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Evaluation datasets 28

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947", "parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue", "sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana’s tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336", "parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed", "sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana’s tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336", "parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed", "sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana’s tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780", "parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue", "sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana’s tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720", "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "251 S.E.2d 165, 167", "parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720", "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "251 S.E.2d 165, 167", "parenthetical": "defendant called the arresting officer a \"son of a bitch,\" \"mother fucker,\" \"pig,\" \"motherfucking pig\" and a \"bastard.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720", "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54", "parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720", "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54", "parenthetical": "defendant called the officer a \"goddamned liar\" and told the officers at the scene to \"fuck off.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720", "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "425 S.E.2d 371, 371", "parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "425 S.E.2d 371, 371", "parenthetical": "defendant \"continually kept getting up in [the officer's] face and cussing him,\" including saying he was \"not going to any goddamn jail\" and \"not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "499 S.E.2d 717, 720", "parenthetical": "upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a \"no-good son of a bitch\" and threatened to \"kick [his] ass.\"", "sentence": "Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1978) (defendant called the arresting officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “motherfucking pig” and a “bastard.”); Evans v. State, 188 Ga.App. 347, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53-54 (1988) (defendant called the officer a “goddamned liar” and told the officers at the scene to “fuck off.”); Person v. State, 206 Ga.App. 324, 425 S.E.2d 371, 371 (1992) (defendant “continually kept getting up in [the officer’s] face and cussing him,” including saying he was “not going to any goddamn jail” and “not wearing any mother-fucking handcuffs.”) (alterations omitted); see also Anderson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 807, 499 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998) (upholding a conviction under the current disorderly conduct statute when an individual called an officer a “no-good son of a bitch” and threatened to “kick [his] ass.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "734 F.2d 463, 467", "parenthetical": "applying the state rate under former SS 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "observing that \"[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,\" but noting that the parties had not raised the issue", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "757 F.2d 734, 741-43", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act's effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "734 F.2d 463, 467", "parenthetical": "applying the state rate under former SS 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "observing that \"[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,\" but noting that the parties had not raised the issue", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "746 F.2d 168, 174-76", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944", "parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "734 F.2d 463, 467", "parenthetical": "applying the state rate under former SS 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "observing that \"[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,\" but noting that the parties had not raised the issue", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944", "parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944", "parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17", "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "728 F.2d 943, 944", "parenthetical": "rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment", "sentence": "See Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a September 1981 judgment against the United States for interest accruing after the act’s effective date); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 746 F.2d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a June 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former § 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that “[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect,” but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the FCIA does not apply to a July 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 553 F.Supp. 114, 116-17 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1982) (same holding for a July 1979 judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "143 F.3d 105, 114-15", "parenthetical": "finding allegations that a communications took place insufficient to show conspiracy, noting that \"the non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation\"", "sentence": "See Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir.1998) (finding allegations that a communications took place insufficient to show conspiracy, noting that “the non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation”) (citations omitted); see also Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir.2011) (upholding dismissal of complaint that contained only “conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights” noting it “fail[ed] to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants”); Carrillos v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, 87 F.Supp.3d 357, 371, 2015 WL 728244, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[T]he summoning of police officers or the provision of information to police officers, even if that information is false or results in the officers taking affirmative action, is not sufficient to constitute joint action with state actors for purposes of Section 1983.” (citing Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir.1999)))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "642 F.3d 364, 369", "parenthetical": "upholding dismissal of complaint that contained only \"conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights\" noting it \"fail[ed] to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants\"", "sentence": "See Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir.1998) (finding allegations that a communications took place insufficient to show conspiracy, noting that “the non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation”) (citations omitted); see also Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir.2011) (upholding dismissal of complaint that contained only “conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights” noting it “fail[ed] to plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants”); Carrillos v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, 87 F.Supp.3d 357, 371, 2015 WL 728244, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[T]he summoning of police officers or the provision of information to police officers, even if that information is false or results in the officers taking affirmative action, is not sufficient to constitute joint action with state actors for purposes of Section 1983.” (citing Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir.1999)))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "201 Ind. 667, 676", "parenthetical": "the Commission must \"determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a 'practical construction' \"", "sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1994) (“nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature” as ascertained from “the plain and obvious meaning” of the words of the statute); see also In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 676, 171 N.E. 65, 68 (1930) (the Commission must “determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a ‘practical construction’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "644 N.E.2d 870, 872", "parenthetical": "\"nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature\" as ascertained from \"the plain and obvious meaning\" of the words of the statute", "sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1994) (“nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature” as ascertained from “the plain and obvious meaning” of the words of the statute); see also In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 676, 171 N.E. 65, 68 (1930) (the Commission must “determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a ‘practical construction’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "644 N.E.2d 870, 872", "parenthetical": "\"nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature\" as ascertained from \"the plain and obvious meaning\" of the words of the statute", "sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1994) (“nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature” as ascertained from “the plain and obvious meaning” of the words of the statute); see also In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 676, 171 N.E. 65, 68 (1930) (the Commission must “determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a ‘practical construction’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "171 N.E. 65, 68", "parenthetical": "the Commission must \"determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a 'practical construction' \"", "sentence": "See Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind.1998); Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1994) (“nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature” as ascertained from “the plain and obvious meaning” of the words of the statute); see also In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 676, 171 N.E. 65, 68 (1930) (the Commission must “determine the question of its jurisdiction ... by giving [the statutes] what is known as a ‘practical construction’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "761 F.2d 1459, 1465", "parenthetical": "recognizing, that \"failure to hold a hearing constitutes ah abuse of discretion only where there is evidence that the jury was subjected to influence by outside sources.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1465 (11th Cir.1985) (recognizing, that “failure to hold a hearing constitutes ah abuse of discretion only where there is evidence that the jury was subjected to influence by outside sources.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "733 F.2d 842, 851", "parenthetical": "recognizing that trial court is obligated to conduct evidentiary hearing only when defendant makes \"a colorable showing of extrinsic influence.... \"", "sentence": "Cf. United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 851 (11th Cir.1984) (recognizing that trial court is obligated to conduct evidentiary hearing only when defendant makes “a colorable showing of extrinsic influence.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "846 F.2d 1148, 1150-51", "parenthetical": "in medical malpractice action, prejudicial error occurred when district court read jury a misleading dictionary definition of \"differentiated\" in response to its question regarding the meaning of \"poorly differentiated tumor\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir.1987) (the Ninth Circuit found prejudicial error when a juror consulted a dictionary and considered an incomplete definition of “malice”); cf. Harold v. Corunn, 846 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (8th Cir.1988) (in medical malpractice action, prejudicial error occurred when district court read jury a misleading dictionary definition of “differentiated” in response to its question regarding the meaning of “poorly differentiated tumor”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "812 F.2d 499, 505", "parenthetical": "the Ninth Circuit found prejudicial error when a juror consulted a dictionary and considered an incomplete definition of \"malice\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir.1987) (the Ninth Circuit found prejudicial error when a juror consulted a dictionary and considered an incomplete definition of “malice”); cf. Harold v. Corunn, 846 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (8th Cir.1988) (in medical malpractice action, prejudicial error occurred when district court read jury a misleading dictionary definition of “differentiated” in response to its question regarding the meaning of “poorly differentiated tumor”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "466 U.S. 697, 697", "parenthetical": "\"If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.\"", "sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); see also Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong); Rodriguez v. Portuondo, No. 01-CV-0547, 2006 WL 2168314, at *7 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "124 F.3d 73, 80", "parenthetical": "declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong", "sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); see also Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong); Rodriguez v. Portuondo, No. 01-CV-0547, 2006 WL 2168314, at *7 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "124 F.3d 73, 80", "parenthetical": "declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong", "sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); see also Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong); Rodriguez v. Portuondo, No. 01-CV-0547, 2006 WL 2168314, at *7 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.\"", "sentence": "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“If it is easier to dispose of an effectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); see also Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to address the first prong of Strickland on the ground that the defendant could not satisfy the prejudice prong); Rodriguez v. Portuondo, No. 01-CV-0547, 2006 WL 2168314, at *7 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "28 F.3d 259, 266", "parenthetical": "recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under Rule 11", "sentence": "See Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 128 (recognizing district court’s wide range of discretion in setting amount of Rule 11 sanctions); see also Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole-CNCA, N.Y. Branch v. Valcorp, Inc., 28 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under Rule 11)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "821 F.2d 128, 128", "parenthetical": "recognizing district court's wide range of discretion in setting amount of Rule 11 sanctions", "sentence": "See Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 128 (recognizing district court’s wide range of discretion in setting amount of Rule 11 sanctions); see also Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole-CNCA, N.Y. Branch v. Valcorp, Inc., 28 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under Rule 11)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "565 F.2d 1364, 1372", "parenthetical": "affirming post-judgment certification where there was a lack of prejudice", "sentence": "See, e.g., Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1976) (approving simultaneous entry of judgment and class certification); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 697 (7th Cir.1975) (stating that \"in some cases the final certification need not be made until the moment the merits are decided”); see also Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 788-90 (10th Cir.1980) (allowing post-judgment class certification under Rule 23(b)(2)); Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1301 (8th Cir.l979)(same); Johnson v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111, 1125 n. 23 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1372 (6th Cir.1977) (affirming post-judgment certification where there was a lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "523 F.2d 689, 697", "parenthetical": "stating that \"in some cases the final certification need not be made until the moment the merits are decided\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1976) (approving simultaneous entry of judgment and class certification); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 697 (7th Cir.1975) (stating that \"in some cases the final certification need not be made until the moment the merits are decided”); see also Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 788-90 (10th Cir.1980) (allowing post-judgment class certification under Rule 23(b)(2)); Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1301 (8th Cir.l979)(same); Johnson v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111, 1125 n. 23 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1372 (6th Cir.1977) (affirming post-judgment certification where there was a lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "155 F.3d 1329, 1332", "parenthetical": "hold-ing that \"[although printing does not require licensing or formal education, it is a unique technical skill that clearly requires special training\"", "sentence": "United States v. Foster, 155 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998)(hold-ing that “[although printing does not require licensing or formal education, it is a unique technical skill that clearly requires special training”); see also United States v. Malgoza, 2 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that “[although not every instance of radio operation requires skills not possessed by members of the general public, it is possible to develop expertise in that field that rises to the level of a-special skill”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2 F.3d 1107, 1111", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[although not every instance of radio operation requires skills not possessed by members of the general public, it is possible to develop expertise in that field that rises to the level of a-special skill\"", "sentence": "United States v. Foster, 155 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998)(hold-ing that “[although printing does not require licensing or formal education, it is a unique technical skill that clearly requires special training”); see also United States v. Malgoza, 2 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that “[although not every instance of radio operation requires skills not possessed by members of the general public, it is possible to develop expertise in that field that rises to the level of a-special skill”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "364 F.3d 1065, 1065", "parenthetical": "court noted that' in certain cases, \"inquiry] into workers' immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices\"", "sentence": "See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (discovery of immigration status denied because employer “had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability”). A reasonable jury could thus consider Ortiz’s suspicions (formed around December 2011) that Lavalle had provided false documentation to the Hotel, his suspicion that she was “most likely”, using a false social security number, and his plan to present that information at the ADU hearing to arrive at the reasonable inference that the matter was being raised for the first time in that' setting to imply that the Hotel could use the information to inflict some adverse action—as was ultimately done in Contreras, 103 F.Supp.2d at 1185; see also Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065 (court noted that' in certain cases, “inquiry] into workers’ immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "364 F.3d 1057, 1074", "parenthetical": "discovery of immigration status denied because employer \"had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability\"", "sentence": "See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (discovery of immigration status denied because employer “had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability”). A reasonable jury could thus consider Ortiz’s suspicions (formed around December 2011) that Lavalle had provided false documentation to the Hotel, his suspicion that she was “most likely”, using a false social security number, and his plan to present that information at the ADU hearing to arrive at the reasonable inference that the matter was being raised for the first time in that' setting to imply that the Hotel could use the information to inflict some adverse action—as was ultimately done in Contreras, 103 F.Supp.2d at 1185; see also Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065 (court noted that' in certain cases, “inquiry] into workers’ immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "103 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1185", "parenthetical": "discovery of immigration status denied because employer \"had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability\"", "sentence": "See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (discovery of immigration status denied because employer “had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability”). A reasonable jury could thus consider Ortiz’s suspicions (formed around December 2011) that Lavalle had provided false documentation to the Hotel, his suspicion that she was “most likely”, using a false social security number, and his plan to present that information at the ADU hearing to arrive at the reasonable inference that the matter was being raised for the first time in that' setting to imply that the Hotel could use the information to inflict some adverse action—as was ultimately done in Contreras, 103 F.Supp.2d at 1185; see also Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065 (court noted that' in certain cases, “inquiry] into workers’ immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "364 F.3d 1065, 1065", "parenthetical": "court noted that' in certain cases, \"inquiry] into workers' immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices\"", "sentence": "See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (discovery of immigration status denied because employer “had the opportunity to examine [that status] upon hiring and that [status was] irrelevant to the question of liability”). A reasonable jury could thus consider Ortiz’s suspicions (formed around December 2011) that Lavalle had provided false documentation to the Hotel, his suspicion that she was “most likely”, using a false social security number, and his plan to present that information at the ADU hearing to arrive at the reasonable inference that the matter was being raised for the first time in that' setting to imply that the Hotel could use the information to inflict some adverse action—as was ultimately done in Contreras, 103 F.Supp.2d at 1185; see also Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065 (court noted that' in certain cases, “inquiry] into workers’ immigration status ... allow[s] [employers] to raise implicitly the threat' of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "292 Ga. 537, 540", "parenthetical": "admission of prior conviction to impeach witness was harmless, where witness \"made an unsolicited reference to his 'rap sheet' \" during his testimony and thus there was \"other evidence before the jury of [the witness's] criminal record\"", "sentence": "See also Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537, 540 (2) (739 SE2d 362) (2013) (admission of prior conviction to impeach witness was harmless, where witness “made an unsolicited reference to his ‘rap sheet’ ” during his testimony and thus there was “other evidence before the jury of [the witness’s] criminal record”); Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 522, 527 (5) (615 SE2d 532) (2005) (admission of defendant’s prior convictions was harmless in light of defendant’s admissions during his testimony before the State brought up his convictions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "292 Ga. App. 560, 563-564", "parenthetical": "trial counsel's failure to object to admission on cross-examination of sentencing sheets as part of prior convictions was not prejudicial, where defendant already admitted to the prior convictions on direct examination", "sentence": "See Daniel v. State, 292 Ga. App. 560, 563-564 (4) (a) (665 SE2d 696) (2008) (trial counsel’s failure to object to admission on cross-examination of sentencing sheets as part of prior convictions was not prejudicial, where defendant already admitted to the prior convictions on direct examination)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "279 Ga. 522, 527", "parenthetical": "admission of defendant's prior convictions was harmless in light of defendant's admissions during his testimony before the State brought up his convictions", "sentence": "See also Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537, 540 (2) (739 SE2d 362) (2013) (admission of prior conviction to impeach witness was harmless, where witness “made an unsolicited reference to his ‘rap sheet’ ” during his testimony and thus there was “other evidence before the jury of [the witness’s] criminal record”); Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 522, 527 (5) (615 SE2d 532) (2005) (admission of defendant’s prior convictions was harmless in light of defendant’s admissions during his testimony before the State brought up his convictions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "292 Ga. App. 560, 563-564", "parenthetical": "trial counsel's failure to object to admission on cross-examination of sentencing sheets as part of prior convictions was not prejudicial, where defendant already admitted to the prior convictions on direct examination", "sentence": "See Daniel v. State, 292 Ga. App. 560, 563-564 (4) (a) (665 SE2d 696) (2008) (trial counsel’s failure to object to admission on cross-examination of sentencing sheets as part of prior convictions was not prejudicial, where defendant already admitted to the prior convictions on direct examination)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575", "parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575", "parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424", "parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424", "parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782", "parenthetical": "striking a corporation's pleadings where they were signed by the corporation's president but not by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "dismissing a corporation's appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782", "parenthetical": "striking a corporation's pleadings where they were signed by the corporation's president but not by an attorney", "sentence": "See, e.g., Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F.Supp.2d 573, 575 (W.D.N.C.2001) (dismissing claims brought pro se on behalf of a corporation based on lack of licensed counsel), aff'd, 21 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir.2001); Carrico v. Village of Sugar Mountain, 114 F.Supp.2d 422, 424 (W.D.N.C.2000) (holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation), aff'd, 13 Fed.Appx. 79 (4th Cir.2001); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Serv. & Repair, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.N.C.2004) (striking a corporation’s pleadings where they were signed by the corporation’s president but not by an attorney); Gilley v. Shoffher, 345 F.Supp.2d 563, 566 (M.D.N.C.2004); see also Battle v. Kadosh, Inc., 238 F.3d 410 (unpublished), 2000 WL 1793066 (4th Cir.2000) (dismissing a corporation’s appeal because the notice of appeal was not signed by an attorney)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "118 F.3d 1344, 1350", "parenthetical": "RICO conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies is a crime of violence under Juvenile Delinquency Act", "sentence": "See United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1994) (RICO conviction will qualify as career offender predicate offense if the activities encompassed pose a serious potential risk of violence); see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.1997) (RICO conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies is a crime of violence under Juvenile Delinquency Act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "22 F.3d 15, 19", "parenthetical": "RICO conviction will qualify as career offender predicate offense if the activities encompassed pose a serious potential risk of violence", "sentence": "See United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1994) (RICO conviction will qualify as career offender predicate offense if the activities encompassed pose a serious potential risk of violence); see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.1997) (RICO conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies is a crime of violence under Juvenile Delinquency Act)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "874 F.2d 638, 642-43", "parenthetical": "finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state's excess payments", "sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract); United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.1993) (false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards); United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.1985) (false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program); but cf. United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 642-43 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state’s excess payments)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract", "sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract); United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.1993) (false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards); United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.1985) (false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program); but cf. United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 642-43 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state’s excess payments)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards", "sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract); United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.1993) (false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards); United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.1985) (false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program); but cf. United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 642-43 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state’s excess payments)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "874 F.2d 638, 642-43", "parenthetical": "finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state's excess payments", "sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract); United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.1993) (false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards); United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.1985) (false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program); but cf. United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 642-43 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state’s excess payments)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program", "sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract); United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.1993) (false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards); United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.1985) (false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program); but cf. United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 642-43 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state’s excess payments)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "874 F.2d 638, 642-43", "parenthetical": "finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state's excess payments", "sentence": "See United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923 (2d Cir.1993) (false statements submitted by federal prisoner to authorities of state prison in which he was held under contract); United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir.1993) (false statements to a state environmental agency with primary enforcement responsibility for federal water quality standards); United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.1985) (false statement to state labor department in connection with federally funded program); but cf. United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 642-43 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (finding no liability for false statements in support of unemployment claims, made to state agency whose administrative costs were federally supported, where federal monitor lacked power to modify payments on account of state’s excess payments)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "415 F.3d 1209, 1209-10", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he involvement of the police in executing the court-ordered search, without more, does not convert [the private defendants'] abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of SS 1983 liability,\" and \"[b]ecause [Yanaki and Moss] allege nothing more than 'private misuse' of state laws, their compliant fails to satisfy the first part of the color of law test\"", "sentence": "See Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding that “[t]he involvement of the police in executing the court-ordered search, without more, does not convert [the private defendants’] abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of § 1983 liability,” and “[b]ecause [Yanaki and Moss] allege nothing more than ‘private misuse’ of state laws, their compliant fails to satisfy the first part of the color of law test”); see also id. at 1211 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (“I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege concerted action between the private Defendants and the police in order to support a finding that the Defendants were acting ‘under color of state law.’ ”); Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 319 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.Utah 2004) (“Plaintiffs allege that [the private] Defendants’ use of state discovery rules to obtain an order from a state court judge permitting the search of their home and the seizure of Yanaki’s property satisfies the first part of the test for fair attribution [to the state for purposes of satisfying the requirement that the deprivation occur under color of state law].”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "319 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265", "parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs allege that [the private] Defendants' use of state discovery rules to obtain an order from a state court judge permitting the search of their home and the seizure of Yanaki's property satisfies the first part of the test for fair attribution [to the state for purposes of satisfying the requirement that the deprivation occur under color of state law].\"", "sentence": "See Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding that “[t]he involvement of the police in executing the court-ordered search, without more, does not convert [the private defendants’] abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of § 1983 liability,” and “[b]ecause [Yanaki and Moss] allege nothing more than ‘private misuse’ of state laws, their compliant fails to satisfy the first part of the color of law test”); see also id. at 1211 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (“I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege concerted action between the private Defendants and the police in order to support a finding that the Defendants were acting ‘under color of state law.’ ”); Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 319 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (D.Utah 2004) (“Plaintiffs allege that [the private] Defendants’ use of state discovery rules to obtain an order from a state court judge permitting the search of their home and the seizure of Yanaki’s property satisfies the first part of the test for fair attribution [to the state for purposes of satisfying the requirement that the deprivation occur under color of state law].”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "259 Ga. 663, 665", "parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860", "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "259 Ga. 663, 665", "parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860", "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "579 N.E.2d 452, 454", "parenthetical": "\"damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860", "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "579 N.E.2d 452, 454", "parenthetical": "\"damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "597 S.W.2d 141, 146", "parenthetical": "\"it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860", "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "597 S.W.2d 141, 146", "parenthetical": "\"it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained\"", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "312 Or. 17, 23", "parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860", "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "312 Or. 17, 23", "parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "242 Kan. 857, 860", "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defining \"physical impact\" as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia", "sentence": "See Gottshall, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (“Most jurisdictions have abandoned this test, but at least five States continue to adhere to it;” citing OBGYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 665, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989) (“there must have been actual bodily contact with plaintiff as a result of defendant’s conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie”); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (“damages for mental distress or emotional trauma may be recovered only when the distress is accompanied by and results from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery”); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky.1980) (“it is necessary that the damages for mental distress sought to be recovered be related to, and the direct and natural result of, the physical contact or injury sustained”); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 23, 816 P.2d 593 (1991) (no liability for emotional injury absent accompanying actual or threatened physical harm); but see Anderson v. Scheffler, 242 Kan. 857, 860, 752 P.2d 667 (1988) (defining “physical impact” as actual physical injury resulting from the emotional distress, beyond generalized physi cal symptoms such as headaches and insomnia))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional", "sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir.1977); Taylor v. Perini, 455 F.Supp. 1241, 1244-45 (N.D.Ohio 1978) (court order for adopting the specific criteria involved here)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "416 U.S. 413, 413", "parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons", "sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (7th Cir.1986) (upholding regulations which were “well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness” and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir.1983) (upholding regulations under Martinez)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "416 U.S. 413, 413", "parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons", "sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (7th Cir.1986) (upholding regulations which were “well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness” and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir.1983) (upholding regulations under Martinez)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional", "sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir.1977); Taylor v. Perini, 455 F.Supp. 1241, 1244-45 (N.D.Ohio 1978) (court order for adopting the specific criteria involved here)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional", "sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir.1977); Taylor v. Perini, 455 F.Supp. 1241, 1244-45 (N.D.Ohio 1978) (court order for adopting the specific criteria involved here)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1811, 1811", "parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons", "sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (7th Cir.1986) (upholding regulations which were “well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness” and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir.1983) (upholding regulations under Martinez)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1811, 1811", "parenthetical": "discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons", "sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (7th Cir.1986) (upholding regulations which were “well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness” and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir.1983) (upholding regulations under Martinez)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional", "sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir.1977); Taylor v. Perini, 455 F.Supp. 1241, 1244-45 (N.D.Ohio 1978) (court order for adopting the specific criteria involved here)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05", "parenthetical": "upholding regulations which were \"well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness\" and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance", "sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (7th Cir.1986) (upholding regulations which were “well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness” and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir.1983) (upholding regulations under Martinez)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional", "sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir.1977); Taylor v. Perini, 455 F.Supp. 1241, 1244-45 (N.D.Ohio 1978) (court order for adopting the specific criteria involved here)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05", "parenthetical": "upholding regulations which were \"well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness\" and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance", "sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 1811, 1812 n. 14 (discussing examples of justifiable censorship and quoting from Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (7th Cir.1986) (upholding regulations which were “well-tailored to minimize their intrusiveness” and which provided prison officials with adequate guidance); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir.1983) (upholding regulations under Martinez)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional", "sentence": "See also Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.Supp. 831 (D.Md.1975) (regulations which lacked specificity and were not narrowly tailored found unconstitutional), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir.1977); Taylor v. Perini, 455 F.Supp. 1241, 1244-45 (N.D.Ohio 1978) (court order for adopting the specific criteria involved here)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "341 S.C. 79, 85", "parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "307 S.C. 33, 37", "parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "341 S.C. 79, 85", "parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "413 S.E.2d 827, 829", "parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "307 S.C. 33, 37", "parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "533 S.E.2d 578, 581", "parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "413 S.E.2d 827, 829", "parenthetical": "holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation's capacity to sue but did not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "533 S.E.2d 578, 581", "parenthetical": "\"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\"", "sentence": "See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporation’s capacity to sue but did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "147 Idaho 694, 709-10", "parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"", "sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had “more than adequate time to prepare his defense”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "145 Idaho 183, 185-86", "parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185-86, 177 P.3d 397, 399-400 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State’s witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant’s claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "147 Idaho 694, 709-10", "parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"", "sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had “more than adequate time to prepare his defense”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "177 P.3d 397, 399-400", "parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185-86, 177 P.3d 397, 399-400 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State’s witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant’s claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "145 Idaho 183, 185-86", "parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185-86, 177 P.3d 397, 399-400 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State’s witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant’s claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "215 P.3d 414, 429-30", "parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"", "sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had “more than adequate time to prepare his defense”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "177 P.3d 397, 399-400", "parenthetical": "holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State's witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant's claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185-86, 177 P.3d 397, 399-400 (Ct.App.2008) (holding that reversal for late disclosure of a State’s witness requires trial prejudice, and defendant’s claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the State could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "215 P.3d 414, 429-30", "parenthetical": "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had \"more than adequate time to prepare his defense\"", "sentence": "See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-30 (2009) (holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend its indictment because he had “more than adequate time to prepare his defense”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "66 A.3d 794, 797-98", "parenthetical": "finding that the appellant's absence was voluntary where he ignored directions printed on his court papers and reported to the wrong location", "sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Akinsanmi, 55 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding that the appellant’s absence was voluntary where she was attending a research conference instead of court.and did not request a continuance); see also Commonwealth v. Dixon, 66 A.3d 794, 797-98 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding that the appellant’s absence was voluntary where he ignored directions printed on his court papers and reported to the wrong location)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "814 A.2d 253, 253", "parenthetical": "finding that the appellant may have shown good cause where, through no fault of his own, he missed a bus to court", "sentence": "See Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d at 253 (finding that the appellant may have shown good cause where, through no fault of his own, he missed a bus to court). Subsequent cases have further defined this term." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "66 A.3d 794, 797-98", "parenthetical": "finding that the appellant's absence was voluntary where he ignored directions printed on his court papers and reported to the wrong location", "sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Akinsanmi, 55 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding that the appellant’s absence was voluntary where she was attending a research conference instead of court.and did not request a continuance); see also Commonwealth v. Dixon, 66 A.3d 794, 797-98 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding that the appellant’s absence was voluntary where he ignored directions printed on his court papers and reported to the wrong location)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "55 A.3d 539, 541", "parenthetical": "finding that the appellant's absence was voluntary where she was attending a research conference instead of court.and did not request a continuance", "sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Akinsanmi, 55 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding that the appellant’s absence was voluntary where she was attending a research conference instead of court.and did not request a continuance); see also Commonwealth v. Dixon, 66 A.3d 794, 797-98 (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding that the appellant’s absence was voluntary where he ignored directions printed on his court papers and reported to the wrong location)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "16 F.3d 1021, 1025", "parenthetical": "holding, in the primary case on which Cuevas-Gaspar relied, imputation of a parent's residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would \"sever[] the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the United States for the better part of their lives....\"", "sentence": "See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (holding, in the primary case on which Cuevas-Gaspar relied, imputation of a parent’s residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would “sever[] the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the United States for the better part of their lives....”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "430 F.3d 1024, 1024", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions 'giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.' \"", "sentence": "See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (holding, in the primary case on which Cuevas-Gaspar relied, imputation of a parent’s residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would “sever[] the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the United States for the better part of their lives....”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "if notice is given within reasonable time, and insurer suffers no prejudice by the delay, coverage under claims-made policy exists under Michigan law", "sentence": "But see Sherlock v. Perry, 605 F.Supp. 1001 (E.D.Mich.1985) (if notice is given within reasonable time, and insurer suffers no prejudice by the delay, coverage under claims-made policy exists under Michigan law)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "allowing notice beyond the policy period would alter a basic term of the contract", "sentence": "City of Harrisburg, supra (claims made coverage exists under Pennsylvania law only when claim is timely reported); Zuck-erman, supra (extension of notice period in claims-made policy constitutes an unbar-gained-for expansion of coverage, gratis, resulting in substantially broader risk to insurer); Civic Associates, Inc. v. Security Insurance Co., 749 F.Supp. 1076 (D.Kan. 1990) (allowing notice beyond the policy period would alter a basic term of the contract)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "1995 WL 104113, *3", "parenthetical": "adverse employment actions include a negative change in employment status such as discharge, suspension, or demotion or disciplinary actions such as reprimand", "sentence": "Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.l995)(citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52, McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1994)); see Acevedo v. City of New York, No. 93 Civ. 3817(RPP), 1995 WL 104113, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.7, 1995)(adverse employment actions include a negative change in employment status such as discharge, suspension, or demotion or disciplinary actions such as reprimand); cf. Bieluch v. Sullivan, 999 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir.1993) (transfer to town fifteen miles from home allowed to constitute retaliation in support of First Amendment claim)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "999 F.2d 666, 669", "parenthetical": "transfer to town fifteen miles from home allowed to constitute retaliation in support of First Amendment claim", "sentence": "Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.l995)(citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52, McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1994)); see Acevedo v. City of New York, No. 93 Civ. 3817(RPP), 1995 WL 104113, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.7, 1995)(adverse employment actions include a negative change in employment status such as discharge, suspension, or demotion or disciplinary actions such as reprimand); cf. Bieluch v. Sullivan, 999 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir.1993) (transfer to town fifteen miles from home allowed to constitute retaliation in support of First Amendment claim)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "139 B.R. 412, 412", "parenthetical": "EPA's bar date extended to file claims for CERCLA response costs fairly within the contemplation of the parties at time of debtor's bankruptcy", "sentence": "Cf. In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 412 (EPA’s bar date extended to file claims for CERCLA response costs fairly within the contemplation of the parties at time of debtor’s bankruptcy)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "133 B.R. 653, 653", "parenthetical": "when governmental agency has not had actual knowledge of the potential claim in time to file claim in bankruptcy proceeding, potential CERCLA liability not' discharged", "sentence": "In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 167-68 (3d Cir.1991), (cleanup claims allowed where CERCLA enacted after consummation date) cert. denied, — U.S. — , 112 S.Ct. 1262, 117 L.Ed.2d 491 (1992); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co., 133 B.R. at 653 (when governmental agency has not had actual knowledge of the potential claim in time to file claim in bankruptcy proceeding, potential CERCLA liability not' discharged)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "867 F.Supp. 494, 495", "parenthetical": "recognizing that prisoner's former attorney had a significant relationship with the prisoner for purposes of next friend standing because attorney had acted on behalf of the prisoner in prior legal proceedings", "sentence": "See In re Cockrum, 867 F.Supp. 494, 495 (E.D.Texas 1994) (recognizing that prisoner’s former attorney had a significant relationship with the prisoner for purposes of next friend standing because attorney had acted on behalf of the prisoner in prior legal proceedings); but cf. Davis v. Austin, 492 F.Supp. 273, 275 (N.D.Ga.1980) (finding that neither ordained minister nor cousin of prisoner had standing to bring an action as next friend of the prisoner because of their lack of contact with the prisoner)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "492 F.Supp. 273, 275", "parenthetical": "finding that neither ordained minister nor cousin of prisoner had standing to bring an action as next friend of the prisoner because of their lack of contact with the prisoner", "sentence": "See In re Cockrum, 867 F.Supp. 494, 495 (E.D.Texas 1994) (recognizing that prisoner’s former attorney had a significant relationship with the prisoner for purposes of next friend standing because attorney had acted on behalf of the prisoner in prior legal proceedings); but cf. Davis v. Austin, 492 F.Supp. 273, 275 (N.D.Ga.1980) (finding that neither ordained minister nor cousin of prisoner had standing to bring an action as next friend of the prisoner because of their lack of contact with the prisoner)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "725 F.2d 56, 57", "parenthetical": "statement that person under suspicion may not be enough to constitute seizure", "sentence": "United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (consensual airport conversation became detention when officer told traveller that officers were there to stop flow of drugs through airport); United States v. Sadosky, 732 F.2d 1388, 1392 (8th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884, 105 S.Ct. 254, 83 L.Ed.2d 191 (1984); but see United States v. Morgan, 725 F.2d 56, 57 (7th Cir.1984) (statement that person under suspicion may not be enough to constitute seizure)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "873 F.2d 182, 184-85", "parenthetical": "consensual airport conversation became detention when officer told traveller that officers were there to stop flow of drugs through airport", "sentence": "United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (consensual airport conversation became detention when officer told traveller that officers were there to stop flow of drugs through airport); United States v. Sadosky, 732 F.2d 1388, 1392 (8th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884, 105 S.Ct. 254, 83 L.Ed.2d 191 (1984); but see United States v. Morgan, 725 F.2d 56, 57 (7th Cir.1984) (statement that person under suspicion may not be enough to constitute seizure)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "814 F.2d 1263, 1270", "parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465", "parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465", "parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465", "parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer's action is readily explained by employer's economic hardship or downturn in business", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "896 F.2d 1465, 1465", "parenthetical": "in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions", "sentence": "See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int’l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir.) (no adverse inference can be drawn in reduction-in-force case if we apply normal prima facie standards because the employer’s action is readily explained by employer’s economic hardship or downturn in business), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987); see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (in reduction-in-force ease proving the normal elements of the prima facie case is not enough because no evidence presented under such test that the workforce reductions were not the reason for the adverse employment actions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "782 F.3d 639, 643-44", "parenthetical": "holding that the government failed to prove the defendant's actions fell under the unlawful possession prong \"[bjecause the Government failed to present any evidence that [the defendant] knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to\" an individual falling under the narrow guidelines' definition of an individual in unlawful possession", "sentence": "See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the government failed to prove the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong “[bjecause the Government failed to present any evidence that [the defendant] knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to” an individual falling under the narrow guidelines’ definition of an individual in unlawful possession); United States v. Howard, 539 Fed.Appx. 904, 908 (10th Cir.2013) (holding that the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon); United States v. Richardson, 427 Fed.Appx. 522, 523-24 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful); United States v. Green, 405 Fed.Appx. 860, 862 (5th Cir.2010) (vacating the sentence in light of the government’s concession that there was no evidence that the individuals receiving the firearms “had a relevant criminal conviction or [were] under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the offense”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525", "parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"", "sentence": "But see United States v. Pepper, 747 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual “was not registered, making [the individual’s] possession of it necessarily unlawful”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "539 Fed.Appx. 904, 908", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon", "sentence": "See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the government failed to prove the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong “[bjecause the Government failed to present any evidence that [the defendant] knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to” an individual falling under the narrow guidelines’ definition of an individual in unlawful possession); United States v. Howard, 539 Fed.Appx. 904, 908 (10th Cir.2013) (holding that the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon); United States v. Richardson, 427 Fed.Appx. 522, 523-24 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful); United States v. Green, 405 Fed.Appx. 860, 862 (5th Cir.2010) (vacating the sentence in light of the government’s concession that there was no evidence that the individuals receiving the firearms “had a relevant criminal conviction or [were] under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the offense”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525", "parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"", "sentence": "But see United States v. Pepper, 747 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual “was not registered, making [the individual’s] possession of it necessarily unlawful”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525", "parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"", "sentence": "But see United States v. Pepper, 747 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual “was not registered, making [the individual’s] possession of it necessarily unlawful”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "427 Fed.Appx. 522, 523-24", "parenthetical": "holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful", "sentence": "See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the government failed to prove the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong “[bjecause the Government failed to present any evidence that [the defendant] knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to” an individual falling under the narrow guidelines’ definition of an individual in unlawful possession); United States v. Howard, 539 Fed.Appx. 904, 908 (10th Cir.2013) (holding that the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon); United States v. Richardson, 427 Fed.Appx. 522, 523-24 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful); United States v. Green, 405 Fed.Appx. 860, 862 (5th Cir.2010) (vacating the sentence in light of the government’s concession that there was no evidence that the individuals receiving the firearms “had a relevant criminal conviction or [were] under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the offense”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "405 Fed.Appx. 860, 862", "parenthetical": "vacating the sentence in light of the government's concession that there was no evidence that the individuals receiving the firearms \"had a relevant criminal conviction or [were] under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the offense\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the government failed to prove the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong “[bjecause the Government failed to present any evidence that [the defendant] knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to” an individual falling under the narrow guidelines’ definition of an individual in unlawful possession); United States v. Howard, 539 Fed.Appx. 904, 908 (10th Cir.2013) (holding that the defendant’s actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon); United States v. Richardson, 427 Fed.Appx. 522, 523-24 (7th Cir.2011) (holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful); United States v. Green, 405 Fed.Appx. 860, 862 (5th Cir.2010) (vacating the sentence in light of the government’s concession that there was no evidence that the individuals receiving the firearms “had a relevant criminal conviction or [were] under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the offense”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "747 F.3d 520, 525", "parenthetical": "holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual \"was not registered, making [the individual's] possession of it necessarily unlawful\"", "sentence": "But see United States v. Pepper, 747 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir.2014) (holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual “was not registered, making [the individual’s] possession of it necessarily unlawful”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "518 U.S. 604, 617", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.\"", "sentence": "See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "146 F.3d 571, 571", "parenthetical": "\"There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.\"", "sentence": "See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "146 F.3d 571, 571", "parenthetical": "\"There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.\"", "sentence": "See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.\"", "sentence": "See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "146 F.3d 571, 571", "parenthetical": "\"There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.\"", "sentence": "See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.\"", "sentence": "See Russell, 146 F.3d at 571 (“There is ... less of a danger of quid pro quo corruption, such as the sort that one might presume from large contributions given directly to candidates, when a contribution is given to a PAC that does not itself wield legislative power.”); cf. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 617, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (“[A]n independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seems less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor.”)." }