiffs to cooperate, which they failed to do in the case. According to the court,\nThe plaintiffs in this case, however, made it abundantly clear that they were, to put it mildly, going for broke. They stated in open court that they likely would not accept a remitted award. And at a retrial on the issue of damages, I would again be presented with the very constitutional issues that the remittitur procedure was designed to avoid.\nAs such, the court analyzed the constitutional question and ruled that, in its view, the proper standard to apply with respect to a due process challenge to a statutory damages award was not the historically deferential Williams standard (as the plaintiffs and the U.S. government had argued), but rather the Supreme Court's more recent punitive damages jurisprudence as expressed in the BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore case . The court found that,\nAlthough Williams upheld the constitutionality of the Arkansas jury's awards, it recognized the possibility that civil damages may in some instances be so excessive as to violate the Constitution. Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has built on this insight by constructing a rather elaborate doctrinal framework for testing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.\nIn other words, the court ignored the distinction between punitive and statutory damages in holding that they had the same constitutional underpinnings of due process. This led the court to analyze the jury's verdict under the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. First the court surveyed this jurisprudence, which is briefly described below.\nThe Supreme Court's 1996 decision, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, established three standards, or guideposts, to \"identify constitutionally excessive\" punitive damages awards. In this decision, the jury had awarded actual damages of $4,000 and punitive damages of $2 million because BMW repainted damage on new cars without disclosing the repair to consumers. According to the Court, the punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause because, at 500 times greater than the plaintiff's actual damages, the amount was grossly excessive. The Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause protects against \"judgments without notice\" of the unlawful conduct and \"the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.\" The Court then prescribed three guideposts by which a punitive damages award should be judged to determine if it is grossly excessive: (1) \"the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,\" (2) the reasonableness of the ratio of the punitive damages award \"to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff,\" and (3) comparability (i.e., \"the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases\"). The BMW Court held that the degree of reprehensibility is the \"most important indicia of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.\" The Court also determined that a \"high degree of culpability\" was necessary for substantial punitive damages. Additionally, the Court reiterated the statement that \"the proper inquiry is 'whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred.'\"\nAfter reviewing the BMW case and other Supreme Court jurisprudence in punitive damages, the Tenenbaum court proceeded to apply the BMW guideposts to the statutory damages award in this case. Before doing so, however, the court acknowledged that unlike a typical case in which punitive damages are awarded, the jury's award in this case fell within a range that had been authorized by Congress, and that the maximum and minimum amount of statutory damages that could be imposed for each act of infringement was expressly provided by statute. Nevertheless, the court stated that \"there should be some nexus between the jury's statutory damages award and the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and the profits, if any, obtained by the defendant.\" In the opinion of the court, the jury's statutory damages award must not be grossly excessive in relation to the government's legitimate interests in prescribing the awards (compensating copyright owners and deterring infringement).\nTurning to the analysis outlined in BMW , the court held that the third comparability guidepost was not satisfied. While satisfying a range of damages set forth in the Copyright Act, this range was for all copyright cases and \"does not mean that the members of Congress who approved the language of section 504(c) intended to sanction the eye-popping award imposed in this case .\" Looking to the most recent 1999 amendments to the Copyright Act's statutory damages section, the court stated that \"it is far from clear that Congress contemplated that a damages award as extraordinarily high as the one assessed in this case would ever be imposed on an ordinary individual engaged in\" non-commercial peer-to-peer file sharing of music. For this determination, the court cited (1) the fact that the amendments were introduced prior to the release of Napster and (2) the House Judiciary Committee's report on an early version of the legislation. The Judiciary Committee report, according to the court, showed that the 1999 amendments were linked to large scale software piracy for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain, not non-profit individual file sharers. According to the court, \"Congress did not foresee that section 504(c) would be used to mulct individual file sharers such as Tenenbaum in damages.\" In addition, the court cited the fact that at two separate Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, two sponsors of the 1999 amendments, engaged in downloading copyrighted sound recordings for demonstration purposes, which they described as qualifying as \"fair use\" because it was carried out for education and governmental purposes. The senators also marveled at the development of the peer-to-peer software Gnutella and praised the founder of Napster, Shawn Fanning. While acknowledging that these statements are not authoritative statements of Congress, the court held that the statements suggest that the Senators \"did not view such downloading as particularly reprehensible\" and that they \"did not anticipate that the statutory damages scheme over which [the] committee had jurisdiction would be applied to users of Napster and other peer-to-peer networks.\"\nAs a result, the court further inquired and looked to other jury awards of statutory damages for copyright infringement to discover whether Tenenbaum's award was significantly out of line with other awards; if so, the award would not be reasonably related to the government's objectives and would be unconstitutionally excessive. The court compared the award in Tenenbaum's case to the award in Thomas-Rasset and found that the cases were similar based upon the number of acts, willfulness, and culpability. According to the court, both knew that file-sharing was illegal and continued, refused to accept responsibility, gave false statements under oath, and tried to shift blame to others. As a result, the court held the award in Tenenbaum's case should be roughly the same as the award in Thomas-Rasset . The court also considered the award in Tenenbaum's case to be excessive when compared with other peer-to-peer copyright infringement cases where the parties settled or a default judgment was awarded in cases. In those cases, the court noted, the infringer did not commit willful conduct and the minimum statutory damage of $750 per infringed work was often imposed. The court also cited the much lower damages that are typically imposed on commercial entities, such as restaurants and bars, that have benefitted financially by broadcasting music in their establishments without first obtaining a license.\nMoving to the second BMW ratio guidepost the court held that while actual damages are difficult to assess in copyright infringement cases, \"there must be some relationship between the jury's verdict and the damages the plaintiffs incurred and the benefits Tenenbaum gained through his infringements.\" Otherwise, according to the court, (1) a chilling effect would occur, deterring socially beneficial activities that run some risk of giving rise to liability for copyright infringement or (2) a risk of unfair and exorbitant settlements could arise. The court held that its analysis was limited to Tenenbaum's individual conduct, the benefits he derived from that conduct, and the harm that he caused, not the harm that other infringers caused. The court viewed Tenenbaum's conduct in isolation and found that his harm merely constituted the loss in profit to the record companies had he bought the individual songs in question legally. The court found the loss in profit in comparison with the damages award to be an excessive ratio and held that Tenenbaum's conduct in isolation did not have a significant impact on the plaintiffs' profit. The court surmised that \"the individuals who downloaded songs from Tenenbaum's shared folder would simply have found another free source for the songs had Tenenbaum never engaged in file-sharing.\"\nThe court also ruled that the benefit Tenenbaum received by infringing the copyrights could not justify the jury's award. Tenenbaum had received no pecuniary gain; his \"profit\" was the \"ability to access an essentially unlimited variety of music on demand.\" This, according to the court, did not justify the jury's award, even when the lack of detection for Tenenbaum's activity is taken into account, because \"most individuals are risk averse, adequate deterrence can undoubtedly be obtained with an award that is much, much lower.\" The court also rejected as a basis for the jury's award the Copyright Act's emphasis on compensating copyright owners for the costs entailed in investigating and detecting infringing behavior. This was because upon the owner's devotion of resources and investigation to detect a single act of infringement \"the marginal cost of detecting additional act of infringement is likely low since the investigation of the file sharer's account ... will generally reveal a treasure trove of unlawfully downloaded works.\" Finally, the court rejected the jury's verdict on the grounds that the statutory damages scheme of the Copyright Act was not proportionate in subjecting those that download one song and those that download 1,000 songs to the same damages.\nTurning lastly to the first and most important BMW guidepost, the court found that several factors weighed in Tenenbaum's favor. This included the fact that the harm he caused was economic rather than physical; the harm did not evince an indifference or recklessness towards the health or safety of others; and the plaintiffs were not financially vulnerable, but large recording companies. Other factors, according to the court, however, militated against Tenenbaum, notably his continued willful conduct and engagement in thousands of acts of infringement despite knowledge of the acts illegality, lying under oath, and blame shifting. While noting that file sharing was \"fairly low on the totem pole of reprehensible conduct,\" the court opined that \"among this group of comparatively venial offenders, Tenenbaum is one of the most blameworthy.\"\nAs a result, based upon its analysis using the BMW guideposts, the court held that the jury's award violated the Due Process Clause because it had no rational relationship to the government's interest in compensating copyright owners and deterring infringement. The court also determined that the award could not be upheld even under the Williams standard because it was \"so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.\" The court maintained that the plaintiffs suffered approximately $1 in actual damages for each song that Tenenbaum had downloaded, yet the jury awarded the plaintiffs $22,500 per song, resulting in a statutory-to-actual-damages ratio of 22,500:1. With the benefits that Tenenbaum derived from file sharing taken into account, approximately $1,500, the ratio of statutory damages to Tenenbaum's \"profits\" was 450:1, or about four times the ratio involved in the Williams case. The court further based its decision upon the fact that \"Tenenbaum was an ordinary young adult engaging in noncommercial file-sharing, not a wealthy railroad bilking customers for its own profit.\" Adopting the reasoning of Thomas-Rasset that had embraced the \"long tradition in the law of allowing treble damages for willful misconduct,\" the court reduced the jury's unconstitutional $675,000 award to three times the statutory minimum, for a total of $67,500 ($2,250 per song). The court attempted to counter anticipated objections to the adoption of $2,250 as a cap on the statutory damages range in P2P file sharing cases because \"this criticism applies to any line drawing process; it is always possible to argue that the line should have been drawn a bit differently.\"\nThe plaintiffs in the Tene n baum case have appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.", "In a case concerning statutory damages in copyright cases (although not involving peer-to-peer file sharing), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court has never decided whether its recent punitive damages jurisprudence ( BMW and its progeny) applies to awards of statutory damages. The appellate court stated that until the Supreme Court applies BMW to an award of statutory damages, the earlier Williams standard is to be used when evaluating the constitutionality of statutory damage awards. However, this appellate decision from 2007 was not binding on the Thomas-Rasset or Tenenbaum courts, as neither of those courts are within the Sixth Circuit (they are within the Eighth and First, respectively—the appellate courts of which have not yet directly addressed the issue).\nSome observers have been critical of the legal reasoning of the Tenenbaum opinion —in particular, three assumptions that had been made by the judge in reaching her conclusions:\n1. There is no constitutional difference between punitive damages and statutory damages; thus, the BMW case is relevant to a case involving an award of statutory damages. 2. Congress did not intend statutory damages to be imposed on non-commercial infringers whose infringement only caused minimal economic harm on copyright holders. 3. Three times the minimum statutory damages amount is the constitutional limit in peer-to-peer file sharing cases.\nCritics of the opinion argue that the Tenenbaum decision \"significantly erodes Congress' power to set the acceptable range of damages in copyright and indeed all civil cases.\" Others, however, have praised the Tenenbaum decision as one that \"helps bring copyright infringement damages awards back down to earth.\"\nWhile Tenenbaum is on appeal, the lower court's decision may have several immediate consequences for copyright infringement cases. Those that involve statutory damages may well require more time and money of the litigants, as \"every copyright infringement defendant can advance a non-frivolous argument that statutory damages in [his/her] case would be unconstitutional.\" Also, because the Tenenbaum (and Thomas-Rasset) court had ruled that there must be some relationship between actual damages and the amount of statutory damages that is awarded, it may be difficult for some copyright plaintiffs to enforce their rights, as they must make some showing of the actual harm that they have suffered from the infringement—a potentially difficult and expensive task, especially in the context of digital media and file sharing. Thus, some copyright holders may be more reluctant to bring cases against non-commercial file sharers. Another possible impact of Tenenbaum is that courts may choose to follow the \"three times the statutory minimum damages\" formulation as a de facto standard in determining statutory damages in certain copyright cases—perhaps limited only to the context of peer-to-peer file sharing, although some courts may extend this standard to other infringing activity.\nAs both of these cases await further judicial developments, this area of copyright law promises to continue to be in an unsettled state. Other federal courts of appeal could also directly address the issue, or Congress could take action to resolve the matter legislatively—to date, however, no related legislation has been introduced." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h1_full", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full", "h2_title h3_title", "h3_full h2_full", "h2_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How widely can statutory damage costs vary under the Copyright Act?", "What power does Congress grant the copyright owner?", "What purposes do statutory damages serve?", "What do P2P file sharing networks allow?", "How are these networks often used illegally?", ":What has happened to many P2P networks as a result of this activity within their networks?", "How have users of these networks likewise seen repercussions due to their activity within these networks?", ":What has happened in most of these lawsuits?", "What was the result of Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset?", "How was the result of this trial similar to Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum?", "What did defendants in each case ask of the judges?", "How did each case played out after the defendant's requests?", "What was the result of the Thomas-Rasset case?", "What did the judge opine, and how did the plaintiffs respond?", "How was the verdict altered as a result of the new trial?", "How did the defendant respond?" ], "summary": [ "The Copyright Act allows statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000 for each act of infringement, and up to $150,000 in cases where the infringement is committed willfully.", "Congress granted the copyright owner the power to choose to recover either statutory damages or the owner's actual damages plus additional profits of the infringer at any time before final judgment is rendered.", "Statutory damages serve both compensatory and deterrent purposes: they provide the copyright owner with restitution of profit and reparation for the harm suffered by the owner in situations where it may be difficult or impossible to submit evidence of actual damages (such as lost profits), and they also punish the infringer and discourage that individual, and others, from further infringement.", "Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks permit computer users to \"share\" with others digital files that are stored on their computers' hard drives.", "While P2P file sharing technology could be used for legitimate purposes, P2P users most often copy and distribute digital files that contain copyrighted sound recordings, television shows, and motion pictures, without the permission of (or payment to) the copyright holders; as such, it is a violation of the copyright holders' exclusive rights to control the reproduction and distribution of their works.", "P2P networks such as Napster, Grokster, Morpheus, Kazaa, and LimeWire have all been sued for copyright infringement or for inducing their users to commit copyright infringement, and most have shut down or changed their business models as a consequence of their adjudged legal liability.", "In addition, many users of P2P networks have been subjected to copyright infringement lawsuits filed by the motion picture and music recording industry associations that represent movie and sound recording copyright holders, respectively.", "The vast majority of these lawsuits have settled, with the file sharer agreeing to pay compensation to the copyright holders. However, a few of these cases have gone to trial, and two cases in particular resulted in substantial statutory damage awards.", "In 2009, in Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset, the jury found the defendant guilty of willful copyright infringement with respect to 24 sound recordings that she had downloaded and distributed using the P2P file sharing software Kazaa, and awarded $1.92 million in statutory damages to the plaintiff ($80,000 per infringed song).", "Also in 2009, the jury in Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum found the defendant guilty of willful infringement for downloading and distributing 30 sound recordings using Kazaa, and awarded to the plaintiff $675,000 in statutory damages ($22,500 per infringed song).", "The defendants in these cases asked their judges to alter or amend the jury award of statutory damages, arguing that the Copyright Act's statutory damages provision, as applied to them, violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.", "The judge in the Tenenbaum case ruled that the $675,000 award was \"unconstitutionally excessive\" and reduced the award to $67,500 ($2,250 per song). The plaintiffs in the Tenenbaum case have appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.", "The judge in the Thomas-Rasset case reduced the original award of nearly $2 million to $54,000 ($2,250 per song) using his power under the common law doctrine of remittitur; the court did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the jury's damages award.", "The judge opined that \"statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages.\" However, the plaintiffs refused to accept the remittitur.", "After a new trial on the issue of statutory damages was held, the jury on November 3, 2010, returned a verdict of $1.5 million ($62,500 per song).", "A month later, the defendant filed a motion with the court to reduce the statutory damages to zero because she argued the award of statutory damages was unconstitutional. The district court has not yet ruled on this motion." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 1, 1, 1, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 0, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3 ] }
CRS_R43105	{ "title": [ "", "The United States, Europe, and Transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)", "Scope of the Report", "European Policies in the MENA Region", "European Interests and Perspectives", "Role of the European Union and its Member States", "Past EU Policies: Focus on Stability", "Revising EU Policies: \"More for More\"", "EU Responses to Change in Selected MENA Countries15", "Tunisia and Egypt", "Morocco and Jordan", "Libya and Syria", "U.S. Policies in the MENA Region25", "U.S. Interests and Perspectives", "Political Development, Diplomatic Initiatives, and U.S. Foreign Assistance", "Economic Development and Trade Initiatives", "Congressional Views", "Prospects for U.S.-EU Cooperation", "Diplomatic Contacts and Ongoing Efforts", "The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)", "The Deauville Partnership", "The International Monetary Fund (IMF)", "Possible Future U.S.-EU Approaches39", "Challenges Ahead", "Related CRS Reports" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Over the last two years, U.S. policymakers, many Members of Congress, and their European counterparts have struggled with how best to respond to the swift pace of change in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Fueled by deeply rooted economic, social, and political frustrations, popular uprisings began in Tunisia in late 2010 and quickly spread to Egypt and Libya in early 2011. In all three of these countries, this so-called \"Arab Spring\" or \"Arab Awakening\" led to the downfall of autocratic leaders in power for decades. Such events also encouraged some citizens in Morocco and Jordan to press the existing monarchies for further political and constitutional reforms. And in Syria, demonstrations challenging the ruling Asad regime triggered a brutal government response that has since escalated into a civil war, in which tens of thousands have been killed.\nAlmost immediately after the onset of the \"Arab Spring,\" analysts on both sides of the Atlantic began calling for robust U.S.-European cooperation to help promote a more peaceful and prosperous MENA region. Those of this view noted that the United States and Europe share a multitude of common concerns in the region (from countering terrorism to guaranteeing a reliable flow of energy exports), and similar interests in ensuring that the transitions underway result in more open and democratically accountable governments, greater economic opportunities, and long-term stability and security. These experts argued that greater transatlantic cooperation, in particular between the United States and the European Union (EU), would enable both sides to leverage one another's strengths, ensure synergy in trade and development policies, and prevent a duplication of diplomatic and economic resources at a time when the United States and Europe are each facing their own political and economic challenges. Despite significant cultural, historical, and geopolitical differences, some commentators early on drew analogies with the way the United States and its West European allies worked together to support the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.\nIn light of the sweeping changes, U.S. and European officials alike asserted their intentions to pursue policies in the MENA region that emphasized supporting democratic and economic reforms to a greater degree than before in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. At the same time, some observers have criticized U.S. and European responses to date as modest at best. Although only one gauge, analysts point out that the bulk of EU financial assistance for the MENA countries for 2011-2013 was budgeted prior to the start of the \"Arab Spring,\" and that U.S. financial support for the transitions in the MENA region over the last two years has largely come from reallocating funding from existing programs.\nExperts contend that stronger EU efforts toward the MENA region have been hindered by different member state policy preferences and competing priorities, such as managing the Eurozone financial crisis. Similarly, many note that the United States has been constrained in its response by its own economic and budgetary problems, a growing sense of \"intervention fatigue\" among the American public after more than a decade of war, and policy debates over the appropriate design and funding level for assistance programs in the region. For example, although the Obama Administration requested new funding to support the changes underway in the MENA region for FY2013, congressional approval of this request was largely derailed by broader disagreements over the U.S. budget and how to handle the national debt. Some analysts suggest that the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya—which resulted in the death of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans—may also weaken the U.S. political appetite for robust engagement in the MENA region.\nAmid such political and fiscal realities, several commentators have suggested that U.S.-European cooperation may be crucial to providing a significant, effective, and complementary package of Western economic and political support to help shape a positive outcome for the MENA region as a whole. The United States and the EU already share a dynamic political and economic relationship, and the United States often looks to the EU for partnership on an extensive range of global challenges. For years, many Members of Congress have called for European allies and friends—both in NATO and the EU—to shoulder a greater degree of the burden in protecting shared interests and addressing common challenges, including many of those emanating from the greater Middle East.\nHowever, others contend that despite the possible benefits of greater U.S.-European coordination toward the Middle East and North Africa, it is likely to remain a lofty and elusive goal. Both the United States and Europe face inherent difficulties in dealing with a changed political landscape in the MENA region in which new actors and unsettled conditions make for considerable uncertainty. As events unfold in the region, potential U.S.-European policy differences—on issues ranging from how best to encourage Egypt's democratic progress and prevent state failure, to how to manage the role of Islamist parties, or what to do about the deteriorating situation in Syria—could arise and complicate the prospects for closer U.S.-European cooperation. Some U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress may also be cautious about working too closely with European governments or the EU if doing so might constrain U.S. policy choices toward the MENA countries or U.S. options in managing challenges elsewhere in the region.\nFurthermore, experts note that the United States and its European partners are limited in what they can or should do to influence events in the region. Past U.S. and European policies that emphasized stability and good relations with autocratic regimes may continue to taint public perceptions in the MENA countries. Others point out that too much Western involvement could be counterproductive if perceived as an attempt to protect U.S.-European interests at the expense of the aspirations of local populations, or if used by some MENA leaders to deflect blame for domestic and regional problems. And some note that the United States and Europe do not have the same tools or global standing as they did when seeking to bolster the transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War—that is, the ability to provide significant economic incentives to the MENA countries given current domestic financial concerns, or to offer a European or transatlantic \"perspective\" in the form of EU and/or NATO membership.", "This report provides a broad overview of European and U.S. responses to the changes in six MENA countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, and Syria). European countries have different histories and relationships in the MENA region, but much of the European response to the events of the last two years has been focused through the EU. As such, the report emphasizes EU efforts, although it also discusses how bilateral member state relations are influencing EU policy.\nAll six of the MENA countries discussed in this report are either part of or considered eligible for the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)—the centerpiece of EU efforts in the region. Discussion of U.S. and European policies toward most of these countries is focused on measures aimed at promoting political reform, good governance, and economic development. The report does not address U.S. and EU policies toward Algeria (although future iterations may do so should reform efforts there gain more momentum), the Middle East peace process, or Gulf states such as Yemen and Bahrain (which are not included in the EU's ENP).\nThe final section of the report describes the current status of U.S.-European efforts to coordinate political and economic policies toward the MENA region, including ongoing diplomatic contact and U.S.-European initiatives to promote a more coherent international response through institutions such as the G8, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund (especially with respect to Egypt). It also presents an array of potential areas and options for further U.S.-European cooperation, and discusses possible challenges and pitfalls to the United States and Europe working more closely together in the MENA region in the future.", "Europe's geographic proximity to and history with the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the nature of its economic ties, shape its relations with the region in ways that are distinct from those of the United States. Over the years, the European Union has established an array of formal policies that seek to guide its relations and those of its member states with the MENA region. Many critics contend, however, that the EU in the past focused more on promoting stability and protecting economic interests—prioritizing concerns such as controlling migration, fighting terrorism, and ensuring access to energy supplies—at the expense of pressuring governments in the MENA region to reform.\nEU policies toward the transformations in the Middle East and North Africa continue to evolve in response to ongoing events. In general, however, the EU has been seeking to impose greater conditionality in its relations with the MENA countries in the wake of the \"Arab Spring,\" offering more financial support and closer ties to those countries more committed to instituting political and economic reforms. But some experts contend that despite such rhetoric, EU policies toward the Middle East and North Africa remain largely the same as before, and many stress that the EU's influence on events in the region is limited by a variety of factors.", "Europe and the MENA region have a long and complex history, and some MENA countries were once European colonies. Today, most European leaders and EU policymakers view the Middle East and North Africa as part of Europe's \"backyard.\" They consider stability in the region as key to Europe's own political and economic security for several reasons.\nFirst, Europe's geographic proximity to the MENA region makes it the destination of choice for many refugees and migrants fleeing political repression or economic hardship. The political upheaval and unrest in North Africa and parts of the Middle East in early 2011 at the start of the \"Arab Spring\" sparked new refugee flows, especially from Tunisia and Libya, to European countries such as Italy, France, and Malta. Although these refugee flows were relatively small and soon dissipated as the former regimes crumbled, they were a stark reminder for many in Europe about the potential for problems and instability in the MENA region to spill over into Europe.\nSecond, a number of European countries (including France, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, and the Netherlands) have large immigrant populations or diaspora communities with roots in various MENA countries (especially Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria). Some experts assert that the presence in Europe of these diaspora communities, many of which are predominantly Muslim, makes unrest or conflict in the Middle East not just a foreign policy concern but also a domestic one for European governments. Over the last four decades, for example, groups or individuals with ties to the MENA region have carried out or planned terrorist attacks in Europe; although some incidents have been driven by grievances related to colonial legacies, others have been linked to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict or opposition to European foreign policies (especially those aimed at the \"war against terrorism\" that are perceived by some Muslims as a \"war against Islam\"). Studies also indicate that upticks in anti-Semitic attacks in Europe, many of which have been committed by disenfranchised Muslim youth in recent years, often correspond to surges in violence or unrest in the Middle East.\nThird, Europe's dependency on the region's natural resources, especially oil, and its extensive trade ties with many MENA countries, engender significant European economic interests in the MENA area. The EU is the largest trading partner for most of the MENA countries that border the Southern Mediterranean (and which take part in or are eligible for the EU's European Neighborhood Policy), and has free trade agreements with many of them. Oil and trade in manufactured goods currently account for the biggest portion of trade between the EU and the MENA region.\nAs Table 1 shows, in 2012, total EU trade in goods with the Southern Mediterranean countries was valued at over $241 billion, with exports and imports nearly in balance. In comparison, the EU exports more than four times as much to these countries and imports almost three times as much from them as does the United States. Some European officials and business leaders believe that additional economic development in these MENA countries would increase their potential as European export markets. Finally, many European policymakers view stability in the Middle East and North Africa as imperative for ensuring a reliable flow of energy exports and commercial transit in and through the region given that it straddles key maritime trading routes and links Europe commercially to Asia and the Persian Gulf.", "For many years, European countries have supported a strong EU role in managing European relations with the Middle East and North Africa, believing that the EU's collective political and economic weight provides greater clout and influence in dealing with the region. The EU has sought to develop common policies toward the MENA countries in order to encourage the political and economic conditions seen as necessary for long-term stability and prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean. Some analysts question, however, the degree to which the EU has succeeded in keeping the policies of its individual member states on the same page.\nUndoubtedly, bilateral member state relations with the MENA countries play a significant part in shaping EU policies toward the region. EU member states have their own national interests, historical relationships, and regional priorities in the Middle East and North Africa. Although the EU strives for consensus and foreign policy coordination in the MENA region, each EU member state retains its own national foreign and defense policy, and commercial ties or military relations are often managed country-to-country. For example, EU member states that border the Mediterranean tend to have greater political and economic interests in the region than do the Nordic countries. As such, the differing national priorities of the various member states may generate conflicting policy preferences and commercial rivalries, and at times, complicate the formulation of common EU policies toward the MENA region.\nIn the early part of 2011, some experts suggested that close relations between certain EU member states and authoritarian governments in the MENA region led to what they viewed as the EU's slow response to the changes underway, as well as to a number of incidents considered embarrassing for member state governments. The French foreign minister, for example, was forced to resign in February 2011 amid revelations about her personal ties to members of the former Tunisian regime. In addition, as the Qadhafi regime began a violent campaign against the Libyan opposition in February 2011, media sources reported that member state governments had issued a total of €343.7 million worth of arms export licenses and shipped €173.9 million of arms exports to Libya in 2009. The licenses included approximately €160 million for small arms and electronic jamming equipment, and Italy, the former colonial power in Libya, granted nearly €108 million in export licenses for military aircraft and related equipment. In 2010, EU member states approved €531 million of arms export licenses to the governments of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.", "For much of the last decade, the EU's European Neighborhood Policy has served as the focal point for EU efforts to engage many of the MENA countries. The ENP was launched in 2004 to coincide with the addition of 10 new EU member states; it aimed to develop deeper political and economic relations with a \"ring of friends,\" that is, countries in close proximity to an enlarged Union. The ENP was proposed to 6 countries on the EU's eastern periphery, and 10 countries or entities to the EU's south along the shores of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Tunisia).\nThe ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country. It offers an enhanced relationship with the EU—including enhanced trade and economic ties, increased mobility, and foreign aid and technical assistance—in return for a demonstrated commitment to EU values such as the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and market economy principles. To date, however, the ENP is not yet fully \"activated\" for Algeria, Syria, or Libya, and EU relations with each are at different stages of development.\nSince 1995, the EU has also sought to engage in regional, multilateral cooperation with the MENA countries on common political, economic, and social challenges through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (formerly known as the Barcelona Process). In addition to fostering greater stability and prosperity, many hoped that this initiative would complement the Middle East peace process by helping to build trust and confidence among all the Mediterranean partners, including Israel and the Palestinians. In 2008, the Barcelona Process was re-launched as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in an effort to reinvigorate the initiative; emphasis in the UfM has been placed on cooperative projects in the areas of economic development, the environment, energy, health, migration, and culture.\nAlthough supporters maintain that the ENP and the UfM provide avenues through which the EU can advocate for the adoption of common political and economic values, others assert that these initiatives have failed to produce any significant reforms in the MENA countries. Critics contend that many MENA citizens have long viewed EU policies in the region as seeking to exploit their markets while backing stable, yet autocratic regimes. Libya's Qadhafi regime, in particular, was viewed as a key partner in controlling migration from Africa to Europe, and the renewed focus of many Europeans on migration issues related to the \"Arab Spring\" has presumably reaffirmed regional perceptions of European priorities to some extent. Observers note that perceived past policy trade-offs of values for interests and long-standing relations with autocrats may continue to taint views of Europe among the populations of transitioning MENA countries. Many also point out that cooperation in the UfM (like the Barcelona Process before it) has been at least partially stalled by the stalemate in the Middle East peace process and tense Arab-Israeli relations.", "Although the long-term conditions leading to the events of the \"Arab Spring\" were well known to observers of the region, the exact timing and sequence of developments were not anticipated. European officials, too, appeared to be caught unprepared as events quickly outpaced the relevance of the EU's policy approach. Consequently, EU officials acknowledged the need to dramatically reassess the ENP and have sought to develop a more values-oriented, conditionality-based ENP, with terms and incentives linked more tightly to the implementation of democratic reforms and free market economic principles. In mid-2011, the EU outlined this \"more for more\" approach by unveiling a revised ENP (\"A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood\") that will apply to all ENP partners on both the EU's eastern and southern borders, and a new \"Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,\" which sets out EU priorities and a roadmap for their implementation in the southern ENP countries.\nOver the last two years, the EU has stressed that ENP partner countries that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater EU support. EU officials have also asserted that for those partners that stall or retrench on agreed reform plans, EU support will be reallocated or refocused. EU efforts in the region now focus on three key goals:\nPromoting \"deep democracy\" (i.e., building respect for the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and basic human rights) and institution-building; Fostering civil society and encouraging more people-to-people contacts; and Boosting economic growth, development, and job creation, especially by supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and expanding trade and investment relations.\nTo promote these goals, the EU has devised incentives for the MENA countries largely organized around the three broad themes of \"money, markets, and mobility,\" also known as the \"3Ms.\" EU leaders maintain that these incentives will be deployed following the \"more for more\" principle. (See the text box on the next page for details on the \"3Ms.\")\nFrom a diplomatic and organizational perspective, the EU has sought to improve its capacity to respond to the changes in the MENA region by taking steps to enhance dialogue and improve the provision of its financial assistance. In July 2011, the EU appointed Bernardino Leon to a newly created position as the EU's Special Representative to the Southern Mediterranean. Leon's primary responsibility has been to coordinate the EU's response to countries in transition in the MENA region. Leon's remit includes not only Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, which have undergone regime change, but also Jordan and Morocco, given their efforts to institute political and economic reforms. The EU has also developed a \"task force\" concept for countries in the MENA region, bringing together officials from the MENA countries with those from the EU and its member states, international financial institutions, the private sector, and civil society. These task forces seek to better identify a given country's political and financial needs and to coordinate offers of assistance from the international community. To date, EU task forces have been launched with Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt.\nIn addition, the EU has established a European Endowment for Democracy (EED), similar to the long-established U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, to help support political actors striving for democratic change. The EED is to function as a private foundation in both the EU's southern and eastern neighborhoods. Proponents argue that its independence should allow the EED to respond to new developments quickly and with greater flexibility. After a slow start-up process due to prolonged debates about the structure of the foundation, the EED has reportedly raised about €16 million, including an initial allocation of €6 million from the European Commission in November 2012, plus €5 million from Poland, whose foreign minister originally proposed the idea in early 2011. Additional member state pledges are expected.\nNevertheless, some analysts suggest that EU commitments to a \"new approach\" to the MENA region and the revised ENP have merely amounted to a re-branding of existing practices, and note that to a large extent, the EU has continued to rely on the technical components and bureaucratic process of the ENP. These critics argue that EU leaders do not possess the political will to impose true conditionality in their relationships in the MENA region, especially if that essentially results in a deterioration of relations with some countries. For example, they contend that despite what some view as backsliding in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia on political reforms, the EU has not withheld or reduced its foreign assistance to those countries. Other experts question the use of conditionality by the EU in the MENA region, viewing it as less valuable and possibly off-putting in countries where change and reform came about as a result of domestic, not external, pressure.\nMany experts also point out that the EU's capacity to shape the Southern Mediterranean's future is severely limited. Many observe that in contrast to the EU's ability to encourage political and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, the EU does not have the same incentives available today with respect to the MENA region. Perhaps most obvious is that EU membership is not an option for the MENA countries because they are not part of Europe. The prospect of EU (and NATO) membership for the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe—and the extensive political and economic reforms required of these countries in order to permit their accession to the EU (and/or NATO)—are viewed by many analysts as key factors in transforming most of these countries into stable democracies and more affluent societies.\nIn addition, the Eurozone crisis and the resulting political fall-out in many European governments continues to consume EU policymakers' time and attention, and has put severe pressure on European treasuries. As such, providing large-scale EU financial assistance for the MENA region is unlikely to be politically possible in the near term. Many EU governments have imposed or are considering austerity measures, and European publics do not appear to support spending significantly more money abroad given their economic problems at home. Although the EU has allocated some additional financial support in response to the events of the \"Arab Spring,\" many commentators view it as relatively marginal, and analysts note that it is not of the same magnitude as that committed to Central and Eastern Europe after the revolutions of 1989, or to the countries of the Balkans following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Critics assert that the additional incentives the EU has offered in the form of \"money, markets, and mobility\" are inadequate to meet the immense needs of the region.\nMoreover, skeptics question the feasibility of certain EU incentives. For example, some experts doubt that any MENA countries will actually be able to conclude Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas—intended to further liberalize trade in goods, services, and investment with the EU (see text box above on the \"3Ms\")—given the complex EU rules and demands embedded in them. In addition, analysts point out that several possible EU incentives can only be delivered if agreed to by the member states. However, a number of EU governments are unenthusiastic about certain measures—such as greater trade liberalization in the agricultural sector or visa liberalization in the mobility field—viewing them as too politically sensitive because they could impinge on national interests or conflict with key domestic sectors.", "Although the MENA countries share a number of significant common challenges, each also has its own particular set of circumstances, and the relationship of individual countries with the EU varies. The EU therefore has a differentiated approach to each MENA country, with relations defined by Association Agreements (AAs) and ENP Action Plans. Association Agreements are bilateral in nature; they set out a broad framework for political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation between the EU and each partner country. AAs are considered treaties, and must be ratified by both the EU and the partner country; they usually include free trade agreements for industrial goods and serve as the basis for the gradual liberalization of trade between the EU and the partner country. An Association Agreement must be completed before a country can participate in the ENP.\nCentral to the ENP are bilateral Action Plans, which set out specific political and economic reforms and priorities in the short and medium term. In contrast to AAs, Action Plans are political documents, and reflect agreement between the EU and each European Neighborhood Policy partner country on the objectives and priorities for future relations. The EU may also grant a partner country \"advanced status\" relations or a \"privileged partnership\" to reflect the EU's satisfaction with political, economic, and social conditions and reform efforts in the partner country. An \"advanced status\" relationship or \"privileged partnership\" may allow for cooperation in a wider number of areas, increased EU aid, and privileged access to the EU market for the partner country's industrial and agricultural goods.\nCountries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco have received EU economic support since joining the ENP through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (the EU financial instrument that provides the main source of funding for the ENP). In general, EU financial support referred to in this section for the period 2011-2013 does not represent entirely new funds allocated specifically in response to the \"Arab Spring.\" Rather, while EU support may now have been increased or re-directed in response to events, initial EU funding levels were budgeted in advance as multi-year allocations that continued previous support committed in national ENP Action Plans. Libya and Syria are considered eligible for the ENP, but as noted above, the ENP is not fully activated for either of these countries, and EU relations with Syria are largely suspended at present.", "EU relations with Tunisia and Egypt are framed by Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans established prior to the events of the \"Arab Spring.\" Following the overthrow of longtime leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, the EU has supported democratization and economic modernization efforts in both countries. Although some European leaders and publics worry about the rise of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt, the EU and most member states maintain that they welcome any truly democratically elected government that embraces inclusivity, respects the rule of law and human rights, and is responsible and accountable to the people it serves.\nEU cooperation with Tunisia has been particularly close since the demise of the former regime of Ben Ali. For much of the last two years, the EU has viewed Tunisia as making tangible progress on political reforms and has touted its enhanced relations with Tunisia as a key example of its \"more for more\" approach. An EU observer mission helped monitor Tunisia's October 2011 elections for a Constituent Assembly, which the EU praised as largely free and fair. Among other measures taken in support of the transition in Tunisia, the EU has:\nIncreased its planned financial assistance to Tunisia for the period 2011-2013 from an initial €240 million to €400 million; this includes €20 million for the poorest areas of Tunisia in order to improve living conditions, provide access to microfinance, and create jobs; Established a joint EU-Tunisia Task Force to bring together officials from the EU, Tunisia, and international financial institutions to improve dialogue and the delivery of political and economic support; Launched a dialogue with Tunisia on migration, mobility, and security issues; Begun preparatory work with Tunisia on establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; and Concluded a \"privileged partnership\" with Tunisia in November 2012, signifying a deepening of relations across a wide range of political and economic areas, and announced an agreement to launch negotiations on an air services accord to help boost Tunisia's tourism sector.\nIn early 2013, however, EU officials became alarmed by rising political tensions in the country. In particular, the EU has expressed concern about the February 2013 killing of a prominent Tunisian opposition leader and the increasing number of violent acts committed by extremist groups.\nSome experts view the EU's response to the changes in Egypt as more tentative. Following the end of the Mubarak regime, the EU was hopeful that Egypt's transition from military to civilian rule would proceed relatively quickly, but EU leaders were dismayed by its slow pace during 2011 and much of 2012. The EU re-directed some previously allocated ENP funding (€150 million per year for 2011-2013) in response to the political changes, but did not immediately allocate new funding. The EU provided technical assistance to Egyptian election officials for parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011-2012 and supported voter education through civil society organizations. In December 2011, the EU approved a negotiating directive for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Egypt, but preliminary work has yet to begin. EU-Egypt frictions rose in early 2012 following Egypt's arrest of personnel affiliated with U.S., Egyptian, and European nongovernmental organizations engaged in democracy promotion.\nAmid Egypt's ongoing economic problems and Egyptian President Morsi's moves to decrease the role of the military in government, the EU appears to have enhanced its support for Egypt. In November 2012, an EU-Egypt Task Force was established. The EU, together with the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also pledged a combined additional financial package of roughly €5 billion in grants, loans, and concessional loans for the 2012-2013 period; a significant portion of this pledged funding, however, is conditional on Egypt concluding a deal on a loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund and on implementing substantive economic reforms. At the same time, EU officials and many Members of the European Parliament remain concerned about Egypt's progress toward democracy, the Morsi government's respect for human rights (including freedom of expression), the independence of the judiciary, and rising societal and sectarian tensions.", "Neither Morocco nor Jordan have experienced political upheaval on the scale of Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya, but both have responded to domestic pressures by initiating a process of gradual—though some would argue limited—political reform. The EU has been strongly supportive of the reform initiatives in both countries. Some observers assert that the pace and nature of change in Morocco and Jordan align with the EU's strengths and preferences, and the EU has, for the most part, been able to maintain its established approach to the two countries. Others criticize the EU for not being more forward-thinking in its relations with Morocco and Jordan, and still view EU efforts as shying away from vigorously encouraging more political reforms in the interest of preserving stable monarchies that are friendly to EU and European interests.\nMorocco is the largest recipient of ENP funds, with €580.5 million initially budgeted for 2011-2013 to support five priority areas: the development of social policies; economic modernization; institution-building; good governance and human rights; and environmental protection. In 2008, Morocco became the first Southern Mediterranean country to be granted \"advanced status\" in its relations with the EU. In November 2011, the EU deployed a team of election experts to assess Morocco's parliamentary elections. Among recent measures aimed at bolstering and further encouraging Morocco's reform efforts, the EU has:\nAllocated an additional €80 million to Morocco for projects in the human rights, governance, and socioeconomic fields; Launched a dialogue with Morocco on migration, mobility, and security issues; Approved a new accord that will expand Morocco's existing free trade agreement with the EU in goods to include preferential market access for agricultural and fisheries products; and Begun negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.\nJordan was upgraded to an \"advanced status\" partnership with the EU in 2010. For 2011, the EU increased its planned allocation of €71 million in assistance to Jordan to €111 million, bringing forward funds that were part of €223 million in aid initially budgeted for Jordan in 2011-2013 to support small- and medium-sized enterprises, innovation, and public financial management reform. In February 2012, the EU announced it would make an extra €70 million available (in two tranches) to support small businesses, vocational training, and good governance, and thus increasing total EU assistance to Jordan to almost €300 million for 2011-2013; EU officials stressed that the release of the second tranche would be linked to progress on democratic reforms. In January 2013, an EU election observer mission was deployed to help monitor Jordan's legislative elections, which initial EU assessments deemed to be in line with democratic standards. Over the last year, the EU has also:\nEstablished a joint EU-Jordanian Task Force; Started a dialogue with Jordan on migration, mobility, and security issues; and Begun preliminary work on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.\nThe EU remains concerned, however, about Jordan's deteriorating economic situation, due in part to the unrest in Egypt and especially, Syria. The EU is considering a €200 million Jordanian request for macro-financial assistance (which would likely be provided as a loan). The EU has also provided €137 million in humanitarian and other financial assistance since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis to help Jordanian authorities deal with the large influx of Syrian refugees.", "As noted previously, the EU has always considered both Libya and Syria as eligible for membership in the ENP, but the ENP mechanisms for these two countries have not been fully activated due to the lack of a prerequisite Association Agreement.\nRegarding Libya , the EU began informal and limited cooperation with the former Qadhafi regime in 2004 (following the lifting of international sanctions that had been imposed for two decades) and provided small amounts of financial and technical assistance related to migration and health issues. With the Qadhafi regime apparently uninterested in joining the ENP, negotiations on a Framework Agreement—a less intense contractual arrangement than an Association Agreement—began in 2008 to formalize EU-Libya relations. These negotiations were suspended, however, in February 2011 following the outbreak of hostilities between rebels and forces loyal to Qadhafi.\nAs the United Nations began debating whether to authorize a military intervention against the Qadhafi regime, EU member states (21 of which also belong to NATO) were unable to form a consensus regarding the use of military force. France and the UK played a leading role in the 2011 NATO air operation in Libya; Germany, after abstaining from the U.N. Security Council vote that authorized force, was not among the operation's participants. During the conflict, the EU and its member states provided roughly €155 million in humanitarian assistance (of which €80.5 million was from the EU itself), and set up a liaison office in Benghazi in support of Libya's Transitional National Council (TNC).\nIn October 2011, following the fall of Qadhafi, the EU announced that it stood ready to resume negotiations on a Framework Agreement with Libya's new government at an appropriate time. In 2012, an EU monitoring mission observed Libya's July elections, and the EU established a training program on parliamentary and constitutional process for Libya's new National General Congress. The EU is preparing to deploy a civilian border management mission to Libya under its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in June 2013.\nPrior to the revolution, the EU had budgeted €60 million in financial and technical support to Libya for the period 2011-2013, but this was suspended during the hostilities. Since the demise of the Qadhafi regime, the EU has been working with the TNC to conduct various need assessments and direct EU funding to areas such as health, migration, border management, the security sector, human rights, democratization, public administration, and the media. The EU put in place a package of short-term assistance measures at the end of 2011 worth €39 million, and has announced it will provide at least €68 million for 2012-2013.\nAs for Syria , the escalation of the conflict into a civil war (in which an estimated 70,000 people have been killed) has become a matter of central concern for the EU, the United States, and the international community. The EU negotiated an Association Agreement with Syria in 2004, and the draft was revised in 2008, but progress on its formal approval was put on hold by the EU in 2011 in response to the Syrian regime's violent response to anti-government protestors. Since then, the EU has taken a leading international role in condemning the Asad regime's actions, and has progressively introduced an extensive set of sanctions aimed at pressuring the regime to agree to a ceasefire and negotiate a political solution (see Table 3 ).\nThe EU had budgeted €129 million in bilateral assistance to Syria for the period 2011-2013, but all bilateral cooperation has been suspended. Financing and loan disbursements from the European Investment Bank have also been suspended. In December 2012, the EU recognized the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the \"legitimate representative\" of the Syrian people. EU members France and Britain extended bilateral recognition to the group. To date, the EU and its member states have provided €626 million in humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees and civilians remaining in Syria (€265 million from the EU's humanitarian assistance budget and over €361 million from the member states).\nEuropean policymakers have debated arming the Syrian rebels and possible military intervention, but many have remained reluctant to pursue either option. In early 2013, the UK and France began seeking to lift the EU arms embargo on Syria in order to arm opposition forces; given a lack of consensus at the EU foreign ministers' meeting in late May, the arms embargo was allowed to expire despite strenuous objections from a number of member states. As a result, arms exports to the opposition may be authorized on a national, case-by-case basis, with safeguards intended to prevent misuse, although member states also agreed to refrain from such deliveries pending a review of the situation in August 2013. European countries have thus far provided non-lethal equipment, humanitarian assistance, and some training. In April 2013, the EU eased a number of its sanctions in order to help the opposition and the Syrian population, allowing member states to authorize oil-related transactions and investments after consultation with the opposition National Coalition.", "In the wake of the \"Arab Spring,\" the U.S. government, like its European counterparts and the EU, has been examining long-standing U.S. policies in the Middle East and North Africa. This section provides a broad overview of U.S. policy in the region. It focuses largely on U.S. initiatives to encourage post-transition political and economic development in the MENA countries and highlights similarities and differences with European efforts to provide a basis for comparison when considering prospects for future U.S.-European cooperation. U.S. programs and policies described in this section should be considered illustrative, rather than exhaustive.", "For decades, U.S. policy in the Middle East and North Africa has largely focused on promoting stability and security. Although U.S. officials also sought to encourage political reforms, protect human rights, and foster economic growth in the region, many experts viewed these U.S. goals as largely secondary, and at times, sacrificed to preserve cooperation with autocratic allies. For example, the United States maintained a strategic partnership with Egypt's former Mubarak regime as a means of ensuring Egyptian-Israeli peace and combating terrorism, despite the regime's stifling of internal dissent. Some U.S. policymakers and analysts, along with many in Europe, also doubted that any Western attempts to promote democracy in the region would succeed, given the political history and lack of civil society in many MENA countries. Meanwhile, others in both the United States and Europe feared that the introduction of democratic reforms in these countries could lead to anti-Western factions, including Islamists, winning elections.\nOver the last two years, however, the United States has declared its intention to put greater emphasis than in the past on supporting democratic transitions, economic development, and the aspirations of the people of the MENA region. In a speech in May 2011, President Barack Obama asserted that the United States \"respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding voices to be heard, even if we disagree with them. We look forward to working with all who embrace genuine and inclusive democracy\"; he also set out a new framework for U.S. policy toward the MENA region \"based on ensuring financial stability, promoting reform, and integrating competitive markets with each other and the global economy.\"\nFor many Europe-watchers, the degree to which President Obama highlighted working with the international community, particularly the EU, to help the transitions underway in the MENA region was particularly notable. Such measures outlined by the President in his May 2011 address included U.S. support for expanding the mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the launch of a U.S. Trade and Investment Partnership for the Middle East, in possible cooperation with the EU; and U.S. efforts to work with international partners and multilateral financial institutions to provide economic assistance to the MENA region (for more information on these initiatives, see \" Prospects for U.S.-EU Cooperation \" below).", "The United States has sought to respond to the transitions in the MENA region with a mix of diplomatic outreach, political engagement, and foreign aid. Initially by utilizing the State Department's existing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID-OTI), U.S. officials and contract personnel worked directly with emerging political groups and civil society organizations in countries such as Tunisia and Libya. In Egypt, however, efforts in 2011 to expand U.S. democracy-support programs were strained by resistance from the former military transitional government, and severely dampened by police raids on U.S. and European non-governmental organizations engaged in democracy promotion in early 2012.\nIn September 2011, the State Department established an Office for Middle East Transitions, led by Special Coordinator Ambassador William Taylor. This office has responsibility for managing U.S. outreach and transition support for Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. It also coordinates U.S. engagement with international partners, including European allies and the EU, aimed at promoting political change and economic growth in the MENA region. Jordan and Morocco, however, are not included in Ambassador Taylor's mandate because they have not experienced regime change. U.S. policy toward Jordan and Morocco seeks to balance continued support for the ruling monarchies in those countries with efforts to encourage political and economic reforms.\nThe Obama Administration has also reallocated portions of U.S. aid to support the transitions throughout the MENA region. For example, a Middle East Response Fund/Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MERF/MENA-IF) was created from unobligated FY2011 and FY2012 Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations to support democratic and economic reforms. According to the U.S. State Department, in response to the events of the \"Arab Spring,\" over $1.5 billion in total was identified in FY2011 and FY2012 from existing bilateral program accounts and other sources; this amount could presumably include humanitarian aid and security assistance, in addition to activities aimed at promoting democracy and economic opportunities.\nIn its FY2013 budget request, the Obama Administration proposed $770 million over five years for the MENA-IF in order to meet continuing needs in the region, provide greater flexibility for responding to new contingencies, and create a lasting framework to support reform efforts in the MENA countries. Of this request, $700 million would have been new funding with the remainder intended for existing programs. However, Congress did not appropriate funding for MENA-IF in the FY2013 continuing resolutions covering State-Foreign Operations activities, in part because of broader disagreements over the size of the U.S. budget and how best to reduce the national debt. For FY2014, the Administration has requested $580 million over five years for the MENA-IF, of which $475 million would be new funding, $75 million would be for the existing Middle East Partnership Initiative, and $30 million would be for USAID's Office of Middle East Programs. The Administration does not specify how the MENA-IF funding would be allocated (or to what countries), but envisions that it could be used for a wide variety of interventions, including enterprise funds, loan guarantees, and humanitarian assistance.\nAs for Syria, the United States has been providing humanitarian assistance to international organizations aiding Syrian civilians and non-lethal support to unarmed elements of the Syrian opposition. In 2012, the Obama Administration notified Congress of its intent to establish a USAID Office of Transition Initiatives program for Syria at an initial cost of $5 million in order to begin laying the foundation for U.S. support for Syria's political transition in the longer term. The Administration has also significantly expanded existing U.S. sanctions on Syria, freezing all U.S.-controlled assets of the Syrian government, prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in any transaction involving the Syrian government, and banning U.S. imports of Syrian-origin petroleum products, among other measures.", "The Obama Administration views improving the socioeconomic conditions of many MENA countries as crucial to reducing inequalities, ensuring successful transitions, and creating a more affluent and peaceful region in the long term. Major Administration initiatives have focused on providing debt relief and loan guarantees (especially for Egypt and to a lesser extent, Tunisia), promoting private investment, and facilitating more trade with the Middle East and North Africa. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has launched a $2 billion initiative to support private investment across the MENA region, and Congress has approved the establishment of U.S. enterprise funds (similar to those set up in Central and Eastern Europe after the revolutions of 1989) for Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan. These enterprise funds will seek to encourage and support the development of small- and medium-sized businesses.\nAs noted previously, a key proposal in President Obama's May 2011 speech called for launching a comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East. This would seek both to facilitate more trade within the MENA region and to promote more trade and investment between the region and markets in the United States, the EU, and elsewhere. President Obama asserted, \"Just as EU membership served as an incentive for reform in Europe, so should the vision of a modern and prosperous economy create a powerful force for reform in the Middle East and North Africa.\"\nSince then, the Administration has established a program called the Middle East and North Africa Trade and Investment Partnership (MENA TIP), to create a regional platform to foster greater trade and investment among the MENA countries and with international partners, as well as to encourage regulatory reform. Under this initiative, the United States has engaged primarily with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia (holding an initial meeting on MENA TIP with these four countries in April 2012), and to a lesser extent, with Libya. Investment, trade facilitation, support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and regulatory practices and transparency have been identified as initial areas for discussion and cooperation. However, some analysts point out that there has been little concrete progress to date and no significant efforts yet toward involving other international actors, such as the EU, in this process.\nVarious experts have also argued for an expansion of bilateral U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) in the MENA region. The United States already has FTAs with Jordan and Morocco, and some analysts have urged the United States to negotiate similar ones with Egypt and Tunisia as a way to advance economic development and other reforms related to transparency, good governance, and regulatory standards. To date, the pursuit of new FTAs in the MENA region does not appear to be a current goal of the Obama Administration, given domestic political tensions and ongoing political uncertainty in some MENA countries.\nHowever, the Administration has made some attempts to strengthen bilateral U.S. trade and investment ties with several MENA countries. For example, U.S. officials have been working to develop a country-specific action plan for Egypt aimed at increasing exports, supporting SMEs, and enhancing U.S. investment. The United States has also re-launched discussions under the U.S.-Tunisian Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to explore options for deepening bilateral and intra-regional trade and investment ties. And U.S. and Libyan officials have reportedly discussed possibilities for increasing market access, addressing intellectual property rights, and improving scientific cooperation. Such efforts could potentially lead to larger-scale trade and investment agreements in the future.", "For many Members of Congress, responding to the rapid pace of events and significant changes in the Middle East and North Africa since early 2011 has been challenging. Although many Members welcome the emerging aspirations of the people of the MENA region for political reform, economic equality, and self-determination, they are also concerned about how best to maintain the benefits of long-standing U.S. partnerships and to protect U.S. global security interests amid regional change. In particular, initial successes by Islamist parties in elections in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia have raised concerns among some Members given uncertainties about how such parties view Israel and whether they will respect social and political rights, particularly those pertaining to women and religious minorities.\nCongress has supported some of the policy proposals outlined by President Obama in May 2011 for the MENA region. As noted above, Congress has authorized debt relief and the creation of U.S. enterprise funds for some MENA countries. Nevertheless, these initiatives have been controversial among Members who worry about new spending commitments given U.S. fiscal constraints, and among those concerned about the eventual shape and political orientations of emerging regimes in the MENA region. For example, Congress attached new conditions on U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt in FY2012, requiring the U.S. Secretary of State to first certify that Egypt had held free and fair elections, was protecting civil liberties, and was meeting its obligations under its 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Congressional efforts to restrict or condition U.S. aid and debt relief to Egypt remain ongoing.\nAlthough U.S. foreign assistance to Libya has been more limited given Libya's vast resources, especially its petroleum reserves, Congress has supported a range of security and transition assistance programs in Libya. However, many Members continue to worry about security in the country, especially with regard to Qadhafi-era weapons and border security, and in light of the reported presence of Al Qaeda-related groups. Such security concerns have intensified since the September 2012 terrorist attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi. Identifying and bringing to justice those responsible for the Benghazi attack has become an important issue for many Members, with some calling for future U.S. assistance to Libya to be conditioned on full Libyan cooperation in the Benghazi investigations. Some Members have made similar calls regarding Tunisia, which recently released a suspect in the Benghazi attack from detention.\nAs for Syria, some Members of Congress have called for more active U.S. and/or NATO engagement in support of the rebels, arguing that U.S. hesitation to arm the opposition forces or intervene militarily has prolonged the conflict, worsened the humanitarian situation, and allowed Islamist elements to seize the initiative. At the same time, many Members of Congress also worry that more direct U.S. intervention could further exacerbate the conflict and result in regional spillover, destabilizing countries such as Turkey or Lebanon, threatening Israel's security, and heightening tensions further with Iran.", "The United States and its European partners share similar interests in ensuring that the changes underway in the Middle East and North Africa result in a more stable, secure, and prosperous region. Common U.S. and European concerns in the region include countering terrorism, weapons proliferation, and transnational crime; curtailing Islamist extremism; ensuring a reliable flow of energy exports and commercial transit; and ensuring Israel's security and advancing peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Europe's geographic proximity to the MENA region also makes controlling migration a key priority for individual European countries and for the EU as a whole, while preserving military cooperation with MENA countries remains critical for the United States, especially given long-standing U.S. interests in Israel and the Persian Gulf.\nMany analysts suggest that to date, U.S. and EU policies have been closely aligned on most issues regarding the changes underway in the MENA region. As noted previously, numerous experts also argue that greater U.S.-European cooperation may be essential to providing robust and effective Western support to the region. This section describes the current status of U.S.-European efforts to coordinate political and economic policies toward the MENA region, presents an array of potential areas and options for future consideration, and discusses possible challenges and pitfalls to closer U.S.-European cooperation.", "Various sources indicate that U.S. and EU officials, from the Cabinet level to the working level, have been in frequent and continuing contact with each other as events in the Middle East and North Africa have unfolded. In October 2011, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon asserted that \"Close transatlantic cooperation is the indispensable starting point in our efforts to respond effectively and efficiently to locally driven demand for real and lasting change across the Arab world.\" He went on to note that, \"while the transatlantic agenda ... is vast and there are hundreds of topics on it, we probably spent more time on this particular challenge over the past six to nine months than on any other.\" The U.S. State Department's Office for Middle East Transitions, led by Ambassador Taylor, and the office of the EU's Special Representative to the Southern Mediterranean Bernardino Leon, have reportedly developed close ties and a good working relationship with each other.\nBeyond such dialogue and diplomatic contact, U.S. and European policymakers point to two key initiatives on which they have cooperated closely in an effort to support the transformation of the MENA region as a whole: expanding the mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and establishing the Deauville Partnership. In addition, many observers note that U.S. and EU officials have been working together over the last two years in the International Monetary Fund to provide financial assistance to several MENA countries (including Egypt).", "The Obama Administration has strongly supported EU efforts to extend the area of operations of the EBRD beyond Europe and Central Asia into the MENA region. The EBRD is an international financing institution established in 1991 to support the emergence of market economies in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the former Soviet Union; it is owned by 64 member countries in both Europe and worldwide, the EU, and the European Investment Bank. The United States is a founding member of the EBRD and the largest contributor after the EU institutions and EU member states combined; the U.S. Treasury Secretary sits on the EBRD's board of governors. The EBRD invests mainly in private sector enterprises, usually together with commercial partners, and helps mobilize foreign direct investment into the countries in which it operates.\nIn October 2011, EBRD shareholders (including the United States) backed the expansion of the bank's activities into the MENA region. As this decision still requires the approval of national governments and/or legislatures to take full effect, the EBRD has opened \"preliminary offices\" in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan to lay the groundwork for its expansion into these countries. Tunisia and Jordan joined the EBRD in December 2011 (Egypt and Morocco have been members of the EBRD since its inception). In May 2012, shareholders approved the creation of a special €1 billion fund to start the process of investments in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. The EBRD is expected to invest up to €2.5 billion a year in the MENA region by 2013.", "The United States, the EU, and key EU member states have cooperated to forge the Deauville Partnership in the context of the Group of Eight (G8). Launched in May 2011 under the French G8 presidency, the Deauville Partnership seeks to support strategies for sustainable and inclusive economic growth in the MENA region, encourage political reforms aimed at establishing accountable governments based on the rule of law, and create the conditions necessary for greater citizen participation in economic life. The Partnership brings together the members of the G8, international and regional financial institutions, several key Arab countries, and Turkey, to provide financial assistance to Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Libya (as well as Yemen).\nBy September 2011, G8 leaders announced that the Deauville Partners, including the multilateral and regional development banks, had pledged a total of $38 billion (in loans, grants, budget support, and technical assistance) between 2011 and 2013 to support reform efforts in the MENA countries. The United States, which held the G8 presidency in 2012, developed a three-pillar structure for the Deauville Partnership to focus efforts on trade and integration, economic growth, and governance. The UK, which currently holds the G8 presidency, has identified a number of priorities within these areas for the Deauville Partnership for 2013, including the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and women's economic participation.\nPartnership members have also been working to establish several assistance vehicles, including a Transition Fund (with an initial capitalization target of $250 million) to provide short-term, quick response technical expertise for MENA countries in implementing reforms; a Capital Market Access Initiative to help transitioning countries gain easier and cheaper access to international capital with reasonable financing terms; and an Asset Recovery Action Plan, to facilitate the return of frozen assets to MENA countries such as Libya. Nevertheless, various observers criticize the Deauville Partnership for being slow to produce tangible benefits for the MENA countries and note that some of the financial institutions and donor countries have not yet followed through on their funding commitments.", "U.S. and European officials have also worked in tandem in the context of the IMF to provide financial support to several MENA countries in transition. The United States and the EU countries combined are the largest IMF shareholders, and thus wield considerable influence within the IMF. Over the last two years, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have all reached financing agreements with the IMF to help promote economic stability and the conditions conducive to political reform. Egypt's deteriorating economic conditions since the demise of the former Mubarak regime and acute cash flow problems are of particular concern, and U.S. and European officials have been devoting considerable efforts to help finalize an IMF loan agreement for Egypt.\nMany U.S. and European policymakers alike contend that without IMF assistance, Egypt's fragile economic situation could jeopardize both its political transition and the stability of the region as a whole. Those of this view assert that a potential economic collapse in Egypt could have serious implications for U.S. and European interests in terms of access to the Suez Canal, Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, and Egyptian cooperation on counterterrorism. Although a \"staff level\" agreement was reached between Egyptian and IMF authorities in November 2012 for almost $5 billion in IMF assistance, it has not yet been finalized because Egyptian officials continue to balk at IMF conditions that would require politically unpopular structural reforms (such as tax and fuel price increases), and which some Egyptians believe could ultimately worsen the country's debt. Despite such difficulties, U.S. and European leaders continue to press for an IMF-Egyptian loan agreement as soon as possible.", "Despite the cooperative U.S.-EU efforts toward the MENA region described above, some commentators view such measures as relatively modest to date. Many observers continue to urge the United States and the EU to further coordinate their policies toward the region or explore options for joint action. Some argue that this is particularly necessary given the political and economic constraints facing both sides of the Atlantic. The United States and the EU could consider a number of possible cooperative approaches to further promote economic development, democratic governments, and civil society in the MENA region. These include:\nJoint or Coordinated Trade and Investment Initiatives. Some analysts assert that economic growth and job creation are crucial to achieving successful transitions in the MENA countries. While direct financial assistance (including through institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF) is a visible way to support development programs and ease cash flow problems, many experts argue that the key to long-term success lies more in stimulating and developing domestic economies, rather than in aid. A focus on trade is potentially one of the main organizing principles for these efforts, and some contend that the United States and the EU should pursue joint or coordinated trade and investment initiatives with the countries of the region, not only to benefit the MENA countries, but also to avoid negotiating competing trade arrangements with different regulatory requirements. Possible measures could include both sides' entering into new free trade agreements that open access to U.S. and EU markets; efforts that promote inter-regional trade and cooperative regional projects in areas such as energy and infrastructure; or technical assistance for regulatory and legal reforms that encourage greater foreign investment. As noted previously, the Obama Administration proposed working with the EU to launch a comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership for the MENA region, but most observers suggest that it remains in the early stages. Coordinated Debt Relief and Debt Swaps. The United States and member countries of the EU could offer coordinated debt relief and debt swaps, allowing MENA countries in transition to use money for economically beneficial projects rather than repaying debt. Coordinating such efforts would hopefully help to reduce duplicative projects and help stretch such funds farther. The issue of debt relief is the responsibility of the individual EU member states, rather than the EU, and such coordination of debt relief initiatives would presumably take place in the Paris Club grouping of major creditor nations. Cooperation on Democracy Promotion and Civil Society. The United States and the EU also have a shared interest in maintaining and expanding support for a range of projects and organizations that relate to democratization, the development of civil society, security sector reform, and the values of a free and open society. In these areas too, analysts assert that it is important for the United States and EU (along with other countries) to coordinate their political messages and policies to avoid duplication and working at cross purposes. Some contend this is especially important \"on-the-ground,\" and suggest that there should be regular meetings of U.S. and European embassy officials and development workers serving in the various MENA countries. Another possibility would be to arrange conferences bringing together U.S. and European non-governmental organizations with local civil society activists to encourage dialogue and partnership (along the lines of a forum organized by the EU in May 2012 that brought together Libyan and European NGOs). At the same time, experts have expressed concerns that associating a high degree of conditionality with democracy promotion policies could generate perceptions of Western interference or encourage regional partners to seek support elsewhere; on the other hand, the United States and the EU may not be able to influence intransigent decision-makers without insisting on coordinated aid conditionality. Cooperation on Police, Judicial, and Rule of Law Training. Both the United States and the EU have assisted a wide range of countries in political transition, from those of the former Yugoslavia to Iraq to East Timor, in developing their police and judicial services in line with the rule of law. Many observers point out that the EU in particular is well-suited to conducting such training, having developed the necessary institutional support structures and civilian capacities. Some analysts contend, however, that U.S. and EU civilian and rule of law missions in countries like Afghanistan have been duplicative or disadvantaged by a lack of coordination; as such, they assert that it might be more beneficial for the United States and the EU to cooperate closely in designing and establishing any potential rule of law or police training missions for the MENA region. Enhancing the Roles of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. Increased engagement by the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament with their counterparts in the MENA region could play a useful role in supporting democratic transitions and offering assistance on parliamentary procedure and process. Both Congress and the Parliament have prior experience in assisting legislatures in emerging democracies. In the past, the U.S. House Democracy Partnership, which grew out of House efforts to provide help to legislatures in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, has worked with partner legislatures in numerous countries ranging from Haiti to Kenya to Iraq and Lebanon. Since the \"Arab Spring,\" the European Parliament has increased its contacts and cooperation with elected assemblies in European Neighbourhood Partnership countries; for example, Members of the European Parliament served in the EU observer mission that helped monitor Tunisia's assembly elections in October 2011, and some Parliamentarians have been working to assist their Moroccan counterparts in contributing to the country's reform process. Some observers also suggest that greater Congress-Parliament coordination might be beneficial; among other possible steps, the two sides could consider undertaking joint trips to the MENA countries or establishing a parliamentary forum with elected representatives from the MENA region. U.S. Participation in EU Forums . Some observers advocate that the United States should have a role in the recently established EU task forces with Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt, or similar ones that might be set up in the future with other MENA countries. This could potentially be a way to institutionalize U.S.-EU coordination toward individual countries in the MENA region and avoid unnecessary duplication of programs and projects. Skeptics of this option suggest that U.S. participation in EU task forces might be redundant given close working ties between U.S. and EU officials on MENA issues and existing forums such as the Deauville Partnership.\nOther experts contend that the most effective and practical form of U.S.-EU cooperation toward the MENA region might be through a \"division of labor\" approach. This would allow each side to play to its strengths, build upon the varying U.S. and EU pre-existing relationships with different MENA countries, and thus stretch limited financial resources farther. The United States could, for example, devote the bulk of its political and economic assistance to Egypt, given its extensive and long-standing ties to that country, while the EU could focus on Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. Many view the EU as already somewhat more engaged than the United States in bolstering reform efforts in Jordan and Morocco. As discussed earlier, the EU has included these two countries in the remit of its Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean, but the mandate of the U.S. State Department's new Office for Middle East Transitions does not extend to Jordan and Morocco because the United States does not view these countries as undergoing the same sort of wholesale transition as other countries in the region. Critics of a \"division of labor\" approach argue that it would be impractical and that neither the United States nor the EU would be willing to cede complete influence over certain MENA countries to the other.", "Some analysts contend that despite the ongoing U.S.-EU dialogue and the potential benefits of greater U.S.-EU coordination toward the Middle East and North Africa, more robust and sustained cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic faces numerous challenges. First, many point out that U.S. and European leaders remain preoccupied with their own respective economic and budgetary issues. Given the domestic pressures in both the United States and Europe, some observers suggest that both U.S. and EU policymakers are focusing on relatively low-cost initiatives that could attract multilateral or private sector investment. \"Big ideas,\" such as a Marshall Plan for the MENA region, are not currently on the table, nor is there, as noted previously, a transatlantic \"perspective\" available for the MENA countries in the form of NATO and/or EU membership.\nSecond, many commentators assert that the EU is still struggling to forge common foreign and security policies among member states that have different viewpoints and national interests. In the early months of the \"Arab Spring,\" for example, EU leaders were divided on whether to pressure former Egyptian President Mubarak to resign and on whether to intervene militarily in Libya. A degree of intra-EU tensions also may exist over the European Neighborhood Policy; while many member states in Southern Europe have been advocating for the EU to do more to support the transitions underway in the Mediterranean, some Central and East European members worry that doing so could take EU attention and financial aid away from those countries on the EU's eastern periphery. An EU unable to \"speak with one voice\" may be a less reliable partner for the United States in promoting political and economic reforms in the MENA region. In addition, some analysts contend that the Eurozone crisis, as well as the resulting political challenges facing both the EU as a whole and individual member states, may generate a more inward-looking EU, at least in the short term, and impede Europe's ability to enhance its cooperation with the United States toward the MENA region.\nThird, observers suggest that potential policy differences between the United States and the EU could arise and complicate efforts to forge more cooperative or coordinated U.S.-European policies. For example, some experts posit that U.S. concerns about the effects of regional change on Israel's security and counterterrorism efforts could make some U.S. officials more hesitant than their European counterparts about imposing strict conditionality (i.e., aid for reforms) on countries such as Egypt. A number of analysts contend that European reactions to the June 2013 conviction in Egypt of 43 employees of U.S. and German pro-democracy organizations were much stronger and harsher than that of the Obama Administration. At the same time, some Members of Congress warned that the court's verdict would have \"significant negative implications\" for U.S.-Egyptian relations. Thus, some experts point out that divisions among U.S. policymakers as they struggle to balance competing interests in the MENA region could also potentially hinder greater transatlantic cooperation.\nFourth, despite the emphasis in both the United States and the EU on increasing trade and investment opportunities as a way to promote economic development, some suggest that U.S. and EU commercial interests and businesses may be in competition in the MENA region. This could limit the political will on both the U.S. and EU sides to forge complementary trade and investment policies.\nFifth, some skeptics question whether greater U.S.-European cooperation in the MENA region is desirable. Some European analysts argue that the EU would be better off having a more independent policy from the United States, given the negative perception of the United States among some segments of Arab society as a result of U.S. policies toward Israel and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Meanwhile, some U.S. commentators suggest that Europe should take the lead in the Middle East and North Africa because Europe's proximity to and history with the region gives European governments not only a more intimate understanding of the MENA countries, but also a more immediate stake in their positive transformation.\nFinally, regardless of the extent of cooperation between the United States and EU, most experts agree that as external actors, the ability of the two partners to influence events in the MENA region will be limited and that ultimately, the governments and peoples of the region will be the main determinants of their own futures. Many analysts worry that the political and economic difficulties facing many MENA countries in transition, combined with deeply problematic issues involving Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Syria, could lead to a progressively worse regional situation in the years ahead. Whatever dynamics of U.S.-EU cooperation emerge, therefore, in the foreseeable future developments in the MENA region are likely to remain a significant foreign policy interest for policymakers on both sides.", "CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report R42393, Change in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Policy , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report R43053, Egypt and the IMF: Overview and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report R41959, The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy , by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers , by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report R42393, Change in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Policy , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues , by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report RS21666, Political Transition in Tunisia , by [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report R42621, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2013 Budget and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], Marian Leonardo Lawson, and [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report R43043, The FY2014 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request , by [author name scrubbed], Marian Leonardo Lawson, and [author name scrubbed].\nCRS Report R42153, U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h4_full h1_full h2_full h0_full h3_full", "", "h0_title", "", "", "", "", "h0_title", "", "", "h0_full", "h4_title h3_title", "", "", "", "h3_full h4_full", "h2_title h3_title h1_full", "h3_title", "", "", "h3_full", "", "h2_full h1_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What has characterized the position of Western policymakers regarding the Middle East and North Africa?", "How did Athe rab Spring spur U.S. and European leaders into action?", "How did the U.S. and European allies coordinate their response in Libya and Syria?", "What are analysts advocating for in the MENA region?", "For what reason do they argue that collaboration would be beneficial?", "With what previous work in another other part of the world did the analysts find roughly analogous to their proposed work in the MENA region?", "What do many observes say regarding joint initiatives between the U.S. and Europe in the MENA region?", "What is the focus of continued debate regarding the MENA region?", "What concerns do skeptics have about such joint initiatives?", "What are other concerns regarding the effectiveness of Western intervention?", "What has Congress been doing to respond to events in the MENA region?", "What interests do the Members have regarding coordinating U.S. and European aid in the MENA region?", "What are the broader implications of such parternships?", "What concerns do Congress have regarding the political situation in the Middle East and North Africa?", "What potential tensions could arise if the U.S. and European governments coordinate their efforts in the MENA region?", "How could U.S.-European cooperation in the MENA region have implications beyond the region?" ], "summary": [ "Over the last two years, many U.S. policymakers, Members of Congress, and their European counterparts have struggled with how best to respond to the wide range of challenges posed by the popular uprisings and political upheaval in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).", "Almost immediately after the onset of the so-called \"Arab Spring\" in early 2011, U.S. and European leaders alike declared their intention to put greater emphasis than in the past on democratic reform and economic development in formulating their respective policies toward countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco.", "In Libya, the United States and many European allies participated in the NATO-led military intervention in support of rebel forces that ultimately toppled the Qadhafi regime. And as demonstrations in Syria escalated into a bloody civil war, the United States and the European Union (EU) have imposed sanctions, called for an end to the ruling Asad regime, and are considering greater material and financial support to the Syrian political and armed opposition.", "In light of the immense changes and what many have long viewed as common U.S. and European interests in the Middle East and North Africa, numerous analysts have advocated for significant U.S.-European cooperation to promote a more peaceful and prosperous MENA region.", "Such collaboration, they argued, would help prevent a wasteful duplication of Western diplomatic and economic resources amid competing domestic political priorities and financial constraints on both sides of the Atlantic.", "Despite notable cultural, historical, and geopolitical differences, some commentators early on drew analogies with the way the United States and its West European allies worked together to support the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, and hopes were high for a similar robust transatlantic effort in the MENA region.", "Nevertheless, many observers contend that so far, tangible joint or coordinated U.S.-European initiatives to encourage political transitions and economic opportunities in the MENA countries have been modest at best.", "Debate thus continues about the prospects for greater U.S.-European collaboration and the possible benefits of it for U.S. interests.", "Skeptics point out that both the United States and Europe are limited in what they can do to influence events in the region, and they worry that the political and economic difficulties facing many MENA countries in transition, combined with deeply problematic issues involving Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Syria, could lead to a progressively worse regional situation in the years ahead.", "Others are also concerned that more intensive Western involvement could be counterproductive if viewed in the region as an attempt to protect U.S.-European interests, or if used by some MENA leaders to deflect blame for domestic and regional problems.", "Many Members of Congress have closely followed events in the MENA region. Congress has been and will be considering the appropriation of U.S. aid to the MENA countries.", "As such, some Members may be interested in ways to coordinate U.S. and European foreign assistance, debt relief, and trade and investment policies in order to maximize their effectiveness as well as to conserve U.S. political capital and economic assets in the years ahead.", "Members may also be interested in European responses to the transitions in the MENA region, and the degree of U.S.-European cooperation, as a test of whether Europe can be an effective partner for the United States in protecting shared global interests and addressing common challenges.", "At the same time, many Members of Congress are concerned about the eventual political orientation of emerging regimes in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, and about the implications of regional change for Israel's security and U.S. counterterrorism efforts.", "Some Members may be apprehensive about working too closely with European governments or the EU if policy differences begin to emerge between the two sides, or if doing so might constrain future U.S. policy choices toward the MENA countries.", "Congress may also want to consider whether more robust U.S.-European cooperation in the MENA region could have implications for U.S. options in addressing challenges elsewhere in the greater Middle East (such as those related to Iran or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict)." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, -1, -1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 5, 5, 5, 5, 7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8 ] }
GAO_GAO-17-709	{ "title": [ "Background", "VHA’s Implementation of Enrollment Processes Has Hindered the Timely and Accurate Enrollment of Veterans, and VHA Is Assessing Efforts to Improve These Processes", "VHA Frequently Did Not Meet Timeliness Standards for Processing Enrollment Applications", "VHA Frequently Made Incorrect Enrollment Determinations", "VHA Is Assessing Efforts to Improve Its Enrollment Processes", "VHA’s Limited Oversight Impedes Its Ability to Ensure Timely and Accurate Enrollment of Veterans", "VHA Lacks a Standardized Process for System-Wide Oversight of Enrollment Processes", "VHA Lacks Complete and Reliable Data to Oversee the Timeliness of Processing Enrollment Applications System-Wide", "VHA Has Efforts Underway and Planned to Oversee the Accuracy of All Enrollment Determinations", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs", "Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The Veterans’ Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 required that VA establish an enrollment system to help manage its health care delivery system. VHA’s HEC is the business owner of the Enrollment System— the official system of record for verifying veterans’ eligibility for health care benefits and maintaining enrollment information.\nTo enroll for health care benefits, veterans submit an application to either HEC or a VAMC. Application information includes demographic, military service, financial, and insurance information. A veteran may apply online, by mail, by fax, by phone, or in person. Once a veteran submits an application, there are three key steps for processing the application: intake of application, verification of eligibility, and enrollment determination. There may be an additional processing step—resolving a pending application—if enrollment staff need additional information to determine eligibility. According to VHA policy, staff are required to process applications within 5 business days of receipt. Figure 1 provides an overview of the enrollment process, as of June 2017.\nIntake of application. If a veteran applies in person, or faxes or mails an application to a VAMC, local enrollment staff enter the application information into the VAMC’s Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) system. If a veteran applies in person, by phone, or faxes or mails an application to HEC, HEC enrollment staff enter application information into the Enrollment System. A veteran may also apply online, and the application information is directly transmitted into the Enrollment System. Historically, VAMCs have received more than 90 percent of enrollment applications for processing.\nVerification of eligibility. After the intake of an application, VAMC and HEC staff attempt to verify whether veterans meet eligibility requirements based on their military service and, if applicable, financial information. VAMC staff attempt to verify military service by reviewing supporting documentation provided by veterans (e.g., military discharge or separation papers). If veterans do not provide any documentation of military service, staff will try to verify this information through military service databases. For application information that HEC staff have entered into the Enrollment System or for those applications that have been submitted online with information transmitted directly to the Enrollment System, the system assesses eligibility based on the information entered. Both VistA and the Enrollment System automatically assess whether a veteran’s self-reported income meets VHA income thresholds for eligibility, as applicable. VAMC staff are required to ensure that application information is accurately entered into VistA. Application information that is entered into local VistA systems is transmitted nightly into the Enrollment System.\nEnrollment determination. The Enrollment System makes all enrollment determinations, including those for applications processed at VAMCs. Specifically, the Enrollment System determines whether veterans are enrolled, rejected, or ineligible for health care benefits. Veterans who are enrolled or rejected are placed in a category based on type of eligibility—called a priority group—established to manage the provision of care. For example, priority group 1 consists of veterans who are rated 50 percent or greater based on service-connected disabilities. Priority group 5 consists of veterans who are eligible because their incomes are at or below VHA’s eligibility thresholds; and priority group 8g consists of non-service connected veterans whose incomes are above the thresholds, and thus are rejected for health care benefits. HEC sends a letter and a personalized handbook to each veteran once it has made an enrollment determination with the decision and a description of benefits, if applicable.\nResolving pending applications. If VAMC or HEC enrollment staff cannot verify veterans’ eligibility for making an enrollment determination, the application is categorized as pending. To resolve a pending application, VAMC or HEC staff are to contact the veteran to obtain the missing information (e.g., military service or financial information). VAMC and HEC staff share responsibility for resolving pending applications. For instance, HEC staff may send a pending application for VAMC staff to help process. VAMC staff may also contact HEC staff for assistance in collecting missing information because, for example, according to officials, HEC has greater access to military service databases.", "VHA enrollment staff, both from HEC and VAMCs, frequently did not process enrollment applications in accordance with VHA’s timeliness standards and made incorrect enrollment determinations. VHA, through HEC, is assessing efforts to improve its enrollment processes.", "Prior studies show that VHA enrollment staff, whether from HEC or VAMCs, frequently did not process enrollment applications within 5 business days in accordance with VHA timeliness standards. Specifically, a June 2016 VHA audit found that HEC staff did not process 143 of 253 applications reviewed (57 percent) within VHA’s timeliness standard. The audit found that this occurred, in part, because HEC enrollment staff were not prioritizing workload to focus on processing applications that were approaching the timeliness standard. In response to an audit recommendation, HEC officials said they have begun prioritizing workload to help meet the timeliness standard.\nA VHA Chief Business Office analysis showed that VAMCs also did not consistently process online applications within 5 business days. According to the analysis, only 35 percent of online applications were processed by VAMCs within 5 business days in fiscal year 2012 and 65 percent through the first 7 months of fiscal year 2016. VAMC officials we contacted said because there is no mechanism for veterans to provide supporting military service records, such as discharge papers, with their online applications, VAMC staff need to obtain the information by querying available military service databases or following up with the veterans, which may cause delays in processing. Several VAMC officials said that HEC should implement automated controls that do not allow veterans to submit online applications without attaching supporting documents that include information needed for making enrollment determinations.\nAdditionally, the overall time needed to process enrollment applications may increase when staff need to place applications in a pending status. In its September 2015 report, VA’s Office of Inspector General found that, as of September 2014, the Enrollment System contained nearly 870,000 pending applications, many of which had been pending for more than 5 years. According to the report, 72 percent of those applications were pending because additional financial information was needed from veterans. In response to the report, in 2016, HEC and VAMCs undertook outreach efforts, such as attempting to contact all veterans with pending applications via phone and letters. According to HEC officials, as of May 2017, they were able to resolve about 30 percent of the applications (about 255,000 applications). This included enrolling approximately 88,000 veterans, as well as removing from pending status applications for which HEC officials said veterans were no longer living. HEC officials and VAMC staff in our review said they experienced problems resolving pending applications because they were generally several years old and lacked accurate contact information. HEC officials stated they would continue to work on resolving them, but if staff cannot obtain the information within 365 days, the applications’ status will change from pending to closed at that time.\nBased on our discussions with enrollment staff, we found that none of the VAMCs in our review had a specific policy or procedure for how to resolve pending applications. Officials indicated that they had not received any national procedure or guidance from VHA, nor had they developed local procedures. According to federal internal control standards, management should design control activities, such as policies and procedures, to achieve objectives and respond to risk. In the absence of a standard procedure for VAMCs to use to resolve pending applications, veterans are at risk for experiencing unnecessary delays while waiting for their applications to be processed.\nFor the six VAMCs in our review, we found that, as of March and April 2017, VAMC enrollment staff had not resolved 31 (55 percent) of the 56 pending applications included in our random, nongeneralizable sample of pending applications. (See table 1.) Specifically we found that for 22 (71 percent) of the 31 unresolved applications there was no evidence that VAMC enrollment staff had attempted to contact the veterans to obtain missing military service or financial information, and that 18 of these 22 applications had been in a pending status for 3 months or longer at the time of our review. VAMC officials told us they were not aware that some of the unresolved were in a pending status prior to our review. For the remaining 9 applications, we found VAMC enrollment staff attempted to contact the veterans, but were unable to resolve the application, for example, due to the lack of response from the veteran or lack of valid contact information. These 9 applications had been in a pending status between 2 and 5 months at the time of our review.\nFor the 25 applications that enrollment staff resolved, we found that staff enrolled the veterans for 19, and for the other 6, staff determined the veterans were ineligible or rejected for enrollment. We also found the time it took staff to make an enrollment determination varied widely—ranging from 3 to 119 days. (See table 2.)\nOfficials from five of the six VAMCs told us that based on our review they recognized the need to improve their processes. For example, officials from two VAMCs indicated that they were going to develop a standard operating procedure for identifying pending applications, following up with veterans to obtain missing information, and documenting actions such as the dates that enrollment staff called veterans or mailed letters to resolve outstanding issues.", "VHA’s Compliance and Internal Control Program Office conducted two audits (in April and August 2016), which found that VHA enrollment staff, including those from HEC and VAMCs, frequently made incorrect enrollment determinations. In some cases, veterans were rejected for health care benefits when those veterans should have been enrolled, and in other cases veterans were enrolled when they were ineligible for benefits, according to these audits. Specifically, VHA’s audits found the following: HEC had a 12 percent error rate. The April 2016 audit found that HEC enrollment staff made incorrect determinations for 31 of 253 randomly selected applications. The audit found that these errors included a combination of incorrect enrollment and rejection determinations, and the most frequent errors—in 15 of the 31 cases—related to enrollment staff enrolling or rejecting veterans for health care benefits without sufficient documentation, such as proof of military service. Audit findings indicated these applications should have been assigned a pending status.\nVAMCs had a 27 percent error rate. The August 2016 audit found that VAMC enrollment staff made incorrect determinations for 101 of 381 randomly selected applications. Similar to the audit of HEC, the audit of VAMCs found that errors included a combination of incorrect enrollment and rejection determinations. For example, the audit of VAMCs identified 15 applications for which enrollment staff incorrectly rejected the veterans for health care benefits. According to the audit, VAMC staff should have either enrolled the veterans because they had provided adequate documentation needed to verify their eligibility, or categorized the applications as pending until adequate documentation was obtained such as proof of military service needed to verify eligibility.\nIn addition to the two audits, VHA’s Compliance and Internal Control Program Office conducted an informal review that found for a sample of 357 phone applications, enrollment staff made incorrect enrollment determinations for 87 (24 percent ). The most frequent errors again related to staff enrolling or rejecting veterans for health care benefits without sufficient documentation, such as proof of military service. In these instances, the applications should have been assigned a pending status, according to the review. Although documentation on the audits and the informal review did not provide information on specific causes of the errors, officials responsible for conducting the audits indicated that the incorrect enrollment determinations were the result of human error.", "Through its HEC, VHA is assessing efforts to improve the timeliness of enrollment application processing and the accuracy of enrollment determinations. Specifically, HEC officials established the National Enrollment Improvement, an initiative which includes two efforts to centralize or standardize key aspects of enrollment processes.\nOne effort involves VAMCs’ processing of applications using the Enrollment System rather than VistA. To examine potential options, HEC implemented two pilots in 2016:\nPilot 1— implemented May through August 2016, required enrollment staff at three VAMCs to process all applications by entering information directly into the Enrollment System. VAMC enrollment staff participating in this pilot told us they encountered challenges, including not being able to log into the Enrollment System, and frequently had to revert to processing many applications in VistA. In total, the VAMCs processed 239 applications using the Enrollment System, which did not provide HEC sufficient data for determining the pilot’s effectiveness, according to the officials responsible for implementing the pilot.\nPilot 2—a case study implemented over 2 weeks in December 2016, required enrollment staff at six VAMCs to enter application information for veterans applying in person into an online application for direct transmittal to the Enrollment System. According to officials, a goal of the pilot was to test the automatic verification of military service information against databases to reduce human intervention in verifying eligibility, thereby improving the timeliness and accuracy of enrollment determinations. Similar to the first pilot, technology issues precluded effective processing. For example, automated verification was not consistently successful, and most applications processed (65 of 86) required manual intervention to reach an enrollment determination. In addition, officials said the online application did not always capture information needed to make an enrollment determination.\nHEC officials told us they did not obtain sufficient information from the pilots to make a decision on which option would replace VAMCs use of VistA for processing applications. As such, HEC officials told us they are planning to conduct a third pilot to further test the option of having VAMCs enter application information directly into the Enrollment System. Officials said they do not have a definitive implementation plan or timeline for conducting this pilot.\nA second effort under the National Enrollment Improvement involves standardizing the process of resolving pending applications. HEC developed procedures for HEC enrollment staff to use when resolving pending applications. Specifically, when a veteran’s application is placed in a pending status, staff are to send the veteran a letter that includes information about why the application is pending; the information HEC needs to make an enrollment determination; and instructions for providing the information to HEC. Additionally, staff are instructed to make phone calls at pre-determined time intervals—8 days, 30 days, 90 days, 180 days, and 310 days after an application becomes pending—in an attempt to contact the veteran to obtain missing information. HEC enrollment staff are also required to document each phone call attempt and the results. If staff are able to obtain the information within 1 year of informing a veteran about an application’s pending status, that information is documented, and staff make an enrollment determination. If, after 365 days, staff cannot obtain the information needed to make an enrollment determination, the application status would be changed from pending to closed in the Enrollment System.\nAlthough HEC has developed standardized procedures for the resolution of pending applications by HEC staff, it has not communicated these procedures to VAMC enrollment staff. Officials from the six VAMCs in our review indicated they were not aware of HEC’s plans to standardize this process, nor had they been asked to provide input or feedback on some of the challenges they have experienced. Furthermore, VAMC officials told us that they had not received any guidance regarding the new procedures and were confused about whether they would continue to have a role in this process. HEC’s new procedures do not specify whether VAMCs have a continued role in resolving pending applications and whether the procedures apply to VAMCs, although HEC officials told us that VAMCs would continue to be involved.\nAccording to federal internal control standards for information and communication, management should internally communicate the necessary information to achieve the agency’s objectives. Communicating quality information down and across reporting lines enables personnel to perform key roles in achieving objectives, addressing risks, and supporting the internal control system. In the absence of HEC coordination and communication with VAMCs about its effort to standardize the process for resolving pending applications, including the role VAMCs will have, there may be duplication of efforts between HEC and VAMC enrollment staff, which could lead to inefficiencies.", "VHA lacks a standardized process for system-wide oversight of enrollment processes to ensure applications are processed in a timely manner and enrollment determinations are accurate. Further, VHA, through HEC, lacks reliable data to oversee timely processing of applications across VAMCs. HEC has recently implemented an effort to review the accuracy of some enrollment determinations, specifically those for which veterans were found to be ineligible or rejected for health care benefits.", "VHA has not sufficiently defined through policies or procedures a standardized oversight process that describes and delineates the roles and responsibilities of HEC and VISNs—the networks that manage and oversee VAMCs in their geographic area—in monitoring and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of enrollment processes. Although HEC officials said they are responsible for oversight of enrollment processes system-wide and VHA policy generally states that HEC is responsible for performing a second-level review of all enrollment determinations, policies and procedures do not document the key oversight activities that should be conducted, how often they should be done, or the data that should be assessed for ensuring timely and accurate enrollment processes system-wide. Additionally, although HEC officials said VISNs should be overseeing VAMCs’ enrollment processes within their networks, we found that VHA’s policies do not describe these oversight role and responsibilities.\nOfficials from the six VISNs in our review reported different perspectives about their role in overseeing enrollment processes, and as a result, oversight activities were limited and varied across these VISNs. For example, officials from two of the VISNs in our review considered VISNs to have no role in the oversight of enrollment processes, and primarily provided information from HEC to the VAMCs within their networks. In contrast, an official from another VISN did consider VISNs to have an oversight responsibility, and that VISN is planning to develop a standard set of report requirements for VAMCs within the network to use so that the VISN would have consistent information to use for monitoring VAMCs’ enrollment processes.\nAccording to federal internal control standards for a control environment, an agency should establish an organizational structure and assign responsibility for achieving its objectives. An oversight structure would help fulfill responsibilities set forth by applicable laws and regulations, and relevant government guidance. Without defining a standardized process for oversight, HEC—VHA’s entity responsible for enrollment—may be unable to determine what oversight, if any, is being conducted system- wide and may not have key information about deficiencies in processing enrollment applications. Thus, HEC is limited in its ability to effectively develop systematic solutions and ensure enrollment processes are efficient and resulting in accurate enrollment determinations. HEC officials said they recognized the need to improve the oversight of enrollment processes, and a goal under the National Enrollment Improvement is for HEC to have 100 percent accountability and oversight of applications— those processed both at HEC and at the VAMCs.", "VHA—through HEC—does not have complete and reliable data for overseeing the timeliness of processing enrollment applications system- wide. HEC has data about processing timeliness for the applications that it receives. HEC officials said it lacks similar data for those applications received by the VAMCs—which comprised about 90 percent of the applications received system-wide in fiscal year 2016. HEC officials said they are able to monitor processing timeliness for the applications they receive because enrollment staff log the dates of the applications received into a workload tool and track monthly the processing timeliness and application status, such as the percent of applications that remained pending. In contrast, applications received by VAMCs are entered into local VistA systems that do not capture information on the date the application was received, which precludes accurate measurement of the timeliness of application processing. Although VistA captures the date enrollment staff entered the application information into the system, this date may not yield an accurate start date to measure timeliness of processing, specifically for applications received by mail or fax, because there is no assurance the information was entered when the application was received, according to HEC officials and VAMC staff. For example, officials from one VAMC in our review said if mailed or faxed applications are missing military service or financial information, staff do not enter the information into VistA until all the required information is obtained.\nAbsent the information in VistA needed to track and monitor their performance in processing enrollment applications, three of the six VAMCs in our review developed Excel spreadsheets to collect this information. These spreadsheets tracked the dates when applications were received, as well as the enrollment determination made for each. However, such Excel spreadsheets were developed and maintained solely at the discretion of individual VAMCs in our review.\nHEC and VAMCs in our review also have varying interpretations of how to measure whether VHA’s 5 business day timeliness standard has been met. VHA policy states the starting point for measuring adherence with its timeliness standard is the date the application was submitted online by the veteran, time-stamped when received by VAMCs or HEC, or the date the veteran came in person to apply. However, the policy does not define the end point for measuring the amount of time elapsed and does not specify whether the processing time includes the time applications are pending due to missing information. HEC officials told us the end point is the date of an enrollment determination, and measurement of timeliness should include any time the application was pending. Officials from four of the six VAMCs in our review, in contrast, said they considered the timeliness standard met when an application was entered into the system, irrespective of whether an enrollment determination was made or whether the application was pending.\nAccording to federal internal control standards for information and communication, management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Management obtains relevant data from relevant internal and external sources in a timely manner based on identified information requirements. Relevant data collected have a logical connection with identified information requirements, and management evaluates the sources of data for reliability. Without a central repository of reliable data about enrollment processes and a clearly defined measurement of the processing standard, VHA cannot reliably and consistently oversee processing timeliness of enrollment applications, assess the extent to which VAMCs face challenges in meeting the standard, and make appropriate decisions to improve processes system- wide.\nHEC officials acknowledged their lack of adequate information to monitor timeliness of application processing system-wide and told us they plan to develop the capacity to collect this information. Under the National Enrollment Improvement, HEC officials identified several steps for collecting standardized and centralized data for conducting oversight, including (1) eliminating VAMCs use of VistA for processing enrollment applications and solely using the Enrollment System, which is able to capture application receipt dates, (2) developing standardized procedures for capturing in the Enrollment System the date a mailed application was received, and (3) developing a series of reporting metrics for assessing the timeliness of processing applications across different modes.\nHowever, HEC officials told us that they need VHA approval to implement these actions, and as of June 2017, they did not have a timeline for when these actions might be implemented to allow them to accurately track and report on processing timeliness across all modes and VAMCs.", "HEC has efforts underway and planned to oversee the accuracy of enrollment determinations made system-wide. First, VHA—through HEC—has recently implemented an effort to review the accuracy of enrollment determinations for which veterans were found to be ineligible or rejected for health care benefits. This effort, which began in March 2017, employs a dedicated team of HEC staff to centrally conduct these secondary reviews daily, according to HEC officials. Prior to this date, VHA instructed VAMCs to conduct monthly secondary reviews of the accuracy of these enrollment determinations, and report the results of these reviews to HEC. However, HEC officials said they conducted an internal review of a sample of applications that had undergone this secondary review, and found that 20 to 30 percent still were incorrectly determined to be ineligible or rejected. Although HEC officials said VAMCs should continue these secondary reviews, HEC will also conduct its own independent review of all ineligible or rejected enrollment determinations. HEC officials said they plan to use the results of the reviews for quality assurance and training purposes with HEC and VAMC enrollment staff. Additionally, HEC officials told us they plan to expand their reviews of the accuracy of enrollment determinations and are currently assessing how to conduct second level reviews effectively system-wide. Although VHA policy states that HEC is responsible for performing a second-level review of all enrollment determinations, HEC officials said they have not been fully adhering with this requirement because, primarily, they have been focused on resolving the backlog of pending applications.", "Timely and accurate processing of veterans’ enrollment applications is critical to ensuring that eligible veterans obtain needed health care. Without efficient and effective enrollment processes, veterans may be delayed in obtaining needed services or incorrectly denied benefits. VHA’s current enrollment processes are decentralized and fragmented, with enrollment processing spread across 170 individual VAMCs as well as VHA’s HEC. The current processes are also prone to delays and errors, such as enrollment staff frequently not meeting the 5-day timeliness standard and making incorrect enrollment determinations when processing veterans’ enrollment applications.\nIn particular, in some instances veterans may not have provided all the information HEC or VAMC staff need to process an enrollment application and the application becomes pending. VAMCs, however, do not have effective processes for obtaining information needed to resolve pending applications, which has resulted in veterans experiencing unnecessary delays waiting for enrollment determinations. Although HEC has developed new procedures for its staff to resolve pending applications, the procedures do not delineate whether VAMCs have a continued role in this process or whether they should be following these new procedures.\nA system-wide standard procedure that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of VAMC enrollment staff in resolving pending applications may help improve efficiency and help ensure that veterans receive a timely response when applying for health care benefits.\nAdditionally, limitations in VHA’s oversight further impede its ability to ensure the timeliness of application processing and the accuracy of enrollment determinations system-wide. VHA has not sufficiently defined roles and responsibilities for HEC and VISNs for conducting oversight of enrollment processing. Without establishing and clearly communicating the entity responsible for oversight and the activities that should be routinely conducted, there are no assurances that oversight is being conducted system-wide and deficiencies are being addressed appropriately. Oversight is further challenged by the lack of reliable and consistent data needed to evaluate timeliness of processing enrollment applications, and a clearly defined policy to measure processing timeliness. Due to this lack of data needed for system-wide oversight, VHA may be unable to determine if all veterans who submit an application to VAMCs—which handle a majority of the applications system-wide—are receiving timely enrollment determinations. HEC has efforts planned to improve its oversight; implementing and assessing these efforts may help ensure the timeliness and accuracy of enrollment processes, and help VHA make appropriate system-wide process improvements.", "We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Acting Under Secretary for Health to take the following four actions: 1. Develop and disseminate a system-wide standard operating procedure that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of VAMCs in resolving pending enrollment applications. 2. Clearly define oversight roles and responsibilities for HEC, and for VISNs as appropriate, to help ensure timely processing of applications and accurate enrollment determinations. 3. Develop procedures for collecting consistent and reliable data system- wide to track and evaluate timeliness of enrollment processes, and institute an oversight mechanism to ensure VAMC and HEC enrollment staff are appropriately following the procedures. 4. Clarify its 5-day timeliness standard for processing enrollment applications, including whether it covers the total time needed to make an enrollment determination and the time applications are pending, and ensure the clarification is communicated system-wide.", "We provided VA with a draft of this report for its review and comment. VA provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix I. In its written comments, VA concurred with all four of the report’s recommendations, and identified actions it is taking to implement them. In addition, VA provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Acting Under Secretary for Health, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Janina Austin, Assistant Director; David Lichtenfeld, Analyst-in-Charge; Joanna Wu Gerhardt; and Joy Kim made key contributions to this report. Also contributing were Jennie Apter, Muriel Brown, Jacquelyn Hamilton, and Richard Lipinski." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "h0_full h2_full h1_title", "h0_full", "", "h0_full h1_full", "h2_title h1_title", "h2_full h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "To what extent did VHA meet timeliness standards?", "At what centers were these issues found?", "How did HEC officials respond to this issue?", "How do differing enrollment applications complicate this issue?", "To what extent did the VAMCs have a policy for resolving pending applications?", "What describes the relationship between HEC and VAMCs?", "What uncertainty has arisen as a result of this lack of communication?", "How is VHA responding to these issues?", "Why is the VHA unable to monitor system-wide enrollment processes?", "What is one example of the HEC policy issue?", "How uniform were interpretations of the timeliness standard?", "Why is reliable data so essential for the VHA?", "How is the VHA hoping to improve this oversight?", "Why did GAO assess the VA in 2016?", "What two things does GAO's report examine?", "In the creation of the report, what did GAO review?", "What were the purposes of the interviews the GAO conducted in the creation of this report?" ], "summary": [ "VHA frequently did not meet timeliness standards: VHA studies conducted in 2016 revealed that enrollment staff frequently did not process veterans' enrollment applications within the timeliness standard of 5 business days.", "These issues were found both at VHA's Health Eligibility Center (HEC)—the central enrollment processing center—and at local VA medical centers (VAMC) that also process enrollment applications.", "In response to an audit recommendation, HEC officials said they have begun prioritizing workload to help meet the timeliness standard.", "Additionally, the overall time needed to process enrollment applications may increase when staff need to place applications in a pending status, as pending applications require additional information, such as military service information, for staff to make enrollment determinations.", "However, none of the six VAMCs GAO reviewed had a specific policy for how to resolve pending applications. GAO found that VAMC enrollment staff had not resolved more than half of the pending applications GAO reviewed at these six VAMCs, some of which had been pending for more than 3 months at the time of the review.", "Although HEC developed new procedures for its enrollment staff to use when resolving pending applications, these procedures were not communicated to VAMCs.", "Officials from the VAMCs GAO reviewed said that they had not received guidance on these procedures and were confused about whether they would continue to have a role in this process. In the absence of HEC communication with VAMCs, there may be inefficiencies in resolving pending applications.", "VHA, through HEC, is assessing efforts to improve the timeliness of enrollment application processing and the accuracy of enrollment determinations.", "VHA lacks a standardized oversight process and reliable data to monitor enrollment processes system-wide: Although HEC officials said they are responsible for oversight of enrollment processes system-wide, VHA has neither sufficient policies that delineate this role nor procedures that document key oversight activities that should be conducted. Further, VHA does not have reliable data for overseeing the timeliness of processing enrollment applications at VAMCs, which process 90 percent of the applications system-wide.", "For example, policies do not describe the oversight activities HEC should conduct to help ensure the accuracy of enrollment determinations system-wide.", "Officials from the six VAMCs in GAO's review and HEC also had varying interpretations of how to measure the timeliness standard. For example, officials from four of the six VAMCs said the standard was met when enrollment staff entered an application into their local system, irrespective of whether an enrollment determination was made. In contrast, HEC officials said the measurement encompasses the time needed to make an enrollment determination, including any time the application was pending.", "Without reliable data that are consistently measured, VHA cannot accurately oversee the timeliness of application processing system-wide, or assess the extent to which VAMCs face challenges in implementing enrollment processes.", "To improve oversight, VHA, through HEC, recently implemented an effort to review the accuracy of some enrollment determinations.", "The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 included a provision for GAO to examine VA's oversight of patient access to care.", "This report examines (1) VHA's processes for enrolling veterans for health care benefits and (2) its related oversight.", "GAO reviewed federal laws, regulations, and VHA policies and procedures.", "GAO also interviewed officials from HEC and 6 of VHA's 170 VAMCs selected to provide variation in factors such as number of enrollment applications processed and geographic location; reviewed actions to resolve a randomly selected, nongeneralizable sample of pending enrollment applications from these 6 VAMCs; and interviewed HEC and VAMC officials on oversight of enrollment processes." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 0, 3, 3, 5, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, 3, -1, -1, 1, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_RL34162	{ "title": [ "", "History and Background", "Fuels Production", "Electricity Production", "Action in the 110th Congress", "Budget and Funding Issues and Action", "EPACT Implementation (P.L. 109-58)", "Loan Guarantee Program", "EPACT Framework for Loan Guarantee Program", "Loan Guarantee Program Regulations", "Subsidy Cost", "Energy Independence Act Provisions", "Program Funding", "First Round of Project Solicitations", "Second Round of Project Solicitations", "Biofuels and Other New Program Authorizations", "Energy Independence Act Implementation (P.L. 110-140)", "Accelerated Research and Development", "International Energy Programs", "Green Jobs", "FY2009 DOE Budget", "Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy", "Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability", "FY2009 Department of Agriculture (USDA) Request", "Congressional Action on FY2009 Appropriations (P.L. 110-329)", "House Passes H.R. 2638, Continuing Appropriations Resolution", "House Passes H.R. 7110, Supplemental Appropriations", "Senate Adopts H.R. 2638", "Tax Credit Issues and Action (P.L. 110-343)", "Debate over Proposed Incentives", "Renewable Energy Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC)", "Background and History", "Current Status and Past Significance", "Revenue Effects", "Impact on Resource Development", "Impact of Boom-Bust Cycle on Wind Energy Industry", "Very Limited Impact on Other Renewables", "Combined Impact with State Renewable Portfolio Standards", "Credit Design Issues", "Extend the Credit to Achieve a Five-Year Period or More", "Debate Over PTC Extension", "Solar Investment Tax Credits", "Residential Credit", "Business Credit", "Other Business Tax Credits", "Clean Renewable Energy (Tax Credit) Bonds", "Revenue Offsets Debate", "Regulatory Issues and Action", "Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)", "State RPS Debate", "Federal Tax Credit (PTC) Supports State RPS Policies", "Federal RPS Debate", "Other Regulatory Issues", "Wind Energy", "Marine (Tidal, Wave, and Ocean) Energy and Hydrokinetic (River Current) Energy", "Renewable Fuels and Energy Security", "Types of Renewable \"Biofuels\"", "Corn Ethanol", "Corn Ethanol Impacts and Debate", "Cellulosic Ethanol", "Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)", "New Goals Set By the Energy Independence Act", "Implementation Concerns", "Potential to Reduce Oil Imports", "Biofuels Funding and Tax Issues", "Biofuels Technology Funding Initiative", "Tax Incentives Provided in P.L. 110-343 (Division B) 139", "Climate Change", "CO2 Emissions Reduction Estimates", "Support for Renewables to Curb CO2", "Climate Security Act (S. 3036)", "Legislation", "Major Laws Enacted in the First Session", "FY2008 Appropriations (P.L. 110-161)", "Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140)", "Major Laws Enacted in Second Session", "Farm Bill (P.L. 110-246) Provisions", "FY2009 Appropriations (P.L. 110-329)", "Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (P.L. 110-343)", "Other Laws and Bills" ], "paragraphs": [ "Renewable energy is derived from resources that are generally not depleted by human use, such as the sun, wind, and water movement. These primary sources of energy can be converted into heat, electricity, and mechanical energy in several ways. There are some mature technologies for conversion of renewable energy such as hydropower, biomass, and waste combustion. Other conversion technologies, such as wind turbines and photovoltaics, are already well developed, but they have not achieved the technological efficiency and market penetration that many expect they will ultimately reach. Although geothermal energy is produced from geological rather than solar sources, it is often included as a renewable energy resource (and is treated as such in this report). Commercial nuclear power is not generally considered to be a renewable energy resource.\nDespite fluctuating government policies since the 1970s, a combination of incentives and high energy prices has enabled wind energy to gain a toe-hold in electric power markets and allowed ethanol to secure a modest, but growing, presence in motor fuels markets. Congress is now debating whether to provide additional subsidies, incentives, and mandates to further expand renewable energy use. This report describes the background and primary policy issue areas affecting renewable energy, including budget and funding, tax incentives, electricity regulatory initiatives, renewable fuels, and climate change.", "The energy crises of the 1970s spurred the federal government, and some state governments, to mount a variety of renewable energy policies. These policies included support for research and development (R&D), technology demonstration projects, and commercial deployment of equipment. For renewable energy, these policies included a focus on the production of both liquid fuels and electricity.", "The Energy Tax Act of 1978 established a 4 cents per gallon excise tax exemption for ethanol blended into gasoline. This incentive expired, and was extended, several times during the 1980s and 1990s. In some cases, the incentive was modified at the same time that it was extended. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 extended the excise tax exemption and created a tax deduction for clean-fuel vehicles that included those using 85% ethanol (E85). It also established a requirement that federal, state, and other vehicle fleets include a growing percentage of alternative-fueled vehicles, including those using ethanol. In 2000, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the excise tax exemption and the alcohol fuel tax credits had been the most important incentives for renewable fuels. By the time that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) was enacted, a variety of tax, grant, loan, and regulatory provisions had been established for renewable fuels. This included some 17 programs spanning five agencies. At present, the major tax incentives are a 51 cents per gallon excise tax exemption for ethanol blends, a $1 dollar per gallon tax credit for agri-biodiesel (50 cents per gallon for recycled biodiesel), and the alternative motor vehicle tax credit. However, some believe that the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) set by EPACT Section 1501—which requires that motor fuels contain increasing amounts of renewable fuel each year through 2012—may now be the most important policy supporting renewable biofuels.", "The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA, Section 210) created a policy framework that required electric utilities to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy sources. PURPA also empowered the states to set the price for such purchases. PURPA aimed to reduce oil use for power production, encourage the use of renewable energy for power production, and to structure a new dimension of competition to help keep electricity prices down. In the early 1980s, under the influence of PURPA regulation, a convergence of federal and state policies launched commercial deployment of wind and solar energy in California. In particular, the development of early wind farms was driven mainly by a combination of federal and state investment tax credits for wind energy.\nAs the new wind industry developed, two emerging aspects stimulated further policy changes. First, some firms took advantage of the investment tax credits by capturing the tax benefits at the front end and leaving wind machines that operated poorly or not at all. Recognition of this problem eventually led to the creation of a production-oriented tax credit. Second, in order to obtain third party financing, wind farm developers needed to secure agreements for power purchases that fixed the price for a long-term (10 years or more) period. This led the California Public Utility Commission to promote the development of \"standard offer\" contracts. These contracts reduced investment risk, established stable revenue streams, and helped launch early wind farm developments.\nOil and natural gas prices slumped during the mid-1980s, and declined more steeply in the late 1980s. Meanwhile, Congress let the residential solar investment tax credit expire in 1985. Funding for Department of Energy (DOE) renewable energy R&D programs also declined, reaching a low point in 1990.\nIn late 1990 and early 1991, the Persian Gulf War re-ignited interest in renewable energy. Other nations, notably Japan and Germany, began to undertake more aggressive policies to subsidize renewables, especially wind and solar technologies. In the United States, Congress began to increase funding for the Department of Energy (DOE) renewable energy R&D program. In 1992, the United States became a signatory of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This action forged a new environmental motive for support of renewable energy. These national interests were reflected in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-486 ). For electricity, this law made permanent the 10% business investment tax credit for solar and geothermal equipment. It also created a new renewable energy electricity production tax credit of 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour (kwh) for wind farms and closed-loop (energy crop) biomass.\nClimate change concerns spurred other industrialized nations to strengthen renewable energy policies and programs. Through the 1990s, concern about global climate change became an increasingly important motive in the European Union (EU), Japan, and other countries for raising renewable energy production goals and providing incentives to support commercial deployment. The Kyoto Protocol set emission reduction targets for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHG). After signing the Protocol, these nations intensified their efforts for commercial deployment of renewable energy. In the United States, concern about climate change was largely offset by a concern about the potential effect of the Kyoto CO 2 emission reduction targets on economic growth and competitiveness. As a result of this economic concern, the United States has taken a more limited effort than many other industrialized nations to support renewable energy as a strategy for addressing climate change. The federal government has continued support for existing funding and subsidies. However, aside from the previously mentioned policies, it has not established major new policies and programs like the feed-in tariff in Germany or the European Union's target for producing 20% of its energy from renewables.\nState action on renewable energy has often supplanted federal action or created models for new federal policies. As one example, California has implemented very aggressive programs for renewable energy. In the mid-1990s, the advent of electric industry restructuring led California state policymakers to create a public goods charge on ratepayer electricity use. Part of the resulting revenue was used to fund renewable energy development and deployment programs. Also, California's electricity shortages in 2000 and 2001 prompted the state to expand its renewable energy programs. Motivated by concern over climate change, California has recently adopted more aggressive actions for renewables. This includes a $3 billion solar deployment initiative, and an increase of its renewable portfolio standard to 33% of total electricity production by 2020.", "Economic and environmental concerns—namely energy security, international competitiveness, high energy prices, air pollution, and climate change—are now driving policy proposals to support renewable energy R&D and market deployment. In the 110 th Congress, more than 200 bills were introduced that would support renewable energy. In the first session, the Energy Independence Act ( P.L. 110-140 ) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-161 ) increased support for renewable energy. In the second session, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act ( P.L. 110-343 , Division B) provided several billion in tax incentives for renewables.\n(For more details on the Energy Independence Act, see CRS Report RL34294, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007: A Summary of Major Provisions , by [author name scrubbed]; for more details on FY2008 appropriations for DOE's renewable energy programs, see CRS Report RL34009, Energy and Water Development: FY2008 Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed] et al. and CRS Report RL34417, Energy and Water Development: FY2009 Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed] et al.; for more information about renewable energy laws and bills, see CRS Report RL33831, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 110 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].)", "", "As part of the strategy to address energy security, climate change, and other national interests, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-58 ) contained several provisions that authorized new programs and spending for renewable energy. Many of those provisions have either gone unfunded or have been funded below the authorized level.", "Title 17 of EPACT created a DOE loan guarantee program for certain energy technologies that could improve energy security, curb air pollution, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Innovative renewable energy power plants and fuel production facilities would be eligible for a federal loan guarantee covering up to 80% of construction costs.", "Many view this program as a key element of EPACT that addresses climate change and supports the commercial development of biofuels, such as cellulosic ethanol. The law authorizes DOE to issue loan guarantees to eligible projects that:\n... avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases ... [and] ... employ new or significantly improved technologies as compared to technologies in service in the United States at the time the guarantee is issued.\nTitle 17 provides broad authority for DOE to guarantee loans that support early commercial use of advanced technologies, if \"there is reasonable prospect of repayment of the principal and interest on the obligation by the borrower.\" The emphasis on \"early commercial use only\" distinguishes the program from other DOE activities that are focused on research, development, and demonstration. Further, DOE states that the program will support the goals of the President's Advanced Energy Initiative.", "In October 2007, DOE issued final loan guarantee regulations. The regulations provide that DOE may issue guarantees for up to 100% of the amount of the loan, subject to the EPACT limitation that DOE may not guarantee more than 80% of the total cost for an eligible project. Under the final rule, if DOE issues a guarantee for 100% of a debt instrument, the loan must be issued and funded by the Treasury Department's Federal Financing Bank. DOE says that it intends to issue loan guarantees only if borrowers and project sponsors pay the \"credit subsidy cost\" for any loan guarantee they receive.", "The subsidy cost is the expected long-term liability to the federal government in issuing the loan guarantee, excluding the administrative cost. Title 17 specifies that DOE must receive either an appropriation for the subsidy cost or payment of that cost by the borrower. No funds have been appropriated for the subsidy cost of loan guarantees. DOE anticipates that the project borrower (sponsor) will pay this cost. Thus, DOE says it does not plan to use taxpayer funds to pay for the credit subsidy cost of the loan guarantees.", "Two provisions of the law ( P.L. 110-140 ) expand the range of facilities eligible for loan guarantees. Section 134 amended EPACT Title 17 to direct that DOE establish a loan guarantee program for facilities that manufacture \"fuel efficient vehicles or parts of those vehicles, including electric drive vehicles and advanced diesel vehicles.\" Section 135 allows DOE, under certain conditions, to establish a loan guarantee program for the construction of facilities that manufacture advanced vehicle batteries and battery systems. Eligible parties would include manufacturers of advanced lithium ion batteries, manufacturers of hybrid electrical systems and components, and software designers.", "DOE Loan Guarantee Program funding is shown in Table 1 . In FY2006, DOE used about $500,000 from three separate appropriation accounts to fund start-up activities for $2 billion in loan guarantee authority. The FY2007 continuing appropriations bill ( P.L. 110-5 , H.J.Res. 20 ) provided $7 million from DOE's Departmental Administration Account for program operating costs. Also, P.L. 110-5 raised the loan guarantee program authority to $4 billion, and required that DOE prepare a rulemaking to implement the program.\nAt both House and Senate energy committee hearings on the DOE FY2008 budget request, concerns were raised that the Loan Guarantee Program had not been implemented. DOE stated that, beginning in FY2008, the administrative activities for the Loan Guarantee Program Office would be funded in a separate discrete appropriation account entitled \"Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program.\"\nThe FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-161 ) directed DOE to issue $38.5 billion in new loan guarantee authority through the end of FY2009. The law calls for $10.0 billion of the $38.5 billion to be designated to support renewables, energy efficiency, distributed energy, and transmission and distribution projects.\nFor FY2009, DOE requests $19.9 million for the Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program. This funding would cover administrative and operational expenses to support personnel and associated costs. DOE expects that the amount requested will be offset by collections authorized by EPACT (§1702[h]). The FY2009 DOE request seeks to extend that authority through the end of FY2011. Specifically, DOE's request calls for $20.0 billion of the $38.5 billion to be available through FY2010 to support renewables and certain other projects. The remaining $18.5 billion would be available through FY2011 to support nuclear power facilities.\nThe Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2009 ( P.L. 110-329 , H.R. 2638 ) provides for continued funding at the FY2008 level through March 6, 2009.", "In February 2007, the FY2007 Continuing Appropriations Resolution ( P.L. 110-5 ) provided $4 billion in authority for loan guarantees. In May 2007, DOE announced a solicitation for the first round of projects. Eligible categories of renewable energy projects included biomass, solar, wind, and hydropower. In October 2007, DOE announced that it was inviting 16 pre-applicants to submit full loan guarantee applications. Among the 16 pre-applicants, eight proposed renewable energy projects. There are six biofuels projects, of which four involve cellulosic ethanol fuel production facilities and two involve biodiesel fuel production facilities. Also, there are two solar projects. One involves concentrated solar-thermal technology, and the other involves the manufacture of thin-film solar photovoltaic equipment.", "On June 30, 2008, DOE announced three solicitations for the 2 nd round of solicitations. A total of up to $30.5 billion of loan guarantee authority was established for \"advanced energy technologies\" that would reduce air pollutants or greenhouse gases. One of the three solicitations was for \"renewable energy and advanced transmission and distribution technologies.\" On October 29, 2008, DOE announced that it was extending the \"Renewables Solicitation\" application due dates for stand-alone and manufacturing projects and for Part I large-scale integration projects, from December 31, 2008, to February 26, 2009. The deadline for Part II applications for large-scale integration projects will remain set at April 30, 2009.", "Several biofuels programs authorized by EPACT have not been funded, including sugar cane ethanol (§208), biodiesel (§757), advanced biofuels (§1514), and cellulosic ethanol (§942, §1511, §1512). Unfunded biomass provisions include forest biomass (§210), biomass research and development (§941g), and bioenergy (§971d). Additionally, residential and small business renewable rebates (§206c) and insular areas (§251, §252) have not been funded. Provisions for technologies that would address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions (§1601, §1602) also remain unfunded. Distributed energy (§921) and renewable energy (§931) are funded below authorized levels.", "As part of the strategy to address energy security, climate change, and other national interests, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2008 (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ) contained several provisions that authorized new programs and spending for renewable energy. Some of those provisions have either gone unfunded or have been funded below the authorized level.", "Title VI directs DOE to conduct several new programs to accelerate the development of renewable energy and hydrogen technologies. For example, $90 million was authorized for new geothermal programs, but the FY2009 continuing appropriations bill ( P.L. 110-329 ) does not include new funding to cover the cost of the programs. Also, $1 billion was authorized over a 10-year period to support the establishment of a hydrogen prize (H-prize) to accelerate technology development. DOE has issued a solicitation for an organizational host, pending congressional appropriations. P.L. 110-329 does not provide new funding for this program.", "Title IX, Subtitle A, calls for a new program of \"Assistance to Promote Clean and Efficient Energy Technologies in Foreign Countries.\" The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is directed to report to Congress on efforts to support policies for clean and efficient energy technologies. The Department of Commerce is directed to increase efforts to export such technologies and report to Congress on the results. Other U.S. agencies with export promotion responsibilities are required to increase efforts to support these technologies. Also, a multi-agency Task Force on International Cooperation for Clean and Efficient Energy Technologies is created to support the implementation of clean energy markets in key developing countries. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $100 million for FY2009 USAID programs that \"directly support zero-carbon\" efficiency and renewables programs. However, P.L. 110-329 does not provide appropriations at that level, and it does not call for the new program developments set out in the Energy Independence Act.\nSubtitle B directs that an \"International Clean Energy Foundation\" be established, with the long-term goal of reducing greenhouse emissions. Authorized funds would be used to make grants to promote projects outside the United States that serve as models of how to reduce emissions. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $200 million for a U.S. contribution to establish an \"International Clean Energy Fund\" at the World Bank or other entity, and requires that the contribution \"be matched by other sources.\" However, P.L. 110-329 does not provide appropriations for such a fund.", "Title X authorizes up to $125 million in funding to establish national and state job training programs, administered by the Department of Labor, to help address job shortages that impair growth in green industries, such as energy efficient buildings and construction, renewable electric power, energy efficient vehicles, and biofuels development. No funding was proposed for such programs in FY2009 budget requests nor in congressional committee appropriations recommendations.", "", "The President's 2008 State of the Union address set out goals to strengthen energy security and confront global climate change, and stated that \"... the best way to meet these goals is for America to continue leading the way toward the development of cleaner and more energy-efficient technology.\" As part of that effort, the Administration proposes to continue its support for the Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI, an element of the American Competitiveness Initiative), which \"aims to reduce America's dependence on imported energy sources.\" The AEI includes hydrogen, biofuels, and solar energy initiatives that are supported by programs in EERE.\nAccording to the FY2009 budget document, the Hydrogen Initiative has a \"long-term aim\" of developing hydrogen technology that will help the Nation achieve a \"cleaner, more secure energy future.\" Further, current research aims to \"enable industry to commercialize a hydrogen infrastructure and fuel cell vehicles by 2020.\" The Biofuels Initiative seeks to make cellulosic ethanol cost competitive by 2012 using a wide array of regionally available biomass sources. The Solar America Initiative aims to \"... accelerate the market competitiveness of photovoltaic systems using several industry-led consortia which are focused on lowering the cost of solar energy through manufacturing and efficiency improvements.\" Further, the Budget states that there is a goal to make solar power \"cost-competitive with conventional electricity by 2015.\"\nAs Table 4 shows, DOE's FY2009 request seeks $1,255.4 million for the EERE programs. Compared to the FY2008 appropriation, the FY2009 request would reduce EERE funding by $467.0 million, or 27.1%. The request would eliminate $186.7 million in Congressionally-Directed Assistance and it would reduce Facilities construction spending by $57.3 million. For renewable energy technologies, Table 4 shows that—compared to the FY2008 appropriation—the key increases are for Biomass Energy ($26.8 million) and Geothermal Energy ($10.2 million). The key decreases are for Water/Hydrokinetic Power (-$6.9 million) and Solar Energy (-$12.3 million). Overall, funding for renewable energy technologies would increase by $20.7 million (4.6%). For deployment programs, the main increase is for the Asia Pacific Partnership ($7.5 million). Also, the request would terminate the Renewable Energy Production Incentive (-$5.0 million).\nIn contrast to the Administration's request, the House Appropriations Committee recommended $2,531.1 million for DOE's EERE programs in FY2009. This would be a $808.7 million (47%) increase over the FY2008 appropriation and a $1,275.7 million (102%) increase over the DOE request. Compared with the request, the Committee recommendation would embrace a $381.5 million increase for R&D programs. Further, the Committee-approved bill would provide $259.2 million more for energy assistance programs, of which $250.0 million would go to the Weatherization Program—in sharp contrast to DOE's proposal to eliminate it. Also, the Committee recommended $500.0 million for new assistance programs authorized by the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ).\nAs a major initiative, the Committee recommended $500.0 million as \"initial program investment\" for several new programs authorized by EISA. The Renewable Fuel Infrastructure Program (EISA §244) would get $25.0 million to begin grant-giving operations. Aside from the $500.0 million initiative, some additional EISA-related funding would be provided under the technology programs. The most notable examples are $25 million for the production of advanced biofuels (EISA §207) under the Biomass and Biorefinery Program and $33 million for zero net energy commercial buildings (EISA §422) under the Buildings Program.\nThe committee recommended $134.7 million for Congressionally-Directed Assistance.\nIn addition to funding recommendations, the House Appropriations Committee report includes three policy directives for DOE. First, DOE would be required to report annually on the return on investment for each of the major EERE program funding accounts. Second, DOE would be directed to make up to $20 million of EERE funds available for \"projects at the local level capable of reducing electricity demand.\" Each project would involve multiple technologies and public-private partnerships. Priority would go to projects that have a substantial local cost-share, help reduce water use, or curb greenhouse gas emissions. Third, DOE would be required to implement \"an aggressive program\" of minority outreach at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and at Hispanic Serving Institutions to deepen the recruiting pool of scientific and technical persons available to support the growing renewable energy marketplace.\nThe Senate Appropriations Committee recommended ( S. 3258 ) $1,928.3 million for EERE, which is $205.9 million (12.0%) more than the FY2008 appropriation and $672.9 million (53.6%) more than the request.\nCompared with the House Appropriations Committee report, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $602.8 million, or 23.8%, less for EERE programs. The main difference ($450.0 million) is that the House Appropriations Committee proposes an increase of $500.0 million for a new EISA Federal Assistance Program, while the Senate Appropriations Committee proposes an increase of $50.0 million for a new Local Government/Tribal Technology Demonstration Program. Further, the Senate report recommended less funding than the House report for several technology programs. Relative to the House Committee report figures, the Senate Committee report's proposed decreases for renewable energy R&D include Geothermal (-$20.0 million), Bioenergy (-$15.0 million), and Water Energy (-$10.0 million). The major decreases for energy efficiency include Weatherization (-$48.8 million), Industrial Technologies (-$34.9) million, and Vehicle Technologies (-$24.5 million).\nThe Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $124.2 million for Congressionally-Directed Projects.\nIn general, both committee reports recommended higher funding levels than the request. In particular, each included more than $200 million for the Weatherization Program. Both committees disagreed with the DOE request to fund the Asia Pacific Partnership, and neither committee recommended funding it. Both committees called for the Biomass program to emphasize the use of non-food sources for the development of biofuels. The Senate Committee report further stressed R&D efforts to focus on algae as a biofuels source.", "The FY2009 request includes $134.0 million for the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE). The House Appropriations Committee recommended $149.3 million, which is $15.3 million more than the request. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $166.9 million, which is $17.7 million more than the House Appropriations Committee recommended. For OE congressionally directed projects, the House Committee report called for $5.3 million, while the Senate Committee report sought $12.9 million.", "The FY2009 budget document states that the Administration's 2007 farm bill proposal \"... provides more than $1.6 billion in new renewable energy funding and targets programs to cellulosic ethanol projects.\" In its FY2009 request document, the USDA states that, \"While discretionary funding is not being requested, the Administration's farm bill proposal includes funding for renewable energy/energy efficiency loans and grants, and biomass research and development grants. (For more details, see CRS Report RL34130, Renewable Energy Policy in the 2008 Farm Bill , by Tom Capehart.)", "", "On September 24, 2008, the House substitute to the Senate substitute to the proposed Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008 ( H.R. 2638 ) was brought to the House floor. The substitute was adopted by vote of 370 to 58. Division A—the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009—would continue federal funding at FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009. Two provisions of the resolution would provide additional funding for energy efficiency. Section 129 would provide $7.51 billion for a DOE Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program authorized by the Energy Independence Act ( P.L. 110-140 , §136[d]). The Program would support $25 billion in loans to domestic automobile manufacturers and automobile part manufacturers to cover up to 30% of the costs of re-equipping, expanding, or establishing a manufacturing facility in the United States to produce advanced technology vehicles or components (automobiles and parts that exceed fuel-efficiency standards). Recipients would be required to pay employees and contractors prevailing wage rates, and the program would be scheduled to expire in 2017. Section 130 would provide an additional $250 million for the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program in FY2009. Those additional funds would remain available until expended.", "On September 26, 2008, the House passed the Supplemental Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2009 ( H.R. 7110 ) by a vote of 264 to 158. The bill would fund a green schools initiative at the Department of Education (DOED) and provide additional funding, above that in the Continuing Resolution ( H.R. 2638 ), for efficiency and renewables programs at DOE.\nChapter 6 (Energy Development) would provide an additional $500 million in FY2009 appropriations for DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). The purpose of the additional funding is to accelerate the development of technologies that would \"diversify the nation's energy portfolio and contribute to a reliable, domestic energy supply.\" An additional $100 million would be provided to DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) to \"modernize the electric grid, enhance security and reliability of the energy infrastructure, and facilitate recovery from disruptions to the energy supply.\" For the cost of loans authorized by the Energy Independence Act ( P.L. 110-140 , §135) the bill would provide $1 billion to remain available until expended. Of that amount, $5 million could be used only for administrative expenses to conduct the loan program. The leveraged loan guarantee commitments would be capped at a total of $3.3 billion in loan principal.", "On September 27, 2008, the Senate adopted the House-passed version of H.R. 2638 by vote of 78 to 12. The Senate did not act on the supplement bill, H.R. 7110 .", "On October 3, 2008, the proposed Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( H.R. 1424 ) was signed into law as P.L. 110-343 . Division B contains the Energy Improvement and Extension Act (EIEA), which extends and establishes several tax incentives for renewable energy.\nP.L. 110-343 extends or re-establishes several tax incentives that support renewable electricity production, biofuels production, transportation efficiency and conservation, buildings efficiency, and equipment efficiency. The law has four incentives for electricity production: the production tax credit, two solar investment tax credits, and new clean energy (tax credit) bonds. Also, the law has several incentives for biofuels. P.L. 110-343 includes $9.1 billion in renewable energy production (electricity and fuels) tax incentives and $3.6 billion in energy efficiency (transportation and buildings/equipment) tax incentives. The renewable energy incentives include $5.8 billion for the renewable energy electricity production tax credit (PTC), $1.9 billion for business solar (and fuel cell) credits, $1.3 billion for residential solar tax credits, and $267 million for clean renewable energy (tax credit) bonds. (For more about the background and debate on the renewable energy incentives, see the discussion below. For more details about the energy efficiency incentives, see CRS Report RL33831, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 110 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] . )\nEIEA offsets the cost of the incentives by reducing several existing subsidies, with the effect of generating nearly $17 billion in revenue over 10 years. The largest offset, $6.67 billion, is provided by a modification of the requirements imposed on brokers for the reporting of their customers' basis in securities transactions. A freeze on a deduction for certain types of oil and natural gas production will provide $4.91 billion. Additional revenue will be derived from changes in foreign income taxes under Foreign Oil and Gas Extraction Income (FOGEI) and Foreign Oil Related Income (FORI) rules for the production and sale of oil and gas products ($2.23 billion), a modification of the excise tax for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund ($1.72 billion), and an extension of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) surtax ($1.47 billion).", "Aside from several differences over the amount and duration of some incentives, the primary issue was focused on House proposals to fully offset the estimated cost of the incentives by reducing other tax subsidies. For example, during the House floor debate over H.R. 5351 , opponents argued that the proposed repeal of oil and natural gas subsidies (§301 and §302) would raise gasoline prices and lead to higher energy costs generally. Further, they contended that such a repeal would cause a decline in oil industry jobs. Also, some opponents argued that the proposed 35% cap on the renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) would severely impair the ability of the credit to stimulate the development of new wind farms.\nProponents argued that the repeal would focus mainly on the five largest oil companies, which have recently made historical record-breaking profits and, thus, do not need the subsidies. Further, they contended that the subsidies currently favor conventional fuels and that the bill would help to bring support into a more equal balance. Proponents also argued that the incentives would spur the development of greater numbers of \"green jobs\" and help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. (For more details about the proposed revenue offsets, see CRS Report RL33578, Energy Tax Policy: History and Current Issues , by [author name scrubbed] . )", "Electricity produced by certain renewable energy facilities is eligible for an income tax credit based on production. Eligible facilities include those that produce electricity from wind, closed-loop biomass, open-loop biomass (including agricultural livestock waste nutrients), geothermal energy, solar energy, small irrigation power, landfill gas, and trash combustion. The credit's expiration date refers to the deadline for a facility to be placed into initial operation. Once a facility is qualified, a taxpayer may claim the credit annually over a 10-year period that commences on the facility's placed-in-service date.", "The PTC was established by federal law ( P.L. 102-486 ) in 1992. The credit was originally set at 1.5 cents/kwh and is adjusted annually for the previous year's inflation rate. Since 1992, it has expired and been reinstated three times, and it has been extended two other times. In August 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 , §1301) extended the PTC for two years, through the end of calendar year 2007. Also, the credit was expanded to include incremental hydropower and to increase the credit duration to 10 years for open-loop biomass, geothermal, solar, small irrigation power, and municipal solid waste. The Tax Relief Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 , §201) extended the PTC for one additional year, through the end of 2008. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act ( P.L. 110-343 , Division B, §101 and§102) extended the PTC for windfarms for one year, through the end of 2009. The PTC for biomass, geothermal, solar, and some other sources was extended for two years, through the end of 2010. Also, the PTC was expanded to include marine (ocean, tidal, wave) and hydrokinetic (river current) power sources, with eligibility established for three years, through the end of 2011.", "For claims against 2008 taxes, the credit stands at 2.1 cents/kwh for wind, closed-loop biomass, geothermal, and solar facilities. The credit stands at 1.0 cents/kwh for marine/hydrokinetic, open-loop biomass, small irrigation power, incremental hydropower, and municipal solid waste (including landfill gas and trash combustion facilities).\nIn 2007, the credit stood at 2.0 cents/kwh for claims against 2006 taxes. To illustrate the credit's significance, this 2.0 cents/kwh represented about one-third of wind production costs in 2006. As Table 5 shows, half credit (valued at 1.0 cents/kwh in 2006) was provided for electricity produced by facilities that used open-loop biomass, small irrigation water flows, incremental hydropower, or landfill gas from municipal solid waste. In application, the credit may be reduced for facilities that receive certain other federal credits, grants, tax-exempt bonds, or subsidized energy financing. The amount of credit that may be claimed is phased out as the market price of electricity exceeds certain threshold levels.", "Claims for the PTC were less than $1 million in 1993 and 1994. Table 6 shows that credit claims started growing more rapidly in 1995 and increased sharply, though erratically, from 1999 through 2005. Wind farm developments accounted for more than 90% of the dollar value of PTC claims through 2005. Given the credit's availability for new projects through 2008, the table shows that the claims for 2006 through 2010 are estimated to increase substantially (in current year dollars) relative to past levels.", "The PTC, combined with other policies, has had a positive though erratic effect on the growth of the wind energy industry. In contrast, it has had very little effect on baseload renewables, such as geothermal and biomass energy, and it has had virtually no effect on solar energy development. The following sections discuss PTC impacts in more detail.", "Coupled with rising energy costs, R&D advances, and a variety of state policies, the PTC has stimulated significant growth in wind capacity over the past 10 years. However, the PTC expirations in 2000, 2002, and 2004 caused annual capacity growth to fall sharply in those years, by as much as 80% relative to the previous year. After each expiration, the PTC was reinstated for one- to two-year periods. In 2005, one wind industry representative testified:\nUnfortunately ... two plus one plus one plus one does not necessarily equal five predictable years. Instead, it represents not the sum total of years the credit has been in place, but rather periods of uncertainty, when new wind construction stopped, jobs were eliminated, and costs were driven up. Business thrives on the known and fails on the unknown. The unpredictable nature of the credit has prevented the needed investment in U.S.-based facilities that will drive economies of scale and efficiencies.\nIn 2007, one renewable energy analyst echoed this observation, testifying that the frequent credit expiration, and short-term nature of reinstatements and extensions, have led to several adverse impacts on wind industry growth. The variability of the credit has caused the growing demand for wind power to be \"compressed into tight and frenzied windows of development. This cycle of boom-and-bust has resulted in under-investment in manufacturing capacity in the United States and variability in equipment and supply costs.\" It may also have caused under-investment in transmission planning and development, further restricting growth.\nThe American Wind Energy Association has noted that the cycle of decline in wind industry activity actually starts about eight months before a PTC expiration date. Representatives of the wind industry have testified that the cycle of peak manufacturing production demands followed by cutbacks \"would be eliminated if a long-term PTC extension was in effect.\" Opponents of the PTC say that the credit was created to provide temporary economic assistance to help the renewable electricity production industry get started. Further, they say that the PTC was not intended to be a permanent subsidy. Despite 15 years of subsidies, wind still apparently cannot compete without the PTC, opponents note.", "Geothermal power facilities are physically and operationally more like conventional coal-fired power plants than wind machines. There is usually one large, highly capital-intensive plant that uses heat to produce base-load power. However, industry testimony suggests that identifying a suitable geothermal resource is similar to prospecting for oil or natural gas. The costs and risks of exploration for geothermal are as high or higher than those for the oil and gas industry, and the ability to attract financing is far more difficult. Once a resource is verified, permitting and construction can take three to five years or more. Since 1992, there has been very limited development of new geothermal facilities.\nIn 2005, EPACT increased the amount of the PTC available to geothermal facilities from half to full credit. However, the PTC's short windows of availability have made the credit largely ineffective as an incentive for the geothermal industry. Industry representatives have noted that the largest projects \"may not go forward because they face unacceptable risks trying to meet the rigid deadline ... [or to avoid] taking an all-or-nothing gamble on future extensions of the credit.\" The geothermal industry says a PTC extension of 10 years or more could be sufficient to stimulate a higher level of sustained industry growth.\nRepresentatives of biomass, hydropower, and landfill gas industries say their facilities are more like geothermal facilities than wind machines and, thus, also require a longer-term PTC period. In 2005 testimony, EIA offered a similar observation:\nShort-term extensions of the PTC are likely to have limited impact on qualifying technologies like biomass and geothermal, which have relatively long development periods, even if the credit were large enough to make them economical.\nThe PTC has been even less valuable for solar energy equipment. Most solar electricity equipment comes as small, widely distributed units that are designed mainly for on-site use, not for power sales to the grid. These aspects make the PTC less valuable for solar than the business and residential investment tax credits (ITC). Due to rules against multiple tax credit use, solar equipment cannot qualify for both the PTC and ITC, and so owners must choose one or the other. Representatives of the solar industry have indicated a clear preference for ITC over PTC. Even with the PTC, solar is too expensive for utility-scale application.", "After its creation in 1992, the PTC was virtually unused until states began to establish renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies. State RPS action began in the mid-1990s. Since then, an increasing number of states have implemented an RPS. Table 5 shows the trend depicting the close correlation between rising PTC claims and the growing number of states with an RPS. Since the late 1990s, many have noted that the combined effect of the PTC with state RPS policies has been a major spur to wind energy growth.", "The variability in tax credit availability has led to erratic growth in energy production, and it has caused the U.S. wind industry to become more dependent on European equipment due to stronger European requirements for renewables. Despite these problems, wind has been the main beneficiary of the credit. A related issue is that the PTC has not been effective at stimulating the development of other renewable energy facilities, which generally need a longer period of credit availability. The main proposal to address the variable impact on wind and the lack of impact on other renewables is the enactment of a longer-term PTC extension. The wind industry prefers an extension of five years or more.\nOn occasion, the PTC has been expanded to include a broader range of renewable energy resources. This credit design issue surfaced in the 110 th Congress, as it addressed the question of whether the credit should be expanded to include production from equipment that uses marine energy (tidal, wave, and ocean thermal) resources and hydrokinetic (river current) resources. P.L. 110-343 (Division B, §102) did expand the credit to cover those resources, establishing a 1.0 cent/kwh credit with a three-year eligibility window.", "At least two studies have attempted to assess the potential results of a longer-term PTC extension. In one study, EIA examined a 10-year extension and found that wind power would continue to show the largest projected gains. Landfill gas, geothermal, and biomass were also projected to experience some capacity expansion. EIA estimated a 7-fold increase for wind, a 50% increase for biomass, and a 20% increase for geothermal facilities.\nIn 2007, DOE's Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley Lab) reported the results of a study that examined the potential benefits of extending the PTC for 5 to 10 years. Relative to a projection with continued cycles of one-year to two-year extensions, it found that the installed cost of wind could be reduced by 5% to 15%. Additional benefits could include better transmission planning and enhanced private R&D spending. Also, Berkeley Lab estimated that a 10-year extension could increase the domestic share of manufactured wind equipment from the current level of 30% to about 70%. The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that the one-year extension of the wind credit's placed-in-service deadline in P.L. 110-343 would reduce tax revenue to the U.S. Treasury by about $5.8 billion over the 10-year duration of credit claims.\nIn 2007 testimony, MidAmerican Energy Company suggested that a 5-to-10 year PTC extension would also be the best way to encourage baseload renewables, such as geothermal and biomass. Such an extension, it said, would provide long-term certainty to utilities, independent project developers, and manufacturers. To address budget-related cost concerns for a PTC extension, Mid-American suggested that a long-term extension could be coupled with a gradual phase-down of the credit to 1.5 cents/kwh. Alternatively, if the credit extension were set at something less than five years, Mid-American proposed that a conditional second deadline could be set up that would extend the placed-in-service eligibility period. That extension would require an offsetting reduction in the credit period, the length of time over which credit claims could be filed. The conditions required for an extension to a secondary placed-in-service deadline are that the project must be under construction and have signed power sales contracts before the initial credit expiration date and it must bring the project online before the secondary placed-in-service deadline. For example, if the secondary deadline were set as one year past the initial placed-in-service deadline, a project that met those conditions would be eligible to receive the credit, but only for nine years instead of ten.", "Because the PTC was set to expire at the end of 2008, proposals to extend it began early in the first session of the 110 th Congress. Table 2 shows that several proposals—with different time periods—were considered. Although PTC cost was a concern, growing higher in relation to the time period, the debate focused mainly on House paygo requirements that drew Administration veto threats. The House consistently proposed that the cost of the incentives be fully offset. Proposed offsets stressed reduced tax subsidies for oil and natural gas, which the Administration found unacceptable. In the first session, H.R. 2776 proposed a four-year extension that was incorporated into H.R. 3221 and, later, into a House-passed version of H.R. 6 . The Senate was unable to pass any tax incentive package in the first session, and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 ) was enacted without tax provisions. In the second session, the key bills were H.R. 5351 , H.R. 6049 , and H.R. 1424 .\nProponents of extending the credit past 2008 argued that the PTC is merited because it corrects a market failure by providing economic value for the environmental benefits of \"clean\" energy sources that emit less (in many cases, far less) air pollutants and CO 2 than conventional energy equipment. Also, they contended that it helps \"level the playing field,\" noting that there is an even longer history of federal subsidies for conventional energy. For example, they point to the permanent depletion allowance for oil and natural gas that has been in place for many decades.\nOpponents of extending the PTC beyond the end of 2008 argued that generally there are no market failures that warrant special tax subsidies for particular types of renewable energy technologies. They argued further that subsidies generally distort the free market and that renewables should not get special treatment that exempts them from this principle. Also, regarding the concern about the environmental problems of \"dirty\" conventional energy sources, they contended that the most cost-effective economic policy is to put a tax on the pollution from energy sources and let the free market make the necessary adjustments. Another argument against the PTC was that much renewable energy production, particularly from wind and solar equipment, has a fluctuating nature that makes it less valuable than energy produced by conventional facilities.\nAt a Senate hearing in February 2007, Energy Secretary Bodman testified that the Administration was unlikely to support a five-year or 10-year PTC extension because it would not be consistent with free markets. Consistent with that stance, the Administration's FY2008 budget request did not include a provision to cover a PTC extension beyond 2008. Similarly, the Administration's FY2009 budget request did not include such a provision. However, Section 304 of the Senate version ( S.Con.Res. 70 ) of the budget resolution proposed the creation a deficit-neutral reserve that could be used to support a five-year PTC extension. Further, Section 305 of the House budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. 312 ) also allowed for support of renewable energy tax incentives.", "", "The Energy Tax Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-618 ) established a residential energy investment tax credit (ITC) for solar and wind energy equipment. As energy prices declined, Congress allowed the credit to expire at the end of 1985. In 2005, EPACT ( P.L. 109-58 , §1335) established a 30% residential solar credit with a cap at $2,000, through the end of 2007. The Tax Relief Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 , §206) extended the credit through the end of 2008.\nThe Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343 , Div. B, §106) extends the residential solar tax credit at the 30% level for eight years, through the end of 2016. Further, the annual cap on the credit is increased from $2,000 to $4,000. Also, residential wind equipment and ground source heat pumps are eligible for a 30% credit.", "The Energy Tax Act also established a 10% business investment tax credit for solar, wind, geothermal, and ocean energy equipment. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 made permanent the 10% business credit for solar and geothermal equipment. In 2005, EPACT (§1337) increased the solar business credit to 30% through the end of 2007. The Tax Relief Act of 2006 extended the 30% rate through the end of 2008. Without an extension, the credit would have dropped back to 10% after 2008.\nP.L. 110-343 (Div. B, §103) extends the business solar tax credit at the 30% level for eight years, through the end of 2016. Further, the credit would be allowed to offset the alternative minimum tax. Also, public utilities would become eligible for the credit.\nThe debate over extending these credits was similar to that for the PTC. Opponents argued that subsidies distort the operation of the free market. They also contended that the most effective policy is to impose a tax on energy equipment that causes pollution. The solar industry has testified that the business ITC is the most important tax incentive for solar equipment. Proponents of the credit counter-argued that the credits correct a market failure and help establish equality with subsidies that exist for conventional energy equipment. They also asserted that the subsidy-induced increase in demand helps manufacturers establish economies of scale that will broaden the use of solar equipment and make it more competitive in the long term.", "P.L. 110-343 established other new business tax incentives. Division B (§104) establishes a 30% credit (capped at $4,000) over an eight-year period (end of 2016) for wind machines with a capacity of 100 kilowatts or less. Also, the permanent 10% credit is expanded to include geothermal (ground source) heat pumps (§105).", "Non-profit electric utilities provide about 25% of the nation's electricity. Due to their tax-exempt status, they are not eligible for the PTC. To address the cost and risk barriers for developing renewable energy facilities, these organizations have sought incentives comparable to the PTC. Using a design that parallels the PTC, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT92) established a renewable energy production incentive (REPI) that provided 1.5 cents/kwh, adjusted for inflation. REPI typically receives about $5 million per year, through DOE appropriations. This limited funding and annual uncertainty may have severely limited REPI's potential. DOE data for 2004 shows, for example, that funding covered only about 10% of requests for REPI payments.\nIn 2005 testimony, the American Public Power Association (APPA) stated that REPI was \"woefully underfunded,\" and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) proposed that a \"clean energy bond\" be created to establish an incentive for non-profit electric utilities that would be more comparable in scope to the PTC. Subsequently, EPACT (§1303) established clean renewable energy bonds (CREBs), a tax credit bond that allowed the bond holder to receive a federal tax credit in lieu of interest paid by the issuer. EPACT authorized $800 million in CREBs for 2006 and 2007. In late 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported requests totaling $2.6 billion in bond authority. The Tax Relief Act of 2006 (§202) authorized a second round of CREBs through the end of 2008, adding $400 million more in total bond authority.\nP.L. 110-343 (Div. B, §107) established a new category of CREBs (New CREBs) for state/local/tribal governments, public power providers (utilities), and cooperative electric companies. The \"New CREBs\" differ from the previously issued CREBs in four aspects. First, issuers of New CREBs will be subjected to a shorter three-year period for use of the bond proceeds, two years less than the previous five-year period for CREBs. Second, the tax credit rate will be lower, set at 70% of the previous rate for CREBs. Third, taxpayers can carry forward unused credits into future years. Fourth, the tax credit benefits can be separated from bond ownership.\nA national limit of $800 million was set for New CREBs, of which one-third will be available for state, local and tribal governments; one-third for public power providers; and one-third for cooperative electric companies. The revenue drain on the U.S. Treasury is estimated at a total of $267 million over the period from 2009 through 2018. The Administration repeatedly stated its opposition to the New CREBs that the House approved in the first session ( H.R. 3221 and the House version of H.R. 6 ) and in the second session ( H.R. 5351 and H.R. 6049 ). For example, it contended that the CREBs are \"expensive and highly inefficient,\" and that New CREBs would be \"inconsistent with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 and/or unduly constrain the Administration's ability to effectively manage Federal credit programs. Proponents of the New CREBs counter-argue that the New CREBs would \"help limit the environmental consequences of continued reliance on power generated using fossil fuels.\" The tax-credit bonds, they argue, can attract investment from taxpayers that are unable to benefit from tax credits.", "The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act ( P.L. 110-343 , Div. B, Title III) requires nearly $17.0 billion in revenue offsets, primarily to support incentives for renewables (Title I) and efficiency (Title II). Debate over the revenue offset provisions in H.R. 1424 directly paralleled the House and Senate floor debates over similar proposals in other key bills during the first session ( H.R. 3221 and H.R. 6 ) and second session ( H.R. 5351 and H.R. 6049 ). In those debates, opponents argued that the reduction in oil and natural gas incentives would dampen production, cause job losses, and lead to higher prices for gasoline and other fuels. Proponents counter-argued that record profits show that the oil and natural gas incentives were not needed and that the new incentives would help spur the development of \"green\" jobs.", "", "Under a renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS), retail electricity suppliers (electric utilities) must provide a minimum amount of electricity from renewable energy resources or purchase tradable credits that represent an equivalent amount of renewable energy production. The minimum requirement is often set as a percentage of retail electricity sales. More than 28 states have established an RPS, with most targets ranging from 10% to 20% and most target deadlines ranging from 2010 to 2025. Most states have established tradable credits as a way to lower costs and facilitate compliance. State RPS action has provided an experience base for the design of a possible national requirement.", "Opponents often contend that state RPS policies are not worth implementing because the incremental costs of renewable energy may lead to substantial increases in electricity prices. RPS proponents often counter by presenting evidence that renewable energy costs would be modest and arguing that RPS creates employment, reduces natural gas prices, and produces environmental benefits.", "The renewable energy electricity production tax credit (PTC) is the single most important form of federal support for state RPS policies. The PTC can \"buy-down\" the cost of renewable energy by about $20/mwh on a long-term levelized cost basis. Thus, assumptions about the future availability and level of the PTC can have a major impact on planning for state RPS policies. Otherwise, federal agency involvement with state RPS programs has primarily involved support for planning and analysis.", "RPS proponents contend that a national system of tradable credits would enable retail suppliers in states with fewer resources to comply at the least cost by purchasing credits from organizations in states with a surplus of low-cost production. Opponents counter that regional differences in availability, amount, and types of renewable energy resources would make a federal RPS unfair and costly.\nDuring the first session of the 110 th Congress, RPS action began with Senate floor consideration of S.Amdt. 1537 to H.R. 6 . The amendment proposed a 15% RPS target. The proposal triggered a lively debate, but was ultimately ruled non-germane. In that debate, opponents argued that a national RPS would disadvantage certain regions of the country, particularly the Southeastern states. They contended that the South lacks a sufficient amount of renewable energy resources to meet a 15% renewables requirement. They further concluded that an RPS would cause retail electricity prices to rise for many consumers.\nRPS proponents countered by citing an EIA study that examined the potential impacts of the 15% RPS proposed in S.Amdt. 1537 . It indicated that the South has sufficient biomass generation, both from dedicated biomass plants and existing coal plants co-firing with biomass fuel, to meet a 15% RPS. EIA noted further that the estimated net RPS requirement for the South would not make it \"unusually dependent\" on other regions and was in fact \"below the national average requirement.... \" Regarding electricity prices, EIA estimated that the 15% RPS would likely raise retail prices by slightly less than 1% over the 2005 to 2030 period. Further, the RPS would likely cause retail natural gas prices to fall slightly over that period.\nIn House floor action on H.R. 3221 , an RPS amendment ( H.Amdt. 748 ) was added by a vote of 220 to 190. The bill subsequently passed the House by a vote of 241 to 172. The RPS amendment would set a 15% target for 2020, of which up to four percentage points of the requirement could be met with energy efficiency measures. Key points and counterpoints of the Senate debate were repeated. On the House floor, RPS opponents also contended that biomass power technologies were not yet ready for commercial use and that certain usable forms of biomass were excluded. Proponents acknowledged that there is a need to expand the definition of biomass resources, and offered to do so in conference committee.\nOn December 6, 2007, the House approved the same RPS provision as section 1401 of the omnibus energy bill, H.R. 6 . However, the Senate passed H.R. 6 without an RPS provision. Thus, the Energy Independence and Security Act ( P.L. 110-140 ) did not contain an RPS. (For more details see CRS Report RL34116, Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS): Background and Debate Over a National Requirement , by [author name scrubbed] . )", "", "Major wind developments in Europe have expanded from land-based operations to include some offshore coastal areas. Proposals to develop offshore wind have emerged in the United States as well. During the 109 th Congress, a major debate erupted over safety, economic, and environmental aspects of a proposal by Cape Wind Associates to develop a 420-megawatt offshore wind farm in Nantucket Sound, south of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Cape Wind and other proponents say the project is a safe, clean way to develop renewable energy and create jobs. Opponents of the project have collaborated to create the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound. The Alliance says that the project poses threats to the area's ecosystem, maritime navigation, and the Cape Cod tourism-based economy.\nEPACT (§388) placed regulatory responsibility for offshore wind developments with the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the Department of the Interior. In 2006, MMS announced that an environmental impact statement (EIS) would be prepared for the project. In February 2007, Cape Wind submitted its draft EIS to MMS. MMS released its Draft Environmental Impact Statement in January 2008. The study found that environmental, fishery, and marine transportation impacts would range from negligible to minor. On-shore visual impacts would be moderate. After the report was released, MMS began a two-month review and comment period. Also, the Coast Guard Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-241 , §414) directs the Coast Guard to determine the status of navigational safety aspects for the Cape Wind Project. The parties to the debate are waiting for the final results of the EIS and Coast Guard study.\nThere is also a concern that tall wind turbines create false radar signals that may disrupt civilian and military radar equipment. This led to federal actions to temporarily halt several wind farm developments. The Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to study the issue and report to Congress. In 2006, the Sierra Club filed suit to compel DOD to complete the radar study. DOD released the report in late 2006, and allowed most of the delayed projects to resume action. However, the report concluded that some mitigation strategies would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis and that the development of additional mitigation measures would require further research and validation.\nThe impact of wind turbines on wildlife has also become a focus of concern. H.R. 3221 (§7231-7234) would have required the Department of the Interior to form a committee to recommend guidance to minimize and assess impacts of land-based wind turbines on wildlife and wildlife habitats. State and federal laws (and regulations) would not be preempted. However, this provision was not included in the final version of H.R. 6 that was enacted as the Energy Independence and Security Act ( P.L. 110-140 ).", "Technology that generates electricity from marine sources—including ocean waves, tides, and river currents—has reached the pre-commercial stage. Tax incentives and other programs have been established in Florida, Maine, and New Jersey to encourage commercial development. MMS has authority under EPACT (§388) to regulate development of ocean energy resources on the outer continental shelf (OCS). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has asserted its authority to regulate these technologies, which it considers to be forms of hydropower. As these technologies develop to commercial scale, environmental issues are likely to arise, over which several other agencies appear to have regulatory jurisdiction. As technologies advance and new incentives become available, the regulatory struggle between MMS and FERC, and the potential regulatory roles of other agencies, may grow in importance.\nThe 110 th Congress, took two major actions to promote marine and hydrokinetic power technologies. First, the Energy Independence and Security Act ( P.L. 110-140 ) directs DOE to create an R&D program focused on technology that produces electricity from waves, tides, currents, and ocean thermal differences (§633). A report to Congress is required. Further, DOE is instructed to award grants to institutions of higher education (or consortia thereof) to establish National Marine Renewable Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Centers (§634). The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-161 ) provided $9.9 million for DOE's Water/Marine Energy Technology Program. The FY2009 Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-329 ) provides funding through March 9, 2009, at the same level as FY2008.\nSecond, P.L. 110-343 (Div. B, §102) expanded the renewable energy electricity production tax credit to include production from marine and hydrokinetic sources. The credit is set at 1 cent/kwh for the 2008 tax year. The window of eligibility will be open for three years, through the end of 2011.", "", "Renewable fuel is defined to include ethanol, biodiesel, and certain other sources. Ethanol is the only one produced in large quantity.", "In the United States, ethanol is produced mainly from corn grown on farms. It is most often used as a 10% blend with gasoline. Ethanol's high cost has been a key barrier to increased commercial use. This barrier has been addressed mainly by a 51-cent per gallon tax credit for fuel use. Also, there has been a debate over the net energy benefit of using corn ethanol. National ethanol production was estimated at 6.48 billion gallons in 2007. However, due to ethanol's lower heat content, this is equivalent to about 4.34 billion gallons of gasoline, or about 285,000 barrels of oil per day (b/d).", "The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that 20% of the 2006 corn crop was used to produce ethanol. The rapid growth in agriculture-based biofuel production generated a sharp upturn in corn, grain, and oilseed prices in late 2006. At the end of 2006, corn ethanol plant capacity expansion was on record pace. The rapid growth in production and plant capacity has raised concerns that further acceleration of ethanol production may pose more challenges, including the development of pipeline capacity and the potential for more food price increases.\nSupporters argue that ethanol displaces petroleum imports, thus improving energy security. They further contend that its use can lead to lower emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases, especially if higher-percentage blends are used. Opponents argue that various federal and state incentives for ethanol distort the market and provide \"corporate welfare\" for corn growers and ethanol producers. Further, they assert that the energy and chemical inputs that fertilize corn and convert it into ethanol actually increase energy use and emissions. However, proponents counter-argue that ethanol provides modest energy and emissions benefits relative to gasoline.", "Cellulosic ethanol can be produced from dedicated fuel crops, such as fast-growing trees and switchgrass. Switchgrass grows well on marginal lands, needing little water and no fertilizer. This allows its growing area to be much larger than that for corn. Cellulosic feedstocks may be cheaper and more plentiful than corn, but they require more extensive and costly conversion to ethanol. Both DOE and USDA are conducting research to improve technology and reduce costs. The United States and Canada have pilot production facilities. Canada has one commercial-scale plant in operation, and the first U.S. commercial plants are expected to start operating in 2009.", "", "Section 202 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-140 ) extends and increases the RFS. The standard requires minimum annual levels of renewable fuel in U.S. transportation fuel. The previous standard was 5.4 billion gallons for 2008, rising to 7.5 billion by 2012. The new standard starts at 9.0 billion gallons in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons in 2022. Starting in 2016, all of the increase in the RFS target must be met with advanced biofuels, defined as cellulosic ethanol and other biofuels derived from feedstock other than corn starch—with explicit carve-outs for cellulosic biofuels and biomass-based diesel.\nThe law gives the EPA Administrator authority to temporarily waive part of the biofuels mandate, if it were determined that a significant renewable feedstock disruption or other market circumstance might occur. Renewable fuels produced from new biorefineries will be required to reduce by at least 20% the life cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to life cycle emissions from gasoline and diesel. Fuels produced from biorefineries that displace more than 80% of the fossil-derived processing fuels used to operate a biofuel production facility will qualify for cash awards. Several studies are required on the potential impacts of the RFS expansion on various sectors of the economy.", "In February 2008, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held an oversight hearing on the new RFS. Both leaders of the Committee, the Chairman and the Ranking Member, expressed concern that the RFS set by the Energy Independence Act may need changes in order to be implemented effectively. One major focus of concern is that the law may unintentionally preclude new technologies and feedstock sources, such as woody biomass from federal lands, urban and commercial waste, and biocrude from algae. (For more details on issues related to the RFS, see CRS Report RL34265, Selected Issues Related to an Expansion of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) , by [author name scrubbed] and Tom Capehart.)", "Table 7 shows baseline EIA data for U.S. oil use and Persian Gulf Imports in 2006 and EIA projections for selected future years through 2030. The table also shows ethanol production estimates for the current RFS of 36 billion gallons by 2022. At its peak in 2022, the current RFS would displace an estimated 1.57 million barrels per day (mbd), or about 59% of projected Persian Gulf imports for that year.", "", "The Bush Administration's Biofuels Initiative, part of the Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI), was designed to increase funding for cellulosic ethanol development with the goal of accelerating its commercial use. In 2006, DOE formed a joint research effort between its Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) and the Office of Science to develop cellulosic biotechnology that would enable the production of 60 billion gallons per year. The research plan aims for biotechnology breakthroughs to increase the quantity of biomass (e.g., switchgrass) per acre and to breed the plants to have more cellulose. The plan would cut costs through biorefinery breakthroughs that reduce the number of conversion steps and shift the process from chemical steps to biological steps.\nAs Table 4 shows, DOE's FY2009 budget request would have provided $225.0 million for DOE's Biomass Program that supports the Biofuels Initiative and the RFS goals. This would have been a $26.8 million increase from the $198.2 million appropriated for FY2008. However, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-329 ) continues FY2009 funding at the FY2008 level through March 6, 2009. It does not provide for a funding increase.", "The law has four key tax incentive provisions for biofuels. Section 201 makes a 50% tax deduction available for the cost of building facilities that produce cellulosic biofuels, with the incentive available for four years (end of 2012). Section 202 extends for one year (end of 2009) the $1.00 per gallon production credit for biodiesel and the 10 cents per gallon credit for small biodiesel producers. Also, it extends the $1.00 per gallon production credit for biomass-derived diesel fuel. Section 207 extends the alternative refueling stations credit for one year, through the end of 2009. The credit value is set at 30%, with a cap at $30,000. Section 203 clarifies that the production incentives in sections 201, 202, and 207 are available only for fuels produced in the United States.", "This section discusses the potential for renewable energy to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions by displacing fossil fuel use.", "In most cases renewable energy appears to release less carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) than fossil fuels. Thus, renewables are seen as a key long-term resource that could substitute for significant amounts of fossil energy that would otherwise be used to produce vehicle fuels and electricity. The potential percentage of renewable energy substitution can depend on many factors, including energy prices, energy demand growth, technology cost, and market penetration. As renewable energy production displaces fossil fuel use, it would also reduce CO 2 emissions in direct proportion, except perhaps for biofuels and biopower.\nIn general, the combustion of biomass for fuel and power production releases CO 2 at an intensity that may be close to that for natural gas. However, the re-growth of biomass material, which absorbs CO 2 , often offsets this release. Hence, net emissions occur only when combustion is based on deforestation. In a \"closed loop\" system, biomass combustion is based on rotating energy crops, there is no net CO 2 release unless fertilizer is used, and any fossil fuel displacement, including decreased natural gas use, would tend to reduce CO 2 emissions.", "Since 1988, the federal government has initiated programs to support renewable energy as a CO 2 mitigation measure at DOE, USDA, EPA, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the World Bank. AID and the World Bank have received funding for renewable energy-related climate actions through foreign operations appropriations bills.\nStates have undertaken a variety of programs that support renewables to curb CO 2 . These programs often have reasons other than climate change for supporting renewables. California and New York are notable examples that have sizable programs for R&D and market deployment. These programs are funded in large part by a surcharge on electricity use, often identified as a public goods charge. As noted in a previous section of this report, many states have enacted a renewable portfolio standard. However, a growing number of states have also undertaken climate programs that specifically include renewables as one mitigation measure. Many local governments have also undertaken climate programs that include renewables as a component.", "The proposed Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act ( S. 3036 ) was introduced during the second session. It would have established a cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The bill contained several provisions for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Revenue from the auctioned allowances could be used for multiple purposes, including accelerated deployment of renewable energy, energy efficiency, and other new energy technologies. Each year, nearly 40% of the revenue from auctions would go to efficiency and renewables. Compared with S. 3036 , the proposed Boxer substitute to the bill would have established an even broader array of incentives for the deployment of energy efficiency and renewable energy measures. Eight of the 17 titles in the substitute contained such measures, including grants, worker training, incentives to facility developers, and leverage for private financing to support international partnerships.", "", "", "DOE's FY2008 budget request sought $1,236.2 million for DOE's Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs. In H.R. 2641 , the House approved $1,873.8 million for EERE and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1,715.6 million for EERE. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2007 ( H.R. 2764 ) subsumed H.R. 2641 , and the enacted law included $1,723.7 million for EERE. (Details of the FY2008 appropriations are available in the \"Key Policy Issues—Department of Energy\" section of CRS Report RL34009, Energy and Water Development: FY2008 Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed] et al.)", "At the end of its first session, the 110 th Congress enacted a major omnibus energy bill focused on improving energy efficiency and increasing the availability of renewable energy. Highlights of the major provisions enacted are:\nCorporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) . Title I sets a target of 35 miles per gallon for the combined fleet of cars and light trucks by model year 2020. Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) . Title II sets a modified standard that starts at 8.5 billion gallons in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons by 2022. Appliance and Lighting Standards. Title III legislates new standards for broad categories of incandescent lamps (light bulbs), incandescent reflector lamps, and fluorescent lamps. Further, a required target is set for lighting efficiency, and energy efficiency labeling is required for consumer electronic products. Efficiency standards are set by law for external power supplies, residential clothes washers, dishwashers, dehumidifiers, refrigerators, refrigerator freezers, freezers, electric motors, residential boilers, commercial walk-in coolers, and commercial walk-in freezers. Further, DOE is directed to set standards by rulemaking for furnace fans and battery chargers.\n(For more details about the provisions in P.L. 110-140 , see CRS Report RL34294, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007: A Summary of Major Provisions , by [author name scrubbed]).", "", "The enacted version of the farm bill ( H.R. 6124 ; \"Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008\") became law on June 18, 2008. The law contains provisions that extend and/or expand upon renewable energy (and energy efficiency) provisions of the Farm Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-171 ). Several programs for grants, loans, and tax incentives were put in place to support renewable energy (and/or energy efficiency). (For more details, see CRS Report RL34130, Renewable Energy Policy in the 2008 Farm Bill , by Tom Capehart.)", "As Table 4 shows, DOE's FY2009 budget request sought $1.255 billion for DOE's Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs. P.L. 110-329 ( H.R. 2638 ) provides continuing appropriations through March 6, 2009, at the FY2008 level. The law provides an additional $250 million to the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program and provides $7.5 billion for a $25 billion loan to help U.S. automakers retool facilities to produce advanced technology energy-efficient vehicles. The law covers appropriations through March 6, 2009.", "Division B of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act ( P.L. 110-343 ) contains the text of the Senate-passed version of H.R. 6049 , which provides several tax incentives for efficiency and renewables. The Senate crafted its substitute to H.R. 6049 as a response to the House-passed version of the bill and to Administration-expressed concerns about House provisions for renewable energy bonds and revenue offsets. The highlights of key provisions enacted into law are as follows:\nRenewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC) . The credit for wind farms is extended for one year, through the end of 2009. Other equipment are eligible for two years, through 2010. Newly eligible marine technologies are eligible for three years, through 2011. Solar Investment Tax Credits (ITC) for Residential and Commercial Sectors . The law extends the existing 30% credit for each sector for eight years, through the end of 2016. Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs). The law authorizes a new round of state and local bond issuances, with a total national value of $800 million. Energy Conservation Bonds. The law authorizes a new state and local program, with a total national value of $800 million. Revenue Offsets. The cost of incentives are offset by a freeze in certain oil and natural gas deductions, a reduced foreign tax credit for certain foreign oil and gas income, reduced deductions for certain securities transactions, a change in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) surtax, and an increase of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund tax.", "In the 110 th Congress, more than 460 bills with provisions for energy efficiency or renewable energy were introduced. A general description of the renewable energy provisions in those bills, including those enacted into law, is available in CRS Report RL33831, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 110 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The report also groups the bills by policy and issue areas, provides a table that identifies recent action on the bills, and discusses recent action." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 3, 3, 4, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_title", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h2_full h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h1_title", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h2_title", "h2_title", "", "h2_full", "h2_full", "h2_title", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_title", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is a large issue for renewable energy programs?", "How did the Energy Policy Act impact renewable energy programs?", "How did the Energy Independence and Security Act perform?", "How was DOE's renewable energy funding increased?", "How was this act extended?", "What is an issue connected to renewable energy?", "How have current tax policies incentivized wind energy development?", "How has the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act supported this effort?", "How does this act affect other types of energy?", "How did ethanol fuel as a topic change for 110th Congress?", "Why was the growth of ethanol production an issue?", "How did this change the ethanol debate?", "What are the benefits and drawbacks of cellulosic fuel?", "How did P.L. 110 change the RFS?", "How did this bill also affect biofuel provisions?" ], "summary": [ "Budget and funding issues are key concerns.", "The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized several new renewable energy demonstration and deployment programs, but most of them have not been funded.", "Further, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) authorized several new renewable energy programs that have not yet received appropriations.", "The Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2008 (P.L. 110-161) increased Department of Energy (DOE) renewable energy funding by $31.4 million (7%).", "The Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329, H.R. 2638) continues DOE funding at the FY2008 level through March 6, 2009.", "Tax policies are also at issue.", "The interaction of the federal renewable energy electricity production tax credit (PTC) with state renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies has forged a strong incentive for wind energy development.", "The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343 [Division B], H.R. 1424) extends the PTC for wind farms for one year (three years for most other renewables) through the end of 2009, provides $800 million for a new category of clean renewable energy (tax credit) bonds, and extends for eight years the 30% level for the business solar tax credit and the 30% residential solar tax credit.", "Further, the law repeals nearly $17.7 billion in tax subsidies for oil and natural gas and reduces certain other financial incentives that will be used to offset the cost of the tax incentives for renewable energy ($9.1 billion) and energy efficiency ($3.6 billion).", "The ethanol fuel issue intensified for much of the 110th Congress.", "Corn ethanol production climbed rapidly, but appeared to be causing food price increases.", "Concerns about rising food prices and apparent limits to the long-term potential for corn ethanol have brought a focus on cellulosic ethanol.", "Cellulosic sources avoid many limits on corn and appear to have much lower net CO2 emissions, but they require an extensive and costly conversion process.", "P.L. 110-140 set a new renewable fuels standard (RFS), which starts at 9.0 billion gallons in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons in 2022.", "P.L. 110-343 (H.R. 1424) and the farm bill (P.L. 110-246, H.R. 6124) contain several tax incentives and other provisions for biofuels." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, -1, 3, -1, -1, 1, 2, -1, -1, 1, 2, -1, 4 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 ] }
CRS_R40494	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Malaria Background", "Cause, Consequences, and Impact of Malaria3", "Prevention, Treatment, and Control of Malaria", "Recent International Attention on Malaria", "U.S. Efforts to Combat Global Malaria", "U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator", "U.S. Programs to Fight Global Malaria", "President's Malaria Initiative24", "Commodities", "National Malaria Control Programs", "Partners", "Other USAID Malaria Programs34", "CDC Malaria Activities35", "Funding", "Policy Issues", "PMI Structure and Scope", "Funding for U.S. Malaria Programs", "Reporting on U.S. Malaria Funding and Activities", "Balance Between Commodities and Technical Assistance", "Commodities: Accessibility and Affordability", "Commodities: Effectiveness", "Disease-Specific versus Health Systems Approach", "PMI and Global Fund Coordination" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Malaria's impact is widespread. Although eradicated almost 60 years ago in the United States, malaria remained a serious problem in 109 countries in 2008. Malaria is a disease caused by a parasite that is transmitted to a person through the bite of a particular mosquito. It can lead to fever, muscle aches, and, without effective treatment, sometimes death. Globally, an estimated 247 million people become ill due to malaria every year; of these, nearly 1 million die, mostly children younger than five years old. Approximately 40% of the world's population is at risk of malaria, but most cases and deaths are in sub-Saharan Africa.\nIn the past decade, the U.S. government and international community have increasingly recognized malaria prevention, treatment, and control as a fundamental factor in community health and economic growth in developing countries. Despite global efforts to eradicate malaria in many regions in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1990s saw a resurgence of the disease after national and international investments in malaria research and control declined. Many leaders expressed their growing concern about the negative impact of high rates of malaria infection and death on many developing countries during high-level meetings and summits, including the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly. Many U.S. policymakers have, likewise, demonstrated a strong interest in combating malaria. In recent years, Congress has passed legislation that states that a major objective of the U.S. foreign assistance program is to provide aid for the prevention, control, and cure of malaria; required the development of a U.S. global malaria strategy; and appropriated increased funding for U.S. programs that fight the disease globally. At the same time, the U.S. government reorganized many U.S. malaria programs and changed program policies to emphasize funding for commodities (such as antimalarial drugs and mosquito nets), their effective distribution and implementation, and monitoring and evaluation activities.\nThis report provides background on malaria's cause, consequences, and impact as well as key interventions for its prevention, control, and treatment. It examines congressional activities related to global malaria, and then it describes U.S. programs through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that address the disease internationally. The report describes U.S. funding for these activities. It also raises possible issues for Congress related to U.S. funding levels, U.S. program priorities and strategies, access to and effectiveness of commodities, and oversight of U.S. programs. Except for CDC operational and applied research, this report does not describe U.S. government activities related to malaria research. Appendix A provides a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations used in the body of this report. Appendix B lists additional key books, articles, and reports on malaria.", "Malaria is a complex disease that has been successfully eradicated in some parts of the world, including the United States. However, in other areas, eradication efforts have failed or not been attempted at all. Experts agree that it is important to understand not only the disease and its impact but also the recent history of international malaria efforts if ongoing efforts are going to succeed in controlling malaria where past programs did not.", "Malaria is caused by Plasmodium parasites, which are transmitted to humans through the bite of infected female A nopheles mosquitoes. First, these parasites multiply in the liver; then they infect red blood cells. A week or two after someone is bitten by an infected mosquito, initial symptoms appear, including fever, shivering, headache, nausea, vomiting, muscle aches and fatigue. Without effective treatment, these symptoms may rapidly progress to include organ failure, delirium, convulsions, coma, and sometimes death.\nMalaria infects people of all ages, but some groups — pregnant women, infants and young children, and people living with HIV/AIDS — are more vulnerable to the disease. Most cases and deaths, including more than 9 out of 10 child deaths from malaria, are in sub-Saharan Africa, but other regions of the world, including parts of Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Europe, are also affected (see Figure 1 ). Those countries that have a fairly constant number of cases throughout the year are considered malaria endemic countries. In 2008, 109 countries were considered malaria endemic; of these, 45 were in sub-Saharan Africa.\nThe incidence of malaria appears to correlate to many other factors affecting the health, economic development, and social well being of people and communities in many developing countries. High rates of malaria in a developing country may negatively affect economic growth and demand a great proportion of public health resources. In 2003, 25-40% of all outpatient clinic visits and 20-50% of hospital admissions in malaria endemic countries in Africa were for malaria. With the scale-up of malaria programs in many malaria endemic countries, some countries report fewer malaria-related hospital admissions. Often, poor or marginalized populations are disproportionately affected by malaria. While experts debate whether poverty leads to malaria or malaria leads to poverty, some suggest that high rates of malaria can continue the cycle of poverty by draining financial resources and contributing to absenteeism from schools or the workplace. Additionally, many malaria deaths in Africa occur among populations affected by conflicts, which may experience malaria outbreaks due to disruptions in healthcare and malaria control efforts as well as exposure to different malaria transmission patterns.", "Experts agree that preventing malaria infections as well as accurately diagnosing and treating malaria quickly are essential to control the spread of malaria. Four key strategies for combating malaria are:\nEffective Treatment with ACTs: Treating malaria early and with effective drugs shortens its duration and prevents complications and most malaria-related deaths. Several drugs are used to treat malaria, and they vary in cost, availability, and effectiveness. In most areas, donors or Ministries of Health prefer to use artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs), which succeed generations of antimalarial drugs, including chloroquine, that have become less effective in fighting the malaria parasite due to increased drug resistance. ACTs are made up of an artemisinin drug and one or more additional antimalarial drugs; using antimalarial drugs in combination rather than singly reduces the likelihood that the malaria parasite will develop resistance to a drug. IPTp: In many malaria-endemic areas, women may be given intermittent preventive treatment of malaria during pregnancy (IPTp) — spaced doses of the drug sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) — in order to reduce the rates of malaria-related low birth weights in newborn babies and malaria-related anemia in pregnant women. IRS: Another way of reducing the transmission of malaria is through indoor residual spraying (IRS) — spraying the inside walls of houses with a long-acting insecticide. By controlling the presence of malaria-infected mosquitoes through IRS, malaria transmission can be reduced or interrupted. Several types of insecticides are used in the environment to control mosquitoes, and, like antimalarial drugs, they vary in cost, availability, and effectiveness. ITNs: The use of insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs) is another strategy to prevent malaria-infected mosquitoes from biting people and transmitting the disease. These nets protect individuals or families from malaria when people sleep under nets hung over their beds. The nets also kill the mosquitoes. These nets usually retain their insecticidal properties for up to six months, depending on how frequently they are washed, without re-treatment. Some long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) have insecticide incorporated into their fibers and last for up to 3 years.\nHowever, the appropriate mix of prevention and treatment interventions may vary according to local conditions, including the presence of parasite resistance to antimalarial drugs (including ACTs and SP) and mosquito resistance to insecticides. USAID's selected interventions in a country also vary based on the pattern of disease transmission, the age and pregnancy status of infected persons, and whether activities are feasible and sustainable.", "Malaria prevention, treatment, and control, which is increasingly recognized as a fundamental component of community health and economic growth in developing countries, has re-emerged as a major international concern in the past decade. In the 1950s and 1960s, multilateral efforts to eradicate malaria globally and in specific countries increased; some programs experienced setbacks or failure while others had more success. However, sub-Saharan Africa was largely excluded from these efforts. Reasons given for this vary: the region's high malaria infection rates; the costs associated with trying to eradicate malaria in many countries; and that the region included \"areas inhabited by populations with primitive tribal organizations incapable of supporting complex administrative structures and high costs of malaria eradication campaigns.\" Many experts in the 1960s believed that malaria in many areas might be eradicated in coming years, but after investments in malaria research and control declined from previous levels and little attention was paid to sub-Saharan Africa, the 1990s saw the resurgence of the disease.\nSeveral high-level meetings and summits have addressed the malaria problem in recent years, reflecting growing political interest in and public recognition of the negative economic and social impacts of malaria on affected regions. For example, in 1995, the U.N. General Assembly expressed concern about malaria's detrimental effects on many developing countries in light of increasing malaria infection rates. The Pan-Africa Malaria Summit of 1997 culminated in the Harare Declaration on Malaria Prevention and Control in the Context of African Economic Recovery and Development. In the Harare Declaration, many African heads of state invited \"governments and other partners including multilateral and bilateral agencies to participate actively in a vigorous coordinated effort to control malaria in Africa\" and pledged their commitment to the African Plan of Action against malaria described in the declaration. A few years later, many African heads of state agreed to the Abuja Declaration on Roll Back Malaria in Africa, which set targets for reducing malaria's impact in Africa.\nSince the late 1990s, governments and international organizations have increased public sector investments in malaria control and research, the private sector has contributed funds to new business coalitions against the disease, and renewed coordinating efforts to reach new goals and raise more funding have gotten under way. The World Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank launched the Roll Back Malaria Partnership (RBM), a partnership of organizations that aims to provide a coordinated global approach to fighting malaria. The U.N. General Assembly resolved to halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria by 2015 as part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Then the World Health Assembly of WHO urged Member-States to increase financial support and national planning for malaria control.", "U.S. policymakers have demonstrated strong interest in combating global malaria over the past ten years. Recognizing the global impact of malaria and its relationship to global HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis challenges, Congress provided increased malaria funding for FY2001 through FY2008 through the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act of 2000 (Control Act, P.L. 106-570 ) and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act, P.L. 108-25 ). However, in 2004 and 2005, criticism of U.S. global malaria policies grew among global health experts and other observers. Some Members of Congress also questioned the U.S. strategy for fighting global malaria, holding congressional hearings to examine USAID's malaria policies and introducing legislation to change the coordination, planning, and spending priorities of U.S. malaria efforts. They expressed concern that USAID's malaria programs focused mainly on technical assistance rather than purchasing and distributing commodities, such as antimalarial drugs and ITNs, and that malaria activities sometimes did not utilize effective interventions to fight the disease. Some also suggested that the agency was either unable or unwilling to provide requested information about programs' results and spending on malaria interventions and that U.S. malaria efforts might be ineffective. One Member noted that recent increases in funding for U.S. malaria activities coincided with a 10% increase in malaria-related deaths in Africa. At the time, USAID spent almost 8% of its FY2004 malaria budget and almost 10% of its FY2005 malaria budget on commodities.\nIn 2005, U.S. policymakers tried to address such concerns and criticisms through several key changes to the policies and structure of U.S. malaria programs. USAID reorganized its malaria programs and altered its malaria policies to emphasize funding for procuring commodities and their effective distribution and implementation, program transparency, and monitoring and evaluation activities. That year, President George W. Bush also proposed the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), a five-year initiative to halve the number of malaria-related deaths in 15 sub-Saharan African countries by 2010, and pledged an additional $1.2 billion over the five years for U.S. global malaria programs through PMI. Some suggest the initiative was part of the Bush Administration's broader African development agenda, which sought to address poverty and disease, among other things, in sub-Saharan Africa. President Bush announced PMI the week before the 2005 G-8 Summit, which had Africa's development as one of its themes; during the Summit, President Bush urged other donors to increase support for malaria efforts in Africa. Although USAID operated malaria programs in many countries before these policy and program changes, these shifts led USAID to concentrate its malaria resources in fewer countries and regions, beginning in 2006. The agency also reported that its intention was to \"combine all malaria activities into a single, strategic, global malaria program.\" Some suggest that PMI is the model for this effort and that, in time, PMI and non-PMI malaria programs may be combined under a broader U.S. malaria program.\nAfter the launch of PMI, Congress continued to express strong interest in U.S. efforts to combat global malaria. During a 2006 congressional hearing on U.S. malaria efforts that evaluated the changes in U.S. global malaria policy and programs, some Members applauded the creation and rapid implementation of the PMI approach in several countries but discussed the need for continued improvement in U.S. malaria activities. In 2008, Congress passed the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act (Lantos-Hyde Act, P.L. 110-293 ), which authorizes $5 billion from FY2009 through FY2013 for U.S. global malaria efforts. It also directs the U.S. President to develop a comprehensive, five-year U.S. government strategy to fight global malaria and authorizes the position of a Coordinator of U.S. Government Activities to Combat Malaria Globally (U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator).\nDuring the 2008 Presidential campaign, then Senator Barack Obama pledged to make the United States a global leader in ending malaria-related deaths by 2015. The Obama Administration has stated that it \"will continue to build on its commitment to save lives through increasing investments in global health programs ... while also emphasizing a commitment to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis through successful programs, such as PEPFAR and the Malaria Initiative.\" It is unclear, however, whether the Administration plans to continue PMI's focus on 15 countries or instead adopt an approach that eliminates distinctions between PMI and non-PMI countries. Similarly, while Members of Congress have stated support for U.S. global malaria programs, Congress has not specified that certain countries should be targeted by U.S. malaria efforts, and some suggest that by authorizing the broader role of a U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator instead of the position of the PMI Coordinator, Congress indicated support for a more integrated U.S. approach to global malaria.", "The U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator at USAID oversees and coordinates all U.S. government activities to fight malaria globally, including U.S. global malaria efforts in not only the 15 PMI countries in sub-Saharan Africa but also in other countries and regions that are not part of PMI. Initially, the 2005 creation of PMI brought selected USAID malaria country programs under the oversight of the PMI Coordinator. Through the Lantos-Hyde Act, however, Congress authorized the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator position, outlining a broader role. This, in effect, replaced the PMI Coordinator with the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator position.\nAn Interagency Steering Group advises the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator and is made up of representatives of USAID, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget.", "USAID and CDC are the primary U.S. agencies that carry out programs to fight malaria globally. USAID supports malaria programs in a number of countries, which may be divided into two groups. The first group consists of 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are part of PMI. The second group consists of countries and regions that are not part of PMI but in which USAID carries out programs to fight malaria. These efforts complement USAID's central programs that address malaria, which are carried out by USAID's Africa Bureau and Global Health Bureau. CDC also carries out operational and applied malaria research and provides technical assistance to U.S. malaria programs or foreign Ministries of Health in a number of countries, including PMI countries, through its Malaria Branch. The U.S. government also contributes to multilateral efforts to fight malaria through not only financial support but also through project coordination and technical assistance to partners' efforts.", "PMI is the coordinated U.S. government effort to fight malaria in 15 sub-Saharan African countries with high malaria rates: Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. PMI is led by USAID and implemented by USAID in conjunction with CDC.\nThe U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator and the Interagency Steering Group selected the 15 PMI countries based on several factors, including whether a country had high rates of malaria, malaria control policies that were in line with internationally accepted standards, the ability to carry out these policies; and a willingness to work with the U.S. government to fight malaria. In the past, after a country was designated a PMI country, the PMI Coordinator would oversee the ongoing USAID malaria program in that country; now PMI country programs are overseen by the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator.\nOver three fiscal years, PMI's implementing agencies expanded PMI's activities to these 15 countries (see Figure 2 for when a country's inclusion in PMI was announced). In FY2006, PMI began operations in the three initial countries – Angola, Tanzania, and Uganda, using some of USAID's FY2005 malaria funding to launch its activities. In FY2007, it added four countries – Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Senegal, and in FY2008 it added another eight countries – Benin, Ethiopia (Oromiya region), Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, and Zambia.\nIn these 15 countries, the main target of the PMI program is to reach 85% of those most vulnerable to malaria — children under five years of age and pregnant women — with a package of four prevention and treatment measures: treatment using ACTs; IPTp; IRS; and ITNs.", "Part of the PMI strategy has been to significantly increase spending on the procurement of commodities above pre-PMI levels. However, PMI programs' support for specific commodities varies by country due to the contributions of other donors.\nThe PMI program supports the procurement of ACTs for the treatment of uncomplicated malaria. As of January 2008, PMI reports that it has procured more than 12.7 million ACT treatments, of which more than 7.4 million have already been distributed to health facilities.\nPMI efforts are often integrated with maternal and child health services as part of a package of health interventions to promote mother and infant health. These integrated programs provide pregnant women with a variety of commodities, such as ITNs, as well as health services and treatments, such as IPTp and immunizations, over the course of one or more visits to the doctor. As of January 2008, PMI implementing agencies report that they have procured more than 1.35 million treatments of IPTp, of which more than 583,000 have been distributed to health facilities.\nTo deliver free or low-cost ITNs to the poorest and most vulnerable groups, PMI implementing agencies often partner with national governments and other organizations and donors in mass campaigns to distribute these commodities. These mass campaigns focus on child survival and may also include vaccination against measles or polio, Vitamin A supplementation, treatment for intestinal worms, and other maternal and child health interventions. PMI efforts also utilize existing programs (such as the maternal and child health efforts described above) to deliver nets. Most PMI-funded ITNs are provided free to vulnerable populations, but in countries where the policy is not to provide free nets, PMI may subsidize the cost of purchase or promote the commercial sale of nets. The PMI program prefers to procure and distribute LLINs, which are longer-lasting ITNs, and also aims to educate users about not only the benefits of ITNs but also their correct use. As of January 2008, PMI implementing agencies report that they have procured more than 6 million LLINs, two-thirds of which have been distributed; re-treated more than 1.1 million ITNs; and procured and distributed an additional 875,000 re-treatment kits.\nTo complement consistent, correct use of ITNs, PMI programs support the use of IRS as an additional method of mosquito control. In addition to educating local residents about IRS, PMI country programs often provide a supply of insecticide, which is selected based on local malaria conditions from a list of 12 WHO-approved insecticides, and train local personnel on its correct application. As of January 2008, PMI implementing agencies report that their programs in 10 of its 15 PMI countries have carried out IRS of homes, benefiting more than 17 million people.", "Part of the PMI approach is a \"commitment to strengthen national malaria control programs [NMCPs] and to build capacity for eventual country ownership of malaria control efforts.\" USAID cooperates with the NMCP of each PMI country's government by working within the overall strategy and plan of the country's NMCP. USAID asserts that PMI programs contribute to capacity building of NMCPs in the areas of pharmaceutical management, malaria diagnosis, IRS, malaria in pregnancy, and monitoring and evaluation. More broadly, as a part of procuring and distributing the commodities described above, PMI programs also address underlying capacity issues in PMI countries. As of January 2008, PMI implementing agencies reported that their programs had trained more than 29,000 health workers in the correct use of ACTs and more than 5,000 health workers in how to administer IPTp treatments.", "PMI efforts sometimes operate alongside other U.S. global health efforts, including programs of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). PEPFAR is the coordinated U.S. effort to fight HIV/AIDS globally. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in the Department of State oversees PEPFAR programs, which operate in a number of U.S. agencies. PEPFAR programs also operate in 7 of the 15 countries in which PMI programs exist. In these countries, PMI and PEPFAR staff cooperate on complementary efforts and share mechanisms for commodity delivery when possible.\nIn carrying out PMI activities, PMI implementing agencies partner with a number of multilateral organizations including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund); WHO; RBM; the World Bank; and UNICEF. It also works with the private sector as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including faith-based organizations (FBOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs). Some of these non-governmental organizations may help to expand PMI's reach through the Malaria Communities Program (MCP), a PMI program that funds efforts to fight malaria through NGOs that have not previously partnered with the U.S. government.", "As USAID has scaled-up its PMI activities in the 15 PMI countries, it has also re-evaluated its malaria programs in other countries, eliminating some altogether while concentrating resources in the remainder, in order to \"implement programs on a scale that can achieve demonstrable results.\" In addition to its programs in PMI countries, USAID currently conducts anti-malaria programs in three other countries in Africa — the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and southern Sudan. It also supports two regional programs, which are primarily focused on identifying and containing antimalarial drug resistance. These are the Mekong Regional Initiative, which operates in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Amazon Initiative, which operates in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname. Additionally, USAID sometimes provides one-time assistance and humanitarian assistance (through the provision of commodities to fight malaria) to selected countries that would not otherwise receive malaria funding through USAID programs. It provided one-time assistance to Sao Tome and Principe in FY2008 and humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe in FY2009.\nThe strategies used in USAID's malaria programs in these non-PMI countries vary depending on the country's malaria situation, national malaria policy, and the contributions of other partners. For example, in Nigeria, USAID reports that it supported the sale of more than 3.5 million ITNs. Another example is the Amazon Initiative: in this region, USAID focused its efforts on the adoption of ACTs as the initial malaria therapy and assisted countries with a variety of issues, including mosquito control, standardized approaches to monitoring resistance, and evaluating the impact of malaria in pregnancy.", "CDC reports that over the past three decades it has played a role in helping to develop and evaluate malaria prevention and control tools, including ITNs, IPTp, and ACTs, through its operations and applied research. For example, in cooperation with partners, CDC has played a role in studying the impact of malaria during pregnancy in sub-Saharan Africa and helped to develop and evaluate IPTp as a prevention strategy. CDC is also conducting similar work in Latin America. In Kenya, CDC supports a research station that conducts malaria field and laboratory research, disease surveillance, program support through technical assistance, and capacity development through training of Kenyan colleagues. CDC also supports other countries' malaria research efforts through technical assistance and collaboration, as it does in India.\nIn addition to PMI countries, CDC provides technical assistance to USAID malaria programs and to foreign Ministries of Health in malaria endemic countries that are not part of PMI. In the 15 PMI countries in sub-Saharan Africa, CDC provides technical assistance in program design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation; and conducts operations research to identify and fill knowledge gaps. For example, in Malawi, the CDC staff focus on strengthening the NMCP by helping to develop national malaria policies and guidelines. In Tanzania, CDC staff collaborate with the Ifakara Health Research and Development Centre on implementation and applied research, which helps to guide malaria control programs in Tanzania as well as other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. CDC's Malaria Branch will soon have staff placed in all 15 PMI countries as technical advisors on the PMI country team. It also provides technical assistance, especially focused on antimalarial drug resistance, to the two USAID regional initiatives in the Amazon and Mekong river basins. CDC staff may be detailed to USAID to support malaria programs at the regional levels. In addition to its role in PMI, CDC provides technical assistance in other countries that have high malaria infection rates, most recently in Indonesia, India, Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Burkina-Faso.\nInternationally, CDC works with multilateral partners such as the Global Fund, RBM, UNICEF, WHO, and the World Bank. In some cases, CDC staff are detailed to these partner organizations to provide expertise on a variety of issues, including policy development, program guidance and support, and monitoring and evaluation of progress toward international malaria goals.", "The 2008 Lantos-Hyde Act ( P.L. 110-293 ) authorizes $5 billion for U.S. global efforts to combat malaria from FY2009 through FY2013. It also authorizes up to $2 billion for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) in FY2009 and such sums as may be necessary from FY2010 through FY2013.\nFrom FY2004 through FY2008, USAID and CDC received more than $915 million for U.S. efforts to fight global malaria ( Table 1 ). Of this, more than $484 million was directed to the President's Malaria Initiative from FY2005 through FY2008. For FY2009, Congress has appropriated $391.9 million for U.S. global malaria programs.\nFrom FY2004 through FY2008, the U.S. government provided $3 billion for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund ( Table 2 ). For FY2009, Congress has appropriated $900 million for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund. Although Congress cannot direct the Global Fund to allot specific amounts of the U.S. contribution to projects aimed at a particular disease, the Global Fund reports that it awarded the following percentages of all contributions to malaria projects: 31% during round 4, 27% during round 5, 24% during round 6, and 25% during round 7.", "When considering U.S. efforts to address malaria, Members of the 111th Congress may wish to take a number of issues into account.", "Some malaria experts question whether the PMI structure is sustainable. A key concern is whether key distinctions between PMI and non-PMI country programs will persist, especially the disparity between PMI and non-PMI programs in resources. This, some malaria experts maintain, is not a sustainable approach to fighting malaria in Africa, because it does not recognize that progress in PMI countries may be reversed if malaria is not also controlled in non-PMI countries that have high rates of malaria, in light of the movement of people across borders and disease transmission patterns within regions. They argue that the PMI country selection process excluded countries with more complex malaria problems that may have required greater resources and where many malaria infections and deaths occur, limiting the U.S. response to malaria in these places. However, others assert that excluding such countries allowed more resources to be spent in countries with fewer program implementation and funding distribution challenges. As a result, implementing partners in selected PMI countries may have been able to progress more quickly in targeted areas and, through these experiences, learn best practices that might be brought to scale in non-PMI countries with additional resources and funding. Advocates recommend that Congress ensure that the five-year U.S. strategy to address global malaria, which Congress directed the Administration to develop in the Lantos-Hyde Act, addresses these issues.\nAdvocates urge Congress to expand PMI's scope to include additional countries. Supporters of PMI expansion maintain that non-PMI countries with high malaria infection and mortality rates, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and southern Sudan, would benefit from increased funding and resources. These proponents assert that PMI is a successful model for other bilateral malaria initiatives and that PMI has demonstrated measurable results that show improvements in malaria mortality rates. They contend that PMI has been successful, because implementing partners have applied many of the lessons learned from implementing PEPFAR to PMI programs. For example, PMI implementing partners have replicated PEPFAR processes such as having one country coordinator who oversees all projects and ensures that all initiatives utilize a common strategy in their execution; collaborating on program implementation and budget planning; concentrating resources on commodity procurement and distribution; and, to the extent possible, coordinating its efforts with other U.S. maternal and child health interventions. Even if the number of PMI countries is not increased, some who support expansion argue that Congress should extend the related mandates and strategies of PMI to countries with high malaria rates.\nCritics of PMI expansion often agree with proponents that PMI is a model for other bilateral malaria efforts and that its approach to fighting malaria may shape the five-year U.S. global malaria strategy. However, PMI expansion opponents contend that PMI should remain limited to the current 15 countries to preserve and support progress toward the five-year targets in each country. They assert that expanding the initiative may distract from the public impact of successful ongoing efforts, which has positive effects for U.S. public diplomacy efforts and also increases recipient country support for U.S. malaria programs. One argument made by those with this view is that including countries with more complex malaria problems and much larger populations would require significant increases in PMI funding and extend U.S. commitments to recipient countries.", "Some advocates urge Congress to increase funding for U.S. malaria programs to reach the Lantos-Hyde Act authorized level of $5 billion from FY2009 through FY2013. This would allow PMI's implementing agencies to extend coverage to more areas; purchase and distribute more commodities; and expand access to related services, such as malaria education and technical assistance. Some malaria experts caution against reducing malaria funding. Supporters of higher PMI funding maintain that decreased support for ongoing U.S. malaria efforts might lead to drug and parasite resistance and threaten advancements made in controlling malaria in areas where U.S. programs have expanded access to key malaria commodities that control the disease.\nIn the absence of increased funding for U.S. malaria programs, many observers advocate maintaining current funding levels to preserve improvements in malaria control in PMI countries and to allow U.S. malaria programs to continue ongoing programs. However, if U.S. malaria programs were not able to realize greater cost efficiencies in purchasing and distributing commodities and other activities, current levels of funding would not allow programs to expand. One argument made by opponents to increasing PMI funding is that support might reduce available funding for other U.S. global health efforts. Over the past five years, funding for U.S. global malaria activities has grown considerably, while other activities, such as child survival and maternal health (CS/MH) and family planning and reproductive health programs (FP/RH), have received small increases in funding. Others, however, argue that malaria efforts were previously underfunded and that increased funding during this period reflects the U.S. commitment to adequately funding malaria activities and still remains less than CS/MH and FP/RH funding levels.\nSome health experts assert that the debate about whether increases in support for U.S. malaria programs, especially PMI, come at the expense of other global health programs exists because overall U.S. global health funding is insufficient. This view holds that U.S. global health programs are inadequately funded relative to the challenges posed to global health by not only infectious diseases like malaria but also other issues such as chronic diseases, climate change, hunger, urbanization, and clean water and sanitation. Opponents of this view agree that global health challenges are considerable but assert that they cannot be addressed by U.S. bilateral programs alone; they contend that leveraging current funding through coordination and collaboration with other governments' and multilateral malaria efforts is a better approach to resource and funding constraints. Some of these critics also maintain that malaria funding, like other U.S. global health funding, should not be increased in light of U.S. budgetary constraints, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other issues.", "Some health and malaria experts assert that PMI does not disburse funds quickly enough, which may slow the scale-up of malaria programs and limit the efforts of partners that rely on USAID funding. Other critics argue that PMI should be required to publicly report PMI funding disbursements in addition to the currently reported committed or planned amounts. They assert that it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts without knowing how quickly funding reaches recipients.\nThose advocating for stronger PMI reporting and transparency requirements also contend that with the increased authority of the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator, the more stringent standard of transparency and detail in reporting that has been applied to PMI countries' activities should be expanded to USAID malaria programs in other areas. One argument made by these observers is that since the reorganization of some of these activities under PMI, public reporting of objectives and achievements in USAID's malaria programs outside of the 15 PMI countries has become less detailed and is often limited to overall malaria country and regional project budgets. Another argument made by some is that CDC's role in U.S. malaria efforts, especially in the area of technical assistance should be clearly and distinctly described in reports on U.S. global efforts to fight malaria, including the annual PMI report. Other experts assert that Congress should direct the Administration to address malaria challenges in non-PMI countries and regions, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and southern Sudan, in the new U.S. global malaria strategy.", "Some experts argue that while PMI has increased the amount of funding available for commodities, the balance between providing commodities and technical assistance should be examined. Some malaria authorities assert that technical assistance is key to the design and sustainability of effective malaria control programs in countries with weak health infrastructures. While many such countries now receive greater funding for malaria control activities and donors often allow their funding to be spent on purchasing and distributing commodities, malaria experts point out that fewer donors support technical assistance. These experts maintain that the development of local knowledge of how to manage malaria will be key to preventing the disease from resurging as it has in the past when outside funding and international attention waned.\nOther health professionals question whether increased funding for technical assistance efforts is prudent. They express concern about the cost of consultants and question whether money is better used to support commodities that are sometimes in short supply or out of reach for the most vulnerable populations. Those that make this argument suggest that, as in USAID's pre-PMI malaria efforts, focusing on technical assistance instead of providing commodities does not give countries the health interventions and commodities necessary to reduce malaria infection rates and deaths.\nStill, some malaria experts say that it is not a choice between commodities and technical assistance: they believe that comprehensive efforts to address malaria through U.S. programs should address both. They assert that while past efforts that focused on technical assistance without commodities did not produce significant results, today the contributions of many donors and national governments to global malaria efforts and funding might allow some programs to focus more on technical assistance while others emphasize funding for commodities.", "Malaria experts and global health groups debate how the United States can best provide access to life-saving commodities in countries where there are high rates of malaria infection: through free or subsidized commodities or through market channels. Some health experts argue that the United States should ensure access and effectiveness of commodities by either subsidizing commodity prices or providing them for free. In the case of antimalarial drugs, for example, in 2004 the Institute of Medicine and other groups recommended that governments and international organizations subsidize the global market for ACTs. At the time, ACTs cost about 10 times as much as the most frequently used drug at the time, chloroquine, which was becoming increasingly ineffective due to parasite resistance. Proponents say that subsidizing antimalarial drugs would help make them more widely available, decrease their prices, and, with accurate and quick diagnosis, delay the emergence of parasite resistance to antimalarial drugs. Proponents of subsidizing other malaria commodities, such as ITNs and RDTs, make similar arguments.\nHowever, opponents believe that malaria commodities should be provided for free in areas with high rates of malaria, because in these regions, many people often live in poverty and cannot afford the cost — even at a subsidized price — of drugs or insecticide-treated nets. One of the arguments opponents make is that providing free tools for preventing, diagnosing, and treating malaria would ensure access for the poor and protect health in the broader community by aiding, for example, the accurate and prompt use of effective antimalarial drugs or the use of ITNs, which both help to reduce malaria transmission community-wide. On the other hand, opponents of free nets contend that U.S. malaria efforts should support countries' capacities to either produce or purchase commodities through the private sector. For example, they believe ITNs should be provided through market channels, because they are concerned that giving away nets may undermine the market for them. One argument opponents of free nets make is that free nets may not be valued by recipients to the degree that purchased nets would be. They express concern that free nets would be used incorrectly or inconsistently compared to those bought at regular or even lower subsidized prices.\nIn addition to debates about pricing commodities for consumers, health experts and NGOs point out that the high demand for commodities created by donor programs, such as PMI and other donors' malaria programs, has led to supply shortages. Despite growing demand from programs like PMI, demand for these commodities from potential recipients is often not as high, due to a lack of education about malaria and the benefits of using these commodities as well as an inability to pay for them. In many malaria endemic countries for a number of reasons — including few commodity producers, high start-up costs, and low profit margins — lack of sufficient commodity production capacity and supply persists, sometimes leading to \"stock-outs,\" which is when malaria programs do not have adequate commodities on hand to carry out their activities. In the absence of additional producers entering these markets, some experts assert that without the involvement of initiatives such as PMI, which may negotiate for large orders of commodities, existing producers may be wary of increasing capacity without knowing that commodities will be purchased at a reasonable price at a particular time.\nSome health and development experts recommend that donors and national governments address not only issues related to commodity supplies but also focus on commodity procurement and supply chain management to ensure that needed commodities are accurately forecast. They point out that better procurement and supply chain management would not only improve donors' efforts to negotiate for sufficient supplies and commodity industries' plans for production but also prevent stock-outs and the expiration of commodities before they can be bought and distributed. Other experts express concern that some producers may not feel that the low negotiated prices for some commodities make additional investments sufficiently profitable to increase production to meet forecasted commodity needs and suggest that perhaps commodity production should also be subsidized, either directly or through price floors for commodity producers, or made more attractive through incentives, such as tax breaks.", "Concerns about how effective commodities may be are closely related to their accessibility and availability: as commodities to address malaria have become more widespread in recent years, parasite and mosquito resistance and misdiagnosis of malaria have become greater problems, impacting how effective or ineffective current commodities are. In some parts of the world, parasite resistance to some malaria medications and mosquito resistance to insecticides are increasing due to several factors, including varying degrees of accessibility or availability of commodities. Drug ineffectiveness has been a problem in past efforts to fight malaria when malaria parasites became increasingly resistant to commonly-used drugs such as chloroquine. An increase in parasite resistance to ACTs in some regions (particularly along the Thai-Cambodian border) has led many experts, including those at WHO, to express concern. Since chloroquine resistance was first noticed in this same area, experts worry that without careful attention to efforts to prevent misuse of ACTs, ACTs will become ineffective before an equally effective alternative antimalarial drug is available. Parasite resistance to SP is also a growing problem. Also contributing to the increase in drug-resistant malaria and, therefore, the risk of drug ineffectiveness is misdiagnosis of malaria or misuse of drugs and other commodities, where available. Misdiagnosis may be the result of several factors, including the difficulty of distinguishing between malaria and other diseases with similar symptoms when a lack of laboratory facilities or accurate, quick diagnostic tools (such as rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs)) exists in an area. RDTs allow healthcare workers to more accurately diagnose malaria, because the tests require only a drop of blood and 15 minutes before the results are known. Malaria previously could only be confirmed through laboratory tests that are not readily available in many malaria-endemic areas. While PMI programs procured 505,000 RDTs and distributed 101,000 of them as of January 2008, health experts recommend that malaria programs increase the number of RDTs available and distribute them more widely.\nAs drug and mosquito resistance to commonly used malaria commodities increases, many malaria experts maintain that malaria programs should not only address misuse of malaria commodities through education but also that donors and national governments should make greater investments in research and development of alternatives to current drugs and insecticides. Malaria experts emphasize that to limit the growth of resistance, donors and national governments' malaria programs need to address incorrect use of commodities through education and ensure that coverage with key malaria interventions continues to increase, especially in areas with high rates of malaria where the entire community benefits from high levels of ITN and IRS use. These experts also express concern that despite the possibility that current malaria drugs and insecticides may one day become ineffective due to resistance, the number of new drugs and insecticides being developed to prevent and treat malaria has declined in recent years. They urge donors and national governments to invest in such research so that alternatives will be available when resistance increases, as it already is in some areas.\nMany experts and policymakers express concern about the negative impact of counterfeit or low quality antimalarial drugs on the effective, safe treatment of malaria. Health authorities report that counterfeit and substandard antimalarials threaten not only the health of infected individuals — who believe they are receiving treatment but actually are not — but also the health of their communities. They assert that ineffective malaria treatment undermines trust in malaria treatment programs and regimens and also allows the malaria parasite to persist, which increases the possibility of further transmission of malaria within the community and may contribute to greater drug resistance. These health professionals recommend that national and international authorities create and enforce strategies to prevent the production, sale, trade, and use of counterfeit or low quality medicines.\nSome debate surrounds the use of certain insecticides, especially dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), by malaria control programs, including U.S. programs. Some environmental groups express concern about the possible impact of insecticides, particularly DDT, on the environment and on human health, arguing that these compounds may stay in the environment for years after their initial use and might enter the food chain. However, some malaria experts maintain that the amount of insecticides used for indoor residual spraying is a small fraction of the amount of insecticide used in agriculture. These malaria professionals contend that the risks to human health of not effectively controlling the population of mosquitoes that transmit malaria are greater than the potential risk to human health of using some insecticides. Some trade and development experts observe that insecticide use may negatively impact developing countries' trade relationships with other countries and regions, such as the European Union (EU), because of recent restrictions on the use of certain insecticides. Health experts, however, raise questions about the possible negative impact of such restrictions on the availability, affordability, and use of insecticides for public health purposes. These health authorities suggest that donors and governments should support the market for public health insecticides (PHIs) by investing in research and development of new insecticides and promoting the use of effective insecticides for IRS and ITNs.", "Some observers oppose a disease-specific approach to global health such as that taken by PMI, which they argue focuses too narrowly on only one disease. They maintain that such an approach ignores the interconnected nature of health care challenges and diverts resources from other health efforts. They argue that in resource-poor countries, it could create competition for limited workforce capacity such as physicians, public health specialists, and U.S. program managers. Some experts argue that the United States must tackle the underlying weaknesses of many health systems in PMI-assisted areas, such as the lack of hospital and clinic infrastructure, laboratory facilities, and trained healthcare workers. They point out that the budgets of Ministries of Health in many PMI-designated countries are dwarfed by donor funding for disease-specific initiatives like malaria and that much of these Ministries of Health budgets often come from donor sources. This raises two questions, they argue, about the sustainability of disease-specific initiatives. First, are the achievements of disease-specific initiatives sustainable if donor support ends before eradication of a disease? This is especially problematic if Ministries of Health continue to lack comparable levels of funding or have not developed the expertise required to manage these funds and programs independently. Second, would Ministries of Health prioritize disease-specific efforts in the absence of donor-directed funding? In other words, would they instead prioritize spending on human resources for health, infrastructure improvement, basic health services, and strengthening their countries' health systems in other ways when faced with limited budgets? Disruptions in donor or national government support may lead to reversals in the progress made against diseases like malaria and associated problems, such as increased disease resistance to past prevention and treatment strategies.\nHowever, some health experts support a disease-specific approach. They argue that, in light of the limited resources of many countries facing both weak health systems and high infectious disease burdens, U.S. efforts such as PMI are vital to arresting the deaths from these diseases. Some malaria experts maintain that without sustained, focused attention and donor-directed funding, large-scale eradication of diseases like malaria would be unlikely, as the history of malaria control and eradication has shown. They contend that disease-specific initiatives support the broader health system in which they operate by transmitting knowledge and building platforms through which other health initiatives may grow and cooperate.\nFinally, some experts maintain that neither approach would be successful in isolation and assert that directed efforts on specific diseases should occur simultaneously with efforts to build health capacity and infrastructure. While they applaud the initial emphasis of PMI on malaria's prevention and treatment, these observers contend that in light of the authorization of $5 billion for the U.S. global malaria efforts over the next five years, the initiative should further integrate efforts to combat malaria with the provision of basic healthcare and the prevention of childhood illness. Supporters argue that some major donors have already recognized the necessity of both approaches to achieving success in fighting particular diseases. One example is the Global Fund, which provides funding for not only HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria projects but also those that focus on strengthening health systems.", "Some global health observers raise the issue of balance between U.S. malaria funding for bilateral and multilateral malaria efforts. The United States is the largest donor to the Global Fund, which is the leading financier of global malaria programs in the world, yet U.S. funding for bilateral efforts has been growing in recent years. It is unclear whether policymakers are concerned about the balance between U.S. funding directed to multilateral versus bilateral efforts to address malaria. While Congress has expressed strong support for increased bilateral malaria funding in recent years, it has not discussed whether funding for multilateral or bilateral malaria efforts should be examined with perhaps one exception. In 2004-2006, several Members noted during congressional hearings that U.S. bilateral programs did not adequately fund commodity procurement and distribution. Although the Global Fund is not an implementing agency, it does support the purchase and provision of malaria commodities through malaria project grants in many countries. Therefore, in light of subsequent U.S. malaria policy changes that now emphasize funding for commodities, some might argue that policymakers determined that U.S. support for multilateral efforts to provide commodities through the Global Fund were not sufficient and should be complemented by bilateral efforts.\nCongress has, however, emphasized the need for coordination to prevent duplication of effort and to leverage funds among partners, which it reiterated in the Lantos-Hyde Act last year. In light of the high levels of funding provided to both bilateral programs, especially PMI, and multilateral efforts to fight malaria, advocates maintain that it is essential for PMI and the Global Fund to coordinate their planning and funding activities. This helps to ensure that funded programs reflect country needs, are not redundant, and operate in a more cost-effective manner. PMI implementing agencies have instituted several processes, based on lessons from PEPFAR, to coordinate PMI programs and funding with the Global Fund. These include cooperating with the Global Fund through NMCPs and other country forums; supporting the development of Global Fund project proposals through these structures; and carrying out joint projects in PMI countries, such as one recent effort in which the Global Fund procured ACTs that the PMI program then distributed. Additionally, U.S. government representatives serve as voting members of the Global Fund Board and on the Board's Policy and Strategy Committee as well its Finance and Audit Committee. However, some malaria experts and global health observers assert that improvement is still needed to ensure that partners' capabilities are reflected in the division of labor in countries, especially with regard to funding technical assistance where other partners, such as the Global Fund, may be able to fund commodities. Others caution that PMI programs should not coordinate efforts to such a degree that the programs' abilities to respond quickly to country needs and reflect U.S. malaria policy priorities might be negatively impacted. Both views urge Congress to examine how U.S. malaria programs leverage their resources and funding in coordinating activities with the Global Fund.\nAppendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations\nThe table below defines acronyms and abbreviations used in the main body of this report.\nAppendix B. Selected Additional Resources\nThis section provides a list of selected additional resources on global malaria. Inclusion of a resource in this list should not be interpreted as an endorsement by the Congressional Research Service of ideas presented therein.\nResources\nMartin S. Alilio, Ib C. Bygbjerg, and Joel G. Breman, \"Are Multilateral Malaria Research and Control Programs the Most Successful? Lessons from the Past 100 Years in Africa,\" The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene ( AJTMH ) , Vol. 71, supp. 2, 2004, pp. 268-278.\nRoger Bate, \"Rolling Back Malaria: Rhetoric and Reality in the Fight against a Deadly Killer,\" Health Policy Outlook , no. 4, AEI.org, April 2008.\nNicole Bates and James Herrington, \"Advocacy for Malaria Prevention, Control, and Research in the Twenty-First Century,\" AJTMH , Vol. 77, supp. 6, 2007, pp. 314-320.\nLuke Gallup and Jeffrey D. Sachs, \"The Economic Burden of Malaria,\" in AJTMH , Vol. 64, supp. 1, 2001, pp. 85–96.\nThe Lancet , \"The U.S. President's Malaria Initiative,\" editorial, Vol. 368, Issue 9523, p. 1, editorial, July 1, 2006.\nSamuel Loewenberg, \"The U.S. President's Malaria Initiative: 2 Years On,\" The Lancet , Vol. 370, Issue 9603, pp. 1893-1894, December 8, 2007.\nRandall M. Packard, The Making of a Tropical Disease: A Short History of Malaria (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).\nWHO, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development , Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001.\nAppendix C. USAID Funding by Program\nFunding for PMI\nOf the $915 million allocated for U.S. global malaria programs from FY2004 through FY2008, over 71% ($619 million) was spent on USAID malaria programs in the 15 countries displayed in Table C -1 , which are all PMI countries now. A country's malaria funding increased after PMI became operational in it (as indicated by the shaded areas). USAID has allocated the following percentages of total PMI funding in the 15 PMI countries for commodities: 56% in FY2006, 52% in FY2007, 46% in FY2008, and a planned 50% in FY2009.\nFunding for Other USAID Malaria Programs\nSince the creation of PMI, USAID's funding for malaria programs has shifted from smaller amounts of funding for many countries to greater amounts for fewer countries and selected regional and central programs ( Table C -2 ). In addition to funding for PMI and central programs through USAID's Africa and Global Health Bureaus, USAID now supports three non-PMI country programs and two regional initiatives.\nAppendix D. Selected Global Malaria Programs and Organizations\nThis section provides a list of selected programs and organizations that address global malaria, including bilateral and multilateral efforts to fight malaria. It also includes private-public partnerships, non-governmental organizations, international alliances, and a coalition of private industry. It provides a brief description of each entity, which is drawn from each organization's website. The programs and organizations listed in this section were randomly selected; their selection should not be interpreted as an endorsement by the Congressional Research Service.\nU.S. Government Programs\nCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Global Malaria Program, http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/cdcactivities/index.htm .\nCDC participates actively in global efforts against malaria through its Global Malaria Program and its role in PMI. Its work spans the spectrum of policy development, program guidance and support, scientific research, monitoring and evaluation of progress toward RBM goals, and technical assistance. It works in malaria-endemic countries with the Ministry of Health and local disease prevention and control partners, in malaria-endemic regional settings, and with key multilateral and bilateral Roll Back Malaria (RBM) partners.\nUnited States Agency for International Development (USAID) President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), http://fightingmalaria.gov/ or http://www.pmi.gov/ .\nPMI represents an historic five-year expansion of U.S. resources to fight malaria in the region most affected by the disease. In 2005, President Bush committed an additional $1.2 billion in malaria funding to PMI with the goal of reducing malaria-related deaths by 50% in 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa by 2010. PMI is an interagency initiative led by USAID and implemented together with CDC.\nOther Organizations\nAffordable Medicines Facility-malaria (AMFm) Taskforce, http://www.rbm.who.int/globalsubsidytaskforce.html .\nAMFm is an initiative to increase access to effective malaria treatment for people in endemic countries by making ACTs available at a much lower price, so more people will be able to afford them. Initiated in 2007, the AMFm Taskforce is a workstream of the RBM Harmonization Working Group.\nAfrica Fighting Malaria (AFM), http://www.fightingmalaria.org/ .\nFounded in 2000, AFM is a non-profit health advocacy group whose mission is to make malaria control more transparent, responsive and effective. It conducts research into the social and economic aspects of malaria and raises the profile of the disease and the issues surrounding its control in the local and international media. AFM strives to hold public institutions accountable for funding and implementing effective, integrated and country-driven malaria control policies and to promote successful private sector initiatives to control the disease.\nBill and Melinda Gates Foundation, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/topics/Pages/malaria.aspx .\nThe Gates Foundation works with partners around the world and supports efforts to speed malaria research, expand access to life-saving drugs and prevention methods, and advocate for greater action.\nCORE Group Malaria Working Group (MWG), http://www.coregroup.org/working_groups/malaria.cfm .\nEstablished in 1997, CORE Group is a membership association of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) whose mission is to improve the health and well being of children and women in developing countries through collaborative NGO action and learning. Collectively, CORE Group members work in 180 countries. The MWG supports existing national collaborative partnerships and promotes new partnerships in which NGOs can actively be engaged in national level policy formation and innovative programming to scale up malaria prevention and control. CORE originally stood for \"Child Survival Collaborations and Resources Group.\"\nDrugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), http://www.dndi.org/ .\nIn 2003, seven organizations from around the world joined forces to establish DNDi. The initiative fosters collaboration both among developing countries and between developing and developed countries. Its design is a blend of centralized management to give it a clear project-specific focus, and decentralized operations that mimic modern drug companies. DNDi does not conduct research and scientific work to develop drugs itself. Instead, it capitalizes on existing, fragmented R&D capacity, especially in the developing world, and complements it with additional expertise as needed. DNDi has built regional networks of scientists actively involved in the research of new drugs for neglected diseases in Asia, Africa and Latin America.\nFasterCures, http://www.fastercures.org/ .\nFasterCures' mission is to identify and implement global solutions to accelerate the process of discovery and clinical development of new therapies for the treatment of deadly and debilitating diseases. It seeks ways to amplify the productivity of the considerable resources and expansive infrastructure dedicated to finding new medical solutions.\nGlobal Business Coalition on AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GBC), http://www.businessfightsmalaria.org/home/home.php .\nFounded in 2001, GBC mobilizes international business against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The organization represents a rapidly expanding alliance of 220 international companies dedicated to combating the world's deadliest epidemics through the business sector's unique skills and expertise. Building on its success with HIV/AIDS, GBC recently added malaria and tuberculosis to its mandate, advocating business action in four key areas: workplace, community involvement, core competency, and advocacy and leadership. GBC is the official focal point of the private sector delegation to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.\nGlobal Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ .\nThe Global Fund is a unique global public/private partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected communities that works in close collaboration with other bilateral and multilateral organizations to supplement existing efforts dealing with the three diseases. Since its creation in 2002, the Global Fund has become the main source of financing for programs to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. It provides a quarter of all international financing for AIDS globally, two-thirds for tuberculosis and three quarters for malaria.\nGlobal Health Council, http://www.globalhealth.org/ .\nCreated in 1972, the Global Health Council is the world's largest membership alliance dedicated to saving lives by improving health throughout the world. Its membership is comprised of health-care professionals and organizations that include NGOs, foundations, corporations, government agencies and academic institutions that work to ensure global health for all. It works to ensure that all who strive for improvement and equity in global health have the information and resources they need to succeed. The Council convenes the Malaria Roundtable, which is a community space where individuals and organizations dedicated to policies and programs that reduce the global burden of malaria can meet, exchange information and share resources.\nFriends of the Global Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, http://www.theglobalfight.org/ .\nFriends of the Global Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is an advocacy organization dedicated to sustaining and expanding U.S. support for the Global Fund's lifesaving work around the world. Created in 2004, Friends supports the Global Fund by raising awareness about its lifesaving work with policy leaders and decision makers in Washington, D.C., as well as the media and the advocacy community. The goal of these efforts is to achieve both sustained governmental funding and meaningful public policy on the Global Fund and the three diseases.\nGlobal Subsidies Initiative (GSI), http://www.globalsubsidies.org/en .\nIn December 2005 the GSI was launched to put a spotlight on subsidies - transfers of public money to private interests - and how they undermine efforts to put the world economy on a path toward sustainable development. The GSI, in cooperation with a growing international network of research and media partners, seeks to lay bare just what good or harm public subsidies are doing; to encourage public debate and awareness of the options that are available; and to help provide policy-makers with the tools they need to secure sustainable outcomes for our societies and our planet.\nInnovative Vector Control Consortium, http://www.ivcc.com/ .\nThe IVCC is a major research consortium which will develop new and better ways to control the transmission of insect borne disease. Five leading research institutions form the IVCC. During the past three decades, there has been little progress in developing new insecticides for public health use in combating vectors (such as mosquitoes), which carry diseases such as malaria and dengue. The IVCC has been established to address problems such as the inefficient deployment of pesticides and the growth of pesticide-resistant insect strains by developing a portfolio of chemical and technological tools that will be immediately accessible to populations in the developing world.\nInstitute of Medicine (IOM),\nThe IOM's mission is to serve as adviser to the United States to improve health. A non-profit organization specifically created to provide science-based advice on matters of biomedical science, medicine, and health as well as an honorific membership organization, the IOM was chartered in 1970 as a component of the National Academy of Sciences. The Institute provides a vital service by working outside the framework of government to ensure scientifically informed analysis and independent guidance. The Institute provides unbiased, evidence-based, and authoritative information and advice concerning health and science policy to policymakers, professionals, leaders in every sector of society, and the public at large.\nMalaria Consortium, http://www.malariaconsortium.org/index.php .\nThe Malaria Consortium is an organization dedicated to improving delivery of prevention and treatment to combat malaria and other communicable diseases in Africa and Asia. It works with communities, health systems, government and non-government agencies, academic institutions and local and international organizations, to ensure good evidence supports delivery of effective services. Started as a research center in 1992 working as part of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, the Malaria Consortium became an independent NGO in 2003.\nMalaria Foundation International (MFI), http://www.malaria.org/ .\nThe MFI is a non-profit organization, dedicated to the fight against malaria since 1992. The MFI works in partnership with many individuals and groups who have since joined this cause. The MFI's goals are to support awareness, education, training, research, and leadership programs for the immediate and long term development and application of tools to combat malaria.\nMalaria-Measles Initiative, http://www.measlesinitiative.org/ .\nThe Measles Initiative is a partnership committed to reducing measles deaths globally. Launched in 2001, the Initiative — led by the American Red Cross, the United Nations Foundation, CDC, UNICEF and WHO — provides technical and financial support to governments and communities on vaccination campaigns and disease surveillance worldwide. Measles vaccination campaigns usually include additional health services: for example, between 2001 and 2007, the Measles Initiative and its partners supported the distribution of more than 31 million insecticide-treated bed nets for malaria prevention.\nMalaria No More, http://www.malarianomore.org/ .\nFounded in 2006, Malaria No More is determined to end malaria deaths. A non-profit, non-governmental organization, Malaria No More makes high-yield investments of time and capital to speed progress, unlock resources, mobilize new assets, and spur the world toward reaching this goal. The Malaria No More Policy Center works to raise awareness and galvanize support to address the global fight against malaria. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the Center works with the global health community to engage policy leaders in the United States and in other donor nations to advance efforts to defeat malaria worldwide.\nMalaria R&D Alliance, http://www.malariaalliance.org/ .\nIn March 2004, leaders and representatives of 15 organizations conducting malaria research and product development formed the Malaria R&D to raise awareness about the important role of malaria R&D in the malaria continuum and to develop a shared responsibility and increase resources for malaria R&D.\nMedicines for Malaria Venture (MMV), http://www.mmv.org/ .\nMedicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) is a non-profit organization created [in 1999] to discover, develop and deliver effective and affordable antimalarial drugs through public-private partnerships.\nMedicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), http://www.msf.org/ .\nMSF has been setting up emergency medical aid missions around the world since 1971. MSF is an international humanitarian aid organization that provides emergency medical assistance to populations in danger in more than 70 countries. In countries where health structures are insufficient or even non-existent, MSF collaborates with authorities such as the Ministry of Health to provide assistance. MSF works in rehabilitation of hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination programs, and water and sanitation projects. MSF also works in remote health care centers, slum areas and provides training of local personnel. All this is done with the objective of rebuilding health structures to acceptable levels. In carrying out humanitarian assistance, MSF seeks also to raise awareness of crisis situations.\nMIMCom (a project of the Multilateral Initiative on Malaria (MIM) and the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM)), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mimcom/mimcomhomepage.html .\nMIMcom was conceived by African malaria researchers in 1997. The mandate for Internet access to medical literature came from African scientists: \"Access to e-mail and the Internet will promote rapid communication between investigators working at different sites as well as access to online literature and data available to scientists outside Africa.\" Having established or enhanced connectivity at 21 research sites in 12 countries, NLM's current focus is on products and databases to aid the efforts of malaria research.\nMultilateral Initiative on Malaria (MIM), http://www.mimalaria.org/index.asp .\nThe Multilateral Initiative on Malaria (MIM) was established in 1997 with a mission to strengthen and sustain, through collaborative research and training, the capacity of malaria-endemic countries in Africa to carry out research that is required to develop and improve tools for malaria control and to strengthen the research-control interphase.\"\nProgram for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI), http://www.malariavaccine.org/ .\nMVI was established in 1999 through a grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation . . . to accelerate the development of malaria vaccines and ensure their availability and accessibility in the developing world.\nRoll Back Malaria Partnership (RBM), http://www.rbm.who.int/ .\nTo provide a coordinated global approach to fighting malaria, the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Partnership was launched in 1998 by the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The RBM Partnership is now made up of a wide range of partners — including malaria-endemic countries, their bilateral and multilateral development partners, the private sector, non-governmental and community-based organizations, foundations, and research and academic institutions — who bring a formidable assembly of expertise, infrastructure and funds into the fight against the disease.\nRotarians Eliminating Malaria – A Rotarian Action Group, http://www.remarag.org/ .\nReMaRAG, which was recognized by the Rotary International Board in 2005, functions as an umbrella association, building a network to keep tabs on Rotary projects in all corners of the world. The group has contacts in countries with malaria projects, and it acts as a resource to prevent duplication of efforts, promote best practices, and connect interested parties.\nUNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html .\nIn recognition of its role as one of the biggest killers of children in Africa, malaria prevention and control interventions form an integral component of a minimum package of UNICEF's high impact maternal and child survival interventions. Integrated programming of this kind utilizes existing systems with relatively high utilization by target groups.\nUNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/index.php/en/ .\nIn 2006, UNITAID was created as an international drug purchase facility to be financed with sustainable, predictable resources in order to facilitate access to drugs for the world's poorest people as part of the fight against the major pandemic diseases. As an economically neutral tool, involved countries agreed a tax on international air tickets was the most suitable instrument for raising funds. This mechanism seeks to fill a critical gap in the global health financing landscape: the need for sustained strategic market intervention to drive price reduction and increases in supply.\nVOICES for a Malaria-Free Future, http://www.malariafreefuture.org/ .\nVOICES for a Malaria-Free Future works to educate policymakers about effective programs and strategies for malaria control by highlighting successful anti-malaria efforts and evidence-based results. VOICES includes advocacy projects in four developing countries — Ghana, Kenya, Mali, and Mozambique — that promote progress made against malaria while also breaking down policy barriers that hamper effective prevention and control.\nWorld Bank Malaria Booster Program for Malaria Control in Africa, http://go.worldbank.org/H31FEKFWE0 .\nThe Booster Program was launched in September 2005, translating the World Bank malaria global strategy into a results-focused effort to bring the disease under control on the African continent. The Booster Program has a ten-year horizon.\nWHO Global Collaboration for Development of Pesticides for Public Health (GCDPP), http://www.who.int/whopes/gcdpp/en/ .\nTo strengthen WHO's Pesticides Evaluation Scheme (WHOPES) activities, to facilitate the search for alternative safe and more cost-effective pesticides and application methodologies, and to further promote the safe and proper use of pesticides and application equipment, WHOPES established the Global Collaboration for Development of Pesticides for Public Health (GCDPP). This collaboration provides a forum for exchange of information and ideas on issues related to the development and use of pesticides and pesticide application equipment within the context of WHO's global disease control strategies, and serves an advisory and resource-mobilizing role to WHOPES.\nWHO Global Malaria Programme (GMP), http://www.who.int/malaria/ .\nGMP is responsible for malaria policy and strategy formulation, operations support and capacity development, and coordination of WHO's global efforts to fight malaria. GMP establishes and promotes — based on evidence and expert consensus — WHO policies, normative standards and guidelines for malaria prevention and control, including monitoring and evaluation.\nWHO International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT), http://www.who.int/impact/en/ .\nResponding to the growing public health crisis of counterfeit drugs, in February 2006, WHO launched IMPACT, which aims to build coordinated networks across and between countries in order to halt the production, trading and selling of fake medicines around the globe. IMPACT is a partnership comprised of all the major anti-counterfeiting players, including international organizations, NGOs, enforcement agencies, pharmaceutical manufacturers associations, and drug and regulatory authorities.\nWHO Tropical Disease Research (TDR), http://www.who.int/tdr/ .\nTDR, a Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, is an independent global programme of scientific collaboration that helps coordinate, support and influence global efforts to combat a portfolio of major diseases of the poor and disadvantaged. Established in 1975, TDR, is sponsored by UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and WHO. Its goal is to have the priority setting, research and development led and managed by scientific leaders in the countries where the diseases and problems occur. It believes this is a sustainable way of not only creating these tools, but making sure that they are distributed, used, and truly owned by the communities they can help." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full h3_full", "", "", "", "", "h2_title h3_title h1_full", "", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "To what extent does malaria constitute a global health problem?", "Where is malaria most concentrated?", "What is the cost of life of malaria?", "How is malaria spread?", "What are the affects of malaria on an individual?", "How do U.S. policymakers view malaria?", "What is the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act?", "What are the foci of congressional hearings on U.S. global efforts to combat malaria?", "How were funds for FY2009 through FY2013 authorized?", "How else did the Act guide U.S. action regarding malaria?", "What U.S. funding for malaria existed FY2004-2008?", "What additional program was funded during this time?", "How does the US plan on providing malaria funds in FY2009?", "What is this report on?", "How does it address malaria-focused programs?", "What kinds of US action does the report cover?", "How does this report address Congress?" ], "summary": [ "In 2008, malaria remained a serious problem in 109 countries, although it was eradicated almost 60 years ago in the United States. In the past decade, the U.S. government and international community have increasingly recognized the impact of malaria prevention, treatment, and control on the health, economic development, and social well-being of people and communities in many developing countries.", "Although approximately 40% of the world's population is at risk of malaria, most cases and deaths are in sub-Saharan Africa.", "Malaria sickens an estimated 247 million people every year; of these, nearly 1 million die, mostly children younger than 5 years old.", "The disease is caused by a parasite that is transmitted to a person through the bite of a particular mosquito.", "Infection can lead to fever, muscle aches, and, without effective treatment, organ failure and sometimes death.", "U.S. policymakers have demonstrated a strong interest in combating malaria.", "In May 2003, Congress passed the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (P.L. 108-25), which states, among other things, that a major objective of the U.S. foreign assistance program is to provide aid for the prevention, control, and cure of malaria, and authorizes funds to carry out these programs.", "In 2004-2006, congressional hearings on U.S. global efforts to combat malaria, especially those of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), discussed USAID policies associated with purchasing and distributing commodities like antimalarial drugs and insecticides, providing technical assistance, and promoting program transparency, and questioned the U.S. strategy for fighting global malaria.", "In July 2008, Congress passed the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act (P.L. 110-293), which authorizes $5 billion from FY2009 through FY2013 for U.S. global malaria efforts.", "It also directs the President to develop a comprehensive, five-year U.S. government strategy to fight global malaria, and authorizes the position of the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator to oversee and coordinate all U.S. government programs to fight malaria globally.", "From FY2004 through FY2008, USAID and CDC received $915 million for U.S. global malaria programs, of which more than $484 million was directed to PMI.", "During this time, the U.S. government also contributed more than $3 billion to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund), which funds malaria projects among other projects.", "For FY2009, Congress has appropriated $391.9 million for U.S. global malaria programs and $900 million for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund.", "This report provides background on malaria's cause, consequences, and impact as well as ways to prevent, treat, and control it.", "The report discusses not only USAID malaria programs and CDC's Malaria Branch, but also efforts to coordinate these bilateral efforts with multilateral efforts.", "The report describes funding for U.S. efforts to fight malaria.", "Finally, it raises possible issues related to these efforts for the 111th Congress, such as U.S. malaria funding levels, U.S. program priorities and strategies, access to commodities, and oversight of U.S. programs." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 3, -1, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
GAO_GAO-18-81	{ "title": [ "Background", "DOD Has Generally Used the GRF to Augment Combatant Command Capabilities and Has Not Assessed the Risk on Its Ability to Respond as a Joint Force", "GRF Units Have Trained Individually to Meet GRF Missions, but They Have Not Trained as Part of an Integrated Joint Force", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "The GRF EXORD generally establishes the GRF as a set, or “menu,” of forces from the military services—each of which possesses unique capabilities—that the Secretary of Defense can deploy rapidly anywhere in the world. According to Joint Staff officials, deployment is for a duration that can range from a few weeks to several months. The GRF EXORD was first issued in 2007 and, according to DOD officials, has been revised several times to modify the number or types of assigned units. The current version, which was issued in 2015, continues to identify two uses for the GRF, described as follows:\nOne is to enhance DOD’s ability to respond quickly to a range of worldwide contingencies. In this scenario, the GRF would generally be used as a tailorable joint force. For example, in the event of a humanitarian crisis such as an earthquake, GRF units possessing the capabilities needed to meet the crisis can be combined into a joint force and rapidly deployed to the affected area. In this scenario, the GRF units selected would act together as a joint force under the GRF- supplied Joint Task Force headquarters or a preexisting one.\nThe other identified use of the GRF is to augment the capabilities of geographic combatant commands in light of unexpected challenges. In this scenario, GRF units would generally be deployed as individual units or in groups. For example, a combatant command may on occasion require additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, and accordingly a GRF unit possessing that requisite capability can be taken from the GRF and temporarily allocated to the combatant command for a certain period of time.\nAlthough the GRF EXORD identifies these two intended uses, the document does not prioritize one use over the other.\nTo meet the range of capabilities delineated in the GRF EXORD, the services nominate and assign units to the GRF on a rotating basis for a certain period of time. Each nominated and assigned unit possesses a specific capability outlined in the GRF EXORD. These specific capabilities correspond to the operational requirements of eight global mission scenarios listed in the GRF EXORD. For example, the GRF includes a Marine Expeditionary Unit and an Airborne Brigade Combat Team because of the unique capabilities of those units. According to DOD officials, once a force is assigned to the GRF, it is on alert status for a period of typically 6 to 9 months, with a potential to be deployed. Accordingly, services rotate units onto and off of the GRF in order to maintain a high state of readiness, which, in turn, allows them to meet the rapid response timeframes required by the GRF EXORD.\nTo gain access to units assigned to the GRF, according to Joint Staff officials, combatant commanders submit an emergent request for forces to the Joint Staff. Generally as part of the global force management process, when a combatant command identifies an emergent requirement for a force that cannot be met using units already assigned or allocated to the combatant command, the combatant command then submits a request for forces. If the Joint Staff, joint force providers, and military services determine that a GRF-assigned unit is the most appropriate solution for the combatant command’s requirement, the Joint Staff will recommend it as the sourcing solution to the Secretary of Defense. Once approved, the GRF-assigned unit will be allocated to the combatant commander.", "According to an official from the Joint Staff office responsible for managing the GRF across DOD, since 2010 DOD has used the GRF 35 times in support of worldwide contingencies—with 32 of those uses involving individual GRF units being deployed in support of or to augment combatant commander needs. However, according to Joint Staff officials overseeing the management of the GRF, DOD has not assessed the extent to which it assumes risk associated with the potential unavailability of GRF units for a short-notice deployment as a joint force in response to a contingency, given the predominant use of the GRF as a resource for combatant commands to obtain individual units. According to an official from the Joint Staff, deployment of select GRF units as part of a joint task force has occurred three times: once to Haiti in support of an earthquake humanitarian response, and twice to Afghanistan in July 2010 and June 2011 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. According to these officials, GRF capabilities in support of Haiti included command and control, security, and transportation and distribution of humanitarian supplies. GRF units in support of Operation Enduring Freedom provided force protection to coalition forces as well as train, advise, and assist capabilities.\nThe predominant use—32 of 35 deployments—of individual GRF units to augment a combatant commander’s needs has, in turn, diminished the set of units available for mission scenarios related to the GRF’s use as a tailorable joint force, and accordingly the capabilities available for inclusion under a GRF joint task force. For example, Joint Staff officials stated that DOD deployed a ballistic missile defense unit designated for the GRF to a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility to augment that combatant command’s missile defense capabilities. According to Joint Staff officials, the deployment of individual GRF- assigned units is intended to be a temporary solution for a specified period of time. According to these officials, the ballistic missile defense unit’s deployment was extended beyond its original timeframe and it was not replaced on the GRF menu of forces with another such unit because there are not enough of these particular types of units to meet the requirements across the combatant commands. Therefore, during the ballistic missile defense unit’s deployment, the particular capability that unit supplied to the GRF was not available as part of a tailorable joint force to respond quickly to a potential worldwide contingency—the other broad intended use of the GRF. Given that DOD has not defined an acceptable level of risk—relative to the length of time during which units remain committed to augmenting combatant commanders’ needs—DOD lacked reasonable assurance that extending the ballistic missile defense unit’s deployment would not surpass an acceptable level of risk to mission for either of the GRF’s uses.\nTwo other units with capabilities particularly suited for use as part of a joint force have also been deployed individually to augment combatant command capabilities. One is U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, which provides joint communications, planning, and public affairs support to a joint force or joint task force headquarters. A second is U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint Task Force – Port Opening, which provides capabilities able to deploy within 12 to 36 hours to support the opening of a port, including the capability to rapidly establish and initially operate an aerial or sea port of debarkation, conduct cargo handling and movement operations to a forward distribution node, and facilitate port throughput in support of contingency operations. Like ballistic missile defense units, these two units are limited in number. According to officials from U.S. Transportation Command, because the units have been used primarily to augment geographic combatant command capabilities, they are at times unavailable for use as part of a tailorable joint force that can be used to respond quickly to unforeseen worldwide contingencies. Because DOD has not defined the risk it assumes in its use of GRF units, it cannot determine the likelihood that units used to augment combatant commanders’ needs might be required to constitute a joint force composed of GRF units, nor has DOD defined the significance of the risk it incurs by not having a given capability available to the GRF. Further, although DOD has used the GRF primarily to augment combatant commanders’ needs, risks for both uses should be identified and analyzed appropriately since neither use is prioritized over the other. While DOD did not encounter issues accessing GRF units that it required during any of the three instances in which the GRF was deployed as part of a joint force, Joint Staff officials have nonetheless raised an issue concerning the degree of risk that DOD continues to assume by using GRF capabilities to augment combatant commander needs that may be needed by the GRF to constitute a joint force.\nDOD officials stated that using GRF units to augment geographic combatant command requirements leaves them unavailable for use as part of a joint force ready to respond to an unforeseen worldwide contingency. They stated that this is largely due to the fact that some GRF units are limited in quantity but in high demand worldwide. For example, according to DOD officials, while intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems are in such high demand that they are consistently used to augment combatant commanders’ requirements, they are also typically used as an essential part of a joint force. As such, there is a likelihood that a GRF joint force might require, but not have access to these capabilities, thus potentially increasing the risk of not accomplishing a given mission. DOD officials stated that in the event of a crisis requiring the employment of GRF units as part of a joint task force, GRF units currently employed elsewhere could be reassigned. It is uncertain, however, whether such reassignment would enable a GRF joint task force to meet its timeframes for deployment given that GRF units are expected to be ready for deployment on very short notice. Moreover, the potential effect of and risks associated with such an occurrence—specifically, the unavailability of required forces to assemble GRF units as part of a joint force—has not been assessed. The identification and analysis of risks provides the basis for developing appropriate risk responses, such as, in this case, further defining and prioritizing the GRF’s intended uses and missions. Because DOD has not identified or analyzed risks associated with the uses of the GRF, it may lack reasonable assurance that this response will be sufficient to mitigate the risks. Further, without identifying risk, DOD is not well positioned to develop other risk-mitigating strategies, and to know when to activate them.\nStandards for Internal Control in the Federal Government establish that management should assess risks related to achieving defined objectives. Specifically, the standards state that management should analyze the identified risks to estimate their significance and define tolerances for levels of risk assumed, thereby providing a basis for responding to the risks. The standards also call for management to design responses such that risks are contained within the defined risk tolerance for the identified objective. DOD has not assessed the risks to readiness for mission scenarios that it might assume for both uses of the GRF because of its general reliance upon the GRF as an augmentation capability available to individual geographic combatant commands for response to unforeseen challenges or opportunities.\nFurthermore, we found that there are varying perspectives within DOD concerning the intended uses of the GRF, although the GRF EXORD generally identifies two overarching uses, as previously discussed. Specifically, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff stated the view that the GRF is a menu of forces, each unit possessing unique capabilities that can be used either individually to address geographic combatant command-identified capability gaps or collectively as a joint force to react to unforeseen worldwide contingencies. However, officials from U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central Command view the GRF primarily as a pool from which they can draw forces, and it is these geographic combatant commands that have most often requested those capabilities provided by individual GRF units. Officials from the Army expressed another perspective, based in large part on the requirement for the Army to provide a joint task force headquarters for the GRF. Army officials said that, in their view, the GRF serves primarily as a pool of forces from which a joint task force can be created to meet unforeseen worldwide contingencies.\nAlthough the GRF EXORD generally identifies the two uses, it does not prioritize the use of GRF assets to meet either. Additionally, DOD has not defined the risk to meeting the objectives of either of the two uses, and, thus does not have the necessary knowledge to determine when to deploy units for one use or the other. As previously stated, DOD has used the GRF to augment combatant commanders’ forces more frequently—32 out of 35 deployments—rather than retaining the units assigned to the GRF to support a rapidly deploying joint force.\nConducting a risk assessment that identifies any risks associated with the use of the GRF could help DOD to design responses, such as further defining and prioritizing the GRF’s intended uses and missions in an effort to mitigate any identified risks. Without conducting a risk assessment and taking steps to address any identified risk to accomplishing either of the GRF’s uses, DOD’s attempt to satisfy one of the two intended uses of the GRF may inadvertently hamper the other intended use.", "GRF units train individually to meet GRF missions, but there are no GRF- specific joint training exercises, and the individual GRF units have limited opportunities to train as part of an integrated joint force, according to DOD officials. Specifically, according to service officials, GRF readiness, and that of assigned units, is based on the assigned force’s participation in their respective service training exercises and are generally focused on the respective units’ core missions or functions. In addition to service- level training, GRF units can also participate in joint training exercises sponsored by one of the geographic combatant commands. These commands can give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including over all aspects of joint training. However, if GRF units are service retained or assigned to different combatant commands, they would not all fall under the authority of a single commander that could direct joint training. According to military service officials, there are no GRF-specific joint training exercises. However, according to some combatant command officials, some joint training exercises have included units currently assigned to the GRF. Few, if any of these exercises, however, provide opportunities to conduct training for the GRF’s joint task force headquarters in conjunction with GRF-assigned units. For example, according to U.S. Southern Command officials, the Joint Staff’s 2017 Joint Task Force Forming Exercises will be held in U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility, and will include the unit currently assigned as the GRF’s Joint Task Force headquarters. However, the exercise will not include any other GRF-assigned units. Therefore, the training will not provide an opportunity for the GRF to demonstrate readiness, gain efficiencies, or identify deficiencies associated with deploying elements of the GRF as a tailorable joint task force.\nChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, notes that U.S. forces may be employed across the range of military operations, and that DOD must support national security requirements with joint military capabilities designed to adapt and succeed in any operational environment. It further states that the department and its mission partners must prepare to operate in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. Finally, it notes that the joint training challenge is to be responsive to all emerging and extant mission requirements of the combatant commanders.\nThe need for interoperability is especially important for units assigned to the GRF not only because the GRF EXORD requires that they be ready for eight global mission scenarios, but because the overall GRF concept suggests they need to be capable of integration into a tailorable joint force. Underscoring this need for interoperability and jointness, the GRF EXORD outlines that combatant commanders should integrate elements of the GRF into Joint Exercise Program events to help sustain the readiness and capabilities of those units to execute various mission capability requirements. It also notes that combatant commanders should conduct a training event with the GRF’s Joint Task Force-capable headquarters at least once every 30 months in order to maintain the headquarters’ readiness to support each geographic combatant command. While these requirements are important to ensure the GRF units receive the proper training and are integrated into combatant command joint exercises, there are no specific GRF joint training exercises that provide opportunities for individual units assigned to the GRF to train as a tailorable joint task force.\nJoint Staff and service officials told us that the GRF’s assigned forces do not require additional or special training because they will perform the core missions for which they train regardless of whether they are deployed individually or as part of the GRF joint task force. These officials stated, therefore, that existing training is sufficient to develop and determine readiness of the GRF. However, the importance of exercising the GRF Joint Task Force headquarters and associated GRF-assigned units was demonstrated to us when we observed an Army-sponsored joint training event involving GRF-assigned forces during a January 2017 Deployment Readiness Exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during which several interoperability challenges arose. For example, the Army and Air Force faced a challenge in calculating the weight of Army heavy equipment being loaded onto Air Force aircraft preparatory to a simulated airdrop mission. Based on the Army’s calculations, the equipment load was well under the specified weight limit for the aircraft, but the Air Force’s onboard computers showed the load as being over the limit. While the cause of the difference in the two figures was not identified to us at the time, Army officials suspected that it could be attributed to a double-counting of the weight of the parachute. In another example, inclement weather at Fort Bragg during the exercise caused ice build-up on participating aircraft. This showed that the Air Force’s de-icing capability was limited to a few aircraft at a time, which caused delays in loading and preparing the aircraft for take-off. According to Army officials, had the mission required more personnel, equipment, and aircraft, this issue would have created a risk to meeting the GRF’s mission timelines.\nDespite the challenges encountered during the exercise, Army officials told us that exercises, such as the Deployment Readiness Exercise conducted at Fort Bragg, are important because they give units from different services the opportunity to identify challenges and develop solutions. As a result, these exercises can enhance the GRF’s joint task force capability. Additionally, a senior official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Force Training Directorate told us that the ability to act jointly was very important in military operations and noted the need for joint training.\nTwo studies conducted on behalf of DOD further underscore the importance of joint exercises for developing GRF force readiness. The first study, released by the Institute for Defense Analysis in 2015, reported that the current joint exercise program did not ensure a proficient and ready GRF. Specifically, the study identified three key issues associated with GRF training. First, realistic interoperability training of individual units assigned to the GRF was not sufficient to ensure overall GRF readiness. Second, while the then-current version of the GRF EXORD assigned joint training responsibilities to the services, according to the study, the service responsible for the Joint Task Force-capable headquarters element lacked the authority to direct the required level of joint training for GRF elements provided by other services. Third, the GRF, in its entirety, had not been exercised or deployed as a joint force since its inception and thus had not demonstrated the ability to rapidly deploy as an operationally coherent joint task force. The report recommended that DOD designate a single commander with authority to establish and enforce joint integrated training at the tactical level, make changes to improve training for the GRF’s Joint Task Force headquarters, and implement a joint demonstration campaign for the GRF. According to Joint Staff officials, they are not aware of any actions taken in response to these recommendations. The second study, released by RAND in 2016, also emphasized that realistic exercises were key to ensuring and validating the GRF’s readiness. The report added that current exercises rarely included full and realistic force packages and recommended that joint airborne exercises be designed explicitly to identify and assess the implications of possible challenges and validate planning assumptions about a GRF joint task force.\nAccording to Army officials, a major factor inhibiting joint training exercises focused at GRF-assigned units as a joint task force is the fact that it can be difficult to get other services to agree to participate in service-sponsored events because—as the Institute for Defense Analysis study pointed out—services lack the authority to direct other services to supply forces for joint training exercises, even when those forces are currently on a GRF rotation. Moreover, since the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2011, which was responsible, among other things, for being the lead agent for joint force training, there is no single commander with the authority to require joint force training. As noted above, although geographic combatant commanders may direct joint training of forces under their command, units designated for the GRF mission may come from forces assigned to different geographic combatant commands or service-retained forces, according to officials.\nAccording to a senior Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Force Training Directorate official, the challenge to conducting joint GRF training is that there is no entity having authority and responsibility for such training. He noted that because the GRF is department-wide and is not assigned to a single service or geographic combatant command, there is no single advocate for the GRF mission and training with the authority to direct the services and geographic combatant commands with GRF-dedicated units to prepare for the joint requirements inherent in the GRF mission. As a result, there are no joint training exercises specifically designed to exercise GRF units as a joint force. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, management should develop an organizational structure with an understanding of the overall responsibilities, and assign these responsibilities to enable the organization to operate in an efficient and effective manner, comply with applicable laws and regulations, and reliably report quality information. To achieve this, management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the entity.\nWithout an entity having the responsibility and authority to plan, direct, and conduct joint training exercises focused on GRF-assigned units deploying as a joint task force as appropriate, DOD risks undermining the effectiveness of the rapid deployment of a GRF joint task force in response to unforeseen worldwide contingencies.", "DOD has developed the GRF as a rapid response force available to react to unforeseen contingencies or crises. While the GRF has responded to worldwide contingencies, GRF units have been primarily used to augment existing geographic combatant command capabilities. DOD has not assessed the risks it assumes by its reliance upon the GRF for augmenting combatant commanders’ forces as opposed to having the GRF-assigned units available for allocation to a joint task force in response to a contingency. Without performing a risk assessment and, as appropriate, designing responses to mitigate any identified unacceptable risks to accomplishing either of the two GRF uses, DOD cannot ensure that the GRF is able to meet its mission. Additionally, without a designated authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training for GRF-assigned units as appropriate, DOD has not developed GRF- specific joint training exercises or fully integrated the GRF into existing joint exercises. Without making improvements in these areas, DOD risks the ability of the GRF to respond to unforeseen, worldwide contingencies as an integrated joint force in a timely fashion with all the resources it needs.", "We are making the following three recommendations to DOD:\nThe Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should assess the risks to accomplishing both of the GRF’s uses: that is, its use as an augmentation capability available as needed to individual geographic combatant commands; and its use as a tailorable joint force available for rapid response to a specific threat. (Recommendation 1)\nThe Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should, as appropriate following the assessment of risk, design responses, such as further defining and prioritizing the GRF’s intended uses and missions, to mitigate any identified risks. (Recommendation 2)\nThe Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should designate an authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training for GRF-assigned units, as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)", "We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its written comments, DOD concurred with our three recommendations and noted planned actions to address them. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431, or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which (1) Department of Defense (DOD) has used the Global Response Force (GRF) and assessed any risks associated with its use; and (2) GRF- assigned units are trained to meet GRF missions, both individually and as a joint force.\nFor our objective of determining the extent to which DOD has used the GRF and assessed any risks associated with its use, we reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GRF Execute Order (EXORD) to identify the GRF’s overall uses and the global mission scenarios it is intended to meet, as well as the operational requirements and forces assigned to meet the requirements. We also interviewed the responsible DOD officials to understand how DOD selects, designates, and validates forces on the GRF, and the processes for making changes to the GRF EXORD, as well as how DOD decides when to use GRF forces for either of the two intended uses of the GRF. Also, we reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to identify relevant internal controls—specifically, that management should assess risks related to achieving defined objectives, analyze the identified risks to estimate their significance, define tolerances for levels of risk assumed, and design responses such that risks are within the defined risk tolerance—and compare them with DOD’s risk assessment efforts for the GRF. Also, we reviewed the Joint Staff’s GRF deployment information from 2010 to 2017 to understand the frequency of GRF deployments and identify specific instances in which the GRF’s ability to accomplish its missions was affected—specifically, instances in which GRF capabilities were unavailable for use during a GRF operation.\nFor our objective of determining the extent to which GRF-assigned units are trained to meet GRF missions, both individually and as a joint force, we reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GRF EXORD and DOD’s Guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System to understand how GRF readiness is developed, reported, and evaluated. We also reviewed DOD’s Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States to identify existing requirements related to joint training, and documents related to GRF training to determine the extent to which the frequency and types of GRF training meet overall joint training requirements as well as training requirements established in the GRF EXORD. We observed a Deployment Readiness Exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to learn about the types of GRF training, as well as challenges and potential benefits of training exercises for GRF units. We also interviewed senior officials from the Joint Staff, military service force providers, and geographic combatant commands to better understand training practices for the GRF and its assigned units, as well as varying perspectives regarding the challenges and potential benefits of GRF training exercises for accomplishing GRF missions.\nWe interviewed senior officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Joint Staff; and Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force headquarters, and conducted site visits to force providers at Army Forces Command, Marine Forces Command, Navy Fleet Forces Command, Air Force Air Combat Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. We also interviewed officials from U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command, and visited U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command. Our interviews focused on understanding the degree to which DOD organizations assess and maintain a consistent understanding of the risks entailed in using GRF forces and gaining an understanding of the challenges encountered in identifying, designating, and employing forces on the GRF, as well as the extent to which the GRF’s ability to accomplish its intended missions has been affected.\nWe conducted this performance audit from May 2016 to October 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key contributions to this report include Guy LoFaro, Assistant Director; Adam Anguiano; Alberto Leff; Michael Shaughnessy; Michael Silver; Yong Song; and Cheryl Weissman." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_full", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "h0_full h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the purpose of DOD's GRF?", "How has the GRF been used since 2010?", "What are the consequences of these uses?", "How might this cause larger issues?", "To what extent does DOD evaluate its GRF risks?", "What are potential consequences of this lack of information?", "How are GRF units trained?", "What factors hamper an effort to conduct joint training?", "What were the implications of the disestablishment of the U.S. Joint Force Command?", "Why are joint exercises important?", "What are the drawbacks of lacking a central authority for GRF?", "Why did GAO review DOD?", "What did GAO specifically review?", "What information did the GAO review for the report?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Defense's (DOD) Global Response Force (GRF) has two distinct uses: one is to enhance DOD's ability to rapidly deploy forces in response to a range of worldwide contingencies with a tailorable joint force; and the other is to provide a set, or “menu,” of units that combatant commands can request to augment their capabilities in light of unexpected challenges when requirements exceed their capabilities.", "Since 2010, according to officials, DOD has used the GRF 35 times in support of worldwide contingencies, with 32 of those times involving deployment of individual GRF units to augment combatant commander needs, and 3 times involving their use as part of a joint task force.", "This predominant use of individual GRF units to augment combatant commanders' needs has diminished the set of units available for mission scenarios related to the GRF's use as a tailorable joint force.", "For example, when DOD deployed a ballistic missile defense unit as a part of the GRF to augment a combatant command's missile defense capabilities, the particular capability it supplied to the GRF was not available for participation in a tailorable joint force to respond quickly to a potential worldwide contingency, if such an event occurred.", "DOD does not know what risks it assumes to readiness for GRF mission scenarios due to its general reliance upon the GRF as an augmentation capability available to individual geographic combatant commands, because DOD has not assessed those risks.", "Without conducting a risk assessment and taking steps to address any identified risk to accomplishing the GRF's intended uses, DOD's attempt to satisfy one of the uses (that is, individual GRF-assigned units assisting combatant commands) may hamper the other use (that is, deployment of a joint task force for a contingency).", "GRF units train individually to meet GRF missions, but DOD does not conduct any GRF-specific joint training exercises, and the individual GRF units have limited opportunities to train as part of an integrated joint force, according to DOD officials.", "While the GRF Execute Order calls for integrating elements of the GRF into existing joint training, the military services lack the authority to direct other services to supply forces for joint training exercises, even when those forces are currently on a GRF rotation.", "Moreover, since the disestablishment in 2011 of U.S. Joint Forces Command—which, among other things, was the lead agent for joint force training—and because units designated for the GRF mission may be assigned to different combatant commands or may be service-retained, no single commander has the authority to require joint force training of GRF units. As a result, no joint training exercises are specifically designed to exercise GRF units as a joint task force.", "Army officials told GAO that joint exercises are important because they give individual units from different services the opportunity to identify challenges and develop solutions, thereby enhancing the GRF's joint task force capability.", "Without an entity having the responsibility and authority to plan, direct, and conduct joint training exercises focused on GRF-assigned units deploying as a joint task force as appropriate, DOD risks undermining the effectiveness of the rapid deployment of a GRF joint task force in response to unforeseen worldwide contingencies.", "House Report 114-537, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to evaluate challenges DOD may be facing regarding the GRF.", "GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has used the GRF, and assessed any risks associated with its use of the GRF; and (2) GRF-assigned units are trained to meet GRF missions individually and as a joint force.", "GAO reviewed GRF deployment information from 2010 to 2017 and the GRF Execute Order, observed a training exercise, and interviewed knowledgeable officials." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 2, 0, 4, -1, 0, 0, -1, 3, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-13-648	{ "title": [ "Background", "DOD Met the Annual Reporting Requirements in Its 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report", "DOD Reported Proposals to Enhance Range Capabilities and Address Shortfalls", "DOD Used Goals and Milestones to Update Its Progress in Implementing Its Comprehensive Training Range Sustainment Plan", "DOD Reported Its Projected Funding Requirements for Implementing Planned Actions", "DOD Has Implemented All Prior GAO Recommendations", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Scope and Methodology", "Appendix II: GAO Recommendations from 2004-2011 Reviews and the Status of the DOD’s Implementation of Those Recommendations", "Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "DOD has been reporting to Congress since fiscal year 2004 on several items related to its training ranges in response to section 366(a) of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The act as subsequently amended required annual progress reports to be submitted at the same time as the President submitted the administration’s annual budget for fiscal years 2005 through 2018. The requirement that GAO evaluate the plans submitted pursuant to subsections 366(a) and (b) within 90 days of receiving the report from DOD has also been extended through fiscal year 2018.\nIn our prior reviews of DOD’s Sustainable Ranges Reports, we noted that DOD had not addressed certain required elements when it initially submitted its comprehensive plan in 2004. Further, we noted that it took DOD some time to develop a plan consistent with the basic requirements of section 366. Over time, we found that as DOD reported annually on its progress in implementing its comprehensive plan, it continued to improve its Sustainable Ranges Reports, and it has reported on the actions it has taken in response to prior GAO recommendations. For instance, DOD has included special interests sections for each service providing additional information on areas affecting training capabilities: the goals, actions, and milestones section; the funding requirements section; and the individual range assessments. A specific example is that, over time, the department progressed from using four common goals and milestones to using seven shared goals for which the services have developed their own actions and milestones that are tailored to their missions. We have reported that these new goals and milestones are more quantifiable and are now associated with identified time frames.\nAs part of the preparation of its annual plan, the Secretary of Defense was to conduct an assessment of current and future training range requirements and an evaluation of the adequacy of DOD’s current range resources to meet those requirements. We found that the 2012 Sustainable Ranges Report met the annual statutory reporting requirements for DOD to describe its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. In its 2012 report, DOD provided updates to several elements of the plan required by the act to be included in DOD’s original submission in 2004. These elements included (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls in resources, (2) goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress, and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions, among others.\nIn our review of DOD’s 2012 Sustainable Ranges Report, we found that DOD had implemented 11 of our 13 recommendations since 2004 for expanding and improving its reporting on sustainable ranges. At that time, DOD officials stated that they were still in the process of implementing 2 recommendations. These recommendations were to: (1) develop an integrated training range database that identifies available training resources, specific capacities and capabilities, and training constraints caused by limitations on the use of training ranges, which could be continuously updated and shared among the services at all command levels, regardless of service ownership; and (2) develop a readiness reporting system to reflect the impact on readiness caused by training constraints due to limitations on the use of training ranges. For a complete presentation of prior GAO recommendations and their implementation status, see appendix II.", "The 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the annual statutory reporting requirements for DOD to describe its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. In its 2013 report, DOD provided updates to several elements of the plan required by the act. These elements include (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls, (2) goals and milestones for tracking progress implementing DOD’s sustainment plan, and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions, among others.", "In our review of DOD’s 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report, we found that DOD again reported on its proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls in resources. DOD developed these proposals by evaluating current and future training range requirements and the ability of current DOD resources to meet these requirements. In its 2013 report, DOD validated as current the 2012 range assessments and provided an update to the special interest sections developed by each service. For example, as the Marine Corps stated that the special interest section from the 2012 Sustainable Ranges Report was still valid for the 2013 report, the Marine Corps revalidated the issues it identified in the 2012 report and provided updates as needed. The Marine Corps identified several training shortfalls that it is working to remedy, such as the capability to fully exercise a large Marine Air-Ground Task Force in a realistically, doctrinally appropriate training scenario. The area currently used to provide this training is not large enough to accommodate a full-scale, live-fire Marine Expeditionary Brigade exercise. In order to address this shortfall, DOD would like to add 150,000 acres of land to this training area, and it is currently, in conjunction with the Bureau of Land Management, pursuing legislation from Congress in support of this objective. In its 2013 report, DOD also reported on four emerging challenges to training and its training ranges. These four challenges are: renewable energy, the demand for frequency spectrum, threatened and endangered species, and the indirect impacts of increased home-station training. For example, the report stated that as U.S. forces draw down from Afghanistan, the competition for airspace and training ranges is expected to increase to levels that have not been experienced for more than 10 years. During the surge of deployments over that period, demand for airspace and training ranges in the United States was commensurately lower since large numbers of forces were deployed to overseas contingency operations. DOD cited policies, programs, and proactive partnering at the federal, state, and local levels as a means to address this challenge.\nDOD’s 2013 report also revalidated as current its 2012 annual assessment of the adequacy of existing range resources to meet training requirements. Beginning with its 2013 report, DOD began conducting full range capability and encroachment assessments every 3 years rather than annually, and to validate those assessments in the years between evaluations. DOD’s analysis of range capability and encroachment data over the preceding 10 years had found that there were not significant changes in the data from year to year, and the military services had confirmed this finding. For the 2013 report, DOD asked the military services to validate the range capability and encroachment data from 2012, and to report on any significant changes. All of the military services reported that their range assessment data had not significantly changed from the 2012 report. Officials from all of the military services told us that they did not believe this change negatively affected the Sustainable Ranges Report, and that they believed this change accurately captured range capability and encroachment data. The next planned full range capability and encroachment assessment is to be included in DOD’s 2015 Sustainable Ranges Report.", "In its 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report, DOD continued to use goals, actions, and milestones to help address the statutory requirement to describe its progress in implementing its comprehensive training range sustainment plan. DOD has developed seven goals in support of this plan. These goals are as follows: to mitigate encroachment pressures on training activities from competing operating space; to mitigate frequency spectrum competition; to meet military airspace challenges; to manage increasing military demand for range space; to address impacts from new energy infrastructure and renewable energy impacts; to anticipate climate change impacts; and to sustain excellence in environmental stewardship. Each military service has developed its own milestones and needed actions for reaching those milestones, using these goals as a common framework. In the 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report, each service provided updates to its milestones and actions. For example, the Army is in the process of implementing the Army Compatible Use Buffer Zone Program at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to protect the military mission and offset training restrictions, and it reported that approximately 22,000 acres have been conserved and more than $14 million in funding has been spent in support of this milestone. DOD also reported on new milestones that have been identified in support of department goals. For example, the Army is planning to relocate an instrumentation system to Fort Shafter, Hawaii, to enable enhanced home-station training in the Pacific by the end of fiscal year 2013. DOD stated that these goals and milestones will be reviewed and updated annually to ensure that DOD continues to address future training requirements and constraints.", "In the 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report, DOD met the statutory requirement to track its progress in implementing the comprehensive plan by identifying the funding requirements needed to accomplish its goals. DOD has delineated four funding categories to be used by the services to project their range sustainment efforts: modernization and investment, operations and maintenance, environmental, and encroachment. This section of the report also includes definitions and specific examples for each category, as well as requested funding levels for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. For example, the environmental category is described as funding dedicated to environmental management of ranges, including range assessments, response actions, and natural and cultural resource management planning and implementation. Examples of environmental funding include conducting range assessments and environmental mitigation costs associated with range modernization and range construction. In this section, DOD also provides an explanation of any fluctuations occurring over the 5-year funding period covered in the report. For example, the Army’s modernization and investment funding decreases from $247.0 million in fiscal year 2013 to a projected $49.3 million in fiscal year 2017 as a result of a significant reduction in military construction funding during this period due to DOD’s reduction in the force structure.\nThe elements of DOD’s 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report describe the department’s progress in implementing its comprehensive plan and addressing training constraints at its ranges, thus meeting the annual reporting requirements of the act.", "DOD has implemented all of the 13 recommendations made by GAO since 2004 for expanding and improving its reporting on sustainable ranges. In our 2012 review, we reported that DOD had implemented 11 recommendations, but had not fully addressed 2 recommendations regarding readiness reporting. DOD subsequently addressed these 2 recommendations by developing and launching a range assessment module within the Defense Readiness Reporting System. Additionally, DOD created a range visibility tool within its range scheduler system to enable a user to query and identify the availability of training ranges across the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. Future improvements include plans to provide a link to the Air Force range scheduling system to optimize utilization of training resources.\nOne of the remaining GAO recommendations that was in the process of being implemented in 2012 called for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop an integrated training range database that would serve as the baseline for the mandated comprehensive training range plan. We reported in 2012 that this database should identify available training resources, specific capacities and capabilities, and training constraints caused by encroachment and other factors, and that such database could be continuously updated and shared among the services at all command levels, regardless of service ownership. Although DOD did not concur with our recommendation to develop a stand-alone training range database, it developed the Defense Readiness Reporting System– Range Assessment Module. The module provides an integrated database that identifies available training ranges, capabilities, and constraints, and this meets the intent of our recommendation.\nThe second remaining recommendation to be implemented called for DOD to develop a readiness reporting system to reflect the impact on readiness caused by training constraints due to limitations on the use of training ranges. Section 366(b) required DOD to report to Congress its plans to improve its readiness reporting system—the Global Status of Resources and Training System—to reflect the extent to which limitations on the use of training ranges affected readiness. DOD did not concur with our recommendation and stated that it was inappropriate to modify this system to address encroachment. However, DOD stated that the department planned to incorporate the impact of range encroachment on readiness into the Defense Readiness Reporting System. DOD developed another phase of its Range Assessment Module, which resides within the Defense Readiness Reporting System–Strategic, that reflects the effect of range-related training constraints on readiness, and this meets the intent of our recommendation.\nThe Defense Readiness Reporting System–Range Assessment Module provides the means to manage and report on the readiness and capability of military ranges. Phases I and II developed an unclassified system that captured the range readiness assessment portion of the Sustainable Ranges Report to Congress in a web-based format compatible with and capable of being integrated within the Defense Readiness Reporting System as a stand-alone module. However, DOD appeared to lack the tools needed to properly define two challenges associated with managing its ranges. The two main issues were as follows: (1) service modernization efforts increased the demand for physical space for individual, unit, and integrated unit training; and (2) encroachment by external development and endangered species seeking refuge in suitable habitats within the department’s ranges, coupled with the growing need for more energy resources, artificially constricted DOD’s ability to train properly. Therefore, DOD had a need to integrate the assessment portion of the Sustainable Ranges Report process into a single comprehensive readiness reporting system, as directed by 10 U.S.C. § 117. DOD consequently developed phase III of the module in order to obtain this assessment. This phase allows DOD to establish a link between range assessments categorized by the services, individual installations, and range complexes. For example, the module can display range capability and encroachment data using service-specific mission areas for training ranges.\nIn addition to providing the assessment of training ranges, DOD also developed a mechanism to provide greater visibility of training resources across the services. DOD created the range visibility tool within its range scheduler system to enable a user to query and identify the availability of training ranges across the services to optimize utilization of training resources. The need for this type of query function arose with the likely increased competition for home-station training resources created by decreased deployments and increasing budget constraints. These factors necessitate more-efficient use of existing training capabilities. The tool allows users to enter an address, zip code, desired proximity, and range capability into the system. It will then display a list of ranges within a specified area, their availability, a map and driving directions, and scheduling information. This type of feature allows units to maximize available military training resources before having to outsource capabilities, resulting in savings.", "We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DOD stated that it agrees in general with the report. DOD also provided technical comments, which were incorporated into the report as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.", "To determine whether the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the reporting requirements specified in section 366(a) of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, as amended, we reviewed the report and compared it with those requirements. We also compared the 2013 and 2012 reports to determine what changes, if any, DOD had made to its Sustainable Ranges Report. In our comparison, we identified changes in the types of information contained in the two reports, such as DOD’s decision to conduct range capability and encroachment assessment every 3 years. We also compared the 2013 and 2012 Sustainable Ranges Reports to track changes in the data that DOD reported, such as changes in training range capability or DOD’s progress in implementing its sustainable ranges initiative from 2012 to 2013. We also reviewed the memorandums that the Office of the Secretary of Defense sent to the military services to request data for the Sustainable Ranges Report to determine what differences, if any, there were in the types of information that were requested for the report. In addition, we met with Office of the Secretary of Defense and service officials to determine whether the 2013 report met the mandated requirements, and whether there were changes to the services’ submission for 2013. The intent of our review was to determine whether the Sustainable Ranges Report met mandated requirements and whether DOD’s reporting could be improved.\nTo determine whether DOD acted on GAO recommendations to improve its report submissions and what opportunities, if any, exist for DOD to improve future reporting, we reviewed the status of prior GAO recommendations. We identified the actions DOD has taken to meet these recommendations in its reporting submissions on sustainable ranges.\nWe conducted this performance audit from February 2013 through July 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Harold Reich (Assistant Director), James Ashley, Susan Langley, Sabrina Streagle, Lindsay Taylor, Cheryl Weissman, and Natasha Wilder made key contributions to this report.", "Military Training: DOD Met Annual Reporting Requirements and Improved Its Sustainable Ranges Report. GAO-12-879R. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.\nMilitary Training: DOD’s Report on the Sustainability of Training Ranges Meets Annual Reporting Requirements but Could Be Improved. GAO-12-13R. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2011.\nMilitary Training: DOD Continues to Improve Its Report on the Sustainability of Training Ranges. GAO-10-977R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2010.\nMilitary Training: DOD’s Report on the Sustainability of Training Ranges Addresses Most of the Congressional Reporting Requirements and Continues to Improve with Each Annual Update. GAO-10-103R. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2009.\nImprovement Continues in DOD’s Reporting on Sustainable Ranges, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Range Assessments and Comprehensive Plan. GAO-09-128R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2008.\nMilitary Training: Compliance with Environmental Laws Affects Some Training Activities, but DOD Has Not Made a Sound Business Case for Additional Environmental Exemptions. GAO-08-407. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2008.\nImprovement Continues in DOD’s Reporting on Sustainable Ranges, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Range Assessments and Comprehensive Plan. GAO-08-10R. Washington, D.C.: October 11, 2007.\nImprovement Continues in DOD’s Reporting on Sustainable Ranges but Additional Time Is Needed to Fully Implement Key Initiatives. GAO-06-725R. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006.\nMilitary Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements. GAO-06-193. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2005.\nSome Improvements Have Been Made in DOD’s Annual Training Range Reporting but It Still Fails to Fully Address Congressional Requirements. GAO-06-29R. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2005.\nMilitary Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Program to Transform Joint Training. GAO-05-548. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.\nMilitary Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges. GAO-05-534. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005.\nMilitary Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.\nMilitary Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training Ranges. GAO-03-976. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2003.\nMilitary Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on Training Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003.\nMilitary Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2002.\nMilitary Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.\nMilitary Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h2_full", "h0_full h2_title", "h0_full h2_full", "", "h0_full", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What report did DOD us to properly fill reporting requirements?", "What does the report include?", "What updates does it include regarding training range?", "What informed the progress updates?", "To what extent has DOD fulfilled GAO recommendations?", "How have the remaining 2 recommendations been addressed?", "How else has the DOD undertaken range improvements?", "What are likely future improvements?", "How will training rages change as Afghanistan forces return to the US?", "What is the Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act?", "What did this act require of GAO?", "What did GAO examine in this report?" ], "summary": [ "The 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report of the Department of Defense (DOD) met the annual statutory reporting requirements for the department to describe its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any additional actions taken or planned for addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace.", "DOD's 2013 report provides updates to several elements of the plan that the act required it to include in its annual progress reports, including (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls; (2) goals and milestones for tracking progress in the implementation of its sustainment plan; and (3) projected funding requirements for each of the military services to implement their planned actions.", "DOD reported that there were no significant changes in range capability or encroachment since 2012. It identified emerging challenges to training range sustainability, and reported on actions being taken to mitigate them.", "It used goals and milestones in its progress updates, and reported its projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions.", "Through the changes DOD has implemented in its annual reporting over the past several years, the department has continually improved reporting on the sustainability of its ranges. DOD has now implemented all prior GAO recommendations focused on meeting the requirements of the act and improving report submissions. GAO reported in 2012 that DOD had implemented all but 2 of 13 prior recommendations.", "DOD has subsequently addressed these 2 recommendations by developing and launching the range assessment module within the Defense Readiness Reporting System.", "Additionally, DOD created a range visibility tool within its range scheduler system to enable a user to query and identify the availability of training ranges across the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy to optimize utilization of training resources.", "Future improvements include plans to provide a link to the Air Force range scheduling system.", "As U.S. forces draw down from Afghanistan and home training is expanded, the competition for training ranges may also increase.", "Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended) required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace available in the United States and overseas for training, and provide annual progress reports on these efforts through 2018.", "The act also requires GAO to submit annual evaluations of DOD’s reports to Congress within 90 days of receiving them from DOD.", "In this report, GAO examined (1) whether DOD’s 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the legislative requirements; and (2) whether DOD acted on GAO previous recommendations to improve its submissions." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, -1, 1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0 ] }
GAO_GAO-14-260	{ "title": [ "Background", "SBA and Cosponsors Jointly Plan, Fund, and Conduct Cosponsored Activities", "Collecting Feedback from Participants Would Help SBA Evaluate Cosponsored Activities and Its Use of Cosponsorship Authority", "Focus Group Participants, SBA, and Cosponsors Generally Reported That Cosponsored Activities Benefited Small Businesses", "Some SBA District Offices Informally Collect Participant Feedback on Cosponsored Activities", "Conclusion", "Recommendation for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Factors SBA Considers in Deciding Whether to Utilize Cosponsorship Authority", "Appendix III: Summary of SBA Office of Inspector General Findings and Recommendations and SBA Required Procedures", "Appendix IV: Additional Focus Group Characteristics and Information", "Appendix V: Comments from the Small Business Administration", "Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "SBA’s standard operating procedures on outreach activities establish the agency’s policy on cosponsored activities and are governed by the cosponsorship authority provided to the agency under Section 4(h) of the act, SBA’s regulations implementing cosponsorship authority, and Office of Government Ethics regulations. SBA’s procedures define, among other things, the entities SBA may enter into a cosponsorship agreement with, certain activities that may and may not be performed as cosponsored activities, and how cosponsored activities may be funded. For example, SBA may enter into a cosponsorship agreement with any eligible entity with whom such partnership would not create a conflict of interest with the agency. Eligible entities can include for-profit or nonprofit entities, or any federal, state, or local government official or entity.\nSBA’s procedures on outreach activities also define certain activities that may be performed as cosponsored activities, described by the following examples:\nTraining: Activity must include delivery of an instructional program— either in person or on-line—that provides information on or experiences with SBA programs or services or a business-related subject.\nMatchmaking: Activity (generally government contracting or financing initiatives) that brings together government and private-sector resources and small business owners. Matchmaking events are permissible so long as the activities are not exclusive to any one group or do not benefit only one entity. No business transactions (e.g., signing of contracts) can take place during the cosponsored activity.\nCounseling: One-to-one counseling may be a part of an activity only if the counseling is performed by an SBA employee or by an SBA grantee that provides counseling services as part of its SBA-funded activity.\nWeb pages or websites: A cosponsored web page or website can refer to a variety of activities including (1) the actual cosponsored activity itself; (2) a means to host the cosponsored activity (i.e., online training, digital publication or podcast); or (3) a means to advertise or register participants for the cosponsored activity. The web page or website must include information or links to SBA programs and services and cannot include commercial activity.\nRecognition: Activity that celebrates the contributions of small business, small business owners, or small business advocates.\nIn addition, SBA’s procedures define activities that may not be performed as cosponsored activities, including political and fundraising activities, and activities that are solely or primarily a networking or social reception and do not provide a formal opportunity for SBA to make a presentation on SBA programs and services.\nFurther, SBA’s procedures define the various ways cosponsored activities may be funded. Cosponsors may provide cash or an in-kind contribution, a cosponsor may charge a participant fee to cover the direct costs of providing the cosponsored activity, or SBA may accept a gift under its gift acceptance authority to support cosponsored activities. SBA also may use appropriated funds to support a cosponsored activity. However SBA must purchase the product or service directly (following the appropriate procurement process) and provide that product or service to the cosponsored activity as an in-kind contribution. Additionally, SBA’s procedures note that funds to support a cosponsored activity may be used for nearly any expense so long as that type of expense is approved as part of the proposed cosponsorship budget, is a direct cost of the activity, and is necessary and integral to the activity.\nSBA district office officials and staff we spoke to said that they consider various factors when making a decision to provide assistance to small businesses under a cosponsorship agreement, including whether a potential cosponsor has expertise in a particular area such as lending or exporting, has resources necessary to conduct an event such as space, or could provide funding to cover these and other event costs.", "SBA and cosponsors share responsibilities for planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities. SBA’s procedures on outreach activities generally describe the roles and responsibilities of the various offices within SBA. In addition, cosponsorship agreements between SBA and cosponsors describe each party’s specific responsibilities; the division of responsibilities and the extent to which SBA and cosponsors share responsibilities differed in the agreements we reviewed. Figure 1 illustrates the key responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors before, during, and after cosponsored activities.\nBefore a cosponsored activity takes place, SBA and cosponsors have several key responsibilities, as the following examples illustrate.\nDetermining type and subject of activity. SBA field and program offices are responsible for originating cosponsored activities. As previously stated, our analysis of the information SBA maintains on cosponsorship agreements showed that the agency executed 132 cosponsorship agreements in fiscal year 2012. In addition, our review of the official file for these agreements and other related materials showed that more than 80 percent of them included training activities, about 20 percent included recognition activities, and about 17 percent included matchmaking activities. Further, the subject matter of the activities conducted under these agreements varied and included business planning and marketing, social media, e-commerce, technology, franchising, employment practices and employee benefits, tax planning and other legal issues, and government contracting.\nMaking conflict-of-interest determinations. SBA field or program offices that originate cosponsored activities are responsible for vetting nonprofit and governmental entities; SBA’s Office of Strategic Alliances is responsible for vetting for-profit entities and upon request may assist originating offices in vetting nonprofit and government entities. Vetting is the process of gathering information to determine whether potential cosponsors have an actual or apparent conflict of interest with SBA that would preclude them from cosponsoring an activity. The information gathered during the vetting process is submitted to SBA’s General Counsel or designee to determine whether any conflicts of interest exist. The SBA Form 1615 documents the conflict-of-interest determination.\nPreparing cosponsorship agreement, agenda and budget. Initially, SBA will prepare a draft cosponsorship agreement and, with the assistance of potential cosponsors as necessary, drafts an agenda and budget. Cosponsorship agreements, among other things, describe the purpose of the activity or event, provide the dates and locations of the event and estimated number of attendees, and include, as applicable, a draft agenda and budget for the activity or event. After SBA’s General Counsel or their designee determines that no conflicts of interest exist with potential cosponsors and reviews the draft cosponsorship agreement for legal sufficiency, SBA field and program offices— with assistance from cosponsors—will work to finalize the agreement and develop a proposed budget for the activity that lists the sources of income, such as cash and in-kind contributions from cosponsors, in-kind contributions from SBA, and fees paid by participants, and the estimated cost of conducting the cosponsored activity. Some SBA district office officials told us that, beyond available human resources and the district office’s own space, they do not have an abundance of discretionary funds to spend on cosponsored activities and they leverage the resources of cosponsors because of this. SBA is responsible for designating a cosponsor as fiscal agent when the cosponsored activity expects to receive cash contributions from cosponsors or fees from participants. The fiscal agent is responsible for collecting, managing, and disbursing cosponsorship funds and establishing a separate mechanism to account for all cosponsorship funds that prevents commingling of cosponsorship funds with the fiscal agent’s own funds.\nOur review of the proposed budgets for all fiscal year 2012 cosponsorship agreements showed that SBA funded direct costs in less than half of the agreements, and when it did it generally funded costs for course materials and instructors, printing, postage, marketing activities, and awards. Table 1 provides information on the budgets for cosponsorship agreements SBA executed in fiscal year 2012. The largest direct cost SBA funded in fiscal year 2012 was $810,475 for the course materials and instructors for the Emerging Leaders Initiative, a 7-month training program provided to small business executives in more than 20 cities (under separate cosponsorship agreements) across the country.", "SBA does not systematically collect feedback on the benefits that cosponsored activities provide to small businesses. However, participants in all eight focus groups that GAO held described various benefits they received from attending specific cosponsored activities. In addition, according to SBA officials, cosponsored activities enable the agency to combine public and private resources and provide assistance to small businesses at little or no cost. SBA officials and cosponsors also said that cosponsored activities provided participants with convenient access to services and resources from multiple organizations in a single location and often included counseling and training. Some SBA district office staff we met with told us that they collected feedback from participants at cosponsored activities—for instance, through a survey, evaluation, or informal follow-up—and as previously noted some fiscal year 2012 cosponsorship agreements we reviewed included specific responsibilities for SBA or cosponsors to collect participant feedback. However, SBA officials told us that the agency did not have a formal policy that required the collection of such information.", "Our focus groups participants identified benefits they received from attending cosponsored activities and also noted that they obtained information on topics useful to their small business (see fig. 2). For example, participants from all eight focus groups commented positively on the quality of the presentations and nearly all of the focus group participants said that the opportunity to network was beneficial. In addition, the focus group participants most often cited topics that provided information on how to develop and implement a business expansion plan (growth management) and information about the federal contracting process as being useful to their business. Further, the benefits reported were directly related to the type of cosponsored activity. For example, those attending the Emerging Leaders Initiative, which emphasized business management skills, reported obtaining information on topics such as financial management, strategic planning, and marketing as being useful. Likewise, those attending cosponsored activities focused on federal contracting, such as the Doing Business with Federal Procuring Agencies and the Small Business Talk series, reported obtaining information on understanding the federal contracting process as being useful.\nFocus group participants also described their reasons for attending certain cosponsored activities (see fig. 3). For example, focus group participants told us that networking and partnering opportunities and improved federal contracting opportunities were among the primary reasons why they attended the cosponsored activity. In addition, the participants noted in 6 of 8 focus groups that growth management, business administration, and the federal contracting process were topics of interest that led them to attend the cosponsored activity.\nWe also noted that the number of focus groups citing certain benefits received from attending the cosponsored activity was higher than the number of groups citing this benefit as a primary reason for attending the cosponsored activity. For example, participants in all eight focus groups cited the quality of the curriculum as a benefit received from attending the cosponsored activity (see fig. 2); participants in four focus groups had mentioned obtaining access to the training curriculum as a reason for attending (see fig. 3). Similarly, participants in seven of eight focus groups cited networking or relationship building as a benefit received from attending the cosponsored activity, while participants in five focus groups said that the possibility of identifying such opportunities had helped motivate them to attend.\nSBA officials told us that having cosponsorship authority allowed the agency to benefit small businesses by combining public and private resources to offer activities and that the events offered benefits that SBA or the cosponsors alone could not provide. Both SBA officials and cosponsors told us that the activities provided attendees with “one-stop shopping,” including access to services and resources from multiple organizations, counseling, and referrals. SBA officials added that when multiple entities acted as cosponsors, small businesses gained a better understanding of the services each entity offered and the way the entities worked together to service small businesses. For example, a district office official said that one Emerging Leaders Initiative cosponsor specialized in business development and another in financing, allowing participants to learn about both opportunities for expanding their businesses. Further, many cosponsored events are offered for free, which an SBA official noted was an important benefit to small businesses that might not be able to spare money for attendance fees. Cosponsors generally shared SBA’s views, with one cosponsor citing one-stop shopping as a benefit.", "Although the act specifies that SBA cosponsored activities provide benefits to small businesses, it does not specify how SBA should identify and measure benefits. Some SBA district office staff we met with told us that they sought to obtain feedback from attendees at cosponsored activities through various means, including surveys, evaluations, and informal follow-up with participants and cosponsors. However, SBA officials told us that the agency did not have a formal policy requiring the collection and use of participant feedback on cosponsored activities. An SBA official told us that the agency had at one time obtained feedback from participants using an Office of Management and Budget approved survey instrument, but added that SBA did not seek to renew the survey instrument once it had expired. As previously noted, some fiscal year 2012 cosponsorship agreements we reviewed included specific responsibilities for SBA or cosponsors to obtain feedback from participants. SBA officials told us that obtaining participant feedback was not a responsibility that cosponsorship agreements were required to include. Although not required by the cosponsorship agreements, obtaining periodic participant feedback is an integral part of the Emerging Leaders Initiative course. The contractor that provides the curriculum and instructors for the course summarize the participant feedback and provide it to SBA. Further, SBA has reported that the Initiative has shown significant employment growth among participating companies and access to new financing since participants graduated from the program.\nCosponsors we met with noted the importance of obtaining participant feedback. For example, three cosponsors told us that having a mechanism to follow up after an activity would help assess its impact— that is, how the activity ultimately benefited participants. Further, small businesses attending focus groups that we held provided us with feedback on ways in which the cosponsored activity could have been improved. As figure 4 shows, participants in seven of the eight focus groups we held commented that they wanted additional follow-up after attending a cosponsored activity. In addition, participants in five of the eight focus groups commented that more time was need for the activity.\nStandards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that federal agencies should have appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms for each of their activities, including those to ensure compliance with key requirements. Obtaining feedback on cosponsored events could provide SBA with direct information from small business participants that could be used to help ensure that the events benefited small businesses. In addition, we found that participants had suggestions for improving the events that could help SBA in designing future activities. Further, evaluating participant feedback could help SBA evaluate its use of cosponsorship authority—that is, whether SBA is most effectively implementing the statutory authority to conduct cosponsored events for the benefit of small businesses.", "Cosponsored activities can allow the agency to leverage public and private resources to benefit small businesses—generally in the form of training, education, or dissemination of information. Various offices within SBA and cosponsors have a shared responsibility for planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities as required under SBA policies and procedures and defined in cosponsorship agreements. Some cosponsorship agreements we reviewed included an additional responsibility for SBA or cosponsors to obtain the views of participants at cosponsored events, but SBA does not have formal policies or procedures for obtaining participant feedback. Federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should have, among other things, appropriate policies and mechanisms for each of their activities, including those to ensure compliance with key requirements. Obtaining feedback on cosponsored events would provide SBA with direct information from small business participants that could be used to help ensure that events are providing benefits to small businesses. Such information could also provide another way for SBA to evaluate the use of its cosponsorship authority.", "To ensure that SBA most effectively implements the statutory authority to conduct cosponsored events for the benefit of small businesses and to enhance SBA’s ability to evaluate the use of its cosponsorship authority, the Administrator of the SBA should develop a mechanism to consistently obtain participant feedback on cosponsored activities.", "We requested comments from SBA on a draft of this report, and the agency provided written comments that are presented in appendix V. SBA generally agreed with our recommendation to develop a mechanism to consistently obtain participant feedback on cosponsored activities. SBA stated that it will evaluate the best means to obtain consistent feedback from participants during cosponsored activities in a manner that is not overly burdensome to the participant. In addition, SBA stated that it thinks there are many ways to obtain feedback on events and activities and it will look to provide a range of options for SBA program and district offices to employ. SBA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe will send copies of this report to SBA and interested congressional committees. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.", "The objectives of this report are to (1) describe the roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors in planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities; and (2) examine the benefits cosponsored activities provide to small businesses.\nTo describe the roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors in planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities, we reviewed Section 4(h) of the Small Business Act, implementing regulations, and SBA’s standard operating procedures and guidance related to the use of cosponsorship authority. In addition, we identified the specific roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors for a nonprobability sample of 27 cosponsorship agreements SBA executed in fiscal year 2012. The results of our analyses of the specific roles and responsibilities described in these agreements cannot be generalized to all cosponsorship agreements SBA executed in fiscal year 2012, but the agreements represent a variety of eligible entities, eligible activities, expected number of businesses assisted, direct costs, and locations and dates.\nWe interviewed officials and staff from SBA’s Office of Strategic Alliances and Office of General Counsel, and officials from six district offices and staff from five of those district offices to gain an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors related to planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities. We selected four of the district offices based primarily on the frequency with which the office conducted cosponsored activities in fiscal years 2010 to 2012 and interviewed officials and staff from the remaining two district offices that originated the cosponsored activities we selected for our focus groups. The district offices were located in California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, North Dakota, and New York. We also interviewed representatives from 10 entities that cosponsored an activity with SBA during calendar years 2012 or 2013 to understand their roles and responsibilities for the activities they cosponsored and how and why they cosponsored them. Seven of these entities had cosponsored the activities selected for our focus groups and the other three entities had cosponsored National Small Business Week activities in 2012 and 2013. Further, we attended two cosponsored events and observed how information was delivered to and received by participants. We also reviewed SBA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) report on its audit of SBA’s controls over cosponsored activities, which assessed the adequacy of those controls, and discussed the audit with the OIG. In addition, we requested the official file for the more than 132 cosponsorship agreements SBA executed in fiscal year 2012 as listed in a spreadsheet the agency maintains on the status of these agreements. Two analysts reviewed the cosponsorship documentation contained in the files and other materials, including cosponsorship agreements, draft and final agendas, marketing materials and final cosponsorship reports (SBA form 2299). As a part of this review, the analysts independently coded the documentation to identify the type of activity and subject matter. The analysts also recorded the type of budgeted direct costs, whether each agreement included a responsibility for SBA or the cosponsor to obtain participant feedback, and compared the budgeted amount to that listed in the spreadsheet data SBA maintains. Any disagreement between the analysts on the coding of the cosponsorship documentation was resolved through discussion. We assessed the reliability of the spreadsheet data SBA maintains on the status of cosponsorship agreements by reviewing it for obvious errors and comparing the data for selected agreements to SBA’s official files. We clarified any discrepancies with SBA and corrected the data accordingly. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the number of executed cosponsorship agreements and the associated date of execution and budgeted direct cost for these agreements.\nTo examine the benefits cosponsored activities provide to small businesses, we conducted eight focus groups in three cities (Atlanta, GA; Detroit, MI; and Kalamazoo, MI) with 48 entrepreneurs that had attended one of three SBA cosponsored activities conducted in 2012 and 2013— the Emerging Leaders Initiative, Doing Business with Federal Procuring Agencies series, and Small Business Talk Series. We considered a number of factors in selecting the three activities. For example, we selected the Emerging Leaders Initiative because of the large amount of direct costs SBA funded for the initiative. We selected the Doing Business with Federal Procuring Agencies and Small Business Talk series because the activities (1) took place in the same or nearby location where an Emerging Leaders Initiative was taking place (2) included a significant training component, (3) had a sizable number of expected attendees from which to solicit 8 to12 people for a focus group, (4) had lists of preregistered participants or attendee lists with contact information, and (5) occurred within 12 months preceding the focus groups. We also considered geographic diversity for the three activities we selected to conduct focus groups. We sought to ensure that the activities we selected to conduct focus groups took place in different regions of the country with differing economic profiles. We determined that these activities would provide us with sufficient information from participants on the benefits participants received or expected to receive in the future from having attended different types of cosponsored activities in different parts of the country.\nThe entrepreneurs who participated in our focus groups included mostly small business owners, but also individuals who were interested in starting up their own small business and those who worked for a small business. We limited our focus group participation to entrepreneurs with recent experience attending a cosponsored activity to minimize recall bias and to ensure that the most accurate account of participants’ experiences could be obtained. To recruit volunteers to our focus groups, we obtained from SBA a list of persons who attended the three activities in locations we selected. We contacted each person by email, soliciting them to participate in our focus groups and took the first volunteers for up to 12 persons per focus group. Our focus groups ranged in size from 3 to 11. Attendees at our focus groups included women-owned and veteran- owned small businesses in a variety of industries including construction, janitorial services, and health care (see app. IV, figs. 5 through 8, for additional information about participant characteristics and focus group responses on various themes).\nThe focus groups were structured small group discussions designed to generate information on the participants’ experiences with SBA cosponsored training, education, and counseling events. Methodologically, information gathered from focus groups cannot be used to make generalizations about a population or to demonstrate the extent of an issue. Thus, while the information we gathered is not generalizable to all participants in SBA cosponsored activities, it provides valuable context regarding their perceptions of the benefits and challenges they experienced when attending these events and this information is more in- depth than is possible using numerous individual interviews. Small business owners and other participants who did not attend our focus groups may have had different experiences.\nA GAO facilitator guided the focus group participants using a structured set of questions. In addition to the GAO facilitator, another team member recorded notes of the proceedings. At the start of each discussion session, ground rules were established encouraging participants to limit their comments to their own personal experiences with the SBA cosponsored event attended unless explicitly asked to respond more broadly. The facilitator encouraged all participants to share their views and react to the views of others. Using a GAO-developed discussion guide, the facilitator asked the participants to give their perspectives on (1) their decision to attend the SBA cosponsored event, (2) the perceived benefits, (3) the challenges associated with their experience or suggestions for improvements, (4) expectations about future uses of what they learned, and (5) events they attended within 12 months preceding the focus groups. We conducted the analysis of the focus group results in three steps. First, two analysts developed a codebook to identify common themes in the focus group notes and worked together to ensure agreement. Second, two GAO analysts independently coded the transcripts and then resolved any coding discrepancies. Third, the coders noted how often a theme was expressed across each focus group and focused on those that were mentioned frequently across the majority of focus groups. The focus group results discussed in this report reflect the range of views and perceptions expressed in a larger number of the focus groups.\nWe also interviewed key officials at SBA headquarters in Washington, D.C., including representatives from the agency’s Office of Strategic Alliances and Office of General Counsel and six SBA district offices and staff from five of those district offices to obtain testimonial information about district office involvement and experiences with their use of SBA’s cosponsorship authority, including how they evaluate the results of the events. Finally, we interviewed representatives from 10 entities that cosponsored an activity with SBA during calendar years 2012 or 2013 to obtain their perspectives on benefits to small business arising from cosponsored events. We analyzed the information obtained from the interviews to determine what perceived benefits small businesses received from attending or were expected to gain from the cosponsored events, what would have improved the cosponsored event experience, whether cosponsors sought feedback about a cosponsored event, and whether SBA had any consistent practices for obtaining participant feedback on cosponsored events.\nWe conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "SBA district office officials and staff we spoke to identified the following factors that they consider in deciding whether to utilize cosponsorship authority to conduct outreach activities: 1. Whether a proposed activity would better meet the needs of small businesses, and more of them, if conducted with other entities under a cosponsorship agreement. 2. Whether a potential cosponsor has expertise in a particular area, such as lending or exporting, or has resources necessary to conduct an event, such as space, or could provide funding to cover these and other event costs. 3. How much control SBA wants to have over the various aspects of an event’s planning, content, and delivery, including setting the agenda, identifying speakers, and selecting a suitable location, or whether it would be helpful to share these responsibilities. 4. Whether potential cosponsors could provide SBA with access to groups that it does not have a well-established relationship with or that might not be familiar with SBA or its programs and services. 5. Whether cosponsorship authority provides SBA with an opportunity to develop and strengthen long-term relationships with groups that represent minority small businesses or those in particular geographic areas that could help identify and target those businesses that might benefit most from a particular event. 6. Whether co-branding of a cosponsored activity—displaying SBA and cosponsor logos on all marketing and event material—could attract greater small business attendance, in part because of the appeal of having multiple small business resources at a single event. 7. What the costs would be in terms of time and SBA’s own resources. 8. Whether potential cosponsors would be able to fulfill their responsibilities under an agreement, including handling cosponsorship funds while serving as a fiscal agent.", "The SBA Office of Inspector General issued Advisory Memorandum Report No. 13-21, SBA Enterprise-wide Controls over Cosponsored Activities, dated September 26, 2013, which presented the results of its work on the adequacy of controls over SBA’s cosponsored activities. The table below summarizes the findings and recommendations from that report and the required procedures that the Office of Inspector General found SBA had not complied with.\nSBA agreed with some but not all of the OIG’s findings and recommendations. SBA stated that the OIG’s findings about the failings of SBA’s cosponsorship program as a whole are too broadly stated, considering that the five agreements the OIG tested represent less than 1 percent of all the cosponsored activities that took place during the fiscal years covered by their audit. SBA also responded to each specific recommendation. For example, SBA agreed that vetting is important, but disagreed with the recommendation because it believed that the OIG’s audit did not demonstrate a deficiency with the vetting process, adding that only one cosponsorship file did not contain the requisite vetting information. Also, SBA agreed with the intent of the OIG’s recommendation to modify the cosponsorship agreement template to include the specific roles and responsibilities of fiscal agents but did not agree with the recommendation itself, as SBA believes that providing staff with supplemental guidance and more instruction would be a better approach.", "As discussed in this report, we conducted eight focus groups with 48 participants and obtained a variety of information about their experience at certain cosponsored events. This appendix provides additional information on the results of the focus groups including selected characteristics of the participants, as shown in the following figures.\nFigure 5 presents information on how the focus group participants thought they might use the information and skills learned at the cosponsored activity attended to improve their business management activities and approaches.\nAs part of the focus group discussions, we asked participants whether they owned a small business or what role they held in the small business activity represented. Figure 6 describes the self-reported responses.\nThis report notes that SBA helps entrepreneurs start, build, and grow businesses by, among other things, providing counseling and training as well as actions to increase federal contracting and subcontracting opportunities. As part of discussions, we asked the participants to describe the ownership of the business they represented, including ownership types that SBA has targeted for assistance. The responses received are noted in figure 7.\nFinally, the participants in the focus group discussions provided information on the industry in which their businesses or planned businesses operated (see fig. 8).", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Marshall Hamlett (Assistant Director), Emily Chalmers, Pamela Davidson, Alexandra Martin- Arseneau, John McGrail, Scott E. McNulty, and Jena Sinkfield made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "", "h0_full", "h3_title h1_full", "h1_full", "h3_full h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "", "", "h0_full h3_full h2_full", "", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What are SBA's responsibilities?", "What actions does SBA take before cosponsored activities occur?", "How are cosponsors reviewed?", "What action must the SBA take after cosponsored activities occur?", "What did the GAO review of SBA demonstrate?", "How does the SBA handle feedback?", "How did stakeholders comment on cosponsored activities?", "What official guidance does SBA receive regarding assessment and measurement?", "What are ways that SBA measures feedback?", "What did GAO find regarding participant feedback?", "How are federal agencies' activities regulated?", "How could better feedback practices serve SBA?", "What is section 4(h) of the SBA?", "What are the benefits of cosponsored activities?", "Why did GAO review SBA?", "What does this report cover?", "What did GAO review for their report?", "How did GAO collect interview data?" ], "summary": [ "The Small Business Administration (SBA) and cosponsors share responsibilities for planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities.", "Before cosponsored activities take place, SBA field and program offices decide on the type and subject of the activity, solicit potential cosponsors, draft an agreement, agenda and budget, and designate a cosponsor as fiscal agent to collect, manage, and disburse any funds received. SBA and cosponsors are both responsible for conducting the activity in accordance with the agreement.", "SBA's General Counsel or designee is responsible for reviewing draft cosponsorship agreements for legal sufficiency and determining whether any conflicts of interest exist with potential cosponsors.", "Following cosponsored activities, SBA field and program offices must submit a final cosponsorship report to SBA's Office of Strategic Alliances, which is responsible for maintaining the official files on these activities.", "GAO's analysis of the official files for 132 cosponsored agreements SBA executed in fiscal year 2012 and other related materials showed that the activities were intended to provide training on a variety of topics, such as business planning and marketing, social media, and government contracting.", "SBA does not consistently collect feedback related to the benefits that cosponsored activities provide to small businesses.", "Participants in focus groups that GAO held commented positively on the quality of the presentations and opportunities to network, among other things, offered by cosponsored activities. Participants also noted that they obtained information on topics useful to their small businesses, including financial management and the federal contracting process. SBA officials and representatives of cosponsors told GAO that the events provided attendees with access to services and resources from multiple organizations in a single venue and often included counseling and referrals to other resources.", "Although the Small Business Act specifies that SBA cosponsored activities provide benefits to small businesses, it does not specify how SBA should identify and measure benefits.", "Some SBA district office staff told GAO that they solicited participant feedback on cosponsored events through a survey, evaluation, or questionnaire. GAO also found that obtaining periodic participant feedback is an integral part of a 7-month training initiative, called the Emerging Leaders Initiative, conducted using cosponsorship authority. However, SBA officials told us that obtaining formal feedback was not required and that the agency did not have a policy on soliciting and using it.", "Cosponsors GAO met with noted the importance of obtaining participant feedback and entrepreneurs GAO spoke to also identified ways in which the cosponsored activities could have been improved.", "Federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should have appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms for each of their activities, including those to ensure compliance with key requirements.", "Federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should have appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms for each of their activities, including those to ensure compliance with key requirements. Obtaining feedback on cosponsored events would provide SBA with direct information from small business participants that could be used to help ensure that events are providing benefits to small businesses. Such information could also provide another way for SBA to evaluate the use of its cosponsorship authority.", "Section 4(h) of the Small Business Act authorizes SBA to provide assistance for the benefit of small businesses through activities the agency cosponsors with eligible for-profit and nonprofit entities, as well as federal, state, and local government entities.", "Cosponsored activities can provide information on SBA programs and services or on subjects of interest to small businesses, bring together government and private sector resources and small business owners (generally for government contracting or financing initiatives), or celebrate the contributions of small business owners.", "GAO was asked to study SBA's use of its cosponsorship authority.", "This report (1) describes the roles and responsibilities of SBA and cosponsors in planning, funding, and conducting cosponsored activities, and (2) examines the benefits cosponsored activities provide to small businesses.", "GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and SBA procedures, guidance, and official cosponsorship files.", "GAO conducted eight focus groups with a total of 48 small business entrepreneurs in three cities to obtain feedback on their experiences with cosponsored activities. GAO also interviewed cosponsors and SBA officials." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 2, -1, -1, 5, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-18-612	{ "title": [ "Background", "Status of ESF Assistance to the West Bank and Gaza for Fiscal Years 2015 and 2016, Including Project Assistance and Payments to PA Creditors", "USAID Vetted PA Creditors and Conducted External Assessments and Financial Audits of PA Ministries", "USAID Vetted PA Creditors as Required by Its Policies and Procedures for Direct Payments to Creditors", "USAID Determined Certain Legal Requirements Were Not Applicable to Payments to PA Creditors", "USAID Commissioned External Assessments and Financial Audits of PA Creditors before Executing Payments", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "Since 1993, USAID has obligated more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, primarily using funds appropriated through the ESF. According to State officials, through the ESF, USAID provides project assistance and debt relief payments to PA creditors. USAID, with overall foreign policy guidance from State, implements most ESF programs, including programs related to private sector development, health, water and road infrastructure, local governance, civil society, rule of law, education, and youth development. According to USAID officials, this assistance to the West Bank and Gaza contributes to building a more democratic, stable, prosperous, and secure Palestinian society—a goal that USAID described as being in the interest of the Palestinians, the United States, and Israel. Figure 1 shows the location of the West Bank and Gaza relative to surrounding countries.\nUSAID assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is conducted under antiterrorism policies and procedures outlined in an administrative policy document known as Mission Order 21. The stated purpose of the mission order, as amended, is to describe policies and procedures to ensure that the mission’s program assistance does not inadvertently provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism.\nWe have previously reported on the status of ESF assistance to the Palestinians and USAID’s antiterrorism policies and procedures in the West Bank and Gaza.", "As of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $544.1 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $350.6 million (over 64 percent) of approximately $544.5 million in ESF assistance allocated for the West Bank and Gaza in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 (see table 1). USAID obligated portions of the allocated funds for direct payments to PA creditors—specifically, payments to two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and to a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network.\nProject assistance obligated for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 accounted for about $215 million (74 percent) and $184 million (72 percent), respectively, of USAID’s obligations of ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for those fiscal years (see fig. 1). Payments to the PA’s creditors accounted for the remaining obligations—about $75 million (26 percent) of fiscal year 2015 obligations and about $70 million (28 percent) of fiscal year 2016 obligations.\nAccording to USAID documents, ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 was obligated for three USAID development objectives: Economic Growth and Infrastructure (about $239 million), Investing in the Next Generation (about $107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million). Program support—which sustains all development objectives, according to USAID—accounted for about $29 million (see table 2).\nEconomic Growth and Infrastructure. The largest share—about 60 percent—of USAID’s ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported the agency’s Economic Growth and Infrastructure development objective. According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, the agency had obligated about $239 million and expended approximately $89 million (about 37 percent) for projects under this objective. USAID officials stated that the agency funded these projects under the following standard State-budgeted program areas: health (including water), infrastructure, private sector competiveness, and stabilization operations and security sector reform. The largest project—the Architecture and Engineering Services project—received about $20 million of fiscal year 2015 ESF assistance and $17 million of fiscal year 2016 ESF assistance. The purpose of the project was to rehabilitate and construct infrastructure through the procurement of infrastructure services, including engineering design and construction management, among other things. The contractor was required to coordinate with relevant PA and Israeli entities, as well as with USAID, to assist in the selection of PA water and wastewater projects and in the planning and design of water projects such as small- to large-scale water distribution systems, water treatment systems, and institutional capacity building.\nInvesting in the Next Generation. The second-largest share—about 27 percent—of USAID’s fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza supported the agency’s Investing in the Next Generation development objective. According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, the agency had obligated about $107 million and expended approximately $79 million (about 74 percent) for projects under this objective. Program areas funded included education, health, social and economic services and protection of vulnerable populations. The largest project funded under this objective—a grant to the World Food Program for assistance to vulnerable groups—received $12 million in fiscal year 2015 and $15 million in fiscal year 2016 ESF assistance. The project focused on ensuring food security, including meeting food needs, of the nonrefugee population; increasing food availability and dietary diversity for the most vulnerable and food-insecure nonrefugee population; and establishing linkages with the Palestinian private sector (shopkeepers, farms, and factories) to produce and deliver the aid being provided to Palestinians. For example, the project directly distributed a standard food ration through both direct food distribution and electronic food vouchers to vulnerable nonrefugee families.\nGovernance and Civic Engagement. The smallest share—about 6 percent—of USAID’s fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza supported the agency’s Governance and Civic Engagement development objective. According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $24.6 million and expended approximately $14.5 million (about 60 percent) for projects in program areas that included civil society, good governance, and rule of law. The largest project funded under this objective—a contract for the Communities Thrive Project— received about $5.2 million and $8 million in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, respectively. The project aimed to help 55 West Bank municipalities improve fiscal management, fiscal accountability and transparency, and delivery and management of municipal services, among other things.\nUnder debt relief grant agreements with the PA, USAID made direct payments of ESF assistance to PA creditors totaling about $75 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $70 million from fiscal year 2016 funds. USAID paid about $40 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $45 million from fiscal year 2016 funds to two oil companies to cover debts for petroleum purchases. In addition, USAID paid about $35 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $25 million from fiscal year 2016 funds to the Bank of Palestine, to pay off a PA line of credit that was used to cover PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network.", "Before using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance to pay PA creditors, USAID vetted the creditors to ensure that the assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism, as required by its policies and procedures. USAID determined that certain legal requirements, including the requirement for an assessment of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning, were not applicable for direct payments of these funds to PA creditors. Nevertheless, USAID continued to commission external assessments and financial audits of the PA Ministries of Health and Finance and Planning.", "USAID documentation for payments to creditors shows that before signing debt relief agreements with the PA, mission officials checked, as required by Mission Order 21, the vetting status of PA creditors who would receive direct payments under the agreements, to ensure their eligibility before any payment was made. USAID Mission Order 21 requires that before payments to PA creditors are executed, the creditors must be vetted—that is, the creditors’ key individuals and other identifying information must be checked against the federal Terrorist Screening Center database and other information sources to determine whether they have links to terrorism. According to USAID policies and procedures, each PA creditor must be vetted if more than 12 months have passed since the last time the creditor was vetted and approved to receive ESF payments. We found that for payments made to PA creditors using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, USAID vetted each PA creditor that received payments and completed the vetting during the 12- month period before the debt relief agreements with the PA were signed (see table 3).", "USAID determined that certain legal requirements applicable to cash transfers to the PA were not applicable to direct payments to PA creditors of fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance. In September 2015, we reported that USAID ceased making cash payments directly to the PA in 2014 and began making payments of ESF assistance directly to PA creditors. In reviewing USAID’s compliance with key legal requirements, we found that USAID had complied with the requirements when making cash transfers to the PA in fiscal year 2013. However, USAID had determined that some requirements were not applicable to direct payments made to PA creditors in fiscal year 2014, because no funds were being provided directly to the PA.\nAfter fiscal year 2015, USAID further defined the scope of statutory requirements it deemed applicable to payments to PA creditors using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, under the rationale that these payments do not constitute direct payments to the PA. Specifically, according to USAID, the agency determined that the following statutory requirements discussed in our prior report were not applicable to direct payments to PA creditors.\nA requirement to notify the Committees on Appropriations 15 days before obligating funds for a cash transfer to the PA\nA requirement for the PA to maintain cash transfer funds in a separate account\nA requirement for the President to waive the prohibition on providing funds to the PA and to submit an accompanying report to the Committees on Appropriations\nA requirement for the Secretary of State to provide a certification and accompanying report to the Committees on Appropriations when the President waives the prohibition on providing funds to the PA\nRequirements for direct government-to-government assistance, including an assessment of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning According to USAID officials, they currently do not plan to resume cash payments to the PA, because making direct payments to creditors minimizes the misuse of funds and assures full transparency and appropriateness of transfers.", "Although USAID concluded that the statutory requirement mandating assessments of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning did not apply to direct payments to PA creditors, the West Bank and Gaza mission commissioned external assessments of the PA Ministry of Health’s medical referral services and Ministry of Finance and Planning’s petroleum procurement system. According to a USAID document, while the payments to the creditors did not constitute direct budget support to the PA, the agency chose to commission external assessments to determine whether the PA’s financial systems were sufficient to ensure adequate accountability for USAID funds consistent with legislative requirements for direct budget support funds. These external assessments identified weaknesses in both systems.\nMinistry of Health medical referrals. The assessment report stated that the ministry did not have approved policies and procedures for the medical referral process, a list of medical services covered by the referral system, and written criteria for selecting referral hospitals in the medical referral systems. In response, in a January 2016 internal memorandum, the West Bank and Gaza mission officials concluded, among other things, that the findings did not pose a significant risk to USAID funds. They also stated that the Ministry of Health’s medical referral system had adequate policies and procedures for referrals to local hospitals. However, after the assessment report was issued, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals.\nMinistry of Finance and Planning petroleum procurements. The assessment report stated that the ministry lacked specific policies and procedures to prevent or detect fraud in the petroleum procurement systems. In the West Bank and Gaza mission’s January 2016 memorandum, USAID mission officials disagreed with the assessment’s findings regarding the petroleum procurement system, stating that the assessment did not take into account sufficient and adequate internal controls at the ministry as a first line of defense against fraud. The memorandum also stated that the finding did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors.\nUSAID officials told us that, while they did not believe the external assessments’ findings affected the integrity of USAID’s debt relief payment process, they took four additional steps to mitigate findings noted in the assessment of the Ministry of Finance and Planning’s fuel procurement processes. According to USAID officials, they (1) confirmed that the fuel companies had controls and systems to ensure an objective and transparent system in receiving and recording PA orders, (2) dispatched orders with official and properly signed shipping delivery and receipt documents, (3) obtained written confirmation from the fuel companies of the costs of the fuel provided to the PA, and (4) confirmed the PA’s petroleum debt with the fuel companies before initiating the payments and after making the payments.\nIn addition, in 2016, USAID commissioned two routine financial audits of the debt relief grant agreed to by USAID and the PA for the use of fiscal year 2015 ESF assistance to make direct payments to PA creditors. According to USAID officials, the auditors were to examine the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning’s recording of USAID payments to PA creditors in its financial records as well as the ministry’s and USAID’s compliance with the terms of the grant agreement and related implementation letters. The audits did not identify any questioned or ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the debt relief grant. Also, in 2017, USAID contracted for a financial audit of the fiscal year 2016 debt relief grant agreed to by USAID and the PA. According to a USAID document, in May 2018, USAID held an entrance conference with the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning for the audit of the fiscal year 2016 grant. In July 2018, USAID sent the final audit report to the Regional Inspector General for review. According to the USAID document, the report did not identify any questioned or ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal controls, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the grant.", "We provided a draft of this report to USAID and State for review and comment. USAID provided comments, which we have reproduced in appendix II, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. State did not provide comments.\nWe are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix III.", "Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries’ capacity to use ESF assistance as intended.\nTo address our first objective, we reviewed appropriations legislation, related budget justification documents, and financial data for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including expenditures as of March 31, 2018, provided by USAID’s West Bank and Gaza mission in Tel Aviv, Israel. We reviewed data that USAID provided on obligations and expenditures of all ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza as of March 31, 2018, from annual allocations for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. We also reviewed relevant USAID documents, including notifications to Congress regarding the use of appropriated funds. In addition, we interviewed USAID and State officials in Washington, D.C., and Tel Aviv.\nTo determine whether the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, we requested and reviewed information from USAID officials about their procedures for entering contract and financial information into USAID’s data system. We determined that the USAID data were sufficiently reliable. For the project information included in this report, we relied on data that USAID provided, showing its obligations and expenditures of fiscal year 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance for West Bank and Gaza. For illustrative purposes, we requested and obtained from USAID descriptions of projects that, according to USAID officials, represented the largest financial obligations for each development objective in fiscal years 2015 and 2016.\nTo address our second objective, we identified and reviewed relevant legal requirements as well as USAID policies and procedures to comply with those requirements. USAID Mission Order 21 is the primary document that details USAID procedures to ensure that the mission’s assistance program does not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism, consistent with the prohibition on such support found in relevant laws and executive orders. In addition, we reviewed 27 USAID determinations of compliance for payments to PA creditors and discussed with USAID mission officials their efforts to comply with the policies and procedures in Mission Order 21 before executing payments to hospitals, companies, and banks that facilitated the payments. We also reviewed the timing of USAID’s vetting of each PA creditor that received payments, to ensure that, as required by Mission Order 21, the vetting occurred within 12 months before USAID signed the relevant debt relief grant agreement with the PA. Further, we reviewed external assessments of the PA Ministries of Health and Finance and Planning and financial audits of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning, and we discussed the assessments’ and audits with USAID officials responsible for payments to PA creditors.\nWe conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to August 2018, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Judith McCloskey (Assistant Director), Tom Zingale (Analyst-in-Charge), Eddie Uyekawa, Jeff Isaacs, and Nicole Willems made significant contributions to this report. David Dornisch, Neil Doherty, Reid Lowe, and Roger Stoltz also contributed to the report." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h1_full", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h2_full", "h2_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "Why were PA creditors vetted?", "How USAID confirm compliance with requirements?", "What did the audits reveal?", "What characterized the USAID assessment of French medical and infrastructural systems?", "What did these assessments discover?", "What assistance has the US provided to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza?", "What interests does this assistance serve?", "How is USAID involved in the region?", "Why did GAO review ESF?", "What does this report cover?", "What data did the GAO collect?" ], "summary": [ "USAID vetted PA creditors to ensure that the program assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism and also conducted external assessments and financial audits of PA ministries of Health and Finance and Planning. In addition, USAID commissioned financial audits of the debt relief grant agreements between USAID and the PA for direct payments to PA creditors in fiscal year 2015 and 2016.", "USAID documentation showed that, as required, officials checked the vetting status of each PA creditor within 12 months before USAID signed its debt relief grant agreements with the PA.", "The audits did not identify any ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreements.", "In addition, although USAID determined that it was not legally required to assess the PA Ministry of Health's medical referral services and the Ministry of Finance and Planning's petroleum procurement system, the agency commissioned external assessments of both ministries.", "These assessments found some weaknesses in both ministries' systems; however, USAID mission officials stated that these weaknesses did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors. Nevertheless, USAID took additional steps to mitigate the identified weaknesses. For example, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals.", "Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.", "According to the Department of State, this assistance to the Palestinians promotes U.S. economic and political foreign policy interests by supporting Middle East peace negotiations and financing economic stabilization programs.", "USAID is primarily responsible for administering ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza.", "Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza.", "This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including project assistance and payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that this assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries' capacity to use ESF assistance as intended.", "GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and USAID financial data, policies, procedures, and documents. GAO also interviewed USAID and State Department officials." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, 3, -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-14-584	{ "title": [ "Background", "DOD Predominately Used Best Value Processes in Fiscal Year 2013, but Increased Its Use of LPTA for Higher Dollar Contracts since Fiscal Year 2009", "Knowledge of Requirements and Potential Vendors Underpin Decisions about Source Selection Process", "DOD Provides Online and Classroom Training on Source Selection Processes, but On-the-Job Training Considered Essential for Making Sound Source Selection Decisions", "Concluding Observations", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Body Armor Vest Acquisitions in Fiscal Year 2013", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "FAR Part 15 allows the use of several competitive source selection processes to meet agency needs. Within the best value continuum, DOD may choose a process that it considers the most advantageous to the government, either the LPTA or the tradeoff process (see figure 1).\nDOD may elect to use the LPTA process where the requirement is clearly defined and the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal. In such cases, DOD may determine that cost or price should play a dominant role in the source selection. When using the LPTA process, DOD specifies its requirements in the solicitation. Contractors submit their proposals and DOD determines which of the contractors meet or exceed those requirements, no tradeoffs between cost or price and non-cost factors are permitted, and the award is made based on the lowest price technically acceptable proposal submitted to the government.\nBy contrast, DOD may elect to use a tradeoff process in acquisitions where the requirement is less definitive, more development work is required, or the acquisition has a greater performance risk. In these instances, non-cost evaluation factors, such as technical capabilities or past performance, may play a dominant role in the source selection process. Tradeoffs among price and non-cost factors allow DOD to accept other than the lowest priced proposal. The FAR requires DOD to state in the solicitation whether all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, are significantly more important than, approximately equal to, or significantly less important than cost or price.\nIn October 2010, we reported that DOD used best value processes for approximately 95 percent of its new, competitively awarded contracts in which $25 million or more was obligated in fiscal year 2009. DOD awarded approximately 26 percent using the LPTA process and 69 percent using the tradeoff process. DOD awarded the remaining 5 percent using sealed bidding, which is a competitive process where award is made to the responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the invitations for bid and is most advantageous for the government considering only price and price-related factors included in the solicitation. At that time, we found that the majority of the contracts were awarded using a tradeoff process in which all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, were significantly more important than cost or price. Our analysis showed that DOD considered past performance and technical capability evaluation factors as the most important among the non-cost factors. Further, we found using a tradeoff process can be more complex and take more time than other source selection methods, and requires that acquisition staff have proper guidance, needed skills, and sound business judgment. While DOD and the military departments had taken steps to improve source selection procedures, acquisition personnel noted a lack of training to assist them in deciding whether or not a price differential is warranted when making tradeoff decisions. We recommended that to help DOD effectively employ best value tradeoff processes, DOD develop training elements, such as case studies, that focus on reaching tradeoff decisions, as it updates its training curriculum. DOD concurred and implemented the recommendation in August 2012.\nDOD issued new guidance that emphasizes affordability and standardization of best value processes since our analysis of fiscal year 2009 contracts. In September 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) issued a memorandum that established its Better Buying Power Initiative to obtain greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending. In its memorandum, USD(AT&L) emphasized that DOD must prepare to continue supporting the warfighter through the acquisition of products and services in potentially fiscally constrained times. USD(AT&L) noted that DOD must “do more without more.” In April 2013, USD(AT&L) issued another memorandum to update the Better Buying Power Initiative. This memorandum identifies seven areas USD(AT&L) is pursuing to increase efficiency and productivity in defense spending. One area is incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry and government. As part of this guidance, USD(AT&L) states that “best value” in a competitive source selection should generally indicate that the government is open to paying more (up to some amount) than the minimum price bid in return for a product that provides more than the minimum needed performance. In addition, USD(AT&L) states that LPTA should be used in situations where DOD would not realize any value from a proposal exceeding its minimum technical or performance requirements and that another process should be used when standards of performance and quality are subjective. A second area of this guidance includes improving the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. DOD has previously reported that training is a critical element of improving and sustaining a high quality workforce with the right skills and capabilities.\nUSD(AT&L) also issued source selection procedures in March 2011 to standardize the methodology and process that DOD uses to conduct competitively negotiated source selections. For example, USD(AT&L) outlined a common set of principles and procedures for conducting acquisitions using the best value processes including the use of standardized rating criteria and descriptions for technical capability and past performance factors. Further, similar to information presented in the Better Buying Power Initiative, USD(AT&L) stated in the procedures that the LPTA process may be used in situations where the government would not realize any value from a proposal exceeding minimum technical or performance requirements, often for acquisitions of commercial or non-complex services or supplies which are clearly defined and expected to be low risk. In its April 2013 memorandum updating the Better Buying Power Initiative, USD(AT&L) directed the director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy to update the guidance to describe the characteristics of a technically acceptable solution by July 1, 2013. As of July 2014, DOD officials are coordinating comments on a draft revision of the guidance. The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy official in charge of the revision told us the original due date of July 1, 2013 was established before they decided to do a more comprehensive update of the guidance, which has contributed to the date slipping for its completion.\nDuring the time that USD(AT&L) issued these initiatives and guidance— specifically, between fiscal years 2009 and 2013—DOD experienced a number of changes in its contracting activity, including:\nTotal obligations for products and services decreased from $380 billion in fiscal year 2009 to $310 billion in fiscal year 2013,\nObligations on new, competed contracts decreased from $70 billion in fiscal year 2009 to $43 billion in fiscal year 2013, and\nObligations on new, competed contracts of $25 million or more decreased from $39 billion in fiscal year 2009 to $24 billion in fiscal year 2013.\nSee figure 2 for our analysis of DOD’s contract obligations from FPDS-NG for fiscal year 2013.\nEven though DOD’s obligations decreased between fiscal year 2009 and 2013, it did acquire a similar mix of products and services in both years. In addition, the percentage of commercial items purchased in those 2 fiscal years was approximately the same.", "DOD predominately used best value processes—tradeoff and LPTA—to evaluate offers from potential vendors in fiscal year 2013. DOD used best value processes for approximately 93 percent of the 2,851 new, competed contracts for which it had obligated over $1 million in fiscal year 2013 and used sealed bid for approximately 7 percent. For contracts with obligations of $25 million or more, DOD used the tradeoff process for approximately 58 percent of the contracts and the LPTA process for approximately 36 percent of the contracts. For contracts with obligations over $1 million and less than $25 million, DOD used tradeoff and LPTA at about the same overall rate—47 percent and 45 percent, respectively.\nIn our sample of 171 contracts that used best value processes, DOD used tradeoff for 96 contracts and LPTA for 75 contracts. We found some variation in terms of what process was used to acquire products and services at the different thresholds we reviewed (see figure 3).\nAs seen in the above figure, DOD used the tradeoff process most often in our sample to acquire services, including those related to construction projects, aircraft maintenance, and other support services, regardless of obligation amount. For contracts with obligations of $25 million or more, DOD used the LPTA process primarily to acquire commercial products such as fuel. In contrast, for contracts with obligations over $1 million and less than $25 million, DOD used the LPTA process to acquire a mix of products and services, including fuel, aircraft parts, computer equipment, construction-related services, engineering support services, and ship maintenance and repairs.\nThe desire to weigh non-cost factors such as technical approach and past performance was a key factor cited in the majority of the solicitations issued for the 96 contracts in our sample that DOD awarded using the tradeoff process, regardless of obligation value (see table 1).\nFor the 76 contracts for which non-cost factors were more important than price, DOD acquired both products and services, such as computer equipment, aircraft maintenance services, and communication network support services.and past performance were the factors most often identified as more important than price among the non-cost factors. For example, 48 out of the 76 contracts in our sample identified technical approach as the most important factor. Additionally, 23 out of the 76 contracts in our sample identified past performance as the most important factor. Other non-cost factors considered in some of the solicitations with much less frequency than technical approach and past performance include small business participation and delivery schedule.\nIn addition, our analysis found that technical approach While data on DOD’s use of source selection processes were not readily available, our analysis found that DOD increased its use of LPTA from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2013 for contracts with obligations of $25 million or more (see table 2). We cannot make a comparison between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2013 for the lower dollar range, because our prior report only focused on contracts with obligations of $25 million or more in fiscal year 2009.\nSeveral contracting and program officials said that their commands gave more attention to whether LPTA is an alternative option in light of declining budgets and Better Buying Power Initiatives. Further, declining budgets encouraged contracting and program officials to streamline requirements. For example:\nThe Executive Director of Army Contracting Command—Aberdeen Proving Ground, one of five Army Contracting Command centers— said that overall there is an increased cost consciousness regarding acquisitions, resulting from the Better Buying Initiatives and declining budgets. As a part of that increased cost consciousness, there is an increased willingness and necessity to re-examine tools that could present better prices. For example, the Executive Director referred to LPTA as “a tool that has been at the bottom of the source selection tool box collecting dust for some time.” As it became necessary to take a look at what is really needed, they have “dusted off” the LPTA tool and had more discussions about how to set the technical acceptability at an appropriate level where there is no additional benefit from paying for more than that level.\nContracting officials from Naval Facilities and Engineering Command stated that in the current fiscal environment of “doing more with less,” they are educating their contracting personnel to use LPTA when appropriate. For example, on March 28, 2013, the Command sent an email communication to its contracting staff that provided guidance on the use of LPTA for task orders on multiple award contracts that are less than $10 million. The guidance stated that the contracting officer may choose to consider only price or cost for award purposes when the requirement is valued at less than $10 million, considered to be non-complex, and where non-cost factors are deemed unnecessary. These officials stated LPTA is less complex and less time consuming than tradeoff, and as a result, they can save personnel resources. In addition to internal guidance, Navy officials told us that the Better Buying Power Initiative also directs acquisition personnel to look for efficiencies and streamlining in acquisitions.\nContracting officials from Naval Supply Systems Command stated they increased their scrutiny on tradeoff acquisitions, which has contributed to a cultural shift to increase the consideration of LPTA as an alternative source selection process. The command issued an October 9, 2012 memorandum to contracting activities that states if non-cost factors are more important than price, the acquisition must be reviewed by a senior level acquisition executive.\nSimilarly, Air Force Materiel Command contracting and program officials stated that given the budget environment, it is increasingly difficult to justify higher dollar solutions from a technical standpoint when solutions may exist that meet the minimum requirement.\nDLA contracting officials stated that in light of resource constraints, it is increasingly common to purchase products that meet the program’s needs without overstating the requirement. These officials told us LPTA is a good choice for mature, commercial requirements where there is no added value in conducting a tradeoff given the need to stretch budgets.", "Our review of contract documents and interviews with program and contracting officials from our 16 case studies found that for these specific acquisitions, DOD’s ability to clearly define its requirements and its knowledge of potential vendors were the key factors that underpinned the decisions about whether to use tradeoff or LPTA. For example, in the eight case studies in which DOD used LPTA, DOD contracting and program officials generally stated they had sufficient knowledge of the requirements or vendors to feel confident that the lowest priced vendor, after meeting technical acceptability requirements, could deliver the product or service. In contrast, in our eight tradeoff case studies, contracting and program officials were less certain about requirements, were looking for innovative solutions, or wanted to use non-cost factors, such as past performance, as a differentiator when selecting the vendor. We found that for these 16 case studies DOD’s reasons for choosing LPTA or tradeoff were generally consistent with guidance in the FAR and DOD’s source selection procedures. Table 3 provides several highlights from the case studies that illustrate where DOD’s ability to clearly define its requirements and its knowledge of potential vendors affected the source selection decision making process.\nPolicy officials from some military departments noted that setting technical acceptability levels is important for contracts awarded through LPTA to be successful. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy officials told us the ongoing efforts to revise DOD’s 2011 source selection procedures is intended, in part, to further define how to conduct best value processes. According to these officials, the revised guidance will emphasize that for LPTA, the solicitation must clearly describe the minimum evaluation standards. In addition, they expect the guide will provide additional information on how to determine when to pay a price premium.", "DOD, through courses offered by DAU and the military departments, provides both classroom and online training related to source selection processes to its acquisition personnel. Both DAU and military department officials stressed, however, the importance of on-the-job training in preparing personnel to make informed source selection determinations.\nCongress passed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) in 1990 to both ensure effective and uniform education, training, and career development of members of the acquisition workforce, including contracting and other career fields, and established DAU to provide training. The act also required DOD to establish career paths, referred to by DOD as certification requirements, for the acquisition workforce. DOD military departments must track acquisition workforce personnel to ensure that they meet mandatory standards established for level I (basic or entry), level II (intermediate or journeyman), or level III (advanced or senior) in a career field, such as contracting, life cycle logistics, and program management. Similar requirements and levels are established for each of the acquisition career fields identified by DOD.\nDOD identified a need to increase the capacity and size of the acquisition workforce over the past several years. For example, in a DOD assessment of the contracting workforce completed in September 2008, senior DOD contracting leaders identified the importance of not only mastering the “what,” but in using critical thinking and sound judgment to apply the knowledge—thus mastering the “how” of contracting among its entry-level and mid-career personnel. To help address concerns that DOD had become too reliant on contractors to support core functions and to rebuild the capacity and skill sets that eroded in the years that followed the downsizing of the workforce in the 1990s, DOD increased its number of acquisition workforce positions from 133,103 in fiscal year 2009 to 151,355 in fiscal year 2013—including a 9.5 percent increase or an additional 2,616 positions—in the contracting career field.\nDAU officials identified five training courses that are taken either online or in the classroom to provide acquisition personnel, including contracting and program officials, the knowledge and skills necessary to make source selection decisions. Contracting personnel are required or recommended to complete all five of the identified training courses at some point in their career to obtain specific DAWIA certifications. Additionally, DAU makes these classes available to personnel outside the DAWIA acquisition workforce. Based on our analysis of student self-reported exit data in fiscal year 2013 and our discussion with DAU officials, we found that many graduates for these courses did not indicate their career field when completing the course registration or exit survey, particularly for online courses, which makes it difficult to know how many personnel outside of the DAWIA workforce with acquisition-related responsibilities took these courses. In September 2011, we reported on personnel working on service acquisitions who are outside the DAWIA acquisition workforce with acquisition-related responsibilities and found the number of these individuals to be substantial. As such, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish criteria and a time frame for identifying personnel outside the DAWIA acquisition workforce with acquisition-related responsibilities. DOD concurred with the recommendation and, as of June 2014, is developing a way to identify all of the non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities and the appropriate training curriculum they should receive. Table 4 outlines each of these five courses.\nWe also found that military departments provided source selection training—offering both overview and refresher courses—to contracting staff and others involved in the source selection process. Table 5 identifies examples of the training courses offered by various military departments.\nDAU and military department officials we spoke with pointed to their training as providing educational resources from which the acquisition workforce can understand the basics of appropriate source selection processes. These officials also stressed the role on-the-job training plays when making such determinations. For example, policy officials within the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics told us that on-the-job training provides important exposure for less experienced acquisition staff to the source selection decision making processes. As a result, contracting officials have a better understanding of situations where a particular source selection process may be more appropriate than others. Many officials told us that contracting officials can best understand the acquisition process and apply their in-classroom training through making real world source selection decisions. As such, several military department officials, including contracting officials from our case studies, provided examples of why they consider on-the-job training to be important, including the following:\nAir Force Installation Contracting Agency contracting officials from one of our case studies and a command official told us that on-the-job training and experience are important factors that affect the source selection process determination. They stated that on-the-job training provides experience and opportunities for contracting officers to make critical decisions that can only occur in a source selection environment. To that end, these officials told us that informal mentoring relationships are established wherein newer, less experienced staff is assigned to work with more senior staff.\nNaval Facilities Engineering Command officials and contracting officials from one of our case studies stated that the task of identifying when requirements would better suit a particular source selection process is learned through gaining experience from on-the-job training.\nNaval Sea Systems Command officials from one of our case studies stated that the best training they received is on-the-job training. These officials explained that more senior contracting officers help newer contracting staff with their acquisitions. They consider mentor type training invaluable in learning how to conduct an acquisition.", "Best value processes continued to underlie the vast majority of DOD’s new, competitively awarded contracts. DOD has increased its use of the LPTA process in recent years for higher value contracts, and its decision making regarding which source selection process to use did not appear to be ill-advised. Its decision making was generally rooted in knowledge about the requirements and vendors. In our sample of 16 cases, we identified instances in which DOD used LPTA for what appeared to be complex acquisitions, such as the system to mimic an anti-aircraft missile, but the acquisition team had considerable knowledge about the requirements or vendors. In other cases, DOD used the tradeoff process for what appeared to be relatively simple acquisitions, such as fabric dyeing, yet the acquisition team identified complexities about the proposed acquisition. Amid the climate of rapidly building fiscal pressures and cost consciousness, selecting the right source selection approach continues to be essential to ensure the department acquires what it needs without paying more than necessary.", "We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. DOD did not provide written comments on this report but did provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nWe are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. The report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.", "Committee reports from the Senate and House Armed Services committees and the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to report on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of best value processes. We determined 1) the extent to which DOD used best value processes in fiscal year 2013; (2) the factors DOD considers when choosing a source selection process; and (3) training DOD provides to its acquisition personnel on source selection processes. In addition, in response to a matter identified in a 2013 report from the House Armed Services Committee, appendix II includes information on the military departments’ acquisitions of body armor vests in fiscal year 2013.\nTo determine the extent DOD used the best value processes in fiscal year 2013, we used data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) as of October 2013 to identify a population of contracts based on the following criteria: (1) newly awarded by DOD in fiscal year 2013, (2) competitively awarded, and (3) had obligations of over $1 million in fiscal year 2013. This analysis identified a population of 2,851 contracts, and from this population we selected a stratified random sample of 227 contracts, with the strata defined by whether the contract had obligations of $25 million or more, or whether its obligations totaled over $1 million and less than $25 million. We divided the data into two groups including contracts with higher obligations of $25 million or more and contracts with lower obligations over $1 million and less than $25 million. We used the $25 million threshold to divide our data set based on a Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) requirement that contracts for products or services with $25 million or more in estimated total costs for any fiscal year have written acquisition plans, which contain information on the anticipated source selection process. more, we compared the percentage of contracts solicited using best value processes to fiscal year 2009 data we reported in October 2010.prior report did not include contracts with lower obligations of less than $25 million.\nDFARS § 207.103(d)(i)(B).\nWe obtained and analyzed the solicitation documents for all of the contracts in our sample to identify the source selection process DOD used. We verified the contract award fields in FPDS-NG with contract and solicitation data to ensure that the contracts within our sample were in-scope. Based on that analysis, we determined that a total of 44 contracts were out of scope for our review. These 44 contracts were excluded from our analysis, because they were either incorrectly coded in our key parameters, or were awarded using processes outside of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 14 on sealed bidding or Part 15 on contracting by negotiation (which includes best value processes) and consequently should not have been in our sample, resulting in a total of 183 contracts in our review (see table 6). After accounting for these errors, we assessed the reliability of FPDS-NG data by electronically testing the data to identify problems with consistency, completeness, or accuracy and reviewed relevant documentation. We determined that the FPDS-NG data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.\nBecause we followed a probability procedure based on random selection, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 8 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. Unless otherwise noted, percentage estimates of contracts with obligations of $25 million or more have 95 percent confidence intervals within +/- 8 percentage points of the estimate itself. Similarly, for contracts with obligations over $1 million and less than $25 million, percentage estimates have confidence intervals within +/- 10 percentage points of the estimate itself.\nIn addition, to compare characteristics of contracts in our sample that used best value processes for both strata, we determined contract type, the type of procurement (product versus service), and if commercial item procedures were used for our sample using FPDS-NG data and conducted data reliability analysis on these fields, by verifying this information with the contract and solicitation documents. For the contracts identified as tradeoff, we analyzed the contract and solicitation documentation to identify the most frequently used non-cost evaluation factors and their relative importance to price.\nTo identify what factors DOD considers when choosing a source selection process, we analyzed the FAR, DFARS, and DOD and military departments’ regulation, policy, and guidance on source selection. We interviewed senior DOD policy officials at Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, and at the Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters. We also interviewed officials from at least two buying commands—based upon such factors as the number of contract actions and obligation amounts—at each military department (Army, Navy, and Air Force), as well as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to discuss factors affecting their decision process on which source selection process to use. In addition, we analyzed our sample of 183 contracts and selected 16 new, competitively awarded contracts with obligations ranging from $1.1 million to $150.7 million to further our understanding of why acquisition officials chose the source selection process. Our 16 case studies—8 tradeoff and 8 LPTA—included at least 1 from each military department and DLA, different product and service types, and amount of dollars obligated in fiscal year 2013. For the case studies, we interviewed DOD contracting and program officials and reviewed contract documentation, including the acquisition plan, solicitation, and source selection decision memorandum to further understand the source selection decision making process. The results from our review of these selected contracts cannot be generalized beyond the specific contracts selected.\nDuring the course of our review, we also interviewed officials from the following commands:\nDepartment of the Army, Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Medical Command, Fort Detrick, Maryland; and Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia\nDepartment of the Army, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C., and Huntsville Center, Alabama\nDepartment of the Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval Facilities Command, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; and Naval Supply Systems Command, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania\nDepartment of the Navy, United States Marine Corps Installations and Logistics Command, Navy Annex, Virginia; and Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia\nDepartment of the Air Force, Installation Contracting Agency and Air Force Materiel Command, both located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio\nDefense Logistics Agency-Energy, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; and Defense Logistics Agency-Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, Kabul, Afghanistan.\nTo determine what training DOD provides to its acquisition personnel on source selection processes, we met with Defense Acquisition University (DAU) officials and instructors and reviewed training materials. We also obtained attendance and workforce data from the DOD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Human Capital Initiatives. Further, we collected and reviewed military department and command specific training documents to identify if additional source selection training is given in addition to DAU provided training. We also interviewed DOD policy officials at Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, several commands at the military departments, as well as contracting and program personnel at the contracting offices of the selected military departments from the 16 case studies on training provided related to source selection processes.\nWe supplemented these case studies with interviews with industry associations to identify their perspectives about DOD’s source selection processes.\nWe conducted this performance audit from September 2013 through July 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "The Marine Corps, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Army bought similar soft body armor vests made of ballistic material in fiscal year 2013 using different source selection processes. Knowledge of requirements or vendors were key considerations in each acquisition, but distinct needs led to different decisions about which source selection process to use even when acquiring the similar product.\nThe Marine Corps issued one delivery order to purchase soft body armor vests for $2.3 million in fiscal year 2013 using the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) process. It issued this order from a multiple award, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract awarded to two vendors in fiscal year 2009 using the LPTA process. The contracting officer told us they chose to use LPTA for the base contract because they consider soft body armor vests to be a commodity product with clearly defined technical performance specifications. Further, the contracting officer, in consultation with the program office, saw no opportunity for tradeoff above industry standard because the industry standard met their current needs. Ongoing research and development showed that any tradeoff for enhanced performance would lead to the armor being heavier, an unacceptable outcome. For the base contracts, the Marine Corps awarded to the second and third lowest priced vendors, because the lowest priced vendor was deemed non-responsible.\nDLA issued 23 delivery orders to purchase soft body armor vests for $288.1 million in fiscal year 2013. It issued these orders from three separate IDIQ contracts awarded to three vendors in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 using the tradeoff process. DLA contracting officials told us that they chose to use the tradeoff process for these contracts because they wanted to use past performance as a key discriminator, which is generally not allowed using the LPTA process. Further, because DLA buys for sustainment purposes and its quantity needs fluctuate, officials told us that past performance was a critical determination factor requiring the use of the tradeoff process, in addition to the vendor’s historic production capacity, delivery schedule, and other performance capabilities.\nThe Army issued one delivery order to purchase soft body armor vests for $10,201 in fiscal year 2013 using the LPTA process. It issued this order from one of the multiple award, IDIQ contracts awarded to eight vendors in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 using the tradeoff process. Army contracting officials told us they chose to use the tradeoff process for the base contract, because it provided the Army more discretion in evaluating past performance as well as leaving open the possibility that industry vendors might offer a more innovative solution. Once the Army had a group of qualified vendors on contract, they could then use the LPTA process for subsequent buys.", "", "", "In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made key contributions to this report: Molly Traci, Assistant Director; James Kim; Anh Nguyen; Erin Stockdale; Jina Yu; Claire Li; Jessica Drucker; Danielle Greene; Roxanna Sun; John Krump; Mark Ramage; Julia Kennon; Virginia Chanley; and Carol Petersen." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h3_full h4_full h1_full", "h0_full h3_full", "h1_full", "h4_full h2_full", "", "", "h0_full h4_full h1_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What were tradeoff and LPTA processes used for?", "What did GAO find about DOD's use of tradeoff processes?", "When was the LPTA process used?", "What did interviewees report about the LPTA process?", "What did GAO find about higher-budget contracts?", "What influenced the choice between tradeoff or LPTA?", "What influenced the choice to use LPTA?", "What characterized the use of tradeoff?", "What is an example of such a situation?", "To what extent are the factors of decisions in compliance with DOD procedures?", "What training does the DOD provide to acquisition personnel?", "What other training for acquisition personnel is important?", "What is one situation for which this type of training is better suited?", "What fiscal support did DOD give its central products and services?", "How does DOD need to manage their spending?", "What is the tradeoff process?", "What is the LPTA process?", "What solicitations did GAO review?", "What DOD process did the GAO review?", "What material did the GAO use to do so?", "What training did GAO review?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Defense (DOD) used two best value processes—tradeoff and lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA)—for approximately 93 percent of the 2,851 new, competitively awarded contracts awarded in fiscal year 2013 with obligations greater than $1 million.", "DOD used the tradeoff process most often in GAO's sample of contracts to acquire services, regardless of obligation value.", "For contracts with higher obligations, DOD used the LPTA process primarily to acquire commercial products, such as fuel. In contrast, for contracts in GAO's sample with lower obligations, DOD used the LPTA process to acquire both products and services.", "Several contracting and program officials said that their commands gave more attention to whether LPTA is an alternative option in light of declining budgets and efficiency initiatives.", "For contracts with obligations of $25 million or more, GAO found that DOD increased its use of LPTA since GAO last reported on this issue in October 2010 using fiscal year 2009 data. GAO's prior report did not include contracts with lower obligations.", "DOD's ability to clearly define its requirements and its knowledge of potential vendors were key factors that underpinned decisions about whether to use tradeoff or LPTA in GAO's 16 case studies.", "In the eight case studies in which DOD used LPTA, contracting and program officials generally stated that they had sufficient knowledge of the requirements or vendors to feel confident that the lowest priced vendor, meeting DOD's technical requirements, could deliver the product or service.", "In contrast, in the eight tradeoff case studies, contracting and program officials were less certain about requirements, were looking for innovative solutions, or wanted to use non-cost factors to differentiate vendors.", "For example, the United States Army Corps of Engineers used technical non-cost factors to evaluate vendors' abilities to use robotics for explosives disposal.", "These factors are generally consistent with guidance in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and DOD's March 2011 source selection procedures.", "DOD, through courses offered by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and the military departments, provides both classroom and online training related to source selection processes to its acquisition personnel.", "Both DAU and military department officials stressed, however, the importance of on-the-job training in preparing personnel to make informed source selection determinations.", "For example, Naval Facilities Engineering Command officials told GAO that determining when requirements are better suited for tradeoff or LPTA is learned through gaining experience from on-the-job training.", "DOD obligated about $310 billion in fiscal year 2013 for products and services needed to support its mission.", "To competitively acquire what is needed, DOD may use best value processes—including tradeoff and LPTA—to evaluate vendors' proposals.", "When using the tradeoff process, DOD weighs the relative importance of price against non-cost factors.", "By contrast, DOD may use the LPTA process and award the contract based on lowest price once technical requirements are met.", "GAO identified and reviewed solicitations for a projectable sample of 183 contracts out of 2,851 new, competitively awarded contracts that DOD awarded in fiscal year 2013 with obligations over $1 million.", "GAO also reviewed DOD and military departments' guidance regarding their use of the best value process.", "GAO selected 16 contracts for case studies based on military department, best value process used, and other factors. GAO reviewed contract documents and interviewed program and contracting officials for these case studies.", "GAO also reviewed DAU and military departments' training on source selection procedures." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, 0, -1, 0, 0, 2, 0, -1, -1, 1, -1, -1, 1, 1, -1, -1, 1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_RL34253	{ "title": [ "", "Scope of the Issue", "Definitions and Characteristics", "Links to U.S. National Security Threats", "Current Threats", "Terrorism", "International Crime", "Weapons Proliferation", "Regional Instability", "Challenges to Development", "Issues for New U.S. Programs and Initiatives", "Conflict and Threat Early Warning", "International Diplomacy", "Foreign Assistance", "Transformational Development", "Civilian Stabilization Assistance", "USAID's Fragile States Strategy", "Military, Police, and Counter-Terrorism Assistance", "Post-Conflict Stability Operations", "Civilian Capabilities", "Military Capabilities", "Interagency Coordination", "Possible Legislative Issues for Congress", "Civilian Post-Conflict Management Authorities", "DOD Transfer Authority to the State Department for Security and Stabilization Assistance", "DOD Global Train and Equip Authorities and Funding", "Foreign Police Training Authorities", "Interagency Policy Effectiveness" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, successive U.S. Administrations have explicitly identified weak or failing states as U.S. national security concerns since 1998. The past three U.S. National Security Strategy documents all point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing or exacerbating conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability. The President, in his 2005 National Security Presidential Directive ( NSPD ) 44, asserts that \"the United States should work ... to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate....\"\nTo this end, the Administration has established as a goal the \"transformation\" of U.S. national security institutions \"to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21 st century,\" which includes strengthening weak and failing states. However, as U.S. policy toward these states has grown in priority and cost—particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—some U.S. officials and other analysts have begun to question the effectiveness of the Administration's policies for dealing with these types of problem states. As the debate continues into the next presidential term, this is likely to continue to be a contentious area, with congressional involvement in U.S. policy toward weak and failing states flowing from its funding and oversight responsibilities.\nCurrently, policy makers and observers are advocating competing visions for addressing state weakness, which could pose significant consequences for U.S. national security policy and U.S. preparedness for combating 21 st -century security threats. On one side of the spectrum are those who advocate a \"Whole-of-Government\" vision for strengthening weak states. Advocates of this approach perceive weak states to present multiple, interdependent challenges to political stability, military and security capabilities, and development and humanitarian needs. As a result, they recommend developing mechanisms and procedures for interagency planning that coordinate all aspects of U.S. policy toward weak states. The implications of enhancing U.S. government interagency processes could be substantial for the legislative and executive branches. Supporters have discussed the potential for significant reform of congressional funding and authorizing responsibilities, as well as a substantial organizational overhaul of several federal agencies.\nAt the other extreme are those who are critical of U.S. nation-building activities; they fundamentally question the appropriateness of state weakness as a lens through which to identify national security threats. Instead, such analysts recommend developing strategies to combat specific threats, such as ungoverned territories conducive to criminal exploitation, international terrorism, transnational crime, and nuclear weapons proliferation, regardless of how strong a state's government is. In the case of conflict or post-conflict situations, some critics also discourage institutionalizing potentially costly U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Some critics also claim that the concept of strengthening states inherently prescribes a Western model of state function that may not be appropriate in all situations. If U.S. national security policy priority on weak and failing states is not necessary or desirable, the existence and funding levels of several recently created programs and strategies to combat weak states threats may be called into question.\nU.S. policy toward weak and failing states currently hangs in an uneasy balance between these two perspectives. In recent years, this has resulted in a proliferation of new programs designed to address the challenges of strengthening weak and failing states. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State, stood up in July 2004, is mandated with leading and coordinating U.S. efforts for conflict prevention and response in failing states; in this capacity, S/CRS has sought to implement a whole-of-government approach for addressing conflict in failed states since at least 2006. At the same time, DOD has expanded its role in conflict prevention and stability operations—revising military doctrine to elevate these activities to primary missions, devoting greater resources to such activities, and establishing new institutions to train DOD personnel and facilitate DOD's involvement in stability operations, including \"phase zero\" or \"shaping\" operations that, prior to 2004, had not been the purview of DOD strategy or mission goals. U.S. weak states initiatives, however, remain limited by a lack of interagency cohesion and unclear resources across agencies to carry out programs to strengthen weak states and combat potential national security threats emerging from such states. Pointing to these limitations, some observers question whether U.S. commitment to strengthening weak states is in decline.\nIn light of the current debate, possible oversight questions for Congress relating to U.S. policy toward weak and failing states include the following:\nIs there a need for an interagency strategy to coordinate agency responses to weak and failing states? When is it appropriate for the United States to prevent or respond to situations of state failure abroad? How effective are U.S. programs in preventing state failure? To what extent are U.S. government \"early warning\" predictors of state failure influencing policy planning? What do other countries do and how can international cooperation on weak and failing states be improved? What types of unintended consequences could U.S. policies to strengthen weak states have in the short- and long-term?\nThis report is intended to serve as a primer on weak and failing states and related U.S. policy issues. The report first provides definitions of weak states and describes the links between weak states and U.S. national security and development challenges. Second, it surveys recent key U.S. programs and initiatives designed to address threats emanating from weak states and identifies remaining issues related to the new programs. Finally, it highlights potential legislative issues that Congress may be asked to consider.", "No universal definition for \"weak state\" or \"failing state\" exists. Some analysts describe state weakness as the erosion of state capacity—a condition characterized by gradations of a regime's ability to govern effectively, which, in its most extreme form, results in the complete collapse of state power and function. Most countries in the developing world fall along this spectrum, exhibiting at least some elements of weakness. Failing states, which are seen as including only a handful of countries in the world, exhibit more pronounced weaknesses than others. Among the universe of weak and failing states, there is no single pathway to failure. In some cases, states are characterized by gradual, yet persistent, institutional decay and political instability. In other cases, states rapidly tumble into failure, faltering under the weight of political instability, an acute natural disaster, or economic crisis. Based on quantitative development indicators, weak and failing states tend to be among the least-developed and most underperforming states in the world.\nNotable U.S. government and government-affiliated efforts to describe weak and failing states focus on four major, often overlapping, elements of state function. Factors stressed include (1) peace and stability, (2) effective governance, (3) territorial control and porous borders, and (4) economic sustainability.\nPeace and Stability: Failing states are often in conflict, at risk of conflict and instability, or newly emerging from conflict. Lacking physical security, other state functions are often compromised; frequently cited examples of such states today include Sudan and Iraq. Effective Governance: Countries can also be hampered by poor governance, corruption, and inadequate provisions of fundamental public services to its citizens. In some cases, as in North Korea or Zimbabwe, this may occur because leaders have limited interest, or political \"will,\" to provide core state functions to all its citizens. A government's perceived unwillingness to provide adequate public services can incite destabilizing elements within a state. Territorial Control and Porous Borders: Weak and failing states may lack effective control of their territory, military, or law enforcement—providing space where instability can fester; such places may also be called \"ungoverned spaces\" or \"safe havens.\" The Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the Sahel region of Northern Africa are common examples where such elements of state weakness exist. Economic Sustainability: Many weak states are also among the poorest countries in the world. Arguably as a consequence of other security and political deficiencies, weak and failing states often lack the conditions to achieve lasting economic development. Such countries include Bangladesh and many in Sub-Saharan Africa.", "Failed states have appeared as a matter of concern in U.S. National Security Strategy documents since 1998, though the term had long been the topic of significant academic debate and implicitly informed U.S. national security policy since at least the end of World War II. As the Cold War concluded in the early 1990s, analysts became aware of an emerging international security environment, in which weak and failing states became vehicles for transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation pathways, and hot spots for civil conflict and humanitarian emergencies. The potential U.S. national security threats weak and failing states pose became further apparent with Al Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attack on the United States, which Osama bin Laden masterminded from the safe haven that Afghanistan provided.\nThe events of 9/11 prompted President George W. Bush to claim in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy that \"weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.\" In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice further emphasized how weak and failing states pose \"unparalleled\" danger to the United States, serving as \"global pathways\" that facilitate the \"movement of criminals and terrorists\" and \"proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.\" Many national security observers highlight such Administration language to indicate that U.S. interest in weak and failing states has become more substantial since 9/11 and is motivated largely by national security interests.", "Analysts identify numerous links between weak and failing states and transnational security threats, ranging from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and energy security. U.S. national security documents generally address weak states in relation to four key threat areas: (1) terrorism, (2) international crime, (3) nuclear proliferation, and (4) regional instability. Other analysts caution, however, that despite anecdotal evidence supporting a potential nexus between state weakness and today's security threats, weak states may not necessarily harbor U.S. national security threats. Furthermore, the weakest states may not necessarily be the most significant threats to U.S. national security; relatively functional states, characterized by some elements of weakness rather than complete state collapse, may also be sites from which threats can emerge.", "According to several analyses, weak and failing states are perceived as \"primary bases of operations\" for most U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Jaish-I-Mohammed. Terrorists can benefit from lax or non-existent law enforcement in these states to participate in illicit economic activities to finance their operations and ease their access to weapons and other equipment. As with Afghanistan in 2001, weak and failing states can also be ideal settings for terrorist training grounds, when the host country's government is unable to control or govern parts of its territory. States mired in conflict also provide terrorists with opportunities to gain on-the-ground paramilitary experience.\nResearchers find, however, that not all weak states serve as safe havens for international terrorists. Terrorists have been known to exploit safe havens in non-weak as well as weak states. The Political Instability Task Force, a research group commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency, found in a 2003 report that terrorists operate in both \"caves\" (i.e., failed states, where militant groups can exist with impunity) and \"condos\" (i.e., states that have the infrastructure to support the international flow of illicit people, funds, and information). The preference for \"condos\" suggests that countries most devoid of functioning government institutions may sometimes be less conducive to a terrorist presence than countries that are still weak, but retain some governmental effectiveness.", "As with terrorist groups, international criminal organizations benefit from safe havens that weak and failing states provide. According to the U.S. Interagency Working Group report on international crime, weak states can be useful sites through which criminals can move illicit contraband and launder their proceeds, due to unenforced laws and high levels of official corruption. Since the Cold War, the international community has seen a surge in the number of transnational crime groups emerging in safe havens of weak, conflict-prone states—especially in the Balkans, Central Asia, and West Africa. Criminal groups can thrive off the illicit needs of failing states, especially those subject to international sanctions; regimes and rebel groups have been known to solicit the services of vast illicit arms trafficking networks to fuel deadly conflicts in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan when arms embargoes had been imposed by the United Nations and other members of the international community. Links between transnational crime and terrorists groups are also apparent: Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have worked with several criminal actors, ranging from rebel groups in the West African diamond trade to crime groups in the Tri-Border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, among others. In 2008, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official stated that at least 19 of 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) listed by the State Department have established links to drug trafficking.\nSome researchers contend, however, that the weakest states are not necessarily the most attractive states for international criminals. This may be because some illicit transnational groups might be too dependent on access to global financial services, modern telecommunication systems, transportation, and infrastructure that do not exist in weak states. Researchers also find that some forms of international crime are more associated with weak states than others. Narcotics trafficking and illicit arms smuggling, for example, often flow through weak states. However, other types, such as counterfeiting and financial fraud, may be more prevalent in wealthier states.", "Weak and failing states, unable or unwilling to guarantee the security of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBRN) materials and related equipment, may facilitate underground networks that smuggle them. Endemic corruption and weak border controls raise the possibility of these states being used as transshipment points for illicit CBRN trafficking. Porous international borders and weak international controls have contributed to 1,080 confirmed nuclear and radiological material trafficking cases by member states from 1993 to 2006, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.\nThe majority of smuggled nuclear material reportedly originates in Central Asia and the Caucasus where known stockpiles are said to be inadequately monitored. Other sources of concern include poorly secured materials in research, industrial, and medical facilities. A relatively new region of concern for the United States is Africa, where more than 18% of the world's known recoverable uranium resources exist. Lax regulations, weak governments, and remotely located mines that are difficult to supervise combine to make the removal and trafficking of radioactive substances in Africa \"a very real prospect.\" Analysts also contend that while the potential for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) trafficking through weak states is considerable, most weak states may be unlikely destinations for smuggled WMD devices. Such equipment requires a certain level of technological sophistication that may not exist in some weak and failing states.", "According to recent research, states do not always become weak or failed in isolation—and the spread of instability across a region can serve as a critical multiplier of state vulnerability to threats. Instability has a tendency to spread beyond a weak state's political borders, through overwhelming refugee flows, increased arms smuggling, breakdowns in regional trade, and many other ways. The National Intelligence Council acknowledges that state failure and its associated regional implications pose an \"enormous cost in resources and time\" to the United States.", "In addition to the potential transnational security threats that weak and failing states pose to the United States, they also present unique challenges from a development perspective—a dimension of U.S. international policy that the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy elevated in priority to be equivalent to U.S. policy on defense and diplomacy. According to some U.S. officials, the primary programs to support development are inappropriate for fragile states. For example, weak and failing states have greater difficulty achieving the U.N. Millennium Development Goals and qualifying for U.S. assistance programs under the Millennium Challenge Act (22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.), which essentially precludes assistance under this act to most weak and failing states.\nSome weak states also have difficulty absorbing large amounts of foreign assistance, even when donor countries provide funding. According to the World Bank, fragile states grow only one-third as fast and have one-third the per capita income, 50% higher debt-to-gross domestic product ratios, and double the poverty rates of other low-income countries. The World Bank also finds that nearly all fragile states identified in 1980 are still fragile today, highlighting the difficulty in achieving sustained progress in weak and failing states. Statistical estimates by World Bank analysts predict that a fragile states is likely to remain so for 56 years, and the probability of a fragile state experiencing a \"sustained turnaround\" in any given year is a mere 1.8%.", "The United States does not have an official strategy or interagency guidelines for dealing with weak and failing states. However, several notable programs and initiatives have been created since 9/11 that aim to help prevent state failure, strengthen weak states, and counter existing threats emanating from weak and failing states. These programs span all aspects of state weakness issues to include (1) identifying threats and monitoring weak states, (2) engaging weak states through diplomacy, (3) directing foreign assistance toward the alleviation of state weakness symptoms, and (4) implementing on-the-ground civilian and military stabilization operations. Depending on the level of state weakness, available resources, and political considerations, U.S. policy makers may decide to apply one or more of these programming areas to weak states. Some analysts remain critical of recent U.S. programs designed to address issues of state weakness. The following sections describe new U.S. programs and initiatives and highlight existing criticism and concerns.", "The U.S. government uses conflict and threat early warning systems to predict which states are likely to fail and to identify which near-term emerging conflict situations require U.S. engagement. These include quantitative measures and subjective government analyses of state fragility. Early warning systems are used to assist U.S. agencies to prepare for international crises and identify areas in which assistance can be provided before a state slides further into failure. The overarching goal behind the implementation and use of these early warning systems is to help identify in advance weak states so that the U.S. government can plan and prepare for a likely crisis situation, and possibly preemptively react to developments. The National Intelligence Council, Department of State's Office of Early Warning and Prevention (located within S/CRS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) have roles in identifying and monitoring potential threats emanating from weak and failing states.\nOne U.S. government warning list of weak and failing states has been prepared by the National Intelligence Council twice per year since 2005, using classified and unclassified sources. According to government officials, this assessment is based at least in part on analysis of the Central Intelligence Agency-commissioned Political Instability Task Force, which boasts more than an 80% accuracy rate for predicting politicide, genocide, and ethnic and revolutionary wars. USAID began producing a separate list of fragile states under its Conflict and Fragility Alert, Consultation, and Tracking System ( C/FACTS ) in 2006. In addition, U.S. officials say DOD has worked on developing a list of potential countries where future U.S. military force may be required; DOD has also worked on identifying potential ungoverned areas and assessing the threats that they pose to U.S. national security.\nAccording to U.S. officials, the lists of weak states generated by these efforts are used to inform the various agency's programming agendas. A May 2007 report by the State Department's Office of Inspector General praised the extent to which interagency coordination for early warning conflict assessment occurs between S/CRS, DOD, USAID, the intelligence community, and others. However, the extent to which the U.S. government can respond to multiple crises, let alone mobilize to prevent a crisis from occurring, based on early warning assessments remains unclear. Among some analysts, the value of effective early warning assessments can often be undermined by lack of political will to mobilize in time for an emerging crisis, as well as the lack of sufficient resources and capabilities to deploy to the potentially numerous states that present early signs of potential state failure at any given time. In the case of S/CRS, for example, which is mandated with leading and coordinating U.S. efforts for conflict prevention and response in failing states, many observers have suggested that the office's small size and limited resources hamper its ability to address the full range of today's weak states; instead, S/CRS has been able to focus only on a small handful of weak states.", "International diplomacy is one way in which the United States can engage countries on issues that weaken the state and pose threats to U.S. national security. By working in cooperation with international actors on weak states issues, including democracy promotion, the United States aims to prevent transnational threats from emerging. In 2006, Secretary Rice unveiled transformational diplomacy as one such initiative. Under the banner of transformational diplomacy, approximately 300 U.S. diplomats were designated to be shifted to \"strategic posts\" in the Near East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America over the course of the next several years. The new posts focus on promoting democracy and good governance as well as bolstering state capacity against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and other security threats in countries often characterized as weak. Although the scope of transformational diplomacy extends beyond the issues of state weakness, the resulting Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007-2012 specifically aims to \"directly confront threats to national and international security from ... failed or failing states,\" and strengthen state capacity to \"prevent or mitigate conflict, stabilize countries in crisis, promote regional stability, protect civilians, and promote just application of government and law.\"\nAccording to some analysts, however, the future of transformational diplomacy hangs in question. There remains some disagreement over whether transformational diplomacy requires new congressional legislation; the Administration claims the initiative does not and has not requested new authorities from Congress to implement transformational diplomacy. In addition, some experts and foreign governments have raised concerns about the particular prominence of democracy promotion in Administration's transformational diplomacy initiative and its potential use as a \"pretext\" for intervening in other country's domestic affairs. Lacking legal requirements to implement the transformational diplomacy initiative, it is possible that the next Administration may rethink or replace it.", "The Bush Administration has begun several new, and sometimes controversial, foreign aid initiatives that seek to help fragile states build, or reinforce weak institutions and basic state infrastructure. These include transformational development; civilian stabilization and reconstruction assistance; USAID's Fragile States Strategy; and military, police, and counter-terrorism assistance. In aggregate, these programs have raised several questions that tie into larger debates about the use of foreign assistance for national security purposes, including weak states. Major related issues include whether the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 should be modified, revised, or entirely rewritten; what role the U.S. military should participate and the extent to which the U.S. military should be involved in foreign assistance funding to strengthen weak states; and whether or to what extent U.S. foreign assistance should be used to train and equip foreign police and other interior law enforcement elements.", "The State Department's 2006 transformational development initiative created the office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) and introduced a new Foreign Assistance Framework. The DFA serves concurrently as the USAID Administrator and has authority over State Department and USAID foreign assistance programs. The Foreign Assistance Framework categorizes foreign aid recipients as rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partners, and restrictive countries, and identifies five development objectives for all country categories—peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance. U.S. officials claim that the Framework implicitly addresses state fragility, with the majority of so-called weak and failing states falling in the rebuilding category and some falling in the developing and restrictive categories.\nThe new framework has the potential to improve alignment of foreign assistance allocations with foreign policy priorities, such as weak and failing states, by centralizing management and accountability over State Department and USAID funds. However, U.S. officials have stated that the new Office of the Director for Foreign Assistance has yet to develop strategic guidelines or a methodology to inform the allocation of aid resources to any of the Framework's country categories and for weak states specifically. Furthermore, the extent to which the Director of Foreign Assistance will be able to influence other U.S. agencies—particularly DOD—that provide foreign assistance funding remains unknown. In CY2005, 48% of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) was controlled by agencies outside of the State Department and USAID, including the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury. In CY2005, DOD alone disbursed more than one-fifth of U.S. foreign assistance.", "From 2006 to 2007, S/CRS has supported projects in 18 countries that it identified as in crisis or at risk of crisis, including Kosovo, Haiti, Colombia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, Liberia, Chad, Somalia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Nepal, and Afghanistan. Funding for these projects was supported through traditional foreign assistance accounts, as well as through DOD under a temporary transfer authority provided by Congress—capped at a total of $100 million per fiscal year through FY2008—in section 1207 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended (commonly referred to as \"Section 1207\" funds).\nSome point to the fact that DOD funds these civilian stabilization assistance programs as indicative of resource shortfalls within the State Department for effectively addressing fragile states. Some also raise concern with DOD's role in approving these civilian programs; such critics argue that the requirement that the Defense Secretary sign off on civilian stabilization assistance projects could encourage DOD to encroach into foreign assistance policymaking that had previously been the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State. On the other hand, supporters of DOD's role in civilian stabilization assistance argue that it creates opportunities for whole-of-government approaches to foreign assistance and enhances interagency programming by requiring approach of both the State Department and DOD (and thus potentially improving civil-military coordination between military combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors, and other State Department and DOD policy officials). Supporters also argue that this budgetary arrangement between the State Department and DOD for civilian stabilization assistance is practical and necessary for U.S. national security purposes, as it enables the State Department to respond to immediate reconstruction and stabilization needs before more formal programs can be developed.", "USAID has been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to prevent future state failure by addressing the underlying sources of weakness. In 2003, USAID established the Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management to examine the underlying causes of political instability, conflict, and extremism, and to improve the Agency's response to such conditions. In 2004, USAID also created a new type of foreign service officer, called \"Crisis, Stabilization, and Governance Officers,\" that specializes in providing the humanitarian, economic stabilization, and governance aspects of development assistance to fragile and weak states. They are given different training and shorter tours that focus specifically on the post-conflict phase of development, and operate in countries such as Afghanistan and Sudan.\nIn 2005, USAID unveiled its Fragile States Strategy, which provides a strategic vision for how USAID can most effectively respond to fragile states. Among its main objectives, the Strategy sought to enhance the Agency's rapid crisis response capabilities and establish a strategic planning process that could take into account conditions of weakness unique to each country. According to U.S. officials and independent observers, however, the Strategy's new programming objectives and strategic priorities for fragile states seem to have been sidelined by the 2006 launch of the Secretary of State's transformational development initiative.", "A subset of foreign assistance distinct from bilateral economic aid, U.S. support for foreign military, police, and counter-terrorism assistance is a primary means by which to prevent security threats emanating from weak and failing states. By providing this specialized form of assistance, the Administration seeks to build and reinforce the security sector capabilities of partner nations in order to prevent state weaknesses that transnational threats could exploit. Examples of counter-terrorism programs in weak states that focus on military assistance and training include the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program and the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI).\nCongress has actively supported the growth of this realm of foreign assistance in recent years through military, police, and counter-terrorism funding appropriated in the annual Foreign Operations and supplemental appropriations bills. Under new authorities granted by Congress in 2005, DOD is using additional funds to train and equip foreign security forces for counter-terrorism and stability operations. DOD's growing prominence in providing security sector assistance, however, has raised particular concern among some policy makers, including Members of Congress, who question whether the U.S. military is playing too large a role in a realm of foreign affairs traditionally dominated by the State Department and USAID.", "", "The current Administration has sought to develop effective civilian procedures for stability operations in failing states that go beyond traditional peacekeeping activities. In August 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to plan and conduct civilian post-conflict operations and to coordinate with DOD in situations that require a military presence. In December 2004, Congress granted statutory authority for the existence of S/CRS in the Department of State and Related Agency Appropriation, 2005. One year later, the President officially lent his support to S/CRS with NSPD 44 in December 2005. NSPD 44 not only identified the State Department as the lead agency for coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations in failing states, but also mandated that it consider and propose \"additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities.\"\nS/CRS responded to the President's NSPD 44 with a proposal for a \"Civilian Stabilization Initiative.\" Under this plan, S/CRS seeks to create a cadre of volunteer civilians that could be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world in response to an emerging crisis. These civilians would have unique skills and training that could be useful in post-conflict situations and would include police officers, judges, lawyers, agronomists, public health officials, city planners, economists, and others. S/CRS aims to develop three distinct pools of such civilians: (1) an \"Active Response Corps\" of about 250 full-time U.S. federal government employees who can be continuous deployed abroad; (2) a \"Standby Response Corps\" of about 2,000 U.S. federal government employees that can be called up from their day jobs to deploy within 45 to 60 days of a crisis; and (3) a \"Civilian Reserve Corps\" of about 2,000 additional people from the private sector and from state and local government work, who can be called up from their day jobs to deploy within two months of a crisis. See \" Possible Legislative Issues for Congress \" section, below, for further discussion.", "The Secretary of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 on \"Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.\" In Directive 3000.05 , the Secretary elevates stability operations to a \"core U.S. military mission\" and calls on the military to be prepared to conduct and support \"all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order\"—including tasks normally \"best performed\" by civilians. Stability operations from a Department of Defense perspective encompass a broad array of non-traditional military engagements, which include peacekeeping, humanitarian and civic assistance, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-insurgency efforts. Since 2005, DOD has created a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, a Defense Reconstruction Support Office, and Senior Directors for stability operations in each Combatant Command. According to DOD officials, Directive 3000.05 remains in the initial stages of implementation and U.S. military doctrine is under revision to incorporate stability and reconstruction operations into military field manuals.\nRecent post-conflict stability operations have highlighted possible tensions in DOD's relationship with civilian agencies. In 2005, for example, a report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on the status of DOD stability operations capabilities found that \"the progress of other organs of Government has been less fulsome\" and that it could not \"have confidence in the speed with which changes in other departments and agencies outside DOD will take place.\" Analysts suggest that DOD efforts to compensate for other agencies' shortcomings may have the unintended consequence of causing civilian agencies to rely increasingly on DOD in future stabilization operations. Some argue that such reliance is not necessarily problematic, as the military's \"built-in\" capabilities in war zones and standby logistics to immediately deploy and provide basic-needs reconstruction relief makes it a \"natural lead\" in post-conflict reconstruction. Others, however, argue that the potential reliance on military capabilities could compromise or conflict with broader U.S. foreign policy goals.", "Cross-agency collaboration on U.S. projects in weak states appears to be increasing in frequency and institutionalization. The creation of S/CRS in 2004 is one testament to this development, as it is the first formally mandated office to serve indefinitely as the lead coordinator for all civilian and military activities related to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. S/CRS is also leading an ongoing effort, the Interagency Management System, to develop interagency planning and improved coordination for stability operations. Prior to the creation of S/CRS, President Clinton's 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 56 ( PDD 56 ) governed interagency management of post-conflict situations. Under PDD 56 , an ad hoc interagency working group called the Executive Committee would be called upon to supervise the day-to-day management of U.S. operations when crises occurred.\nMany analysts and U.S. officials observe, however, that the current interagency approach to weak states—which spans not only post-conflict stability operations planning, but also development assistance and intelligence community cooperation on early warning threat assessments in weak and failing states—nevertheless remains a \"messy amalgam\" of programs and policies, lacking strategy-level, cross-agency guidance. Criticism by U.S. officials points to overlapping and redundant responsibilities, as well as programs that are, at times, working at cross-purposes. Recent World Bank and OECD research indicates, for example, that foreign assistance flows to fragile states tend to be uneven, irregular, and fragmented from all major donor countries and organizations, including the United States. Some officials acknowledge that confusion also remains regarding which agencies should be invited to interagency policy planning discussions on various weak state issues.\nIn the case of the S/CRS Interagency Management System, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that this proposed interagency planning mechanism for post-conflict situations remains hampered by several fundamental problems. These include (1) \"unclear and inconsistent guidance\" on the roles and responsibilities of S/CRS and other offices within the State Department, which have resulted in \"confusion and disputes\" about who leads policy development and who controls the resources for stability operations; (2) a \"lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction operations\" across the interagency, which makes it unclear when, where, or how the Interagency Management System would be applied in actual crises; and (3) concerns that the Interagency Management System was \"unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant\" and general skepticism among interagency participants that this new planning process would improve outcomes or increase resources available for fragile states.\nOther recent U.S. projects in weak states are also testing U.S. capacity for interagency coordination. Such efforts include the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, and counter-extremism projects in the Horn of Africa. In all of these recent initiatives, civilian and military officials are working together to strengthen state capacity holistically across multiple dimensions of security sector reform, institutional capacity building, and economic development. In the case of the Horn of Africa projects, as an illustrative example, USAID funded an assessment that examined the causes of extremism and identified the most unstable areas in the region. USAID then collaborated with the Department of State and DOD's Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa to implement a variety of initiatives to counter extremism in the region. DOD provided the \"hardware\" by building or rehabilitating essential infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, and wells, while the Department of State and USAID provided the \"software,\" which included educational and medical training and resources and building institutional capacity.\nUSAID has also been working to synchronize civilian-military relations in national security-related programming since 2005, with the creation of the Office of Military Affairs and the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework for on-the-ground conflict situations. The recently created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new DOD combatant command post that will include significant State Department leadership, is also indicative of increasing civil-military collaboration. According to U.S. officials, DOD also aims to apply the AFRICOM model to transform the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) by 2016.", "The following sections identify several wide-ranging legislative issues that relate to U.S. programs and initiatives for weak and failing states. They include (1) civilian post-conflict management authorities, (2) DOD transfer authority to the State Department for Security and Stabilization Assistance, (3) DOD global train and equip authorities and funding, (4) foreign police training authorities, and (5) interagency policy effectiveness.", "Building civilian post-conflict capabilities in weak states is a key area of focus, which policymakers have been debating at least since 2004. At the State Department's request, Congress is considering new authorizations to develop civilian post-conflict stabilization capabilities in the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 ( S. 613 , H.R. 1084 , and H.R. 5658 ). These bills seek to authorize funding for stabilization and reconstruction assistance in failing states, as well as the creation of a Response Readiness Corps. This Response Readiness Corps would include what S/CRS currently calls the \"Active Response Corps\" and the \"Standby Response Corps.\"\nCongress has appropriated up to $75 million in initial funding for the Response Readiness Corps to the State Department and USAID in FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriations ( P.L. 110-252 ). Congress also appropriated an additional $50 million for the creation of the third component of the S/CRS Civilian Stabilization Initiative, the \"Civilian Reserve Corps,\" in FY2007 supplemental appropriations; this funding, however, is contingent upon specific authorization. For FY2009, the State Department included in its budget request to Congress a total of $248.6 million to stand up the Civilian Stabilization Initiative and other costs associated with S/CRS. The State Department did not include in its FY2009 request funding for a Conflict Response Fund; instead it requests the continuation of DOD's authority to transfer funds to the State Department for security and stabilization assistance, which currently is set to expire at the end of FY2008.\nSupporters of the bill, including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, maintain that the State Department's ability to perform its mandated mission in post-conflict situations is hindered by the lack of support for a conflict response fund and a civilian reserve corps; critics remain hesitant to provide additional funding to a relatively new office, charged with developing new concepts. Unlike the State Department, which has had difficulty in obtaining permanent funding for civilian stabilization capabilities, the Department of Defense has obtained more congressional funds for U.S. stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some analysts have pointed to DOD's Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) as a potentially useful example of an emergency funding mechanism for strengthening weak and failing states. Through CERP, U.S. commanders can rapidly disburse discretionary funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs of local civilians.\nInternational support for the development of civilian post-conflict capabilities appears to be developing, albeit slowly. In early 2008, British Prime Minister [author name scrubbed] proposed a 1,000-person civilian rapid reaction force that could respond to crises in fragile and failing states. This force would resemble the State Department's proposed Civilian Stabilization Initiative, consisting of police, emergency service personnel, judges, trainers, and other crisis experts who could be called upon in humanitarian or post-conflict emergencies.", "U.S. foreign assistance for stabilization efforts in fragile states is funded in part by DOD through a controversial, temporary transfer authority. Under authority stated in Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-163 , H.R. 1815 ), Congress provided the State Department a mechanism to receive DOD funds for \"reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.\" In the conference report that accompanied H.R. 1815 ( H.Rept. 109-360 ), the conferees noted that they viewed this provision as a \"temporary authority to provide additional resources, if needed, to the Department of State until S/CRS is fully stood up and adequately resourced.\" S.Rept. 110-77 , which accompanied the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, also described it as a \"pilot project.\" Nevertheless, Section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ( P.L. 110-181 ) extended the original transfer authority to September 30, 2008. For FY2009, DOD is requesting an increase in the transfer authority cap, up to $200 million per fiscal year from the current $100 million. DOD is also requesting that the transfer authority be extended to other U.S. agencies, besides the State Department.\nSupporters of the extended transfer authority provision argue that the State Department's stabilization capabilities remain underfunded and prevent effective civilian management of post-conflict situations. Critics echo the 2006 conference report, which states that the conferees \"do not believe it is appropriate, and are not inclined, to provide long-term funding from the Department of Defense to the Department of State so that they Department of State can fulfill its statutory authorities.\" Highlighting continued debate over the appropriateness of DOD's Section 1207 authority, the House version of the FY2008 bill did not extend the transfer authority, while the Senate version extended the transfer authority through September 30, 2008, and increases such authorized funding from $100 million to $200 million. In the final FY2008 defense authorization, Congress ultimately agreed to extend the transfer authority, but maintained the funding limit of $100 million through FY2008.", "An ongoing congressional concern is the extent to which DOD should be involved in strengthening weak states' militaries to combat terrorism and other transnational threats that are perceived to emanate through such states. At the heart of this debate is a temporary congressional authority to allow DOD to train and equip foreign military forces for counter-terrorism operations and military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are involved (under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 [ P.L. 109-163 ]). In 2006, DOD obligated $100.1 million under this authority; in 2007, $279.5 million; and as of May 2008, $24.8 million. This new authority, which began as a two-year pilot program, has raised concerns among some analysts that it is contributing to a perceived shift in U.S. foreign assistance funding control from the State Department to DOD. Supporters of Section 1206, however, argue that DOD may be better able to operate such train and equip programs than the Department of State.\nTo this end, the Administration has requested that Congress broaden DOD's Section 1206 authorities to include (1) training and equipping foreign gendarmerie, constabulary, border protection, and internal defense forces; (2) increasing funding authorization levels from $300 million to $750 million; (3) allowing the President or the Secretary of State to waive any legislative restrictions, including human rights restrictions, that may apply to assistance for military or other security forces; and (4) making the authorities permanent. Although Congress raised the initial amount of authorized funding from $200 million to $300 million per year in Section 1206 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 ( P.L. 109-364 ), Congress has turned down the Administration's request to broaden Section 1206 authorities further. Additionally, Congress has not appropriated funds in any fiscal year for the purpose of Section 1206 authorities.\nFor FY2009, the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 5658 ), which passed on May 22, 2008, would extend Section 1206 authorities to FY2010. The Senate version would extend the authorities to FY2011, increase the authorized funding cap to $400 million per fiscal year, and extend the authorities' use beyond foreign national militaries to include building the capacity of a foreign country's coast guard, border protection, and other security forces engaged primarily in counter-terrorism missions.", "The U.S. government's ability to assist foreign countries in law enforcement is a critical component in stabilizing weak states. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended by the 1973 Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-189 ), restricts the use of foreign assistance funds for the training of foreign police, unless Congress grants an exception. Some observers consider Section 660 as \"among the most significant restrictions for stabilization and reconstruction operations\" in weak and failing states. Such analysts recommend repealing this prohibition to allow for greater flexibility in developing strategies to address weaknesses in foreign police forces. On the other hand, some observers also point to Congress's willingness to grant numerous exemptions to Section 660 over the years as indication that Congress has already taken sufficient account of the potential importance of foreign police training assistance for strengthening weak states.", "According to some observers, the issues surrounding challenges posed by weak and failing states highlight the broader problem of interagency coordination in national security affairs. In one recent, congressionally mandated effort to address long-term strategies related to foreign assistance policy, the bipartisan \"HELP Commission\" recommended that Congress rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to address, among other considerations, the perceived need for improved coordination between security concerns and development priorities in failed and failing states. \"Once thought to be distinct and removed from one another, security and development now intersect regularly,\" the Commission explains. \"Moving states from failed and failing to capable requires going beyond assistance, linking trade, democratic principles of governance, and security with traditional assistance.\" Other groups are exploring options for reforming interagency coordination on national security issues, which could include rewriting the National Security Act of 1947 and revising congressional rules governing committee structure and practice to improve oversight of interagency activity.\nThe implications of enhancing U.S. government interagency processes, not only could be substantial; observers often compare calls for interagency reform of U.S. national security institutions to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-433 ), which fundamentally altered how the various branches of the U.S. armed services coordinate capabilities and function. Advocates of interagency reform call for institutionalized mechanisms to require interagency strategic and operational planning, as well as coordinated resource allocation and execution. Critics, however, caution that such proposals could potentially involve significant reform of congressional funding and authorizing responsibilities for national defense, foreign operations, and intelligence.\nAppendix A. Definitions of Weak States\nSelected U.S. government and government affiliated efforts to define weak states include the following:\nU.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)\nIn the 2005 Fragile States Strategy, USAID uses the term \"fragile states\" to include those that fall along a spectrum of \"failing, failed, and recovering from crisis.\" The most severe form of fragile states are \"crisis states,\" where conflict is ongoing or \"at great risk\" of occurring and the central government does not exert \"effective control\" over its territory, is \"unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory,\" and holds \"weak or non-existent legitimacy among its citizens.\"\nNational Intelligence Council (NIC)\nThe NIC describes \"failed or failing states\" as having \"expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective government control\" and are caused by internal conflicts, in the 2020 Project's 2004 final report, Mapping the Global Future . In this report, the NIC considers the terms \"post-conflict\" and \"failed state\" to be synonymous.\nNational Security Council (NSC)\nThe NSC defines \"weak states\" as lacking the \"capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities\" in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism ( NSCT ). The strategy document also describes some weak states as lacking \"law enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to assert effective control over their entire territory.\" The NSC describes \"failing states\" in the 2006 NSCT as similar to \"states emerging from conflict.\"\nU.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)\nGAO, in its 2007 report Forces That Will Shape America ' s Future , defines \"failed or failing states\" as \"nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the governments as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services or domestic security.\"\nU.S. Interagency Working Group on International Crime\nIn the 2000 International Crime Threat Assessment report, an interagency working group created under the Clinton Administration defines \"failed states\" as \"unwilling or unable\" to meet \"many of the accepted standards and responsibilities of sovereign control over its territory,\" which may lead to \"significant economic deterioration and political unrest that threatens both internal and regional stability.\"\nOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)\nThe OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of which the United States is a member, defines \"fragile states\" as lacking \"either the will or the capacity to engage productively with their citizens to ensure security, safeguard human rights, and provide the basic function for development.\" They are further characterized as possessing \"weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, violence, or the legacy of civil war.\"\nPolitical Instability Task Force (PITF)\nOriginally commissioned by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence in 1994 and called the \"State Failure Task Force,\" PITF defines \"state failure\" as a \"range of severe political conflicts and regime crises\" and is characterized by a \"total or near-collapse of central political authority.\" The Task Force's statistical methodology identifies instances of politicide, genocide, adverse regime changes, and ethnic and revolutionary wars as situations when total or partial state failure occur.\nU.S. Commission on Weak States\nThis bipartisan commission, sponsored by the Washington think tank Center for Global Development, in its final 2003 report entitled On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security , defines \"weak states\" as those with \"governments unable to do the things that their own citizens and the international community expect from them: protecting people from internal and external threats, delivering basic health services and education, and providing institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the population.\"\nWorld Bank\nThe World Bank's Fragile States Initiative, previously called the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Initiative, describes \"fragile states\" as often characterized by poor governance, internal conflicts or tenuous post-conflict transitions, weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdowns in the rule of law, and insufficient mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority. All are low-income, which is defined as countries with a 2006 gross national income (GNI) per capita of $905 or less, calculated using the World Bank's Atlas Method.\nAppendix B. Various Lists Identifying \"At Risk\" States" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_title", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What has been a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the Cold War?", "How have government documents treated such states?", "What threats do failing states pose?", "How is the U.S. effort to address weak states progressing?", "What are the intiatives being developed by the U.S. government?", "What is the stance of policymakers and analysts regarding this commitment?" ], "summary": [ "Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War.", "Numerous U.S. government documents point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed.", "These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability.", "The U.S. government remains in the early stages of developing targeted capabilities and resources for addressing a complex mix of security, development, and governance challenges confronting weak states.", "U.S. programs and initiatives fall under five main categories: (1) conflict and threat early warning, (2) international cooperation and diplomacy, (3) foreign development assistance, (4) post-conflict stability operations, and (5) interagency coordination.", "However, as U.S. policies toward weak and failing states have grown in priority and cost, particularly since 9/11, some policy makers and analysts have begun to question the Administration's commitment to addressing effectively the problems posed by these states." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-19-291	{ "title": [ "Background", "AI/AN Veterans", "VA and IHS Structure and Benefits", "The VA and IHS MOU and Reimbursement Agreements", "VA and IHS Continue to Jointly Oversee the MOU, but Gaps Exist in Measuring Performance", "VA and IHS Have Continued to Carry Out MOU Oversight Activities and Implementation, and Are in the Process of Revising the MOU", "VA and IHS MOU Performance Measures Are Not Sufficient", "Use of Reimbursement Agreements Has Increased Since 2014 and IHS and THP Facilities Viewed the Agreements as Beneficial", "The Number of Reimbursement Agreements Entered, and the Amount of Claims Reimbursed and Veterans Served through Them, Have Increased Since 2014", "IHS and THP Facilities Viewed the Reimbursement Agreements as Beneficial, but Identified Some Concerns", "Facilities Cited Varying Levels of Coordination, and Key Challenges Included Making Referrals from IHS and THP Facilities to VA", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs", "Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services", "Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The number of AI/AN veterans eligible for both VA and IHS services is unknown. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2017 approximately 141,000 AI/AN individuals identified themselves as veterans. This estimate includes only individuals who identified as AI/AN alone and not in combination with another racial group. IHS and VA do not have an administrative mechanism for determining the number of AI/AN veterans who are users of both systems. Instead, each agency separately relies on individuals to identify either as veterans, or as AI/AN, resulting in different counts. Specifically, according to IHS, in fiscal year 2017, 48,169 active IHS users self-identified as veterans. According to VA, in fiscal year 2017, 80,507 VA-enrolled veterans self-identified as AI/AN.", "VA is charged with providing health care services to the nation’s eligible veterans, and served 6.8 million veterans in fiscal year 2017 with a total health care budget of about $69 billion. VA’s health care system includes 18 regional networks—Veterans Integrated Service Networks—to which each of VA’s facilities is assigned. VA has 170 medical centers, which offer a variety of inpatient and outpatient services, ranging from routine examinations to complex surgical procedures. VA’s health care system also includes community-based outpatient clinics and other facilities that generally limit services to primary care and some specialty care. When needed services are not available at VA facilities or within required driving distances or time frames, VA may purchase care from non-VA providers through its community care programs, such as the Veterans Choice Program. Eligibility for VA health care is based on several factors, including the veteran’s period of active service, discharge status, the presence of service connected disabilities or exposures, income, and other factors. VA uses factors such as these to categorize eligible veterans into eight enrollment priority groups—established to manage the provision of care. Some veterans qualify for free health care services based on service connected disabilities, income, or other special eligibilities, while others may be responsible for co-payments.\nIHS was established to provide health services to members of AI/AN tribes, and its facilities are primarily in rural areas on or near reservations. IHS’s fiscal year 2017 budget was approximately $5 billion, and the agency served about 1.6 million individuals. The agency is organized into 12 federally designated geographic areas. IHS provides services directly through a federally operated network of 25 hospitals, 53 health centers, and 30 health stations in 37 U.S. states. In addition, about 54 percent of IHS’s funds are provided to THPs to operate about 580 of their own facilities such as hospitals, health centers, clinics and health stations. IHS also provides funding to 41 nonprofit organizations through the Urban Indian Health program to provide health care services to AI/AN individuals living in urban areas.\nIHS and THP facilities are often limited to providing primary and emergency care services. When needed health care services are not available at IHS or THP facilities, in certain circumstances the facilities may pay external providers to provide these services through IHS’s Purchased/Referred Care (PRC) program. Before the PRC program can provide payment, patients must exhaust all health care resources available to them from private insurance, state health programs, and other federal programs, including VA. Furthermore, eligibility for PRC payment is not automatic, and IHS has reported that PRC funds are not sufficient to pay for all necessary care and, therefore, generally pay for only the highest priority costs, such as emergency care and transportation to that care.\nTo be eligible for IHS health care services, an individual must generally be a member or descendant of one of the current 573 federally recognized Indian tribes, as evidenced by such factors as tribal membership, enrollment, residence on tax-exempt land, ownership of restricted property, active participation in tribal affairs, or other relevant factors. In instances where an AI/AN veteran is eligible for a particular health care service from both VA and IHS, VA is the primary payer.", "The 2010 MOU between VA and IHS set mutual goals and objectives to facilitate coordinating and resource-sharing between the two agencies. Specifically, the five MOU goals are as follows: 1. Increase access to and improve quality of health care and services to the mutual benefit of both agencies. Effectively leverage the strengths of the VA and IHS at the national and local levels to afford the delivery of optimal clinical care. 2. Promote patient-centered collaboration and facilitate communication among VA, IHS, AI/AN veterans, tribal facilities, and Urban Indian clinics. 3. In consultation with tribes at the regional and local levels, establish effective partnerships and sharing agreements among VA headquarters and facilities, IHS headquarters and facilities, tribal facilities, and Urban Indian Health Programs in support of AI/AN veterans. 4. Ensure that appropriate resources are identified and available to support programs for AI/AN veterans. 5. Improve health promotion and disease prevention services to AI/AN veterans to address community-based wellness.\nIn accordance with these five goals, the MOU contains specific areas in which VA and IHS agreed to collaborate and coordinate, including:\nReimbursement: development of payment and reimbursement policies and mechanisms to support care delivered to dually eligible AI/AN veterans.\nSharing staff: sharing of specialty services, joint credentialing and privileging of health care staff, and arranging for temporary assignment of IHS Public Health Service commissioned officers to VA.\nStaff training: providing systematic training for VA, IHS, THP, and Urban Indian Health Program staff on VA and IHS eligibility requirements to assist them with appropriate referrals for services.\nInformation Technology Interoperability: interoperability of systems to facilitate sharing of information on common patients, and establishment of standard mechanisms for VA, IHS, and THP providers to access records for patients receiving care in multiple systems.\nVA and IHS each designated certain staff to oversee and implement the MOU, but VA is generally responsible for administering the MOU. For example, VA’s Office of Community Care provides oversight of the reimbursement agreements—which are a key part of the MOU. Within that office, VA established the IHS/THP Reimbursement Agreements Program to carry out portions of the MOU related to the development of payment and reimbursement policies. Under these policies, in instances where an AI/AN veteran is eligible for a particular health care service from a VA facility, that veteran can instead receive the eligible service at an IHS or THP facility without prior VA approval and, under a reimbursement agreement, VA will reimburse the facility for the service. Some key aspects of the reimbursement agreement program are as follows:\nAll IHS facilities are covered under one national reimbursement agreement between VA and IHS.\nTHPs each negotiate their own separate reimbursement agreements with VA. While VA uses a reimbursement agreement template based on the agreement with IHS, the terms of each THP agreement may deviate from those in IHS’s national agreement.\nUrban Indian Health Programs are generally not eligible for reimbursement agreements.\nVA provides reimbursement for outpatient and inpatient direct care services provided at IHS and THP facilities.\nVA also reimburses IHS and THP facilities for costs of outpatient prescriptions for AI/AN veterans, as well as filling prescriptions for AI/AN veterans served at IHS and THP facilities through VA’s Consolidated Mail Outpatient Pharmacy program.\nVA does not provide reimbursement for those services from external providers paid for by IHS or THP PRC programs.\nVA reports that the process of establishing reimbursement agreements with THPs has multiple phases. The process begins with initial communication between the THP and VA, followed by an orientation briefing. The THP then begins to draft the agreement (based on VA’s template) and prepare required VA paperwork (e.g., an implementation plan and proof of certification or accreditation). Once drafted, the THP submits the draft agreement and paperwork for review by VA’s IHS/THP Reimbursement Agreements Program, followed by review by a VA contracting officer and legal team. The agreement is complete once it is signed by VA and the THP.", "A joint leadership team of VA and IHS officials continues to oversee the implementation of the 2010 MOU through meetings, regular reporting, and the establishment of goals and measures to assess performance— but these measures lack targets for assessing progress toward the goals. VA and IHS officials also told us they are drafting a revised MOU to be broader and more flexible than the existing MOU and are updating the performance measures. However, officials have not indicated that any revised measures will include targets.", "Since our last report in 2014, a joint national leadership team comprised of VA and IHS officials has continued to use quarterly meetings, routine reporting, and MOU goals and measures to oversee MOU implementation and help facilitate collaboration. VA and IHS officials told us that the leadership team consists of officials in VA’s Office of Rural Health and Office of Tribal Government Relations, and the IHS Deputy Director for Intergovernmental Affairs. Specifically, the leadership team has met to discuss the progress and status of the MOU, develop implementation policy and procedures, create performance measures and timelines, and evaluate progress on those measures. The leadership team also compiles annual reports on progress in MOU implementation that includes information about activities and challenges on meeting MOU goals using established measures, and information on the reimbursement agreements and outpatient pharmacy program. In addition, VA and IHS issue monthly data reports on the reimbursement agreements, including the total amount disbursed, the number of veterans receiving services reimbursed by VA, and the number of claims processed for IHS and THP facilities.\nThe leadership team receives input from workgroups tasked with the responsibility for implementing and developing strategies to address the goals of the MOU. The workgroups primarily consist of VA and IHS staff who meet periodically to discuss goals and report quarterly to the leadership team. Tribal officials have participated in some MOU workgroups, though they are not a part of the MOU leadership team. Since our last report in 2014, the number of workgroups decreased from 12 to three groups. (See table 1.) VA and IHS officials said that there were a number of reasons why the number of workgroups had decreased over time, such as consolidation into broader groups because the missions of some groups were similar. VA officials noted that the 12 original workgroups reflected the structure of the MOU, but over time they realized that there was not a need for workgroups in some of these areas.\nWith the establishment of the MOU, VA and IHS have been able to share resources and collaborate on activities to improve access of care for AI/AN veterans. VA and IHS reported that the MOU has helped both agencies develop an outpatient pharmacy program for AI/AN veterans, hold joint training and recruitment events, and establish the reimbursement agreement program, among other accomplishments. The VA, IHS, and THP facility officials we spoke with noted activities related to the reimbursement agreements and a few noted improvements in areas such as training and telehealth as a result of the MOU. However, most of the facility officials generally reported they had not observed improvements in national-level VA and IHS collaboration and coordination in other areas identified by the MOU. Additionally, these facility officials told us that their facilities have not implemented any new policies, procedures, or any specific facility performance goals or targets that were linked to the MOU.\nVA and IHS headquarters officials acknowledged that all areas of the MOU have not been implemented at all facilities, and noted that while improvements have been made in many areas, organizational challenges remain, such as in the area of information technology. One IHS headquarters official added that even though VA and IHS have not fully implemented all parts of the MOU, they have addressed each area of the MOU in some manner. For example, one of the goals of the MOU is to improve coordination of care by developing and testing innovative approaches and disseminating best practices. IHS headquarters officials indicated that the agency has addressed this goal in part by creating an Improving Patient Care program that was informed by using VA curriculum and utilizing lessons learned from VA’s Patient Aligned Care Teams.\nVA and IHS leadership said they are currently in the process of revising the MOU to be broader and more flexible to better meet the care needs of AI/AN veterans. Regularly monitoring and updating written agreements on collaboration, such as the MOU, is consistent with our key collaboration practices. IHS officials said that in contrast to the current MOU, in the new MOU, they are not looking to delineate every area of coordination and instead are grouping topics into broader areas of coordination. In the fiscal year 2017 MOU annual report, VA and IHS noted they were removing outdated language from the MOU and planned to create a more comprehensive, flexible MOU that would serve both agencies well into the future. VA and IHS officials indicated that these revisions will address some areas in the current MOU that they have not yet been able to implement. In June 2018, VA officials said that the leadership team had decided upon a revised set of MOU goals and associated objectives. In February 2019, VA and IHS reported that the target completion date for the new MOU was spring 2020.", "VA and IHS have improved their efforts to measure progress towards meeting the five MOU goals since 2014. In response to a recommendation made in our April 2013 report, VA and IHS revised their MOU performance measures in 2015—better aligning the measures with the MOU goals. In addition, as a result of our work in 2013, the agencies revised an existing data collection reporting template used to gather information for each measure—such as the measurable objective, rationale and intent of the measures, action plan, milestones, and barriers—to help determine whether MOU goals were being met. While we found that the three existing MOU workgroups had since stopped using this template, a VA official confirmed that they believe relevant information is still captured through its monthly and quarterly reports.\nNonetheless, while VA and IHS improved their performance measurement efforts since our 2013 report, we found that the revised MOU performance measures still do not have quantitative and measurable targets to assess agency progress toward the goals. We have previously reported that performance measures should have numerical targets or other measurable values, which help assess whether overall goals and objectives were achieved by easily comparing projected performance and actual results. Besides having measureable targets, other key attributes of successful performance measures include linkage to an agency’s goals and mission, clarity, objectivity, and balance. None of the 15 revised measures have targets against which performance can be measured to assess progress and evaluate effectiveness. (The results of our assessment are shown in table 2.) For example, while the number of shared VA-IHS trainings and webinars is a performance measure, there is no target for the number of shared trainings VA and IHS hope to complete each year.\nVA officials we spoke with stated VA has not considered adding targets to these measures, noting that the nature of the measures and MOU work against establishing targets. For example, officials said that the measures related to the reimbursement agreements are dictated by the needs of the population seeking health care and the providers at the IHS and THP facilities. VA officials we spoke with said instead of targets, they assess success or failure by whether they see incremental growth in the measures. Officials added that they examine these measures quarterly to determine if they have increased, decreased, or remained stable. If the measures are stable or decrease, officials said they consider if these trends can be reversed.\nHowever, the absence of targets limits the ability of VA and IHS to use these measures to assess performance. Without defined measurable targets or goals, VA and IHS lack a clear basis for objectively and strategically evaluating how and where improvements should be made. For example, while it is helpful to count the number of tribal outreach activities conducted, setting an annual target for such activities would allow the agencies to better assess whether they are meeting their goals in this area.\nIn addition, some of these measures also lacked other attributes important for assessing performance. Specifically, five of the measures listed the completion of an annual metric review, which is a task to execute rather than a desired performance outcome to be measured. VA and IHS also are not using two measures. Specifically, they have not collected any data to track results on the number of VA and IHS employees who attend training and on the quality of health care provided. Relatedly, for the measure on health care quality, VA and IHS have not developed a clear definition against which to measure performance, as specific quality measures have not been determined and data are not being collected.\nVA and IHS have documented challenges related to confusion and difficulty in tracking some measures; for example, at a meeting in March 2017, the MOU leadership team discussed that measures were not well tailored to the workgroup structure at that time. IHS officials also acknowledged that the measures currently in place are counting activities, but not necessarily always measuring performance—such as whether trainings held were effective. VA officials said that revising the MOU will give them an opportunity to revisit the performance measures used, and that they are looking to apply lessons learned to do a better job in the future at defining the measures. Similarly, IHS officials noted that the agencies are engaged in conversation about the performance measures to make them more useful. However, as previously noted, VA officials said that they have not considered establishing targets for the measures.", "THP facilities’ use of reimbursement agreements with VA increased from 2014 through 2018. The selected IHS and THP facilities we spoke with viewed the reimbursement agreements as beneficial, but also identified some concerns.", "The use of VA’s reimbursement agreements with THPs increased from 2014 through 2018, as measured by the number of agreements, claims reimbursed, and veterans served. In addition, there was also an increase in payments made for prescriptions filled through the VA’s Consolidated Mail Outpatient Pharmacy program for AI/AN veterans receiving services at IHS and THP facilities. As all IHS facilities are covered under a single national agreement that was instituted prior to 2014, there was less change in the use of reimbursement agreements by these facilities.\nReimbursement agreements entered. The number of reimbursement agreements with THPs more than doubled from 2014 to 2018, increasing about 113 percent. We previously reported, as of May 16, 2014, that VA had 53 reimbursement agreements with THPs. VA data showed that as of December 2018 it had 113 reimbursement agreements with THPs, representing about 34 percent of the 337 total IHS-funded THPs. (See fig. 1.) VA also reported that there were 42 additional pending reimbursement agreements with THPs that were in varying phases of submission, processing, and review. In addition, as in 2014, IHS facilities are covered under a single national agreement, and the number of IHS facilities covered by it has remained similar.\nIn 2014, we reported that VA officials had conducted outreach through tribal letters and events to educate THPs about the option of establishing reimbursement agreements, and officials told us this outreach has continued. As we reported previously, there are several reasons a THP might decide not to have an agreement with VA, such as deciding it was not worth the time and resources needed to establish an agreement. Officials from a national tribal organization we spoke with said that smaller tribes without many veterans or resources may not be interested. IHS officials also noted that if a THP’s veteran population has alternate payment resources (e.g., Medicaid or private insurance), it may not be worth the steps to implement a reimbursement agreement if the THP will not be billing VA for veterans’ services.\nAmount of claims reimbursed. In fiscal year 2014, VA paid IHS and THP facilities $11.5 million for services provided to AI/AN veterans, which grew to $20.1 million in fiscal year 2018. This increase mainly represents the growth in reimbursement to THP facilities—which grew 181 percent, from $4.3 million in fiscal year 2014 to $12.1 in fiscal year 2018. During this same time period, reimbursements to IHS facilities remained relatively stable, reflecting the stable number of IHS facilities receiving reimbursements. (See fig. 2.)\nVeterans served. Between fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2018, according to VA data, the number of unique AI/AN veterans receiving services reimbursed by VA each year has increased from about 3,800 in 2014 to a high of nearly 5,300. (See fig. 3.) While IHS facilities accounted for a larger percentage of veterans with reimbursed services compared to THPs, the number of veterans receiving services reimbursed by VA at THPs increased significantly. For fiscal year 2014, 2,965 AI/AN veterans received services reimbursed by VA at IHS facilities, which decreased slightly to 2,829 in fiscal year 2018. In comparison, 885 veterans received services reimbursed by VA at THP facilities in fiscal year 2014, which nearly tripled to 2,531 veterans in fiscal year 2018.\nPrescriptions filled. Similar to increases in the numbers of AI/AN veterans served under the reimbursement agreements, AI/AN veterans’ utilization of VA’s Consolidated Mail Outpatient Pharmacy program has also increased. Prescriptions filled through this program more than doubled—from more than 440,000 prescriptions in fiscal year 2014 to nearly 886,000 prescriptions in fiscal year 2018. (See fig. 4.) VA and IHS annual reports indicate that the pharmacy program has been one of the most successful collaborations between VA and IHS for AI/AN veterans, providing more than 2 million prescriptions for VA-IHS patients since the pharmacy program collaboration began in 2010. While this program was originally limited to AI/AN veterans served at IHS facilities, in December 2016, VA and IHS entered into an Interagency Agreement that extended the program to THPs.", "Officials from the majority of IHS and THP facilities we contacted said they were generally pleased with the reimbursement agreements. Among those, officials from one THP noted that the revenue received from their reimbursement agreement freed up other resources that allowed them to hire an additional part-time worker to conduct VA outreach activities. Additionally, a representative of a national tribal organization noted that IHS and THP facilities’ funding is limited and this revenue helps them extend services to eligible AI/AN veterans.\nHowever, officials from a number of IHS and THP facilities also had concerns about the agreements, including the lack of reimbursement for PRC program services provided by IHS and THP facilities, the length of time it took to enter into the agreements, and the time frames of the agreements: Lack of reimbursement for PRC program services. Officials at most IHS and THP facilities we contacted said they believed VA should reimburse facilities for services from external providers paid through the PRC program. Officials at some facilities said they have had to deny PRC services due to a lack of program funds. According to some facility and IHS area office officials, this issue is particularly relevant in states where Medicaid was not expanded under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). In states where Medicaid eligibility was expanded, more AI/AN individuals may therefore be eligible for Medicaid—potentially freeing up PRC funds. For example, an IHS official noted that prior to Medicaid expansion in his state they would have to limit PRC funds to be used only in life or death scenarios after May or June of each year, but that currently his facility was not limiting any PRC services. Given the limitations in PRC program funds, officials from a national tribal organization and some THPs noted they have raised the possibility of including the PRC program in the reimbursement agreements with VA, although the program was ultimately not included.\nVA officials noted that there is no statutory requirement for them to include the PRC program in the reimbursement agreements and also identified several other reasons for not including it. For example, they said that VA does not want to pay for services externally that it already offers internally and that it would prefer to coordinate the patient’s care within VA’s existing programs, such as VA’s own programs for purchasing care from external providers—like the Veterans Choice Program.\nThe length of time to enter into an agreement. Officials from a few THP facilities and one national tribal organization we spoke with noted concerns about the amount of time it took to enter into reimbursement agreements. Our analysis of VA reimbursement agreement data shows that the median amount of time that it took to enter an agreement with THPs was over 1 year (about 403 days). We found that the number of days from the first contact by a THP to the actual signing of the agreement ranged from 96 days (over 3 months) to 1,878 days (more than 5 years).\nAccording to VA records and interviews, there were reasons for delays in completing reimbursement agreements, including lengthy negotiations, incomplete submission of information from the THPs, lapses in communication between VA and the THP, and a THP’s lack of medical certification or accreditation. VA officials explained that the amount of time increases if the THP does not want to use the VA-approved reimbursement agreement template or wants to change the terms of the agreement. For example, an official from one THP facility said that it took 2.5 years to finalize its reimbursement agreement due, in part, to internal challenges with their legal counsel and external challenges with negotiating the terms of the agreement during a time when the VA was developing a national reimbursement agreement template. VA officials also explained that entering the agreement with IHS was simpler than entering agreements with THPs because it was a national agreement between two federal agencies and, for example, did not require having a contracting officer review the agreement—an extra step needed for agreements with non-federal agencies.\nThe length of time reimbursement agreements are in effect. Officials from a few THP facilities expressed a desire for longer reimbursement agreements that would permit greater planning ability. The agreement between VA and IHS was initially set for 3 years. It was then extended twice, once for 2 years and once for 1.5 years. The time frames for THP agreements have generally been extended consistent with extensions to the national agreement. Officials from one THP we spoke with said that having short-term reimbursement agreements causes problems with internal organizational planning and it would be beneficial to have a longer term non-expiring agreement that can be cancelled so that THPs do not continue to expend resources to complete new agreements or amendments every 2 years. In June 2018, VA and IHS signed an amendment to extend the terms of the national reimbursement agreement through June 30, 2022. VA officials said they are currently in the process of working with THPs to similarly extend their agreements.", "In speaking to officials at selected VA, IHS, and THP facilities about key issues related to coordinating care for AI/AN veterans, we found that the extent of coordination they reported varied widely. For example, three IHS and THP facilities said they had little to no care coordination with their local VA partners; noting, for example, that they rarely refer veterans to VA since they offer more services than the closest VA facilities. Other facilities described more extensive and formalized care coordination, including shared funding of certain VA and THP employees, or VA employees on site at THP facilities to manage veterans’ care and referrals to and from VA. In Alaska, for example, where services offered by VA are very limited, VA instead has formal sharing and reimbursement agreements established with 26 THPs, which provide the majority of services to AI/AN veterans, as well as some non-Native veterans. Two of the THP facilities we spoke with in Alaska have VA employees working on site to help coordinate veterans’ care. VA and IHS headquarters officials indicated that the MOU was intended to allow for variation in the level of coordination at the local, facility level not to create demands or obligations on facilities. One VA official noted that as the new MOU is developed, both VA and IHS want to continue to allow VA, IHS, and THP facilities to engage in whatever level of coordination makes sense.\nDespite variation in the extent of coordination, officials identified several common challenges regarding coordination between local VA, IHS, and THP facilities: Referring patients to VA facilities. Officials from 9 of the 15 VA, IHS, and THP facilities we contacted reported conflicting information about the process for referring AI/AN veterans from IHS and THP facilities to VA facilities for specialty care. For example, 4 of the IHS and THP facilities we spoke with said that AI/AN veterans generally could not be referred directly to VA specialty care by IHS or THP providers without first being seen and referred by a provider at VA. These facility officials indicated that this practice was a barrier to care. These officials also noted that this could result in the patient receiving, and the federal government paying for, duplicative tests. However, officials at another IHS facility indicated that IHS and THP facilities should be able to refer patients directly to VA specialty care. Additionally, during an interview at a VA facility, local and regional officials had differing understandings of whether IHS and THP facilities could refer patients directly to VA specialty care.\nVA and IHS headquarters officials both reported that in general, IHS or THP facilities cannot refer a patient to VA specialty care without that patient first being seen in VA primary care. However, VA officials reported that there is no national policy or written guidance on how to refer patients from an IHS or THP facility to a VA facility. VA officials said that the coordination process is left to the local VA facility and the respective IHS or THP facilities and the process can vary from one facility to another— explaining why differing information was reported by facility officials. Our past work on interagency collaborative mechanisms identifies that it is a leading collaboration practice to have written guidance and agreements to document how agencies will collaborate. Without a written policy or guidance about how referrals of AI/AN veterans from IHS and THP facilities to VA facilities may be managed, VA and IHS cannot ensure that VA, IHS, and THP facilities have a consistent understanding of the options available for these referrals.\nInformation technology interoperability and access. Officials at 10 of the 15 VA, IHS, and THP facilities we contacted cited challenges related to accessing each other’s health information technology systems. Most stated that a lack of interoperability of their electronic health records caused challenges, while a few IHS and THP facilities also mentioned that the lack of access to VA systems makes it difficult to verify a veteran’s eligibility or determine the services for which VA will reimburse. For example, one THP noted that if an AI/AN veteran was sent to VA for a service, the THP provider would not receive the veteran’s follow-up records as quickly as if they had access to each other’s systems. Improving systems’ interoperability was a focus area identified in the MOU, and an IHS official indicated that while the agencies had some initial work on the topic, no systematic solutions were identified. We have previously identified VA’s lack of systems interoperability—particularly with the Department of Defense—as a contributor to the agency’s challenges related to health care.\nVA and IHS officials identified some potential workarounds to this lack of interoperability, although they noted that some of the described workarounds could be time consuming and may not be feasible for all facilities:\nAn IHS headquarters official said that IHS and VA each have the ability to request the sharing of information from an individual electronic health record held by the other agency through secure emails—although the official noted that this is not as fast or efficient as being able to log in to each other’s systems.\nVA officials also reported that VA belongs to the eHealth Exchange— a national health information exchange—and said that IHS or THPs could join that, through which they would be able to access information about common veteran patients. However, IHS reported that although the agency explored connecting to the eHealth Exchange several years ago, testing and onboarding costs to participate were prohibitive. IHS noted that several individual facilities across the IHS system have elected to invest in connections with regional health information exchanges. Similarly, two THPs we spoke with reported being a part of other, more locally-based health information exchanges, but noted that VA was not part of these exchanges.\nA VA official noted that there is an enrollment guide that details how enrollment and eligibility verification will be managed between IHS, THP, and VA facilities. This guide describes how IHS or THP facilities can request veterans’ enrollment and eligibility information from the VA Health Eligibility Center using a templated spreadsheet that sends requests via email through a secure data transfer service. VA’s Health Eligibility Center verifies the list and returns the completed enrollment/eligibility excel spreadsheet to the IHS or THP facility securely. IHS and THP facilities can also contact the VA Health Eligibility Center directly by telephone for fewer than five veterans per call, or their local VA medical center by telephone to verify one AI/AN veteran’s enrollment and eligibility per call.\nIHS or THP facilities could also enter an arrangement with a local VA facility to have VA employees or co-funded employees on site at IHS or THP facilities, or to have VA-credentialed employees that can access VA systems to share information. However, these options may not be systemic solutions that work at all facilities. An IHS headquarters official noted, for example, that not all IHS or THP facilities have the type of relationship with their local VA facility that would lead to the establishment of such arrangements.\nIn terms of the potential for improving interoperability in the future, VA is in the process of implementing a new electronic health record system, and we have previously reported that VA has identified increased interoperability as a key expected outcome of its decision to switch systems. Officials from two VA and THP facilities were hopeful that this new system will help improve interoperability since some THPs use an electronic health record system from the same company that VA has a contract with. Additionally, an IHS headquarters official said that IHS is also reevaluating its information technology platform and one requirement of any new IHS system will be to enhance interoperability with VA, pending the funding to do so. IHS also reported that the agency will consider health information exchange participation as part of the agency’s information technology modernization efforts.\nStaff turnover. Officials from 9 of 15 facilities identified staff turnover at VA, IHS, and THP facilities as an impediment to having better or consistent coordination. VA, IHS, and THP facility officials described situations in which the coordination between facilities was dependent on specific staff or facility leadership. According to officials, when there was turnover among these staff or positions went unfilled, or were eliminated, the coordination decreased or came to a halt. For example, officials at one VA facility said that they have found that if a sitting tribal government expresses interest in VA collaboration, they have to act quickly and work with the tribe before there is turnover and new tribal leadership comes in with different priorities. Additionally, officials from one IHS facility described a situation in which they had previously coordinated with their local VA facility through that facility’s AI/AN liaison. However, the coordination lapsed when the liaison left VA and the position went unfilled. Similarly, a THP official stated that coordination with VA was previously led by a nurse case manager on site who was a joint VA and THP employee. The official said that since that person’s retirement, she did not know who to contact at VA to coordinate veterans’ care.\nOfficials at one IHS facility noted that due to turnover and attrition they would like to see more education for front line staff at both IHS and VA, so they can more efficiently obtain care for patients at the VA. VA headquarters officials acknowledged that staff turnover and retraining is a challenge that they will need to continually address as the MOU is carried out. In our prior work related to IHS and VA, we have found that both agencies face challenges related to staff turnover and training.\nVA Co-Payments. Officials at 3 of the 11 IHS and THP facilities we contacted, as well as IHS headquarters officials and representatives of two national tribal organizations said that the copayments that VA charges veterans represented a barrier to AI/AN veterans receiving care. While AI/AN veterans do not have any cost-sharing for care provided at IHS or THP facilities, they are subject to the same copayments as other veterans when they receive care from VA facilities. VA data shows, for example, that of the 80,507 VA-enrolled self-identified AI/AN veterans in in fiscal year 2017, about 30 percent were charged copayments, averaging about $281.56 billed per veteran. Officials from one THP noted that this kind of financial liability may discourage AI/AN veterans from getting care at VA, or lead them to return to the THP after they realize they will have to pay for care at VA.\nWhile some of our interviewees suggested that VA should waive copayments for AI/AN veterans, a VA official said they do not have the legal authority to do this. The official said that their statute specifies the categories of veterans for which they must charge copayments and VA is not authorized to waive the copayments for AI/AN veterans on the basis of their AI/AN status without statutory exemptions. While certain AI/AN veterans may qualify for waived copayments based on their inclusion in other statutory categories, AI/AN veterans are not specifically listed as a category for which copayments can otherwise be waived. VA officials also cautioned that because AI/AN veterans may qualify for waived copayments through these other categories, the possibility of copays should not discourage IHS or THP facilities from referring AI/AN veterans to VA.", "Since 2014, VA and IHS have continued to work together to oversee and implement their MOU aimed at improving the health care provided to dually eligible AI/AN veterans. While the agencies have made progress in certain areas of the MOU, especially those related to reimbursement, other parts have seen less attention. VA and IHS are now updating the MOU, and plan to revisit the related performance measures. This gives the agencies an opportunity to evaluate how well their existing oversight mechanisms have been working, and to improve these mechanisms accordingly in the future. Regardless of these updates, the agencies need to have effective performance measures. While the agencies took steps to improve MOU performance measures in response to one of our prior reports, these steps were not sufficient and the measures they set lack important attributes, including measurable targets. VA and IHS have indicated that they plan to reevaluate performance measures as they update the MOU, but have not indicated that these new measures will identify targets. Absent targets, VA and IHS are limited in their ability to measure progress towards MOU goals and ultimately make strategic decisions about how and where improvements should be made.\nAt the local level, care for AI/AN veterans relies on coordination among individual VA, IHS, and THP facilities. However, variations in relationships among these many facilities and staff turnover creates challenges, which heightens the importance of clear and consistent guidance from the national level. Yet no written guidance exists related to referring AI/AN veterans to VA facilities for specialty care. Without such guidance, VA and IHS cannot ensure that facilities have a consistent understanding of the available referral options for AI/AN veterans. Enhancing their guidance in this area will help VA and IHS ensure that AI/AN veterans have access to needed care.", "We are making a total of three recommendations, including two to VA and one to IHS. Specifically:\nAs VA and IHS revise the MOU and related performance measures, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure these measures are consistent with the key attributes of successful performance measures, including having measurable targets. (Recommendation 1)\nThe Secretary of Veterans Affairs should, in consultation with IHS and tribes, establish and distribute a written policy or guidance on how referrals from IHS and THP facilities to VA facilities for specialty care can be managed. (Recommendation 2)\nAs VA and IHS revise the MOU and related performance measures, the Director of IHS should ensure these measures are consistent with the key attributes of successful performance measures, including having measurable targets. (Recommendation 3)", "We provided a draft of this report to VA and the Department of Health and Human Services for review and comment. We have reprinted the comments from VA in appendix I and the comments from the Department of Health and Human Services in appendix II. Both departments concurred with our recommendations. The Department of Health and Human Services also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nIn response to our recommendations to ensure revised performance measures include key attributes of successful performance measures, VA and the Department of Health and Human Services provided information about the process for finalizing the new MOU, including conducting tribal consultation. They noted that VA and IHS will work together to ensure that performance measures under the new MOU include appropriate measurable targets.\nRegarding our recommendation to VA about establishing and distributing a written policy or guidance on how referrals from IHS and THP facilities to VA facilities for specialty care can be managed, VA noted the Office of Community Care is working on a process to enhance care coordination among all VA and non-VA providers—including IHS and THP providers. VA noted that for IHS and THPs, this will include establishing forms and procedures to refer patients to VA for specialty care, and that VA will provide training to applicable staff once the process and procedures are finalized. VA also noted that it is in the process of establishing an advisory group that will include tribal, IHS, and VA representation, and will make recommendations related to care coordination guidance and policies. The target completion date for establishing this group is spring 2020.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of VA and the Department of Health and Human Services, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov/.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Office of Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.", "", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Kathleen M. King (Director), William Hadley (Assistant Director), Christina Ritchie (Analyst-in-Charge), Jennie Apter, Shaunessye D. Curry, Jacquelyn Hamilton, and Vikki Porter made key contributions to this report." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "", "h1_full", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full", "h3_full h1_title", "h1_full", "", "h3_full h2_full", "h0_full", "", "h0_full h3_full", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What was established by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Service?", "What is one problem facing the VA and IHS in the implementation of their MOU?", "What is one example of performance metrics that are going unmeasured?", "How could these agencies modify the execution of their MOU to meet standards on best practices for measuring program performance?", "What is the current status of such modifications?", "How did VA reimbursments for AI/AN veterans change between 2014 and 2018?", "What accounts for this increase?", "What is an additional reason for the increase in total reimbursements?", "What did the VA, IHS, and tribal facility officials describe?", "What was one of the central challenges reported by the VA, IHS, and tribal officials?", "What is one of the practices identified by GEO that will assist with collaboration?", "Why is a written policy important?", "What could be a result of not having a consistent understanding of the referrals of AI/AN veterans to VA specialty care?", "How did the GAO strengthen oversight and coordination?", "How were the VA and IHS interviewees selected?", "What other organizations were interviewed?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS) established a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to improve the health status of American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) veterans through coordination and resource sharing among VA, IHS, and tribes.", "Since GAO's last report on the topic in 2014, VA and IHS have continued to jointly oversee the implementation of their MOU—for example, through joint workgroups and quarterly meetings and reports—but they lack sufficient measures for assessing progress towards MOU goals. Specifically, while the agencies established 15 performance measures, they did not establish targets against which performance could be measured.", "For example, while the number of shared VA-IHS trainings and webinars is a performance measure, there is no target for the number of shared trainings VA and IHS plan to complete each year.", "GAO's work on best practices for measuring program performance has found that measures should have quantifiable targets to help assess whether goals and objectives were achieved by comparing projected performance and actual results.", "VA and IHS officials said they are currently in the process of revising the MOU and updating the performance measures used. However, officials have not indicated that any revised measures will include targets.", "Total reimbursements by VA for care provided to AI/AN veterans increased by about 75 percent from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2018.", "This increase mainly reflects the growth in reimbursement from VA to tribal health program facilities—facilities that receive funding from IHS, but are operated by tribes or tribal organizations.", "Similarly, the number of VA's reimbursement agreements with tribal health programs and the number of AI/AN veterans served under the reimbursement agreements also increased during this period.", "The VA, IHS, and tribal facility officials GAO spoke with described several key challenges related to coordinating care for AI/AN veterans.", "For example, facilities reported conflicting information about the process for referring AI/AN veterans from IHS or tribal facilities to VA, and VA headquarters officials confirmed that there is no national policy or guide on this topic.", "One of the leading collaboration practices identified by GAO is to have written guidance and agreements to document how agencies will collaborate.", "Without a written policy or guidance about how referrals from IHS and tribal facilities to VA facilities should be managed, the agencies cannot ensure that VA, IHS, and tribal facilities have a consistent understanding of the options available for referrals of AI/AN veterans to VA specialty care.", "This could result in an AI/AN veteran receiving, and the federal government paying for, duplicative tests if the veteran is reassessed by VA primary care before being referred to specialty care.", "To conduct this work, GAO reviewed VA and IHS documents, reports, and reimbursement data from 2014 through 2018.", "GAO interviewed VA and IHS officials at the headquarters level, and officials at 15 VA, IHS, and tribal facilities in four states—Alaska, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—selected based on factors including the number of reported AI/AN veterans served, and geographic diversity.", "GAO also interviewed organizations representing tribes and tribal health programs." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, 3, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, 2, 2, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_RL33975	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Overview", "Age of Youth and the Transition to Adulthood", "Defining the Vulnerable Youth Population", "Groups of Vulnerable Youth", "Risk Factors", "Disconnectedness", "Positive Youth Development: The Importance of Resiliency and Opportunity", "What is Youth Development?", "The Youth Development Movement", "Evolution of the Federal Role in Assisting Vulnerable Youth", "1912-1950s: Children's Bureau Programs and Workforce Programs", "1960s-1970s: War on Poverty Initiatives and Expansion of Programs", "White House Conferences on Children and Youth: 1960s and 1970s", "Family and Youth Services Bureau", "1980s-Present: Current Youth Programs", "Job Training and Workforce Development54", "Education", "Programs Authorized by Title I of the ESEA", "Other ESEA Programs", "Programs Authorized Under HEA", "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act", "Education of Homeless Children and Youths Program", "Youth ChalleNGe Program", "Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention", "Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act61", "Social Services", "Foster Care Program and Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP)", "Runaway and Homeless Youth Program", "Public Health", "Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services", "Teen Pregnancy Prevention and Support Programs", "National and Community Service", "Federal Efforts to Improve Coordination Among Programs for Vulnerable Youth", "Overview", "Claude Pepper Young Americans Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-501)", "Federal Council on Children, Youth, and Families", "Grants for States and Community Programs", "Other Concerns about Coordination of Youth Programs", "Youth Build Transfer Act (P.L. 109-281)", "Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (P.L. 109-365)", "Executive Order 13459", "Comparison of the Federal Youth Development Council and the Interagency Working Group", "Federal Initiatives to Improve Coordination", "The White House Council for Community Solutions", "Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention", "My Brother's Keeper", "Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth (P3)", "Child Welfare Partnerships", "Shared Youth Vision Initiative", "Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Initiative103", "Drug-Free Communities Support Program104", "Conclusion", "Appendix. Federal Youth Programs and Relevant CRS Reports and Experts" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Congress has long been concerned about the well-being of youth. The nation's future depends on young people today to leave school prepared for college or the workplace and to begin to make positive contributions to society. Some youth, however, face barriers to becoming contributing taxpayers, workers, and participants in civic life. These youth have characteristics or experiences that put them at risk of developing problem behaviors and outcomes that have the potential to harm their community, themselves, or both. Poor outcomes often develop in home and neighborhood environments that do not provide youth with adequate economic and emotional supports. Groups of vulnerable (or \"at-risk\") youth include emancipating foster youth, runaway and homeless youth, and youth involved in the juvenile justice system, among others. Like all youth, vulnerable youth face a difficult transition to adulthood; however, their transition is further complicated by a number of challenges, including family conflict and obstacles to securing employment that provides adequate wages, health insurance, and potential for upward mobility.\nThe federal government has not adopted a single overarching federal policy or legislative vehicle that addresses the challenges at-risk youth experience in adolescence or while making the transition to adulthood. Rather, federal youth policy today has evolved from multiple programs established in the early 20 th century and expanded through Great Society initiatives. These programs, concentrated in six areas—workforce development, education, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, social services, public health, and national and community service—provide vulnerable youth with opportunities to develop skills that will assist them in adulthood.\nDespite the range of federal services and activities for vulnerable youth, many of the programs have not been developed into a coordinated system of support. In response, federal policymakers have periodically undertaken efforts to develop a comprehensive federal policy around youth. Congress has passed legislation (the Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act, P.L. 109-365 ) that authorizes the federal government to establish a youth council to improve coordination of federal programs serving youth. The youth council has not been established, but in 2008, the Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs was convened. The Working Group is made up of multiple federal departments and agencies, and has worked to address common goals for youth. In the past three decades, Congress has also considered other legislation (the Youth Community Development Block Grant of 1995 and the Younger Americans Act of 2000) to improve the delivery of services to vulnerable youth and provide opportunities to these youth through policies with a \"positive youth development\" focus.\nThis report first provides an overview of the youth population and the increasing complexity of transitioning to adulthood for all adolescents. It also provides a separate discussion of the concept of \"disconnectedness,\" as well as the protective factors youth can develop during childhood and adolescence that can mitigate poor outcomes. Further, the report describes the evolution of federal youth policy, focusing on three time periods, and provides a brief overview of current federal programs targeted at vulnerable youth. ( Table A-1 at the end of the report, enumerates the objectives and funding levels of such programs. Note that the table does not enumerate all programs that target, even in small part, vulnerable or disconnected youth.) The report then discusses the challenges of coordinating federal programs for youth, as well as federal legislation and initiatives that promote coordination among federal agencies and support programs with a positive youth development focus.", "", "For the purposes of this report, \"youth\" refers to adolescents and young adults between the ages of 10 and 24. Under this definition, there are approximately 64.1 million youth (or 20% of the population) in the United States. Although traditional definitions of youth include adolescents ages 12 to 18, cultural and economic shifts have protracted the period of adolescence. Children as young as 10 are included because puberty begins at this age for some youth, and experiences in early adolescence often shape enduring patterns of behavior. Older youth, up to age 24, are in the process of transitioning to adulthood. Many young people in their mid-20s attend school or begin to work, and some live with their parents or other relatives.\nThe current move from adolescence to adulthood has become longer and more complex, particularly since the postwar period. Youth of the 1950s were more likely to follow an orderly path to adulthood. They generally completed their education and/or secured employment (for males), including military service, which was followed by marriage and parenthood in their early 20s. (This was not true for every young person; for example, African Americans and immigrants in certain parts of the country faced barriers to employment.) Unlike their postwar counterparts who had access to plentiful jobs in the industrial sector, youth today must compete in a global, information-driven economy that favors highly skilled, educated workers. The ability for young people to secure well-paid employment is contingent on higher levels of education. From the 1970s to the 2000s, real wages and hours worked rose most significantly for those with some college or who had a college degree. Many more youth now receive vocational training or enroll in colleges and universities after leaving high school compared to earlier generations.\nDuring the period of transition, young adults cycle between attending school, living independently, and staying with their parents. They also use this time to explore career options and relationships with potential long-term partners. The median age of first marriage has risen each decade since the 1950s, to 27.4 years for women and 29.5 years for men as of 2016. The extended transition to adulthood for some youth may delay becoming financially independent, which can create a burden for their families. A study of support to 19- to 22-year-olds, based on data from 2005 through 2009, found that just over 60% of these young adults receive some form of financial assistance from their parents, including help with paying bills (42.2%), tuition assistance (34.7%), providing personal vehicles (23.0%), and paying rent (21.5%). The average value of all assistance to young adult children from 2005 to 2009, reported in 2009 dollars, was $7,490. Higher income families provided more support to their children. Young adults whose parents were in the top quartile of family income received support ($15,449) six times as large as the assistance ($2,113) provided by parents in the bottom quartile. Other research shows support provided by parents to their children has increased over time. Among high school graduates ages 19 through 22, both the share receiving any support and the share receiving a high level of support have increased since the early 1980s. While a greater proportion of young adults ages 23 through 28 have increasingly received more support from their parents, the amount of support has not increased. In addition, support for young adults has been concentrated in the period since 2003. Related to these trends, approximately 15% of adults ages 25 to 34 lived with their parents in 2016, and nearly all of these youth had lived with their parents for at least the past year.\nPrograms that assist youth making the transition to adulthood also recognize that adolescence is no longer a finite period ending at age 18. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 ), the health reform law, requires health insurance companies to provide coverage to the children of parents who are enrolled in their health care plans up to their 26 th birthday. Since January 2014, it also has provided a new Medicaid pathway for children who age out of foster care up to their 26 th birthday. Since FY2003, the federal Chafee Foster Care Education and Training Vouchers program has provided vouchers worth up to $5,000 annually per youth who is \"aging out\" of foster care or was adopted from foster care after 16 years of age. The vouchers are available for the cost of attendance at an institution of higher education, as defined by the Higher Education Act of 1965. Youth receiving a voucher at age 21 may continue to participate in the voucher program until age 23.\nFurther, the changing concept of the age of adulthood has gained currency among organizations and foundations that support and study youth development projects. The Youth Transition Funders Group is a network of grant makers whose mission is to help all adolescents make the successful transition to adulthood by age 25. Similarly, the Network on Transitions to Adulthood, a consortium of researchers from around the country, was created in 2000 to study the changing nature of early adulthood.", "The majority of young people in the United States grow up healthy and safe in their communities. Those of primary and secondary school age live with parents who provide for their emotional and economic well-being and they attend schools that prepare them for continuing education or the workforce, and ultimately, self-sufficiency. Just over one-third of young adults today have graduated from a four-year college or university. Nonetheless, some young people do not grow up in a secure environment or with parents that provide a comprehensive system of support. These youth often live in impoverished neighborhoods, where they may be exposed to violence, and come to school unprepared to learn. Their communities and schools often lack resources. Even youth who have adequate academic and emotional support may experience greater challenges as they transition to adulthood.\nThere is no universal definition of the terms \"vulnerable\" or \"at-risk\" youth, and some believe that these labels should not be used because of their potentially stigmatizing effects. The terms have been used to denote individuals who experience emotional and adjustment problems, are at risk of dropping out, or lack the skills to succeed after graduation. They have also been used to suggest that youth grow up in unstable family or community environments. Researchers, policymakers, and youth advocates, however, might agree to this definition: vulnerable youth have characteristics and experiences that put them at risk of developing problem behaviors and outcomes that have the potential to hurt their community, themselves, or both. \"At risk\" does not necessarily mean a youth has already experienced negative outcomes but it suggests that negative outcomes are more likely. Youth may also experience different levels of risk, to high risk. Youth may also experience multiple risk factors. Vulnerable youth may also display resiliency that mitigates negative outcomes.", "Researchers on vulnerable youth have identified multiple groups at risk of experiencing poor outcomes as they enter adulthood. These groups include, but are not limited to the following:\nyouth emancipating from foster care; runaway and homeless youth; youth involved in the juvenile justice system; immigrant youth and youth with limited English proficiency; youth with physical and mental disabilities; youth with mental disorders; and youth receiving special education.\nSome researchers have also classified other groups of vulnerable youth on the basis of risk outcomes: young unmarried mothers, high school dropouts, and disconnected (e.g., not in school nor working) youth.\nAmong the seven groups listed above, some lack financial assistance and emotional support from their families. Former foster youth, for example, often do not have parents who can provide financial assistance while they attend college or vocational schools. Other vulnerable youth have difficulty securing employment because of their disabilities, mental illness, juvenile justice history, or other challenges. Vulnerable youth who have depended on public systems of support often lose needed assistance at the age of majority. Many will lose health insurance coverage, vocational services, and supplementary income. They will also face challenges in accessing adult public systems, where professionals are not always trained to address the special needs of young adults. Regardless of their specific risk factor(s), groups of vulnerable youth share many of the same barriers to successfully transitioning into their 20s.\nEven within these groups, the population is highly diverse. For example, among youth with disabilities, individuals experience visual or hearing impairments, emotional disturbances, congenital heart disease, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, diabetes, cancer, and spina bifida. Youth in these seven groups also represent diverse socioeconomic and racial backgrounds. However, youth of color and the poor tend to be overrepresented in vulnerable populations. This is due, in part, to their exposure to poverty, and crime, racism, and lack of access to systems of care, such as health care and vocational assistance.\nYouth may also be members of multiple vulnerable populations. For instance, former foster youth are particularly at risk of becoming homeless. In recent years, approximately 20,500 to 25,000 youth have \"aged out\" of foster care. Emancipated youth may have inadequate housing supports. Recently emancipated foster youth also tend to be less economically secure than their counterparts in the general youth population because they earn lower wages and are more likely to forego college and vocational training. Their economic vulnerability can place them at risk of losing their housing.", "Not all vulnerable youth experience negative outcomes. However, reviews of social science literature have identified multiple factors that can influence whether youth face negative outcomes in adolescence and as they transition to adulthood. Such factors include the following:\nPoverty: Poverty is linked to a number of potential future problems among youth, including chronic health conditions, low educational attainment, and engagement in delinquent behaviors. Family Instability: Children who grow up in two-parent families tend to have better health outcomes and more positive behaviors. Family Dysfunction: Two types of family dysfunction are particularly detrimental to the future well-being of children: witnessing violence against their mothers and criminal activity among their family members. Child Maltreatment: Abuse and neglect by their parents or other caretakers puts children at risk for many negative outcomes, including poor physical and mental health, lower cognitive functioning and educational attainment, and poor social development and behavior. Exposure to Violence in the Community: Witnessing violence in a community is linked to several negative outcomes such as depression, aggressive behavior, anxiety, posttraumatic stress, psychological trauma, and antisocial behavior. School Resources and Environment: Schools with fewer resources are associated with poor academic outcomes, and schools can create environments with problematic social issues such as bullying and behavioral problems. Community Resources: Children who live in high-poverty neighborhoods might be less likely than their peers who live in low-poverty neighborhoods to perceive work as a common activity, and therefore less likely to succeed in school. Residential Mobility: Children who move frequently may experience negative outcomes, such as lower academic performance, high rates of school dropout, emotional and behavioral problems, and engaging in premarital sex. Minority Status: Children of color are more likely to live in high-poverty neighborhoods and to attend lower-performing schools, compared to white youth. Further, racial discrimination can hinder job opportunities for youth.\nThe research literature points out that children are particularly vulnerable if they experience two or more of these risk factors.", "Youth advocates and researchers have recently focused on vulnerable youth who experience negative outcomes in both employment and educational attainment. Generally characterized as disconnected , these youth are not working or attending school. However, there is no uniform definition of this term. On the basis of a CRS review of studies on the population, the definition of disconnected varies, with differences in ages of the youth and the length that youth are not in school or working. The studies count youth as young as age 16 and as old as age 24, with ages in between (i.e., 16 to 19, 18 to 24). Youth are generally considered disconnected if they were not working or in school at the time they were surveyed, or over a period of time prior to the survey. Some of the definitions, however, incorporate other characteristics, such as marital status and educational attainment. Further, several studies used definitions that included only noninstitutionalized youth. This means that these studies do not count youth in prisons, college dorms, mental health facilities, and other institutions.", "Although vulnerable youth experience more negative outcomes than their counterparts who are not considered to be at risk, some of these youth go on to attend college and/or secure employment. Advocates for youth argue that vulnerable youth can reach their goals if given adequate opportunities to develop positive behaviors during adolescence. The federal Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs characterizes positive youth development as a process that engages young people in positive pursuits that help them acquire and practice the skills, attitudes, and behaviors that they will need to become effective and successful adults in their work, family, and civic lives. Further, positive youth development emphasizes that youth can be engaged in their communities, schools, organizations, peer groups, and families in a productive and constructive manner.", "Youth development refers to the processes—physical, cognitive, and emotional—that youth undergo during adolescence. The competencies that youth begin to gain during adolescence can assist them as they transition to adulthood. Youth who master competencies across several domains are more likely to achieve desirable outcomes, including educational and professional success, self-confidence, connections to family and the community, and contributions to society. These areas of competency include the following:\nCognitive : Knowledge of essential life skills, problem solving skills, academic adeptness; Social : Connectedness with others, perceived good relationships with peers, parents, and other adults; Physical: Good health habits, good health risk management skills; Emotional: Good mental health, including positive self-regard; good coping skills; Personal: Sense of personal autonomy and identity, sense of safety, spirituality, planning for the future and future life events, strong moral character; Civic: Commitment to community engagement, volunteering, knowledge of how to interface with government systems; and Vocational: Knowledge of essential vocational skills, perception of future in terms of jobs or careers.\nA primary factor that influences how well youth develop these competencies is the interaction among individual characteristics , or traits influenced by genetic inheritance and prenatal environment; the social environment , which encompasses societal conditions, communities, and schools that can serve to reinforce positive behaviors and promote positive outcomes for vulnerable youth; and the home environment , including discord among parents and monitoring of children by their parents.\nIndividual conditions refer to the characteristics of individuals that can influence resilience. Individual-level characteristics that can promote resilience include social skills, coping strategies, a positive sense of self, and high expectations. Societal conditions —economic conditions, the prevalence of discrimination, and educational institutions—affect the development of youth competencies and connectedness to others. Adolescents who perceive their future in terms of jobs or careers often achieve desirable outcomes. For vulnerable youth, poor economic conditions and fewer opportunities to work can affect how they perceive their future. Youth's interaction with the community is another variable that shapes their development. Community culture, or the values and beliefs of a particular community, may support the positive development of youth by reinforcing cultural norms that favor academic achievement and professional success. Communities can play a role in fostering youth development by providing multiple pathways to help youth strengthen their competencies through schools and other institutions. Youth advocates argue that these pathways should involve services and long-term programs that provide opportunities for youth during the school day and in nonschool hours when youth may be more susceptible to risky behaviors. Within schools, the availability of resources for youth and their parents, such as programs that monitor and supervise youth, and quality youth-serving institutions and organizations can buffer youth from negative community cultures. Outside of schools, youth development programs—such as mentoring and leadership programs—emphasize the positive elements of growing up and engage young people in alternatives to counteract negative pressures.\nFinally, the family context plays a pivotal role in youth development. Parental oversight of their children and family structure affect how well youth transition to adulthood. Positive adolescent development is facilitated when youth express independence from their parents, yet rely on their parents for emotional support, empathy, and advice. Parenting styles and family structure play important roles in the lives of youth. Parents who discipline in a moderate and caring manner, and provide positive sanctions for prosocial behaviors can assist youth to develop a sense of control over their future. Family structures that promote positive parent-child relationships, even after divorce or times of stress (such as separation or loss of a parent), can provide youth with emotional and other support during adolescence and beyond.", "The belief that all youth have assets has formed the basis of the youth development movement that began in the 1980s in response to youth policies and programs that attempted to curb the specific problems facing youth (e.g., pregnancy, drug use) without necessarily focusing on how to holistically improve outcomes for youth and ease their transition to adulthood. A range of institutions have promoted this approach through their literature and programming: policy organizations (Forum for Youth Investment and National Network for Youth); national direct service organizations for youth (4-H and the Boys and Girls Clubs of America); public and private research and philanthropic entities (National Research Council, Carnegie Corporation of New York, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Transitions to Adulthood, Youth Transitions Funders Group); and government sub-agencies with a youth focus (the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Family and Youth Services Bureau and the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention). The youth development movement has attempted to shift from an approach to youth that emphasizes problem prevention to one that addressed the types of attitudes, skills, knowledge, and behaviors young people need to develop for adulthood.\nDespite the endorsement of the positive youth development approach by prominent organizations, the movement has faced challenges. Youth advocates within the movement point to insufficient guidance for program planners and policymakers about prioritizing which youth to serve, given the limited resources available to communities for youth programs. They have also criticized the lack of sufficient evaluation of programs and organizations using a positive development approach. According to these advocates, some youth development efforts have been built on insufficient data about demand for or supply of programs and were started without baseline data on reasonable youth indicators. Further, they argue that youth development messages have, at times, failed to generate excitement among policymakers because they did not convey how positive youth development policy and programs could respond to the challenges young people face and lead to better outcomes for youth and society at large. In turn, the movement has failed to adequately link to local and regional infrastructures that assist with funding, training, and network development.\nTo address these challenges, youth advocates (the same groups that have raised criticisms about the movement) have proposed a number of recommendations. For example, the Forum for Youth has urged advocates to clarify a youth development message that specifies concrete deliverables and to connect the movement to sustainable public and private resources and other youth advocacy efforts. The recommendations have also called for evaluations of youth programs with a positive youth approach and improved monitoring and assessment of programs.\nSince these recommendations were made (over 10 ten years ago), the federal government has increased coordination among federal agencies with youth programs and funded initiatives to assist localities and regions in responding to challenges facing youth. The role of the federal government in assisting vulnerable youth is discussed in the next section.", "The remainder of this report describes the evolution of federal youth policy and provides an overview of current programs and initiatives that focus on vulnerable youth. Many of these initiatives promote coordination of federal youth programs and positive youth development.\nThe federal government has not adopted a single overarching federal policy or legislative vehicle that addresses the challenges that young people experience in adolescence or while making the transition to adulthood. Rather, federal youth policy today evolved from multiple programs and initiatives that began in the early 1900s to assist children and youth. From the turn of the 20 th century through the 1950s, youth policy was generally subsumed under a broad framework of child welfare issues. The Children's Bureau, established in 1912, focused attention on child labor and the protection of children with special needs. The age boundaries of \"youth\" were not clearly delineated, but on the basis of proposed child labor reform legislation at that time, \"child\" referred to those individuals age 16 and under. Also during this period, work and education support programs were created to ease the financial pressures of the Great Depression for older youth (ages 16 to 23), and increasingly, federal attention focused on addressing the growing number of youth classified as delinquent.\nThe subsequent period, spanning the 1960s and 1970s, was marked by the creation of programs that targeted youth in six policy areas: workforce development and job training, education, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, social services, public health, and national and community service. Finally, from the 1980s until the present, many of these programs have been expanded; others like them have been eliminated. The federal government has also recently adopted strategies to better serve the youth population through targeted legislation and initiatives.", "At the turn of the 20 th century, psychologists first formally defined the concept of adolescence. American psychologist G. Stanley Hall characterized the period between childhood and adulthood as a time of \"storm and stress,\" with youth vulnerable to risky behavior, conflict with parents, and perversion. The well-being of adolescents was emerging as an area of concern during this time, albeit as part of a greater focus on child welfare by states and localities. States began to recognize the distinct legal rights of children, generally defined as age 16 and younger, and to establish laws for protecting children against physical abuse, cruelty, and neglect. Children who were abused or neglected were increasingly removed from their homes and placed in almshouses and foster homes by the state. Juvenile courts and reform schools, first created in the late 1800s, were also expanding during this period. By 1912, 22 states had passed legislation to establish juvenile courts.\nThe year 1912 also marked the federal government's initial involvement in matters relating to child welfare with the creation of the Children's Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor. The bureau emerged out of the Progressive Movement, which emphasized that the stresses on family life due to industrial and urban society were having a disproportionately negative effect on children. Though not a Cabinet-level agency, the purpose of the bureau was to investigate and report upon all \"matters pertaining to the welfare of children and child life\" for the federal government; however, the legislation creating the bureau named for special consideration: \"infant mortality, the birth rate, orphanages, juvenile court, desertion, dangerous occupations, accidents and diseases of children, employment, and legislation affecting children in the several States and Territories.\"\nThe concept of a \"youth policy\" in those early years was virtually nonexistent. However, the bureau's efforts in combating child labor and investigating juvenile delinquency from 1912 through the early 1950s targeted youth ages 10 to 16. Bureau Chief Julia Lathrop and Progressive Era advocates pushed for laws that would prohibit the employment of children under age 16. The bureau also tracked the rising number of juvenile delinquents in the 1930s and evaluated the causes of delinquency, citing unhappy home conditions and other factors as a predictor of gang activity. In 1955, the bureau established a division on juvenile delinquency prevention.\nPerhaps the most well-known policies the Children's Bureau implemented that affected youth were through the child health and welfare programs established by the Social Security Act (P.L. 74-231) of 1935. As originally enacted, the law authorized indefinite annual funding of $1.5 million for states to establish, extend, and strengthen public child welfare services in \"predominately rural\" or \"special needs\" areas. For purposes of this program (now at Title IV-B, Subpart 1 of the Social Security Act), these were described as services \"for the protection and care of homeless, dependent, and neglected children, and children in danger of becoming delinquent.\" The Aid to Dependent Children Program (now Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant) was also created under the act to provide financial assistance to impoverished children. \"Dependent\" children were defined as children under age 16 who had been deprived of parental support or care due to a parent's death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity, and was living with a relative. Amendments to the program extended the age of children to 18.\nSeparately in the 1930s, the federal government addressed youth poverty triggered by the Great Depression. The Federal Transient Relief Act of 1933 established a Transient Division within the Federal Transient Relief Administration to provide relief services through state grants. Also in 1933, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) opened camps and shelters for more than 1 million low-income older youth. Two years later, in 1935, President Franklin Roosevelt created the National Youth Administration (NYA) by executive order to open employment bureaus and provide cash assistance to poor college and high school students. The Transient Division was disbanded shortly thereafter.\nFrom 1936 to 1940, legislation was proposed to provide for comprehensive educational and vocational support for older youth. As introduced in 1938, the American Youth Act (S. 1463), if passed, would have established a federal National Youth Administration to administer a system of public-works projects that would employ young persons who were not employed or full-time students. The act would have also provided unemployed youth with vocational advisors to assist them in securing apprentice training. Further, young people enrolled in school and unable to continue their studies without financial support would have been eligible to receive financial assistance to pay school fees and school materials, and personal expenses. The act, however, was never brought to a full vote by the House or Senate. The Roosevelt Administration raised concerns in hearings on the bill that it was too expensive and would have provided some of the same services already administered through the CCC and NYA. (The two programs were eliminated in the early 1940s.)\nBy the late 1940s, the Children's Bureau no longer had jurisdiction to address \"all matters\" concerning children and youth because of federal government reorganizations that prioritized agency function over a particular constituency (e.g., children, poor families, etc.). The bureau was moved in 1949 from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to the Federal Security Agency (FSA), and child health policy issues were transferred to the Public Health Service. The bureau's philosophy of the \"whole child\" diminished further when the FSA was moved to the newly organized Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1953, which was renamed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 1979.", "The 1960s and 1970s marked a period of federal efforts to assist poor and disadvantaged children and their families. President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty initiatives and subsequent social legislation established youth-targeted programs in the areas of workforce development and job training, education, delinquency prevention, social services, and health. The major legislation during this period included the following:\nEconomic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 (P.L. 88-452): As the centerpiece of the War on Poverty, the EOA established the Office of Economic Opportunity. The office administered programs to promote the well-being of poor youth and other low-income individuals, including Job Corps, Upward Bound, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), Head Start, and Neighborhood Youth Corps, among others. The mission of the Job Corps was (and still is) to promote the vocational and educational opportunities of older, low-income youth. Similarly, Upward Bound was created to assist disadvantaged high school students who went on to attend college. Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-10): The purpose of the ESEA was to provide federal funding to low-income schools. Amendments to the act in 1966 (P.L 89-750) created the Migrant Education Program and Migrant High School Equivalency Program to assist states in providing education to children of migrant workers. Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-329): The HEA increased federal funding to universities and created scholarships and low interest loans for students. The act also created the Talent Search Program to identify older, low-income youth with potential for postsecondary education. The act was amended in 1968 (P.L. 90-575) to include two programs: Student Support Services and Upward Bound (which was transferred from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the Office of Education, and later to the U.S. Department of Education). Student Support Services was created to improve disadvantaged (defined as disabled, low-income, or first in their family to attend college) college students' retention and graduation rates. Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-378): The legislation permanently established the Youth Conservation Pilot Program to employ youth of all backgrounds to perform work on federal lands. Comprehensive Employment and Training Activities Act (CETA) of 1973 ( P.L. 93-203 ): The program established federal funding for the Youth Employment and Training Program and the Summer Youth Employment Program. The programs financed employment training activities and on-the-job training. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974 ( P.L. 93-415 ): The act extended federal support to states and local governments for rehabilitative and preventive juvenile justice delinquency projects, as established under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act (P.L. 90-445). The major provisions of the JJDPA funded preventive programs in local communities outside of the juvenile justice system. The act's Title III established the Runaway Youth Program to provide temporary shelter, counseling, and after-care services to runaway youth and their families. Congress later amended ( P.L. 95-115 ) Title III to include homeless youth (and the law is now known as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act). Education for All Handicapped Children of 1975 ( P.L. 94-142 ): The act required all public schools accepting federal funds to provide equal access to education for children with physical and mental disabilities. Public schools were also required to create an educational plan for these students, with parental input, that would emulate as closely as possible the educational experiences of able-bodied children. (This legislation is now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or IDEA.)", "Since 1909, the executive branch has organized a White House Conference on Children (and youth, in later decades). The White House conferences of 1960 and 1971 focused on efforts to promote opportunities for youth. The recommendations from the 1960 conference's forum on adolescents discussed the need for community agencies to assist parents in addressing the concerns of youth, as well as improved social services to adolescents and young adults. The recommendations called for the federal government to establish a unit devoted to youth and to support public and private research regarding the issues facing this population, including their employment, education, military service, marriage, mobility, and community involvement. The 1971 conference had a broader focus on issues that were important to youth at the time. Recommendations from the conference included a suspension of the draft, less punitive measures for drug possession, and income guarantees for poor families.", "In the 1960s, the Children's Bureau began focusing more attention on the needs of adolescents. For example, a Youth Services Unit was established in 1966 and focused on assisting youth in the transition to adulthood by \"identifying the problems and needs of adolescents and young adults in today's changing society, exploring existing resources for meeting these needs, and stimulating new approaches for dealing with them.\" An early focus of the unit was a program on the needs of young parents ages 14 to 19.\nThe separate Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) was created outside of the Children's Bureau (in what was then the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)) in 1970 to provide leadership on youth issues in the federal government. At that time, it was held that young people were placed inappropriately in the juvenile justice system, while others were not receiving needed social services. Known then as the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, the sub-agency proposed a new service delivery strategy (similar to the contemporary positive youth development approach) that emphasized youth's competence, usefulness, and belonging. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974 emphasized that youth committing status offenses (behaviors considered offenses only if carried out by a juvenile, such as truancy or running away) were more in need of care and guidance than they were of punishment. Passage of the JJDPA laid the foundation for much of FYSB's work today with runaway and homeless youth and other vulnerable youth groups.", "Current federal youth policy has resulted from the piecemeal creation of programs across several areas of social policy. Many of the youth-focused programs that trace their history to the War on Poverty continue today, and several new programs, spread across several agencies, have been created. (While the Family and Youth Services Bureau, FYSB, was created to provide leadership on youth issues, it administers a small number of youth programs, including the Runaway and Homeless Youth program and the Teen Pregnancy Prevention program, among others.) Federal youth policy today also includes recent initiatives to promote positive youth development and increase coordination between federal agencies that administer youth-focused programs. Table A-1 in the Appendix provides a description of over 50 major federal programs for youth in six policy areas discussed previously—job training and workforce development, education, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, social services, public health, and national and community service. The table includes the programs' authorizing legislation and U.S. code section; objectives; FY2006 through FY2015 funding levels; agency with jurisdiction; and targeted at-risk youth population. The programs were selected based upon their objectives to serve vulnerable youth primarily between the ages of 10 to 24, or to research this population.\nThe CRS contributors to Table A-1 , their contact information, and CRS reports on some of the programs are listed in Error! Reference source not found. .\nAs enacted, the programs are intended to provide vulnerable youth with the opportunities to develop skills and abilities that will assist them in adolescence and during the transition to adulthood. Congress has allocated funding to these programs for a number of services and activities, including conflict resolution; counseling; crime/violence prevention; gang intervention; job training assistance; mentoring; parental/family intervention; planning and program development; and research and evaluation. The programs differ in size, scope, and funding authorization levels and type (mandatory vs. discretionary).\nThe list is not exhaustive and may omit programs that serve the targeted youth population. Two major block grant programs—the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) and the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG)—are not included because they do not provide dedicated funding for youth activities. However, states can choose to use TANF and SSBG funds for such purposes. TANF law permits states to use block grant funds to provide services to recipient families and other \"needy\" families (defined by the state) so long as the services are expected to help lead to independence from government services or enable needy families to care for children at home. States may also provide services to nonneedy families if they are directed at the goals of preventing and reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies or encouraging the formation of two-parent families. SSBG provides funding to assist states to provide a range of social services to adults and children, and each state determines what services are provided and who is eligible. Youth-focused categories of services that can be funded through the SSBG include education and training services to improve knowledge or daily living skills and to enhance cultural opportunities; foster care services for children and older youth; independent and transitional living services; pregnancy and parenting services for young parents; and special services for youth involved in or at risk of involvement with criminal activity.\nThe following sections briefly discuss selected programs under six policy areas—job training and workforce development, education, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, social services, public health, and national and community service", "The federal government funds four major job training and workforce development programs for youth: Job Corps, Youth Activities, YouthBuild, and Youth Conservation Corps. These programs (except for the Youth Conservation Corps) are administered by the Department of Labor (DOL) and target low-income youth ages 14 (or 16) to 24 who require additional assistance in meeting their vocational goals.\nThe Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA, P.L. 113-128 ) authorizes the DOL programs through FY2020. The Youth Activities programs fund employment training and academic support services for both in-school youth ages 14 to 21 and out-of-school youth ages 16 to 24. In-school youth includes those who are attending school, low-income, and have a specified barrier to employment. Out-of-school youth includes those who meet certain criteria such as being a high school dropout or being low-income. No less than 75% of funds may be used to serve out-of-school youth.\nJob Corps has centers in all 50 states and Puerto Rico where youth live and receive training. Program training consists of career preparation, development, and transition; academic initiatives; and character building.\nCreated by the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1992 ( P.L. 101-625 ) and currently authorized under WIOA, YouthBuild has many of the same educational and vocational objectives as those established under the Job Corps and Youth Activities programs. YouthBuild participants ages 16 to 24 work toward their GED or high school diploma while learning job skills by building affordable housing. Finally, the Youth Conservation Corps, established in 1970 by the Youth Conservation Corps Act (P.L. 91-378) and administered by the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, targets youth ages 15 to 18 of all backgrounds to work on projects that conserve natural resources.", "Most federal education programs for vulnerable youth are authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 and the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The ESEA provides the primary source of federal funds to K-12 education programs, with the largest program being Title I-A. The purpose of the Title I-A program, from its original enactment in 1965 to the present, is, in part, to provide supplementary educational and related services to educationally disadvantaged children who attend schools serving relatively low-income areas. The Higher Education Act is the source of grant, loan, and work-study assistance to help meet the costs of postsecondary education. The act also supports programs by providing incentives and services to disadvantaged youth to help increase their secondary or postsecondary educational attainment. Separate legislation authorizes additional education programs serving youth with disabilities and homeless youth.", "Title I of ESEA provides most of the funding for programs that serve disadvantaged youth, and was most recently reauthorized and amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act ( P.L. 114-95 ). Title I-A (Local Educational Agency Grants) is the largest federal elementary and secondary education program. Title I-A grants fund supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Title I-A also directs state education agencies (SEAs) and local education agencies (LEAs) to support the enrollment, attendance, and success of homeless children and youth. Title I-C (Education of Migratory Children) provides formula grants to state education agencies (SEAs) for the development of programs targeted to migrant students, and Title I-D (Neglected, Delinquent, or At Risk Children and Youth) gives funding to LEAs and SEAs to meet the special educational needs of youth in institutions and correctional facilities for neglected and delinquent youth, as well as youth at risk of dropping out.", "Titles III and IV of the ESEA also target disadvantaged youth. Title III (Language Instruction for English Learners and Immigrant Students) provides grant funding to states to ensure that limited English proficient (LEP) children and youth, including immigrant children and youth, attain English proficiency. Title IV-B (21 st Century Community Learning Centers) provides funding to LEAs for academic and other after-school programs. The purpose of the program is to provide opportunities for academic enrichment, offer students a broad array of additional services, and offer families of served students opportunities for active and meaningful engagement with their children's education.", "The Higher Education Act (P.L. 89-329) authorizes a few programs targeted to vulnerable youth. The primary programs are TRIO, GEAR UP, and the Migrant High School Equivalency program.\nTRIO Programs . The five programs that make up TRIO are designed to assist students from disadvantaged backgrounds to pursue higher education and to complete their postsecondary studies. These programs are Talent Search, Upward Bound, Educational Opportunity Centers, Student Support Services, and Ronald E. McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement. Each of these programs is designed to intervene at various points along the education continuum.\nTalent Search , authorized under the original HEA legislation, encourages youth who have completed at least five years of elementary education to complete high school and enter postsecondary education; to encourage dropouts to reenter school; and to disseminate information about available postsecondary educational assistance. Upward Bound projects seek to motivate middle school and high school students and veterans to complete secondary education and succeed in postsecondary education through instruction and counseling, among other activities.\nEducational Opportunity Centers provide information to prospective postsecondary students regarding available financial aid and academic assistance, and help them apply to college. Student Support Services projects are intended to improve college students' retention and graduation rates, and improve transfer rates from two-year to four-year colleges through instruction; exposure to career options; mentoring; and assistance in graduate admissions and financial aid processes. Finally, the Robert E. McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement program prepares disadvantaged students for postdoctoral study through seminars, research opportunities, summer internships, tutoring, mentoring, and exposure to cultural events and academic programs.\nGEAR UP . Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Program (GEAR UP), a program not part of the TRIO array of programs, was added to the HEA by the Higher Education Act Amendments of 1998 ( P.L. 105-244 ). GEAR UP seeks to increase disadvantaged students' secondary school completion and postsecondary enrollment by providing support services. GEAR UP differs from Trio in two key aspects: the program (1) may serve a cohort of students from seventh grade to their first year of college and (2) may assure students of the availability of financial aid to meet college costs. States or partnerships (schools and at least two other entities, such as community organizations and state agencies) are eligible for funding. Any funded state or partnership must provide comprehensive mentoring, tutoring, counseling, outreach, and support services to participating students.\nSpecial Programs for Students Whose Families Are Engaged in Migrant and Seasonal Farmwork . This program, authorized under HEA, funds institutions of higher education (or private nonprofits in cooperation with institutions of higher education) to recruit and provide academic and support services to individuals who lack a high school diploma and who are or whose parents are engaged in migrant and other seasonal farm work. The purpose of the program is to assist students to obtain a high school equivalency diploma and gain employment, or to attend college or another postsecondary education or training program.", "The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the major statute that provides federal funding for the education of children and youth with disabilities. Part B of the act includes provisions for the education of school-aged children. As a condition for the receipt of funds states must provide \"free appropriate public education\" to youth as old as 21 (age may vary depending on state law). This term refers to the right of all children with disabilities to receive an education and related services that meet state curriculum requirements, at no costs to parents. Appropriateness is defined according to the child's individualized education program (IEP) which delineates the special instruction the child should receive and his or her educational goals.", "The McKinney-Vento Act ( P.L. 100-77 ), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act ( P.L. 114-95 ), authorizes the Department of Education to fund local education agencies (LEAs) to provide homeless children and youth comparable education services. LEAs must assist in determining the school that is in the best interest for a child or youth to attend, and implement policies that remove barriers from these students in attending school.", "The Youth ChalleNGe Program is a quasi-military training program administered by the Army National Guard to improve outcomes for youth who have dropped out of school or have been expelled. The program was established as a pilot program under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1993 ( P.L. 102-484 ), and Congress permanently authorized the program under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 ( P.L. 105-85 ). Currently, 35 programs operate in 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Youth are eligible for the program if they are ages 16 to 18 and enroll prior to their 19 th birthday; have dropped out of school or been expelled; are unemployed; are not currently on parole or probation for anything other than juvenile status offenses and not serving time or awaiting sentencing; and are drug free. The program consists of three phases: a two-week pre-program residential phase where applicants are assessed to determine their potential for completing the program; a 20-week residential phase; and a 12-month postresidential phase. During the residential phase, youth—known as cadets—work toward their high school diploma or GED and develop life-coping, job, and leadership skills. They also participate in activities to improve their physical well-being, and they engage in community service.", "The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) coordinates federal activities and administers programs relating to the treatment of juvenile offenders and the prevention of juvenile delinquency. These programs include those enacted under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.", "The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) was first enacted in 1974 (P.L. 90-415) and was most recently reauthorized in 2002 by the 21 st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act ( P.L. 107-273 ). Its provisions were authorized through FY2007 and FY2008. The JJDPA as originally enacted had three main components: it created a set of institutions within the federal government that were dedicated to coordinating and administering federal juvenile justice efforts; it established grant programs to assist the states with setting up and running their juvenile justice systems; and it promulgated core mandates that states had to adhere to in order to be eligible to receive grant funding. While the JJDPA has been amended several times since 1974, it continues to feature the same three components. While the JJDPA contains a number of major grants, those currently funded include State Formula Grants, the Juvenile Mentoring Program, and Title V Community Prevention Block Grants.\nThe JJDPA authorizes OJJDP to make State Formula Grants to states that can be used to fund the planning, establishment, operation, coordination, and evaluation of projects for the development of more effective juvenile delinquency programs and improved juvenile justice systems. The Juvenile Mentoring Program was repealed in 2002 by the 21 st Century Department of Justice Reauthorization Act ( P.L. 107-273 ); however, it has continued to receive appropriations each subsequent fiscal year. These grants could be awarded to local educational agencies (in partnership with public or private agencies) to establish and support mentoring programs. The Title V Community Prevention Block Grant program authorizes OJJDP to make grants to states, that are then transmitted to units of local government, in order to carry out delinquency prevention programs for juveniles who have come into contact with, or are likely to come into contact with, the juvenile justice system.", "The major social service programs to assist at-risk youth are authorized under the Social Security Act, as amended, and are administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.", "Title IV-E of the Social Security Act authorizes the federal foster care program. Under this program, a state, territory, or tribe may seek federal funds for partial reimbursement of the room and board costs needed to support eligible children who are neglected, abused, or who, for some other reason, cannot remain in their own homes. To be eligible for Title IV-E, a child must be in the care and responsibility of the state and (1) the child must meet income/assets tests and family structure rules in the home he/she was removed from; (2) have specific judicial determinations made related to reasons for the removal and other aspects of his/her removal and placement; and (3) be placed in an eligible licensed setting with an eligible provider(s).\nFoster youth who reach the \"age of majority\" (18 years in most states) and who have not been reunited with their parents or placed with adoptive parents or guardians are said to \"emancipate\" or \"age out\" of foster care. The Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP), created in 1999 ( P.L. 106-169 ) under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. States, territories, and tribes with approved plans receive CFCIP funds to provide services intended to help children who are expected to age out of foster care, those who aged out of foster care, and those who left foster care for adoption or guardianship at age 16 or older to make a successful transition to adulthood. Separately, formula funds are authorized for states, territories, and tribes to provide Education and Training Vouchers (ETVs) for CFCIP-eligible youth. ETVs are intended to cover the cost of attending institutions of higher education (e.g., colleges, universities, and job training programs). Only youth receiving a voucher at age 21 may continue to participate in the voucher program until age 23.", "The Runaway and Homeless Youth Program, established in 1974 under Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, contains three components: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). These programs are designed to provide services to runaway and homeless youth outside of the law enforcement, juvenile justice, child welfare, and mental health systems. Services include temporary and long-term shelter, counseling services, and referrals to social service agencies, among other supports.", "Public health programs for vulnerable youth are concentrated in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). These programs address youth mental health, substance abuse, teen pregnancy prevention, and support for pregnant and parenting teens.", "Public health programs for vulnerable youth are concentrated in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). These programs address youth mental health, substance abuse, teen pregnancy prevention, and support for pregnant and parenting teens.\nSAMHSA is organized into four centers: the Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS), the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), and the Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality (CBHSQ). Collectively, three of the centers administer approximately 13 programs (not all discussed here or in Table A-1 ) for youth ages 10 to 21 (and up to 25 for some programs). The programs primarily target youth with serious emotional disturbances (SED) and youth at risk of abusing drugs and alcohol.\nCMHS . Youth-focused suicide prevention activities are funded by SAMHSA's Garrett Lee Smith (GLS) Campus Suicide Prevention Grant Program and GLS State/Tribal Youth Suicide Prevention and Early Intervention Grant Program. The campus grant program funds services for all students (including those with mental health problems and substance abuse that makes them vulnerable to suicide), while the state/tribal program supports statewide and tribal activities to develop and implement youth suicide prevention and intervention strategies. The Children's Mental Health Services program supports community-based systems of care for children and adolescents with serious emotional disturbances and their families. The program aims to ensure that services are provided collaboratively across youth-serving systems (such as schools and foster care placements) and that each youth receives an individual service plan developed with the participation of the family (and, where appropriate, the youth) to meet the mental health needs of that youth. A second program, the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, was created to establish a national network that provides services and referrals for children and adolescents who have experienced traumatic events. CSAT . The Juvenile Treatment Drug Courts provide treatment for youth who are drug dependent. This program targets juvenile offenders (preadjudicated or adjudicated status, or postdetention), and provides substance abuse treatment, wrap-around services supporting substance abuse treatment, and case management. A judge oversees the drug treatment program and may allow the youth to avoid (further) penalties for their delinquent behavior. CSAP. The Strategic Prevention Framework grants address underage drinking (among those aged 12 to 20) and prescription drug misuse and abuse (among those aged 12 to 25). These grants are intended to prevent the onset and reduce the progression of substance abuse by incorporating SAMSHA's Strategic Prevention Framework, which emphasizes strategic planning and the implementation of evidence-based prevention. The grants support implementation of a five-step process: (1) conduct a community needs assessment; (2) mobilize and/or build capacity; (3) develop a comprehensive strategic plan; (4) implement evidence-based prevention programs and infrastructure development activities; and (5) monitor process and evaluate effectiveness. CSAP also administers, in cooperation with the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, the \" Drug-Free Communities Support Program \" (see subsequent section).", "The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services administers research and education programs to reduce adolescent pregnancy or to provide care services for pregnant and parenting adolescents. The Title IV-E Abstinence Education Grants program provides competitive grants for abstinence education. States may request funding for the Abstinence Education Grants when they solicit Maternal and Child Health block grant funds (used for a variety of health services for women and children, including adolescent pregnancy prevention activities); this funding must be used exclusively for teaching abstinence.\nP.L. 111-148 (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ACA) established a state formula grant program to enable states to operate the Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), which is a comprehensive approach to teen pregnancy prevention that educates adolescents on both abstinence and contraception to prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. It is intended to provide youth with information on several adulthood preparation subjects (i.e., healthy relationships, adolescent development, financial literacy, parent-child communication, educational and career success, and healthy life skills). The program is mandated to provide programs that are evidence-based, medically accurate, and age-appropriate.\nTwo additional programs have been created under recent appropriation laws. The FY2010 omnibus appropriations law ( P.L. 111-117 ) established the authority and funding for HHS to create the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program. Subsequent appropriation laws have provided funding as well. As required in appropriations law, the majority of TPP program grants (Tier 1) must use evidence-based models that have been shown to be effective in reducing teen pregnancy and related outcomes. A smaller share of funding is available for research and demonstration grants (Tier 2) for innovative strategies to prevent teenage pregnancy. Separately, the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education (SRAE) program was established and funded by the FY2016 omnibus appropriations law ( P.L. 114-113 ), and was subsequently funded by the FY2017 omnibus appropriations law ( P.L. 115-31 ). These laws have specified that SRAE funding is available for education in sexual risk avoidance, defined as \"voluntarily refraining from non-marital sexual activity.\"", "The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) is an independent federal agency that administers programs authorized by two statutes: the National and Community Service Act (NCSA, P.L. 101-610 ) of 1990, as amended, and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act (DVSA, P.L. 93-113 ) of 1973, as amended. The focus of these programs is to provide public service to communities in need through multiple service activities. Although CNCS works to involve a diverse range of individuals in their programs, the agency makes particular efforts to engage disadvantaged youth, either because they enroll these youth to help to carry out the programs (i.e., members or volunteers) or provide services to them through the programs (i.e., beneficiaries).\nThe major CNCS programs are organized into two service streams, AmeriCorps and Senior Corps.\nAmeriCorps: AmeriCorps identifies and addresses critical community needs by tutoring and mentoring disadvantaged youth, managing or operating after-school programs, helping communities respond to disasters, improving health services, building affordable housing, and cleaning parks and streams, among other services. There are three AmeriCorps programs: AmeriCorps State and National, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC). Some of the projects funded under the program support youth who are disadvantaged, and a certain share of participants in the NCCC program must be disadvantaged. For example, grantees under the AmeriCorps State and National program place members in organizations and schools to serve disadvantaged youth in grades K through 12 in after-school, before school, and enrichment programs. For providing services full-time for a term of service (up to one year), AmeriCorps members earn an education award equal to the maximum amount of a Pell Grant in the year in which service is rendered (and proportionally less if they provide services for half-time, reduced half-time, etc.). Senior Corps: Senior Corps is composed of volunteers age 55 or older who help to meet a wide range of community challenges through three programs: Foster Grandparents Program (FGP), Retired and Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP), and Senior Companion program. The first two provide assistance in the community by working with children and youth with a variety of needs, among other populations and activities. The FGP provides aid to children and youth with exceptional needs, including children who have been abused or neglected or are otherwise at risk; mentors troubled teenagers and young mothers; cares for premature infants and children with physical disabilities; and teaches reading instruction to children who are falling behind their grade level. RSVP provides a variety of services to communities. These services include tutoring children and teenagers, renovating homes, and serving as museum docents.", "", "Despite the range of services and activities programs for vulnerable youth, many of these programs appear to have developed with little attempt to coordinate them in a policy area or across policy areas. Policymakers and youth advocates argue that federal agencies must develop mechanisms to improve coordination—defined, at minimum, as communication and consultation. They argue that coordination is necessary because of the expansion of programs that serve youth, the increasing complexity and interrelated nature of public policies that affect youth, the fragmentation of policy-making among agencies, and the establishment of new policy priorities that cross older institutional boundaries.\nThe following section discusses federal efforts to improve coordination of youth programs. The section first addresses laws and an executive order that have sought to spur coordination across multiple government agencies. These laws include the Claude Pepper Young Americans Act ( P.L. 101-501 ), YouthBuild Transfer Act ( P.L. 109-281 ), and Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act ( P.L. 109-365 ). Of the three, only the YouthBuild Transfer Act has been funded. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13459 to establish an Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs. Following this discussion is a description of efforts to coordinate programs around specific youth topic areas and youth populations, such as through coordinating councils and grant programs carried out by two or more agencies.", "The Claude Pepper Young Americans Act of 1990 (Title IX of the August F. Hawkins Human Services Reauthorization Act, P.L. 101-501 ) was the first law in recent history to address youth coordination issues; however, the law was never funded. P.L. 101-501 sought to increase federal coordination among agencies that administer programs for children and youth, while also enhancing the delivery of social services to children, youth, and their families through improved coordination at the state and local levels. In its report supporting the act's coordinating provisions, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee noted:\nThe Committee is concerned that the current system of service is fragmented and disjointed, making it difficult, if not impossible for children and families who are being served in one system to access needed services from another. This creates a situation in which problems of children and families not only go unmet but undetected and unresolved. Through the inclusion of these proposals, the Committee hopes to articulate a national commitment to our nation's children, youth, and families and to encourage greater cooperation at federal, state, and local levels.", "The Federal Council on Children, Youth, and Families was authorized by the Young Americans Act to address concerns about the fragmentation and duplication of services for youth at the federal and local levels. The act provided that the council comprise representatives from federal agencies and state or local agencies that serve youth, rural and urban populations; and national organizations with an interest in young individuals, families, and early childhood. The duties of the council were to include (1) advising and assisting the President on matters relating to the special needs of young individuals (and submitting a report to the President in FY1992 through FY1998); (2) reviewing and evaluating federal policies, programs, or other activities affecting youth and identifying duplication of services for these youth; and (3) making recommendations to the President and Congress to streamline services, reduce duplication of services, and encourage coordination of services for youth and their families at the state and local levels. The act was amended in 1994 ( P.L. 103-252 ) to require that the council also identify program regulations, practices, and eligibility requirements that impede coordination and collaboration and make recommendations for their modifications or elimination. Though the council was to be funded through FY1998, funding was never appropriated.", "The Young Americans Act also established grant funding for coordinating resources and providing comprehensive services to children, youth, and families at the state and local levels. For states to receive funding, the act required each state to submit a plan discussing how state and local entities would coordinate developmental, preventive, and remedial services, among other provisions. This grant program was never funded.", "In addition to the programs described in Table A-1 , dozens of other programs in multiple federal agencies target, even in small part, vulnerable youth. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) cataloged 131 programs for at-risk or delinquent youth across 16 agencies in FY1996. GAO defined these youth as individuals age five to 24 who, due to certain characteristics or experiences, were statistically more likely than other youth to encounter certain problems—legal, social, financial, educational, emotional, and health—in the future. The White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth, convened in 2002 under President George W. Bush, compiled a similar list of over 300 programs for disadvantaged youth (using nearly the same definition as GAO) in 12 agencies for FY2003 targeting vulnerable youth and youth generally. (Some of these programs do not necessarily target the most disadvantaged youth or have a singular focus on youth populations.) The task force's final report identified concerns with coordinating these programs. One concern raised was that the federal government does not coordinate services for specific groups of youth (e.g., abused/neglected youth, current or former foster youth, immigrant youth, minority youth, obese youth, urban youth, and youth with disabilities, among others).\nCongress has also examined challenges to coordinating programs targeted to certain groups of youth. For example, the House Committee on Government Reform held a hearing to examine the federal agencies and programs responsible for responding to abused and neglected children. The committee sought to determine the extent to which overlap and duplication among federal child abuse and neglect programs creates inefficiencies that hinder overall effectiveness. In addition, the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support (now known as the Subcommittee on Human Resources) held a hearing on disconnected and homeless youth, and the programs that can assist this population. The hearing examined the ways some of these programs are coordinated or otherwise collaborate.", "The Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth identified several programs, including YouthBuild, that were located in a federal department whose mission does not provide a clear and compelling reason for locating them within that agency. As such, the task force recommended that YouthBuild be transferred from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to the U.S. Department of Labor because of DOL's mission of administering workforce and training programs. As discussed previously, the YouthBuild program provides educational services and job training in construction for low-income youth ages 16 to 24 who are not enrolled in school. On September 22, 2006, the YouthBuild Transfer Act ( P.L. 109-281 ), authorizing the transfer of the program from HUD to DOL, was signed into law. The program is authorized under the Workforce Investment Act, which will be superseded by the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act as of July 1, 2015.", "In response to the concerns generally raised by the White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth, Congress passed the Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (Title VIII of the Older Americans Act, P.L. 109-365 ), which created the Federal Youth Development Council and specified that it would be chaired by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The Council was authorized for FY2007 and FY2008, but was not ultimately established. Funds were not appropriated for these years (or subsequent years). However, on February 7, 2008, President Bush signed Executive Order 13459 to establish an Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs, discussed in the next section, to improve coordination of youth policy.\nAlthough not explicitly stated in P.L. 109-365 , the purpose of the legislation appeared to be twofold: to improve coordination across federal agencies that administer programs for vulnerable youth and to assist federal agencies with evaluating these programs. Table 1 describes the duties of the Council that were discussed in the law to meet these two goals. Prior to the passage of the law, policymakers and advocates asserted that the council could help to improve policy effectiveness by reducing the duplication of effort and working at cross-purposes, while integrating distinct but reinforcing responsibilities among relatively autonomous agencies. They argued that the council could improve accountability of various federal components by consolidating review and reporting requirements. Other duties of the council that are not listed in the table, include providing technical assistance to states to support a state-funded council for coordinating state youth efforts, at a state's request, and coordinating with other federal, state, and local coordinating efforts to carry out its duties.\nThe law specified that the council coordinate with three existing interagency bodies: the Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, the Interagency Council on Homelessness, and the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. (The legislation did not describe how the council should coordinate with these other bodies. For further information on the Coordinating Council, see below.) Further, the law required that the council provide Congress with an interim report within one year after the council's first meeting, as well as a final report not later than two years after the council's first meeting. The final report was to include (1) a comprehensive list of recent research and statistical reporting by various federal agencies on the overall well-being of youth; (2) the assessment of the needs of youth and those who serve youth; (3) a summary of the plan in coordinating to achieve the goals and objectives for federal youth programs; (4) recommendations to coordinate and improve federal training and technical assistance, information sharing, and communication among federal programs and agencies; (5) recommendations to better integrate and coordinate policies across federal, state, and local levels of government, including any recommendations the chair determines appropriate for legislation and administrative actions; (6) a summary of the actions taken by the council at the request of federal agencies to facilitate collaboration and coordination on youth serving programs and the results of those collaborations, if available; (7) a summary of the action the council has taken at the request of states to provide technical assistance; and (8) a summary of the input and recommendations by disadvantaged youth, community-based organizations, among others.", "On February 7, 2008, President Bush signed Executive Order 13459 to establish an Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs (hereinafter, IWGYP). In the order, President Bush cited the success of the interagency collaboration that resulted from the Helping America's Youth (HAY) initiative as the impetus for creating an Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs. HAY was a national initiative, led by First Lady Laura Bush, to promote positive youth development by raising awareness about the challenges facing youth and motivating caring adults to connect with youth through forums and an online resource. This online resource was known as the Community Action Guide, and sought to help communities assess their needs and resources and link them to effective programs to help youth. This tool was created in partnership with nine federal agencies.\nThe IWGYP was convened in 2008. Pursuant to the executive order, the working group consists of multiple federal departments and federal agencies. The primary functions of the working group, as specified in the executive order, include (1) identifying and engaging key government and private or nonprofit organizations that can play a role in improving the coordination and effectiveness of programs serving and engaging youth, such as faith-based and other community organizations; (2) developing a new federal website on youth, built upon HAY's Community Guide, (3) encouraging all youth-serving federal and state agencies, communities, grantees, and organizations to adopt high standards for assessing program results, including through the use of rigorous impact evaluations, as appropriate; and (4) reporting to the President on its work and on the implementation of any recommendations arising from its work.\nCongress has appropriated funds for the IWGYP in one year since the group was established. The IWGYP received a one-time appropriation of $1 million in FY2009 to HHS to be used for soliciting input from young people, state children's cabinet directors, and nonprofit organizations on youth programs; developing an \"overarching strategic plan for federal youth policy,\" and \"recommendation to improve the coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency of programs affecting youth.\" The IWGYP developed a framework to guide development of the plan, which focuses on three overarching outcomes for youth up to the age of 24: health, safety, and wellness; school, family, and community engagement and connections; and education, training, employment, transitions, and readiness for careers and adulthood. From May to December 2010, the Working Group convened listening sessions in 10 communities throughout the United States to solicit input from stakeholders, including state leaders and youth, about the plan. In August and October 2010, the Working Group held meetings, at HHS, to solicit information from the public on the strategic plan. In December 2010, the Working Group published an outline of the strategic plan in the Federal Register and asked for public comments. In February 2013, the IWGYP released a draft report of the strategic plan based on these public comments. A final report was issued in December 2016. The plan describes three overarching goals to improve outcomes for youth:\nCollaboration and coordination: This refers to promoting coordinated strategies to improve youth outcomes across a number of youth-serving programs at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Evidence-based and innovative strategies: This refers to disseminating and encouraging evidence-based programs that have been studied with rigorous evaluation designs and have shown positive effects on intended outcomes. Youth engagement and partnership: This refers to promoting youth engagement and partnership to strengthen programs and benefit youth and their families, and can involve strategies such as information sharing and shared decisionmaking.", "Major differences between the Federal Youth Development Council and the Interagency Working Group, as outlined in the law and executive order, appear to be their leadership structures, membership, and some of their duties. Under both the Federal Youth Development Council and IWGYP, the HHS Secretary is to serve as chair. As part of the IWGYP, the Secretary has the discretion to designate other agency heads as the chair and vice chair after two years, and biennially thereafter. Although the Federal Youth Development Council was authorized for a two-year period (FY2007 and FY2008), the executive order does not specify a date that the IWGYP should be terminated.\nThe authorization for the two entities identified different, but overlapping, memberships. The Council was authorized to include representatives from outside organizations and groups, and the President would have been required to consult with Congress about these appointments. In contrast, the IWGYP consists exclusively of federal staff. The two bodies have some distinct duties, as specified in the law and executive order. Unlike the IWGYP, the Council would have been charged with assessing the needs of youth and those who work with youth to promote positive youth development; recommending quantifiable goals and objectives for youth-serving programs; and advising on the allocation of resources in support of these goals and objectives. And unlike the Council, the IWGYP was directed to create a new federal website on youth that provides training to youth-serving entities and to develop and disseminate strategies to reduce the factors that put youth at risk.\nDespite these differences, the functions of the Council and the IWGYP, as described in law and E.O. 13459, respectively, are similar. Both bodies were directed to improve coordination and collaboration among federal agencies. For example, the law specifies that one of the duties of the Council would have been to ensure communication among the agencies; to assist federal agencies in collaborating on model programs, such as those involving special populations and projects to promote parental involvement; and to coordinate with federal interagency entities, including the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Likewise, the IWGYP is charged with identifying and promoting initiatives and activities that merit strong interagency collaboration because of their potential to offer cost-effective solutions, including mentoring, in concert with the Federal Mentoring Council. The IWGYP is actively working with other partnerships as well.\nThe law and executive order also directed the two bodies to identify and disseminate information about promising youth programs. The law specified that the Council should work with federal agencies to \"promote high-quality research and evaluation, identify and replicate model programs and promising practices, and provide technical assistance relating to the needs of youth.\" Similarly, the executive order directs the IWGYP to encourage various levels of government and organizations to adopt \"high standards for assessing program results ... so that effective practices can be identified and replicated.\" The role of the Working Group's website is to disseminate promising practices and to provide technical assistance to youth-serving organizations and partnerships.\nFinally, the executive order appears broad enough to permit the IWGYP to take on some of the functions that were specified for the Council, such as identifying target populations of youth who are disproportionately at risk for negative outcomes; supporting initiatives that target certain populations of youth, such as migrant youth or youth in foster care; and soliciting and documenting ongoing input and recommendations from youth, national youth development experts, researchers, community-based organizations, state and local governments, and other stakeholders.", "", "The White House Council for Community Solutions was created by President Obama under Executive Order 13560. The order directed leaders from public, private, and other sectors to identify areas in which the federal government can contribute to cross-sector collaboration, among other responsibilities. The council focused its efforts on disconnected youth, or those youth ages 16 to 24 who are not working or in school. The council engaged in outreach and listening sessions with youth and other stakeholders, and determined that it would refer to disconnected youth as \"opportunity youth\" because they found that young people have \"energy and aspirations and do not view themselves as disconnected.\" The council also developed a final report of its findings and recommendations for creating these collaborative initiatives. The report discusses types of collaborations, identifies the characteristics of successful collaborations, and addresses the resources these collaborations need to be sustained.", "The Coordinating Council (Council) on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention was established by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-415 ) and is administered by the Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The Council's primary functions are to coordinate federal programs and policies concerning juvenile delinquency prevention, unaccompanied juveniles, and missing and exploited children; however, the Council has convened meetings on other groups of vulnerable youth. The Council is led by the Attorney General and the Administrator of OJJDP and includes the heads of all the federal agencies that touch on these broad areas, including the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Education; the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation for National and Community Service; and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (now the Commissioner of Immigration and Customs Enforcement).", "In February 2014, President Obama established the My Brother's Keeper Task Force (\"MBK Task Force\") to determine the public and private efforts needed to enhance positive outcomes for boys and young men of color. The MBK Task Force is made up of representatives from various federal agencies. In a June 2014 report, the MBK Task Force developed a set of recommendations that identify roles for government, business, nonprofit, philanthropic, faith-based, and community partners. The recommendations focus on ensuring that boys and young men of color are ready for school, achieve in school, complete postsecondary education or training, and successfully enter the workforce. In addition, the report discusses the need for partnerships between the public and private sector, such as recruiting mentors for youth. In its April 2016 report, the MBK Task Force described selected federal, state, and local initiatives aimed at improving the educational and employment outcomes for young men of color under the auspices of the MBK initiative. The report noted that the private sector has committed more than $600 million in grants and in-kind resources (and $1 billion in low-interest financing) to support activities that are aligned with the priorities outlined in the initiative. It continues as an initiative of the Obama Foundation.", "President Obama's FY2013 budget request proposed using existing funds to support Performance Partnership Pilots (P3) for disconnected youth. Specifically, the proposal sought to identify, through a demonstration, strategies for providing services to assist youth ages 14 to 24 with specified barriers (homeless, in foster care, involved in the juvenile justice system, or neither employed nor enrolled in an educational institution) in achieving educational, employment, and other goals. Such strategies would be carried out at the local, regional, or state level and would involve two or more federal programs with related goals. This proposal was not funded in FY2013; however, the FY2014 appropriations law ( P.L. 113-76 ), FY2015 appropriations law ( P.L. 113-235 ), FY2016 appropriations law ( P.L. 114-113 ), and FY2017 appropriations law ( P.L. 115-31 ) have provided authority for the Departments of Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services (along with the Corporation for National and Community Service and related agencies) to carry out up to 10 Performance Partnership Pilot projects. In addition, the appropriation laws for FY2015 through FY2017 specified that selected appropriations for the Department of Justice and Department of Housing and Urban Development can be used to support the P3 initiative.\nGenerally, these federal agencies may use discretionary funding to carry out pilots that involve federal education, training, employment, social services, juvenile justice, and housing assistance programs targeted to disconnected youth, or are designed to prevent youth from disconnecting from school or work. The law enables the agencies to enter into agreements with states, regions, localities, or tribal communities that give them flexibility in using discretionary funds across these programs. The pilots must identify the populations to be served, outcomes to be achieved, and methodology for measuring outcomes, among other items. Federal agencies must ensure that their participation does not result in restricting eligibility of any individual for any of the services funded by the agency or will not otherwise adversely affect vulnerable populations that receive such services under the pilot. The law also specifies that federal agencies that use discretionary funds may seek to waive certain program requirements necessary for achieving the outcomes of the pilots, provided that the agencies deliver written notice to Congress (and subject to limitations on waivers related to nondiscrimination, wage and labor standards, or allocation of funds to states or other jurisdictions). In addition, appropriation laws for FY2016 and FY2017 have specified that the pilot communities must include those that have experienced civil unrest.\nThe Department of Education, on behalf of the agencies involved, has invited eligible entities to apply for funding. Eligible applicants could include partnerships that involve public and private (nonprofit, business, industry, and labor) organizations, with a lead entity being a state, local, or tribal government entity head. The most recent authority for the initiative, the FY2017 appropriations law, enables P3 to extend through September 30, 2021.", "HHS's Administration for Children and Families (ACF), the agency that carries out most federal child welfare programs, has partnered with other agencies to focus on the mental health and educational needs of children in foster care. ACF is coordinating with the Centers on Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), both agencies at HHS, to \"support effective management\" of prescription medication for children in foster care, and they have called on their state counterparts to do the same. Further, CMS, ACF, and SAMHSA convened state directors of child welfare, Medicaid, and mental health agencies in August 2012 to address use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care as well as the mental health needs of children who have experienced maltreatment. In a letter to states about their joint work, the three federal agencies said that \"State Medicaid/CHIP agencies and mental health authorities play a significant role in providing continuous access to and receipt of quality mental health services for children in out-of-home care. Therefore it is essential that State child welfare, Medicaid, and mental health authorities collaborate in any efforts to improve health, including medication use and prescription monitoring structures in particular.\"\nSeparately, HHS has partnered with the Department of Education (ED) in an effort to improve the educational outcomes of youth in foster care. HHS and ED convened a meeting in 2011 with state child welfare, education, and juvenile court officials for every state, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico. The purpose of the meeting was to encourage collaboration across these different systems as a way to ensure that youth are continuously enrolled in school and that schools are meeting the needs of these youth. The jurisdictions worked on action plans to implement strategies for collaboration, and they continue to implement these plans. Since this time, the two departments have published guidance on educational support for children in foster care. In June 2014, ED and HHS issued a joint letter to education authorities about the provisions in the Fostering Connections Act ( P.L. 110-351 , enacted in 2008) that seek to increase educational stability for children in foster care. In June 2016, the two departments released guidance on the provisions in the Every Student Succeeds Act ( P.L. 114-95 , enacted in 2015) for supporting children in foster care.", "In response to the recommendations made by the Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth, the U.S. Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Labor partnered with the Social Security Administration to improve communication and collaboration across programs that target at-risk youth groups under an initiative called the \"Shared Youth Vision.\" The agencies convened an Interagency Work Group and conducted regional forums in 16 states to develop and coordinate policies and research on the vulnerable youth population. Representatives from federal and state agencies in workforce development, education, social services, and juvenile justice participated in the forums. The purpose of these forums was to create and implement plans for improving communication and collaboration between local organizations that serve at-risk youth. In FY2014, DOL competitively awarded grants to these states (totaling $1.6 million) for assisting them in developing strategic plans to link their systems that serve youth. For example, Arizona created an initiative to bring together state and county agencies that can help youth exiting foster care or the juvenile justice system in two counties in connecting to education and employment services and supports.", "Since FY2009, HHS, ED, and DOJ have supported the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative to reduce violence and drug abuse at schools (K-12) and in communities. Local education agencies—in partnership with local law enforcement, public mental health, and juvenile justice entities—apply for SS/HS funding. The initiative has sponsored projects in schools and communities that (1) provide a safe school environment; (2) offer alcohol-, other drug-, and violence-prevention activities and early intervention for troubled students; (3) offer school and community mental health preventive and treatment intervention programs; (4) offer early childhood psychosocial and emotional development programs; (5) support and connect schools and communities; and (6) support safe-school policies. Examples of programs for youth K through 12 th grade have included after-school and summer tutoring programs; recreational activities such as chess club; volunteering; and coordinated social service and academic activities for youth at risk of engaging in delinquent behavior, including mental health care services, peer mentoring, and parent workshops.", "The Drug-Free Communities Support Program is administered by SAMSHA and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (which has entered into an agreement with OJJDP to manage the program on behalf of the agency). The program awards grants to community coalitions through a competitive grant award process. The program is intended to strengthen the capacity of the coalitions to reduce substance abuse among youth (and adults) and to disseminate timely information on best practices for reducing substance abuse.", "This report provided an overview of the vulnerable youth population and examined the federal role in supporting these youth. Although a precise number of vulnerable youth cannot be aggregated (and should not be, due to data constraints), these youth are generally concentrated among seven groups: youth \"aging out\" of foster care, runaways and homeless youth, juvenile justice-involved youth, immigrant youth and youth with limited English proficiency (LEP), youth with physical and mental disabilities, youth with mental disorders, and youth receiving special education. Each of these categories is comprised of youth with distinct challenges and backgrounds; however, many of these youth share common experiences, such as unstable home and neighborhood environments, coupled with challenges in school. Without protective factors in place, vulnerable youth may have difficulty transitioning to adulthood. Detachment from the labor market and school—or disconnectedness—is perhaps the single strongest indicator that the transition has not been made adequately. Despite the negative forecast for the employment and education prospects of vulnerable youth, some youth experience positive outcomes in adulthood. Youth who develop strong cognitive, emotional, and vocational skills, among other types of competencies, have greater opportunities to reach their goals. Advocates for youth promote the belief that all youth have assets and can make valuable contributions to their communities despite their challenges.\nThe federal government has not developed a single overarching policy or program to assist vulnerable youth, like the Older Americans Act program for the elderly. Since the 1960s, a number of programs, many operating in isolation from others, have worked to address the specific needs (i.e., vocational, educational, social services, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, and health) of these youth. More recently, policymakers have taken steps toward a more comprehensive federal response to the population. The YouthBuild Transfer Act of 2006 moved the YouthBuild program from HUD to DOL because the program is more aligned with DOL's mission of administering workforce and training programs. Also in 2006, the Tom Osborne Youth Coordination Act was passed to improve coordination across federal agencies that administer programs for vulnerable youth and to assist federal agencies with evaluating these programs. In February 2008, President Bush signed an executive order establishing a federal Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs. Other coordinating efforts, such as the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and Shared Youth Vision initiative, may have the resources and leadership to create a more unified federal youth policy, albeit the Council has a primary focus on juvenile justice-involved youth.\nIn addition to the Federal Youth Coordination Act, the few youth-targeted acts over the over the past several years have not passed or have passed without full implementation. The unfunded Claude Pepper Young Americans Act of 1990 sought to increase coordination among federal children and youth agencies by creating a Federal Council on Children, Youth, and Families that would have streamlined federal youth programs and advised the President on youth issues.\nThough federal legislation targeted at vulnerable young people has not been passed or implemented in recent years, Executive Order 13459 and current collaborations (My Brother's Keeper and the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) appear to have begun addressing, even in small measure, the needs of this population.", "" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h3_full h2_full h4_full h1_full", "h0_title", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "h3_title h1_full", "", "h3_full", "", "", "h2_title", "", "", "", "", "h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h4_title h3_title", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h3_full", "", "", "h4_title", "", "h4_full", "", "h4_full", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What characterizes the safety of American youth?", "What is the pattern that is observed that, for most children, leads to self-sufficiency?", "What describes the assistance that many youth receive from their parents?", "What additional challenges might those who are in vulnerable youth populations experience?", "What are some potential consequences for youth who are at risk and who are struggling to transition to adulthood?", "What is the strongest indicator that the transition to adulthood has not been successful?", "From what has current federal policy evolved?", "On what six areas do the government programs focus?", "What is one problem that exists, even though there is a range of federal services to assist disadvantaged youth?", "What is the lack of coherence due to, in part?", "What was one response to the to the concerns about the structure?", "How else has Congress addressed this problem?", "How does the Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs characterize positive youth development?", "What has the executive branch established to support youth?", "How has the judicial branch supported at-risk youth?", "What is the purpose of the Performance Partnership Pilots (P3) initiative?" ], "summary": [ "The majority of young people in the United States grow up healthy and safe in their communities.", "Most of those of school age live with parents who provide for their well-being, and they attend schools that prepare them for advanced education or vocational training and, ultimately, self-sufficiency. Many youth also receive assistance from their families during the transition to adulthood. During this period, young adults cycle between attending school, living independently, and staying with their families.", "A study from 2009 found that over 60% of young people ages 19 to 22 receive financial support from their parents, including help with paying bills (42%), tuition assistance (35%), providing personal vehicles (23%), and paying rent (21.5%). Even with this assistance, the current move from adolescence to adulthood has become longer and increasingly complex.", "For vulnerable (or \"at-risk\") youth populations, the transition to adulthood is further complicated by a number of challenges, including family conflict or abandonment and obstacles to securing employment that provides adequate wages and health insurance.", "These youth may be prone to outcomes that have negative consequences for their future development as responsible, self-sufficient adults. Risk outcomes include teenage parenthood; homelessness; drug abuse; delinquency; physical and sexual abuse; and school dropout.", "Detachment from the labor market and school—or disconnectedness—may be the single strongest indicator that the transition to adulthood has not been made successfully.", "The federal government has not adopted a single overarching federal policy or legislative vehicle that addresses the challenges vulnerable youth experience in adolescence or while making the transition to adulthood. Rather, federal youth policy today has evolved from multiple programs established in the early 20th century and expanded in the years following the 1964 announcement of the War on Poverty.", "These programs are concentrated in six areas: workforce development, education, juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, social services, public health, and national and community service. They are intended to provide vulnerable youth with opportunities to develop skills to assist them in adulthood.", "Despite the range of federal services and activities to assist disadvantaged youth, many of these programs have not developed into a coherent system of support.", "This is due in part to the administration of programs within several agencies and the lack of mechanisms to coordinate their activities.", "In response to concerns about the complex federal structure developed to assist vulnerable youth, Congress passed the Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (P.L. 109-365) in 2006. Though activities under the act were never funded, the Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs was formed in 2008 under Executive Order 13459 to carry out coordinating activities across multiple agencies that oversee youth programs.", "Separately, Congress has considered other legislation to improve the delivery of services to vulnerable youth and provide opportunities to these youth through policies with a \"positive youth development\" focus.", "The Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs characterizes positive youth development as a process that engages young people in positive pursuits that help them acquire and practice the skills, attitudes, and behaviors that they will need to become successful adults.", "In addition to the Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs, the executive branch has established working groups and initiatives to coordinate supports for youth.", "The Department of Justice has carried out the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention since the 1970s to coordinate federal policies on youth involved in the juvenile justice system.", "More recently, the Obama and Trump Administrations have carried out the Performance Partnership Pilots (P3) initiative to coordinate funding across selected agencies to support local communities in serving vulnerable youth." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 3, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4 ] }
CRS_94-908	{ "title": [ "", "The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 (As Amended)", "Origins of the Act", "A Gradual Process of Evolution7", "Early Modification", "Executive Order No. 5778 (1932)", "The Copeland \"Anti-Kickback\" Act (1934)", "The Davis-Bacon Amendments of 1935", "A Period of Growing Contentiousness", "The Roosevelt Subcommittee (1962-1964)", "The Nixon Suspension of Davis-Bacon (1971)", "Administrative Clashes Over Davis-Bacon", "The 1979 GAO Report", "Administrative Reform Under President Reagan", "The Bush Suspension of Davis-Bacon (1992 1993)", "Developments During the Clinton Administration", "A New Suspension under George W. Bush (2005 ff.)", "Getting to Know the Davis-Bacon Act, Pro and Con", "Arguments Generally Critical of Davis-Bacon", "Arguments Generally Supportive of Davis-Bacon", "How Good is the Information We Have Concerning the Effects of the Davis-Bacon Act?", "The General Nature of Davis-Bacon Research", "Significant Gaps", "Some Agency Studies", "Views from the Private Sector", "Bibliography" ], "paragraphs": [ "The Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. §§ 276a-276a-5, now re-codified as 40 U.S.C. 3141-3148) became law in 1931. As amended, the act requires that construction contracts entered into by the federal government specify minimum wages to be paid to the various classes of laborers and mechanics working under those contracts. Minimum wages are defined by the act as those determined by the Secretary of Labor (a) to be prevailing (b) in the locality of the project (c) for similar crafts and skills (d) on comparable construction work. The prevailing wage concept was expanded in 1964 to include a fringe benefit component. The act has a coverage threshold of $2,000.\nThrough the years, Davis-Bacon prevailing wage provisions have been added to more than 50 program statutes. In addition, many states and some local jurisdictions have \"little Davis-Bacon\" acts of their own. Most of these differ from each other in coverage or other requirements—and differ, as well, from the federal statute.\nThis report sketches the evolution of the Davis-Bacon Act and suggests the scope of the controversy that has formed around it. It then examines, briefly, some of the trends in the scholarship and reportage concerning the act and, finally, provides a bibliography of published non-documentary sources that are generally available to persons with a deeper interest in the statute, its history, and its administration.", "Early in the 20 th century, it was not at all clear that the federal government had the authority to regulate wages and conditions of work in the private sector. When Congress attempted to deal legislatively with hours of work, child labor or minimum wages, its enactments were often found by the courts to be in violation of its constitutional authority. Only after 1937 when the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a Washington state labor standards statute ( West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (300 U.S. 379)) did Congress assume a more confident affirmative role in regulation of the workplace.", "If government found its role in the private sector somewhat circumscribed by the courts, it was on was on firmer constitutional ground in prescribing labor standards for its own direct employees. Thus, public employees, both federal and those in state and local government, were often protected by mandated minimum wage and overtime pay standards.\nBut, while their own employees were protected, some public agencies sought to circumvent these requirements (and to expand their purchasing power) by \"contracting out\" for construction, goods and services. This caused some reformers to protest that the various units of government ought to provide a better example of fairness for private sector employers.\nIn 1891, Kansas adopted a law requiring that \"not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed shall be paid to laborers, workmen, mechanics, and other persons so employed by or on behalf of the state of Kansas\" or of other local jurisdictions. Through the next several decades, other states followed suit, enacting a variety of labor-protective statutes covering workers in contract production.\nFederal contracting practice, into the 1930s, required that \"the lowest responsible bid\" be accepted. In this instance, responsibility referred to a reasonable expectation that a project could be completed in a timely fashion without regard for the wages paid to workers or the conditions under which they worked. This \"made the government an unwilling collaborator with unscrupulous firms that sought to get government business by cutting wages.\" In the construction field, it was alleged that migratory contractors from low-wage sections of the country would bid for federal work and, because they paid wage rates lower than those prevailing in the locality of a proposed project (and employed nonresident workers), they enjoyed a competitive advantage over \"fair\" local contractors.\nIn 1927, Representative Robert L. Bacon (R-NY) introduced legislation to require that locally prevailing wage standards be met in federal construction work. Although hearings were conducted, the legislation was not brought to the floor. Similar legislation was introduced in 1928 and again in 1930. Finally, in March 1931, at the urging of the Hoover Administration, the Bacon Act (co-sponsored by Senator James Davis (R-PA), formerly Secretary of Labor in the Harding, Coolidge and Hoover Administrations) was passed and signed by President Herbert Hoover.", "Almost immediately after its adoption, certain deficiencies in the Davis-Bacon Act became apparent. Both industry and organized labor, while voicing different concerns, appealed to the Congress and to the White House for revision of the statute.", "While mandating under Davis-Bacon that not less than the locally prevailing wage be paid, Congress had not established a regular system though which such wage rate determinations might be made. Thus, contractors, when bidding on a public project, had to commit themselves to pay whatever wage could be agreed upon or, in the event of a dispute, whatever wage the Secretary of Labor might later decide was prevailing. Thus, industry sought amendment of the act to provide for predetermination of wage rates.\nOrganized labor was concerned that enforcement procedures under the act were inadequate. Pointing to the $5,000 threshold for triggering the statute, it noted that certain employers might fragment contracts in order to escape the act's requirements. Besides, the unions suggested, many contracts for painting and decorating fell below the threshold and thus, workers in those fields would not be covered at all.\nIt was alleged that some employers paid the locally prevailing rate to their employees as the act required, but would then demand, under the table, a \"kick-back\" of a portion of that wage. Some estimated that as much as 25% of the legitimate wage costs for federal projects was being returned to employers through kick-back arrangements.", "Under pressure both from labor and employers, Congress commenced oversight hearings on the recently adopted statute in January 1932; but, just as the hearings began, President Hoover issued Executive Order No. 5778, generally strengthening the enforcement and administration of the act. Since the Hoover reforms, a fine tuning of implementation of the statute, had been achieved through administrative action and, thus, could be reversed at will by a later President, Congress pressed forward with legislative action. But, when the legislation reached the President's desk in July 1932, Mr. Hoover vetoed the bill, his Labor Secretary, William Doak, observing that the measure \"would be impracticable of administration\" and \"would stretch a new bureaucracy across the country.\"", "Congressional hearings on public contracting issues continued through the next several years. With support from the Roosevelt Administration, legislation authored by Senator Royal Copeland (D-NY) was called up in the Senate (April 26, 1934) and, after a brief statement by the Senator, passed. The House proceeded in a similar fashion, acting without debate. On June 13, 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the measure. The Copeland \"anti-kickback\" Act provided a fine and/or imprisonment for anyone who induces any person engaged in federal or federally financed construction \"to give up any part of the compensation to which he is entitled under his contract of employment.\" The act authorized the administering agencies to \"make reasonable regulations\" for its enforcement, but specifically required that \"each contractor and subcontractor shall furnish weekly a sworn affidavit with respect to the wages paid each employee during the preceding week.\"", "By the spring of 1935, Senator David Walsh (D-MA) had drawn up general Davis-Bacon amendments, designed to address perceived administrative problems. The Davis-Bacon amendments of 1935 reduced the threshold for coverage from $5,000 to $2,000. They provided coverage for all federal contract construction of whatever character to which the United States and the District of Columbia might be a party: \"construction, alteration, and/or repair, including painting and decorating, of public buildings or public works.\" Henceforth, bids for contracts covered by Davis-Bacon were to state \"the minimum wages to be paid various classes of laborers and mechanics,\" thus establishing a requirement of predetermination of the wage rates. The Comptroller General was directed to prepare a list of contractors who had \"disregarded their obligations to employees and subcontractors\" with such violators of the Davis-Bacon/Copeland provisions to suffer potential debarment from further federal contracts for a period of up to three years. Other administrative provisions were also included.", "For a period of about 20 years following adoption of the 1935 Davis-Bacon Act amendments, the act appears to have attracted little attention. Then, in the mid-1950s, Congress began, increasingly, to add Davis-Bacon provisions to program statutes, triggering debate over both the substance and application of the act. Defense construction and the new space program brought the act into renewed prominence during the early 1960s and, since that time, it has remained more-or-less continuously a focus of congressional interest.", "In 1962, a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor was assigned the task of general oversight of Davis-Bacon Act—by this point, three decades old—and the related contract labor standards statutes. Chaired by Representative James Roosevelt (D-CA), the Subcommittee conducted the most extensive review of the act since the mid-1930s.\nIn addition to general operation of the statute, the Roosevelt Subcommittee focused specifically upon the following areas: (a) how Davis-Bacon wage rate determinations are made and the extent to which they are an accurate reflection of wage rates that actually prevail, locally, in the area of construction; (b) whether a system of review of Davis-Bacon wage rate determinations and related decisions of the Department of Labor might be needed; and (c) \"any other constructive proposals\" for the improvement of the act and of its administration. The work of the Subcommittee resulted in enactment of the 1964 \"fringe benefit\" amendment to the act which expanded the prevailing rate concept from the cash wage alone to both cash and fringe benefits—or the value of the latter. Further, indirectly, it may have encouraged the Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, to create within the Department in 1964 the Wage Appeals Board to hear Davis-Bacon cases. But, there were no broad changes in the act comparable to those of 1935.\nThe Subcommittee, however, exposed what appears to have been a jurisdictional clash between the General Accounting Office (recently renamed Government Accountability Office) (GAO) and the Department of Labor (DOL) with respect to Davis-Bacon. Spokespersons for GAO, testifying before the Subcommittee, were openly critical of the Department's administration of the act. In the wake of the hearings, there followed, between 1962 and 1971, a series of eight separate GAO reports that urged reform of the administration of the act and that seemed to argue that Davis-Bacon might be ill-advised as public policy. How seriously GAO's perspectives were taken is not entirely clear, but Congress continued to support the act and to extend its provisions as various construction-related measures were adopted.", "The authors of the Davis-Bacon, in 1931, had included a provision which allows the President, \"[i]n the event of a national emergency,\" to suspend the act. The concept of \"national emergency\" was not defined nor were the conditions under which a suspension might occur. In 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt had suspended the act for three weeks , apparently for purposes of administrative convenience related to operation of the various New Deal enactments of that period. The Nixon suspension of Davis-Bacon (1971) occurred within the context of the President's campaign to bring inflation under control.\nIn 1970, President Richard Nixon was engaged in an effort to curb inflationary pressures—notably within the construction industry. He had conferred both with industry and trade union officials urging moderation in wage/price matters but, apparently, without entire success. In that context, on February 23, 1971, President Nixon suspended the Davis-Bacon Act and suspended, as well, the Davis-Bacon provisions that had been incorporated by Congress in the various federal program statutes. His action raised a number of issues, some of them legal, and gave the Davis-Bacon Act renewed visibility. A month later, on March 29, 1971, the President restored the act, unchanged, but also established a tripartite Construction Industry Stabilization Committee as part of his wage/price control apparatus.", "Through the 1970s, administrative conflict over Davis-Bacon (and efforts to reform or to repeal the act) grew more intense. With the diverse character of federal programs (in construction, goods and services), a need arose for better operational coordination of various statutes and regulations, among them the federal contract labor standards statutes. In reorganization plans set forth in 1947 and 1950, the Truman Administration had attempted to establish, clearly, responsibility for administration of the Davis-Bacon Act; but that initiative notwithstanding, interagency disputes with respect to Davis-Bacon (and the related Walsh-Healey and McNamara-O'Hara Acts) appear to have continued.\nDuring the Ford and Carter Administrations, these interagency disputes continued intermittently, involving the Department of Labor, the several contracting agencies, the Office of Management and Budget, and GAO. Further, interest groups, journalists and political pundits lined up on each side of these conflicts—and, ultimately, these matters, essentially administrative, became the focus of congressional hearings. In turn, the hearings generated further public comment and reaction both from defenders and from critics of the act.", "Amid interagency squabbles and industry criticism of the act, a new report appeared from the General Accounting Office. The 1979 GAO report was titled simply, The Davis-Bacon Act Should Be Repealed . Immediately controversial, the report reviewed GAO's longstanding criticism of the DOL's administration of the act. Through the summer of 1979, the report and the issues it raised became the focus of three congressional hearings—though no legislated revision of the act was passed. Perhaps as important as legislation, however, the GAO report (with the hearings record) provided a body of material from which critics of the act would draw through the next decade and beyond.\nInfluenced in part by the GAO report and by the attention that it had focused upon Davis-Bacon issues, the DOL (late in the Carter Administration) proposed certain changes in the administration of the act. But, in practical terms, these proposals came too late. Published on January 16, 1981, they would have taken effect on February 14, 1981—by which point a new Presidential administration had assumed control. The proposals for reform of the Davis-Bacon Act, issued by the Carter Administration, were promptly withdrawn by President Reagan.", "Building from the foundation laid down by the Carter Administration, the Reagan Labor Department proposed a new body of Davis-Bacon reforms in August 1981, calling for public comment. Final regulations were issued in May 1982 to take effect in July of that year. Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan affirmed that \"the final rule should be very well received by contractor groups.\" He also acknowledged that \"labor may react unfavorably.\" He was right on both counts. Trade union leaders were \"shocked and angered\" and viewed the regulations as a \"back door attempt to nullify the law.\" Industry sources, noting that they had been \"working for years to abolish or amend the Davis-Bacon law and the regulations that implement it\" termed the Reagan regulations \"a major improvement.\"\nEssentially, the Reagan regulations simplified the wage rate determination procedures, weakened or streamlined (depending upon one's perspective) the reporting requirements of the Copeland \"anti-kickback\" Act, and would have allowed increased flexibility in the employment of \"helpers\" (persons not necessarily possessing craft training) on Davis-Bacon projects. Litigation extended into the Bush Administration. At large, the courts acceded to the Secretary of Labor's discretion in wage rate determination. However, the Department was instructed to restructure its Copeland Act proposals and those dealing with the use of helpers. That process has not yet resulted in final regulatory change. Meanwhile, some have argued that the Reagan reforms, like those instituted by President Hoover 50 years earlier, are vulnerable to further change, administratively, and therefore ought to be codified in statute.", "Davis-Bacon critics had, through the years and for a variety of reasons, urged that the act be suspended by Presidential decree—as the President has the authority to do within the context of a \"national emergency.\" During the winter and spring of 1992, that action was urged upon George Bush but, by early summer, the issue had faded from public view.\nThen, on October 14, 1992, President Bush suspended Davis-Bacon as applied in parts of the states of Florida, Louisiana and Hawaii. The three states had been battered by hurricanes and President Bush declared the resulting destruction an emergency for purposes of suspending Davis-Bacon. The suspension, he affirmed, could create \"as many as five to eleven thousand new jobs in the construction industry in these states\" and he noted further that payment of the locally prevailing wage in the storm-damaged areas would \"increase the costs\" of rebuilding. Critics argued that the suspension was not justified. The suspension was open-ended—to remain in effect until President Bush or his successor restored the act. On March 6, 1993, President William Clinton did restore the statute to its full force.\nBecause of the difficulty of collecting relevant data, it would have been necessary to have had a plan for such collection in place at the time of the 1992-1993 suspension. Since this apparently was not done, there is no available comprehensive assessment of the impact, if any, of the suspension.", "With President Clinton in the White House, the future of Davis-Bacon seemed, to some, secure. But, in the wake of the 1994 election, things changed. On January 4, 1995, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), new chair of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, introduced S. 141 , an uncomplicated proposal that would have repealed both Davis-Bacon and the Copeland Act. In the House, Representative Cass Ballenger (R-NC) proposed a similar bill ( H.R. 500 ).\nBut, as a potential repeal movement was mounted, an opposition gradually came into play. Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) proposed legislation to revise and to strengthen the act ( S. 1183 ). Companion legislation was introduced in the House: H.R. 2472 by Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA). Although both bills died at the close of the 104 th Congress (as did S. 141 and H.R. 500 ), momentum had disappeared. No sustained effort toward repeal or modification of the statutes was made during the later Clinton Administration—though the Davis-Bacon Act remained a source of concern as program legislation was introduced. However, there were those who were convinced that repeal was in the best interest of the country.", "Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast with great force in late August 2005. Various Members of Congress suggested that a suspension of Davis-Bacon \"will avoid costly delays that [will] impede clean-up and reconstruction efforts.\" It was charged that Davis-Bacon \"regulations effectively discriminate against\" employment of \"non-union and lower-skilled workers\" and \"can even raise total construction costs by up to 38%.\" \"Faced with the massive rebuilding challenges ahead,\" a letter to the President stated, \"we respectively urge you to make a presidential proclamation to suspend Davis-Bacon until our country is once again whole.\"\nOn September 8, 2005, stating that wage rates imposed by Davis-Bacon \"increase the cost to the Federal Government of providing Federal assistance\" to the Gulf Coast region, President George W. Bush suspended the Davis-Bacon Act as it relates to specific segments of the country : that is, to portions of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. He specified both the act and \"the provisions of all other acts providing for the payment of wages, which provisions are dependent upon determinations by the Secretary of Labor\" under the Davis-Bacon rules, would be suspended. The suspension would continue \"until otherwise provided.\" However, the Davis-Bacon Act would remain in effect throughout the remainder of the nation.\nOn October 26, the White House announced that the suspension of the act would be lifted as of November 8, 2005. But, the Washington Post stated, reinstatement of Davis-Bacon \"will not apply retroactively.\"", "Through the years, arguments for and against Davis-Bacon have become largely fixed—as have the counter-arguments of defenders and critics. The logic and many of the assumptions that these arguments contain have been questioned at length. In the evolving debate, few contentions about the act have gone (or are likely to go) unchallenged.", "Some critics of Davis-Bacon argue, among other things, that the act has an inflationary impact (unnecessarily increasing the cost of federal construction) and that it hampers competition—especially with respect to small and minority-owned businesses unfamiliar with federal contracting procedures. They contend that it impedes efficient utilization of manpower, limiting the use of \"helpers\" or general utility workers. Some argue, were Davis-Bacon restrictions absent, that contractors would employ more minority and women workers because they can hire them more cheaply and, by fragmenting the tasks to be performed, use them as substitutes for more broadly skilled workers. Implicit, here, is the assumption that if employers are forced by Davis-Bacon to pay not less than the locally prevailing wage in a craft, they will hire more broadly skilled, highly trained, or experienced workers.\nBesides, critics note, Congress has provided a general minimum wage floor with enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938). They argue that a \"super minimum wage\" for federal construction work is both unnecessary and unjust. They assert that labor costs for federal construction could be reduced (with savings for the taxpayer) if actual local market wages were paid rather than administratively determined locally prevailing wages (often the union rate, some argue). In addition, they urge simplification of the Copeland Act reporting requirements and of the compliance and wage rate determination process.", "Supporters of Davis-Bacon hold that the act prevents cutthroat competition from \"fly-by-night\" firms that undercut local wages and working conditions and compete \"unfairly\" with local contractors: that the act helps stabilize the local construction industry, an advantage to workers and employers alike. The act, they suggest, may tend to assure the consuming agency of higher quality work since employers who are required to pay at least the locally prevailing wage are likely to hire more competent and productive workers—resulting in better workmanship, less waste, reduced need for supervision, and fewer mistakes requiring corrective action. This may lead to fewer cost overruns and more timely completion of public construction and, in the long-term, lower rehabilitation and repair needs down the line. Thus, some argue, the Davis-Bacon Act could actually save the taxpayer money on public construction.\nSupporters of the act also argue that Davis-Bacon deters contractors from fragmenting construction tasks to utilize low-wage (and often low-skill) \"helpers\" or pick-up crews. They believe this could result in a trade-off of long-term social benefits for short-term profits. Some argue that without Davis-Bacon (and in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement), contractors would be unlikely to provide training, whether formally through a certified program or through informal investment in human capital (improving the skills of their regular employees). Advocates also contend that repeal or weakening of the act may adversely affect apprenticeship programs in the construction industry to the disadvantage of minority and women workers who are entering the building trades in growing numbers. If \"helpers\" are substituted for skilled craft workers, it would likely be minorities (and, to a lesser extent, women) who would be laid off or forced into lower-wage jobs, some assert.", "The Davis-Bacon Act, among labor laws, is widely known but it may not be well known . The Davis-Bacon literature, if one takes into account agency reports and congressional hearings, is extensive. These public documents have provided a basis both for popular and scholarly consideration of the act.\nPerhaps the most frequently asked question concerning the Davis-Bacon Act is: Would we save money if the Davis-Bacon Act were repealed or modified to narrow its scope? The short answer is: No one really knows. Conversely, might Davis-Bacon result in savings to the federal government in its purchases of construction? That, too, would seem to be an open question.\nAnother question frequently asked by those, both in industry and in the workforce, who may have to deal with the Davis-Bacon Act is: Is this particular project covered? And further: If so, why? If not, why not? To whom is assigned the judgment for making such determinations? Such questions might be answered were there a scholarly, institutional history of the act and of its place within the broader field of public contracting policy. If such a study exists, it does not appear to be generally available.", "There have been numerous hearings through the years since the Davis-Bacon legislation was first considered. They have tended to focus on policy issues or have served as a forum for airing complaints. Less time has been devoted to examination of economic impact or to its assessment.\nThe Davis-Bacon literature is extensive and diverse. Generally, it falls into three categories: public materials (i.e., agency reports and analyses); journalistic pieces; and academic studies. The latter are also diverse: work commissioned by interest groups (which may be scholarly, nonetheless), articles that merge journalism with scholarship, and putatively independent academic work.\nGiven the number of projects covered by the act, it is nearly impossible for an independent scholar to review its administration and to assess its impact. First . There is the scope of the task: thousands of projects throughout the United States, administered by different agencies and involving hundreds of contractors. Second . There is the problem of availability of basic documentation. How much information has actually been preserved? Are the reports, required under the Copeland Act, factual and complete? Access to data presents a third problem. Assuming that the data are available, securing such documentation (and access to administrative personnel) may be problematic.\nIf one assumes that documentation exists, that the independent analyst is granted access to it, that all of the parties are cooperative, and that the means, financial and other, are available for such an undertaking, the analyst is left with a fourth complication. He is comparing something that did happen with something that in fact, for whatever reasons, did not happen . In the absence of a Davis-Bacon requirement, would the contract have gone to the same contractor? If so (or if not), would it have been managed in the same way? Did the contracting agency monitor the project carefully—and was such monitoring comparable with that for non Davis-Bacon projects? Did the act have any impact upon the wages actually paid or upon workforce utilization? Without Davis-Bacon, would different workers have been employed?\nThese same questions confront a public agency in its efforts to investigate Davis-Bacon impact: the availability of the data, the willingness of the various parties to cooperate in an investigation, and the speculative character of the comparison between what did happen, what did not happen, and what might or might not have happened under different circumstances. For a public agency, the task is no less massive than for a private scholar. And, in the public sector, there may be other constraints. How much funding and staff time should be devoted to an investigation of Davis-Bacon impact? What political or policy concerns may come into play?", "There appear to be significant gaps in our knowledge of the act and of its administration despite oversight by Congress, extensive study by public and private agencies, and the work of individual scholars. Further, few studies of the act, whether public or private, have escaped criticism on the grounds of flawed methodology or inadequate sample size.", "Federal agency reports provide primary documentation concerning the Davis-Bacon Act. But often the various agencies have disagreed about assessment methodologies—sometimes, as in the 1970s, vigorously.\nThe General Accounting Office, as might be expected, has conducted extensive oversight of the act. During 1962 to 1971 alone, GAO issued eight reports, increasingly critical both of the statute and of its administration by the Department of Labor. In 1979, as noted above, it published an extensive analysis titled simply, Davis-Bacon Should Be Repealed . The 1979 GAO report was immediately controversial—and frequently cited. Labor Secretary Ray Marshall severely attacked the report, maintaining that it had \"little credibility.\" Subsequently, the report and the issues it raised were a focus of review by three separate congressional committees during which both its methodology and findings were questioned.\nThe Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is frequently cited with respect to Davis-Bacon impact. In a 1983 report, Modifying the Davis-Bacon Act: Implications for the Labor Market and the Federal Budget , CBO attempted to set a dollar figure for any increased cost of federal construction sparked by Davis-Bacon requirements. Cautiously, CBO noted \"a number of problems in [the] available data and method\" and noted that \"data on these effects are highly inconclusive.\" CBO does not appear to have conducted independent research for its 1983 report, relying upon the existing literature which estimated a range of impact \"from $75 million to $1 billion a year.\"\nA decade later, in his May 4, 1993, testimony before the House Subcommittee on Labor Standards, CBO Director Robert D. Reischauer noted: \"Let me at this point mention a caveat about CBO's estimates, and this is that they are based on relatively old information. They are derived from a 1983 report that CBO issued that weighed the evidence from all of the studies that were available at that time. Unfortunately,\" he added, \"little has been written about the impact of the Davis-Bacon Act since 1983, and so we have had no reason to adjust our estimates.\"\nBoth the 1979 GAO report and the 1983 CBO report (which still provide a basis for many Davis-Bacon impact estimates) are now dated. The Reagan Administration regulations governing administration of the act, issued in the early 1980s, were proffered as a means through which to render implementation more efficient and to eliminate unnecessary costs. Parts of these reforms have been given effect, gradually, through the past decade. Thus, whatever the merit of GAO's findings in 1979 and the CBO's analysis in 1983, they may no longer be valid. New research, taking into account the effect of the Reagan reforms, may be needed.", "The first question to ask when assessing Davis-Bacon literature is: What is the date of the data upon which it is based? If the data are from the pre-Reagan era (as most are), then the resultant studies may be of little use for current economic or policy analysis—the rules for implementation of the act having been changed during that period and, thus, presumably, the cost impact of the statute.\nFor many years, virtually the only major study of the statute was Armand Thieblot's 1975 monograph, The Davis-Bacon Act . Funded in part by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and published by The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, it is strongly critical of the act. Thieblot concluded that the act \"makes little sense under conditions of prosperity and expansion and provides far too few benefits to offset its immense costs.\" Thieblot's work was updated in 1986—but appears to rely upon pre-Reagan data.\nWhat is Thieblot's impact assessment for Davis-Bacon? He notes, broadening the range used by CBO, that \"Davis-Bacon impact estimates have been presented during the past 10 years ranging from less than $50 million to more than $2 billion.\" While he suggests \"there is no direct way to measure the Davis-Bacon impact,\" still, for his own part, he asserts: Davis-Bacon \"costs more to operate than the whole federal judiciary establishment, and perhaps more to run than the entire legislative branch of government.\" The basis for this assertion, however, is unclear.\nSince 1980, Steven Allen has produced a number of studies that deal, directly or indirectly, with Davis-Bacon. In an essay with David Reich, Prevailing Wage Laws Are Not Inflationary , they argue that \"there is strong evidence to suggest that there are significant productivity differences between low-wage and high-wage workers.\" Allen and Reich state: \"Paying at least the locally prevailing wage rate will make it possible to attract better trained and more highly skilled construction workers able to complete the job quickly and efficiently.\" Focusing upon state experience, they conclude that \"once all the relevant variables are taken into consideration, there is no evidence whatsoever of any correlation between the level of construction costs and the presence or absence of a state 'little Davis-Bacon Act.'\" The essay was prepared for the Center to Protect Workers' Rights, chaired by Robert Georgine, President of the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO. Allen has developed this theme in subsequent academic work and is often cited.\nA 1982 study, Effect of the Davis-Bacon Act on Construction Costs in Non-Metropolitan Areas of the United States , was prepared by Martha N. Fraundorf (with others) of Oregon State University. Fraundorf suggests that the cost estimates for Davis-Bacon offered by GAO, Thieblot, and certain others are based on \"an erroneous procedure\" and she chides GAO for working from a sample even the agency recognized was \"really too small for extrapolation.\" But, the Oregon team, funded by the American Farm Bureau Federation (a critic of Davis-Bacon), was forced to scale back its own work because of difficulties it encountered in securing adequate data.\nFraundorf and her colleagues began with an assumption: \"While it is fairly clear that the law results in higher wages, it does not follow that the law therefore raises overall costs.\" To determine the latter, they attempted an empirical study of total costs. But, they found this to be complex. First, they looked only at rural non-residential construction—which, they conceded, might differ from urban work. Second, they could not disaggregate Davis-Bacon costs from other federal requirements (i.e., \"affirmative action, or different standards for quality and safety.\") Third, they were not able to access varying \"alternative method[s] of construction.\" Within those parameters, they compared federal with non-federal construction, concluding: \"While the exact size of the impact is still uncertain, our results show that it is likely to be between 26% and 38%.\"\nFrequently cited in the Davis-Bacon literature is the work of economists Robert Goldfarb and John Morrall. Begun as public research for the U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS) during the mid-1970s, the work of Goldfarb and Morrall was further developed in a series of private academic articles. At COWPS, they found themselves working with data provided by DOL which they viewed as not entirely satisfactory for their purposes. In their COWPS analysis (1976), they identified the deficiencies they found in the data they were using and spoke of \"some rough order of magnitude\" of \"possible cost savings\" from changes in the administration of Davis-Bacon. But, they cautioned by way of conclusion: \"... the data are somewhat ambiguous and perhaps unreliable.\"\nIn a private academic article (1978), Goldfarb and Morrall seem to have been somewhat less cautious suggesting that, with administrative changes with respect to Davis-Bacon, \"an overall savings in the hundreds of millions is possible.\" And, they point out, various administrative changes \"might well encourage an expansion of the nonunion sector, which might in turn have cost-lowering effects in the long run.\"\nTheir work sparked some criticism which, in yet another article (1981), they attempted to refute. Critiques, in the abstract, are difficult to evaluate and, even more so, critiques of critiques; and, by the early 1980s, the literature was beset by argument and counter argument, often focusing (as Goldfarb and Morrall had done themselves in 1976) upon the inadequacies of the data. Seeming to share the approach of Thieblot (and, like Thieblot, basing their work on pre-Reagan data), Goldfarb and Morrall acknowledge the data problems but reject the notion \"that this invalidates the usefulness of cost calculations.\" They affirm, rather, that even \"rough estimates of possible magnitudes of effects based on imperfect data are very useful background information for helping inform policy decisions.\"\nDuring the early 1980s, a private sector body working under the auspices of the Reagan Administration reviewed the operation of the federal government and recommended ways in which to effect efficiency and reduce costs. The Grace Commission, as it was popularly known, examined the operation of the Davis-Bacon Act (among other statutes and programs). Its review of Davis-Bacon, frequently cited at the time, was based on prior studies rather than original research. Thus, it was subject to all of the strengths and weaknesses of the earlier research upon which it relied.\nIn 1985, Chairman J. Peter Grace reviewed the work of the commission in testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Evidencing some exasperation with quibbles over impact estimates in general, he urged that policymakers should set aside the dispute about \"how accurate the numbers are\" and get on with the business of reform. \"No one can ever tell what something will save until one does it,\" he affirmed. While many may share Grace's frustration, others may argue that numbers do matter and that reasonable precision is important—especially when cost-savings projections become a central rationale in public policy formation.\nDuring recent years, Peter Philips, professor of economics at the University of Utah, with others, has produced a number of analyses of the impact of state \"little Davis-Bacon\" acts—or, of the implications of the repeal of such statutes. Speaking generally, these studies appear to have found a certain utility in prevailing wage legislation: i.e., that prevailing wage statutes may (and, likely do) have positive economic impacts for the community apart from any advantage to workers. Further, these studies seem to suggest that allegations of negative impact (for example, unjustifiably inflating the cost of public construction—or increasing such costs at all) may be overstated.", "Through the years, the Davis-Bacon Act has attracted considerable attention from economists, attorneys, policy analysts, journalists and others. The result is a moderately extensive bibliography of materials readily available to the public. Its quality, as noted above, varies from one item to another.\nMost of the entries in this bibliography deal specifically with Davis-Bacon. There are, however, a number that focus upon issues related tangentially (but importantly) to questions that have been raised about the application of the act. For example, an extensive literature has been developed dealing with the impact of trade unions upon productivity, a central factor in estimating the cost impact of the act. A representative sample of these studies has been included in the listing. Also included are a number of entries bearing upon the nature of the construction industry and upon legal issues associated with administration of the Davis-Bacon Act and with its impact.\nThis bibliography is selective. While primarily of published materials, it also includes, in a few instances, materials that have not been published but which have been widely circulated through the years and/or which have had an impact upon the Davis-Bacon debate. Because its focus is primarily upon analytical or policy literature, a listing of congressional hearings and reports has not been included, though these have been cited in the footnotes of the covering essay as appropriate. Also omitted (with select exceptions) are studies produced by the Department of Labor and the several legislative branch agencies such as the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office.\nThere has been, through the years, a significant reportage concerning the Davis-Bacon Act in the industry and trade union press: sometimes brief editorial comment; on other occasions, publication of testimony presented before a committee of the Congress or an analysis of legislation. For the most part, these industry and trade union materials have not been included, though this latter policy has not been followed uniformly. Finally, there are a number of manuals—how to administer the act, how to conduct wage surveys, how to comply with the provisions of the statute—that have been prepared by an agency or one of the interest groups. These, too, have been omitted from the listing here.\nFor the most part, items listed in the bibliography are available from the general collection of the Library of Congress and, frequently, are also available from university collections and public libraries.\nAddison, John T. \"Are Unions Good for Productivity?\" Journal of Labor Research, Spring 1982: pp. 125−138.\n——. Chilton, John B. \"Can We Identify Union Productivity Effects?\" Industrial Relations , Winter 1993: pp. 124−132.\n——. Hirsch, Barry T. The Economic Analysis of Unions: New Approaches and Evidence . Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986. [See Chapter 9, \"Unions and Politics,\" pp. 268-295.]\nAlario, Linda E. \"Project Agreements and Government Procurement,\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , October 1996: pp. 17-30.\nAllen, Steven G. \"Can Union Labor Ever Cost Less?\" The Quarterly Journal of Economics , May 1987: pp. 347−373.\n——. \"Declining Unionization in Construction: The Facts and the Reasons.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1988: pp. 343−359.\n——. \"Declining Unionization in Construction: Fresh Facts and New Reasons.\" Workplace Topics, June 1994: pp. 45-60.\n——. Developments in Collective Bargaining in Construction in the 1980s and 1990s. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 4674, March 1994. 40 pp.\n——. \"Further Evidence on Union Efficiency in Construction.\" Industrial Relations, Spring 1988: pp. 232−240.\n——. Human Resource Policies and Union-Nonunion Productivity Differences. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 2744, October 1988. 39 pp.\n——. \"Much Ado about Davis-Bacon: A Critical Review and New Evidence.\" Journal of Law and Economics, October 1983: pp. 707-736.\n——. \"Productivity Levels and Productivity Change under Unionism.\" Industrial Relations , Winter 1988: pp. 94−112.\n——. \"Union Work Rules and Efficiency in the Building Trades.\" Journal of Labor Economics, April 1986: pp. 212−242.\n——. Unionization and Productivity in Office Building and School Construction. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 1139, June 1983. 46 pp.\n——. \"Unionization and Productivity in Office Building and School Construction.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , January 1986: pp. 187−201.\n——. Unionized Construction Workers Are More Productive. Washington, Center to Protect Workers' Rights, November 1979. 25 pp.\n——. Unions and Efficiency in Private Sector Construction: Further Evidence. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 2254. May 1987. 23 pp.\n——. \"Unit Costs, Legal Shocks, and Unionization in Construction.\" Journal of Labor Research , Summer 1995: pp. 367-377. [See also Herbert R. Northrup, \"Doublebreasted Operations and the Decline of Construction Unionism,\" Journal of Labor Research , Summer 1995, pp. 379-385.]\n——. \"Why Construction Industry Productivity Is Declining.\" Review of Economics and Statistics , November 1985: pp. 661−669.\n——. Reich, David. Prevailing Wage Laws Are Not Inflationary: a Case Study of Public School Construction Costs . Washington: Center to Protect Workers' Rights, December 1980. 24 pp.\nBarrow, Clyde W. \"Unions and Community Mobilization: The 1988 Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Campaign.\" Labor Studies Journal, Winter 1989: pp. 18−39.\nBarry, Patrick. \"Congress's Deconstruction Theory.\" Washington Monthly , January 1990: pp. 10−14, 16.\nBeard, Edward P. \"Straight Talk about Davis-Bacon: an Interview with Representative Edward P. Beard, D-RI.\" Builders , V. 1, April 9, 1979: pp. 1−4.\nBelman, Dale. Prevailing Wage Laws, Unions, and Minority Employment in Construction, pp. 101-119, in Philips, Azari-rad, and Prus (2005), the Economics of Prevailing Wage Laws, Cited Separately.\n——. Voos, Paula B. \"Prevailing Wage Laws in Construction: The Costs of Repeal to Wisconsin,\" The Institute for Wisconsin ' s Future , October 1995, 20 pp.\nBerg, John T., and Erickson, Ralph C. \"An Evaluation of the Impact of the Davis-Bacon Act.\" Government Union Review , Summer 1985: pp. 1−32.\nBernstein, David. \"Bring Jim Crow to an End by Repealing the Davis-Bacon Act.\" USA Today [Magazine], July 1993: pp. 14−16.\n——. \"Clinton Should Scrap Davis-Bacon.\" Human Events , March 6, 1993: p. 11.\n——. The Davis-Bacon Act: Let's Bring Jim Crow to an End. The Cato Institute, Briefing Paper No. 17, January 18, 1993. 15 p. [See Also, the Davis-Bacon Act: A Response to the Cato Institute's Attack. Washington: Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, 1993. 26 pp.]\n——. \"The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow.\" National Black Law Journal , Fall 1994: pp. 276-297.\n——. \"Exclusionary Rule: Something's Not Kosher about Davis-Bacon.\" Reason , August/September 1991: pp. 32−35.\n——. \"It's Time to Reform New York's Prevailing Wage Law.\" Empire Foundation for Public Policy Research, September 1993. [Published in Updated Form in the George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal , Spring 1997.]\n——. Only One Place of Redress: African-Americans, Labor Regulations, and the Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, 191 pp.\n——. \"The Shameful, Wasteful History of New York's Prevailing Wage Law.\" George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal , Spring 1997: pp. 1-23.\n——. \"The Supreme Court and 'Civil Rights,' 1886-1908.\" The Yale Law Journal , December 1990: pp. 725-744.\n——. \"Roots of the 'Underclass:' The Decline of Laissez-faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation.\" The American University Law Review , Fall 1993: pp. 85-138.\nBilginsoy, Cihan. \"The Hazards of Training: Attrition and Retention in Construction Industry Apprenticeship Programs.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , October 2003: pp. 54-67.\n——. \"Wage Regulation and Training: the Impact of State Prevailing Wage Laws on Apprenticeship,\" pp. 149-168, in Philips, Azari-rad, and Prus (2005), The Economics of Prevailing Wage Laws, Cited Separately.\nBolick, Clint. \"The Revolt Against the Davis-Bacon Act.\" The American Enterprise , January/February 1997: pp. 78-79.\n——. \"Transformation: the Promise and Politics of Empowerment.\" Oakland: Ics [Institute for Contemporary Studies] Press . pp. 83-93.\nBullock, Scott, and Frantz, John. \"Removing Barriers to Opportunity: A Constitutional Challenge to The Davis-Bacon Act,\" Washington: Institute for Justice, undated for post 1993. 9 pp. http://www.ij.org/economic_liberty/davis_bacon /backgrounder.html .\nBourdon, Clinton C. \"Union-non-union Struggle Sharpens,\" Engineering News Record , September 11, 1980, p. 205.\n——. Levitt, Raymond E. \"Cost Impacts of Prevailing Wage Laws in Construction.\" Journal of the Construction Division , American Society of Civil Engineers, December 1979: pp. 281−288.\n——. Levitt, Raymond E. \"The Impact of the Davis-Bacon Act.\" Union and Open-Shop Construction. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1980. pp. 91−103.\n——. Solomon, Arthur P. The Inflationary Effects of the Davis-Bacon Act: A Summary and Analysis of the Research Literature. Report Prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, July 2, 1979. 37 pp. (Mimeographed)\nBrazier, Nona. \"The Devils of Davis-Bacon.\" Common Sense , Fall 1994: pp. 24-34.\nBrown, Charles, and James Medoff. \"Trade Unions in the Production Process.\" Journal of Political Economy , June 1978: pp. 355−378.\nBrown, William W. \"The Challenges of a Changing Workforce.\" Constructor , April 1992: pp. 23-26.\nBrozen, Yale. The Davis-Bacon Act: How to Load the Dice Against Yourself. Manuscript, in Mimeograph Form, in the files of the Congressional Research Service, 1971. 9 pp.\n——. The Law That Boomeranged. Nation ' s Business , April 1974: pp. 70−73.\nBuchsbaum, Peter A., and Mark Erlich. \"The Debate over Union Wage Requirements for Subsidized Housing.\" Shelter Force , March/April 1993: pp. 12−14.\nBurck, Gilbert. \"A Time of Reckoning for the Building Unions.\" Fortune , June 4, 1979: pp. 82-85, 88, 93-94, and 96.\n——. \"The Building Trades Versus the People.\" Fortune , October 1970: pp. 94−97 and 159−160.\nCaruso, Lawrence R. \"An Analysis of the Litigation Regarding the Regulations Implementing the Davis-Bacon Act.\" Federal Bar News & Journal , March 1984: pp. 117−122.\nChin, Felix. The Davis-Bacon Act: A Selected Bibliography. Monticello, Ill., Vance Bibliographies, 1981. 22 pp.\nClark, Kim B. \"The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , July 1980: pp. 451−469.\nClark, Mike. \"The Effects of Prevailing Wage Laws: A Comparison of Individual Workers' Wages Earned on and off Prevailing Wage Construction Projects,\" Journal of Labor Research , Fall 2005, pp. 725-737.\n\"Conspiracy To Destroy Davis-Bacon: A Laborer Journal Special Report,\" The Laborer, April 1975, pp. 4-5.\nCox, Louis A. The Davis-Bacon Act and Defense Construction: Problems of Statutory Coverage. In Stein, Manual, Ed., Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual New York University Conference on Labor, June 11−13, 1962. New York: Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 1962: pp. 151−174.\n\"Davis-Bacon Reform Blasted,\" Engineering News Record , January 24, 1980, p. 75.\n\"Davis-Bacon 'Reform' Under Fire,\" Engineering News Record , April 17, 1980, p. 198.\nDelury, Bernard E. \"Davis-Bacon: an Insider's Viewpoint.\" The International Operating Engineer , December 1975: pp. 10-11.\nDerthick, Martha, and Quirk, Paul J. \"The Politics of Deregulation.\" Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985. pp. 219−224.\nDillon, Roger. Potential Economic Impact: Proposals of the Department of Industrial Relations to Alter Methodology Relating to Prevailing Wages. Sacramento: California Senate Office of Research. Stock Number 862-s, May 1996. 28 pp.\nDonahue, Charles. \"The Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-healey Public Contracts Act: a Comparison of Coverage and Minimum Wage Provisions.\" Law and Contemporary Problems , Spring 1964: pp. 488−513.\nDouglas, Davison M. \"Contract Rights and Civil Rights.\" Michigan Law Review , May 2002, pp. 1541-1563.\nDunn, Sarah, Quigley, John M., and Rosenthal, Larry A. The Effects of Prevailing Wage Requirements on the Cost of Low-Income Housing (Working Paper no. W03-003). Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley, September 2003. 47 pp. [See, also, Dunn, Quigley, and Rosenthal, \"The Effects of Prevailing Wage Requirements on the Cost of Low-Income Housing,\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 2005, pp. 141-157.]\nEasterbrook, Greg. \"How Big Labor Brings Home the Bacon.\" The Washington Monthly , February 1991: pp. 40−47.\nEberly, Don. \"Labor as a Property Right: Guaranteeing Economic Opportunity.\" Lincoln Review , Spring 1983: pp. 31−47.\nElisburg, Donald. \"Wage Protection under the Davis-Bacon Act.\" Labor Law Journal , June 1977: pp. 323−328.\nErlick, Mark. Labor at the Ballot Box: The Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Campaign of 1988. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. 219 pp.\n——. \"Labor Rises up to Show the Way.\" The Nation , December 26, 1988: pp. 716−718.\n——. \"Who Will Build the Future?\" Labor Research Review , Fall 1988: pp. 1-19.\n——. Grabelsky, Jeff. \"Standing at a Crossroads: The Building Trades in the Twenty-First Century,\" Labor History , November 2005, pp. 421-445.\nFine, Janice. \"Organizing for Prevailing Wage in Florida.\" Labor Research Review , Fall 1988: pp. 71-79.\nFine, Sidney. \"Without Blare of Trumpets\"—Walter Drew, the National Erector's Association, and the Open Shop Movement, 1903-57. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995. 384 pp.\nFoster, Howard G. \"Industrial Relations in Construction, 1970−1977.\" Industrial Relations , February 1978: pp. 1−17.\n——. Manpower in Homebuilding: A Preliminary Analysis. Philadelphia: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1974. 179 pp.\n——. \"The Labor Market in Nonunion Construction.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , July 1973: pp. 1071-1085.\n——. Northrup, Herbert. Open Shop Construction. Philadelphia: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1975. 394 pp.\n——. Strauss, George. \"Labor Problems in Construction: A Review.\" Industrial Relations , October 1972: pp. 289−313.\nFowler, George. \"Davis-Bacon Needs a Decent Burial.\" Nation ' s Business , March 1979: pp. 57-58, 60.\nFoxvog, Donald R. \"Industry's United Position: On Missile Base Sites, 'Construction Work by Construction Men.'\" The Constructor , July 1960: pp. 45-46, 49-51.\nFranklin, William S. \"A Comparison of Formally and Informally Trained Journeymen in Construction.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , July 1973: pp. 1086−1094.\nFraundorf, Martha Norby, with Farrell, John P., and Mason, Robert. Effect of the Davis-Bacon Act on Construction Costs in Non-Metropolitan Areas of the United States. Corvallis: The Oregon State University, January 1982. 41 pp.\n——. \"The Effect of the Davis-Bacon Act on Construction Costs in Rural Areas.\" The Review of Economics and Statistics , February 1984: pp. 142−146.\nFreeman, Richard B., and Medoff, James L. \"The Two Faces of Unionism.\" The Public Interest , Fall 1979: pp. 69−93.\nFunk, William G. \"The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law.\" Harvard Journal on Legislation , Winter 1987: pp. 1-116.\nGallaway, Lowell, and Vedder, Richard. Cracked Foundation: Repealing the Davis-Bacon Act. St. Louis: Washington University Center for the Study of American Business. Policy study number 127, November 1995. 28 pp.\n——. \"Labor Laws: Then and Now.\" Journal of Labor Research , Spring 1996: pp. 253-275.\n——. Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America . New York: Holmes & Meier, 1993, 336 pp.\n——. \"Prevailing Wages as Perceived by the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission.\" Government Union Review , September 2002: pp. 1-10.\n——. \"Why Johnny Can't Work: the Causes of Unemployment.\" Policy Review , Fall 1992: pp. 24-30.\nGamrat, Frank. \"Prevailing Wages: Costly to State and Local Taxpayers.\" Government Union Review , May 2002: pp. 1-19.\nGoldfarb, Robert S. \"A Davis-Bacon Musicale: Symphony Orchestras as Migrant Labor.\" Journal of Labor Research , Fall 1984: pp. 427−433.\n——. Metzger, Michael R. \"Do Davis-Bacon Minimum Wages Raise Product Quality?\" Journal of Labor Research , Summer 1983: pp. 265−272.\n——. Morrall, John F. An Analysis of Certain Aspects of the Administration of the Davis-Bacon Act . Washington: The Council on Wage and Price Stability, 1976. 14 pp. (Mimeographed)\n——. Morrall, John F. \"Cost Implications of Changing Davis-Bacon Administration.\" Policy Analysis , Fall 1978: pp. 439−453.\n——. Morrall, John F. \"The Davis-Bacon Act: An Appraisal of Recent Studies.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , January 1981: pp. 191−206.\nGoldfinger, Nathaniel. \"The Myth of Housing Costs.\" American Federationist , December 1969: pp. 1-6.\nGould, John P. Davis-Bacon Act: the Economics of Prevailing Wage Laws . Washington: The American Enterprise Institute, November 1971. 44 pp.\n——. The Labor Component in the Cost of Housing in the Seventies: Working Papers, I . Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. pp. 588-597.\n——. Bittlingmayer, George. The Economics of the Davis-Bacon Act: An Analysis of Prevailing Wage Laws . Washington: The American Enterprise Institute, 1980. 89 pp.\nGramm, Phil. \"The Inapplicability of the Davis-Bacon Act to Military Construction Projects.\" Labor Law Journal , July 1985: pp. 387-389.\nGujarati, D. N. \"The Economics of the Davis-Bacon Act.\" Journal of Business , July 1967: pp. 303−316.\nHaber, William. Industrial Relations in the Building Industry . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930. 578 pp.\n——. Levinson, Harold. Labor Relations and Productivity in the Building Trades. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956. 260 pp.\nHartman, Paul T., and Franke, Walter H. \"The Changing Bargaining Structure in Construction: Wide-area and Multicraft Bargaining.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , January 1980: pp. 170−184.\nHermanson, Beth. \"Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act: an Appropriate Target for Erisa Preemption.\" Dickinson Law Review , Summer 1996: pp. 919-962.\nHill, Norman. \"Minorities, Women and the Davis-Bacon Act: the Most Vulnerable.\" National Journal , September 19, 1981: pp. 1700-1701.\nHintze, Arthur. \"A Davis-Bacon Primer.\" Constructor , June 1975: pp. 15−16, 33.\n——. \"Can Davis-Bacon Decisions Be Reviewed?\" Constructor , January 1967: pp. 51-52.\n——. \"How to Comply with Davis-Bacon Rules.\" Constructor , November 1975: pp. 34−36.\n——. \"Taking the Waste out of Davis-Bacon.\" Constructor , June 1977: pp. 16−17, and 43.\n——. \"Unscrambling Davis-Bacon Administration.\" Constructor , August 1975: pp. 34-36.\nHoehn, James G. \"The Davis-Bacon Act: an Example of the Problems of Wage-Price Administration.\" Economic Review , published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, March 1982: pp. 13−18.\nHunter, William J. Discriminatory Effects of Wisconsin ' s Prevailing Wage Laws . Milwaukee, A Heartland Policy Study, December 2, 1988. 17 pp.\n——. \"In Search of a Cure for Davis-Bacon.\" Nation ' s Business , July 1981: pp. 60−62.\nIsokait, William A. \"Anatomy of a Victory: Reason Restored, Courts Rule Davis-Bacon Act Language Means What it Says.\" Constructor , August 1994: pp. 20-22.\n——. \"Davis-Bacon Developments after Midway Excavators.\" Constructor , July 1991: pp. 100-102.\n——. \"Project Labor Agreements: An Industry Perspective.\" Journal of Labor Research , Winter 1998: pp. 65-71.\n——. \"Reason Restored: Courts Rule Davis-Bacon Act Language Means What it Says.\" Constructor , August 1994: pp. 20-22.\n——. \"What Midway Excavators Means for Federal Construction Contractors.\" Constructor , August 1992: pp. 27-29.\nJenkins, Kirk. \"Congress: Waging War over the Prevailing Wage.\" Harvard Political Review , Spring 1982: p. 16.\nJohnson, David B. Prevailing Wage Law. In Somers, Gerald G., Ed. Labor, Management, and Social Policy: Essays in the John R. Commons Tradition. Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1963. pp. 231−262.\n——. \"Prevailing Wage Legislation in the States.\" Monthly Labor Review , August 1961: pp. 839−845.\nKentucky. General Assembly. Legislative Research Commission. Capital Construction and Equipment Purchase Oversight Committee. The Economic Impact of the Kentucky Prevailing Wage Law. Frankfort, 1981. 129 pp. (Research Report No. 185)\nKessler, Daniel P., and Lawrence F. Katz. Prevailing Wage Laws and Construction Labor Markets. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 2001: 259-274. [An Earlier Version of this Article Appeared as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W7454. December 1999.] [See, also: Kessler, Daniel P., and Katz, Lawrence F., \"Prevailing Wage Laws and Construction Labor Markets,\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , January 2001, pp. 259-274.]\nKeyes, William A. \"The Minimum Wage and the Davis-Bacon Act: Employment Effects on Minorities and Youth.\" Journal of Labor Research , Fall 1982: pp. 399−413.\n——. \"Why the Davis-Bacon Act Means Unemployment.\" Lincoln Review , Autumn 1979: pp. 29−38.\nKovach, Kenneth A. \"Should the Davis-Bacon Act Be Repealed?\" Business Horizons , September−October 1983: pp. 33−37.\n——. Viehmyer Eide, Laura. \"The Case for Repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act.\" Labor Law Journal , January 1998: pp. 761-772.\nLanouette, William L. \"Foes May Use Salami Tactics to Wipe the Davis-Bacon Act off the Books.\" National Journal , September 5, 1981: pp. 1587−1591.\nLeader, Laurie E., and Jenero, Kenneth A. \"Implied Private Right of Action under the Davis-Bacon Act: Closing Some Loopholes in Administrative Enforcement.\" Depaul Law Review , Spring 1980: pp. 793-817.\nLee, Gene Ming. \"A Case for Fairness in Public Works Contracting.\" Fordham Law Review , December 1996: pp. 1075-1121. [The focus of the article is upon the nature of public works contracting, not the Davis-Bacon Act, specifically.]\nLevinson, David. \"The Hard-hats, the Davis-Bacon Act and Nixon's Incomes Policy.\" Labor Law Journal , June 1971: pp. 323−331.\nLevitt, Raymond E. \"Union Versus Nonunion Construction in the U.S.\" Journal of the Construction Division , American Society of Civil Engineers, December 1979: pp. 289−303.\nLindauer, Stephen R. \"Use of Subjourneymen: a Competitive Advantage.\" Constructor , May 1985: pp. 79-80.\nLindsey, Lawrence B. \"Increased Opportunity Through Deregulation.\" Government Union Review , Fall 1994: pp. 43-51.\nLundell, Allan. A Study of the Effects of the Exemption of School Construction and Renovation Projects from Ohio ' s Prevailing Wage Law . An Interim Report of a Five-year Study: Year Two. Columbus: Ohio Legislative Budget Office, January 2000.\nLyons, Max. \"The Estimated Cost of Project Labor Agreements on Federal Construction,\" Journal of Labor Research , Winter 1998: pp. 73-87.\nMainland, Mary. \"'Prevailing' Wages.\" America , February 22, 1986: pp. 140−142.\nMandelstamm, Allan B. \"The Effects of Unions on Efficiency in the Residential Construction Industry: a Case Study.\" Industrial and Labor Relations Review , July 1965: pp. 503−521.\nMarshall, Ray. \"America Still Needs Davis-Bacon.\" National Journal , October 10, 1981: pp. 1837−1939.\n——. \"Davis-Bacon Works—and Works Well! An Interview with U.S. Labor Secretary Ray Marshall,\" IBEW Journal , August 1979, pp. 20-21, 23, and 70.\nMartin, Christopher J., and Meyers, John F. \"Court Rejects Efforts to Impose Prevailing Wages on Private Sector Employers.\" Employee Relations Law Journal , V. 17, no. 3, Winter 1991−1992: pp. 483−489.\nMartucci, William C., and Utz, John L. \"Special Construction Industry Provisions under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act.\" Labor Law Journal , May 1984: pp. 281−288.\nMcAllister, Eugene J. Davis-Bacon: A Costly Contradiction. Backgrounder No. 88. Washington: the Heritage Foundation, June 14, 1979. 11 pp.\nMelman, Stephen J. \"Davis-Bacon Prevails.\" Housing Economics , May 1994: pp.9-10.\nMethvin, Eugene H. \"A Scandalous Law That's Costing Taxpayers Billions.\" Reader ' s Digest , December 1994: pp. 123-126.\nMiller, Scott. \"Preemptive Effect of Erisa on the Prevailing Wage Act.\" The John Marshall Law Review , Fall 1995: pp. 55-73.\nMills, D. 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[Pages 841-848 focus upon Louisiana's Prevailing Wage Statute.]\nMurphy, Cait. \"Unfinished Business: Who's Holding up Grace Commission Reform?\" Policy Review , Fall 1986: pp. 60-65.\nNorthrup, Herbert R. \"The 'Helper' Controversy in the Construction Industry.\" Journal of Labor Research , Fall 1992: pp. 421−435.\n——. \"Construction Union Programs to Regain Jobs: Background and Overview.\" Journal of Labor Research , Winter 1997: pp. 1-15.\n——. \"Doublebreasted Operations and the Decline of Construction Unionism,\" Journal of Labor Research , Summer 1995, pp. 379-385. [See also Steven Allen, \"Unit Costs, Legal Shocks, and Unionization in Construction,\" Journal of Labor Research , Summer 1995, pp. 367-377.]\n——. Alario, Linda E. \"'Boston Harbor'-type Project Labor Agreements in Construction: Nature, Rationales, and Legal Challenges.\" Journal of Labor Research , Winter 1998: pp. 1-63.\n——. White, Augustus. \"Subsidizing Contractors to Gain Employment: Construction Union 'Job Targeting.'\" Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law , no. 1, 1996: pp. 62-90.\nO'Brecht, Richard. \"Davis-Bacon in the '80s,\" Constructor , December 1980, p. 61.\nO'Connell, John F. \"The Effects of Davis-Bacon on Labor Cost and Union Wages.\" Journal of Labor Research , Summer 1986: pp. 239−253.\nOhio Legislative Service Commission. S.B. 102 Report: the Effects of the Exemption of School Construction Projects from Ohio ' s Prevailing Wage Law . Staff Research Report No. 149. May 20, 2002. 76 pp.\nPayne, Phillis. \"The Plot to Subvert Labor Standards.\" American Federationist , July 1979: pp. 17−21.\nPendolino, Timothy J. \"The Davis-Bacon and Service Contracts Acts: Laws Whose Time Has Passed?\" Military Law Review , Winter 1995: pp. 218-261.\nPerloff, Jeffrey M. \"The Impact of Licensing Laws on Wage Changes in the Construction Industry,\" The Journal of Law & Economics , October 1980, pp. 409-428.\nPetersen, Jeffrey S. \"Health Care and Pension Benefits for Construction Workers: The Role of Prevailing Wage Laws,\" Industrial Relations , April 2000, pp. 246-2264.\nPhilips, Peter. Lessons for Post-Katrina Reconstruction: a High-road Vs. Low-Road Recovery. Briefing Paper, Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC: October 2005. 14 pp.\n——. Square Foot Construction Costs for Newly Constructed State and Local Schools, Offices and Warehouses in Nine Southwestern and Intermountain States, 1992-1994. Prepared for the Legislative Education Study Committee of the New Mexico State Legislature. Salt Lake City, September 6, 1996. 43 pp.\n——. Azari-rad, Hami (2005). \"Thoughtless Think Tanks: Sound Bite Thinking about History and Intent of Prevailing Wage Laws,\" pp. 64-100, in Philips, Azari-Rad, and Prus (Editors), The Economics of Prevailing Wage Laws , Cited Separately.\n——. Azari-rad, Hamid, and Prus, Mark J. \"Making Hay When it Rains: The Effect Prevailing Wage Regulations, Scale Economies, Seasonal, Cyclical and Local Business Patterns Have on School Construction Costs.\" Journal of Education Finance , Spring, 2002, pp. 997-1012.\n——. Azari-rad, Hamid, and Prus, Mark J. Prus (editors). The Economics of Prevailing Wage Laws. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005. 262 pp.\n——. Azari-rad, Hamid, and Yeagle, Anne. \"The Effects of the Repeal of Utah's Prevailing Wage Law on the Labor Market in Construction.\" In Friedman, Sheldon, et al., Editors, Restoring the Promise of American Labor Law . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994: pp. 207-222.\n——. Bilginsoy, Cihan. \"Prevailing Wage Regulations and School Construction Costs: Evidence from British Columbia.\" Journal of Education Finance , Winter 2000, pp. 415-432.\n——. Mangum, Garth, Waitzman, Norm, and Yeagle, Anne. Losing Ground: A Report on the Repeal of Nine Little Davis-Bacon Acts. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1995. 83 pp.\nPohlman, Jerry E. \"Hard-Core Unemployment, Public Housing Construction and the Davis-Bacon Act.\" Labor Law Journal , April 1971: pp. 195−203.\nPresident's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control. Report on the Department of Labor. Approved by the Subcommittee for the Full Executive Committee, Spring-fall 1983. 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The Journal of Corporate Law , Fall 1984: pp. 277-290.\nRoss, Irwin. \"The Outdated Law That's Costing Taxpayers Billions.\" The Reader ' s Digest , December 1981: pp. 43−48.\nRothman, Stuart. \"The Work of the Wage Appeals Board with Respect to the Davis-Bacon and Related Federal Construction Laws.\" Constructor , September 1964: pp. 34−37.\nRowan, Richard L., and Rubin, Lester. Opening the Skilled Construction Trades to Blacks: a Study of the Washington and Indianapolis Plans for Minority Employment. Philadelphia: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1972. 193 pp.\nRustin, Bayard. \"The Blacks and the Unions,\" in C. Vann Woodward, ed., Down the Line: The Collected Writing of Bayard Rustin . Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1971, pp. 335-347.\nSautter, Udo. \"Government and Unemployment: the Use of Public Works Before the New Deal.\" Journal of American History , June 1986: pp. 59-86.\nScheibla, Shirley Hobbs. \"Big Labor's Big Rip-off.\" Conservative Digest . 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December 20, 1999. 11 pp.\nWeil, David. \"The Contemporary Industrial Relations System in Construction: Analysis, Observations and Speculations,\" Labor History, November 2005, pp. pp. 447-471.\nWelch, Stephen W. \"Union-Nonunion Construction Wage Differentials.\" Industrial Relations , Spring 1980: pp. 152−162.\nWells, Robert Marshall. \"GOP Planning to Topple Wall of Rules Around Workplace.\" Congressional Quarterly , May 13, 1995: pp. 1328-1330.\nWilson, Ginny, Clark, Mike, Hager, Greg, Upton, Cindy, Davis, Betty, Boardman, Barry, and Hewlett, Tom. An Analysis of Kentucky ' s Prevailing Wage Laws and Procedures. Frankfort: Legislative Research Commission, Research Report no. 304. 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New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. 307 pp.\nZanglein, Jayne Elizabeth. \"To Preempt or Not To Preempt: Will the Supreme Court Do Some Serious Bushhogging Through the Preemption Thicket?\" Journal of Pension Planning and Compliance, Fall 1997: pp. 22-38." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_title", "", "h0_title", "h0_title", "", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h0_full h2_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "How was the statute modified?", "How was the concept of \"prevailing wage\" expanded in 1964?", "How else has the statute changed through the years?", "What characterizes the literature regarding the act?", "What have the changes of the Reagan Administration produced?", "What topic does this bibliography address?", "What kinds of sources does the bibliography include?", "How will most of the documentation cited in the bibliography be available?", "How often will the bibliographic report be updated?" ], "summary": [ "Enacted at the urging of the Hoover Administration, the statute was modified in 1934 with adoption of the Copeland (\"anti-kickback\") Act and in 1935 through general amendments dealing with administration and implementation: among them, establishment of a $2,000 coverage threshold (the threshold had been $5,000 in the original enactment), a requirement that the prevailing wage rate be determined prior to submission of bids, and extension of coverage both to public buildings and public works including painting and decorating.", "In 1964, the concept of \"prevailing wage\" was expanded to include a fringe benefit component. The statute has also been the subject of technical amendments through the years, and Davis-Bacon provisions have been added to more than 50 federal program statutes.", "The statute has also been the subject of technical amendments through the years, and Davis-Bacon provisions have been added to more than 50 federal program statutes.", "While there is a relatively extensive literature (both popular and scholarly) concerning the act, there also appear to be significant gaps in our knowledge of the statute and its impact.", "During the Reagan Administration, changes were instituted in the manner in which the act was implemented and these, in turn, have produced a need for further, more current, data for analytical purposes.", "Included, here, is a select bibliography of published materials dealing with the Davis-Bacon Act and immediately related issues.", "The list includes popular and scholarly sources but does not, for the most part, include an inventory of congressional documents, agency reports or publications of interest groups.", "Most of the documentation cited here will be available from the collections of the Library of Congress or from major public or university library collections. In some cases, privately published materials are available through the Internet.", "This bibliographic report will be updated periodically." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }
CRS_R41303	{ "title": [ "", "Background", "Declining Revenue-Sharing Payments Leads to Enactment of SRS", "SRS and PILT", "Revenue-Sharing Program Concerns and Responses", "Declining Timber Receipts", "Annually Fluctuating Payments", "Linkage", "Legislative History of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, as Amended", "FY2007 Reauthorization Enacted in the 110th Congress", "Four-Year Extension Through FY2011 Enacted in the 110th Congress", "Full Funding", "Calculated Payments", "Transition Payments", "Title II and Title III Activities", "Rolling Seven-Year Average for Calculating Revenue-Sharing Payment", "One-Year Extension Through FY2012 Enacted in the 112th Congress", "One-Year Extension Through FY2013 Enacted in the 113th Congress", "Two-Year Extension Through FY2015 Enacted in the 114th Congress", "Legislative Activity in the 115th Congress", "Legislative Issues", "Offsets for New Mandatory Spending", "Geographic Distribution of SRS and PILT Payments", "Lands Covered", "Basis for Compensation", "Source of Funds", "Authorized and Required Uses of the Payments", "Duration of the Programs" ], "paragraphs": [ "U nder federal law, local governments are compensated through various programs due to the presence of federal lands within their borders. Federally owned lands cannot be taxed by state or local governments but may create demand for services from state or local entities, such as fire protection, police cooperation, or longer roads to skirt the property. Counties with national forest lands or certain Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands have historically received a percentage of agency revenues, primarily from timber sales. In the 1990s, timber sales declined substantially from the historic levels in the late 1980s—by more than 90% in some areas—which had led to substantially reduced payments to the counties. Congress enacted the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS) to provide a temporary, optional system to supplant the revenue-sharing programs for the national forests managed by the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture and for certain public lands administered by the BLM in the Department of the Interior.\nThe law authorizing these payments (SRS) originally expired at the end of FY2006 but was extended an additional nine years through several reauthorizations:\nThe 109 th Congress considered the program, but did not enact reauthorizing legislation. The 110 th Congress extended the payments for one year through FY2007, and it then enacted legislation to reauthorize the program for four years with declining payments and to modify the formula for allocating the payments. The 112 th Congress extended the program for one more year through FY2012 and amended the program to slow the decline in payments. The 113 th Congress again approved a one-year extension, reauthorizing the program through FY2013, but did not reauthorize the program for FY2014 prior to its expiration. After FS and BLM distributed the revenue-sharing payment for FY2014, the 114 th Congress reauthorized SRS for two years (through FY2015) and required the agencies to issue the FY2014 SRS payment within 45 days of enactment. SRS expired at the end of FY2015; payments were disbursed after the fiscal year ended, so the FY2015 payment was made in FY2016.\nThis report provides background information on FS and BLM revenue-sharing and SRS payments and describes the issues that Congress has debated and may continue to debate in the 115 th Congress.", "In 1908, Congress directed FS to begin paying 25% of its gross receipts to states for use on roads and schools in the counties where national forests are located. Receipts come from sales, leases, rentals, or other fees for using national forest lands or resources (e.g., timber sales, recreation fees, and communication site leases). This mandatory spending program was enacted to compensate local governments for the tax-exempt status of the national forests, but the statutory compensation rate (10% of gross receipts in 1906 and 1907; 25% of gross receipts since) was not discussed in the 1906-1908 debates. This revenue- or receipt-sharing program is called Forest Service Payments to States (also referred to as the 1908 payment, or the 25% payment). The states have no discretion in assigning the funds to the county. FS determines the amount to be allocated to each county based on the national forest acreage in each county and provides that amount to the state. The states cannot retain any of the funds; they must be passed through to local governmental entities for use at the county level (but not necessarily to county governments themselves). Each state must spend the funds on road and school programs, and state law sets forth how the payments are to be allocated between road and school projects. The state laws differ widely, generally ranging from 30% to 100% for school programs, with a few states providing substantial local discretion on the split.\nCongress has also enacted numerous programs to share receipts from BLM lands for various types of resource use and from various classes of land. One program—the Oregon and California (O&C) payments—accounts for more than 95% of BLM receipt-sharing. The O&C payments are made to the counties in western Oregon containing the revested Oregon and California grant lands that were returned to federal ownership for failure of the states to fulfill the terms of the grant. The O&C counties receive 50% of the receipts from these lands. These mandatory payments go directly to the counties for any local governmental purposes. Concerns about, and proposals to alter, FS revenue-sharing payments also typically include the O&C payments, because both are substantial payments derived largely from timber receipts.", "Timber sale revenue—and, consequently, revenue-sharing payments—peaked in the late 1980s. The FY1989 FS 25% payments totaled $362 million, while O&C payments totaled $110 million. FS and O&C receipts have declined substantially since FY1989, largely because of declines in federal timber sales (see Figure 1 ) and other factors. The decline began in the Pacific Northwest, owing to a combination of forest management policies and practices, efforts to protect northern spotted owl habitat, increased planning and procedural requirements, changing public preferences, economic and industry factors, and other developments. Provisions in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 authorized FS and BLM to make so-called owl payments to several counties in Washington, Oregon, and California. These payments were set at a declining percentage of the average revenue-sharing payments made to those counties between FY1986 and FY1990.\nAs federal timber sales—and revenue-sharing payments—began to decline nationwide, Congress replaced the regional owl payments with the nationwide SRS program in 2000. Similar to the owl payments for the Pacific Northwest, the SRS program was an optional payment that counties could elect to receive instead of receiving the 25% receipt-sharing payment. As originally enacted, the SRS payment was calculated as an average of the three highest payments made to counties between FY1986 and FY1999. With the program extension in FY2008, the SRS payment calculation was modified to also consider county population and per capita income, and it established an annually declining payment level.\nPayments under SRS (see Table 1 ) were substantial and significantly greater than the receipt-sharing payments. The FS payment rose from $194 million in FY2000 (all figures in nominal dollars) to a $346 million SRS payment in FY2001. For the initial six years SRS was authorized, the average FS SRS payment was $360 million annually, more than $130 million above the average annual FS payment for the six years prior to the enactment of SRS (FY1995-FY2000). Over the life of the program, the FS SRS payments have averaged $337 million and the BLM SRS payments have averaged $78 million per year.\nFigure 2 shows a comparison of the FS actual payments to estimates of what the payments would have been had SRS not been enacted. To illustrate, FS receipts (for revenue-sharing purposes) in FY2012 totaled $230 million. Without SRS, the revenue-sharing payment would have been around $58 million. With SRS, the payments totaled $274 million. Similarly, BLM timber receipts from western Oregon (which includes some non-O&C lands) totaled $28 million in FY2012. Without SRS, the 50% revenue-sharing payment would have been approximately $14 million, compared to the $34 million payment under SRS.\nSRS expired—temporarily—on October 1, 2014. With the expiration of SRS, the FY2014 payments were again to be based on a percentage of agency receipts (the rolling seven-year average of 25% for national forest lands and of 50% for O&C lands). As nonexempt, nondefense mandatory spending, the payments were subject to the annual sequestration of budgetary authority. The post-sequester revenue-sharing payment for FS was $50 million and $18 million for BLM. These payments were distributed in February 2015.\nP.L. 114-10 was enacted on April 16, 2015. It included provisions for a \"make-up\" FY2014 SRS payment, and it authorized an FY2015 SRS payment. The FY2014 payment was set at 95% of the FY2013 payment level, but for counties that opted to receive an SRS payment, the FY2014 payment was offset by the revenue-sharing payment already distributed. In effect, the counties received their FY2014 SRS payment in two installments. The total FS SRS payment for FY2014 was $274 million; for BLM it was $38 million. Because the payments were authorized after the sequestration amount was calculated for both FY2015 and FY2016, the payments were not subject to sequestration either year.\nSRS expired on October 1, 2016, without congressional reauthorization. Thus, counties received revenue-sharing payments for FY2016 (issued in early 2017). The post-sequester revenue-sharing payment was $54 million for the Forest Service and $19 million for BLM (see Figure 2 ). If SRS payments had been authorized, the FS payment to counties would have been approximately $248 million and the BLM payment would have been approximately $34 million.", "In addition to the FS and BLM receipt-sharing programs, Congress has enacted other programs to compensate for the presence of federal land. The most widely applicable program, administered by the Department of the Interior, is the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) Program. PILT payments to counties are calculated in dollars per acre of federal land and are based on eligible federal lands, as specified in statute. The eligible lands include national forests and O&C lands in each county (but total amounts are restricted in counties with very low populations). PILT payments are reduced (to a minimum payment per acre) by other payment programs—including FS Payments to States but not including BLM's O&C payments—so increases in FS payments may decrease a county's payments under PILT (and vice versa). This helps to explain why FY2012 PILT payments to Colorado were double the PILT payments to Oregon, even though there is more federal land in Oregon (32.6 million acres) than in Colorado (23.8 million acres).\nBefore 2008, annual appropriations were necessary to fund PILT. When the appropriations were less than the authorized total payments, each county received its calculated pro rata share of the appropriation. However, the 2008 and 2012 SRS amendments also made PILT payments mandatory spending for FY2008-FY2013, and the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ) extended mandatory spending to FY2014. Thus, for those fiscal years, each county received 100% of its authorized PILT payment. For FY2015 , Congress provided $439.5 million for PILT payments, 97% of the total authorized payment of $451.5 million. The FY2015 payment was provided through both mandatory spending and discretionary appropriations. For FY2016, Congress provided $452 million in discretionary appropriations ( P.L. 114-113 ) for PILT payments, 98% of the total authorized payment. For FY2017, Congress provided $465 million in discretionary appropriations ( P.L. 115-31 ) for PILT payments, which are expected to be paid in June 2017. The amount paid to counties is likely to be near the total authorized funding amount.", "Congress, counties receiving SRS funding, and other observers have raised three principal concerns about FS and O&C revenue-sharing programs. These are the decline in FS and O&C receipts due to the decline in timber sales, the annual uncertainty about payment amounts, and the linkage between timber revenue and county payments.", "A primary concern about the revenue-sharing programs is the effect of declining revenue on counties. National forest receipts (subject to sharing) declined from their peak of $1.44 billion in FY1989 to a low of $182.3 million in FY2009—a drop of 87%. In FY2015, national forest receipts totaled $254.5 million. In some local areas, the decline was steeper; for example, payments to the eastern Oregon counties containing the Ochoco National Forest fell from $10 million in FY1991 to $309,000 in FY1998—a decline of 97% in seven years. The extent of declining revenues in individual counties is varied, ranging from minimal to substantial. Some counties in Oregon, for example, have begun exploring alternative options to generating revenue to replace the loss of timber receipts and declining SRS payments.", "Another concern has been annual fluctuations in the payments based on revenue generated. Even in areas with modest declines or increases in recent decades, payments have varied widely from year to year. From FY1985 to FY2000, the payments from each national forest fluctuated an average of nearly 30% annually—that is, on average, a county's payment in any year was likely to be nearly 30% higher or lower than its payment the preceding year. Such wide annual fluctuations imposed serious budgeting uncertainties on the counties.", "A third, longer-term concern is referred to as linkage. Some observers have noted that, because the counties receive a portion of receipts, they are rewarded for advocating receipt-generating activities (principally timber sales) and for opposing management decisions that might reduce or constrain such activities (e.g., designating wilderness areas or protecting commercial, tribal, or sport fish harvests). County governments have often been allied with the timber industry, and opposed to efforts of environmental and other interest groups to reduce timber harvests, in debates over FS management and budget decisions.\nTimber sales as the source of funds was deemed appropriate in 1906 when the FS program was created (albeit, prior to creation of federal income taxes). Some interests support retaining the linkage between county compensation and agency receipts; local support for receipt-generating activities is seen as appropriate by these constituencies, because such activities usually also provide local employment and income, especially in rural areas where unemployment is often high. Others assert that ending the linkage is important so that local government officials can be independent in supporting whatever management decisions benefit their locality, rather than having financial incentives to support particular decisions.", "In 2000, Congress enacted the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS) after extensive debates and several different bill versions. (See Appendix B for an overview of historic proposals to change the revenue-sharing system prior to the enactment of SRS.)\nThe act established an optional alternative payment system for FY2001-FY2006. At each county's discretion, the states with FS land and counties with O&C land received either the regular receipt-sharing payments or the SRS payment. Each county's SRS payment was calculated as 100% of the average of the three highest payments between FY1986 and FY1999. Title I of the act directed that counties receiving an SRS payment less than $100,000 under the alternative system could distribute the entire payment to roads and schools in the same manner as the 25% payments. However, counties receiving over $100,000 under the alternative system were required to spend 15%-20% of the payment on either (1) federal land projects proposed by local resource advisory committees and approved by the appropriate Secretary (Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Agriculture) if the projects met specified criteria, including compliance with all applicable laws and regulations and with resource management and other plans (identified in Title II of the act) or (2) certain county programs (specified in Title III of the act). Funds needed to achieve the full payment were mandatory spending, and came first from agency receipts (excluding deposits to special accounts and trust funds) and then from \"any amounts in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.\"\nSRS was originally enacted as a temporary program, expiring after payments were made for FY2006. However, SRS has been reauthorized five times, extending the payments an additional nine years (see Table 2 ). The following sections describe each reauthorization process and any enacted program modifications.", "SRS expired at the end of FY2006, with final payments made in FY2007. Legislation to extend the program was considered in the 110 th Congress; various bills would have extended the program for one or seven years. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY2007 extended SRS for one year, but the bill was vetoed by President George W. Bush. However, Congress passed and the President signed a new version of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2007 which included a one-year extension of SRS payments. P.L. 110-28 authorized payments of $100 million from receipts and $425 million from discretionary appropriations, to \"be made, to the maximum extent practicable, in the same amounts, for the same purposes, and in the same manner as were made to States and counties in 2006 under that Act.\" Thus, preliminary FY2007 payments were made at the end of September 2007, with final payments made at the end of December 2007.", "In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act ( P.L. 110-343 ), which extended SRS payments for four years (through FY2011) and made several changes to the program. Changes included providing \"full funding\" that declined over four years; altering the basis for calculating payments; providing transition payments for certain states; and modifying the use of SRS funds for Title II and Title III activities. In addition, Section 601(b) modified the original FS 25% payment program by basing the payment on the average revenue generated over the preceding seven years. These provisions are discussed in more detail below.", "The act defined full funding for SRS in P.L. 110-343 , Section 3(11). For FY2008, full funding was defined as $500 million; for FY2009-FY2011, full funding was 90% of the previous year's funding. However, total payments exceeded the full funding amount in the first two years: payments under SRS totaled $572.9 million in FY2008 and $612.8 million in FY2009. This occurred because the calculated payments (discussed below) are based on full funding, as defined in the bill, but the act also authorized transition payments (discussed below) in lieu of the calculated payments in eight states. Since the transition payments exceeded the calculated payments for those states, the total payments were higher than the full funding amount.", "SRS payments to each state (for FS lands) or county (for O&C lands) differed significantly from the payments made under the original SRS; Table A-1 shows the dollars and share of total SRS payments in each state in FY2006 and FY2009. Title I payments were based on historic revenue-sharing payments (like SRS as originally enacted), but modified based on each county's share of federal land and relative income level. The revised payment calculations required multiple steps:\nStep 1. Determine the three highest revenue-sharing payments between FY1986 and FY1999 for each eligible county, and calculate the average of the three. Step 2. Calculate the proportion of these payments in each county (divide each county's three-highest average [ Step 1 ] by the total of three-highest average in all eligible counties, with separate calculations for FS lands and O&C lands). Step 3. Calculate the proportion of FS and O&C lands in each eligible county (divide each county's FS and O&C acreage by the total FS and O&C acreage in all eligible counties, with separate calculations for FS lands and O&C lands). Step 4. Average these two proportions (add the payment proportion [ Step 2 ] and the acreage proportion [ Step 3 ] and divide by 2, with separate calculations for FS lands and O&C lands). This is the base share for counties with FS lands and the 50% base share for counties with O&C lands. Step 5. Calculate each county's income adjustment by dividing the per capita personal income in each county by the median per capita personal income in all eligible counties. Step 6. Adjust each county's base share [ Step 4 ] by its relative income (divide each county's base share or 50% base share by its income adjustment [ Step 5 ]). Step 7. Calculate each county's adjusted share or 50% adjusted share as the county's proportion of its base share adjusted by its relative income [ Step 6 ] from the total adjusted shares in all eligible counties (divide each county's result from Step 6 by the total for all eligible counties [FS and O&C combined]).\nIn essence, the new formula differed from the original SRS by basing half the payments on historic revenues and half on proportion of FS and O&C land, with an adjustment based on relative county income. This was done because of the concentration of payments under the original SRS to Oregon, Washington, and California (more than 75% of payments in FY2006; see Table A-1 ). Several counties opted out of the amended SRS system, while others opted in, because of the altered allocation. For example, in FY2006 100% of the payments to Pennsylvania were under SRS, but in FY2009 only 54% of the payments to Pennsylvania were under SRS. Conversely, in FY2006 none of the payments to New Hampshire were under SRS, but in FY2009, 44% of the payments to New Hampshire were under SRS.\nIn addition, the act set a full payment amount allocated among all counties that chose to participate in the program (eligible counties). Thus, the fewer counties that participated (i.e., the more that opted for the revenue-sharing payment programs), the more each participating county received.", "In lieu of the payments calculated using the formula described above, counties in eight states—California, Louisiana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington—received transition payments for three fiscal years, FY2008-FY2010. These counties were included in the calculations, but received payments of a fixed percentage of the FY2006 payments under SRS, instead of their calculated payments. The schedule in the act specified FY2008 payments equaling 90% of FY2006 payments, FY2009 payments at 81% of FY2006 payments, and FY2010 payments at 73% of FY2006 payments. Because the transition payments were higher than the calculated payments (using the multi-step formula, above), total payments were greater than the \"full funding\" defined in the act.", "As with the original SRS, the amended version allowed counties with less than $100,000 in annual payments to use 100% of the payments for roads and schools (or any governmental purpose for O&C counties). However, it modified the requirement that counties with \"modest distributions\" (annual payments over $100,000 but less than $350,000) use 15%-20% of the funds for Title II projects (reinvestment in federal lands). Instead, these counties could use the required 15%-20% either for Title II projects or for Title III projects (county projects). Counties with payments of more than $350,000 were limited to a maximum of 7% of the payments for Title III programs. The amendment also modified the authorized uses of Title III funds, deleting some authorized uses (e.g., community work centers) while expanding authorized uses related to community wildfire protection.", "In addition to extending SRS funding through FY2011, P.L. 110-343 altered the FS revenue-sharing (25% payment) program. It changed the payment from 25% of current-year gross receipts to 25% of average gross receipts over the past seven years—essentially a seven-year rolling average of receipts. This reduced the annual fluctuation and provided more stability in the payments. Thus payments increase more slowly than in the past when and where national forest receipts are rising, but decline more slowly when and where receipts are falling. This change immediately affected counties with FS land that chose not to participate in the SRS payment program and all counties with FS land in FY2016.", "SRS was set to expire at the end of FY2011, with final payments made at the end of December 2012 (FY2012). Legislation to extend the program for five years was considered in the 112 th Congress but not enacted. However, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21) contained a one-year extension for SRS. MAP-21 authorized an FY2012 SRS payment set at 95% of the FY2011 level (approximately $344 million) and included requirements for the counties to select their payment option in a timely manner.", "SRS was again set to expire at the end of FY2012, with final payments made in February 2013 (FY2013). In the first session of the 113 th Congress, Congress enacted the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013, which included a one-year extension of SRS through FY2013 at 95% of the FY2012 SRS payment (approximately $329 million). The payments were disbursed in early 2014.\nThe 113 th Congress also conducted oversight on the SRS program, particularly regarding the sequestration of the FY2012 SRS payment (see Appendix C ).", "SRS expired after the FY2013 payments were made in early 2014. Although the 113 th Congress considered options for reauthorizing or modifying SRS for FY2014, the program was not reauthorized prior to adjournment.\nIn April 2015, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-10 ), which included a two-year reauthorization of mandatory spending for SRS payments in Section 524. Payment amounts will continue at 95% of the funding level for the preceding fiscal year. P.L. 114-10 provided that counties that elected to receive an SRS payment for FY2013 would automatically receive SRS payments for FY2014 and FY2015. The FY2014 payment was to be made within 45 days of enactment and take into account the revenue-sharing payment already disbursed to the counties.\nThe 114 th Congress considered, but did not enact, several additional options to extend or modify the expired SRS program.", "Two bills have been introduced in the 115 th Congress to address SRS. Both H.R. 2340 and S. 1027 would reauthorize SRS for two years (through FY2017, with the last payment to be issued in FY2018) and would provide a make-up payment for the FY2016 SRS payment.", "Options under congressional consideration include reauthorizing SRS, with or without modifications, implementing other legislative proposals to address the county payments, or taking no action (thus continuing the revenue-based system that took effect upon the program's expiration). Seven issues commonly have been raised about compensating counties for the tax-exempt status of federal lands: the geographic distribution of the payments; the lands covered; the basis for compensation; the source of funds; the authorized and required uses of the payments; and the duration of the new system. In addition, any new mandatory spending in excess of the baseline that would result in an increase in the deficit may be subject to budget rules such as congressional pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules, which generally require budgetary offsets. Although SRS has previously been authorized as mandatory spending, Congress might consider funding the program through the regular annual discretionary appropriations process.", "The original SRS authorization—and most subsequent reauthorizations—have been for mandatory spending. One policy issue concerns legislation with mandatory spending that would increase federal expenditures, and whether such spending should be offset so as not to increase the deficit. Congress has enacted a set of budget rules requiring that most legislation that creates new or extends existing mandatory spending (in excess of the baseline) be balanced—offset—by increases in receipts or decreases in other spending. Congress may choose to waive or set aside these rules in particular instances, but the increased deficit spending remains a consideration.\nLegislation to reauthorize SRS (with or without other modifications), or to enact a different alternative, would require an offset—increased revenues or decreased spending from other mandatory spending accounts—or a waiver to the budget rules. In 2000, Congress provided such a waiver by including a specific type of provision, called a reserve fund, in the budget resolution.\nIn 2006, to fund a six-year reauthorization of SRS, the Bush Administration proposed selling some federal lands. To fund the O&C payments, the BLM would have accelerated its land sales under Section 203 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA; 43 U.S.C. §1713). For the FS payments, estimated at $800 million, the FS would have sold approximately 300,000 acres of national forest land. This would have required legislation, as the FS currently has only very narrow authority to sell any lands. The Administration offered draft legislation to authorize these land sales, but no bill to authorize that level of national forest land sales was introduced in the 109 th Congress. Instead, Congress again included a reserve fund for SRS payments in the budget resolution. In 2007, the Bush Administration again proposed selling national forest lands to fund a phase-out of SRS payments, with half of the land sale revenues to be used for other programs (including land acquisition and conservation education). Again, no legislation to authorize national forest land sales was introduced.", "Another issue for Congress is the geographic allocation of the SRS and PILT payments (see Figure 3 ). Table 3 shows the payments for FY2014 that were made in FY2015. The only BLM SRS payment is made to Oregon for the O&C lands, and Oregon also receives the largest FS SRS payment. With a total SRS payment of approximately $94 million, Oregon received nearly one-third of the total SRS payments made in FY2015. The next-largest SRS payments are in California and Idaho, which both received just under 10% of the total payment that year. PILT payments are more evenly distributed, with no state receiving more than 10% of the total payments.", "SRS includes payments only for national forests and the O&C lands. These compensation programs provide substantial funding for the specified lands, but other federal lands that are exempt from state and local taxation receive little or nothing. The easiest comparison is with the counties that contain national grasslands, which receive 25% of net receipts and were excluded from SRS. Both forests and grasslands are part of the National Forest System, although the laws authorizing their establishment differ. However, it is unclear why national forest counties are compensated with 25% of gross receipts and were protected from declines in receipts under SRS, whereas national grassland counties are compensated with 25% of net receipts and did not receive the option of receiving SRS payments.\nMore significantly, many other tax-exempt federal lands provide little compensation to local governments. The BLM has numerous compensation programs, but generally the payments are quite small. (The O&C payments account for about 95% of BLM compensation payments, but O&C lands are only about 1% of BLM lands.) The National Park Service has two small compensation programs related to public schooling of park employees' children at two parks. PILT provides some compensation for most federal lands, but many lands—inactive military bases, Indian trust lands, and certain wildlife refuge lands, for example—are excluded, and the national forests and O&C lands get PILT payments in addition to other compensation. In 1992, the Office of Technology Assessment recommended \"fair and consistent compensation for the tax exempt status of national forest lands and activities.\" Congress could consider several options related to extending a compensation program to all tax-exempt federal lands, although determining a fair and consistent compensation level likely would generate significant debate.", "The legislative histories of the agriculture appropriations acts establishing the FS payments to states (the last of which, enacted on May 23, 1908, made the payments permanent) indicate that the intent was to substitute receipt-sharing for local property taxation, but no rationale was discussed for the level chosen (10% in 1906 and 1907; 25% in 1908 and since). Similarly, the rationale was not clearly explained or discussed for the Reagan tax-equivalency proposal, for the owl payments (a declining percent of the historical average), or for the legislation debated and enacted by the 106 th Congress (generally the average of the three highest payments during a specified historical period). The proposals' intents were generally to reduce (Reagan Administration) or increase (more recently) the payments.\nThe geographic basis has been raised as a potential problem for FS payments. FS revenue-sharing payments (25% payments) are made to the states, but are calculated for each county with land in each national forest. Depending on the formula used—the average of selected historical payments from each national forest or to each county or each state—the calculations could result in different levels of payments in states with multiple national forests. (This is not an issue for O&C lands, because the O&C payments are made directly to the counties.)", "As noted above, the FS revenue-sharing payments (25% payments) are permanently appropriated from agency receipts and were established prior to federal income taxes and substantial federal oil and gas royalties. Most of the proposals for change also would establish mandatory payments; lacking a specified funding source, funds would come from the General Treasury. SRS directed payments first from receipts, then from the General Treasury. Figure 4 shows the breakdown of FS SRS funding between receipts and the General Treasury. The amount of funding that came from the Treasury fluctuated in part due to the declining full funding level but also due to fluctuations in the level offset by receipts. Critics are concerned about the continued availability of General Treasury funds, given the current fiscal climate and some Members' desire to reduce government spending. On the other hand, recipients of these funds argue that continuing Treasury funding is fair compensation for the presence of FS lands in their jurisdiction. Another concern for some is that retaining the linkage between agency receipts (e.g., from timber sales) and county payments (albeit less directly than for the 25% payments) still encourages counties to support timber sales over other FS uses.", "Compared to the revenue-sharing programs, SRS modified how the counties could use the payments by requiring (for counties with at least $100,000 in annual payments) that 15%-20% of the payments be used for other specified purposes: certain local governmental costs (in Title III); federal land projects recommended by local advisory committees and approved by the Secretary (under Title II); or federal land projects as determined by the Secretary (under §402). Use of the funds for federal land projects has been touted as \"reinvesting\" agency receipts in federal land management, but opponents argue that this \"re-links\" county benefits with agency receipt-generating activities and reduces funding for local schools and roads. The Forest Counties Payments Committee recommended granting local governments more flexibility in their use of the payments. The committee also recommended that the federal government prohibit the states from adjusting their education funding allocations because of the FS payments. In practice, such a prohibition could be difficult to determine and enforce. The O&C payments are available for any local governmental purpose.", "Other policy questions that arise from the SRS payments include (1) how often Congress should review the payment systems (these or any other county compensation programs) to assess whether they still function as intended and (2) which options, if any, Congress might consider (e.g., a sunset provision) to induce future Congresses to undertake such a review. The FS revenue-sharing payments and the O&C payments are permanently authorized.\nSRS was originally enacted as a six-year program that expired on September 30, 2006, but was extended an additional nine years through five separate reauthorizations. As noted earlier, SRS expired on September 30, 2015, with the final payment made in FY2016. The last three reauthorizations have been for one or two years. The annual uncertainty about the continuation and funding level of the program concerns those interested in providing a consistent and predictable payment for local governments and also may concern those interested in reviewing federal spending more broadly.\nAppendix A. SRS Payments in FY2006 and FY2009\nAs described in the text (under \" Four-Year Extension Through FY2011 Enacted in the 110th Congress \"), P.L. 110-343 modified the SRS payment formula to include federal acreage and relative income in each county, as well as transition payments in some states. The result was a change in the payments and the allocation of total payments in the modified formula. These changes are shown in Table 2 . Note, however, that the change in the payment formula led some counties that had chosen 25% payments for FY2006 to opt for SRS payments for FY2009, and vice versa. Some of the increase in SRS payments in FY2009 is due to more counties opting for SRS payments in some states, such as Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Puerto Rico, and Wisconsin. In at least one state—Pennsylvania—a portion of the decline is due to some counties opting for 25% payments in FY2009.\nAppendix B. Historical Proposals to Change the Revenue-Sharing System\nConcerns about the FS and BLM programs have led to various proposals over the years to alter the compensation system. Most have focused on some form of tax equivalency —compensating the states and counties at roughly the same level as if the lands were privately owned and managed. Many consider this to be a valid approach for fairly and consistently compensating state and county governments. However, most also note the difficulty in developing a tax equivalency compensation system, because counties and states use a wide variety of mechanisms to tax individuals and corporations—property taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, excise taxes, severance taxes, and more. Thus, developing a single federal compensation system for the tax-exempt status of federal lands may be very difficult if not impossible.\nIn his 1984 budget request, President Reagan proposed replacing the receipt-sharing programs with a tax equivalency system, with a guaranteed minimum payment. The counties argued that the proposal was clearly intended to reduce payments, noting that the budget request projected savings of $40.5 million (12%) under the proposal. The change was not enacted. The FY1986 FS budget request included a proposal to change the payments to 25% of net receipts (after deducting administrative costs). Legislation to effect this change was not offered.\nIn 1993, President Clinton proposed a 10-year payment program to offset the decline in FS and O&C timber sales, and thus payments, resulting from efforts to protect various resources and values including northern spotted owls in the Pacific Northwest. Congress enacted this program in Section 13982 of the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ( P.L. 103-66 ). These \"owl\" payments began in 1994 at 85% of the FY1986-FY1990 average payments, declining by 3 percentage points annually, to 58% in 2003, but with payments after FY1999 at the higher of either this formula or the standard payment.\nIn his FY1999 budget request, President Clinton announced that he would propose legislation \"to stabilize the payments\" by extending the owl payments formula to all national forests. The proposal would have directed annual payments from \"any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,\" at the higher of (1) the FY1997 payment, or (2) 76% of the FY1986-FY1990 average payment. This approach would have increased payments in areas with large payment declines while decreasing payments in other areas, as well as eliminating annual fluctuations in payments and de-linking the payments from receipts. The Administration's proposed legislation was not introduced in Congress. The FY2000 and FY2001 FS budget requests contained similar programs, but no legislative proposals were offered.\nThe National Association of Counties (NACo) proposed an alternative in 1999. The NACo proposal would have provided the counties with the higher of (1) the standard payment, or (2) a replacement payment determined by the three highest consecutive annual payments for each county between FY1986 and FY1995, indexed for inflation. NACo also proposed \"a long-term solution ... to allow for the appropriate, sustainable, and environmentally sensitive removal of timber from the National Forests\" by establishing local advisory councils. The NACo approach would have maintained or increased the payments and might have reduced the annual fluctuations, and would likely have retained the linkage between receipts and payments in at least some areas.\nAppendix C. FY2013 Sequestration Issues\nSection 302 of the Budget Control Act (BCA) required the President to sequester, or cancel, budgetary resources for FY2013, in the event that Congress did not enact a specified deficit reduction by January 15, 2012. Congress did not enact such deficit reduction by that date, and on March 1, 2013, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined the amount of the total sequestration for FY2013 to be approximately $85 billion.\nUnder the BCA, half of the total reduction for FY2013 was allocated to defense spending, and the other half to non-defense spending. Within each half, the reductions were further allocated between discretionary appropriations and direct spending. Discretionary appropriations are defined in the BCA as budgetary resources provided in annual appropriations acts. In contrast, direct spending was defined to include budget authority provided by laws other than appropriations acts. The BCA further required OMB to calculate a uniform percentage reduction to be applied to each program, project, or activity within the direct spending category. For the direct spending category, OMB determined this percentage to be 5.1% for FY2013.\nSection 102(d)(3)(e) of SRS directed that payments for a fiscal year were to be made to the state as soon as practicable after the end of that fiscal year, meaning that the FY2012 payment was made in FY2013. Because the authority to make these payments is not provided in an annual appropriations act, such payments are not discretionary spending for purposes of the BCA. These payments were classified as non-defense, direct spending for purposes of sequestration. The BCA exempts a number of programs from sequestration; however, the payments under SRS were not identified in the legislation as exempt. Consequently, these payments were subject to sequestration as non-defense, direct spending. However, BLM and FS managed the sequestration of the FY2013 payments in different ways.\nBLM Sequestration of SRS Funds\nBLM issues SRS payments only for the O&C lands in Oregon. In February 2013, BLM distributed $36 million to the 18 O&C counties in Oregon for FY2012 SRS payments. However, DOI had held back 10% of the scheduled payments across all three titles in anticipation of the possibility of sequestration. The reduction to DOI's SRS program required by sequestration was 5.1% of the total payment, or $2.0 million. Since the sequestered amount was less than the amount withheld, DOI-BLM owed an additional SRS payment for the difference. In May 2013, BLM distributed the remaining 4.9% of the payment, resulting in a total of $38 million for the SRS payment to the O&C counties for FY2012.\nForest Service Sequestration of SRS Funds\nThe Forest Service distributed the full FY2012 SRS payments in January and February 2013, without withholding any amount in preparation for the potential sequester order. On March 19, 2013, the Forest Service announced it would seek to recover from the states the 5.1% of the payments that were subject to sequestration. In letters sent to each affected governor, the Forest Service outlined two repayment options and asked for the states to respond by April 19, 2013, with how they planned to repay. Invoices for repayment were not included. In addition to repaying the 5.1%, the FS offered the states the option of having the full sequestered amount taken out of Title II funds (for those states with enough Title II money). Three states—Alaska, Washington, and Wyoming—publicly indicated their intention not to repay the SRS funds. In an April 16, 2013, hearing before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the FS indicated that invoices for the repayment would be sent in late April 2013.\nOn August 5, 2013, the Forest Service sent additional letters which included invoices for the repayment to the governors of the 18 states with insufficient Title II money to cover the sequestered amount. The invoices outlined three options for the affected states to take within 30 days: pay the debt in full; agree to a payment plan; or petition for administrative review of the debt. The invoices also included a Notice of Indebtedness to the U.S. Forest Service and Intent to Collect by Administrative Offset, which describes the basis of the indebtedness and the Forest Service's intent to offset future payments—without assessing penalties—from future Forest Service and Department of Agriculture state payments. As of May 21, 2014, two states had remitted an SRS sequester-related payment—New Hampshire paid $27,884.17 and Maine paid $3,648—and no collection efforts have been initiated by the Forest Service or Treasury Department in the remaining 16 states. On August 20, 2013, the Forest Service sent additional letters to the governors of the 22 states that had sufficient Title II money to cover the sequestered amount. The letters informed the governors that the Title II allocations were reduced by the sequestered amount.\nTo date, the last congressional action on the issue was a House Committee on Natural Resources oversight hearing on January 14, 2014." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "h0_full h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_full", "", "h1_full", "", "h0_title h2_full", "h2_full", "", "h0_full", "", "", "h0_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What do counties containing federal lands often receive from the federal government?", "Upon what is the money that those counties receive based?", "What are some examples of revenue-generating activities?", "What was the cause of revenue declines in the 1990s?", "How did Congress respond to the decline of federal timer sales?", "How did SRS respond to the decline?", "How did Congress respond to the expiration of SRS payment authorization?", "What did the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act do?", "How did Congress amend the program in 2012?", "How did Congress extend the program until its final authorized payment?", "What has animated Congressional debates over the reauthorization of this act?", "What sort of policy questions are raised by legislation that includes mandatory spending?", "What constraints do current budget rules impose?" ], "summary": [ "Counties containing federal lands often receive payments from the federal government based on the presence of such lands.", "Counties containing National Forest System lands and certain Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands historically have received payments based on the revenue generated from those lands.", "Revenue-generating activities include recreation, grazing permits, and land use rentals, among other activities.", "Starting in the 1990s, federal timber sales began to decline substantially—by more than 90% in some areas—which led to substantially reduced payments to the counties.", "Thus, Congress enacted the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS; P.L. 106-393) as a temporary, optional program of payments.", "SRS provided payments to counties based on historic rather than current revenues from land use activities, thus minimizing the effect of reduced revenue streams on those counties.", "The last authorized SRS payment was distributed in FY2016. Authorization for SRS payments originally expired at the end of FY2006, but Congress extended the program through FY2015 with several reauthorizations, starting with a one-year reauthorization for FY2007 (P.L. 110-28).", "In 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (P.L. 110-343) enacted a four-year extension to SRS authorization through FY2011, with declining payments, a modified formula, and transition payments for certain areas.", "In 2012, Congress enacted a one-year extension through FY2012 and amended the program to slow the decline in payment levels and to tighten requirements that counties select a payment option promptly (P.L. 112-141).", "In 2013, Congress again enacted a one-year extension through FY2013 (P.L. 113-40). In 2014, the 114th Congress enacted a two-year extension through FY2015 (P.L. 114-10). SRS payments are disbursed after the fiscal year ends, so the FY2015 SRS payment—the last authorized payment—was made in FY2016.", "Congressional debates over reauthorization have considered the basis and level of compensation to counties (historical, tax equivalency, etc.); the source of funds (receipts, a new tax or other revenue source, etc.); the authorized and required uses of the payments; interaction with other compensation programs (notably Payments in Lieu of Taxes); and the duration of any changes (temporary or permanent).", "In addition, legislation with mandatory spending, such as SRS, raises policy questions about congressional control of appropriations.", "Current budget rules to restrain deficit spending typically impose a procedural barrier to such legislation, generally requiring offsets by additional receipts or reductions in other spending." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, -1, 3, 3, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, -1, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3 ] }
CRS_R41242	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Historical Background", "Current Law", "Social Security Worker and Auxiliary Benefits", "The RET Applies to Beneficiaries Below the Social Security Full Retirement Age", "The RET Reduces Social Security Benefits", "The RET Exempt Amounts", "Grace Year", "The RET May Affect Social Security Benefits Received by Spouses, Survivors and Other Dependents", "Dually Entitled Beneficiaries", "Benefits Withheld Under the RET are Restored Starting at FRA", "Worker Beneficiaries with Earnings in 2006", "Application of the Retirement Earnings Test", "Policy Issues", "The RET and Work Incentives", "The RET and Incentives to Claim Social Security Benefits", "The RET, Retirement Security and Early Benefit Claims", "Other Policy Issues", "Financial Effect of Repealing the RET on the Social Security Trust Fund" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Social Security benefits received before a person attains full retirement age (FRA) are subject to an actuarial reduction for early retirement and also may be reduced by the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test (RET) if the beneficiary has earnings that exceed an annual threshold. Under the RET, a beneficiary who is below FRA and will not attain FRA during the calendar year is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $2 of earnings above an annual exempt amount, which is $14,640 in 2012. During the calendar year in which a beneficiary attains FRA, he or she is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $3 of earnings above a higher annual exempt amount, which is $38,880 in 2012.\nThis report explains how the RET is applied under current law and provides detailed benefit examples to show how the RET affects both the worker beneficiary and any family members (auxiliary beneficiaries) who receive benefits based on the worker beneficiary's record. The report points out features of the RET that are not widely known or understood, such as the recomputation of benefits when a beneficiary attains FRA to adjust (increase) benefits to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET. Finally, the report discusses policy issues related to the RET, including recent research on the effect of the RET on work effort and the decision to claim Social Security benefits.\nKey points discussed in the report include the following:\nBenefits may be reduced in part or in full for one or more months as a result of the RET. Benefit reductions under the RET apply both to the worker beneficiary and to any family members (auxiliary beneficiaries) who receive benefits based on the worker beneficiary's record. This would include, for example, a dependent child and a spouse who may have already attained FRA. When a worker beneficiary and family members are subject to a benefit reduction under the RET, the reduction is pro-rated and applied to each person's benefit in proportion to each person's original entitlement amount. (The total amount of the reduction remains the same, but the reduction is pro-rated across more people.) An auxiliary beneficiary may be subject to a reduction in benefits under the RET both on the basis of the worker beneficiary's earnings above the exempt amount and on the basis of his or her own earnings above the exempt amount. Benefits \"lost\" as a result of the RET may be recouped by the beneficiary. When a beneficiary attains FRA and is no longer subject to the RET, his or her benefits are adjusted upward to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET. The Social Security Administration (SSA) estimates that elimination of the RET for individuals aged 62 or older would have no major effect on Social Security's projected long-range financial outlook. In the short run, however, SSA estimates that eliminating the RET would have a negative effect on the Social Security trust fund in the amount of $81 billion from 2012 to 2018. The RET raises several policy issues, including the effect of the RET on labor supply (how many hours to work and when to retire) and its effect on when workers claim Social Security benefits.", "In general, Social Security benefits are meant to replace, in part, earnings lost to an individual or family because of retirement, disability, or death. The rationale for the RET was outlined in the 1935 report of the Committee on Economic Security, which recommended that no benefits be paid before a person had \"retired from gainful employment.\"\nThe original Social Security Act barred payment of benefits for any month in which a beneficiary received wages from \"regular employment.\" This provision never went into effect, however, because the Social Security Board and many other analysts thought it would be nearly impossible to determine what was \"regular\" employment in different industries and occupations. Instead, the board recommended a specific monetary amount to simplify administration. In 1939, Congress incorporated these recommendations in amendments to the Social Security Act. Starting with the first benefits paid in 1940, benefits were withheld for months in which covered earnings were $15 or more.\nThe RET has evolved from a monthly test to an annual one (with the exception of the \"grace year\" as discussed below) and from a provision that initially affected all worker beneficiaries to one that affects beneficiaries who are below the FRA. The most recent legislative change to the RET was in 2000 when Congress eliminated the RET for beneficiaries beginning with the month they attain FRA. This change was made under the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act ( P.L. 106-182 ). Before the change in 2000, the RET applied to beneficiaries until they attained the age of 70.", "", "Social Security benefits are based on the average of a worker's highest 35 years of earnings. A worker's primary insurance amount (PIA) is computed by applying the Social Security benefit formula to the worker's career-average, wage-indexed earnings. The benefit formula replaces a higher percentage of the pre-retirement earnings of workers with low career-average earnings than for workers with high career-average earnings.\nA worker's initial monthly benefit is equal to the worker's PIA if he or she begins receiving benefits at FRA. A worker's initial monthly benefit will be less than his or her PIA if the worker begins receiving benefits before FRA, and it will be greater than his or her PIA if the worker begins receiving benefits after FRA. For a more detailed explanation of the Social Security benefit computation and the actuarial adjustment to benefits claimed before or after FRA, see Appendix A .\nSocial Security also provides auxiliary benefits to eligible family members of a retired, disabled or deceased worker. Benefits payable to family members are equal to a specified percentage of the worker's PIA. For example, a spouse's benefit is equal to 50% of the worker's PIA, and a widow(er)'s benefit is equal to 100% of the deceased worker's PIA. The total amount of benefits payable to a family based on a retired or deceased worker's record is capped by the maximum family benefit amount, which varies from 150% to 188% of the retired or deceased worker's PIA. For more information on auxiliary benefits and the maximum family benefit amount, see Appendix B .", "The RET applies to beneficiaries who are below the Social Security FRA and have earnings that exceed a specified dollar amount (an annual exempt amount). The RET does not apply to worker beneficiaries who are at or above FRA (the RET no longer applies beginning with the month the beneficiary attains FRA) or to those who are disabled. In addition, the RET does not apply to beneficiaries living outside the United States whose work is not covered by the U.S Social Security system; in this case, the \"foreign work test\" is applied. Self-employed persons are subject to the RET if they have performed \"substantial services,\" which are determined by the nature of the service performed rather than by profit or loss.", "For beneficiaries who are below FRA and will not attain FRA during the calendar year, Social Security benefits are reduced by $1 for each $2 earned above the exempt amount. For beneficiaries who will attain FRA during the calendar year, Social Security benefits are reduced by $1 for each $3 earned above the exempt amount.\nEarnings above the exempt amount are charged against monthly benefits beginning with the first chargeable month of the year, at the applicable rate of $1 for each $2 or $3 of earnings above the exempt amount, and continue to be charged each month until all earnings above the exempt amount have been charged against the worker's benefits and any benefits payable to family members on his or her work record. A partial benefit is paid when the charge to a given month is less than the monthly benefit.", "The RET applies only to wage and salary income (i.e., earnings from work). It does not apply to income from pensions, rents, dividends, interest, and other types of \"unearned\" income.\nThe RET annual exempt amounts in 2012 are $14,640 for beneficiaries who are below FRA and will not attain FRA in 2012, and $38,880 for beneficiaries who will attain FRA in 2012. The RET exempt amounts generally increase each year at the same rate as average wages in the economy. Appendix C shows the annual exempt amounts under the RET from calendar years 2000 to 2012.", "A \"grace year\" applies during the first year of benefit entitlement (or, for dependent beneficiaries, in the last year of benefit entitlement). During the grace year, the RET is applied effectively on a monthly basis. A beneficiary may receive full benefits for any month during which his or her earnings do not exceed one-twelfth of the annual exempt amount, regardless of the total amount of earnings for the year.\nAs an example, consider a worker aged 62 who (1) has $60,000 in earnings from January through June 2012, (2) claims Social Security retirement benefits on July 1, 2012, and (3) has no additional earnings for the remainder of the year (July through December 2012). Because this person does not have earnings above the 2012 monthly exempt amount of $1,220 in any month from July through December 2012, full benefits are paid for each month of the second half of the year. This is the case even though this person's total earnings for 2012 are $60,000, an amount higher than the 2012 annual exempt amount of $14,640.", "There are two ways in which a person who receives Social Security auxiliary benefits (benefits paid to spouses, survivors, and other dependents) could be affected by the RET. First, benefits paid to spouses and dependents are affected by the RET when the benefits are based on the record of a worker beneficiary who is subject to the RET (i.e., the worker beneficiary is below FRA and has earnings above the exempt amount). This includes benefits paid to spouses who are below FRA as well as to those who are above FRA. An exception is made for auxiliary benefits paid to divorced spouses. If a divorced spouse has been divorced from the worker beneficiary for at least two years, the auxiliary benefit is not affected by the worker beneficiary's earnings.\nSecond, benefits paid to spouses (including divorced spouses) and dependents are affected by the RET when the auxiliary beneficiary is below FRA and has his or her own earnings above the exempt amount. Auxiliary beneficiaries are subject to the same annual exempt amounts and benefit reduction rates that apply to worker beneficiaries.", "A person receiving spousal benefits who is affected by the RET based on his or her own earnings above the exempt amount may be simultaneously (dually) entitled to a retired-worker benefit based on his or her own work record. A dually entitled beneficiary receives his or her own retired-worker benefit first, plus any spousal benefit remaining after the spousal benefit is reduced based on the retired-worker benefit. In effect, the total benefit payable to a dually entitled beneficiary is capped at the higher of the retired-worker benefit and the spousal benefit.\nIn the case of a dually entitled beneficiary, his or her own earnings above the exempt amount affect both his or her own retired-worker benefit and the spousal benefit. In addition, if the worker beneficiary on whose record the spousal benefit is based has earnings above the exempt amount, the spousal benefit is affected by those earnings as well. When a dually entitled beneficiary attains FRA, each benefit that was affected by the RET (the retired-worker benefit or the spousal benefit) is adjusted upward to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET.\nAn example is provided later in the report to show how benefits paid to a non-working spouse are affected when the worker beneficiary has earnings above the exempt amount. In addition, an example is provided to show how spousal benefits are affected when both the worker beneficiary and the spouse have earnings above the exempt amount.", "When a beneficiary has had benefits fully or partially withheld under the RET, benefits \"lost\" as a result of the RET are restored starting at FRA. Specifically, the worker's benefits are recomputed—and increased—when he or she attains FRA. In the benefit recomputation at FRA, the actuarial reduction for benefit entitlement before FRA that was applied in the initial benefit computation is adjusted (the actuarial reduction for early retirement is lessened) to reflect the number of months the worker received no benefit or a partial benefit as a result of the RET.\nIn the initial benefit computation, retirement benefits are reduced for early retirement by a fraction of the worker's PIA for each month of entitlement before FRA. Retirement benefits are reduced by five-ninths of 1% (or 0.0056) of the worker's PIA for each of the first 36 months of entitlement before FRA. Stated another way, the actuarial reduction for early retirement is about 6.7% per year for the first three years of entitlement before FRA (i.e., from the age of 62 to 65). For each additional month of entitlement before FRA (up to 24 months), retirement benefits are reduced by five-twelfths of 1% (or 0.0042) of the worker's PIA, for an actuarial reduction of 5% per year (i.e., from the age of 65 to 67).\nStated generally, if a worker's benefits are reduced in the initial benefit computation to reflect x months of early retirement, and the worker subsequently has benefits withheld under the RET for y months , the benefit recomputation at FRA will reflect an actuarial reduction for x minus y months of early retirement, resulting in a higher monthly benefit amount starting at FRA.\nAs an example, consider a worker who starts receiving Social Security retirement benefits at the age of 62, although his or her FRA is 66, and he or she has earnings above the RET exempt amount. Because the person claims retirement benefits four years before attaining FRA and has earnings above the RET threshold, he or she will be subject to both the actuarial reduction for benefit entitlement before FRA and benefit withholding under the RET. The actuarial reduction is equal to about 6.7% per year for the first three years of benefit entitlement before FRA and 5% per year thereafter. In this example, the total actuarial reduction in the person's initial monthly benefit is 25% ((6.7% * 3 years) + (5% * 1 year)). In addition, the person continues to work throughout the four-year period from the age of 62 to 66 and has earnings high enough to cause a reduction in his or her monthly benefit under the RET. If the RET results in a 50% reduction in Social Security benefits in each of the four years from the age of 62 to 66, the person would have benefits withheld for six months each year, for a total of 24 months. The benefit recomputation when the person attains FRA will take into account that the person received no benefits for 24 months as a result of the RET. Specifically, the reduction factor for benefit entitlement before FRA will be adjusted from 48 months to 24 months. Starting at FRA, the person's monthly benefit will be increased to reflect an actuarial reduction for benefit entitlement before FRA of about 13.4% (6.7% * 2 years), instead of 25%. The person receives a higher monthly benefit because benefits withheld under the RET are restored starting at FRA.\nIf spousal benefits are withheld under the RET (as discussed in section \" The RET May Affect Social Security Benefits Received by Spouses, Survivors and Other Dependents \"), they will be adjusted upward when the spouse attains FRA (not when the worker beneficiary attains FRA). For a spouse who has already attained FRA, there is no subsequent adjustment to benefits to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET.", "Table 1 shows the number of worker beneficiaries who had earnings in 2006, the most recent year for which data are available. About 1.3 million worker beneficiaries who were below FRA during all or part of 2006 had earnings.\nWith respect to the data shown in Table 1 , it is important to note that not all worker beneficiaries with earnings are affected by the RET. For example, those who have earnings below the exempt amount are not affected by the RET. In addition, those who are in the first year of entitlement may benefit from the \"grace year\" provision and are not subject to the RET during any months in which they have earnings that are lower than the monthly RET exempt amount (i.e., the annual RET exempt amount divided by 12).", "Table 2 illustrates the application of the RET to a single person who receives benefits based on his or her own work record. The table illustrates the effect of the RET on single worker beneficiaries in two different age groups, reflecting the application of different annual exempt amounts and benefit reduction rates under the RET for beneficiaries who will remain below FRA throughout the calendar year and beneficiaries who will attain FRA during the calendar year. The two single worker beneficiaries in the examples have the following characteristics:\nSingle Worker Beneficiary Who is Below FRA Throughout the Calendar Year . This example shows a worker beneficiary with a monthly benefit amount of $2,000 (this amount has already been adjusted for retirement before FRA) and $40,000 of earnings in 2012. Because this worker beneficiary is below FRA throughout the calendar year, he or she is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $2 of earnings above the annual exempt amount of $14,640 in 2012.\nSingle Worker Beneficiary Who Will Attain FRA During the Calendar Year . This example shows a worker beneficiary with a monthly benefit amount of $2,000 (this amount has already been adjusted for retirement before FRA) and $40,000 of earnings in 2012. Because this worker beneficiary will attain FRA during the calendar year, he or she is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $3 of earnings above the annual exempt amount of $38,880 in 2012.\nAs discussed above, certain auxiliary benefits (benefits paid to the worker's family members such as a spouse or children) are subject to withholding under the RET if either the worker beneficiary or the auxiliary beneficiary has earnings above the exempt amount. When the worker beneficiary has earnings above the exempt amount, these earnings are charged against the total family benefit, that is, the total of benefits paid to the worker beneficiary and auxiliary beneficiaries who receive benefits based on the worker beneficiary's record. (When the auxiliary beneficiary has earnings above the exempt amount, these earnings are charged only against the auxiliary beneficiary's benefit, as discussed below.)\nTable 3 provides an example of a worker beneficiary who is entitled to a monthly retirement benefit of $2,000 (this amount has already been adjusted for retirement before FRA). In addition, the worker beneficiary's spouse and child are each entitled to a monthly auxiliary benefit of $1,000 based on the worker beneficiary's record. Therefore, the total monthly family benefit is $4,000.\nIf the worker beneficiary is below FRA and has earnings above the exempt amount, reductions under the RET are pro-rated among family members in proportion to each family member's original entitlement amount, before any adjustment for the family maximum or for retirement before FRA. The total amount of the reduction remains the same, but the reduction is pro-rated across two or more people. If reductions under the RET are large enough to exceed the total family benefit for one or more months, no benefits are payable to the family for those months. If a partial benefit is payable for a given month, reflecting a reduction under the RET for that month that is less than the total family benefit, the partial benefit is pro-rated among family members.\nIn Table 3 , benefits for the illustrative family are shown under two cases of the RET. The first case shows a family headed by a worker beneficiary who is below FRA throughout the calendar year and is subject to a benefit reduction under the RET equal to one-half of earnings above the lower exempt amount of $14,640 in 2012. The second case shows a family headed by a worker beneficiary who will attain FRA during the calendar year and is subject to a benefit reduction under the RET equal to one-third of earnings above the higher exempt amount of $38,880 in 2012.\nThe preceding examples illustrate cases in which the worker beneficiary has earnings above the exempt amount. In some cases, both the worker beneficiary and an auxiliary beneficiary (such as a spouse) may have earnings above the exempt amount. Table 4 shows an example of a couple in which (1) one member, the worker beneficiary, receives a retired-worker benefit based on his or her own work record, and (2) one member, the auxiliary beneficiary, receives a spousal benefit only. Both beneficiaries are assumed to be below FRA throughout the calendar year and to have earnings above the RET exempt amount. Because neither beneficiary will attain FRA during the calendar year, both are subject to the same RET exempt amount and benefit reduction rate. Benefit reductions under the RET are applied to the couple in the following order:\nFirst, the worker beneficiary's RET charge is pro-rated and applied to both the worker beneficiary's retired-worker benefit and the auxiliary beneficiary's spousal benefit. Second, if there is a balance remaining on the spousal benefit (if the spousal benefit has not been reduced to zero), the auxiliary beneficiary's RET charge is applied to (and further reduces) his or her spousal benefit only (the auxiliary beneficiary's earnings above the RET exempt amount do not affect the worker beneficiary's retired-worker benefit).\nMore complex situations may exist in which, for example, a person is dually entitled to a retired-worker benefit (based on his or her own work record) and a spousal benefit (based on a different work record) and the person has earnings above the exempt amount. In the case of a dually-entitled beneficiary, his or her earnings above the exempt amount affect both his or her own retired-worker benefit and the spousal benefit that he or she receives. The dually entitled beneficiary's earnings above the exempt amount do not affect the retired-worker benefit received by his or her spouse because that benefit is based on the spouse's work record.\nTable 5 summarizes the applicability of the RET to worker beneficiaries and auxiliary beneficiaries when either type of beneficiary has earnings above the exempt amount.", "Policymakers have asked questions about the RET's impact on labor supply and on the timing of Social Security benefit claims. Some argue that the RET is perceived as a \"tax\" on work effort, and that it induces workers to work fewer hours, or even to retire completely from the workforce. Another line of enquiry is whether the RET causes workers to delay claiming Social Security benefits. Both of these effects could have important implications for the retirement security of workers, their spouses and their survivors.\nQuantitative studies have found mixed evidence concerning the RET's impact on work hours, retirement and the timing of Social Security benefit claims. Although the RET has been found to have a substantial effect on the labor supply of workers at or just above the annual RET threshold, the impact on workers with higher wages and salaries is more ambiguous. There is somewhat stronger evidence that the RET causes workers to delay claiming Social Security benefits.", "The impact of the RET on work hours varies by income level. At wages and salaries that are at or just above the annual RET threshold, the RET may encourage workers to work fewer hours, to keep wages or salaries just under the RET threshold. This effect is known as \"bunching\" or \"clustering\" under the RET threshold. A 1999 study found that a subset of workers do cluster at earnings levels just below the RET threshold.\nAt higher earnings levels, the RET's impact on work hours is more ambiguous. Some workers perceive the RET as a tax on work effort (despite the recomputation of benefits at FRA). Moreover, other workers who are aware of the recomputation may place a relatively low value on future income. To the extent that the RET is perceived as a tax on earnings, it may induce some workers to reduce their work hours or even to retire completely from the workforce. Other workers, however, may respond to the RET reduction to Social Security benefits by working more, not fewer, hours to reach their income goals or requirements. For these workers, eliminating the RET would increase total income (income from labor plus income from Social Security). This has led some to argue that eliminating the RET would benefit some higher earners because the additional Social Security benefits that would become available would permit higher earners, if they wished, to reduce their work hours.\nOne study of the period from 1973 to 1998 found that the RET had little or no effect on the aggregate work hours and earnings of men aged 62 and older, although there is somewhat stronger evidence that the RET had an impact on women's earnings (no evidence was found for an impact on women's work hours). However, a study of Social Security beneficiaries' response to the 2000 removal of the RET for beneficiaries at or above FRA found that, when workers are segmented by earnings level, fairly large effects on earnings are found, with the effects on earnings concentrated just below and above the RET threshold. (The study did not examine how work hours were affected by the 2000 change in the RET.) Research has not found the RET to have a large effect on labor force participation, that is, a worker's decision to retire or remain in the workforce. This is perhaps in part because the RET is a relatively small part of the larger retirement decision that includes other factors such as pension rules and the worker's health, and also because it is difficult to separate the RET's impact from the trend toward later retirement that is already under way.", "Because the RET applies to persons who are younger than FRA, it may discourage persons below the FRA from claiming benefits. As noted earlier, some workers perceive the RET as a \"tax\" on benefits received before FRA, even though the recomputation of benefits at FRA (which results in a higher monthly benefit starting at FRA) allows the worker to recoup benefits withheld under the RET.\nThe quantitative evidence that the RET has an impact on the decision concerning when to claim Social Security benefits is somewhat stronger than the quantitative evidence for the RET's impact on work and earnings. For example, the Gruber and Orszag study that examined persons aged 62 and older during the period from 1973 to 1998 estimated that a $1,000 increase in the RET threshold could increase the share of men aged 62 and older who receive Social Security benefits by 0.7% to 1.6%, while eliminating the RET could increase that share by 5.2% to 13.5%. A more recent study that examined the 2000 elimination of the RET for men and women at or above FRA found a 2 to 5 percentage point increase in benefit claims among men and women aged 65 to 69, and a 3 to 5 percentage point increase among men and women who reach the age of 65.", "Some argue that, to the extent the RET causes some workers to delay claiming Social Security benefits, this can be beneficial for the worker as well as for his or her spouse or survivor. Claiming Social Security benefits before the FRA can reduce a worker's Social Security benefit amount in two ways, as noted earlier: (1) through the RET, although when the worker attains FRA his or her benefits are recomputed and a higher monthly benefit amount is payable starting at FRA; and (2) through the actuarial reduction for early retirement which, although it is intended to be actuarially fair to the individual over his or her expected lifetime, causes a permanent reduction to the worker's monthly Social Security benefit amount.\nAs discussed, the RET applies to spousal benefits. (See section \" The RET May Affect Social Security Benefits Received by Spouses, Survivors and Other Dependents .\") Spousal benefits that have been reduced by the RET are restored starting when the spouse attains FRA. Spousal benefits are not restored, however, when the RET is applied to the benefits of a spouse who is already at or above FRA. (See \" Benefits Withheld Under the RET are Restored Starting at FRA .\")\nSurvivors' benefits may be permanently affected by the worker beneficiary's decision to claim benefits before FRA. Under a provision in the Social Security Act called the widow(er)'s limit provision , the widow(er)'s benefit may be reduced if the widow(er)'s benefit payable on the worker's record exceeds the benefit the worker was receiving (including any actuarial reduction for early retirement that may have reduced the worker's benefit) before his or her death. If a worker has benefits withheld under the RET and he or she dies before attaining FRA (when the worker's benefit would have been recomputed), for purposes of determining the limit on the widow(er)'s benefit, the worker's benefit is recomputed at the time of the worker's death to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET.\nElderly widows, in particular, may face reduced living standards if their spouses claim benefits before FRA, because of the actuarial reduction to benefits described above. Women tend to outlive their husbands and are therefore more likely than men to receive Social Security survivors' benefits. In addition, individuals and couples are more likely to deplete other assets later in retirement, leaving the couple or surviving spouse more reliant on Social Security.", "Some argue that eliminating the RET would have positive budget and economic effects because people would work more and pay more Social Security payroll and other taxes. The effect of the RET on labor supply is probably modest, however, as discussed above.\nA common complaint among beneficiaries affected by the RET is that they are being denied a benefit they have \"bought and paid for.\" A related argument is that the RET resembles a form of needs testing, making benefit receipt contingent on demonstrating \"need\" for this earned benefit. Supporters of the RET counter that Social Security is intended as a form of insurance against the risks of retirement and disability; just as the program does not pay disability benefits to those who are not disabled, it should not pay retirement benefits to those who are not retired.\nThe recomputation of benefits at FRA to restore benefits withheld under the RET is not widely known or understood. As noted previously, if a beneficiary has benefits withheld under the RET, his or her benefit is recomputed when he or she attains FRA to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid due to the RET. The recomputation results in a higher monthly benefit amount starting at FRA and allows the worker to recoup the value of any benefits \"lost\" under the RET, assuming he or she lives to average life expectancy. As a result, some observers argue that the RET should not be perceived as a \"tax.\" However, for some workers with shorter lifespans, the recovery of benefits may be incomplete. Conversely, for those who live longer than average, the recomputation may result in higher lifetime benefits that more than make up for the initial benefit reductions under the RET. Because life expectancy is linked to income, some argue that the RET may be regressive on a lifetime basis.\nCritics of the RET argue that it discriminates against claimants who must continue working to supplement their benefits. In contrast, claimants with no earnings who have other forms of income, such as private pensions or investment income, can receive full Social Security benefits. Supporters of the RET counter that eliminating the RET would provide a bonus to people who are fortunate enough to be able to continue working after becoming entitled to retirement benefits, and the additional Social Security benefits may allow or encourage some individuals to reduce their work hours.", "Under current law, the RET has no major effect on Social Security financing over the long run because, on average , the RET has \"no significant effect\" on lifetime benefits. Therefore, the Social Security Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) estimates that elimination of the RET for individuals aged 62 or older would have no major effect on Social Security's projected long-range financial outlook.\nIn the short run, however, OCACT estimates that elimination of the RET would have a negative effect on the Social Security trust fund in the amount of $81 billion from 2012 to 2018. The trust fund would experience a projected cash-flow deficit of $12.1 billion in 2012, and a projected cash-flow deficit of $10.4 billion in 2018. OCACT notes: \"In the first several years after elimination of the retirement earnings test, benefit payments are projected to increase substantially, because benefits are paid under the proposal where such payments would be withheld, or the individual would have not applied for benefits yet, under current law.\"\nIn summary, OCACT notes that the projected financial effects for the Social Security program of eliminating the RET are due to \"(1) some individuals no longer having their benefits withheld, (2) some individuals who would apply for Social Security benefits earlier because of the earnings test elimination, and (3) a small net increase in earnings for individuals currently subject to the earnings test.\"\nAppendix A. Computation of the Social Security Retired-Worker Benefit\nTo be eligible for a Social Security retired-worker benefit, a person generally needs 40 earnings credits, or 10 years of Social Security-covered employment (among other requirements). A worker's initial monthly benefit is based on his or her 35 highest years of earnings which are indexed to historical wage growth (earnings through the age of 60 are indexed; earnings thereafter are counted at nominal value). The 35 highest years of indexed earnings are divided by 35 to determine the worker's career-average annual earnings. The resulting amount is divided by 12 to determine the worker's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). If a worker has fewer than 35 years of earnings in covered employment, years of no earnings are entered as zeros.\nThe worker's basic benefit amount (i.e., before any adjustments for early or delayed retirement) is the primary insurance amount (PIA). The PIA is determined by applying a formula to the AIME as shown in Table A -1 . First, the AIME is sectioned into three brackets, or levels, of earnings. Three progressive factors—90%, 32%, and 15%—are applied to the three different brackets of AIME. The three products derived from multiplying each factor and bracket of AIME are added together. For workers who become eligible for retirement benefits (i.e., those who attain age 62), become disabled, or die in 2012, the PIA is determined as shown in the example in Table A -1 .\nAdjustment to Benefits Claimed Before or After FRA\nA worker's initial monthly benefit is equal to his or her PIA if he or she begins receiving benefits at FRA (i.e., FRA is the earliest age at which full (unreduced) retirement benefits are payable). A worker's initial monthly benefit will be less than his or her PIA if he or she begins receiving benefits before FRA, and it will be greater than his or her PIA if he or she begins receiving benefits after FRA. As noted previously, FRA ranges from the age of 65 to 67 depending on the person's year of birth.\nRetirement benefits are reduced by five-ninths of 1% (or 0.0056) of the worker's PIA for each month of entitlement before FRA up to 36 months, for a reduction of about 6.7% a year. For each month of benefit entitlement before FRA in excess of 36 months, retirement benefits are reduced by five-twelfths of 1% (or 0.0042), for a reduction of 5% a year. Workers who delay filing for benefits until after FRA receive a delayed retirement credit (DRC). The DRC applies beginning with the month the worker attains FRA and ending with the month before he or she attains the age of 70. Starting in 1990, the DRC increased until it reached 8% per year for workers born in 1943 or later (i.e., starting with those who attained age 62 in 2005 or age 66 in 2009).\nAppendix B. Social Security Auxiliary Benefits (Benefits for the Worker's Family Members)\nSocial Security provides benefits to eligible family members of a retired, disabled or deceased worker. Benefits payable to family members are equal to a specified percentage of the worker's PIA, subject to a maximum family benefit amount.\nSocial Security provides a monthly benefit to the spouse or divorced spouse (if the marriage lasted 10 or more years) of an entitled retired or disabled worker equal to 50% of the worker's PIA. A monthly survivor benefit equal to 100% of the deceased worker's PIA is payable to the surviving spouse or surviving divorced spouse of a worker who was fully insured at the time of death. Benefits for spouses, divorced spouses and surviving spouses are reduced if claimed before FRA. In addition, these benefits are reduced or fully offset if the beneficiary receives his or her own Social Security retired-worker benefit or a pension from a job that was not covered by Social Security (such as certain federal, state or local government jobs).\nThe child of a disabled or retired worker is eligible for 50% of the worker's PIA. The child of a deceased worker is eligible for 75% of the worker's PIA. Social Security also provides a monthly mother's or father's benefit, equal to 75% of the worker's PIA, to a surviving parent of any age who cares for the deceased worker's child, when that child is under the age of 16 or disabled.\nTable B -1 provides a summary of Social Security auxiliary benefits for the family of a retired, disabled or deceased worker, including eligibility requirements related to age and other factors.\nMaximum Family Benefit Amount\nThe total amount of benefits payable to a family based on a retired or deceased worker's record is capped by the maximum family benefit amount. The maximum family benefit varies from 150% to 188% of the retired or deceased worker's PIA, and the maximum family benefit cannot be exceeded regardless of the number of beneficiaries entitled to benefits on the worker's record. If the sum of all benefits based on the worker's record exceeds the maximum family benefit amount, each dependent's or survivor's benefit is reduced in equal proportion to bring the total amount of benefits within the family maximum. For the family of a worker who attains age 62 in 2012, or dies in 2012 before attaining age 62, the total amount of benefits payable is limited to\n150% of the first $980 of PIA, plus 272% of PIA over $980 and through $1,415, plus 134% of PIA over $1,415 and through $1,845, plus 175% of PIA over $1,845.\nThe dollar amounts in the maximum family benefit formula are indexed to average wage growth, as in the primary benefit formula. A separate maximum family benefit formula applies to the family of a worker who is entitled to disability benefits.\nAppendix C. Annual Exempt Amounts Under the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test, Calendar Years 2000-2012\nThe RET annual exempt amount is indexed to average wage growth in the economy. An exception, however, is that the annual exempt amount is not increased in a year during which no Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is payable. In 2010 and 2011 there was no Social Security COLA, therefore the RET exempt amount did not increase in these years.\nThe RET applies only to wage and salary income (i.e., earnings from work). It does not apply to \"unearned\" income, such as income from pensions, rents, dividends, or interest." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h4_title h3_title h1_title", "h0_full h4_full h1_full", "h2_full", "h0_title h2_title h1_title", "", "h2_full", "", "h0_full", "", "h1_full", "", "h3_full h2_full h1_full", "", "h0_full", "h3_title", "", "", "h3_full", "h3_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What happens if someone who is a Social Security beneficiary and below full retirement age has earnings that exceed the annual threshold?", "What specific reduction scenarios exist?", "How are the annual exemption amounts generally adjusted?", "What happens if a beneficiary is affected by the RET?", "How can the RET reduction can be pro-rated for those who have family members who also receive auxiliary benefits?", "In what circumstance would a benefit reduction be charged against the total family benefit?", "What agency is the RET part of?", "What is the original rationale for the RET?", "What groups do not fall under the RET?", "What happens if a beneficiary is affected by RET?", "How is the recomputation at FRA calculated?", "How do spousal benefits change under the RET?", "To what extent is this feature of the RET well-known?", "What does this report explain?", "What else does the report contain?", "How often will this report be updated?" ], "summary": [ "Under the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test (RET), the monthly benefit of a Social Security beneficiary who is below full retirement age (FRA) is reduced if he or she has earnings that exceed an annual threshold.", "In 2012, a beneficiary who is below FRA and will not attain FRA during the year is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $2 of earnings above $14,640. A beneficiary who will attain FRA in 2012 is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $3 of earnings above $38,880.", "The annual exempt amounts ($14,640 and $38,880 in 2012) generally are adjusted each year according to average wage growth.", "If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly benefit may be reduced in part or in full, depending on the total applicable reduction. For example, if the total applicable reduction is greater than the beneficiary's monthly benefit amount, no monthly benefit is payable for one or more months.", "If family members also receive auxiliary benefits based on the beneficiary's work record, the reduction is pro-rated and applied to all benefits payable on that work record (including benefits paid to spouses who are above FRA).", "For example, in the case of a family consisting of a worker beneficiary who has earnings above the annual exempt amount and a spouse and child who receive benefits based on his or her work record, the benefit reduction that applies under the RET is charged against the total family benefit.", "The RET has been part of the Social Security program in some form throughout the program's history.", "The original rationale for the RET was that, as a social insurance system, Social Security protects workers from certain risks, including the loss of earnings due to retirement. Therefore, benefits should be withheld from workers who show by their earnings that they have not \"retired.\"", "The RET does not apply to Social Security disability beneficiaries who are subject to separate limitations on earnings.", "If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly benefit is recomputed, and the dollar amount of the monthly benefit is increased, when he or she attains FRA.", "The benefit recomputation at FRA is done by adjusting (lessening) the actuarial reduction for retirement before FRA that was applied in the initial benefit computation to take into account months for which benefits were reduced in part or in full under the RET.", "Any spousal benefits that were reduced because of the RET are recomputed when the spouse attains FRA. For a spouse who has already attained FRA, however, there is no subsequent adjustment to benefits to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET.", "This feature of the RET, which allows beneficiaries to recoup benefits \"lost\" as a result of the RET, is not widely known or understood.", "This report explains how the RET works under current law.", "In addition, it provides benefit examples to illustrate the effect of the RET on Social Security beneficiaries who are below FRA and family members who receive benefits based on their work records. It also briefly discusses policy issues, including recent research on the effect of the RET on work effort and the decision to claim Social Security benefits.", "This report will be updated periodically." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 5, 5, 5 ] }
CRS_R41215	{ "title": [ "", "An Overview of Illicit Drugs in Latin America and the Caribbean1", "Drug Traffickers and Related Criminal-Terrorist Actors", "Drug Trafficking-Related Crime and Violence", "U.S. Antidrug Assistance Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean37", "Plan Colombia and U.S. Assistance to the Andean Region", "Current and Future U.S. Assistance to the Andean Region", "Mérida Initiative and U.S. Assistance to Mexico59", "Background", "The Mérida Initiative and Future U.S.-Mexican Counterdrug Cooperation", "Mérida Initiative/Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)66", "Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)72", "DOD Counternarcotics Assistance Programs77", "Foreign Assistance Prohibitions and Conditions87", "Annual Drug Certification Process", "Conditions on Counternarcotics Assistance", "Human Rights Prohibitions on Assistance to Security Forces", "Drug Eradication-Related Provisions", "Issues for Congress94", "An Integrated Approach to Counternarcotics in the Region?", "The Future of Drug Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes110", "U.S. Domestic Initiatives to Counter Drug Demand", "Appendix. DOD Support to Latin America and the Caribbean" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "In recent decades, Latin America has played a central role in several major global illicit drug markets. Multiple aspects of the drug supply chain take place in the region, including drug crop cultivation, drug production, drug trafficking, and, ultimately, drug consumption. Today, South America is the sole producer of cocaine for the global market; Mexico and Colombia are the primary sources of opiates in the United States; Mexico and the Caribbean are major foreign sources of cannabis (marijuana) consumed in the United States; and Mexico is the primary source of foreign methamphetamine in the United States. Marijuana and methamphetamine are also produced domestically.\nMajor drug crops in Latin America include coca bush, used to produce cocaine, and opium poppy, used to produce opiates, including heroin. Source zones for coca bush cover the Andean region of South America, particularly Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. For more than a decade, Colombia has been the largest producer of coca bush. However, as Colombia's coca cultivation has declined, there have been increases in the number of hectares under cultivation in Peru and Bolivia. Source zones for opium poppy include Mexico, Colombia, and to a lesser extent, Guatemala. Cannabis is cultivated in virtually all countries in the region, mainly for local consumption, but notable cannabis exporters include Mexico and Jamaica.\nDrug processing and refining may take place in source zones as well as along transit routes. According to U.S. estimates, Peru now has the world's highest potential production of pure cocaine and the second-highest potential production of export quality cocaine. Production is also occurring in Central America, as Honduran officials discovered a large-scale cocaine processing plant in March 2011, the first of its kind discovered in Central America. Key chemical ingredients used to process coca bush and opium poppy into their refined, finished products, as well as those used to produce methamphetamine, are legally manufactured for legitimate industry purposes, but diverted clandestinely for use in the illegal drug trade. Precursor chemicals are also imported from third countries like India and China.\nWhile overall drug consumption in Latin America remains low, the prevalence of cocaine use in the region is now above the global average. According to data from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), increases in cocaine use have been reported in Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and Haiti. These countries are notably located along major cocaine transit routes. Despite increases in cocaine usage, marijuana remains the most widely used drug in the region, particularly in the Southern Cone.\nAccording to the State Department, roughly 95 percent of Andean cocaine flowing toward the United States transits the Mexico-Central America corridor. (see Figure 1 ). Traffickers appear to be using overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking, and short-distance aerial trafficking to transport cocaine from South America. Some 79% of drug flights from South America land in Honduras. A large but unknown proportion of opiates, as well as foreign-produced marijuana and methamphetamine, also flow through the same pathways. The overwhelming use of the Central America-Mexico corridor as a transit zone represents a major shift in trafficking routes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, drugs primarily transited through the Caribbean into South Florida.\nThe Caribbean-South Florida route continues to be active, and although it is currently less utilized than the Central America-Mexico route, some observers have warned that activity along this route may surge once more in the near future. As U.S. counternarcotics cooperation with Venezuela has diminished since 2005, Venezuela has become a major transit point for drug flights through the Caribbean into the United States as well as to Europe. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, Jamaica is a transit country for cocaine and the Bahamas is a major transit country for both Jamaican marijuana and cocaine.\nBesides going to the United States, Latin American drugs, particularly cocaine, are also shipped to Europe. Drugs destined for Europe mainly depart Latin America via Venezuela through the Caribbean or via the eastern coast of Brazil. An increasing percentage of drug shipments from Latin America to Europe now transit West Africa. While Europe has long been the second-largest cocaine consumption market after North America, the number of European users has been increasing over the last decade as the number of North American users has declined.\nLatin America's central role in the illicit drug market stems largely from the Andean region's unique position as the world's only source region for coca and cocaine. Another major factor contributing to the region's prominence in today's drug trade is its proximity to the United States, a major drug consumption market. Underlying factors that have allowed drug trafficking to\nflourish include poverty, inequality, and a lack of viable economic opportunities for farmers and youth in many countries aside from emigration. At the same time, underfunded security forces and the failure to complete institutional reform efforts have generally left police, prisons, and judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption. On average, fewer than 5% of murders committed in Latin America result in criminal convictions, which gives drug traffickers the freedom to act with relative impunity. The presence of insurgent groups involved in drug production and trafficking in some countries has impeded antidrug efforts. Uneven political support for counterdrug efforts may also fuel drug trafficking.", "Latin American drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) control various aspects of the drug supply chain and vary in terms of capabilities, organizational structures, and levels of associated violence. Some of the more sophisticated groups possess extensive paramilitary and counterintelligence capabilities that allow them to rival state security forces and operate with relative impunity through deep networks of corrupt officials in key offices. Some of the most successful groups operating today have also shifted from a hierarchical, personality-driven leadership that dominated the Pablo Escobar-type \"cartels\" in the 1980s and 1990s to a networked and more fluid organizational structure that is more resilient in the face of law enforcement pressure. Still, many smaller drug trafficking organizations in the hemisphere operate in a limited territory and specialize in particular aspect of the drug trade.\nThe most prominent DTOs in the region are of Mexican and Colombian origin. Combined, Mexican and Colombian DTOs reportedly \"generate, remove, and launder\" between $18 billion and $39 billion in wholesale drug proceeds annually, according to the U.S. Department of Justice. They operate not only in the Western Hemisphere, but are known to be aggressively transnational, seeking to expand their consumer markets and explore new transit routes and safe havens with low law enforcement capacity and high corruption. News and various government reports suggest that Mexican and Colombian DTOs have a presence throughout Europe, West Africa, and the Asia-Pacific regions. They are also known to participate in a diversity of criminal enterprises and to collaborate with other organized crime and terrorist elements.\nFor the past several years, U.S. government reports have characterized Mexican drug trafficking organizations as representing the \"greatest organized crime threat\" to the United States. Mexican drug trafficking organizations and their affiliates now \"dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States\" and are present more than one thousand U.S. cities. Drug trafficking-related violence has surged in Mexico since late 2006, when Mexican President Felipe Calderón began to increase security pressure against drug trafficking organizations. The brutality of the Mexican DTOs has escalated as an increasing number of groups have battled each other and the Mexican government for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes into the United States. When President Calderón took office, the Gulf Cartel was generally considered the most powerful Mexican DTO. Today, the Sinaloa organization, composed of a network of smaller drug trafficking groups, and Los Zetas, reported to be Mexico's most violent DTO, are competing for dominance.\nPrior to the Mexican drug trafficking organizations' rise to prominence, Colombian DTOs, primarily the Cali and Medellín drug cartels, reigned. Since their height in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several generations of DTOs have followed. Immediately following the Cali and Medellín's dismantlement, the Norte del Valle DTO emerged from the vacuum. Less hierarchical and more decentralized than its predecessors, Norte Del Valle has been described as being composed of many smaller organizations, or \"baby cartels.\"\nIn addition, by the late 1990s, left-wing insurgent groups and rightwing paramilitary groups in Colombia had become extensively involved in the drug trade. The two main left-wing insurgent groups (also State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations or FTOs ), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), are now primarily funded through drug production and trafficking operations. While the two groups differ in terms of size and territorial reach, both have increased their involvement in the drug trade from levying \"taxes\" on coca harvesters and mid-level buyers to directly controlling multiple aspects of the drug supply chain. The FARC, in contrast to the smaller ELN, is particularly known for its international contacts and relationships with foreign terrorist groups, transnational organized crime groups, and even some state actors.\nThe largest right-wing paramilitary group in Colombia (also a State Department-designated FTO), the United Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), formed in the 1980s with the political goal of defeating leftist guerrillas, began the process of demobilization in 2003. Not all paramilitaries demobilized, however, and still others have returned to paramilitary activities since demobilizing. Former and non-disbanded paramilitary elements are increasingly involved in the drug trade, having formed new illegally armed groups broadly described by the Colombian government as bandas criminales (criminal gangs) or BACRIM.\nColombia's AUC, FARC, and ELN are not the only terrorist groups active in the Western Hemisphere. In Peru, the previously dormant Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) has revived its involvement in both terrorist and drug activity, launching small-scale attacks on Peruvian police and military forces. At the same time, Sendero Luminoso has reestablished its relationship with Peruvian coca growers, taxing the coca industry in its area of operation in exchange for providing growers protection from drug trafficker violence and ensuring fair prices for their coca crops.\nInternational terrorist groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah, have also reportedly raised funding for their terrorist activities through linkages formed with DTOs in South America, particularly those operating in the tri-border area (TBA) of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. In February 2011, the Treasury Department identified the Lebanon-based Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) for its role in facilitating the money laundering activities of an international narcotics trafficking and money laundering network with ties to Hezbollah and imposed sanctions that effectively prohibited the bank from operating in the United States. The Treasury Department maintained that the network was involved in moving illegal drugs from South America to Europe and the Middle East via West Africa.\nFollowing on from the U.S. investigation of the LCB, the Department of Justice filed a federal criminal indictment against Lebanese citizen Ayman Joumaa in November 2011 for conspiring to coordinate shipments of cocaine from Colombia through Central America for sale to Los Zetas, one of Mexico's most violent drug trafficking organizations. The indictment alleged that Joumaa laundered hundreds of millions of dollars in drug trafficking proceeds from Europe, Mexico, the United States and West Africa for cocaine suppliers in Colombia and Venezuela. A subsequent civil indictment filed by the Department of Justice in December 2011 alleged that Joumaa's drug trafficking organization operates in Lebanon, West Africa, Panama, and Colombia, and launders proceeds from illicit activities through various channels, including bulk cash smuggling operations and Lebanese exchange houses, and pays fees to Hezbollah to facilitate the transportation and laundering of the proceeds.", "The Latin America and the Caribbean region has among the highest crime rates, including violent crime rates, of any region in the world. In February 2010, the UNODC released an updated analysis of global homicide rates, which found that in sharp contrast to a global trend of decreasing or stabilizing homicide rates, homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean had, on average, increased from 19.9 per 100,000 people in 2003 to 32.6 per 100,000 people in 2008 (see Figure 2 ).\nIn 2011, UNODC released a new report on global homicides that showed continued increases in homicide rates through 2010 in Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and parts of South America. As a region, the report found that Latin America had a higher percentage of homicides committed with a firearm (74%) and a greater percentage of homicides attributed to organized crime and gangs (greater than 25%) than other regions where those figures were calculated. While the average percentage of homicides related to drug trafficking specifically is unknown, a number of other studies, including U.N. reports, suggest that drug trafficking continues to be a major contributing factor behind rising homicide rates in the region.\nDrug trafficking-related violence is particularly concentrated in drug production and drug transit zones, affecting the Andean region as well as the drug transit zones through Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Venezuela, and Brazil. Some violence is directly associated with the protection of drug trafficking routes and syndicate power struggles. Other violence occurs as drug trafficking organizations corrupt and undermine police and criminal justice institutions. In extreme cases, Mexican DTOs have used car bombs, political assassinations, and coordinated attacks on different cities to intimidate their rivals, citizens, and the government. Criminality directly associated with the illegal drug trade has also increased the prevalence of related crimes, including kidnapping, money laundering, and arms trafficking.\nIn recent years, drug trafficking-related violence has surged most dramatically in Mexico, as heavily armed drug traffickers have battled each other and the Mexican government for control of drug smuggling routes into the United States. Targets most often include rival DTO or affiliated gang members, but have also included Mexican police, military and government officials; journalists; and civilians, including Americans. Escalating violence in northern Mexico has raised concerns among some U.S. officials about the potential for \"spillover violence\" seeping into the United States. While Colombia has made significant progress in reducing crime and violence since 2002, in a few parts of the country, drug-related murders have reportedly risen once more. Central American and Caribbean countries are particularly susceptible to violent crime fueled by drug trafficking because they are geographically located between some of the world's largest drug producing and drug consuming countries. Stepped up enforcement efforts in Mexico have led traffickers to use Central America, particularly Honduras, as a transshipment point for Andean cocaine, increasing the already endemic levels of violence in those countries.", "For at least 30 years, combating drug production and trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean has been a major focus of U.S. international drug control efforts. Amid a broad array of policy tools available to combat drugs, the provision of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to foreign countries has been a key component of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. The central premise of counternarcotics assistance has been to halt drug production and trafficking at the foreign source, both through assistance to eliminate drug crops or to interdict drug shipments, as well as through assistance to address related economic, social, and institutional vulnerabilities that made drug source and transit countries susceptible to the drug trade in the first place.\nWhile the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) oversees the overall strategy related to U.S. drug control efforts, both domestically and internationally, counterdrug assistance programs in the region are funded by the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). The State Department is responsible for coordinating all counterdrug assistance programs in the region and funding most aspects of those programs aside from alternative livelihood programs and some rule of law initiatives supported by USAID. DOD has its own legislative authorities to provide certain counterdrug assistance to train, equip, and improve the counternarcotics capacity and capabilities of relevant agencies of foreign governments. Additional agencies, including various aspects of the U.S. Department of Justice, as well as private contractors, implement the assistance programs. From 1980 to 2010, U.S. antidrug obligations (actual expenditures) from the State Department, USAID, and DOD to Latin America and the Caribbean totaled roughly $16.2 billion (see Figure 3 ). U.S. State Department appropriations for programs identified under the \"counternarcotics\" budget objective totaled $425.2 million in FY2011.\nU.S. drug control programs in Latin America and the Caribbean were first authorized by Congress in the mid-1970s, coinciding with national policy debates on the so-called \"war on drugs.\" At that time, U.S. assistance primarily focused on the drug source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and later Mexico, with training and equipment to eradicate illicit drug crops and strengthen counternarcotics law enforcement capabilities. Calls by many policymakers, including by Members of Congress, for the inclusion of the U.S. military in foreign anti-drug efforts began in the 1970s, spurring a lively debate on DOD's role and mission in counternarcotics that would continue decades later. U.S. aid to the region increased gradually, albeit unevenly, through the 1980s, with increased funding provided for interdiction efforts in transit countries, particularly the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific regions. Pressure for U.S. military involvement increased throughout the 1980s, as U.S. officials grew concerned that law enforcement personnel were ill-equipped to effectively combat well-armed drug cartels and operate in conflict situations in drug source countries. Despite objections from top DOD officials, the U.S. military increasingly participated in interdiction operations in the early 1980s and became sporadically engaged in training, equipping, and transporting foreign anti-narcotics personnel in the mid- to late 1980s.\nIn the 1980s and 1990s under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the threat of international drug trafficking, particularly drugs sourced in Latin America, further emerged as a national security priority for the United States. On April 8, 1986, President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221), which declared narcotics trafficking a U.S. national security concern, identifying the Western Hemisphere as particularly affected. On August 21, 1989, President Bush issued National Security Directive 18 (NSD-18), which explicitly states that the \"first priority of our international drug control strategy will be to enhance greatly our counternarcotics programs in the Andean region.\" In addition, NSD-18 directed the Secretary of Defense to redefine the Pentagon's mission to include counternarcotics as one of its core priorities. In the same year, President Bush launched the \"Andean Initiative\" to bolster counternarcotics support to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, and Congress provided DOD with its first major counternarcotics authority, identifying DOD as the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs from abroad into the United States. As U.S. counternarcotics engagement in the Andean region continued through the 1990s, Congress authorized DOD to provide a broad range of counternarcotics support, as well as assistance to train and equip foreign governments.\nIn FY2000, counterdrug assistance to South America increased significantly after the Clinton Administration proposed, and Congress began funding, a multi-year assistance package to complement Colombian President Andres Pastrana's counterdrug initiative, Plan Colombia. That aid package, then called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), aimed to provide a broad variety of counternarcotics assistance—manual and aerial eradication, alternative development, interdiction, and institutional capacity building and support to civilian and military institutions—for Colombia and six neighboring countries. Through ACI, Colombia, along with Peru and Bolivia, received the bulk of U.S. counterdrug aid to the region until Congress increased assistance for Mexico through the Mérida Initiative beginning in FY2008.\nU.S. State Department-funded drug control assistance programs in the Western Hemisphere are currently undergoing a period of transition. Counterdrug assistance to Colombia and the Andean region is in decline, after record assistance levels that began with U.S. support for Plan Colombia in FY2000. Conversely, antidrug funding for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean is significantly higher now than in the mid-2000s as a result of the Mérida Initiative and two related programs that received initial funding in FY2010, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Separately, DOD counternarcotics assistance and support continues in the region (See Table A-1 in the Appendix ).\nThe following sections provide broad overviews of the current major U.S. antidrug initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most sections contain appropriations figures through FY2012, as well as the FY2013 budget requests for each program.", "The Andean region has been the focus of intense counterdrug efforts by the United States for three decades. The major components of U.S. strategy have been coca crop eradication, interdiction of cocaine, and alternative development programs, all with an eye to reducing the drug supply at its source. Successful eradication and interdiction efforts in the 1980s and 1990s in Peru and Bolivia—then the largest suppliers—inadvertently pushed cultivation to Colombia. Colombia has been the largest producer of both coca leaf and cocaine for more than a decade, but Colombia's portion of the world's coca cultivation declined from about 74% in 2000 to 43% in 2009, and continued to decline in 2010. As Colombia's coca cultivation has declined, however, the number of hectares under cultivation in Bolivia and particularly Peru has increased. Indeed, Peru's potential cocaine production of raw cocaine surpassed that of Colombia in 2010. These changes in production from one country back to another appear to provide evidence of the aforementioned balloon effect.\nColombia's success in reducing its cultivation of coca and production of cocaine, with significant U.S. support, merits a close look. The framework for the current enforcement regime dates to 1999 when the government of President Andrés Pastrana unveiled \"Plan Colombia.\" Plan Colombia was a strategy forged by Colombians in collaboration with U.S. advisors to end Colombia's decades-long armed conflict, combat drug trafficking, and promote economic development. Plan Colombia also aimed to reduce cultivation, processing, and distribution of illicit drugs by 50% over six years—a goal not met for coca and cocaine, but met for opium and heroin, a newer, smaller, less entrenched component of the Colombian drug trade. More recent gains have brought down coca yields and estimates of potential production. Between FY2000 and FY2012, Congress provided more than $8 billion in support of Plan Colombia and its follow on plans through the U.S. State Department and DOD accounts. The Obama Administration asked for an additional $332 million in State Department funding for these programs in its FY2013 budget request. Aid to the Colombian military and police has been conditioned upon vetting requirements for trainees and meeting human rights conditions.\nThe U.S.-Colombian partnership, initially focused on counternarcotics, shifted in 2002. Because narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency had become intertwined problems, the U.S. Congress granted the State Department and DOD flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist groups. Congress capped the number of U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors that could be stationed in Colombia in support of that effort. President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) aggressively embraced Plan Colombia, and his \"democratic security\" policy successfully pushed back the FARC and ELN insurgencies. Uribe also negotiated an agreement with Colombia's rightwing paramilitaries organized under the AUC that led to the group's disbandment in 2006 after more than 31,000 of its members demobilized. The leftwing insurgencies were further weakened by numerous military, police, and intelligence operations, many of which were carried out with U.S. support. U.S. assistance also led to greater professionalization of the Colombian National Police and armed forces.\nPresident Uribe modified Plan Colombia in 2007, with a strategy to consolidate state presence in marginal areas where violence by illegal armed groups, poverty, and illicit crop cultivation had historically converged. In 2009, this \"whole-of-government\" approach was modified and renamed the National Consolidation Plan (NCP). It is a sequenced process that integrates security, eradication, interdiction, and development. The parallel U.S. program, the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), supports Colombia's initiative in remote, but strategically important, areas by increasing the presence of civilian state development institutions. The National Consolidation Plan was re-launched by President Juan Manuel Santos after his inauguration in August 2010 to focus on fewer municipalities and to increase the integration of the newly consolidated areas into Colombia's overall development plans.\nIn 2008, the United States began turning over operational and financial responsibility for Plan Colombia programs to the Colombians in a process of nationalization. Over the last four years, as U.S. funding for Plan Colombia has gradually declined, several programs were successfully nationalized, including the Air Bridge Denial Program and several police and military aviation operations. The nationalization efforts are not intended to end U.S. assistance, but rather reduce it to pre-Plan Colombia levels adjusted for inflation.\nMost analysts agree that Plan Colombia has significantly improved security conditions in Colombia. Proponents and U.S. officials say that Plan Colombia dramatically reduced violence that once threatened to undermine the state, rolled back the power of the illegally armed groups that are funded by drug profits, and reduced the role of illegal narcotics in the Colombian economy. However, some observers, while acknowledging the gains made through manual eradication and advances against the FARC, maintain that aerial spraying has had detrimental effects. Those include the displacement of vulnerable populations, environmental damage, and the dispersal of coca cultivation. Critics also argue that the strategy has not rigorously promoted human rights, provided sustainable economic alternatives for drug crop farmers, or reduced the amount of drugs available in the United States. According to the State Department, Colombia still produces more than 95% of the cocaine seized in the United States.", "The U.S. and Colombian governments are committed to locking in existing gains as the United States gradually transfers responsibility for security and counterdrug programs to the Colombians . The State Department maintains that two of its core goals for the Colombia program are to \"pursue the 'nationalization' of security and counternarcotics programs, while strengthening social, economic and rule of law programs; and [to] stabilize U.S. programs at levels sufficient to sustain the progress that has been achieved.\" As overall U.S. assistance to Colombia has declined, Congress has, since 2008, sought to more evenly balance aid between security-related programs and economic and social assistance.\nWhile the magnitude of the security challenges the country faces will likely mean that Colombia will continue to receive U.S. assistance, Colombia has also begun to provide antidrug training and technical assistance to other countries. Colombia has not yet moved to a \"post conflict\" phase of confronting its armed insurgencies and, as its drug trade is deeply entrenched, the country will likely remain a major drug-producing nation. Nevertheless, some observers maintain that Colombia's improved security conditions and more limited counternarcotics successes may provide lessons for other countries that are now confronting drug trafficking-related organized crime. Colombia has shared its expertise in combating drug trafficking and reforming its institutions with officials in some 20 countries, including Mexico.\nThe Andean Counterdrug Program ended in FY2008, and, with the exception of assistance to Peru, U.S. bilateral antidrug aid to Andean countries has been scaled back since that time. Peru continues to receive a steady flow of U.S. assistance for eradication, interdiction, and alternative development and remains a close counternarcotics partner with the United States. There has been debate over how much emphasis to put on eradication versus alternative development in Peru. Venezuela, a major transport country for cocaine, suspended its cooperation with the U.S. DEA in August 2005, alleging that DEA agents were spies. Venezuela no longer receives U.S. antidrug assistance. U.S. assistance to Bolivia has declined dramatically since President Evo Morales shut down DEA operations in the country and sent home the U.S. Ambassador in 2008. Ecuador, wedged between Peru and Colombia, is a major transit country for both cocaine and heroin. While its counternarcotics cooperation with the United States has generally been strong, President Rafael Correa terminated a U.S. lease for a base that was used for drug monitoring and interdiction in September 2009. Given current budget constraints, U.S. assistance to the Andean region is likely to remain focused on Colombia and Peru.", "", "Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana and a major transit country for cocaine sold in the United States. According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment , Mexican DTOs and their affiliates \"dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States\" and are present more than one thousand U.S. cities. While the illicit drug trade has been prevalent in Mexico for decades, an increasing number of DTOs are fighting for control of smuggling routes into the United States and resisting the Mexican government's campaign against them. As the threat posed by the DTOs has increased, U.S.-Mexican antidrug cooperation has intensified.\nIn the 1970s, the United States began providing Mexico with equipment and training to eradicate marijuana and opium poppy fields, but bilateral cooperation declined dramatically after Enrique Camarena, a U.S. DEA agent, was assassinated in Mexico in 1985. From the mid-1980s through the end of the 1990s, bilateral cooperation stalled due to U.S. mistrust of Mexican counterdrug officials and concerns about the Mexican government's overall tendency to accommodate drug leaders. At the same time, the Mexican government was reluctant to accept large amounts of U.S. assistance due to its opposition to U.S. drug certification procedures. The Mexican government also expressed opposition to the DEA and other U.S. agencies carrying out operations against DTOs in Mexican territory without authorization.\nU.S.-Mexican cooperation began to improve and U.S. assistance to Mexico increased after the two countries signed a Binational Drug Control Strategy in 1998. U.S. assistance to Mexico, which totaled some $397 million from FY2000-FY2006, supported programs aimed at interdicting cocaine; combating production and trafficking of marijuana, opium poppy, and methamphetamine; strengthening the rule of law; and countering money-laundering. In 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that while U.S. programs had helped improve Mexico's counterdrug efforts, seizures in Mexico remained relatively low, and corruption continued to hinder bilateral efforts.", "Over the last five years, U.S.-Mexican counterdrug cooperation has increased significantly, largely as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative. Upon taking office in December 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón made combating drug trafficking and organized crime a top priority of his administration. In response to the Calderón government's request for increased U.S. cooperation, in October 2007 the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a new package of U.S. assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010.\nThe Mérida Initiative, as it was originally conceived, sought to (1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug demand. Initial funding requests for the Initiative focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to intensify its efforts against transnational criminal organizations and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Unlike Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative did not include a U.S. military presence in Mexico.\nWith funding for the original Mérida Initiative ending in FY2010 and new initiatives underway for Central America and the Caribbean, the Obama Administration worked with the Mexican government to develop a new four-pillar strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. That strategy, adopted in March 2010, focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21 st century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. The first two pillars built upon existing efforts, whereas pillars three and four broadened the scope of Mérida programs to include efforts to facilitate \"secure flows\" through the U.S.-Mexico border and to improve conditions in communities wracked by violence. The strategy also involved gradually shifting U.S. efforts from the federal to the state and local levels, including police assistance and community development programs. In terms of funding priorities, the Administration has requested less funding to provide equipment for Mexican security forces and more funding for training and technical assistance programs in Mexico.\nThe 112 th Congress is continuing to fund and oversee the Mérida Initiative as well as related domestic initiatives. From FY2008-FY2012, Congress appropriated more than $1.9 billion in Mérida assistance for Mexico. The Obama Administration asked for an additional $234.0 million in Mérida assistance for Mexico in its FY2013 budget request. Congress has been closely monitoring Mérida implementation. As of December 31, 2011, some $896.0 million worth of assistance had been provided to Mexico. Congress has also debated how to measure the impact of Mérida Initiative programs, as well as the extent to which Mérida has adequately evolved to respond to security conditions in Mexico. Another issue of congressional interest has involved whether human rights conditions placed on Mérida Initiative funding are appropriate or sufficient.\nAs previously mentioned, the Mérida Initiative was designed in response to the Calderón Administration's request for specific U.S. equipment, training, and technical assistance. Increased U.S. operational support for Mexico's struggle against organized crime has recently included, among other things, the deployment of U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles to gather intelligence on DTO activities. This support has only occurred in accordance with requests by the Mexican government. As such, while the Mérida Initiative's broad four-pillar strategy may remain in place, the specific type of assistance and the depth of U.S. involvement, as requested by Mexico, may change over time, particularly after the July 1, 2012, Mexican elections.", "Counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and Mexico have put pressure on drug trafficking organizations in those countries. As a result, many DTOs have increased their operations in Central America, a region with fewer resources and weaker institutions with which to combat drug trafficking and related criminality. In September 2011, President Obama identified every Central American country as a major drug transit country, with Belize and El Salvador making their first appearance on the \"drug majors\" list. Increasing flows of narcotics through Central America are contributing to rising levels of violence and the corruption of government officials, both of which are weakening citizens' support for democratic governance and the rule of law.\nIn contrast to the wide range of programs funded in Mexico, U.S. counterdrug programs in Central America have traditionally focused on interdiction, with some anti-money laundering programs in Panama. Prior to the Mérida Initiative, the vast majority of U.S. counterdrug assistance to Central America had gone to Guatemala and Panama, traditionally the two primary drug transit countries in the region. A 2008 GAO report found that although U.S. assistance had helped Guatemala, Panama, and six other transit countries participate in antidrug operations and prosecute drug-related cases, a lack of political will, budget constraints, and corruption in recipient countries hindered the sustainability of U.S. efforts.\nThe impetus for increased U.S.-Central American cooperation on security issues stemmed from a trip by then-President George W. Bush to Central America and Mexico in March 2007. Concerns over an increase in narcotics flows and the rapid escalation of crime and violence in the region reportedly dominated the President's conversations with his counterparts, as well as follow-on consultations between U.S., Central American, and Mexican officials. As previously mentioned, in October 2007 the Bush Administration requested funding for a security assistance package known as the Mérida Initiative. Congress split the Central America portion of Mérida into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in FY2010. Officials from nearly every Central American nation maintain that the region was not sufficiently involved in the formulation of Mérida/CARSI, and that the initiative could be more responsive to host government priorities.\nAs currently formulated, CARSI provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to build the capacity of Central American institutions to counter criminal threats. In addition, CARSI supports community-based programs designed to address underlying economic and social conditions that leave communities vulnerable to those threats. The five primary goals of CARSI are to:\n1. create safe streets for the citizens of the region; 2. disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and among the nations of Central America; 3. support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments; 4. establish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and 5. foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and cooperation among the nations of the region.\nSince FY2008, Congress has appropriated $466.5 million for the countries of Central America under what was formerly known as the Mérida Initiative-Central America and is now known as CARSI. The Administration requested an additional $107.5 million for CARSI for FY2013.\nIn addition to supporting ongoing efforts under CARSI, the Obama Administration has sought to ensure that broader U.S. initiatives in Central America complement Central American government efforts and those being supported by other donors. In 2010, international donors (including the United States) formed a Group of Friends of Central America that worked with the Central American governments and the Security Commission of the Central American Integration System (SICA) to revise an existing regional security plan that had never been implemented. The 2007 plan was revised to prioritize fewer initiatives and to address new security threats that have emerged in the last few years. SICA convened a donors' conference in Guatemala City on June 22-23, 2011, at which donors pledged roughly $1.1 billion in new funding for specific projects and ongoing support for the regional security strategy . The extent to which the United States and other bilateral and multilateral donors will now refocus their existing efforts to align better with Central America's top priorities still remains to be seen.", "Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean nations are transit countries for illicit drugs from South America and the Caribbean destined for the U.S. and European markets. Currently, of the 15 countries in the Caribbean region, President Obama identified four—the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica—as major drug-producing or drug-transit countries in September 2011 pursuant to annual legislative drug certification requirements. Many other Caribbean nations, particularly in the Eastern Caribbean, are also vulnerable to drug trafficking and associated crimes because of their geographic location.\nThe United States has provided antidrug assistance to Caribbean countries through bilateral assistance programs, USAID's Caribbean Regional Program, and the State Department's Western Hemisphere Regional Program. The Bahamas has cooperated extensively with the United States on interdiction efforts through Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), a multinational interdiction effort first established in 1982. In 1999, the United States began utilizing forward operating locations in the Dutch territories of Curaçao (formerly part of the Netherlands Antilles, which officially dissolved in 2010) and Aruba, both located just off the coast of Venezuela, for U.S. military aircraft to conduct counternarcotics detection and monitoring flights. Although not included in the original Mérida Initiative request, Congress dedicated $2.5 million in funding each for Haiti and the Dominican Republic for FY2008 and again for FY2009.\nIn April 2009, at the Fifth Summit of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago, President Obama announced that he would engage with Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states and the Dominican Republic in a strategic security dialogue to address challenges such as transnational crime, illicit trafficking, and citizen security. This engagement, later dubbed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), was in response to increased crime and violence in the Caribbean in recent years and in anticipation of a potential balloon effect of narcotics trafficking through the region resulting from counternarcotics efforts funded by the Mérida Initiative for Mexico. In May 2010, U.S. and Caribbean representatives held the inaugural Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue in Washington, DC, and approved a declaration of principles, a framework for engagement, and a broad action plan.\nCaribbean countries and the United States pledged to work together on three strategic priorities:\nto substantially reduce illicit trafficking in the Caribbean (including measures to counter and reduce narcotics trafficking, trafficking in small arms and light weapons, trafficking in persons, and money laundering); to advance public safety and security (including measures to deal with crime and violence, organized gangs and gang-related activities, border security, illegal undocumented migration, human smuggling, terrorism threats, criminal deportees, and natural disasters); and to further promote social justice (including crime prevention, justice sector reform, and anti-corruption measures).\nThe second annual Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue was held in the Bahamas in November 10, 2011, and featured a keynote address by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, who reiterated the Obama Administration's support to the security of the Caribbean Basin and the main goals of the CBSI—to reduce illicit trafficking, increase public safety and security, and promote social justice. Caribbean nations and the United States issued a joint statement at the end of the dialogue in which nations reaffirmed their commitment to the CBSI partnership.\nU.S. funding for the CBSI amounted to almost $62 million in FY2010, $77 million in FY2011, and an estimated $64 million will be provided in FY2012. The Administration asked for $59 million for CBSI in its FY2013 budget request. Funding for the program is part of the State Department's Western Hemisphere Regional program, and has included assistance in the following five areas:\n1. Maritime and Aerial Security Cooperation , with equipment and training to enable Caribbean countries to carry out maritime and aerial operations, and support for improvement in radar coverage in strategic locations; 2. Law Enforcement Capacity Building , with support for police professionalization, anti-corruption training, community-based policing, and the sharing of regional ballistics and fingerprint information; 3. Border/Port Security and Firearms Interdiction , with technical support and training for intercepting smuggled narcotics, weapons, bulk cash, and other contraband at commercial airports and seaports as well as support for firearms interdiction and secure management of weapons and ammunition stockpiles; 4. Justice Sector Reform , with support to reform and strengthen juvenile justice systems, provide technical assistance to judges and prosecutors, address critical crime issues, and support prison assessments and training to alleviate overcrowding and improve prison conditions; and 5. Crime Prevention and At-risk Youth , with support for educational opportunities and job training for at-risk youth as well as training for drug treatment and rehabilitation professionals.", "The U.S. Department of Defense provides a broad range of counterdrug support to Latin America and the Caribbean, including training and equipping assistance for security forces engaged in counterdrug efforts. Although DOD is a provider of international counterdrug assistance, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, vests responsibility for coordinating all U.S. counterdrug assistance with the Secretary of State. As a result, DOD counterdrug programs generally complement existing foreign assistance programs run mainly by the State Department. However, due to its independent authorities and counterdrug missions, DOD programs are not necessarily integrated into the policy planning and the budgeting process for State Department-led counterdrug assistance programs. Within DOD, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats is the primary source of counternarcotics policy. Two regional combatant commands bear responsibility for DOD operations in the Western Hemisphere: the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which covers Latin America, and the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which includes Mexico and the Bahamas.\nSince Latin America has been the source of most illicit drugs arriving into the United States, DOD's role in the hemisphere has been long-standing. In FY1990, Congress mandated that DOD be the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. DOD's lead agency responsibilities extend to support for foreign law enforcement agencies in the detection and monitoring of drugs flowing toward the United States. Support in its current form has evolved over time to include not only detection and monitoring, but also U.S. military deployments, infrastructure support, intelligence support, and operational support. Two legislative authorities define the types of foreign assistance support that DOD can provide for counternarcotics purposes—Section 1004 of P.L. 101-510 , the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1991 as amended through FY2014, and Section 1033 of P.L. 105-85 , the NDAA of 1998 as amended through FY2013, which allows DOD to provide additional support to certain countries.\nColombia has historically been the focus of most DOD counterdrug efforts in the region, providing the military aspect of U.S. support for Plan Colombia. DOD counterdrug assistance to Colombia has included training and equipping of both the Colombian military and police, including the Colombian Army's Counternarcotics Brigade, assisting the Colombian Ministry of Defense with the development of a modern budget and logistics organizations, assisting the Colombian government with demobilization programs, and providing humanitarian assistance to local populations affected by the drug situation. Since FY2002, Congress has given DOD a country-specific authority to pursue a \"unified campaign\" against narcotics trafficking and against designated terrorist organizations operating in Colombia—the FARC, ELN, and AUC.\nDOD is gradually shifting away from concentrating most of its counternarcotics assistance programs in Colombia and planning on how to absorb budget cuts. In FY2012, for example, Mexico is likely to receive slightly more DOD funding than Colombia. (See Table A-1 in the Appendix for an overview of DOD assistance to the region from FY2005-FY2013). Future assistance levels may require adjustment as DOD absorbs a potential reduction of about $490 billion in planned programs through FY2021 as a result of the discretionary spending limits enacted through the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ). SOUTHCOM, for example, began implementing cost-saving measures in 2011, including reductions in joint foreign military exercises, discretionary travel, and \"certain lower-priority portfolios.\"", "In addition to defining the authorities by which the State Department and DOD fund counterdrug efforts and determining the types and levels of funding to appropriate for those efforts, Congress requires that the provision of that assistance be conditioned on certain counterdrug-related performance measures. Such aid conditions are intended to discourage aid recipients from shirking their commitments to combating drugs, as well as to ensure that they are cooperating with the U.S. government on related foreign policy priorities, including human rights and anti-corruption efforts.", "Beginning in 1986 ( P.L. 99-570 ), Congress introduced an annual procedure to withhold certain types of bilateral foreign assistance, not including counternarcotics assistance, to major drug producing and major drug transit countries worldwide, commonly termed the \"drug majors.\" In the past, this certification process had generated both criticism for the severity of its penalties as well as praise for its ability to improve political will internationally to combat drugs. Today, however, it is widely viewed as having lost much of its strength as a diplomatic tool.\nThe President is required annually to issue a presidential determination to identify which countries are to be included in the list of drug majors for the following fiscal year. For FY2012, President Barack Obama identified 22 drug majors—77% of which are countries in the Western Hemisphere. Twelve of the Latin American and Caribbean countries identified this year have been on the drug majors list for at least the past decade, including the Bahamas, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Three countries—Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua—were added to the drug majors list in FY2011. Two are new to the list: Belize and El Salvador.\nThe drug majors are then evaluated on the basis of their efforts to combat drugs and cooperate with the U.S. government on drug policy issues. The President must accordingly \"certify\" to Congress that drug majors have either \"cooperated fully\" or have \"failed demonstrably\" in U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts. If the President does not certify a drug major country, it is \"decertified\" and ultimately subject to possible sanction from receiving certain types of bilateral assistance. Decertification can have implications for country eligibility for other assistance programs, including eligibility for debt relief. For FY2012, three drug majors were \"decertified\" after the President determined that they \"failed demonstrably\" at cooperating with the U.S. government and international community on counternarcotics measures. Two of the three are countries in the Western Hemisphere: Bolivia and Venezuela.\nThe President, however, reserves the discretion to waive the foreign assistance prohibition that decertification triggers if it is of vital national interest that U.S. aid continue to those countries. In the case of both Bolivia and Venezuela, President Obama waived the aid sanctions, thus allowing for bilateral assistance to continue in the case of Bolivia and assistance related to democracy promotion programming to continue in Venezuela.", "Several conditions on counternarcotics assistance exist in current law, including general and country-specific prohibitions on providing aid to security forces (potentially including counterdrug forces) and drug eradication-related conditions. In order for the counterdrug funding to be released, these conditions require the Secretary of State to certify that the countries in question have achieved certain performance criteria. These assistance restrictions have been variously viewed as either supplements to the drug certification process, providing additional diplomatic pressure to support counternarcotics and related foreign policy goals, or additional bureaucratic obstacles to overcome. In the case of aid conditions on counternarcotics assistance for Mexico through the Mérida Initiative, for example, the delay of funds has been a source of policy frustration.", "Congress has taken measures to ensure that U.S. security assistance not be provided to foreign security forces that have been associated with gross human rights violations. Human rights conditions restrict foreign assistance to security forces authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. Specifically, units of a foreign country's security forces are prohibited from receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives \"credible evidence\" that such units have committed \"a gross violation of human rights.\" In response to these provisions, the State Department has developed vetting procedures for potential security force trainees. A modified and non-codified, but similar, provision restricts DOD training of foreign security forces in cases where the Secretary of Defense receives \"credible information\" that units of foreign security forces have committed \"a gross violation of human rights.\" While the term \"security forces\" is not defined in the FAA, AECA, or the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 112-74 ), in practice these provisions often affect assistance to foreign counternarcotics units, among others.\nIn addition to human rights vetting requirements, there are restrictions on assistance provided through State Department accounts to the security forces of certain countries that are designed to encourage the governments to address human rights concerns. In FY2012, Congress conditioned the provision of certain counterdrug-related aid to countries in Latin America on the Secretary of State reporting to congressional appropriators on a range of human rights issues. The countries included: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. DOD aid, which often dwarfs State Department security assistance, is generally not subject to the same human rights conditions.", "Colombia, the only country in the world to which the U.S. government provides assistance for eradicating drug crops through the aerial application of herbicide, is also subject to some aerial eradication-related conditions (§7045(a) of P.L. 112-74 ). Funds for aerial eradication are not made available unless alternative development programs are being implemented by USAID, the Colombian government, or another organization, where security permits, for small growers and communities targeted by aerial eradication. Funds may not be used for aerial eradication in Colombia's national parks or reserves unless the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that there are no effective alternative eradication methods and the eradication is in accordance with Colombian laws.", "Congress is playing a role in shaping the design of U.S. antidrug programs in Latin America at a time when regional support for U.S. counternarcotics policy appears to be at a crossroads. The United States enjoys sustained counterdrug partnerships with countries like Peru and Colombia in South America and multilateral support from the U.N. and Organization of American States, as well as expanding relationships on drug issues with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean through the Mérida Initiative, CARSI, and CBSI. While many governments continue to support U.S. drug control efforts, some policymakers in the region have concluded that the current U.S.-led counterdrug approach needs to be re-evaluated. Criticism of U.S. drug activities has translated into a reduction in U.S. participation in counternarcotics efforts in certain countries, particularly Bolivia and Venezuela, as well as a growth in support in some countries for a range of alternative drug policy approaches, including drug decriminalization.\nThere has also been increasing criticism of U.S. drug policy coming from prominent observers, as well as former and, more recently, current leaders in countries that have been key partners in the struggle against illicit drug trafficking. Newly inaugurated Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina recently asserted that the region needs to consider legalizing the use and transport of drugs. He argues that the United States has failed to curb illegal drug consumption, and that his country has no choice but to seek alternatives to the current \"war on drugs\" in order to stem violence related to drug trafficking. Other leaders have agreed that a debate concerning the effectiveness of current efforts in the region is warranted. Perez Molina's arguments echo the conclusions of a report issued by a group of prominent world leaders, including former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, which argues that supply reduction and incarceration strategies are ineffective and that government resources would be better spent on demand and harm reduction efforts. These recommendations are similar to some of the suggestions that have been made by U.S. drug policy experts. During a recent visit to Mexico, Vice President Biden reportedly stated that while alternative drug policies are worth discussing, \"there is no possibility the Obama/Biden Administration will change its policy on [drug] legalization.\"\nCongress has influenced aspects of U.S. counterdrug assistance programs in Latin America and related domestic efforts in oversight hearings, legislation, and through the appropriations process. Thus far, the 112 th Congress has convened hearings on the President's requests for foreign assistance programs in Latin America (including regional security initiatives); citizen security in the Americas; the Mérida Initiative, CARSI, and CBSI; and on bulk cash smuggling along the Southwest border. The Senate has approved legislation that would create new penalties to deter the construction and use of border tunnels to smuggle drugs into the United States ( S. 1236 ) and to establish penalties for chemical producers from other countries that illegally ship precursor chemicals into the United States knowing these chemicals will be used to make illegal drugs ( S. 1612 ). Congress is likely to consider several questions as it continues to fund, oversee, and evaluate U.S. drug control programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Some of these questions might include what, if anything does the growing regional support for alternatives to the current counterdrug policy mix suggest in terms of U.S. drug policy priorities and strategies? How might the U.S. government better plan, implement, and evaluate counterdrug assistance programs in Latin America? What should be the future of eradication and alternative development programs in the Andes? To what extent are U.S. domestic drug policy efforts complementing counterdrug assistance programs in Latin America?", "Some Members of Congress have raised questions regarding whether there is the need for a more integrated approach to counternarcotics policies in the region. Members have expressed concern that the overall effectiveness of hemispheric counterdrug efforts has been hindered by \"fragmented management, unclear reporting chains, and duplicative and overlapping agendas\" among the agencies charged with implementing aspects of antidrug programs in the region. Some Members have argued that a more integrated effort might include having the State Department develop a multi-year drug strategy for the region that would seek to avoid the so-called \"balloon effect\" in which successful efforts in one area drive drug-related activities to another area. Members have also urged the Administration to establish a coordinator within the State Department to oversee the planning and implementation of the various counterdrug assistance programs in Latin America.\nThe Obama Administration has taken steps to better coordinate the country and regional antidrug programs previously discussed, and to ensure that U.S.-funded efforts complement the efforts of partner governments and other donors. The Administration has appointed a coordinator within the State Department to oversee the planning and implementation of the aforementioned regional security assistance packages. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is also working with other federal agencies, as well as independent policy experts, to develop a Western Hemisphere Counterdrug Strategy that is scheduled to be published later this year. According to ONDCP, the strategy will emphasize \"interdiction and disrupting transnational criminal organizations, institutional strengthening, building strong and resilient communities, and drug demand reduction.\" The Administration is encouraging countries that have received U.S. assistance in the past—particularly Colombia—to share technical expertise with other countries in the region, a strategy that analysts have recommended. Colombia and Mexico are supporting the implementation of the Central American Security Strategy adopted at a donor's conference in Guatemala in June 2011 as part of the Group of Friends of Central America.\nAnother aspect of developing a more integrated approach to counterdrug efforts in Latin America involves ensuring that non-aid programs related to drug policy complement the goals of U.S. counterdrug assistance programs. Those include:\nDrug Kingpin Sanctions: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targets and blocks financial assets, subject to U.S. jurisdiction, of drug kingpins and related associates and entities. First instituted in 1995 to block assets owned by principal figures of the Colombia's Cali Cartel (E.O. 12978), a second, expanded sanctions program was later introduced in 1999, which has a global scope (Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act). Targets from Latin America and the Caribbean are a central focus of both programs, with traffickers centered in Colombia constituting the entirety of E.O. 12978 and Latin American and Caribbean kingpins representing the majority of all listed kingpins since 2000. International Trade Incentives to the Andes: Through the 1991 Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and its subsequent replacement, the 2002 Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), as amended, the U.S. government has historically sought to offer trade benefits to four partner nations in the Andes—Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia—as part of a broader effort to combat drug production and trafficking in the region. The program was suspended for Bolivia in December 2008, because it failed to meet one of the eligibility requirements for the program. Specifically, the President determined that Bolivia \"failed demonstrably\" to make substantial efforts to uphold its international commitments to combat drugs. The benefits to Peru expired at the end of 2010 and were not renewed because Peru has entered into a free trade agreement with the United States, which was implemented in February 2009. The most recent extension of ATPA for Colombia and Ecuador took place on October 12, 2011, when the 112th Congress enacted implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement ( P.L. 112-42 ). As part of the free trade agreement implementing legislation, ATPA was renewed for Colombia and Ecuador until July 31, 2013. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Activities: U.S. efforts to identify and dismantle drug networks include intelligence and law enforcement activities that are not categorized as foreign assistance. DOD plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drug flows through its regional operational assets, including the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), which coordinates multi-agency drug intelligence; and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), where drug interdiction aircraft can be deployed close to drug production sources and transit zones. International drug interdiction efforts in the Western Hemisphere account for approximately 81% of all cocaine interdictions worldwide. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) maintains 37 country or regional DEA offices at U.S. embassies in Latin America and the Caribbean. DEA, with the support of other law enforcement agencies, use a variety of legal tools to ensure that international criminals are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, including extradition and extra-territorial law enforcement authorities to investigate and prosecute drug offenses overseas. DEA reportedly also provides training and operational support, in conjunction with foreign law enforcement units, for counternarcotics missions.\nThese non-foreign aid programs have figured prominently in U.S. counterdrug efforts in Latin America for some time. Yet it remains a challenge for policymakers to evaluate how such programs—conducted by a variety of U.S. agencies and offices, with separate budgets, planning procedures, and priorities and missions—may improve, detract from, or prove ineffective in the overall U.S. approach to combating drugs in the region. As Congress evaluates U.S. drug policy towards Latin America, it may choose to consider whether it is feasible and desirable to incorporate non-foreign assistance programs into a counterdrug strategy for the region.\nThe ability to monitor progress and make adjustments in programs that are not achieving their intended results has been identified as another key component of a well-integrated drug policy. Supply control programs have traditionally been evaluated by calculating the acreage of crops eradicated, drugs interdicted, or DTO leaders arrested, or by examining the price and purity of drugs in the United States. These measures, though important, can sometimes fail to capture progress that has taken place in terms of advancing bilateral or regional cooperation on anti-drug efforts and/or problems in existing policies. Measuring the effects of institution-building and development programs may prove to be even more difficult, particularly in the short term. Across the U.S. government, there has historically been a tendency to calculate the impact of particular programs by measuring \"outputs,\" such as the number of individuals trained by a justice sector program or served by a particular development program. The GAO and others have urged U.S. officials, particularly those carrying out so-called \"soft-side\" institution-building and development programs, to develop performance indicators that attempt to measure the societal \"outcomes\" that occur as result of U.S. efforts. Congress may suggest new ways for the Administration to assess the effectiveness of drug control programs across different agencies, funding streams, and jurisdictions. Congress might also consider including more funding for program evaluations in foreign appropriations measures.", "In recent years, Congress has increased funding for drug interdiction programs in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, but has gradually reduced funding for eradication and alternative development programs in the Andean region. Eradication has been a long-standing but often controversial U.S. drug control tool, particularly in Latin America. As recently as 2008, the State Department h ad asserted that \"drug crops are the weakest link in the drug production chain\" and that source-zone eradication remained \"the cornerstone of U.S. supply reduction strategy.\" More recently, some U.S. officials have argued that there are certain situations, including in conflict or post-conflict environments like the current situation in Afghanistan, in which eradication might be ineffective, or even counterproductive. When the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, then the Obama Administration's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, halted U.S.-funded eradication programs in Afghanistan, he echoed the arguments made by many Andean drug policy experts regarding the importance of having \"alternative livelihoods\" and some level of security conditions in place before eradication programs are undertaken. Without those conditions in place, analysts have warned that eradication programs, particularly of an involuntary nature, risk alienating poor farmers and peasants and driving them into the hands of insurgent groups like the FARC in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru. In some parts of Colombia and Peru, anti-government groups continue to provide security and protection to peasant farmers growing illicit drug crops, while in others, farmers have sought government assistance for alternative crop cultivation so as to free their communities from the influence of drug traffickers and allied criminal groups. Given these concerns, Congress is likely to continue evaluating the amount of foreign assistance devoted to eradication in the Andes and the circumstances under which eradication programs are carried out, as well as how eradication efforts should be sequenced with alternative development programs.\nEradication of drug crops occurs through manual removal, which involves the physical up-rooting and destruction of crops, mechanical removal, which involves the use of tractors and all-terrain vehicles to harrow the fields, or by aerial spraying, which involves the spraying of fields with herbicide mixture. Eradication can be conducted with the voluntary agreement of growers, or involuntarily. The United States supports programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in several countries in Latin America, primarily in Colombia, but also in Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, and Mexico. Manual eradication is the preferred method for eradicating in areas where illicit plants have been interspersed with licit crops, such as in national parks. Aerial eradication is only permitted in Colombia, where proponents of the practice say it remains the safest and most effective means to defoliate large areas being used for drug crop cultivation. U.S. officials have credited years of repeated aerial spraying with reducing the productivity of coca plants and fields in Colombia. However, since 2006, the percentage of illicit crops eradicated through aerial spraying in Colombia has declined vis-à-vis the percentage eradicated by manual eradication.\nDespite eradication's perceived benefits, it has also been a subject of long-standing criticism. Manual eradication requires significant time and human resources and aerial application of herbicide is not legal or feasible in many countries and is expensive to implement where it is permitted. Eradication remains a high-risk activity, as spray planes and manual eradication crews are often targeted by drug traffickers. Critics have also asserted that aerial spraying in Colombia has caused negative human, animal, and environmental damage. However, a series of reports produced by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States have concluded that the herbicide chemical used for aerial fumigation in Colombia has not caused damage to humans or wildlife. The Secretary of State has reported similar findings to Congress.\nIn the case of eradication in Colombia, results have been mixed. Crop eradication efforts provided short-term instances of success in the early 2000s when aerial spraying was first permitted. In the following years, however, farmers adapted to eradication efforts through a variety of strategies that essentially involved farmers moving cultivation locations or growing practices, but not reducing the overall harvest size. Some of these coping strategies included replanting or pruning back coca plants after spraying and increasing the number of harvest cycles per season. Other coping strategies, such as interspersing licit crops with coca crops and growing coca plants under dense foliage as well as in national parks, proved to make detection much more difficult. Nevertheless, both U.S. and U.N. estimates since 2008 have shown declines in overall coca cultivation and cocaine production projections in Colombia.\nIn the absence of the credible threat of eradication, critics question what alternative strategies exist to effectively deter drug producers from cultivating drug crops in the first place. The development of licit livelihood options in drug producing areas is often raised as an alternative option to eradication. Essentially, such a strategy would provide a positive incentive for farmers to abandon their drug crops, rather than serve as a negative deterrent. However, policymakers have been challenged to find viable income alternatives in often remote, underdeveloped regions for impoverished peasants who lack basic skills. In conflict regions, where insecurity prevails, alternative development may not even be an option. In best case scenarios, alternative development can take years to show results, rendering it an ineffective short-term solution.\nAlternative development need not be a zero-sum drug policy option. With regard to Colombia, for example, recent studies have found that the combination of jointly implemented eradication, alternative development, and interdiction is more effective than the independent application of any one of these three strategies. In La Macarena, Colombia, for example, the Colombian government has had success by focusing its efforts on improving security conditions and government services in that area and by coordinating eradication with food security for farmers and then with alternative livelihoods projects. As previously mentioned, many analysts have suggested that the likelihood of success would increase if there were modifications in the sequencing of eradication and alternative development strategies, implementing alternative development programs first and eradication programs later. Others have urged Andean governments, as well as USAID, not to disqualify an entire community from participating in an alternative development project if a few families are found to be producing coca.", "Congress has also taken some interest in the extent to which U.S. domestic initiatives to counter drug demand affect counterdrug assistance efforts in Latin America. Drug demand in the United States fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry. In 2010, about 22.6 million individuals were current (past month) illegal drug users, representing 8.9% of individuals aged 12 and older. Obama Administration officials and experts alike have acknowledged that U.S. domestic demand for illegal drugs is a significant factor driving the global drug trade, including the drug trafficking-related violence that is occurring in source and transit countries in Latin America.\nIn July 2011, the Administration released its 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, which continues to emphasize the need to reduce U.S. drug demand. The Strategy includes a five-year goal of cutting drug use among youth by 15%. Drug policy experts have praised the Administration's focus on reducing consumption, but criticized the Administration for requesting relatively modest budget increases in funding for treatment programs. Some have questioned whether the federal government allocates enough of the drug budget to adequately address the demand side. In FY2011, the Administration dedicated $10 million to drug demand reduction programs. Nevertheless, the FY2012 drug budget and FY2013 drug budget request continue to spend a majority of funds on supply reduction programs including drug crop eradication in source countries, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement efforts. In addition to federal efforts, however, many state, local, and nonprofit agencies also channel funds toward demand reduction.", "" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h2_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full h1_title", "h0_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_title h2_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "h3_full", "", "", "", "", "h3_full h2_title h1_full", "h2_full", "h2_full h1_full", "h2_full h1_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism?", "Which DTOs are most prominent in the United States?", "What has caused drug trafficking to raise to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns?", "What is the purpose of the billions of dollars invested by the U.S. government in anti-drug assistance programs?", "What have most of these programs emphasized?", "What is the success of these efforts?", "What have the former Latin American presidents claimed regarding the \"war on drugs\"?", "How has the Obama Administration developed \"war on drugs\" initiatives?", "What do newer programs emphasize?", "What is the role of the coordinator within the State Department?", "What was the stance of President Obama regarding U.S drug demand?", "How has Congress influenced U.S. drug policy in Latin America?", "What programs has Congress implemented to ensure counterdrug programs are more effective?" ], "summary": [ "The production and trafficking of popular illicit drugs—cocaine, marijuana, opiates, and methamphetamine—generate a multi-billion dollar black market in which Latin American criminal and terrorist organizations thrive. These groups challenge state authority in source and transit countries where governments are often fragile and easily corrupted.", "According to the Department of Justice, Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and their affiliates \"dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States\" and are solidifying that dominance.", "Drug trafficking is viewed as a primary threat to citizen security and U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean despite decades of anti-drug efforts by the United States and partner governments. Drug trafficking-related crime and violence in the region has escalated in recent years, raising the drug issue to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns.", "Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. government has invested billions of dollars in anti-drug assistance programs aimed at reducing the flow of Latin American-sourced illicit drugs to the United States.", "Most of these programs have emphasized supply reduction tools, particularly drug crop eradication and interdiction of illicit narcotics, and have been designed on a bilateral or sub-regional level.", "Many would argue that the results of U.S.-led drug control efforts have been mixed. Temporary successes in one country or sub-region have often led traffickers to alter their cultivation patterns, production techniques, and trafficking routes and methods in order to avoid detection. As a result of this so-called \"balloon effect,\" efforts have done little to reduce the overall availability of illicit drugs in the United States.", "Former Latin American presidents and Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina have challenged the effectiveness of the so-called \"war on drugs.\" Perez Molina has recently asserted that the region needs to consider legalizing the use and transport of some drugs in order to stem drug trafficking-related violence.", "The Obama Administration has continued U.S. support for Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative, but has broadened the focus of those aid packages to focus more on citizen security and institution-building than on mainly prioritizing drug supply control efforts.", "Newer programs like the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) include an emphasis on rule of law, anti-corruption, and community and youth development programs.", "The Administration has appointed a coordinator within the State Department to oversee the aforementioned assistance packages, which it has termed \"citizen security programs,\" and is developing a comprehensive Western Hemisphere Counterdrug Strategy.", "In order to complement these international efforts, President Obama and his top advisers have acknowledged the role that U.S. drug demand has played in fueling the drug trade in the region and requested increased funding for prevention and treatment programs. Obama Administration officials remain opposed to legalization or decriminalization of illicit drug use.", "Congress has influenced U.S. drug control policy in Latin America by appropriating certain types and levels of funding for counterdrug assistance programs and conditioning the provision of antidrug funding on the basis of human rights and other reporting requirements.", "Congress has also sought to ensure that counterdrug programs are implemented in tandem with judicial reform, anti-corruption, and human rights programs. The 112th Congress has held hearings evaluating drug assistance programs and related domestic initiatives and border security efforts." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3 ] }
GAO_GAO-18-470	{ "title": [ "Background", "Executive Order Summaries", "Federal Budget Process and Status Since Executive Order Issuance", "Agency Roles and Responsibilities", "DHS, DOJ, and State Took Initial Planning and Programming Actions to Implement Provisions of the Executive Orders", "DHS, DOJ, and State Used Existing Fiscal Year 2017 Resources to Support Initial Executive Order Actions; DHS also Received and Expended Supplemental Funds", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Key Actions and Budgetary Costs Related to Implementing Executive Order 13767, 13768, and 13780 Provisions", "Purpose", "Methodology for Selecting Executive Order Provisions", "Executive Order: 13767", "Provision Summary:", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Program Context:", "Statutes enacted from 1996 through 2007 authorize DHS, subject to certain criteria, to take necessary actions to construct physical barriers and roads to deter illegal crossings in border areas experiencing high levels of illegal entry. As we previously reported in 2017, from fiscal years 2005 through 2015, CBP increased the total miles of primary border fencing on the southwest border from 119 miles to 654 miles.", "Provision Summary:", "Section 11 directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that parole is exercised on a case- by-case basis in accordance with existing statutory criteria, and that asylum referrals and credible and reasonable fear determinations are conducted in a manner consistent with relevant statute and regulation.", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Program Context:", "In fiscal year 2019, USCIS requested a total increase of $287.5 million for all programs, projects, and activities to support changes in operational requirements driven by changes to benefit request receipt volumes and complexity of work, including implementing the executive orders.", "Executive Order: 13767 and 13768", "Provision Summary:", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Program Context:", "CBP and ICE hiring demands are driven by various factors, such as national security objectives, executive-level policies, legislative mandates, and component-specific operational requirements. Border Patrol agents are to respond to, and interdict, cross-border threats and ICE officers are responsible for apprehending individuals within the United States who may be removable for various reasons, including entering the country illegally or being convicted of certain crimes.", "Executive Order: 13767 and 13768", "Provision: Sections 13 and 11", "Provision Summary:", "Section 13 of Executive Order 13767 directs the Department of Justice (DOJ) to establish prosecution guidelines and allocate appropriate resources to ensure that federal prosecutors prioritize offenses with a nexus to the southern border.", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Program Context:", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Program Context:", "Provision Summary:", "Section 9 directs the Department of State (State) to suspend the Visa Interview Waiver Program, subject to certain exceptions. To support this, the provision also directs State to expand the Consular Fellows program so that visa wait times are not unduly affected. The provision also directs State to make language training available to Consular Fellows outside of their core linguistic abilities.", "Key Agency(ies) Responsible:", "Program Context:", "Appendix II: Executive Order Reports", "Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security", "Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "The President issued two executive orders addressing border security and immigration enforcement on January 25, 2017. These orders direct executive branch agencies to implement a series of reporting, policy, and programmatic provisions to carry out the administration’s border security and immigration policies and priorities.\nExecutive Order 13767 lays out key policies of the executive branch with regard to securing the southern border, preventing further unlawful entry into the United States, and repatriating removable foreign nationals. To support these purposes, the order directs DHS to, among other actions, produce a comprehensive study of the security of the southern border; issue new policy guidance regarding the appropriate and consistent use of detention of foreign nationals for violations of immigration law; plan, design, and construct a wall or other physical barriers along the southern border; and hire and on- board, as soon as practicable, 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents.\nExecutive Order 13767 also directs DOJ to assign immigration judges to immigration detention facilities in order to conduct removal and other related proceedings.\nExecutive Order 13768 focuses on immigration enforcement within the United States. Among other things, the order lays out the administration’s immigration enforcement priorities for removable foreign nationals; directs ICE to hire 10,000 additional immigration officers; states that, as permitted by law, it is the policy of the executive branch to empower state and local law enforcement officials to perform the functions of immigration officers; calls for weekly public reports on criminal actions committed by foreign nationals and any jurisdictions that do not honor ICE detainers with respect to such individuals; and terminates the Priority Enforcement Program while reinstituting Secure Communities. The order also directs DHS and DOJ to ensure that jurisdictions that willfully prohibit or otherwise restrict communication with DHS regarding immigration status information are not eligible to receive federal grants, except as determined necessary for law enforcement purposes.\nOn March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13780. This order directed agencies to take various actions to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Specifically, the order directed agencies to conduct a worldwide review to identify any additional information needed from each foreign country to adjudicate visas and other immigration benefits to ensure that individuals applying for such benefits are not a security or public-safety threat. The order also instituted visa entry restrictions for nationals from certain listed countries for a 90-day period; directed agencies to develop a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures; and suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days in order to review refugee application and adjudication procedures. The order further directed DHS to expedite the completion and implementation of a biometric entry-exit tracking system for travelers to the United States. Implementation of Executive Order 13780 entry restrictions for visa travelers and refugees commenced on June 29, 2017, subject to a June 26 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court prohibiting enforcement of such restrictions against foreign nationals with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States.", "The federal budget process provides the means for the President and Congress to make informed decisions between competing national needs and policies, allocate resources among federal agencies, and ensure laws are executed according to established priorities. The President generally submits the budget request for the upcoming fiscal year to Congress no later than the first Monday of February (e.g. the fiscal year 2019 budget request was submitted in February 2018). To ensure there is not a lapse in appropriations for one or more federal departments or agencies, regular appropriations bills must be enacted to fund the government before the expiration of the prior appropriations, which would typically be in effect through September 30 in a regular appropriations cycle. If these regular full-year appropriations bills are not enacted by the deadline, Congress must pass a continuing appropriation (or resolution) to temporarily fund government operations into the next fiscal year. For fiscal year 2017, multiple continuing appropriations were enacted to extend funding until the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, was enacted in May 2017.\nAt the time the President issued the executive orders in January and March of 2017, agencies were operating under a continuing appropriation which did not incorporate any funding explicitly for the administration’s immigration and border security priorities, such as hiring 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents. The administration sought additional funds to implement the executive orders through an out-of-cycle March 2017 budget amendment and supplemental appropriations request for the remainder of fiscal year 2017. In May 2017, Congress provided funding for selected priorities through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017. The administration submitted additional funding requests related to the executive orders through the President’s fiscal year 2018 and 2019 budget requests. A number of continuing appropriations acts were enacted from September 2017 through February 2018, providing fiscal year 2018 funding at fiscal year 2017 levels through March 23, 2018. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, was signed into law on March 23, 2018, providing funding for government operations for the remainder of fiscal year 2018. Figure 1 below provides a timeline of executive order issuance and key milestones in the budget process from December 2016 through March 2018.", "DHS, DOJ, and State each play key roles in enforcing U.S. immigration law and securing U.S. borders. Key components and bureaus at the three agencies, and their general roles and responsibilities with regard to border security and immigration enforcement, are described in table 1.", "DHS, DOJ, and State issued reports, developed or revised policies, and took initial planning and programmatic actions in response to the executive orders. Each agency took a distinct approach to implementing the orders based on its organizational structure and the scope of its responsibilities. Each executive order established near-term reporting requirements for agencies, including updates on the status of their efforts, studies to inform planning and implementation, and reports for the public. According to officials, agencies focused part of their initial implementation efforts on meeting these reporting requirements. In addition, agencies developed and revised policies, initiated planning efforts, and made initial program changes (such as expanding or expediting programs) to reflect the administration’s priorities.\nDHS: DHS established an Executive Order Task Force (EOTF), which was responsible for coordinating and tracking initial component actions to implement the executive orders. The EOTF assembled an operational planning team with representatives from key DHS components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and ICE. The EOTF and the planning team inventoried tasks in the orders, assigned component responsibilities for tasks, and monitored the status of the tasks through an online tracking mechanism and weekly coordination meetings. Additionally, the EOTF coordinated and moved reports required by the orders through DHS. For example, Section 4 of Executive Order 13767 directed DHS to produce a comprehensive study of the security of the southern border. DHS completed and submitted this report to the White House on November 22, 2017, according to EOTF officials. DHS also publicly issued three Declined Detainer Outcome Reports pursuant to Section 9 of Executive Order 13768. Additionally, EOTF officials stated that, in 2017, DHS produced and submitted to the White House 90-day and 180-day reports on the progress of implementing Executive Orders 13767 and 13768.\nThe Secretary of Homeland Security issued two memoranda establishing policy and providing guidance related to Executive Orders 13767 and 13768 in February 2017. One memorandum implemented Executive Order 13767 by outlining new policies designed to stem illegal entry into the United States and to facilitate the detection, apprehension, detention, and removal of foreign nationals seeking to unlawfully enter or remain in the United States. For example, the memorandum directed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), CBP, and ICE to ensure that appropriate guidance and training is provided to agency officials to ensure proper exercise of parole in accordance with existing statue. The other memorandum implemented Executive Order 13768 and provided additional guidance with respect to the enforcement of immigration laws. For example, it terminated the Priority Enforcement Program, under which ICE prioritized the apprehension, detention, and removal of foreign nationals who posed threats to national security, public safety, or border security, including convicted felons; and restored the Secure Communities Program, pursuant to which ICE may also target for removal those charged, but not yet convicted, of criminal offenses, among others. Additionally, the memorandum reiterated DHS’s general enforcement priorities. ICE, CBP, and USCIS may allocate resources to prioritize enforcement activities as they deem appropriate, such as by prioritizing enforcement against convicted felons or gang members.\nDHS components subsequently issued additional guidance further directing efforts to implement the executive orders and apply the guidance from the memoranda. For example, ICE issued guidance to its legal program to review all cases previously administratively closed based on prosecutorial discretion. ICE’s new guidance requested its attorneys to determine whether the basis for closure remains appropriate under DHS’s new enforcement priorities. USCIS also reviewed its guidance for credible and reasonable fear determinations—the initial step for certain removable individuals to demonstrate they are eligible to be considered for particular forms of relief or protection from removal in immigration court. As a result, USCIS made select modifications pursuant to Executive Order 13767, including adding language related to evaluating an applicant’s credibility based on prior statements made to other DHS officials, such as CBP and ICE officers.\nDHS also initiated a number of planning and programmatic actions to implement the executive orders. In some cases DHS components expanded or enhanced existing regular, ongoing agency activities and programs in response to the orders. For example, in response to Executive Order 13768, ICE officials reported that they expanded the use of the existing Criminal Alien Program. In other instances, DHS components altered their activities consistent with the administration’s immigration priorities. For instance, in response to Executive Order 13768, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed ICE to terminate outreach or advocacy services to potentially removable foreign nationals, and reallocate all resources currently used for such purposes to a new office to assist victims of crimes allegedly perpetrated by removable foreign nationals (the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement, or VOICE, office, established in April 2017). Additional examples of planning and programmatic actions that DHS took, or officials reported taking, in response to the executive orders are described in table 2.\nDOJ: Within DOJ, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General coordinated and oversaw DOJ’s initial implementation of key provisions in the executive orders, according to DOJ officials. Specifically, DOJ officials said that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General coordinated and collected information for executive order reporting requirements and participated in an interagency working group related to Executive Order 13780, and interagency meetings related to Executive Order 13767. However, DOJ components were responsible for implementing the provisions and ensuring that they met executive order requirements. In addition, DOJ assisted in the creation and issuance of various reports. For example, officials told us that DOJ provided data to State for a report on foreign assistance to the Mexican government, as required by Section 9 of Executive Order 13767. DOJ also jointly issued three reports with DHS in response to Executive Order 13768 Section 16, which included information regarding the immigration status of foreign-born individuals incarcerated under the supervision of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and in pre-trial detention in U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) custody.\nThe Attorney General issued two memoranda providing policy and guidance related to Executive Orders 13767 and 13768 in April and May of 2017. The April 2017 memorandum contains guidance for federal prosecutors on prioritizing certain immigration-related criminal offenses. For example, the memorandum requires that federal prosecutors consider prosecution of foreign nationals who illegally re-enter the United States after prior removal, and prioritize defendants with criminal histories. The May 2017 memorandum addresses Executive Order 13768’s provision directing DOJ and DHS to ensure that jurisdictions willfully prohibiting immigration status-related communication with the federal government (referred to as “sanctuary jurisdictions”) are not eligible for federal grants. It requires jurisdictions to certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C §1373, under which a federal, state, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict the exchange of citizenship or immigration status information with DHS.\nAdditionally, DOJ took a number of initial planning and programmatic steps to implement the executive orders. DOJ officials stated that some provisions outlined in the executive orders represent regular, ongoing agency activities and did not require any major changes to be implemented. For example, DOJ detailed Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs) and immigration judges to southern border districts and detention centers to assist in prosecutions and to conduct removal proceedings in response to the executive orders. However, while they expanded their efforts, DOJ officials said that detailing immigration judges and AUSAs to the border districts is a regular practice, and not a new function created by the executive orders. Examples of actions that DOJ took, or officials reported taking, in response to the executive orders are described in table 3.\nState: State’s Bureaus of Population, Refugees, and Migration and Consular Affairs led efforts to implement key provisions in Executive Order 13780. Several legal challenges and resulting federal court injunctions affected State’s implementation of Executive Order 13780 and at times curtailed specific provisions. Initial State actions included conducting reviews and contributing to reports required by the order. For instance, while State generally suspended refugee travel for 120 days, the department, in conjunction with DHS and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, conducted a review to determine what, if any, additional procedures should be implemented in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. According to State officials, the agencies provided a joint memorandum to the President in October 2017 that contained recommendations regarding resumption of the program, specific changes to refugee processing, and further reviews and steps that the interagency group should take. Additionally, State worked with DHS and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a worldwide review. This review identified any additional information that the United States may need from each foreign country to adjudicate visas and other immigration benefit applications and ensure that individuals seeking to enter the United States do not pose a threat to public safety or national security. In July 2017, upon completion of this review, DHS, in consultation with State and other interagency partners, issued a report to the President cataloguing information needed from each country and listing countries not providing adequate information.\nState also issued a number of policies and guidance in response to the executive orders; however, guidance on how to implement certain provisions often changed due to legal challenges. For example, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration issued 23 iterations of refugee travel restrictions guidance to overseas refugee processing centers in response to federal litigation and budgetary uncertainties. Similarly, the Secretary of State issued a number of cables to visa-issuing foreign posts on implementing travel restrictions for nationals of selected countries following court orders limiting the implementation of such restrictions.\nExecutive Order 13780 contained several time-sensitive provisions directed to the Secretary of State. State focused on first addressing these provisions while working towards longer-term priorities outlined in the order. For instance, Executive Order 13780 Sections 2 and 6 established visa and refugee entry restrictions, which contained near-term timelines. State implemented these provisions, consistent with judicial decisions. Examples of planning and programmatic actions that State took, or officials reported taking, to implement Executive Order 13780 are described in table 4.\nFor more information on specific planning or programmatic actions DHS, DOJ, and State have taken to implement the executive orders, see appendix I.\nThe examples we provided for DHS, DOJ, and State represent initial actions and do not constitute an exhaustive list of actions that agencies have taken, or may take in the future, to fully implement the executive orders. Agency officials anticipate that implementation of the executive orders will be a multi-year endeavor comprising present and future reporting, planning, and other actions. For example, DOJ officials noted that many of the actions that they took to implement the orders will be ongoing and responsive to additional DHS actions. Specifically, DOJ bases the number of immigration judges and AUSAs detailed to the southern border districts on court caseloads driven by ICE. If ICE hires additional officers and attorneys and arrests and files charges of removability against more foreign nationals, then DOJ may need to staff additional judges and AUSAs to meet caseload needs.", "Existing Fiscal Year 2017 Resources: Many of the initial actions agencies and components took in response to the executive orders fit within their existing fiscal year 2017 budget framework and aligned with their established missions. At the time the executive orders were issued in January and March of 2017, federal agencies were operating under existing continuing appropriations pending enactment of fiscal year 2017 appropriations; therefore the new administration’s border security and immigration priorities and policies had not yet been incorporated into the budget process. As a result, it is not always possible to disaggregate which fiscal year 2017 funds were used for implementation of the executive orders versus other agency activities. For example, while the orders call for a surge in hiring at CBP and ICE, these agencies regularly hire additional personnel to offset attrition or to meet budget hiring targets as part of their normal operations.\nWe asked agencies to identify budgetary resources they used specifically to address the executive orders. In some cases agencies were able to quantify their expenditures; however in other cases they could not. For example, according to DOJ officials, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which conducts immigration court proceedings, spent close to $2.4 million in existing funds to surge approximately 40 immigration judge positions to detention centers and the southwest border from March through October 2017 in response to Executive Order 13768. DHS’s USCIS reported expending approximately $4.2 million detailing asylum officers to immigration detention facilities along the southern border from February 2017 through February 2018. Additionally, as a result of the 120-day suspension of refugee admissions, State cancelled airline tickets for previously approved refugee applicants, which resulted in a cost of nearly $2.4 million in cancellation and unused ticket fees. State officials noted that, aside from the ticket costs, other budgetary costs associated with implementing the order are difficult to disaggregate from other processing activities. For example, any budgetary costs associated with refugees who were admitted on a case-by-case basis were absorbed into overseas processing budgets. In some cases, agencies also identified cost savings or avoidances. For example, State reported a total cost avoidance of over $160 million in fiscal year 2017, partially as a result of admitting fewer refugees than originally planned under the prior administration.\nWhile the costs above were part of agencies’ normal operations, we identified one case where Congress approved a DHS request to reprogram $20 million from existing programs to fund the planning and design of new physical barriers along the border, including prototype design and construction. Specifically, CBP reprogrammed $15 million from funds originally requested for Mobile Video Surveillance System deployments and $5 million from a border fence replacement project in Naco, Arizona. Additionally, we identified another case where DHS shifted funds and notified Congress, but determined Congressional approval for reprogramming was not required. Specifically, in response to Executive Order 13768, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed ICE to reallocate any and all resources used to advocate on behalf of potentially removable foreign nationals (except as necessary to comply with a judicial order) to the new VOICE office. As part of this effort, ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor determined that the creation of the VOICE office fell within ICE’s authority to carry out routine or small reallocations of personnel or functions. According to officials at DHS, DOJ, and State, there were no additional requests to reprogram or transfer funds to implement the executive orders. DHS budget officials stated that any future requests from DHS components to reprogram or transfer funds would typically be considered at the midway point in the budget cycle.\nAll three agencies indicated that they used existing personnel to implement the executive orders and, in some cases, a substantial amount of time was spent preparing reports, planning to implement provisions, and responding to changes or new developments in the executive orders. For example, USCIS officials noted that the agency devoted a significant number of manpower hours to aligning USCIS priorities to the executive orders. ICE’s Office of Human Capital established a dedicated executive order hiring team to plan for the hiring surge directed by Executive Order 13768. Additionally, officials at State told us that personnel were diverted from normal operations in order to implement executive order policy actions and that there were overtime costs associated with some provisions. In most cases, agencies did not specifically track or quantify the amount of time spent on these efforts; however, ICE’s Office of Human Capital tracked the amount of time spent on planning for the potential surge in ICE hiring in its human resource data system. According to ICE information, ICE personnel charged approximately 14,000 regular hours (the equivalent of 1,750 8-hour days) and 2,400 overtime hours to this effort from January 2017 through January 2018.\nFiscal Year 2017 Request for Supplemental Appropriations: In March 2017, the President submitted a budget amendment along with a request for $3 billion in supplemental appropriations for DHS to implement the executive orders and address border protection activities. In May 2017, an additional appropriation of approximately $1.1 billion was provided in response to this request, some of which DHS used to fund actions to implement the orders. For example, CBP received $65.4 million for hiring and, according to CBP officials, used these funds to plan and prepare for the surge in Border Patrol agents directed by Executive Order 13767. As of January 2018, CBP had obligated $18.8 million and expended $14.1 million of the $65.4 million it received. Additionally, ICE received $147.9 million for custody operations. At the end of fiscal year 2017, ICE had obligated and expended nearly all—over 99.9 percent—of the funds it received.\nFiscal Years 2018 and 2019 Budget Requests and Fiscal Year 2018 Appropriations: Agency officials anticipate additional costs to further implement the executive orders and expect that certain provisions will require a multi-year effort. According to DHS officials, the agency expects to incorporate executive order implementation into its annual strategic and budgetary planning processes. DHS officials also noted that additional future planning and funds will be needed to fully implement actions in the orders. Agencies plan to continue to use their base budgets as well as request additional funds as needed to carry out their mission. Examples of DHS and DOJ fiscal year 2018 budget requests and appropriations to implement executive order provisions are listed below.\nCBP requested $1.6 billion and in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, received approximately $1.3 billion to build new and replace existing sections of physical barriers along the southern border. CBP also projected out-year funding for construction along certain segments of the border through 2024.\nICE requested $185.9 million for approximately 1,000 new immigration officers and 606 support staff. ICE’s fiscal year 2018 appropriation included $15.6 million to support the hiring of 65 additional investigative agents, as well as 70 attorneys and support staff.\nDOJ requested approximately $7.2 million to hire additional attorneys in support of the orders. According to DOJ officials, DOJ received sufficient funds in the fiscal year 2018 budget to meet the hiring goal for attorneys.\nDHS and DOJ also requested funds for fiscal year 2019 to implement executive order provisions, examples of which are listed below.\nICE requested $571 million to hire 2,000 immigration officers (including 1,700 deportation officers and 300 criminal investigators) and 1,312 support staff (including attorneys).\nDOJ requested $1.1 million for 17 paralegal support positions to support the additional attorneys requested in the fiscal year 2018 request. DOJ also requested approximately $40 million to hire new immigration judges and their supporting staff, citing an over 25 percent increase in new cases brought forward by DHS over the course of fiscal year 2017.\nDHS and DOJ components that were not directly tasked with responsibilities in the executive orders have also begun to plan for potential effects as agencies implement the orders. For example, as CBP and ICE work to meet the hiring surge in the orders, USMS anticipates a likely increase in the number of individuals who are charged with criminal immigration offenses and detained pending trial, resulting in a corresponding increase in its workload. USMS developed a multi-year impact statement which projected possible effects on USMS prisoner operations, judicial security, and investigative operations. According to DOJ officials, these efforts may inform USMS’s budget requests and future year planning. For example, for fiscal year 2018 USMS requested approximately $9 million to hire 40 USMS deputies to support the executive orders. For fiscal year 2019, USMS projected that the administration’s policies to increase immigration enforcement and immigration-related prosecutions could result in an increase of nearly 19,000 prisoners between fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2019 and a corresponding budget increase of approximately $105 million for immigration expenses. In addition, officials at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers stated that they coordinated with Border Patrol and ICE to assess future training needs and project future resource requirements based on the hiring assumptions in the executive orders. For example, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers requested an increase of $29 million in fiscal year 2018 and $25.7 million in fiscal year 2019 for tuition and training requirements to implement the executive orders, among other funding requested.\nAppendix I includes additional information on funds DHS, DOJ, and State have obligated, expended, or shifted, to implement provisions of the executive orders.", "We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOJ, and State for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III; DOJ and State did not provide written comments. In its written comments, DHS discussed resources and legislative authorities the department believes it needs to carry out executive order requirements. All three agencies provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\nAs agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.", "", "This appendix contains summaries of initial actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of State (State) took to implement selected programmatic provisions of the President’s executive orders on border security and immigration. These orders include Executive Order 13767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements; Executive Order 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States; and Executive Order 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. These summaries also contain overviews of budget information related to implementing the executive orders, including obligations, expenditures, and budget requests where available, among other things. Table 5 lists the summaries and the executive order provisions on which they focus.", "We reviewed the executive orders and placed each provision directed at DHS, DOJ, and State into one of three categories: (1) analyses and reports, (2) policies, and (3) programs. We defined the analyses and reports category as executive order provisions that direct agencies to review and analyze data, policies, processes, and operational mission areas and produce reports. We defined the policies category as executive order provisions that establish new or modify existing policies, guidance, or processes related to border security or immigration. We defined the programs category as tangible, measurable, and quantifiable executive order provisions that implement policies. We confirmed our categorization with each agency, particularly for the programs category, since it was sometimes ambiguous whether provisions would lead to actions that were tangible, measurable, and quantifiable. Specifically, we reviewed agency documentation, such as a DHS inventory of tasks related to the executive orders, and interviewed agency officials. In some cases, we moved policy provisions to the programs category if agency efforts to implement the policy were underway.\nWe prepared summaries for each executive order provision(s) we categorized as a program. For each program, we identified actions planned, completed, or underway at DHS, DOJ, and State as of March 2018 through reviewing documentation, interviewing agency officials, and submitting data collection instruments. For each program we also collected available budgetary costs—specifically, any funds requested, appropriated, obligated, and expended for executive order implementation from January 2017 through March 2018. We reviewed publicly available budget requests, congressional budget justifications, public laws, and budgetary data from agencies’ internal data systems. While we were able to identify certain funds directly attributed to the executive order provisions from these documents, it was not always possible to extract funds specifically meant for implementing the executive order provisions from more general budget increase requests, appropriations, or expenditures. To specifically identify funds used for the executive order provisions, we reviewed agency documentation, interviewed agency budget and program officials, and submitted written questions as necessary. In instances where we were unable to differentiate executive order provision funds from regular operating funds, we identified the larger account used for executive order funds and noted this distinction. We analyzed agency documentation on the policies, procedures, and processes for maintaining budgetary data and interviewed agency officials about their data collection practices to assess the reliability of these data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.", "", "", "", "", "Action Overview CBP has taken initial steps to plan, design, and construct new and replacement physical barriers on the southern border.\nFor instance, CBP began the acquisition process for a Border Wall System Program, including developing plans to construct barrier segments and awarding eight task orders with a total value of over $3 million to design and construct barrier prototypes (four made from concrete and four made from non-concrete materials).\nCBP selected San Diego, California as the first segment and plans to replace an existing 14 miles of primary and secondary barriers. DHS plans to use fiscal year 2017 funding for the replacement of the primary barrier which it plans to rebuild to existing—as opposed to prototype—design standards.\nIn January 2018, DHS leadership also approved cost, schedule, and performance goals for a second segment in the Rio Grande Valley in Texas, which will extend an existing barrier with 60 miles of new fencing.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, stated that fiscal year 2018 funds for primary pedestrian fencing are only available for “operationally effective designs deployed as of ,” such as steel bollard fencing currently deployed in areas of the border. As of April 2018, CBP and DHS were evaluating what, if any, impact this direction will have on the department’s plans, according to DHS officials.\nAdditionally, DHS waived specific legal restrictions, such as environmental restrictions, in order to begin construction of barriers in the El Centro and San Diego Border Patrol sectors in California; and the Santa Teresa, New Mexico segment of the El Paso Border Patrol Sector. DHS also completed a categorical exclusion for replacement of a segment of existing barriers in El Paso, Texas.\nBudget Overview To fund the barrier prototypes, Congress approved a DHS request to reprogram $20 million in fiscal year 2017. Specifically:\nCBP reprogrammed $15 million from funds originally requested for Mobile Video Surveillance System deployments. The funds were originally part of the fiscal year 2015/2017 Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) Development and Deployment funding and were available due to a contract bid protest and delays associated with the Mobile Video Surveillance System Program.\nCBP also reprogrammed $5 million from funds originally intended for a fence replacement project in Naco, Arizona. The funds were part of fiscal year 2016 BSFIT Operations and Maintenance funding and were available as a result of unanticipated contract savings. The Naco Fence Replacement project will be completed within its original scope, according to CBP documentation.\nDHS also received an appropriation in fiscal year 2017 to replace existing fencing and to install new gates; and an appropriation in fiscal year 2018 for border barrier planning and design, and to replace existing fencing and build new barriers. As previously discussed, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, limited the use of funds provided for construction of new and replacement primary pedestrian fencing to previously deployed fencing designs. DHS has requested, but has not received, fiscal year 2019 funds for building new barriers. For more information regarding funding for future barrier construction projects along the southern border, see table 6.\nAccording to CBP documentation, the total cost to construct the Border Wall System Program over approximately 10 years is $18 billion. DHS headquarters conducted an independent cost estimate for the San Diego and Rio Grande Valley segments of the program, which CBP adopted as the program’s life cycle cost estimate. Acquisition and operations and maintenance costs for the Rio Grande Valley segment were separately described in other DHS documents and are shown in table 7 below.\nProvision: Sections 5 and 6 Sections 5 and 6 pertain to detention facilities and detention of foreign nationals for violations of immigration law, pending the outcome of their proceedings or to facilitate removal. The order directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take immediate actions to construct, operate, or control facilities to detain foreign nationals at or near the southern border, and assign asylum officers to immigration detention facilities, among other things. Additionally, the order directs the Department of Justice (DOJ) to immediately assign immigration judges to immigration detention facilities.\nDHS: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)\nDOJ: Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)\nICE and U.S. Border Patrol officials stated they consider custody determinations on a case by case basis. Additionally, officials from CBP’s Office of Field Operations stated they inspect all applicants for admission in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act, as prescribed by the executive order and a February 2017 memorandum the Secretary of Homeland Security issued.\nICE, through its Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate, manages the nation’s immigration detention system, which houses foreign nationals detained while their immigration cases are pending or after being ordered removed from the country. DOJ’s EOIR is responsible for conducting immigration court proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings, pursuant to U.S. immigration law and regulation.\nICE initially intended to increase bed capacity at detention facilities in order to accommodate potential surges in apprehensions that could result from implementation of the executive order. According to ICE officials, ICE identified 1,100 additional beds available at detention facilities already in use. However, officials also stated that, as of February 2018, ICE has not needed to use these additional beds due to a decrease in the number of apprehensions.\nAdditionally, ICE officials indicated no acquisition actions were needed because contracts and agreements are in place at existing detention facilities and additional beds are available for excess capacity. CBP and ICE are continuously monitoring bed space requirements based on migration volume. According to ICE officials, as of February 2018, ICE had no additional actions planned to increase bed capacity.\nDHS’s Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans convened a cross-component meeting to discuss detention standards, which govern the conditions of detainee confinement, according to DHS officials. ICE officials reported that ICE is currently re-writing its national detention standards (the standards applicable at most county jails housing immigration detainees). According to officials, the new standards are intended to make it easier for local jurisdictions to comply with standards without completely re-writing their existing policies to conform to ICE’s requirements.\nUSCIS officials told us they began working with ICE to identify where additional asylum officers were needed based on workload needs and space availability as soon as the executive order was issued in January 2017. From February 2017 through February 2018, USCIS deployed between 30 and 64 asylum officers during any given week along the southern border and continues to do so in response to caseload needs. USCIS continues to monitor and periodically adjust asylum officer staffing requirements, according to USCIS officials.\nDOJ officials stated that DOJ components coordinated with ICE to identify removal caseloads along the southern border that were large enough to warrant additional immigration judges. According to DOJ officials, from March 2017 through October 2017, EOIR detailed approximately 40 immigration judge positions, both in person and by video teleconference, to 19 DHS detention facilities, including many along the southern border, in response to the executive order. DOJ officials further explained that as caseloads fluctuated, some of the details ended, some in- person details were converted to video teleconference, and some details were converted to permanent immigration judge positions. EOIR often details immigration judges for operational reasons; however officials noted that the scale of this detail mobilization was larger because of the executive order.\nFiscal Year 2017: Because Executive Orders 13767 and 13768 were issued during fiscal year 2017, DHS submitted a budget amendment and requested supplemental appropriations to address the needs of the department in support of executive order implementation. The request proposed funding to increase daily immigration detention capacity to 45,700 detention beds by the end of fiscal year 2017. The request stated that the detention capacity was necessary to implement the administration’s immigration enforcement policies for removing foreign nationals illegally entering or residing in the United States.\nICE: On May 5, 2017, ICE received a supplemental appropriation of $236.9 million for enforcement and removal operations, including $147.9 million for custody operations, $57.4 million for alternatives to detention, and $31.6 million for transportation and removal operations. According to ICE documentation, almost all of the funds from that additional appropriation were obligated and expended at the conclusion of fiscal year 2017, as shown in table 8.\nUSCIS: USCIS documentation estimated that it expended at least $4.2 million detailing asylum officers to immigration detention facilities along the southern border from February 2017 through February 2018.\nFiscal Year 2018: The President’s budget requested an additional $1.5 billion above the 2017 annualized continuing appropriations level, for expanded detention, transportation, and removal of foreign nationals who enter, or remain in, the United States, in violation of U.S. immigration law. As part of the $1.5 billion requested, the ICE congressional budget justification requested $1.2 billion in additional funds to support an average daily population (ADP) of detainees of 51,379—a 49 percent increase over fiscal year 2016 ADP (34,376). The request stated that Executive Order 13768 and subsequent department guidance were expected to drive increases in the ADP due to the increase in ICE law enforcement officers and an expected increase in the average length of stay at detention facilities. ICE also requested funds for transportation and alternatives to detention. In fiscal year 2018, ICE was appropriated $4.1 billion to support enforcement and removal operations. According to DHS officials, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, provides funds for an ADP of 40,520 total beds, 10,859 lower than requested.\nFiscal Year 2019: The President’s budget requested $2.5 billion for detention and removal capacity. As part of the $2.5 billion requested, ICE’s congressional budget justification states $2.3 billion will support an ADP of 47,000. According to the ICE congressional budget justification, the number of beds will sustain the fiscal year 2017 ADP level (38,106) and provide additional detention capacity stemming from the continued implementation of Executive Order 13768. ICE also requested funds for transportation and alternatives to detention.\nPrior GAO Work: Our prior work on immigration detention examined ICE’s formulation of its budget request and cost estimate for detention resources. In April 2018, we found errors and inconsistencies in ICE’s calculations for its congressional budget justifications and bed rate model. Specifically, we found that ICE made errors in its budget justifications, underestimated the actual bed rate, and its methods for estimating detention costs did not meet the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. We also found ICE did not document its methodology for its projected ADP. We recommended that ICE assess and update its adult bed rate and ADP methodology and take steps to ensure that its budget estimating process fully addresses cost estimating best practices. DHS concurred with our recommendations and plans to take actions in response to them.\nFiscal Year 2017: DOJ documentation showed it expended approximately $2.4 million detailing immigration judge positions to immigration detention facilities from March 2017 through October 2017, either through video teleconferencing, or in-person, to adjudicate removal proceedings. EOIR officials explained the funds used were unobligated balances carried over from a prior fiscal year.\nFiscal Year 2018: For fiscal year 2018, DOJ requested an increase of $75 million to hire 75 additional immigration judge teams to enhance public safety and law enforcement. According to DOJ officials, the agency received sufficient funds in the fiscal year 2018 budget to meet this hiring goal.\nFiscal Year 2019: The fiscal year 2019 President’s budget also requests an increase of $40 million for 75 new immigration judge teams at EOIR and nearly $40 million for 338 new prosecuting attorneys at ICE to ensure immigration cases are heard expeditiously. According to the President’s budget, these investments are critical to the prompt resolution of newly-brought immigration charges and to reduce the 650,000 backlog of cases currently pending in the immigration courts. EOIR’s fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification includes a program increase totaling almost $65 million to provide funding for immigration judges and support staff, as well as information technology efforts. This increase supports initiatives that implement Presidential and Attorney General priority areas, among other things.", "", "", "", "USCIS has discretion to authorize parole for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, which it uses to allow an individual, who may be inadmissible or otherwise ineligible for admission to come to the United States for a temporary period. USCIS asylum officers adjudicate asylum applications filed with USCIS, and conduct credible and reasonable fear screenings to determine if certain removable foreign nationals may be eligible to seek particular forms of relief or protection in immigration court.", "Additional Funds Saved and Expended:\nAccording to USCIS officials, USCIS saved approximately $274,000 from not renewing contracts to administer the Central American Minors Parole Program.\nAccording to USCIS documentation, USCIS expended approximately $70,300 to deploy FDNS officers along the southern border from March 2017 to February 2018.", "", "", "", "", "Action Overview DHS has taken a number of actions to implement the executive order hiring provisions. Specifically, DHS requested and the Office of Personnel Management approved a number of changes to assist DHS and its components with the executive order hiring directives. These changes include granting CBP and ICE direct hire authority and a special salary rate for polygraphers, among others. DHS’s Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer and DHS components’ human capital offices also began additional hiring planning, such as refining component-level hiring plans, coordinating on potential joint hiring events, and targeting specific recruitment efforts, such as military veterans. CBP and ICE have also taken the following additional actions:\nCBP: In November 2017, CBP awarded a contract not to exceed $297 million to Accenture Federal Service LLC to help with law enforcement hiring for all CBP components. The contract is structured so the contractor receives a set dollar amount for each law enforcement officer hired—80 percent for each final offer letter and 20 percent for each law enforcement officer who enters on duty. The contractor is to assist CBP in hiring 7,500 qualified agents and officers, including 5,000 Border Patrol agents, 2,000 CBP officers, and 500 Air and Marine Interdiction agents over 5 years. CBP expects Accenture to be fully operational and effectively provide surge hiring capacity by June 2018, according to CBP officials.\nICE: According to ICE Office of Human Capital (OHC) officials, OHC is ensuring policies and procedures are in place so that ICE is ready to begin hiring additional immigration officers and support staff if funds are appropriated. In January 2018, ICE OHC also issued a contract solicitation for recruitment, market research, data analytics, marketing, hiring, and onboarding activities. ICE OHC sought to procure comprehensive hiring and recruitment services to assist ICE OHC in meeting the demands required to achieve the executive order’s hiring goals and develop efficiencies to current OHC processes. ICE aimed to have a similar pricing structure as CBP’s Accenture contract, according to the solicitation. Specifically, according to the solicitation, the yet to be selected contractor would receive a set dollar amount for each frontline officer hired–80 percent for each preliminary offer letter and 20 percent for each frontline officer who enters on duty. The contractor would assist ICE in hiring 10,000 law enforcement agents, including 8,500 deportation officers and 1,500 criminal investigators. It would also assist in the hiring of approximately 6,500 support personnel positions. In May 2018, the contract solicitation was cancelled; however, the government anticipates re-soliciting the requirement in fiscal year 2019. According to the contract cancellation notice and an ICE OHC official, DHS cancelled the contract due to delays associated with the fiscal year 2018 budget and hiring timelines, as well as the limited number of additional ICE positions funded in the fiscal year 2018 budget. In the interim, ICE is partnering with the Office of Personnel Management to meet the executive order’s hiring goals and develop efficiencies to current OHC processes, according to ICE officials.\nBecause Executive Orders 13767 and 13768 were issued during fiscal year 2017, DHS submitted a budget amendment and requested supplemental appropriations to help address the needs of the department in support of executive order implementation. The request included funding for DHS agencies to begin building the administrative capacity necessary to recruit, hire, train and equip the additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents and 10,000 ICE officers. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), which provides training to law enforcement professionals who protect the homeland, including any new ICE and CBP personnel hired as result of the executive orders, also requested funds to support these efforts.\nOn May 5, 2017, CBP received an additional appropriation of $65.4 million to improve hiring processes for Border Patrol agents, CBP officers, and Air and Marine Operations personnel, and for officer relocation enhancements. Of the $65.4 million appropriated in fiscal year 2017, CBP obligated $18.8 million and expended $14.1 million as of January 2018. While ICE also received additional funding for custody operations, alternatives to detention, and transportation and removal, it did not receive supplemental funds in fiscal year 2017 specifically for hiring. DHS also requested funds for CBP, ICE, and FLETC hiring and training in fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019. For additional details, see table 9.\nAccording to FLETC officials, the total average cost to provide basic law enforcement training varies by agencies and position, as shown in table 10. FLETC officials noted their partners also provide additional training unique to their missions, which is not included in the costs below.\nAction Overview ICE officials reported expediting review of pending 287(g) requests and approved 46 additional state and local jurisdictions for the program from February 2017 through March 2018, bringing the total to 76 law enforcement agencies in 20 states. See figure 2 for a map of additional jurisdictions approved.\nSection 10 and Section 8 of Executive Orders 13767 and 13768, respectively, direct the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to engage with state and local entities to enter into agreements under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.\nDHS: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)\nThe Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 added Section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes ICE to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, permitting designated state and local officers to perform immigration law enforcement functions.\nAccording to ICE officials, ICE also conducted outreach with state and local officials and identified potential law enforcement partners with whom to enter into possible future 287(g) agreements. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials stated that they agreed to support ICE’s program expansion efforts and provided hundreds of viable state and local law enforcement referrals to ICE to assist with this effort. For example, CBP reviewed data and conducted a gap analysis, to include a survey, to identify potential law enforcement partners for future 287(g) memorandums of agreement.\nCBP officials further noted that they introduced new language into Operation Stonegarden grant guidance that allows the use of grant funding to support CBP-identified, 287(g) law enforcement operational activities. According to CBP and ICE officials, efforts to develop a 287(g) enforcement model that can be used for this purpose are pending.\nAccording to ICE officials, the agency is considering developing a program under which designated local law enforcement officers would be trained and authorized to serve and execute administrative warrants for individuals who are in violation of U.S. immigration laws at the time they are released from state criminal custody. ICE officials indicated that program participants would have limited authority under 287(g). For example, they would not interview individuals regarding nationality and removability, lodge detainers, or process individuals for removal. ICE has not yet finalized the program and it may evolve as ICE further develops the program, according to ICE officials.\nICE is also leveraging an existing Basic Ordering Agreement, a procurement tool to expedite acquisition of a substantial, but presently unknown, quantity of supplies or services, according to ICE officials. A Basic Ordering Agreement is not a contract, but rather, is a written instrument of understanding, negotiated between ICE and state and local jurisdictions, to house detainees upon ICE’s issuance and their acceptance of an Immigration Detainer and either a Warrant for Arrest of Alien or Warrant of Removal. For any order placed under the agreement, ICE will reimburse the provider, such as a state or local jurisdiction, for up to 48 hours of detention, under applicable regulations. The rate will be fixed at $50.00 for up to 48 hours of detention. No payment will be made for any detention beyond 48 hours.\nThe Secretary of Homeland Security vested authority in CBP to accept state services to carry out certain immigration enforcement functions pursuant to Title 8, United States Code Section 1357(g). According to CBP officials, CBP also joined a 287(g) Program Advisory Board, which reviews and assesses ICE field office recommendations about pending 287(g) applications.\nParticipation in the 287(g) program is expected to expand further in fiscal years 2018 and 2019, according to ICE. Additionally, ICE anticipates further increase in the number of 287(g) memorandums of agreement in fiscal years 2018 and 2019.\nIn fiscal year 2018, ICE requested $24.3 million for ICE 287(g) program funding. According to the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, the 287(g) program was fully funded at the requested level.\nIn fiscal year 2019, ICE requested $75.5 million for ICE 287(g) program funding.", "", "", "", "Section 11 of Executive Order 13768 directs DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop and implement a program to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to prosecuting criminal immigration offenses, and to develop cooperative strategies to reduce the reach of transnational criminal organizations and violent crime.", "border districts developed guidelines for prioritizing misdemeanor cases involving individuals illegally entering the United States for the first time. However, according to these officials, southern border districts developed these guidelines based on an initial high volume of apprehensions, and when apprehensions decreased the guidelines were no longer necessary and never published.\nDOJ: Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA)\nDHS: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)\nEOUSA provides executive and administrative support for United States Attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs). AUSAs conduct trial work, as prosecutors, in which the United States is a party, including prosecution of criminal immigration offenses.\nWestern District of Texas and Arizona, and two AUSAs each to the Southern District of California, the District of New Mexico, and the Southern District of Texas, for a total of 12 details according to DOJ officials. The first round of details lasted for 6 months, and EOUSA extended the details of one AUSA at each southern border district for an additional 6 months. DOJ officials told us that EOUSA will continue to evaluate the need for additional details along the southern border based on the needs of the districts, as determined by the number of DHS apprehensions. According to DOJ officials, implementation of these provisions is ongoing and will depend largely upon DHS executive order actions—for instance, as DHS hires more enforcement personnel, criminal immigration cases may increase which could spur a need for more AUSAs.\nICE litigates charges of removability against foreign nationals and conducts criminal investigations, including investigations of immigration fraud.\nThe Secretary of Homeland Security released a memorandum with guidance on the enforcement of immigration laws in the United States on February 20, 2017. In response to this memorandum, ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor sent guidance to its attorneys directing them to prioritize legal services supporting the timely removal of foreign nationals in accordance with Executive Order 13768. The guidance directed ICE to review all cases previously administratively closed based on prosecutorial discretion to determine whether the basis for closure remains appropriate under DHS’s enforcement priorities. The guidance also directed ICE to coordinate with the Executive Office for Immigration Review to ensure that foreign nationals charged as removable and who meet the enforcement priorities remain on active immigration court dockets and that their cases are completed as expeditiously as possible.\nIn response to the executive orders, ICE Homeland Security Investigations officials stated that the agency began to focus more of its resources on the investigation and criminal prosecution of immigration fraud. ICE Homeland Security Investigations added five new Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces throughout the nation and directed field offices to increase staffing of task forces. Additionally, ICE is in the process of combining five Benefit Fraud Units into an immigration fraud center—the National Lead Development Center— that will serve as a new centralized entity that will refer cases to the task forces for enforcement action.\nA summary of DOJ budget increase requests, appropriations, and expenditures related to prosecution priorities in the executive orders that we identified can be found in table 11.\nThe fiscal year 2018 President’s budget request included $19.3 million for 195 attorney positions in ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor. According to ICE officials, while the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, included funds for 70 positions for the Homeland Security Investigations Law Division, it did not include funds for additional attorney positions for immigration litigation within the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor.\nThe fiscal year 2019 President’s budget request included $39.7 million for additional attorney resources in ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor.\nProvision: Sections 5 and 10 Sections 5 and 10 direct the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take action related to immigration enforcement. Specifically, Section 5 directs DHS to prioritize the removal of certain categories of removable foreign nationals. Section 10 directs DHS to terminate the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) and reinstitute Secure Communities, among other things.\nDHS: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)\nUnder PEP (from 2015 to 2017), ICE issued a request for detainer (with probable cause of removability) or information or transfer, for a priority removable individual, such as one posing a threat to national security or public safety, including a foreign national convicted of a felony, among others, under DHS’s former tiered civil enforcement categories. Under Secure Communities, ICE may issue detainers for removable individuals charged, but not yet convicted, of criminal offenses, in addition to individuals subject to a final order of removal whether or not they have a criminal history.\nPursuant to Executive Order 13768, the Secretary of Homeland Security terminated PEP and reinstituted the Secure Communities program. As such, DHS is no longer required to utilize a tiered approach to civil immigration enforcement with direction to dedicate resources to those deemed of highest priority. Instead, under Section 5 of the executive order, various categories of removable individuals are general priorities for removal, and DHS personnel may initiate enforcement actions against all removable persons they encounter. Further, the DHS memorandum implementing this executive order allows ICE, CBP, and USCIS to allocate resources to prioritize enforcement activities within these categories, such as by prioritizing enforcement against convicted felons or gang members.\nAs part of this effort, ICE reported it reviewed policies, regulations, and forms relevant to enforcement priorities. ICE subsequently rescinded prior enforcement priority guidance and issued new guidance directing application of the new approach to immigration enforcement prioritization. Additionally, ICE eliminated existing forms and created a new form to place detainers on foreign nationals who have been arrested on local criminal charges and for whom ICE possesses probable cause to believe that they are removable from the United States, so that ICE can take custody of such individuals upon release.\nAccording to ICE officials, more than 43,300 convicted criminal aliens have been identified and removed through Secure Communities from January 25, 2017 through the end of fiscal year 2017.\nPursuant to Executive Order 13768 and in accordance with the Secretary of Homeland Security’s memorandum entitled, Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) expanded the use of the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) by increasing the use of Criminal Alien Program Surge Enforcement Team (CAPSET) operations, traditional CAP Surge operations, and the Institutional Hearing Program. Specifically, ICE took the following actions: ICE ERO conducted four CAPSET operations in Louisiana, Georgia, and California in fiscal year 2017, resulting in a total of 386 encounters, 275 detainers, and 261 charging documents issued, according to ICE documentation.\nICE ERO field offices conducted CAP Surge operations, which concluded in March 2017. According to ICE documentation, the operations collectively resulted in 2,061 encounters, 668 arrests, 1,307 detainers issued, and 614 charging documents issued.\nICE, along with the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, expanded the number of Institutional Hearing Program sites by nine, from 12 to 21. As of January 22, 2018, five of the nine Institutional Hearing Program expansion sites were operational.\nICE officials reported that ICE also detailed over 30 percent more officers (79 officers) to support Community Shield efforts, an international law enforcement initiative to combat the growth and proliferation of transnational criminal street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs throughout the United States.\nAccording to ICE officials, CAP used existing resources in fiscal year 2017 to support the efforts required by Executive Order 13768.\nICE also requested funds in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 for CAP. Specifically, ICE stated in its fiscal year 2018 and 2019 congressional budget justifications that CAP performs its duties in accordance with immigration enforcement priorities defined by Executive Order 13768.\nIn fiscal year 2018, ICE requested $412.1 million for CAP. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, funded $319.4 million for CAP, $92.6 million less than requested.\nSection 9 directs the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that jurisdictions in willful noncompliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (section 1373) are ineligible to receive federal grants. The section also directs DOJ to take appropriate enforcement action against any entity that violates section 1373, or which has in effect a policy, statute, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of federal law.", "", "conducted a compliance review of certain jurisdictions relative to 8 U.S.C. § 1373, and issued a report in May 2016 finding that 10 jurisdictions raised compliance concerns. In response, DOJ placed a special condition on certain fiscal year 2016 grant awards, requiring recipients to submit an assessment of their compliance with section 1373. In November 2017, as part of the section 1373 compliance effort predating Executive Order 13768, DOJ sent letters to 29 jurisdictions expressing concern that they may not be in compliance with section 1373, and requesting responses regarding compliance. In January 2018, DOJ sent 23 follow-up demand letters to jurisdictions seeking further documents to determine whether they are unlawfully restricting information sharing by their law enforcement officers with federal immigration authorities, and stating that failure to respond will result in records being subpoenaed.\nThe Attorney General determined that Section 9 will be applied solely to DOJ or DHS federal grants for jurisdictions willfully refusing to comply with section 1373. Under section 1373, a federal, state, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict the exchange of information regarding citizenship or immigration status with DHS.\nICE developed weekly Declined Detainer Outcome Reports detailing jurisdictions with the highest volume of declined detainers and a list of sample crimes suspected or determined to have been committed by released individuals. According to ICE officials, ICE identified data processing errors and incorrect detainer information and is working to correct these issues. ICE officials noted that they temporarily suspended the reports, and have not yet determined a specific time frame for future publications.\nDHS reviewed all DHS grant programs to determine which programs could be conditioned to require compliance with section 1373 and plans to provide this information to the Office of Management and Budget, according to DHS officials.\nDOJ has not obligated, expended, or requested any additional funds to implement Executive Order 13768, section 9(a).\nThe fiscal year 2019 President’s budget proposed to amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to condition DHS and DOJ grants and cooperative agreements on state and local governments’ cooperation with immigration enforcement.\nSection 2 directed multiple agencies, including the Department of State (State) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to conduct a worldwide review to identify any additional information needed from each foreign country to adjudicate immigration benefit applications and ensure that individuals applying for a visa or other immigration benefit are not a security or public safety threat. It also directed the agencies to send a report of the findings of the worldwide review to the President. This section further established visa entry restrictions applicable to foreign nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for a 90-day period. It also stated that agencies, including State and DHS, could continue to submit additional countries for inclusion in visa entry restrictions.\nSection 5 required agencies, including State, DHS, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), to develop a uniform baseline for screening and vetting to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis or who support terrorism or otherwise pose a danger to national security or public safety. practices based on the criteria identified above. In July 2017, State directed its posts to inform their respective host governments of the new information-sharing criteria and request that host governments provide the required information or develop a plan to do so. CA directed posts to engage more intensively with countries whose information-sharing and identity-management practices were preliminarily deemed “inadequate” or “at risk” and submit an assessment of mitigating factors or specific interests that should be considered in the deliberations regarding any travel restrictions. According to officials, State and its posts will continue to engage with foreign countries to address information-sharing and identify management deficiencies.", "State: Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), DHS, and DOJ CA provides consular services in reviewing and adjudicating visa applications for those seeking to enter the United States. DHS adjudicates visa petitions, and DHS and DOJ also play roles in screening and vetting applicants. DHS and DOJ, along with State, are responsible for implementing the enhanced screening and vetting protocols established under the executive order.\nJune 29, 2017 through September 24, 2017. During the implementation period, if an applicant was found ineligible for a visa on other grounds unrelated to the executive order, such as prior criminal activity or immigration violations, the applicant would be refused the visa on those grounds, according to State officials. If the applicant was found to be otherwise eligible for the visa and did not qualify for an exemption or a waiver under the executive order, he or she would be refused on the basis of the executive order. CA sent several cables to posts with guidance on implementing the 90-day travel restriction, including operational guidance and updated guidance following court decisions. CA also offered trainings to consular posts on implementation of the order.\nA series of legal challenges ultimately led to the June 26, 2017 Supreme Court decision prohibiting enforcement of entry restrictions against foreign nationals who could credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.\nOn September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of Executive Order 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, which established conditional restrictions on U.S. entry for certain categories of nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen and Somalia, for an indefinite period.\nAccording to State officials, State, DHS, DOJ, and other agencies formed a working group and developed a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures to ensure ineligible individuals are not permitted to enter the United States, and are implementing the new requirements. The working group conducted a review of the visa screening and vetting process and established uniform standards for (1) applications, (2) interviews, and (3) system security checks, including biographic and biometric checks. According to State officials, for applications, the group identified data elements against which applicants are to be screened and vetted. For interviews, the working group established a requirement for all applicants to undergo a baseline uniform national security and public safety interview. The working group modeled its interview baseline on elements of the refugee screening interview.\nAs of June 2017, State collected most of the data elements online for immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, according to State officials.\nThe President issued a memorandum on February 6, 2018, directing DHS, in coordination with State, DOJ, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to establish a national vetting center to coordinate agency vetting efforts to identify individuals who pose a threat to national security, border security, homeland security, and public safety. The National Vetting Center will be housed in DHS, and will leverage the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community to identify, and prevent entry of, individuals that may pose a threat to national security. On February 14, 2018, the Secretary of Homeland Security appointed a director for the National Vetting Center. The Secretary also delegated authorities of the National Vetting Center to the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.\nState officials said that personnel worked overtime to implement Section 2 and the following Presidential Proclamation, but did not identify monetary costs or budget increases associated with implementation. DHS also dedicated several full-time staff positions to developing and implementing enhanced screening and vetting protocols, and DHS employees worked overtime to implement these provisions, according to officials.\nSection 6 directed the Department of State (State) to suspend travel of refugees seeking to enter the United States, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to suspend adjudications on refugee applications, for 120 days. Section 6 further ordered that during the 120- day period, State, together with DHS, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence review the refugee application and adjudication process to identify and implement additional procedures to ensure that refugees seeking entry into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) do not pose a threat to U.S. security and welfare. This section also capped annual refugee admission at 50,000 in fiscal year 2017.\nState generally suspended travel of refugees into the United States from June 29, 2017 through October 24, 2017.\nState coordinated with DHS, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other security vetting agencies on the 120-day review of the USRAP application and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures should be used to ensure that individuals seeking admission as refugees do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, according to State officials. Upon completion of the review, the agencies submitted a joint memorandum to the President.\nThe United States admitted 53,716 refugees in fiscal year 2017, according to State officials. Throughout fiscal year 2017, State issued guidance that steered the refugee admissions program to different refugee arrival goals during different periods of time due to court decisions and budget considerations. Prior to the issuance of Executive Order 13769, which, after largely being blocked nationwide by a federal court injunction was revoked and replaced by Executive Order 13780, PRM operated at the rate of 110,000 refugees per year. After the issuance of Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, PRM officials noted that at times, State made no bookings for refugee arrivals, and also made bookings based on 50,000 arrivals, as well as 110,000 arrivals.", "", "A series of legal challenges and resulting court injunctions culminated in the June 26, 2017, Supreme Court order limiting State’s implementation of this section to prospective refugees without bona fide ties to the United States. Together with budget uncertainties, State could not enact the refugee travel suspension or 50,000-person admissions cap based on the timeline set in the executive order. Figure 3 below shows key milestones related to this section of the order.\nThe USRAP resettles refugees to the United States in accordance with a refugee admission ceiling set by the President each year. PRM is responsible for coordinating and managing the USRAP. USCIS is responsible for adjudicating refugee applications.\nAccording to USCIS officials, USCIS is implementing new requirements and vetting procedures for refugees. For example, these officials stated that USCIS is accessing more detailed biographical information earlier in the vetting process. Additionally, these officials noted that USCIS’s Fraud Detection and National Security unit is conducting additional reviews of applicants, including social media and other information against various databases. USCIS officials further noted that USCIS’s International Operations office sent guidance to the field that established the logistical requirements of the new procedures. As of April 2018, USCIS was finalizing further guidance and training officers for the enhanced review and vetting procedures, according to USCIS officials.\nState officials said that State and DHS executed four categories of exemptions during the 120-day USRAP suspension: a Congolese woman with a life-threatening illness and her family; 29 unaccompanied refugee minors; 17 Yezidis and other religious minorities in northern Iraq who had been victims of ISIS; and 53 individuals on Nauru and Manus Islands.", "", "", "", "appointments by 12 months. In October 2017, State approved extending offers for follow-on 60-month Limited Non-Career Appointments to Consular Fellows who complete a successful initial 60-month appointment. State officials noted the first officer to accept a follow-on appointment was sworn in during April 2018. CA and State’s Bureau of Human Resources updated the CA Limited Non-Career Appointments handbook to include an implementation plan for extending such appointments, and according to officials, providing language training outside of the applicant’s area of core linguistic ability.\nConsular Fellows serve in U.S. embassies and consulates overseas and primarily adjudicate visa applications for foreign nationals. The Visa Interview Waiver Program formerly waived in-person interviews for certain categories of visa applicants.\nIn early 2017, State streamlined the application process for Consular Fellows and realigned resources to expedite their security clearance process, according to CA officials. From February 2017 through February 2018, State hired 134 new Consular Fellows, according to CA officials. Additionally, State officials said that they expect to hire 120 more Consular Fellows for the remainder of fiscal year 2018.\nIn August 2017, the Foreign Service Institute created a 12-week Spanish Language program for Consular Fellows who received certain scores on the Spanish language exam, according to CA officials. Eleven Consular Fellows completed the program in January 2018 and 20 more are expected to complete the program in July 2018, according to CA officials. As of January 2018, five Consular fellows were being trained in a language outside their core linguistic ability, according to CA officials.\nWhile these actions were taken to support implementation of the executive order, CA officials also told us that hiring Consular Fellows has been a State priority for some time. CA officials said that the bureau has hired an increasing number of Consular Fellows to meet worldwide visa demand since 2012, and that providing consular services is one of State’s highest priorities, as well as a national security imperative.\nAccording to CA officials, because the Consular Fellows program is entirely funded by non-appropriated consular fees, subject to fluctuating demand for passports and visas, the expansion of the program did not have appropriations impacts. However, officials did provide per unit costs associated with aspects of expanding the Consular Fellows program. For example, Consular Fellows salaries range from approximately $48,000 to approximately $98,000 and Foreign Service Institute language courses last from 24 to 36 weeks, at a cost of $1,700 per week, per student.", "Executive orders 13767 (Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements), 13768 (Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States), and 13780 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States) include reporting requirements for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of State (State), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Table 13 lists completed reports as of April 2018, according to DHS, State, and DOJ officials.", "", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Taylor Matheson (Assistant Director), Sarah Turpin (Analyst-in-Charge), Isabel Band, and Kelsey Hawley made key contributions to this report, along with David Alexander, Eric Hauswirth, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Kevin Reeves, and Adam Vogt." ], "depth": [ 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h3_title", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "h3_full", "h0_full h4_full h2_full h1_full", "", "h1_title h4_title", "", "h4_full h1_title", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How did DHS, DOJ, and State use the existing fiscal year 2017 resources?", "How did the agencies deploy personnel and time?", "What problem did GAO encounter with assessing these actions?", "What budget action did the President take in March 2017?", "What did the DHS recieve as a result of the President's request?", "How did DHS use these funds?", "How do agencies intend to carry out their responsibilities?", "What is an example of an agency requesting additional funds?", "Why did other agencies request additional funds?", "To what did the President's executive orders in January and March 2017 relate?", "How did the orders affect federal agencies?", "What does Executive Order 13767 instruct DHS to do?", "What are the implications of Executive Order 13768?", "What does Executive Order 13780 direct agencies to do?", "What was GAO asked to do?", "How did GAO complete its research?", "What does this report cover?" ], "summary": [ "DHS, DOJ, and State used existing fiscal year 2017 resources to support initial executive order actions that fit within their established mission areas.", "All three agencies indicated that they used existing personnel to implement the orders and, in some cases, these efforts took substantial time. For example, according to ICE data, personnel spent about 14,000 regular hours (the equivalent of 1,750 8-hour days) and 2,400 overtime hours planning for the ICE hiring surge from January 2017 through January 2018.", "GAO found that it was not always possible to disaggregate which fiscal year 2017 funds were used for implementation of the orders versus other agency activities.", "In March 2017, the President submitted a budget amendment along with a request for $3 billion in supplemental appropriations for DHS to implement the orders.", "In May 2017, DHS received an appropriation of just over $1.1 billion, some of which DHS used to fund actions to implement the orders.", "For example, CBP received $65 million for hiring and, according to CBP officials, used these funds to plan and prepare for the surge in U.S. Border Patrol agents. As of January 2018, CBP had obligated $18.8 million of the $65 million.", "Agencies plan to continue to use their base budgets and request additional funds as needed to carry out their missions and implement the orders.", "For example, for fiscal year 2018, CBP requested approximately $1.6 billion and received (in March 2018) approximately $1.3 billion to build new and replace existing sections of physical barriers along the southern border.", "For fiscal year 2019, ICE requested $571 million to hire 2,000 immigration officers and DOJ requested approximately $40 million to hire new immigration judges and supporting staff.", "In January and March 2017, the President issued a series of executive orders related to border security and immigration.", "The orders direct federal agencies to take a broad range of actions with potential resource implications.", "For example, Executive Order 13767 instructs DHS to construct a wall or other physical barriers along the U.S. southern border and to hire an additional 5,000 U.S. Border Patrol agents.", "Executive Order 13768 instructs federal agencies, including DHS and DOJ, to ensure that U.S immigration law is enforced against all removable individuals and directs ICE to hire an additional 10,000 immigration officers.", "Executive Order 13780 directs agencies to develop a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures; and established nationality-based entry restrictions with respect to visa travelers for a 90-day period, and refugees for 120 days.", "GAO was asked to review agencies' implementation of the executive orders and related spending.", "GAO reviewed agency planning, tracking, and guidance documents related to the orders, as well as budget requests, appropriations acts, and internal budget information. GAO also interviewed agency officials regarding actions and budgetary costs associated with implementing the orders.", "This report addresses (1) actions DHS, DOJ, and State have taken, or plan to take, to implement provisions of the executive orders; and (2) resources to implement provisions of the executive orders, particularly funds DHS, DOJ, and State have obligated, expended, or shifted." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 1, 1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
CRS_RL34212	{ "title": [ "", "Overview", "Cancellation of Indebtedness Income", "Exceptions", "Gain From the Disposition of Property", "Legislative Developments", "Analysis", "Homeownership Retention or Loss", "Equity Among Homeowners", "Data", "Policy Options", "Temporary vs. Permanent Exclusion", "Modify Definition of Debt Eligible for Cancellation", "Modify Homeowner Eligibility", "Ownership Tenure", "Household Income", "Should Basis Be Adjusted?" ], "paragraphs": [ "M ortgage debt cancellation occurs when lenders engage in loss-mitigation solutions that either (1) restructure the loan and reduce the principal balance or (2) sell the property, either in advance, or as a result of foreclosure proceedings. Under current law, the canceled debt (sometimes referred to as discharge of indebtedness) may be income subject to taxation.\nThe Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ) signed into law on December 20, 2007, temporarily excluded qualified COD income. Thus, the act allowed taxpayers who did not qualify for the existing exceptions to exclude COD income. The provision was effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343 ) extended the exclusion of COD income to debt discharged before January 1, 2013. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) subsequently extended the exclusion through the end of 2013. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-295 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2014. The exclusion was extended again through the end of 2016 by Division Q of P.L. 114-113 —the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (or \"PATH\" Act). Most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) retroactively extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. The extension also allowed for debt discharged after 2017 to be excluded from income if the taxpayer had entered into a binding written agreement before January 1, 2018.\nThe rationales for this change are to minimize hardship for households in distress and to ensure that non-tax-related homeowner retention efforts are not thwarted by tax policy. Critics argue that the exclusion could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations. Critics may also argue that owner-occupied housing is sufficiently subsidized even without a COD income exclusion.\nThis report begins with an overview and analysis of the historical tax treatment of canceled debt income. Next, the changes enacted by P.L. 110-142 , P.L. 110-343 , P.L. 112-240 , P.L. 113-295 , P.L. 114-113 , and P.L. 115-123 are reviewed . A discussion of policy options concludes.", "For federal income tax purposes, there are two types of income that may arise when an individual's mortgage is fully or partially canceled: cancellation of indebtedness income and gain from the disposition of property.", "When all or part of a taxpayer's debt is forgiven, the amount of the canceled debt is ordinarily included in the taxpayer's gross income. This income is typically referred to as cancellation of debt (COD) income. The borrower will realize ordinary income to the extent the canceled debt exceeds the value of any cash or property given to the lender in exchange for cancelling the debt. Lenders report canceled debt to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) using Form 1099-C, and borrowers must generally include the amount in gross income in the year of discharge.", "Historically, there have been several exceptions to the general rule that canceled debt is included in the gross income of the borrower. Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains two exceptions that are particularly relevant in the case of canceled home mortgage debt: a borrower may exclude canceled debt from gross income if (1) the debt is discharged in Title 11 bankruptcy or (2) the borrower is insolvent (that is, has liabilities that exceed the fair market value of his or her assets, determined immediately prior to discharge).\nIn the case of the bankruptcy exception, the debt must be discharged by the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceedings or pursuant to a plan approved by that court. No involvement by a court is necessary for a taxpayer to claim an insolvency exception—the taxpayer calculates his or her assets and liabilities to determine whether he or she is insolvent. For an insolvent taxpayer, the amount of COD income that may be excluded is limited to the amount by which the taxpayer is insolvent.\nFor both the bankruptcy and insolvency exceptions, a taxpayer who excludes canceled debt must essentially give back some of the benefit of the exclusion. Specifically, the taxpayer must reduce certain beneficial tax attributes, including basis in property, that would otherwise decrease the taxpayer's income or tax liability in future years. The attributes are reduced until the reductions generally account for the excluded amount. As a result of the attribute reduction, the taxpayer may be subject to tax on the excluded COD income in years following the year of discharge—in other words, the tax on the COD income is deferred.\nIn addition to the IRC Section 108 exclusions, there are several other circumstances under which COD income may be excluded. For example, a taxpayer with nonrecourse, as opposed to recourse, debt will not realize COD income. Other examples of when COD income may be excluded from the borrower's income are if the cancellation was intended to be a gift or was the result of a disputed debt.", "When an individual sells property, the excess of the sales price over the original cost plus improvements (adjusted basis) is normally gain subject to tax. If the property was held for more than 12 months, the gain is taxed at a maximum rate of 15% rather than regular income tax rates. If the property was held for less than 12 months, the gain is taxed at regular income tax rates.\nIn situations involving canceled home mortgage debt, if the lender takes the home in exchange for the debt cancellation, the homeowner realizes gain from the disposition of property in the amount that the property's fair market value (or the amount of outstanding debt, in the case of nonrecourse debt) exceeds the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property. A taxpayer may have both gain from the disposition of property and COD income.\nIRC Section 121 provides an exclusion for gain from the sale or disposition of a personal residence. The provision excludes gain of up to $250,000 for single taxpayers and $500,000 for married couples filing joint returns if the taxpayer meets a use test (has used the house as the principal residence for at least two of the last five years) and an ownership test (has owned the house for at least two of the last five years). A taxpayer who does not meet the qualifications may be eligible for a partial exclusion if the home was sold because of a change in employment or health or due to unforeseen circumstances. Additionally, other taxpayers may qualify for special treatment (e.g., members of the Armed Forces). The exclusion can generally be used every two years.", "On December 20, 2007, The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ) was signed into law. The act, among other things, excluded discharged qualified residential debt from gross income. Qualified indebtedness is defined as debt, limited to $2 million ($1 million if married filing separately), incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving the taxpayer's principal residence that is secured by such residence. It also includes refinancing of this debt, to the extent that the refinancing does not exceed the amount of refinanced indebtedness. The taxpayer was required to reduce the basis in their principal residence by the amount of the excluded income. The provision did not apply if the discharge was on account of services performed for the lender or any other factor not directly related to a decline in the residence's value or to the taxpayer's financial condition. The provision applied to debt discharges that are made on or after January 1, 2007, and before January 1, 2010.\nThe Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343 ) extended the exclusion described above through the end of 2012. Subsequently, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2013. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-295 ) extended the exclusion through the end of 2014. The exclusion was extended again through the end of 2016 by Division Q of P.L. 114-113 —the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (or \"PATH\" Act). Most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) retroactively extended the exclusion through the end of 2017. The extension also allowed for debt discharged after 2017 to be excluded from income if the taxpayer had entered into a binding written agreement before January 1, 2018.", "In order to evaluate the policy of including discharged debt as income, it is helpful to understand why it exists. According to economic theory, one way of defining income is as the change (over the period in question) in a person's net worth—that is, the change in the value of the person's assets minus the change in their liabilities. By this definition, a forgiven loan is income: a canceled debt reduces a taxpayer's liabilities, and thus increases net worth. In the past, tax law has generally adhered to this concept by providing that if the obligation to repay the lender is forgiven, the amount of loan proceeds that is forgiven is reportable income subject to tax.\nThis portion of the report provides analysis of the issues associated with the tax treatment of canceled mortgage debt income.", "In some instances, lenders may restructure or rearrange debt, cancel some debt, and allow the homeowner to retain ownership of the home. Then, all other things being equal, the borrower's net worth has increased, as liabilities have declined and assets have remained unchanged. Alternatively, homeowners may experience debt cancellation while losing their home, through foreclosure or as a result of voluntarily deeding the property back to the lender. The homeowner no longer has the asset and, to the extent the asset value exceeded liabilities, may be worse off as a result of declining net worth. Additionally, he or she may realize gains or losses, which may make the taxpayer better or worse off as well.\nIf the taxpayer is not able to exclude the COD income, then the tax consequences of the COD income, assuming equal amounts of canceled debt, are the same regardless of whether the home is retained or lost.\nAn illustration is shown in Table 1 . Assuming residential debt of $200,000, a loan restructuring could occur, after which the homeowner owes $180,000 and the lender has agreed to cancel the remaining amount. The discharged debt, $20,000, is income subject to tax if no exclusion applies (e.g., the taxpayer is not insolvent)—if a rate of 28% is assumed, the tax liability is $5,600. Alternatively, the home could have been sold as a result of foreclosure with a sales price of $180,000 along with a lender agreement to cancel the remaining debt. The $20,000 discharge is income and, assuming no exclusion applies and the same tax rate, generates the same tax liability. This is in addition to any taxes the taxpayer may owe on the gain from the sale of the house.\nOn the other hand, if the taxpayer is able to exclude the COD income, as is temporarily allowed in certain circumstances, then the $20,000 discharge is not included in gross income and the taxpayer does not owe the $5,600 tax liability. As previously mentioned, current law stipulates that the excluded COD income be accounted for through reducing the basis in the residence.\nThe impact of such basis adjustment could differ, depending on whether the home is retained or lost, if the taxpayer owes taxes when the house is disposed. A taxpayer who retains the house and sells a later year, while accounting for the excluded COD income through basis adjustment, defers taxes owed on the disposition until the year of sale.\nIn contrast, the tax consequences would depend on the timing of the basis adjustment for a taxpayer that loses a home. If basis is reduced in the year following discharge, as under IRC Section 1017, then the excluded COD income could not be accounted for because the taxpayer had already disposed of the home. If basis were required to be reduced earlier (e.g., at the time of discharge), then the excluded COD income would be accounted for through basis adjustment and the taxpayer would be worse off than a similarly situated taxpayer who had retained the house and was able to defer taxes until the year of sale.", "An exclusion of certain types of income can result in individuals with identical incomes paying different amounts of tax. A standard of fairness frequently invoked by public finance analysts in evaluating tax policy is \"horizontal equity\"—a standard that is met when similarly situated tax units pay the same amount of tax. Like other exclusions, excluding debt forgiveness, a unique type of income, violates the standard of horizontal equity.\nAn exclusion of income can also reduce the tax system's progressivity—in other words, likely favor upper-income individuals. This is likely to occur because an exclusion of a given amount is more valuable to persons with higher marginal tax rates. This effect is magnified if homeownership is more concentrated among upper-income individuals.\nAt this point, an example may be useful for illustrating the effect income tax exclusions can have on the tax system's progressivity. Consider two individual homeowners, both of whom incur $20,000 in COD income. The tax benefit differs when the taxpayers are in different tax brackets. The value of the exclusion for a homeowner with lower income, who may be in the 15% income tax bracket, is $3,000, while the value to another homeowner, with higher income and thus in the higher 28% bracket, is $5,600. The higher-income taxpayer, with presumably greater ability to pay taxes, receives a greater tax benefit than the lower-income taxpayer.\nCongress has provided an exclusion for COD income several times in the past, though the economic and political circumstances for relief were not the same in each case. For example, in 1986 and again in 1993, relief was provided for commercial property owners and farmers, and in 2005, for victims of Hurricane Katrina. The residential housing crisis of 2007 and subsequent recession initiated the most recent legislative action.", "Lenders report canceled debt income to the IRS on Form 1099-C. A copy is also sent to the borrower, who reports the amount as income. Form 1099-C is used to report all types of canceled debt, not just residential. As shown in Table 2 , the number of 1099-C forms filed and the amount of canceled debt rose during and following the financial crisis. Canceled debt peaked in 2011 at $13.8 billion. The most recent data available show that the amount of canceled debt has fallen 50% from its peak, but still remains elevated relative to the start of the financial crisis, suggesting that some taxpayers are still experiencing financial distress. Unfortunately, the data do not allow for specific conclusions to be drawn about mortgage-related debt.", "The changes enacted by P.L. 110-142 and then extended by P.L. 110-343 , P.L. 112-240 , P.L. 113-295 , P.L. 114-113 , and P.L. 115-123 are temporary and are scheduled to expire at the end of 2017. Congress may choose to allow the latest extension to expire, thus subjecting canceled mortgage debt income to its traditional tax treatment after 2017. If this were to happen, canceled debt income would be subject to taxation unless the taxpayer meets a qualified exception (e.g., the taxpayer is insolvent). If the exclusion on canceled debt income were to expire, improving awareness about the existing exclusions for canceled debt, such as for insolvency or bankruptcy, may be an option to pursue. Congress may choose to extend the exclusion of canceled debt income again, either temporarily or permanently, possibly with some modifications. Which modifications, if any, are enacted will depend on the goal of policymakers.", "One consideration for Congress is whether the exclusion provision should be temporary or permanent. Some argue that housing market conditions have improved significantly since conditions bottomed, and therefore warrant a temporary solution for those still feeling the lingering effects of the crash. A temporary exclusion of canceled debt income would appear to be consistent with a policy of minimizing adverse consequences associated with loan renegotiations in the short term.\nIt could also be argued that the temporary exclusion of residential COD income is preferable because owner-occupied housing is already heavily subsidized even without a COD exclusion. Three principal tax provisions for owner-occupied housing currently exist in the tax code: the deduction for mortgage interest, the exclusion of gain on the sales of homes, and the deduction of state and local real estate taxes. When combined these three provisions result in over $125 billion in reduced federal revenue annually. Some economists feel that this preferential tax treatment encourages households to overinvest in housing and less in business investments that might contribute more to increasing the nation's productivity and output.\nOn the other hand, some analysts might argue that the provision should be permanent. A case could be made that a temporary provision is unfair because there is no difference between an individual experiencing canceled debt income in 2010, when foreclosure rates were relatively high compared to three or four years from now, when foreclosure rates may be lower. If the intent is to minimize hardship when taxpayers experience distress, then making the provision permanent would seem consistent with that objective.", "Several options are possible for determining in what situations canceled mortgage debt income may be excluded from taxation. The broadest modification would exclude all canceled residential debt from income. Currently, only debt associated with the primary (or principal) residence of a taxpayer may be excluded and not vacation homes or investment property.\nSome policy analysts have suggested disallowing second liens as qualified residential debt. Second liens are not directly ineligible for the exclusion, although currently, qualified debt is restricted to include debt incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving the taxpayer's principal residence.\nFor some individuals, second liens may be home equity lines of credit; for others, second liens may be debt incurred as part of the purchase of the home. To the extent that home equity lines of credit are used to enhance the home and make capital improvements, it may be consistent with stated policy goals to include this debt as eligible for the exclusion. Yet, home equity lines of credit can also be used to finance consumption, such as vacations or paying off other debt. It may not be consistent with the stated policy goals, some might argue, to include this type of debt in the exclusion.\nCongress may also wish to consider changing the limit on the amount of canceled debt that can be excluded from income. P.L. 110-142 imposed a limit of $2 million ($1 million if married filing separate returns). Increasing the limit would likely increase revenue loss associated with the exclusion, while decreasing the limit would have the opposite effect. Decreasing the exclusion limit might also reduce the benefit to upper-income taxpayers.", "Policymakers could modify homeowner eligibility requirements based on ownership tenure or income.", "The exclusion for canceled debt income could be limited to homeowners who meet certain ownership and/or use tests similar to other housing-related tax provisions. For example, a homeowner must meet both an ownership and use test in order to claim the exclusion for gain on owner-occupied housing that is available under IRC Section 121. The ownership test requires the taxpayer to have owned the house for two of the last five years, while the use test requires the owner to have lived in the house for at least two years out of the last five years. Limiting the exclusion of capital gains in this manner was designed to minimize the possibility that investors, rather than owner-occupants, would exclude capital gains from taxation.\nIf an ownership and/or use test were applied to an exclusion of COD income, the number of tax filers eligible to claim the exclusion might be reduced. This reduction in filers may result in lower revenue loss. This policy option would add complexity to the reporting and filing processes and thus the tax code. In addition, it could be argued that tenure is not relevant to the stated policy goals of mortgage debt cancellation.", "Some policymakers have suggested that foreclosure assistance be provided only to households with low and moderate incomes. As with other housing tax incentives, such as the mortgage revenue bond program and the first-time homebuyer tax credit for District of Columbia residents, income levels could be capped and the exclusion made unavailable to those households with income above the ceiling. It would seem that income and foreclosure would be highly correlated because lower- income taxpayers may be more financially constrained than higher-income taxpayers. Regardless of whether this is true, it could be argued that household income is not relevant to the stated policy goals for the legislation.\nThis option could reduce the revenue loss associated with the provision, but would add complexity to the administration and tax filing process.", "As discussed above, current law requires that taxpayers who exclude COD income must \"return\" some tax benefit by reducing other tax attributes, such as basis in property. Several policy issues arise from this rule. The first is which tax attributes, if any, should be adjusted to account for excluded canceled mortgage debt income. One option is that there be no \"attribute reduction\" requirement. Alternatively, homeowners could be required to reduce specified tax attributes that include, but are not limited to, basis in the residence (e.g., taxpayers would be able to reduce basis in property other than the home subject to the discharged mortgage). A third option would be to require basis reduction in the taxpayer's residence. All taxpayers would benefit from the first option by not accounting for the excluded COD income. Taxpayer preference between the second option and the third option would depend on his or her circumstances (e.g., whether the taxpayer has basis in other property that would have to be reduced in the event of insufficient basis in the residence). The temporary exclusion of COD income enacted by P.L. 110-142 uses the third option—homeowners are required to reduce basis in the principal residence to account for the excluded COD income.\nAnother issue is when tax attributes should be adjusted. If basis is adjusted, one option could be to make the proposal consistent with current law, under which basis adjustment occurs in the year following discharge of the debt. Alternatively, basis adjustment could occur earlier (e.g., at the time of discharge or exclusion). If basis adjustment occurred in the year after discharge, homeowners losing their home at the time of debt cancellation would have already disposed of the property.\nThe requirement that a basis adjustment in the amount of cancelled debt suggests a desire by policymakers for homeowners to account for the benefit of the cancelled debt. Basis adjustment results in the taxation of cancelled debt income to the extent that gain from the disposition of the home is taxable; however, the timing of the basis adjustment may result in different tax consequences for taxpayers who lose their home.\nThe exclusion of COD income may result in differential treatment of taxpayers depending on basis adjustment timing, eligibility for exclusion of gain from the disposition of the residence, and homeownership retention. Policymakers may wish to account for that differential treatment, although doing so may add complexity and administrative cost to the proposal relative to its current state." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "h0_full", "h0_full", "", "", "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h1_title", "", "h1_full", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "What events may have important tax consequences?", "How have some addressed this issue?", "How does mortgage debt cancellation occur?", "How does tax law treat such cancellation of debt by lenders?", "What exceptions exist?", "What is the rationale for excluding canceled mortgage debt income?", "How have policymakers expressed this view?", "What systemic rationales exist for excluding canceled mortgage debt income?" ], "summary": [ "A home foreclosure, mortgage default, or mortgage modification can have important tax consequences.", "As lenders and borrowers work to resolve indebtedness issues, some transactions are resulting in cancellation of debt.", "Mortgage debt cancellation can occur when lenders restructure loans, reducing principal balances, or sell properties, either in advance, or as a result, of foreclosure proceedings.", "Historically, if a lender forgives or cancels such debt, tax law has treated it as cancellation of debt (COD) income subject to tax.", "Exceptions have been available for taxpayers who are insolvent or in bankruptcy, among others—these taxpayers may exclude canceled mortgage debt income under existing law.", "A rationale for excluding canceled mortgage debt income has focused on minimizing hardship for households in distress.", "Policymakers have expressed concern that households experiencing hardship and that are in danger of losing their home, presumably as a result of financial distress, should not incur an additional hardship by being taxed on canceled debt income.", "Some analysts have also drawn a connection between minimizing hardship for individuals and consumer spending; reductions in consumer spending, if significant, can lead to recession." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 1, 3, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2 ] }
GAO_GAO-14-737T	{ "title": [ "Background", "OMB and Agencies Reported Estimates of Improper Payments", "Challenges in Achieving Complete and Accurate Reporting of Improper Payments", "Strategies to Reduce Improper Payments", "Identifying and Analyzing Root Causes of Improper Payments", "Designing and Implementing Effective Preventive Controls to Avoid Improper Payments", "Implementing Effective Detective Controls to Identify and Recover Overpayments", "GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "Related GAO Products" ], "paragraphs": [ "The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA)—as amended by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) and the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA)—requires federal executive branch agencies to (1) review all programs and activities, (2) identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments,amount of improper payments for those programs and activities, (4) implement actions to reduce improper payments and set reduction targets, and (5) report on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements. IPERA also established a requirement for agency inspectors general (IG) to report annually on agencies’ compliance with criteria listed in IPERA. Under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) implementing guidance, these reports should be completed within 120 (3) estimate the annual days of the publication of the federal agencies’ annual PARs or AFRs. IPERIA also enacted into law a Do Not Pay (DNP) initiative, elements of which were already being developed under executive branch authority. DNP is a web-based, centralized data-matching service that allows agencies to review multiple databases to determine a recipient’s award or payment eligibility prior to making payments. In addition to the laws and guidance noted above, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 requires that all funding received under the act be deemed susceptible to significant improper payments and consequently requires agencies to estimate improper payments, implement corrective actions, and report on their results for these funds.\nOMB continues to play a key role in the oversight of government-wide improper payments. OMB has set a goal of reaching a government-wide improper payment error rate of 3 percent or less by the end of fiscal year 2016. Further, OMB has established guidance for federal agencies on reporting, reducing, and recovering improper payments as required by IPIA and IPERA and on protecting privacy while reducing improper IPERIA requires that OMB issue payments with the DNP initiative. guidance to agencies for improving estimates of improper payments. OMB has reported that it plans to revise its guidance related to improper payments.\nOffice of Management and Budget, Revised, Financial Reporting Requirements, OMB Circular No. A-136 (Oct. 21, 2013); Protecting Privacy while Reducing Improper Payments with the Do Not Pay Initiative, OMB Memorandum M-13-20 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2013); Issuance of Revised Parts I and II to Appendix C of OMB Circular A-123, OMB Memorandum M-11-16 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2011); Increasing Efforts to Recapture Improper Payments by Intensifying and Expanding Payment Recapture Audits, OMB Memorandum M-11-04 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2010); and Issuance of Part III to OMB Circular A-123, Appendix C, OMB Memorandum M-10-13 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2010).", "Federal agency improper payment estimates totaled $105.8 billion in fiscal year 2013, a decrease of $1.3 billion from the prior year’s revised estimate of $107.1 billion. The decrease in the fiscal year 2013 estimate is attributed primarily to a decrease in program outlays for the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Unemployment Insurance program and decreases in reported error rates for fiscal year 2013 for the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Medicaid and Medicare Advantage (Part C) programs. The $105.8 billion in estimated federal improper payments reported for fiscal year 2013 was attributable to 84 programs spread among 18 agencies. Five of these 84 programs account for most of the $105.8 billion of reported improper payments. Specifically, these five programs accounted for about $82.9 billion or 78 percent of the total estimated improper payments agencies reported for fiscal year 2013. Table 1 lists the five programs with the highest reported improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2013.\nOMB reported a government-wide improper payment error rate of 3.5 percent of program outlays in fiscal year 2013 when including the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Commercial Pay program, a decrease from 3.7 percent in fiscal year 2012. When excluding the DFAS Commercial Pay program, the reported government-wide error rate was 4.0 percent of program outlays in fiscal year 2013 compared to the revised 4.3 percent reported in fiscal year 2012. In May 2013, we reported on major deficiencies in DOD’s process for estimating fiscal year 2012 improper payments in the DFAS Commercial Pay program and recommended that DOD (1) develop key quality assurance procedures to ensure the completeness and accuracy of sampled populations and (2) revise its sampling procedures to meet OMB guidance and generally accepted statistical standards and produce a statistically valid error rate and dollar estimate with appropriate confidence intervals. According to its fiscal year 2013 AFR, DOD is reevaluating its sampling methodology for fiscal year 2014 for the DFAS Commercial Pay program based on our recommendations. Consequently, the fiscal year 2013 improper payment estimate for the DFAS Commercial Pay program may not be reliable.\nAdditionally, in fiscal year 2013, federal agencies reported improper payment error rates for seven risk-susceptible programs—accounting for more than 50 percent of the government-wide improper payment estimate—that exceeded 10 percent. As shown in table 2, the seven programs with error rates exceeding 10 percent ranged from 10.1 percent to 25.3 percent. Under IPERA, an agency reporting an improper payment rate of 10 percent or greater for any risk-susceptible program or activity must submit a plan to Congress describing the actions that the agency will take to reduce improper payment rates below 10 percent.\nSince the implementation of IPIA in 2004, federal agencies have continued to identify new programs or activities as risk susceptible and to report estimated improper payment amounts. Federal agencies have also identified programs or activities that they have determined to no longer be risk susceptible and therefore did not report improper payment estimates for these programs. For example, with OMB approval an agency can obtain relief from estimating improper payments if the agency has reported improper payments under the threshold for significant improper payments at least 2 consecutive years. Consequently, the specific programs included in the government-wide improper payment estimate may change from year to year. For example, a net of 10 additional programs were added to the government-wide estimate by OMB in fiscal year 2013 when compared to fiscal year 2012.Department of Education’s improper payment estimate for the Direct Loan program, approximately $1.1 billion, was included in the government-wide improper payment estimate for the first time in fiscal year 2013. We view Most notably, the these agencies’ efforts as a positive step toward increasing the transparency of the magnitude of improper payments.\nIn addition, agencies have continued efforts to recover improper payments, for example through recovery audits. OMB reported that government-wide, agencies recovered over $22 billion in overpayments through recovery audits and other methods in fiscal year 2013.", "In our fiscal year 2013 audit of the Financial Report of the United States Government, we reported the issue of improper payments as a material weakness in internal control because the federal government is unable to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them.the agency level, we also found that existing internal control weaknesses—such as financial system limitations and information system control weaknesses—heighten the risk of improper payments occurring.\nWe found that not all agencies have developed improper payment estimates for all of the programs and activities they identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. Specifically, four federal agencies did not report fiscal year 2013 estimated improper payment amounts for four risk-susceptible programs. For example, HHS’s fiscal year 2013 reporting cited statutory limitations for its state-administered Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, which prohibited it from requiring states to participate in developing an improper payment estimate for the TANF program. Despite these limitations, HHS reported that the agency has taken actions to assist states in reducing improper payments, such as providing guidance related to appropriate uses of TANF program funds. For fiscal year 2013, the TANF program reported outlays of about $16.5 billion.\nIn addition, two programs that reported estimates in fiscal year 2013 were not included in the government-wide totals because their estimation methodologies were not approved by OMB. The two excluded programs were the Department of Transportation’s High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail program, with fiscal year 2013 outlays of $2.3 billion, and the Railroad Retirement Board’s Railroad Unemployment Insurance program, with fiscal year 2013 outlays of $119.2 million.\nCompliance with statutory requirements is another challenge for some federal agencies. For fiscal year 2013, two agency auditors reported on compliance issues with IPIA and IPERA as part of their 2013 financial statement audits. Specifically, auditors of the Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported noncompliance with the requirements of IPERA regarding the design of program internal controls related to improper payments. HHS auditors reported that, as previously noted, HHS did not report an improper payment estimate for its TANF program for fiscal year 2013. In addition to noncompliance reported in financial statement audits, various IGs reported deficiencies related to compliance with the criteria listed in IPERA for fiscal year 2013 at their respective federal agencies, including risk-susceptible programs that did not have reported improper payment estimates, estimation methodologies that were not statistically valid, and risk assessments that may not accurately assess the risk of improper payment.\nAs reported in our March 2014 update to items identified in our annual reports on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, to determine the full extent of improper payments government-wide and to more effectively recover and reduce them, continued agency attention is needed to (1) identify programs susceptible to improper payments, (2) develop reliable improper payment estimation methodologies, (3) report on improper payments as required, and (4) implement effective corrective actions based on root cause analysis.", "As previously reported, there are a number of strategies that can help agencies in reducing improper payments, including analyzing the root causes of improper payments and implementing effective preventive and detective controls. Designed and implemented effectively, these strategies could help advance the federal government’s efforts to reduce improper payments.", "Agencies cited a number of causes for the estimated $105.8 billion in reported improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2013, including insufficient documentation, incorrect calculations, and duplicate payments. According to OMB guidance, agencies are required to classify the root causes of estimated improper payments into three general categories for reporting purposes: (1) documentation and administrative errors, (2) authentication and medical necessity errors, and (3) verification errors.improper payments for their respective programs in their fiscal year 2013 financial reports using these categories, a more detailed analysis beyond these general categories regarding the root causes can help agencies to identify and implement more effective preventive, detective, and corrective actions in the various programs. For example, in its fiscal year 2013 AFR, HHS reported diagnosis coding errors as a root cause of improper payments in its Medicaid program and cited corrective actions While some agencies reported the causes of related to provider communication and education. OMB has reported plans to develop more granular categories of improper payments in an upcoming revision to its guidance.", "Implementing strong preventive controls can serve as the frontline defense against improper payments. Proactively preventing improper payments increases public confidence in the administration of benefit programs and avoids the difficulties associated with the “pay and chase” aspects of recovering overpayments. Many agencies and programs are in the process of implementing preventive controls to avoid improper payments, including overpayments and underpayments.controls may involve a variety of activities such as up-front validation of eligibility, predictive analytic tests, and training programs. Further, addressing program design issues that are a factor in causing improper payments is an effective preventive strategy to be considered. The following are examples of preventive strategies, some of which are currently under way.\nUp-front eligibility validation through data sharing. Data sharing allows entities that make payments—to contractors, vendors, participants in benefit programs, and others—to compare information from different sources to help ensure that payments are appropriate. When effectively implemented, data sharing can be particularly useful in confirming initial or continuing eligibility of participants in benefit programs and in identifying improper payments that have already been made. Analyses and reporting on the extent to which agencies are participating in data- sharing activities, and additional data-sharing efforts that agencies are currently pursuing or would like to pursue can help to advance the federal government’s efforts to reduce improper payments.\nOne example of data sharing is agencies’ use of the Do Not Pay (DNP) initiative. DNP is a web-based, centralized data-matching service that allows agencies to review multiple databases to determine a recipient’s award or payment eligibility prior to making payments. IPERIA requires entities to review prepayment and preaward procedures and ensure a thorough review of available databases to determine program or award eligibility before the release of any federal funds. IPERIA lists five databases that should be included in the DNP initiative and allows for the inclusion of other databases designated by OMB in consultation with the appropriate agencies. In August 2013, the Director of OMB issued Memorandum No. M-13-20 (M-13-20), Protecting Privacy while Reducing Improper Payments with the Do Not Pay Initiative. As required by IPERIA, M-13-20 sets forth implementation guidance for the DNP initiative to help ensure that the federal government’s efforts to reduce improper payments comply with privacy laws and policies.\nPredictive analytic technologies. The analytic technologies used by HHS’s Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) are examples of preventive techniques that may be useful for other programs to consider. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 requires CMS to use predictive modeling and other analytic techniques—known as predictive analytic technologies—both to identify and to prevent improper payments under the Medicare Fee-for-Service program. technologies are to be used to analyze and identify Medicare provider networks, billing patterns, and beneficiary utilization patterns and detect those that represent a high risk of fraudulent activity. Through such analysis, unusual or suspicious patterns or abnormalities can be identified and used to prioritize additional review of suspicious transactions before payment is made.\nPub. L. No. 111-240, § 4241 (Sept. 27, 2010). detect improper payments and training providers or beneficiaries on program requirements. For example, in its fiscal year 2013 AFR, HHS reported that it has offered training through its Medicaid Integrity Institute to over 4,000 state employees and officials from fiscal years 2008 through 2013.\nProgram design review and refinement. To the extent that provider enrollment and eligibility verification problems are identified as a significant root cause in a specific program, agencies may look to establish enhanced controls in this area. For example, CMS has taken steps to strengthen standards and procedures for Medicare provider enrollment to help reduce the risk of providers intent on defrauding or abusing the program. Further, exploring whether certain complex or inconsistent program requirements—such as eligibility criteria and requirements for provider enrollment—contribute to improper payments may lend insight to developing effective strategies for enhancing compliance and may identify opportunities for streamlining or changing eligibility or other program requirements.", "Although strong preventive controls remain the frontline defense against improper payments, effective detection techniques can help to quickly identify and recover those overpayments that do occur. Detection activities play a significant role not only in identifying improper payments but also in providing data on why these payments were made and, in turn, highlighting areas that need strengthened prevention controls. The following are examples of key detection techniques.\nData mining. Data mining is a computer-based control activity that analyzes diverse data for relationships that have not previously been discovered. The central repository of data commonly used to perform data mining is called a data warehouse. Data warehouses store tables of historical and current information that are logically grouped. As a tool in managing improper payments, applying data mining to a data warehouse allows an organization to efficiently query the system to identify potential improper payments, such as multiple payments for an individual invoice to an individual recipient on a certain date, or to the same address. For example, CMS has established One Program Integrity, a web-based portal intended to provide CMS staff and contractors with a single source of access to Medicare and other data needed to help detect improper payments as well as tools for analyzing those data.\nRecovery auditing. While internal control should be maintained to help prevent improper payments, recovery auditing is used to identify and recover overpayments. IPERA requires agencies to conduct recovery audits, if cost effective, for each program or activity that expends $1 million or more annually. In its fiscal year 2013 AFR, HHS reported that the Medicare Fee-for-Service recovery audit program identified approximately $4.2 billion and recovered $3.7 billion in overpayments by the end of the fiscal year. Medicare recovery audit contractors are paid a contingency fee based on both the percentage of overpayments collected and underpayments identified.\nIt is important to note that some agencies have reported statutory or regulatory barriers that affect their ability to pursue recovery auditing. For example, in its fiscal year 2013 AFR, USDA reported that Section 281 of the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 precluded the use of recovery auditing techniques because Section 281 provides that 90 days after the decision of a state, a county, or an area committee is final, no action may be taken to recover the amounts found to have been erroneously disbursed as a result of the decision unless the participant had reason to believe that the decision was erroneous. This statute is commonly referred to as the Finality Rule, and according to USDA, it affects the Commodity Credit Corporation’s ability to recover improper payments.\nIPERA allows agencies to use up to 25 percent of funds recovered, net of recovery costs, under a payment recapture audit program, including providing a portion of funding to state and local governments. improper payments. Incentives and penalties can be helpful to create management reform and to ensure adherence to performance standards.\nChairman Mica, Ranking Member Connolly, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.", "For more information regarding this testimony, please contact Beryl H. Davis, Director, Financial Management and Assurance, at (202) 512-2623 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony included Phillip McIntyre (Assistant Director), James Healy, and Ricky A. Perry, Jr.", "Medicare Fraud: Further Actions Needed to Address Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-14-712T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2014.\nMedicare: Further Action Could Improve Improper Payment Prevention and Recoupment Efforts. GAO-14-619T. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2014.\nMedicaid Program Integrity: Increased Oversight Needed to Ensure Integrity of Growing Managed Care Expenditures. GAO-14-341. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2014.\nSchool-Meals Programs: USDA Has Enhanced Controls, but Additional Verification Could Help Ensure Legitimate Program Access. GAO-14-262. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2014.\nFinancial Audit: U.S. Government’s Fiscal Years 2013 and 2012 Consolidated Financial Statements. GAO-14-319R. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2014.\nSocial Security Death Data: Additional Action Needed to Address Data Errors and Federal Agency Access. GAO-14-46. Washington, D.C.: November 27, 2013.\nDisability Insurance: Work Activity Indicates Certain Social Security Disability Insurance Payments Were Potentially Improper. GAO-13-635. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2013.\nFarm Programs: USDA Needs to Do More to Prevent Improper Payments to Deceased Individuals. GAO-13-503. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2013.\nDOD Financial Management: Significant Improvements Needed in Efforts to Address Improper Payment Requirements. GAO-13-227. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2013.\nMedicaid: Enhancements Needed for Improper Payments Reporting and Related Corrective Action Monitoring. GAO-13-229. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2013.\nFinancial Audit: U.S. Government’s Fiscal Years 2012 and 2011 Consolidated Financial Statements. GAO-13-271R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2013.\nFoster Care Program: Improved Processes Needed to Estimate Improper Payments and Evaluate Related Corrective Actions. GAO-12-312. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2012.\nImproper Payments: Moving Forward with Governmentwide Reduction Strategies. GAO-12-405T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012.\nGovernment Operations: Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011.\nImproper Payments: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments. GAO-09-628T. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2009.\nThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h3_full", "h0_full h4_full", "h4_full h1_full", "h2_title h3_title", "h3_full h2_full", "", "", "", "h3_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What have federal agencies reported about improper payments?", "To what was the fiscal year 2013 estimate attributed?", "Why may this estimate be subject to change?", "How did the programs change from 2012 to 2013?", "In what circumstances can an agency find relief from estimating improper payments?", "What did GAO assess for fiscal year 2013?", "What increased the risk of improper payments?", "Which agencies did not report their risk estimates?", "Why were the estimates not reported?", "Why were some estimates not included in the government total?", "What other deficiences were reported?", "How can analysis of improper payments be beneficial?", "How were root causes of improper payments reported?", "Why might more detailed analysis of these reports be required?", "How has GAO addressed improper payment?", "How does the Improper Payments Act attempt to address this issue?", "How are improper payments classified?", "What does this testimony address?", "How did GAO gain information for this testimony?", "What other information does the testimony include?" ], "summary": [ "Federal agencies reported an estimated $105.8 billion in improper payments in fiscal year 2013, a decrease from the prior year revised estimate of $107.1 billion.", "The fiscal year 2013 estimate was attributable to 84 programs spread among 18 agencies.", "The specific programs included in the government-wide estimate may change from year to year.", "A net of 10 additional programs were added to the government-wide estimate by OMB in fiscal year 2013 when compared to fiscal year 2012.", "For example, with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval, an agency can obtain relief from estimating improper payments if the agency has reported improper payments under a certain threshold for at least 2 consecutive years.", "For fiscal year 2013, GAO identified the federal government's inability to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them as a material weakness in internal control.", "In addition, existing internal control weaknesses at the agency level continued to increase the risk of improper payments occurring.", "In fiscal year 2013, four agencies did not report estimates for four risk-susceptible programs, including the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.", "HHS cited a statutory barrier that prevents it from requiring states to estimate improper payments for TANF.", "Estimates reported for two programs were also not included in the government-wide total because their estimation methodologies were not approved by OMB.", "Further, inspectors general reported deficiencies related to compliance with criteria listed in the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 for fiscal year 2013, such as the use of estimation methodologies that were not statistically valid.", "Analysis of the root causes of improper payments can help agencies target effective corrective actions.", "Some agencies reported root causes of improper payments using three error categories required by OMB (documentation and administrative, authentication and medical necessity, and verification).", "However, because the three categories are general, more detailed analysis to understand the root causes could help agencies identify and implement more effective corrective actions.", "Over the past decade, GAO has issued numerous reports and testimonies highlighting improper payment issues across the federal government as well as at specific agencies.", "The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012, requires federal executive branch agencies to (1) review all programs and activities, (2) identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments, (3) estimate the annual amount of improper payments for those programs and activities, (4) implement actions to reduce improper payments and set reduction targets, and (5) report on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements.", "In general, reported improper payment estimates include payments that should not have been made, were made in the incorrect amount, or were not supported by sufficient documentation.", "This testimony addresses (1) federal agencies' reported estimates of improper payments, (2) remaining challenges in meeting current requirements to estimate and report improper payments, and (3) strategies for reducing improper payments.", "This testimony is primarily based on GAO's fiscal year 2013 audit of the Financial Report of the United States Government and prior GAO reports related to improper payments issued over the past 3 years.", "The testimony also includes improper payment information recently presented in federal agencies' fiscal year 2013 financial reports." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, 0, -1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, -1, -1, 1, -1, 0, 0 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 5, 5, 5, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 ] }
GAO_GAO-14-432	{ "title": [ "Scope and Methodology", "Background", "Promise Neighborhoods Model", "Types of Grants", "Education’s Grant Strategy Aligns with Promise Goals, but Education Has Not Clearly Communicated Expectations for Planning Grants", "Grant Requirements Enabled Education to Identify Organizations with Potential to Coordinate Student Services", "Education’s Two-Phase Grant Strategy Created Challenges for Some Grantees", "Education’s Selection Process", "Challenges with the Two- Phase Strategy", "Promise Neighborhoods Program Coordinates with Some Programs with Related Goals but Has No Inventory of Related Programs", "Promise Program Coordinates Closely with Some Related Federal Programs to Align Grants", "Education Does Not Have an Inventory of Federal Programs with Similar Goals", "Education Collects Extensive Data but Has Not Determined Whether or How to Evaluate the Program", "Grantees Collaborate Using Leading Practices, Resulting in Benefits and Challenges", "Promise Grant Framework Encourages Collaboration", "Grantees Collaborate to Deliver a Range of Services", "Conclusions", "Recommendations for Executive Action", "Agency Comments", "Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology", "Appendix II: Promise Neighborhood Grantees", "Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments", "GAO Contact", "Staff Acknowledgments" ], "paragraphs": [ "To determine the extent to which the structure of the Promise Neighborhoods program aligns with program goals and how Education selected grantees, we reviewed relevant Federal Register notices, application guidance, and agency information on applicants for fiscal year 2011 and 2012 implementation grants. To determine how Education aligns Promise grant activities with other federal programs, we reviewed documentation on Education’s alignment efforts. To assess Education’s approach to evaluating the program, we reviewed its grant monitoring reports, performance measures, and guidance for data collection. To determine the extent to which Promise grants enabled collaboration at the local level, we used GAO’s prior work on enhancing collaboration in interagency groups as criteria. We compared the Promise grants’ collaboration approaches to certain successful approaches used by select interagency groups and reviewed implementation grantees’ application materials. To learn about grantees’ experiences with the program, we conducted a web-based survey of all planning and implementation grantees nationwide from late August to early November 2013. We received responses from all 48 grantees. We asked grantees to provide information on the application and peer review process, coordination of federal resources, collaboration with local organizations, and results of the planning grants. Because not all respondents answered every question, the number of grantees responding to any particular question will be noted throughout the report. In addition, we conducted site visits to 11 planning and implementation grantees. During these visits, we interviewed five planning grantees and six implementation grantees. Sites were selected based on several factors, such as the type of grant awarded, the location of grantees, and whether they were urban or rural. For all four objectives, we interviewed Education officials, technical assistance providers, and subject matter specialists from the Promise Neighborhoods Institute.(See appendix I for more detail on the scope and methodology.)\nWe conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "The Promise Neighborhoods program is a place-based program that attempts to address the problems of children and youth in a designated geographic footprint. The program is designed to identify and address the needs of children in low-performing schools in areas of concentrated poverty by aligning a cradle-to-career continuum of services. The program moves beyond a focus on low-performing schools by recognizing the role an entire community plays in a child’s education (see fig. 1). Place-based initiatives provide communities the flexibility to address their unique needs and interrelated problems by taking into account the unique circumstances, challenges, and resources in that particular geographic area.\nThe Promise program is one of several place-based initiatives at the federal level, but it is the only one focused on educational issues. In addition to Education, the Departments of Justice (Justice), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Health and Human Services (HHS) also have grant programs aimed at impoverished neighborhoods. Together, these four agencies and their grant programs form the core of the White House Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative. This initiative coordinates neighborhood grant programs at the federal level across agencies, and identifies and shares best practices. Each agency’s grant program focuses on its respective agency’s core mission, but together, they focus on key components of neighborhood revitalization, education, housing, crime prevention, and healthcare.", "Generally, the purpose of the Promise grants is to fund individual grantees’ efforts to plan for and create a cradle-to-career pipeline of services based on the specific needs of their communities. The grants are focused on improving student outcomes on 15 performance indicators, chosen by Education. Along with the grantee, partner organizations, funded by federal, state, local, private, or nonprofit organizations, are expected to collaborate to provide matching funds and services.\nA number of nonprofits and foundations have worked on initiatives to address complex problems in a similarly comprehensive way. Their approach brings together a group of stakeholders from different sectors to collaborate on a common agenda, align their efforts, and use common measures of success. This approach has been described as the collective impact model. The premise of the model is that better cross-sector alignment and collaboration creates change more effectively than isolated interventions by individual organizations. A number of organizations have used this approach to address issues such as childhood obesity and water pollution.\nSeveral other cradle-to-career place-based collective impact programs share key characteristics with the Promise program, including Cincinnati’s Strive program and the Harlem Children’s Zone. These collective impact initiatives use a centralized infrastructure and a structured process, including training, tools, and resources, intended to result in a common agenda, shared measurement, and mutually-reinforcing activities among all participants. This centralized infrastructure requires staff to manage technology, communications support, data collection, reporting, and administrative details. The Promise grantees’ role is to create and provide this centralized infrastructure for their communities.", "The Promise program relies on a two-phase strategy for awarding grants, which includes both one-year planning grants and three- to five-year implementation grants. (See table 1.)\nAmong other things, planning grantees are required to conduct a comprehensive needs assessment of children and youth in the neighborhood and develop a plan to deliver a continuum of solutions with the potential to achieve results. This effort involves building community support for and involvement in developing the plan. Planning grantees are also expected to establish effective partnerships with organizations for purposes such as providing solutions along the continuum and obtaining resources to sustain and scale up the activities that work. Finally, planning grantees are required to plan to build, adapt, or expand a longitudinal data system to provide information and use data for learning, continuous improvement, and accountability.\nThe implementation grant provides funds to develop the administrative capacity to implement the planned continuum of services. Education expects implementation grantees to build and strengthen the partnerships they developed to provide and sustain services and to continue to build their longitudinal data systems.\nEducation awarded most of the 2010-2012 grants to non-profit organizations (38 of 48), eight to institutions of higher education, and two to tribal organizations. Almost all (10 of 12) implementation grantees received planning grants, while two did not. (See fig. 2 for locations of grantees.) (See appendix II for a list of grantees and year of grant award.)", "", "The planning and implementation grant activities that Education developed for the Promise program generally align with Education’s goal of significantly improving the educational and developmental outcomes of children and youth in the nation’s most distressed communities. According to Education officials, the planning grant award process enabled them to identify community-based organizations in distressed neighborhoods with the potential to effectively coordinate the continuum of services for students living in the neighborhood. The eligibility requirements, which included matching funds or in-kind donations and an established relationship with the community to be served, helped to ensure that grantees had financial and organizational capacity and were representative of the area to be served. Education developed criteria to evaluate applications and select grantees based on the grantees’ ability to describe the need for the project; the quality of the project design, including the ability to leverage existing resources; the quality of the project services; and the quality of the management plan.\nEducation’s Promise planning grants were intended to enhance the capacity of identified organizations to create the cradle-to-career continuum. The activities required of planning grantees enable grantees and their partners to gain a depth of knowledge about their communities and the communities’ needs, which can increase their capacity to focus on improving educational and developmental outcomes for children and youth throughout their neighborhood.\nThrough a separate competition, Education identified organizations that application reviewers determined were most ready to implement their plans. While acknowledging that the implementation grantees are best positioned to determine the allocation of grant funds, Education expects that grant funds will be used to develop the administrative capacity to implement the planned continuum and that the majority of resources to provide services to students and families will come from other public and private funding sources rather than from the grant itself. This expectation gives the Promise strategies a chance to extend beyond the 5-year life of the grant. Further, the requirement that grantees build a longitudinal data set allows Promise grantees and their partners to review and analyze robust data in real time to make informed decisions about whether to adjust their strategies. The data can also help the grantees and Education learn about the impact of the program.\nEducation identified 10 desired results from implementation of the program, which cover the cradle-to-career age span that Promise Neighborhoods are expected to address. A technical assistance provider stated that the list of desired results help grantees focus on improving educational and developmental outcomes across the entire continuum. (See table 2.) (The indicators that measure progress toward achieving results are listed in Appendix III.)", "Education’s grantee selection process was generally clear and transparent. However, Education did not communicate clearly to planning grantees about the probability of receiving an implementation grant and its expectations for grantees to continue their efforts without implementation funding. This lack of clarity created challenges for some grantees.", "Education outlined its selection criteria and how grant applications would be scored in its grant announcements and selected peer reviewers from outside the organization. According to Education officials, the peer reviewers had expertise in various related fields, including community development and all levels of education. Education provided additional training on the application review process. For the planning grant selection, Education divided about 100 peer reviewers into panels of three to review packages of about 10 applications. Afterward, peer reviewers conferred about scores in a conference call.\nFor the first implementation grant selection, Education had a two-tiered peer review process. During the first tier, peer reviewers were divided into panels of three to review approximately seven applications. During the second tier review of the 16 highest scoring applications, panels of reviewers were adjusted so that different reviewers read and scored different applications. For the second implementation grant selection, there was only one round of reviews. Reviewers were asked to review the applications and submit comments before meeting on-site to discuss applications. Education posted the results online, including peer reviewer comments for grantees and a list of applicants with scores above 80 out of 100 points.\nIn our web-based survey of grantees, grantees had mixed views on the clarity of application requirements and the helpfulness of peer reviewer comments. Specifically, 13 of 18 planning grantees who applied unsuccessfully for implementation grants and responded to the relevant survey question said the application requirements were very clear or extremely clear, while 8 of 19 grantees that responded said the same about peer reviewer scores and comments (see fig. 3). The unsuccessful applicants gave somewhat lower marks to the helpfulness of peer reviewer comments in improving their future applications and strengthening their current strategies (see fig. 4).\nSome of the 11 planning and implementation grantees that we interviewed raised concerns about specific application guidelines, such as how the term “neighborhood” is defined and the length of the application. Specifically, two rural grantees said that the grant application and materials had a few areas that seemed to be more geared to urban or suburban grantees. For example, the term “neighborhood” was somewhat difficult for them to interpret in a rural context. In fact, two rural grantees included multiple towns or counties in their neighborhood footprints. Additionally, two grantees we spoke with had concerns about the implementation grant application’s 50-page recommended maximum for the project narrative. Both organizations limited their narratives to 50 pages, but said they later learned that most of the successful grant recipients had exceeded this limit, often by a large amount.\nThe timing of the grant cycles created either an overlap or a long gap between the two grants. Grantees who applied for the implementation grant in the first cycle after receiving a planning grant had an overlap between executing the first grant and applying for the second grant. According to Education officials these grantees were unable to fully apply the knowledge gained in the planning year to develop their implementation applications. For example, one grantee said having to apply for the implementation grant during the planning year made it difficult to create opportunities for community input into the planning process. On the other hand, one of the four grantees that received an implementation grant 2 years after receiving a planning grant faced challenges sustaining the momentum of its efforts without additional funding. Another grantee in the same situation was able to sustain momentum with a separate grant from a private foundation. Education officials said they became aware of the problems with the timing of the implementation applications a few months into the first planning grant year. However, they said they did not have much flexibility in timing the grant cycles. For example, they said that they needed to allow time for public comment on the grant notification in the Federal Register. In addition, they said that agency budget decisions were delayed that year because the Department was operating under a continuing resolution for over 6 months in fiscal year 2011—the first year implementation grants were awarded.\nSome grantees also said there was a disconnect between the planning and the implementation grant application processes. Specifically, two officials from the six implementation grantees we visited told us that a high-quality planning year was not nearly as important for obtaining an implementation grant as having someone who could write a high-quality federal grant application. For example, one grantee noted that writing a good implementation grant application was not heavily dependent on information gleaned from the planning process. Another grantee said that the implementation grant application was written by a completely different person who was not involved in planning grant activities.", "Some grantees who received only planning grants reported in our survey and in interviews that they experienced challenges continuing their work without implementation funds. In addition, two of the five planning grantees we interviewed had concerns with Education’s strategy of awarding few implementation grants compared with the number of planning grants.\nEducation informed grantees there was a possibility they would not receive an implementation grant following the planning grant, but no information was provided about the likelihood of whether this would occur. We found indications that grantees did not fully appreciate that receiving a planning grant would not necessarily result in receiving an implementation grant. Three of the five planning grantees we interviewed stated that they did not have contingency plans for continuing their Promise Neighborhood efforts in the event that they did not receive implementation funding. The lack of contingency planning raises questions about the grantees’ understanding of the probability of receiving an implementation grant. Internal control standards state that management should ensure that effective external communications occur with groups that can have a serious impact on programs, projects, operations, and other activities, including budgeting and financing. To date, Education has awarded 46 planning grants (21, 15, and 10 in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively) and 12 implementation grants. Even though all but two implementation grants were awarded to planning grantees, fewer than one-quarter of planning grantees received implementation funding. (See table 3.)\nEducation officials provided several reasons for separating the planning and implementation grants and for not awarding implementation grants to all planning grantees who applied. Officials said that when they awarded the first planning grants, they were not sure which neighborhoods had potential grantees with the capacity to implement a Promise plan. In their view, the planning grants allowed them to invest in the capacity of communities to take on this work, while the implementation grants were only awarded to those that demonstrated they were ready for implementation. Education officials said it was important that grantees demonstrate they have an implementation plan in place before receiving such a large sum of money. In addition, after the first round of implementation grants were awarded, they noted that some applicants did not receive implementation grants because they were not yet competitive—in part because they had applied for the implementation grants before their planning efforts were complete. Finally, in commenting on a draft of this report, Education officials said that in several years, Congress appropriated less funds than were requested, which, they said, affected the number of implementation grants Education awarded.\nIn 2010, both Education’s Federal Register Notice Inviting Applications for planning grants and a related frequently asked questions document informed organizations receiving planning grants that they should not necessarily plan on automatically receiving implementation grants. The frequently asked questions guidance noted that the two types of grants could stand alone. For example, an applicant could receive just a planning grant, consecutive planning and implementation grants, or—if the applicant was further along in the planning process—just an implementation grant. Education officials told us that they viewed the planning grant activities as useful in themselves. For example, they told us that the planning process offers rich data and begins the process of bringing together partners and breaking down silos. They expected that planning grantees that applied for but did not receive implementation funding could continue their efforts without implementation grant funding, using their partners’ pledged matching funds to implement their plans on a smaller scale. They noted that the requirement to develop memoranda of understanding with partners should have signaled that the obligations of the partner organizations were not to be contingent upon receipt of an implementation grant. However, Education did not require grantees to have matching funds in-hand before submitting their applications. Especially in light of the difficult fiscal climate that federal agencies will likely continue to face in the future, we believe that it is important for Education to clearly communicate to grantees regarding expectations for planning and implementation grants. Clear communication and expectations can also help promote more realistic expectations among grantees about future funding opportunities given the fiscal realities of the Promise program over the past 5 years.\nGrantees who had not received implementation grants were trying to continue their efforts and most reported significant challenges in sustaining momentum. According to our survey, since the end of the planning grant, most planning grantees who did not receive an implementation grant (17 out of 29 that answered the related question) found it very or extremely challenging to maintain funding, 12 out of 29 planning grantees felt that maintaining key leadership positions was very or extremely challenging, and 13 out of 29 planning grantees found that hiring staff was very or extremely challenging.\nFour of the five planning grantees we interviewed who had not received implementation grants told us that they need to determine how to implement scaled-down versions of programs and services identified in their implementation grant applications. They described challenges continuing their work without implementation funding. For example, three grantees noted that partners had pledged funding as a match for federal dollars in their implementation grant proposal. Without the leverage of implementation grant funds, it was difficult to maintain the proposed funding streams. All of the five grantees we interviewed that had received only planning grants said the planning process was very helpful in building connections and trust and deepening communication among partners, and between partners and the community. Four grantees were concerned, however, that the trust and momentum they had built might dissipate if they were not able to carry out their plans without an implementation grant.", "", "In an effort to target its resources and align the Promise program goals with those of other place-based initiatives, the Promise program coordinates closely with a limited number of federal programs within Education and with other federal programs as part of the White House Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (NRI).The NRI is an interagency coordinating body that aligns place-based programs run by HUD, HHS, Justice, and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) (see fig. 5). Coordination through NRI is more structured than internal coordination within Education, which, according to Promise program officials, occurs as needed. Liaisons from each grant program meet at biweekly and monthly NRI meetings. They have formed a program integration workgroup to coordinate program development, monitoring, and technical assistance for the grant programs included. For example, they conducted a joint monitoring trip to a neighborhood in San Antonio, Texas that has Promise, HUD’s Choice Neighborhood, and Justice’s Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation grants.\nIn coordinating within Education and with NRI, Education’s efforts are focused on ensuring that grants are mutually reinforcing. These coordination activities include aligning goals, developing common performance measures where there are common purposes, and sharing technical assistance resources in areas where programs address similar issues or fund similar activities. (See table 4.)\nThe Promise program has also participated in another place-based program led out of the White House Domestic Policy Council: the Strong Cities, Strong Communities initiative. This program sends teams of federal officials to work with distressed cities, providing them expertise to more efficiently and effectively use the federal funds they already receive. Education’s Promise program participates in initial on-site assessments of communities. Education staff assisted two of the participating communities by providing education expertise at their request.\nPromise Zones had to meet a number of requirements, including meeting certain poverty thresholds and having certain population levels. agencies and five other agencies in partnership with state and local governments, businesses, and non-profit organizations. Only areas that already had certain NRI grants or a similar rural or tribal grant were eligible to apply in the first round. As of January 2014, three Promise Neighborhoods implementation sites in San Antonio, Los Angeles, and Southeastern Kentucky were located in designated Promise Zones, which provide additional opportunity for coordination at the federal and local level.\nThe Promise Neighborhoods program does, on occasion, coordinate with other individual federal agencies and programs outside of the NRI, but officials stated that the program is focused on deepening and broadening the communication it has with the five named NRI programs and Promise Zones. Promise Neighborhoods officials explained that they had concerns about spreading their coordination efforts too thinly given the large number of programs grantees may include in their strategies.", "In addition to Promise grants from Education, individual Promise Neighborhoods have access to a broad range of federal programs from other agencies, including many programs that are not part of NRI. However, Education has not developed an inventory of federal programs that could contribute to Promise program goals that it could share with planning and implementation grantees and use to make its own decisions about coordination across agencies. In recent work examining approaches used by interagency groups that successfully collaborated, we found that an inventory of resources related to reaching interagency goals can be used to promote an understanding of related governmentwide programs. Such inventories are useful in making decisions about coordinating related programs across agency lines and between levels of government, according to officials. We have also found that creating a comprehensive list of programs is a first step in identifying potential fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among federal programs or activities.\nAs shown in table 5, the 12 implementation grantees we surveyed stated that they included a variety of federal resources in their Promise Neighborhoods strategies. AmeriCorps was included in 9 out of 11 implementation grantees’ strategies, followed by Head Start (8 of 12) and Education’s School Improvement Grants (6 of 11). None of these are part of NRI. Few grantees said that NRI programs were part of their Promise strategies. For example, four grantees said that a Choice Neighborhood grant was part of their Promise strategy, and three grantees stated that DOJ’s Byrne program was part of their strategy. Education officials attributed the small number of grantees that use HUD’s Choice program to the fact that few grantees have distressed public housing within their footprint that is eligible for this funding.\nAlthough Promise grantees conduct their own inventories of the existing federal and other resources in their neighborhoods in order to develop their strategies, two grantees we spoke with were unaware of some of the other federal programs that could contribute towards their strategies. For example, one implementation grantee we spoke to with concerns about school safety was unaware of DOJ’s Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation grant program. Another planning grantee who completed our survey commented that a list of related federal programs like the one in our survey would be especially useful to grantees who did not receive implementation grants. Education officials with the Promise program told us that sometimes grantees are unaware that the community is benefiting from certain federal programs because programs are renamed as they filter down through the state or local levels. Education officials said they emphasize to grantees the importance of reaching out to key partners to ensure they are aware of other federally funded programs in the neighborhood because their partners may be more knowledgeable about other sources of federal funding. While encouraging grantees to reach out to key partners is helpful, Education, through its coordination with other federal agencies, would likely have more knowledge about existing federal resources.\nWithout a federal level inventory, Education is not well-positioned to support grantee efforts to identify other federal programs that could contribute to Promise program goals. Further, Education lacks complete information to inform decisions about future federal coordination efforts and identify potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.", "While Education is collecting a large amount of data from Promise grantees that was intended, in part, to be used to evaluate the program, the Education offices responsible for program evaluation— the Institute for Educational Sciences (IES) and Office of Planning, Evaluation, and Policy Development (OPEPD)—have not yet determined whether or how they will evaluate the program.\nOne of Education’s primary goals for the Promise program, as described in the Federal Register, is to learn about the overall impact of the program through a rigorous program evaluation. Applicants are required to describe their commitment to work with a national evaluator for Promise Neighborhoods to ensure that data collection and program design are consistent with plans to conduct a rigorous national evaluation of the program and the specific solutions and strategies pursued by individual grantees. We have found that federal program evaluation studies provide external accountability for the use of public resources. Evaluation can help to determine the “value added” of the expenditure of federal resources or to learn how to improve performance—or both. Evaluation can play a key role in strategic planning and in program management, informing both program design and execution.\nEducation requires implementation grantees to report annually on their performance using 15 indicators. The indicators include graduation rates, attendance, academic proficiency, student mobility, physical activity, and perceptions of safety. (See table 11 in appendix III.) Education contracted with the Urban Institute to provide guidance on how to collect data on the indicators, including data sources and survey techniques. According to Urban Institute officials, they used existing, validated measures whenever possible to ensure comparability across programs. Seven of twelve implementation grantees we surveyed said the guidance documents were extremely or very helpful, while four found it moderately helpful and one somewhat helpful.\nThe Urban Institute has analyzed the data on the indicators for the first implementation year (the baseline), but Education has not decided whether it will make the first year’s data public because it was not collected in a consistent manner and not all grantees were able to collect all of the necessary data. According to Promise program officials there were inconsistencies in data collection because guidance was not available until February 2013, 13 months after 2011 implementation grants were awarded and over 1 month after 2012 implementation grants were awarded.\nPromise officials stated that they will use the performance data to target their technical assistance. They are still working with grantees to develop meaningful targets for the second implementation year. Urban Institute officials noted that these 15 indicators help grantees focus their efforts on the outcomes they are trying to achieve.\nIn addition, Promise grantees are required to develop a longitudinal data system to collect information on the individuals served, services provided in the cradle-to-career continuum, and the related outcomes.are expected to use the longitudinal data to evaluate their programs on an Grantees ongoing basis and make adjustments to their strategies and services, as discussed later in this report.\nGrantees are also required to provide the longitudinal data to Education, which Education officials said they may use to create a restricted-use data set. However, Education currently does not have a plan for analyzing the data. In commenting on a draft of this report, Education stated it must first conduct a systematic examination of the reliability and validity of the data to determine whether it can be used for a descriptive study and a restricted-use data set. Education further stated that the restricted-use data set would only be made available to external researchers after Education determines that the data quality is adequate and appropriate for research; analyzes the data, taking into account privacy concerns; and determines whether to release its own report. In addition, officials from IES and OPEPD cited limitations and challenges to using the longitudinal data for program evaluation.\nAn official from IES, the entity responsible for all impact evaluations conducted by Education, told us that it is not feasible to conduct an impact evaluation of individual program pieces or an overall evaluation of the Promise approach. The official offered three options for evaluation. IES’ preferred option is to conduct a rigorous impact evaluation with a control group obtained through randomized assignment to the program. However, Promise Neighborhoods are not designed to create such a control group. Another option would be for IES to use students or families who were not chosen to participate in an oversubscribed program as a control group, but an informal poll that IES took at a Promise Neighborhoods conference suggested that there were not a sufficient number of oversubscribed programs. A third option was to develop a comparison group of neighborhoods that did not receive a Promise Neighborhood grant. However, IES officials question whether such an approach would enable them to match neighborhoods that were comparable to Promise neighborhoods at the beginning of the grant period. Finally, IES noted that collecting additional data for a control group could be expensive.\nEducation’s OPEPD is responsible for conducting other types of program evaluations. According to Education officials, it could conduct a more limited evaluation focused on outcomes without demonstrating that they are a direct result of the Promise program, but they have no specific plans to do so. An OPEPD official stated OPEPD is reluctant to commit to a plan because they have not yet seen the data and do not know how reliable or complete it will be. In addition, the official said that OPEPD is unsure about funding and that any comprehensive evaluations are expensive to carry out. By creating a restricted-use data set, OPEPD hopes that other researchers may have the funding to use the data to reach some conclusions about the program. The OPEPD official further explained that no one has ever evaluated a community-based approach like this one and that they hope researchers may have some ideas about how to do so.\nResearchers at the Urban Institute and within the Promise grantee community have proposed other options for evaluating the program. A researcher at the Urban Institute noted that random assignment is not the right approach for evaluating place-based programs. Instead, the researcher recommends a variety of other options for evaluating such programs, including approaches that estimate a single site’s effect on outcomes and aggregating those outcomes. This differs from the traditional program evaluation approach, which IES has considered, of isolating the effects of an intervention so that its effects can be measured separately from other interventions.\nWhile Education recognizes the importance of evaluating the Promise program, they lack a plan to do so. If an evaluation is not conducted, Education will have limited information about the Promise program’s success or the viability of the program’s collaborative approach.", "", "The Promise program generally requires grantees to use collaborative approaches. We found that grantees are following approaches consistent with those we have recognized as enhancing and sustaining collaboration with partners. The approaches we have previously identified include:\nEstablishing common outcomes: Establishing common outcomes helps collaborating agencies develop a clear and compelling rationale to work together.\nAddressing needs by leveraging resources: Leveraging the various human, information technology, physical and financial resources available from agencies in a collaborative group allows the group to obtain benefits that would not be available if they worked separately.\nTracking performance and maintaining accountability: Tracking performance and other mechanisms for maintaining accountability are consistent with our prior work, which has shown that performance information can be used to improve results by setting priorities and allocating resources to take corrective actions to solve program problems.\nThe approaches are discussed below and in Tables 6 through 8.", "Grantees and partners provided examples of how they have collaborated through the Promise grant to deliver services and supports that are intended to improve educational and developmental outcomes. Grantees and their partners focused on delivering services at various steps along the cradle-to-career pipeline, including:\nEarly learning supports: programs or services designed to improve outcomes and ensure that young children enter kindergarten and progress through early elementary school grades demonstrating age- appropriate functioning.\nK-12 supports: programs, including policies and personnel, linked to improving educational outcomes for children in pre-school through 12th grade. These include developing effective teachers and principals, facilitating the use of data on student achievement and student growth to inform decision-making, supporting a well-rounded curriculum, and creating multiple pathways for students to earn high school diplomas.\nCollege and career supports: programs preparing students for college and career success. These include partnering with higher education institutions to help instill a college-going culture in the neighborhood, providing dual-enrollment opportunities for students to gain college credit while in high school, and providing access to career and technical education programs.\nFamily and community supports: these include child and youth physical, mental, behavioral and emotional health programs, safety programs such as those to prevent or reduce gang activity and programs that expand access to quality affordable housing.\nFor examples of the services delivered and outcomes reported by grantees for each part of the cradle-to-career pipeline, see table 9 below.", "The Promise program has energized the 48 planning and implementation grantees and their partners to tackle the complex challenges facing impoverished neighborhoods together. While grantees said they will continue their efforts to build their Promise Neighborhoods, planning grantees faced challenges in sustaining their work over the long term without implementation grants. Planning grantees, especially those concerned about building trust with their communities and partners, may have been better served if Education had provided a more transparent, realistic picture of the fiscal reality of the Promise program and its potential impact on implementation grant funding. Lack of clear communication about the expectations Education had for planning grantees who did not receive implementation funding made it difficult for these grantees to develop specific plans to continue their efforts without future Promise funds. However, the reported small, yet tangible benefits that some communities pursued during the planning year—such as a safe place for children to play—increased momentum and built trust with community members. Encouraging such “early wins” could help all grantees and their partners build upon and improve their efforts, especially since implementation funding has proven scarce.\nAdditionally, much of the information grantees use about what existing federal, state, and local programs and resources to incorporate into their strategies is gleaned through their needs assessment at the local level. Education has not provided grantees with comprehensive information about other federal resources that may be available to use in their Promise strategies. Education is best positioned to develop and share such an inventory of federal programs that relate to the goals of the Promise program. Without such an inventory, Education may be missing opportunities to better support grantees, find other federal programs for future coordination efforts, and identify potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication at the federal level.\nOne of the Promise program’s primary goals is to identify the overall impact of its approach and the relationship between particular strategies and student outcomes. Grantees are investing significant time and resources to collect data to assess the program, but Education lacks a clear plan for using it. Without evaluating program, it will be difficult for Education to determine whether it is successfully addressing the complex problem of poor student outcomes in impoverished neighborhoods. Finally, the Promise program is one of several place-based and collective impact programs being implemented across many federal agencies. Given the number of these initiatives, not evaluating the program limits Education and other agencies from learning about the extent to which model is effective and should be replicated.", "In order to improve grantees’ planning and implementation efforts, increase the effectiveness of grantee efforts to integrate and manage resources, and learn more about the program’s impact, we recommend that the Secretary of Education take the following three actions: 1. Clarify program guidance about planning and implementation grants to provide reasonable assurance that planning grantees are better prepared to continue their efforts in the absence of implementation funding. Additional guidance could include encouraging grantees to set aside a small amount of the grant to identify and deliver early, tangible benefits to their neighborhoods. 2. Develop and disseminate to grantees on an ongoing basis an inventory of federal programs and resources that can contribute to the Promise Neighborhoods program’s goal to better support coordination across agency lines. 3. Develop a plan to use the data collected from grantees to conduct a national evaluation of the program.", "We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Education for review and comment. Education’s comments are reproduced in appendix IV and are summarized below. Education also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the final report as appropriate. Education outlined the steps it would take to implement our three recommendations, and provided its perspective on communicating expectations to grantees regarding future funding. Education did not explicitly agree or disagree with our findings.\nRegarding our finding that Education did not communicate clearly to planning grantees about its expectations for the grants, Education stated that in any given year it does not know and therefore cannot communicate the amount of funding available or the number of grant awards anticipated in the following year. We agree, and have clarified our finding in the report accordingly.\nEducation stated that an early assessment of planning grantees’ likelihood of receiving implementation funding would have been premature. Education noted that although Congress has funded the Promise program for the past 5 years, in 4 of those 5 years it appropriated far less than the President requested, and for the last 3 years the program has essentially been level funded. Education further stated that this underscores the limited control that the program had over the number of implementation grants made. We recognize that federal agencies have faced a difficult fiscal climate over the past few years, particularly for discretionary programs. For that reason—and especially given the level at which the Promise program has been funded for the past 3 years—we believe it is even more important that Education be clear and transparent with planning grantees about historical fiscal realities of the Promise program and the implications this may have on future implementation grants. We also believe this situation highlights the need for planning grantees to have contingency plans, especially given Education’s expectations that grantees continue their efforts even in the absence of implementation funding. We further believe that this also underscores the importance of “early wins” to demonstrate what can be achieved when grantees and their partners work collaboratively, as such demonstrations can encourage them to continue their efforts even without implementation funding.\nIn discussing its perspective on communicating expectations to grantees regarding future funding, Education stated that its Notifications Inviting Applications indicated that future funding was contingent on the availability of funds and that the program’s frequently asked questions document noted that implementation funding was not guaranteed and that planning grantees would have to compete for implementation grants. We believe that our report adequately reflects these communication efforts. However, as we reported, Education did not communicate to planning grantees that it expected them to continue their efforts even in the absence of implementation funding. Nor did Education communicate to implementation grant applicants that it expected them to be able to use their partners’ pledged matching funds even if they did not receive implementation grants. This lack of communication was evidenced by planning grantees’ lack of contingency plans and challenges they faced accessing the pledged matching funds, according to the grantees we interviewed.\nIn response to our first recommendation, Education stated that it would continue to communicate to planning grant applicants that implementation funding is contingent on the availability of funds, and that it would provide more targeted technical assistance to planning grant recipients regarding strategies for continuing grantees’ efforts absent implementation funding. Education also stated that it would clarify to grantees that planning grant funds could be used to achieve early, tangible benefits.\nRegarding our second recommendation, Education stated that it would work with its technical assistance providers to create a mechanism to distribute a comprehensive list of external funding opportunities, programs and resources on a regular basis to better support the grantees’ implementation efforts.\nWith regard to our final recommendation, Education stated that it will consider options for how and whether it can use the data collected from grantees to conduct a national evaluation. Education stated that as a first step it will conduct a systematic evaluation of the reliability and validity of the data, given issues that we and Education noted about inconsistencies in data collection and privacy concerns. In addition, Education stated that to date, it has not received sufficient funding to support a national evaluation. We agree that conducting evaluations can be costly. However, given that one of Education’s primary goals is to learn about the overall impact of the program through a rigorous program evaluation, we continue to believe that absent an evaluation, it will be difficult for Education to determine whether it is successfully addressing the complex problem of poor student outcomes in impoverished neighborhoods—one of its stated goals. Further, developing an evaluation plan would provide critical information about the resources required to conduct an evaluation, and could better inform future funding requests for such an evaluation.\nAs agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Education and other interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.\nIf you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 617-788-0580 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are in appendix V.", "To better understand grantees’ experiences with the Promise Neighborhoods program, we conducted a web-based survey of all 48 planning and implementation grantees. The survey was conducted from August 23, 2013 through November 7, 2013. We received completed surveys from all 48 grantees for a 100 percent response rate. The survey included questions about the clarity and helpfulness of the application and peer review process, challenges sustaining efforts after the end of the planning grant, coordination of federal resources, collaboration with local organizations and associated challenges, the extent to which local coordination reduced duplication, overlap and fragmentation, if at all, the mechanisms organizations use to track the results of their efforts, the results of the grants, and the helpfulness of Education’s guidance and resources for the program.\nBecause this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce nonsampling errors, such as variations in how respondents interpret questions and their willingness to offer accurate responses. We took steps to minimize nonsampling errors, including pretesting draft instruments and using a web-based administration system. Specifically, during survey development, we pretested draft instruments with five grantees that received planning and/or implementation grants. In the pretests, we were generally interested in the clarity, precision, and objectivity of the questions, as well as the flow and layout of the survey. For example, we wanted to ensure definitions used in the surveys were clear and known to the respondents, categories provided in closed-ended questions were complete and exclusive, and the ordering of survey sections and the questions within each section was appropriate. We revised the final survey based on pretest results. We took another step to minimize nonsampling errors by using a web-based survey. This allowed respondents to enter their responses directly into an electronic instrument and created a record for each respondent in a data file—eliminating the need for manual data entry and its associated errors. To further minimize errors, programs used to analyze the survey data were independently verified to ensure the accuracy of this work. Because not all respondents answered every question, we reported the number of grantees responding to particular questions throughout the report.\nIn addition, we conducted site visits to 11 Promise grantees. We selected sites based on several factors, such as the type of grant awarded, the location of the grantees, and whether the Promise Neighborhood was urban or rural. The site visits provided opportunities to collect more in- depth information on the program and highlighted different types of grantees and approaches. We visited six implementation grantees in Boston, Massachusetts; Berea, Kentucky; Chula Vista, California; Indianola, Mississippi; Los Angeles, California; and Washington, DC. We visited five planning grantees in Campo, California; Lawrence, Massachusetts; Los Angeles, California; Nashville, Tennessee; and Worcester, Massachusetts. These include one tribal and two rural grantees. We also interviewed Education officials and technical assistance providers, as well as other experts who have worked with Promise grant applicants, such as the Promise Neighborhoods Institute.\nTo determine how well the structure of Education’s Promise Neighborhoods grant program aligns with program goals and how Education selected grantees, using Education’s goals for the Promise program as criteria, we reviewed Education reports on place-based strategies; relevant Federal Register notices; and application guidance and training materials, including both the guidance available to applicants and to the peer reviewers regarding the technical evaluation/grant selection process. We reviewed agency information on applicants for implementation grants in the fiscal year 2011 and 2012 cycles, as fiscal years 2011 and 2012 were the only years in which Education awarded implementation grants. For both cycles, we analyzed application materials and technical evaluation documentation for a subset of implementation grant applicants—those that received planning grants in prior years. We compared the scores in each component of the application for both successful and unsuccessful applicants to identify criteria or factors that accounted for significant variation in total scores. We conducted a limited review of selected peer reviewer comments to gain more insight into the reasons for any differences. We interviewed Education officials about the process that the department used for the selection of both planning and implementation grantees.\nTo determine how the Promise Neighborhoods program coordinated with other Education programs and with the other federal agencies, including those involved in the White House Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (NRI), we reviewed documentation of the NRI’s efforts and interviewed agency officials participating in the NRI. We also interviewed cognizant officials at other agencies participating in the NRI. To assess Education’s approach to evaluating the success of the grants, we reviewed grant monitoring reports, Education’s performance measures, and related guidance for data collection for this program and interviewed agency officials responsible for evaluation, including technical assistance providers.\nTo determine the extent to which Promise grants enabled collaboration at the local level, we used GAO’s prior work on implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms as criteria. We compared the Promise grants’ collaboration mechanisms to certain successful approaches used by select interagency groups and reviewed implementation grantees’ application materials. Our 11 site visits provided additional insight into how selected grantees align services supported by multiple funding streams and delivered by multiple providers. Using survey responses from all planning grantees, we determined whether they have continued their efforts, whether they have implemented any of their strategies, and what, if any, interim results they have identified, regardless of whether they received implementation grants. Site visits provided illustrative examples of interim benefits and challenges.\nWe conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.", "Location New York , NY (Harlem)\nAthens Clarke County Family Connection Inc.\nClay, Jackson, and Owsley Counties, KY Boys & Girls Club of the Northern Cheyenne Nation Northern Cheyenne Reservation, MT Community Day Care Center of Lawrence, Inc.\nNew York , NY (Brooklyn)\nUnited Way of Central Massachusetts, Inc.\nNew York, NY (Brooklyn)\nNew York, NY (Queens)\nNew York, NY (Brooklyn)", "", "", "In addition to the contact named above, Elizabeth Sirois, Assistant Director; Jacques Arsenault; Aimee Elivert; and Lara Laufer made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were James Bennett, Deborah Bland, Mallory Barg Bulman, Holly Dye, Alex Galuten, Jean McSween, Matthew Saradjian, and Sarah Veale." ], "depth": [ 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h4_full", "h4_full h0_title", "", "h0_full", "h0_title h1_title h3_title", "h0_full h3_full", "h0_title h1_title h3_title", "", "h0_full h3_full h1_full", "h1_title", "h1_full", "h1_full", "h3_full h2_full", "h4_title h3_title", "", "h3_full h4_full", "h3_full h1_full", "", "h3_full", "h3_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How did the Department of Education award Promise grants?", "How were organizations chosen to receive 1-year planning grants?", "What is the purpose of planning grants?", "How were organizations chosen to receive 5-year implementation grants?", "What problems emerged in this process?", "What was the result of this problem?", "What is the main goal of the Promise program?", "How does the Promise program coordinate with other groups?", "How does Education's coordination compare with that of Promise grantees?", "Why does the Department of Education coordinate with other groups in this way?", "What problem existed with Education's implementation of Promise?", "How well does Education evaluate its promise grantees?", "How are grantees required to collect data?", "Why must the Department of Education conduct an examination of grant results?", "How did the Promise grant help grantees?", "What are some examples of the ways the grant has aligned with GAO leading practices?", "What other collaborative practices have some grantees used?", "What did grantees report on the benefits of collaboration?", "What challenges did grantees encounter?", "What is the Promise Neighborhoods program?", "How does the program help community-based organizations?", "Why did the GAO report on the Promise Neighborhoods program?" ], "summary": [ "The Department of Education (Education) used a two-phase strategy for awarding Promise Neighborhoods (Promise) grants, and aligned grant activities with program goals.", "Education awarded 1-year planning grants to organizations with the potential to effectively align services for students in their respective neighborhoods.", "Planning grants were generally intended to enhance the grantees' capacity to plan a continuum of services.", "Through a separate competition, Education awarded 5-year implementation grants to organizations that demonstrated they were most ready to implement their plans.", "However, Education did not communicate clearly to grantees about its expectations for the planning grants and the likelihood of receiving implementation grants.", "As a result, some grantees experienced challenges sustaining momentum in the absence or delay of implementation grant funding.", "The Promise program's efforts are focused on ensuring that grants are mutually reinforcing by aligning goals, developing common performance measures, and sharing technical assistance resources.", "The Promise program coordinates with related federal efforts primarily through a White House initiative that brings together neighborhood grant programs at five federal agencies.", "While Promise grantees incorporate a wide range of federal programs in their local strategies, Education coordinates with a more limited number of federal programs.", "Officials told us that they do this to avoid spreading program resources too thin.", "Further, Education did not develop an inventory of the federal programs that share Promise goals, a practice that could assist grantees; help officials make decisions about interagency coordination; and identify potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.", "Education requires Promise grantees to develop information systems and collect extensive data, but it has not developed plans to evaluate the program.", "Specifically, implementation grantees must collect data on individuals they serve, services they provide, and related outcomes and report annually on multiple indicators.", "However, Education stated it must conduct a systematic examination of the reliability and validity of the data to determine whether it will be able to use the data for an evaluation. Absent an evaluation, Education cannot determine the viability and effectiveness of the Promise program's approach.", "The Promise grant enabled grantees and their partners to collaborate in ways that align with leading practices GAO previously identified for enhancing collaboration among interagency groups including establishing common outcomes, leveraging resources, and tracking performance.", "For example, Education required grantees to work with partners to develop common goals and a plan to use existing and new resources to meet identified needs in target areas. Grantees were also required to leverage resources by committing funding from multiple sources. Implementation grantees were required to collect and use data to track performance.", "Some planning grantees used a leading collaborative strategy not required by Education that produced early benefits. For example, several grantees and partners told us they completed easily achievable projects during the planning year to help build momentum and trust.", "Grantees told us that collaboration yielded benefits, including deeper relationships with partners, such as schools, as well as the ability to attract additional funding.", "However, grantees also said they faced some challenges collaborating with partners, particularly in overcoming privacy concerns related to data collection.", "Education's Promise Neighborhoods program is a competitive grant program with goals to improve educational and developmental outcomes for children in distressed neighborhoods.", "The grants fund community-based organizations' efforts to work with local partners to develop and evaluate a cradle-to-career continuum of services in a designated geographic footprint.", "As it is one of several federal programs using this model GAO was asked to review the program." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 4, -1, 0, 1, 2, 0, -1, 0, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 0, -1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 0, 0, 0 ] }
CRS_RL32076	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "An Historical Perspective", "The Rationale", "The Patent System: A Brief Overview", "University-Industry Cooperation", "Small Business", "Bayh-Dole Act and Related Law", "Provisions", "Implementation and Results", "Current Issues and Concerns", "Recoupment", "Government Rights: Royalty Free Licenses and Reporting Requirements", "University Research", "Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals", "Concluding Observations" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Congressional interest in facilitating U.S. technological innovation led to the passage of P.L. 96 - 517 , Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act, commonly referred to as the \"Bayh-Dole Act\" after its two main sponsors former Senators Robert Dole and Birch Bayh. Under this 1980 law, as amended, title to inventions made with government support may be provided to the contractor if that contractor is a small business, a university, or other non-profit institution. The legislation is intended to use patent ownership as an incentive for private sector development and commercialization of federally funded research and development (R&D). As a response to congressional efforts to create a unified government patent policy pertaining to inventions made with federal support, the Bayh-Dole Act promotes cooperative activities among academia, small business, and industry leading to new products and processes for the marketplace.\nThis report discusses the rationale behind the passage of P.L. 96 - 517 , its provisions, and implementation of the law. Observers generally agree that the Bayh-Dole Act has successfully met its objectives. However, some experts argue that the issues associated with the law's patent policies should be revisited given the current R&D environment. Much of the renewed interest is a result of the legislation's effect on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries where critics assert that the private sector is receiving benefits to the detriment of the public interest. Other analysts, particularly in the defense arena, maintain that the existing rights maintained by the government are too restrictive and prevent industry from meeting national needs. Many of these issues and concerns are similar, if not identical to those addressed during the 15 to 20 years of deliberation prior to enactment of the law. These too will be explored to provide a context for current discussions.", "", "In the late 1970s, the United States Congress was involved in a series of legislative debates over ways to promote private sector development and utilization of federally funded research and development. This was soon followed by expanded congressional interest in additional means to foster technological advancement and commercialization in industry. During the 1980s and 1990s, various initiatives resulted in laws designed to encourage increased innovation-related activities in the business community and to remove barriers to technology development, thereby permitting market forces to operate. Laws promoting cooperative R&D and/or joint ventures involving the federal government, industry, and academia have been a cornerstone of the majority of these efforts and include legislation that created a system to transfer technology from federal laboratories to the private sector; implemented tax incentives for collaborative work; instituted direct and indirect government support for increased R&D; and changed government patent policy to provide an economic inducement for commercialization of federally funded technology, the subject of this report.\nP.L. 96 - 517 , the Bayh-Dole Act, was one of the first of these initiatives. Prior to 1980, only 5% of government owned patents were ever used in the private sector although a portion of the intellectual property portfolio had potential for further development, application, and marketing. The Bayh-Dole Act was constructed, in part, to address the low utilization rate of these federal patents. The House report to accompany H.R. 6933 (the House counterpart to the Senate bill that eventually became the Bayh-Dole Act) noted that, at the time the bill was considered, 26 different agency policies existed regarding the use of the results of federally funded R&D. Generally the government retained title to inventions made with government support whether the research was performed in federal laboratories, in universities, or by individual companies. Licenses to use government patents were then negotiated with firms either on a non-exclusive basis (meaning additional companies could use the technology) or, more rarely, for the exclusive use by one manufacturer. However, it was widely argued that without title (or at least an exclusive license) to an invention and the protection it conveys, a company would not invest the additional, and often substantial time and money necessary to commercialize a product or process for the marketplace.\nIn 1980, the federal expenditure for research and development totaled $55.5 billion (in constant 2000 dollars). The money typically was used to support research and development to meet the mission requirements of the federal departments and agencies (e.g., defense, public health, environmental quality) or to finance work in areas where there was an identified need for research, primarily basic research, not being performed in the private sector. While the government's investment led to many new inventions that have profoundly influenced our society, many in Congress were of the opinion that additional applications could be pursued by the private sector if provided the proper incentives.\nThe intent of the new law was to replace this situation with a \"single, uniform national policy designed to cut down on bureaucracy and encourage private industry to utilize government financed inventions through the commitment of the risk capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of commercial application.\" Expanded technology commercialization was to be accomplished by employing the patent system to augment collaboration between universities (as well as other nonprofit institutions) and the business community to ensure that inventions are brought to market. The Bayh-Dole Act also provides for the increased participation of small firms in the national R&D enterprise under the assumption that these companies tend to be more innovative than larger companies.", "The patent system was created to promote invention and innovation. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution states: \"The Congress Shall Have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.... \" Patents are widely believed to encourage innovation by simultaneously protecting the inventor and fostering competition. They provide the inventor with a right to exclude others, temporarily, from use of the invention without compensation. Patents give the owner an exclusive right for 20 years (from date of filing) to further develop the idea, commercialize a product or process, and potentially realize a return on the initial investment. Concurrently, the process of obtaining a patent places the concept in the public arena. As a disclosure system, the patent can, and often does, stimulate other firms or individuals to invent \"around\" existing patents to provide for parallel technical developments or meet similar market needs.\nNot everyone agrees that the patent system facilitates innovation. Critics argue that patents provide a monopoly which induces additional social costs. Others assert that the patent system is unnecessary due to market forces that already suffice to create an optimal level of innovation. The desire to obtain a lead time advantage over competitors, as well as the recognition that technologically backward firms lose out to their rivals, may well provide sufficient inducement to invent without the need for further incentives. Some commentators believe that the patent system encourages industry concentration and presents a barrier to entry in some markets and that cross licensing between companies can result in exploitation of other markets. Still other observers believe that the patent system too frequently attracts speculators who prefer to acquire and enforce patents rather than engage in socially productive activity.\nThe importance of patents varies among industrial sectors. Patents are perceived as critical in the drug and chemical industries in part because of the ease of replicating the finished product. While it is expensive, complicated, and time consuming to duplicate an airplane, it is relatively simple to chemically analyze a pill and reproduce it. Studies have found that in many other industries the protection offered by patents is diminished by the ability to invent around the patent and limited by the disclosure of vital information in the patent itself. In the aircraft and semiconductor industries, patents have not been the most successful mechanism for capturing the benefits of investments. Instead, lead time and the strength of the learning curve were determined to be more important. Later studies bear this out; secrecy and lead time were deemed to have greater effect than patents in the semiconductor and related equipment industry, as well as the aerospace and machine tool industries, among others.\nPatents can provide an economic incentive for companies to pursue further development and commercialization. Studies indicate that research funding accounts for approximately one-quarter of the costs associated with bringing a new product to market. According to The Economist , \"A dollar's worth of academic invention or discover requires upwards of $10,000 of private capital to bring [it] to market.\" Patent ownership is seen as a way to encourage the additional, and often substantial investment necessary for new goods and services, particularly in the case of small business. In an academic setting, the possession of title to inventions is expected to provide motivation for the university to license the technology to the private sector for commercialization in anticipation of royalty payments.", "Changes to the patent laws embodied in the Bayh-Dole Act had as an objective the facilitation of collaborative ventures between and among academia, industry, and government. In 1980, universities performed 14% of the R&D undertaken in the United States (similar to today); much of this the fundamental research basic to technological advance. The work is accomplished as part of the education process and provides training for scientists, engineers, and managers subsequently employed by the private sector.\nUniversities, however, generally do not have the means of production necessary to take the results of research and generate marketable products. Such activities are carried out by industry. Thus, the emphasis in the Bayh-Dole Act on the promotion of cooperative efforts between academia and the business community. By providing universities with intellectual property ownership with which to pursue and structure collaborative ventures, the legislation is intended to encourage the two sectors to work together to generate new goods, processes, and services for the marketplace. Such joint work allows for shared costs, shared risks, shared facilities, and shared expertise.\nPrior to World War II, industry was the primary source of funding for basic research in universities. This financial support helped shape priorities and build relationships. However, after the war, the federal government supplanted the private sector as the major financial contributor and became the principal determinant of the type and direction of the research performed in academic institutions. This situation oftentimes resulted in a disconnect between the university and industrial communities. Because the private sector and not the government typically is involved in commercialization, the difficulties in moving an idea from the research stage to a marketable product or process appeared to have been compounded. Thus, efforts to encourage increased collaboration between and among the sectors through the Bayh-Dole Act were expected to augment the contribution of both parties to technological advancement.", "Special consideration concerning patent title was given to small businesses in part because of the role these companies were seen as playing in the generation of new jobs and in technological advancement. Early research supported by several federal agencies concluded that small, high technology companies are the source of significant innovation. An often cited 1982 study financed by the Small Business Administration determined that small firms were 2.4 times as innovative per employees as large companies. Similar work performed at the time the legislation was being considered found that firms of less than 1,000 employees were responsible for more major innovations than large firms in the years 1953-1966 and for an equal number from 1967-1973. More recent research points to the contribution of small businesses to economic growth \"as measured by net new job creation.... \" According to the National Science Foundation, \"U.S. small business is closely associated with the development of new technologies in many of the science-based industries likely to be important to future economic growth.\"\nCommentators argue that small firms act as entrepreneurs and change agents, undertaking innovative activities that stimulate the evolution of new and existing industries. Because these companies often are involved in \"leading-edge technical niches,\" the contribution of this sector to innovation \"is most intense in new technologies.\" Experts claim that\nsmall firm innovators are extremely effective at producing technically important innovations—and technically important innovations are more than twice as likely as large firm innovations to be extremely high impact.\nTherefore, small companies appear to be dominant in certain high technology industries including biotechnology, new materials, information technology and communications.\nHowever, certain caveats need to be stated particularly within the context of small business, innovation, and technology development. Over the years, experts have argued that the contribution of small firms to the economy is overstated. [author name scrubbed], writing in Dun's Business Month during the 1980s, maintained that small companies tended to produce fewer goods than larger ones because they are less capital intensive and, on the whole, add less to the gross national product because they offer lower salaries and often do not provide health insurance or pension plans. Professors Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch argued that the relationship between company size and innovation capacity varied by industry. They note that \"the evidence also suggests that there tends to be more innovative activity in industries consisting of larger and not smaller firms.\" One commentator claims that the\nvalue of the innovations tended to increase with the size of the innovating firms. Consequently ... the interpretations that small firms are more innovative (or more efficient innovators) than large firms because they have introduced a larger number of innovations relative to their employment is unsound.\nOthers maintain that there is no conclusive evidence that firm size affects the \"success\" of R&D.\nAn important factor affecting the ability of small companies to effect technological advance appears to be the relationship between these firms and large corporations, a concept that is reflected in the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act:\nthe corporate contribution and that of the innovative entrepreneur are characteristically very different from one another and characteristically play complementary roles. Moreover, the contribution of the two together is superadditive, that is, the combined result is greater than the sum of their individual contributions.\nAs small firms look to larger companies for additional resources, large firms look for partners as the new technologies developed by smaller companies look more viable. Small businesses tend to be willing to take those technological risks that are not pursued by large firms and may be in a position to quickly exploit market opportunities. However, they may need to depend on large companies to meet large-scale manufacturing and/or market needs. In specific cases, experts note, \"an innovative disadvantage of large firms is an innovative advantage for small firms, and vice versa, which can make collaboration between two firms of different size desirable for both parties.\"", "", "In enacting P.L. 96 - 517 , the Congress accepted the proposition that providing title to the contractor will encourage commercialization and that this should be used to support innovation in certain identified sectors. The law states:\nIt is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally-supported research or development; ... to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; ... to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United States by United States industry and labor; [and] to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally-supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions....\nEach nonprofit organization (including universities) or small business is permitted to elect (within a reasonable time) to retain title to any \"subject invention\" made under federally funded R&D. (According to a recent Supreme Court decision in Stanford University v. Roche Molecular Systems Inc. , \"The Bayh-Dole Act does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions.\" The act only clarifies \"the order of priority of rights between the Federal Government and a federal contractor in a federally funded invention that already belongs to the contractor\" and that certain conditions must be met before the invention belongs to the contractor. ) The institution must commit to commercialization within a predetermined, agreed upon, time frame. However, the government may keep title under \"exceptional circumstances when it is determined by the agency that restriction or elimination of the right to retain title to any subject invention will better promote the policy and objectives of this chapter.\" Additionally, the government may withhold title if the contractor \"is not located in the United States or does not have a place of business located in the United States or is subject to the control of a foreign government,\" in situations associated with national security, or when the work is related to the naval nuclear propulsion or weapons programs of the Department of Energy.\nCertain other rights are reserved for the government to protect the public's interests. The government retains \"a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world.... \" The government also retains \"march-in rights\" which enable the federal agency to require the contractor (whether the organization owns the title or has an exclusive license) to \"grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible applicant or applicants ...\" (with due compensation) or to grant a license itself under certain circumstances. The special situation necessary to trigger march-in rights involves a determination that the contractor has not made efforts to commercialize within an agreed upon time frame or that the \"action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor.... \"\nThe government is \"authorized\" to withhold public disclosure of information for a \"reasonable time\" until a patent application can be made. Licensing by any contractor retaining title under this act is restricted to companies which will manufacture substantially within the United States. Initially, universities were limited in the time they could grant exclusive licenses for patents derived from government sponsored R&D to large companies (5 of the then 17 years of the patent). This restriction, however, was voided by P.L. 98 - 620 , the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984. According to S.Rept. 98-662, extending the time frame for licensing to large firms \"is particularly important with technologies such as pharmaceuticals, where long development times and major investments are usually required prior to commercialization.\"\nMost experts continue to argue that patent exclusivity is important for both large and small firms. In a February 1983 memorandum concerning the vesting of title to inventions made under federal funding, then President Ronald Reagan ordered all agencies to treat, as allowable by law, all contractors regardless of size the same as prescribed in P.L. 96 - 517 . This, however, does not have a legislative basis. P.L. 98 - 620 , noted above, further amended Bayh-Dole by loosening the time limitations for both disclosure of an invention to the government agency and for the amount of time provided within which to elect to take title. Nonprofit institutions were subsequently permitted to assign title rights to another organization (e.g., one which markets technology) and government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories (primarily those of the Department of Energy) run by nonprofits were permitted to retain title to inventions made in the facility with the exception of those dedicated to naval nuclear propulsion or weapons development. In addition, the Federal Technology Transfer Act ( P.L. 99 - 502 ) allows firms regardless of size to be awarded patents generated under a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) with a federal laboratory.", "The Bayh-Dole Act appears to have met its expressed goals of using \"the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally-supported research or development; ... and to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities.... \" In one of the earliest studies of the legislation, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office, GAO) found agreement among university administrators and small business representatives that P.L. 96 - 517 had \"a significant impact on their research and innovation efforts.\" While noting it was not correct to generalize about academia from the 25 universities studied, GAO did find that by 1987 all university administrators questioned indicated that the Bayh-Dole Act had \"been significant in stimulating business sponsorship of university research, which has grown 74 percent\" from FY1980 to FY1985. According to the National Science Foundation (NSF), industry support for academic research grew faster than any other funding source until FY2002. Industry financing expanded from 3.9% of university R&D in 1980 to 7.2% in 2000, although by FY2009 industry support had dropped to 5.8% of academic R&D. In 1980, federal financing comprised 67.5% of the total academic undertaking; by 2000 federal support declined to 58.2% of university funding, yet increased to 59.3% in FY2009. It should be noted, however, that the federal government still remains the major source of academic research funding.\nThe majority of the university personnel involved in the GAO study indicated that the increase in industry support for research at universities was \"directly\" attributed to the patent changes in P.L. 96 - 517 and P.L. 98 - 620 . Academic faculty interviews conducted by GAO found that \"since businesses knew that universities could take title to federally funded inventions, they no longer were concerned that their research efforts could be 'contaminated' by federal funding with the possibility that a federal agency could assert title rights to resulting inventions.\" All respondents agreed that the removal of licensing restrictions on nonprofit institutions (including universities) by P.L. 98 - 620 was of vital importance in promoting industry-university interaction. This was reinforced by the finding that 9 out of 10 business executives questioned identified the Bayh-Dole Act as an \"important factor\" in their decisions to fund R&D in academia.\nAnother GAO study published in May of 1998 reported that agency and university representatives believed the Bayh-Dole Act was meeting its goals as articulated by the Congress and the law had a positive impact on all involved. Academia was \"receiving greater benefits from their inventions and were transferring technology better than the government did when it retained title to inventions.\" In addition, the report states that the increased commercialization of federally funded research resulting from the implementation of the act positively affected both the federal government and the American people.\nOther experts agree. Yale President Richard Levin argued that the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is to transition the results of government funded research \"into practice for the benefit of humanity\" and that results indicate a \"pretty emphatic positive answer that the Bayh-Dole Act has created public benefits\" with minimal costs. As stated in an article in The Economist , the Bayh-Dole Act is \"probably the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century.... \"\nOne of the major factors in the reported success of the Bayh-Dole Act is the certainty it conveys concerning ownership of intellectual property. The Director of Stanford University's Office of Technology Licensing, Katherine Ku, noted that exclusivity is what motivates firms to invest financial and human resources in technology development. It provides an incentive for universities to take the time and effort to pursue a patent and to license those patents in its portfolio. This has led to a significant increase in academic patenting. In 1980, 390 patents were awarded to universities; by 2009, the number increased to 3,088.\nAcademia has become a major source of innovation for local and regional economic development. In the latest survey (FY2011) performed by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), universities identified a total of 591 new commercial products were marketed as a result of academic R&D. In addition, the survey indicated the creation of more than 671 new companies to commercialize university research with 6,051 new licenses/options granted primarily to small businesses. Since 1980, more than 8,778 new firms have been established to develop and market academic R&D, with \"3,927 startups still operating as of the end of FY2011.\"\nMany of the start-up businesses initially created from university R&D were associated with just seven schools including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the University of California, California Tech, the University of Minnesota, the Johns Hopkins University, the University of Utah, and the University of Virginia. While only a few universities earn large returns from licensing, studies indicated that licensing by the University of California system generates $91 million in net licensing income annually with Columbia University receiving approximately $80 million and Florida State University $45 million. Forbes also found that\nin many cases, a few big hits went a long way. New York University—which pulled in $175 million in research-related income on $210 million in research and development expenditures—tops the list with a 75% yield. Credit NYS's serious return in great part to smash-hit Remicade, a rheumatoid arthritis drug developed along with Centacor and Johnson & Johnson.\nA recent report found that \"without accounting for product substitution effects, … over the period 1996 to 2007, university licensing agreements based on product sales contributed at least $47 billion and as much as $187 billion to the U.S. GDP.\"\nHowever, several analysts argue that \"Bayh-Dole was only one of a number of important factors behind the rise of university patenting and licensing activity.\" In a study of the technology transfer and patenting activities of the University of California, Stanford University, and Columbia University, Professor David Mowery and his colleagues concluded that increased federal funding for basic biomedical research, expanded research in biotechnology, specific court rulings, and government policies augmenting what can be patented all contributed to the rise in academic intellectual property activities. According to their assessment, the Bayh-Dole Act had \"little impact on the content of academic research.\" The pursuit of patenting and licensing at universities has expanded because of changes in biomedical and biotechnology R&D, not because of the act. Later work by Professor Mowery follows this approach, arguing that \"the emphasis on the Bayh-Dole Act as a catalyst to these interactions [increased university-industry cooperation and technology transfer] also seems somewhat misplaced, ignoring as it does the long history, extending to at least the earliest decades of the 20 th century, of collaboration and knowledge flows between universities and industry in the United States.\"\nSome experts criticize this assessment and point out that the act had the most significant impact on universities that were not actively engaged in patenting prior to its passage. Proponents of this position argue that as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, in part, \"university patenting increased particularly rapidly during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s.\" This growth in patenting has been concentrated in \"middle-tier\" schools, not just the top research universities. Researchers who take this position suggest that the Mowery et al. study focused solely on universities that were previously involved in patenting and licensing and may not have fully considered patent problems that existed before the legislation was implemented. According to critics of the study, the analysts also failed to take into account changes in the venture capital industry that promoted the development of start-up companies to commercialize the results of university R&D.\nOther research questions the effect of increased university licensing on U.S. innovation. A study by Bhavan Sampat suggests that while the Bayh-Dole Act augmented patent and licensing by universities, these activities are just \"one of many channels through which universities make economic contributions and in most industries less important contributions than those made by placing scientific and technological information in the public domain.\" This author's work indicates that \"there is little evidence that increased university patenting and licensing has facilitated increased technology transfer or any meaningful growth in the economic contributions of universities.\"\nHowever, commentators argue that the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act provide incentives to take university inventions and develop them into products for the marketplace. University technology generally is in the early stage and not yet ready for commercialization, requiring additional funding and the involvement of faculty to move the idea into a marketable product. While most universities do not receive large amounts of funds as a result of licensing their technologies, it\nis clear from the evidence ... that faculty involvement in the further development of university technologies is an important element in getting those technologies to market. Mechanisms to ensure such efforts are an important element of commercialization regardless of whether those mechanisms included licensing by universities.\nIn addition, Professor Scott Shane observes:\nBecause universities exploit their inventions primarily through the licensing of technology, and licensing is not equally effective across all technologies ... the incentive to become more commercially focused led universities to concentrate their patenting in fields in which knowledge is transferred effectively through licensing.\nWhile the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on the small business sector have not been as extensively studied, the results appear similar. All eight small business owners interviewed by GAO for its 1987 study indicated that the patent changes had a significant beneficial effect on research, development, and innovation in their firms. Perhaps most illustrative of the influence of the Bayh-Dole Act on small business is the biotechnology industry. According to Dr. Bernadine Healy, the former Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), P.L. 96 - 517 was responsible for the development and growth of the biotechnology sector. The biotechnology industry primarily is composed of small firms that are developing technologies and techniques derived from R&D funded by NIH. Many of these companies have been established by NIH alumni or university professors previously supported by NIH grants. In Senate testimony delivered on August 1, 2001, Dr. Marie Freire, then Director of the Office of Technology Transfer at NIH, stated that \"[i]t is widely recognized that the Bayh-Dole Act and the Federal Technology Transfer Act continue to contribute to the global leadership of the U.S. biomedical enterprise.... \" An industry that was in its infancy when the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, by the end of 2009 1,699 biotechnology firms generated annual sales of $48.2 billion. The number of U.S. biotechnology patents granted has increased from 619 in 1985 to 4,853 in 2010.\nThe value of the Bayh-Dole Act might be reflected in state efforts to promote industry-university cooperation based on the contributions of these activities to local economic growth. As Mark Myers, retired Senior Vice-President of Xerox, told a meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, \"[t]he role of the research university is growing ever important as an economic force in our economy.... \" In a report by Battelle for the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), analysts found that there are biotechnology-related initiatives in 44 states, including many that involve cooperative efforts between academia and the private sector. In 2008, 28 states and Puerto Rico had specific programs to facilitate industry-university collaboration in the biotechnology arena. Pre-seed and seed fund programs have been established in 25 states and Puerto Rico while 19 states have venture capital initiatives to invest in biotechnology R&D. State laws also have been changed to allow universities to become equity partners in start up firms designed to commercialize academic R&D. Later analysis indicates that by 2010, 42 states support initiatives to assist in the commercialization of new technologies in the bioscience arena.", "While the Bayh-Dole Act provides a general framework to promote expanded utilization of the results of federally funded research and development, questions have been raised as to the adequacy of current arrangements. Most experts agree that closer cooperation among government, industry, and academia can augment funding sources (both in the private and public sectors), increase technology transfer, stimulate more innovation (beyond invention), lead to new products and processes, and expand markets. However, others point out that cooperation may provide an increased opportunity for conflict of interest, redirection of research, less openness in sharing of scientific discovery, and a greater emphasis on applied rather than basic research.\nThe successes of the Bayh-Dole Act and the visibility of the results of its implementation have generated certain concerns, many of which are associated with the role of the university in research, as well as biomedical and biotechnology R&D, particularly as related to the availability and cost of pharmaceuticals. Several of these issues are discussed below. However, it is important to place the Bayh-Dole Act in context. The law is one significant factor in expanded industry, university, small business collaboration, but not the only one. Therefore, it may be difficult to assess what concerns are the direct result of the Bayh-Dole Act and which arise from the overall research environment. The rising costs associated with the performance of research and development, the availability of venture capital, increased R&D outsourcing by large firms, and expanded federal funding for biomedical research all contribute to increased interaction among the parties. Additional legislative initiatives including the research and experimentation tax credit, the National Cooperative Research Act, the small business technology transfer program, the advanced technology program, and cooperative R&D agreements established by the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act all facilitate joint R&D activities leading to the commercialization of new technologies for the marketplace.", "Over the years, several legislators have suggested that the government \"recoup\" its investments from firms using federally supported research and development after profits are generated. This is particularly true in the area of pharmaceuticals. Such arguments are similar to those that were identified and considered as part of the original legislative debate over patent policy and cooperative R&D. The concept of recoupment is based upon the argument that the government should be reimbursed for research and development expenses provided to a contractor if the resulting product is brought to the market and generates profits. Proponents of this approach also maintained that providing the contractor with a limited time monopoly on the results of federally funded R&D through assignment of patent rights should be balanced by compensation for the government's initial investment. In the debate over related legislation, then-Senator Robert Dole stated on the floor of the Senate on April 23, 1980, the provision for recoupment was intended to insure that \"the Government's investment, paid for by the taxpayers of this country, is returned to the Federal coffer.\" During the same debate, Senator Birch Bayh argued that a payback provision means that, \"in the final analysis, the taxpayer will not be out the cost of the research and they also will have the benefit of the product.\"\nSuch suggestions are based on several factors. In addition to funding research performed by individual companies, under certain circumstances, the government furnishes the private sector ownership of the intellectual property resulting from this public investment. Patent protection gives firms monopoly rights on these innovations for a specified amount of time. By providing patent protection to the results of federally funded research, a company receives an individual benefit based upon public investments. Thus, proponents of recoupment assert that the monopoly power of patents should be modified by this \"public subsidization.\" They contend that the public has a right to a return on its investment. However, it is argued that \"this right is not preserved under the patent system, which ascribes solely to the patent holder all proprietary rights and interests in the patented product or process.\"\nTo date, Congress has weighed these issues and decided that, in the case of patent and technology policies, the benefits to the nation brought about by increased innovation are paramount. The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act represented a determination that, with respect to certain types of organizations, the economic incentive to realize a return on investment provided by a patent is necessary to stimulate companies to provide the often substantial financial commitment to turn federally funded R&D into marketable technologies and techniques. This is suggestive of the idea that the promise of a large return on investment \"is precisely the tool sanctioned by the Constitution to promote the progress of science.\" The decision was based on several determinations deriving from the rationale for federal support of basic research, the importance of technological progress to the nation, and the critical role of private sector commercialization in technological advancement.\nFederal support for basic research is founded, in large part, on the understanding that the rate of return to society as a whole generated by investments in research is significantly larger than the benefits that can be captured by any one firm performing it. It has been estimated that the returns to society generated by investments in basic research are approximately twice those to the company performing the work. Government support reflects a consensus that basic research is the foundation for many innovations, but that incentives for private sector financial commitments are dampened by the fact that spending for R&D runs a high risk of failure. Even results of fruitful R&D often are exploited by other domestic and foreign companies, thus resulting in underinvestment in research by the private sector. The returns from basic research are generally long term, sometimes not marketable, and not always evident.\nIt is now widely accepted that \"from one-third to one-half of all [U.S.] growth has come from technical progress, and that it is the principal driving force for long-term economic growth and the increased standards of living of modern industrial societies.\" Technological advancement can clearly contribute to the resolution of those national problems which are amenable to technological solutions. Such progress is achieved through innovation, the process by which industry provides new and improved products, processes, and services. An invention becomes an innovation when it has been integrated into the economy such that the knowledge created results in a new or improved good or service that can be sold in the marketplace or is applied to production to increase productivity and quality. It is only through commercialization, a function of the business sector, that a significant stimulus to economic growth occurs. Thus, there is congressional interest in accelerating development and commercialization activities in the private sector through the Bayh-Dole Act as well as other legislation.\nActual experience and cited studies suggest that companies which do not control the results of their investments—either through ownership of patent title, exclusive license, or pricing decisions—tend to be less likely to engage in related R&D. This likelihood is reflected in the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act (as well as other laws). Providing universities, nonprofit institutions, and small businesses with title to patents arising from federally funded R&D offers an incentive for cooperative work and commercial application. Royalties derived from intellectual property rights provide the academic community an alternative way to support further research and the business sector a means to obtain a return on their financial contribution to the endeavor. While the idea of recoupment was considered by the Congress in hearings on the legislation, it was rejected as an unnecessary obstacle, one which would be perceived as an additional burden to working with the government. It was thought to be particularly difficult to administer. Instead, Congress accepted as satisfactory the anticipated payback to the country through increased revenues from taxes on profits, new jobs created, improved productivity, and economic growth. For example, as discussed above, from 1980, when the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, through 2010, 8,107 new spin-off companies were created, and, in 2010 alone, 657 new products were introduced into the market by these firms. The emergence of the biotechnology industry and the development of new therapeutics to improve health care are other prominent indications of such benefits. To date, these benefits have been considered more important than the initial cost of the technology to the government or any potential unfair advantage.", "As discussed above, the government retains certain rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to protect the public interest. The act states that the government is provided a \"nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world.... \" This license, commonly known as a \"royalty free license,\" has been the subject of some discussion including whether or not this permits government purchasers to obtain discounts on products developed from federally funded R&D, particularly pharmaceuticals. A July 2003 GAO report addressed this issue and concluded that the license entitles the government to practice or have practiced the invention on the government's behalf, but \"does not give the federal government the far broader right to purchase, 'off the shelf' and royalty free (i.e. at a discounted price), products that happen to incorporate a federally funded invention when they are not produced under the government's license.\" The study goes on to say that rights in one patent do not \"automatically\" permit rights in subsequent, related patents. Because the government apparently holds few licenses on the biomedical products it purchases (generally through the Veteran's Administration and the Department of Defense), federal officials indicated that procurement costs were best reduced by use of the Federal Supply Schedule and national contracts. Government licenses are used primarily in the performance of research in the biomedical area.\nA related issue is that of tracking the government's interest in patents resulting from federally funded research and development. In an August 1999 study, GAO noted that federal contractors and grantees were not meeting the reporting requirements associated with the Bayh-Dole Act, making it difficult to identify and assess what licenses the government retained, among other things. Two years later, in a follow-up report, GAO stated that four of the five agencies had taken steps to insure improved compliance with the law including several new monitoring systems, although more needed to be done. Of particular interest is iEdison, created by the NIH, which electronically tracks federal inventions and is used by other agencies in addition to NIH.", "A question often posed is whether or not patent ownership rights provided by P.L. 96 - 517 have interfered with the traditional operating procedures of academia. A fear is that private sector funding of university R&D has led to conflicts of interest by scientists performing the research, particularly when academics have equity positions in the relevant companies. There are concerns that industry agendas will distort or supplant the basic research and educational responsibilities of academia. Complaints have also been expressed that the free exchange of ideas and scientific discovery are constrained as a result of both the university and the business community's interest in protecting their competitive positions.\nThe issue of conflict of interest is a complex one particularly when trying to determine what direct role the Bayh-Dole Act has in generating such concerns and what are the results of other factors that have led to increased industrial funding of university research. As noted above, laws that provide tax incentives for private sector financing of university basic research and facilitate technology transfer and cooperative R&D among government, industry, and academia, as well as changes in the way companies obtain the basic research necessary for product development shape the environment within which academic research is pursued. Thus, as argued by Katherine Ku, it is necessary to evaluate criticisms of the Bayh-Dole Act and to understand that the success of the law has made many in government uncomfortable despite the clear guidelines for technology transfer it established.\nSenior Research Scholar Mildred Cho and her coauthors assert that the Bayh-Dole Act\nhas created opportunities for conflict of interest for university faculty members because academic-industry partnerships can offer direct financial rewards to individual faculty members in the form of consulting fees, royalties, and equity in companies while simultaneously funding these faculty members' research.\nThis, it is argued, has resulted in situations where the researcher's ties to private sector interests may not be evident and may adversely affect \"the quality, outcome, and dissemination of research.\" Other studies indicate that obligations to industry \"pose a threat to scientific integrity.\" Some commentators maintain that private sector funded research tends to generate conclusions favorable to industry; however, the factor that is primarily associated with the withholding or delay of information is the involvement of the scientist in bringing his research to market in a product, not the industrial financing itself.\nData collected by Professor David Blumenthal and his colleagues also support the assessment that involvement in commercialization activities is related to delays in publication. This study indicated that approximately 20% of life science researchers delayed publication of their studies more than six months at least once for reasons associated with patents and commercialization considerations. Almost 9% of faculty refused to share research or materials with other university scientists in the past three years. However, the authors conclude that \"withholding of research results is not a widespread phenomenon among life-science researchers.\" A survey of industry-university research centers by Professor Wesley Cohen and his colleagues found that over half of the centers permitted firms to request publication delays and 35% of the institutions allowed researchers to delete information prior to publication. At those centers with a mission to improve industrial products and processes, 63% allowed publication delays and 54% permitted the deletion of information.\nDelays in publication and the free flow of information from academia, according to Professor Richard Florida, \"may well discourage or even impede the advancement of knowledge, which retards the efficient pursuit of scientific progress, in turn slowing innovation in industry.\" Professor Florida also points to concerns over the increasing number of academic institutions taking equity positions in and/or incubating spin-off companies. These actions \"simply tend to distract the university from its core missions of conducting research and generating talent.\" Florida concludes that publication delays and greater secrecy in the research process resulting from implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act have shifted the university away from the pursuit of its traditional goals.\nOther experts, including Robert Barchi, Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, maintain that the Bayh-Dole Act has not generated a significant set of issues concerning conflicts of interest and publication delays primarily because of the importance of academic freedom to the faculty. Publications are the basis for promotion and tenure and methods to respect reasonable intellectual property protection have been established. Similarly, as noted by Professor Pam Samuelson, conflicts of interest would jeopardize tenure thus regulations are in place to instruct faculty what is required of them. Research conducted by Professors Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding, and Toby Stuart indicates that\npatenting is often accompanied by a flurry of publication activity ... academic scientists who patent are more productive than otherwise equivalent scientists that are not listed as inventors on patents, but that publication quality appears relatively similar in the two groups.\nIn response to these issues, many universities have hired professional technology managers to work with faculty and to address patents. Universities with extensive research capabilities and resources were the first to create offices of technology transfer; after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act these offices were established with much greater frequency. These university technology transfer offices have established guidelines to cover industry-university relationships, with education and publication remaining academic priorities. The financial rewards derived from patenting often are only a small portion of the total amount of R&D funding for academic institutions and what substantial money does flow into individual institutions tends to be the result of one \"blockbuster\" patent. University technology managers report that the major reason for patent licensing is commercialization, not profit, particularly since the cost of a patent, which can run approximately $10,000, is so high. While the Bayh-Dole Act focused universities on \"commercially relevant technologies and closer ties between research and technological development,\" the costs of patenting are such that \"most university licensing offices barely break even.\"\nUniversity limitations on outside research, expeditious publication obligations mandated for certain federally funded R&D, and conflict of interest provisions also help to preserve a balance between federal policies like the Bayh-Dole Act that promote industry-university cooperation and concerns over excessive control of the research environment by the business community. For example, NIH requires grant recipients to publish the results of their government funded R&D. This is augmented by tax code regulations necessitating prompt dissemination of actual research results in order for a university or research institution to retain its tax exempt status. NIH also has policies and guidelines promoting the availability of patents arising from federal funding for use by other scientists for research purposes without acquisition of a license.\nCritics argue that the Bayh-Dole Act is distorting the traditional role of the university to the detriment of future technological development. Professor Florida maintained that because universities are seen as \"engines\" of growth, they focus on applied rather than fundamental research. This has led to unrealistic national and local policies and practices that encourage the commercialization of academic research while ignoring the real value of universities as the \"nation's primary source of knowledge creation and talent.\" Mildred Cho also asserted that university research is \"skewed\" toward marketable products and not basic research. Studies by researchers Dianne Rahm and Robert P. Morgan et. al. indicated the greater the faculty interaction with industry the more the applied research. According to an article in Fortune magazine, the Bayh-Dole Act has had \"unintended consequences\" in that \"universities have evolved from public trusts into something closer to venture capital firms. What used to be a scientific community of free and open debate now often seems like a litigation scrum of data-hoarding and suspicion.\"\nOther experts disagree. A study of 3,400 faculty at six major research institutions by Professors Jerry Thursby and Marie Thursby found that \"the basic/applied split in research did not change over the period 1983-1999 even though licensing had increased by a factor greater than 10.\" Data collected by the National Science Foundation appear to support this assessment. According to NSF, in 1980, basic research comprised 66.6% of academic R&D endeavors while applied research and development were 33.4% of the total. In 2009, the percent of academic R&D expenditures devoted to basic research increased to 74.6% while applied research and development declined to 25.4% of the total.\nCommentators claim that the Bayh-Dole Act encourages the type of research that is attractive to faculty. James Severson, President of the Cornell Research Foundation, testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary that\nToday, the protection and commercialization of academic research is one way for universities to attract, retain, and reward talented faculty who wish to see the results of their research programs benefit society. A commitment to the protection of research results is important for universities to develop closer ties to companies, and to attract additional funds to support research programs.\nAs noted by Terry Young, Assistant Vice Chancellor for Technology Transfer at Texas A&M University, the act requires funds generated by licensing to be used for future education and research necessary to \"deliver 'real world' products to the public.\" Assessing the legislation, the Biotechnology Industries Association, contends that \"without the Bayh-Dole Act, few licensing agreements would be executed between private companies and federally supported research institutions, and the enormous investment our government makes in medical research would be wasted.\"", "Many of the current concerns about the Bayh-Dole Act primarily arise out of its application to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. Congressional interest in providing lower cost drugs, particularly to seniors, has focused attention on the role the act has had on the development of new pharmaceuticals for the marketplace. Certain critics maintain that the price of many therapeutics derived from federally funded R&D are excessive considering the government's financial contribution. Others argue that the Bayh-Dole Act does not significantly affect pharmaceutical prices and point to a July 2001 study by NIH that found only 4 of the 47 FDA approved drugs generating $500 million a year were developed in part with NIH funded technologies. Although the government generally does not directly support pharmaceutical research aimed at product development, legislative attempts have been made to require cost controls or recoupment on drugs generated, in part, with federal funds. This is in sharp contrast to congressional and executive branch efforts, particularly in the defense arena, to make it easier for firms to acquire and utilize intellectual property associated with federally financed R&D.\nOverall support for biological and medical sciences has grown significantly since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. As measured in constant 2000 dollars, total (federal and non-federal) spending for academic R&D in these areas has increased from $4.6 billion in 1980 to $22.1 billion in 2008. Funding for university R&D in the life science, particularly biological and medical sciences, comprises by far the largest portion of academic research support. In 2008, 52.1% of total R&D expenditures at academic institutions went to finance the medical and biological sciences. When the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980, 40.5% of the research spending at universities was in these areas. Expanded support for university R&D in this arena appears to be important in relation to findings by the late Professor Edwin Mansfield showing that academic research was particularly significant in the development of new products and processes in the pharmaceutical and medical device industries.\nInterest and activity in the biomedical and biotechnology sectors has sparked some concern over the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on research in these areas. According to information provided by the Boston Consulting Group, in the years between 1990 and 1999, new gene patents granted increased from about 400 to 2,800 while the number granted to universities expanded from 55% to 73% during that time period. Another study \"estimated that in the U.S. over 3,000 new DNA-related patents have issued every year since 1998, and more than 40,000 such patents have been granted.\" Similarly, the number of U.S. biotechnology patents granted continues to grow. The focus on intellectual property has led critics to charge that the Bayh-Dole Act encourages the patenting of fundamental research which, in turn, prevents further biomedical innovation. Law professors Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai argue that due to the legislation, \"proprietary claims have increasingly moved upstream from the end products themselves to the ground-breaking discoveries that made them possible in the first place.\" While patents are designed to spur innovation, Rai and Eisenberg maintain that certain patents hinder the process. From their perspective, by permitting universities to patent discoveries made under federal funding, the Bayh-Dole Act \"draws no distinction between inventions that lead directly to commercial products and fundamental advances that enable further scientific studies.\" These basic innovations are generally known as \"research tools.\"\nEisenberg and Professor Richard Nelson argue that ownership of research tools may \"impose significant transaction costs\" that result in delayed innovation and possible future litigation. It also can stand in the way of research by others:\nBroad claims on early discoveries that are fundamental to emerging fields of knowledge are particularly worrisome in light of the great value, demonstrated time and again in history of science and technology, of having many independent minds at work trying to advance a field. Public science has flourished by permitting scientists to challenge and build upon the work of rivals.\nSimilar concerns were expressed by Harold Varmus, President of Memorial Sloan-Kettering and former Director of NIH. In July 2000 prepared testimony, he spoke to being \"troubled by widespread tendencies to seek protection of intellectual property increasingly early in the process that ultimately leads to products of obvious commercial value, because such practices can have detrimental effects on science and its delivery of health benefits.\" While the Bayh-Dole Act and scientific advances have helped generate a dynamic biotechnology industry, there have been changes that \"are not always consistent with the best interests of science.\"\nHowever, as Varmus and others acknowledge, the remedies to this situation are not necessarily associated with the Bayh-Dole Act. Yale's Richard Levin noted that while some research should be kept in the public domain, including research tools, the fact that it is privatized is not the result of the Bayh-Dole Act, but rather the result of patent law made by the courts and the Congress. Therefore, he believes that changes to the act are not the appropriate means to address the issues. Other experts agree that \"many of the issues that are identified today as negative consequences of Bayh-Dole can be traced to the institutional polices [of universities] structured to optimize institutional benefits and income, rather than to the Act itself.\"\nCurrent law, as reaffirmed by court decisions, permits the patenting of research tools. However, there have been efforts to encourage the widespread availability of these tools. Marie Freire testified that the value to society is greatest if the research tools are easily available for use in research. She asserted that there is a need to balance commercial interests with public interests. To achieve this balance, NIH has developed guidelines for universities and companies receiving federal funding that make clear research tools are to be made available to other scientists under reasonable terms. In addition, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently made changes in the guidelines used to determine the patentability of biotechnology discoveries.\nStudies by Professors John Walsh, Ashish Arora, Wesley Cohen, and Charlene Cho found that although there are now more patents associated with biomedical research, and on more fundamental work, there is little evidence that work has been curtailed due to intellectual property issues associated with research tools. Scientists are able to continue their research by \"licensing, inventing around patents, going offshore, the development and use of public databases and research tools, court challenges, and simply using the technology without a license (i.e., infringement).\" According to the authors, private sector owners of patents permitted such infringement in academia (with the exception of those associated with diagnostic tests in clinical trials) \"partly because it can increase the value of the patented technology.\"", "The discussion surrounding changes to the patent laws in the 1980s, and the debate over technology transfer since the late 1970s, acknowledged many of the issues currently being explored. As a result of expressed concerns, certain safeguards were built into the activities authorized by the Bayh-Dole Act. As discussed previously, march-in rights, the government's retention of an irrevocable license to patents generated under federally funded R&D, publication requirements, and commercialization schedules, among other things, all are incorporated into the process to protect the public interest. While there is a potential for creating an \"unfair\" advantage for one company over another, this is balanced against the need for new technologies and techniques and their contribution to the well-being of the nation.\nDespite arguments that title should remain in the public sector where it is accessible to all interested parties, the earlier lack of exclusivity appeared to interfere with the further development and commercialization of federally funded R&D. During the 1980s, Congress determined that the dispensation of patent rights to universities, small businesses, and nonprofit institutions and cooperative efforts took precedence, projecting the greater good generated by new products and processes that improve the country's health and welfare. Lawmakers anticipated the economic benefits through increased revenues from profits, wages, and salaries. The government receives a significant payback through taxes on profits and society benefits from new jobs created and expanded productivity. The importance of patent ownership has been reinforced by the positive effects studies have demonstrated P.L. 96 - 517 is reported to have had on the emergence of new technologies and new techniques generated by American companies.\nThere remain areas of concern, as discussed above, that Congress may decide to pursue. Some argue, particularly with respect to pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, that under the Bayh-Dole Act companies are receiving too many benefits at the expense of the public. Others, particularly in the defense arena, assert that the existing rights retained by the government under the act are too restrictive and are an impediment to meeting federal needs. But the impact of the legislation is still seen as significant. As summed up by Howard Bremer, who was patent counsel to the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation from 1960 through 1988:\nOne important factor, which is often overlooked, is that the success was achieved without cost to the taxpayer. In other words, no separate appropriation of government funds was needed to establish or manage the effort. In fact, it has been estimated that the economic benefits flowing from the universities' licensing activities adds about $41 billion to the United States economy.\nSignificant as that dollar amount is, it should not be overlooked that university inventions, arising, as most of them do, from basic research, have led to many products which have or exhibit the capability of saving lives or of improving the lives, safety and health of the citizens of the United States and around the world. In that context their contribution to society is immeasurable." ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_title h1_title", "h0_full", "h1_full", "h1_full", "", "", "", "", "h1_full" ] }	{ "question": [ "What is the Bayh-Dole Act?", "What does the act facilitate?", "How is the Bayh-Dole Act generally viewed?", "What are the benefits of the act?", "In what ways do others see the Act as detrimental?", "What other concerns have been raised regarding the Act?" ], "summary": [ "Congressional interest in facilitating U.S. technological innovation led to the passage of P.L. 96-517, Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act (commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act after its two main sponsors).", "The act provides patent rights to certain inventions arising out of government-sponsored research and development (R&D) to non-profit institutions and small businesses with the expressed purpose of encouraging the commercialization of new technologies through cooperative ventures between and among the research community, small firms, and industry.", "The Bayh-Dole Act has been seen as particularly successful in meeting its objectives. However, while the legislation provides a general framework to promote expanded utilization of the results of federally funded research and development, questions have been raised as to the adequacy of current arrangements.", "Most agree that closer cooperation among industry, government, and academia can augment funding sources (both in the private and public sectors), increase technology transfer, stimulate more innovation (beyond invention), lead to new products and processes, and expand markets.", "However, others point out that collaboration may provide increased opportunities for conflicts of interest, redirection of research, less openness in sharing of scientific discovery, and a greater emphasis on applied rather than basic research.", "Additional concerns have been expressed, particularly in relation to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, that the government and the public are not receiving benefits commensurate with the federal contribution to the initial research and development." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 2 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2 ] }
CRS_R42621	{ "title": [ "", "Introduction", "Most Recent Developments and Legislative Status", "The FY2013 Request and Congressional Action", "State Department FY2013 Budget Request―Key Issues", "Iraq Operations: From \"Transition\" to Normalized Relations", "QDDR Implementation", "Bureau of Energy Resources", "Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations", "Human Resource Issues", "Palestinian Statehood and the United Nations", "Foreign Operations FY2013 Budget Request―Key Issues", "Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund", "Frontline States", "Iraq", "Afghanistan", "Pakistan", "Administration Initiatives", "Global Health Initiative", "Food Security", "Climate Change", "International Family Planning and Abortion-Related Issues21", "Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)", "State-Foreign Operations Background and Trends", "Overseas Contingency Operations", "10-Year Funding Trends", "Top 10 U.S. Foreign Aid Recipient Countries", "Regional Distribution", "Sector Distribution" ], "paragraphs": [ "", "Facing significant pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit, some in the 112 th Congress viewed international affairs spending, particularly for foreign aid programs, as expenditures of limited benefit to U.S. taxpayers and eligible for cuts. Others favored a more robust foreign affairs budget for various reasons. In particular, some Members of Congress in both political parties, as well as the previous and current Secretaries of Defense, viewed a solid foreign affairs budget as essential to assisting the Defense Department in promoting U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, perhaps even saving long-term spending by preventing the much costlier use of troops overseas. To address budget costs, Congress considered the FY2013 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations in the context of the Budget Control Act of 2011. (See text box below.)\nCongress delayed passing most appropriations bills, including State-Foreign Operations, until after the start of the new fiscal year and the fall elections. It passed a continuing resolution (CR) that provided government funding until March 27, 2013. With that resolution soon to expire, the House passed legislation ( H.R. 933 ) on March 6, 2013, that would fund federal programs for the remainder of FY2013. The Senate approved an expanded version of the bill on March 20, 2013, and the House adopted the Senate version the next day. The legislation was signed into law on March 26, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 ).\nThe State-Foreign Operations appropriation, typically representing about 1.5% of the total federal budget in recent years, supports most programs and activities within the international affairs budget account, known as Function 150, including foreign economic and security assistance, contributions to international organizations and multilateral financial institutions, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) operations, public diplomacy, and international broadcasting programs. The bill does not align perfectly with the international affairs budget, however. Food aid, which is appropriated through the Agriculture appropriations bill, and the International Trade Commission and Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, both funded through the Commerce-Science-Justice appropriation, are international affairs (Function 150) programs not funded through the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill. Furthermore, a number of international commissions that are not part of Function 150, such as the International Boundary and Water Commission, are funded through the State-Foreign Operations bill.\nA chart illustrating the organizational structure of the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill is provided in Appendix A . Abbreviations of terms used throughout this report are in Appendix B . The report focuses on the accounts funded through the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill (see Appendix C for data), and it also provides appropriations figures for the entire international affairs (Function 150) budget in Appendix D .", "In order of the most recent events, congressional activity related to the State-Foreign Operations appropriations includes the following as summarized in Table 1 below:\nOn March 26, 2013, President Obama signed the FY2013 Defense and Military Construction/VA, Full Year Continuing Resolution, P.L. 113-6 (see text box above), which funds most State-Foreign operations accounts for the remainder of FY2013 at the FY2012-enacted level, not including sequestration. Appendix C has been updated to show enacted FY2013 funding by account, but does not reflect estimated budget sequestration reductions. On September 28, 2012, President Obama signed the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, H.J.Res. 117 into law ( P.L. 112-175 ), funding the government until March 27, 2013. On September 22, 2012, the Senate passed H.J.Res. 117 . On September 13, 2012, the House passed H.J.Res. 117 , a continuing resolution that would fund the federal government through March 27, 2013. H.J.Res. 117 would provide 0.612% more than FY2012 levels for State and Foreign Operations non-OCO funded activities. OCO-designated activities would be funded at the FY2012-enacted level. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the annualized State-Foreign Operations funding rate under the CR was estimated to be $53.52 billion. On May 24, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved by a vote of 29-1 its FY2013 State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill ( S. 3241 / S.Rept. 112-172 ). The bill provided a total of $52.3 billion, including $2.3 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds. This was 5% below the $54.9 billion requested and 2% below the FY2012 estimated level. For the State Department and Related Agencies, the Senate sets FY2013 funding at $16.3 billion, including $1.6 billion for OCO. It funded Foreign Operations at $36.0 billion, including $709.8 million in OCO funds. On May 17, 2012, the House Appropriations Committee approved by voice vote its FY2013 State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill ( H.R. 5857 / H.Rept. 112-494 ) totaling $40.3 billion for regular funding and $8.2 billion for OCO. In total, the bill's $48.5 billion was 12% less than requested and 9% below the FY2012 estimated levels. Within the total, the bill provided $15.8 billion for the Department of State and Related Agencies accounts, including $2.9 billion in OCO funding and $32.9 billion for Foreign Operations accounts, including $5.4 billion in OCO funding On April 25, using the caps in the March 29, 2012, House-passed budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. 112 ) for guidance, the House Appropriations Committee approved its initial subcommittee allocations. The House allocation for the State-Foreign Operations subcommittee was $48.38 billion, including $8.2 billion in OCO funds, or almost 12% below the Administration's request and nearly 9% below the Senate allocation. On April 19, using the FY2013 budget authority caps in the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) as guidance, the Senate Appropriations Committee adopted its initial FY2013 subcommittee allocations. The Senate allocated $53.02 billion for the State-Foreign Operations subcommittee, or 3% less than the Administration's request. This included $3.2 billion in OCO funds. On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2013 budget request to Congress, seeking an increase of 2.6% above the estimated FY2012 level for the Department of State-Foreign Operations and Related Agencies.", "On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2013 budget proposal. The Administration's priorities on foreign affairs funding for FY2013 did not differ significantly from the congressional priorities indicated by the enacted FY2012 funding levels. The FY2013 request totaled $54.9 billion for the State-Foreign Operations appropriations, including a core budget proposal of $46.6 billion plus $8.2 billion for extraordinary and temporary war-related Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in frontline states. The total request represented an increase of 2.6% over the estimated FY2012 funding level for State-Foreign Operations, including a 4.5% increase in State Department and Related Agencies accounts and a 0.1% increase in Foreign Operations accounts. Within the budget, the Administration requested authority and $770 million in funds for a new bilateral economic aid account—the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF)—to provide flexible and transparent support for Arab Spring countries in transition toward democracy. Within the security aid category, the Administration sought $800 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), even though most past PCCF funding has not been disbursed and many lawmakers have voiced concerns about U.S.-Pakistan relations, in general, and aid to Pakistan, specifically. Figure 1 provides a breakout of the FY2013 request by funding category.\nThe FY2013 request reflected a slight increase of State Department Administration of Foreign Affairs funding as a share of the total request, from 25% in FY2012 to 26% requested for FY2013, a slight decrease from 40% in FY2012 to 39% requested for FY2013 for bilateral economic aid, and a small increase from 19% in FY2012 to 19.5% in the FY2013 request for security assistance funding. These three categories make up more than 85% of the total State-Foreign Operations funding requested. For a full listing of funds requested for State, Foreign Operations and Related Agency accounts, by account, see Appendix C . (For a description of all the accounts, see CRS Report R40482, State, Foreign Operations Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].)", "The State Department and Related Agencies portion of the international affairs budget request included funding for State Department operations, International Organizations (including U.S. assessed dues to the U.N. system) and International Peacekeeping activities, International Broadcasting, and entities such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP).\nThe State Department and Related Agencies accounts would have seen, under the Administration request, a 4.5% boost in FY2013 to a total of $18.8 billion. This amount included $14.1 billion for Administration of Foreign Affairs, which provided for the personnel, operations, and programs of the department as well as the construction and maintenance of its facilities around the world. The FY2013 request focused on supporting several key efforts, including the unprecedented military-to-civilian transition in Iraq and ongoing State Department-led efforts in the other \"frontline states\" of Afghanistan and Pakistan; internal reorganizations under the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR); and ongoing efforts addressing personnel issues. These issues are highlighted below. Note that the synopses of legislative action in the following sections reflect the initial proposals considered by each chamber, not the part-year or full-year FY2013 continuing resolutions.", "In what U.S. officials have called the largest military-to-civilian transition since the Marshall Plan, the Department of State has become the lead agency for all U.S. programs in Iraq, after the departure of U.S. military forces in late 2011. The State Department is pursuing a wide-ranging policy agenda while also seeking to execute the unprecedented scope of responsibilities it took over from the U.S. military forces that were withdrawn, ranging from air transport, to environmental cleanup, to medical support.\nFor FY2013, the first post-transition fiscal year, the Administration requested 23% less funding than the estimated FY2012 level for State Operations in Iraq: $2.7 billion, including $2.3 billion in OCO. Officials suggested that this lower funding level reflects the Administration's intent to \"normalize\" the U.S. presence in Iraq. Its original plans in the FY2012 request for $3.7 billion included funds for an embassy branch office in Diyala that was not included in the FY2013 request, as well as funding for another office in Mosul that has been postponed. Factors cited by the State Department as cost-saving included a planned 25% reduction in the State Department presence in Iraq by the fall of 2012, reductions in security and sustainment contracts, and anticipated completion of construction that was funded in FY2012.\nThe House appropriations bill included a total of $2.8 billion for State Department operations in the three frontline states (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan); funding for increased security for staff in these states was provided, but funding for increased staff was not. The Senate Appropriations Committee bill stated that new funding, in addition to carryover balances, provided a total of $2.1 billion for Department of State operations in Iraq in FY2013, a level it deemed adequate under State's revised operational assumptions.", "The FY2013 budget request was the first to reflect reforms outlined in the QDDR. The QDDR, completed in the fall of 2010 and modeled on the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Reviews, identified several reforms intended to shift diplomatic resources towards the highest priority countries and programs. Among the reforms spelled out in the QDDR were the establishment of a new Bureau of Energy Resources and elevation of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to a Bureau. Both occurred in 2011 without any specific authorization or additional funding from Congress. Additionally, activities of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization were subsumed in the renamed Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.\nFunding for the State Department's operations in support of the Counterterrorism mission has increased from $3.2 million in FY2011, when the Office of Counterterrorism was an element of the Office of the Secretary of State, to $19 million for the new Bureau of Counterterrorism in the FY2013 request (an increase of $2.4 million over the FY2012 levels). The Administration requested funds for an additional 12 new positions within the Bureau, in addition to the 70 U.S. direct-hires and 30 contract staff already in place. Neither the House nor Senate bill mentioned the Bureau of Counterterrorism, but could still provide funding for new hires within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) account.", "The Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) similarly sought 22 additional direct-hire positions in the FY2013 budget request, at a cost of $5.4 million (out of a total $16.9 million budget request for ENR). The Bureau, announced in late 2011, requested the additional funding to grow its capacity \"to strengthen market incentives to transform the future of energy supplies, deepening the Department's human resource expertise on energy matters, and institutionalizing improved capabilities to engage more broadly and deeply on U.S. global energy priorities.\" The Administration's funding request also included plans for the Bureau to establish four regional hubs in Istanbul, Singapore, Johannesburg, and Rio de Janeiro, to engage regional partners and promote energy-issue involvement at posts and in State's regional bureaus. The House Appropriations Committee recommendation did not include the additional $5.4 million and 22 new positions specifically for the Bureau of Energy Resources. The Senate Appropriations Committee report did not mention this Bureau. Funding within the D&CP could support these new hires, however.", "The Administration's FY2013 request for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) totaled $56.5 million, an 86% increase over FY2012 levels. Staffing levels would drop by 64 positions as part of a restructuring to make the Bureau more agile and expeditionary, with a greater emphasis on creating a flexible response capacity with a smaller staff. The proposed change was intended to produce greater deployment capacity, but with significantly less overhead. In addition, the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) model was modified from a standing group of experts deployed less than half the time, to a structure that funds experts only when they are deployed; as part of this reorganization, the FY2012 high of 144 CRC members would be reduced by 76 members.\nThe House Appropriations Committee's FY2013 proposal replicated its FY2012 action for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, continuing to provide authority for the Secretary of State to transfer up to $35 million of the funds appropriated under the D&CP heading to CSO. It also provided $8.5 million in OCO funding, as it did in FY2012. The Senate Appropriations Committee proposal included no funding for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, but did authorize up to $56.5 million (the amount requested) to be transferred from Diplomatic & Consular Program funding to this account, as well as an additional $10 million from the Complex Crisis Fund, as requested by the Administration.", "The Administration's FY2013 request for additional human resources D&CP was a total of $2.5 billion, or $71.2 million above its FY2012 request. Of the FY2013 request, $24.9 million was requested to bolster State's staffing by 121 new positions (including those mentioned in the above sections) in a continuation of State's multi-year hiring efforts to fill human resources gaps and bolster new programs and organizations under the \"Diplomacy 3.0\" initiative. Secretary Clinton originally sought to increase the number of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) by 25% from 2008 to 2014. With the proposed FY2013 funding, State would have reached 18% growth since 2008, through the hiring of an additional 82 FSOs. The proposed funding also would have permitted State to hire an additional 39 civil servants. In the context of constrained budgeting, the department postponed its goal of 25% growth in the Foreign Service to future years beyond 2014.\nThe Administration also requested $81.4 million for the third and final phase of implementing its Overseas Comparability Pay (OCP) for FSOs. According to the Department of State, prior to 2009 Foreign Service employees transferring abroad experienced a 23.1% cut in basic pay from what they had been receiving as locality pay for serving in Washington, DC. This situation was compounded by lowered employer contributions by the department to the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. Entry and mid-level Foreign Service employees were particularly affected, according to State officials, who suggested that this issue could affect diplomatic readiness by increased attrition and recruitment challenges, and is \"critical for the Department's Foreign Service competitiveness in the workplace.\"\nCongress approved two prior OCP adjustments since 2009, reducing the pay differential by nearly 70%. The FY2013 request would have provided for a third and final tranche of funds to bring the comparability pay level to the Washington, DC, locality pay rate.\nOn the above human resources issues, the House Appropriations Committee recommendation included no funding for hiring above attrition in FY2013. The committee also rejected the department's requested extension of authority for overseas comparability pay, stating that \"the authority to grant overseas comparability pay is a matter within the jurisdiction of the authorization committee and should be considered in the context of legislation addressing the authorities and compensation rules governing the Foreign Service.\" The Senate Appropriations Committee also did not include the overseas comparability pay authority or funding in its FY2013 proposal.", "In October 2011, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) voted to admit Palestine as a full member, prolonging a U.S. policy debate that is being played out, in part, in the State-Foreign Operations appropriations process. The United States has long opposed any path to Palestinian statehood outside of a negotiated agreement with Israel, and U.S. law prohibits American funding, which is assessed at 22% of the UNESCO budget, to any U.N. agency that accepts the Palestinians as a full member. U.S. assessed contributions to UNESCO within the State Department's Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account have been withheld since the vote. The Administration, which supports U.S. participation in UNESCO, sought almost $80 million for UNESCO to pay U.S. assessed contributions for calendar year 2012, explaining that it would work with Congress to seek authority to waive the restriction.\nThe House committee report stated that the House specifically would withhold U.S. contributions to UNESCO within the CIO account. The report also included language prohibiting the disbursement of Economic Support Funds (ESF) assistance to the Palestinian Authority if, after enactment of the legislation, the Palestinians gain full membership in the United Nations or any U.N. entity outside of a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian agreement. The Senate legislation did not recommend funding for UNESCO within the CIO account, which it said is prohibited by law, and also included the same ESF restriction, as well as an explicit prohibition on U.S. funding to UNESCO and other U.N. entities that grant full membership status to the Palestinian Authority. Both proposals included less funding than requested for the International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account through which a small ($880,000) amount was requested for U.S. voluntary contributions to UNESCO for International Contributions for Scientific, Educational, and Cultural Activities (UNESCO/ICSECA) for FY22013.", "The Foreign Operations budget comprises the majority of both bilateral and multilateral U.S. foreign assistance programs. The main exception is food assistance, which is appropriated through the Agriculture Appropriations bill. Foreign Operations accounts are managed primarily by USAID and the State Department, together with several smaller independent foreign assistance agencies such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Peace Corps, as well as the Inter-American and African Development Foundations, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Trade and Development Agency (TDA). The Foreign Operations budget also encompasses U.S. contributions to major multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank and U.N. entities, and includes funds for the Export-Import Bank, whose activities are regarded more as trade promotion than foreign aid. On occasion, the budget replenishes U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.\nThe Foreign Operations budget request for FY2013 totaled $36.07 billion, representing a 0.1% increase from the enacted FY2012 level of $36.03 billion. The request continued to emphasize the Administration's ongoing foreign assistance initiatives—the Global Health Initiative, Food Security Initiative, and the Global Climate Change Initiative—as well as funding for the \"front line\" war-related states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In addition, the request called for a new regional funding account to respond to political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. House and Senate committee action indicated that these priorities may not be shared by all in Congress. In addition to funding levels, policy issues such as restrictions on funding for international family planning programs and conditions on aid to certain countries and entities continued to be a focus of the congressional foreign aid funding debate. These key issues are highlighted below. Note that the synopses of legislative action in the following sections reflect the initial proposals considered by each chamber, not the part-year or full-year FY2013 continuing resolutions.", "With recent popular uprisings leading to the fall of some governments in the Middle East and North Africa, the use of foreign assistance as a democracy promotion tool has received significant scrutiny. In particular, the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, long a top U.S. aid recipient, and the U.S. role in ousting Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, have raised a number of policy questions about the appropriate U.S. role in foreign political transitions. Members of the 112 th Congress had expressed interest in supporting popular uprisings against undemocratic regimes, yet were concerned about accountability and potential unintended consequences of providing assistance to entities that may pursue actions counter to U.S. policy interests.\nTo support effective U.S. engagement in the evolving situation in the Middle East, the Administration proposed in its FY2013 budget request the creation of a $770 million Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF) . Of the requested funds, some would have supported existing programs: $65 million would be base funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and $5 million would be for the Office of Middle East Programs (OMEP) regional activities. These programs are currently funded through regional Economic Support Funds. The remaining $700 million would have been unallocated funds intended to provide incentives for beneficiary countries to move toward democracy, while allowing for State Department flexibility and transparency in supporting Arab Spring countries in transition, eliminating the need to transfer funds from other programs and accounts to meet evolving circumstances. The Administration stated that the funds would have been allocated in close consultation with Congress, but suggested that the funds could have been used for humanitarian relief, contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities, or bilateral loan forgiveness, among other possibilities, depending on the circumstances.\nSome Members of Congress expressed concerns about the proposed MENA IF, which some believe would have given the Administration too much discretion and Congress too little opportunity for oversight. The House committee bill provided no funding for a new account, but would have allocated $175 million within the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account and $25 million in the Foreign Military Finance account for \"Middle East Response,\" including the funding of MEPI and OMEP and no less than $50 million for Jordan, leaving $75 million unallocated and \"flexible.\" In sharp contrast, the Senate committee report included $1 billion for MENA IF—about 30% more than the $770 million requested. The bill would have increased MEPI funding to $70.0 million.", "As a result of their strategic significance in the so-called Global War on Terror, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, referred to by the Administration as the \"frontline states,\" consistently have been top U.S. aid recipients over the past decade. For FY2013, the Administration requested $6.8 billion (including OCO), or about 19% of the foreign operations budget, for aid to these three countries.", "For FY2013, the Administration sought $2.1 billion in foreign operations funds for Iraq, of which the great majority, $1.8 billion, was designated as OCO. This was 22% more than the FY2012 enacted level. The department's FY2013 request for Iraq included $1 billion for the Police Development Program (PDP), the State Department's largest single program in Iraq. The Administration stated that the funding reflected the transition to full State Department authority of the PDP, which was described in State's budget justification as the cornerstone of U.S. security engagement and assistance in Iraq. In the spring of 2012, the PDP came under scrutiny when news reports suggested that the program was being reduced significantly and might be abandoned altogether. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad forcefully rejected this notion in a statement calling the program a \"vital part of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship and an effective means of standing by our Iraqi friends.\" Still, doubts remain among some foreign policy observers regarding the program's ultimate efficacy in the face of numerous obstacles including security challenges and Iraqi indifference.\nThe House legislation did not provide specific funds for Iraq, but expressed support for the PDP while requiring the Administration to report on revised personnel, scope, and costs of the program to reflect a review conducted earlier this year. The House report ( H.Rept. 112-494 ) stated that appropriations provided within the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program would continue funding the PDP program. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided $635 million in foreign operations funds for Iraq, but did not include funding for the PDP, citing its largely unsuccessful implementation due to Iraqi disinterest and inadequate planning by the Department of State.", "For FY2013, the Administration requested $2.5 billion in foreign operations funds for Afghanistan, of which almost half, or $1.2 billion, was designated as OCO. This was 7.6% more than the FY2012 enacted level. According to the Administration, the increase reflected a surge in infrastructure programs and other investments in economic growth, as well as the ramping up of justice sector programs in anticipation of the transition of these programs from the Department of Defense to civilian management. The House legislation did not specify total funding for Afghanistan and specified that assistance to Afghanistan would be withheld until certification that adequate security is in place for civilian aid workers. The Senate bill included $1.8 billion in foreign operations funds for Afghanistan, asserting that less funding than requested would be needed as the Afghan government is taking control of more programs.", "The Administration's FY2013 budget requested $2.2 billion in foreign operations funds for Pakistan, including $800 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) designated as OCO. This was about 6% more than the FY2012 enacted level. According to the Administration, the request reflected a modest increase in civilian assistance focused on energy, economic growth, stabilization, education, and health, but remained well below the levels authorized in the Enhance Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. The House legislation did not specify an aid level for Pakistan, and prohibited all economic and security assistance if Pakistan is uncooperative in anti-terrorism and other efforts. The Senate bill included $842.3 million in foreign operations funds for Pakistan, including $50 million for the PCCF (reflecting the significant unobligated funds still in the pipeline, rather than lack of support for the activities funded) and continued existing aid restrictions. The Senate bill also included new conditions on aid to Pakistan, including withholding $33 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Pakistan until the Secretary of State certifies that Dr. Shakil Afridi is released from prison and cleared of all charges related to providing assistance to the United States in locating Osama bin Laden.", "", "The budget request included roughly $7.9 billion for the Administration's Global Health Initiative (GHI) through State-Foreign Operations appropriations, compared to the FY2012 enacted level of $8.2 billion. The proposed cut of approximately $300.0 million was the largest foreign operations account reduction requested, in dollar terms, and would have represented the end of a decade-long growth trend in global health funding. Compared to the FY2012-enacted amount, the request included decreases for each global health activity area, except for a 1.2% increase in funding for international family planning and reproductive health and a 57% increase in funding ($1.7 billion) for the Global Fund to Fight HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). The most significant proposed reductions were for bilateral HIV/AIDS activities. The Administration asserted that current goals could be attained at the lower funding level as a result of program efficiencies and reduced drug costs.\nBoth House and Senate would have provided more than the request. The House legislation provided $8 billion for global health, slightly more than the request, which included $1.3 billion for a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. The Senate proposed $8.5 billion for the GHI, 8% more than was requested, including $1.7 billion for the Global Fund, and 4% more than the FY2012 level.", "Feed the Future (FtF), the Obama Administration's food security initiative announced in 2010, continues to be a priority for the Administration. The FY2013 request was for $1.1 billion in Foreign Operations funds for related programs. FtF is the outgrowth of a pledge made by the President at a G-8 summit in 2009 to provide at least $3.5 billion over three years (FY2010-FY2012) to address root causes of global hunger. The initiative also emphasizes the benefits of working multilaterally and in partnership with other stakeholders to leverage resources. The FY2013 request included $134 million for the multi-donor Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), managed by the World Bank.\nThe House proposal for FY2013 included language supporting the goals of FtF, but did not specify a funding level, with the exception of $99.8 million allocated for GAFSP. The Senate proposal recommended that $1.2 billion in assistance from all accounts in the act be made available for agricultural and food security, including $200 million specifically appropriated for GAFSP.", "The FY2013 request for programs supporting the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) was $770 million, a 1% increase from the $760.9 million enacted estimate for FY2012. Funds for GCCI activities flow through a number of appropriations accounts, including ESF, DA, IO&P, and several multilateral funds. The initiative supports activities relating to climate change with an emphasis on adaptation, deployment of clean energy technologies, and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through sustainable landscapes. A significant portion of this climate change funding would be channeled through World Bank Trust Funds, which the Administration promotes as a cost effective approach, claiming that every dollar of U.S. contribution to these funds leverages four to five dollars from other donor countries and 6 to 10 times that amount from other sources.\nThe House and Senate took notably different positions on GCCI in their FY2013 proposals. The House legislation did not mention the GCCI and recommended zero funding for the Clean Technology Fund and Strategic Climate Fund, while providing just half of the requested funds for the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The Senate committee chose not to provide a minimum funding level for climate change programs as a whole, but recommended that $111 million be spent on Sustainable Landscapes, a pillar of the GCCI. The Senate also indicated strong support for the multilateral climate change funds, providing $139.4 million for the GEF, $100.0 million for the Strategic Climate Fund, and $300.0 million for the Clean Technology Fund—exceeding the Administration's request for each account.", "The Administration requested $643 million for family planning and reproductive health activities in FY2013. These activities have generated contentious debate in Congress for over three decades, primarily over policy rather than funding concerns, resulting in frequent clarification and modification of family planning laws and policies. Recent congressional debate centers around two key issues: (1) implementation of the \"Mexico City policy\" and (2) U.S. funding of the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA). The Mexico City policy, issued by President Reagan in 1984, required foreign NGOs receiving USAID family planning assistance to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, even if such activities were undertaken with non-U.S. funds. The policy has been rescinded and reissued by past and current Administrations. It was most recently rescinded by President Obama in January 2009. The proposed FY2013 House legislation included language that would codify the Mexico City Policy. The Senate bill did not include such language.\nPrevious Administrations have also suspended grants to UNFPA due to evidence of coercive family planning practices in China, citing violations of the \"Kemp-Kasten\" amendment, which bans U.S. assistance to organizations that support or participate in the management of coercive family planning programs. Past and current Administrations have disagreed as to whether UNFPA engages in such activities. The George W. Bush Administration suspended U.S. contributions to UNFPA from FY2002 to FY2008 following a State Department investigation of family planning programs in China. President Obama resumed U.S. contributions to the organization in 2009, and requested $39 million for UNFPA for FY2013. The proposed FY2013 House legislation included $461 million for family planning and reproductive health activities and prohibited funding for UNFPA, while the Senate legislation included $700 million for family planning and reproductive health, including $44.5 million for UNFPA. Both the House and Senate bills included the Kemp-Kasten amendment.", "The Administration proposed that the AEECA account, a remnant of the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 and the Freedom Support Act of 1992, be dissolved in FY2013 to reflect the end of an era of special focus on former Soviet and Eastern bloc states transitioning to democracy and free market economies. While the request included $420.9 million in funding for programs currently funded through AEECA, an 18% cut from FY2012 funding of $513.9 million, funding for the programs that had been under AEECA would have come from ESF, GHP, and INCLE accounts in FY2013 and beyond. The House legislation adopted this approach, merging AEECA funds with ESF, GHP, and INCLE, while stating that the change is not intended to signal diminished support for the region or for the role of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. The Senate proposal also included a provision that funds from ESF and other accounts may be used to provide assistance to countries that are eligible for AEECA assistance. Neither House nor Senate proposals provide a minimum funding level for AEECA-eligible countries.", "U.S. national security, trade promotion, and humanitarian interests are rationales for most international affairs activities. During the Cold War, foreign aid and diplomatic programs had a primarily anti-communist focus, while concurrently pursuing other U.S. policy interests, such as promoting economic development, advancing U.S. trade, expanding access to basic education and health care, promoting human rights, and protecting the environment. After the early 1990s, with the Cold War ended, distinct policy objectives—including stopping nuclear weapons proliferation, curbing the production and trafficking of illegal drugs, expanding peace efforts in the Middle East, achieving regional stability, protecting religious freedom, and countering trafficking in persons—replaced the Cold War-influenced foreign policy objectives.\nA defining change in focus came following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Since then, many U.S. foreign aid and diplomatic programs have emphasized national security objectives, frequently cast in terms of contributing to efforts to counter terrorism. In 2002, President Bush released a National Security Strategy that for the first time established global development as the third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy. Development was again underscored in the Administration's 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategy.\nAlso in 2002, foreign assistance budget justifications began to highlight the war on terrorism as the top foreign aid priority, emphasizing U.S. assistance to 28 \"front-line\" states—countries that cooperated with the United States in the war on terrorism or faced terrorist threats themselves. Large reconstruction programs in Afghanistan and Iraq began to dominate the foreign aid budget and exemplified the emphasis on using foreign aid as a tool of national security. State Department efforts focused extensively on diplomatic security and finding more effective ways of presenting American views and culture through public diplomacy, particularly in Muslim communities. At the same time, the Bush Administration vastly increased aid to combat HIV/AIDS globally, with the creation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and explored a new approach to development assistance with creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which supports the development strategies of countries that have demonstrated good governance.\nThe Obama Administration has carried forward many Bush foreign aid initiatives, including the MCC, massive global health funding (though the Obama Administration's Global Health Initiative is broader in scope than PEPFAR), and robust assistance to the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Funding for these, rather than being in supplemental appropriations requests, however, has been requested within Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in regular appropriations bills.\nThe Obama Administration completed the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) in the fall of 2010. Within that context, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was named the leading government agency for development assistance. The QDDR also identified several reforms for the Department of State that have been implemented, including establishment of the Bureau of Energy and elevating the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction to the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.", "In its FY2012 budget proposals, the Department of State proposed a significant change in how funding for the \"front line states\" of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is viewed in budgetary terms. It requested that the use of OCO funds, through which war-related Defense appropriations had flowed for years, be extended to include \"extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in the front line states of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.\" Congress not only adopted the OCO designation in the FY2012 State-Foreign Operations appropriations legislation, but expanded it to include funding for additional accounts and countries.\nThe OCO designation gained increased significance in August 2011 with enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), as previously discussed, specifying that funds designated as OCO do not count toward the budget caps established by the act. OCO designation makes it possible to keep war-related funding from crowding out core international affairs activities within the budget allocation. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recently determined, however, that OCO funds are not exempt from the BCA automatic across-the-board reductions that are to occur January 2, 2013.\nThe OCO approach is reminiscent of the use of supplemental international affairs appropriations for much of the past decade. Significant emergency supplemental funds for foreign operations were appropriated in FY2002-FY2010 for activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and were not counted toward subcommittee budget allocations. (See Figure 2 below.) The Obama Administration criticized this practice, asserting that after several years such activities should no longer be considered emergencies, and pledged to request funds for these activities through the regular budget process starting in FY2010. This resulted in a sharp increase in base funding in FY2010, yet supplemental international affairs funds were still requested and enacted for that year, largely in response to the earthquake in Haiti, but also for activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. The FY2011 funding cycle was the only one in the last decade in which all international affairs funding was appropriated as part of the base budget, before the OCO approach was adopted for FY2012. Unlike supplementals that often have been submitted to Congress separate from regular funding requests, OCO allows all the funding to be considered simultaneously in the regular appropriations process.\nFor FY2013, the Administration again used this approach, requesting that $8.24 billion, or about 15% of the international affairs request, be designated as OCO. This amount was 5% less than was requested for OCO in FY2012, and about 26% less than the $11.2 billion that Congress enacted for that year. The House legislation designated $8.3 billion as OCO, similar to the Administration request, but designated proportionately more of the funds within foreign operations accounts and less within State operations accounts. The Senate bill designated $2.3 billion as OCO, or 72% less than requested, largely because it provided no funding for the Iraq Police Development program, as mentioned above, and would fund disaster assistance and migration and refugee assistance accounts entirely through the base budget.", "Over the past decade, State Department-Foreign Operations funding generally trended upward until 2011, with the exception of a spike in FY2004 that reflected large reconstruction funds for Iraq and Afghanistan. This changed in FY2011 when Congress significantly reduced foreign affairs spending to help meet deficit reduction goals. The FY2012 estimate and FY2013 request in current dollars leveled off largely due to congressional efforts to reduce deficit spending, and after adjusting for inflation, both in constant dollars were below the FY2009 overall funding level. Table 2 and Figure 3 below show State-Foreign Operations appropriations for the past decade in both current and constant dollars.\nTable 3 and Figure 4 show appropriations for the State Department and related agencies over the past decade in both current and constant dollars. Note that while there was a spike in foreign aid in 2004, there was only a slight increase in State Department funding that year as diplomacy funding lagged. In recent years, however, the State Department and related agencies funding trends upward at a steeper rate than the overall foreign affairs spending, reflecting an interest by both the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations to increase human resource capacity at the Department of State.\nTable 4 and Figure 5 show appropriations for the Foreign Operations (foreign aid) portion of the foreign affairs budget over the past decade in both current and constant dollars. Because Foreign Operations typically makes up about two-thirds of the State-Foreign Operations appropriations, it shows a similar trend as the overall State-Foreign Operations budget. Unlike the State Department trend line, which continues upward in FY2012 and FY2013, foreign aid funding levels off in those years.", "Prior to 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel and Egypt typically received the largest amounts of U.S. foreign aid every year since the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978. The reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan moved those countries into the top five, though assistance to Iraq has declined significantly in recent years with the completion of many reconstruction activities. Meanwhile, a combination of security assistance and economic aid designed to limit the appeal of extremist organizations has moved Pakistan up the list in recent years. Funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan includes temporary OCO appropriations.\nThe top five recipient countries in the FY2013 request were the same as the top five aid recipients of the allocated FY2012 funds. Israel topped the list at $3,100 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Afghanistan ranked second, with $2,505 million requested, of which $1,237.9 million was designated as OCO funds. Nearly three-quarters of aid requested for Afghanistan was within ESF. Pakistan ranked third at $2,228 million, including $800 million for PCCF and $928 million within ESF. Iraq moved up from sixth in FY2010 to fourth in FY2012 and in the FY2013 request. Of the $2,045 million for Iraq, $1,750 million was OCO money. (See Table 5 above.)", "As shown in Figure 6 , under the FY2013 budget request, aid to Africa would have declined by 10% from the current level to $6.4 billion; U.S. aid to the Near East would have increased by 12% to $9.0 billion, largely due to support for the Arab Spring; and aid to South Central Asia would have increased by 6% to $5.3 billion. Aid to Africa primarily supports HIV/AIDS and other health-related programs while 88% of the aid to South Central Asia was requested, largely for war-related costs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Near East region request continued to be dominated by assistance to Israel ($3.1 billion), Iraq ($2.0 billion), Egypt ($1.6 billion), and Jordan ($0.7 billion). The Western Hemisphere's projected relative decline in FY2013 was attributable to a reduction in funding of ESF and INCLE for Colombia. Europe and Eurasia's 14% decline was largely due to progress made by many countries in the region and other more pressing global priorities. Aid to East Asia and Pacific remained relatively low and consistent with past years' levels.", "Over the years, Congress has expressed interest in various discrete aid sectors, such as education, building trade capacity, maternal and child health, and biodiversity, that are funded across multiple accounts and/or agencies. Administrations have begun presenting their respective budget requests with a section showing what portion of the request would address some of these \"key interest areas.\" The Administration did not provide allocation data, limiting comparisons to year-to-year requested funds rather than comparing requested funds to previous enacted levels. Comparing past and present requested levels do provide an indication of the Administration's interests and priorities, but not those of congressional appropriators.\nTable 6 compares the FY2012 and FY2013 budget requests for key interest areas identified by the Administration. Out of 23 sectors listed, the Administration's FY2013 request was less than the FY2012 request for all except five. Perhaps surprisingly, two of the Administration's major initiatives—Food Security and Global Climate Change―showed declines in the FY2013 request . Other sectors with reduced funding requests included Sustainable Landscapes (helping manage forests and ecosystems to reduce greenhouse effects), Neglected Tropical Diseases, Nutrition, Maternal and Child Health, Higher Education, Clean Energy, and Basic Education. The Administration emphasized increased funding for two focus areas that were new in FY2012: Gender Funding (up by 330% over last year's request) and Science, Technology, and Innovation (up 85% over last year's request).\nAppendix A. Structure of State-Foreign Operations Appropriations\nAppendix B. Abbreviations\nAppendix C. State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies Appropriations\nAppendix D. International Affairs (150) Budget Account" ], "depth": [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 ], "alignment": [ "h0_title h1_title", "h1_full", "h0_full h1_full", "h0_title", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_title", "h0_full", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "h0_full", "", "h1_title", "h1_full", "", "", "", "" ] }	{ "question": [ "How did the House and Senate actions compare to each other?", "How did the House and Senate bills differ?", "What else distinguished the two bills?", "How did the bills differ on the topic of family planning?", "How did Congress address FY2013 appropriations bills?", "What did Congress do in the interim?", "How does this legislation fund State-Foreign Operations?", "Why did the legislation include some anomalies?", "Why might actual funding levels under this legislation be reduced?" ], "summary": [ "Early action by the House and Senate appropriators demonstrated differing priorities and funding levels.", "The House Appropriations Committee-approved State-Foreign Operations FY2013 funding bill (H.R. 5857/H.Rept. 112-494) would have provided a total of $48.5 billion (including $8.3 billion in OCO and $160 million in rescissions), while the Senate committee bill (S. 3241/S.Rept. 112-172) would have provided a total of $52.3 billion (including $2.3 billion in OCO).", "Both House and Senate committees provided more than requested for GHP, but differed significantly on funding MENA IF—the House committee provided no funding for it, and the Senate committee recommended $1 billion.", "The House bill provided $461 million for international family planning and reproductive health activities, prohibited funding for UNFPA, and included a \"Mexico City Policy\" provision prohibiting funding for organizations that perform or promote abortions. In contrast, the Senate bill included $700 million for international family planning, including $44.5 million for UNFPA, and did not include \"Mexico City Policy\" language.", "Congress delayed floor consideration of FY2013 appropriations bills until after the start of the new fiscal year and the November 2012 elections, instead enacting a six-month stopgap funding measure that expired in March 2013 (P.L. 112-175).", "Before that measure expired, Congress approved new legislation on March 21, signed by the President on March 26, 2013 (P.L. 113-6), to fund federal programs through the end of FY2013.", "Under P.L. 113-6, State-Foreign Operations accounts are funded through a continuing resolution at the same level as in FY2012, though several anomalies were specified in the legislation.", "For example, funding for Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance was increased significantly and offset largely by a rescission in unobligated Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds, while the International Disaster and Famine Assistance account received OCO funding, which was not in the FY2012 appropriation.", "While this report lists FY2013-enacted account level estimates in Appendix C, these funds are subject to the budget sequestration process that is currently in effect, which may significantly reduce the actual funding levels that are made available to agencies." ], "parent_pair_index": [ -1, 0, 0, 2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 1 ], "summary_paragraph_index": [ 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 ] }

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