opinion
stringlengths 349
204k
| instruction
stringclasses 163
values | question
stringclasses 160
values | choices
sequencelengths 0
311
| answer
sequencelengths 1
1
| task
stringclasses 157
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FIELDS et al. v. SOUTH CAROLINA.
No. 399.
Decided March 18, 1963.
Jack Greenberg, Constance Baker Motley, Matthew J. Perry and Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr. for petitioners.
Daniel B. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina, Everett N. Brandon, Assistant Attorney General, and Julian S. Wolfe for respondent.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is vacated and the case is remanded for consideration in light of Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229.
Mr. Justice Clark dissents for the reasons expressed in his dissenting opinion in Edwards v. South Carolina, supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. | What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
47
] | sc_casesourcestate |
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, et al.
No. 81.
Argued January 29, 1958.
Decided June 30, 1958.
Dominick L. Manoli argued the causes for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jerome D. Fenton and Stephen Leonard. Solicitor General Rankin and Frederick U. Reel were also with them on the brief in No. 289.
David E. Feller argued the cause for the United Steelworkers of America, CIO, respondent in No. 81. With him on the brief was Arthur J. Goldberg.
Frank A. Constangy argued the cause for respondent in No. 289. With him on the brief were M. A. Prowell and Fred W. Elarbee, Jr.
Together with No. 289, National Labor Relations Board v. Avondale Mills, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two cases, argued in succession, are controlled by the same considerations and will be disposed of in a single opinion. In one case the National Labor Relations Board ruled that it was not an unfair labor practice for an employer to enforce against his employees a no-solicitation rule, in itself concededly valid, while the employer was himself engaged in anti-union solicitation in a context of separate unfair labor practices. This ruling was reversed by a Court of Appeals. In the second case the Board on the basis of similar facts, except that the employer’s anti-union solicitation by itself constituted a separate unfair labor practice, found the enforcement of the rule to have been an unfair labor practice, but another Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board’s order. We brought both cases here because of the importance of the question they present in the administration of the Taft-Hartley Act, and because of the apparent conflict in the decisions in the Courts of Appeals. 353 U. S. 921; 355 U. S. 811.
No. 81. — In April of 1953 the respondent Steelworkers instituted a campaign to organize the employees of respondent NuTone, Inc., a manufacturer of electrical devices. In the early stages of the campaign, supervisory personnel of the company interrogated employees and solicited reports concerning the organizational activities of other employees. Several employees were discharged; the Board later found that the discharges had been the result of their organizational activities. In June the company began to distribute, through its supervisory personnel, literature that, although not coercive, was clearly anti-union in tenor. In August, while continuing to distribute such material, the company announced its intention of enforcing its rule against employees’ posting signs or distributing literature on company property or soliciting or campaigning on company time. The rule, according to these posted announcements, applied to “all employees — whether they are for or against the union.” Later the same month a representation election was held, which the Steelworkers lost.
In a proceeding before the Board commenced at the instance of the Steelworkers, the company was charged with a number of violations of the Act alleged to have taken place both before and after the election, including the discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule. The Board found that the pre-election interrogation and solicitation by supervisory personnel and the discharge of employees were unfair labor practices; it also found that the company had, in violation of the Act, assisted and supported an employee organization formed after the election. However, the Board dismissed the allegation that the company had discriminatorily enforced its no-solicitation rule. 112 N. L. R. B. 1153. The Steelworkers sought review of this dismissal in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Board petitioned for enforcement of its order in the same court. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was an unfair labor practice for the company to prohibit the distribution of organizational literature on company property during non-working hours while the company was itself distributing anti-union literature ; and it directed that the Board’s order be modified accordingly and enforced as modified. 100 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 243 F. 2d 593.
No. 289. — In the fall of 1954 the Textile Workers conducted an organizational campaign at several of the plants of respondent Avondale Mills. A number of individual employees were called before supervisory personnel of the company, on the ground that they had been soliciting union membership, and informed that such solicitation was in violation of plant rules and would not be tolerated in the future. The rule had not been promulgated in written form, but there was evidence that it had been previously invoked in a non-organizational context. During this same period, both in these interviews concerning the rule and at the employees’ places of work, supervisory personnel interrogated employees concerning their organizational views and activities and solicited employees to withdraw their membership cards from the union. This conduct was in many cases accompanied by threats that the mill would close down or that various employee benefits would be lost if the mill should become organized. Subsequently three employees, each of whom had been informed of the no-solicitation rule, were laid off and eventually discharged for violating the rule.
As a result of charges filed with the Board by the Textile Workers, a complaint was brought against the company alleging that it had committed a number of unfair labor practices, including the discriminatory invocation of the no-solicitation rule and the discharge of employees for its violation. The Board found that the interrogation, solicitation and threatening of employees by the company’s supervisory personnel were unfair labor practices. Moreover, it found that resort to the no-solicitation rule and discharge of the three employees for its violation were discriminatory and therefore in violation of the Act; it further held that, even if the rule had not been invoked discriminatorily, the discharge of one of the employees had resulted solely from his organizational activities apart from any violation of the rule and was therefore an unfair labor practice. The Board ordered the cessation of these practices and the reinstatement of the discharged employees. 115 N. L. R. B. 840. Upon the Board’s petitioning for enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the company contested only the portions of the Board’s findings and order relating to the rule and the discharges. The court enforced the uncontested portions of the order but, finding insufficient evidence of discrimination in the application of the no-solicitation rule, denied enforcement to the portion of the order relating to the rule and to two of the discharges. As to the third discharge, the court agreed with the Board that it was the result of discrimination unrelated to a violation of the rule, and the court enforced the portion of the Board’s order directing the employee’s reinstatement. 242 F. 2d 669.
Employer rules prohibiting organizational solicitation are not in and of themselves violative of the Act, for they may duly serve production, order and discipline. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793; Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105. In neither of the cases before us did the party attacking the enforcement of the no-solicitation rule contest its validity. Nor is the claim made that an employer may not, under proper circumstances, engage in non-coercive anti-union solicitation; indeed, his right to do so is protected by the so-called “employer free speech” provision of § 8 (c) of the Act. Contrariwise, as both cases before us show, coercive anti-union solicitation and other similar conduct run afoul of the Act and constitute unfair labor practices irrespective of the bearing of such practices on enforcement of a no-solicitation rule. The very narrow and almost abstract question here derives from the claim that, when the employer himself engages in anti-union solicitation that if engaged in by employees would constitute a violation of the rule — particularly when his solicitation is coercive or accompanied by other unfair labor practices— his enforcement of an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule against the employees is itself an unfair labor practice. We are asked to rule that the coincidence of these circumstances necessarily violates the Act, regardless of the way in which the particular controversy arose or whether the employer’s conduct to any considerable degree created an imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication. For us to lay down such a rule of law would show indifference to the responsibilities imposed by the Act primarily on the Board to appraise carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases and in light of the Board’s special understanding of these industrial situations.
There is no indication in the record in either of these cases that the employees, or the union on their behalf, requested the employer, himself engaging in anti-union solicitation, to make an exception to the rule for pro-union solicitation. There is evidence in both cases that the employers had in the past made exceptions to their rules for charitable solicitation. Notwithstanding the clear anti-union bias of both employers, it is not for us to conclude as a matter of law — although it might well have been open to the Board to conclude as a matter of industrial experience — that a request for a similar qualification upon the rule for organizational solicitation would have been rejected. Certainly the employer is not obliged voluntarily and without any request to offer the use of his facilities and the time of his employees for pro-union solicitation. He may very well be wary of a charge that he is interfering with, or contributing support to, a labor organization in violation of § 8 (a) (2) of the Act.
No attempt was made in either of these cases to make a showing that the no-solicitation rules truly diminished the ability of the labor organizations involved to carry their messages to the employees. Just as that is a vital consideration in determining the validity of a no-solicitation rule, see Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at 797-798; Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra, at 112, it is highly relevant in determining whether a valid rule has been fairly applied. Of course the rules had the effect of closing off one channel of communication; but the Taft-Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every possible means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium of communication simply because the employer is using it. Cf. Bonwit Teller, Inc., v. Labor Board, 197 F. 2d 640, 646; Labor Board v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F. 2d 78, 84 (concurring opinion). No such mechanical answers will avail for the solution of this non-mechanical, complex problem in labor-management relations. If, by virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities and resources available to the union, the opportunities for effectively reaching the employees with a pro-union message, in spite of a no-solicitation rule, are at least as great as the employer’s ability to promote the legally authorized expression of his anti-union views, there is no basis for invalidating these “otherwise valid” rules. The Board, in determining whether or not the enforcement of such a rule in the circumstances of an individual case is an unfair labor practice, may find relevant alternative channels available for communications on the right to organize. When this important issue is not even raised before the Board and no evidence bearing on it adduced, the concrete basis for appraising the significance of the employer’s conduct is wanting.
We do not at all imply that the enforcement of a valid no-solicitation rule by an employer who is at the same time engaging in anti-union solicitation may not constitute an unfair labor practice. All we hold is that there must be some basis, in the actualities of industrial relations, for such a finding. The records in both cases — the issues raised in the proceedings — are barren of the ingredients for such a finding. Accordingly the judgment in No. 81 is reversed, insofar as it sets aside and requires the Board to modify its order, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion; in all other respects, it is affirmed. The judgment in No. 289 is affirmed. J °
T, . , , It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment in No. 81 for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 100 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 243 F. 2d 593.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas join in the dissent in No. 289, Labor Board v. Avondale Mills.
The statutory basis for the decision that this conduct constituted an unfair labor practice was § 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 452, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 140, 29 U. S. C. §158 (a)(1), which provides:
“(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
“(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
Section 7 provides that “ [employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a)(3).”
49 Stat, 449, 452, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 142, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (c):
“The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”
49 Stat. 449, 452, as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 140, 29 U. S. C. §158 (a) (2). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bureau of Prisons",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"State Agency",
"Unidentifiable",
"Office of Thrift Supervision",
"Department of Homeland Security",
"Board of General Appraisers",
"Board of Tax Appeals",
"General Land Office or Commissioners",
"NO Admin Action",
"Processing Tax Board of Review"
] | [
81
] | sc_adminaction |
PENNSYLVANIA v. MIMMS
No. 76-1830.
Decided December 5, 1977
Per Curiam.
Petitioner Commonwealth seeks review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversing respondent’s conviction for carrying a concealed deadly weapon and a firearm without a license. That court reversed the conviction because it held that respondent’s “revolver was seized in a manner which violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 471 Pa. 546, 548, 370 A. 2d 1157, 1158 (1977). Because we disagree with this conclusion, we grant the Commonwealth’s petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
The facts are not in dispute. While on routine patrol, two Philadelphia police officers observed respondent Harry Mimms driving an automobile with an expired license plate. The officers stopped the vehicle for the purpose of issuing a traffic summons. One of the officers approached and asked respondent to step out of the car and produce his owner’s card and operator’s license. Respondent alighted, whereupon the officer noticed a large bulge under respondent’s sports jacket. Fearing that the bulge might be a weapon, the officer frisked respondent and discovered in his waistband a .38-caliber revolver loaded with five rounds of ammunition. The other occupant of the car was carrying a .32-caliber revolver. Respondent was immediately arrested and subsequently indicted for carrying a concealed deadly weapon and for unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. His motion to suppress the revolver was denied; and, after a trial at which the revolver was introduced into evidence, respondent was convicted on both counts.
As previously indicated, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed respondent’s conviction, however, holding that the revolver should have been suppressed because it was seized contrary to the guarantees contained in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Pennsylvania court did not doubt that the officers acted reasonably in stopping the car. It was also willing to assume, arguendo, that the limited search for weapons was proper once the officer observed the bulge under respondent’s coat. But the court nonetheless thought the search constitutionally infirm because the officer's order to respondent to get out of the car was an impermissible “seizure.” This was so because the officer could not point to “objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety.” Since this unconstitutional intrusion led directly to observance of the bulge and to the subsequent “pat down,” the revolver was the fruit of an unconstitutional search, and, in the view of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, should have been suppressed.
We do not agree with this conclusion. The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968). Reasonableness, of course, depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975).
In this case, unlike Terry v. Ohio, there is no question about the propriety of the initial restrictions on respondent’s freedom of movement. Respondent was driving an automobile with expired license tags in violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code. Deferring for a moment the legality of the “frisk” once the bulge had been observed, we need presently deal only with the narrow question of whether the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. This inquiry must therefore focus not on the intrusion resulting from the request to stop the vehicle or from the later “pat down,” but on the incremental intrusion resulting from the request to get out of the car once the vehicle was lawfully stopped.
Placing the question in this narrowed frame, we look first to that side of the balance which bears the officer’s interest in taking the action that he did. The State freely concedes the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behavior. It was apparently his practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation. The State argues that this practice was adopted as a precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground. Establishing a face-to-face confrontation diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, that the driver can make unobserved movements; this, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault.
We think it too plain for argument that the State’s proffered justification — the safety of the officer — is both legitimate and weighty. “Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 23. And we have specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile. “According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings — A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 93 (1963).” Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 148 n. 3 (1972). We are aware that not all these assaults occur when issuing traffic summons, but we have before expressly declined to accept the argument that traffic violations necessarily involve less danger to officers than other types of confrontations. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 234 (1973). Indeed, it appears “that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.” Id., at 234 n. 5.
The hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on the driver’s side of the vehicle may also be appreciable in some situations. Rather than conversing while standing exposed to moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer to ask the driver of the vehicle to step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both.
Against this important interest we are asked to weigh the intrusion into the driver’s personal liberty occasioned not by the initial stop of the vehicle, which was admittedly justified, but by the order to get out of the car. We think this additional intrusion can only be described as de minimis. The driver is being asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already exposed. The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence of the police on the latter choice not a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,” but it hardly rises to the level of a “ ‘petty indignity.’ ” Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 17. What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.
There remains the second question of the propriety of the search once the bulge in the jacket was observed. We have as little doubt on this point as on the first; the answer is controlled by Terry v. Ohio, supra. In that case we thought the officer justified in conducting a limited search for weapons once he had reasonably concluded that the person whom he had legitimately stopped might be armed and presently dangerous. Under the standard enunciated in that case— whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate” — there is little question the officer was justified. The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these circumstances, any man of “reasonable caution” would likely have conducted the “pat down.”
Respondent’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Three judges dissented on the federal constitutional issue.
471 Pa., at 552, 370 A. 2d, at 1160.
We note that in his brief in opposition to a grant of certiorari respondent contends that this case is moot because he has already completed the 3-year maximum of the 1%- to 3-year sentence imposed. The case has, he argues, terminated against him for all purposes and for all time regardless of this Court’s disposition of the matter. See St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41 (1943).
But cases such as Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 53-57 (1968); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), bear witness to the fact that this Court has long since departed from the rule announced in St. Pierre, supra. These more recent cases have held that the possibility of a criminal defendant’s suffering “collateral legal consequences” from a sentence already served permits him to have his claims reviewed here on the merits. If the prospect of the State’s visiting such collateral consequences on a criminal defendant who has served his sentence is a sufficient burden as to enable him to seek reversal of a decision affirming his conviction, the prospect of the State’s inability to impose such a burden following a reversal of the conviction of a criminal defendant in its own courts must likewise be sufficient to enable the State to obtain review of its claims on the merits here. In any future state criminal proceedings against respondent, this conviction may be relevant to setting bail and length of sentence, and to the availability of probation. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1321, 1322, 1331, 1332 (Purdon Supp. 1977); Pa. Rule Crim. Proc. 4004. In view of the fact that respondent, having fully served his state sentence, is presently incarcerated in the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pa., we cannot say that such considerations are unduly speculative even if a determination of mootness depended on a case-by-case analysis.
Operating an improperly licensed motor vehicle was at the time of the incident covered by 1959 Pa. Laws, No. 32, which was found in Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 75, §511 (a) (Purdon 1971), and has been repealed by 1976 Pa. Laws, No. 81, § 7, effective July 1, 1977. This offense now appears to be covered by 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1301, 1302 (Purdon 1977).
The State does not, and need not, go so far as to suggest that an officer may frisk the occupants of any car stopped for a traffic violation. Rather, it only argues that it is permissible to order the driver out of the car. In this particular case, argues the State, once the driver alighted, the officer had independent reason to suspect criminal activity and present danger and it was upon this basis, and not the mere fact that respondent had committed a traffic violation, that he conducted the search.
Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent of our Brother Stevens, post, at 122, we do not hold today that “whenever an officer has an occasion to speak with the driver of a vehicle, he may also order the driver out of the car.” We hold only that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.
392 U. S., at 21-22. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York. | What is the court in which the case originated? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims",
"United States Supreme Court"
] | [
159
] | sc_caseorigin |
HEWITT et al. v. HELMS
No. 81-638.
Argued November 8, 1982
Decided February 22, 1983
Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 478. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, and in Parts II and III of which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 479.
LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Francis R. Filipi and Gregory R. Neuhauser, Deputy Attorneys General.
Richard G. Fishman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Barbara E. Etkind, and Kathleen A. Felton filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leonard Es-quina, Jr., and Larry Bennett for the State Bar of Michigan, Prisons and Corrections Committee; and by Frederick M. Stanczak for Susquehanna Legal Services.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Aaron Helms was serving a term in the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pa. (SCIH), which was administered by petitioners. He sued in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming that petitioners’ actions confining him to administrative segregation within the prison violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The District Court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 655 F. 2d 487 (1981). We granted certiorari, 455 U. S. 999 (1982), to consider what limits the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places on the authority of prison administrators to remove inmates from the general prison population and confine them to a less desirable regimen for administrative reasons.
In the early evening of December 3, 1978, a prisoner in the state penitentiary at Huntingdon, assaulted two guards. The prisoner was subdued with the assistance of other guards, but one guard received a broken nose, and another a broken thumb. Later in the evening, the violence erupted into a riot during which a group of prisoners attempted to seize the institution’s “control center.” One group of inmates attacked a prison guard and a trainee, using table legs, the guard’s flashlight, barbells, and whatever else came to hand. On another floor, three inmates were subdued while trying to attack a sergeant of the prison guard with a flashlight, and it was necessary to forcibly subdue them and handcuff them to pipes. Inmates in one of the prison blocks tried to break a grille to enter the prison’s control center, but they were held back. One of the assaulted guards suffered cuts and bruises on the face and leg areas, and another reported a possible skull fracture, broken jaw, broken teeth, and an injured collarbone.
This uprising was eventually quelled, but only with the assistance of state police units, local law enforcement officers, and off-duty prison guards whose aid was summoned. Several hours after the riot ended, respondent Helms was removed from his cell and the general prison population for questioning by the state police. Following the interview, he was placed in restrictive confinement, and the state police and prison authorities began an investigation into his role in the riot.
On December 4, 1978, Helms was given a “Misconduct Report” charging him with “Assaulting Officers and Conspiracy to Disrupt Normal Institution Routine by Forcefully Taking Over the Control Center.” The report briefly described the factual basis for the charge and contained a lengthy recitation of the procedures governing the institution’s disciplinary hearing. On December 8, 1978, a “Hearing Committee,” consisting of three prison officials charged with adjudicating alleged instances of misconduct by inmates, was convened to dispose of the charges against Helms. Following a review of the misconduct report, the panel summarized its decision as “[n]o finding as to guilt reached at this time, due to insufficient information,” and ordered that Helms’ confinement in restricted housing be continued.
While as a matter of probabilities it seems likely that Helms appeared personally before the December 8 Hearing Committee, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the record does not allow definitive resolution of the issue on summary judgment. Helms signed a copy of the misconduct report stating that “[t]he circumstance of the charge has been read and fully explained to me,” and that “I have had the opportunity to have my version reported as part of the record.” App. 41a. Likewise, he admitted in an affidavit filed during this litigation that he was “informed by an institutional hearing committee” of the disposition of the misconduct charge against him. Id., at 33a. The same affidavit, however, asserted that no “hearing” was conducted on December 8, suggesting that respondent did not appear before the Committee. The State did not file any affidavit controverting Helms’ contention.
On December 11, 1978, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed state criminal charges against Helms, charging him with assaulting Correction Officer Rhodes and with riot. On January 2, 1979, SCIH’s Program Review Committee, which consisted of three prison officials, was convened. The Committee met to review the status of respondent’s confinement in administrative segregation and to make recommendations as to his future confinement. The Committee unanimously concluded that Helms should remain in administrative segregation; affidavits of the Committee members said that the decision was based on several related concerns. Helms was seen as “a danger to staff and to other inmates if released back into general population,” id., at 11a; he was to be arraigned the following day on state criminal charges, id., at 24a; and the Committee was awaiting information regarding his role in the riot, id., at 16a. The Superintendent of SCIH personally reviewed the Program Review Committee’s determination and concurred in its recommendation. Id., at 15a, 18a.
The preliminary hearing on the state criminal charges against Helms was postponed on January 10, 1979, apparently due to a lack of evidence. On January 19, 1979, a second misconduct report was given to respondent; the report charged Helms with assaulting a second officer during the December 3 riot. On January 22 a Hearing Committee composed of three prison officials heard testimony from one guard and Helms. Based on this, the Committee found Helms guilty of the second misconduct charge and ordered that he be confined to disciplinary segregation for six months, effective December 3, 1978. The Committee also decided to drop the earlier misconduct charge against respondent, without determining guilt. On February 6, 1979, the State dropped criminal charges relating to the prison riot against Helms.
The Court of Appeals, reviewing these facts, concluded that Helms had a protected liberty interest in continuing to reside in the general prison population. While the court seemed to doubt that this interest could be found in the Constitution, it held that Pennsylvania regulations governing the administration of state prisons created such an interest. It then said that Helms could not be deprived of this interest without a hearing, governed by the procedures mandated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), to determine whether such confinement was proper. Being uncertain whether the hearing conducted on December 8 satisfied the Wolff requirements, see supra, at 464-465, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for an eviden-tiary hearing regarding the character of that proceeding. On these same facts, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Pennsylvania statutory framework governing the administration of state prisons gave rise to a liberty interest in respondent, but we conclude that the procedures afforded respondent were “due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” it is well settled that only a limited range of interests fall within this provision. Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 223-227 (1976). Respondent argues, rather weakly, that the Due Process Clause implicitly creates an interest in being confined to a general population cell, rather than the more austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters. While there is little question on the record before us that respondent’s confinement added to the restraints on his freedom, we think his argument seeks to draw from the Due Process Clause more than it can provide.
We have repeatedly said both that prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests. As to the first point, we have recognized that broad discretionary authority is necessary because the administration of a prison is “at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking,” Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 566, and have concluded that “to hold . . . that any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts.” Meachum v. Fano, supra, at 225. As to the second point, our decisions have consistently refused to recognize more than the most basic liberty interests in prisoners. “Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948). Thus, there is no “constitutional or inherent right” to parole, Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 7 (1979), and “the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison,” Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 557, despite the undoubted impact of such credits on the freedom of inmates. Finally, in Meachum v. Fano, supra, at 225, the transfer of a prisoner from one institution to another was found unprotected by “the Due Process Clause in and of itself,” even though the change of facilities involved a significant modification in conditions of confinement, later characterized by the Court as a “grievous loss.” Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976). As we have held previously, these decisions require that “[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236, 242 (1976). See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 493 (1980).
It is plain that the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence. The phrase “administrative segregation,” as used by the state authorities here, appears to be something of a catchall: it may be used to protect the prisoner’s safety, to protect other inmates from a particular prisoner, to break up potentially disruptive groups of inmates, or simply to await later classification or transfer. See 37 Pa. Code §§95.104 and 95.106 (1978), and n. 1, supra. Accordingly, administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration. This conclusion finds ample support in our decisions regarding parole and good-time credits. Both these subjects involve release from institutional life altogether, which is a far more significant change in a prisoner’s freedoms than that at issue here, yet in Greenholtz and Wolff we held that neither situation involved an interest independently protected by the Due Process Clause. These decisions compel an identical result here.
Despite this, respondent points out that the Court has held that a State may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause through its enactment of certain statutory or regulatory measures. Thus, in Wolff, where we rejected any notion of an interest in good-time credits inherent in the Constitution, we also found that Nebraska had created a right to such credits. 418 U. S., at 556-557. See also Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra (parole); Vitek v. Jones, supra (transfer to mental institution). Likewise, and more relevant here, was our summary affirmance in Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (ND Cal. 1976), summarily aff’d, 434 U. S. 1052 (1978), where the District Court had concluded that state law created a liberty interest in confinement to any sort of segregated housing within a prison. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5 (1980) (per curiam), while involving facts similar to these in some respects, was essentially a pleading case rather than an exposition of the substantive constitutional issues involved.
Respondent argues that Pennsylvania, in its enactment of regulations governing the administration of state prisons, has created a liberty interest in remaining free from the restraints accompanying confinement in administrative segregation. Except to the extent that our summary affirmance in Wright v. Enomoto, supra, may be to the contrary, we have never held that statutes and regulations governing daily operation of a prison system conferred any liberty interest in and of themselves. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, supra, held to the contrary; in Wolff, supra, we were dealing with good-time credits which would have actually reduced the period of time which the inmate would have been in the custody of the government; in Greenholtz, supra, we dealt with parole, which would likewise have radically transformed the nature of the custody to which the inmate was subject; and in Vitek, supra, we considered the transfer .from a prison to a mental institution.
There are persuasive reasons why we should be loath to transpose all of the reasoning in the cases just cited to the situation where the statute and regulations govern the day-to-day administration of a prison system. The deprivations imposed in the course of the daily operations of an institution are likely to be minor when compared to the release from custody at issue in parole decisions and good-time credits. Moreover, the safe and efficient operation of a prison on a day-to-day basis has traditionally been entrusted to the expertise of prison officials, see Meachum v. Fano, supra, at 225. These facts suggest that regulations structuring the authority of prison administrators may warrant treatment, for purposes of creation of entitlements to “liberty,” different from statutes and regulations in other areas. Nonetheless, we conclude in the light of the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations here in question, the relevant provisions of which are set forth in full in the margin, that respondent did acquire a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population.
Respondent seems to suggest that the mere fact that Pennsylvania has created a careful procedural structure to regulate the use of administrative segregation indicates the existence of a protected liberty interest. We cannot agree. The creation of procedural guidelines to channel the decision-making of prison officials is, in the view of many experts in the field, a salutary development. It would be ironic to hold that when a State embarks on such desirable experimentation it thereby opens the door to scrutiny by the federal courts, while States that choose not to adopt such procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of the Due Process Clause. The adoption of such procedural guidelines, without more, suggests that it is these restrictions alone, and not those federal courts might also impose under the Fourteenth Amendment, that the State chose to require.
Nonetheless, in this case the Commonwealth has gone beyond simple procedural guidelines. It has used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures “shall,” “will,” or “must” be employed, see n. 6, supra, and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates — viz., "the need for control,” or “the threat of a serious disturbance.” Petitioners argue, with considerable force, that these terms must be read in light of the fact that the decision whether to confine an inmate to administrative segregation is largely predictive, and therefore that it is not likely that the State meant to create binding requirements. But on balance we are persuaded that the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest.
That being the case, we must then decide whether the process afforded respondent satisfied the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause. We think that it did. The requirements imposed by the Clause are, of course, flexible and variable dependent upon the particular situation being examined. E. g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S., at 12; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). In determining what is “due process” in the prison context, we are reminded that “one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society ... to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 560. “Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 547 (1979). These considerations convince us that petitioners were obligated to engage only in an informal, non-adversary review of the information supporting respondent’s administrative confinement, including whatever statement respondent wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation.
. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), we: consider the private interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of procedural requirements in determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent’s private interest is not one of great consequence. He was merely transferred from one extremely restricted environment to an even more confined situation. Unlike disciplinary confinement the stigma of wrongdoing or misconduct does not attach to administrative segregation under Pennsylvania’s prison regulations. Finally, there is no indication that administrative segregation will have any significant effect on parole opportunities.
Petitioners had two closely related reasons for confining Helms to administrative segregation prior to conducting a hearing on the disciplinary charges against him. First, they concluded that if housed in the general population, Helms would pose a threat to the safety of other inmates and prison officials and to the security of the institution. Second, the prison officials believed that it was wiser to separate respondent from the general population until completion of state and institutional investigations of his role in the December 3 riot and the hearing on the charges against him. Plainly, these governmental interests are of great importance. The safety of the institution’s guards and inmates is perhaps the most fundamental responsibility of the prison administration. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 547; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 132 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 823 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404 (1974). Likewise, the isolation of a prisoner pending investigation of misconduct charges against him serves important institutional interests relating to the insulating of possible witnesses from coercion or harm, see infra, at 476.
Neither of these grounds for confining Helms to administrative segregation involved decisions or judgments that would have been materially assisted by a detailed adversary proceeding. As we said in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 349, n. 14 (1981), “a prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.” In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate, easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on “purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior,” Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 464 (1981); indeed, the administrators must predict not just one inmate’s future actions, as in parole, but those of an entire institution. Owing to the central role of these types of intuitive judgments, a decision that an inmate or group of inmates represents a threat to the institution’s security would not be appreciably fostered by the trial-type procedural safeguards suggested by respondent. This, and the balance of public and private interests, lead us to conclude that the Due Process Clause requires only an informal nonadversary review of evidence, discussed more fully below, in order to confine an inmate feared to be a threat to institutional security to administrative segregation.
Likewise, confining respondent to administrative segregation pending completion of the investigation of the disciplinary charges against him is not based on an inquiry requiring any elaborate procedural safeguards. We think the closest case in point dealing with an analogous situation in the world outside of prisons is Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). There, in the context of a challenge to the pretrial detainment of persons suspected of criminal acts, we held that States must “provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty,” and we required that “this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.” Id., at 125. We explicitly rejected the suggestion, however, that an adversary proceeding, accompanied by traditional trial-type rights, was required, and instead permitted an informal proceeding designed to determine whether probable cause existed to believe that the detained person had committed a crime. Id., at 119-123.
While Gerstein was grounded in the Fourth Amendment, we think it provides a useful point of departure with respect to the due process question raised here. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 335, again suggests the points at which Gerstein is inapposite in the prison context. As our discussion above suggests, the private interest at stake here is far less weighty than that at issue in Gerstein, which involved removing a suspect from unrestricted liberty in open society and placing him in an institution. In contrast, as noted above, Helms was merely transferred from an extremely restricted environment to an even more confined situation. Under the Mathews formula, respondent has a far less compelling claim to procedural safeguards than did the pretrial detainees in Gerstein. Likewise, weighty governmental interests are at stake. To be sure, Gerstein involved a situation in which a real possibility existed that the suspected criminal would flee from justice; it is unlikely, to say the least, that confinement to administrative segregation is necessary for this purpose where an inmate has been charged with misconduct. Yet the State has other important interests. For example, it must protect possible witnesses— whose confinement leaves them particularly vulnerable — from retribution by the suspected wrongdoer, and, in addition, has an interest in preventing attempts to persuade such witnesses not to testify at disciplinary hearings. These considerations lead us to conclude that while general patterns of the Gerstein procedures should be our guide, some of the elements required in that case are unnecessary in the much more informal context of prison officials who propose to confine an inmate to administrative segregation pending completion of an investigation against him.
We think an informal, nonadversary evidentiary review is sufficient both for the decision that an inmate represents a security threat and the decision to confine an inmate to administrative segregation pending completion of an investigation into misconduct charges against him. An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where they believe a written statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied. This informal procedure permits a reasonably accurate assessment of probable cause to believe that misconduct occurred, and the “value [of additional ‘formalities and safeguards’] would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle” that they must be adopted, Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 122.
Measured against these standards we are satisfied that respondent received all the process that was due after being confined to administrative segregation. He received notice of the charges against him the day after his misconduct took place. Only five days after his transfer to administrative segregation a Hearing Committee reviewed the existing evidence against him, including a staff member’s statement that “[t]his inmate was a member of an organized plot and did actively involve himself with at least 10 other inmates in the assault upon 5 corrections officers in ‘C’ Block and attempted to break thru the ‘C’ grill to the Control Center to disrupt the normal institution routine by usurping the authority of institution officials.” App. 38a. While the Court of Appeals may have been correct that the record does not clearly demonstrate that a Wolff hearing was held, it does show that he had an opportunity to present a statement to the Committee. As noted previously, Helms acknowledged on the misconduct form that he “had the opportunity to have [his] version reported as part of the record”; we see no reason to question the accuracy of his statement. This proceeding plainly satisfied the due process requirements for continued confinement of Helms pending the outcome of the investigation.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Pennsylvania has adopted regulations promulgated by the State Bureau of Corrections establishing two basic types of restricted housing in its correctional facilities — disciplinary and administrative segregation. 37 Pa. Code §95.107 (1978). Other jurisdictions follow a similar pattern. See 28 CFR pt. 541 (1982). Confinement in disciplinary segregation is imposed when an inmate has been found to have committed a misconduct violation. 37 Pa. Code § 95.106(2) (1978). Administrative segregation may be imposed when an inmate poses a threat to security, when disciplinary charges are pending against an inmate, or when an inmate requires protection. §95.104. According to the state regulations, administrative segregation is somewhat less restrictive than disciplinary segregation, compare §95.107(a)(2) with § 95.107(b)(2), although, as noted elsewhere, see n. 4, infra, we assume for purposes of this case that the conditions in the two types of confinement are substantially identical.
The misconduct report informed respondent that a hearing would be held as soon as possible, that he could remain silent at the hearing, that he could be represented by an inmate or staff member, and that he could request witnesses who would be permitted to appear if they were found willing, capable of giving relevant testimony, and not a security hazard. App. 38a-39a.
Wolff required that inmates facing disciplinary charges for misconduct be accorded 24 hours' advance written notice of the charges against them; a right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, unless doing so would jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals; the aid of a staff member or inmate in presenting a defense, provided the inmate is illiterate or the issues complex; an impartial tribunal; and a written statement of reasons relied on by the tribunal. 418 U. S., at 563-572.
As noted previously, the case is here on motions for summary judgment. Respondent submitted an affidavit that the State did not rebut, claiming that confinement to administrative segregation imposed severe hardships on him. Among other things, he alleged a denial of access to vocational, educational, recreational, and rehabilitative programs, restrictions on exercise, and confinement to his cell for lengthy periods of time.
We held there that it was error to dismiss for failure to state a claim a pro se prisoner’s complaint alleging confinement to restricted quarters without a hearing. Observing that “[w]e [could not] say with assurance that petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief,” 449 U. S., at 12-13, we expressly stated that “[o]ur discussion of this claim is not intended to express any view on its merits.” Id., at 12. Rowe is likewise factually dissimilar from this case, since in Rowe we also noted that “[tjhere [was] no suggestion in the record that. . . emergency conditions” existed and the prisoner’s “offense did not involve violence.” Id., at 11.
Title 37 Pa. Code § 95.104(b)(1) (1978) provides:
“An inmate who has allegedly committed a Class I Misconduct may be placed in Close or Maximum Administrative Custody upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution, not routinely but based upon his assessment of the situation and the need for control pending application of procedures under § 95.103 of this title.”
Section 95.104(b)(3) of the same Title provides:
“An inmate may be temporarily confined to Close or Maximum Administrative Custody in an investigative status upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution where it has been determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance, or a serious threat to the individual or others. The inmate shall be notified in writing as soon as possible that he is under investigation and that he will receive a hearing if any disciplinary action is being considered after the investigation is completed. An investigation shall begin immediately to determine whether or not a behavior violation has occurred. If no behavior violation has occurred, the inmate must be released as soon as the reason for the security concern has abated but in all cases within ten days.”
Finally, a State Bureau of Correction Administrative Directive states that when the State Police have been summoned to an institution:
“Pending arrival of the State Police, the institutional representative shall:
“1. Place all suspects and resident witnesses or complainants in such custody, protective or otherwise, as may be necessary to maintain security. A hearing complying with [37 Pa. Code § 95.103 (1972)] will be carried out after the investigation period. Such hearing shall be held within four (4) days unless the investigation warrants delay and in that case as soon as possible.” Pa. Admin. Dir. BC-ADM 004, § IV(B) (1975).
Indeed, we think an administrator’s judgment probably would be hindered. Prison officials, wary of potential legal liability, might well spend their time mechanically complying with cumbersome, marginally helpful procedural requirements, rather than managing their institution wisely.
The proceeding must occur within a reasonable time following an inmate’s transfer, taking into account the relatively insubstantial private interest at stake and the traditionally broad discretion of prison officials.
Of course, administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner — which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to administrative segregation — and on the officials’ general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for “proof” in any highly structured manner. Likewise, the decision to continue confinement of an inmate pending investigation of misconduct charges depends upon circumstances that prison officials will be well aware of — most typically, the progress of the investigation. In both situations, the ongoing task of operating the institution will require the prison officials to consider a wide range of administrative considerations; here, for example, petitioners had to consider prison tensions in the aftermath of the December 3 riot, the ongoing state criminal investigation, and so forth. The record plainly shows that on January 2 a Program Review Committee considered whether Helms’ confinement should be continued, App. 13a-15a. This review, occurring less than a month after the initial decision to confine Helms to administrative segregation, is sufficient to dispel any notions that the confinement was a pretext. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
UNITED STATES v. O'HAGAN
No. 96-842.
Argued April 16, 1997
Decided June 25, 1997
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, III, and IV. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 679. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 680.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Richard, Paul R. Q. Wolf son, Joseph C. Wyderko, Richard H. Walker, Paul Gonson, Jacob H. Stillman, Eric Summergrad, and Randall W. Quinn.
John D. French argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Elizabeth L. Taylor.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants by Louis A. Craco, Richard I. Miller, and David P. Murray; for the Association for Investment Management and Research by Stuart H. Singer; and for the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., et al. by Karen M. O’Brien, Meyer Eisenberg, Louis Loss, and Donald C. Langevoort.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Law Professors and Counsel by Richard W. Painter and Douglas W. Dunham; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Arthur F. Mathews, David M. Becker, Andrew B. Weissman, Robert F. Hoyt, Lisa Kemler, Milton V. Freeman, and Elkan Abramowitz.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the interpretation and enforcement of § 10(b) and § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rules made by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to these provisions, Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3(a). Two prime questions are presented. The first relates to the misappropriation of material, nonpublic information for securities trading; the second concerns fraudulent practices in the tender offer setting. In particular, we address and resolve these issues: (1) Is a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? (2) Did the Commission exceed its rulemaking authority by adopting Rule 14e-3(a), which proscribes trading on undisclosed information in the tender offer setting, even in the absence of a duty to disclose? Our answer to the first question is yes, and to the second question, viewed in the context of this case, no.
I
Respondent James Herman O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In July 1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met), a company based in London, England, retained Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to represent Grand Met regarding a potential tender offer for the common stock of the Pillsbury Company, headquartered in Minneapolis. Both Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney took precautions to protect the confidentiality of Grand Met’s tender offer plans. O’Hagan did no work on the Grand Met representation. Dorsey & Whitney withdrew from representing Grand Met on September 9, 1988. Less than a month later, on October 4,1988, Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock.
On August 18, 1988, while Dorsey & Whitney was still representing Grand Met, O’Hagan began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock. Each option gave him the right to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury stock by a specified date in September 1988. Later.in August and in September, O’Hagan made additional purchases of Pillsbury call options. By the end of September, he owned 2,500 unexpired Pillsbury options, apparently more than any other individual investor. See App. 85,148. O’Hagan also purchased, in September 1988, some 5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stock, at a price just under $39 per share. When Grand Met announced its tender offer in October, the price of Pillsbury stock rose to nearly $60 per share. O’Hagan then sold his Pillsbury call options and common stock, making a profit of more than $4.3 million.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) initiated an investigation into O’Hagan’s transactions, culminating in a 57-count indictment. The indictment alleged that O’Hagan defrauded his law firm and its client, Grand Met, by using for his own trading purposes material, nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer. Id., at 8. According to the indictment, O’Hagan used the profits he gained through this trading to conceal his previous embezzlement and conversion of unrelated client trust funds. Id., at 10. O’Hagan was charged with 20 counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341; 17 counts of securities fraud, in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-6, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1996); 17 counts of fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer, in violation of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), and SEC Rule 14e-3(a), 17 CFR §240.14e-3(a) (1996); and 3 counts of violating federal money laundering statutes, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1957. See App. 13-24. A jury convicted O’Hagan on all 57 counts, and he was sentenced to a 41-month term of imprisonment.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed all of O’Hagan’s convictions. 92 F. 3d 612 (1996). Liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Eighth Circuit held, may not be grounded on the “misappropriation theory” of securities fraud on which the prosecution relied. Id., at 622. The Court of Appeals also held that Rule 14e-3(a) — which prohibits trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer — exceeds the SEC’s § 14(e) rulemaking authority because the Rule contains no breach of fiduciary duty requirement. Id., at 627. The Eighth Circuit further concluded that O’Hagan’s mail fraud and money laundering convictions rested on violations of the securities laws, and therefore could not stand once the securities fraud convictions were reversed. Id., at 627-628. Judge Fagg, dissenting, stated that he would recognize and enforce the misappropriation theory, and would hold that the SEC did not exceed its rulemaking authority when it adopted Rule 14e-3(a) without requiring proof of a breach of fiduciary duty. Id., at 628.
Decisions of the Courts of Appeals are in conflict on the propriety of the misappropriation theory under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see infra this page and 650, and n. 3, and on the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3(a) under § 14(e), see infra, at 669-670. We granted certiorari, 519 U. S. 1087 (1997), and now reverse the Eighth Circuit’s judgment.
II
We address first the Court of Appeals reversal of 0 Ha-gan’s convictions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Following the Fourth Circuit’s lead, see United States v. Bryan, 58 F. 3d 933, 943-959 (1995), the Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory as a basis for § 10(b) liability. We hold, in accord with several other Courts of Appeals, that criminal liability under § 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory.
A
In pertinent part, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
“(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b).
The statute thus proscribes (1) using any deceptive device (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, in contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission. The provision, as written, does not confine its coverage to deception of a purchaser or seller of securities, see United States v. Newman, 664 F. 2d 12, 17 (CA2 1981); rather, the statute reaches any deceptive device used “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Commission has adopted Rule 10b-5, which, as relevant here, provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
“(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]
“(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1996).
Liability under Rule 10b-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 214 (1976) (scope of Rule 10b-5 cannot exceed power Congress granted Commission under § 10(b)); see also Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994) (“We have refused to allow [private] 10b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.”).
Under the “traditional” or “classical theory” of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information. Trading on such information qualifies as a “deceptive device” under § 10(b), we have affirmed, because “a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 228 (1980). That relationship, we recognized, “gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from trading] because of the ‘necessity of preventing a corporate insider from . . . tak[ing] unfair advantage of. . . uninformed . . . stockholders.’” Id., at 228-229 (citation omitted). The classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 655, n. 14 (1983).
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. See Brief for United States 14. Under this theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information. The misappropriation theory is thus designed to “protec[t] the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders’ to a corporation who have access to confidential information that will affect th[e] corporation’s security price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation’s shareholders.” Ibid.
In this case, the indictment alleged that O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer for Pillsbury common stock. App. 16. This conduct, the Government charged, constituted a fraudulent device in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
B
We agree with the Government that misappropriation, as just defined, satisfies §10(b)’s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a “deceptive device or contrivance” used “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. We observe, first, that misappropriators, as the Government describes them, deal in deception. A fiduciary who “[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain,” Brief for United States 17, “dupes” or defrauds the principal. See Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 101, 119 (1984).
We addressed fraud of the same species in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19 (1987), which involved the mail fraud statute’s proscription of “any scheme or artifice to defraud,” 18 U. S. C. § 1341. Affirming convictions under that statute, we said in Carpenter that an employee’s undertaking not to reveal his employer’s confidential information “became a sham” when the employee provided the information to his co-conspirators in a scheme to obtain trading profits. 484 U. S., at 27. A company’s confidential information, we recognized in Carpenter, qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use. Id., at 25-27. The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty, the Court said in Carpenter, constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement — “‘the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.’ ” Id., at 27 (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 189 (1902)); see Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 119. Carpenter’s discussion of the fraudulent misuse of confidential information, the Government notes, “is a particularly apt source of guidance here, because [the mail fraud statute] (like Section 10(b)) has long been held to require deception, not merely the breach of a fiduciary duty.” Brief for United States 18, n. 9 (citation omitted).
Deception through nondisclosure is central to the theory of liability for which the Government seeks recognition. As counsel for the Government stated in explanation of the theory at oral argument: “To satisfy the common law rule that a trustee may not use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there would have to be consent. To satisfy the requirement of the Securities Act that there be no deception, there would only have to be disclosure.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 12; see generally Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 390, 395 (1958) (agent’s disclosure obligation regarding use of confidential information).
The misappropriation theory advanced by the Government is consistent with Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462 (1977), a decision underscoring that § 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving manipulation or deception. See id., at 473-476. In contrast to the Government’s allegations in this case, in Santa Fe Industries, all pertinent facts were disclosed by the persons charged with violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see id., at 474; therefore, there was no deception through nondisclosure to which liability under those provisions could attach, see id., at 476. Similarly, full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no “deceptive device” and thus no § 10(b) violation — although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.
We turn next to the § 10(b) requirement that the misappro-priator’s deceptive use of information be “in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security.” This element is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information. See Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 120 (“a fraud or deceit can be practiced on one person, with resultant harm to another person or group of persons”). A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public. See id., at 120-121, and n. 107.
The misappropriation theory targets information of a sort that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities. Should a misappropriator put such information to other use, the statute’s prohibition would not be implicated. The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving confidential information; rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information through securities transactions.
The Government notes another limitation on the forms of fraud § 10(b) reaches: “The misappropriation theory would not. . . apply to a case in which a person defrauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and then used the proceeds of the misdeed to purchase securities.” Brief for United States 24, n. 13. In such a case, the Government states, “the proceeds would have value to the malefactor apart from their use in a securities transaction, and the fraud would be complete as soon as the money was obtained.” Ibid. In other words, money can buy, if not anything, then at least many things; its misappropriation may thus be viewed as sufficiently detached from a subsequent securities transaction that § 10(b)’s "in connection with” requirement would not be met. Ibid.
Justice Thomas’ charge that the misappropriation theory is incoherent because information, like funds, can be put to multiple uses, see post, at 681-686 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), misses the point. The Exchange Act was enacted in part “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets,” 15 U. S. C. § 78b, and there is no question that fraudulent uses of confidential information fall within § 10(b)’s prohibition if the fraud is “in connection with” a securities transaction. It is hardly remarkable that a rule suitably applied to the fraudulent uses of certain kinds of information would be stretched beyond reason were it applied to the fraudulent use of money.
Justice Thomas does catch the Government in overstatement. Observing that money can be used for all manner of purposes and purchases, the Government urges that confidential information of the kind at issue derives its value only from its utility in securities trading. See Brief for United States 10, 21; post, at 683-684 (several times emphasizing the word “only”). Substitute “ordinarily” for “only,” and the Government is on the mark.
Our recognition that the Government’s “only” is an overstatement has provoked the dissent to cry “new theory.” See post, at 687-689. But the very case on which Justice Thomas relies, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29 (1983), shows the extremity of that charge. In State Farm, we reviewed an agency’s rescission of a rule under the same “arbitrary and capricious” standard by which the promulgation of a rule under the relevant statute was to be judged, see id., at 41-42; in our decision concluding that the agency had not adequately explained its regulatory action, see id., at 57, we cautioned that a “reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies,” id., at 43. Here, by contrast, Rule 10b-5’s promulgation has not been challenged; we consider only the Government’s charge that O’Hagan’s alleged fraudulent conduct falls within the prohibitions of the Rule and § 10(b). In this context, we acknowledge simply that, in defending the Government’s interpretation of the Rule and statute in this Court, the Government’s lawyers have pressed a solid point too far, something lawyers, occasionally even judges, are wont to do.
The misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)’s language, which requires deception “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller. The theory is also well tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence. See 45 Fed. Reg. 60412 (1980) (trading on misappropriated information “undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities markets”). Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An investor’s informational disadvantage vis-á-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 356 (1979) (“If the market is thought to be systematically populated with . . . transactors [trading on the basis of misappropriated information] some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome their unerodable informational advantages.”); Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 122-123.
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading on misappropriated information, and the congressional purposes underlying § 10(b), it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like O’Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder. The text of the statute requires no such result. The misappropriation at issue here was properly made the subject of a.§ 10(b) charge because it meets the statutory requirement that there be “deceptive” conduct “in connection with” securities transactions.
c
The Court of Appeals rejected the misappropriation theory primarily on two grounds. First, as the Eighth Circuit comprehended the theory, it requires neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure. See 92 F. 3d, at 618. As we just explained, however, see supra, at 654-665, deceptive nondisclosure is essential to the § 10(b) liability at issue. Concretely, in this case, “it [was O’Hagan’s] failure to disclose his personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey, in breach of his duty to do so, that ma[de] his conduct ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of [§]10(b).” Reply Brief 7.
Second and “more obvious,” the Court of Appeals said, the misappropriation theory is not moored to § 10(b)’s requirement that “the fraud be ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.’” 92 F. 3d, at 618 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b)). According to the Eighth Circuit, three of our decisions reveal that § 10(b) liability cannot be predicated on a duty owed to the source of nonpublic information: Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983); and Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A, 511 U. S. 164 (1994). “[Ojnly a breach of a duty to parties to the securities transaction,” the Court of Appeals concluded, “or, at the most, to other market participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give rise to § 10(b) liability.” 92 F. 3d, at 618. We read the statute and our precedent differently, and note again that § 10(b) refers to “the purchase or sale of any security,” not.to identifiable purchasers or sellers of securities.
Chiarella involved securities trades by a printer employed at a shop that printed documents announcing corporate takeover bids. See 445 U. S., at 224. Deducing the names of target companies from documents he handled, the printer bought shares of the targets before takeover bids were announced, expecting (correctly) that the share prices would rise upon announcement. In these transactions, the printer did not disclose to the sellers of the securities (the target companies’ shareholders) the nonpublic information on which he traded. See ibid. For that trading, the printer was convicted of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We reversed the Court of Appeals judgment that had affirmed the conviction. See id., at 225.
The jury in Chiarella had been instructed that it could convict the defendant if he willfully failed to inform sellers of target company securities that he knew of a takeover bid that would increase the value of their shares. See id., at 226. Emphasizing that the printer had no agency or other fiduciary relationship with the sellers, we held that liability could not be imposed on so broad a theory. See id., at 235. There is under § 10(b), we explained, no “general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.” Id., at 233. Under established doctrine, we said, a duty to disclose or abstain from trading “arises from a specific relationship between two parties.” Ibid.
The Court did not hold in Chiarella that the only relationship prompting liability for trading on undisclosed information is the relationship between a corporation’s insiders and shareholders. That is evident from our response to the Government’s argument before this Court that the printer’s misappropriation of information from his employer for purposes of securities trading — in violation of a duty of confidentiality owed to the acquiring companies — constituted fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and thereby satisfied the terms of § 10(b). Id., at 235-236. The Court declined to reach that potential basis for the printer’s liability, because the theory had not been submitted to the jury. See id., at 236-237. But four Justices found merit in it. See id., at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 240-243 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 245 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). And a fifth Justice stated that the Court “wisely le[ft] the resolution of this issue for another day.” Id., at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chiarella thus expressly left open the misappropriation theory before us today. Certain statements in Chiarella, however, led the Eighth Circuit in the instant case to conclude that § 10(b) liability hinges exclusively on a breach of duty owed to a purchaser or seller of securities. See 92 F. 3d, at 618. The Court said in Chiarella that § 10(b) liability “is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transac- . tion,” 445 U. S., at 230 (emphasis added), and observed that the printshop employee defendant in that case “was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence,” see id., at 232. These statements rejected the notion that § 10(b) stretches so far as to impose “a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information,” id., at 233, and we confine them to that context. The statements highlighted by the Eighth Circuit, in short, appear in an opinion carefully leaving for future resolution the validity of the misappropriation theory, and therefore cannot be read to foreclose that theory.
Dirks, too, left room for application of the misappropriation theory in cases like the one we confront. Dirks involved an investment analyst who had received information from a former insider of a corporation with which the analyst had no connection. See 463 U. S., at 648-649. The information indicated that the corporation had engaged in a massive fraud. The analyst investigated the fraud, obtaining corroborating information from employees of the corporation. During his investigation, the analyst discussed his findings with clients and investors, some of whom sold their holdings in the company the analyst suspected of gross wrongdoing. See id., at 649.
The SEC censured the analyst for, inter alia, aiding and abetting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations by clients and investors who sold their holdings based on the nonpublic information the analyst passed on. See id., at 650-652. In the SEC’s view, the analyst, as a “tippee” of corporation insiders, had a duty under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to refrain from communicating the nonpublic information to persons likely to trade on the basis of it. See id., at 651, 655-656. This Court found no such obligation, see id., at 665-667, and repeated the key point made in Chiarella: There is no “ ‘general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.’” 463 U. S., at 655 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 233); see Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev., at 122 (misappropriation theory bars only “trading on the basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the owner or rightful possessor of the information”).
No showing had been made in Dirks that the “tippers” had violated any duty by disclosing to the analyst nonpublic information about their former employer. The insiders had acted not for personal profit, but to expose a massive fraud within the corporation. See 463 U. S., at 666-667. Absent any violation by the tippers, there could be no derivative liability for the tippee. See id., at 667. Most important for purposes of the instant case, the Court observed in Dirks: “There was no expectation by [the analyst’s] sources that he would keep their information in confidence. Nor did [the analyst] misappropriate or illegally obtain the information . . . .” Id., at 665. Dirks thus presents no suggestion that a person who gains nonpublic information through misappropriation in breach of a fiduciary duty escapes § 10(b) liability when, without alerting the source, he trades on the information.
Last of the three cases the Eighth Circuit regarded as warranting disapproval of the misappropriation theory, Cen tral Bank held that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).” 511 U. S., at 191. We immediately cautioned in Central Bank that secondary actors in the securities markets may sometimes be chargeable under the securities Acts: “Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b—5, assuming . . . the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit isolated the statement just quoted and drew from it the conclusion that § 10(b) covers only deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers and sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely. See 92 F. 3d, at 619. It is evident from the question presented in Central Bank, however, that this Court, in the quoted passage, sought only to clarify that secondary actors, although not subject to aiding and abetting liability, remain subject to primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for certain conduct.
Furthermore, Central Bank’s discussion concerned only private civil litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, not-criminal liability. Central Bank’s reference to purchasers or sellers of securities must be read in light of a longstanding limitation on private § 10(b) suits. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (1975), we held that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities may maintain a private civil action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We so confined the § 10(b) private right of action because of “policy considerations.” Id., at 737. In particular, Blue Chip Stamps recognized the abuse potential and proof problems inherent in suits by investors who neither bought nor sold, but asserted they would have traded absent fraudulent conduct by others. See id., at 739-747; see also Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 285 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 289-290 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Criminal prosecutions do not present the dangers the Court addressed in Blue Chip Stamps, so that decision is “inapplicable” to indictments for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774, n. 6 (1979); see also Holmes, 503 U. S., at 281 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he purchaser/seller standing requirement for private civil actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is of no import in criminal prosecutions for willful violations of those provisions.”).
In sum, the misappropriation theory, as we have examined and explained it in this opinion, is both consistent with the statute and with our precedent. Vital to our decision that criminal liability may be sustained under the misappropriation theory, we emphasize, are two sturdy safeguards Congress has provided regarding scienter. To establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove that a person “willfully” violated the provision. See 15 U. S. C. §78ff(a). Furthermore, a defendant may not be imprisoned for violating Rule 10b-5 if he proves that he had no knowledge of the Rule. See ibid. O’Hagan’s charge that the misappropriation theory is too indefinite to permit the imposition of criminal liability, see Brief for Respondent 30-33, thus fails not only because the theory is limited to those who breach a recognized duty. In addition, the statute’s “requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the [statute]” in circumstances such as O’Hagan’s is unjust. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 342 (1952).
The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with § 10(b). The Court of Appeals may address on remand O’Hagan’s other challenges to his convictions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
H-H HH HH
We consider next the ground on which the Court of Appeals reversed O’Hagan’s convictions for fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer, in violation of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14e-3(a). A sole question is before us as to these convictions: Did the Commission, as the Court of Appeals held, exceed its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it adopted Rule 14e-3(a) without requiring a showing that the trading at issue entailed a breach of fiduciary duty? We hold that the Commission, in this regard and to the extent relevant to this case, did not exceed its authority.
The governing statutory provision, § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, reads in relevant part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer.... The [SEC] shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” 15 U. S. C. §78n(e).
Section 14(e)’s first sentence prohibits fraudulent acts in connection with a tender offer. This self-operating proscription was one of several provisions added to the Exchange Act in 1968 by the Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454. The section’s second sentence delegates definitional and prophylactic rulemaking authority to the Commission. Congress added this rule-making delegation to § 14(e) in 1970 amendments to the Williams Act. See § 5, 84 Stat. 1497.
Through § 14(e) and other provisions on disclosure in the Williams Act, Congress sought to ensure that shareholders “confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock [would] not be required to respond without adequate information.” Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); see Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F. 2d 192, 195 (CA2 1980) (per curiam) (“very purpose” of Williams Act was “informed decision-making by shareholders”). As we recognized in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U. S. 1 (1985), Congress designed the Williams Act to make “disclosure, rather than court-imposed principles of ‘fairness’ or ‘artificiality,’ . . . the preferred method of market regulation.” Id., at 9, n. 8. Section 14(e), we explained, “supplements the more precise disclosure provisions found elsewhere in the Williams Act, while requiring disclosure more explicitly addressed to the tender offer context than that required by § 10(b).” Id., at 10-11.
Relying on § 14(e)’s rulemaking authorization, the Commission, in 1980, promulgated Rule 14e-3(a). That measure provides:
“(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the ‘offering person’), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the [Exchange] Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
“(1) The offering person,
“(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
“(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.” 17 CFR §240.14e-3(a) (1996).
As characterized by the Commission, Rule 14e-3(a) is a "disclose or abstain from trading” requirement. 45 Fed. Reg. 60410 (1980). The Second Circuit concisely described the Rule’s thrust:
“One violates Rule 14e-3(a) if he trades on the basis, of material nonpublic information concerning a pending tender offer that he knows or has reason to know has been acquired ‘directly or indirectly’ from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or someone working on their behalf. Rule 14e-3(a) is a disclosure provision. It creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information.” United States v. Chestman, 947 F. 2d 551, 557 (1991) (en banc) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 1004 (1992).
See also SEC v. Maio, 51 F. 3d 623, 635 (CA7 1995) (“Rule 14e-3 creates a duty to disclose material non-public information, or abstain from trading in stocks implicated by an impending tender offer, regardless of whether such information was obtained through a breach of fiduciary duty.” (emphasis added)); SEC v. Peters, 978 F. 2d 1162, 1165 (CA10 1992) (as written, Rule 14e-3(a) has no fiduciary duty requirement).
In the Eighth Circuit’s view, because Rule 14e-3(a) applies whether or not the trading in question breaches a fiduciary duty, the regulation exceeds the SEC’s § 14(e) rulemaking authority. See 92 F. 3d, at 624, 627. Contra, Maio, 51 F. 3d, at 634-635 (CA7); Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1165-1167 (CA10); Chestman, 947 F. 2d, at 556-563 (CA2) (all holding Rule 14e-3(a) a proper exercise of SEC’s statutory authority). In support of its holding, the Eighth Circuit relied on the text of § 14(e) and our decisions in Schreiber and Chiarella. See 92 F. 3d, at 624-627.
The Eighth Circuit homed in on the essence of §14(e)’s rulemaking authorization: “[T]he statute empowers the SEC to 'define* and ‘prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent’ ‘acts and practices’ which are ‘fraudulent.’” Id., at 624. All that means, the Eighth Circuit found plain, is that the SEC may “identify and regulate,” in the tender offer context, “acts and practices” the law already defines as “fraudulent”; but, the Eighth Circuit maintained, the SEC may not “create its own definition of fraud.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court, the Eighth Circuit pointed out, held in Schrei-ber that the word “manipulative” in the § 14(e) phrase “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices” means just what the word means in § 10(b): Absent misrepresentation or nondisclosure, an act cannot be indicted as manipulative. See 92 F. 3d, at 625 (citing Schreiber, 472 U. S., at 7-8, and n. 6). Section 10(b) interpretations guide construction of § 14(e), the Eighth Circuit added, see 92 F. 3d, at 625, citing this Court’s acknowledgment in Schreiber that §14(e)’s “ ‘broad antifraud prohibition’ . . . [is] modeled on the anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b). .. and Rule 10b-5,” 472 U. S., at 10 (citation omitted); see id., at 10-11, n. 10.
For the meaning of “fraudulent” under § 10(b), the Eighth Circuit looked to Chiarella. See 92 F. 3d, at 625. In that case, the Eighth Circuit recounted, this Court held that a failure to disclose information could be “fraudulent” under § 10(b) only when there was a duty to speak arising out of “ ‘a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence.’ ” Chiarella, 445 U. S., at 228 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)). Just as § 10(b) demands a showing of a breach of fiduciary duty, so such a breach is necessary to make out a § 14(e) violation, the Eighth Circuit concluded.
As to the Commission’s § 14(e) authority to “prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent acts, the Eighth Circuit stated: “Properly read, this provision means simply that the SEC has broad regulatory powers in the field of tender offers, but the statutory terms have a fixed meaning which the SEC cannot alter by way of an administrative rule.” 92 F. 3d, at 627.
The United States urges that the Eighth Circuit’s reading of § 14(e) misapprehends both the Commission’s authority to define fraudulent acts and the Commission’s power to prevent them. “The ‘defining’ power,” the United States submits, “would be a virtual nullity were the SEC not permitted to go beyond common law fraud (which is separately prohibited in the first [self-operative] sentence of Section 14(e)).” Brief for United States 11; see id., at 37.
In maintaining that the Commission’s power to define fraudulent acts under § 14(e) is broader than its rulemaking power under § 10(b), the United States questions the Court of Appeals’ reading of Schreiber. See Brief for United States 38-40. Parenthetically, the United States notes that the word before the Schreiber Court was “manipulative”; unlike “fraudulent,” the United States observes, “‘manipulative’ ... is ‘virtually a term of art when used in connection with the securities markets.’ ” Brief for United States 38, n. 20 (quoting Schreiber, 472 U. S., at 6). Most tellingly, the United States submits, Schreiber involved acts alleged to violate the self-operative provision in § 14(e)’s first sentence, a sentence containing language similar to § 10(b). But § 14(e)’s second sentence, containing the rulemaking authorization, the United States points out, does not track § 10(b), which simply authorizes the SEC to proscribe “manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s].” Brief for United States 38. Instead, § 14(e)’s rulemaking prescription tracks § 15(c)(2)(D) of the Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o(c)(2)(D), which concerns the conduct of broker-dealers in over-the-counter markets. See Brief for United States 38-39. Since 1938, see 52 Stat. 1075, § 15(c)(2) has given the Commission authority to “define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such [broker-dealer] acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” 15 U. S. C. § 78o(c)(2)(D). When Congress added this same rulemaking language to § 14(e) in 1970, the Government states, the Commission had already used its § 15(c)(2) authority to reach beyond common-law fraud. See Brief for United States 39, n. 22.
We need not resolve in this case whether the Commission’s authority under § 14(e) to “define . .. such acts and practices as are fraudulent” is broader than the Commission’s fraud-defining authority under § 10(b), for we agree with the United States that Rule 14e-3(a), as applied to cases of this genre, qualifies under § 14(e) as a “means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the tender offer context. A prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically encompasses more than the core activity prohibited. As we noted in Schreiber, § 14(e)’s rulemaking authorization gives the Commission “latitude,” even in the context of a term of art like “manipulative,” “to regulate nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed’ means of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in the meaning of the term ‘manipulative’ itself.” 472 U. S., at 11, n. 11. We hold, accordingly, that under § 14(e), the Commission may prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition is “reasonably designed to prevent . . . acts and practices [that] are fraudulent.” 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e).
Because Congress has authorized the Commission, in § 14(e), to prescribe legislative rules, we owe the Commission’s judgment “more than mere deference or weight.” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424-426 (1977). Therefore, in determining whether Rule 14e-3(a)’s “disclose or abstain from trading” requirement is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts, we must accord the Commission’s assessment “controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). In this case, we conclude, the Commission’s assessment is none of these.
In adopting the “disclose or abstain” rule, the SEC explained:
“The Commission has previously expressed and continues to have serious concerns about trading by persons in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer. This practice results in unfair disparities in market information and market disruption. Security holders who purchase from or sell to such persons are effectively denied the benefits of disclosure and the substantive protections of the Williams Act. If furnished with the information, these security holders would be able to make an informed investment decision, which could involve deferring the purchase or sale of the securities until the material information had been disseminated or until the tender offer had been commenced or terminated.” 45 Fed. Reg. 60412 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
The Commission thus justified Rule 14e-3(a) as a means necessary and proper to assure the efficacy of Williams Act protections.
The United States emphasizes that Rule 14e-3(a) reaches trading in which “a breach of duty is likely but difficult to prove.” Reply Brief 16. “Particularly in the context of a tender offer,” as the Tenth Circuit recognized, “there is a fairly wide circle of people with confidential information,” Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167, notably, the attorneys, investment bankers, and accountants involved in structuring the transaction. The availability of that information may lead to abuse, for “even a hint of an upcoming tender offer may send the price of the target company’s stock soaring.” SEC v. Materia, 745 F. 2d 197, 199 (CA2 1984). Individuals entrusted with nonpublic information, particularly if they have no long-term loyalty to the issuer, may find the temptation to trade on that information hard to resist in view of “the very large short-term profits potentially available [to them].” Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167.
“[I]t may be possible to prove circumstantially that a person [traded on the basis of material, nonpublic information], but almost impossible to prove that the trader obtained such information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed either by the trader or by the ultimate insider source of the information.” Ibid. The example of a “tippee” who trades on information received from an insider illustrates the problem. Under Rule 10b-5, “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.” Dirks, 463 U. S., at 660. To show that a tippee who traded on nonpublic information about a tender offer had breached a fiduciary duty would require proof not only that the insider source breached a fiduciary duty, but that the tippee knew or should have known of that breach. “Yet, in most cases, the only parties to the [information transfer] will be the insider and the alleged tippee.” Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167.
In sum, it is a fair assumption that trading on the basis of material, nonpublic'information will often involve a breach of a duty of confidentiality to the bidder or target company or their representatives. The SEC, cognizant of the proof problem that could enable sophisticated traders to escape responsibility, placed in Rule 14e-3(a) a “disclose or abstain from trading” command that does not require specific proof of a breach of fiduciary duty. That prescription, we are satisfied, applied to this case, is a “means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the tender offer context. See Chestman, 947 F. 2d, at 560 (“While dispensing with the subtle problems of proof associated with demonstrating fiduciary breach in the problematic area of tender offer insider trading, [Rule 14e-3(a)] retains a close nexus between the prohibited conduct and the statutory aims.”); accord, Maio, 51 F. 3d, at 635, and n. 14; Peters, 978 F. 2d, at 1167. Therefore, insofar as it serves to prevent the type of misappropriation charged against O’Hagan, Rule 14e-3(a) is a proper exercise of the Commission’s prophylactic power under § 14(e).
As an alternate ground for affirming the Eighth Circuit’s judgment, O’Hagan urges that Rule 14e-3(a) is invalid because it prohibits trading in advance of a tender offer — when “a substantial step ... to commence” such an offer has been taken — while § 14(e) prohibits fraudulent acts “in connection with any tender offer.” See Brief for Respondent 41-42. O’Hagan further contends that, by covering pre-offer conduct, Rule 14e-3(a) “fails to comport with due process on two levels”: The Rule does not “give fair notice as to when, in advance of a tender offer, a violation of § 14(e) occurs,” id., at 42; and it “disposes of any scienter requirement,” id., at 43. The Court of Appeals did not address these arguments, and O’Hagan did not raise the due process points in his briefs before that court. We decline to consider these contentions in the first instance. The Court of Appeals may address on remand any arguments O’Hagan has preserved.
HH
>
Based on its dispositions of the securities fraud convictions, the Court of Appeals also reversed O’Hagan’s convictions, under 18 U. S. C. § 1341, for mail fraud. See 92 F. 3d, at 627-628. Reversal of the securities convictions, the Court of Appeals recognized, “d[id] not as a matter of law require that the mail fraud convictions likewise be reversed.” Id., at 627 (citing Carpenter, 484 U. S., at 24, in which this Court unanimously affirmed mail and wire fraud convictions based on the same conduct that evenly divided the Court on the defendants’ securities fraud convictions). But in this case, the Court of Appeals said, the indictment was so structured that the mail fraud charges could not be disassociated from the securities fraud charges, and absent any securities fraud, “there was no fraud upon which to base the mail fraud charges.” 92 F. 3d, at 627-628.
The United States urges that the Court of Appeals’ position is irreconcilable with Carpenter: Just as in Carpenter, so here, the “mail fraud charges are independent of [the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both rest on the same set of facts.” Brief for United States 46-47. We need not linger over this matter, for our rulings on the securities fraud issues require that we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment on the mail fraud counts as well.
O’Hagan, we note, attacked the mail fraud convictions in the Court of Appeals on alternate grounds; his other arguments, not yet addressed by the Eighth Circuit, remain open for consideration on remand.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
As evidence that O’Hagan traded on the basis of nonpublic information misappropriated from his law firm, the Government relied on a conversation between O’Hagan and the Dorsey & Whitney partner heading the firm’s Grand Met representation. That conversation allegedly took place shortly before August 26,1988. See Brief for United States 4. O’Hagan urges that the Government’s evidence does not show he traded on the basis of nonpublic information. O’Hagan points to news reports on August 18 and 22,1988, that Grand Met was interested in acquiring Pillsbury, and to an earlier, August 12, 1988, news report that Grand Met had put up its hotel chain for auction to raise funds for an acquisition. See Brief for Respondent 4 (citing App. 73-74, 78-80). O’Hagan’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence remains open for consideration on remand.
O’Hagan was convicted of theft in state court, sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, and fined. See State v. O’Hagan, 474 N. W. 2d 613, 615, 623 (Minn. App. 1991). The Supreme Court of Minnesota disbarred O’Hagan from the practice of law. See In re O’Hagan, 450 N. W. 2d 571 (1990).
See, e. g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F. 2d 551, 566 (CA2 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 1004 (1992); SEC v. Cherif 933 F. 2d 403, 410 (CA7 1991), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 1071 (1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F. 2d 439, 453 (CA9 1990).
Twice before we have been presented with the question whether criminal liability for violation of § 10(b) may be based on a misappropriation theory. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 235-237 (1980), the jury had received no misappropriation theory instructions, so we declined to address the question. See infra, at 661. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19, 24 (1987), the Court divided evenly on whether, under the circumstances of that case, convictions resting on the misappropriation theory should be affirmed. See Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 Ohio St. L. J. 373, 375 (1988) (observing that “Carpenter was, by any reckoning, an unusual case,” for the information there misappropriated belonged not to a company preparing to engage in securities transactions, e. g., a bidder in a corporate acquisition, but to the Wall Street Journal).
The Government could not have prosecuted O’Hagan under the classical theory, for O’Hagan was not an “insider” of Pillsbury, the corporation in whose stock he traded. Although an “outsider” with respect to Pillsbury, O’Hagan had an intimate association with, and was found to have traded on confidential information from, Dorsey & Whitney, counsel to tender offeror Grand Met. Under the misappropriation theory, O’Hagan’s securities trading does not escape Exchange Act sanction, as it would under Justice Thomas’ dissenting view, simply because he was associated with, and gained nonpublie information from, the bidder, rather than the target.
Under the misappropriation theory urged in this case, the disclosure obligation runs to the source of the information, here, Dorsey & Whitney and Grand Met. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Chiarella, advanced a broader reading of § 10(b) and Rule 10b—5; the disclosure obligation, as he envisioned it, ran to those with whom the misappropriator trades. 445 U. S., at 240 (“a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading”); see also id., at 243, n. 4. The Government does not propose that we adopt a misappropriation theory of that breadth.
Where, however, a person trading on the basis of material, nonpublie information owes a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to two entities or persons — for example, a law firm and its client — but makes disclosure to only one, the trader may still be liable under the misappropriation theory.
Justice Thomas’ evident struggle to invent other uses to which O’Ha-gan plausibly might have put the nonpublie information, see post, at 685, is telling. It is imaginative to suggest that a trade journal would have paid O’Hagan dollars in the millions to publish his information. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-37. Counsel for O’Hagan hypothesized, as a nontrading use, that O’Hagan could have “misappropriat[ed] this information of [his] law firm and its client, delivered] it to [Pillsbury], and suggested] that [Pillsbury] in the future ... might find it very desirable to use [O’Hagan] for legal work.” Id., at 37. But Pillsbury might well have had large doubts about engaging for its legal work a lawyer who so stunningly displayed his readiness to betray a client’s confidence. Nor is the Commission’s theory “incoherent” or “inconsistent,” post, at 680, 692, for failing to inhibit use of confidential information for “personal amusement ... in a fantasy stock trading game,” post, at 685.
As noted earlier, however, see supra, at 654-655, the textual requirement of deception precludes § 10(b) liability when a person trading on the basis of nonpublic information has disclosed his trading plans to, or obtained authorization from, the principal — even though such conduct may affect the securities markets in the same manner as the conduct reached by the misappropriation theory. Contrary to Justice Thomas’ suggestion, see post, at 689-691, the fact that § 10(b) is only a partial antidote to the problems it was designed to alleviate does not call into question its prohibition of conduct that falls within its textual proscription. Moreover, once a disloyal agent discloses his imminent breach of duty, his principal may seek appropriate equitable relief under state law. Furthermore, in the context of a tender offer, the principal who authorizes an agent’s trading on confidential information may, in the Commission’s view, incur liability for an Exchange Act violation under Rule 14e-3(a).
The Eighth Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary was based in large part on Dirks’s reiteration of the Chiarella language quoted and discussed above. See 92 F. 3d 612, 618-619 (1996).
The United States additionally argues that Congress confirmed the validity of the misappropriation theory in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), § 2(1), 102 Stat. 4677, note following 15 U. S. C. § 78u-1. See Brief for United States 32-35. ITSFEA declares that “the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . governing trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information are, as required by such Act, necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors.” Note following 15 U. S. C. §78u-1. ITSFEA also includes a new §20A(a) of the Exchange Act expressly providing a private cause of action against persons whq violate the Exchange Act “by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information”; such an action may be brought by “any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased ... or sold . . . securities of the same class.” 15 U. S. C. § 78t-1(a). Because we uphold the misappropriation theory on the basis of § 10(b) itself, we do not address ITSFEA’s significance for eases of this genre.
In relevant part, § 32 of the Exchange Act, as set forth in 15 U. S. C, § 78ff(a), provides:
“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter ... or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter ... shall upon conviction be fined not more than $1,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or. both ...; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.”
The statute provides no such defense to imposition of monetary fines. See ibid.
In addition to § 14(e), the Williams Act and the 1970 amendments added to the Exchange Act the following provisions concerning disclosure: § 13(d), 15 U. S. C. § 78m(d) (disclosure requirements for persons acquiring more than five percent of certain classes of securities); § 13(e), 15 U. S. C. § 78m(e) (authorizing Commission to adopt disclosure requirements for certain repurchases of securities by issuer); § 14(d), 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d) (disclosure requirements when tender offer results in offeror owning more than five percent of a class of securities); § 14(f), 15 U. S. C. § 78n(f) (disclosure requirements when tender offer results in new corporate directors constituting a majority).
The Rule thus adopts for the tender offer context a requirement resembling the one Chief Justice Burger would have adopted in Chiarella for misappropriators under § 10(b). See supra, at 655, n. 6.
The Government draws our attention to the following measures: 17 CFR § 240.15e2-1 (1970) (prohibiting a broker-dealer’s hypothecation of a customer’s securities if hypothecated securities would be commingled with the securities of another customer, absent written consent); § 240.15c2-3 (prohibiting transactions by broker-dealers in unvalidated German securities); § 240.15c2-4 (prohibiting broker-dealers from accepting any part of the sale price of a security being distributed unless the money received is promptly transmitted to the persons entitled to it); §240.15c2-5 (requiring broker-dealers to provide written disclosure of credit terms and commissions in connection with securities sales in which broker-dealers extend credit, or participate in arranging for loans, to the purchasers). See Brief for United States 39, n. 22.
We leave for another day, when the issue requires decision, the legitimacy of Rule 14e-3(a) as applied to “warehousing,” which the Government describes as “the practice by which bidders leak advance information of a tender offer to allies and encourage them to purchase the target company’s stock before the bid is announced.” Reply Brief 17. As we observed in Chiarella, one of the Commission’s purposes in proposing Rule 14e-3(a) was “to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender offers.” 445 U. S., at 234. The Government acknowledges that trading authorized by a principal breaches no fiduciary duty. See Reply Brief 17. The instant ease, however, does not involve trading authorized by a principal; therefore, we need not here decide whether the Commission’s proscription of warehousing falls within its § 14(e) authority to define or prevent fraud.
The Commission’s power under § 10(b) is more limited. See supra, at 651 (Rule 10b-5 may proscribe only conduct that § 10(b) prohibits).
Justice Thomas’ dissent urges that the Commission must be precise about the authority it is exercising — that it must say whether it is acting to “define” or to “prevent” fraud — and that in this instance it has purported only to define, not to prevent. See post, at 696. Justice Thomas sees this precision in Rule 14e-3(a)’s words: “it shall constitute a fraudulent . . . act . . . within the meaning of section 14(e) . . . .” We do not find the Commission’s Rule vulnerable for failure to recite as a regulatory preamble: We hereby exercise our authority to,“define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, . . . [fraudulent] acts.” Sensibly read, the Rule is an exercise of the Commission’s full authority. Logically and practically, such a rule may be conceived and defended, alternatively, as definitional or preventive.
Justice Thomas opines that there is no reason to anticipate difficulties in proving breach of duty in “misappropriation” cases. “Once the source of the [purloined] information has been identified,” he asserts, “it should be a simple task to obtain proof of any breach of duty.” Post, at 697. To test that assertion, assume a misappropriating partner at Dorsey & Whitney told his daughter or son and a wealthy friend that a tender for Pillsbury was in the offing, and each tippee promptly purchased Pillsbury stock, the child borrowing the purchase price from the wealthy friend. Justice Thomas’ confidence, post, at 698, n. 12, that “there is no reason to suspect that the tipper would gratuitously protect the tippee,” seems misplaced.
Justice Thomas insists that even if the misappropriation of information from the bidder about a tender offer is fraud, the Commission has not explained why such fraud is “in connection with” a tender offer. Post, at 697, 698. What else, one can only wonder, might such fraud be “in connection with”?
Repeating the argument it made concerning the misappropriation theory, see supra, at 665, n. 11, the United States urges that Congress confirmed Rule 14e-3(a)’s validity in ITSFEA, 15 U. S. C. § 78u-1. See Brief for United States 44-45. We uphold Rule 14e-3(a) on the basis of § 14(e) itself and need not address ITSFEA’s relevance to this case.
As to O’Hagan’s scienter argument, we reiterate that 15 U. S. C. § 78ff(a) requires the Government to prove “willful[l] violation]” of the securities laws, and that lack of knowledge of the relevant rule is an affirmative defense to a sentence of imprisonment. See supra, at 665-666.
The Court of Appeals reversed respondent’s money laundering convictions on similar reasoning. See 92 F. 3d, at 628. Because the United States did not seek review of that ruling, we leave undisturbed that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
Justice Thomas finds O’Hagan’s convictions on the mail fraud counts, but not on the securities fraud counts, sustainable. Post, at 700-701. Under his view, securities traders like O’Hagan would escape SEC civil actions and federal prosecutions under legislation targeting securities fraud, only to be caught for their trading activities in the broad mail fraud net. If misappropriation theory cases could proceed only under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, practical consequences for individual defendants might not be large, see Aldave, 49 Ohio St. L. J., at 381, and n. 60; however, “proportionally more persons accused of insider trading [might] be pursued by a U. S, Attorney, and proportionally fewer by the SEC,” id., at 382. Our decision, of course, does not rest on such enforcement policy considerations. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent. | Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdisagreement |
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA v. ENTERPRISE WHEEL & CAR CORP.
No. 538.
Argued April 28, 1960.
Decided June 20, 1960.
Elliot Bredhoff and David E. Feller argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were Arthur J. Goldberg, James P. Clowes and Carney M. Layne.
William C. Beatty argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jackson N. Huddleston.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Brennan.
Petitioner union and respondent during the period relevant here had a collective bargaining agreement which provided that any differences “as to the meaning and application” of the agreement should be submitted to arbitration and that the arbitrator’s decision “shall be final and binding on the parties.” Special provisions were included concerning the suspension and discharge of employees. The agreement stated:
“Should it be determined by the Company or by an arbitrator in accordance with the grievance procedure that the employee has been suspended unjustly or discharged in violation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Company shall reinstate the employee and pay full, compensation at the employee’s regular rate of pay for the time lost.”
The agreement also provided:
. . It is understood and agreed that neither party will institute civil suits or legal proceedings against the other for alleged violation of any of the provisions of this labor contract; instead all disputes will be settled in the manner outlined in this Article III — Adjustment of Grievances.”
A group of employees left their jobs in protest against the discharge of one employee. A union official advised them at once to return to work. An official of respondent at their request gave them permission and then rescinded, it. The next day they were told they did not have a job any more “until this thing was settled one way or the other.”
• A grievance was filed; and when respondent finally refused to arbitrate^ this suit was brought for specific enforcement of the arbitration provisions of the agreement. The District Court ordered arbitration. The arbitrator found that the discharge of the men was not justified, though their conduct, he said, was improper. In his view the facts warranted at most a suspension of the men for 10 days each. After their discharge and before the arbitration award the collective bargaining agreement had expired. The union, however, continued to represent the workers at the plant. The arbitrator rejected the contention that expiration of the agreement barred reinstatement of the employees. He held that the provision of the agreement above quoted imposed an unconditional obligation on the employer. He awarded reinstatement with back pay, minus pay for a 10-day suspension and such sums as these employees received from other employment.
Respondent refused to comply with the award. Petitioner moved the District Court for enforcement. The District Court directed respondent to comply. 168 F. Supp. 308. The Court of Appeals, while agreeing that the District Court had jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement, held that the failure of the award to specify the amounts to be deducted from the back pay rendered the award unenforceable. That defect, it agreed, could be remedied by requiring the parties to complete the arbitration. It went on to hold, however, that an award for back pay subsequent to the date of termination of the collective bargaining agreement could not be enforced. It also held that the requirement for reinstatement of the discharged employees was likewise unenforceable because the collective bargaining agreement had expired. 269 F. 2d 327. We granted certiorari. 361 U. S. 929.
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards. As we stated in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., ante, p. 574, decided this day, the arbitrators under these collective agreements are indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining'process. They sit to settle disputes at the plant level — disputes that require for their solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected in particular agreements.
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency. Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words' manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
The opinion of the arbitrator in this case, as it bears upon the award of back pay beyond the date of the agreement's expiration and reinstatement, is ambiguous. It may be read as based solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation, which would mean that he exceeded the scope of the submission. Or it may be read as embodying a construction of the agreement itself, perhaps with the arbitrator looking to “the law” for help in determining the sense of the agreement. A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award. To reqhire opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing no supporting opinions. This would be undesirable for a well-reasoned opinion tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the underlying agreement. Moreover, we see no reason to assume that this arbitrator has abused the trust the parties confided in him and has not stayed within the areas marked out for his consideration. It is not apparent that he went beyond the submission. The Court of Appeals’ opinion refusing to enforce the reinstatement and partial back pay portions of the award was not based upon any finding that the arbitrator did not premise his award on his construction of the contract. It merely disagreed with the arbitrator’s construction of it.
The collective bargaining agreement could have provided that if any of the employees were wrongfully discharged, the remedy would be reinstatement and back pay up to the date they were returned to work. Respondent’s major argument seems to be that by applying correct principles of law to the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement it can be determined that the agreement did not so provide, and that therefore the arbitrator’s decision was not based upon the contract. The acceptance of this view would require courts, even under the standard arbitration clause, to review the merits of every construction of the contract. This plenary review by a court of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator’s decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be final. This underlines the fundamental error which we have alluded to in United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., ante, p. 564, decided this day. As we there emphasized, the question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the judgment of the District Court should be modified so that the amounts due the employees may be definitely determined by arbitration. In all other respects we think the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, except for that modification, and remand the case to the District Court for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante, p. 569.]
See Textile Workers v. Cone Mills Corp., 268 F. 2d 920 (C. A. 4th Cir.).
“Persons unfamiliar with mills and factories — farmers or professors, for example — often remark upon visiting them that they seem like another world. This is particularly true if, as in the steel industry, both tradition and technology have strongly and uniquely molded the ways men think and act when at work. The newly hired employee, the ‘green hand,’ is gradually initiated into what amounts to a miniature society. There he finds himself in a strange environment that assaults his senses with unusual sounds and smells and often with different ‘weather conditions’ such as sudden drafts of heat, cold, or humidity. He discovers that the society of which he only gradually becomes a part has of course a formal government of its own — the rules which management and the union have laid down — but that it also differs from or parallels the world outside in social classes, folklore, ritual, and traditions.
“Under the process in the old mills a very real ‘miniature society’ had grown up, and in important ways the technological revolution described in this case history shattered it. But a new society or work community was born immediately, though for a long time it developed slowly. As the old society was strongly molded by the discontinuous process of making pipe, so was the new one molded by the continuous process and strongly influenced by the characteristics of new high-speed automatic equipment.” Walker, Life in the Automatic Factory, 36 Harv. Bus. Rev. Ill, 117.
See Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 Cornell L. Q. 519, 522. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | Did administrative action occur in the context of the case? | [
"No",
"Yes"
] | [
0
] | sc_adminaction_is |
PENRY v. LYNAUGH, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
No. 87-6177.
Argued January 11, 1989
Decided June 26, 1989
O’ConnoR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and IV-A, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-B and III, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-A and IV-B, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-C. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 341. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 349. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 350.
Curtis C. Mason argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Charles A. Palmer, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Jim Mattox, Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General, Lou McCreary, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Michael P. Hodge and William C. Zapalac, Assistant Attorneys General.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association on Mental Retardation et al. by James W. Ellis, Ruth Luckas-son, Barbara Bergman, and Donald N. Bersoff; for the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association by David Botsford, Mark Stevens, and Carolyn Garcia; and for Billy Conn Gardner by Eugene 0. Duffy and Christine M. Wiseman.
Stanley G. Schneider filed a brief for the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-C.
In this case, we must decide whether petitioner, Johnny Paul Penry, was sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the jury was not instructed that it could consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence in imposing its sentence. We must also decide whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits Penry’s execution because he is mentally retarded.
H-I
On the morning of October 25, 1979, Pamela Carpenter was brutally raped, beaten, and stabbed with a pair of scissors in her home in Livingston, Texas. She died a few hours later in the course of emergency treatment. Before she died, she described her assailant. Her description led two local sheriff’s deputies to suspect Penry, who had recently been released on parole after conviction on another rape charge. Penry subsequently gave two statements confessing to the crime and was charged with capital murder.
At a competency hearing held before trial, a clinical psychologist, Dr. Jerome Brown, testified that Penry was mentally retarded. As a child, Penry was diagnosed as having organic brain damage, which was probably caused by trauma to the brain at birth. App. 34-35. Penry was tested over the years as having an IQ between 50 and 63, which indicates mild to moderate retardation. Id., at 36-38, 55. Dr. Brown’s own testing before the trial indicated that Penry had an IQ of 54. Dr. Brown’s evaluation also revealed that Penry, who was 22 years old at the time of the crime, had the mental age of a 654-year-old, which means that “he has the ability to learn and the learning or the knowledge of the average 654 year old kid.” Id., at 41. Penry’s social maturity, or ability to function in the world, was that of a 9- or 10-year-old. Dr. Brown testified that “there’s a point at which anyone with [Penry’s] IQ is always incompetent, but, you know, this man is more in the borderline range.” Id., at 47.
The jury found Penry competent to stand trial. Id., at 20-24. The guilt-innocence phase of the trial began on March 24, 1980. The trial court determined that Penry’s confessions were voluntary, and they were introduced into evidence. At trial, Penry raised an insanity defense and presented the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Jose Garcia. Dr. Garcia testified that Penry suffered from organic brain damage and moderate retardation, which resulted in poor impulse control and an inability to learn from experience. Id., at 18, 19, 87-90. Dr. Garcia indicated that Penry’s brain damage was probably caused at birth, id., at 106, but may have been caused by beatings and multiple injuries to the brain at an early age. Id., at 18, 90. In Dr. Garcia’s judgment, Penry was suffering from an organic brain disorder at the time of the offense which made it impossible for him to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law. Id., at 86-87.
Penry’s mother testified at trial that Penry was unable to learn in school and never finished the first grade. Penry’s sister testified that their mother had frequently beaten him over the head with a belt when he was a child. Penry was also routinely locked in his room without access to a toilet for long periods of time. Id., at 124, 126, 127. As a youngster, Penry was in and out of a number of state schools and hospitals, until his father removed him from state schools altogether when he was 12. Id., at 120. Penry’s aunt subsequently struggled for over a year to teach Penry how to print his name. Id., at 133.
The State introduced the testimony of two psychiatrists to rebut the testimony of Dr. Garcia. Dr. Kenneth Vogts-berger testified that although Penry was a person of limited mental ability, he was not suffering from any mental illness or defect at the time of the crime, and that he knew the difference between right and wrong and had the potential to honor the law. Id., at 144-145. In his view, Penry had characteristics consistent with an antisocial personality, including an inability to learn from experience and a tendency to be impulsive and to violate society’s norms. Id., at 149-150. He testified further that Penry’s low IQ scores underestimated his alertness and understanding of what went on around him. Id., at 146.
Dr. Felix Peebles also testified for the State that Penry was legally sane at the time of the offense and had a “full-blown anti-social personality.” Id., at 171. In addition, Dr. Peebles testified that he personally diagnosed Penry as being mentally retarded in 1973 and again in 1977, and that Penry “had a very bad life generally, bringing up.” Id., at 168-169. In Dr. Peebles’ view, Penry “had been socially and emotionally deprived and he had not learned to read and write adequately.” Id., at 169. Although they disagreed with the defense psychiatrist over the extent and cause of Penry’s mental limitations, both psychiatrists for the State acknowledged that Penry was a person of extremely limited mental ability, and that he seemed unable to learn from his mistakes. Id., at 149, 172-173.
The jury rejected Penry’s insanity defense and found him guilty of capital murder. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (1974 and Supp. 1989). The following day, at the close of the penalty hearing, the jury decided the sentence to be imposed on Penry by answering three “special issues”:
“(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
“(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
“(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 1989).
If the jury unanimously answers “yes” to each issue submitted, the trial court must sentence the defendant to death. Arts. 37.071(c)-(e). Otherwise, the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment. Ibid.
Defense counsel raised a number of objections to the proposed charge to the jury. With respect to the first special issue, he objected that the charge failed to define the term “deliberately.” App. 210. With respect to the second special issue, he objected that the charge failed to define the terms “probability,” “criminal acts of violence,” and “continuing threat to society.” Id., at 210-211. Defense counsel also objected to the charge because it failed to “authorize a discretionary grant of mercy based upon the existence of mitigating circumstances” and because it “fail[ed] to require as a condition to the assessment of the death penalty that the State show beyond a reasonable doubt that any aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh any mitigating circumstances.” Id., at 211. In addition, the charge failed to instruct the jury that it may take into consideration all of the evidence whether aggravating or mitigating in nature which was submitted in the full trial of the case. Id., at 212. Defense counsel also objected that, in light of Penry’s mental retardation, permitting the jury to assess the death penalty in this case amounted to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 211.
These objections were overruled by the trial court. The jury was then instructed that the State bore the burden of proof on the special issues, and that before any issue could be answered “yes,” all 12 jurors must be convinced by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to that issue should be “yes.” Id., at 25. The jurors were further instructed that in answering the three special issues, they could consider all the evidence submitted in both the guilt-innocence phase and the penalty phase of the trial. Id., at 26. The jury charge then listed the three questions, with the names of the defendant and the deceased inserted.
The jury answered “yes” to all three special issues, and Penry was sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Penry v. State, 691 S. W. 2d 636 (1985). That court held that terms such as “deliberately,” “probability,” and “continuing threat to society” used in the special issues need not be defined in the jury charge because the jury would know their common meaning. Id., at 653-654. The court concluded that Penry was allowed to present all relevant mitigating evidence at the punishment hearing, and that there was no constitutional infirmity in failing to require the jury to find that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones or in failing to authorize a discretionary grant of mercy based upon the existence of mitigating circumstances. Id., at 654. The court also held that imposition of the death penalty was not prohibited by virtue of Penry’s mental retardation. Id., at 654-655. This Court denied certiorari on direct review. Sub nom. Penry v. Texas, 474 U. S. 1073 (1986).
Penry then filed this federal habeas corpus petition challenging his death sentence. Among other claims, Penry argued that he was sentenced in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on how to weigh mitigating factors in answering the special issues and failed to define the term “deliberately.” Penry also argued that it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded person. The District Court denied relief, App. 234-273, and Penry appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment. 832 F. 2d 915 (1987). The court stressed, however, that it found considerable merit in Penry’s claim that the jury was not allowed to consider and apply all of his personal mitigating circumstances in answering the Texas special issues. Although the jury was presented with evidence that might mitigate Penry’s personal culpability for the crime, such as his mental retardation, arrested emotional development, and abused background, the jury could not give effect to that evidence by mitigating Penry’s sentence to life imprisonment. “Having said that it was a deliberate murder and that Penry will be a continuing threat, the jury can say no more.”. Id., at 920. In short, the court did not see how Penry’s mitigating evidence, under the instructions given, could be fully acted upon by the jury because “[tjhere is no place for the jury to say ‘no’ to the death penalty” based on the mitigating force of those circumstances. Id., at 925. Although the court questioned whether Penry was given the individualized sentencing that the Constitution requires, it ultimately concluded that prior Circuit decisions required it to reject Penry’s claims. Id., at 926. The court also rejected Penry’s contention that it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded person such as himself. Id., at 918 (citing Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F. 2d 338, 341 (CA5 1987)).
We granted certiorari to resolve two questions. 487 U. S. 1233 (1988). First, was Penry sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the jury was not adequately instructed to take into consideration all of his mitigating evidence and because the terms in the Texas special issues were not defined in such a way that the jury could consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence in answering them? Second, is it cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally retarded person with Penry’s reasoning ability?
I — I HH
A
Penry is currently before the Court on his petition in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Penry is before us on collateral review, we must determine, as a threshold matter, whether granting him the relief he seeks would create a “new rule.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 301 (1989). Under Teague, new rules will not be applied or announced in cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two exceptions. Id., at 311-313.
Teague was not a capital case, and the plurality opinion expressed no views regarding how the retroactivity approach adopted in Teague would be applied in the capital sentencing context. Id., at 314, n. 2. The plurality noted, however, that a criminal judgment necessarily includes the sentence imposed, and that collateral challenges to sentences “delay the enforcement of the judgment at issue and decrease the possibility that ‘there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation.’” Ibid, (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). See also Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 690-695 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). In our view, the finality concerns underlying Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity are applicable in the capital sentencing context, as are the two exceptions to his general rule of nonretroactivity. See Teague, supra, at 311-313.
B
As we indicated in Teague, “[i]n general ... a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” 489 U. S., at 301. Or, “[t]o put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). Teague noted that “[i]t is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule.” Ibid. Justice Harlan recognized “the inevitable difficulties that will arise in attempting ‘to determine whether a particular decision has really announced a “new” rule at all or whether it has simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law.’ ” Mackey, supra, at 695 (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). See generally Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 216-217 (1988) (concluding that Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985), did not announce a new rule but was “merely an application of the principle that governed our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, [442 U. S. 510 (1979),] which had been decided before petitioner’s trial took place”).
Penry’s conviction became final on January 13, 1986, when this Court denied his petition for certiorari on direct review of his conviction and sentence. Sub nom. Penry v. Texas, supra. This Court’s decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), were rendered before his conviction became final. Under the retroactivity principles adopted in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), Penry is entitled to the benefit of those decisions. Citing Lockett and Eddings, Penry argues that he was sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because, in light of the jury instructions given, the jury was unable to fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of his mental retardation and abused background, which he offered as the basis for a sentence less than death. Penry thus seeks a rule that when such mitigating evidence is presented, Texas juries must, upon request, be given jury instructions that make it possible for them to give effect to that mitigating evidence in determining whether a defendant should be sentenced to death. We conclude, for the reasons discussed below, that the rule Penry seeks is not a “new rule” under Teague.
Penry does not challenge the facial validity of the Texas death penalty statute, which was upheld against an Eighth Amendment challenge in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976). Nor does he dispute that some types of mitigating evidence can be fully considered by the sentencer in the absence of special jury instructions. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 175 (1988) (plurality opinion); id., at 185-186 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Instead, Penry argues that, on the facts of this case, the jury was unable to fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of his mental retardation and abused background in answering the three special issues. In our view, the relief Penry seeks does not “impos[e] a new obligation” on the State of Texas. Teague, supra, at 301. Rather, Penry simply asks the State to fulfill the assurance upon which Jurek was based: namely, that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present in imposing sentence.
In Jurek, the joint opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens noted that the Texas statute narrowed the circumstances in which the death penalty could be imposed to five categories of murders. 428 U. S., at 268. Thus, although Texas had not adopted a list of statutory aggravating factors that the jury must find before imposing the death penalty, “its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose,” id., at 270, and effectively “requires the sentencing authority to focus on the particularized nature of the crime.” Id., at 271. To provide the individualized sentencing determination required by the Eighth Amendment, however, the sentencer must be allowed to consider mitigating evidence. Ibid. Indeed, as Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976), made clear, “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Id., at 304 (plurality opinion).
Because the Texas death penalty statute does not explicitly mention mitigating circumstances, but rather directs the jury to answer three questions, Jurek reasoned that the statute’s constitutionality “turns on whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors.” 428 U. S., at 272. Although the various terms in the special questions had yet to be defined, the joint opinion concluded that the sentencing scheme satisfied the Eighth Amendment on the assurance that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would interpret the question concerning future dangerousness so as to allow the jury to consider whatever mitigating circumstances a defendant may be able to show, including a defendant’s prior criminal record, age, and mental or emotional state. Id., at 272-273.
Our decisions subsequent to Jurek have reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment mandates an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), a plurality of this Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Id., at 604 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court held unconstitutional the Ohio death penalty statute which mandated capital punishment upon a finding of one aggravating circumstance unless one of three statutory mitigating factors were present.
Lockett underscored Jurek,’s recognition that the constitutionality of the Texas scheme “turns on whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors.” Jurek, supra, at 272. The plurality opinion in Lockett indicated that the Texas death penalty statute had “survived the petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment attack [in Jurek] because three Justices concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had broadly interpreted the second question — despite its facial narrowness — so as to permit the sentencer to consider ‘whatever mitigating circumstances’ the defendant might be able to show.” 438 U. S., at 607. Thus, the Lockett plurality noted that neither the Texas statute upheld in 1976 nor the statutes that had survived facial challenges in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976), “clearly operated at that time to prevent the sen-tencer from considering any aspect of the defendant’s character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an independently mitigating factor.” Lockett, supra, at 607. Cf. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U. S. 393 (1987) (sustaining “as applied” challenge to Florida death penalty statute); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980) (sustaining “as applied” challenge to Georgia death penalty statute).
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), a majority of the Court reaffirmed that a sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as the basis for a sentence less than death. In Eddings, the Oklahoma death penalty statute permitted the defendant to introduce evidence of any mitigating circumstance, but the sentencing judge concluded, as a matter of law, that he was unable to consider mitigating evidence of the youthful defendant’s troubled family history, beatings by a harsh father, and emotional disturbance. Applying Lockett, we held that “[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.” 455 U. S., at 113-114 (emphasis in original). In that case, “it was as if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence [the defendant] proffered on his behalf.” Id., at 114.
Thus, at the time Penry’s conviction became final, it was clear from Lockett and Eddings that a State could not, consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant’s background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigate against imposing the death penalty. Moreover, the facial validity of the Texas death penalty statute had been upheld in Jurek on the basis of assurances that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to enable sentencing juries to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present. Penry argues that those assurances were not fulfilled in his particular case because, without appropriate instructions, the jury could not fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood in rendering its sentencing decision. The rule Penry seeks — that when such mitigating evidence is presented, Texas juries must, upon request, be given jury instructions that make it possible for them to give effect to that mitigating evidence in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed— is not a “new rule” under Teague because it is dictated by Eddings and Lockett. Moreover, in light of the assurances upon which Jurek was based, we conclude that the relief Penry seeks does not “impos[e] a new obligation” on the State of Texas. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301.
Underlying Lockett and Eddings is the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant. If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the appropriateness, of the death penalty, “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, Eddings makes clear that it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence. Hitchcock v. Dugger, supra. Only then can we be sure that the sen-tencer has treated the defendant as a “uniquely individual human bein[g]” and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence. Woodson, 428 U. S., at 304, 305. “Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.” California v. Brown, supra, at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Although Penry offered mitigating evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood as the basis for a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death, the jury that sentenced him was only able to express its views on the appropriate sentence by answering three questions: Did Penry act deliberately when he murdered Pamela Carpenter? Is there a probability that he will be dangerous in the future? Did he act unreasonably in response to provocation? The jury was never instructed that it could consider the evidence offered by Penry as mitigating evidence and that it could give mitigating effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.
Like the petitioner in Franklin v. Lynaugh, Penry contends that in the absence of his requested jury instructions, the Texas death penalty statute was applied in an unconstitutional manner by precluding the jury from acting upon the particular mitigating evidence he introduced. Franklin was the first case considered by this Court since Jurek to address a claim concerning the treatment of mitigating evidence under the Texas special issues. Like Jurek itself, Franklin did not produce a majority opinion for the Court. The Franklin plurality, and the two concurring Justices, concluded that Franklin was not sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the jury was free to give effect to his mitigating evidence of good behavior in prison by answering “no” to the question on future dangerousness. 487 U. S., at 177 (plurality opinion); id., at 185 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Moreover, a majority agreed that “residual doub[t]” as to Franklin’s guilt was not a constitutionally mandated mitigating factor. Id., at 173, and n. 6 (plurality opinion); id., at 187-188 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
In Franklin, however, the five concurring and dissenting Justices did not share the plurality’s categorical reading of Jurek. In the plurality’s view, Jurek had expressly and unconditionally upheld the manner in which mitigating evidence is considered under the special issues. Id., at 179-180, and n. 10. In contrast, five Members of the Court read Jurek as not precluding a claim that, in a particular case, the jury was unable to fully consider the mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant in answering the special issues. 487 U. S., at 183 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 199-200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, both the concurrence and the dissent understood Jurek as resting fundamentally on the express assurance that the special issues would permit the jury to fully consider all the mitigating evidence a defendant introduced that was relevant to the defendant’s background and character and to the circumstances of the offense. Moreover, both the concurrence and the dissent stressed that “the right to have the sentencer consider and weigh relevant mitigating evidence would be meaningless unless the sen-tencer was also permitted to give effect to its consideration” in imposing sentence. 487 U. S., at 185 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The concurrence in Franklin concluded that there was no Eighth Amendment violation in that case because Franklin’s evidence of his good prison behavior had no clear relevance to his character other than to demonstrate his ability to live in a highly structured prison environment without endangering others. Thus, the jury was able to give effect to the mitigating force of this evidence in answering the second special issue. The concurrence noted, however:
“If . . . petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, or that had relevance to the defendant’s moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral response’ to that evidence. If this were such a case, then we would have to decide whether the jury’s inability to give effect to that evidence amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id., at 185.
Penry argues that his mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse has relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues, and that the jury was unable to express its “reasoned moral response” to that evidence in determining whether death was the appropriate punishment. We agree. Thus, we reject the State’s contrary argument that the jury was able to consider and give effect to all of Penry’s mitigating evidence in answering the special issues without any jury instructions on mitigating evidence.
The first special issue asks whether the defendant acted “deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased . . . would result.” Neither the Texas Legislature nor the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have defined the term “deliberately,” and the jury was not instructed on the term, so we do not know precisely what meaning the jury gave to it. Assuming, however, that the jurors in this case understood “deliberately” to mean something more than that Penry was guilty of “intentionally” committing murder, those jurors may still have been unable to give effect to Penry’s mitigating evidence in answering the first special issue.
Penry’s mental retardation was relevant to the question whether he was capable of acting “deliberately,” but it also “had relevance to [his] moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questio[n].” Franklin, supra, at 185. Personal culpability is not solely a function of a defendant’s capacity to act “deliberately.” A rational juror at the penalty phase of the trial could have concluded, in light of Penry’s confession, that he deliberately killed Pamela Carpenter to escape detection. Because Penry was mentally retarded, however, and thus less able than a normal adult to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences of his conduct, and because of his history of childhood abuse, that same juror could also conclude that Penry was less morally “culpable than defendants who have no such excuse,” but who acted “deliberately” as that term is commonly understood. California v. Brown, 479 U. S., at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (evidence concerning a defendant’s “emotional history . . . bear[s] directly on the fundamental justice of imposing capital punishment”).
In the absence of jury instructions defining “deliberately” in a way that would clearly direct the jury to consider fully Penry’s mitigating evidence as it bears on his personal culpability, we cannot be sure that the jury was able to give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry’s mental retardation and history of abuse in answering the first special issue. Without such a special instruction, a juror who believed that Penry’s retardation and background diminished his moral culpability and made imposition of the death penalty unwarranted would be unable to give effect to that conclusion if the juror also believed that Penry committed the crime “deliberately.” Thus, we cannot be sure that the jury’s answer to the first special issue reflected a “reasoned moral response” to Penry’s mitigating evidence.
The second special issue asks “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” The mitigating evidence concerning Penry’s mental retardation indicated that one effect of his retardation is his inability to learn from his mistakes. Although this evidence is relevant to the second issue, it is relevant only as an aggravating factor because it suggests a “yes” answer to the question of future dangerousness. The prosecutor argued at the penalty hearing that there was “a very strong probability, based on the history of this defendant, his previous criminal record, and the psychiatric testimony that we’ve had in this case, that the defendant will continue to commit acts of this nature.” App. 214. Even in a prison setting, the prosecutor argued, Penry could hurt doctors, nurses, librarians, or teachers who worked in the prison.
Penry’s mental retardation and history of abuse is thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future. As Judge Reavley wrote for the Court of Appeals below:
“What was the jury to do if it decided that Penry, because of retardation, arrested emotional development and a troubled youth, should not be executed? If anything, the evidence made it more likely, not less likely, that the jury would answer the second question yes. It did not allow the jury to consider a major thrust of Penry’s evidence as mitigating evidence.” 832 F. 2d, at 925 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
The second special issue, therefore, did not provide a vehicle for the jury to give mitigating effect to Penry’s evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse.
The third special issue asks “whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.” On this issue, the State argued that Penry stabbed Pamela Carpenter with a pair of scissors not in response to provocation, but “for the purpose of avoiding detection.” App. 215. Penry’s own confession indicated that he did not stab the victim after she wounded him superficially with a scissors during a struggle, but rather killed her after her struggle had ended and she was lying helpless. Even if a juror concluded that Penry’s mental retardation and arrested emotional development rendered him less culpable for his crime than a normal adult, that would not necessarily diminish the “unreasonableness” of his conduct in response to “the provocation, if any, by the deceased.” Thus, a juror who believed Penry lacked the moral culpability to be sentenced to death could not express that view in answering the third special issue if she also con-eluded that Penry’s action was not a reasonable response to provocation.
The State contends, notwithstanding the three interrogatories, that Penry was free to introduce and argue the significance of his mitigating circumstances to the jury. In fact, defense counsel did argue that if a juror believed that Penry, because of the mitigating evidence of his mental retardation and abused background, did not deserve to be put to death, the juror should vote “no” on one of the special issues even if she believed the State had proved that the answer should be “yes.” Thus, Penry’s counsel stressed the evidence of Penry’s mental retardation and abused background, and asked the jurors, “can you be proud to be a party to putting a man to death with that affliction?” App. 222. He urged the jury to answer the first special issue “no” because “it would be the just answer, and I think it would be a proper answer.” Id., at 223. As for the prediction of the prosecution psychiatrist that Penry was likely to continue to get into trouble, the defense argued: “That may be true. But, a boy with this mentality, with this mental affliction, even though you have found that issue against us as to insanity, I don’t think that there is any question in a single one of you juror’s [sic] minds that there is something definitely wrong, basically, with this boy. And I think there is not a single one of you that doesn’t believe that this boy had brain damage. ...” Id., at 223-224. In effect, defense counsel urged the jury to “[t]hink about each of those special issues and see if you don’t find that we’re inquiring into the mental state of the defendant in each and every one of them.” Id., at 221.
In rebuttal, the prosecution countered by stressing that the jurors had taken an oath to follow the law, and that they must follow the instructions they were given in answering the special issues:
“You’ve all taken an oath to follow the law and you know what the law is. ... In answering these questions based on the evidence and following the law, and that’s all that I asked you to do, is to go out and look at the evidence. The burden of proof is on the State as it has been from the beginning, and we accept that burden. And I honestly believe that we have more than met that burden, and that’s the reason that you didn’t hear Mr. Newman [defense attorney] argue. He didn’t pick out these issues and point out to you where the State had failed to meet this burden. He didn’t point out the weaknesses in the State’s case because, ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you we’ve met our burden. . . . [Y]our job as jurors and your duty as jurors is not to act on your emotions, but to act on the law as the Judge has given it to you, and on the evidence that you have heard in this courtroom, then answer those questions accordingly.” Id., at 225-226.
In light of the prosecutor’s argument, and in the absence of appropriate jury instructions, a reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.
The State conceded at oral argument in this Court that if a juror concluded that Penry acted deliberately and was likely to be dangerous in the future, but also concluded that because of his mental retardation he was not sufficiently culpable to deserve the death penalty, that juror would be unable to give effect to that mitigating evidence under the instructions given in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The State contends, however, that to instruct the jury that it could render a discretionary grant of mercy, or say “no” to the death penalty, based on Penry’s mitigating evidence, would be to return to the sort of unbridled discretion that led to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). We disagree.
To be sure, Furman held that “in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 199 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). But as we made clear in Gregg, so long as the class of murderers subject to capital punishment is narrowed, there is no constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a jury to recommend mercy based on the mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant. Id., at 197-199, 203. As Justice White wrote in Gregg:
“The Georgia legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in the exercise of its discretion, while at the same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute, and I cannot accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound to fail. As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed become more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are particularly serious or for which the death penalty is particularly appropriate as they are in Georgia by reason of the aggravating-circumstance requirement, it becomes reasonable to expect that juries — even given discretion not to impose the death penalty — will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined. If they do, it can no longer be said that the penalty is being imposed wantonly and freakishly or so infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing device.” Id., at 222 (opinion concurring in judgment).
“In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer’s discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State’s ability to narrow a sentencer’s discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 304 (1987) (emphasis in original). Indeed, it is precisely because the punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant that the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s character or record or the circumstances of the offense. Rather than creating the risk of an unguided emotional response, full consideration of evidence that mitigates against the death penalty is essential if the jury is to give a “ ‘reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.’” Franklin, 487 U. S., at 184 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U. S., at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). In order to ensure “reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,” Woodson, 428 U. S., at 305, the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the circumstances of the crime.
In this case, in the absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry’s mental retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death penalty, we conclude that the jury was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its “reasoned moral response” to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision. Our reasoning in Lockett and Eddings thus compels a remand for resentencing so that we do not “risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.” Lockett, 438 U. S., at 605; Eddings, 455 U. S., at 119 (O’Connor, J., concurring). “When the choice is between fife and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Lockett, supra, at 605.
IV
Penry’s second claim is that it would be cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, to execute a mentally retarded person like himself with the reasoning capacity of a 7-year-old. He argues that because of their mental disabilities, mentally retarded people do not possess the level of moral culpability to justify imposing the death sentence. He also argues that there is an emerging national consensus against executing the mentally retarded. The State responds that there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing the retarded, and that existing procedural safeguards adequately protect the interests of mentally retarded persons such as Penry.
A
Under Teague, we address the retroactivity issue as a threshold matter because Penry is before us on collateral review. 489 U. S., at 310. If we were to hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry, we would be announcing a “new rule.” Id., at 301. Such a rule is not dictated by precedent existing at the time Penry’s conviction became final. Moreover, such a rule would “brea[k] new ground” and would impose a new obligation on the States and the Federal Government. Ibid. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 410 (1986), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of insane persons, as a case announcing a new rule).
In Teague, we concluded that a new rule will not be applied retroactively to defendants on collateral review unless it falls within one of two exceptions. Under the first exception articulated by Justice Harlan, a new rule will be retroactive if it places “‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’” Teague, supra, at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U. S., at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). Although Teague read this exception as focusing solely on new rules according constitutional protection to an actor’s primary conduct, Justice Harlan did speak in terms of substantive categorical guarantees accorded by the Constitution, regardless of the procedures followed. This Court subsequently held that the Eighth Amendment, as a substantive matter, prohibits imposing the death penalty on a certain class of defendants because of their status, Ford v. Wainwright, supra, at 410 (insanity), or because of the nature of their offense, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977) (rape) (plurality opinion). In our view, a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the State’s power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the State’s power to punish at all. In both cases, the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the finality and comity concerns underlying Justice Harlan’s view of retro-activity have little force. As Justice Harlan wrote: “There is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose.” Mackey, supra, at 693. Therefore, the first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Thus, if we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule would fall under the first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable to defendants on collateral review. Accordingly, we address the merits of Penry’s claim.
B
The Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. At a minimum, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. Ford v. Wainwright, supra, at 405; Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 285-286 (1983). The prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment are not limited, however, to those practices condemned by the common law in 1789. Ford, supra, at 406; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 171. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments also recognizes the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); Ford, supra, at 406. In discerning those “evolving standards,” we have looked to objective evidence of how our society views a particular punishment today. See Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593-597; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 788-796 (1982). The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures. We have also looked to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries. Enmund, supra, at 794-796; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815, 831 (1988) (plurality opinion).
It was well settled at common law that “idiots,” together with “lunatics,” were not subject to punishment for criminal acts committed under those incapacities. As Blackstone wrote:
“The second case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of crimes, arises also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz. in an idiot or a lunatic. . . . [IJdiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself. . . . [A] total idiocy, or absolute insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of the senses. ...” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24 — *25 (emphasis in original).
See also 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 1-2 (7th ed. 1795) (“[TJhose who are under a natural disability of distinguishing between good and evil, as . . . ideots, and lunaticks are not punishable by any criminal prosecution whatsoever”). Idiocy was understood as “a defect of understanding from the moment of birth,” in contrast to lunacy, which was “a partial derangement of the intellectual faculties, the senses returning at uncertain intervals.” Id., at 2, n. 2.
There was no one definition of idiocy at common law, but the term “idiot” was generally used to describe persons who had a total lack of reason or understanding, or an inability to distinguish between good and evil. Hale wrote that a person who is deaf and mute from birth “is in presumption of law an ideot. . . because he hath no possibility to understand what is forbidden by law to be done, or under what penalties: but if it can appear, that he hath the use of understanding, . . . then he may be tried, and suffer judgment and execution.” 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 34 (1736) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 29 (citing A. Fitzherbert, 2 Natura Brevium 233 (7th ed. 1730)); Trial of Edward Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 765 (Eng. 1724) (“[A] man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment”); S. Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 128-144 (1925).
The common law prohibition against punishing “idiots” and “lunatics” for criminal acts was the precursor of the insanity defense, which today generally includes “mental defect” as well as “mental disease” as part of the legal definition of insanity. See, e. g., American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §4.01, p. 61 (1985) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law”); 18 U. S. C. § 17 (1982 ed., Supp. V) (it is an affirmative defense to federal prosecution if “the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts” at the time the offense was committed). See generally Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 432-444 (1985).
In its emphasis on a permanent, congenital mental deficiency, the old common law notion of “idiocy” bears some similarity to the modern definition of mental retardation. Ellis & Luckasson, supra, at 417. The common law prohibition against punishing “idiots” generally applied, however, to persons of such severe disability that they lacked the reasoning capacity to form criminal intent or to understand the difference between good and evil. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the term “idiot” was used to describe the most retarded of persons, corresponding to what is called “profound” and “severe” retardation today. See A AMR, Classification in Mental Retardation 179 (H. Grossman ed. 1983); id., at 9 (“idiots” generally had IQ of 25 or below).
The common law prohibition against punishing “idiots” for their crimes suggests that it may indeed be “cruel and unusual” punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. Because of the protections afforded by the insanity defense today, such a person is not likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment. See ÁBA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-9.1, commentary, p. 460 (2d ed. 1980) (most retarded people who reach the point of sentencing are mildly retarded). Moreover, under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986), someone who is “unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it” cannot be executed. Id., at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Such a case is not before us today. Penry was found competent to stand trial. In other words, he was found to have the ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and was found to have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960); App. 20-24. In addition, the jury rejected his insanity defense, which reflected their conclusion that Penry knew that his conduct was wrong and was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01(a) (1974 and Supp. 1989).
Penry argues, however, that there is objective evidence today of an emerging national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded, reflecting the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 101. Brief for Petitioner 37-39. The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, §7001(1), 102 Stat. 4390, 21 U. S. C. §848(1) (1988 ed.), prohibits execution of a person who is mentally retarded. Only one State, however, currently bans execution of retarded persons who have been found guilty of a capital offense. Ga. Code Ann. § 17 — 7—131(j) (Supp. 1988). Maryland has enacted a similar statute which will take effect on July 1, 1989. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (1989).
In contrast, in Ford v. Wainwright, which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the insane, considerably more evidence of a national consensus was available. No State permitted the execution of the insane, and 26 States had statutes explicitly requiring suspension of the execution of a capital defendant who became insane. Ford, 477 U. S., at 408, n. 2. Other States had adopted the common law prohibition against executing the insane. Ibid. Moreover, in examining the objective evidence of contemporary standards of decency in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the plurality noted that 18 States expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty statutes, and all of them required that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the offense. 487 U. S., at 829, and n. 30. In our view, the two state statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus.
Penry does not offer any evidence of the general behavior of juries with respect to sentencing mentally retarded defendants, nor of decisions of prosecutors. He points instead to several public opinion surveys that indicate strong public opposition to execution of the retarded. For example, a poll taken in Texas found that 86% of those polled supported the death penalty, but 73% opposed its application to the mentally retarded. Reply Brief for Petitioner 6-7; Austin American Statesman, November 15, 1988, p. B3. A Florida poll found 71% of those surveyed were opposed to the execution of mentally retarded capital defendants, while only 12% were in favor. Brief for Petitioner 38; App. 279. A Georgia poll found 66% of those polled opposed to the death penalty for the retarded, 17% in favor, with 16% responding that it depends how retarded the person is. Brief for Petitioner 38; App. 283. In addition, the AAMR, the country’s oldest and largest organization of professionals working with the mentally retarded, opposes the execution of persons who are mentally retarded. AAMR, Resolution on Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, January 1988, App. to Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae la-2a (hereafter Amici Brief for AAMR et al.). The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we can rely. But at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
C
Relying largely on objective evidence such as the judgments of legislatures and juries, we have also considered whether application of the death penalty to particular categories of crimes or classes of offenders violates the Eighth Amendment because it “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering” or because it is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S., at 592 (plurality opinion); Thompsons v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S., at 833 (plurality opinion); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S., at 798-801. Gregg noted that “[t]he death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 183 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). “The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” Tison v. Arizona, supra, at 149. See also Enmund, supra, at 825 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (the Eighth Amendment concept of “proportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant’s blameworthiness”).
Penry argues that execution of a mentally retarded person like himself with a reasoning capacity of approximately a 7-year-old would be cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate to his degree of personal culpability. Brief for Petitioner 49-50. Just as the plurality in Thompson reasoned that a juvenile is less culpable than an adult for the same crime, 487 U. S., at 835, Penry argues that mentally retarded people do not have the judgment, perspective, and self-control of a person of normal intelligence. In essence, Penry argues that because of his diminished ability to control his impulses, to think in long-range terms, and to learn from his mistakes, he “is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty,” id., at 823.
The AAMR and other groups working with the mentally retarded agree with Penry. They argue as amici that all mentally retarded people, regardless of their degree of retardation, have substantial cognitive and behavioral disabilities that reduce their level of blameworthiness for a capital offense. Amici Brief for AAMR et al. 5-9, 13-15. Amici do not argue that people with mental retardation cannot be held responsible or punished for criminal acts they commit. Rather, they contend that because of “disability in the areas of cognitive impairment, moral reasoning, control of impul-sivity, and the ability to understand basic relationships between cause and effect,” mentally retarded people cannot act with the level of moral culpability that would justify imposition of the death sentence. Id., at 4. Thus, in their view, execution of mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses serves no valid retributive purpose. Id., at 19.
It is clear that mental retardation has long been regarded as a factor that may diminish an individual’s culpability for a criminal act. See supra, at 331-333; ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-9.3, commentary, at 463; State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 310, 125 N. W. 2d 918, 927 (1964). See generally Ellis & Luckasson, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 414. In its most severe forms, mental retardation may result in complete exculpation from criminal responsibility. Moreover, virtually all of the States with death penalty statutes that list statutory mitigating factors include as a mitigating circumstance evidence that “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.” A number of States explicitly mention “mental defect” in connection with such a mitigating circumstance. Indeed, as the Court holds in Part III of this opinion, the sentencing body must be allowed to consider mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance in making the individualized determination whether death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case.
On the record before the Court today, however, I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded people of Penry’s ability — by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of their personal responsibility — inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty. Mentally retarded persons are individuals whose abilities and experiences can vary greatly. As the AAMR’s standard work, Classification in Mental Retardation, points out:
“The term mental retardation, as commonly used today, embraces a heterogeneous population, ranging from totally dependent to nearly independent people. Although all individuals so designated share the common attributes of low intelligence and inadequacies in adaptive behavior, there are marked variations in the degree of deficit manifested and the presence or absence of associated physical handicaps-, stigmata, and psychologically disordered states.” Classification in Mental Retardation, at 12.
In addition to the varying degrees of mental retardation, the consequences of a retarded person’s mental impairment, including the deficits in his or her adaptive behavior, “may be ameliorated through education and habilitation.” Ellis & Luckasson, supra, at 424, n. 54. Although retarded persons generally have difficulty learning from experience, Amici Brief for AAMR et al. 7, some are fully “capable of learning, working, and living in their communities.” Id., at 6. See American Association on Mental Deficiency, Monograph 6, Lives in Process: Mildly Retarded Adults in a Large City (R. Edgerton ed. 1984). In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of mentally retarded persons, it cannot be said on the record before us today that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty.
Penry urges us to rely on the concept of “mental age,” and to hold that execution of any person with a mental age of seven or below would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-25. Mental age is “calculated as the chronological age of nonretarded children whose average IQ test performance is equivalent to that of the individual with mental retardation.” Amici Brief for AAMR et al. 14, n. 6. See D. Wechsler, The Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelligence 24-25 (4th ed. 1958). Such a rule should not be adopted today. First, there was no finding below by the judge or jury concerning Penry’s “mental age.” One of Penry’s expert witnesses, Dr. Brown, testified that he estimated Penry’s “mental age” to be 6)4. App. 41. That same expert estimated that Penry’s “social maturity” was that of a 9- or 10-year-old. Ibid. As a more general matter, the “mental age” concept, irrespective of its intuitive appeal, is problematic in several respects. As the AAMR acknowledges, “[t]he equivalence between nonretarded children and retarded adults is, of course, imprecise.” Amici Brief for AAMR et al. 14, n. 6. The “mental age” concept may underestimate the life experiences of retarded adults, while it may overestimate the ability of retarded adults to use logic and foresight to solve problems. Ibid. The mental age concept has other limitations as well. Beyond the chronological age of 15 or 16, the mean scores on most intelligence tests cease to increase significantly with age. Wechsler 26. As a result, “[t]he average mental age of the average 20 year old is not 20 but 15 years.” Id., at 27. See also In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 429, 584 P. 2d 524, 531 (1978) (“[T]he ‘mental age’ of the average adult under present norms is approximately 16 years and 8 months”).
Not surprisingly, courts have long been reluctant to rely on the concept of mental age as a basis for exculpating a defendant from criminal responsibility. See, e. g., In re Ramon M., supra, at 429, 584 P. 2d, at 531; State v. Schilling, 95 N. J. L. 145, 148, 112 A. 400, 402 (1920); People v. Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 267, 176 N. E. 314, 316 (1931); Chriswell v. State, 171 Ark. 255, 259, 283 S. W. 981, 983 (1926). Cf. Pickett v. State, 71 So. 2d 102, 107 (Ala. 1954). See generally Ellis & Luckasson, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 435. Moreover, reliance on mental age to measure the capabilities of a retarded person for purposes of the Eighth Amendment could have a disempowering effect if applied in other areas of the law. Thus, on that premise, a mildly mentally retarded person could be denied the opportunity to enter into contracts or to marry by virtue of the fact that he had a “mental age” of a young child. In light of the inherent problems with the mental age concept, and in the absence of better evidence of a national consensus against execution of the retarded, mental age should not be adopted as a line-drawing principle in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence..
In sum, mental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant’s culpability for a capital offense. But we cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry’s ability convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone. So long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental retardation in imposing sentence, an individualized determination whether “death is the appropriate punishment” can be made in each particular case. While a national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge reflecting the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” there is insufficient evidence of such a consensus today.
Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Persons who are mentally retarded are described as having “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period.” American Association on Mental Deficiency (now Retardation) (AAMR), Classification in Mental Retardation 1 (H. Grossman ed. 1983). To be classified as mentally retarded, a person generally must have an IQ of 70 or below. Id., at 11. Under the AAMR classification system, individuals with IQ scores between 50-55 and 70 have “mild” retardation. Individuals with scores between 35-40 and 50-55 have “moderate” retardation. “Severely” retarded people have IQ scores between 20-25 and 35-40, and “profoundly” retarded people have scores below 20 or'25. Id., at 13. Approximately 89% of retarded persons are “mildly” retarded. Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 423 (1985).
Ala. Code § 13A-5-51(6) (1982). See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-702(E)(2) (Supp. 1988); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-ll-103(5)(b) (1986 and Supp. 1988); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(g)(2) (1989); Fla. Stat. §921.141(6)(f) (1987); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(f) (Supp. 1988); Mo. Rev. Stat. §565.032(3X6) (1986); Mont. Code Ann. §46-18-304(4) (1987); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5 (II)(b)(4) (1986); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6(C) (1987); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(f)(6) (1988); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(3) (1982); S. C. Code § 16-3-20(C)(b)(6) (1985); Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (1983); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102(j)(vi) (1988).
Ark. Code Ann. §5-4-605(3) (1987); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3(h) (West 1988); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.025(2)(b)7 (Baldwin 1984); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.5(e) (West 1984); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2523 (2)(g) (1985); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C: ll-3(c)(5)(d) (West Supp. 1988); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)(3) (1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(j)(8) (1982); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.070(6) (1987). Other formulations are used in Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (1988); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413 (g)(4) (1988); and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(d) (Supp. 1988). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"involuntary confession",
"habeas corpus",
"plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise",
"retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)",
"search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)",
"search and seizure, vehicles",
"search and seizure, Crime Control Act",
"contempt of court or congress",
"self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)",
"Miranda warnings",
"self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution",
"right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)",
"line-up",
"discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)",
"double jeopardy",
"ex post facto (state)",
"extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous",
"extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence",
"extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom",
"extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)",
"extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance",
"extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)",
"extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity",
"confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous",
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: assault",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous",
"jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)",
"speedy trial",
"miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)"
] | [
12
] | sc_issue_1 |
UNITED STATES v. CAMPOS-SERRANO
No. 70-46.
Argued October 14, 1971
Decided December 20, 1971
William Bradford Reynolds argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Roger A. Pauley.
John J. Cleary, by appointment of the Court, 401 U. S. 990, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
William J. Scott, Attorney General, Joel M. Flaum, First Assistant Attorney General, and James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Illinois as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent was convicted in a federal district court of possession of a counterfeit alien registration receipt card in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1546, and sentenced to a three-year prison term. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, 430 F. 2d 173, holding that because of the circumstances under which Government agents had acquired the card from the respondent, it had been unconstitutionally admitted against him at the trial under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. We granted certiorari. 401 U. S. 936. We do not reach the constitutional issue, however, for we have concluded that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed upon a discrete statutory ground. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandéis, J., concurring). We hold that possession of a counterfeit alien registration receipt card is not an act punishable under 18 U. S. C. § 1546.
The statutory provision in question prohibits, inter alia, the counterfeiting or alteration of, or the possession, use, or receipt of an already counterfeited or altered “immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States.” This offense originated in Section 22 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1924, which covered only an “immigration visa or permit.” The words “other document required for entry into the United States,” were added in 1952 as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act. §402 (a), 66 Stat. 275. The legislative history of the 1952 Act, however, does not make clear which “other” entry documents the Congress had in mind.
Alien registration receipt cards were first issued in 1941. They are small, simple cards containing the alien’s picture and basic identification information. They have no function whatsoever in facilitating the initial entry into the United States. Rather, they are issued after an alien has entered the country and taken up residence. Their essential purpose is to effectuate the registration requirement fór all resident aliens established in the Alien Registration Act of 1940.
Until 1952, alien registration receipt cards could not even be used to facilitate re-entry into the United States by a resident alien who had left temporarily. Such an alien was required to obtain special documents authorizing his re-entry into the country, such as a visa or a re-entry permit. However, in 1952 — less than a month before final enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act — the Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated a regulation that allowed resident aliens to use their registration receipt cards for re-entry purposes as a permissible substitute for the specialized documents. The apparent reason for this regulation was to minimize paper work and streamline administrative procedures by giving resident aliens the option of using for re-entry a document already issued and serving other purposes. Thus, the registration receipt cards may now be used in lieu of a visa or a re-entry permit on condition that the holder is returning to the United States after a temporary absence of not more than one year.
The Court of Appeals held that the limited, merely permissible, re-entry function of the alien registration receipt card is sufficient to make it a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546. 430 F. 2d, at 175. We cannot agree. It has long been settled that “penal statutes are to be construed strictly,” Federal Communications Comm’n v. American Broadcasting Co,, 347 U. S. 284, 296, and that one “is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it,” Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U. S. 356, 362. “[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222. In § 1546, Congress did speak in “clear and definite” language. But, taken literally and given its plain and ordinary meaning, that language does not impose a criminal penalty for possession of a counterfeited alien registration receipt card. Alien registration receipt cards may be used for re-entry by certain persons into the United States. They are not required for entry.
The canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, of course, “does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.” United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 510. If an absolutely literal reading of a statutory provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose, a less literal construction must be considered. In this spirit, we read § 1546 in conjunction with 8 U. S. C. §1101 (a) (13) — another part of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act — which provides that, under most circumstances, an “entry” into the United States is defined to include a “re-entry.” We have held in the past that Congress did not intend these terms to be taken entirely synonymously. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449. But Congress clearly did intend a significant overlap, and we cannot say that a document usable for “entry” into the United States under § 1546 does not include some documents usable for “re-entry.” Nor do we hold that § 1546 applies only to those documents absolutely “required” in order to enter or re-enter the country. To do so would undermine the congressional purpose behind § 1546, since the Immigration and Naturalization Service has not required that presentation of any one particular document be the exclusive condition of crossing our borders.
While the apparent congressional purpose underlying § 1546 would thus seem to bar an uncompromisingly literal construction, the precise language of the provision must not be deprived of all force. The principle of strict construction of criminal statutes demands that some determinate limits be established based upon the actual words of the statute. Accordingly, a “document required for entry into the United States” cannot be construed to include any document whatsoever that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, from time to time, decides may be presented for re-entry at the border. The language of § 1546 denotes a very special class of “entry” documents — documents whose primary raison d’etre is the facilitation of entry into the country. The phrase, “required for entry into the United States,” is descriptive of the nature of the documents; it is not simply an open-ended reference to future administrative regulations.
If, for example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service were to allow the presentation of identification such as a driver’s license at the border, the nature of such a license would not suddenly change so that it would fall into the category of a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546. To be sure, if a counterfeit driver’s license were presented to secure entry or re-entry into the country, the bearer could be prosecuted under 8 U. S. C. § 1325, which provides for the punishment of “[a]ny alien who . . . obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation . . . .” But mere possession of a counterfeit driver’s license, far from the border, could not be prosecuted under § 1546. The reason is that a driver’s license is not essentially an “entry” document. Rather, its primary purpose is to allow its bearer lawfully to drive a car, and the bearer’s possession of a counterfeit license, far from the border, could not be assumed to be related to the policies underlying the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.
The same analysis applies to the alien registration receipt card. Its essential purpose is not to secure entry into the United States, but to identify the bearer as a lawfully registered alien residing in the United States. It is issued to an alien after he has taken up residence in this country. It is intended to govern his activities and presence within this country. The card has been given a convenient, additional function as a permissible substitute for a visa or re-entry permit in facilitating re-entry into the United States by a resident alien. But, unlike a visa or a re-entry permit, an alien registration receipt card serves this function in only a secondary way. Unlike a visa or a re-entry permit, it is not, by its nature, a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546.
This construction of the language of § 1546 is conclusively supported by that section’s statutory context. In the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress clearly regarded alien registration receipt cards as serving policies separate and distinct from those served by pure “entry” documents. Although, in 1952, those cards could be used as substitutes for visas or re-entry permits, the Congress chose to deal with them separately. In 8 U. S. C. § 1306 (c) and § 1306 (d), it specifically provided for the punishment of one “who procures or attempts to procure registration of himself or another person through fraud” and of one who counterfeits an alien registration receipt card. The fact that the Congress did not rely on § 1546 to ensure the integrity of alien registration receipt cards indicates that it did not believe that they were covered by that section. Moreover, there is a very specific overlap between § 1546 and § 1306. Both sections explicitly prohibit counterfeiting, and both explicitly prohibit fraud in the acquisition of documents. Unless we assume that § 1306 is mere sur-plusage, we must conclude that § 1546 covers only specialized “entry” documents, and not alien registration receipt cards specifically covered in § 1306.
For these reasons the judgment is
Affirmed.
The applicable portion of § 1546 reads as follows:
“Whoever . . . knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, or document, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained ....
“Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
The sentence was suspended, and the respondent was placed on probation for three years “on condition that he return to Mexico and not return to the United States illegally.” Pursuant to this sentence, he was remanded to the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation under a previous order. It appears that he is now in Mexico. Clearly, the fact that the respondent is now out of the country does not render this case moot. He is still under the sentence of the District Court and on probation subject to conditions imposed by the District Court. Should he violate those conditions, he will be subject to imprisonment under his continuing criminal sentence.
Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189, is irrelevant to this case. There, the -petitioner fled voluntarily from the United States and successfully resisted extradition. We, therefore, declined to consider the merits of his case, just as we have declined over the years to consider the merits of criminal cases in which the party seeking review has escaped “from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366; Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692; Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97. “While such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles [the party] to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, supra, at 366. In the present case, by contrast, the respondent has not fled from the restraints imposed by the District Court pursuant to this conviction. Rather, he is living under those restraints today.
“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”
Accord, United States v. Fernandez-Gonzalez (64 CR 101, ND Ill.) (unpublished opinion). Contrary to the suggestion in the dissenting opinion, our decision on this issue of statutory construction will hardly come as a “surprise” to the parties. The issue was presented to and decided by the Court of Appeals. It was argued and fully briefed before this Court by both parties.
43 Stat. 165.
See H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. The only one of these reports to make any mention whatsoever of the changes in § 1546 was H. R. Rep. No. 1365. It simply stated that “necessary amendments [are made] to other laws .... Most of those amendments are in the nature of conforming changes.” Id., at 88. It seems most likely that the purpose of the new language in § 1546 was to reach the specialized border-crossing identification cards, authorized as a substitute for a visa or a permit in the Alien Registration Act of 1940. See n. 9 and n. 12, infra. At the time H. R. Rep. No. 1365 was published, the alien registration receipt card had no “entry” or “re-entry” function.
The Appendix filed by the Government in this case contains a reproduction of an alien registration receipt card, Form 1-151 of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
See 54 Stat. 673. The statutory provisions for the registration of aliens are now contained in 8 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1306.
Provision for the use of re-entry permits was made in the Immigration Act of 1924, § 10, 43 Stat. 158. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 required that an alien present one of three special documents — a visa, a re-entry permit, or a border-crossing identification card — in order to come into the United States. 54 Stat. 673.
The 1952 INS regulation provided that the alien registration receipt card could be used as a permissible substitute for a visa or a re-entry permit in effecting a re-entry into this country from a contiguous country. 17 Fed. Reg. 4921. In 1957, this permissible use of the alien registration receipt card was expanded to include re-entry from noncontiguous nations. 22 Fed. Reg. 6377. The present INS regulation appeals in 8 CFR §211.1 (b).
8 CFR §211.1 (b).
Visas and re-entry permits are the specialized “entry” documents for which the alien registration receipt card is a permissible substitute under present INS regulations. See n. 10, supra.
Border-crossing identification cards are like visas and re-entry permits, and unlike alien registration receipt cards, in that they are specialized documents whose sole purpose and function is to regulate the crossing of our national borders. Hence; the likelihood that Congress in 1952 wished to expand the coverage of § 1546 to reach border-crossing identification cards, see n. 6, supra, supports our holding. The expansion mandated by Congress was simply within the class of specialized “entry” documents.
The prohibition of counterfeiting in § 1546 is contained in the first paragraph of that section. See n. 1, supra. The prohibition of fraud in the acquisition of documents is contained in the third paragraph of § 1546, which reads as follows:
“Whoever, when applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States, or for admission to the United States personates another, or falsely appears in the name of a deceased individual, or evades or attempts to evade the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name without disclosing his true identity ....
“Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
“ `[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115-116. See Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307-308. To be sure, the overlap between § 1546 and § 1306 is only partial, since § 1546 goes farther than § 1306—prohibiting the possession of counterfeit documents as well as the counterfeiting of documents. But the Congress would hardly have thought it necessary to create any overlap at all, if it had believed alien registration receipt cards were covered by § 1546. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_lcdisposition |
McKENNON v. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO.
No. 93-1543.
Argued November 2, 1994
Decided January 23, 1995
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Michael E. Terry argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Eric Schnapper.
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Kent L. Jones, Dennis J. Dimsey, Mark L. Gross, James R. Neely, Jr., Gwendolyn Young Reams, and Carolyn L. Wheeler.
R. Eddie Way land argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Elizabeth B. Mamey.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha Berzon and Laurence Gold; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by William F. Sheehan, Steven R. Shapiro, Helen Hersh-koff, Michael A Cooper, Norman Redlich, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Sharon R. Vinick, and Cathy Ventrell-Monsees; and for the Women’s Legal Defense Fund et al. by Judith L. Lichtman and Donna R. Lenhoff.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Zachary D. Fasman, Charles A Sha-nor, Kelly J. Koelker, Stephen A Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Douglas S. McDowell, Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Lee T. Paterson, Dwight H. Vincent, John F. Sturm, René P. Milam, and Peter G. Stone.
Jeffrey Robert White, Nancy Erika Smith, and Neil Mullin filed a brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. as amici curiae.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether an employee discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is barred from all relief when, after her discharge, the employer discovers evidencé of wrongdoing that, in any event, would have led to the employee’s termination on lawful and legitimate grounds.
I
For some 30 years, petitioner Christine McKennon worked for respondent Nashville Banner Publishing Company. She was discharged, the Banner claimed, as part of a work force reduction plan necessitated by cost considerations. McKen-non, who was 62 years old when she lost her job, thought another reason explained her dismissal: her age. She filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging that her discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer:
“to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1).
McKennon sought a variety of legal and equitable remedies available under the ADEA, including backpay. App. 10a-lla.
In preparation of the case, the Banner took McKennon’s deposition. She testified that, during her final year of employment, she had copied several confidential documents bearing upon the company’s financial condition. She had access to these records as secretary to the Banner’s comptroller. McKennon took the copies home and showed them to her husband. Her motivation, she averred, was an apprehension she was about to be fired because of her age. When she became concerned about her job, she removed and copied the documents for “insurance” and “protection.” Deposition, Dec. 18, 1991, Record, Docket Entry No. 39, Vol. 2, p. 241. A few days after these deposition disclosures, the Banner sent McKennon a letter declaring that removal and copying of the records was in violation of her job responsibilities and advising her (again) that she was terminated. The Banner’s letter also recited that had it known of McKennon’s misconduct it would have discharged her at once for that reason.
For purposes of summary judgment, the Banner conceded its discrimination against McKennon. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Banner, holding that McKennon’s misconduct was grounds for her termination and that neither backpay nor any other remedy was available to her under the ADEA. 797 F. Supp. 604 (MD Tenn. 1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same rationale. 9 F. 3d 539 (1993). We granted certiorari, 511 U. S. 1106 (1994), to resolve conflicting views among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether all relief must be denied when an employee has been discharged in violation of the ADEA and the employer later discovers some wrongful conduct that would have led to discharge if it had been discovered earlier. Compare Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F. 3d 1403 (CA8 1994); O’Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 12 F. 3d 176 (CA10 1994); 9 F. 3d 539 (CA6 1993) (case below); Washington v. Lake County, 969 F. 2d 250 (CA7 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., 955 F. 2d 409 (CA6 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 864 F. 2d 700 (CA10 1988); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F. 2d 614 (CA4), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 832 (1984), with Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F. 3d 1221 (CA3 1994); Kristufek v. Hussman Foodservice Co., Toastmaster Div., 985 F. 2d 364 (CA7 1993); Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F. 2d 1174 (CA11 1992), vacated pending rehearing en banc, 32 F. 3d 1489 (1994). We now reverse.
II
We shall assume, as summary judgment procedures require us to assume, that the sole reason for McKennon’s initial discharge was her age, a discharge violative of the ADEA. Our further premise is that the misconduct revealed by the deposition was so grave that McKennon’s immediate discharge would have followed its disclosure in any event. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found no basis for contesting that proposition, and for purposes of our review we need not question it here. We do question the legal conclusion reached by those courts that after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing which would have resulted in discharge bars employees from any relief under the ADEA. That ruling is incorrect.
The Court of Appeals considered McKennon’s misconduct, in effect, to be supervening grounds for termination. That may be so, but it does not follow, as the Court of Appeals said in citing one of its own earlier cases, that the misconduct renders it “ ‘irrelevant whether or not [McKennon] was discriminated against.’” 9 F. 3d, at 542, quoting Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F. 2d 302, 305 (CA6 1992), cert. granted, 509 U. S. 943, cert. dism’d, 509 U. S. 903 (1993). We conclude that a violation of the ADEA cannot be so altogether disregarded.
The ADEA, enacted in 1967 as part of an ongoing congressional effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace, reflects a societal condemnation of invidious bias in employment decisions. The ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V) (race, color, sex, national origin, and religion); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V) (disability); the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a) (union activities); the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d) (sex). The ADEA incorporates some features of both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which has led us to describe it as “something of a hybrid.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 578 (1978). The substantive, antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA are modeled upon the prohibitions of Title VIÍ. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985); Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 584. Its remedial provisions incorporate by reference the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). When confronted with a violation of the ADEA, a district court is authorized to afford relief by means of reinstatement, backpay, injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and attorney’s fees. Ibid.; see also Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 584. In the case of a willful violation of the Act, the ADEA authorizes an award of liquidated damages equal to the backpay award. 29 U. S. C. § 626(b). The Act also gives federal courts the discretion to “grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act].” Ibid.
The ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and also a common purpose: “the elimination of discrimination in the workplace.” Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 756 (1979). Congress designed the remedial measures in these statutes to serve as a “spur or catalyst” to cause employers “to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763 (1976). Deterrence is one object of these statutes. Compensation for injuries caused by the prohibited discrimination is another. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 418; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., supra, at 763-764. The ADEA, in keeping with these purposes, contains a vital element found in both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act: It grants an injured employee a right of action to obtain the authorized relief 29 U. S. C. § 626(c). The private litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the compensation objectives of the ADEA. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 45 (1974) (“[T]he private litigant [in Title VII] not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices”); see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 364 (1977). It would not accord with this scheme if after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operates, in every instance, to bar all relief for an earlier violation of the Act.
The objectives of the ADEA are furthered when even a single employee establishes that an employer has discriminated against him or her. The disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices that violate national policies respecting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of the Act’s operation or entrenched resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance. The efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one measure of the success of the Act.
The Court of Appeals in this case relied upon two of its earlier decisions, Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., 955 F. 2d 409 (CA6 1992); Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F. 2d 302 (CA6 1992), and the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 864 F. 2d 700 (1988). Consulting those authorities, it declared that it had “firmly endorsed the principle that after-acquired evidence is a complete bar to any recovery by the former employee where the employer can show it would have fired the employee on the basis of the evidence.” 9 F. 3d, at 542. Summers, in turn, relied upon our decision in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), but that decision is inapplicable here.
In Mt. Healthy we addressed a mixed-motives case, in which two motives were said to be operative in the employer’s decision to fire an employee. One was lawful, the other (an alleged constitutional violation) unlawful. We held that if the lawful reason alone would have sufficed to justify the firing, the employee could not prevail in a suit against the employer. The case was controlled by the difficulty, and what we thought was the lack of necessity, of disentangling the proper motive from the improper one where both played a part in the termination and the former motive would suffice to sustain the employer’s action. Id., at 284-287.
That is not the problem confronted here. As we have said, the case comes to us on the express assumption that an unlawful motive was the sole basis for the firing. McKen-non’s misconduct was not discovered until after she had been fired. The employer could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason. Mixed-motive cases are inapposite here, except to the important extent they underscore the necessity of determining the employer’s motives in ordering the discharge, an essential element in determining whether the employer violated the federal antidiscrimination law. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 252 (1989) (plurality opinion) (employer’s legitimate reason for discharge in mixed-motive case will not suffice “if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision”); id., at 260-261 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). As has been observed, “proving that the same decision would have been justified ... is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made.” Id., at 252 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id., at 260-261 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
Our inquiry is not at an end, however, for even though the employer has violated the Act, we must consider how the after-acquired evidence of the employee’s wrongdoing bears on the specific remedy to be ordered. Equity’s maxim that a suitor who engaged in his own reprehensible conduct in the course of the transaction at issue must be denied equitable relief because of unclean hands, a rule which in conventional formulation operated in limine to bar the suitor from invoking the aid of the equity court, 2 S. Symons, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence § 397, pp. 90-92 (5th ed. 1941), has not been applied where Congress authorizes broad equitable relief to serve important national policies. We have rejected the unclean hands defense “where a private suit serves important public purposes.” Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 138 (1968) (Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts). That does not mean, however, the employee’s own misconduct is irrelevant to all the remedies otherwise available under the statute. The statute controlling this case provides that “the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for [amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter].” 29 U. S. C. § 626(b); see also § 216(b). In giving effect to the ADEA, we must recognize the duality between the legitimate interests of the employer and the important claims of the employee who invokes the national employment policy mandated by the Act. The employee’s wrongdoing must be taken into account, we conclude, lest the employer’s legitimate concerns be ignored. The ADEA, like Title VII, is not a general regulation of the workplace but a law which prohibits discrimination. The statute does not constrain employers from exercising significant other prerogatives and discretions in the course of the hiring, promoting, and discharging of their employees. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra, at 239 (“Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ freedom of choice”). In determining appropriate remedial action, the employee’s wrongdoing becomes relevant not to punish the employee, or out of concern “for the relative moral worth of the parties,” Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., supra, at 139, but to take due account of the lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its business and the corresponding equities that it has arising from the employee’s wrongdoing.
The proper boundaries of remedial relief in the general class of cases where, after termination, it is discovered that the employee has engaged in wrongdoing must be addressed by the judicial system in the ordinary course of further decisions, for the factual permutations and the equitable considerations they raise will vary from case to case. We do conclude that here, and as a general rule in cases of this type, neither reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate remedy. It would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.
The proper measure of backpay presents a more difficult problem. Resolution of this question must give proper recognition to the fact that an ADEA violation has occurred which must be deterred and compensated without undue infringement upon the employer’s rights and prerogatives. The object of compensation is to restore the employee to the position he or she would have been in absent the discrimination, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S., at 764, but that principle is difficult to apply with precision where there is after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to termination on legitimate grounds had the employer known about it. Once an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore the information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit. The beginning point in the trial court’s formulation of a remedy should be calculation of backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered. In determining the appropriate order for relief, the court can consider taking into further account extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party. An absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay, however, would undermine the ADEA’s objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their motivations, and of penalizing them for employment decisions that spring from age discrimination.
Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge. The concern that employers might as a routine matter undertake extensive discovery into an employee’s background or performance on the job to resist claims under the Act is not an insubstantial one, but we think the authority of the courts to award attorney’s fees, mandated under the statute, 29 U. S. C. §§ 216(b), 626(b), and to invoke the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will deter most abuses.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence. | What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision? | [
"judicial review (national level)",
"judicial review (state level)",
"Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction",
"statutory construction",
"interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order",
"diversity jurisdiction",
"federal common law"
] | [
3
] | sc_authoritydecision |
TEXAS v. LOUISIANA
No. 36,
Orig.
Argued January 19, 1976
Decided June 14, 1976
John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Elizabeth B. Levatino, First Special Assistant Attorney General, Daniel 0. Goforth, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Larry F. York.
Oliver P. Stockwell, Special Assistant Attorney General of Louisiana, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, Warren E. Mouledoux and Gary Keyser, Assistant Attorneys General, and Emmett C. Sole, Special Assistant Attorney General.
John P. Rupp argued the cause for the United States as intervenor. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kiechel, William L. Patton, Bruce C. Rashkow, and Michael W. Reed.
Per Curiam.
We have already decided that the relevant boundary between the States of Texas and Louisiana is the geographic middle of Sabine Pass, Sabine Lake, and Sabine River from the mouth of the Sabine in the Gulf of Mexico to the thirty-second degree of north latitude. 410 U. S. 702 (1973). We have also held that all islands in the east half of the Sabine River when Louisiana was admitted as a State in 1812, or thereafter formed, belong to Louisiana. Delimitation of the boundary and decision as to ownership of the islands in the west half of the Sabine were deferred pending further proceedings before the Special Master in which the United States was invited to participate. Id., at 712-714.
The litigation subsequently was enlarged upon the motion of Louisiana to include a determination of the lateral seaward boundary between Texas and Louisiana, and Texas and the United States extending into the Gulf of Mexico. 414 U. S. 904 (1973). Pleadings relating to the lateral boundary were filed by the States and by the United States. The United States also claimed title to six of the islands in the western half of the Sabine, 414 U. S. 1107 (1973); it subsequently amended its complaint, however, to withdraw its claim to all islands except one identified as “Sam.” 416 U. S. 903 (1974). The city of Port Arthur, Tex., was permitted to intervene for purposes of protecting its interests in the island claims of the United States. 416 U. S. 966 (1974).
After hearings on referral, the Special Master has concluded and recommends:
“1) That the boundary between the States of Texas and Louisiana from 32° to 30° north latitude be established as shown upon Texas Exhibit AAA 1-12, pursuant to agreement of the parties.
“2) That the boundary line from 30° north latitude to the Gulf of Mexico and to the terminus of the jetties be established as being the median line marked on Louisiana Exhibits DDD and III and hereinabove described specifically, with the right to the States of Texas and Louisiana to alter such boundary within Sabine Lake by agreement within the time proposed.
“3) That the claim of the United States of America to an island named 'Sam’ be denied.
“4) That the lateral boundary in the Gulf of Mexico between the States of Texas and Louisiana and between the State of Texas and the United States of America be established as the line shown on your Special Master’s Exhibit and marked 'U. S.’
“5) That the cost be taxed to the parties in accordance with their contribution to the fund established by your Special Master and deposited in the First National Bank & Trust Company, Lincoln, Nebraska; that no costs be taxed for the services of your Special Master herein; that upon the order of termination of this case your Special Master file a report setting forth the amount of money received by him from the parties for the payment of costs and expenses pursuant to his requests and of the disbursement thereof for approval by the Court unless prior thereto the parties in writing have approved your Special Master’s report as to the disbursement of said moneys.”
Exceptions to the recommendations of the Special Master have been filed by Louisiana and Texas. 423 U. S. 909 (1975).
At approximately 30° north latitude, the Sabine River enters into Sabine Lake through three channels. Louisiana excepts to that portion of the Special Master’s report which marks the boundary line between the States through the passage more recently known as “middle pass,” instead of in the geographic middle of the “west pass.” Louisiana contends that the Special Master acted contrary to our rejection of the thalweg doctrine earlier in this case, 410 U. S., at 709, by considering navigation as the criterion to locate the boundary in the middle channel. We think it clear, however, that the Special Master makes reference to the volume of water flowing through these passes solely in an analytic context reflecting the history and geography of the region. We are persuaded that the Special Master made his determination consistent with our earlier holding.
Texas has filed exceptions to the Special Master’s delimitation of the lateral seaward boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. Texas argues that the Special Master erred in concluding that Texas and Louisiana did not have a historic boundary in the Gulf; we think that misreads the findings of the Special Master. The Special Master does not reject Texas’ contention that there was a historic “inchoate” boundary; what he concludes is that there has never been an established offshore boundary between the States. We find the Special Master correct in his conclusion and conclude that he properly considered how such a boundary should be now constructed.
All parties agree that the lateral seaward boundary is to be constructed by reference to the median line, or equidistant principle, recognized in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 TJ. S. T. (pt. 2) 1606, T. I. A. S. No. 5639. Texas, however, excepts to the Special Master’s determination that the equidistant principle is to be applied to the coastlines of the States as affected by jetties at the mouth of the Sabine River. Texas urges that the relevant coastline is the coastline that existed in 1845 when it was admitted to the Union. Texas argues that this is a domestic dispute involving historical precedents and that the States’ offshore boundary should be constructed as Congress would have done in 1845 had it considered the matter.
The short answer to Texas’ argument is that no line was drawn by Congress and that the boundary is being described in this litigation for the first time. The Court should not be called upon to speculate as to what Congress might have done. We hold that the Special Master correctly applied the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to this suit. As we previously have recognized, “the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome.” United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 165 (1965). When read together, Arts. 12 and 8 of the Convention clearly require that the median line be measured with reference to the jetties.
Accordingly, the exceptions of Louisiana and Texas are overruled. The parties are directed within 90 days to submit a proposed decree which has the approval of the Special Master. If the States cannot agree, the Special Master is requested, after appropriate hearings, to prepare and submit a recommended decree.
We held in United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960), that under the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., Texas as against the United States was entitled to the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil extending three marine leagues from its coastline into the Gulf, but that Louisiana may claim such rights only for a distance of three geographical miles from its coastline. Thus, for three geographical miles Texas and Louisiana are in dispute as to the location of their boundary. The remaining boundary area out to three marine leagues is in dispute between Texas and the United States.
Article 12 of the Convention provides:
“1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision.
“2. The line of delimitation between the territorial seas of two States lying opposite to each other or adjacent to each other shall be marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal States.” [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2), at 1610, T. I. A. S. No. 5639.
There are two jetties — one originating from Texas and one from Louisiana — and each extending approximately 3.1 miles into the Gulf. The jetties were constructed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers in the 1880’s to provide an adequate ship canal to the Sabine Pass for the benefit of such cities as Port Arthur, Beaumont, and others. They were completed to their present terminus in 1936.
Article 8 of the Convention provides:
"For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.” Id., at 1609, T. I. A. S. No. 5639.
The result is not inconsistent with our holding in United States v. Louisiana, 389 U. S. 155 (1967), that Texas’ three-league grant under the Submerged Lands Act is measured from Texas’ historic coastline, without reference to the jetties. We had earlier held that the coastal States had no claim to the submerged lands off their coastlines and that the United States had paramount rights in these lands. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947). This holding was applied to Louisiana and Texas in our first Louisiana decision. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699 (1950). In our 1967 Louisiana decision, supra, we were concerned only with interpretation of the statutory grant of the Submerged Lands Act. We concluded that “[n]o definitions are required by this Court and there is no need to resort to international law; Texas has simply been given that amount of submerged land it owned when it entered the Union.” 389 U. S., at 160. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
8
] | sc_casedisposition |
HEIDER, ADMINISTRATOR v. MICHIGAN SUGAR CO.
No. 48.
Argued December 8, 1966.
Decided December 12, 1966.
Gregory M. Pillon argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Thomas C. Mayer.
Harry M. Plotkin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Carl H. Smith.
Per Curiam.
The writ is dismissed as improvidently granted. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
TOLL, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, et al. v. MORENO et al.
No. 80-2178.
Argued March 2, 1982
Decided June 28, 1982
Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 19. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 24. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 25.
Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General.
James R. Bieke argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was John Townsend Rich
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Charles A. Graddick of Alabama, Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, John Steven Clark of Arkansas, George Deukmejian of California, J. D. MacFarlane of Colorado, Carl R. Ajello of Connecticut, Richard S. Gebelein of Delaware, Jim Smith of Florida, Arthur K. Bolton of Georgia, Tany S. Hong of Hawaii, David H. Leroy of Idaho, Tyrone C. Fahner of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Steven L. Beshear of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Warren R. Spannaus of Minnesota, William A. Attain of Mississippi, John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, Richard H. Bryan of Nevada, Gregory H. Smith of New Hampshire, James R. Zazzali of New Jersey, Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, Robert.Abrams of New York, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, Jan Eric Cartwright of Oklahoma, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, William J. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, Mark White of Texas, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, John J. Easton of Vermont, J. Marshall Coleman of Virginia, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and Steven Freudenthal of Wyoming; and for the American Council on Education et al. by Sheldon Elliot Steinbach.
Bruce J. Ennis, Donald N. Bersoff, and Paul R. Friedman filed a brief for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The state-operated University of Maryland grants preferential treatment for purposes of tuition and fees to students with “in-state” status. Although citizens and immigrant aliens may obtain in-state status upon a showing of domicile within the State, nonimmigrant aliens, even if domiciled, are not eligible for such status. The question in this case is whether the University’s in-state policy is invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, insofar as the policy categorically denies in-state status to domiciled nonimmigrant aliens who hold G-4 visas.
I
The factual and procedural background of this case, which has prompted two prior decisions of this Court, requires some elaboration. The focus of the controversy has been a policy adopted by the University in 1973 governing the eligibility of students for in-state status with respect to admission and fees. The policy provides in relevant part:
“1. It is the policy of the University of Maryland to grant in-state status for admission, tuition and charge-differential purposes to United States citizens, and to immigrant aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in accordance with the laws of the United States, in the following cases:
“a. Where a student is financially dependent upon a parent, parents, or spouse domiciled in Maryland for at least six consecutive months prior to the last day available for registration for the forthcoming semester.
“b. Where a student is financially independent for at least the preceding twelve months, and provided the student has maintained his domicile in Maryland for at least six consecutive months immediately prior to the last day available for registration for the forthcoming semester.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a-168a.
In 1975, when this action was filed, respondents Juan Carlos Moreno, Juan Pablo Otero, and Clare B. Hogg were students at the University of Maryland. Each resided with, and was financially dependent on, a parent who was a nonimmigrant alien holding a “G-4” visa. Such visas are issued to nonimmigrant aliens who are officers or employees of certain international organizations, and to members of their immediate families. 66 Stat. 168, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv). Despite respondents’ residence in the State, the University denied them in-state status pursuant to its policy of excluding all nonimmigrant aliens. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the three respondents filed a class action against the University of Maryland and its President. They contended that the University’s policy violated various federal laws, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause.
The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the three named plaintiffs and the class of G-4 visa-holders represented by them. In the view of the District Court, the University’s denial of in-state status to these plaintiffs rested upon an irrebuttable presumption that a G-4 alien cannot establish Maryland domicile. Concluding that the presumption was “not universally true” as a matter of either federal or Maryland law, the District Court held that under Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), the in-state policy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 541, 559 (Md. 1976). Accordingly, in an order dated July 13, 1976, the District Court enjoined the President of the University from denying respondents the opportunity to establish in-state status solely on the basis of an “irrebuttable presumption of non-domicile.” Id., at 565. The court stayed its order pending appeal in reliance on the University’s representation that it would make appropriate refunds “in the event the Court’s Order of July 13, 1976, were finally affirmed on appeal.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adopting the reasoning of the District Court. Id., at 102a. Affirmance order reported at 556 F. 2d 573 (1977).
We reviewed the case on writ of certiorari. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647 (1978). We held that “[b]ecause petitioner makes domicile the ‘paramount’ policy consideration and because respondents’ contention is that they can be domiciled in Maryland but are conclusively presumed to be unable to do so, this case is squarely within Vlandis as limited by [Weinberger v.] Salfi, [422 U. S. 749 (1975)].” Id., at 660. It was therefore necessary to decide whether the presumption was universally true. With respect to federal law, we concluded that G-4 visaholders could “adopt the United States as their domicile.” Id., at 666. We were thus left with the “potentially dispositive” question whether G-4 aliens are as a matter of state law incapable of becoming domiciliaries of Maryland. We certified this question to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The state court answered the certified question in the negative, advising us that “nothing in the general Maryland law of domicile renders G-4 visa holders, or their dependents, incapable of becoming domiciled in this State.” Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 444, 397 A. 2d 1009, 1019 (1979).
After our certification, but before the state court’s response, the University adopted a “clarifying resolution” concerning its in-state policy. By its terms the resolution did not offer a new definition of “in-state” students; rather, it purported to “reaffirm” the existing policy. The resolution indicated, however, that the University’s policy, “insofar as it denies in-state status to nonimmigrant aliens, serves a number of substantial purposes and interests, whether or not it conforms to the generally or otherwise applicable definition of domicile under the Maryland common law.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 173a. The interests assertedly served by the policy were described in the following terms:
“(a) limiting the University’s expenditures by granting a higher subsidy toward the expenses of providing educational services to that class of persons who, as a class, are more likely to have a close affinity to the State and to contribute more to its economic well-being;
“(b) achieving equalization between the affected classes of the expenses of providing educational services;
“(c) efficiently administering the University’s in-state determination and appeals process; and
“(d) preventing disparate treatment among categories of nonimmigrants with respect to admissions, tuition, and charge-differentials.” Id., at 173a-174a.
Following the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision, the case returned to this Court. But we declined to restore the case to the active docket for full briefing and argument, concluding that the University’s clarifying resolution had “fundamentally altered the posture of the case.” Toll v. Moreno, 441 U. S. 458, 461 (1979) (per curiam). We noted that “if domicile [was] not the ‘paramount’ policy consideration of the University, this case [was] no longer ‘squarely within Vlandis as limited by Salfi,’” and thus raised “new issues of constitutional law which should be addressed in the first instance by the District Court.” Id., at 461-462, quoting Elkins v. Moreno, supra, at 660. Accordingly, we vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case “to the District Court for further consideration in light of our opinion and judgment in Elkins, the opinion and judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Toll, and the Board of Regents’ clarifying resolution of June 23, 1978.” 441 U. S., at 462.
On remand, the District Court determined that the clarifying resolution constituted a change in the University’s position. Before that resolution, the University’s primary concern had in fact been domicile; after the resolution, domicile was no longer “the paramount consideration in the University’s policy.” 480 F. Supp. 1116, 1124 (Md. 1979). Thus, with respect to the period preceding the issuance of the resolution, the District Court reaffirmed its earlier determination that insofar as the policy precluded G-4 aliens (or their dependents) from acquiring in-state status, it denied due process under Vlandis. 480 F. Supp., at 1122-1125. With respect to the period following the promulgation of the resolution, however, the court held that Vlandis did not control: The University had abandoned its position that G-4 aliens could not establish domicile in Maryland. 480 F. Supp., at 1125. Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that the revised in-state policy was constitutionally invalid, basing its conclusion on two alternative grounds. First, the court held that the policy ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the challenged portion of the University’s policy contained a classification based on alienage, requiring strict scrutiny, an analysis which the policy did not, survive, since the policy did not further any compelling interest. 489 F. Supp. 658, 660-667 (Md. 1980). Alternatively, the court held that the in-state policy violated the Supremacy Clause by encroaching upon Congress’ prerogatives with respect to the regulation of immigration. Id., at 667-668.
The Court of Appeals affirmed for “reasons sufficiently stated” by the District Court. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 645 F. 2d 217, 220 (1981) (per curiam). We granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 815 (1981). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the University of Maryland’s instate policy, as applied to G-4 aliens and their dependents, violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, and on that ground affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether the policy violates the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.
II
Our cases have long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders. See, e. g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 377-380 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 418-420 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 62-68 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915). Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various sources, including the Federal Government’s power “[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, its power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”, id., cl. 3, and its broad authority over foreign affairs, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936); Mathews v. Diaz, supra, at 81, n. 17; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588-589 (1952).
Not surprisingly, therefore, our cases have also been at pains to note the substantial limitations upon the authority of the States in making classifications based upon alienage. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, supra, we considered a California statute that precluded aliens who were “ineligible for citizenship under federal law” from obtaining commercial fishing licenses, even though they “met all other state requirements” and were lawful inhabitants of the State. 334 U. S., at 414. In seeking to defend the statute, the State argued that it had “simply followed the Federal Government's lead” in classifying certain persons as “ineligible for citizenship.” Id., at 418. We rejected the argument, stressing the delicate nature of the federal-state relationship in regulating aliens:
“The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization. Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.” Id., at 419 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted).
The decision in Graham v. Richardson, supra, followed directly from Takahashi. In Graham we held that a State may not withhold welfare benefits from resident aliens “merely because of their alienage.” 403 U. S., at 378. Such discrimination, the Court concluded, would not only violate the Equal Protection Clause, but would also encroach upon federal authority over lawfully admitted aliens. In support of the latter conclusion, the Court noted that Congress had “not seen fit to impose any burden or restriction on aliens who become indigent after their entry into the United States,” id., at 377, but rather had chosen to afford “lawfully admitted resident aliens . . . the full and equal benefit of all state laws for the security of persons and property,” id., at 378. The States had thus imposed an “auxiliary burde[n] upon the entrance or residence of aliens” that was never contemplated by Congress. Id., at 379.
Read together, Takahashi and Graham stand for the broad principle that “state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 358, n. 6 (1976). To be sure, when Congress has done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the country temporarily, the proper application of the principle is likely to be a matter of some dispute. But the instant case does not present such a situation, and there can be little doubt regarding the invalidity of the challenged portion of the University’s in-state policy.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), represents “a comprehensive and complete code covering all aspects of admission of aliens to this country, whether for business or pleasure, or as immigrants seeking to become permanent residents.” Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S., at 664. The Act recognizes two basic classes of aliens, immigrant and nonimmigrant. With respect to the nonimmigrant class, the Act establishes various categories, the G-4 category among them. For many of these nonimmigrant categories, Congress has precluded the covered alien from establishing domicile in the United States. Id., at 665. But significantly, Congress has allowed G-4 aliens — employees of various international organizations, and their immediate families — to enter the country on terms permitting the establishment of domicile in the United States. Id., at 666. In light of Congress’ explicit decision not to bar G-4 aliens from acquiring domicile, the State’s decision to deny “instate” status to G-4 aliens, solely on account of the G-4 alien’s federal immigration status, surely amounts to an ancillary “burden not contemplated by Congress” in admitting these aliens to the United States. We need not rely, however, simply on Congress’ decision to permit the G-4 alien to establish domicile in this country; the Federal Government has also taken the additional affirmative step of conferring special tax privileges on G-4 aliens.
As a result of an array of treaties, international agreements, and federal statutes, G-4 visaholders employed by the international organizations described in 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv) are relieved of federal and, in many instances, state and local taxes on the salaries paid by the organizations. For example, the international agreements governing the international banks for which the parents of the named respondents are employed specifically exempt the parents from all taxes on their organizational salaries. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Art. VII, § 9(b), 60 Stat. 1458, T. I. A. S. No. 1502 (1945) (“No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Bank to executive directors, alternates, officials or employees of the Bank who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nationals”); Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Art. XI, § 9(b), [1959] 10 U. S. T. 3029, 3096, T. I. A. S. No. 4397 (1959) (“No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Bank to . . . employees of the Bank who are not local citizens or other local nationals”). Not only have some of the specific tax exemptions contained in international agreements been incorporated into a federal statute, see 22 U. S. C. §286h, but also the International Organizations Immunities Act has explicitly afforded a federal tax exemption for those G-4 visaholders employed by international organizations for which no treaty or international agreement has provided a tax exemption for foreign employees. § 4(b), 59 Stat. 670, reenacted, 68A Stat. 284, as § 893 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §893 (“Wages, fees, or salary of any employee [except citizens of the United States and of the Republic of the Philippines] of... an international organization . . . , received as compensation for official services to such . . . international organization shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from [federal] taxation”).
In affording G-4 visaholders such tax exemption, the Federal Government has undoubtedly sought to benefit the employing international organizations by enabling them to pay salaries not encumbered by the full panoply of taxes, thereby lowering the organizations’ costs. See 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 170, 172-173 (1954). The tax benefits serve as an inducement for these organizations to locate significant operations in the United States. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1945); S. Rep. No. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1945). By imposing on those G-4 aliens who are domiciled in Maryland higher tuition and fees than are imposed on other domiciliaries of the State, the University’s policy frustrates these federal policies. Petitioners’ very argument in this Court only buttresses this conclusion. One of the grounds on which petitioners have sought to justify the discriminatory burden imposed on the named respondents is that the salaries their parents receive from the international banks for which they work are exempt from Maryland income tax. Indeed, petitioners suggest that the “dollar differential ... at stake here [is] an amount roughly equivalent to the amount of state income tax an international bank parent is spared by treaty each year.” Brief for Petitioners 23 (footnote omitted). But to the extent this is indeed a justification for the University’s policy with respect to the named respondents, it is an impermissible one: The State may not recoup indirectly from respondents’ parents the taxes that the Federal Government has expressly barred the State from collecting.
In sum, the Federal Government has not merely admitted G-4 aliens into the country; it has also permitted them to establish domicile and afforded significant tax exemptions on organizational salaries. In such circumstances, we cannot conclude that Congress ever contemplated that a State, in the operation of a university, might impose discriminatory tuition charges and fees solely on account of the federal immigration classification. We therefore conclude that insofar as it bars domiciled G-4 aliens (and their dependents) from acquiring in-state status, the University’s policy violates the Supremacy Clause.
Ill
Finally, we must address petitioners’ contention that the Eleventh Amendment precluded the District Court from ordering the University to pay refunds to various class members who would have obtained in-state status but for the stay of the District Court’s original order of July 13,1976. As petitioners concede, in seeking a stay of that order the University made the representation to the District Court that in the event the 1976 order was “finally affirmed on appeal,” it would make appropriate refunds. This representation was incorporated in the stay orders of both the District Court and Court of Appeals. It is petitioners’ contention, however, that the 1976 order was “effectively” vacated when this Court, in Toll v. Moreno, 441 U. S. 458 (1979), vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the District Court for reconsideration. Petitioners therefore conclude that the terms of the University’s waiver of sovereign immunity can no longer be satisfied.
Petitioners’ argument is not persuasive. We do not interpret Toll as having vacated the judgment of the District Court. In Toll the Court recognized that the University had altered its position through the promulgation of the clarifying resolution, raising “new issues of constitutional law which should be addressed in the first instance by the District Court.” Id,., at 462. The Court declined, however, to decide whether the District Court, in issuing its 1976 order, had improperly relied on due process grounds, and whether continuation of the order was justified on equal protection or pre-emption grounds. Thus, while we vacated “the judgment of the Court of Appeals,” ibid., we left the judgment of the District Court undisturbed. And contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, a vacatur of the District Court’s judgment was not necessary to give the District Court jurisdiction to reconsider the case. See Goldberg v. United States, 425 U. S. 94, 111-112 (1976); Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85, 98-99 (1961); 28 U. S. C. §2106 (“The Supreme Court . . . may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment. . . and may. . . require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances”).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The international organizations covered by the provision are those that are entitled to the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669, 22 U. S. C. § 288 et seq. At the time suit was brought, the named plaintiffs in this case were dependents of employees of either the Inter-American Development Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).
A fourth individual, Rene Otero, Jr., a respondent in this Court, was made a named plaintiff in 1980 when a supplemental complaint was filed.
The court certified a class of G-4 visaholders or their dependents who, “residing in Maryland,. . . are current students at the University of Maryland, or . . . chose not to apply to the University of Maryland because of the challenged policies but would now be interested in attending if given an opportunity to establish ‘in-state’ status, or . . . are currently students in senior high schools in Maryland.” Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 541, 563 (Md. 1976).
Citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), the District Court dismissed the claim against the University itself. 420 F. Supp., at 548-550. The plaintiffs did not appeal that dismissal.
The District Court did not order the University to grant the named plaintiffs in-state status. Rather, it merely barred the University from denying them and the members of the class “the opportunity to demonstrate that they or any of them are entitled to ‘in-state’ status for purposes of tuition and charge differential determinations.” Id., at 565.
The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate “on the same terms as the district court originally granted its stay.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 103a-104a.
Salfi limited Vlandis “to those situations in which a State ‘purports] to be concerned with [domicile, but] at the same time denfies] to one seeking to meet its test of [domicile] the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing on that issue.’ ” Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S., at 660, quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 771 (1975).
We noted that as to some categories of nonimmigrant aliens, Congress had “expressly conditioned admission... on an intent not to abandon a foreign residence or, by implication, on an intent not to seek domicile in the United States.” 435 U. S., at 665. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(15) (B), (F), (H). With respect to G-4 nonimmigrant aliens, however, we concluded that Congress had deliberately declined to “impose restrictions on intent,” thereby permitting them to “adopt the United States as their domicile.” 435 U. S., at 666.
The certified question was phrased as follows:
“Are persons residing in Maryland who hold or are named in a visa under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1976 ed.), or who are financially dependent upon a person holding or named in such a visa, incapable as a matter of state law of becoming domiciliaries of Maryland?” Id., at 668-669 (footnote omitted).
It was entitled “A Resolution Clarifying the Purposes, Meaning, and Application of the Policy of the University of Maryland for Determination of In-State Status for Admission, Tuition, and Charge-Differential Purposes, Insofar as It Denies In-State Status to Nonimmigrant Aliens.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a.
“Reaffirmation of In-State Policy. Regardless of whether or not the policy approved by the Board of Regents on September 21, 1973, conforms with the generally or otherwise applicable definition of domicile under the Maryland common law, the Board of Regents reaffirms that policy . . . .” Id., at 174a.
We further noted:
“Our decision in Elkins rests on the premise that ‘the University apparently has no interest in continuing to deny in-state status to G-4 aliens as a class if they can become Maryland domiciliaries since it has indicated both here and in the District Court that it would redraft its policy “to accommodate” G-4 aliens were the Maryland courts to hold that G-4 aliens can’ acquire such domicile. 435 U. S., at 661. After the clarifying resolution, this premise no longer appears to be true.” 441 U. S., at 461.
The District Court’s pre-emption holding rested in part on its equal protection analysis; according to the court, “the standard utilized to uphold a state regulation dealing with benefits to be accorded to aliens is essentially the strict scrutiny analysis” of equal protection. 489 F. Supp., at 668.
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2.
At the time Takahashi was decided, federal law “permitted Japanese and certain other non-white racial groups to enter and reside in the country, but . . . made them ineligible for United States citizenship.” 334 U. S., at 412 (footnote omitted).
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, suggests that the italicized language should not be interpreted literally. Post, at 28-29. Rather, he suggests, the language can only be understood as explaining three prior Court cases that Takahashi cited in a footnote immediately after the italicized language. 334 U. S., at 419, n. 6, citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915), Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 280 (1876), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 65-68 (1941). According to Justice Rehnquist, “in each of these cases, the Court found either a clear encroachment on exclusive federal power to admit aliens into the country or a clear conflict with a specific congressional purpose.” Post, at 29. Justice Rehnquist thus concludes that the language in Takahashi does not mean what it says; instead it means that absent a clear encroachment on exclusive federal power or clear conflict with a federal statute, the States are free to treat aliens as they will. Justice Rehnquist is wrong. If the language were read in the manner suggested by the dissent, it would fail to explain Takahashi itself: The California statute at issue in Takahashi, denying certain lawful aliens the right to obtain commercial fishing licenses from the State, presented neither “a clear encroachment on exclusive federal power to admit aliens” nor “a clear conflict with a specific congressional purpose.” Justice RehnquiSt’s wowliteral interpretation of the Takahashi holding is simply wishful thinking on his part.
While pre-emption played a significant role in the Court’s analysis in Takahashi, the actual basis for invalidation of the California statute was apparently the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Commentators have noted, however, that many of the Court’s decisions concerning alienage classifications, such as Takahashi, are better explained in preemption than in equal protection terms. See, e. g., Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1060-1065 (1979); Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 1069 (1979).
Our cases do recognize, however, that a State, in the course of defining its political community, may, in appropriate circumstances, limit the participation of noncitizens in the States’ political and governmental functions. See, e. g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 72-75 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291, 295-296 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 646-649 (1973).
In De Canas, we considered whether a California statute making it unlawful in some circumstances to employ illegal aliens was invalid under the Supremacy Clause. We upheld the statute. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in the present case suggests that the pre-emption claim was rejected in De Canas because “the Court found no strong evidence that Congress intended to pre-empt” the State’s action. Post, at 31. Justice Rehn-QUIST has misread De Canas. We rejected the pre-emption claim not because of an absence of congressional intent to pre-empt, but because Congress intended that the States be allowed, “to the extent consistent with federal law, [to] regulate the employment of illegal aliens.” 424 U. S., at 361.
Immigrant aliens are subject to stricter qualitative tests than nonimmigrant aliens. See E. Harper, Immigration Laws of the United States 228 (3d ed. 1975). And whereas there are no quantitative restrictions on the admission of nonimmigrant aliens, there are, with a few exceptions, quota limitations for immigrant aliens. See 8 U. S. C. § 1151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV); Harper, supra, at 228. As we noted in Elkins v. Moreno:
“Congress defined nonimmigrant classes to provide for the needs of international diplomacy, tourism, and commerce, each of which requires that aliens be admitted to the United States from time to time and all of which would be hampered if every alien entering the United States were subject to a quota and to the more strict entry conditions placed on immigrant aliens.” 435 U. S., at 665 (footnote omitted).
See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (temporary visitors for pleasure or business); § 1101(a)(15)(C) (aliens in transit); § 1101(a)(15)(F) (foreign students); § 1101(a)(15)(H) (temporary workers).
Among the similar agreements pertaining to other international organizations are the following: Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, Art. VI, § 9(b), [1956] 7 U. S. T. 2197, 2216, T. I. A. S. No. 3620 (1955) (“No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Corporation to . . . employees of the Corporation who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nationals”); Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, Art. VIII, § 9(b), [1960] 11 U. S. T. 2284, 2306, T. I. A. S. No. 4607 (1960) (“No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Association to . . . employees of the Association who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nationals”); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Art. 24, §2, [1966] 17 U. S. T. 1270, 1279, T. I. A. S. No. 6090 (1965) (“Except in the case of local nationals, no tax shall be levied ... on or in respect of salaries, expense allowances or other emoluments paid by the Centre to officials or employees of the Secretariat”); Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. IX, § 9(b), 60 Stat. 1414, T. I. A. S. No. 1501 (1945) (“No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Fund to . . . employees of the Fund who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nationals”).
And by virtue of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 81, § 280(a) (1980), this group of G-4 visaholders is able to shield organizational income from Maryland income tax.
Petitioners point out that the international banks for which the named respondents’ parents work provide reimbursement for the difference between in-state and out-of-state tuition. Certainly, this fact does not assist — but undermines — petitioners’ argument. Such reimbursements only add to the employment costs of the international organizations, thereby frustrating the federal intention of benefiting the international organizations.
Some members of the class represented by the respondents derive their state tax exemption not from a treaty or international agreement, but from the combination of federal and state statutes. See supra, at 15-16, and n. 22. As to these G-4 aliens, it is true, as the dissent notes, post, at 34-35, that the Federal Government has not precluded the collection of a state income tax that is imposed on domiciliaries of the State. But even with respect to this group of G-4 aliens, the Federal Government has taken the affirmative steps of permitting the establishment of domicile and of providing federal income tax exemption on organizational salaries. This special status afforded by the Federal Government is, in our view, inconsistent with the University of Maryland’s discriminatory denial of in-state status to G-4 aliens who are domiciled in the State.
It is important to note that this case does not involve, and we express no views regarding, a State’s imposition of a burden on all individuals sharing a common relevant characteristic, of whom only some are aliens.
Petitioners note, however, that whereas the District Court’s 1976 order was based solely on due process grounds, the District Court, on remand, held the in-state policy as it operated during the period following the clarifying resolution invalid on two different grounds — equal protection and pre-emption. In our view, this fact is of little moment. Just as a respondent is entitled to defend in this Court a judgment on grounds diffeient from those relied on by the court below, e. g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 397, n. 16 (1979), respondents in this case were entitled, following our remand, to support a reaffirmance of the earlier order on grounds previously urged but not relied on.
Even if we were to assume that the judgment of the District Court was indeed vacated, we could not say that the terms of the University’s waiver of sovereign immunity — that the District Court’s order be “finally affirmed on appeal” — would not be satisfied. Petitioners have not prevailed on the merits in a single court, despite the numerous decisions that this litigation has prompted. By its original order, the District Court held that the University’s in-state policy was invalid insofar as it discriminated against G-4 aliens. Today, we reaffirm that conclusion. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
34
] | sc_respondent |
LEHR v. ROBERTSON et al.
No. 81-1756.
Argued December 7, 1982 —
Decided June 27, 1983
David J. Freeman argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
Jay L. Samoff argued the cause for appellees and filed a brief for appellees Robertson et al. Robert Abrams, Attorney General, pro se, Peter H. Schiff, and Robert J. Schack, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for appellee Attorney General of New York.
Louise Gruner Gans and Stanley A. Bass filed a brief for Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Elinor Hadley Stillman filed a brief for the National Committee for Adoption, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether New York has sufficiently protected an unmarried father’s inchoate relationship with a child whom he has never supported and rarely seen in the two years since her birth. The appellant, Jonathan Lehr, claims that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), give him an absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the child may be adopted. We disagree.
Jessica M. was born out of wedlock on November 9, 1976. Her mother, Lorraine Robertson, married Richard Robertson eight months after Jessica’s birth. On December 21, 1978, when Jessica was over two years old, the Robertsons filed an adoption petition in the Family Court of Ulster County, New York. The court heard their testimony and received a favorable report from the Ulster County Department of Social Services. On March 7, 1979, the court entered an order of adoption. In this proceeding, appellant contends that the adoption order is invalid because he, Jessica’s putative father, was not given advance notice of the adoption proceeding.
The State of New York maintains a “putative father registry.” A man who files with that registry demonstrates his intent to claim paternity of a child born out of wedlock and is therefore entitled to receive notice of any proceeding to adopt that child. Before entering Jessica’s adoption order, the Ulster County Family Court had the putative father registry examined. Although appellant claims to be Jessica’s natural father, he had not entered his name in the registry.
In addition to the persons whose names are listed on the putative father registry, New York law requires that notice of an adoption proceeding be given to several other classes of possible fathers of children born out of wedlock — those who have been adjudicated to be the father, those who have been identified as the father on the child’s birth certificate, those who live openly with the child and the child’s mother and who hold themselves out to be the father, those who have been identified as the father by the mother in a sworn written statement, and those who were married to the child’s mother before the child was six months old. Appellant admittedly was not a member of any of those classes. He had lived with appellee prior to Jessica’s birth and visited her in the hospital when Jessica was born, but his name does not appear on Jessica’s birth certificate. He did not live with appellee or Jessica after Jessica’s birth, he has never provided them with any financial support, and he has never offered to marry appellee. Nevertheless, he contends that the following special circumstances gave him a constitutional right to notice and a hearing before Jessica was adopted.
On January 30, 1979, one month after the adoption proceeding was commenced in Ulster County, appellant filed a “visitation and paternity petition” in the Westchester County Family Court. In that petition, he asked for a determination of paternity, an order of support, and reasonable visitation privileges with Jessica. Notice of that proceeding was served on appellee on February 22, 1979. Four days later appellee’s attorney informed the Ulster County Court that appellant had commenced a paternity proceeding in West-chester County; the Ulster County judge then entered an order staying appellant’s paternity proceeding until he could rule on a motion to change the venue of that proceeding to Ulster County. On March 3, 1979, appellant received notice of the change of venue motion and, for the first time, learned that an adoption proceeding was pending in Ulster County.
On March 7, 1979, appellant’s attorney telephoned the Ulster County judge to inform him that he planned to seek a stay of the adoption proceeding pending the determination of the paternity petition. In that telephone conversation, the judge advised the lawyer that he had already signed the adoption order earlier that day. According to appellant’s attorney, the judge stated that he was aware of the pending paternity petition but did not believe he was required to give notice to appellant prior to the entry of the order of adoption.
Thereafter, the Family Court in Westchester County granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the paternity petition, holding that the putative father’s right to seek paternity “must be deemed severed so long as an order of adoption exists.” App. 228. Appellant did not appeal from that dismissal. On June 22,1979, appellant filed a petition to vacate the order of adoption on the ground that it was obtained by fraud and in violation of his constitutional rights. The Ulster County Family Court received written and oral argument on the question whether it had “dropped the ball” by approving the adoption without giving appellant advance notice. Tr. 53. After deliberating for several months, it denied the petition, explaining its decision in a thorough written opinion. In re Adoption of Martz, 102 Misc. 2d 102, 423 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (1979).
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court affirmed. In re Adoption of Jessica “XX,” 77 App. Div. 2d 381, 434 N. Y. S. 2d 772 (1980). The majority held that appellant’s commencement of a paternity action did not give him any right to receive notice of the adoption proceeding, that the notice provisions of the statute were constitutional, and that Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), was not retroactive. Parenthetically, the majority observed that appellant “could have insured his right to notice by signing the putative father registry.” 77 App. Div. 2d, at 383, 434 N. Y. S. 2d, at 774. One justice dissented on the ground that the filing of the paternity proceeding should have been viewed as the statutory equivalent of filing a notice of intent to claim paternity with the putative father registry.
The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed by a divided vote. In re Adoption of Jessica “XX,” 54 N. Y. 2d 417, 430 N. E. 2d 896 (1981). The majority first held that it did not need to consider whether our decision in Caban affected appellant’s claim that he had a right to notice, because Caban was not retroactive. It then rejected the argument that the mother had been guilty of a fraud upon the court. Finally, it addressed what it described as the only contention of substance advanced by appellant: that it was an abuse of discretion to enter the adoption order without requiring that notice be given to appellant. The court observed that the primary purpose of the notice provision of § 111-a was to enable the person served to provide the court with evidence concerning the best interest of the child, and that appellant had made no tender indicating any ability to provide any particular or special information relevant to Jessica’s best interest. Considering the record as a whole, and acknowledging that it might have been prudent to give notice, the court concluded that the Family Court had not abused its discretion either when it entered the order without notice or when it denied appellant’s petition to reopen the proceedings. The dissenting judges concluded that the Family Court had abused its discretion, both when it entered the order without notice and when it refused to reopen the proceedings.
Appellant has now invoked our appellate jurisdiction. He offers two alternative grounds for holding the New York statutory scheme unconstitutional. First, he contends that a putative father’s actual or potential relationship with a child born out of wedlock is an interest in liberty which may not be destroyed without due process of law; he argues therefore that he had a constitutional right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before he was deprived of that interest. Second, he contends that the gender-based classification in the statute, which both denied him the right to consent to Jessica’s adoption and accorded him fewer procedural rights than her mother, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Due Process Claim.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. When that Clause is invoked in a novel context, it is our practice to begin the inquiry with a determination of the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the State. See, e. g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895-896 (1961). Only after that interest has been identified, can we properly evaluate the adequacy of the State’s process. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 482-483 (1972). We therefore first consider the nature of the interest in liberty for which appellant claims constitutional protection and then turn to a discussion of the adequacy of the procedure that New York has provided for its protection.
I
The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases. In deciding whether this is such a case, however, we must consider the broad framework that has traditionally been used to resolve the legal problems arising from the parent-child relationship.
In the vast majority of cases, state law determines the final outcome. Cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U. S. 341, 351— 353 (1966). Rules governing the inheritance of property, adoption, and child custody are generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State. Moreover, equally varied state laws governing marriage and divorce affect a multitude of parent-child relationships. The institution of marriage has played a critical role both in defining the legal entitlements of family members and in developing the decentralized structure of our democratic society. In recognition of that role, and as part of their general overarching concern for serving the best interests of children, state laws almost universally express an appropriate preference for the formal family.
In some cases, however, this Court has held that the Federal Constitution supersedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relationships. In those cases, as in the state cases, the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed. Thus, the “liberty” of parents to control the education of their children that was vindicated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), was described as a “right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [the child] for additional obligations.” Id., at 535. The linkage between parental duty and parental right was stressed again in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944), when the Court declared it a cardinal principle “that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Ibid. In these cases the Court has found that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). “[S]tate intervention to terminate [such a] relationship . . . must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982).
There are also a few cases in which this Court has considered the extent to which the Constitution affords protection to the relationship between natural parents and children born out of wedlock. In some we have been concerned with the rights of the children, see, e. g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972). In this case, however, it is a parent who claims that the State has improperly deprived him of a protected interest in liberty. This Court has examined the extent to which a natural father’s biological relationship with his child receives protection under the Due Process Clause in precisely three cases: Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979).
Stanley involved the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit person to have custody of his children. The father in that case had lived with his children all their lives and had lived with their mother for 18 years. There was nothing in the record to indicate that Stanley had been a neglectful father who had not cared for his children. 405 U. S., at 655. Under the statute, however, the nature of the actual relationship between parent and child was completely irrelevant. Once the mother died, the children were automatically made wards of the State. Relying in part on a Michigan case recognizing that the preservation of “a subsisting relationship with the child’s father” may better serve the child’s best interest than “uprooting him from the family which he knew from birth,” id., at 654-655, n. 7, the Court held that the Due Process Clause was violated by the automatic destruction of the custodial relationship without giving the father any opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent.
Quilloin involved the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that authorized the adoption, over the objection of the natural father, of a child born out of wedlock. The father in that case had never legitimated the child. It was only after the mother had remarried and her new husband had filed an adoption petition that the natural father sought visitation rights and filed a petition for legitimation. The trial court found adoption by the new husband to be in the child’s best interests, and we unanimously held that action to be consistent with the Due Process Clause.
Caban involved the conflicting claims of two natural parents who had maintained joint custody of their children from the time of their birth until they were respectively two and four years old. The father challenged the validity of an order authorizing the mother’s new husband to adopt the children; he relied on both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Because this Court upheld his equal protection claim, the majority did not address his due process challenge. The comments on the latter claim by the four dissenting Justices are nevertheless instructive, because they identify the clear distinction between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility.
Justice Stewart correctly observed:
“Even if it be assumed that each married parent after divorce has some substantive due process right to maintain his or her parental relationship, cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 862-863 (opinion concurring in judgment), it by no means follows that each unwed parent has any such right. Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.” 441 U. S., at 397 (emphasis added).
In a similar vein, the other three dissenters in Caban were prepared to “assume that, if and when one develops, the relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process.” Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 414 (emphasis added).
The difference between the developed parent-child relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the potential relationship involved in Quilloin and this case, is both clear and significant. When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by “com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,” Caban, 441 U. S., at 392, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he “act[s] as a father toward his children.” Id., at 389, n. 7. But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds. “[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in ‘promoting] a way of life’ through the instruction of children ... as well as from the fact of blood relationship.” Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 231-233 (1972)).
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.
In this case, we are not assessing the constitutional adequacy of New York’s procedures for terminating a developed relationship. Appellant has never had any significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with Jessica, and he did not seek to establish a legal tie until after she was two years old. We are concerned only with whether New York has adequately protected his opportunity to form such a relationship.
II
The most effective protection of the putative father’s opportunity to develop a relationship with his child is provided by the laws that authorize formal marriage and govern its consequences. But the availability of that protection is, of course, dependent on the will of both parents of the child. Thus, New York has adopted a special statutory scheme to protect the unmarried father’s interest in assuming a responsible role in the future of his child.
After this Court’s decision in Stanley, the New York Legislature appointed a special commission to recommend legislation that would accommodate both the interests of biological fathers in their children and the children’s interest in prompt and certain adoption procedures. The commission recommended, and the legislature enacted, a statutory adoption scheme that automatically provides notice to seven categories of putative fathers who are likely to have assumed some responsibility for the care of their natural children. If this scheme were likely to omit many responsible fathers, and if qualification for notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be thought procedurally inadequate. Yet, as all of the New York courts that reviewed this matter observed, the right to receive notice was completely within appellant’s control. By mailing a postcard to the putative father registry, he could have guaranteed that he would receive notice of any proceedings to adopt Jessica. The possibility that he may have .failed to do so because of his ignorance of the law cannot be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself. The New York Legislature concluded that a more open-ended notice requirement would merely complicate the adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed mothers, create the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair the desired finality of adoption decrees. Regardless of whether we would have done likewise if we were legislators instead of judges, we surely cannot characterize the State’s conclusion as arbitrary.
Appellant argues, however, that even if the putative father’s opportunity to establish a relationship with an illegitimate child is adequately protected by the New York statutory scheme in the normal case, he was nevertheless entitled to special notice because the court and the mother knew that he had filed an affiliation proceeding in another court. This argument amounts to nothing more than an indirect attack on the notice provisions of the New York statute. The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie the entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge’s determination to require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the statute. The Constitution does not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own rights. Since the New York statutes adequately protected appellant’s inchoate interest in establishing a relationship with Jessica, we find no merit in the claim that his constitutional rights were offended because the Family Court strictly complied with the notice provisions of the statute.
The Equal Protection Claim.
The concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 587 (1979). The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971). Specifically, it may not subject men and women to disparate treatment when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197-199 (1976).
The legislation at issue in this case, N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 111 and 111-a (McKinney 1977 and Supp. 1982-1983), is intended to establish procedures for adoptions. Those procedures are designed to promote the best interests of the child, to protect the rights of interested third parties, and to ensure promptness and finality. To serve those ends, the legislation guarantees to certain people the right to veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding. The mother of an illegitimate child is always within that favored class, but only certain putative fathers are included. Appellant contends that the gender-based distinction is invidious.
As we have already explained, the existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child. In Quilloin v. Walcott, we noted that the putative father, like appellant, “ha[d] never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child. Appellant does not complain of his exemption from these responsibilities . . . .” 434 U. S., at 256. We therefore found that a Georgia statute that always required a mother’s consent to the adoption of a child born out of wedlock, but required the father’s consent only if he had legitimated the child, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Because appellant, like the father in Quilloin, has never established a substantial relationship with his daughter, see supra, at 262, the New York statutes at issue in this case did not operate to deny appellant equal protection.
We have held that these statutes may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child. In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), the Court held that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to grant the mother a veto over the adoption of a 4-year-old girl and a 6-year-old boy, but not to grant a veto to their father, who had admitted paternity and had participated in the rearing of the children. The Court made it clear, however, that if the father had not “come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclud[e] the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.” Id., at 392.
Jessica’s parents are not like the parents involved in Caban. Whereas appellee had a continuous custodial responsibility for Jessica, appellant never established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with her. If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never estab-fished a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights.
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Although both Lorraine and Richard Robertson are appellees in this proceeding, for ease of discussion the term “appellee” will hereafter be used to identify Lorraine Robertson.
The order provided for the adoption of appellee’s older daughter, Renee, as well as Jessica. Appellant does not challenge the adoption of Renee.
Appellee has never conceded that appellant is Jessica’s biological father, but for purposes of analysis in this opinion it will be assumed that he is.
At the time Jessica’s adoption order was entered, N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 372-c (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) provided:
“1. The department shall establish a putative father registry which shall record the names and addresses of. . . any person who has filed with the registry before or after the birth of a child out-of-wedlock, a notice of intent to claim paternity of the child ....
“2. A person filing a notice of intent to claim paternity of a child ... shall include therein his current address and shall notify the registry of any change of address pursuant to procedures prescribed by regulations of the department.
“3. A person who has filed a notice of intent to claim paternity may at any time revoke a notice of intent to claim paternity previously filed therewith and, upon receipt of such notification by the registry, the revoked notice of intent to claim paternity shall be deemed a nullity nunc pro tunc.
“4. An unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of a child may be introduced in evidence by any party, other than the person who filed such notice, in any proceeding in which such fact may be relevant.
“5. The department shall, upon request, provide the names and addresses of persons listed with the registry to any court or authorized agency, and such information shall not be divulged to any other person, except upon order of a court for good cause shown.”
At the time Jessica’s adoption order was entered, N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 111-a (2) and (3) (McKinney 1977 and Supp. 1982-1983) provided:
“2. Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall include:
“(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the child;
“(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law;
“(e) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two of the social services law;
“(d) any person who is recorded on the child’s birth certificate as the child’s father;
“(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child’s mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child’s father;
“(f) any person who has been identified as the child’s father by the mother in written, sworn statement; and
“(g) any person who was married to the child’s mother within six months subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law.
“3. The sole purpose of notice under this section shall be to enable the person served pursuant to subdivision two to present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of the child.”
Without trying to intervene in the adoption proceeding, appellant had attempted to file an appeal from the adoption order. That appeal was dismissed.
Caban was decided on April 24, 1979, about two months after the entry of the order of adoption. In Caban, a father who had lived with his two illegitimate children and their mother for several years successfully challenged the constitutionality of the New York statute providing that children could be adopted without the father’s consent even though the mother’s consent was required.
Although the dissenters in Caban discussed the question of retroactivity, see 441 U. S., at 401, 415-416, that question was not addressed in the Court’s opinion.
We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction until after hearing argument on the merits. 456 U. S. 970 (1982). Our review of the record persuades us that appellant did in fact draw into question the validity of the New York statutory scheme on the ground of its being repugnant to the Federal Constitution, that the New York Court of Appeals upheld that scheme, and that we therefore have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2).
The question whether the Family Court abused its discretion in not requiring notice to appellant before the adoption order was entered and in not reopening the proceeding is, of course, not before us. That issue was presented to and decided by the New York courts purely as a matter of state law. Whether we might have given such notice had we been sitting as the trial court, or whether we might have considered the failure to give such notice an abuse of discretion had we been sitting as state appellate judges, are questions on which we are not authorized to express an opinion. The only question we have jurisdiction to decide is whether the New York statutes are unconstitutional because they inadequately protect the natural relationship between parent and child or because they draw an impermissible distinction between the rights of the mother and the rights of the father.
At present, state legislatures appear inclined to retain the unique attributes of their respective bodies of family law. For example, as of the end of 1982, only eight States had adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. 9A U. L. A. 171 (Supp. 1983).
See Hafen, Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 479-481 (1983).
See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 769 (1977) (“No one disputes the appropriateness of Illinois’ concern with the family unit, perhaps the most fundamental social institution of our society”). A plurality of the Court noted the societal value of family bonds in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 505 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.):
“Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home. . . . Especially in times of adversity, such as the death of a spouse or economic need, the broader family has tended to come together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life.”
In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N. W. 2d 27 (1967).
Having “concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody,” the Court also held “that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.” 405 U. S., at 658.
In the balance of that paragraph Justice Stewart noted that the relation between a father and his natural child may acquire constitutional protection if the father enters into a traditional marriage with the mother or if “the actual relationship between father and child” is sufficient.
“The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father’s parental claims must be gauged by other measures. By tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother. By definition, the question before us can arise only when no such marriage has taken place. In some circumstances the actual relationship between father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father parental interests comparable to those of the married father. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, supra. But here we are concerned with the rights the unwed father may have when his wishes and those of the mother are in conflict, and the child’s best interests are served by a resolution in favor of the mother. It seems to me that the absence of a legal tie with the mother may in such circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father’s actual relationship with the children.” 441 U. S., at 397.
Commentators have emphasized the constitutional importance of the distinction between an inchoate and a fully developed relationship. See Comment, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 95, 115-116 (1979) (“the unwed father’s interest springs not from his biological tie with his illegitimate child, but rather, from the relationship he has established with and the responsibility he has shouldered for his child”); Note, 58 Neb. L. Rev. 610, 617 (1979) (“a putative father’s failure to show a substantial interest in his child’s welfare and to employ methods provided by state law for solidifying his parental rights . . . will remove from him the full constitutional protection afforded the parental rights of other classes of parents”); Note, 29 Emory L. J. 833, 854 (1980) (“an unwed father’s rights in his child do not spring solely from the biological fact of his parentage, but rather from his willingness to admit his paternity and express some tangible interest in the child”). See also Poulin, Illegitimacy and Family Privacy: A Note on Maternal Cooperation in Paternity Suits, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 910, 916-919 (1976) (hereinafter Poulin); Developments in the Law, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1275-1277 (1980); Note, 18 Duquesne L. Rev. 375, 383-384, n. 73 (1980); Note, 19 J. Family L. 440, 460 (1980); Note, 57 Denver L. J. 671, 680-683 (1980); Note, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 1029,1035; Note, 12 U. C. D. L. Rev. 412, 450, n. 218 (1979).
Of course, we need not take sides in the ongoing debate among family psychologists over the relative weight to be accorded biological ties and psychological ties, in order to recognize that a natural father who has played a substantial role in rearing his child has a greater claim to constitutional protection than a mere biological parent. New York's statutory scheme reflects these differences, guaranteeing notice to any putative father who is living openly with the child, and providing putative fathers who have never developed a relationship with the child the opportunity to receive notice simply by mailing a postcard to the putative father registry.
This case happens to involve an adoption by the husband of the natural mother, but we do not believe the natural father has any greater right to object to such an adoption than to an adoption by two total strangers. If anything, the balance of equities tips the opposite way in a case such as this. In denying the putative father relief in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978), we made an observation equally applicable here:
“Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant. Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the ‘best interests of the child.’” Id,., at 255.
In a report explaining the purpose of the 1976 amendments to § 111-a of the New York Domestic Relations Law, the temporary state commission on child welfare that was responsible for drafting the legislation stated, in part:
“The measure will dispel uncertainties by providing clear constitutional statutory guidelines for notice to fathers of out-of-wedlock children. It will establish a desired finality in adoption proceedings and will provide an expeditious method for child placement agencies of identifying those fathers who are entitled to notice through the creation of a registry of such fathers within the State Department of Social Services. Conversely, the bill will afford to concerned fathers of out-of-wedlock children a simple means of expressing their interest and protecting their rights to be notified and have an opportunity to be heard. It will also obviate an existing disparity of Appellate Division decisions by permitting such fathers to be petitioners in paternity proceedings.
“The measure is intended to codify the minimum protections for the putative father which Stanley would require. In so doing it reflects policy decisions to (a) codify constitutional requirements; (b) clearly establish, as early as possible in a child’s life, the rights, interests and obligations of all parties; (c) facilitate prompt planning for the future of the child and permanence of his status; and (d) through the foregoing, promote the best interest of children.” App. to Brief for Appellant C-15.
Cf. Roe v. Norton, 422 U. S. 391 (1975), vacating and remanding 365 F. Supp. 65 (Conn. 1973). See Poulin 922-932; Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights, 9 Family L. Q. 527, 542 (1975).
Nor can we deem unconstitutionally arbitrary the state courts’ conclusion that appellant’s absence did not distort their analysis of Jessica’s best interests. The adoption does not affect Jessica’s relationship with her mother. It gives legal permanence to her relationship with her adoptive father, a relationship they had maintained for 21 months at the time the adoption order was entered. Appellant did not proffer any evidence to suggest that legal confirmation of the established relationship would be unwise; he did not even know the adoptive father.
It is a generally accepted feature of our adversary system that a potential defendant who knows that the statute of limitations is about to run has no duty to give the plaintiff advice. There is no suggestion in the record that appellee engaged in fraudulent practices that led appellant not to protect his rights.
In Reed, the Court considered an Idaho statute providing that in designating administrators of the estates of intestate decedents, “[o]f several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females.” See 404 U. S., at 73. The State had sought to justify the statute as a way to reduce the workload of probate courts by eliminating one class of contests. Writing for a unanimous Court, The Chief Justice observed that in using gender to promote that objective, the legislature had made “the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.” Id,., at 76. The State’s articulated goal could have been completely served by requiring a coin flip. The decision instead to choose a rule that systematically harmed women could be explained only as the product of habit, rather than analysis or reflection, cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 222 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), or as the product of an invidious and indefensible stereotype, cf. id., at 218. Such legislative decisions are inimical to the norm of impartial government.
The mandate of impartiality also constrains those state actors who implement state laws. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause would have been violated in precisely the same manner if in Reed there had been no statute and the probate judge had simply announced that he chose Cecil Reed over Sally Reed “because I prefer males to females.”
Appellant does not contest the vital importance of those ends to the people of New York. It has long been accepted that illegitimate children whose parents never marry are “at risk” economically, medically, emotionally, and educationally. See E. Crellin, M. Pringle, & P. West, Born Illegitimate: Social and Educational Implications 96-112 (1971); cf. T. Lash, H. Sigal, & D. Dudzinski, State of the Child: New York City II, p. 47 (1980).
In Caban, the Court noted that an adoption “may proceed in the absence of consent when the parent whose consent otherwise would be required . . . has abandoned the child.” 441 U. S., at 392.
Appellant also makes an equal protection argument based upon the manner in which the statute distinguishes among classes of fathers. For the reasons set forth in our due process discussion, supra, we conclude that the statutory distinction is rational and that appellant’s argument is without merit. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
0
] | sc_certreason |
BARTONE v. UNITED STATES.
No. 337.
Decided October 28, 1963.
O. B. Cline, Jr. and Nicholas J. Capuano for petitioner.
Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
Per Curiam.
Although there were other questions before the Court of Appeals, the sole question presented by this petition is stated as follows:
“May a United States District Judge orally revoke the probation of a Defendant in open court and in the presence of the Defendant and his counsel and impose a sentence of confinement for a specific period of time and thereafter enter a formal written judgment and commitment in which a larger and longer sentence of confinement is imposed and set forth?”
It appears that on September 14, 1962, petitioner and his counsel appeared in the District Court, at which time a sentence of confinement of one year was imposed. Subsequently, and in petitioner’s absence, the court enlarged the penalty by one day.
The propriety of this enlargement of the sentence, along with other questions, was presented on the appeal to the Court of Appeals, which made no mention of it in its opinion. 317 F. 2d 608. The Court of Appeals did, however, deny a motion of the United States to remand the cause for the purpose of correcting the sentence — relief to which the United States concedes petitioner is entitled. See Rakes v. United States, 309 F. 2d 686. The only question is whether the error will be corrected here and now or whether petitioner will be remitted to his remedy under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ; and whether petitioner will be advantaged by one procedure or another is not our concern.
This error, in enlarging the sentence in the absence of petitioner, was so plain in light of the requirements of Rule 43 that it should have been dealt with by the Court of Appeals, even though it had not been alleged as error.
As seen from our Miscellaneous Docket for 1962, the use of collateral proceedings for relief from federal judgments of conviction is considerable:
October Term, 1962. — Miscellaneous Docket.
totals.
Federal prisoners:
Direct attack. 109
28 U. S. C. § 2255. 93
Habeas corpus through federal courts. 38
Original habeas corpus (in this Court). 40
Rule 35, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 4
284
Where state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an effective state remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391. But the situation is different in federal proceedings, over which both the Courts of Appeals and this Court (McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332) have broad powers of supervision. It is more appropriate, whenever possible, to correct errors reachable by the appeal rather than remit the parties to a new collateral proceeding.
We grant certiorari and reverse the judgment denying correction of the sentence.
Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant’s voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return of the verdict. A corporation may appear by counsel for all purposes. In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both, the court, with the written consent of the defendant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence in the defendant’s absence. The defendant’s presence is not required at a reduction of sentence under Rule 35.”
Supra, note 1. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states. | What is the issue area of the decision? | [
"Criminal Procedure",
"Civil Rights",
"First Amendment",
"Due Process",
"Privacy",
"Attorneys",
"Unions",
"Economic Activity",
"Judicial Power",
"Federalism",
"Interstate Relations",
"Federal Taxation",
"Miscellaneous",
"Private Action"
] | [
0
] | sc_issuearea |
VANDERBILT v. VANDERBILT et al.
No. 302.
Argued April 22-23, 1957.
Decided June 24, 1957.
Sol A. Rosenblatt argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Charles Roden.
Monroe J. Winsten argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Charles L. Raskin for Vanderbilt, respondent.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., petitioner, and Patricia Vanderbilt, respondent, were married in 1948. They separated in 1952 while living in California. The wife moved to New York where she has resided since February 1953. In March of that year the husband filed suit for divorce in Nevada. This proceeding culminated, in June 1953, with a decree of final divorce which provided that both husband and wife were “freed and released from the bonds of matrimony and all the duties and obligations thereof . ...” The wife was not served with process in Nevada and did not appear before the divorce court.
In April 1954, Mrs. Vanderbilt instituted an action in a New York court praying for separation from petitioner and for alimony. The New York court did not have personal jurisdiction over him, but in order to satisfy his obligations, if any, to Mrs. Vanderbilt, it sequestered his property within the State. He appeared specially and, among other defenses to the action, contended that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution compelled the New York court to treat the Nevada divorce as having ended the marriage and as having destroyed any duty of support which he owed the respondent. While the New York court found the Nevada decree valid and held that it had effectively dissolved the marriage, it nevertheless entered an order, under § 1170-b of the New York Civil Practice Act, directing petitioner to make designated support payments to respondent. 207 Misc. 294, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 222. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the support order. 1 N. Y. 2d 342, 135 N. E. 2d 553. Petitioner then applied to this Court for certiorari contending that § 1170-b, as applied, is unconstitutional because it contravenes the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 820.
In Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, this Court decided that a Nevada divorce court, which had no personal jurisdiction over the wife, had no power to terminate a husband’s obligation to provide her support as required in a preexisting New York separation decree. The factor which distinguishes the present case from Estin is that here the wife’s right to support had not been reduced to judgment prior to the husband’s ex parte divorce. In our opinion this difference is not material on the question before us. Since the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right which she had under the law of New York to financial support from her husband. It has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Here, the Nevada divorce court was as powerless to cut off the wife’s support right as it would have been to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife had brought the divorce action and he had not been subject to the divorce court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife’s right to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New York to give it recognition.
Petitioner claims that this case is governed by Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551. For the reasons given in a concurring opinion in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U. S. 568, 575, at 580-581, the Thompson case, insofar as it held that an ex parte divorce destroyed alimony rights, can no longer be considered controlling.
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
It seems clear that in Nevada the effect of this decree was to put an end to the husband’s duty to support the wife — provided, of course, that the Nevada courts had power to do this. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431, 438-439, 179 P. 638, 639-640; Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68, 25 P. 2d 378, 380. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 547.
See Pennington v. Fourth Natl. Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U. S. 269; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215.
Art. IV, § 1. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” Congress has provided that judgments shall have the same force and effect in every court throughout the United States that they have in the State where they were rendered. 28 U. S. C. § 1738.
“In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, . . . where the court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by the court that a divorce . . . declaring the marriage a nullity had previously been granted to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the same action such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife.” Gilbert-Bliss’ N. Y. Civ. Prac., Vol. 6A, 1956 Cum. Supp., § 1170-b.
The petition for certiorari also raised a number of other contentions. We have considered them and find that they do not justify reversing the decision below.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 726-727. If a defendant has property in a State it can adjudicate his obligations, but only to the extent of his interest in that property. Pennington v. Fourth Natl. Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U. S. 269; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215.
A concurring opinion in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U. S. 568, 575, and the authorities collected there, set forth in greater detail the reasons underlying this holding. Cf. Meredith v. Meredith, 96 U. S. App. D. C. 355, 226 F. 2d 257, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1497.
“A state lacks judicial jurisdiction to absolve a spouse from any duty of support which, under the law of a second state, he may owe the other spouse in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the latter.” Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 116 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953), and see Comment f to § 116. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the opinion effectively says that the decision in this case "overruled" one or more of the Court's own precedents. Alteration also extends to language in the majority opinion that states that a precedent of the Supreme Court has been "disapproved," or is "no longer good law". Note, however, that alteration does not apply to cases in which the Court "distinguishes" a precedent. | Did the the decision of the court overrule one or more of the Court's own precedents? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_precedentalteration |
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. TEXACO INC. et al.
No. 386.
Argued March 25, 1.964.
Decided April 20, 1964.
Howard E. Wahrenbrock argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Ralph S. Spritzer, Richard A. Solomon, Josephine H. Klein and Peter H. Schiff.
Alfred C. DeCrane, Jr. argued the cause for respondent Texaco Inc. With him on the brief was Paul F. Schlicher. Carroll L. Gilliam argued the cause for respondent Pan American Petroleum Corp. With him on the brief were W. W. Heard, Wm. H. Emerson and William J. Grove.
J. Calvin Simpson and John T. Murphy filed a brief for the State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of California, as amici curiae, urging reversal.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Power Commission in its regulation of independent producers of natural gas has required them to file their contracts as rate schedules. This was done by regulations which evolved as a result of a series of rule-making proceedings. The pertinent regulations presently provide that only certain pricing provisions in the contracts of independent producers are “permissible,” any other being “inoperative and of no effect at law.” The regulations go on to say that any contract executed on or after April 2, 1962, containing price-changing provisions other than the “permissible” ones, “shall be rejected” so far as producer rates are concerned, that a producer’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act “shall be rejected” if any contract submitted in support of it contains any of the forbidden provisions, and that, so far as pipeline certificates are concerned, any producer contract executed after that date which has that infirmity “will be given no consideration in determining adequacy” of a pipeline company’s gas supply.
These regulations were adopted pursuant to the provisions of § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 238, 5 U. S. C. § 1003. General notice of the proposed rule making was published in the Federal Register as required by § 4 (a) of that Act. The Commission also gave interested parties a “hearing” under § 4 (b). No oral argument was had but an opportunity was afforded for all interested parties to submit their views in writing; and the two respondents in this case — Texaco and Pan American — along with others, did so.
Later, each respondent submitted an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act, to supply natural gas to a pipeline company. Section 7 provides, with exceptions not presently material, that the Commission “shall set” such an application “for hearing.” Since, however, the applications disclosed price clauses that are not “permissible” under the regulations, the Commission without a hearing rejected the applications. 28 F. P. C. 551; 29 F. P. C. 378. Petitions for review were filed with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the orders of the Commission. 317 F. 2d 796. It held that while the regulations are valid as a statement of Commission policy, they cannot be used to deprive an applicant of the statutory hearing granted those who seek certificates of public convenience and necessity. The two cases are here in one petition for certiorari which we granted because of an apparent conflict between that decision and Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 322 F. 2d 601, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 375 U. S. 902.
I.
A preliminary question, which concerns Texaco Inc., alone, is whether venue to review these orders of the Commission was properly in the Tenth Circuit. The governing provision is § 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act which provides:
“Any party to a proceeding under this Act aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit wherein the natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia . . . .”
The term “is located” would have an ambivalent meaning if venue lay only in “any circuit” where the natural gas company “is located.” But in the context of § 19 (b) “any circuit” covers either the place where the company “is located” or where it “has its principal place of business.” Hence the main argument of Texaco derives from the fact that “is located” was substituted for “resides” in an early draft of the bill which later emerged as the Federal Power Act, from which § 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act is derived. The Court of Appeals found that change decisive; but we can only conjecture as to why it was made, as no explanation appears. The bill in which “resides” was used gave review to “any person aggrieved” and the bill substituting “is located” for “resides” substituted “licensee or public utility” for “person aggrieved.” Since the latter language was changed from the personal to the impersonal it may be, as the Commission says, that the Congress was trying to use common legal parlance that a corporation “can have its legal home only at the place where it is located by or under the authority of its charter,” as stated in Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 377. And see Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 169. However that may be, we think that “is located” means more than having physical presence or existence in a place, since the alternate venue referred to in § 19 (b) is “principal place of business.” The Court of Appeals recognized the overlap between the two clauses inherent in its construction but resolved its doubts in favor of Tenth Circuit venue because the gas sold by Texaco under the contested contracts was produced in that circuit and the performance of the contract took place there.
The Act with which we deal was enacted August 26, 1935. At that time and down to the 1948 amendment of § 1391 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c), the only residence of a corporation for purposes of federal venue was the State and district in which it had been incorporated. See 9 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (1931), § 4385. That theme runs through the cases. See, e. g., Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 449-450. We conclude that, although “located” sometimes is used as indicating a place of business (Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555), in the setting of this Act “is located” and “resides” are equated and that “is located” refers in the case of Texaco to its State of incorporation. There is symmetry in that construction as the choice, so far as circuits are concerned, is then left between that State, the “principal place of business” (with no penumbra of other places of business, as here), or the District of Columbia where the Commission sits.
Texaco is a Delaware corporation and there is no claim that its principal place of business is within the Tenth Circuit. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in failing to dismiss its petition for lack of venue. There is, however, another respondent, Pan American, whose principal place of business is within the Tenth Circuit. We therefore proceed to the merits of its application.
II.
The main issue in the case is whether the “hearing” granted under § 4 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act is adequate, so far as the price clauses are concerned, for purposes of § 7 of the Natural Gas Act. We think the Court of Appeals erred, that the present case is governed by the principle of United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, and that the statutory requirement for a hearing under § 7 does not preclude the Commission from particularizing statutory standards through the rule-making process and barring at the threshold those who neither measure up to them nor show reasons why in the public interest the rule should be waived.
In Storer the Federal Communications Commission, pursuant to its general rule-making authority, limited permissible multiple ownership for radio and television stations. Storer, which had seven radio stations and five television stations, was under that rule automatically disqualified for further licensing. To surmount that barrier it argued that the Act required a license to issue where the public interest would be served and that before an application could be denied, a hearing must be held. We said:
“We read the Act and Regulations as providing a ‘full hearing’ for applicants who have reached the existing limit of stations, upon their presentation of applications conforming to Rules 1.361 (c) and 1.702, that set out adequate reasons why the Rules should be waived or amended. The Act, considered as a whole, requires no more. We agree with the contention of the Commission that a full hearing, such as is required by § 309 (b) ... would not be necessary on all such applications. As the Commission has promulgated its Rules after extensive administrative hearings, it is necessary for the accompanying papers to set forth reasons, sufficient if true, to justify a change or waiver of the Rules. We do not think Congress intended the Commission to waste time on applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing. If any applicant is aggrieved by a refusal, the way for review is open.” 351 U. S., at 205.
In the present case, as in Storer, there is a procedure provided in the regulations whereby an applicant can ask for a waiver of the rule complained of. Facts might conceivably be alleged sufficient on their face to provide a basis for waiver of the price-clause rules and for a hearing on the matter. Cf. Atlantic Refining Co., 28 F. P. C. 469 ; 29 F. P. C. 384. But no such attempt was made here by Pan American, the only respondent to which the present point has any immediate applicability.
The rule-making authority here, as in Storer, is ample to provide the conditions for applications under § 4 or § 7. Section 16 of the Natural Gas Act gives the Commission power to prescribe such regulations “as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act.” We deal here with a procedural aspect of a rate question and with a certificate question that is important in effectuating the aim of the Act to protect the consumer interest. Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 610. In a rate case under § 5 (a) of the Act the Commission can pass on existing contracts affecting rates, can find that particular contracts are “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential” and thereupon has power to determine the “just and reasonable” rate or contract and “fix the same.” And see United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 341. And where, as here, applications for certificates are made under § 7 of the Act, the Commission under § 7 (e) is required to control the terms and conditions under which natural gas companies, such as respondent, may initiate sales at wholesale of natural gas in commerce. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 360 U. S. 378, 389.
Pan American does not disagree on that score; it insists that those changes and adjustments can be made only after an adversary hearing. To that there are two answers. The present regulations do not pass on the merits of any rate structure nor on the merits of a certificate of public convenience and necessity; they merely prescribe qualifications for applicants. Those qualifications are in the category of conditions that relate to the ability of applicants to serve the consumer interest in this regulated field. They are kin to the kind of capital structure that an applicant has and to his ability by reason of the rate structure to serve the public interest. It must be remembered that under this Act rate increases are initiated by the natural gas company, the Commission having the burden by reason of § 4 (e) of the Act to initiate a hearing on their legality with only a limited power to suspend new rates. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Co. Service Corp., supra. Natural gas companies that seek to enter the field with prearranged escalator clauses and the like have a built-in device for ready manipulation of rates upward. Protection of the consumer interests against that device may be best achieved if it is given at the very threshold of the enterprise. At least the Commission may so conclude; and the legislative history makes clear that its authority reaches that far. H. R. Rep. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3, states:
. . The bill when enacted will have the effect of giving the Commission an opportunity to scrutinize the financial set-up, the adequacy of the gas reserves, the feasibility and adequacy of the proposed services, and the characteristics of the rate structure in connection with the proposed construction or extension at a time when such vital matters can readily be modified as the public interest may demand. . . .” (Italics added.)
And see S. Rep. No. 948, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1-2.
To require the Commission to proceed only on a case-by-case basis would require it, so long as its policy outlawed indefinite price-changing provisions, to repeat in hearing after hearing its'conclusions that condemn all of them. There would be a vast proliferation of hearings, for as a result of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672, there are thousands of individual producers seeking applications. See Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm’n, 373 U. S. 294, 300. We see no reason why under this statutory scheme the processes of regulation need be so prolonged and so crippled.
Pan American finally argues that the “hearing” accorded it under § 4 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act did not comply with that Act nor with the Natural Gas Act. It points out that § 7 of the Natural Gas Act requires a hearing and that § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that a full-fledged adversary-type of hearing be held in “every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the'record after opportunity for an agency hearing. . . .” “Adjudication” is defined in § 2 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act as “agency process for the formulation of an order”; “order” is defined as “the whole or any part of the final disposition . . . of any agency in any matter other than rule making but including licensing.” And “licensing” is defined as “agency process respecting the . . . denial ... of a license.” § 2 (e). What the Commission did in these cases, however, is not an “adjudication,” not “an order,” not “licensing” within the meaning of § 2. Whether Pan American can qualify for a certificate of public convenience and necessity has never been reached. It has only been held that its application is not in proper form because of the pricing provisions in the contracts it tenders. No decisions on the merits have been reached. The only hearing to which Pan American so far has been entitled was given when the regulations in question were adopted pursuant to § 4 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Reversed.
See Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821-833, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§717-717w; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672.
See Order No. 174-B, 13 F. P. C. 1576, 18 CFR § 157.25; Order No. 232, 25 F. P. C. 379, 26 Fed. Reg. 1983, as amended by Order No. 232A, 25 F. P. C. 609, 26 Fed. Reg. 2850; Order No. 242, 27 F. P. C. 339, 27 Fed. Reg. 1356; Reg. §154.91 et seq., as amended, 18 CFR (Cum. Supp. 1963) § 154.91 et seq.
Section 154.93 defines the “permissible” provisions:
“(a) Provisions that change a price in order to reimburse the seller for all or any part of the changes in production, severance, or gathering taxes levied upon the seller;
“(b) Provisions that change a price to a specific amount at a definite date; and
“(c) Provisions that, once in five-year contract periods during which there is no provision for a change in price to a specific amount (paragraph (b) of this section), change a price at a definite date by a price-redetermination based upon and not higher than a producer rate or producer rates which are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, are not in issue in suspension or certificate proceedings, ■and, are in the area of the price in question . . . .”
Ibid. For a discussion of escalation clauses see Pure Oil Co., 25 F. P. C. 383, aff’d 299 F. 2d 370.
Ibid.
§ 157.25.
§157.14 (a) (10) (v).
Section 4 (b) provides:
“After notice required by this section, the agency shall afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to present the same orally in any manner; and, after consideration of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. Where rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, the requirements of sections 7 and 8 shall apply in place of the provisions of this subsection.”
Pan American’s contracts provide (1) for a one-cent escalation in 1968, 1973, and 1978, and (2) for a redetermination of a “fair market price” in each five-year period commencing October 1, 1983, but in no event for less than 20.5 cents per thousand cubic feet.
'Texaco’s contract contained price clauses to become effective at definite times or upon the happening of definite circumstances in the future, e. g., the passage of 5, 10, or 15 years, increased taxation on the production, severance, gathering, transportation, sale, or delivery of gas or as a result of renegotiations undertaken six months prior to the beginning of the third (1974) and fourth (1979) of the four five-year periods into which the contract term was divided.
See § 313 (b) of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 860, 16 U. S. C. § 8251 (b); cf. S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., with S. 2796 of the same session.
Regulation § 1.7 (b), 18 CFR (Cum. Supp. 1963) § 1.7 (b), provides in relevant part:
“A petition for the issuance, amendment, waiver, or repeal of a rule by the Commission shall set forth clearly and concisely petitioner’s interest in the subject matter, the specific rule, amendment, waiver, or repeal requested, and cite by appropriate reference the statutory provision or other authority therefor. If a rate filing is accompanied by a request for waiver pursuant to this section the thirty-day notice period provided in section 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act and section 205 (d) of the Federal Power Act shall begin to run if and when the Commission grants the request. Such petition shall set forth the purpose of, and the facts claimed to constitute the grounds requiring, such rule, amendment, waiver, or repeal, and shall conform to the requirements of §§ 1.15 and 1.16. Petitions for the issuance or amendment of a rule shall incorporate the proposed rule or amendment.”
The Commission in making the last amendment to the regulation now challenged said:
“Protection of the public interest is the touchstone of our regulatory powers under the Natural Gas Act. The Commission’s obligation under the Act to the natural gas companies, as one segment of the public whose interest is to be protected, does not compel it to acquiesce in the use of contracts which carry provisions incompatible with a scheme of effective rate regulation. To be sure, the proposed rule will have impact upon contractual practices which have been fairly widespread. But the real issue is not one of ‘freedom of contract’; the question is whether the rule is rationally related to a condition which requires correction if regulatory objectives embraced by the statute are to be achieved. See American Trucking Associations v. United States, 344 U. S. 298. In our view, the rule we adopt fully meets this test.
“We held in the Pure Oil case [see note 4, supra] that indefinite escalation clauses are contrary to the public interest and restated this conclusion in Order No. 232A. Increases in producer prices, triggered by indefinite escalation clauses, have resulted in a flood of almost simultaneous filings. These filings bear no apparent relationship to the economic requirements of the producers who file them. The Natural Gas Act contemplates that prices, to be just and reasonable, be related to economic needs. The elimination of indefinite escalation provisions does not, of course, cut off other avenues by which a producer may make provision for filing for increased rates.
“Filings under indefinite escalation clauses have created a significant portion of the administrative burdens under which this Commission is laboring today. The Natural Gas Act contemplates that rate increases shall be sought when there is economic justification, but not that there shall be a chain reaction in a wide area whenever one producer in the area negotiates a contract at a new price level. The Act requires the Commission to give precedence to the hearing and decision of rate increases, but the complexity of indefinite price clauses requires it to spend an undue amount of time in their interpretation and application at the expense of making a prompt determination of the rate issues involved. Accordingly, in protecting the public against waves of increases which have no defensible basis, we also serve the need — which we believe we should take into account— of making the tasks of regulation more manageable.” 27 F. P. C. 339, 340, 27 Fed. Reg. 1356, 1357.
In one recent case seven years elapsed between the date of the new rate filing and the close of the review proceedings. Shell Oil Co., 18 F. P. C. 617, 19 F. P. C. 74, set aside sub nom.. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Powér Comm’n, 263 F. 2d 223, rev’d sub nom. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U. S. 263; on remand, aff'd sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 292 F. 2d 149, cert. denied, 368 U. S. 915.
See note 8, supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
239
] | sc_petitioner |
RAYONIER INCORPORATED v. UNITED STATES.
NO. 45.
Argued December 4, 1956.
Decided January 28, 1957.
Luden F. Marion argued the cause for petitioner in No. 45. With him on the brief were Lowell P. Mickel-wait, Chester Rohrlich and Burroughs B. Anderson.
William H. Ferguson argued the cause for petitioners in No. 47. With him on the brief were Donald McL. Davidson and Charles S. Burdell.
Assistant Attorney General Doub argued the causes for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Paul A. Sweeney and Alan S. Rosenthal.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In both of these cases petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court in the State of Washington seeking to recover damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b) and 2671-2680, for losses which they allege were caused by the negligence of employees of the United States in allowing a forest fire to be started on Government land and in failing to act with due care to put this fire out. The complaints in the two cases are substantially the same and in summary make the following allegations. The United States owned certain land in the State of Washington. It permitted a railroad to run trains over a right of way passing through this land. On August 6, 1951, sparks from a railroad engine ignited six fires on the right of way and adjoining land. These fires started in areas where highly inflammable dry grasses, brush, and other materials had been negligently allowed to accumulate by the Government. Shortly after the fires started United States Forest Service personnel appeared and took exclusive direction and control of all fire suppression activities. The Forest Service had entered into an agreement with the State of Washington to protect against and to suppress any fires in an area which included the public lands where these fires started and the petitioners’ lands. Petitioners were aware of this contract and relied on the Forest Service to control and put out the fires involved in this case. But as a result of the Forest Service’s improper firefighting these fires spread until they became a single fire covering 1,600 acres. By August 11, however, this blaze was under control and was substantially out except for certain spots that continued to burn and smolder until September 20. During the period between August 11 and September 20 there were men, equipment and a plentiful supply of water available to the Forest Service and if these resources had been properly utilized the fire could have been completely extinguished. For several days immediately preceding September 20 there was decreasing humidity accompanied by strong winds. But the Forest Service kept only a few men guarding the fire despite the fact that it was smoldering close to a tinder-dry accumulation of debris, down logs and dead undergrowth. On September 20 the winds blew sparks from the smoldering embers into these inflammable materials and the fire exploded spreading as much as twenty miles in one direction. As it fanned out it destroyed timber, buildings and other property some of which belonged to the petitioners.
The complaints allege that these consequences were caused by the Forest Service’s negligence (1) in permitting inflammable materials to accumulate on Government land thereby allowing the fires to start and to spread; (2) in not preventing the railroad from starting the original spot fires; (3) in not properly suppressing the spot fires; and (4) in failing to quench and prevent the spread of the fire when it was under control in the 1,600 acre area. The district judge dismissed the complaints holding that they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He indicated that the facts alleged were sufficient to show actionable negligence on the part of a private person under the laws of Washington, but nevertheless felt compelled to dismiss the complaints because of the following statements by this Court in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 43.
“As to the alleged failure in fighting the fire, we think this too without the [Tort Claims] Act. The Act did not create new causes of action where none existed before. . . . ‘Its effect is to waive immunity from recognized causes of action and was not to visit the Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities.’... It did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure or carelessness of public firemen does not create private actionable rights.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge’s disposal of the complaints. 225 F. 2d 642 and 225 F. 2d 650. In agreeing that the United States could not be sued for any carelessness by the Forest Service in fighting the fire, it also relied exclusively on the Dalehite case. It rejected petitioners’ other claims of negligence on the ground that Washington law would impose no liability for the misconduct alleged. We hold that the courts below erred in deciding that the United States was immune from liability for any negligence by the Forest Service in fighting the fire.
The Tort Claims Act makes the United States liable (with certain exceptions which are not relevant here) for the negligence of its employees
. . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . 28 U. S. C. § 2674.
It gives the District Courts jurisdiction of all claims against the Government for losses
“. . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b).
These provisions, given their plain natural meaning, make the United States liable to petitioners for the Forest Service’s negligence in fighting the forest fire if, as alleged in the complaints, Washington law would impose liability on private persons or corporations under similar circumstances.
Nevertheless the Government, relying primarily on the Dalehite case, contends that Congress by the Tort Claims Act did not waive the United States’ immunity from liability for the negligence of its employees when they act as public firemen. It argues that the Act only imposes liability on the United States under circumstances where governmental bodies have traditionally been responsible for the misconduct of their employees and that neither the common law nor the law of Washington imposes liability on municipal or other local governments for the negligence of their agents acting in the “uniquely governmental” capacity of public firemen. But as we recently held in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, the test established by the Tort Claims Act for determining the United States’ liability is whether a private person would be responsible for similar negligence under the laws of the State where the acts occurred. We expressly decided in Indian Towing that the United States’ liability is not restricted to the liability of a municipal corporation or other public body and that an injured party cannot be deprived of his rights under the Act by resort to an alleged distinction, imported from the law of municipal corporations, between the Government’s negligence when it acts in a “proprietary” capacity and its negligence when it acts in a “uniquely governmental” capacity. To the extent that there was anything to the contrary in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing.
It may be that it is “novel and unprecedented” to hold the United States accountable for the negligence of its firefighters, but the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government’s traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability. The Government warns that if it is held responsible for the negligence of Forest Service firemen a heavy burden may be imposed on the public treasury. It points out the possibility that a fire may destroy hundreds of square miles of forests and even burn entire communities. But after' long consideration, Congress, believing it to be in the best interest of the nation, saw fit to impose such liability on the United States in the Tort Claims Act. Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are charged against the public treasury they are in effect spread among all those who contribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently did, decide that this would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from the services performed by Government employees. And for obvious reasons the United States cannot be equated with a municipality, which conceivably might be rendered bankrupt if it were subject to liability for the negligence of its firemen. There is no justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress. If the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body that adopted it.
The record shows that the trial judge dismissed both complaints in their entirety solely on the basis of the Dalehite case. While the Court of Appeals relied on state law to uphold the dismissal of those allegations in the complaints which charged negligence for reasons other than the Forest Service’s carelessness in controlling the fire, we cannot say that court’s interpretation of Washington law was wholly free from its erroneous acceptance of the statements in Dalehite about public firemen. Furthermore it has been strongly contended here that the Court of Appeals improperly interpreted certain allegations in the complaints and as a result of such misinterpretation incorrectly applied Washington law in passing on the sufficiency of these allegations. In view of the circumstances, we think it proper to vacate both judgments in their entirety so that the District Court may consider the complaints anew, in their present form or as they may be amended, wholly free to determine their sufficiency on the basis of whether the allegations and any supporting material offered to explain or clarify them would be sufficient to impose liability on a private person under the laws of the State of Washington. The judgments of both courts are vacated and the cases are remanded to the District Court for consideration in accordance with this opinion. ^
T, . 7 7 It is so ordered.
And see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 548-550.
See also Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 95 U. S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F. 2d 62, aff’d per curiam sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U. S. 907; Air Transport Associates v. United States, 221 F. 2d 467. Cf. United States v. Praylou, 208 F. 2d 291, 294-295.
See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383.
Cf. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551, 555; State Tax Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511, 514-515; and Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisposition |
HENRY v. MISSISSIPPI.
No. 6.
Argued October 13, 1964.
Decided January 18, 1965.
Barbara A. Morris argued the cause, for petitioner. With her on the brief were Robert L. Carter, Jack H. Young,. R. Jess Brown, Jr., and Alvin K. Hellerstein.
G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court, .
Petitioner was convicted of disturbing the peace, by indecent proposals to and offensive contact with an 18-year-old hitchhiker to whom he is said to have given a ride in his car. The trial judge charged the jury that “you cannot find the defendant guilty on the unsupported and uncorroborated testimony of the complainant alone.” The petitioner’s federal claim derives from the admission of a police officer’s testimony, introduced to corroborate the' hitchhiker’s testimony. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the officer’s testimony was improperly admitted as the fruit of “an unlawful search and was in violation of § 23, Miss. Constitution 1890.” 154 So. 2d 289, 294. The tainted evidence tended to substantiate the hitchhiker’s testimony by showing its accuracy in a detail which could have been seen only by one inside the car. In particular, it showed that the right-hand ashtray of the car in which the incident took place was full of Dentyne chewing gum wrappers, and that the cigarette lighter did not function. The police officer testified that after petitioner’s arrest he had returned to the petitioner’s home and obtained the permission of petitioner’s wife to look in petitioner’s- car. The wife provided the officer with the keys, with which the officer opened the car. He testified that he tried the lighten and it would not work, and also that the ashtray “was filled with red dentyne chewing gum wrappers.”
The Mississippi Supreme Court first filed an opinion which reversed petitioner’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the wife’s consent to the search of the car did not waive petitioner’s constitutional rights, and noted that the “ [t] estimony of the State’s witness"... is, in effect, uncorroborated without the evidence disclosed by the inspection of defendant’s automobile.” 154 So. 2d, at 296 (advance sheet). Acting .in the belief that petitioner had been represented by nonresident counsel unfamiliar with local procedure, the court reversed despite petitioner’s failure to comply with the Mississippi requirement that an objection to illegal evidence be made at the time it is introduced. The court noted that petitioner had moved for a directéd verdict at the close of the State’s case, assigning as one ground the use of illegally obtained evidence; it did not mention petitioner’s renewal of his motion at the close of all evidence.
After the first opinion was handed down, the State filed a Suggestion of Error, pointing out that petitioner was in fact 'represented at his trial by competent local counsel, as well as by out-of-state lawyers. Thereupon the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and filed a new opinion in support of a judgment affirming petitioner’s conviction. The new opinion is ' identical with , the first save for the result, the statement that petitioner had local counsel, and the discussion of the effect of failure for whatever reason to make timely objection to the evidence. “In such circumstances, even if honest mistakes of counsel in respect to policy or strategy or otherwise occur, they are binding upon the client as a part of the hazards of courtroom battle.” 154 So. 2d, at 296 (bound volume). Moreover, the court reasoned, petitioner’s cross-examination of the State’s witness before the initial motion for directed verdict, and introduction of other evidence of the car’s interior appearance afterward, “cured” the original error and estopped petitioner from complaining of the tainted evidence. We granted certiorari, 376 U. S. 904. We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a hearing on the question whether the petitioner is to be deemed to have knowingly waived decision of his federal claim when timely objection was not made to the admission of the illegally seized evidence.
It is, of course, a familiar principle that this Court will decline to review state court judgments which rest on independent and adequate state grounds, even where those judgments also decide federal questions. The principle applies not only in cases involving state substantive grounds, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, but also in cases involving state procedural grounds. Compare Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125-126, with Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22. But it is important to distinguish between state substantive grounds and state procedural grounds. Where the ground involved is substantive, the determination of the federal question cannot affect the disposition if the state court decision on the state law question is allowed to stand. Under the view taken in Murdock of the statutes conferring appellate jurisdiction tin this Court, we have no power to revise judgments on questions of state law. Thus, the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine is necessary to avoid advisory opinions.
These justifications have no application where the state ground is purely procedural. A procedural default which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state courts, even on federal constitutional grounds, prevents implementation of the federal right. Accordingly, we have consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question. Cf. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450. As Mr. Justice Holmes said:
“When as here there is a plain assertion of federal rights in the lower court, local rules as to how far it shall be reviewed on appeal do not necessarily prevail. . . . Whether the right was denied or not given due recognition by the [state court] ... is a question as to which the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke our judgment.” Love v. Griffith, 266 U. S. 32, 33-34.
Only last Term, we reaffirmed this principle, holding that a state appellate court’s refusal, on the ground of mootness, to consider a federal claim,. did not preclude our independent determination of the question of mootness; that is itself a question of federal law which this. Court must ultimately decide. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301. These cases settle the proposition that a litigant’s procedural defaults in state proceedings do not prevent vindication of his federal rights unless the State’s insistence on compliance with its procedural rule serves a legitimate state interest. In every case we must' inquire whether the enforcement of a procedural forfeiture serves such a state interest. If it does not, the state procedural rule ought not be permitted to bar vindication of important federal rights.
The Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the introduction of illegal evidence clearly does serve a legitimate state interest. By immediately apprising the trial judge of the objection, counsel gives the court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using the tainted evidence. If the objection is well taken the fruits of the illegal search may be excluded from jury consideration, and a reversal and new-trial avoided. But on the record before us it appears that this purpose of the contemporaneous-objection rule may have been substantially served by petitioner’s motion at the close of the State’s evidence asking for a directed verdict because of the erroneous admission of the officer’s testimony. For at this stage the trial judgé could have called for elaboration of the search and seizure argument and, if persuaded, could have stricken the tainted testimony or have taken other, appropriate corrective action. For example, if there was sufficient competent evidence without this testimony to go to the jury, the motion for a directed verdict might have been denied, and the case submitted to the jury with a properly worded appropriate cautionary instruction. In these circumstances, the delay until the close of the State’s case in presenting the objection cannot be said to have frustrated the State’s interest in avoiding delay and waste of time in the disposition of the case. If this is so, and enforcement of the rule here would serve no substantial state interest, then settled principles would preclude treating the state ground as adequate; giving effect.to the contemporaneous-objection rulé for its own sake “would be to force resort to an arid ritual of meaningless form.” Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 320; see also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284, 289-291.
We have no reason, however, to decide that question now or to express any view on the merits of petitioner’s substantial constitutional claim. For even assuming that the making of the objection on the motion for a directed verdict satisfied the state interest served by the contemporaneous-objection rule, the record suggests a possibility that petitioner’s counsel deliberately bypassed the opportunity to make timely objection in the state court, and thus that the petitioner should be. deemed to have forfeited his state court remedies. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court characterized the failure to object as an “honest mistake,” 154 So. 2d, at 296 (bound volume), the State, in the brief in support of its Suggestion of Error in the Supreme Court of Mississippi asserted its willingness to agree that its Suggestion of Error “should not be sustained if either of the three counsel [for petitioner] participating in this trial would respond hereto with an affidavit that he did not know that at some point in a trial in criminal court in Mississippi that an objection to such testimony must have been made.” The second opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court does not refer to the State’s proposal and thus it appears that the Court did not believe that the issue was properly presented for decision. Another indication of possible waiver appears in an affidavit attached to the State’s brief in this Court; there, the respondent asserted that one of petitioner’s lawyers stood up as if to object to. the officér’s. tainted testimony, and was pulled down by co-counsel. Again, this furnishes an insufficient basis for decision qf the waiver questions at this time. But, together with the proposal in the Suggestion of Error, it is enough to justify an evidentiary hearing to determine whether petitioner “after' consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of 'seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures . . . .” Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 439.
The evidence suggests reasons for a strategic move. Both the complaining witness and the police officer testified that the cigarette lighter in the car did not work. After denial of its motion for a directed verdict the defense called a mechanic who had repaired the cigarette lighter. The defense might have planned to allow the complaining witness and the officer to testify that the cigarette lighter did not work, and then, if the motion for directed verdict were not granted, to discredit both witnesses by showing that it did work, thereby persuading the jury to acquit. Or, by delaying objection to the evidence, the defense might have hoped to invite error and lay the foundation for a subsequent reversal. If either reason motivated the action of petitioner’s counsel, and their plans backfired, counsel’s deliberate choice of the strategy would amount to a waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude him from a decision on the merits of his federal claim either in the state courts or here. Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims, see Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F. 2d 496 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1964), we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case.
Only evidence extrinsic to the record before us can establish the fact of waiver, and the State should have an opportunity to establish that fact.. In ~ comparable cases arising in federal courts we have vacated the judgments of conviction and remanded for a hearing, suspend.-ing the determination of the validity of the conviction pending the outcome of the hearing. See United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U. S. 233; Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85. We recently adopted a similar procedure to determine an issue essential to the fairness of a state conviction. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 393-394; Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U. S. 43. We think a similar course is particularly desirable here, since a dismissal on the basis of an adequate state ground would not end this case; petitioner might still pursue vindication of his federal claim in a federal habeas corpus pioceeding in which the procedural default will not alone preclude consideration of his claim, at least unless it is shown that petitioner deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts. Fay v. Noia, supra, at 438.
Of course, in so remanding we neither hold nor even remotely imply that the State must forgo insistence on its procedural requirements if it finds no waiver. Such a finding would only mean that petitioner could have a federal court apply settled principles to test the effectiveness of the procedural default to foreclose consideration of his constitutional claim. If it finds the procedural default ineffective, the federal court will itself decide the merits of his federal claim, at least so long as the state court does not wish to do so. By permitting the Mississippi courts to make an initial determination of waiver, we serve the causes of efficient administration of criminal justice, and of harmonious federal-state judicial relations. Such a disposition may make unnecessary the processing of the case through federal courts already laboring under congested dockets, or it may make unnecessary the reliti-gation in a federal forum of certain issues. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 312-319. The Court is not blind to the fact that the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has been a source of irritation between the federal and state judiciaries. It has been suggested that this friction might be ameliorated if the States would look upon our decisions in Fay v. Noia, supra, and Townsend v. Sain, supra, as affording them an opportunity to provide state procedures, direct or collateral, for a full airing of federal claims. That prospect is better served by a remand than by relegating petitioner to his federal habeas remedy. Therefore, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Mississippi Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Mississippi Supreme Court wrote two opinions. The first is reported in the July 11, 1963, issue of the Southern Reporter advance sheets, 154 So. 2d 289. This was withdrawn when the court filed the second opinion, which appears at the. same page in the bound volume of the Southern Reporter; Citations hereinafter will designate the bound volume or the advance sheet if the cited material appears in only one opinion. The material referred to at this point in the'text,appears in both opinions.
The complaining witness also testified as to the last four digits of petitioner’s license plate, and to the fact that the first three digits were obscured; these facts were independently substantiated. Since the license plate could be seen from outside the par, and petitioner denied that the complaining witness had ever been in his car, the Mississippi Supreme Court apparently accepted the officer’s testimony concerning the Dentyne wrappers and cigarette lighter as the only cogent corroborative evidence.
This will not lead inevitably to a plethora of attacks on the application of state procedural-rules; where the state rule is a reasonable one and clearly announced to defendant and counsel, application of the waiver doctrine will yield the same result as that of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine in the vast majority of cases.
The view-of the Mississippi court in its first opinion seems to have been that there was insufficient evidence apart from the tainted testimony to support the conviction. Hence, appropriate corrective action as a matter of state law might have included granting petitioner’s motion. We have not overlooked the .fact that the first opinion remanded for a new trial, although the usual practice of the Mississippi Supreme Court where a motion for directed verdict, renewed at the close of all the evidence, is improperly denied is to dismiss the prosecution. See Lewis v. State, 198 Miss. 767, 23 So. 2d 401; Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So.2d 593; Smith v. State, 205 Miss. 170, 38 So. 2d 698. The opinion offers no explanation, of the mandate; the answer is probably that the court refers only to the' motion at the end of the State’s case, 154 So. 2d, at 294, 295, and overlooks the fact that it was renewed at the close of all the evidence,, just as it overlooks the .presence of local counsel. If the motion were not renewed, the appellate court could not dismiss the prosecution. See Smith v. State, supra.
We do not rely on the principle that our review is not precluded when the .state court has failed to exercise discretion to disregard the procedural default. See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375. We read the second Mississippi Süpreme Court opinion as holding that there is no such discretion where it appears that petitioner was represented by competent local counsel familiar with local procedure.
Thus, consistently with the policy of avoiding premature decision oh the merits of-constitutional questions, we intimate no view whether the pertinent controlling federal standard governing the legality of a search'or seizure, see Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, is the same as the Mississippi standard applied here, which holds that the wife’s consent cannot validate a search as against her husband. Nor do we ride at this time on the question whether petitioner’s cross-examination of the officer, before, raising any objection, “cured” the effect of the inadmissible testimony; this Court has not yet ruled on the roíe • of' harmless error in search and seizure cases. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 376. Of course, nothing occurring after the judge’s refusal to honor petitioner’s objection could have this curative effect.
The state court’s holding that petitioner was estopped because his counsel brought up the question of the.car’s interior appearance on direct examination and cross-examination, see p. 446, supra, amounts to a holding that petitioner waived his federal right. In the absence of a showing that this was prompted by litigation strategy, the present record is insufficient to support such a holding. The cross-examination during the. State’s case, amounting to little more than a half-page in the printed record, adds little to petitioner’s failure to make contemporaneous objection. The evidence brought in on direct examination was only after petitioner had moved for a directed verdict, pointing to the illegal evidence. This would scarcely support a finding of waiver.
Habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal district courts increased from 1, 903 to 3, 531, or 85.5%, from the 1963 to the 1964 fiscal year. Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, p. 46 (1964); our own Miscellaneous Docket, where cases of state prisoners are primarily fisted, continues to show substantial increases. The number has increased from 878 for the 1956 Term to 1, 532 for the 1963 Term.
See Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconviction Review, 50 A. B. A. J. 928 (October 1964). And see Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 945, 957-959 (1964). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
KAISER STEEL CORP. v. MULLINS et al.
No. 80-1345.
Argued November 10, 1981
Decided January 13, 1982
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 89.
A. Douglas Melamed argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Lynn Bregman.
Stephen J. Poliak argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Ralph J. Moore, Jr., Wendy S. White, and E. Calvin Golumbic.
Barbara E. Etkind argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Baxter, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert B. Nicholson, Robert J. Wiggers, and T. Timothy Ryan, Jr
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by James D. Hutchinson and John M. Cannon for the Mid-America Legal Foundation; and by Steven L. Friedman and John L. Kilcullen for the Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Alan M. Levy for the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund; by James P. Watson, George M. Cox, John S. Miller, Jr., and Lionel Rickman for the Construction Laborers Trust Funds for Southern California et al.; by Gerald M. Feder and Denis F. Gordon for the National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans; by Wayne Jett and Julius Reich for the Operating Engineers Pension Trust et al.; and by Harrison Combs and Willard P. Owens for the United Mine Workers of America.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether a coal producer, when it is sued on its promise to contribute to union welfare funds based on its purchases of coal from producers not under contract with the union, is entitled to plead and have adjudicated a defense that the promise is illegal under the antitrust and labor laws.
I
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974 is a collective-bargaining agreement between the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and hundreds of coal producers, including steel companies such as petitioner Kaiser Steel Corp. The agreement required signatory employers to contribute to specified employee health and retirement funds. Section (d)(1) of Article XX required employers to pay specified amounts for each ton of coal produced and for each hour worked by covered employees. In addition, the section included a purchased-coal clause requiring employers to contribute to the trust specified amounts on “each ton of two thousand (2,000) pounds of bituminous coal after production by another operator, procured or acquired by [the employer] for use or for sale on which contributions to the appropriate Trusts as provided for in this Article have not been made. . . Section (d) also provided that employers would furnish the trustees with monthly statements showing the full amounts due the trust funds as well as the tons of coal produced, procured, or acquired for use or for sale. The parties agreed that if the clause requiring contributions based on purchased coal was held illegal by any court or agency, the union could demand negotiations with respect to a replacement for the invalidated provision.
Kaiser operates a steel mill in California and coal mines in Utah and New Mexico. Its mines produce only high-volatile coal, so it must purchase mid-volatile coal used in steel manufacturing from another producer. Since 1959, Kaiser has purchased virtually all of its mid-volatile coal requirements from Mid-Continent Coal and Coke Co. Mid-Continent’s employees are represented by the Redstone Workers’ Association, and their wages and benefits during the period covered by the 1974 Agreement were equal or superior to those required by the UMW contract. Nevertheless, the UMW has repeatedly attempted to become the collective-bargaining representative for Mid-Continent’s employees. According to affidavits submitted by Kaiser, the purchased-coal clause was not taken into account in calculating the needs and revenues of the various UMW trust funds during the negotiation of the 1974 Agreement.
Kaiser complied with its obligation under the 1974 contract to make contributions based on the coal it produced and the hours worked by its miners. It did not, however, report the coal that it acquired from others or make contributions based on such purchased coal. After the expiration of the 1974 contract, the trustees of the UMW Health and Retirement Funds, respondents here, sued Kaiser seeking to enforce the latter’s obligation to report and contribute with respect to coal not produced by Kaiser but acquired from others. Jurisdiction was asserted under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185, and § 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 891, 29 U. S. C. §1132. Kaiser admitted its failure to report and contribute but defended on the ground, among others, that the agreement in these respects was void and unenforceable as violative of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. §§1 and 2, and § 8(e) of the NLRA, 73 Stat. 543, 29 U. S. C. § 158(e). The District Court did not pass on the legality of the purchased-coal agreement under either the Sherman Act or the NLRA. It nevertheless rejected Kaiser’s defense of illegality and granted the trustees’ motion for summary judgment. 466 F. Supp. 911 (1979). The Court of Appeals affirmed, 206 U. S. App. D. C. 334, 642 F. 2d 1302 (1980), also rejecting Kaiser’s defense without adjudicating the legality of the purchased-coal clause.
We granted Kaiser’s petition for certiorari raising the question, among others, whether the Court of Appeals had properly foreclosed its defense based on the illegality of its promise to report and contribute in connection with coal purchased from other producers. 451 U. S. 969 (1981). We now reverse.
II
There is no statutory code of federal contract law, but our cases leave no doubt that illegal promises will not be enforced in cases controlled by the federal law. In McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639 (1899), two bidders for public work submitted separate bids without revealing that they had agreed to share the work equally if one of them were awarded the contract. One of the parties secured the work and the other sued to enforce the agreement to share. The Court found the undertaking illegal and refused to enforce it, saying:
“The authorities from the earliest time to the present unanimously hold that no court will lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an illegal contract. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove the illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it. . . .” Id., at 654.
“[T]o permit a recovery in this case is in substance to enforce an illegal contract, and one which is illegal because it is against public policy to permit it to stand. The court refuses to enforce such a contract and it permits defendant to set up its illegality, not out of any regard for the defendant who sets it up, but only on account of the public interest.” Id., at 669.
The rule was confirmed in Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U. S. 227 (1909), where the Court refused to enforce a buyer’s promise to pay for purchased goods on the ground that the promise to pay was itself part of a bargain that was illegal under the antitrust laws. “In such cases the aid of the court is denied, not for the benefit of the defendant, but because public policy demands that it should be denied without regard to the interests of individual parties.” 7d., at 262.
Kaiser’s position is that to require it to make contributions based on purchased coal would be to enforce a bargain that violates two different federal statutes, the Sherman Act and the NLRA. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act prohibit contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, as well as monopolization and attempts to monopolize. Kaiser urges that the purchased-coal clause is illegal under these sections because it puts non-UMW producers at a disadvantage in competing for sales to concerns like Kaiser and because it penalizes Kaiser for shopping among sellers for the lowest available price.
Section 8(e) of the NLRA forbids contracts between a union and an employer whereby the employer agrees to cease doing business with or to cease handling the products of another employer. Kaiser submits that being forced to contribute based on its purchases of coal from other employers violates §8(e), the hot-cargo provision, because it penalizes Kaiser for dealing with other employers who do not have a contract with the union and because the major purpose of prohibiting hot-cargo agreements is to protect employers like Kaiser from being coerced into aiding the union in its organizational or other objectives with respect to other employers.
The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, declined to pass on the legality of the purchased-coal clause under either the Sherman Act or the NLRA. It was apparently of the view that even if the agreement was unlawful, the illegality defenses should not be sustained in this case. We disagree. None of the grounds offered by the Court of Appeals or by the respondents for rejecting Kaiser’s defenses are persuasive.
We do not agree, in the first place, that if Kaiser’s agreement to contribute based on purchased coal is assumed to be illegal under either the Sherman Act or the NLRA, its promise to contribute could be enforced without commanding unlawful conduct. The argument is that employers’ contributions to union welfare funds are not, in themselves and standing alone, illegal acts and that ordering Kaiser to pay would therefore not demand conduct that is inherently contrary to public policy. Kaiser, however, did not make a naked promise to pay money to the union funds. The purchased-coal provision obligated it to pay only if it purchased coal from other employers and then only if contributions to the UMW funds had not been made with respect to that coal. Kaiser’s obligation arose from and was measured by its purchases from other producers. If Kaiser’s undertaking is illegal under the antitrust or the labor laws, it is because of the financial burden which the agreement attached to purchases of coal from non-UMW producers, even though they may have contributed to other employee welfare funds. It is plain enough that to order Kaiser to pay would command conduct that assertedly renders the promise an illegal undertaking under the federal statutes.
We do not agree that Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U. S. 516 (1959), compels or even supports a contrary result. In that case, both petitioner and respondent were engaged in marketing onions. Petitioner agreed to buy a substantial portion of the onions owned by respondent. Petitioner and respondent mutually agreed that neither would deliver any onions to the futures market for the balance of the trading season. The agreement was for the purpose of fixing the price and limiting the amount of onions sold in the State of Illinois, thereby “creating a false and a fictitious market” for that produce. Id., at 517. After petitioner defaulted on the payments due under the contract, respondent sued for the balance of the purchase price and was awarded summary judgment. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s claim that his undertaking was unenforceable because part of the agreement violated the Sherman Act. This Court affirmed. The Court said that “[a]s a defense to an action based on contract, the plea of illegality based on violation of the Sherman Act has not met with much favor,” id., at 518, particularly where the plea is made by a purchaser in an action to recover from him the agreed price for goods sold. Various cases in this Court were cited to support the observation, and Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U. S. 227 (1909), where the defense was sustained, was distinguished as a case where a judgment for an excessive purchase price “would be to make the courts a party to the carrying out of one of the very restraints forbidden by the Sherman Act.” Kelly v. Kosuga, supra, at 520. The Court went on to say that “[p]ast the point where the judgment of the Court would itself be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by the Act, the courts are to be guided by the overriding general policy ... ‘of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying it.’” 358 U. S., at 520-521 (quoting Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., supra, at 271). Applying this approach to the facts before it, the Court observed:
“[WJhile the nondelivery agreement between the parties could not be enforced by a court, if its unlawful character under the Sherman Act be assumed, it can hardly be said to enforce a violation of the Act to give legal effect to a completed sale of onions at a fair price. . . . [W]here, as here, a lawful sale for a fair consideration constitutes an intelligible economic transaction in itself, we do not think it inappropriate or violative of the intent of the parties to give it effect even though it furnished the occasion for a restrictive agreement of the sort here in question.” 358 U. S., at 521.
Respondents construe Kosuga as standing for two general propositions: first, that when a contract is wholly performed on one side, the defense of illegality to enforcing performance on the other side will not be entertained; and second, that the express remedies provided by the Sherman Act are not to be added to by including the avoidance of contracts as a sanction. It is apparent from the opinion in that case, however, that both propositions were subject to the limitation that the illegality defense should be entertained in those circumstances where its rejection would be to enforce conduct that the antitrust laws forbid. In Kosuga, there were two promises, one to pay for purchased onions and the other to withhold onions from the market. The former was legal and could be enforced, the latter illegal and unenforceable.
Kosuga thus contemplated that the defense of illegality would be entertained in a case such as this. If the purchased-coal agreement is illegal, it is precisely because the promised contributions are linked to purchased coal and are a penalty for dealing with producers not under contract with the UMW. In Kosuga, withholding onions from the market was not in itself illegal and could have been done unilaterally. But the agreement to do so, as the Court recognized, was unenforceable. Here, employer contributions to union welfare funds may be quite legal more often than not, but an agreement linking contributions to purchased coal, if illegal, is subject to the defense of illegality.
Respondents’ reliance on Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459 (1960), is no more persuasive. There, as here, a collective-bargaining contract bound the coal company to contribute to an employee trust fund. When sued by the trustees for delinquent contributions, the employers defended on the ground that the union had violated the no-strike clause contained in the contract. Although the strikes were illegal, the Court held that the company’s promise to contribute to the fund was independent of and not conditioned on the union’s performance of its promise not to strike. Furthermore, the company was not entitled to a setoff against the trustees, who were innocent third parties, at least in the absence of some indication in the contract that the parties had intended to permit the employer to reduce its contributions by the amount of his damages caused by the striking unions. Just as in Kosuga, however, the promise that was enforced was not an illegal undertaking. Aside from the defense based on the union’s default, there was no claim that the employer’s promise to pay was illegal and unenforceable. The decision in no respect suggests that trustees could collect payments pursuant to a promise that itself violates the antitrust laws or the NLRA.
HH HH
We also do not agree that the question of the legality of the purchased-coal clause under § 8(e) of the NLRA was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that the District Court was therefore without authority to adjudicate Kaiser’s defense in this respect. The Board is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine what is or is not an unfair labor practice. As a general rule, federal courts dp not have jurisdiction over activity which “is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the [NLRA],” and they “must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 245 (1959). See also Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485, 490-491 (1953). It is also well established, however, that a federal court has a duty to determine whether a contract violates federal law before enforcing it. “The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United States as manifested in . . . federal statutes. . . . Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial power.” Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 34-35 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
The “touchstone” and “central theme” of § 8(e) is the protection of neutral employers, such as Kaiser, which are caught in the middle of a union’s dispute with a third party. National Woodwork Manufacturers Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 624-626, 645 (1967). Section 8(e) provides not only that “it shall be an unfair labor practice” to enter an agreement containing a hot-cargo clause, but also that “any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing [a hot-cargo clause] shall be. to such extent unenforcible [sic] and void.” This strongly implies that a court must reach the merits of an illegality defense in order to determine whether the contract clause at issue has any legal effect in the first place.
That § 8(e) renders hot-cargo clauses void at their inception and at all times unenforceable by federal courts is also evident from its legislative history. It was enacted to close a loophole created by Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door). There the Court held that the existence of a hot-cargo clause was not a defense to an unfair labor practice charge brought by a union against an employer, emphasizing that observance of the clause was not unlawful. “Section 8(e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by making the “hot cargo’ clause itself unlawful. The Sand Door decision was believed by Congress ... to create the possibility of damage actions against employers for breaches of ‘hot cargo’ clauses . . . .” National Woodwork Manufacturers Assn. v. NLRB, supra, at 634. If a union may not maintain a damages action for violation of a hot-cargo clause, it also may not enforce a hot-cargo clause in an action for specific performance.
That a federal court may determine the merits of Kaiser’s § 8(e) defense is further supported by Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U. S. 616 (1975). There the petitioner filed suit claiming that an agreement between it and the respondent union violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Respondent contended that the agreement was exempt from the antitrust laws because it was authorized by § 8(e). The Court of Appeals refused to decide whether § 8(e) permitted the agreement or whether the agreement constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(e), holding that the NLRB “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide in the first instance what Congress meant in 8(e) and 8(b)(4).” Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 483 F. 2d 1154, 1174 (CA5 1973) (footnote omitted). This Court reversed on the ground that “the federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws.” 421 U. S., at 626 (footnote omitted). See also Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676, 684-688 (1965). The Court then addressed the §8(e) issue on the merits and found that §8(e) did not allow the agreement at issue. 421 U. S., at 633. As a result, the agreement was subject to the antitrust laws, for the majority was persuaded that the legislative history did not suggest “labor-law remedies for § 8(e) violations were intended to be exclusive, or that Congress thought allowing antitrust remedies in cases like the present one would be inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the NLRA.” Id., at 634 (footnote omitted).
In Connell, we decided the § 8(e) issue in the first instance. It was necessary to do so to determine whether the agreement was immune from the antitrust laws. Here a court must decide whether the purchased-coal clause violates § 8(e) in order to determine whether to enforce the clause. As the Court recently stated with respect to a statute which also provides that contracts which violate it are “void,” “[a]t the very least Congress must have assumed that [the statute] could be raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforcement of . . . [a] contract.” Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 18 (1979). Therefore, where a § 8(e) defense is raised by a party which § 8(e) was designed to protect, and where the defense is not directed to a collateral matter but to the portion of the contract for which enforcement is sought, a court must entertain the defense. While only the Board may provide affirmative remedies for unfair labor practices, a court may not enforce a contract provision which violates § 8(e). Were the rule otherwise, parties could be compelled to comply with contract clauses, the lawfulness of which would be insulated from review by any court.
IV
On September 26, 1980, nine days after the Court of Appeals issued the decision under review, Congress enacted legislation which respondents argue established -a special rule governing the availability of illegality defenses in actions for delinquent contributions brought by pension fund trustees. It is urged that Congress intended to preclude employers from raising defenses such as those Kaiser has attempted to raise here. Section 306(a) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, 94'Stat. 1295, added § 515 to ERISA, which provides:
“Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.” 29 U. S. C. §1145 (1976 ed., Supp. V).
The provision which was eventually enacted as § 306(a) was added to S. 1076 by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. The Committee explained that the provision was added because “simple collection actions brought by plan trustees have been converted into lengthy, costly and complex litigation concerning claims and defenses unrelated to the employer’s promise and the plans’ entitlement to the contributions,” and steps must be taken to “simplify delinquency collection.” Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,. S. 1076 — The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980: Summary and Analysis of Consideration, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (Comm. Print, Apr. 1980) (1980 Senate Labor Committee Print) (emphasis added). During floor debate, Senator Williams and Representative Thompson explained the purpose and meaning of § 306(a) in the same language used in the Senate Labor Committee Print. Both legislators also stated that they endorsed cases such as Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459 (1960); Huge v. Long’s Hauling Co., 590 F. 2d 457 (CA3 1978), cert. denied, 442 U. S. 918 (1979); Lewis v. Mill Ridge Coals, Inc., 298 F. 2d 552 (CA6 1962); and disapproved cases such as Washington Area Carpenters’ Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816 (DC 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-1501 (CADC), and Western Washington Laborers-Employers Health and Security Trust Fund v. McDowell, 103 LRRM 2219 (WD Wash. 1979), appeal pending, No. 80-3024 (CA9).
Assuming, arguendo, that the 1980 Amendments are applicable to this case, they do not alter the result. Far from abolishing illegality defenses, § 306(a) explicitly requires employers to contribute to pension funds only where doing so would not be “inconsistent with law.” Even if §306(a) were construed as completely embracing the views expressed by Senator Williams and Representative Thompson, the statute would not require prohibiting Kaiser from raising defenses to the purchased-coal clause. The legislators did not say that employers should be prevented from raising all defenses; rather they spoke in terms of “unrelated” and “extraneous” defenses. As the United States points out in its brief, none of the cases the legislators endorsed “involved the enforcement of a contribution clause that itself was alleged to violate the law.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (footnote omitted). Neither Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., supra, Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., supra, nor Lewis v. Mill Ridge Coals, Inc., supra, involved a defense based on the illegality of the very promise sought to be enforced.
Respondents’ contention that § 306(a) permits only one defense to be raised in suits to recover delinquent contributions — that the making of the payment itself violates § 302(a) of the LMRA — must be rejected for another reason. Respondents’ argument necessarily assumes that in enacting § 306(a), Congress implicitly repealed the antitrust laws, the labor laws, and any other statute which might be raised as a defense to a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement requiring an employer to contribute to a pension fund. Since “repeals by implication are disfavored,” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 99 (1980), “ ‘the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.’” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 189 (1978), quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). The statutory language provides no basis for implying such a repeal, and nowhere in the legislative history is there any mention that § 306(a) might conflict with other laws.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Kaiser has been a UMW signatory since the 1940’s. The purchased-coal clause was first included in the 1964 Agreement, although the UMW agreements left steel companies such as Kaiser free to purchase non-UMW coal for use in steel production until 1971 without penalty.
The 1971 purchased-coal clause and its predecessors have been subject to litigation on the grounds that the clause is an illegal “hot cargo” agreement under § 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U. S. C. § 158(e), see, e. g., Riverton Coal Co. v. UMW, 458 F. 2d 1035 (CA6), cert. denied, 407 U. S. 915 (1972), and that it constitutes a group boycott in violation of the antitrust laws. See, e. g., Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965); South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F. 2d 767 (CA6 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 983 (1971).
If Kaiser had purchased its mid-volatile coal requirements from a UMW producer, it would not be required to make any payments under the purchased-coal clause. The producer of mid-volatile coal would increase its contributions to the trust funds based on the amount of coal mined and the number of hours worked by employees, but in turn the trust funds’ obligations to UMW members would increase.
See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 34-35 (1948); D. R. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U. S. 165, 177 (1915); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 88 (1902); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 548-549 (1902).
In order to sell coal to Kaiser, a non-UMW producer must lower its price such that when added to the amount Kaiser must pay under the purchased-coal clause, the price is still competitive with those charged by UMW producers.
The contention is that since the contract has expired, enforcing the promise to contribute will not bring about any of the evils that the antitrust or labor laws are designed to prevent. But if a promise is illegal at its inception and cannot be enforced during the term of the contract, it does not spring to life and become enforceable when the contract expires. If penalizing Kaiser for purchasing coal from producers without contracts with the UMW is illegal, it is not less so if the penalty is extracted after the termination of the promise. The suit is still a suit on a presumptively illegal undertaking. If a promisee need only wait until a contract expires to enforce an illegal provision, the defense of illegality would obviously be ephemeral. Cases such as Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U. S. 227 (1909), and McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639 (1899), confound such a rule. And if it be suggested that Kaiser should not have waited so long to assert its defense, the Court has held that “rules of estoppel will not be permitted to thwart the purposes of statutes of the United States.” Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176 (1942).
Refusing to enforce a promise that is illegal under the antitrust or labor laws is not providing an additional remedy contrary to the will of Congress. A defendant proffering the defense seeks only to be relieved of an illegal obligation and does not ask any affirmative remedy based on the antitrust or labor laws. “[A]ny one sued upon a contract may set up as a defence that it is a violation of the act of Congress, and if found to be so, that fact will constitute a good defence to the action. . . . The act. . . gives to any person injured in his business or property the right to sue, but that does not prevent a private individual when sued upon a contract which is void as in violation of the act from setting it up as a defence, and we think when proved it is a valid defence to any claim made under a contract thus denounced as illegal.” Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S., at 88.
As is evident from the text, Kelly v. Kosuga did not hold that the promi-sor may be forced to perform an illegal contract because he has another remedy that would make him whole. The case did hold that the promisor may not avoid performing a perfectly legal promise because he has also made a separate, illegal undertaking. In doing so, Kosuga conforms to a common-law exception to the rule that courts will not enforce illegal contracts. See 6A A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 1518-1531 (1962 ed. and Supp. 1964); Comment, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 758, and n. 2 (1959-1960).
As the Court of Appeals recognized, “third-party beneficiaries, like the Trustees here, are subject to the contract defenses of nonperforming prom-isors.” 206 U. S. App. D. C. 334, 344, 642 F. 2d 1302,1312 (1980). In this respect, pension fund trustees have no special status which exempts them from the general rule that courts do not enforce illegal contracts. Only Congress could create such an exemption and, as discussed in Part IV, it has not done so.
The dissent rests entirely on § 306(a). • It does not suggest that absent § 306(a), the purchased-coal clause would not be subject to the defense that its enforcement is forbidden by both the antitrust and labor laws.
Senator Williams was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and floor manager of S. 1076, the Senate counterpart of H. R. 3904, which became the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. Similarly, Representative Thompson was Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee and floor manager of H. R. 3904.
126 Cong. Rec. 23039 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id., at 23288 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
Ibid, (remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 23039 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id., at 20180 (colloquy between Sen. Williams and Sen. Matsunaga). See also 1980 Senate Labor Committee Print, at 44.
According to the dissent, Congress intended to permit a union to extract a promise from an employer that would be illegal under the antitrust and labor laws as long as the promise is to pay money to pension fund trustees. Under this view, the defense of illegality would be unavailable during the life of the contract; it would be of no avail to the employer to secure a declaratory judgment that its promise violated federal statutes. The promise would still be enforceable, the effect being that the antitrust and labor laws would be suspended for the life of the contract. The dissent concedes that § 306(a) itself does not support this result. It instead relies on scraps of legislative history to work its partial repeal of the antitrust and labor laws. We are unconvinced that Congress intended any such result.
It should also be pointed out that Kaiser paid all sums that were anticipated in calculating the needs of the trust funds. The purchased-coal clause was not taken into account in providing trust fund revenues. We are unpersuaded that Congress intended to give pension fund trustees the benefit of illegal bargains that were not, and should not have been, relied upon to ensure the solvency of the trust funds.
Because attorney’s fees are normally awarded only to prevailing parties, the award of attorney’s fees to respondents is also reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to § 502 of ERISA and did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under § 502(g). That section permits a court to “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party” in an action brought under § 502. Petitioners contend that this is not a suit to enforce ERISA, it cannot be brought under § 502, and therefore there is no authority for an award of attorney’s fees. It is unnecessary to reach this issue. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
ALBRECHT v. HERALD CO., dba GLOBE-DEMOCRAT PUBLISHING CO.
No. 43.
Argued November 9, 1967.
Decided March 4, 1968.
Gray L. Dorsey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Donald S. Siegel.
Lon Hooker argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Thomas Newman.
Arthur B. Hanson filed a brief for the American Newspaper Publishers Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A jury returned a verdict for respondent in petitioner’s suit for treble damages for violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Judgment was entered on the verdict and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 367 F. 2d 517 (1966). The question is whether the denial of petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Because this case presents important issues under the antitrust laws, we granted certiorari. 386 U. S. 941 (1967).
We take the facts from those stated by the Court of Appeals. Respondent publishes the Globe-Democrat, a morning newspaper distributed in the St. Louis metropolitan area by independent carriers who buy papers at wholesale and sell them at retail. There are 172 home delivery routes. Respondent advertises a suggested retail price in its newspaper. Carriers have exclusive territories which are subject to termination if prices exceed the suggested maximum. Petitioner, who had Route 99, adhered to the advertised price for some time but in 1961 raised the price to customers. After more than once objecting to this practice, respondent wrote petitioner on May 20, 1964, that because he was overcharging and because respondent had reserved the right to compete should that happen, subscribers on Route 99 were being informed by letter that respondent would itself deliver the paper to those who wanted it at the lower price. In addition to sending these letters to petitioner’s customers, respondent hired Milne Circulation Sales, Inc., which solicited readers for newspapers, to engage in telephone and house-to-house solicitation of all residents on Route 99. As a result, about 300 of petitioner’s 1,200 customers switched to direct delivery by respondent. Meanwhile, respondent continued to sell papers to petitioner but warned him that should he continue to overcharge, respondent would not have to do business with him. Since respondent did not itself want to engage in home delivery, it advertised a new route of 314 customers as available without cost. Another carrier, George Kroner, took over the route knowing that respondent would not tolerate overcharging and understanding that he might have to return the route if petitioner discontinued his pricing practice. On July 27 respondent told petitioner that it was not interested in being in the carrier business and that petitioner could have his customers back as long as he charged the suggested price. Petitioner brought this lawsuit on August 12. In response, petitioner’s appointment as a carrier was terminated and petitioner was given 60 days to arrange the sale of his route to a satisfactory replacement. Petitioner sold his route for $12,000, $1,000 more than he had paid for it but less than he could have gotten had he been able to turn over 1,200 customers instead of 900.
Petitioner’s complaint charged a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. At the close of the evidence the complaint was amended to charge only a combination between respondent and “plaintiff’s customers and/or Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. and/or George Kroner.” The case went to the jury on this theory, the jury found for respondent, and judgment in its favor was entered on the verdict. The court denied petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which asserted that under United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960), and like cases, the undisputed facts showed as a matter of law a combination to fix resale prices of newspapers which was per se illegal under the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In its view “the undisputed evidence fail[ed] to show a Sherman Act violation,” because respondent’s conduct was wholly unilateral and there was no restraint of trade. The previous decisions of this Court were deemed inappo-site to a situation in which a seller establishes maximum prices to be charged by a retailer enjoying an exclusive territory and in which the seller, who would be entitled to refuse to deal, simply engages in competition with the offending retailer. We disagree with the Court of Appeals and reverse its judgment.
On the undisputed facts recited by the Court of Appeals respondent’s conduct cannot be deemed wholly unilateral and beyond the reach of § 1 of the Sherman Act. That section covers combinations in addition to contracts and conspiracies, express or implied. The Court made this quite clear in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960), where it held that an illegal combination to fix prices results if a seller suggests resale prices and secures compliance by means in addition to the “mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal . . . .” Id., at 44. Parke Davis had specified resale prices for both wholesalers and retailers and had required wholesalers to refuse to deal with noncomplying retailers. It was found to have created a combination “with the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices . . . .” Id., at 45. The combination with retailers arose because their acquiescence in the suggested prices was secured by threats of termination; the combination with wholesalers arose because they cooperated in terminating price-cutting retailers.
If a combination arose when Parke Davis threatened its wholesalers with termination unless they put pressure on their retail customers, then there can be no doubt that a combination arose between respondent, Milne, and Kroner to force petitioner to conform to the advertised retail price. When respondent learned that petitioner was overcharging, it hired Milne to solicit customers away from petitioner in order to get petitioner to reduce his price. It was through the efforts of Milne, as well as because of respondent’s letter to petitioner’s customers, that about 300 customers were obtained for Kroner. Milne’s purpose was undoubtedly to earn its fee, but it was aware that the aim of the solicitation campaign was to force petitioner to lower his price. Kroner knew that respondent was giving him the customer list as part of a program to get petitioner to conform to the advertised price, and he knew that he might have to return the customers if petitioner ultimately complied with respondent’s demands.' He undertook to deliver papers at the suggested price and materially aided in the accomplishment of respondent’s plan. Given the uncontradicted facts recited by the Court of Appeals, there was a combination within the meaning of § 1 between respondent, Milne, and Kroner, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding to the contrary.
The Court of Appeals also held there was no restraint of trade, despite the long-accepted rule in § 1 cases that resale price fixing is a per se violation of the law whether done by agreement or combination. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U. S. 305 (1956).
In Kiefer-Stewart, supra, liquor distributors combined to set maximum resale prices. The Court of Appeals held the combination legal under the Sherman Act because in its view setting maximum prices “. . . constituted no restraint on trade and no interference with plaintiff’s right to engage in all the competition it desired.” 182 F. 2d 228, 235 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1950). This Court rejected that view and reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that agreements to fix maximum prices “no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.” 340 U. S. 211, 213.
We think Kiefer-Stewart was correctly decided and we adhere to it. Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market. Competition, even in a single product, is not cast in a single mold. Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for which they are willing to pay. Maximum price fixing may channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition. Moreover, if the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the fixed maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the maximum price approaches the actual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices. It is our view, therefore, that the combination formed by the respondent in this case to force petitioner to maintain a specified price for the resale of the newspapers which he had purchased from respondent constituted, without more, an illegal restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
We also reject the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that Kiejer-Stewart is inapposite and that maximum price fixing is permissible in this case. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since respondent granted exclusive territories, a price ceiling was necessary to protect the public from price gouging by dealers who had monopoly power in their own territories. But neither the existence of exclusive territories nor the economic power they might place in the hands of the dealers was at issue before the jury. Likewise, the evidence taken was not directed to the question of whether exclusive territories had been granted or imposed as the result of an illegal combination in violation of the antitrust laws. Certainly on the record before us the Court of Appeals was not entitled to assume, as its reasoning necessarily did, that the exclusive rights granted by respondent were valid under § 1 of the Sherman Act, either alone or in conjunction with a price-fixing scheme. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365, 373, 379 (1967). The assertion that illegal price fixing is justified because it blunts the pernicious consequences of another distribution practice is unpersuasive. If, as the Court of Appeals, said, the economic impact of territorial exclusivity was such that the public could be protected only by otherwise illegal price fixing itself injurious to the public, the entire scheme must fall under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
In sum, the evidence cited by the Court of Appeals makes it clear that a combination in restraint of trade existed. Accordingly, it was error to affirm the judgment of the District Court which denied petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Beveraed má remmded,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1, in part provides that “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ... I’
The record indicates that petitioner raised his price by 10 cents a month.
The record shows that at about this time petitioner lowered his price to respondent’s advertised price. Although petitioner notified all his customers of this change, respondent apparently remained unaware of it.
Kroner testified at trial that he sold the customers he had within Route 99 to petitioner’s vendee for $3,600.
Petitioner also charged respondent with tortious interference with business relations under state law, but this count was dismissed before trial.
Petitioner’s original complaint broadly asserted an illegal combination under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Under Parke, Davis petitioner could have claimed a combination between respondent and himself, at least as of the day he unwillingly complied with respondent’s advertised price. Likewise, he might successfully have claimed that respondent had combined with other carriers because the firmly enforced price policy applied to all carriers, most of whom acquiesced in it. See United. States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365, 372 (1967). These additional claims, however, appear to have been abandoned by petitioner when he amended his complaint in the trial court.
Petitioner’s amended complaint did allege a combination between respondent and petitioner’s customers. Because of our disposition of this case it is unnecessary to pass on this claim. It was not, however, a frivolous contention. See Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922); Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325 F. 2d 196 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1963); Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1964), aff’d per curiam, 344 F. 2d 775 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1965).
Our Brother HarlaN seems to state that suppliers have no interest in programs of minimum resale price maintenance, and hence that such programs are “essentially” horizontal agreements between dealers even when they appear to be imposed unilaterally and individually by a supplier on each of his dealers. Although the empirical basis for determining whether or not manufacturers benefit from minimum resale price programs appears to be inconclusive, it seems beyond dispute that a substantial number of manufacturers formulate and enforce complicated plans to maintain resale prices because they deem them advantageous. See E. Grether, Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation, c. X (1939); Federal Trade Commission, Report- on Resale Price Maintenance 5-11, 59 (1945); Select Committee on Small Business, Fair Trade: The Problem and the Issues, H. R. Rep. No. 1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 825, 832-843 (1955); Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 30 Harv. Bus. Rev. No. 5, p. 47 (1952); Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 175, 184AL86 (1954). As a theoretical matter, it is not difficult to conceive of situations in which manufacturers would rightly regard minimum resale price maintenance to be in their interest. Maintaining minimum resale prices would benefit manufacturers when the total demand for their product would not be increased as much by the lower prices brought about by dealer competition as by some other nonprice, demand-creating activity. In particular, when total consumer demand (at least within that price range marked at the bottom by the minimum cost of manufacture and distribution and at the top by the highest price at which a price maintenance scheme can operate effectively) is affected less by price than by the number of retail outlets for the product, the availability of dealer services, or the impact of advertising and promotion, it will be in the interest of manufacturers to squelch price competition through a scheme of resale price maintenance in order to concentrate on nonprice competition. Finally, if the retail price of each of a group of competing products is stabilized through manufacturer-imposed price maintenance schemes, the danger to all the manufacturers of severe interbrand price competition is apt to be alleviated.
Our Brother HarlaN appears to read Kiefer-Stewart as prohibiting only combinations of suppliers to squeeze retailers from the top. Under this view, scarcely derivable from the opinion in that case, signed contracts between a single supplier and his many dealers to fix maximum resale prices would not violate the Sherman Act. With all deference, we reject this view, which seems to stem from the notion that there can be no agreement violative of § 1 unless that agreement accrues to the benefit of both parties, as determined in accordance with some a priori economic model. Cf. Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing — Sans Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 837 (1952).
In Kiejer-Stewart after the manufacturer established the maximum price at which its product could be sold, it fair-traded the product so as to fix that price as the legally permissible minimum. 182 F. 2d, at 230-231. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
3
] | sc_casedisposition |
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., et al.
v.
APPLE INC.
No. 15-777.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Oct. 11, 2016.
Decided Dec. 6, 2016.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
Seth P. Waxman, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Brian H. Fletcher for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court.
Michael T. Zeller, B. Dylan Proctor, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Victoria F. Maroulis, Brett J. Arnold, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Redwood Shores, CA, Kathleen M. Sullivan, William B. Adams, David M. Cooper, Cleland B. Welton II, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
Harold J. McElhinny, Rachel Krevans, Erik Olson, Nathan B. Sabri, Christopher L. Robinson, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA, William F. Lee, Mark C. Fleming, Lauren B. Fletcher, Eric F. Fletcher, Sarah R. Frazier, Steven J. Horn, Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, Seth P. Waxman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 289 of the Patent Act provides a damages remedy specific to design patent infringement. A person who manufactures or sells "any article of manufacture to which [a patented] design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit." 35 U.S.C. § 289. In the case of a design for a single-component product, such as a dinner plate, the product is the "article of manufacture" to which the design has been applied. In the case of a design for a multicomponent product, such as a kitchen oven, identifying the "article of manufacture" to which the design has been applied is a more difficult task.
This case involves the infringement of designs for smartphones. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified the entire smartphone as the only permissible "article of manufacture" for the purpose of calculating § 289 damages because consumers could not separately purchase components of the smartphones. The question before us is whether that reading is consistent with § 289. We hold that it is not.
I
A
The federal patent laws have long permitted those who invent designs for manufactured articles to patent their designs. See Patent Act of 1842, § 3, 5 Stat. 543-544. Patent protection is available for a "new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture." 35 U.S.C. § 171(a). A patentable design "gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives form." Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, 525, 20 L.Ed. 731 (1872). This Court has explained that a design patent is infringed "if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same." Id., at 528.
In 1885, this Court limited the damages available for design patent infringement. The statute in effect at the time allowed a holder of a design patent to recover "the actual damages sustained" from infringement. Rev. Stat. § 4919. In Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439, 5 S.Ct. 945, 29 L.Ed. 177 (1885), the lower courts had awarded the holders of design patents on carpets damages in the amount of "the entire profit to the [patent holders], per yard, in the manufacture and sale of carpets of the patented designs, and not merely the value which the designs contributed to the carpets." Id., at 443, 5 S.Ct. 945. This Court reversed the damages award and construed the statute to require proof that the profits were "due to" the design rather than other aspects of the carpets. Id., at 444, 5 S.Ct. 945 ; see also Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 17, 6 S.Ct. 946, 30 L.Ed. 63 (1886) ("The plaintiff must show what profits or damages are attributable to the use of the infringing design").
In 1887, in response to the Dobson cases, Congress enacted a specific damages remedy for design patent infringement. See S. Rep. No. 206, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1886); H.R. Rep. No. 1966, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1886). The new provision made it unlawful to manufacture or sell an article of manufacture to which a patented design or a colorable imitation thereof had been applied. An act to amend the law relating to patents, trademarks, and copyright, § 1, 24 Stat. 387. It went on to make a design patent infringer "liable in the amount of" $250 or "the total profit made by him from the manufacture or sale ... of the article or articles to which the design, or colorable imitation thereof, has been applied." Ibid.
The Patent Act of 1952 codified this provision in § 289. 66 Stat. 813. That codified language now reads, in relevant part:
"Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250...." 35 U.S.C. § 289.
B
Apple Inc. released its first-generation iPhone in 2007. The iPhone is a smartphone, a "cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity." Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2480, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). Apple secured many design patents in connection with the release. Among those patents were the D618,677 patent, covering a black rectangular front face with rounded corners, the D593,087 patent, covering a rectangular front face with rounded corners and a raised rim, and the D604,305 patent, covering a grid of 16 colorful icons on a black screen. App. 530-578.
Samsung Electronics Co., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (Samsung), also manufacture smartphones. After Apple released its iPhone, Samsung released a series of smartphones that resembled the iPhone. Id., at 357-358.
Apple sued Samsung in 2011, alleging, as relevant here, that various Samsung smartphones infringed Apple's D593,087, D618,677, and D604,305 design patents. A jury found that several Samsung smartphones did infringe those patents. See id., at 273-276. All told, Apple was awarded $399 million in damages for Samsung's design patent infringement, the entire profit Samsung made from its sales of the infringing smartphones. See id., at 277-280, 348-350.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the design patent infringement damages award. In doing so, it rejected Samsung's argument "that the profits awarded should have been limited to the infringing 'article of manufacture' "-for example, the screen or case of the smartphone-"not the entire infringing product"-the smartphone. 786 F.3d 983, 1002 (2015). It reasoned that "limit[ing] the damages" award was not required because the "innards of Samsung's smartphones were not sold separately from their shells as distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary purchasers." Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 577 U.S. ---- (2016), and now reverse and remand.
II
Section 289 allows a patent holder to recover the total profit an infringer makes from the infringement. It does so by first prohibiting the unlicensed "appli[cation]" of a "patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale" or the unlicensed sale or exposure to sale of "any article of manufacture to which [a patented] design or colorable imitation has been applied." 35 U.S.C. § 289. It then makes a person who violates that prohibition "liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250." Ibid. "Total," of course, means all. See American Heritage Dictionary 1836 (5th ed. 2011) ("[t]he whole amount of something; the entirety"). The "total profit" for which § 289 makes an infringer liable is thus all of the profit made from the prohibited conduct, that is, from the manufacture or sale of the "article of manufacture to which [the patented] design or colorable imitation has been applied."
Arriving at a damages award under § 289 thus involves two steps. First, identify the "article of manufacture" to which the infringed design has been applied. Second, calculate the infringer's total profit made on that article of manufacture.
This case requires us to address a threshold matter: the scope of the term "article of manufacture." The only question we resolve today is whether, in the case of a multicomponent product, the relevant "article of manufacture" must always be the end product sold to the consumer or whether it can also be a component of that product. Under the former interpretation, a patent holder will always be entitled to the infringer's total profit from the end product. Under the latter interpretation, a patent holder will sometimes be entitled to the infringer's total profit from a component of the end product.
A
The text resolves this case. The term "article of manufacture," as used in § 289, encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product.
"Article of manufacture" has a broad meaning. An "article" is just "a particular thing." J. Stormonth, A Dictionary of the English Language 53 (1885) (Stormonth); see also American Heritage Dictionary, at 101 ("[a]n individual thing or element of a class; a particular object or item"). And "manufacture" means "the conversion of raw materials by the hand, or by machinery, into articles suitable for the use of man" and "the articles so made." Stormonth 589; see also American Heritage Dictionary, at 1070 ("[t]he act, craft, or process of manufacturing products, especially on a large scale" or "[a] product that is manufactured"). An article of manufacture, then, is simply a thing made by hand or machine.
So understood, the term "article of manufacture" is broad enough to encompass both a product sold to a consumer as well as a component of that product. A component of a product, no less than the product itself, is a thing made by hand or machine. That a component may be integrated into a larger product, in other words, does not put it outside the category of articles of manufacture.
This reading of article of manufacture in § 289 is consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 171(a), which makes "new, original and ornamental design[s] for an article of manufacture" eligible for design patent protection. The Patent Office and the courts have understood § 171 to permit a design patent for a design extending to only a component of a multicomponent product. See, e.g., Ex parte Adams, 84 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 311 (1898) ("The several articles of manufacture of peculiar shape which when combined produce a machine or structure having movable parts may each separately be patented as a design ..."); Application of Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A.1980) ( "Section 171 authorizes patents on ornamental designs for articles of manufacture. While the design must be embodied in some articles, the statute is not limited to designs for complete articles, or 'discrete' articles, and certainly not to articles separately sold ...").
This reading is also consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 101, which makes "any new and useful ... manufacture ... or any new and useful improvement thereof" eligible for utility patent protection. Cf. 8 D. Chisum, Patents § 23.03[2], pp. 23-12 to 23-13 (2014) (noting that "article of manufacture" in § 171 includes "what would be considered a 'manufacture' within the meaning of Section 101 "). "[T]his Court has read the term 'manufacture' in § 101... to mean 'the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.' " Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980) (quoting American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11, 51 S.Ct. 328, 75 L.Ed. 801 (1931) ). The broad term includes "the parts of a machine considered separately from the machine itself." 1 W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 183, p. 270 (1890).
B
The Federal Circuit's narrower reading of "article of manufacture" cannot be squared with the text of § 289. The Federal Circuit found that components of the infringing smartphones could not be the relevant article of manufacture because consumers could not purchase those components separately from the smartphones. See 786 F.3d, at 1002 (declining to limit a § 289 award to a component of the smartphone because "[t]he innards of Samsung's smartphones were not sold separately from their shells as distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary purchasers"); see also Nordock, Inc. v. Systems Inc., 803 F.3d 1344, 1355 (C.A.Fed.2015) (declining to limit a § 289 award to a design for a " 'lip and hinge plate' " because it was "welded together" with a leveler and "there was no evidence" it was sold "separate[ly] from the leveler as a complete unit"). But, for the reasons given above, the term "article of manufacture" is broad enough to embrace both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product, whether sold separately or not. Thus, reading "article of manufacture" in § 289 to cover only an end product sold to a consumer gives too narrow a meaning to the phrase.
The parties ask us to go further and resolve whether, for each of the design patents at issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smartphone, or a particular smartphone component. Doing so would require us to set out a test for identifying the relevant article of manufacture at the first step of the § 289 damages inquiry and to parse the record to apply that test in this case. The United States as amicus curiae suggested a test, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-29, but Samsung and Apple did not brief the issue. We decline to lay out a test for the first step of the § 289 damages inquiry in the absence of adequate briefing by the parties. Doing so is not necessary to resolve the question presented in this case, and the Federal Circuit may address any remaining issues on remand.
III
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Samsung raised a host of challenges on appeal related to other claims in the litigation between Apple and Samsung. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part-with respect to the design patent infringement finding, the validity of two utility patent claims, and the design and utility patent infringement damages awards-and reversed and remanded in part-with respect to trade dress dilution. Only the design patent infringement award is at issue here.
In its petition for certiorari and in its briefing, Samsung challenged the decision below on a second ground. It argued that 35 U.S.C. § 289 contains a causation requirement, which limits a § 289 damages award to the total profit the infringer made because of the infringement. Samsung abandoned this theory at argument, and so we do not address it. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.
As originally enacted, the provision protected "any new and original design for a manufacture." § 3, 5 Stat. 544. The provision listed examples, including a design "worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture" and a "shape or configuration of any article of manufacture." Ibid. A streamlined version enacted in 1902 protected "any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture." Ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193. The Patent Act of 1952 retained that language. See § 171, 66 Stat. 813. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
61
] | sc_petitioner |
SCHAFFER TRANSPORTATION CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
No. 20.
Argued November 13, 1957.
Decided December 9, 1957.
Peter T. Beardsley argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.
Charles H. Weston argued the cause for the United States, appellee. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Assistant Attorney General Hansen.
H. Neil Garson argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellee. With him on the brief was Robert W. Ginnane.
Amos Mathews argued the cause for the Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were J. D. Feeney, Jr., Joseph H. Hays, H. F. Chapman, Carl Helmetag, Jr., James G. Lane and Ed White.
John S. Burchmore and Robert N. Burchmore filed a brief for the National Industrial Traffic League, as amicus curiae.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission adequately and correctly applied the standards of the National Transportation Policy in denying a motor carrier’s application to provide service between points now served exclusively by rail. The applicant, A. W. Schaffer, a common carrier by motor-doing business as Schaffer Transportation Co., holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing him to transport granite from Grant County, South Dakota, to points in 15 States. In the present application he sought additional authority under § 207 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1940, to transport granite from Grant County to various new points as well as authority to transport from points in Vermont to several States in the Midwest and South. From all that appears in the Commission’s report, rail service is currently the only mode of transportation available to shippers of granite between the points sought to be served by Schaffer.
The evidence adduced to demonstrate the need for Schaffer’s service came from three shippers, six receivers and an association composed primarily of Vermont manufacturers of finished granite products. Their evidence, as summarized in the report of Division 5 of the Commission, disclosed the following advantages to be gained from motor carrier service:
“They all agree that [existing rail] service, in the main, is satisfactory for the transportation of carload shipments but entirely inadequate for the transportation of less-than-carload shipments, not only from the standpoint of cost, but also and primarily from a service standpoint. In this respect, the record shows that on movements of small shipments the supporting witnesses have experienced delays, damage to their merchandise, and have been hampered to some degree by the lack or insufficiency of rail sidings. In many instances, they have been asked by customers to furnish delivery by motor carrier but because of the lack of such service they have been unable to comply with these requests. Moreover, and no less important from a business point of view, the shippers are faced with the competitive disadvantage of having to compete with producers of granite at other locations which have truck delivery available. Then, too, the lack of truck service has impeded shippers’ ability to increase their sales and expand their markets in this area. By use of the proposed service, certain other benefits also would accrue to the shippers or dealers. For example, the latter would be able to maintain lower inventories, receive their freight faster and more frequently, and thus, be able better to meet erection deadlines, especially during the peak seasons. Furthermore, the amount of crating now necessary would be reduced with resultant savings in time and money.”
Relying on these factors, Division 5 approved the application, but the full Commission reconsidered the application on the same record, and, with four Commissioners dissenting, ordered it denied. A. W. Schaffer Extension — Granite, 63 M. C. C. 247. Schaffer brought an action before a statutory three-judge court under 49 U. S. C. § 305 (g) to set the order aside. The District Court denied relief and ordered the complaint dismissed. 139 F. Supp. 444. The case is here on direct appeal. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2101 (b). We noted probable jurisdiction. 352 U. S. 923.
The National Transportation Policy, formulated by Congress, specifies in its terms that it is to govern the Commission in the administration and enforcement of all provisions of the Act, and this Court has made it clear that this policy is the yardstick by which the correctness of the Commission’s actions will be measured. Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 351 U. S. 56; Eastern-Central Motor Carriers Assn. v. United States, 321 U. S. 194; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67. Of course, the Commission possesses a “wide range of discretionary authority” in determining whether the public interest warrants certification of any particular proposed service. United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U. S. 236, 241; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60. But that discretion must be exercised in conformity with the declared policies of the Congress. To see whether those policies have been implemented we look to the Commission’s own summary of the evidence, and particularly to the findings, formal or otherwise, which the Commission has made. Just as we would overstep our duty by undertaking to evaluate the evidence according to our own notions of the public interest, we would shirk our duty were we summarily to approve the Commission’s evaluation of the record without determining that the agency’s evaluation had been made in accordance with the mandate of Congress.
The Commission denied Schaffer’s application on the following basis:
“On the foregoing facts, we are unable to conclude that the public convenience and necessity require the proposed operation. It is seen that for one reason or another the supporting witnesses find fault with the presently utilized rail service. Actually, however, the evidence warrants the conclusion that the witnesses are reasonably satisfied with rail service except for the one complaint that all share, namely, that rail service is too slow. Nevertheless, it is the practice for the Vermont shippers to hold finished granite until they can accumulate a pool-car load in order that the shipments may move at the lower pool-car rate. This practice is followed with the knowledge and consent of the consignees, and the sole purpose therein is to take advantage of the lower rail rate. Less-than-carload rail service, while not as expeditious as the proposed service, is fairly good, but because of the higher rate involved this service is seldom used by the supporting witnesses. The testimony of the South Dakota shipper also indicates that its support of the application is largely motivated by anticipated cheaper transportation.
“We have carefully considered applicant’s arguments to the contrary, but are forced to conclude that the service presently available is reasonably adequate. The evidence indicates that the witnesses’ main purpose in supporting the application is to obtain lower rates rather than improved service. It is well established that this is not a proper basis for a grant of authority, and the application, therefore, must be denied.”
Viewing these conclusions in light of the National Transportation Policy we find at-the outset that there has been no evaluation made of the “inherent advantages” of the motor service proposed by the applicant. That policy requires the Commission to administer the Act so as to “recognize and preserve the inherent advantages” of each mode of transportation. Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. United States, supra; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 330 U. S. 567. When a motor carrier seeks to offer service where only rail transportation is presently authorized, the inherent advantages of the proposed service are a critical factor which the Commission must assess. How significant these advantages are in a given factual context and what need exists for a service that can supply these advantages are considerations for the Commission.
Rather than evaluate the benefit that Schaffer's proposed motor service might bring to the public, the Commission cast its first principal conclusion in terms of the adequacy of existing rail service, finding that service to be “reasonably adequate.” Yet the Commission itself has previously stated: “That a particular point has adequate rail service is not a sufficient reason for denial of a certificate [to a motor carrier].” Bowles Common Carrier Application, 1 M. C. C. 589, 591. Of course, adequacy of rail service is a relevant consideration, but as the Commission recognized in Metler Extension — Crude Sulphur, 62 M. C. C. 143, 148, “relative or comparative adequacy” of the existing service is the significant consideration when the interests of competition are being reconciled with the policy of maintaining a sound transportation system. The record here does not disclose the factors the Commission compared in concluding that existing rail service is “reasonably adequate.” For example, the Commission has not determined whether there are benefits that motor service would provide which are not now being provided by the rail carriers, whether certification of a motor carrier would be “unduly prejudicial” to the existing carriers, and whether on balance the public interest would be better served by additional competitive service. To reject a motor carrier’s application on the bare conclusion that existing rail service can move the available traffic, without regard to the inherent advantages of the proposed service, would give one mode of transportation unwarranted protection from competition from others. As the report of Division 5 emphasizes, “[N]o carrier is entitled to protection from competition in the continuance of a service that fails to meet a public need, nor, by the same token, should the public be deprived of a new and improved service because it may divert some trafile from other carriers.”
The Commission’s second basic conclusion from the record was that the main purpose of the witnesses in supporting the application was the prospect of obtaining lower rates. For this reason the Commission discounted the testimony of these witnesses, apparently without even evaluating the claimed advantages of the proposed service other than reduced rates. We think this approach runs counter to the National Transportation Policy. The ability of one mode of transportation to operate with a rate lower than competing types of transportation is precisely the sort of “inherent advantage” that the congressional policy requires the Commission to recognize. Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. United States, supra. The Commission asserts that it has always considered rates irrelevant in certification proceedings under § 207 (a), yet, with but one exception, it relies on administrative decisions involving applications by a carrier to provide service to an area already served by the same mode of transportation. Those decisions are entirely different from the situation presented here, where a motor carrier seeks to compete for traffic now handled exclusively by rail service. In these circumstances a rate benefit attributable to differences between the two modes of transportation is an “inherent advantage” of the competing type of carrier and cannot be ignored by the Commission.
Since the Commission has failed to evaluate the benefits that Schaffer’s proposed service would provide the public, including whatever benefit may be determined to exist from the standpoint of rates, and since the findings as to the adequacy of rail service do not provide this Court with a basis for determining whether the Commission’s decision comports with the National Transportation Policy, that decision must be set aside, and the Commission must proceed further in light of what we have said.
We do not minimize the complexity of the task the Commission faces in evaluating and balancing the numerous considerations that collectively determine where the public interest lies in a particular situation. And we do not suggest that the National Transportation Policy is a set of self-executing principles that inevitably point the way to a clear result in each case. On the contrary, those principles overlap and may conflict, and, where this occurs, resolution is the task of the agency that is expert in the field. But there is here no indication in the Commission’s findings of a conflict of policies. Shippers and receivers now served exclusively by rail have testified to the advantages they would gain from a proposed motor carrier service. There is no finding that the authorization of the proposed service would impair the sound operation of the carriers already certificated. Nor has the Commission properly evaluated the advantages urged by the supporting witnesses to determine whether the standard of public convenience and necessity has been met.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to set aside the Commission’s order and remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. Justice Frankfurter.
The Transportation Act of 1940 (amending the Interstate Commerce Act) grants to the Interstate Commerce Commission powers and imposes limitations upon their exercise in terms of greatly varying degrees of definiteness. As a consequence, the range of discretion left to the Commission and, correspondingly, the scope of judicial review of Commission orders greatly vary. Thus, our decision this day in Nos. 6 and 8, American Trucking Associations v. United States, post, p. 141, is a striking illustration of the difference between the limitation to which the Commission is subjected in a proceeding under § 5 (2) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2) (b), and the requirements of § 207 of that Act, as amended by 49 Stat. 551, 49 U. S. C. § 307, although both relate to motor carrier service by railroads. The Commission’s power to grant relief under the undefined terms of the long-and-short-haul clause of § 4 of that Act, as amended by the Mann-Elkins Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, 547, see Interfnountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, was modified by the specific requirements which Congress wrote into the long-and-short-haul clause in § 6 of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 904, 49 U. S. C. § 4 (1). In short, some rules dealing with the regulation of surface transportation are narrowly specific, leaving practically no scope for discretion in their application by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Other provisions are expressed in terms which necessarily leave considerable scope in the evaluation of their implied ingredients, while still others are of such breadth as to leave even wider opportunity for an exercise of judgment by the Commission not to be displaced by a court’s independent judgment under the guise of judicial review.
In the case before us, the Interstate Commerce Commission denied an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity under § 207 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended. On review of this denial, the three-judge District Court sustained the Commission. This Court reverses the District Court on the ground that the Commission has failed to enforce the National Transportation Policy in § 1 of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., at p. 7107. The very name of these introductory recitals to the Transportation Act illumines their legal significance: “All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” Congress thus conveyed to the Commission a most generalized point of view for carrying out its manifold, complicated and frequently elusive duties. In the very nature of things this Policy is unlike a more or less specific rule affording more or less defined criteria for application in a particular case. Still less does it afford concrete, definable criteria for judicial overturning of the Commission’s conscientious attempt to translate such Policy into concreteness in a particular case.
No doubt the Commission is under obligation to heed what was declared to be “the national transportation policy of the Congress,” namely, “to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each.” Surely these are not mechanical or self-defining standards. They inevitably imply the widest areas for judgment to be exercised, as the Commission has sought to exercise it, with the massive experience which must be attributed to it in this particular case. It is because I find myself regretfully in disagreement with my brethren regarding the nature and scope of the problem of judicial review in a case like this that I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
It is, however, pertinent to add that the Court’s decision may serve a useful purpose if it will lead the Interstate Commerce Commission, despite its enormous volume of business, to a more detailed and illuminating formulation of the reasons for the judgment that it reaches even in that class of cases where Congress has relied on the Commission’s discretion in enforcing the most broadly expressed congressional policy. Since the orders in such cases also fall under judicial scrutiny, it is desirable to insist upon precision in the findings and the reasons for the Commission’s action.
49 Stat. 551, as amended, 54 Stat. 923, 49 U. S. C. §307 (a). Section 207 (a) of the Act provides:
“(a) Subject to section 210, a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operations covered by the application, if it is found that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform the service proposed and to conform to the provisions of this part and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed service, to the extent to be authorized by the certificate, is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied . . . .”
A portion' of the requested East-bound authority was opposed by a motor carrier already certificated to serve points in five of the Eastern States. This portion of the requested authority was denied by Division 5 of the Commission and is no longer in issue as Schaffer did not seek reconsideration. With this exception, the requested authority was opposed solely by railroads-which presently serve the points involved.
Whether these advantages demonstrate that the public convenience and necessity required Schaffer’s proposed service is not for us to say. We take note of them only to indicate that some showing of need was established.
The American Trucking Associations, Inc., was a plaintiff below and is an appellant here. The United States supported the ICC’s order in the District Court but has since concluded “on further analysis” that the order is erroneous; the United States therefore opposed in this Court the Commission’s motion to affirm and both filed a brief and presented oral argument in support of appellants. Fifty-four railroads, presently serving the areas for which Schaffer seeks operating authority, appear as appellees along with the Commission.
“It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust dis-criminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions; — all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C. preceding § 1.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60, 70.
The Commission did not purport to rely on any evidence indicating what revenue the railroads might lose by certification of the applicant.
Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co. Common Carrier Application, 52 M. C. C. 207, 234-235; Pomprowitz Extension — Packing House Products, 51 M. C. C. 343, 347-348; Black Extension of Operations— Prefabricated Houses, 48 M. C. C. 695, 708-709; Johnson Common Carrier Application, 18 M. C. C. 194, 195-196; Wellspeak Common Carrier Application, 1 M. C. C. 712, 714.
In the one exception, Youngblood Extension of Operations — Canton, N. C., 8 M. C. C. 193, the motor carrier’s application was opposed by-other motor carriers. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
173
] | sc_petitioner |
SWEENEY, SHERIFF, v. WOODALL.
No. 100.
Nov. 17, 1952.
Frank T. Cullitan and Gertrude M. Bauer for petitioner.
Frank C. Lyons for respondent.
Eugene Cook, Attorney General, M. H. Blackshear, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Lamar W. Size-more, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Georgia, as amicus curiae, supporting the petition.
Per Curiam.
The respondent is a fugitive from a prison in Alabama. The Governor of that State instituted proceedings for his return, and respondent was arrested in Ohio. Petitioner, the Sheriff of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, now holds respondent for delivery to the authorities of Alabama.
In an attempt to prevent his rendition to Alabama, respondent applied to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that during his confinement in Alabama he had been brutally mistreated, that he would be subjected to such mistreatment and worse if returned. Invoking the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, he asserted that his past confinement had amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, that any future confinement administered by Alabama would similarly be in violation of rights secured to him under the Federal Constitution. Respondent asked that petitioner’s efforts to return him to the custody of Alabama be halted and that he be immediately released.
Refusing to hear this claim on its merits, the Court of Common Pleas denied respondent’s application. This judgment was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District. 88 Ohio App. 202, 89 N. E. 2d 493. An appeal to the State’s Supreme Court was dismissed. 152 Ohio St. 368, 89 N. E. 2d 494. This Court denied a petition for certiorari. 339 U. S. 945.
Respondent then applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, seeking his release upon the same ground theretofore urged in the Ohio courts. The District Court dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus without hearing evidence. But the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, without opinion, remanding the cause to the District Court for a hearing on the merits of the constitutional claim. 194 F. 2d 542. Petitioner has now applied to this Court for a writ of certiorari.
Recently, in Dye v. Johnson, 338 U. S. 864 (1949), this Court considered a petition for certiorari in a similar ease. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had sustained an application for habeas corpus by a fugitive prisoner from Georgia who alleged, as respondent does now, that his confinement in the demanding state amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his constitutional rights. Presented with a petition for certiorari to review this decision, we reversed, summarily, citing Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944). Shortly after our decision in the Dye case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a District Court’s dismissal of a similar petition for habeas corpus from still another fugitive, holding that the federal courts in the asylum should not entertain such applications. Johnson v. Matthews, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 376, 182 F. 2d 677 (1950).
In the present case, as in the others, a fugitive from justice has asked the federal court in his asylum to pass upon the constitutionality of his incarceration in the demanding state, although the demanding state is not a party before the federal court and although he has made no attempt to raise such a question in the demanding state. The question is whether, under these circumstances, the district court should entertain the fugitive’s application on its merits.
Respondent makes no showing that relief is unavailable to him in the courts of Alabama. Had he never eluded the custody of his former jailers he certainly would be entitled to no privilege permitting him to attack Alabama’s penal process by an action brought outside the territorial confines of Alabama in a forum where there would be no one to appear and answer for that State. Indeed, as a prisoner of Alabama, under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2254, and under the doctrine of Ex parte Hawk, supra, he would have been required to exhaust all available remedies in the state courts before making any application to the federal courts sitting in Alabama.
By resort to a form of “self help,” respondent has changed his status from that of a prisoner of Alabama to that of a fugitive from Alabama. But this should not affect the authority of the Alabama courts to determine the validity of his imprisonment in Alabama. The scheme of interstate rendition, as set forth in both the Constitution and the statutes which Congress has enacted to implement the Constitution, contemplates the prompt return of a fugitive from justice as soon as the state from which he fled demands him; these provisions do not contemplate an appearance by Alabama in respondent’s asylum to defend against the claimed abuses of its prison system. Considerations fundamental to our federal system require that the prisoner test the claimed unconstitutionality of his treatment by Alabama in the courts of that State. Respondent should be required to initiate his suit in the courts of Alabama, where all parties may be heard, where all pertinent testimony will be readily available and where suitable relief, if any is necessary, may be fashioned.
The District Court properly dismissed the application for habeas corpus on its face, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the applicant was entitled to a hearing in the District Court of Ohio on the merits of his constitutional claim against prison officials of Alabama.
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
In other similar cases, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F. 2d 308 (1951), and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Davis v. O’Connell, 185 F. 2d 513 (1950), have reached a like result. In United. States ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 181 F. 2d 588 (1950), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a fugitive from Georgia was not entitled to a hearing in the federal courts in his asylum on the ground that the merits had been fully heard in the state courts of the asylum and the fugitive’s claim disproved.
“An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
“An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”
U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2:
“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”
1 Stat. 302, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3281.
Cf. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432 (1914). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_casedisposition |
NATIONAL BOARD OF YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSNS. et al. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 517.
Argued March 3, 1969.
Decided May 19, 1969.
Ronald A. Jacks argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Harding A. Orren and Sherman L. Cohn,
Peter L. Strauss argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Taylor, Roger P. Marquis, and S. Billingsley Hill.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners brought this suit against the United States in the Court of Claims seeking just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for damages done by rioters to buildings occupied by United States troops during the riots in Panama in January 1964. The Court of Claims held that the actions of the Army did not constitute a “taking” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and entered summary judgment for the United States. 184 Ct. Cl. 427, 396 F. 2d 467 (1968). We granted certiorari. 393 U. S. 959 (1968). We affirm.
Petitioners’ buildings, the YMCA Building and the Masonic Temple, are situated next to each other on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone at its boundary with the Republic of Panama. Rioting began in this part of the Zone at 8 p. m. on January 9, 1964. Between 9:15 and 9:30 p. m., an unruly mob of 1,500 persons marched to the Panama Canal Administration Building, at the center of the Atlantic segment of the Zone and there raised a Panamanian flag. Many members of the mob then proceeded to petitioners’ buildings — and to the adjacent Panama Canal Company Office and Storage Building. They entered these buildings, began looting and wrecking the interiors, and started a fire in the YMCA Building.
At 9:50 p. m., Colonel Sachse, the commander of the 4th Battalion, 10th Infantry, of the United States Army, was ordered to move his troops to the Atlantic segment of the Zone with the mission of clearing the rioters from the Zone and sealing the border from further encroachment. The troops entered the three buildings, ejected the rioters, and then were deployed outside of the buildings. The mob began to assault the soldiers with rocks, bricks, plate glass, Molotov cocktails, and intermittent sniper fire. The troops did not return the gunfire but sought to contain the mob with tear gas grenades. By midnight, one soldier had been killed and several had been wounded by bullets; many others had been injured by flying debris. Shortly after midnight, Colonel Sachse moved his troops inside the three buildings so that the men might be better protected from the sniper fire.
The buildings remained under siege throughout the night. On the morning of January 10, the YMCA Building was the subject of a concentrated barrage of Molotov cocktails. The building was set afire, and in the early afternoon the troops were forced to evacuate it and take up positions in the building’s parking lot which had been sandbagged during the night. Following the evacuation, the YMCA Building continued to be a target for Molotov cocktails. The troops also withdrew from the Masonic Temple on the afternoon of January 10, except that a small observation post on the top floor of the building was maintained. The Temple, like the YMCA Building, continued to be under heavy attack following withdrawal of the troops, the greatest damage being suffered on January 12 as a result of extensive fire-bomb activity. The third building under heavy attack in the area — the Panama Canal Company Office and Storage Building — was totally destroyed on January 11 by a fire started by Molotov cocktails.
On January 13, the mob dispersed, and all hostile action in the area ceased. The auditorium-gymnasium in the YMCA Building had been destroyed, and the rest of the building was badly damaged. The Masonic Temple suffered considerably less damage because of its predominantly concrete and brick construction. Other buildings in the Atlantic segment of the Canal Zone were also damaged or destroyed. These buildings were all located along the boundary between the Zone and the Republic of Panama, and none, except the Office and Storage Building, had been occupied by troops during the riot.
Petitioners’ suit in the Court of Claims sought compensation for the damage done to their buildings by the rioters after the troops had entered the buildings. The basic facts were stipulated, and all parties moved for summary judgment. The court found it “abundantly clear from the record . . . that the military units dispatched to the Atlantic side of the Zone by General O’Meara were not sent there for the purpose or with the intention of requisitioning or taking [petitioners’] buildings to house soldiers. Both buildings had previously been looted and damaged by the rioters. Colonel Sachse’s men were ordered to remove the Panamanians from the buildings in order to prevent further loss or destruction and then to seal off the border from further incursions by the rioters into the Atlantic portion of the Canal Zone.” 184 Ct. Cl., at 438, 396 F. 2d, at 473-474. Accordingly, the court held that “the temporary occupancy of [petitioners’] buildings and the damage inflicted on them by the rioters during such occupancy did not constitute a taking of the buildings for use by the Army within the contemplation of the fifth amendment . . . .” Id., at 438, 396 F. 2d, at 473. The Government’s motion for summary judgment was granted, petitioners’ motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case was dismissed.
At the outset, we note that although petitioners claim compensation for all the damage which occurred after the troops retreated into the buildings in the early hours of January 10, there was no showing that any damage occurred because of the presence of the troops. To the contrary, the record is clear that buildings which were not occupied by troops were destroyed by rioters, and that petitioners’ very buildings were under severe attack before the troops even arrived. Indeed, if the destroyed buildings have any common characteristic, it is not that they were occupied by American soldiers, but that they were on the border and thus readily susceptible to the attacks of the mobs coming from the Republic of Panama. We do not rest our decision on this basis, however, for petitioners would not have a claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment even if they could show that damage inflicted by. rioters occurred because of the presence of the troops.
The Just Compensation Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); see also United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256, 266 (1939). Petitioners argue that the troops entered their buildings not for the purpose of protecting those buildings but as part of a general defense of the Zone as a whole. Therefore, petitioners contend, they alone should not be made to bear the cost of the damage to their buildings inflicted by the rioters while the troops were inside. The stipulated record, however, does not support petitioners’ factual premise; rather, it demonstrates that the troops were acting primarily in defense of petitioners’ buildings.
The military had made no advance plans to use petitioners’ buildings as fortresses in case of a riot. Nor was the deployment of the troops in the area of petitioners’ buildings strategic to a defense of the Zone as a whole. The simple fact is that the troops were sent to that area because that is where the rioters were. And once the troops arrived in the area, their every action was designed to protect the buildings under attack. Eirst, they expelled the rioters from petitioners’ buildings and the Office and Storage Building, putting out the fire started by the rioters in the YMCA Building. Then they stood guard outside to defend the buildings from renewed attack by the 2,000 to 3,000 Panamanian rioters who remained in the area. In this defense of petitioners’ property the troops suffered considerable losses and were forced to retreat into the buildings.
It is clear that the mission of the troops forced inside the buildings continued to be the protection of those buildings. In a fact sheet, to which the parties have stipulated, the General Counsel of the United States Department of the Army stated that:
“[T]he troops had occupied the buildings in the YMCA-Masonic Temple vicinity under instructions to protect the property, [and] their actions, according to all statements taken, were consistent with instructions. A captain, in his affidavit, states that he was given a message by the battalion commander to convey to the officer who had been placed in charge of the Masonic Temple. The order was, in the captain’s words, '. . . that if the rioters attempted to enter the building with the intent to do damage to persons or property that appropriate action . . . could be used. . . .’ According to the captain, the order went on to state, '. . . Those people on the 1st floor could assume that rioters forcibly entering the building had the intent to do damage to either property or persons.’ The officer in charge received that order, and it was passed along to the men. One sergeant’s affidavit names the officer, and recounts receiving the order from him. In the sergeant’s own words, ‘The building would be defended at all costs’
“Other statements by individual soldiers describe actions taken to minimize damage which the rioters were attempting to cause. Several soldiers describe throwing and firing rifle-launched tear gas grenades at rioters who were hurling Molotov cocktails at the buildings. Another describes using similar agents 'to keep the crowd from entering the YMCA,’ while still others describe action by themselves or other soldiers in physically routing Panamanians from the YMCA after they had come in through the windows.” (Italics supplied.)
Colonel Sachse, the commanding officer in the Atlantic riot area, testified to the same effect:
“The YMCA building was on fire from Molotov cocktails being thrown from the Republic of Panama side into the front of it. We were unable to protect it due to the fact that it is set on the border between the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama. Therefore we practically lost most of this building by Molotov cocktails.”
Thus, there can be no doubt that the United States Army troops were attempting to defend petitioners’ buildings. Of course, any protection of private property also serves a broader public purpose. But where, as here, the private party is the particular intended beneficiary of the governmental activity, “fairness and justice” do not require that losses which may result from that activity “be borne by the public as a whole,” even though the activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the public. See Armstrong v. United States, supra, at 49; United States v. Sponenbarger, supra, at 266. Were it otherwise, governmental bodies would be liable under the Just Compensation Clause to property owners every time policemen break down the doors of buildings to foil burglars thought to be inside.
Petitioners’ claim must fail for yet another reason. On oral argument, petitioners conceded that they would have had no claim had the troops remained outside the buildings, even if such presence would have incited the rioters to do greater damage to the buildings. We agree. But we do not see that petitioners’ legal position is improved by the fact that the troops actually did occupy the buildings. Ordinarily, of course, governmental occupation of private property deprives the private owner of his use of the property, and it is this deprivation for which the Constitution requires compensation. See, e. g., United States v. General Motors, 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945). There are, however, unusual circumstances in which governmental occupation does not deprive the private owner of any use of his property. For example, the entry by firemen upon burning premises cannot be said to deprive the private owners of any use of the premises. In the instant case, the physical occupation by the troops did not deprive petitioners of any use of their buildings. At the time the troops entered, the riot was already well under way, and petitioners’ buildings were already under heavy attack. Throughout the period of occupation, the buildings could not have been used by petitioners in any way. Thus, petitioners could only claim compensation for the increased damage by rioters resulting from the presence of the troops. But such a claim would not seem to depend on whether the troops were positioned in the buildings. Troops standing just outside a building could as well cause increased damage by rioters to that building as troops positioned inside. In either case — and in any case where government action is causally related to private misconduct which leads to property damage — a determination must be made whether the government involvement in the deprivation of private property is sufficiently direct and substantial to require compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Constitution does not require compensation every time violence aimed against government officers damages private property. Certainly, the Just Compensation Clause could not successfully be invoked in a situation where a rock hurled at a policeman walking his beat happens to damage private property. Similarly, in the instant case, we conclude that the temporary, unplanned occupation of petitioners’ buildings in the course of battle does not constitute direct and substantial enough government involvement to warrant compensation under the Fifth Amendment. We have no occasion to decide whether compensation might be required where the Government in some fashion not present here makes private property a particular target for destruction by private parties.
Affirmed.
Jurisdiction in the Court of Claims was based upon 28 U. S. C. § 1491.
For a general discussion of the purposes of the Just Compensation Clause, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. .Rev. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 (1964).
It is significant that at the outset of the rioting Colonel Sachse sent one of his companies — “B” Company — to an area several blocks away from petitioners’ buildings. It was only because “[t]he number of rioters in the ‘B’ Company area was practically none” that “B” Company was subsequently sent to the area near petitioners’ buildings. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
2
] | sc_casesource |
Robert R. TOLAN
v.
Jeffrey Wayne COTTON.
No. 13-551.
Supreme Court of the United States
May 5, 2014.
Martin J. Siegel, Law Offices of Martin J. Siegel, Houston, TX, for Petitioner.
William S. Helfand, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Martin, Houston, TX; Anthony S. Barkow, Jenner & Block, LLP, New York, NY, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
During the early morning hours of New Year's Eve, 2008, police sergeant Jeffrey Cotton fired three bullets at Robert Tolan; one of those bullets hit its target and punctured Tolan's right lung. At the time of the shooting, Tolan was unarmed on his parents' front porch about 15 to 20 feet away from Cotton. Tolan sued, alleging that Cotton had exercised excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Cotton, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that regardless of whether Cotton used excessive force, he was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate any clearly established right. 713 F.3d 299 (2013). In articulating the factual context of the case, the Fifth Circuit failed to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For that reason, we vacate its decision and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
A
The following facts, which we view in the light most favorable to Tolan, are taken from the record evidence and the opinions below. At around 2:00 on the morning of December 31, 2008, John Edwards, a police officer, was on patrol in Bellaire, Texas, when he noticed a black Nissan sport utility vehicle turning quickly onto a residential street. The officer watched the vehicle park on the side of the street in front of a house. Two men exited: Tolan and his cousin, Anthony Cooper.
Edwards attempted to enter the license plate number of the vehicle into a computer in his squad car. But he keyed an incorrect character; instead of entering plate number 696BGK, he entered 695BGK. That incorrect number matched a stolen vehicle of the same color and make. This match caused the squad car's computer to send an automatic message to other police units, informing them that Edwards had found a stolen vehicle.
Edwards exited his cruiser, drew his service pistol and ordered Tolan and Cooper to the ground. He accused Tolan and Cooper of having stolen the car. Cooper responded, "That's not true." Record 1295. And Tolan explained, "That's my car." Ibid. Tolan then complied with the officer's demand to lie face-down on the home's front porch.
As it turned out, Tolan and Cooper were at the home where Tolan lived with his parents. Hearing the commotion, Tolan's parents exited the front door in their pajamas. In an attempt to keep the misunderstanding from escalating into something more, Tolan's father instructed Cooper to lie down, and instructed Tolan and Cooper to say nothing. Tolan and Cooper then remained facedown.
Edwards told Tolan's parents that he believed Tolan and Cooper had stolen the vehicle. In response, Tolan's father identified Tolan as his son, and Tolan's mother explained that the vehicle belonged to the family and that no crime had been committed. Tolan's father explained, with his hands in the air, "[T]his is my nephew. This is my son. We live here. This is my house." Id., at 2059. Tolan's mother similarly offered, "[S]ir this is a big mistake. This car is not stolen.... That's our car." Id., at 2075.
While Tolan and Cooper continued to lie on the ground in silence, Edwards radioed for assistance. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton arrived on the scene and drew his pistol. Edwards told Cotton that Cooper and Tolan had exited a stolen vehicle. Tolan's mother reiterated that she and her husband owned both the car Tolan had been driving and the home where these events were unfolding. Cotton then ordered her to stand against the family's garage door. In response to Cotton's order, Tolan's mother asked, "[A]re you kidding me? We've lived her[e] 15 years. We've never had anything like this happen before." Id., at 2077; see also id., at 1465 .
The parties disagree as to what happened next. Tolan's mother and Cooper testified during Cotton's criminal trial 1 that Cotton grabbed her arm and slammed her against the garage door with such force that she fell to the ground. Id., at 2035, 2078-2080. Tolan similarly testified that Cotton pushed his mother against the garage door. Id., at 2479. In addition, Tolan offered testimony from his mother and photographic evidence to demonstrate that Cotton used enough force to leave bruises on her arms and back that lasted for days. Id., at 2078-2079, 2089-2091. By contrast, Cotton testified in his deposition that when he was escorting the mother to the garage, she flipped her arm up and told him to get his hands off her. Id., at 1043. He also testified that he did not know whether he left bruises but believed that he had not. Id., at 1044.
The parties also dispute the manner in which Tolan responded. Tolan testified in his deposition and during the criminal trial that upon seeing his mother being pushed, id., at 1249, he rose to his knees, id., at 1928. Edwards and Cotton testified that Tolan rose to his feet. Id., at 1051-1052, 1121.
Both parties agree that Tolan then exclaimed, from roughly 15 to 20 feet away, 713 F.3d, at 303, "[G]et your fucking hands off my mom." Record 1928. The parties also agree that Cotton then drew his pistol and fired three shots at Tolan. Tolan and his mother testified that these shots came with no verbal warning. Id., at 2019, 2080. One of the bullets entered Tolan's chest, collapsing his right lung and piercing his liver. While Tolan survived, he suffered a life-altering injury that disrupted his budding professional baseball career and causes him to experience pain on a daily basis.
B
In May 2009, Cooper, Tolan, and Tolan's parents filed this suit in the Southern District of Texas, alleging claims under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Tolan claimed, among other things, that Cotton had used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 After discovery, Cotton moved for summary judgment, arguing that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred the suit. That doctrine immunizes government officials from damages suits unless their conduct has violated a clearly established right.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Cotton. 854 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.Tex.2012). It reasoned that Cotton's use of force was not unreasonable and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 477-478. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on a different basis. 713 F.3d 299. It declined to decide whether Cotton's actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it held that even if Cotton's conduct did violate the Fourth Amendment, Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate a clearly established right. Id., at 306.
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit began by noting that at the time Cotton shot Tolan, "it was ... clearly established that an officer had the right to use deadly force if that officer harbored an objective and reasonable belief that a suspect presented an 'immediate threat to [his] safety.' " Id., at 306 (quoting Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (C.A.5 2009)). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Tolan failed to overcome the qualified-immunity bar because "an objectively-reasonable officer in Sergeant Cotton's position could have ... believed" that Tolan "presented an 'immediate threat to the safety of the officers.' " 713 F.3d, at 307.3 In support of this conclusion, the court relied on the following facts: the front porch had been "dimly-lit"; Tolan's mother had "refus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm"; and Tolan's words had amounted to a "verba[l] threa[t]." Ibid. Most critically, the court also relied on the purported fact that Tolan was "moving to intervene in" Cotton's handling of his mother, id., at 305, and that Cotton therefore could reasonably have feared for his life, id., at 307. Accordingly, the court held, Cotton did not violate clearly established law in shooting Tolan.
The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 538 Fed.Appx. 374 (2013). Three judges voted to grant rehearing. Judge Dennis filed a dissent, contending that the panel opinion "fail[ed] to address evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether an objective officer in Cotton's position could have reasonably and objectively believed that [Tolan] posed an immediate, significant threat of substantial injury to him." Id., at 377.
II
A
In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks whether the facts, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... show the officer's conduct violated a [federal] right [.]" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). When a plaintiff alleges excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The inquiry into whether this right was violated requires a balancing of " 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' "
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); see Graham, supra, at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.
The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Governmental actors are "shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Ibid. "[T]he salient question ... is whether the state of the law" at the time of an incident provided "fair warning" to the defendants "that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional." Id., at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508.
Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to engage these two prongs. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). But under either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195, n. 2, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) ( per curiam ); Saucier, supra, at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151;Hope, supra, at 733, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 2508. This is not a rule specific to qualified immunity; it is simply an application of the more general rule that a "judge's function" at summary judgment is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S., at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). In making that determination, a court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the opposing party." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Anderson, supra, at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505
Our qualified-immunity cases illustrate the importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant, even when, as here, a court decides only the clearly-established prong of the standard. In cases alleging unreasonable searches or seizures, we have instructed that courts should define the "clearly established" right at issue on the basis of the "specific context of the case." Saucier, supra, at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Accordingly, courts must take care not to define a case's "context" in a manner that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions. See Brosseau,supra, at 195, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596 (inquiring as to whether conduct violated clearly established law " 'in light of the specific context of the case' " and construing "facts ... in a light most favorable to" the nonmovant).
B
In holding that Cotton's actions did not violate clearly established law, the Fifth Circuit failed to view the evidence at summary judgment in the light most favorable to Tolan with respect to the central facts of this case. By failing to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual conclusions, the court improperly "weigh[ed] the evidence" and resolved disputed issues in favor of the moving party, Anderson, 477 U.S., at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
First, the court relied on its view that at the time of the shooting, the Tolans' front porch was "dimly-lit." 713 F.3d, at 307. The court appears to have drawn this assessment from Cotton's statements in a deposition that when he fired at Tolan, the porch was " 'fairly dark,' " and lit by a gas lamp that was " 'decorative.' " Id., at 302. In his own deposition, however, Tolan's father was asked whether the gas lamp was in fact "more decorative than illuminating." Record 1552. He said that it was not. Ibid. Moreover, Tolan stated in his deposition that two floodlights shone on the driveway during the incident, id., at 2496, and Cotton acknowledged that there were two motion-activated lights in front of the house. Id., at 1034. And Tolan confirmed that at the time of the shooting, he was "not in darkness." Id., at 2498-2499.
Second, the Fifth Circuit stated that Tolan's mother "refus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm," thereby "compound[ing]" Cotton's belief that Tolan "presented an immediate threat to the safety of the officers." 713 F.3d, at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). But here, too, the court did not credit directly contradictory evidence. Although the parties agree that Tolan's mother repeatedly informed officers that Tolan was her son, that she lived in the home in front of which he had parked, and that the vehicle he had been driving belonged to her and her husband, there is a dispute as to how calmly she provided this information. Cotton stated during his deposition that Tolan's mother was "very agitated" when she spoke to the officers. Record 1032-1033. By contrast, Tolan's mother testified at Cotton's criminal trial that she was neither "aggravated" nor "agitated." Id., at 2075, 2077.
Third, the Court concluded that Tolan was "shouting," 713 F.3d, at 306, 308, and "verbally threatening" the officer, id., at 307, in the moments before the shooting. The court noted, and the parties agree, that while Cotton was grabbing the arm of his mother, Tolan told Cotton, "[G]et your fucking hands off my mom." Record 1928. But Tolan testified that he "was not screaming." Id., at 2544. And a jury could reasonably infer that his words, in context, did not amount to a statement of intent to inflict harm. Cf. United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374, 383 (C.A.5 2001) ("A threat imports '[a] communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm' " (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1480 (6th ed. 1990))); Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1196 (C.A.10 2012) (inferring that the words "Why was you talking to Mama that way" did not constitute an "overt threa[t]"). Tolan's mother testified in Cotton's criminal trial that he slammed her against a garage door with enough force to cause bruising that lasted for days. Record 2078-2079. A jury could well have concluded that a reasonable officer would have heard Tolan's words not as a threat, but as a son's plea not to continue any assault of his mother.
Fourth, the Fifth Circuit inferred that at the time of the shooting, Tolan was "moving to intervene in Sergeant Cotton's" interaction with his mother. 713 F.3d, at 305; see also id., at 308 (characterizing Tolan's behavior as "abruptly attempting to approach Sergeant Cotton," thereby "inflam [ing] an already tense situation"). The court appears to have credited Edwards' account that at the time of the shooting, Tolan was on both feet "[i]n a crouch" or a "charging position" looking as if he was going to move forward. Record 1121-1122. Tolan testified at trial, however, that he was on his knees when Cotton shot him, id., at 1928, a fact corroborated by his mother, id., at 2081. Tolan also testified in his deposition that he "wasn't going anywhere," id., at 2502, and emphasized that he did not "jump up," id., at 2544.
Considered together, these facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that the court below credited the evidence of the party seeking summary judgment and failed properly to acknowledge key evidence offered by the party opposing that motion. And while "this Court is not equipped to correct every perceived error coming from the lower federal courts," Boag v. MacDougall 454 U.S. 364, 366, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring), we intervene here because the opinion below reflects a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards in light of our precedents. Cf. Brosseau, 543 U.S., at 197-198, 125 S.Ct. 596 (summarily reversing decision in a Fourth Amendment excessive force case "to correct a clear misapprehension of the qualified immunity standard"); see also Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) ( per curiam ) (summarily reversing an opinion that could not "be reconciled with the principles set out" in this Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
The witnesses on both sides come to this case with their own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases. It is in part for that reason that genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our adversarial system. By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary to Tolan's competent evidence, the court below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.
Applying that principle here, the court should have acknowledged and credited Tolan's evidence with regard to the lighting, his mother's demeanor, whether he shouted words that were an overt threat, and his positioning during the shooting. This is not to say, of course, that these are the only facts that the Fifth Circuit should consider, or that no other facts might contribute to the reasonableness of the officer's actions as a matter of law. Nor do we express a view as to whether Cotton's actions violated clearly established law. We instead vacate the Fifth Circuit's judgment so that the court can determine whether, when Tolan's evidence is properly credited and factual inferences are reasonably drawn in his favor, Cotton's actions violated clearly established law.
* * *
The petition for certiorari and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund's motion to file an amicus curiae brief are granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice ALITO, with whom Justice SCALIA joins, concurring in the judgment.
The Court takes two actions. It grants the petition for a writ of certiorari, and it summarily vacates the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The granting of a petition for plenary review is not a decision from which Members of this Court have customarily registered dissents, and I do not do so here. I note, however, that the granting of review in this case sets a precedent that, if followed in other cases, will very substantially alter the Court's practice. See, e.g., this Court's Rule 10 ("A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law"); S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3), p. 352 (10th ed. 2013) ("[E]rror correction ... is outside the mainstream of the Court's functions and ... not among the 'compelling reasons' ... that govern the grant of certiorari").
In my experience, a substantial percentage of the civil appeals heard each year by the courts of appeals present the question whether the evidence in the summary judgment record is just enough or not quite enough to support a grant of summary judgment. The present case falls into that very large category. There is no confusion in the courts of appeals about the standard to be applied in ruling on a summary judgment motion, and the Court of Appeals invoked the correct standard here. See 713 F.3d 299, 304 (C.A.5 2013). Thus, the only issue is whether the relevant evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient to support a judgment for that party. In the courts of appeals, cases presenting this question are utterly routine. There is no question that this case is important for the parties, but the same is true for a great many other cases that fall into the same category.
On the merits of the case, while I do not necessarily agree in all respects with the Court's characterization of the evidence, I agree that there are genuine issues of material fact and that this is a case in which summary judgment should not have been granted.
I therefore concur in the judgment.
The events described here led to Cotton's criminal indictment in Harris County, Texas, for aggravated assault by a public servant. 713 F.3d 299, 303 (C.A.5 2013). He was acquitted. Ibid. The testimony of Tolan's mother during Cotton's trial is a part of the record in this civil action. Record 2066-2087.
The complaint also alleged that the officers' actions violated the Equal Protection Clause to the extent they were motivated by Tolan's and Cooper's race. 854 F.Supp.2d 444, 465 (S.D.Tex.2012). In addition, the complaint alleged that Cotton used excessive force against Tolan's mother. Id., at 468. Those claims, which were dismissed, id., at 465, 470, are not before this Court. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state associated with the respondent. If the respondent is a federal court or federal judge, note the "state" as the United States. The same holds for other federal employees or officials. | What state is associated with the respondent? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
50
] | sc_respondentstate |
SHAPIRO, COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF CONNECTICUT v. THOMPSON.
No. 9.
Argued May 1, 1968.
Reargued October 23-24, 1968.
Decided April 21, 1969
Francis J. MacGregor, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for appellant in No. 9 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the brief on the original argument was Robert K. Killian, Attorney General. Richard W. Barton argued the cause for appellants in No. 33 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the brief on the original argument were Charles T. Duncan and Hubert B. Pair. William C. Sennett, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for appellants in No. 34 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the brief on the reargument was Edgar R. Casper, Deputy Attorney General, and on the original argument were Mr. Casper and Edward Friedman.
Archibald Cox argued the cause for appellees in all three cases on the reargument. With him on the brief were Peter S. Smith and Howard Lesnick. Brian L. Hollander argued the cause pro hac vice for appellee in No. 9 on the original argument. With him on the brief were Norman Dorsen and William D. Graham. Mr. Smith argued the cause for appellees in No. 33 on the original argument. With him on the brief were Joel J. Rabin, Jonathan Weiss, and Joseph F. Dugan. Thomas K. Gilhool argued the cause pro hac vice for appellees in No. 34 on the original argument. With him on the brief were Harvey N. Schmidt, Paul Bender, and Mr. Lesnick.
Lorna Lawhead Williams, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Iowa as amicus curiae in support of appellants in all three cases on the original argument and on the reargument. With her on the briefs on the original argument was Richard C. Turner, Attorney General.
Briefs of amici curiae in support of appellant in No. 9 were filed by David P. Buckson, Attorney General, and Ruth M. Ferrell, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of Delaware; by William B. Saxbe, Attorney General, Winifred A. Dunton, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles S. Lopeman for the State of Ohio; by Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, A. J. Carubbi, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, and J. C. Davis, John Reeves, and Pat Bailey, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Texas; and by Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of California.
Briefs of amici curiae in support of appellee in No. 9 were filed by Arthur L. Schiff for Bexar County Legal Aid Association; by Eugene M. Swann for the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County; and by A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, Laurence R. Sperber, and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union et ah Brief of amicus curiae in support of appellees in No. 33 was filed by John F. Nagle for the National Federation of the Blind. Briefs of amici curiae in support of appellees in all three cases were filed by J. Lee Rankin and Stanley Buchsbaum for the City of New York; by Joseph B. Robison, Carlos Israels, and Carl Rachlin for the American Jewish Congress et al.; and by Charles L. Heilman and Leah Marks for the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law et ah
Together with No. 33, Washington et al. v. Legrant et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, argued May 1, 1968, and No. 34, Reynolds et al. v. Smith et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, argued May 1-2, 1968, both reargued on October 23-24, 1968.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These three appeals were restored to the calendar for reargument. 392 U. S. 920 (1968). Each is an appeal from a decision of a three-judge District Court holding unconstitutional a State or District of Columbia statutory provision which denies welfare assistance to residents of the State or District who have not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance. We affirm the judgments of the District Courts in the three cases.
I.
In No. 9, the Connecticut Welfare Department invoked § 17-2d of the Connecticut General Statutes to deny the application of appellee Vivian Marie Thompson for assistance under the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). She was a 19-year-old unwed mother of one child and pregnant with her second child when she changed her residence in June 1966 from Dorchester, Massachusetts, to Hartford, Connecticut, to live with her mother, a Hartford resident. She moved to her own apartment in Hartford in August 1966, when her mother was no longer able to support her and her infant son. Because of her pregnancy, she was unable to work or enter a work training program. Her application for AFDC assistance, filed in August, was denied in November solely on the ground that, as required by § 17-2d, she had not lived in the State for a year before her application was filed. She brought this action in the District Court for the District of Connecticut where a three-judge court, one judge dissenting, declared § 17— 2d unconstitutional. 270 F. Supp. 331 (1967). The majority held that the waiting-period requirement is unconstitutional because it “has a chilling effect on the right to travel.” Id., at 336. The majority also held that the provision was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the denial of relief to those resident in the State for less than a year is not based on any permissible purpose but is solely designed, as “Connecticut states quite frankly,” “to protect its fisc by discouraging entry of those who come needing relief.” Id., at 336-337. We noted probable jurisdiction. 389 U. S. 1032 (1968).
In No. 33, there are four appellees. Three of them— appellees Harrell, Brown, and Legrant — applied for and were denied AFDC aid. The fourth, appellee Barley, applied for and was denied benefits under the program for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. The denial in each case was on the ground that the applicant had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of her application, as required by § 3-203 of the District of Columbia Code.
Appellee Minnie Harrell, now deceased, had moved with her three children from New York to Washington in September 1966. She suffered from cancer and moved to be near members of her family who lived in Washington.
Appellee Barley, a former resident of the District of Columbia, returned to the District in March 1941 and was committed a month later to St. Elizabeths Hospital as mentally ill. She has remained in that hospital ever since. She was deemed eligible for release in 1965, and a plan was made to transfer her from the hospital to a foster home. The plan depended, however, upon Mrs. Barley's obtaining welfare assistance for her support. Her application for assistance under the program for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled was denied because her time spent in the hospital did not count in determining compliance with the one-year requirement.
Appellee Brown lived with her mother and two of her three children in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Her third child was living with appellee Brown's father in the District of Columbia. When her mother moved from Fort Smith to Oklahoma, appellee Brown, in February 1966, returned to the District of Columbia where she had lived as a child. Her application for AFDC assistance was approved insofar as it sought assistance for the child who had lived in the District with her father but was denied to the extent it sought assistance for the two other children.
Appellee Legrant moved with her two children from South Carolina to the District of Columbia in March 1967 after the death of her mother. She planned to live with a sister and brother in Washington. She was pregnant and in ill health when she applied for and was denied AFDC assistance in July 1967.
The several cases were consolidated for trial, and a three-judge District Court was convened. The court, one judge dissenting, held § 3-203 unconstitutional. 279 F. Supp. 22 (1967). The majority rested its decision on the ground that the one-year requirement was unconstitutional as a denial of the right to equal protection secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction. 390 U. S. 940 (1968).
In No. 34, there are two appellees, Smith and Foster, who were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for a year prior to their applications as required by § 432 (6) of the Pennsylvania Welfare Code. Appellee Smith and her five minor children moved in December 1966 from Delaware to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where her father lived. Her father supported her and her children for several months until he lost his job. Appellee then applied for AFDC assistance and had received two checks when the aid was terminated. Appellee Foster, after living in Pennsylvania from 1953 to 1965, had moved with her four children to South Carolina to care for her grandfather and invalid grandmother and had returned to Pennsylvania in 1967. A three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, one judge dissenting, declared § 432 (6) unconstitutional. 277 F. Supp. 65 (1967). The majority held that the classification established by the waiting-period requirement is “without rational basis and without legitimate purpose or function” and therefore a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 67. The majority noted further that if the purpose of the statute was “to erect a barrier against the movement of indigent persons into the State or to effect their prompt departure after they have gotten there,” it would be “patently improper and its implementation plainly impermissible.” Id., at 67-68. We noted probable jurisdiction. 390 U. S. 940 (1968).
II.
There is no dispute that the effect of the waiting-period requirement in each case is to create two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist — food, shelter, and other necessities of life. In each case, the District Court found that appel-lees met the test for residence in their jurisdictions, as well as all other eligibility requirements except the requirement of residence for a full year prior to their applications. On reargument, appellees’ central contention is that the statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws. We agree. The interests which appellants assert are promoted by the classification either may not constitutionally be promoted by government or are not compelling governmental interests.
III.
Primarily, appellants justify the waiting-period requirement as a protective device to preserve the fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs. It is asserted that people who require welfare assistance during their first year of residence in a State are likely to become continuing burdens on state welfare programs. Therefore, the argument runs, if such people can be deterred from entering the jurisdiction by denying them welfare benefits during the first year, state programs to assist long-time residents will not be impaired by a substantial influx of indigent newcomers.
There is weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who need or may need relief was the specific objective of these provisions. In the Congress, sponsors of federal legislation to eliminate all residence requirements have been consistently opposed by representatives of state and local welfare agencies who have stressed the fears of the States that elimination of the requirements would result in a heavy influx of individuals into States providing the most generous benefits. See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 10032 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 309-310, 644 (1962); Hearings on H. R. 6000 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 324-327 (1950). The sponsor of the Connecticut requirement said in its support: “I doubt that Connecticut can and should continue to allow unlimited migration into the state on the basis of offering instant money and permanent income to all who can make their way to the state regardless of their ability to contribute to the economy.” H. B. 82, Connecticut General Assembly House Proceedings, February Special Session, 1965, Vol. II, pt. 7, p. 3504. In Pennsylvania, shortly after the enactment of the one-year requirement, the Attorney General issued an opinion construing the one-year requirement strictly because “[a]ny other conclusion would tend to attract the dependents of other states to our Commonwealth.” 1937-1938 Official Opinions of the Attorney General, No. 240, p. 110. In the District of Columbia case, the constitutionality of § 3-203 was frankly defended in the District Court and in this Court on the ground that it is designed to protect the jurisdiction from an influx of persons seeking more generous public assistance than might be available elsewhere.
We do not doubt that the one-year waiting-period device is well suited to discourage the influx of poor families in need of assistance. An indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during his first year of residence, when his need may be most acute. But the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible.
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. That proposition was early stated by Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849):
“For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.”
We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision. It suffices that, as Mr. Justice Stewart said for the Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-758 (1966):
“The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.
“. . . [T]he right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.”
Thus, the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible. If a law has “no other purpose . . . than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.” United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 581 (1968).
Alternatively, appellants argue that even if it is impermissible for a State to attempt to deter the entry of all indigents, the challenged classification may be justified as a permissible state attempt to discourage those indigents who would enter the State solely to obtain larger benefits. We observe first that none of the statutes before us is tailored to serve that objective. Rather, the class of barred newcomers is all-inclusive, lumping the great majority who come to the State for other purposes with those who come for the sole purpose of collecting higher benefits. In actual operation, therefore, the three statutes enact what in effect are nonrebuttable presumptions that every applicant for assistance in his first year of residence came to the jurisdiction solely to obtain higher benefits. Nothing whatever in any of these records supplies any basis in fact for such a presumption.
More fundamentally, a State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. Implielt in any such distinction is the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of securing higher welfare benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not take this consideration into account. But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among others factors, the level of a State’s public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take advantage of its better educational facilities.
Appellants argue further that the challenged classification may be sustained as an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of taxes. We have difficulty seeing how long-term residents who qualify for welfare are making a greater present contribution to the State in taxes than indigent residents who have recently arrived. If the argument is based on contributions made in the past by the long-term residents, there is some question, as a factual matter, whether this argument is applicable in Pennsylvania where the record suggests that some 40% of those denied public assistance because of the waiting period had lengthy prior residence in the State. But we need not rest on the particular facts of these cases. Appellants’ reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from its schools. Similarly, in the cases before us, appellants must do more than show that denying welfare benefits to new residents saves money. The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification.
In sum, neither deterrence of indigents from migrating to the State nor limitation of welfare benefits to those regarded as contributing to the State is a constitutionally permissible state objective.
IV.
Appellants next advance as justification certain administrative and related governmental objectives allegedly served by the waiting-period requirement. They argue that the requirement (1) facilitates the planning of the welfare budget; (2) provides an objective test of residency; (3) minimizes the opportunity for recipients fraudulently to receive payments from more than one jurisdiction; and (4) encourages early entry of new residents into the labor force.
At the outset, we reject appellants’ argument that a mere showing of a rational relationship between the waiting period and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suffice to justify the classification. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961). The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963).
The argument that the waiting-period requirement facilitates budget predictability is wholly unfounded. The records in all three cases are utterly devoid of evidence that either State or the District of Columbia in fact uses the one-year requirement as a means to predict the number of people who will require assistance in the budget year. None of the appellants takes a census of new residents or collects any other data that would reveal the number of newcomers in the State less than a year. Nor are new residents required to give advance notice of their need for welfare assistance. Thus, the welfare authorities cannot know how many new residents come into the jurisdiction in any year, much less how many of them will require public assistance. In these circumstances, there is simply no basis for the claim that the one-year waiting requirement serves the purpose of making the welfare budget more predictable. In Connecticut and Pennsylvania the irrelevance of the one-year requirement to budgetary planning is further underscored by the fact that temporary, partial assistance is given to some new residents and full assistance is given to other new residents under reciprocal agreements. Finally, the claim that a one-year waiting requirement is used for planning purposes is plainly belied by the fact that the requirement is not also imposed on applicants, who are long-term residents, the group that receives the bulk of welfare payments. In short, the States rely on methods other than the one-year requirement to make budget estimates. In No. 34, the Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Assistance Policies and Standards testified that, based on experience in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, her office had already estimated how much the elimination of the one-year requirement would cost and that the estimates of costs of other changes in regulations “have proven exceptionally accurate.”
The argument that the waiting period serves as an administratively efficient rule of thumb for determining residency similarly will not withstand scrutiny. The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites for assistance under these three statutes, and the facts relevant to the determination of each are directly examined by the welfare authorities. Before granting an application, the welfare authorities investigate the applicant’s employment, housing, and family situation and in the course of the inquiry necessarily learn the facts upon which to determine whether the applicant is a resident.
Similarly, there is no need for a State to use the one-year waiting period as a safeguard against fraudulent receipt of benefits; for less drastic means are available, and are employed, to minimize that hazard. Of course, a State has a valid interest in preventing fraud by any applicant, whether a newcomer or a long-time resident. It is not denied, however, that the investigations now conducted entail inquiries into facts relevant to that subject. In addition, cooperation among state welfare departments is common. The District of Columbia, for example, provides interim assistance to its former residents who have moved to a State which has a waiting period. As a matter of course, District officials send a letter to the welfare authorities in the recipient's new community “to request the information needed to continue assistance.” A like procedure would be an effective safeguard against the hazard of double payments. Since double payments can be prevented by a letter or a telephone call, it is unreasonable to accomplish this objective by the blunderbuss method of denying assistance to all indigent newcomers for an entire year.
Pennsylvania suggests that the one-year waiting period is justified as a means of encouraging new residents to join the labor force promptly. But this logic would also require a similar waiting period for long-term residents of the State. A state purpose to encourage employment provides no rational basis for imposing a one-year waiting-period restriction on new residents only.
We conclude therefore that appellants in these cases do not use and have no need to use the one-year requirement for the governmental purposes suggested. Thus, even under traditional equal protection tests a classification of welfare applicants according to whether they have lived in the State for one year would seem irrational and unconstitutional. But, of course, the traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Connecticut and Pennsylvania argue, however, that the constitutional challenge to the waiting-period requirements must fail because Congress expressly approved the imposition of the requirement by the States as part of the jointly funded AFDC program.
Section 402 (b) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (b), provides that:
“The Secretary shall approve any [state assistance] plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to families with dependent children, a residence requirement which denies aid with respect to any child residing in the State (1) who has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the application for such aid, or (2) who was born within one year immediately preceding the application, if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the birth.”
On its face, the statute does not approve, much less prescribe, a one-year requirement. It merely directs the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to disapprove plans submitted by the States because they include such a requirement. The suggestion that Congress enacted that directive to encourage state participation in the AFDC program is completely refuted by the legislative history of the section. That history discloses that Congress enacted the directive to curb hardships resulting from lengthy residence requirements. Rather than constituting an approval or a prescription of the requirement in state plans, the directive was the means chosen by Congress to deny federal funding to any State which persisted in stipulating excessive residence requirements as a condition of the payment of benefits.
One year before the Social Security Act was passed, 20 of the 45 States which had aid to dependent children programs required residence in the State for two or more years. Nine other States required two or more years of residence in á particular town or county. And 33 jurisdictions required at least one year of residence in a particular town or county. Congress determined to combat this restrictionist policy. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports expressly stated that the objective of § 402(b) was to compel “[l]iberality of residence requirement.” Not a single instance can be found in the debates or committee reports supporting the contention that § 402 (b) was enacted to encourage participation by the States in the AFDC program. To the contrary, those few who addressed themselves to waiting-period requirements emphasized that participation would depend on a State's repeal or drastic revision of existing requirements. A congressional demand on 41 States to repeal or drastically revise offending statutes is hardly a way to enlist their cooperation.
But even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Congress did approve the imposition of a one-year waiting period, it is the responsive state legislation which infringes constitutional rights. By itself § 402 (b) has absolutely no restrictive effect. It is therefore not that statute but only the state requirements which pose the constitutional question.
Finally, even if it could be argued that the constitutionality of § 402 (b) is somehow at issue here, it follows from what we have said that the provision, insofar as it permits the one-year waiting-period requirement, would be unconstitutional. Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Perhaps Congress could induce wider state participation in school construction if it authorized the use of joint funds for the building of segregated schools. But could it seriously be contended that Congress would be constitutionally justified in such authorization by the need to secure state cooperation? Congress is without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651, n. 10 (1966).
VI.
The waiting-period requirement in the District of Columbia Code involved in No. 33 is also unconstitutional even though it was adopted by Congress as an exercise of federal power. In terms of federal power, the discrimination created by the one-year requirement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. “[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' ” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). For the reasons we have stated in invalidating the Pennsylvania and Connecticut provisions, the District of Columbia provision is also invalid — the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from denying public assistance to poor persons otherwise eligible solely on the ground that they have not been residents of the District of Columbia for one year at the time their applications are filed.
Accordingly, the judgments in Nos. 9, 33, and 34 are
Affirmed.
Accord: Robertson v. Ott, 284 F. Supp. 735 (D. C. Mass. 1968); Johnson v. Robinson, Civil No. 67-1883 (D. C. N. D. Ill., Feb. 20, 1968); Ramos v. Health and Social Services Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (D. C. E. D. Wis. 1967); Green v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. C. Del. 1967). Contra: Waggoner v. Rosenn, 286 F. Supp. 275 (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1968); see also People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N. E. 2d 46 (1940).
All but one of the appellees herein applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program which was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-609. The program provides partial federal funding of state assistance plans which meet certain specifications. One appellee applied for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled which is also jointly funded by the States and the Federal Government. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1351-1355.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 17-2d (1965 Supp.), now § 17-2c, provides:
“When any person comes into this state without visible means of support for the immediate future and applies for aid to dependent children under chapter 301 or general assistance under part I of chapter 308 within one year from his arrival, such person shall be eligible only for temporary aid or care until arrangements are made for his return, provided ineligibility for aid to dependent children shall not continue beyond the maximum federal residence requirement.”
An exception is made for those persons who come to Connecticut with a bona fide job offer or are self-supporting upon arrival in the State and for three months thereafter. 1 Conn. Welfare Manual, c. II, §§219.1-219.2 (1966).
D. C. Code Ann. §3-203 (1967) provides:
“Public assistance shall be awarded to or on behalf of any needy individual who either (a) has resided in the District for one year immediately preceding the date of filing his application for such assistance; or (b) who was bom within one year immediately preceding the application for such aid, if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in the District for one year immediately preceding the birth; or (c) is otherwise within one of the categories of public assistance established by this chapter.” See D. C. Handbook of Pub. Assistance Policies and Procedures, HPA-2, EL 9.1, I, III (1966) (hereinafter cited as D. C. Handbook).
In Ex parte Cogdell, 342 U. S. 163 (1951), this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to determine whether 28 U. S. C. § 2282, requiring a three-judge court when the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is challenged, applied to Acts of Congress pertaining solely to the District of Columbia. The case was mooted below, and the question has never been expressly resolved. However, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), this Court heard an appeal from a three-judge court in a case involving the constitutionality of a District of Columbia statute. Moreover, three-judge district courts in the District of Columbia have continued to hear cases involving such statutes. See, e. g., Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (1967). Section 2282 requires a three-judge court to hear a challenge to the constitutionality of “any Act of Congress.” (Emphasis supplied.) We see no reason to make an exception for Acts of Congress pertaining to the District of Columbia.
Pa. Stat., Tit. 62, §432 (6) (1968). See also Pa. Pub. Assistance Manual' §§3150-3151 (1962). Section 432 (6) provides:
“Assistance may be granted only to or in behalf of a person residing in Pennsylvania who (i) has resided therein for at least one year immediately preceding the date of application; (ii) last resided in a state which, by law, regulation or reciprocal agreement with Pennsylvania, grants public assistance to or in behalf of a person who has resided in such state for less than one year; (iii) is a married woman residing with a husband who meets the requirement prescribed in subclause (i) or (ii) of this clause; or (iv) is a child less than one year of age whose parent, or relative with whom he is residing, meets the requirement prescribed in subclause (i), (ii) or (iii) of this clause or resided in Pennsylvania for at least one year immediately preceding the child's birth. Needy persons who do not meet any of the requirements stated in this clause and who are transients or without residence in any state, may be granted assistance in accordance with rules, regulations, and standards established by the department.”
This constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a “privilege” and not a “right.” See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963).
The waiting-period requirement has its antecedents in laws prevalent in England and the American Colonies centuries ago which permitted the ejection of individuals and families if local authorities thought they might become public charges. For example, the preamble of the English Law of Settlement and Removal of 1662 expressly recited the concern, also said to justify the three statutes before us, that large numbers of the poor were moving to parishes where more liberal relief policies were in effect. See generally Coll, Perspectives in Public Welfare: The English Heritage, 4 Welfare in Review, No. 3, p. 1 (1966). The 1662 law and the earlier Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 were the models adopted by the American Colonies. Newcomers to a city, town, or county who might become public charges were “warned out” or “passed on” to the next locality. Initially, the funds for welfare payments were raised by local taxes, and the controversy as to responsibility for particular indigents was between localities in the same State. As States — first alone and then with federal grants — assumed the major responsibility, the contest of nonresponsibility became interstate.
In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1825), Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869), and Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871), the right to travel interstate was grounded upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79 (1873); Tunning v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97 (1908). In Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160,- 181, 183-185 (1941) (Douglas and Jackson, JJ., concurring), and Twining v. New Jersey, supra, reliance was placed on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868). In Edwards v. California, supra, and the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (1849), a Commerce Clause approach was employed.
See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 125 (1958) ;. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 505-506. (1964);' Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 14 (1965), where the freedom of Americans to travel outside the country was grounded upon .the Due Process-Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Furthermore, the contribution rationale can hardly explain why the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania bar payments to children who have not lived in the jurisdiction for a year regardless of whether the parents have lived in the jurisdiction for that period. See D. C. Code §3-203; D. C. Handbook, EL 9.1, I (C) (1966); Pa. Stat., Tit. 62, §432 (6) (1968). Clearly, the children who were barred would not have made a contribution during that year.
We are not dealing here with state insurance programs which may legitimately tie the amount of benefits to the individual’s contributions.
In Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 (1966), New Jersey attempted to reduce expenditures by requiring prisoners who took an unsuccessful appeal to reimburse the State out of their institutional earnings for the cost of furnishing a trial transcript. This Court held the New Jersey statute unconstitutional because it did not require similar repayments from unsuccessful appellants given a suspended sentence, placed on probation, or sentenced only to a fine. There was no rational basis for the distinction between unsuccessful appellants who were in prison and those who were not.
Appellant in No. 9, the Connecticut Welfare Commissioner, disclaims any reliance on this contention. In No. 34, the District Court found as a fact that the Pennsylvania requirement served none of the claimed functions. 277 F. Supp. 65, 68 (1967).
Of course, such advance notice would inevitably be unreliable since some who registered would not need welfare a year later while others who did not register would need welfare.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 17-2d, now § 17-2c, and Pa. Pub. Assistance Manual §3154 (1968).
Both Connecticut and Pennsylvania have entered into open-ended interstate compacts in which they have agreed to eliminate the durational requirement for anyone who comes from another State which has also entered into the compact. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 17-21a (1968); Pa. Pub. Assistance Manual §3150, App. I (1966).
In Pennsylvania, the one-year waiting-period requirement, but not the residency requirement, is waived under reciprocal agreements. Pa. Stat., Tit. 62, § 432 (6) (1968); Pa. Pub. Assistance Manual §3151.21 (1962).
1 Conn. Welfare Manual, c. II, § 220 (1966), providés that “[r]esi-dence within the state shall mean that the applicant is living in an established place of abode and the plan is to remain.” A person who meets this requirement does not have to wait a year for assistance if he entered the State with a bona fide job offer or with sufficient funds to support himself without welfare for three months. Id., at §219.2.
HEW Handbook of Pub. Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 3650 (1946), clearly distinguishes between residence and duration of residence. It defines residence, as is conventional, in terms of intent to remain in the jurisdiction, and it instructs interviewers that residence and length of residence “are two distinct aspects . . . .”
See, e. g., D. C. Handbook, chapters on Eligibility Payments, Requirements, Resources, and Reinvestigation for an indication of how thorough these investigations are. See also 1 Conn. Welfare Manual, c. I (1967); Pa. Pub. Assistance Manual §§ 3170-3330 (1962).
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has proposed the elimination of individual investigations, except for spot checks, and the substitution of a declaration system, under which the “agency accepts the statements of the applicant for or recipient of assistance, about facts that are within his knowledge and competence ... as a basis for decisions regarding his eligibility and extent of entitlement.” HEW, Determination of Eligibility for Public Assistance Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 17189 (1968). See also Hoshino, Simplification of the Means Test and its Consequences, 41 Soc. Serv. Rev. 237, 241-249 (1967); Burns, What’s Wrong With Public Welfare?, 36 Soc. Serv. Rev. 111, 114-115 (1962). Presumably the statement of an applicant that he intends to remain in the jurisdiction would be accepted under a declaration system.
The unconcern of Connecticut and Pennsylvania with the one-year requirement as a means of preventing fraud is made apparent by the waiver of the requirement in reciprocal agreements with other States. See n. 15, supra.
D. C. Handbook, RV 2.1, I, II (B) (1967). See also Pa. Pub. Assistance Manual §3153 (1962).
Under the traditional standard, equal protection is denied only if the classification is “without any reasonable basis,” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603 (1960).
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
As of 1964, 11 jurisdictions imposed no residence requirement whatever for AFDC assistance. They were Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. See HEW, Characteristics of State Public Assistance Plans under the Social Security Act (Pub. Assistance Rep. No. 50, 1964 ed.).
Social Security Board, Social Security in America 235-236 (1937).
H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 24; S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 35. Furthermore, the House Report cited President Roosevelt’s statement in his Social Security Message that “People want decent homes to live in; they want to locate them where they can engage in productive work . . . .” H. R. Rep., supra, at 2. Clearly this was a call for greater freedom of movement.
In addition to the statement in the above Committee report, see the remarks of Rep. Doughton (floor manager of the Social Security bill in the House) and Rep. Vinson. 79 Cong. Rec. 5474, 5602-5603 (1935). These remarks were made in relation to the waiting-period requirements for old-age assistance, but they apply equally to the AFDC program.
Section 402 (b) required the repeal of 30 state statutes which imposed too long a waiting period in the State or particular town or county and 11 state statutes (as well as the Hawaii statute) which required residence in a particular town or county. See Social Security Board, Social Security in America 235-236 (1937).
It is apparent that Congress was not intimating any view of the constitutionality of a one-year limitation. The constitutionality of any scheme of federal social security legislation was a matter of doubt at that time in light of the decision in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). Throughout the House debates congressmen discussed the constitutionality of the fundamental taxing provisions of the Social Security Act, see, e. g., 79 Cong. Rec. 5783 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Cooper), but not once did they discuss the constitutionality of § 402 (b). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bureau of Prisons",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"State Agency",
"Unidentifiable",
"Office of Thrift Supervision",
"Department of Homeland Security",
"Board of General Appraisers",
"Board of Tax Appeals",
"General Land Office or Commissioners",
"NO Admin Action",
"Processing Tax Board of Review"
] | [
116
] | sc_adminaction |
ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
No. 92-1550.
Argued December 1, 1993
Decided January 24, 1994
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 325. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 326.
John V. Jansonius argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jill J. Weinberg and Alan Wright.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Michael R. Dreeben, Jerry M. Hunter, Nicholas E. Karatinos, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, and John Emad Arbab.
James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, and Daniel R. Barney filed a brief for the American Trucking Associations as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon and Laurence Gold; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Herbert M. Wacktell, William H. Brown III, Norman Redlich, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Sharon R. Vinick, Mitchell Rogovin, Randal S. Milch, Robert C. Bell, Jr., and Donna R. Lenhoff.
E. Carl Uehlein, Jr., Joseph E. Santucci, Jr., Stephen A Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Mona C. Zeiberg filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. as amici curiae.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Michael Manso gave his employer a false excuse for being late to work and repeated that falsehood while testifying under oath before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Notwithstanding Manso’s dishonesty, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) ordered Manso’s former employer to reinstate him with backpay. Our interest in preserving the integrity of administrative proceedings prompted us to grant certiorari to consider whether Manso’s misconduct should have precluded the Board from granting him that relief.
h — i
Manso worked as a casual dockworker at petitioner ABF Freight System, Inc.’s (ABF’s) trucking terminal in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from the summer of 1987 to August 1989. He was fired three times. The first time, Manso was 1 of 12 employees discharged in June 1988 in a dispute over a contractual provision relating to so-called “preferential casual” dockworkers. The grievance Manso’s union filed eventually secured his reinstatement; Manso also filed an unfair labor practice charge against ABF over the incident.
Manso’s return to work was short lived. Three supervisors warned him of likely retaliation from top management— alerting him, for example, that ABF was “gunning” for him, App. 96, and that “the higher echelon was after [him],” id., at 96-97. See also ABF Freight System, Inc., 304 N. L. R. B. 685, 592, 597 (1991). Within six weeks ABF discharged Manso for a second time on pretextual grounds— ostensibly for failing to respond to a call .to work made under a stringent verification procedure ABF had recently imposed upon preferential casuals. Once again, a grievance panel ordered Manso reinstated.
Manso’s third discharge came less than two months later. On August 11, 1989, Manso arrived four minutes late for the 5 a.m. shift. At the time, ABF had no policy regarding lateness. After Manso was late to work, however, ABF decided to discharge preferential casuals — though not other employees — who were late twice without good cause. Six days later Manso triggered the policy’s first application when he arrived at work nearly an hour late for the same shift. Manso telephoned at 5:25 a.m. to explain that he was having car trouble on the highway, and repeated that excuse when he arrived. ABF conducted a prompt investigation, ascertained that he was lying, and fired him for tardiness under its new policy on lateness.
Manso filed a second unfair labor practice charge. In the hearing before the ALJ, Manso repeated his story about the car trouble that preceded his third discharge. The ALJ credited most of his testimony about events surrounding his dismissals, but expressly concluded that Manso lied when he told ABF that car trouble made him late to work. Id., at 600. Accordingly, although the ALJ decided that ABF had illegally discharged Manso the second time because he was a party to the earlier union grievance, the AU denied Manso relief for the third discharge based on his finding that ABF had dismissed Manso for cause. Ibid.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Manso’s second discharge was unlawful, but reversed with respect to the third discharge. Id., at 591. Acknowledging that Manso lied to his employer and that ABF presumably could have discharged him for that dishonesty, id., at 590, n. 13, the Board nevertheless emphasized that ABF did not in fact discharge him for lying and that the ALJ’s conclusion to the contrary was “a plainly erroneous factual statement of [ABFj’s asserted reasons.” Instead, Manso’s lie “established only that he did not have a legitimate excuse for the August 17 lateness.” Id., at 589. The Board focused primarily on ABF’s retroactive application of its lateness policy to include Manso’s first time late to work, holding that ABF had “seized upon” Manso’s tardiness “as a pretext to discharge him again and for the same unlawful reasons it discharged him on June 19.” In addition, though the Board deemed Manso’s discharge unlawful even assuming the validity of ABF’s general disciplinary treatment of preferential casuals, it observed that ABF’s disciplinary approach and lack of uniform rules for all dockworkers “raise[dj more questions than they resolve[dj.” Id., at 590. The Board ordered ABF to reinstate Manso with backpay. Id., at 591.
The Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s, order. Miera v. NLRB, 982 F. 2d 441 (CA10 1992). Its review of the record revealed “abundant evidence of antiunion animus in ABF’s conduct towards Manso,” id., at 446, including “ample evidence” that Manso’s third discharge was not for cause, ibid. The court regarded as important the testimony in the record confirming that Manso would not have been discharged under ABF’s new tardiness policy had he provided a legitimate excuse. Ibid. The court also rejected ABF’s argument that awarding reinstatement and backpay to an employee who lied to his employer and to the ALJ violated public policy. Noting that “Manso’s original misrepresentation was made to his employer in an attempt to avoid being fired under a policy the application of which the Board found to be the result of antiunion animus,” the court reasoned that the Board had wide discretion to ascertain what remedy best furthered the policies of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). Id., at 447.
II
The question we granted certiorari to review is a narrow one. We assume that the Board correctly found that ABF discharged Manso unlawfully in August 1989. We also assume, more importantly, that the Board did not abuse its discretion in ordering reinstatement even though Manso gave ABF a false reason for being late to work. We are concerned only with the ramifications of Manso’s false testimony under oath in a formal proceeding before the AU. We recognize that the Board might have decided that such misconduct disqualified Manso from profiting from the proceeding, or it might even have adopted a flat rule precluding reinstatement when a former employee so testifies. As the case comes to us, however, the issue is not whether the Board might adopt such a rule, but whether it must do so.
False testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a “flagrant affront” to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 576-577 (1976). See also United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 (1969); Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966); Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938); United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 141-142 (1911). If knowingly exploited by a criminal prosecutor, such wrongdoing is so “inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice” that it can vitiate a judgment even after it has become final. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112 (1935). In any proceeding, whether judicial or administrative, deliberate falsehoods “well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal,” United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564, 574 (1937), and may put the factfinder and parties “to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross examination, by extraneous investigation or other collateral means.” Ibid. Perjury should be severely sanctioned in appropriate eases.
ABF submits that the false testimony of a former employee who was the victim of an unfair labor practice should always preclude him from winning reinstatement with back-pay. That contention, though not inconsistent with our appraisal of his misconduct, raises countervailing concerns. Most important is Congress’ decision to delegate to the Board the primary responsibility for making remedial decisions that best effectuate the policies of the Act when it has substantiated an unfair labor practice. The Act expressly authorizes the Board “to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the Act].” 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). Only in cases of discharge for cause does the statute restrict the Board’s authority to order reinstatement. This is not such a case.
When Congress expressly delegates to an administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts must give the agency’s decision controlling weight unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). Because this case involves that kind of express delegation, the Board’s views merit the greatest deference. This has been our consistent appraisal of the Board’s remedial authority throughout its long history of administering the Act. As we explained over a half century ago:
“Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board’s discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941).
Notwithstanding our concern about the seriousness of Manso’s ill-advised decision to repeat under oath his false excuse for tardiness, we cannot say that the Board’s remedial order in this case was an abuse of its broad discretion or that it was obligated to adopt a rigid rule that would foreclose relief in all comparable cases. Nor can we fault the Board’s conclusions that Manso’s reason for being late to work was ultimately irrelevant to whether antiunion animus actually motivated his discharge and that ordering effective relief in a case of this character promotes a vital public interest.
Notably, the ALJ refused to credit the testimony of several ABF witnesses, see, e. g., 304 N. L. R. B., at 598, and the Board affirmed those credibility findings, id., at 585. The unfairness of sanctioning Manso while indirectly rewarding those witnesses’ lack of candor is obvious. Moreover, the rule ABF advocates might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility. Its decision to rely on “other civil and criminal remedies” for false testimony, cf. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 521 (1993), rather than a categorical exception to the familiar remedy of reinstatement is well within its broad discretion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ABF at this time had three dockworker classifications: those on the regular seniority list, nonpreferential casuals, and preferential casuals. ABF Freight System, Inc., 304 N. L. R. B. 585, 589, n. 10 (1991). A supplemental labor agreement ABF negotiated with the union in April 1988 created the preferential casual dockworker classification with certain seniority rights. Id., at 585-586.
The policy required preferential casuals — though not other dockworkers — to be available by phone prior to a shift in case a foreman needed them to work. A worker who did not respond risked disciplinary action for failing to “protect his shift”; two such failures authorized ABF to discharge the worker. Id., at 597. ABF issued a written warning to Manso on May 6,1989, after he failed to respond to such a call. On June 19, a supervisor again asked a regular dockworker to summon Manso to work just prior to 6 a.m. for the 8:30 a.m. shift. When Manso did not answer, the employee who had dialed his number asked to dial it again, fearing he had misdialed. The supervisor denied permission and instead had the employee sign a form verifying that Manso had not responded. Manso was then discharged. The ALJ found that the special call policy discriminated against preferential casual dockworkers as a class, id., at 598, 600; both the AU and the Board concluded that it was discriminatorily applied to Manso, id., at 600, 589, n. 11.
Manso told ABF management that his car had overheated on the highway, that he had to phone his wife to pick him up and take him to work. Manso also said a deputy sheriff stopped him for speeding in his ensuing rush. A plant manager who looked for Manso’s overheated car on the highway found nothing, however, and the officer who Manso said issued him a warning for speeding told ABF officials — and later the AU — that Manso had been alone in the car.
Specifically, the ALJ held that the dismissal violated §§ 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3), and (4).
304 N. L. R. B., at 590. The Board found that the record in this case unequivocally established that ABF did not treat Manso’s dishonesty “in and of itself as an independent basis for discharge or any other disciplinary action.” Ibid.
Id., at 591. The Board also noted that the supervisors’ threats of retaliation and the earlier unlawful discharge under the verification policy provided “strong evidence” of unlawful motivation regarding Manso’s third discharge. Id., at 590.
ABF’s public policy argument relies on several decisions refusing to enforce reinstatement orders where the employee had engaged in serious misconduct. See, e. g., Precision Window Mfg. v. NLRB, 963 F. 2d 1105, 1110 (CA8 1992) (employee lied about extent of union activities and threatened to kill supervisor); NLRB v. Magnusen, 523 F. 2d 643, 646 (CA9 1975) (employee padded time card and lied about it under oath); NLRB v. Commonwealth Foods, Inc., 506 F. 2d 1065, 1068 (CA4 1974) (employees engaged in theft from employer); NLRB v. Breitling, 378 F. 2d 663, 664 (CA10 1967) (employee confessed to stealing from employer).
We limited our grant of certiorari to the third question in the petition: “Does an employee forfeit the remedy of reinstatement with backpay after the Administrative Law Judge finds that he purposefully testified falsely during the administrative hearing?” Pet. for Cert. i.
“No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.” 29 U. S. C. § 160(c).
See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U. S. 533, 539-540 (1943). We stated in Virginia Electric that such administrative determinations should stand “unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.” Id., at 540. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiondirection |
HARRIS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS COURT et al. v. MOORE et al.
No. 73-1475.
Argued November 11, 1974
Decided February 18, 1975
Edward J. Landry argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Joe Resweber and Michael R. Davis.
John G. Gilleland argued the cause for appellees Moore et al. With him on the brief was Virgil H. Bar-field. C. Anthony Friloux, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee Zaboroski.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Marshall,
announced by Mr. Chief Justice Burger.
The appellees brought this action to challenge a plan redistricting the justice of the peace precincts in Harris County, Tex. Because the plan provided for consolidation of several precincts, three justices of the peace and two constables lost their jobs. These five officials, along with two voters from the defunct precincts, sought to enjoin implementation of the redistricting plan on the ground that the Texas statute providing for their removal from office at the time of redistricting denied them the equal protection of the laws. The three-judge District Court granted relief, declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining the redistricting. The order of the District Court was stayed by Mr. Justice Powell. We denied a motion to vacate the stay, 415 U. S. 905 (1974), and subsequently noted probable jurisdiction, 417 U. S. 928 (1974). We reverse and remand to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
I
Under Texas law, the Commissioners Court is the general governing body of each county; one of its duties is to divide the county into precincts for the election of justices of the peace and constables, and to redistrict the precincts when necessary. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 2351 (1) (1971).
In June 1973, the Commissioners Court of Harris County adopted a redistricting plan for the eight justice of the peace precincts in the county. The last redistricting had taken place in 1876, and the enormous population changes in the Houston area had resulted in gross disparities in population among the precincts: the largest precinct contained approximately one million persons, while the smallest had fewer than 7,000.
Under the old plan, one justice of the peace and one constable were assigned to each precinct except the largest, which was allotted two justices and one constable. Because of the apparent discrepancy in the workload of the officials in different precincts, the Commissioners Court adopted a redistricting plan that redrew the precinct lines. Although the proposed new precincts still varied substantially in population size, the disparity was much less than it had been.
Among other changes, the plan consolidated three of the smallest precincts and parts of two others into a single new precinct. As a result, four justices and three constables found themselves residents of a single precinct, which was entitled by law to a maximum of only one constable and two justices of the peace. Pursuant to a Texas statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art 2351% (c) (1971), the Commissioners Court declared the constable and justice posts for that precinct to be vacant, since there were more officials living in the precinct than positions available. The Commissioners Court then filled the vacancies, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 2355 (1971), appointing one of the displaced constables to the new constable post and one of the displaced justices to one of the two new justice positions. A nonincumbent was appointed to fill the other slot.
The five officeholders, threatened with removal prior to the expiration of their elected terms, resorted to court action in an effort to block implementation of the redistricting plan. One of the constables filed suit in state court, but when that court denied his application for a temporary injunction, he apparently abandoned the action. Shortly thereafter, the three displaced justices and two constables, along with two voters who had lived in their precincts, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, claiming that the redistricting scheme was unconstitutional. Their removal pursuant to Art. 2351% (c) violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the officials contended. More specifically, they argued that the redistricting order was constitutionally invalid because it did not meet “one man, one vote” standards, because it denied voters in certain precincts the full effect of their votes, and because the precincts were redrawn along racial lines. Although the appellees did not expressly raise a state-law claim in their complaint, they argued in their pretrial brief that Art. 2351% (c) was invalid under the State Constitution as well, relying on several state-court cases and two opinions of the Texas Attorney General. In response, the appellants requested that the complaint be dismissed because the suit raised no substantial federal questions and because the appellees had failed to exhaust their state remedies before bringing suit in federal court.
A three-judge court was convened. It heard argument and issued an order later the same day. In its order, the court asserted jurisdiction and enjoined implementation of the redistricting plan on the ground that the Texas statute providing for the removal of the plaintiff justices and constables. was unconstitutional on its face. A week later the court filed a brief opinion in which it wrote that insofar as the statute shortens the term of an elected public official merely because redistricting places him in a district with others, “it invidiously and irrationally discriminates between him and others not so affected.” In addition, the court held that the statute as applied had discriminated between those who voted for or were entitled to vote for the displaced officials, and the voters in other precincts where the elected officials were permitted to serve a full term. Because it found no compelling interest served by redistricting in the middle of plaintiffs’ terms, the court held that to the extent that the redistricting order appointed other persons to plaintiffs’ offices and prevented plaintiffs from carrying out their duties and receiving their salaries for the remainder of their elected terms, the order was invalid.
II
The appellants urge us to reverse the District Court on the merits or, in the alternative, to order the court to abstain pending determination of the state-law questions that pervade this case. Because we agree with appellants that the District Court should have abstained, we reverse without reaching the merits of the equal protection claim sustained by the District Court.
In Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), the Court held that when a federal constitutional claim is premised on an unsettled question of state law, the federal court should stay its hand in order to provide the state courts an opportunity to settle the underlying state-law question and thus avoid the possibility of unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question. Since that decision, we have invoked the “Pullman doctrine” on numerous occasions. E. g., Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498 (1972); Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U. S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167 (1959); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944); see Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 1084-1101 (1974). We have repeatedly warned, however, that because of the delays inherent in the abstention process and the danger that valuable federal rights might be lost in the absence of expeditious adjudication in the federal court, abstention must be invoked only in “special circumstances,” see Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 248 (1967), and only upon careful consideration of the facts of each case. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 375-379 (1964); Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., supra, at 500.
Where there is an action pending in state court that will likely resolve the state-law questions underlying the federal claim, we have regularly ordered abstention. See Askew v. Hargrave, supra; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U. S. 242 (1953); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168, 173 (1942); cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 236 (1943). Similarly, when the state-law questions have concerned matters peculiarly within the province of the local courts, see Reetz v. Bozanich, supra; Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41 (1970); cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25 (1959), we have inclined toward abstention. On the other hand, where the litigation has already been long delayed, see Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 329 (1964), or where it has seemed unlikely that resolution of the state-law question would significantly affect the federal claim, see Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 84 (1958); Public Utilities Comm’n v. United Fuel Cas Co., 317 U. S. 456, 462-463 (1943), the Court has held that abstention should not be required.
Among the cases that call most insistently for abstention are those in which the federal constitutional challenge turns on a state statute, the meaning of which is unclear under state law. If the state courts would be likely to construe the statute in a fashion that would avoid the need for a federal constitutional ruling or otherwise significantly modify the federal claim, the argument for abstention is strong. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973); Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, supra; Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528 (1965); Harrison v. NAACP, supra. The same considerations apply where, as in this case, the uncertain status of local law stems from the unsettled relationship between the state constitution and a statute. Here resolution of the question whether the Texas Constitution permits the County Commissioners Court to replace constables and justices of the peace when several live in the same precinct will define the scope of Art. 2351% (c) and, as a consequence, the nature and continued vitality of the federal constitutional claim. As we wrote in Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S., at 87, “the nub of the whole controversy may be the state constitution.”
The appellees insist that abstention would be improper in this case because a Texas court construction of Art. 2351% (c) would not modify or avoid the equal protection question passed on by the District Court. Having analyzed the relevant Texas statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedents, however, we are unable to share their conviction.
The Texas Constitution provides that a justice of the peace or constable “shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified.” Art. 5, § 18. Justices of the peace and constables may be removed by state district court judges for various causes, after notice and a trial by jury. Art. 5, § 24. What is unsettled is whether these two provisions ensure justices and constables tenure until the completion of their elected terms even when midterm redistricting places them outside their original precinct or puts them into a precinct that has more than its full complement of officeholders.
In two early cases, the Texas courts held that the State Constitution provides no guarantee of tenure for justices and constables when the County Commissioners Court elects to exercise its redistricting authority. State ex rel. Dowlen v. Rigsby, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 171, 43 S. W. 271, holding approved, 91 Tex. 351, 43 S. W. 1101 (1897); Ward v. Bond, 10 S. W. 2d 590 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1928). The State Supreme Court later appeared to reverse this stand in approving a lower court decision that the State Constitution guaranteed to county commissioners the right to serve until the expiration of their terms, even if redistricting resulted in their living outside their precincts. Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S. W. 2d 414 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.), holding approved, 158 Tex. 371, 312 S. W. 2d 380 (1958). In an opinion filed shortly before the District Court hearing in this case, the Texas Attorney General applied the reasoning of the Sachse case and ruled that to the extent that Art. 2351% (c) vacated the office of a justice of the peace who no longer lived within his precinct, the statute was invalid. The Attorney General concluded that the State Constitution entitles justices and constables to serve their full terms unless they are removed pursuant to Art. 5, § 24. Op. Atty. Gen. H-220 (1974). The reasoning of the Attorney General’s opinion would appear to extend to this case. Although appellants contend that the Attorney-General has misconstrued the Texas precedents, it seems far from settled that under state law the appellee officeholders must lose their jobs.
These difficult state-law questions intrude in yet another way that strengthens the case for abstention. The proper scope of the order entered by the District Court and the applicability of that order to the plaintiffs’ claims depend directly on questions of state law. The court’s initial order held Art. 2351% (c) unconstitutional and enjoined the redistricting plan altogether. In its opinion, the court apparently intended to narrow its order somewhat, by holding the statute unconstitutional as applied and by enjoining the redistricting order only to the extent that it removed the appellees from their jobs. Yet even that relief was broader than the court’s holding would support. Absent Art. 2351% (c), Texas law may well dictate that upon redistricting, all the justice and constable positions in the county would be vacated. Since the District Court concluded only that Art. 2351% (c) denied the officeholders and voters equal protection by removing some officials in the county but not others, it should not automatically have imposed one remedy — reinstatement—when Texas law might well call for quite another — removal of all the affected officeholders. Yet if the District Court had limited itself to declaring Art. 2351% (c) unconstitutional, and the Commissioners Court had determined that state law would then require that all the county justice and constable positions be vacated, the appellees would be forced to resort to state court in order to vindicate their claimed right to reinstatement. In short, not only the character of the federal right asserted in this case, but even the availability of the relief sought turn in large part on the same unsettled state-law questions. Because the federal claim in this case is “entangled in a skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed,” McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 674 (1963), we conclude that the District Court erred in not adopting appellants’ suggestion to abstain.
In order to remove any possible obstacles to- state-court jurisdiction, we direct the District Court to dismiss the complaint. The dismissal should be without prejudice so that any remaining federal claim may be raised in a federal forum after the Texas courts have been given the opportunity to address the state-law questions in this case. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 421-422 (1964).
Reversed and remanded.
Article 2351% (c) provides:
“When boundaries of justice of the peace precincts are changed, so that existing precincts are altered, new precincts are formed, or former precincts are abolished, if only one previously elected or appointed justice of the peace or constable resides within a precinct as so changed, he shall continue in office as justice or constable of that precinct for the remainder of the term to which he was elected or appointed. If more than one justice or constable resides within a precinct as so changed, or if none resides therein, the office shall become vacant and the vacancy shall be filled as other vacancies; provided, however, that in precincts having two justices, if two reside therein, both shall continue in office, and if more than two reside therein, both offices shall become vacant.”
Another statute, Tex. Elec. Code Ann., Art. 1.05 (Supp. 197¿H975), has been read to require that school district officials reside throughout their terms in the districts that they serve. Whitmarsh v. Buckley, 324 S. W. 2d 298 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1959). County commissioners, by contrast, are not required to reside in their precincts for their full terms. Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S. W. 2d 414 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.), holding approved, 158 Tex. 371, 312 S. W. 2d 380 (1958). The Texas courts have not yet settled whether Art. 1.05 requires that justices of the peace and constables reside in their precincts throughout their terms, or whether the state constitutional provisions establishing a requirement of county residence for all county officers, Tex. Const., Art. 16, § 14; Art. 5, § 24, excuse justices and constables from the requirements of Art. 1.05.
The appellees noted in their First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, filed September 17, 1973, that the state statute, as interpreted by the Commissioners Court, was in apparent conflict with Art. 5, § 24, of the Texas Constitution, which provides a mechanism for removal of county officers, including justices and constables.
In their pretrial brief, the appellants more properly characterized their “exhaustion” defense as a request for the District Court to abstain.
The appellants point out that since staggered terms are constitutionally mandated in Texas, Tex. Const., Art. 16, § 65, it would have been impossible for the Commissioners Court to have redistricted at a time that would not have fallen in the middle of some of the justices’ or constables’ terms.
Because it granted relief on the equal protection claim, the court found it unnecessary to reach the appellees’ other contentions. Nor did the court address the state-law questions or the appellants’ abstention argument.
We have jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. The statute challenged here was plainly of statewide application; it was attacked as being unconstitutional on its face or as applied; and for the purposes of the Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2281, the defendant county commissioners were “state officers” in administering the challenged statute. Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project, 404 U. S. 541, 544 n. 2 (1972). The appellees’ claim, moreover, appears sufficient to raise a question for a three-judge court. We recently stated that “claims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2281.” Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512, 518 (1973).
In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 580-581 (1973), we held that abstention was not required, even though a suit that might have obviated the need for federal injunctive relief was pending in the state courts. In Gibson, however, state authorities were pressing charges against the plaintiffs without awaiting the results of the state-court action, and some of the charges against the plaintiffs might have survived even a favorable ruling in the State Supreme Court. Under those circumstances, we held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to decline to abstain.
In Wisconsin v. Gonstantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971), we declined to order abstention where the federal due process claim was not complicated by an unresolved state-law question, even though the plaintiffs might have sought relief under a similar provision of the state constitution. But where the challenged statute is part of an integrated scheme of related constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations, and where the scheme as a whole calls for clarifying interpretation by the state courts, we have regularly required the district courts to abstain. See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639 (1959).
The appellees’ allegation that Art. 2351% (c) is unconstitutionally vague is revealing. The “vagueness” of which they complain is no more than uncertainty about the applicability of the statute to a particular situation; it is not the sort of vagueness that leaves those subject to a statute uncertain about what is required of them. In the case where applicability of the statute is uncertain, abstention is often proper, while in the case where the vagueness claim goes to the obligations imposed by the statute, it is not, since a single state construction often would not bring the challenged statute "within the bounds of permissible constitutional certainty.” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378 (1964); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 401 n. 5 (1974).
Opinions of the Attorney General are “entitled to careful consideration by the courts, and quite generally regarded as highly persuasive,” Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 98, 45 S. W. 2d 130, 131 (1931). The 1974 opinion, however, may be given close scrutiny by the state courts, as it appears to be in direct conflict with several earlier opinions of the Attorney General, see n. 12, infra.
Even if the Sachse case does not apply to justice precincts, Art. 2351% (c) may still be invalid under state law as a legislative encroachment on the county commissioners’ constitutional powers to fill justice vacancies created in the course of redistricting. Tex. Const., Art. 5, §28. See Op. Atty. Gen. M-68 (1967). If the statute is unconstitutional for this reason, all the justice positions in the county would have been vacated, not just those occupied by the appellees. Obviously, this construction of Texas law would drastically alter the nature of appellees’ federal claim.
There is support for this view in several early cases and in a number of state Attorney General’s opinions. See Brown v. Meeks, 96 S. W. 2d 839 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1936); State ex rel. Dowlen v. Rigsby, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 171, 43 S. W. 271, holding approved, 91 Tex. 351, 43 S. W. 1101 (1897); Ops. Atty. Gen. V-790 (1949) ; V-1032 (1950); WW-536 (1958); 0-112 (1963). These opinions of the Attorney General were qualified in a manner not affecting this case in Op. Atty. Gen. M-68 (1967); see also Op. Atty. Gen. M-562 (1970).
The Commissioners Court has in fact adopted this view of Texas law in this case. Brief for Appellants 18-20.
Ordinarily the proper course in ordering “Pullman abstention” is to remand with instructions to retain jurisdiction but to stay the federal suit pending determination of the state-law questions in state court. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 244 n. 4 (1967). The Texas Supreme Court has ruled, however, that it cannot grant declaratory relief under state law if a federal court retains jurisdiction over tbe federal claim. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S. W. 2d 855 (1965); see Romero v. Coldwell, 455 F. 2d 1163, 1167 (CA5 1972); Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 444 F. 2d 38, 45-46 (CA5 1971).
We have adopted the unusual course of dismissing in this case solely in order to avoid the possibility that some state-law remedies might otherwise be foreclosed to appellees on their return to state court. Obviously, the dismissal must not be used as a means to defeat the appellees’ federal claims if and when they return to federal court. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the case was heard by a three-judge federal district court. Beginning in the early 1900s, Congress required three-judge district courts to hear certain kinds of cases. More modern-day legislation has reduced the kinds of lawsuits that must be heard by such a court. As a result, the frequency is less for the Burger Court than for the Warren Court, and all but nonexistent for the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. | Was the case heard by a three-judge federal district court? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_threejudgefdc |
GARRITY et al. v. NEW JERSEY.
No. 13.
Argued November 10, 1966.
Decided January 16, 1967.
Daniel L. O’Connor argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Eugene Gressman.
Alan B. Handler, First Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General, and Norman Heine.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants were police officers in certain New Jersey boroughs. The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered that alleged irregularities in handling cases in the municipal courts of those boroughs be investigated by the Attorney General, invested him with broad powers of inquiry and investigation, and directed him to make a report to the court. The matters investigated concerned alleged fixing of traffic tickets.
Before being questioned, each appellant was warned (1) that anything he said might be used against him in any state criminal proceeding; (2) that he had the privilege to refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him; but (3) that if he refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office.
Appellants answered the questions. No immunity was granted, as there is no immunity statute applicable in these circumstances. Over their objections, some of the answers given were used in subsequent prosecutions for conspiracy to obstruct the administration of the traffic laws. Appellants were convicted and their convictions were sustained over their protests that their statements were coerced, by reason of the fact that, if they refused to answer, they could lose their positions with the police department. See 44 N. J. 209, 207 A. 2d 689, 44 N. J. 259, 208 A. 2d 146.
We postponed the question of jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits. 383 U. S. 941. The statute whose validity was sought to be “drawn in question,” 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), was the forfeiture statute. But the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to reach that question (44 N. J., at 223, 207 A. 2d, at 697), deeming the volun-tariness of the statements as the only issue presented. Id., at 220-222, 207 A. 2d, at 695-696. The statute is therefore too tangentially involved to satisfy 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), for the only bearing it had was whether, valid or not, the fear of being discharged under it for refusal to answer on the one hand and the fear of self-incrimination on the other was “a choice between the rock and the whirlpool” which made the statements products of coercion in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore dismiss the appeal, treat the papers as a petition for certiorari (28 U. S. C. § 2103), grant the petition and proceed to the merits.
We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court that the forfeiture-of-office statute is relevant here only for the bearing it has on the voluntary character of the statements used to convict petitioners in their criminal prosecutions.
The choice imposed on petitioners was one between self-incrimination or job forfeiture. Coercion that vitiates a confession under Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, and related cases can be “mental as well as physical”; “the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206. Subtle pressures (Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503) may be as telling as coarse and vulgar ones. The question is whether the accused was deprived of his “free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 241.
We adhere to Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, a civil forfeiture action against property. A statute offered the owner an election between producing a document or forfeiture of the goods at issue in the proceeding. This was held to be a form of compulsion in violation of both the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 634-635. It is that principle that we adhere to and apply in Spevack v. Klein, post, p. 511.
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like interrogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 464-465, is “likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.” We think the statements were infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning and cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior decisions.
It is said that there was a “waiver.” That, however, is a federal question for us to decide. Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm., 248 U. S. 67, 69-70; Stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 243-244. The Court in Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm., supra, in speaking of a certificate exacted under protest and in violation of the Commerce Clause, said:
“Were it otherwise, as conduct under duress involves a choice, it always would be possible for a State to impose an unconstitutional burden by the threat of penalties worse than it in case of a failure to accept it, and then to declare the acceptance voluntary . . . .” Id., at 70.
Where the choice is “between the rock and the whirlpool,” duress is inherent in deciding to “waive” one or the other.
.“It always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly so called.” Ibid.
In that case appellant paid under protest. In these cases also, though petitioners succumbed to compulsion, they preserved their objections, raising them at the earliest possible point. Cf. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 776. The cases are therefore quite different from the situation where one who is anxious to make a clean breast of the whole affair volunteers the information.
Mr. Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517, stated a dictum on which New Jersey heavily relies:
“The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.” Id., at 220, 29 N. E., at 517-518.
The question in this case, however, is not cognizable in those terms. Our question is whether a State, contrary to the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, can use the threat of discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against an employee.
We held in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, that a public school teacher could not be discharged merely because he had invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when questioned by a congressional committee:
“The privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury. . . . The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.” Id., at 557-558.
We conclude that policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.
There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price. Engaging in interstate commerce is one. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1. Resort to the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases is another. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U. S. 529. Assertion of a First Amendment right is still another. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 305-306. The imposition of a burden on the exercise of a Twenty-fourth Amendment right is also banned. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528. We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic.
Reversed.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, see post, p. 530.]
“Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive public office, position or employment (whether state, county or municipal), who refuses to testify upon matters relating to.the office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding wherein he is a defendant or is called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, upon the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself or refuses to waive immunity when called by a grand jury to testify thereon or who willfully refuses or fails to appear before any court, commission or body of this state which has the right to inquire under oath upon matters relating to the office, position or employment of such person or who, having been sworn, refuses to testify or to answer any material question upon the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself, shall, if holding elective or public office, position or employment, be removed therefrom or shall thereby forfeit his office, position or employment and any vested or future right of tenure or pension granted to him by any law of this state provided the inquiry relates to a matter which occurred or arose within the preceding five years. Any person so forfeiting his office, position or employment shall not thereafter be eligible for election or appointment to any public office, position or employment in this state.” N. J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 81-17.1 (Supp. 1965).
At the trial the court excused the jury and conducted a hearing to determine whether, inter alia, the statements were voluntary. The State offered witnesses who testified as to the manner in which the statements were taken; the appellants did not testify at that hearing. The court held the statements to be voluntary.
N. 1, supra.
Stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 243, quoting from Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S. 583, 593.
Cf. Lamm, The 5th Amendment and Its Equivalent in Jewish Law, 17 Decalogue Jour. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1967):
“It should be pointed out, at the very outset, that the Halakhah does not distinguish between voluntary and forced confessions, for reasons which will be discussed later. And it is here that one of the basic differences between Constitutional and Talmudic Law arises. According to the Constitution, a man cannot be compelled to testify against himself. The provision against self-incrimination is a privilege of which a citizen may or may not avail himself, as he wishes. The Halakhah, however, does not permit self-incriminating testimony. It is inadmissible, even if voluntarily offered. Confession, in other than a religious context, or financial cases completely free from any traces of criminality, is simply not an instrument of the Law. The issue, then, is not compulsion, but the whole idea of legal confession.
“The Halakhah, then, is obviously concerned with protecting the eonfessant from his own aberrations which manifest themselves, either as completely fabricated confessions, or as exaggerations of the real facts. . . . While certainly not all, or even most criminal confessions are directly attributable, in whole or part, to the Death Instinct, the Halakhah is sufficiently concerned with the minority of instances, where such is the case, to disqualify all criminal confessions and to discard confession as a legal instrument. Its function is to ensure the total victory of the Life Instinct over its omnipresent antagonist. Such are the conclusions to be drawn from Maimonides’ interpretation of the Halakhah’s equivalent of the Fifth Amendment.
“In summary, therefore, the Constitutional ruling on self-incrimination concerns only forced confessions, and its restricted character is a result of its historical evolution as a civilized protest against the use of torture in extorting confessions. The Halakhic ruling, however, is much broader and discards confessions in toto, and this because of its psychological insight and its concern for saving man from his own destructive inclinations.” Id., at 10, 12. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. | What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
34
] | sc_casesourcestate |
WIDMAR et al. v. VINCENT et al.
No. 80-689.
Argued October 6, 1981
Decided December 8, 1981
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 277. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 282.
Ted D. Ayres argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Jackson A. Wright.
James M. Smart, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Michael K. Whitehead
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Jerold Blumoff and Marc D. Stem for the American Jewish Congress; and by Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Meyer Eisenberg for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Joel H. Paget for the Association for the Coordination of University Religious Affairs; by Wilkes C. Robinson and Jane E. Nelson for Bible Study; by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., and Kenneth F. Ripple for the Center for Constitutional Studies et al.; by Barry A. Fisher for the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity; by Nathan Lewin, Daniel D. Chazin, and Dennis Rapps for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs; and by Wilfred R. Caron for the United States Catholic Conference.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Earl W. Trent, Jr., for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs; by J. Robert Brame, John W. Whitehead, and James J. Knicely for the National Association of Evangelicals; and by Donald L. Reidhaar for the Regents of the University of California.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents the question whether a state university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.
HH
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognizes over 100 student groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the costs to the University.
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities. In 1977, however, the University informed the group that it could no longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or grounds “for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, brought suit to challenge the regulation in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri. They alleged that the University’s discrimination against religious activity and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (1979). It found the regulation not only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the State could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of religion. 480 F. Supp., at 915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the University could not discriminate against religious speech on the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to less protection than other types of expression. Id., at 918.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (1980). Rejecting the analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. Id., at 1315-1320. The court held that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. According to the Court of Appeals, the “primary effect” of such a policy would not be to advancé religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of developing students’ “ ‘social and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity.’” Ibid, (quoting from the University bulletin’s description of the student activities program, reprinted in id., at 1312, n. 1).
We granted certiorari. 450 U. S. 909. We now affirm.
II
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U. S. 167, 175, and n. 8 (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private session, “[w]here the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement,” exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).
The University’s institutional mission, which it describes as providing a “secular education” to its students, Brief for Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960).
Here UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group’s intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 (1980).
HH HH
In this case the University claims a compelling interest m maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives this interest from the “Establishment Clauses” of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions.
A
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States. We agree that the interest of the University in complying with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not follow, however, that an “equal access” policy would be incompatible with this Court’s Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: “First, the [governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . .; finally, the [policy] must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976).
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with religion. But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the “primary effect” of advancing religion.
The University’s argument misconceives the nature of this case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972). In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion.
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum’s likely effects. It is possible — perhaps even foreseeable — that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has explained that a religious organization’s enjoyment of merely “incidental” benefits does not violate the prohibition against the “primary advancement” of religion. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961).
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open forum at UMKC would be “incidental” within the meaning of our cases. Two factors are especially relevant.
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy “would no more commit the University ... to religious goals” than it is “now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,” or any other group eligible to use its facilities. 635 F. 2d, at 1317.
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 781-782, and n. 38. If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, “a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair.” Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., supra, at 747 (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S., at 658, n. 6. At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate UMKC’s open forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the forum’s “primary effect.”
B
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect state support for religion, the University claims a compelling interest in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution.
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious and nonreligious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We limit our holding to the case before us.
On one hand, respondents’ First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the state interest asserted here — in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution — is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State’s interest as sufficiently “compelling” to justify content-based discrimination against respondents’ religious speech.
IV
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); see University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S., at 188-189, that recognize a university’s right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional standards.
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.
Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 1977, “perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone and form the backbone of the campus organization.” Affidavit of Florian Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 (WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms and in the student center. These meetings were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences.
The pertinent regulations provide as follows:
“4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in University facilities. . . .
“4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be used for religious services but not for regular recurring services of any groups. Special rules and procedures shall be established for each such chapel by the Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any religious group.”
There is no chapel on the campus of UMKC. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never “authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a meeting where they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 910.
Respondent Clark Vincent and Florian Chess, a named plaintiff in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University’s Board of Curators.
This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. See generally Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 636 (1965). “The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly ‘the marketplace of ideas.’” Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual “to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate . . . [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students.” Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the campus, and that the “denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes” must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 184.
At the same time, however, our cases have recognized that First Amendment rights must be analyzed “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.
The dissent argues that “religious worship” is not speech generally protected by the “free speech” guarantee of the First Amendment and the “equal protection” guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If “religious worship” were protected “speech,” the dissent reasons, “the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form of speech.” Post, at 284. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the First Amendment. See post, at 283-284, and n. 2, 286. It does not argue that descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as “speech.” Nor does it repudiate last Term’s decision in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., which assumed that religious appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected “speech.” Rather, the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious “speech act[s],” post, at 285, constituting “worship.” There are at least three difficulties with this distinction.
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible content. There is no indication when “singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles,” post, at 283, cease to be “singing, teaching, and reading” — all apparently forms of “speech,” despite their religious subject matter — and become unprotected “worship.”
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw the distinction would require the university — and ultimately the courts — to inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970).
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on which it seeks to rely, The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See post, at 284-286. But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.
See also Healy v. James, supra, at 184:
“It is to be remembered that the effect of the College’s denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners’ organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may justify such restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.”
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish between “religious” speech — speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an establishment of religion — and “nonreligious” speech — speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an establishment of religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). The dissent attempts to equate this distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between religious “speech” and religious “worship.” See post, at 285, and n. 3. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially unmanageable.
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the forum with which the University desires no association.
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 383 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to sponsor the views of the speaker.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk greater “entanglement” by attempting to enforce its exclusion of “religious worship” and “religious speech.” See Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310, 1318 (CA8 1980). Initially, the University would need to determine which words and activities fall within “religious worship and religious teaching.” This alone could prove “an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional definition of religion.” O’Hair v. Andrus, 198 U. S. App. D. C. 198, 203, 613 F. 2d 931, 936 (1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-6 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.
In finding that an “equal access” policy would have the primary effect of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, the Court considered this restriction insufficient: “If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion.” Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposition that state funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used by religious organizations.
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the State’s capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
This case is different from cases in which religious groups claim that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Here, the University’s forum is already available to other groups, and respondents’ claim to use that forum does not rest solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents’ claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which free exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if state accommodation of free exercise and free speech rights should, in a particular case, conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.
University students are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University’s policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. Richardson, supra, at 685-686. The University argues that the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that “[s]tudents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting.” Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, App. 18, 19. In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University’s student handbook already notes that the University’s name will not “be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members.” 1980-1981 UMKC Student Handbook 25.
This Court has similarly rejected “the recurrent argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends.” Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973).
See, e. g., Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720 (Mo.) (en banc) (holding Missouri Constitution requires stricter separation of church and State than does Federal Constitution), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 815-816, 163 S. W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1942) (en banc) (same).
See Mo. Const., Art. 1, §§ 6, 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (WD Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (1974), the District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with its own Constitution.
U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972) (“The nature of a place, ‘the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable,’” quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1042 (1969)).
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post, at 277-287, Justice Stevens expresses concern that use of the terms “compelling state interest” and “public forum” may “undermine the academic freedom of public universities.” As the text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See also n. 5, supra. Our holding is limited to the context of a public forum created by the University itself. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
BUCHANAN v. STANSHIPS, INC., et al.
No. 87-133.
Decided March 21, 1988
Per Curiam.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) provides that if any party files a timely motion “under Rule 59 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to alter or amend the judgment,” then the time for appeal “shall run from the entry of the order . . . granting or denying” such a motion. The Rule specifically indicates that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of such a motion “shall have no effect” but that a “new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” In this case, we are asked to determine whether a prevailing party’s motion for costs constitutes a Rule 59 motion and thereby renders ineffective a notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of that motion.
I
Petitioners, a widow and her minor child, brought this wrongful-death" action against respondents in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. § 761 et seq. The court initially granted summary judgment for respondents, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed this ruling. 744 F. 2d 1070 (1984). On remand, the District Court conducted a bench trial. Then, on January 26, 1987, the court entered judgment in favor of respondents, dismissing petitioners’ suit with prejudice. Pet. for Cert. 15. The judgment made no mention of costs. The next day petitioners filed a notice of appeal in the District Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Id., at 16.
On January 29, 1987, respondents filed an application for the allowance of costs, styled as a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.” Id., at 17. The motion asked that the District Court “amend its judgment” to reflect that respondents were “entitled to recover their taxable costs,” and specifically invoked Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ibid. The District Court issued an order granting respondents’ request the next day. Id., at 18.
Petitioners did not file a second notice of appeal following the District Court’s order granting respondents’ motion. Respondents subsequently moved the Court of Appeals to dismiss petitioners’ appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Id., at 19. Respondents argued that Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure rendered petitioners’ first notice of appeal void because the motion for the allowance of costs was a Rule 59(e) motion. Relying on its prior decision in Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F. 2d 665 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 930 (1986), the Court of Appeals agreed and dismissed petitioners’ appeal. Pet. for Cert. 25. See also Charles v. Daley, 799 F. 2d 343, 347 (CA7 1986) (adopting the analysis of Harcon Barge). Petitioners seek certiorari, noting that the Court of Appeals’ decision is in tension with our decision in White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U. S. 445 (1982), and in conflict with decisions of the Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, see Durham v. Kelly, 810 F. 2d 1500 (CA9 1987); Alimenta (U. S. A.), Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 803 F. 2d 1160 (CA11 1986); Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 729 F. 2d 1300 (CA11 1984).
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) concerns “motion[s] to alter or amend the judgment.” The Rule requires that such motions be filed within 10 days of the initial entry of judgment. “[T]he federal courts generally have invoked Rule 59(e) only to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.” White, supra, at 451. In White, we held that a motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 was not a Rule 59(e) motion. We reasoned that because § 1988 provides for fees independently of the underlying cause of action and only for a “prevailing party,” a motion for fees required an inquiry “separate from the decision on the merits — an inquiry that cannot even commence until one party has ‘prevailed.’” 455 U. S., at 451-452. Cf. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F. 2d 155 (CA10 1986) cert. granted, 484 U. S. 895 (1987) (presenting issue whether a different rule applies when fees are not provided for independently, as by § 1988, but as an aspect of the underlying action). Such a motion therefore “‘does not imply a change in the judgment, but merely seeks what is due because of the judgment.’” 455 U. S., at 452 (emphasis added) (quoting Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F. 2d 795, 797 (CA5 1980)).
Respondents’ postjudgment motion for costs similarly sought only what was due because of the judgment. Because the Death on the High Seas Act contains no provision regarding costs, respondents’ motion for costs necessarily was predicated on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Assessment of such costs does not involve reconsideration of any aspect of the decision on the merits. Under Rule 54(d), the “prevailing party” automatically is entitled to costs “unless the court otherwise directs.” Indeed, the Rule contemplates that applications for costs will be presented in the first instance not to the court but to the clerk; a district judge need not take up the issue at all unless the losing party makes a timely motion for judicial review. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d) (“On motion served within 5 days [after the clerk’s taxing of costs], the action of the clerk may be reviewed by the court”); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2679, p. 396 (2d ed. 1983). A sharp distinction between the judgment on the merits and an award of costs under Rule 54(d) also is evident in Rule 58’s instruction that “[e]ntry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs.” Thus it is apparent that the Rules “attemp[t] to divorce the process of entering judgment from that of determining and assessing the costs.” 10 Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, § 2679, p. 392.
•While a different issue may be presented if expenses of this sort were provided as an aspect of the underlying action, we are satisfied that a motion for costs filed pursuant to Rule 54(d) does not seek “to alter or amend the judgment” within the meaning of Rule 59(e). Instead, such a request for costs raises issues wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of action, issues to which Rule 59(e) was not intended to apply. White, supra, at 451. Cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U. S. 364, 373-374, n. 10 (1984) (issue of entitlement to “attorney’s fees and costs” described as “wholly collateral” to judgment on the merits) (emphasis added); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 172 (1974) (order assigning costs held immediately appealable under the “collateral order” doctrine because it “involved a collateral matter unrelated to the merits”). Respondents’ inaccurate designation of their costs request as a Rule 59(e) motion cannot change this fact. Nor can respondents’ incorrect label deprive petitioners of the benefit of their timely notice of appeal. Because respondents’ motion, properly viewed, was a Rule 54(d) motion for costs rather than a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment, petitioners’ notice of appeal was timely under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Certiorari is therefore granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
136
] | sc_petitioner |
OHIO v. ROBINETTE
No. 95-891.
Argued October 8, 1996
Decided November 18, 1996
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 40. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 45.
Carley J. Ingram argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
on Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Paul A. Engel-mayer, and Joseph C. Wyderko. brief for
mayer, James D. Ruppert argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were bama et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. leyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Ma-zurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theodore Kulongoski of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Bennett of South Dakota, Charles W. Bursen of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., by Fred E. lnbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Bernard J. Farber.
Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, and Jeffrey M. Gamso filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amicus curiae were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Sheryl Gordon McCloud; and for the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by W. Andrew Hasselbach.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised that he is “free to go” before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. We hold that it does not.
This case arose on a stretch of Interstate 70 north of Dayton, Ohio, where the posted speed limit was 45 miles per hour because of construction. Respondent Robert D. Robi-nette was clocked at 69 miles per hour as he drove his car along this stretch of road, and was stopped by Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office. New-some asked for and was handed Robinette’s driver’s license, and he ran a computer check which indicated that Robinette had no previous violations. Newsome then asked Robinette to step out of his car, turned on his mounted video camera, issued a verbal warning to Robinette, and returned his license.
At this point, Newsome asked, “One question before you get gone: ]A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?” App. to Brief for Respondent 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Robinette answered “no” to these questions, after which Deputy Newsome asked if he could search the car. Robinette consented. In the car, Deputy Newsome discovered a small amount of marijuana and, in a film container, a pill which was later determined to be methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine (MDMA). Robinette was then arrested and charged with knowing possession of a controlled substance, MDMA, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2925.11(A) (1993).
Before trial, Robinette unsuccessfully sought to suppress this evidence. He then pleaded “no contest,” and was found guilty. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the search resulted from an unlawful detention. The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a divided vote, affirmed. 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N. E. 2d 695 (1995). In its opinion, that court established a bright-line prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these circumstances:
“The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure in one’s person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase At this time you legally are free to go’ or by words of similar import.” Id., at 650-651, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696.
We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1157 (1996), to review this per se rule, and we now reverse. to
per se We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision. Respondent contends that we lack such jurisdiction because the Ohio decision rested upon the Ohio Constitution, in addition to the Federal Constitution. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), when “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.” Id., at 1040-1041. Although the opinion below mentions Art. I, §14, of the Ohio Constitution in passing (a section which reads identically to the Fourth Amendment), the opinion clearly relies on federal law nevertheless. Indeed, the only cases it discusses or even cites are federal cases, except for one state case which itself applies the Federal Constitution.
Our jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that these citations appear in the body of the opinion, while, under Ohio law, “[the] Supreme Court speaks as a court only through the syllabi of its cases.” See Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U. S. 257, 259 (1976). When the syllabus, as here, speaks only in general terms of “the federal and Ohio Constitutions,” it is permissible for us to turn to the body of the opinion to discern the grounds for decision. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 566 (1977).
Respondent Robinette also contends that we may not reach the question presented in the petition because the Supreme Court of Ohio also held, as set out in the syllabus paragraph (1):
“When the motivation behind a police officer’s continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure.” 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696.
In reliance on this ground, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that when Newsome returned to Robinette’s car and asked him to get out of the car, after he had determined in his own mind not to give Robinette a ticket, the detention then became unlawful.
Respondent failed to make any such argument in his brief in opposition to certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 15.2. We believe the issue as to the continuing legality of the detention is a “predicate to an intelligent resolution” of the question presented, and therefore “fairly included therein.” This Court’s Rule 14.1(a); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258-259, n. 5 (1980). The parties have briefed this issue, and we proceed to decide it.
We think that under our recent decision it. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996) (decided after the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the present case), the subjective intentions of the officer did not make the continued detention of respondent illegal under the Fourth Amendment. As we made clear in Whren, “ ‘the fact that [an] officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’ . . . Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id., at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978)). And there is no question that, in light of the admitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, Deputy Newsome was objectively justified in asking Robinette to get out of the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 111, n. 6 (1977) (“We hold . . . that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures”).
We now turn to the merits of the question presented. We have long held that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248, 250 (1991). Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.
In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. Thus, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), we expressly disavowed any “litmus-paper test” or single “sentence or . . . paragraph . . . rule,” in recognition of the “endless variations in the facts and circumstances” implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 506. Then, in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567 (1988), when both parties urged “bright-line rule[s] applicable to all investigatory pursuits,” we rejected both proposed rules as contrary to our “traditional contextual approach.” Id., at 572-573. And again, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), when the Florida Supreme Court adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a seizure, we reversed, reiterating that the proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.” Id., at 439.
We have previously rejected a per se rule very similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), it was argued that such a consent could not be valid unless the defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request. We rejected this argument: “While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” Id., at 227. And just as it “would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning,” id., at 231, so too would it be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.
The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,” id., at 248-249. The Supreme Court of Ohio having held otherwise, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Respondent and his amici ask us to take this opportunity to depart from Michigan v. Long. We are no more persuaded by this argument now than we were two Terms ago, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995), and we again reaffirm the Long presumption. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent. | Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdisagreement |
BALDWIN COUNTY WELCOME CENTER v. BROWN
No. 83-181.
Decided April 16, 1984
Per Curiam.
On November 6, 1979, respondent Celinda Brown filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discriminatory treatment by her former employer, petitioner Baldwin County Welcome Center (Welcome Center). A notice of right to sue was issued to her on January 27, 1981. It stated that if Brown chose to commence a civil action “such suit must be filed in the appropriate United States District Court within ninety days of [her] receipt of this Notice.” Later, Brown mailed the notice to the United States District Court, where it was received on March 17, 1981. In addition, she requested appointment of counsel.
On April 15, 1981, a United States Magistrate entered an order requiring that Brown make application for court-appointed counsel using the District Court’s motion form and supporting questionnaire. The Magistrate’s order to Brown reminded her of the necessity of filing a complaint within 90 days of the issuance of the right-to-sue letter. The questionnaire was not returned until May 6, 1981, the 96th day after receipt of the letter. The next day, the Magistrate denied Brown’s motion for appointment of counsel because she had not timely complied with his orders, but he referred to the District Judge the question whether the filing of the right-to-sue letter with the court constituted commencement of an action within the meaning of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 9, 1981, the 130th day after receipt of the right-to-sue letter, Brown filed an “amended complaint,” which was served on June 18.
On December 24, 1981, the District Court held that Brown had forfeited her right to pursue her claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of her failure to file a complaint meeting the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within 90 days of her receipt of the right-to-sue letter. It noted that the right-to-sue letter did not qualify as a complaint under Rule 8 because there was no statement in the letter of the factual basis for the claim of discrimination, which is required by the Rule.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the filing of a right-to-sue letter “tolls” the time period provided by Title VII. Judgment order reported at 698 F. 2d 1236 (1983). Although conceding that its interpretation was “generous,” the court stated that “[t]he remedial nature of the statute requires such an interpretation.” The court then stated that the filing of the right-to-sue letter “satisfied the ninety day statutory limitation.”
The Welcome Center petitioned for a writ of certiorari from this Court. We grant the petition and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The section of Title VII at issue here states that within 90 days after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter “a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge.” 86 Stat. 106, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(f)(1). Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” A complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). The District Court held that the right-to-sue letter did not satisfy that standard. The Court of Appeals did not expressly disagree, but nevertheless stated that the 90-day statutory period for invoking the court’s jurisdiction was satisfied, apparently concluding that the policies behind Title VII mandate a different definition of when an action is “commenced.” However, it identified no basis in the statute or its legislative history, cited no decision of this Court, and suggested no persuasive justification for its view that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were to have a different meaning in, or were not to apply to, Title VII litigation. Because we also can find no satisfactory basis for giving Title VII actions a special status under the Rules of Civil Procedure, we must disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
With respect to its apparent alternative holding that the statutory period for invoking the court’s jurisdiction is “tolled” by the filing of the right-to-sue letter, the Court of Appeals cited no principle of equity to support its conclusion. Brown does little better, relying only on her asserted “diligent efforts.” Nor do we find anything in the record to call for the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.
The right-to-sue letter itself stated that Brown had the right to sue within 90 days. Also, the District Court informed Brown that “to be safe, you should file the petition on or before the ninetieth day after the day of the letter from the EEOC informing you of your right to sue.” Finally, the order of April 15 from the Magistrate again reminded Brown of the 90-day limitation.
This is not a case in which a claimant has received inadequate notice, see Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F. 2d 292 (CA9 1974); or where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling the statutory period until the motion is acted upon, see Harris v. Walgreen’s Distribution Center, 456 F. 2d 588 (CA6 1972); or where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything required of her, see Carlile v. South Routt School District RE 3-J, 652 F. 2d 981 (CA10 1981). Nor is this a case where affirmative misconduct on the part of a defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction. See Villasenor v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 640 F. 2d 207 (CA9 1981); Wilkerson v. Siegfried Insurance Agency, Inc., 621 F. 2d 1042 (CA10 1980); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F. 2d 255 (CA6 1979). The simple fact is that Brown was told three times what she must do to preserve her claim, and she did not do it. One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.
Brown also contends that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply because the Welcome Center has not demonstrated that it was prejudiced by her failure to comply with the Rules. This argument is unavailing. Although absence of prejudice is a factor to be considered in determining whether the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply once a factor that might justify such tolling is identified, it is not an independent basis for invoking the doctrine and sanctioning deviations from established procedures.
Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants. As we stated in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 826 (1980), “in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.”
The petition for certiorari is granted, respondent’s motion to proceed informa pauperis is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The presumed date of receipt of the notice was January 30,1981. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(e).
Brown mailed the letter to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The case was transferred to the Southern District of Alabama, however, because the events giving rise to the charge had occurred there.
Neither the parties nor the courts below addressed the application of Rule 15(c) to the “amended complaint” filed on June 9. That Rule provides that amendment of a pleading “relates back” to the date of the original pleading. We do not believe that Rule 15(c) is applicable to this situation. The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitations were intended to provide. 3 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[3], p. 15-194 (1984). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that the pleadings “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957). Because the initial “pleading” did not contain such notice, it was not an original pleading that could be rehabilitated by invoking Rule 15(c).
Justice Stevens makes much of a letter dated March 21,1981, sent by Brown to the District Court in which she describes the basis of her claim. Suffice it to say that no one but the dissent has relied upon this letter to sustain Brown’s position. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the letter was considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals, and Brown does not rely upon it before this Court as a basis for affirming the judgment. The issue before the Court of Appeals and before this Court is whether the filing of a right-to-sue letter with the District Court constituted the commencement of an action. The Court of Appeals held that it did and based its judgment on that ground. We reverse that judgment. Even if respondent had relied on the letter in this Court, we would not be required to assess its significance without having the views of the lower courts in the first instance.
Justice Stevens also suggests that we should be more solicitous of the pleadings of the pro se litigant. It is noteworthy, however, that Brown was represented by counsel at the time of the dismissal by the District Court, before the Court of Appeals, and before this Court. Neither Brown nor her counsel ever requested that the letter in the record be construed as a complaint.
It is not clear from the opinion of the Court of Appeals for how long the' statute is tolled. Presumably, under its view, the plaintiff has a “reasonable time” in which to file a complaint that satisfies the requirements of Rule 8. See Huston v. General Motors Corp., 477 F. 2d 1003 (CA8 1973). In this case, it was another 84 days until such a complaint was filed.
Brown also contends that application of the doctrine of equitable tolling is mandated by our decision in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385 (1982). In Zipes, we held that the requirement of a timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in district court and that it is subject to waiver and equitable tolling. Brown’s argument is without merit, for we did not in Zipes declare that the requirement need not ever be satisfied; we merely stated that it was subject to waiver and tolling. There was neither waiver nor tolling in this case. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
79
] | sc_petitioner |
MATLES v. UNITED STATES.
No. 378.
Decided April 7, 1958.
Frank J. Donner, Arthur Kinoy and Marshall Perlin for petitioner in No. 378.
Richard J. Burke for petitioner in No. 450.
Edward Bennett Williams and Morris Shilensky for petitioner in No. 494.
Solicitor General Rankin, Warren Olney, III, then Assistant Attorney General, Beatrice Rosenberg and /. F. Bishop for the United States in Nos. 378 and 450. Mr. Rankin, Acting Assistant Attorney General McLean, Miss Rosenberg and Eugene L. Grimm for the United States iii No. 494.
Together with No. 450, Lucchese v. United States, and No. 494, Costello v. United States, also on petitions for writs of certiorari to the same Court.
Per Curiam.
The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. In No. 378 the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to vacate the order holding the petitioner in contempt and to dismiss the complaint. In Nos. 450 and 494 the judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaints. An affidavit showing good cause is a prerequisite to the initiation of denaturalization proceedings. The affidavit must be filed with the complaint when the proceedings are instituted. United States v. Zueca, 351 U. S. 91, 99-100. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | Did administrative action occur in the context of the case? | [
"No",
"Yes"
] | [
0
] | sc_adminaction_is |
WILLIAMS v. FLORIDA
No. 927.
Argued March 4, 1970
Decided June 22, 1970
Richard Kanner argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Earl Faircloth, Attorney General, and Ronald W. Sabo, Assistant Attorney General.
Jack Greenberg and Michael Meltsner filed a brief for Virgil Jenkins as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prior to his trial for robbery in the State of Florida, petitioner filed a “Motion for a Protective Order,” seeking to be excused from the requirements of Rule 1.200 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule requires a defendant, on written demand of the prosecuting attorney, to give notice in advance of trial if the defendant intends to claim an alibi, and to furnish the prosecuting attorney with information as to the place where he claims to have been and with the names and addresses of the alibi witnesses he intends to use. In his motion petitioner openly declared his intent to claim an alibi, but objected to the further disclosure requirements on the ground that the rule “compels the Defendant in a criminal case to be a witness against himself” in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The motion was denied. Petitioner also filed a pretrial motion to impanel a 12-man jury instead of the six-man jury provided by Florida law in all but capital cases. That motion too was denied. Petitioner was convicted as charged and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The District Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s claims that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. We granted certiorari. 396 U. S. 955 (1969).
I
Florida’s notice-of-alibi rule is in essence a requirement that a defendant submit to a limited form of pretrial discovery by the State whenever he intends to rely at trial on the defense of alibi. In exchange for the defendant’s disclosure of the witnesses he proposes to use to establish that defense, the State in turn is required to notify the defendant of any witnesses it proposes to offer in rebuttal to that defense. Both sides are under a continuing duty promptly to disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses bearing on the alibi as they become available. The threatened sanction for failure to comply is the exclusion at trial of the defendant’s alibi evidence — except for his own testimony — or, in the case of the State, the exclusion of the State’s evidence offered in rebuttal of the alibi.
In this case, following the denial of his Motion for a Protective Order, petitioner complied with the alibi rule and gave the State the name and address of one Mary Scotty. Mrs. Scotty was summoned to the office of the State Attorney on the morning of the trial, where she gave pretrial testimony. At the trial itself, Mrs. Scotty, petitioner, and petitioner’s wife all testified that the three of them had been in Mrs. Scotty’s apartment during the time of the robbery. On two occasions during cross-examination of Mrs. Scotty, the prosecuting attorney confronted her with her earlier deposition in which she had given dates and times that in some respects did not correspond with the dates and times given at trial. Mrs. Scotty adhered to her trial story, insisting that she had been mistaken in her earlier testimony. The State also offered in rebuttal the testimony of one of the officers investigating the robbery who claimed that Mrs. Scotty had asked him for directions on the afternoon in question during the time when she claimed to have been in her apartment with petitioner and his wife.
We need not linger over the suggestion that the discovery permitted the State against petitioner in this case deprived him of “due process” or a “fair trial.” Florida law provides for liberal discovery by the defendant against the State, and the notice-of-alibi rule is itself carefully hedged with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant. Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State’s interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate. Reflecting this interest, notice-of-alibi provisions, dating at least from 1927, are now in existence in a substantial number of States. The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as “due process” is concerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.
Petitioner’s major contention is that he was “compelled ... to be a witness against himself” contrary to the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the notice-of-alibi rule required him to give the State the name and address of Mrs. Scotty in advance of trial and thus to furnish the State with information useful in convicting him. No pretrial statement of petitioner was introduced at trial; but armed with Mrs. Scotty’s name and address and the knowledge that she was to be petitioner’s alibi witness, the State was able to take her deposition in advance of trial and to find rebuttal testimony. Also, requiring him to reveal the elements of his defense is claimed to have interfered with his right to wait until after the State had presented its case to decide how to defend against it. We conclude, however, as has apparently every other court that has considered the issue, that the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by a requirement that the defendant give notice of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi witnesses.
■ The defendant in a criminal trial is frequently forced to testify himself and to call other witnesses in an effort to reduce the risk of conviction. When he presents his witnesses, he must reveal their identity and submit them to cross-examination which in itself may prove incriminating or which may furnish the State with leads to incriminating rebuttal evidence. That the defendant faces such a dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The pressures generated by the State's evidence may be severe but they do not vitiate the defendant’s choice to present an alibi defense and witnesses to prove it, even though the attempted defense ends in catastrophe for the defendant. However “testimonial” or “incriminating” the alibi defense proves to be, it cannot be considered “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Very similar constraints operate on the defendant when the State requires pretrial notice of alibi and the naming of alibi witnesses. Nothing in such a rule requires the defendant to rely on an alibi or prevents him from abandoning the defense; these matters are left to his unfettered choice. That choice must be made, but the pressures that bear on his pretrial decision are of the same nature as those that would induce him to call alibi witnesses at the trial: the force of historical fact beyond both his and the State’s control and the strength of the State’s case built on these facts. Response to that kind of pressure by offering evidence or testimony is not compelled self-incrimination transgressing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments..
In the case before us, the notice-of-alibi rule by itself in no way affected petitioner’s crucial decision to call alibi witnesses or added to the legitimate pressures leading to that course of action. At most, the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the petitioner from the beginning planned to divulge at trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State’s case before announcing the nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the jury’s verdict on the State’s case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand himself.
Petitioner concedes that absent the notice-of-alibi rule the Constitution would raise no bar to the court’s granting the State a continuance at trial on the ground of surprise as soon as the alibi witness is called. Nor would there be self-incrimination problems if, during that continuance, the State was permitted to do precisely what it did here prior to trial: take the deposition of the witness and find rebuttal evidence. But if so utilizing a continuance is permissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, then surely the same result may be accomplished through pretrial discovery, as it was here, avoiding the necessity of a disrupted trial. We decline to hold that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guarantees the defendant the right to surprise the State with an alibi defense.
II
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), we held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury in all criminal cases that — were they to be tried in a federal court — would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee. Petitioner’s trial for robbery on July 3, 1968, clearly falls within the scope of that holding. See Baldwin v. New York, ante, p. 66; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968). The question in this case then is whether the constitutional guarantee of a trial by “jury” necessarily requires trial by exactly 12 persons, rather than some lesser number — in this case six. We hold that the 12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of “trial by jury,” and that respondent’s refusal to impanel more than the six members provided for by Florida law did not violate petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the States through the Fourteenth.
We had occasion in Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, to review briefly the oft-told history of the development of trial by jury in criminal cases. That history revealed a long tradition attaching great importance to the concept of relying on a body of one’s peers to determine guilt or innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement. That same history, however, affords little insight into the considerations that gradually led the size of that body to be generally fixed at 12. Some have suggested that the number 12 was fixed upon simply because that was the number of the presentment jury from the hundred, from which the petit jury developed. Other, less circular but more fanciful reasons for the number 12 have been given, “but they were all brought forward after the number was fixed,” and rest on little more than mystical or superstitious insights into the significance of “12.” Lord Coke’s explanation that the “number of twelve is much respected in holy writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes, etc.,” is typical. In short, while sometime in the 14th century the size of the jury at common law came to be fixed generally at 12, that particular feature of the jury system appears to have been a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place. The question before us is whether this accidental feature of the jury has been immutably codified into our Constitution.
This Court’s earlier decisions have assumed an affirmative answer to this question. The leading case so construing the Sixth Amendment is Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898). There the defendant had been tried and convicted by a 12-man jury for a crime committed in the Territory of Utah. A new trial was granted, but by that time Utah had been admitted as a State. The defendant’s new trial proceeded under Utah’s Constitution, providing for a jury of only eight members. This Court reversed the resulting conviction, holding that Utah’s constitutional provision was an ex post facto law as applied to the defendant. In reaching its conclusion, the Court announced that the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the defendant’s trial when Utah was a Territory, and that the jury referred to in the Amendment was a jury “constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less.” 170 U. S., at 349. Arguably unnecessary for the result, this announcement was supported simply by referring to the Magna Carta, and by quoting passages from treatises which noted — what has already been seen— that at common law the jury did indeed consist of 12. Noticeably absent was any discussion of the essential step in the argument: namely, that every feature of the jury as it existed at common law — whether incidental or essential to that institution — was necessarily included in the Constitution wherever that document referred to a “jury.” Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed the announcement in Thompson, often in dictum and usually by relying — where there was any discussion of the issue at all — solely on the fact that the common-law jury consisted of 12. See Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288 (1930); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516, 519 (1905); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 586 (1900).
While “the intent of the Framers” is often an elusive quarry, the relevant constitutional history casts considerable doubt on the easy assumption in our past decisions that if a given feature existed in a jury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily preserved in the Constitution. Provisions for jury trial were first placed in the Constitution in Article Ill’s provision that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” The “very scanty history [of this provision] in the records of the Constitutional Convention” sheds little light either way on the intended correlation between Article Ill’s “jury” and the features of the jury at common law. Indeed, pending and after the adoption of the Constitution, fears were expressed that Article Ill’s provision failed to preserve the common-law right to be tried by a “jury of the vicinage.” That concern, as well as the concern to preserve the right to jury in civil as well as criminal cases, furnished part of the impetus for introducing amendments to the Constitution that ultimately resulted in the jury trial provisions of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. As introduced by James Madison in the House, the Amendment relating to jury trial in criminal cases would have provided that:
“The trial of all crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites . ..
The Amendment passed the House in substantially this form, but after more than a week of debate in the Senate it returned to the House considerably altered. While records of the actual debates that occurred in the Senate are not available, a letter from Madison to Edmund Pendleton on September 14, 1789, indicates that one of the Senate’s major objections was to the “vicinage” requirement in the House version. A conference committee was appointed. As reported in a second letter by Madison on September 23, 1789, the Senate remained opposed to the vicinage requirement, partly because in its view the then-pending judiciary bill — which was debated at the same time as the Amendments — adequately preserved the common-law vicinage feature, making it unnecessary to freeze that requirement into the Constitution. “The Senate,” wrote Madison:
“are . . . inflexible in opposing a definition of the locality of Juries. The vicinage they contend is either too vague or too strict a term; too vague if depending on limits to be fixed by the pleasure of the law, too strict if limited to the county. It was proposed to insert after the word Juries, 'with the accustomed requisites,’ leaving the definition to be construed according to the judgment of professional men. Even this could not be obtained. . . . The Senate suppose, also, that the provision for vicinage in the Judiciary bill will sufficiently quiet the fears which called for an amendment on this point.”
The version that finally emerged from the Committee was the version that ultimately became the Sixth Amendment, ensuring an accused:
“the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”
Gone were the provisions spelling out such common-law features of the jury as “unanimity,” or “the accustomed requisites.” And the “vicinage” requirement itself had been replaced by wording that reflected a compromise between broad and narrow definitions of that term, and that left Congress the power to determine the actual size of the “vicinage” by its creation of judicial districts.
Three significant features may be observed in this sketch of the background of the Constitution’s jury trial provisions. First, even though the vicinage requirement was as much a feature of the common-law jury as was the 12-man requirement, the mere reference to “trial by jury” in Article III was not interpreted to include that feature. Indeed, as the subsequent debates over the Amendments indicate, disagreement arose over whether the feature should be included at all in its common-law sense, resulting in the compromise described above. Second, provisions that would have explicitly tied the “jury” concept to the “accustomed requisites” of the time were eliminated. Such action is concededly open to the explanation that the “accustomed requisites” were thought to be already included in the concept of a “jury.” But that explanation is no more plausible than the contrary one: that the deletion had some substantive effect. Indeed, given the clear expectation that a substantive change would be effected by the inclusion or deletion of an explicit “vicinage” requirement, the latter explanation is, if anything, the more plausible. Finally, contemporary legislative and constitutional provisions indicate that where Congress wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing common-law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express language to that effect. Thus, the Judiciary bill, signed by the President on the same day that the House and Senate finally agreed on the form of the Amendments to be submitted to the States, provided in certain cases for the narrower “vicinage” requirements that the House had wanted to include in the Amendments. And the Seventh Amendment, providing for jury trial in civil cases, explicitly added that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”
We do not pretend to be able to divine precisely what the word “jury” imported to the Framers, the First Congress, or the States in 1789. It may well be that the usual expectation was that the jury would consist of 12, and that hence, the most likely con-elusion to be drawn is simply that little thought was actually given to the specific question we face today. But there is absolutely no indication in “the intent of the Framers” of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the jury. Nothing in this history suggests, then, that we do violence to the letter of the Constitution by turning to other than purely historical considerations to determine which features of the jury system, as it existed at common law, were preserved in the Constitution. The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must be the function that the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial. Measured by this standard, the 12-man requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment.
The purpose of the jury trial, as we noted in Duncan, is to prevent oppression by the Government. “Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.” Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 156. Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence. The performance of this role is not a function of the particular number of the body that makes up the jury. To be sure, the number should probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community. But we find little reason to think that these goals are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12 — particularly if the requirement of unanimity is retained. And, certainly the reliability of the jury as a factfinder hardly seems likely to be a function of its size.
It might be suggested that the 12-man jury gives a defendant a greater advantage since he has more “chances” of finding a juror who will insist on acquittal and thus prevent conviction. But the advantage might just as easily belong to the State, which also needs only one juror out of twelve insisting on guilt to prevent acquittal. What few experiments have occurred — usually in the civil area — indicate that there is no discernible difference between the results reached by the two different-sized juries. In short, neither currently available evidence nor theory suggests that the 12-man jury is necessarily more advantageous to the defendant than a jury composed of fewer members.
Similarly, while in theory the number of viewpoints represented on a randomly selected jury ought to increase as the size of the jury increases, in practice the difference between the 12-man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the community represented seems likely to be negligible. Even the 12-man jury cannot insure representation of every distinct voice in the community, particularly given the use of the peremptory challenge. As long as arbitrary exclusions of a particular class from the jury rolls are forbidden, see, e. g., Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U. S. 320, 329-330 (1970), the concern that the cross-section will be significantly diminished if the jury is decreased in size from 12 to six seems an unrealistic one.
We conclude, in short, as we began: the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance “except to mystics.” Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 182 (Harlan, J., dissenting). To read the Sixth Amendment as forever codifying a feature so incidental to the real purpose of the Amendment is to ascribe a blind formalism to the Framers which would require considerably more evidence than we have been able to discover in the history and language of the Constitution or in the reasoning of our past decisions. We do not mean to intimate that legislatures can never have good reasons for concluding that the 12-man jury is preferable to the smaller jury, or that such conclusions — reflected in the provisions of most States and in our federal system— are in any sense unwise. Legislatures may well have their own views about the relative value of the larger and smaller juries, and may conclude that, wholly apart from the jury’s primary function, it is desirable to spread the collective responsibility for the determination of guilt among the larger group. In capital cases, for example, it appears that no State provides for less than 12 jurors— a fact that suggests implicit recognition of the value of the larger body as a means of legitimating society’s decision to impose the death penalty. Our holding does no more than leave these considerations to Congress and the States, unrestrained by an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment that would forever dictate the precise number that can constitute a jury. Consistent with this holding, we conclude that petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, were not violated by Florida’s decision to provide a six-man rather than a 12-man jury. The judgment of the Florida District Court of Appeal is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Fla. Rule Crina. Proc. 1.200:
“Upon the written demand of the prosecuting attorney, specifying as particularly as is known to such prosecuting attorney, the place, date and time of the commission of the crime charged, a defendant in a criminal case who intends to offer evidence of an alibi in his defense shall, not less than ten days before trial or such other time as the court may direct, file and serve upon such prosecuting attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim such alibi, which notice shall contain specific information as to the place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish such alibi. Not less than five days after receipt of defendant's witness list, or such other times as the court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve upon the defendant the names and addresses (as particularly as are known to the prosecuting attorney) of the witnesses the State proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the defendant’s alibi at the trial of the cause. Both the defendant and the prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing duty to promptly disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which come to the attention of either party subsequent to filing their respective witness lists as provided in this rule. If a defendant fails to file and serve a copy of such notice as herein required, the court may exclude evidence offered by such defendant for the purpose of proving an alibi, except the testimony of the defendant himself. If such notice is given by a defendant, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the defendant for the purpose of proving an alibi if the name and address of such witness as particularly as is known to defendant or his attorney is not stated in such notice. If the prosecuting attorney fails to file and serve a copy on the defendant of a list of witnesses as herein provided, the court may exclude evidence offered by the state in rebuttal to the defendant’s alibi evidence. If such notice is given by the prosecuting attorney, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the prosecuting attorney for the purpose of rebutting the defense of alibi if the name and address of such witness as particularly as is known to the prosecuting attorney is not stated in such notice. For good cause shown the court may waive the requirements of this rule.”
The full text of the -rule is set out in the appendix to this opinion, infra, at 104. Subsequent references to an appendix are to the separately bound appendix filed with the briefs in this case [hereinafter “App.”].
See App. 5.
Fla. Stat. §913.10 (1) (1967):
“Twelve men shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and six men shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases.”
See App. 82.
The Supreme Court of Florida had earlier held that it was without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s direct appeal from the trial court. See id., at 92. Under Florida law, the District Court of Appeal became the highest court from which a decision could be had. See Fla. Const., Art. V, § 4 (2); Fla. App. Rule 2.1a (5) (a); Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (1958).
“For good cause shown” the court may waive the requirements of the rule. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.200.
See App. 58-60.
Id., at 65-66.
See Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.220. These discovery provisions were invoked by petitioner in the instant case. See App. 3, 4, 8.
See Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 29, 32 (1964).
In addition to Florida, at least 15 States appear to have alibi-notice requirements of one sort or another. See Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 192 B (1956); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§9-1631 to 9-1633 (1956); Iowa Code §777.18 (1966); Kan. Stat. Ann. §62-1341 (1964); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 768.20, 768.21 (1948); Minn. Stat. § 630.14 (1967); N. J. Rule 3:5-9 (1958); N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. §295-1 (1958); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.58 (1954); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 585 (1969); Pa. Rule Crim. Proc. 312 (1970); S. D. Comp. Laws §§ 23-37-5, 23-37-6 (1967); Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-17 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §§ 6561, 6562 (1959); Wis. Stat. § 955.07 (1961). See generally 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 18556 (3d ed. 1940).
We do not, of course, decide that each of these alibi-notice provisions is necessarily valid in all respects; that conclusion must await a specific context and an inquiry, for example, into whether the defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery against the State.
See, e. g., Brennan,, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 Wash. U. L. Q. 279, 292.
E. g., State v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 119 N. W. 2d 210, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 853 (1963); State v. Baldwin, 47 N. J. 379, 221 A. 2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 980 (1966); People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 457-458, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 607, 612-613 (1940); Commonwealth v. Vecchiolli, 208 Pa. Super. 483, 224 A. 2d 96 (1966); see Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P. 2d 919 (1962); Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 89 (1965); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 228 (1964); Comment, The Self-Incrimination Privilege: Barrier to Criminal Discovery?, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 135 (1963); 76 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (1963).
We emphasize that this case does not involve the question of the validity of the threatened sanction, had petitioner chosen not to comply with the notice-of-alibi rule. Whether and to what extent a State can enforce discovery rules against a defendant who fails to comply, by excluding relevant, probative evidence is a question raising Sixth Amendment issues which we have no occasion to explore. Cf. Brief for Amicus Curiae 17-26. It is enough that no such penalty was exacted here.
Petitioner’s apparent suggestion to the contrary is simply not borne out by the facts of this case. The mere requirement that petitioner disclose in advance his intent to rely on an alibi in no way “fixed” his defense as of that point in time. The suggestion that the State, by referring to petitioner’s proposed alibi in opening or closing statements might have “compelled” him to follow through with the defense in order to avoid an unfavorable inference is a hypothetical totally without support in this record. The first reference to the alibi came from petitioner’s own attorney in his opening remarks; the State’s response did not come until after the defense had finished direct examination of Mrs. Scotty. Petitioner appears to raise this issue as a possible defect in alibi-notice requirements in general, without seriously suggesting that his choice of defense at trial in this case would have been different but for his prior compliance with the rule. Indeed, in his Motion for a Protective Order, petitioner freely disclosed his intent to rely on an alibi; his only objection was to the further requirement that he disclose the nature of the alibi and the name of the witness. On these facts, then, we simply are not confronted with the question of whether a defendant can be compelled in advance of trial to select a defense from which he can no longer deviate. We do not mean to suggest, though, that such a procedure must necessarily raise serious constitutional problems. See State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 137, 163 N. W. 2d 177, 181 (1968) (“[i]f we are discussing the right of a defendant to defer until the moment of his testifying the election between alternative and inconsistent alibis, we have left the concept of the trial as a search for truth far behind”).
See Reply Brief for Petitioner 2 and n. 1.
It might also be argued that the “testimonial” disclosures protected by the Fifth Amendment include only statements relating to the historical facts of the crime, not statements relating solely to what a defendant proposes to do at trial.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 151-154 (1968).
In tracing the development of the jury from the time when the jury performed a different, “inquisitory” function, James R. Thayer notes the following:
“In early times the inquisition had no fixed number. In the Frankish empire we are told of 66, 41, 20, 17, 13, 11, 8, 7, 53, 15, and a great variety of other numbers. So also among the Normans it varied much, and ‘twelve has not even the place of the prevailing grundzahl;’ the documents show all sorts of numbers — 4, 5„ 6, 12, 13-18, 21, 27, 30, and so on. It seems to have been the recognitions under Henry II. that established twelve as the usual number; even then the number was not uniform.” The Jury and Its Development, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 295 (1892) (citations omitted).
See J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 85 (1898).
Similarly, Professor Scott writes:
“At the beginning of the thirteenth century twelve was indeed the usual but not the invariable number. But by the middle of the fourteenth century the requirement of twelve had probably become definitely fixed. Indeed this number finally came to be regarded with something like superstitious reverence.” A. Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law 75-76 (1922) (footnotes omitted).
W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 325 (1927); Wells, The Origin of the Petty Jury, 27 L. Q. Rev. 347, 357 (1911). The latter author traces the development of the 12-man petit jury through the following four stages. The first stage saw the development of the presentment jury, made up generally of 12 persons from the hundred, whose function was simply to charge the accused with a crime; the test of his guilt or innocence was by some other means, such as trial by ordeal, battle, or wager of law. In the second stage, the presentment jury began to be asked for its verdict on the guilt or innocence of the person it had accused, and hence began to function as both a petit and a grand jury. In the third stage, “combination juries” were formed to render the verdict in order to broaden the base of representation beyond the local hundred, or borough, to include the county. These juries were formed by adding one or more presentment juries from one or more hundreds, as well as certain officials such as coroners or knights. “These combination juries numbered from twenty-four to eighty-four jurors, and the number became embarrassingly large and unwieldy, and the sense of the personal responsibility of each juror was in danger of being lost.” Id., at 356. The obvious fourth step was the creation of a special jury “formed by selecting one or more jurors from each of several of the presentment juries of the hundreds, until the number twelve is reached . . . probably because that was the number of the presentment jury from the hundred. Therefore, just as the presentment jury represented the voice of the hundred in making the accusation, so the jury of ‘the country’, with the same number, represented the whole county in deciding whether the accused was guilty or not.” Id., at 357.
Neither of these authors hazards a guess as to why the presentment jury itself numbered 12.
Id., at 357.
1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England *155a (1st Amer. ed. 1812).
Thus John Proffatt in his treatise on jury trials notes that the reasons why the number of the petit jury is 12, are “quaintly given” in Duncombe’s Trials per Pais, as follows:
“[T]his number is no less esteemed by our own law than by holy writ. If the twelve apostles on their twelve thrones must try us in our eternal state, good reason hath the law to appoint the number twelve to try us in our temporal. The tribes of Israel were twelve, the patriarchs were twelve, and Solomon’s officers were twelve.” Trial by Jury 112 n. 4 (1877), quoting G. Duncombe, 1 Trials per Pais 92-93 (8th ed. 1766).
Attempts have also been made to trace the number 12 to early origins on the European Continent, particularly in Scandinavia. See F. Busch, 1 Law and Tactics in Jury Trials §24 (1959). See generally W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 4 (1852); T. Repp, Trial by Jury (1832). But even as to the continental practice, no better reasons are discovered for the number 12. Thus Proffatt, in discussing the ancient Scandinavian tribunals, comments:
“Twelve was not only the common number throughout Europe, but was the favorite number in every branch of the polity and jurisprudence of the Gothic nations.
“The singular unanimity in the selection of the number twelve to compose certain judicial bodies, is a remarkable fact in the history of many nations. Many have sought to account for this general custom, and some have based it on religious grounds. One of the ancient kings of Wales, Morgan of Gla-Morgan, to whom is accredited the adoption of the trial by jury in A. D. 725, calls it the 'Apostolic Law.’ ‘For,’ said he, ‘as Christ and his twelve apostles were finally to judge the world, so human tribunals should be composed of the king and twelve wise men.’ ” Proffatt, Trial by Jury 11 n. 2 (1877) (citations omitted).
See also 1 L. Pike, A History of Crime in England 122 (1873).
In this connection it is interesting to note the following oath, required of the early 12-man jury:
“Hear this, ye Justices! that I will speak the truth of that which ye shall ask of me on the part of the king, and I will do faithfully to the best of my endeavour. So help me God, and these holy Apostles.” W. Forsyth, Trial by Jury 197 (1852).
See Proffatt, supra, at 42.
See supra, n. 19.
P. Devlin, Trial by Jury 8 (1956); F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 64 (1951); W. Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration 503 (1929); Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 Geo. L. J. 120, 128-130 (1962); Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 Gonzaga L. Rev. 35, 38-39 (1968); see Thayer, supra, n. 19, at 89-90; White, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 8, 15-16, 17 (1959).
At the time of the crime and at the first trial the statutes of the Territory of Utah — wholly apart from the Sixth Amendment— ensured Thompson a 12-man jury. See 170 U. S., at 345. The Court found the ex post facto question easy to resolve, once it was assumed that Utah’s subsequent constitutional provision deprived Thompson of a right previously guaranteed him by the United States Constitution; the possibility that the same result might have been reached solely on the basis of the rights formerly accorded Thompson under the territorial statute was hinted at, but was not explicitly considered.
Whether or not the Magna Carta’s reference to a judgment by one's peers was a reference to a “jury” — a fact that historians now dispute, see, e. g., 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, p. 173 n. 3 (2d ed. 1909); Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 922 n. 14 (1926) (criticizing Thompson v. Utah’s reliance on the document “long after scholars had exposed this ancient error”)— it seems clear that the Great Charter is not authority for fixing the number of the jury at 12. See W. McKechnie, Magna Carta 134-138, 375-382 (1958); Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 672 (1918).
As the text indicates, the question is not whether the 12-man jury is traced to 1215 or to 1789, but whether that particular feature must be accepted as a sine qua non of the jury trial guaranteed by the Constitution. See Heller, supra, n. 25, at 64.
The Thompson opinion also reasoned that if a jury can be reduced from 12 to eight, then there was nothing to prevent its similarly being reduced to four or two or even zero, thus dispensing with the jury altogether. See 170 U. S., at 353. That bit of “logic,” resurrected today in Mr. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, post, at 126, suffers somewhat as soon as one recognizes that he can get off the “slippery slope” before he reaches the bottom. We have no occasion in this case to determine what minimum number can still constitute a “jury,” but we do not doubt that six is above that minimum.
A ruling that the Sixth Amendment refers to a common-law jury was essential to the holding in Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516 (1905), where the Court held invalid a conviction by a six-man jury in Alaska. The ruling was accepted at the Government’s concession without discussion or citation; the major focus of the case was on the question whether the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the territory in question at all. See 197 U. S., at 519.
Similarly, cases interpreting the jury trial provisions of the Seventh Amendment generally leap from the fact that the jury possessed a certain feature at common law to the conclusion that that feature must have been preserved by the Amendment’s simple reference to trial by “jury.” E. g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1899); American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464, 468 (1897). While much of our discussion in this case may be thought to bear equally on the interpretation of the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial provisions, we emphasize that the question is not before us; we do not decide whether, for example, additional references to the “common law" that occur in the Seventh Amendment might support a different interpretation. See infra, at 97 and n. 44.
The Patton opinion furnishes an interesting illustration of the Court’s willingness to re-examine earlier assertions about the nature of “jury trial” in almost every respect except the 12-man-jury requirement. Patton reaffirmed the 12-man requirement with a simple citation to Thompson v. Utah, while at the same time discarding as “dictum” the equally dogmatic assertion in Thompson that the requirement could not be waived. See 281 U. S., at 293.
U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra, n. 27, at 969.
The only attention given the jury trial provisions involved such questions as whether the right should also be extended to civil cases, see Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 289, 292-294 (1966), whether the wording should embrace the “trial of all crimes” or the “trial of all criminal offenses,” see Frankfurter & Corcoran, swpra, n. 27, at 969, and how to provide for the trial of crimes not committed in any State, id., at 969 n. 244. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 144, 173, 187, 433, 438, 676, 587-588, 601, 628 (1911). See also 4 id., at 121 (1937) (indexing all references to Art. Ill, §2, cl. 3 in Farrand’s records).
See Heller, supra, n. 25, at 31-33, 93; Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 105 (1923). Technically, “vicinage” means neighborhood, and “vicin-age of the jury” meant jury of the neighborhood or, in medieval England, jury of the county. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *350-351. While Article III provided for venue, it did not impose the explicit juror-residence requirement associated with the concept of “vicinage.” See Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63, 80 (1969). In the Virginia Convention, Madison conceded that the omission was deliberate and defended it as follows:
“It was objected yesterday, that there was no provision for a jury from the vicinage. If it could have been done with safety, it would not have been opposed. It might so happen that a trial would be impracticable in the county. Suppose a rebellion in a whole district, would it not be impossible to get a jury? The trial by jury is held as sacred in England as in America. There are deviations of it in England: yet greater deviations have happened here since we established our independence, than have taken place there for a long time, though it be left to the legislative discretion. It is a misfortune in any case that this trial should be departed from, yet in some cases it is necessary. It must be therefore left to the discretion of the legislature to modify it according to circumstances. This is a complete and satisfactory answer.” 3 M. Far-rand, Records of the Federal Convention 332 (1911).
1 Annals of Cong. 435 (1789).
The Senate Journal indicates that every clause in the House version of the proposed Amendment was deleted except the clause relating to grand jury indictment. Senate Journal, Sept. 4, 1789, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 71. A subsequent motion to restore the words providing for trial “by an impartial jury of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites” failed of adoption. Senate Journal, Sept. 9, 1789, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 77.
The principal source of information on the proceedings of the Senate in the First Congress is the Journal of Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania, who unfortunately was ill during the Senate debate on the amendments. See Journal of William Maclay 144-151 (1927); Heller, supra, n. 25, at 31-32.
Madison writes:
“The Senate have sent back the plan of amendments with some alterations, which strike, in my opinion, at the most salutary articles. In many of the States, juries, even in criminal cases, are taken from the State at large; in others, from districts of considerable extent; in very few from the County alone. Hence a dislike to the restraint with respect to vicinage, which has produced a negative on that clause. . . . Several others have had a similar fate.” Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Sept. 14, 1789, in 1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 491 (1865).
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Sept. 23, 1789, in id., at 492-493. See generally Heller, supra, n. 25, at 28-34; Warren, supra, n. 35, at 118-132.
See Heller, supra, n. 25, at 93.
Proffatt, supra, n. 23, at 119; 1 G. Curtis, History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States 23 (1863).
The Act provided in. § 29:
“That in cases punishable with death, the trial shall be had in the county where the offence was committed, or where that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 29, 1 Stat. 88.
Similarly, the First Continental Congress resolved in October 1774:
“That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.” 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 69 (C. Ford ed. 1904) (emphasis added). And the Northwest Ordi-nanee of 1787 declared that the inhabitants of that Territory should ‘‘always be entitled to the benefits of the writs of habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury . . . and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.” Ordinance of 1787, Art. II, 1 U. S. C. xxxviii (emphasis added). See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 5-8 (1899) (concluding from these sources that the explicit reference to the “common law” in the Seventh Amendment, referred to the rules of the common law of England, not the rules as modified by local or state practice).
One scholar, however, in investigating the reception of the English common law by the early American colonies, notes that the process:
“was not so simple as the legal theory would lead us to assume. While their general legal conceptions were conditioned by, and their terminology derived from, the common law, the early colonists were far from applying it as a technical system,, they often ignored it or denied its subsidiary force, and they consciously departed from many of its most essential principles.” Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 367, 415 (1907).
With respect to the jury trial in particular, while most of the colonies adopted the institution in its English form at an early date, more than one appears to have accepted the institution at various stages only with “various modifications.” See id., at 412. Thus Connecticut permitted majority decision in case of continued failure to agree, id., at 386, Virginia expressed regret at being unable to retain the “vicinage” requirement of the English jury, id., at 405, Pennsylvania permitted majority verdicts and employed juries of six or seven, id., at 398, and the Carolinas discontinued the unanimity requirement, 5 F. Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions 2781 (1909) (Art. 69, “Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina”). See also Heller, supra, n. 25, at 13-21.
The States that had adopted Constitutions by the time of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 appear for the most part to have either explicitly provided that the jury would consist of 12, see Va. Const, of 1776, § 8, in 7 F. Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions 3813 (1909), or to have subsequently interpreted their jury trial provisions to include that requirement. In at least one instance involving conviction by eight jurors, a subsequent South Carolina decision interpreting the provision for trial by “jury,” refused to declare the 12-man requirement an essential feature of that institution, immune from change by the legislature. See State v. Starling, 15 Rich. 120, 134 (S. C. Ct. of Errors 1867). The conviction was affirmed without deciding the question, since the State had by that time adopted a Constitution specifically empowering the legislature to determine the number of jurors in certain inferior courts. South Carolina remains today one of apparently five States, including Florida, that provide for juries of less than 12 in felony eases where imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed. See La. Const., Art. 7, §41; La. Crim. Proc. Code Ann., Art. 779 (Supp. 1969); S. C. Const., Art. 1, §§ 18, 25; Art. 5, §22; S. C. Code Ann. §§ 15-618, 15-612 (1962); Tex. Const., Art. 1, §§10, 15; Art. 5, § 17; Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Arts. 4.07, 37.02 (1966); Tex. Pen. Code, Art. 1148 (1961); Utah Const., Art. 1, §§ 10, 12; Utah Code Ann. §78-46-5 (1953).
In addition, it appears that at least nine States presently provide for less than 12-man juries in trials of certain offenses carrying maximum penalties of one year’s imprisonment. See Brief for Appellee A13-A15, Baldwin v. New York, ante, p. 66 (collecting statutory provisions). See also 17 Mass. L. Q. No. 4, p. 12 (1932) (noting States that have interpreted the “right of trial by jury” to permit trial by less than 12 in certain cases). For a “poll of state practice,” see Mr. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, post, at 122, 136-137, and App.
intimate no view whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment jury trial. While much of the above historical discussion applies as well to the unanimity as to the 12-man requirement, the former, unlike the latter, may well serve an important role in the jury function, for example, as a device for insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of proof. See Hibdon v. United States, 204 F. 2d 834, 838 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1953); Tamm, supra, n. 25, at 139. But cf. Comment, Waiver of Jury Unanimity — Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 438, 441-443 (1954). See generally American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury 42-45 (Approved Draft 1968).
It is true, of course, that the “hung jury” might be thought to result in a minimal advantage for the defendant, who remains uncon-victed and who enjoys the prospect that the prosecution will eventually be dropped if subsequent juries also “hang.” Thus a 100-man jury would undoubtedly be more favorable for defendants than a 12-man jury. But when the comparison is between 12 and six, the odds of continually “hanging” the jury seem slight, and the numerical difference in the number needed to convict seems unlikely to inure perceptibly to the advantage of either side.
See Wiehl, supra, n. 25, at 40-41; Tamm, supra, n. 25, at 134-136; Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 Boston B. J. No. 4, p. 27 (1958); Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 136 (1958). See also New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man Jury, 9 Bull, of the Section of Jud. Admin, of the ABA (May 1966); Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 Conn. B. J. 354 (1956).
Studies of the operative factors contributing to small group deliberation and decisionmaking suggest that jurors in the minority on the first ballot are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of the majority aligned against them. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 462-463, 488-489 (1966); C. Hawkins, Interaction and Coalition Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury Deliberations 13, 146, 156, Aug. 17, 1960 (unpublished thesis on file at Library of Congress); cf. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in Readings in Social Psychology 2 (G. Swanson, T. Newcomb & E. Hartley et al., eds., 1952). See generally Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 Yale L. J. 100, 108 and n. 30 (and authorities cited), 110-111 (1968). Thus if a defendant needs initially to persuade four jurors that the State has not met its burden of proof in order to escape ultimate conviction by a 12-man jury, he arguably escapes by initially persuading half that number in a six-man jury; random reduction, within limits, of the absolute number of the jury would not affect the outcome. See also C. Joiner, Civil Justice and the Jury 31, 83 (1962) (concluding that the deliberative process should be the same in either the six- or 12-man jury).
See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 23 (b) (“[j]uries shall be of 12”). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. | What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
11
] | sc_casesourcestate |
MASTRO PLASTICS CORP. et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
No. 19.
Argued October 17, 1955.
Decided February 27, 1956.
Bernard H. Fitzpatrick argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Theophil C. Kammholz and David P. Findling.
Mr. Justice Bukton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two principal questions: (1) whether, in the collective-bargaining contract before us, the union’s undertaking “to refrain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement” waives not only the employees’ right to strike for economic benefits but also their right to strike solely against unfair labor practices of their employers, and (2) whether § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, deprives individuals of their status as employees if, within the waiting period prescribed by § 8 (d) (4), they engage in a strike solely against unfair labor practices of their employers. For the reasons hereafter stated, we answer each in the negative.
Mastro Plastics Corp. and French-American Reeds Manufacturing Co., Inc., petitioners herein, are New York corporations which, in 1949 and 1950, were engaged in interstate commerce, manufacturing, selling and distributing plastic articles, including reeds and other accessories for musical instruments. They operated in the City of New York within the same plant, under the same management and with the same employees. For collective bargaining, their employees were represented by Local 22045, American Federation of Labor, or by Local 3127, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL. These locals occupied the same office and used the services of the same representatives. During the period in question, the right of representation of petitioners’ employees was transferred back and forth between them for reasons not material here. Accordingly, they are referred to in this opinion as the “Carpenters.”
In August 1950, Local 65 of the Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union began a campaign among petitioners’ employees in an effort to become their collective-bargaining representative. Petitioners bitterly opposed the movement, believing Local 65 to be Communist-controlled. Feeling that the Carpenters were too weak to cope successfully with Local 65, petitioners asked the Carpenters to transfer their bargaining rights to Local 318, International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, AFL. When the Carpenters declined to do so, petitioners selected a committee of employees to visit 318, obtain membership cards and seek members for that union. The cards were distributed during working hours and petitioners paid their employees for time spent in the campaign, including attendance at a meeting of 318. Petitioners’ officers and supervisors instructed employees to sign these cards and indicated that those refusing to do so would be “out.”
September 28, Local 65 filed with the National Labor Relations Board its petition for certification as bargaining representative. October 24, Local 318 intervened in the representation proceedings and asked that it be certified. However, many employees revoked their applications for membership in 318 and reaffirmed their adherence to the Carpenters. This was followed on October 31 by the Carpenters’ refusal to consent to an election on the ground that petitioners had unlawfully assisted 318 in the campaign.
November 10, 1950, a crisis developed when the president of petitioners summarily discharged Frank Ciccone, an employee of over four years’ standing, because of the latter’s activity in support of the Carpenters and his opposition to 318. We accept the finding of the National Labor Relations Board that petitioners “discriminatorily discharged, and thereafter refused to reinstate, Frank Ciccone because of his organizational activities in support of the . . . [Carpenters].” This discharge at once precipitated the strike which is before us and which the Board found “was clearly caused and prolonged by the cumulative effects of the [petitioners’] unfair labor practices culminating in the discriminatory discharge of Ciccone.” There was no disorder but the plant was virtually shut down until December 11 and it was March 9, 1951, before the Carpenters, on behalf of petitioners’ employees, made an unconditional request to return to work. Petitioners ignored that request and neither Ciccone nor any of the other 76 striking employees has been reinstated.
While the strike against petitioners’ unfair labor practices continued, the collective-bargaining contract between petitioners and the Carpenters approached its expiration date of November 30, 1950, and, apart from the above-described organizational controversy, the Carpenters had taken timely steps to secure modification of their agreement. October 10, they had delivered to petitioners a notice (dated September 29, 1950) “requesting modification” of the contract. They thus had started the statutory negotiating period running as prescribed by the above-mentioned § 8 (d). The Carpenters met several times with petitioners and pressed their demands for changes in the contract but the expiration date passed without any agreement being reached.
In January 1951, the Carpenters initiated the present proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board by charging petitioners with unfair labor practices. Acting on those charges, the Board’s general counsel filed a complaint alleging petitioners’ support of Local 318 and discharge of numerous employees, including Ciccone, as violations of § 8 (a)(1), (2) and (3) of the Act.
Petitioners admitted that they had discharged the employees in question and had not rehired them. They denied, however, that in so doing they had committed any unfair labor practices. Their first affirmative defense was that the waiver of the right to strike, expressed by their employees in their collective-bargaining contract, applied to strikes not only for economic benefits but to any and all strikes by such employees, including strikes directed solely against unfair labor practices of the employer.
Petitioners’ other principal defense was that the existing strike began during the statutory waiting period initiated by the employees’ request for modification of the contract and that, by virtue of § 8 (d) of the Act, the strikers had lost their status as employees. That defense turned upon petitioners’ interpretation of § 8 (d), applying it not only to strikes for economic benefits but to any and all strikes occurring during the waiting period, including strikes solely against unfair labor practices of the employer.
The trial examiner made findings of fact sustaining the complaint and recommended that petitioners be ordered to cease and desist from the interference complained of and be required to offer to Ciccone and the 76 other discharged employees full reinstatement, together with back pay for Ciccone from November 10, 1950, and for the other employees from March 9,1951. See 103 N. L. R. B. 511, 526-563. With minor modifications, the Board adopted the examiner’s findings and conclusions and issued the recommended order. 103 N. L. R. B. 511. The chairman and one member dissented in part.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting in part, accepted the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and enforced the Board’s order. 214 F. 2d 462. Since then, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. Labor Board v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F. 2d 126. Because of the importance of the issues in industrial relations and in the interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we granted certiorari. 348 U. S. 910.
Apart from the issues raised by petitioners’ affirmative defenses, the proceedings reflect a flagrant example of interference by the employers with the expressly protected right of their employees to select their own bargaining representative. The findings disclose vigorous efforts by the employers to influence and even to coerce their employees to abandon the Carpenters as their bargaining representatives and to substitute Local 318. Accordingly, unless petitioners sustain at least one of their affirmative defenses, they must suffer the consequences of their unfair labor practices violating §8 (a) (1), (2) or (3) of the Act, as amended.
In the absence of some contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, petitioners’ unfair labor practices provide adequate ground for the orderly strike that occurred here. Under those circumstances, the striking employees do not lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements for them have been made. Failure of the Board to enjoin petitioners’ illegal conduct or failure of the Board to sustain the right to strike against that conduct would seriously undermine the primary objectives of the Labor Act. See Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 673. While we assume that the employees, by explicit contractual provision, could have waived their right to strike against such unfair labor practices and that Congress, by explicit statutory provision, could have deprived strikers, under the circumstances of this case, of their status as employees, the questions before us are whether or not such a waiver was made by the Carpenters in their 1949-1950 contract and whether or not such a deprivation of status was enacted by Congress in § 8 (d) of the Act, as amended in 1947.
I. Does the collective-bargaining contract waive the employees’ right to strike against the unfair labor practices committed by their employers? The answer turns upon the proper interpretation of the particular contract before us. Like other contracts, it must be read as a whole and in the light of the law relating to it when made.
“. . . we have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.” Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. S, 325 U. S. 797, 806.
This contract was made in the light of that declared policy. A similar dual purpose is emphasized as follows in § 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended:
“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 61 Stat. 137, 29 U. S. C. § 151. See also, the declaration of policy in § 1 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 17. S. C. § 141 (b).
The two policies are complementary. They depend for their foundation upon assurance of “full freedom of association.” Only after that is assured can the parties turn to effective negotiation as a means of maintaining “the normal flow of commerce and . . . the full production of articles and commodities . . . .” 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 141 (b).
On the premise of fair representation, collective-bargaining contracts frequently have included certain waivers of the employees' right to strike and of the employers’ right to lockout to enforce their respective economic demands during the term of those contracts. Provided the selection of the bargaining representative remains free, such waivers contribute to the normal flow of commerce and to the maintenance of regular production schedules. Individuals violating such clauses appropriately lose their status as employees.
The waiver in the contract before us, upon which petitioners rely, is as follows:
“5. The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement, there shall be no interference of any kind with the operations of the Employers, or any interruptions or slackening of production of work by any of its members. The Union further agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement.”
That clause expresses concern for the continued operation of the plant and has a natural application to strikes and work stoppages involving the subject matter of the contract.
Conceding that the words “in any strike or work stoppage during the [one-year] term of this agreement,” if read in complete isolation, may include all strikes and work stoppages of every nature, yet the trial examiner, the Board and the Court of Appeals agree that those words do not have that scope when read in their context and in the light of the law under which the contract was made. This unanimity of interpretation is entitled to much weight.
Petitioners argue that the words “any strike” leave no room for interpretation and necessarily include all strikes, even those against unlawful practices destructive of the foundation on which collective bargaining must rest. We disagree. We believe that the contract, taken as a whole, deals solely with the economic relationship between the employers and their employees. It is a typical collective-bargaining contract dealing with terms of employment and the normal operations of the plant. It is for one year and assumes the existence of a lawfully designated bargaining representative. Its strike and lockout clauses are natural adjuncts of an operating policy aimed at avoiding interruptions of production prompted by efforts to change existing economic relationships. The main function of arbitration under the contract is to provide a mechanism for avoiding similar stoppages due to disputes over the meaning and application of the various contractual provisions.
To adopt petitioners’ all-inclusive interpretation of the clause is quite a different matter. That interpretation would eliminate, for the whole year, the employees’ right to strike, even if petitioners, by coercion, ousted the em--ployees’ lawful bargaining representative and, by threats of discharge, caused the employees to sign membership cards in a new union. Whatever may be said of the legality of such a waiver when explicitly stated, there is no adequate basis for implying its existence without a more compelling expression of it than appears in § 5 of this contract.
There has been no court decision called to our attention which has held that the employees’ right to strike against unfair labor practices has been waived by language such as that which is before us. On the other hand, prior to such contract, such language had been held by the Board to apply appropriately to economic strikes with consequent loss of employee status.
It is suggested that § 13 of the Act, as amended, precludes reliance by the Board upon the Act for support of its interpretation of the strike-waiver clause. That section provides that “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” 61 Stat. 151, 29 U. S. C. § 163. On the basis of the above language, petitioners claim that because the contract-waiver clause prohibits all strikes of every nature, nothing in the Act may be construed to affect the “limitations or qualifications” which the contract thus places on that right. Such a claim assumes the point at issue. The Board relies upon the context of the contract and upon the language of the clause itself, rather than upon the statute, to define the kind of strike that is waived.
As a matter of fact, the initial provision in § 13 that nothing in the Act “shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike” adds emphasis to the Board's insistence upon preserving the employees' right to strike to protect their freedom of concerted action. Inasmuch as strikes against unfair labor practices are not anywhere specifically excepted from lawful strikes, § 13 adds emphasis to the congressional recognition of their propriety.
For the reasons stated above and those given by the Board and the court below, we conclude that the contract did not waive the employees’ right to strike solely against the unfair labor practices of their employers.
II. Does § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, deprive individuals of their status as employees if, within the waiting period prescribed by § 8 (d)(4), they engage in a strike solely against unfair labor practices of their employers ? Here again the background is the dual purpose of the Act (1) to protect the right of employees to be free to take concerted action as provided in §§ 7 and 8 (a), and (2) to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare in securing satisfactory wages, hours of work and employment conditions. Section 8 (d) seeks to bring about the termination and modification of collective-bargaining agreements without interrupting the flow of commerce or the production of goods, while §§ 7 and 8 (a) seek to insure freedom of concerted action by employees at all times.
The language in § 8 (d) especially relied upon by petitioners is as follows: “Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended . . . 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d).
Petitioners contend that the above words must be so read that employees who engage in any strike, regardless of its purpose, within the 60-day waiting period, thereby lose their status as employees. That interpretation would deprive Ciccone and his fellow strikers of their rights to reinstatement and would require the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. If the above words are read in complete isolation from their context in the Act, such an interpretation is possible. However, “In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122. See also, Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 622-623; Duparquet Co. v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216, and United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 542-543.
Reading the clause in conjunction with the rest of § 8, the Board points out that “the sixty-day period” referred to is the period mentioned in paragraph (4) of § 8 (d). That paragraph requires the party giving notice of a desire to “terminate or modify” such a contract, as part of its obligation to bargain under § 8 (a) (5) or § 8 (b) (3), to continue “in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.” Section 8 (d) thus seeks, during this natural renegotiation period, to relieve the parties from the economic pressure of a strike or lockout in relation to the subjects of negotiation. The final clause of § 8 (d) also warns employees that, if they join a proscribed strike, they shall thereby lose their status as employees and, consequently, their right to reinstatement.
The Board reasons that the words which provide the key to a proper interpretation of § 8 (d) with respect to this problem are “termination or modification.” Since the Board expressly found that the instant strike was not to terminate or modify the contract, but was designed instead to protest the unfair labor practices of petitioners, the loss-of-status provision of § 8 (d) is not applicable. We sustain that interpretation. Petitioners’ construction would produce incongruous results. It concedes that prior to the 60-day negotiating period, employees have a right to strike against unfair labor practices designed to oust the employees’ bargaining representative, yet petitioners’ interpretation of § 8 (d) means that if the employees give the 60-day notice of their desire to modify the contract, they are penalized for exercising that right to strike. This would deprive them of their most effective weapon at a time when their need for it is obvious. Although the employees’ request to modify the contract would demonstrate their need for the services of their freely chosen representative, petitioners’ interpretation would have the incongruous effect of cutting off the employees’ freedom to strike against unfair labor practices aimed at that representative. This would relegate the employees to filing charges under a procedure too slow to be effective. The result would unduly favor the employers and handicap the employees during negotiation periods contrary to the purpose of the Act. There also is inherent inequity in any interpretation that penalizes one party to a contract for conduct induced solely by the unlawful conduct of the other, thus giving advantage to the wrongdoer.
Petitioners contend that, unless the loss-of-status clause is applicable to unfair labor practice strikes, as well as to economic strikes, it adds nothing to the existing law relating to loss of status. Assuming that to be so, the clause is justifiable as a clarification of the law and as a warning to employees against engaging in economic strikes during the statutory waiting period. Moreover, in the face of the affirmative emphasis that is placed by the Act upon freedom of concerted action and freedom of choice of representatives, any limitation on the employees’ right to strike against violations of §§ 7 and 8 (a), protecting those freedoms, must be more explicit and clear than it is here in order to restrict them at the very time they may be most needed.
There is sufficient ambiguity here to permit consideration of relevant legislative history. While such history provides no conclusive answer, it is consistent with the view taken by the Board and by the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits.
Senator Ball, who was a manager for the 1947 amendments in the Senate and one of the conferees on the bill, stated that § 8 (d) made mandatory what was already good practice and was aimed at preventing such interruptions of production as the “quickie strikes” occasionally used to gain economic advantages.
“The provision in the National Labor Relations Act defining collective bargaining, and providing that where a contract between a union and an employer is in existence, fulfilling the obligation on both sides to protect [bargain] collectively means giving at least 60 days’ notice of the termination of the contract, or of the desire for any change in it, is another provision aimed primarily at protecting the public, as well as the employee, who have been the victims of 'quickie’ strikes. I do not think that is taking away any rights of labor ... it is simply saying that they should all follow the sound, fair, and sane procedure which a majority of the good ones now follow.” 93 Cong. Rec. 5014.
One minority report suggested a fear that § 8 (d) would be applicable to unfair practice strikes. The suggestion, however, was not even made the subject of comment by the majority reports or in the debates. An unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of the majority and thus, indirectly, amend a bill.
The record shows that the supporters of the bill were aware of the established practice which distinguished between the effect on employees of engaging in economic strikes and that of engaging in unfair practice strikes. If Congress had wanted to modify that practice, it could readily have done so by specific provision. Congress cannot fairly be held to have made such an intrusion on employees’ rights, as petitioners claim, without some more explicit expression of its purpose to do so than appears here.
Finally, petitioners seek support for their interpretation of § 8 (d) from the fact that its last clause makes a cross-reference to §§ 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. Such reference does not expand the scope of § 8 (d). It merely makes it clear that if % 8 (d) is violated by the employees to whom it applies, then they lose their status as employees for the purposes of §§ 8, 9 and 10.
As neither the collective-bargaining contract nor § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, stands in the way, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
61 Stat. 140, 142-143, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d).
In December, Locals 318 and 65 withdrew their representation proceedings from before the Board and the Carpenters (through Local 3127) filed its own representation proceeding. January 29, 1951, the Board issued a direction of election in the latter proceeding but, after the Carpenters filed charges of unfair practices, the Board postponed the holding of any election until the regional director might deem it proper.
103 N. L. R. B. 511, 512, and see 214 F. 2d 462, 464.
103 N. L. R. B., at 513. See also, the following findings of the trial examiner:
"... the purpose of the strike was to protest and seek to remedy the [petitioners’] unfair labor practices. The record does not support a finding that the strike also had as an additional objective the termination or modification of the existing contract. It is true that demands for contract changes had previously been presented to the [petitioners], and there had been some discussion at meetings of Local 22045 or Local 3127 of a possible strike if such demands were not met. But no strike vote on that issue had ever been taken, nor was any strike action otherwise determined upon. On the record as a whole, I am fully satisfied, and I find, that the strike which immediately followed Ciccone’s discharge was unplanned and began as a spontaneous demonstration by employees of their protest of the [petitioners’] unfair labor practices. Nor does the record reflect that its character changed after it began to one where the strikers were seeking to compel changes or modifications in economic terms or conditions of employment. There is no evidence that any negotiations were conducted or overtures made along such lines at any time after the commencement of the strike. The [petitioners] at the hearing made no such claim, and offered no evidence to establish that the strike had any purpose other than, or in addition to, that claimed by the General Counsel.” 103 N. L. R. B., at 560. These were adopted by the Board, id., at 511-512, and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, 214 F. 2d, at 465.
103 N. L. R. B., at 560 and 512, n. 2.
“Sec. 8. . . .
“(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested b^ either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided,, That where,there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification—
“(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
“(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
“(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and
“(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:
“The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 9 (a), and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer.” (Emphasis supplied except for the word “Provided") 61 Stat. 140, 142-143, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d).
“Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).
“Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
“(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ;
“ (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: . . .
“(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §§ 157, 158 (a) (1), (2) and (3).
See note 6, supra.
Before the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, see Labor Board v. Poultrymen’s Service Corp., 138 F. 2d 204, 210; Labor Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F. 2d 919, 927-928; Labor Board v. Moore-Lowry Flour Mills Co., 122 F. 2d 419, 426; Ritzwoller Co. v. Labor Board, 114 F. 2d 432, 437; Labor Board v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F. 2d 780, 792; Labor Board v. Boss Manufacturing Co., 107 F. 2d 574, 579; Labor Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. 2d 533, 535; Labor Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, 871. Since the 1947 amendments, see Labor Board v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F. 2d 902, 907-908; Labor Board v. Kobritz, 193 F. 2d 8, 16-17.
See Dyson & Sons, 72 N. L. R. B. 445, 457; ScvUin Steel Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 1294, enforced as modified, 161 F. 2d 143. While these cases were decided under the Act before its 1947 amendments, there is nothing in the amendments to suggest their subsequent inapplicability. Both are referred to with approval in the House Conference Report on the 1947 amendments. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39. See also, 93 Cong. Rec. 6442. But see National Electric Products Corp., 80 N. L. R. B. 995, distinguished by the Board in the instant case, 103 N. L. R. B., at 514.
While two members of the Board and one of the Court of Appeals disagreed with their respective majorities as to petitioners’ defense based upon § 8 (d), no member of either body has expressed a dissent from the Board’s interpretation of the contract.
The preamble states that “the parties hereto desire to enter into an agreement relating to the rates of pay, hours of work and other conditions of employment which will provide methods of harmonious co-operation between the Employers and their employees and to that end accomplish fair and peaceful adjustments which may arise without interruption of the Employers’ businesses
The balance of the contract relates to: (1) Limitation of employment to union members in good standing; definitions of exempt employees and union shop; (2) Availability of arbitration, under § 19, in disputes as to failures to maintain union memberships; (3) Checkoff of union dues; (4) Exempt employees and new employees; (5) Strike waiver as quoted in text; (6) Lockout waiver as follows: “The Employers agree that there shall be no lockout during the term of this agreement." (7) Arbitration, under § 19, to determine whether a strike, work stoppage or lockout has actually occurred; (8) Probationary periods for new employees; (9) Employers to have control over plant production and business requirements resulting in layoffs, furloughs or intra-plant transfers; (10) Employee seniority; (11) Hours of work; (12) Work weeks and extra shifts; (13) Rest periods; (14) Overtime; (15) Holidays; (16) Rates of pay and wage incentives; (17) Contract not to be interpreted so as to reduce wages, standards or working conditions; (18) Union officers who are active employees and union stewards governed by plant rules; (19) (a) Disputes as to meaning and application of the contract are subject to arbitration; (b) Rights of employees to present grievances to their employers are assured; (20) Notice of work days; (21) Vacations; (22) Employers’ rights to manage plant and to discharge employees “for proper cause” preserved; union to cooperate with employers in interest of employee efficiency; (23) A specific wage increase is prescribed in lieu of an increase recently awarded by arbitration; (24) Effective December 1, 1949 — November 30, 1950, with 60-day notice of intention to modify or terminate, and in such event “negotiations shall be promptly started.”
See note 10, supra.
See Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S., at 673.
See note 7, supra.
See note 6, supra.
Although the notice required to put the 60-day waiting period into operation in this case was not delivered until 51. days before the expiration of the contract, it was dated more than 60 days before such expiration date and it has been treated by all concerned as putting the waiting period into effect.
See note 4, supra.
See Note, 53 Col. L. Rev. 1023,1025.
With the exception of one suggestion in a minority report, which is discussed elsewhere, the relevant committee reports describe the provisions of § 8 (d) as being applicable to economic strikes and do not suggest their applicability to strikes against unfair labor practices in violation of §§ 7 and 8 (a). S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35.
S. Rep. No. 105, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22; 93 Cong. Rec. 6385, 4036, 6503.
“The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395, and see S. H. Camp & Co. v. Labor Board, 160 F. 2d 519, 521.
“. . . to hold that a worker who because of an unfair labor practice has . . . gone on strike is no longer an employee, would be to give legal sanction to an illegal act and to deny redress to the individual injured thereby.” S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7.
For example, Senator Ball proposed an amendment, to the definition of “employee” in § 2 (3) of the Act, which unintentionally might have abrogated the distinction which favored the employees’ right to engage in unfair practice strikes as against economic strikes, but at once withdrew the amendment as going “too far,” when this possible effect of it was brought to his attention. 93 Cong. Rec. 1827-1828.
See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
JOHNSON ET AL. v. MISSISSIPPI et al.
No. 73-1531.
Argued February 26, 1975
Decided May 12, 1975
Frank R. Parker argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were /. Harold Flannery and Paul R. Dimond.
Ed Davis Noble, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were A. F. Summer, Attorney General, and William A. Attain, First Assistant Attorney General.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court. .
This case concerns the application of 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1), permitting defendants in state cases to remove the proceedings to the federal district courts under certain conditions, in the light of Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 101 (a), 82 Stat. 73, 18 U. S. C. § 245.
I
During March 1972, petitioners, six Negro citizens of Vicksburg, Miss., along with other citizens of Vicksburg, made various demands upon certain merchants and city officials generally relating to the number of Negroes employed or serving in various positions in both local government and business enterprises. In late March, petitioners began picketing some business establishments in Vicksburg and urging, by word of mouth and through leaflets, that the citizens of Vicksburg boycott those establishments until such time as petitioners’ demands were realized. On May 2, 13, 14, and 21 of that year, petitioners, along with 43 other Negroes, were arrested on the basis of warrants charging, in general terms, their complicity in a conspiracy unlawfully to bring about a boycott of merchants and businesses. At least some of these arrests took place at a time when some of those arrested were engaged in picketing in protest of the racial discrimination allegedly practiced by certain merchants of Vicksburg. Following the arrests, which were made by Vicksburg police officers, those arrested were transported to the city jail where they each remained after processing until the posting of bail. There is no indication in the record in this case that the arrests and subsequent detentions of petitioners or the other 43 persons so arrested and detained involved the application of any force by the arresting officers beyond the verbal directions issued by those officers and the coercive custody normally incident to arrest, processing, and detention.
On May 25, 1972, those arrested filed a petition in the Federal District Court in compliance with the procedures established by 28 U. S. C. § 1446 seeking transfer of the trial of charges against them to the District Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1443, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
“(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof----”
In their removal petition, it was alleged, inter alia, that those arrested were being prosecuted under several state conspiracy statutes which were “on their face and as applied repugnant to the Constitution . . . ,” and that:
“The charges against petitioners, their arrest, and subsequent prosecution on those charges have no basis in fact and have been effectuated solely and exclusively for the purpose and effect of depriving petitioners of their Federally protected rights, including by force or threat of force, punishing, injuring, intimidating, and interferring [sic], or attempting to punish, injure, intimidate,... and interfere with petitioners, and the class of persons participating in the . . . boycott and demonstrations, for the exercise of their rights peacefully to protest discrimination and to conduct and publicize a boycott which seeks to remedy the denial of equal civil rights ... which activities are protected by 18 U. S. C. [§] 245.”
On December 29, 1972, after an evidentiary hearing was held by the District Court in which testimony was presented both by petitioners and the Vicksburg chief of police, who was one of the named respondents to the removal petition, the District Court remanded the prosecutions to the state courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that § 245, as a criminal statute, “confers no rights whatsoever . . . ,” 488 F. 2d 284, 287 (CA5 1974), and that, under this Court’s decisions in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780 (1966), and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808 (1966), a federal statute must “provide” for the equal rights of citizens before it can be invoked as a basis for removal of prosecutions under § 1443 (1). Rehearing and rehearing en banc, Fed. Rule App. Proc. 35, were denied, five Circuit Judges dissenting in an opinion. 491 F. 2d 94 (CA5 1974). We granted certiorari, 419 U. S. 893 (1974), and, for reasons stated below, affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
Our most recent cases construing § 1443 (1) are the companion cases of Georgia v. Rachel, supra, and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra. Those cases established that a removal petition under 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1) must satisfy a two-pronged test. First, it must appear that the right allegedly denied the removal petitioner arises under a federal law “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.” Georgia v. Rachel, supra, at 792. Claims that prosecution and conviction will violate rights under constitutional or statutory provisions of general applicability or under statutes not protecting against racial discrimination, will not suffice. That a removal petitioner will be denied due process of law because the criminal law under which he is being prosecuted is allegedly vague or that the prosecution is assertedly a sham, corrupt, or without evidentiary basis does not, standing alone, satisfy the requirements of § 1443 (1). City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra, at 825.
Second, it must appear, in accordance with the provisions of § 1443 (1), that the removal petitioner is “denied or cannot enforce” the specified federal rights “in the courts of [the] State.” This provision normally requires that the “denial be manifest in a formal expression of state law,” Georgia v. Rachel, supra, at 803, such as a state legislative or constitutional provision, “ ‘rather than a denial first made manifest at the trial of the case.’ ” Id., at 799. Except in the unusual case where “an equivalent basis could be shown for an equally firm prediction that the defendant would be ‘denied or cannot enforce’ the specified federal rights in the state court,” id., at 804, it was to be expected that the protection of federal constitutional or statutory rights could be effected in the pending state proceedings, civil or criminal. Under § 1443 (1),
“the vindication of the defendant’s federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.” City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra, at 828.
In Rachel, the allegations of the petition for removal were held to satisfy both branches of the rule. The federal right claimed arose under §§ 201 (a) and 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000a (a) and 2000a-2 (c). Section 201 (a) forbids refusals of service in, or exclusions from, public accommodations on account of racé or color; and § 203 (c) prohibits any “attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 . . . .” The removal petition fairly alleged that the prosecutions sought to be removed from state court were brought and would be tried “solely as the result of peaceful attempts to obtain service at places of public accommodation.” 384 U. S., at 793. We concluded that if the allegations in the removal petition were true, the defendants by being prosecuted under a state criminal trespass law would be denied or could not enforce their rights in the courts of Georgia, since the “burden of having to defend the prosecutions is itself the denial of a right explicitly conferred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id., at 805.
In Peacock, on the contrary, the state-court defendants petitioning for removal were being prosecuted for obstructing public streets, assault and battery, and various other local crimes. The federal rights allegedly being denied were said to arise under the Constitution as well as under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1971 and 1981, the former section guaranteeing the right to vote without discrimination on the grounds of race or color and forbidding interference therewith, and the latter guaranteeing all persons equal access to specified rights enjoyed by white persons. The Court assumed that the claimed statutory rights were within those rights contemplated by § 1443 (1), but went on to hold that there had been no showing that petitioners would be denied or could not enforce their rights in the state courts. The removal petitions alleged “(1) that the defendants were arrested by state officers and charged with various offenses under state law because they were Negroes or because they were engaged in helping Negroes assert their rights under federal equal civil rights laws, and that they are completely innocent of the charges against them, or (2) that the defendants will be unable to obtain a fair trial in the state court.” 384 U. S., at 826. The Court held, however, that it was not enough to support removal to allege that “federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court.” Id., at 827. Petitioners could point to no federal law conferring on them the right to engage in the specific conduct with which they were charged; and there was no “federal statutory right that no State should even attempt to prosecute them for their conduct.” Id., at 826.
Ill
With our prior cases in mind, it is apparent, without further discussion, that removal under § 1443 (1) was not warranted here based solely on petitioners’ allegations that the statutes underlying the charges against them were unconstitutional, that there was no basis in fact for those charges, or that their arrest and prosecution otherwise denied them their constitutional rights. We are also convinced for the following reasons that §245, on which petitioners principally rely, does not furnish adequate basis for removal under § 1443 (1) of these state prosecutions to the federal court.
Whether or not § 245, a federal criminal statute, provides for “specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality . . . ,” Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S., at 792, it evinces no intention to interfere in any manner with state criminal prosecutions of those who seek to have their cases removed to the federal courts. On the contrary, § 245 (a)(1) itself expressly provides:
“Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to prevent any State . . . from exercising jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this section ....”
The Mississippi courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction over conspiracy and boycott cases brought under state law; and § 245 (a)(1) appears to disavow any intent to interrupt such state prosecutions, a conclusion that is also implicit in the operative provisions of that section. Section 245 (b) makes it a crime for any persons, by “force or threat of force” to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any individual engaged in specified activities. The provision on its face focuses on the use of force, and its legislative history confirms that its central purpose was to prevent and punish violent interferences with the exercise of specified rights and that it was not aimed at interrupting or frustrating the otherwise orderly processes of state law.
Section 245, which was Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, was the antidote prescribed by Congress to deter and punish those who would forcibly suppress the free exercise of civil rights enumerated in that statute. The bill which eventually became Title I, H. R. 2516, was substantially identical to H. R. 14765, passed by the House as Title V of the Civil Rights Act of 1966. Title I was enacted against a background of racial violence described in the Report of the bill that was adopted by the House:
“The brutal crimes committed in recent years against Negroes exercising Federal rights and against white persons who have encouraged or aided Negroes seeking equality need no recital. Violence and threats of violence have been resorted to in order to punish or discourage Negroes from voting, from using places of public accommodation and public facilities, from attending desegregated schools, and from engaging in other activities protected by Federal law. Frequently the victim of the crime has recently engaged or is then engaging in the exercise of a Federal right. In other cases, the victim is a civil rights worker — white or Negro — who has encouraged others to assert these rights or engaged in peaceful assembly opposing their denial. In still other cases Negroes, not known to have had anything to do with civil rights activities, have been killed or assaulted to discourage other Negroes from asserting their rights.” H. R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1967).
The Senate Report likewise explained Title I as a measure “to meet the problem of violent interference, for racial or other discriminatory reasons, with a person’s free exercise of civil rights.” S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1967). This concern with racially motivated acts of violence pervaded the report, see id., at 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. In the debate on the floor of the Senate, frequent references to the bill’s being directed at crimes of racial violence were made, the following being particularly relevant here:
“This new law would provide that when a law enforcement officer totally abandons his duty in order to violently intimidate individuals seeking lawfully to exercise certain enumerated Federal rights, he will be punished like any other citizen.
“. . . So long as it appears that an officer reasonably believed he was doing his duty, that is, that the arrest took place because of a perceived violation of a then-valid law, no case of knowing interference with civil rights could be made against him.” 114 Cong. Rec. 2268 (1968).
Viewed in this context, it seems quite evident that a state prosecution, proceeding as it does in a court of law, cannot be characterized as an application of “force or threat of force” within the meaning of § 245. That section furnishes federal protection against violence in certain circumstances. But whatever “rights” it may confer, none of them is denied by a state criminal prosecution for conspiracy or boycott. Here, as in Peacock, there is no “federal statutory right that no State should even attempt to prosecute them for their conduct.” 384 U. S., at 826.
IV
We think further observations are in order. We stated in City of Greenwood v. Peacock:
“[I]f changes are to be made in the long-settled interpretation of the provisions of this century-old removal statute, it is for Congress and not for this Court to make them. Fully aware of the established meaning the removal statute had been given by a consistent series of decisions in this Court, Congress in 1964 declined to act on proposals to amend the law. All that Congress did was to make remand orders appealable, and thus invite a contemporary judicial consideration of the meaning of the unchanged provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1443.” Id., at 834-835.
When we decided that case, there had been introduced in the Congress no fewer than 12 bills which, if enacted, would have enlarged in one way or another the right of removal in civil rights cases. Id., at 833 n. 33. None of those bills was reported from the cognizant committee of Congress; none has been reported in the intervening years; and the parties have informed us of no comparable bill under active consideration in the present Congress. The absence of any evidence or legislative history indicating that Congress intended to accomplish in § 245 what it has failed or refused to do directly through amendment to § 1443 necessitates our considered rejection of the right of removal in this case. Also, as we noted in Peacock, there are varied avenues of relief open to these defendants for vindication of any of their federal rights that may have been or will be violated, 384 U. S., at 828-830; and, indeed, it appears from the record in this case that at least one such avenue was pursued early on by them and continues to be pursued.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
With respect to these business establishments, the specific demands made by the petitioners were that 40% of their employees and managers should be drawn from the Negro community.
All of the petitioners were arrested on May 2, 1972; petitioners Albert Johnson, Eddie McBride, Charles Chiplin, and James Odell Dixon were arrested again on either May 13 or 14, and petitioner Johnson was arrested once again on May 21.
The warrants were supported by the sworn affidavits of the Vicksburg chief of police and charged various persons among the total of 49 eventually arrested
“with the felonious intent on their part, and each of them to commit acts injurious to trade or commerce among the public and did wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire, combine, confederate and agree among themselves and each of them with the other, and did enter into an unlawful conspiracy, plan and design among themselves, and each with the other, to unlawfully and feloniously bring about a boycott of merchants and businesses and pursuant of the said unlawful conspiracy did then and there, promote, encourage and enforce acts injurious to trade or commerce among the public.”
Although the petitioners pleaded § 1443 generally, they made no suggestion that any among them was in the position to claim the protection of § 1443 (2) as construed by our decision in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 815-824 (1966), nor do they press such a claim in this Court.
At the time the removal petition was filed, the precise statutes under which prosecutions might eventually be brought were apparently unknown to petitioners and the other persons arrested. In their amended petition filed in the District Court, petitioners claimed that they were to be prosecuted under “[conspiracy statutes 2056 and all other conspiracy statutes as well as 2384.5 . . . .” The reference to “2056” is an apparent reference to § 2056 of the 1942 Code, now recodified as Miss. Code Ann. §97-1-1 (1972). The reference to “2384.5” is an apparent reference to §2384.5 of the 1942 Code, now recodified as Miss. Code Aim. §97-23-83 (1972).
After filing a notice of appeal, petitioners applied to the District Court for a stay of its mandate remanding the prosecutions to the state courts, which stay was denied. The record does not indicate that a stay was sought at that point from the Court of Appeals, the prosecutorial process proceeding in its normal fashion until March 1973, when the grand jury having cognizance over the charges "no billed” the charges against 43 of the persons having been previously arrested. App. 140. That same grand jury at the same time returned indictments against the six remaining persons, petitioners here; two of the petitioners were indicted for violation of Miss. Code Ann. §97-23-83 (1972), and the other four with violation of Miss. Code Aim. §97-23-85 (1972). Tr. of Oral Arg. 26.
Shortly after the Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc, 491 F. 2d 94 (CA5 1974), that court granted an application for a stay of its mandate to petitioners for purposes of their seeking a writ of certiorari in this Court, that stay being effective until disposition of the case by this Court. Since that time the prosecution of petitioners on the indictments handed down by the grand jury has not gone forward.
We had earlier construed § 203 (c) as prohibiting “prosecution of any person for séeking service in a covered establishment, because of his race or color.” Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, 311 (1964).
“The several defendants were charged variously with assault, interfering with an officer in the performance of his duty, disturbing the peace, creating a disturbance in a public place, inciting to riot, parading without a permit, assault and battery by biting a police officer, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, operating a motor vehicle with improper license tags, reckless driving, and profanity and use of vulgar language.” 384 U. S., at 813 n. 5.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1971 reads, in pertinent part:
“(a) (1) All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State . . . shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State ... to the contrary notwithstanding.
“(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such.other person to vote or to vote as he may choose . ...” We take note of the similarity between the language of § 1971 (b) set out above and the comparable language of § 245 (b) as set out in n. 11, infra.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides:
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”
Title 18 U. S. C. §245, in relevant part, provides:
“(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with—
“(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because he is or has been—
"(C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any private employer . . .
“(4) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from—
“(A) participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in [subparagraph (2)(C)]; or
“(B) affording another person or class of persons opportunity or protection to so participate; or
“(5) any citizen because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such citizen or any other citizen from lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in [subparagraph 2 (C)], or participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly opposing any denial of the opportunity to so participate—
“shall be fined . . . (Emphasis added.)
This truncated quotation of § 245 merely focuses on that activity, enumerated in subparagraph (2)(C), which would appear to be most closely connected to both the activity in which some defendants were engaged when actually arrested and the activity to which the state charges most closely'relate. We recognize that the defendants’ picketing during the several months relevant expressed their dissatisfaction with what they contended to be racial discrimination in areas other than private employment.
Section 245 (a)(1) goes on to negative any intent by Congress to foreclose state prosecution of the acts forbidden by that section: “nor shall anything in this section be construed as depriving State and local law enforcement authorities of responsibility for prosecuting acts that may be violations of this section and that are violations of State and local law.”
The Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966, while it passed the House, did not pass the Senate.
This Report stated: “The bill is intended to strengthen the Government’s capability to meet the problem of civil rights violence.” H. R. Rep. No. 473, p. 3. The bulk of the Report simply adopted by reference certain language that had appeared in the “Additional Views” of Chairman Celler of the House Committee on the Judiciary that had been appended to the House Report of the Civil Rights Act of 1966, H. R. Rep. No. 1678, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1966). The language quoted in the text is taken from those views of Chairman Celler as expressed in the earlier House Report and as adopted by the House in the subsequent Congress. Chairman Celler made abundantly clear in those views that the bill that became § 245 “is designed to meet the problem of present-day racial violence . . .,” H. R. Rep. No. 473, supra, at 5, and he reiterated this view of the bill when it arrived on the House floor for consideration after finally passing the Senate in 1967:
“[The Senate version of the bill] reenacts the bill that we passed, giving protection to civil rights workers who might be endeavoring to express their beliefs in various parts of the country, and the provisions therein would protect them against violence.” 114 Cong. Rec. 6490 (1968). See id., at 9559.
See id., at 318-320, 333, 335, 399, 535, 538, 913, 928, 1391, 1392. A Department of Justice witness testifying before a Senate subcommittee in support of Title I, stated that it “would afford the Federal Government an effective means of deterring and punishing forcible interference with the exercise of Federal rights,” and that “[t]he mere fact that a policeman who is performing his duty in good faith uses force does not bring him under the act at all.” Hearings on the Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 82, 355 (1967). Those hearings, like the Senate Report and the floor debate in the Senate, are replete with numerous references to the use of violence to deter the exercise of' federal rights. See id., at 61, 81, 210-212, 222, 312, 322, 325, 349.
The three Courts of Appeals faced with the issue now before us are in accord with our decision. New York v. Horelick, 424 F. 2d 697, 703 (CA2), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 939 (1970); Hill v. Pennsylvania, 439 F. 2d 1016, 1022 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 985 (1971) (alternative holding); Williams v. Tri-County Community Center, 452 F. 2d 221, 223 (CA5 1971) (quo warranto proceeding).
Brief for Petitioners 16 n. 9:
“Simultaneously [with the filing of the removal petition sub judice], the petitioners also filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against the arrests and prosecutions in a companion action, Concerned Citizens of Vicksburg v. Sills, Civ. No. 72W-18 (N) (SD Miss. filed May 24, 1972), but the District Court denied temporary injunctive relief which would have held the prosecutions in status quo pending a final hearing on the merits (Order of May 26, 1972). A final hearing in that action has not yet been held, and is not part of this appeal.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
27
] | sc_respondent |
PUBLIC CITIZEN v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 88-429.
Argued April 17, 1989
Decided June 21, 1989
Eric R. Glitzenstein argued the cause for appellant in No. 88-429. With him on the briefs were Patti A. Goldman and Alan B. Morrison. Paul D. Kamenar argued the cause for appellant in No. 88-494. With him on the briefs was Daniel J. Popeo.
Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for ap-pellees in both cases. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., and Douglas Letter. Rex E. Lee, Ronald S. Flagg, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, H. Blair White, David T. Pritikin, and Darryl L. DePriest filed a brief for appellee American Bar Association.
Together with No. 88-494, Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Department of Justice et al., also on appeal from the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, Walter A. Kamiat, and Laitrence Gold; and for the People for the American Way Action Fund et al. by Timothy B. Dyk, Thomas F. Connell, and William L. Taylor.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Department of Justice regularly seeks advice from the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary regarding potential nominees for federal judge-ships. The question before us is whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 86 Stat. 770, as amended, 5 U. S. C. App. § 1 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), applies to these consultations and, if it does, whether its application interferes unconstitutionally with the President’s prerogative under Article II to nominate and appoint officers of the United States; violates the doctrine of separation of powers; or unduly infringes the First Amendment right of members of the American Bar Association to freedom of association and expression. We hold that FACA does not apply to this special advisory relationship. We therefore do not reach the constitutional questions presented.
1 — H
¡>
The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint” Supreme Court Justices and, as established by Congress, other federal judges. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Since 1952 the President, through the Department of Justice, has requested advice from the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary (ABA Committee) in making such nominations.
The American Bar Association is a private voluntary professional association of approximately 343,000 attorneys. It has several working committees, among them the advisory body whose work is at issue here. The ABA Committee consists of 14 persons belonging to, and chosen by, the American Bar Association. Each of the 12 federal judicial Circuits (not including the Federal Circuit) has one representative on the ABA Committee, except for the Ninth Circuit, which has two; in addition, one member is chosen at large. The ABA Committee receives no federal funds. It does not recommend persons for appointment to the federal bench of its own initiative.
Prior to announcing the names of nominees for judgeships on the courts of appeals, the district courts, or the Court of International Trade, the President, acting through the Department of Justice, routinely requests a potential nominee to complete a questionnaire drawn up by the ABA Committee and to submit it to the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy, to the chair of the ABA Committee, and to the committee member (usually the representative of the relevant judicial Circuit) charged with investigating the nominee. See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, What It Is and How It Works (1983), reprinted in App. 43-49; Brief for Federal Ap-pellee 2. The potential nominee’s answers and the referral of his or her name to the ABA Committee are kept confidential. The committee member conducting the investigation then reviews the legal writings of the potential nominee, interviews judges, legal scholars, and other attorneys regarding the potential nominee’s qualifications, and discusses the matter confidentially with representatives of various professional organizations and other groups. The committee member also interviews the potential nominee, sometimes with other committee members in attendance.
Following the initial investigation, the committee representative prepares for the chair an informal written report describing the potential nominee’s background, summarizing all interviews, assessing the candidate’s qualifications, and recommending one of four possible ratings: “exceptionally well qualified,” “well qualified,” “qualified,” or “not qualified.” The chair then makes a confidential informal report to the Attorney General’s Office. The chair’s report discloses the substance of the committee representative’s report to the chair, without revealing the identity of persons who were interviewed, and indicates the evaluation the potential nominee is likely to receive if the Department of Justice requests a formal report.
If the Justice Department does request a formal report, the committee representative prepares a draft and sends copies to other members of the ABA Committee, together with relevant materials. A vote is then taken and a final report approved. The ABA Committee conveys its rating— though not its final report — in confidence to the Department of Justice, accompanied by a statement whether its rating was supported by all committee members, or whether it only commanded a majority or substantial majority of the ABA Committee. After considering the rating and other information the President and his advisers have assembled, including a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and additional interviews conducted by the President’s judicial selection committee, the President then decides whether to nominate the candidate. If the candidate is in fact nominated, the ABA Committee’s rating, but not its report, is made public at the request of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
B
FACA was born of a desire to assess the need for the “numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and similar groups which have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government.” § 2(a), as set forth in 5 U. S. C. App. § 2(a). Its purpose was to ensure that new advisory committees be established only when essential and that their number be minimized; that they be terminated when they have outlived their usefulness; that their creation, operation, and duration be subject to uniform standards and procedures; that Congress and the public remain apprised of their existence, activities, and cost; and that their work be exclusively advisory in nature. § 2(b).
To attain these objectives, FACA directs the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and agency heads to establish various administrative guidelines and management controls for advisory committees. It also imposes a number of requirements on advisory groups. For example, FAGA requires that each advisory committee file a charter, § 9(c), and keep detailed minutes of its meetings. § 10(c). Those meetings must be chaired or attended by an officer or employee of the Federal Government who is authorized to adjourn any meeting when he or she deems its adjournment in the public interest. § 10(e). FACA also requires advisory committees to provide advance notice of their meetings and to open them to the public, § 10(a), unless the President or the agency head to which an advisory committee reports determines that it may be closed to the public in accordance with the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U. S. C. §552b(c). § 10(d). In addition, FACA stipulates that advisory committee minutes, records, and reports be made available to the public, provided they do not fall within one of the Freedom of Information Act’s exemptions, see 5 U. S. C. § 552, and the Government does not choose to withhold them. § 10(b). Advisory committees established by legislation or created by the President or other federal officials must also be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions” they perform. §§ 5(b)(2), (c). Their existence is limited to two years, unless specifically exempted by the entity establishing them. § 14(a)(1).
C
In October 1986, appellant Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) brought suit against the Department of Justice after the ABA Committee refused WLF’s request for the names of potential judicial nominees it was considering and for the ABA Committee’s reports and minutes of its meetings. WLF asked the District Court for the District of Columbia to declare the ABA. Committee an “advisory committee” as FACA defines that term. WLF further sought an injunction ordering the Justice Department to cease utilizing the ABA Committee as an advisory committee until it complied with FACA. In particular, WLF contended that the ABA Committee must file a charter, afford notice of its meetings, open those meetings to the public, and make its minutes, records, and reports available for public inspection and copying. See WLF Complaint, App. 5-11. The Justice Department moved to dismiss, arguing that the ABA Committee did not fall within FACA’s definition of “advisory committee” and that, if it did, FACA would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Appellant Public Citizen then moved successfully to intervene as a party plaintiff. Like WLF, Public Citizen requested a declaration that the Justice Department’s utilization of the ABA Committee is covered by FACA and an order enjoining the Justice Department to comply with FACA’s requirements.
The District Court dismissed the action following oral argument. 691 F. Supp. 483 (1988). The court held that the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee is subject to FACA’s strictures, but that “FACA cannot constitutionally be applied to the ABA Committee because to do so would violate the express separation of nomination and consent powers set forth in Article II of the Constitution and because no overriding congressional interest in applying FACA to the ABA Committee has been demonstrated.” Id., at 486. Congress’ role in choosing judges “is limited to the Senate’s advice and consent function,” the court concluded; “the purposes of FACA are served through the public confirmation process and any need for applying FACA to the ABA Committee is outweighed by the President’s interest in preserving confidentiality and freedom of consultation in selecting judicial nominees.” Id., at 496. We noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U. S. 979 (1988), and now affirm on statutory grounds, making consideration of the relevant constitutional issues unnecessary.
II
As a preliminary matter, appellee American Bar Association contests appellants’ standing to bring this suit. Appel-lee’s challenge is twofold. First, it contends that neither appellant has alleged injury sufficiently concrete and specific to confer standing; rather, appellee maintains, they have advanced a general grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, and thus lack standing under our precedents. Brief for Appellee ABA 12-15. Second, appellee argues that even if appellants have asserted a sufficiently discrete injury, they have not demonstrated that a decision in their favor would likely redress the alleged harm, because the meetings they seek to attend and the minutes and records they wish to review would probably be closed to them under FACA. Hence, the American Bar Association submits, Article III bars their suit. Id., at 15-17.
We reject these arguments. Appellee does not, and cannot, dispute that appellants are attempting to compel the Justice Department and the ABA Committee to comply with FACA’s charter and notice requirements, and that they seek access to the ABA Committee’s meetings and records in order to monitor its workings and participate more effectively in the judicial selection process. Appellant WLF has specifically requested, and been refused, the names of candidates under consideration by the ABA Committee, reports and minutes of the Committee’s meetings, and advance notice of future meetings. WLF Complaint, App. 8. As when an agency denies requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act, refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA Committee’s activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue. Our decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act have never suggested that those requesting information under it need show more than that they sought and were denied specific agency records. See, e. g., Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989); Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U. S. 1 (1988); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U. S. 792 (1984); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U. S. 615 (1982); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352 (1976). There is no reason for a different rule here. The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA does not lessen appellants’ asserted injury, any more than the fact that numerous citizens might request the same information under the Freedom of Information Act entails that those who have been denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.
We likewise find untenable the American Bar Association’s claim that appellants lack standing because a ruling in their favor would not provide genuine relief as a result of FACA’s exceptions to disclosure. Appellants acknowledge that many meetings of the ABA Committee might legitimately be closed to the public under FACA and that many documents might properly be shielded from public view. But they by no means concede that FACA licenses denying them access to all meetings and papers, or that it excuses noncompliance with FACA’s other provisions. As Public Citizen contends, if FACA applies to the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee without violating the Constitution, the ABA Committee will at least have to file a charter and give notice of its meetings. In addition, discussions and documents regarding the overall functioning of the ABA Committee, including its investigative, evaluative, and voting procedures, could well fall outside FACA’s exemptions. See Reply Brief for Appellant in No. 88-429, pp. 5-6, and n. 3.
Indeed, it is difficult to square appellee’s assertion that appellants cannot hope to gain noteworthy relief with its contention that “even more significant interference [than participation of Government officials in the ABA Committee’s affairs] would result from the potential application of the ‘public inspection’ provisions of Section 10 of the Act.” Brief for Appellee ABA 36. The American Bar Association explains: “Disclosure and public access are the rule under FACA; the exemptions generally are construed narrowly. In fact, the Government-in-the-Sunshine Act has no deliberative process privilege under which ABA Committee meetings could be closed.” Id., at 38-39 (citations omitted). Appellee therefore concludes: “At bottom, there can be no question that application of FACA will impair the sensitive and necessarily confidential process of gathering information to assess accurately the qualifications and character of prospective judicial nominees.” Id., at 39. Whatever the merits of these claims and whatever their relevance to appellee’s constitutional objections to FACA’s applicability, they certainly show, as appellants contend, that appellants might gain significant relief if they prevail in their suit. Appellants’ potential gains are undoubtedly sufficient to give them standing.
Ill
Section 3(2) of FACA, as set forth in 5 U. S. C. App. §3(2), defines “advisory committee” as follows:
“For the purpose of this Act —
“(2) The term ‘advisory committee’ means any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as ‘committee’), which is —
“(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
“(B) established or utilized by the President, or
“(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that such term ex-eludes (i) the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (ii) the Commission on Government Procurement, and (iii) any committee which is composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government.”
Appellants agree that the ABA Committee was not “established” by the President or the Justice Department. See Brief for Appellant in No. 88-429, p. 16; Brief for Appellant in No. 88-494, pp. 13, 15-16, 21. Equally plainly, the ABA Committee is a committee that furnishes “advice or recommendations” to the President via the Justice Department. Whether the ABA Committee constitutes an “advisory committee” for purposes of FACA therefore depends upon whether it is “utilized” by the President or the Justice Department as Congress intended that term to be understood.
A
There is no doubt that the Executive makes use of the ABA Committee, and thus “utilizes” it in one common sense of the term. As the District Court recognized, however, “reliance on the plain language of FACA alone is not entirely satisfactory.” 691 F. Supp., at 488. “Utilize” is a woolly verb, its contours left undefined by the statute itself. Read unqualifiedly, it would extend FACA’s requirements to any group of two or more persons, or at least any formal organization, from which the President or an Executive agency seeks advice. We are convinced that Congress did not intend that result. A nodding acquaintance with FACA’s purposes, as manifested by its legislative history and as recited in § 2 of the Act, reveals that it cannot have been Congress’ intention, for example, to require the filing of a charter, the presence of a controlling federal official, and detailed minutes any time the President seeks the views of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) before nominating Commissioners to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or asks the leaders of an American Legion Post he is visiting for the organization’s opinion on some aspect of military policy.
Nor can Congress have meant — as a straightforward reading of “utilize” would appear to require — that all of FACA’s restrictions apply if a President consults with his own political party before picking his Cabinet. It was unmistakably not Congress’ intention to intrude on a political party’s freedom to conduct its affairs as it chooses, cf. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 230 (1989), or its ability to advise elected officials who belong to that party, by placing a federal employee in charge of each advisory group meeting and making its minutes public property. FACA was enacted to cure specific ills, above all the wasteful expenditure of public funds for worthless committee meetings and biased proposals; although its reach is extensive, we cannot believe that it was intended to cover every formal and informal consultation between the President or an Executive agency and a group rendering advice. As we said in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892): “[Frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.”
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would “compel an odd result,” Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 509 (1989), we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope. See also, e. g., Church of the Holy Trinity, supra, at 472; FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426, 432 (1986). “The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,” for example, “may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 266 (1981). Even though, as Judge Learned Hand said, “the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing,” nevertheless “it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (CA2), aff’d, 326 U. S. 404 (1945). Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.). See also United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940) (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination’ ”) (citations omitted).
Consideration of FACA’s purposes and origins in determining whether the term “utilized” was meant to apply to the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee is particularly appropriate here, given the importance we have consistently attached to interpreting statutes to avoid deciding difficult constitutional questions where the text fairly admits of a less problematic construction. See infra, at 465-467. It is therefore imperative that we consider indicators of congressional intent in addition to the statutory language before concluding that FACA was meant to cover the ABA Committee’s provision of advice to the Justice Department in connection with judicial nominations.
B
Close attention to FACA’s history is helpful, for FACA did not flare on the legislative scene with the suddenness of a meteor. Similar attempts to regulate the Federal Government’s use of advisory committees were common during the 20 years preceding FACA’s enactment. See Note, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 Harv. J. Legis. 217, 219-221 (1973). An understanding of those efforts is essential to ascertain the intended scope of the term “utilize.”
In 1950, the Justice Department issued guidelines for the operation of federal advisory committees in order to forestall their facilitation of anticompetitive behavior by bringing industry leaders together with Government approval. See Hearings on WOC’s [Without Compensation Government employees] and Government Advisory Groups before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 586-587 (1955) (reprinting guidelines). Several years later, after the House Committee on Government Operations found that the Justice Department’s guidelines were frequently ignored, Representative Fascell sponsored a bill that would have accorded the guidelines legal status. H. R. 7390, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Although the bill would have required agencies to report to Congress on their use of advisory committees and would have subjected advisory committees to various controls, it apparently would not have imposed any requirements on private groups, not established by the Federal Government, whose advice was sought by the Executive. See H. R. Rep. No. 576, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-7 (1957); 103 Cong. Rec. 11252 (1957) (remarks of Rep. Fascell and Rep. Vorys).
Despite Congress’ failure to enact the bill, the Bureau of the Budget issued a directive in 1962 incorporating the bulk of the guidelines. See Perritt & Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees and the Political Process: The Federal Advisory Committee Act After Two Years, 63 Geo. L. J. 725, 731 (1975). Later that year, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 11007, 3 CFR 573 (1959-1963 Comp.), which governed the functioning of advisory committees until FACA’s passage. Executive Order No. 11007 is the probable source of the term “utilize” as later employed in FACA. The Order applied to advisory committees “formed by a department or agency of the Government in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations,” or “not formed by a department or agency, but only during any period when it is being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee.” §2(a) (emphasis added). To a large extent, FACA adopted wholesale the provisions of Executive Order No. 11007. For example, like FACA, Executive Order No. 11007 stipulated that no advisory committee be formed or utilized unless authorized by law or determined as a matter of formal record by an agency head to be in the public interest, § 3; that all advisory committee meetings be held in the presence of a Government employee empowered to adjourn the meetings whenever he or she considered adjournment to be in the public interest, § 6(b); that meetings only occur at the call of, or with the advance approval of, a federal employee, § 6(a); that minutes be kept of the meetings, §§ 6(c), (d); and that committees terminate after two years unless a statute or an agency head decreed otherwise, § 8.
There is no indication, however, that Executive Order No. 11007 was intended to apply to the Justice Department’s consultations with the ABA Committee. Neither President Kennedy, who issued the Order, nor President Johnson, nor President Nixon apparently deemed the ABA Committee to be “utilized” by the Department of Justice in the relevant sense of that term. Notwithstanding the ABA Committee’s highly visible role in advising the Justice Department regarding potential judicial nominees, and notwithstanding the fact that the Order’s requirements were established by the Executive itself rather than Congress, no President or Justice Department official applied them to the ABA Committee. As an entity formed privately, rather than at the Federal Government’s prompting, to .render confidential advice with respect to the President’s constitutionally specified power to nominate federal judges — an entity in receipt of no federal funds and not amenable to the strict management by agency officials envisaged by Executive Order No. 11007— the ABA Committee cannot easily be said to have been “utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee.” That the Executive apparently did not consider the ABA Committee’s activity within the terms of its own Executive Order is therefore unsurprising.
Although FACA’s legislative history evinces an intent to widen the scope of Executive Order No. 11007’s definition of “advisory committee” by including “Presidential advisory committees,” which lay beyond the reach of Executive Order No. 11007, see H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, pp. 9-10 (1970); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1017, p. 4 (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-1098, pp. 3-5, 7 (1972), as well as to augment the restrictions applicable to advisory committees covered by the statute, there is scant reason to believe that Congress desired to bring the ABA Committee within FACA’s net. FACA’s principal purpose was to enhance the public accountability of advisory committees established by the Executive Branch and to reduce wasteful expenditures on them. That purpose could be accomplished, however, without expanding the coverage of Executive Order No. 11007 to include privately organized committees that received no federal funds. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Congress sought nothing more than stricter compliance with reporting and other requirements — which were made more stringent — by advisory committees already covered by the Order and similar treatment of a small class of publicly funded groups created by the President.
The House bill which in its amended form became FACA applied exclusively to advisory committees “established” by statute or by the Executive, whether by a federal agency or by the President himself. H. R. 4383, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(2) (1972). Although the House Committee Report stated that the class of advisory committees was to include “committees which may have been organized before their advice was sought by the President or any agency, but which are used by the President or any agency in the same way as an advisory committee formed by the President himself or the agency itself,” H. R. Rep. No. 92-1017, supra, at 4, it is questionable whether the Report’s authors believed that the Justice Department used the ABA Committee in the same way as it used advisory committees it established. The phrase “used ... in the same way” is reminiscent of Executive Order No. 11007’s reference to advisory committees “utilized ... in the same manner” as a committee established by the Federal Government, and the practice of three administrations demonstrates that Executive Order No. 11007 did not encompass the ABA Committee.
This inference draws support from the earlier House Report which instigated the legislative efforts that culminated in FACA. That Report complained that committees “utilized” by an agency — as opposed to those established directly by an agency — rarely complied with the requirements of Executive Order No. 11007. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, supra, at 15. But it did not cite the ABA Committee or similar advisory committees as willful evaders of the Order. Rather, the Report’s paradigmatic example of a committee “utilized” by an agency for purposes of Executive Order No. 11007 was an advisory committee established by a quasi-public organization in receipt of public funds, such as the National Academy of Sciences. There is no indication in the Report that a purely private group like the ABA Committee that was not formed by the Executive, accepted no public funds, and assisted the Executive in performing a constitutionally specified task committed to the Executive was within the terms of Executive Order No. 11007 or was the type of advisory entity that legislation was urgently needed to address.
Paralleling the initial House bill, the Senate bill that grew into FACA defined “advisory committee” as one “established or organized” by statute, the President, or an Executive agency. S. 3529,92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3(1), (2) (1972). Like the House Report, the accompanying Senate Report stated that the phrase “established or organized” was to be understood in its “most liberal sense, so that when an officer brings together a group by formal or informal means, by contract or other arrangement, and whether or not Federal money is expended, to obtain advice and information, such group is covered by the provisions of this bill.” S. Rep. No. 92-1098, supra, at 8. While the Report manifested a clear intent not to restrict FACA’s coverage to advisory committees funded by the Federal Government, it did not indicate any desire to bring all private advisory committees within FACA’s terms. Indeed, the examples the Senate Report offers — “the Advisory Council on Federal Reports, the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, the National Petroleum Council, advisory councils to the National Institutes of Health, and committees of the national academies where they are utilized and officially recognized as advisory to the President, to an agency, or to a Government official,” ibid,.— are limited to groups organized by, or closely tied to, the Federal Government, and thus enjoying quasi-public status. Given the prominence of the ABA Committee’s role and its familiarity to Members of Congress, its omission from the list of groups formed and maintained by private initiative to offer advice with respect to the President’s nomination of Government officials is telling. If the examples offered by the Senate Committee on Government Operations are representative, as seems fair to surmise, then there is little reason to think that there was any support, at least at the committee stage, for going beyond the terms of Executive Order No. 11007 to regulate comprehensively the workings of the ABA Committee.
It is true that the final version of FACA approved by both Houses employed the phrase “established or utilized,” and that this phrase is more capacious than the word “established” or the phrase “established or organized.” But its genesis suggests that it was not intended to go much beyond those narrower formulations. The words “or utilized” were added by the Conference Committee to the definition included in the House bill. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1403, p. 2 (1972). The Joint Explanatory Statement, however, said simply that the definition contained in the House bill was adopted “with modification.” Id., at 9. The Conference Report offered no indication that the modification was significant, let alone that it would substantially broaden FACA’s application by sweeping within its terms a vast number of private groups, such as the Republican National Committee, not formed at the behest of the Executive or by quasi-public organizations whose opinions the Federal Government sometimes solicits. Indeed, it appears that the House bill’s initial restricted focus on advisory committees established by the Federal Government, in an expanded sense of the word “established,” was retained rather than enlarged by the Conference Committee. In the section dealing with FACA’s range of application, the Conference Report stated: “The Act does not apply to persons or organizations which have contractual relationships with Federal agencies nor to advisory committees not directly established by or for such agencies.” Id., at 10 (emphasis added). The phrase “or utilized” therefore appears to have been added simply to clarify that FACA applies to advisory committees established by the Federal Government in a generous sense of that term, encompassing groups formed indirectly by quasi-public organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences “for” public agencies as well as “by” such agencies themselves.
Read in this way, the term “utilized” would meet the concerns of the authors of House Report No. 91-1731 that advisory committees covered by Executive Order No. 11007, because they were “utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee” — such as the groups organized by the National Academy of Sciences and its affiliates which the Report discussed— would be subject to FACA’s requirements. And it comports well with the initial House and Senate bills’ limited extension to advisory groups “established,” on a broad understanding of that word, by the Federal Government, whether those groups were established by the Executive Branch or by statute or whether they were the offspring of some organization created or permeated by the Federal Government. Read in this way, however, the word “utilized” does not describe the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee. Consultations between the Justice Department and the ABA Committee were not within the purview of Executive Order No. 11007, nor can the ABA Committee be said to have been formed by the Justice Department or by some semiprivate entity the Federal Government helped bring into being.
In sum, a literalistic reading of §3(2) would bring the Justice Department’s advisory relationship with the ABA Committee within FACA’s terms, particularly given FACA’s objective of opening many advisory relationships to public scrutiny except in certain narrowly defined situations. A literalistic reading, however, would catch far more groups and consulting arrangements than Congress could conceivably have intended. And the careful review which this interpretive difficulty warrants of earlier efforts to regulate federal advisory committees and the circumstances surrounding FACA’s adoption strongly suggests that FACA’s definition of “advisory committee” was not meant to encompass the ABA Committee’s relationship with the Justice Department. That relationship seems not to have been within the contemplation of Executive Order No. 11007. And FACA’s legislative history does not display an intent to widen the Order’s application to encircle it. Weighing the deliberately inclusive statutory language against other evidence of congressional intent, it seems to us a close question whether FACA should be construed to apply to the ABA Committee, although on the whole we are fairly confident it should not. There is, however, one additional consideration which, in our view, tips the balance decisively against FACA’s application.
C
“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932) (footnote collecting citations omitted). It has long been an axiom of statutory interpretation that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). See also St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U. S. 772, 780 (1981); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500-501 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961). This approach, we said recently, “not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., supra, at 575. Our reluctance to decide constitutional issues is especially great where, as here, they concern the relative powers of coordinate branches of government. See American Foreign Service Assn. v. Garfinkel, 490 U. S. 153, 161 (1989) (per curiam). Hence, we are loath to conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous constitutional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils.
That construing FACA to apply to the Justice Department’s consultations with the ABA Committee would present formidable constitutional difficulties is undeniable. The District Court declared FACA unconstitutional insofar as it applied to those consultations, because it concluded that FACA, so applied, infringed unduly on the President’s Article II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Whether or not the court’s conclusion was correct, there is no gainsaying the seriousness of these constitutional challenges.
To be sure, “[w]e cannot press statutory construction ‘to the point of disingenuous evasion’ even to avoid a constitutional question.” United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 96 (1985), quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933). But unlike in Locke, where “nothing in the legislative history remotely suggest[ed] a congressional intent contrary to Congress’ chosen words,” 471 U. S., at 96, our review of the regulatory scheme prior to FACA’s enactment and the likely origin of the phrase “or utilized” in FACA’s definition of “advisory committee” reveals that Congress probably did not intend to subject the ABA Committee to FACA’s requirements when the ABA Committee offers confidential advice regarding Presidential appointments to the federal bench. Where the competing arguments based on FACA’s text and legislative history, though both plausible, tend to show that Congress did not desire FACA to apply to the Justice Department’s confidential solicitation of the ABA Committee’s views on prospective judicial nominees, sound sense counsels adherence to our rule of caution. Our unwillingness to resolve important constitutional questions unnecessarily thus solidifies our conviction that FACA is inapplicable.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
The Justice Department does not ordinarily furnish the names of potential Supreme Court nominees to the ABA Committee for evaluation prior to their nomination, although in some instances the President has done so. See Brief for Federal Appellee 4-5.
The ratings now used in connection with Supreme Court nominees are “well qualified,” “not opposed,” and “not qualified.” See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, What It Is and How It Works (1983), reprinted in App. 50.
The Senate regularly requests the ABA Committee to rate Supreme Court nominees if the Justice Department has not already sought the ABA Committee’s opinion. As with nominees for other federal judgeships, the ABA Committee’s rating is made public at confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Federal advisory committees are legion. During fiscal year 1988, 58 federal departments sponsored 1,020 advisory committees. General Services Administration, Seventeenth Annual Report of the President on Federal Advisory Committees 1 (1988). Over 3,500 meetings were held, and close to 1,000 reports were issued. Ibid. Costs for fiscal year 1988 totaled over $92 million, roughly half of which was spent on federal staff support. Id., at 3.
WLF originally sued the ABA Committee, its members, and the American Bar Association, but not the Department of Justice. The District Court dismissed that complaint on the ground that the Justice Department was the proper defendant. Washington Legal Foundation v. American Bar Assn. Standing Comm. on Federal Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353 (DC 1986). WLF’s appeal on the issue whether a committee can be sued directly for noncompliance with FACA is pending before the Court of Appeals. See Brief for Appellant in No. 88-494, p. 10, n. 9.
The American Bar Association was not a party below, but intervened for purposes of this appeal after the District Court rendered judgment.
The Justice Department concedes that appellants have standing to challenge the application of at least some of FACA’s provisions to the Justice Department’s consultations with the ABA Committee. See Brief for Federal Appellee 11-16. Because those challenges present the threshold question whether the ABA Committee constitutes an advisory committee for purposes of FACA, and because we hold that it does not, we need not address the Department’s claim that appellants lack standing to contest the application of certain other provisions.
FACA provides exceptions for advisory committees established or utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal Reserve System, § 4(b), as well as for “any local civic group whose primary function is that of rendering a public service with respect to a Federal program, or any State or local committee, council, board, commission, or similar group established to advise or make recommendations to State or local officials or agencies.” § 4(c). The presence of these exceptions does little to curtail the almost unfettered breadth of a dictionary reading of FACA’s definition of “advisory committee.”
Justice Kennedy agrees with our conclusion that an unreflective reading of the term “utilize” would include the President’s occasional consultations with groups such as the NAACP and committees of the President’s own political party. See post, at 472. Having concluded that groups such as these are covered by the statute when they render advice, however, Justice Kennedy refuses to consult FACA’s legislative history — which he later denounces, with surprising hyperbole, as “unauthori-tative materials,” post, at 473, although countless opinions of this Court, including many written by the concurring Justices, have rested on just such materials — because this result would not, in his estimation, be “absurd,” post, at 472. Although this Court has never adopted so strict a standard for reviewing committee reports, floor debates, and other non-statutory indications of congressional intent, and we explicitly reject that standard today, see also infra, at 455, even if “absurdity” were the test, one would think it was met here. The idea that Members of Congress would vote for a bill subjecting their own political parties to bureaucratic intrusion and public oversight when a President or Cabinet officer consults with party committees concerning political appointments is outlandish. Nor does it strike us as in any way “unhealthy,” post, at 470, or undemocratic, post, at 473, to use all available materials in ascertaining the intent of our elected representatives, rather than read their enactments as requiring what may seem a disturbingly unlikely result, provided only that the result is not “absurd.” Indeed, the sounder and more democratic course, the course that strives for allegiance to Congress’ desires in all cases, not just those where Congress’ statutory directive is plainly sensible or borders on the lunatic, is the traditional approach we reaffirm today.
Neither Public Citizen nor WLF contends that the ABA Committee is a Presidential advisory committee as Congress understood that term. Nor does it appear to be one. In a House Report on the effectiveness of federal advisory committees, which provided the impetus for legislative proposals that eventually produced FACA, the Committee on Government Operations noted that Presidential committees were a special concern because they often consumed large amounts of federal money and were subject to no controls. The House Committee, however, defined “Presidential committee” narrowly, “as a group with either one or all of its members appointed by the President with a function of advising or making recommendations to him.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, p. 10 (1970). None of the ABA Committee’s members are appointed by the President, nor does the ABA Committee report directly to him. The House and Senate Reports accompanying early versions of P’ACA likewise referred to advisory committees “formed” or “established” or “organized” by the President, or to committees created by an Act of Congress to advise the President — categories into which the ABA Committee cannot readily be fitted. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1017, pp. 4-5 (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-1098, p. 7 (1972). Although FACA itself provides a more open-ended definition of “Presidential advisory committee,” applying it to “an advisory committee which advises the President,” §3(4), as set forth in 5 U. S. C. §3(4), that category is a species of “advisory committee,” and does not purport to cover committees advising the President that were not “established or utilized” by him. As FACA’s legislative history reveals, the Presidential advisory committees Congress intended FACA to reach do not include the ABA Committee.
The relevant paragraph of H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, supra, at 15 (footnotes omitted), reads in full:
“The definition, further, states ‘the term also includes any committee, board, . . . that is not formed by a department or agency, when it is being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee.’ Rarely were such committees reported. A great number of the approximately 500 advisory committees of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and its affiliates possibly should be added to the above 1800 advisory committees as the NAS committees fall within the intent and literal definition of advisory committees under Executive Order 11007. The National Academy of Sciences was created by Congress as a semi-private organization for the explicit purpose of furnishing advice to the Government. This is done by the use of advisory committees. The Government meets the expense of investigations and reports prepared by the Academy committees at the request of the Government. Yet, very few of the Academy committees were reported by the agencies and departments of the Government.”
Appellants note as well that regulations of the General Services Administration (GSA), the agency responsible for administering FACA, define a “utilized” advisory committee as
“a committee or other group composed in whole or in part of other than full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government with an established existence outside the agency seeking its advice which the President or agency official(s) adopts, such as through institutional arrangements, as a preferred source from which to obtain advice or recommendations . . . in the same manner as that individual would obtain advice or recommendations from an established advisory committee.” 41 CFR §101-6.1003 (1988).
Appellants argue that the ABA Committee comes within the terms of this regulatory definition, because it exists outside the Justice Department and because it serves as a “preferred source” of advice, inasmuch as the ABA Committee’s recommendations regarding potential judicial nominees are unfailingly requested and accorded considerably more weight than those advanced by other groups. See Brief for Appellant in No. 88-429, pp. 17-18; Brief for Appellant in No. 88-494, pp. 18-20.
This argument is not without force. For several reasons, however, we do not think it conclusive, either alone or together with appellants’ arguments from FACA’s text and legislative history. The first is that the regulation, like FACA’s definition of “advisory committee,” appears too sweeping to be read without qualification unless further investigation of congressional intent confirms that reading. And our review of FACA’s legislative history and purposes demonstrates that the Justice Department, assisting the Executive’s exercise of a constitutional power specifically assigned to the Executive alone, does not use the ABA Committee in what is obviously the “same manner” as federal agencies use other advisory committees established by them or by some other creature of the Federal Government.
Second, appellants’ claim that the regulation applies to the ABA Committee is questionable. GSA publishes an annual report listing advisory committees covered by FACA. Although 17 reports have thus far been issued, not once has the ABA Committee been included in that list. The agency’s own interpretation of its regulation thus appears to contradict the expansive construction appellants ask us to give it — a fact which, though not depriving the regulation’s language of independent force, see post, at 479, nevertheless weakens the claim that the regulation applies to the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee.
Third, even if the ABA Committee were covered by the regulation, appellants’ case would not be appreciably bolstered. Deference to the agency’s expertise in interpreting FACA is less appropriate here than it would be were the regulatory definition a contemporaneous construction of the statute, since the current definition was first promulgated in 1983, see 48 Fed. Reg. 19327 (1983), and did not become final until 1987, see 52 Fed. Reg. 45930 (1987) — more than a decade after FACA’s passage. See,'e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility Dist., 467 U. S. 380, 390 (1984); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 142 (1976) (discounting significance of agency interpretive guideline promulgated eight years after statute’s enactment, although fact that guideline contradicted agency’s earlier position deemed “more important]”); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408 (1961); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933).
In addition, we owe GSA’s regulation diminished deference for a reason independent of its not having been issued contemporaneously with FACA’s passage. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, supra, we held that an agency’s interpretive regulations not promulgated pursuant to express statutory authority should be accorded less weight than “administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of law, or to regulations which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability.” Id., at 141 (citations omitted). GSA’s regulatory definition falls into neither category. Section 7(c), as set forth in 5 U. S. C. App. § 7(c), authorizes the Administrator to “prescribe administrative guidelines and management controls applicable to advisory committees, and, to the maximum extent feasible, provide advice, assistance, and guidance to advisory committees to improve their performance.” It does not empower the agency to issue, in addition to these guidelines, a regulatory definition of “advisory committee” carrying the force of law. Justice Kennedy’s assertion that GSA’s interpretation of FACA’s provisions is “binding,” post, at 478, 480, confuses wish with reality.
In addition, appellee American Bar Association contends that application of FACA to the ABA Committee would impermissibly interfere with the associational and expressive rights guaranteed its members by the First Amendment. See Brief for Appellee ABA 40-48; Brief for People for the American Way Action Fund and Alliance for Justice as Amicus Curiae 22-29. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence. | What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision? | [
"judicial review (national level)",
"judicial review (state level)",
"Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction",
"statutory construction",
"interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order",
"diversity jurisdiction",
"federal common law"
] | [
3
] | sc_authoritydecision |
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES.
No. 531,
Misc.
Decided March 4, 1957.
William H. Timbers for petitioner.
Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, as is leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
By the Act of June 25, 1910, 86 Stat. 866, as now enlarged in 28 U. S. C. § 1915, Congress provided for proceedings in forma pauperis on appeal unless “the trial court certifies in writing that it [the appeal] is not taken in good faith.” Such certification is not final in the sense that the convicted defendant is barred from showing that it was unwarranted and that an appeal should be allowed. Of course, certification by the judge presiding at the trial carries great weight but, necessarily, it cannot be conclusive. Upon a proper showing a Court of Appeals has a duty to displace a District Court’s certification. Moreover, a Court of Appeals must, under Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, afford one who challenges that certification the aid of counsel unless he insists on being his own. Finally, either the defendant or his assigned counsel must be enabled to show that the grounds for seeking an appeal from the judgment of conviction are not frivolous and do not justify the finding that the appeal is not sought in good faith. This does not require that in every such case the United States must furnish the defendant with a stenographic transcript of the trial. It is essential, however, that he be assured some appropriate means — such as the district judge’s notes or an agreed statement by trial counsel — of making manifest the basis of his claim that the District Court committed error in certifying that the desired appeal was not pursued in good faith. See Miller v. United States, 317 U. S. 192, 198.
Since here the Court of Appeals did not assign counsel to assist petitioner in prosecuting his application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and since it does not appear that the Court of Appeals assured petitioner adequate means of presenting it with a fair basis for determining whether the District Court’s certification was warranted, the judgment below must be vacated and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
JACKSON v. TAYLOR, ACTING WARDEN.
No. 619.
Argued April 30, 1957.
Decided June 3, 1957.
Urban P. Van Susteren argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and James W. Booth.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner, a soldier, attacks the validity of a sentence of 20 years he is now serving as the result of his conviction by an Army court-martial of the offense of attempted rape. While serving in the United States Army in Korea, he was found guilty by a general court-martial of the separate offenses of premeditated murder and attempted rape of a Korean woman. He was given an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment for both offenses. The Army board of review found “incorrect in law and fact” the court-martial finding of guilty on the murder charge, but it approved the guilty finding for attempted rape. As to the sentence, the board found “that only so much of the approved sentence as provides for dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement at hard labor for 20 years is correct in law and fact.” As so modified, it approved the sentence. United States v. Fowler, 2 C. M. R. 336. The petitioner makes no attack on his original conviction on the attempted rape charge and its affirmance by the board. But he attacks the sentence of the board alleging that “the action of the Review Board in reserving twenty (20) years of the life sentence imposed by the Court-Martial for the crime of murder, even though it had reserved and set aside the conviction, was null and void.” The District Court denied the writ and discharged the rule to show cause, Jackson v. Humphrey, 135 F. Supp. 776, holding that the board of review on reversing the murder conviction, properly modified the sentence and was not required to order a new trial or to remand the case for resentencing by the general court-martial. The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed. Jackson v. Taylor, 234 F. 2d 611. It held that the board of review upon affirming the attempted rape conviction was authorized to “affirm . . . such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct,” citing Article 66 (c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U. S. C. § 653 (c). We believe the sentence must stand.
Petitioner was tried with two other soldiers and each was convicted of the same offenses, premeditated murder and attempted rape. Each was also sentenced to life imprisonment. The record of the trial was then forwarded to the convening authority where the convictions and sentences were approved. In accordance with military procedure, the record was then forwarded with the convening authority’s approval to a board of review in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. That board, as already stated, found the murder convictions unsupported by the record and set them aside, but sustained the convictions for attempted rape and modified the sentences. The soldiers then sought further review by petition before the United States Court of Military Appeals. No question regarding the authority of the review board to modify the sentences was raised and the petition was denied without opinion. United States v. Fowler, 1 U. S. C. M. A. 713. The soldiers, having started to serve their sentences, were held in different prisons. Each filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district in which he was imprisoned and each raised the same issue of the authority of the board of review to sentence in the manner described. A conflict between the Circuits has resulted and we granted certiorari, limited to the gross sentence question, not only to resolve this conflict but to settle an important question in the administration of the Uniform Code. 352 U. S. 940.
Petitioner claims no deprivation of constitutional rights. He argues only that under military law the board of review should have ordered either a rehearing or that he be released because it was without authority to impose the 20-year sentence.
The review board derives its power from Article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U. S. C. § 653. We are concerned more particularly with subsection (c) of that section. It provides:
“(c) In a case referred to it, the board of review shall act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority. It shall affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved. In considering the record it shall have authority to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses.”
Here the board relied on its power to “affirm . . . such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct . . . .” Petitioner argues, however, that the 20-year sentence was not a “part or amount” of the sentence imposed by the court-martial. He supports this by reference to the action of the law officer of the court-martial who, after the findings of guilt were returned, advised its members in open court of the punishment it might impose. In view of the finding on the murder charge, he told the court-martial it had only two alternatives, a death sentence or life imprisonment. Art. of War 92, 62 Stat. 640. He made no reference to the punishment for attempted rape, the maximum for which is 20 years. Since the court-martial was required to impose a single sentence covering both of the guilty findings, it entered a life sentence. Petitioner claims there was no sentence on the attempted rape conviction and, therefore, the entry of a 20-year sentence thereon by the board was an entirely new and independent imposition which was beyond its power. He bases this conclusion wholly on deduction. He contends that since the law officer advised the court-martial only as to the punishment for murder it follows that it did not sentence him on the attempted rape charge. But why should the officer go through the useless motion of instructing on the attempted rape when the court-martial by law was required to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment? The sentence could have been no heavier unless it were death. What possible good would it have done for the court-martial, if it had been authorized, to add 20 or any other number of years onto a life sentence? In addition to the fact that the Uniform Code authorizes no such sentence we should not construe the Act of Congress to require the doing of a useless act.
But, the petitioner says, simple arithmetic shows that no sentence was imposed on the attempted rape finding. He reasons that the offense of premeditated murder carries a minimum punishment of life imprisonment, the exact sentence he received. The sentence therefore included no punishment covering the attempted rape finding he claims. It is true that the sentence was not broken down as to offenses. That is not permitted. However, the petitioner in his analysis overlooks entirely the requirement of military law that only the entry of a single gross sentence for both of the offenses is permitted. This Court has approved this practice. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 393 (1902). See also McDonald v. Lee, 217 F. 2d 619, 622 (1954); Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1920), 404. The sentence here was a gross sentence. It covered both the convictions. What the petitioner would have us do is to strike down this long practice, not only approved over the years by the Congress but by our cases. This we cannot do.
The question remains whether the board had the authority to modify the life sentence to 20 years after the murder conviction was set aside. Reviewing authorities have broad powers under military law. Unlike a civilian trial in most jurisdictions, the initial sentence under military law is imposed by the members of the court-martial. Otherwise the court-martial performs functions more like those of a jury than a court. It is composed of laymen. See Art. 25 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 116, 50 U. S. C. § 589. The powers of review, modification, and sentence-adjustment under the Uniform Code rest elsewhere than on this body of laymen.
Review of a court-martial conviction is first provided by the convening authority — the commanding officer who directed that the case bé tried before a court-martial. He is empowered to reduce a sentence though he cannot increase it. He can weigh facts, determine credibility of witnesses, disapprove findings of guilt which he believes erroneous in law or fact, and determine sentence appropriateness without regard to what the court-martial might have done had it considered only the approved findings. Art. 64 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U. S. C. §651. He has other broad powers. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951), c. 17. Here the convening authority approved the action of the court-martial.
The next stage of review is that with which we are particularly concerned. It is conducted by the board of review composed of legally-trained officers. Such boards first received statutory recognition in 1920. Art. of War 50%, 41 Stat. 797-799. At that time Congress gave them power to review, with the Judge Advocate General, records for legal sufficiency. By 1949 this power was increased to weigh facts, though, as petitioner argues, these boards still did not have power to determine sentence appropriateness. Art. of War 50 (g), 62 Stat. 637. Such power was, however, given to the Judge Advocate General and a Judicial Council.
Against this background of broad powers of review under military law, Congress began the drafting of the new Uniform Code of Military Justice. Their work culminated, so far as we are here concerned, with Article 66 (c), supra. Petitioner finds the language of this section ambiguous and argues that any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. That would be true if there were ambiguity in the section. But the words are clear. The board may “affirm ... such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct . . . That is precisely what the review board did here. It affirmed such part, 20 years, of the sentence, life imprisonment, as it found correct in fact and law for the offense of attempted rape. Were the words themselves unclear, the teachings from the legislative history of the section would compel the same result.
The Uniform Code was drafted by a committee chair-manned by Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Jr. In testifying before the Senate Subcommittee which considered the bill, Professor Morgan stated with reference to the review board that it now
“has very extensive powers. It may review law, facts, and practically, sentences; because the provisions stipulate that the board of review shall affirm only so much of the sentence as it finds to be justified by the whole record. It gives the board of review . . . the power to review facts, law and sentence . . . Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H. R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 42.
Military officials opposed giving the review boards power to alter sentences. Id., at 262, 285. The Subcommittee nevertheless decided the boards should have that power. Id., at 311. The Committee Report to the Senate augments the conclusion that the boards of review were to have the power to alter sentences. A study of the legislative history of the Code in the House of Representatives leads to the same conclusion. See H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 31; 95 Cong. Rec. 5729. Article 66 was enacted in the language approved by the committees. It is manifest then that it was the intent of Congress that a board of review should exercise just such authority as was exercised here.
Boards of review have been altering sentences from the inception of the Code provision. These alterations have been attacked but have found approval in the courts as is shown by the list of cases collected in the opinion of Judge Hastie in the Court of Appeals. 234 F. 2d, at 614, n. 3. Petitioner objects, however, that the board of review should not have imposed the maximum sentence for attempted rape because the court-martial might have imposed a lesser sentence had it considered the matter initially. But this is an objection that might properly be addressed to Congress. It has laid down the military law and it can take it away or restrict it. The Congress could have required a court-martial to enter a sentence on each separate offense just as is done in the civilian courts. The board of review would then know the attitude of the court-martial as to punishment on each of its findings of guilt. But this the Congress did not do. The argument, therefore, falls since it is based on pure conjecture. No one could say what sentence the court-martial would have imposed if it had found petitioner guilty only of attempted rape. But Congress avoided the necessity for conjecture and speculation by placing authority in the board of review to correct not only the findings as to guilt but the sentence as well. Likewise the apportionment of the sentence that the court-martial intended as between the offenses would be pure speculation. But because of the gross sentence procedure in military law we need not concern ourselves with these problems. Military law provides that one aggregate sentence must be imposed and the board of review may modify that sentence in the manner it finds appropriate. To say in this case that a gross sentence was not imposed is to shut one’s eyes to the realities of military law and custom.
Finally the petitioner suggests that the case should be remanded for a rehearing before the court-martial on the question of the sentence. We find no authority in the Uniform Code for such a procedure and the petitioner points to none. The reason is, of course, that the Congress intended that the board of review should exercise this power. This is true because the nature of a court-martial proceeding makes it impractical and unfeasible to remand for the purpose of sentencing alone. See United States v. Keith, 1 U. S. C. M. A. 442, 451, 4 C. M. R. 34, 43 (1952). Even petitioner admits that it would now, six years after the trial, be impractical to attempt to reconvene the court-martial that decided the case originally. A court-martial has neither continuity nor situs and often sits to hear only a single case. Because of the nature of military service, the members of a court-martial may be scattered throughout the world within a short time after a trial is concluded. Recognizing the impossibility of remand to the same court-martial, petitioner suggests as an alternative that the case should be remanded for a rehearing before a new court-martial. He admits that it would now be impractical for such a new court-martial to hear all of the evidence, and that the court would have to make its sentence determination on the basis of what it could learn from reading the record. Such a procedure would merely substitute one group of nonparticipants in the original trial for another. Congress thought the board of review could modify sentences when appropriate more expeditiously, more intelligently, and more fairly. Acting on a national basis the board of review can correct disparities in sentences and through its legally-trained personnel determine more appropriately the proper disposition to be made of the cases. Congress must have known of the problems inherent in rehearing and review proceedings for the procedures were adopted largely from prior law. It is not for us to question the judgment of the Congress in selecting the process it chose.
Affirmed.
The Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951), App. 8, at 521, specifically provides, inter alia: “The court will adjudge a single sentence for all the offenses of which the accused was found guilty.” This sentence is known as an “aggregate” or “gross” sentence. A court-martial may not impose separate sentences for each finding of guilt, but may impose only a single, unitary sentence covering all of the guilty findings in their entirety, no matter how many such findings there may be.
Carl De Coster, one of the codefendants with petitioner, was released on an order of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See De Coster v. Madigan, 223 F. 2d 906 (1955). The other code-fendant, Harriel Fowler, was denied release by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Wilkinson v. Fowler, 234 F. 2d 615 (1956). While no petition was filed in the De Coster case, we granted certio-rari in both the petitioner’s and Fowler’s cases.
Since this action was filed this section has been revised and recodi-fied as 70A Stat. 59, 10 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 866. The changes in language are not pertinent to this case. Other sections of the Uniform Code are cited in the form and source in which they appeared during the course of this litigation. The Uniform Code now appears in 70A Stat. 36-78, 10 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) §§ 801-934.
See note 1, supra.
For a detailed analysis and history of review powers under military law see Fratcher, Appellate Review in American Military Law, 14 Mo. L. Rev. 15 (1949).
Art. 66(a) of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U. S. C. § 653 (a) provides:
“(a) The Judge Advocate General of each of the armed forces shall constitute in his office one or more boards of review, each composed of not less than three officers or civilians, each of whom shall be a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State of the United States.”
See Art. of War 51 (a), 62 Stat. 638, and Art. of War 49, 62 Stat. 635.
“The Board of Review shall affirm a finding of guilty of an offense or a lesser included offense ... if it determines that the finding conforms to the weight of the evidence and that there has been no error of law which materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused. . . . The Board may set aside, on the basis of the record, any part of a sentence, either because it is illegal or because it is inappropriate. It is contemplated that this power will be exercised to establish uniformity of sentences throughout the armed forces.” S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 28.
Commentators have recognized this power of sentence review since the enactment of the Code. See, e. g., Currier and Kent, The Boards of Review of the Armed Services, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 241 (1953). “The greatest single change brought about in the powers and duties of the boards of review by the Uniform Code of Military Justice is the power of the board to affirm only so much of the sentence in a given case as it finds appropriate.” Id., at 242. See also 65 Yale L. J. 413.
Petitioner complains that the 20-year sentence for attempted rape was excessive. He argues that because the court-martial gave him the minimum sentence for premeditated murder, it would not have given the maximum sentence for attempted rape. We need not speculate on what the court-martial would have done, nor will we interfere with the discretion exercised by the board of review. It held that in the “vicious circumstances of this case,” 20 years was an appropriate sentence. Furthermore, since the sentence was legally imposed, its severity is not reviewable on habeas corpus in the civil courts. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 401 (1902).
The United States Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Field, 5 U. S. C. M. A. 379, 18 C. M. R. 3 (1955), hesitatingly suggested in dictum that a convening authority might return a case to a court-martial solely for the purpose of a reassessment of sentence on the findings of guilt affirmed by him. The court indicated that such a practice would be unlikely for “obvious and compelling reasons of a practical character.” Id., at 385, 18 C. M. R., at 9. It explicitly refused to express an opinion concerning the desirability of the practice. There, of course, was no suggestion that the practice was mandatory for the convening authority has, just as has the board of review, the power to modify a sentence to make it appropriate. See also United States v. Voorhees, 4 U. S. C. M. A. 509, 543, 16 C. M. R. 83, 117 (1954).
It is well to point out that the Uniform Code permits the convening authority under limited circumstances to return a case for “reconsideration and revision” to a court-martial composed of “only ... the members of the court who participated in the findings and sentence.” See Art. 62 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 127, 50 U. S. C. § 649, and Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951), at 130. This would be impossible after the passage of time in nearly every case since the original court-martial could not be reassembled. On the other hand, if resentencing is a limited type of rehearing, the Uniform Code requires the rehearing to “take place before a court-martial composed of members not members of the court-martial which first heard the case.” (Emphasis added.) Art. 63 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 127, 50 U. S. C. § 650. Such a court-martial would be no more capable — if as capable — as a board of review. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
LOUISIANA et al. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 67.
Argued January 26-27, 1965.
Decided March 8, 1965.
Harry J. Kron, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Louisiana, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, and Carroll Buck, First Assistant Attorney General.
Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Harold H. Greene and David Rubin.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to authority granted in 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (c) (1958 ed., Supp. V), the Attorney General brought this action on behalf of the United States in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the State of Louisiana, the three members of the State Board of Registration, and the Director-Secretary of the Board. The complaint charged that the defendants by following and enforcing unconstitutional state laws had been denying and unless restrained by the court would continue to deny Negro citizens of Louisiana the right to vote, in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (a) (1958 ed.) and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The case was tried and after submission of evidence, the three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1958 ed.), gave judgment for the United States. 225 F. Supp. 353. The State and the other defendants appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 377 U. S. 987.
The complaint alleged, and the District Court found, that beginning with the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution of 1898, when approximately 44% of all the registered voters in the State were Negroes, the State had put into effect a successful policy of denying Negro citizens the right to vote because of their race. The 1898 constitution adopted what was known as a “grandfather clause,” which imposed burdensome requirements for registration thereafter but exempted from these future requirements any person who had been entitled to vote before January 1, 1867, or who was the son or grandson of such a person. Such a transparent expedient for disfranchising Negroes, whose ancestors had been slaves until 1863 and not entitled to vote in Louisiana before 1867, was held unconstitutional in 1915 as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, in a case involving a similar Oklahoma constitutional provision. Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347. Soon after that decision Louisiana, in 1921, adopted a new constitution replacing the repudiated “grandfather clause” with what the complaint calls an “interpretation test,” which required that an applicant for registration be able to “give a reasonable interpretation” of any clause in the Louisiana Constitution or the Constitution of the United States. From the adoption of the 1921 interpretation test until 1944, the District Court’s opinion stated, the percentage of registered voters in Louisiana who were Negroes never exceeded one percent. Prior to 1944 Negro interest in voting in Louisiana had been slight, largely because the State’s white primary law kept Negroes from voting in the Democratic Party primary election, the only election that mattered in the political climate of that State. In 1944, however, this Court invalidated the substantially identical white primary law of Texas, and with the explicit statutory bar to their voting in the primary removed and because of a generally heightened political interest, Negroes in increasing numbers began to register in Louisiana. The white primary system had been so effective in barring Negroes from voting that the “interpretation test” as a disfranchising device had been ignored over the years. Many registrars continued to ignore it after 1944, and in the next dozen years the proportion of registered voters who were Negroes rose from two-tenths of one percent to approximately 15% by March 1956. This fact, coupled with this Court’s 1954 invalidation of laws requiring school segregation, prompted the State to try new devices to keep the white citizens in control. The Louisiana Legislature created a committee which became known as the “Segregation Committee” to seek means of accomplishing this goal. The chairman of this committee also helped to organize a semiprivate group called the Association of Citizens Councils, which thereafter acted in close cooperation with the legislative committee to preserve white supremacy. The legislative committee and the Citizens Councils set up programs, which parish voting registrars were required to attend, to instruct the registrars on how to promote white political control. The committee and the Citizens Councils also began a wholesale challenging of Negro names already on the voting rolls, with the result that thousands of Negroes, but virtually no whites, were purged from the rolls of voters. Beginning in the middle 1950’s registrars of at least 21 parishes began to apply the interpretation test. In 1960 the State Constitution was amended to require every applicant thereafter to “be able to understand” as well as “give a reasonable interpretation” of any section of the State or Federal Constitution “when read to him by the registrar.” The State Board of Registration in cooperation with the Segregation Committee issued orders that all parish registrars must strictly comply with the new provisions.
The interpretation test, the court found, vested in the voting registrars a virtually uncontrolled discretion as to who should vote and who should not. Under the State’s statutes and constitutional provisions the registrars, without any objective standard to guide them, determine the manner in which the interpretation test is to be given, whether it is to be oral or written, the length and complexity of the sections of the State or Federal Constitution to be understood and interpreted, and what interpretation is to be considered correct. There was ample evidence to support the District Court’s finding that registrars in the 21 parishes where the test was found to have been used had exercised their broad powers to deprive otherwise qualified Negro citizens of their right to vote; and that the existence of the test as a hurdle to voter qualification has in itself deterred and will continue to deter Negroes from attempting to register in Louisiana.
Because of the virtually unlimited discretion vested by the Louisiana laws in the registrars of voters, and because in the 21 parishes where the interpretation test was applied that discretion had been exercised to keep Negroes from voting because of their race, the District Court held the interpretation test invalid on its face and as applied, as a violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (a). The District Court enjoined future use of the test in the State, and with respect to the 21 parishes where the invalid interpretation test was found to have been applied, the District Court also enjoined use of a newly enacted “citizenship” test, which did not repeal the interpretation test and the validity of which was not challenged in this suit, unless a reregistration of all voters in those parishes is ordered, so that there would be no voters in those parishes who had not passed the same test.
I.
We have held this day in United States v. Mississippi, ante, p. 128, that the Attorney General has power to bring suit against a State and its officials to protect the voting rights of Negroes guaranteed by 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (a) and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. There can be no doubt from the evidence in this case that the District Court was amply justified in finding that Louisiana’s interpretation test, as written and as applied, was part of a successful plan to deprive Louisiana Negroes of their right to vote. This device for accomplishing unconstitutional discrimination has been little if any less successful than was the “grandfather clause” invalidated by this Court’s decision in Guinn v. United States, supra, 50 years ago, which when that clause was adopted in 1898 had seemed to the leaders of Louisiana a much preferable way of assuring white political supremacy. The Governor of Louisiana stated in 1898 that he believed that the “grandfather clause” solved the problem of keeping Negroes from voting “in a much more upright and manly fashion” than the method adopted previously by the States of Mississippi and South Carolina, which left the qualification of applicants to vote “largely to the arbitrary discretion of the officers administering the law.” A delegate to the 1898 Louisiana Constitutional Convention also criticized an interpretation test because the “arbitrary power, lodged with the registration officer, practically places his decision beyond the pale of judicial review; and he can enfranchise or disfranchise voters at his own sweet will and pleasure without let or hindrance.”
But Louisianans of a later generation did place just such arbitrary power in the hands of election officers who have used it with phenomenal success to keep Negroes from voting in the State. The State admits that the statutes and provisions of the state constitution establishing the interpretation test “vest discretion in the registrars of voters to determine the qualifications of applicants for registration” while imposing “no definite and objective standards upon registrars of voters for the administration of the interpretation test.” And the District Court found that “Louisiana ... provides no effective method whereby arbitrary and capricious action by registrars of voters may be prevented or redressed.” The applicant facing a registrar in Louisiana thus has been compelled to leave his voting fate to that official’s uncontrolled power to determine whether the applicant’s understanding of the Federal or State Constitution is satisfactory. As the evidence showed, colored people, even some with the most advanced education and scholarship, were declared by voting registrars with less education to have an unsatisfactory understanding of the Constitution of Louisiana or of the United States. This is not a test but a trap, sufficient to stop even the most brilliant man on his way to the voting booth. The cherished right of people in a country like ours to vote cannot be obliterated by the use of laws like this, which leave the voting fate of a citizen to the passing whim or impulse of an individual registrar. Many of our cases have pointed out the invalidity of laws so completely devoid of standards and restraints. See, e. g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. Squarely in point is Schnell v. Davis, 336 U. S. 933, affirming 81 F. Supp. 872 (D. C. S. D. Ala.), in which we affirmed a district court judgment striking down as a violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments an Alabama constitutional provision restricting the right to vote in that State to persons who could “understand and explain any article of the Constitution of the United States” to the satisfaction of voting registrars. We likewise affirm here the District Court’s holding that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and statutes which require voters to satisfy registrars of their ability to “understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any section” of the Federal or Louisiana Constitution violate the Constitution. And we agree with the District Court that it specifically conflicts with the prohibitions against discrimination in voting because of race found both in the Fifteenth Amendment and 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (a) to subject citizens to such an arbitrary power as Louisiana has given its registrars under these laws.
H-i k-i
This leaves for consideration the District Court’s decree. We bear in mind that the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future. Little if any objection is raised to the propriety of the injunction against further use of the interpretation test as it stood at the time this action was begun, and without further discussion we affirm that part of the decree.
Appellants’ chief argument against the decree concerns the effect which should be given the new voter-qualification test adopted by the Board of Registration in August 1962, pursuant to statute and subsequent constitutional amendment after this suit had been filed. The new test, says the State, is a uniform, objective, standardized “citizenship” test administered to all prospective voters alike. Under it, according to the State, an applicant is “required to indiscriminately draw one of ten cards. Each card has six multiple choice questions, four of which the applicant must answer correctly.” Confining itself to the allegations of the complaint, the District Court did not pass upon the validity of the new test, but did take it into consideration in formulating the decree. The court found that past discrimination against Negro applicants in the 21 parishes where the interpretation test had been applied had greatly reduced the proportion of potential Negro voters who were registered as compared with the proportion of whites. Most if not all of those white voters had been permitted to register on far less rigorous terms than colored applicants whose applications were rejected. Since the new “citizenship” test does not provide for a reregistration of voters already accepted by the registrars, it would affect only applicants not already registered, and would not disturb the eligibility of the white voters who had been allowed to register while discriminatory practices kept Negroes from doing so. In these 21 parishes, while the registration of white persons was increasing, the number of Negroes registered decreased from 25,361 to 10,351. Under these circumstances we think that the court was quite right to decree that, as to persons who met age and residence requirements during the years in which the interpretation test was used, use of the new “citizenship” test should be postponed in those 21 parishes where registrars used the old interpretation test until those parishes have ordered a complete reregistration of voters, so that the new test will apply alike to all or to none. Cf. United States v. Duke, 332 F. 2d 759, 769-770 (C. A. 5th Cir.).
It also was certainly an appropriate exercise of the District Court’s discretion to order reports to be made every month concerning the registration of voters in these 21 parishes, in order that the court might be informed as to whether the old discriminatory practices really had been abandoned in good faith. The need to eradicate past evil effects and to prevent the continuation or repetition in the future of the discriminatory practices shown to be so deeply engrained in the laws, policies, and traditions of the State of Louisiana, completely justified the District Court in entering the decree it did and in retaining jurisdiction of the entire case to hear any evidence of discrimination in other parishes and' to enter such orders as justice from time to time might require.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan considers that the constitutional conclusions reached in this opinion can properly be based only on the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment. In all other respects, he fully subscribes to this opinion.
“All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.” 16 Stat. 140, 42 U. S. C. § 1971 (a) (1958 ed.).
The appellants did not present any evidence. By stipulation all the Government’s evidence was presented in written form.
La. Const. 1898, Art. 197, § 5. See generally Eaton, The Suffrage Clause in the New Constitution of Louisiana, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 279.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1868 for the first time permitted Negroes to vote. La. Const. 1868, Art. 98.
La. Const. 1921, Art. VIII, §§ 1 (c), 1 (d).
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483.
La. Acts 1960, No. 613, amending La. Const. Art. VIII, § 1 (d), previously implemented in La. Rev. Stat. § 18:36. Under the 1921 constitution the requirement that an applicant be able “to understand” a section “read to him by the registrar” applied only to illiterates. La. Const. 1921, Art. VIII, § 1 (d); compare id., § 1 (c).
“Although the vote-abridging purpose and effect of the [interpretation] test render it per se invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment, it is also per se invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. The vices cannot be cured by an injunction enjoining its unfair application.” 225 F. Supp., at 391-392.
It is argued that the members of the State Board of Registration were not properly made defendants because they were “mere conduits,” without authority to enforce state registration requirements. The Board has the power and duty to supervise administration of the interpretation test and prescribe rules and regulations for the registrars to follow in applying it. La. Rev. Stat. § 18:191 A; La. Const. Art. VIII, § 18. The Board also is by statute directed to fashion and administer the new “citizenship” test. La. Rev. Stat. § 18:191 A; La. Const. Art. VIII, § 18. And the Board has power to remove any registrar from office “at will.” La. Const. Art. VIII, § 18. In these circumstances the Board members were properly made defendants. Compare United States v. Mississippi, ante, at 141-142.
There is also no merit in the argument that the registrars, who were not defendants in this suit, were indispensable parties. The registrars have no personal interest in the outcome of this case and are bound to follow the directions of the State Board of Registration.
Louisiana Senate Journal, 1898, p. 33.
Ibid.
Kernan, The Constitutional Convention of 1898 and its Work, Proceedings of the Louisiana Bar Association for 1898-1899, pp. 59-60.
225 F. Supp., at 384.
La. Acts 1962, No. 62, amending La. Rev. Stat. 18:191A.
La. Acts 1962, No. 539, amending La. Const. Art. VIII, § 18.
Like the District Court, we express no opinion as to the constitutionality of the new “citizenship” test. Any question as to that point is specifically reserved. That test was never challenged in the complaint or any other pleading. The District Court said “we repeat that this decision does not touch upon the constitutionality of the citizenship test as a state qualification for voting.” 225 F. Supp., at 397. The Solicitor General did not challenge the validity of the new test in this Court either in briefs or in oral argument, but instead recognized specifically that that issue was not before us in this case. And at oral argument in this Court the attorney for the United States stated that the Government has pending in a lower court a new suit challenging registration procedures in Louisiana “under the new regime,” i. e., employed subsequent to the invalidation of the interpretation test in this case. The new “citizenship” test, he said, “is simply not an issue in this proceeding and was not invalidated in the lower court and we are not here challenging it.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the case was heard by a three-judge federal district court. Beginning in the early 1900s, Congress required three-judge district courts to hear certain kinds of cases. More modern-day legislation has reduced the kinds of lawsuits that must be heard by such a court. As a result, the frequency is less for the Burger Court than for the Warren Court, and all but nonexistent for the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. | Was the case heard by a three-judge federal district court? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_threejudgefdc |
UNITED STATES v. BUFFALO SAVINGS BANK.
No. 96.
Argued December 3, 1962.—
Decided January 7, 1963.
John B. Jones, Jr. argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Stephen J. Poliak, Joseph Kovner and George F. Lynch.
John Horace Little argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent.
Laurens Williams and William Poole filed a brief for the American Bar Association, as auiicus curiae, urging affirmance.
Per Curiam.
In 1946, respondent Buffalo Savings Bank made a loan secured by a real estate mortgage. The United States filed notice of a federal tax lien against the mortgagor’s property in 1953. Thereafter, in 1957 and 1958, liens for unpaid real estate taxes and other local assessments attached to the property. The bank instituted foreclosure proceedings, naming the United States as a party. The trial court’s decree ordered the property sold and the payment of local real estate taxes and other assessments as part of the expenses of the sale prior to the satisfaction of the tax lien of the United States. The United States appealed and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, only to be reversed in turn by the New York Court of Appeals, which reinstated the trial court’s judgment on the ground that the federal tax lien attached only to the mortgagor’s interest in the surplus after the foreclosure sale and therefore was subordinate to the local taxes as “expenses of sale.” 11 N. Y. 2d 31, 181 N. E. 2d 413.
We must reverse the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals for failure to take proper account of United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81. That case rules this one, for there the Court quite clearly held that federal tax liens have priority over subsequently accruing liens for local real estate taxes, even though the burden of the local taxes in the event of a shortage would fall upon the mortgagee whose claim under state law is subordinate to local tax liens.
A similar argument based on the general character of the ■ federal tax lien was made and specifically rejected in New Britain. Moreover, the state may not avoid the priority rules of the federal tax lien by the formalistic device of characterizing subsequently accruing local liens as expenses of sale. Cf. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361. Finally, respondent’s reliance on United States v. Brosnan, 363 U. S. 237, and Crest Finance Co. v. United States, 368 U. S. 347, is misplaced. Brosnan was concerned with foreclosure procedures, not with priorities, and in connection with the latter subject relied upon New Britain among other cases. Crest is wholly inapposite here.
The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. KORELL.
No. 384.
Argued February 7, 1950. —
Decided June 5, 1950.
Arnold Raum argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack and Oscar H. Davis.
Paul L. Peyton argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Nat Schmulowitz and Peter S. Sommer filed a brief for Shoong et al., as amici curiae, supporting respondent.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The tax consequences of a purchase of convertible bonds are in issue here. In August, 1944, respondent, an individual taxpayer, purchased certain American Telephone and Telegraph Company bonds, each having a face value of $100, at a premium price averaging slightly in excess of $121. Each bond was convertible into a share of common stock, at the option of the bondholder, upon the payment of $40. The market price of the stock was over $163 when respondent made his bond purchases. The bonds were callable prior to maturity date according to a schedule appearing in the indenture; had the corporation given appropriate notice at the dates of respondent’s purchases, the bonds would have been redeemed at $104.
In his 1944 income tax return, respondent claimed a deduction in excess of $8,600 for amortizable bond premium. He computed his deduction on each bond as the difference between his purchase price, $121, and the call price, $104. This computation is concededly correct if the deduction is allowable. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner here, refused to allow any such deduction. His theory was that § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code establishing the deduction for “amortizable bond premium” did not include premium paid for the conversion privilege. A contrary view of the statute was adopted by the Tax Court. 10 T. C. 1001 (1948). The court below affirmed, holding that respondent was entitled to the amortization deduction. 176 F. 2d 152 (1949). We granted certiorari, 338 U. S. 890 (1949), to resolve the conflict between the decision below and that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Shoong, 177 F. 2d 131 (1949).
Prior to 1942, bond premium was irrelevant for tax purposes. Whether or not the purchase price exceeded the face value of the bond, the holder considered the full price as the basis for capital gain or loss, and reported all taxable interest received as income. In presenting its 1942 tax proposals, however, the Treasury adopted the view that each receipt of interest is not entirely income but is partially a restoration of capital. Its spokesman pointed to the consequent discrimination against holders of taxable bonds: they were being taxed on a return of capital, while holders of tax-exempt bonds were not. To remedy this inequity, the Treasury recommended that amortization of premium be permitted in the case of taxable bonds, and that the basis for capital gain or loss for all bonds be adjusted by the amount of deduction allowable for taxables and disallowable for tax-exempts. These recommendations were ultimately included in the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 822, as §§ 113 and 125 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 125 contains four subsections. In (a), the general rule is established, applicable “In the case of any bond . . .,” that the deduction for amortizable bond premium may not be taken if the interest is tax-exempt, but may be if the bond interest is taxable. Taxpayers holding bonds in the latter category may elect whether or not to amortize in accordance with rules laid down in subsection (c). Subsection (b) defines the method of computing “the amount of bond premium, in the case of the holder of any bond Petitioner urges that this does not define the kind of bond premium which is amortizable; respondent contends that this provision establishes a mandatory computation applicable to any bond premium. Subsection (d) consists of a general definition of “bond” and certain exceptions thereto, chiefly bonds held for sale or as stock in trade. That the securities purchased by respondent fall within the general definition and without the exceptions is undisputed.
There can be no doubt that , the callability and convertibility of these bonds do not remove them from the reach of § 125. The role of such bonds was specifically brought into the congressional discussion by at least one witness at the hearings. And the Congress rendered unmistakably clear answers in the language of the Act, e. g., by express reference to “earlier call date,” § 125 (b) (1), and in both Committee Reports. “The fact that a bond is callable or convertible into stock does not of itself prevent the application of this section. In the case of a callable bond, the earliest call date will, for the purposes of this section, be considered as the maturity date. Hence, the total premium is required to be spread over the period from the date as of which the basis of the bond is established down to the earliest call date, rather than down to the maturity date. In the case of a convertible bond, if the option to convert the bond into stock rests with the owner of the bond [as it did in this case], the bond is within the purview of this section.” The express decision of Congress to include the type of bonds purchased by respondent is of course binding on the courts.
Petitioner concedes that the bonds purchased by respondent are within the reach of § 125, but he urges that this case does not involve the kind of premium which Congress had in mind. The argument is that this premium was paid for the conversion privilege, whereas Congress intended to include only that premium (entitled “true” premium by petitioner) which is paid for securing a higher rate of interest than the market average and for nothing else. We reject this argument as inapposite to the structure of the statute, unsupported by the legislative history and inconsistent with the normal use of the term “bond premium.”
As Congress wrote the statute, the scope of “bond premium” is adequately denoted by defining “bond.” There was no need for Congress to qualify both words in order to make its meaning clear; “premium” as an isolated term may not be defined in the statute nor explained in the legislative history, but “premium” is never used in the statute apart from its mate “bond.” No attempt to define and distinguish the reasons for paying premium mark the pertinent Treasury Regulations 111, § 29.125. They mirror the structure of the statute and are constructed in terms of “bonds.” Again, we note that the bonds here involved are without question embraced by the statute.
To be sure, Congress might have proceeded by defining “premium” (and “true” premium) rather than, or as well as “bond.” But we cannot reject the clear and precise avenue of expression actually adopted by the Congress because in a particular case we may know, if the bonds are disposed of prior to our decision, that the public revenues would be maximized by adopting another statutory path. Congress was legislating for the generality of cases. It not only created a new deduction but also required that the basis be adjusted to the extent of the deduction allowable for taxables and disallowable for tax-exempts. The adjustment increased the revenue potential, for the lower basis obviously raised possible capital gain and lowered allowable capital loss. In the case of tax-exempt bonds, which had a total par value in 1942 of over 58.5 billion dollars, there was no allowable deduction to be set off against this new revenue potential. In the case of taxable bonds, whether the tax paid on capital gains will exceed the tax avoided by the deduction depends in each particular instance upon the uncertainties of market fluctuations and tax rates and the cluster of other factors which induces a bondholder to act and determines his tax in given years. These factors may combine in a specific case to produce an effect upon revenue which to some may appear too drastic for Congress to have intended. But there is nothing in this record to indicate that Congress or the Treasury anticipated that the total long-run effect of §§ 113 and 125 on the yield from both taxables and tax-exempts would be to decrease federal revenue. And even if Congress had expected that some loss of revenue would be entailed, it might have decided that more equal treatment of taxpayers was more important than possible revenue loss; it cannot be argued that Congress lacked the legislative discretion to have reached such a conclusion. If in practice these sections are causing such loss of revenue as to indicate that Congress may have erred in its balancing of the competing considerations involved, the amendment must obviously be enacted by the Congress and not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or this Court.
The legislative history fails to intimate that Congress intended to confine the deduction to bonds the premium on which was paid for a higher-than-market interest rate. At most, petitioner’s presentation of the legislative materials suggests that Congress may have had the bondholder who was seeking a higher interest rate primarily in mind; but it does not establish that Congress in fact legislated with reference to him exclusively. Congress, and the Treasury in advising Congress, may well have concluded that the best manner of affording him relief and correcting the inequitable treatment of bondholders whose interest receipts were taxable, was to define the scope of the amendment by reference to types of bonds rather than causes of premium payment.
As “bond premium” is used by accountants and other writers in the securities field, it is any payment in addition to face value. There is no suggestion that the words have only a limited significance, echoing petitioner’s “true” premium, applicable solely to that extra price caused by the desire to obtain a higher than average interest yield. On the contrary, some authors have noted the variety of causes which induce the payment of. bond premium, and the practical impossibility of disentangling and isolating them for the purpose of relative evaluation, as would be required if petitioner’s reading of the statute were upheld We adopt the view that “bond premium” in § 125 means any extra payment, regardless of the reason therefor, in accordance with the firmly established principle of tax law that the ordinary meaning of terms is persuasive of their statutory meaning.
We conclude that Congress made no distinctions based upon the inducements for paying the premium. Congress delimited the bond premium it wished to make amortizable in terms of categories of bonds, and there is no doubt that respondent purchased bonds which are included within the purview of § 125. Respondent is therefore entitled to this deduction and the judgment below is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black dissents. He believes that this case should be decided in accordance with, and for the reasons given by, the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Shoong, 177 F. 2d 131 (1949).
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U. S. 109, 116 (1926); cf. Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 561 (1932).
Statement of Randolph Paul, then Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury and subsequently General Counsel of the Department, 1 Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on-Revenue Revisions of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942).
Int. Rev. Code § 125, titled “Amortizable Bond Premium,” reads as follows:
“(a) General rule. In the case of any bond, as defined in subsection (d), the following rules shall apply to the amortizable bond premium (determined under subsection (b)) on the bond for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941:
“(1) Interest wholly or partially taxable. In the case of a bond (other than a bond the interest on which is exeludible from gross income), the amount of the amortizable bond premium for the taxable year shall be allowed as a deduction.
“(2) Interest wholly tax-exempt. In the case of any bond the interest on which is excludible from gross income, no deduction shall be allowed for the amortizable bond premium for the taxable year.
“(3) Adjustment of credit in case of interest partially tax-exempt. In the case of any bond the interest on which is allowable as a credit against net income, the credit provided in section 25 (a) (1) or (2), or section 26 (a), as the case may be, shall be reduced by the amount of the amortizable bond premium for the taxable year.
“ (For adjustment to basis on account of amortizable bond premium, see section 113 (b) (1) (H)). [See note 6, post, p. 625.]
“(b) Amortizable bond premium—
“(1) Amount of bond premium. For the purposes of paragraph (2), the amount of bond premium, in the case of the holder of any bond, shall be determined with reference to the amount of the basis (for determining loss on sale or exchange) of such bond, and with reference to the amount payable on maturity or on earlier call date, with adjustments proper to reflect unamortized bond premium with respect to the bond, for the period prior to the date as of which subsection (a) becomes applicable with respect to the taxpayer with respect to such bond.
“(2) Amount amortizable. The amortizable bond premium of the taxable year shall be the amount of the bond premium attributable to such year.
“(3) Method of determination. The determinations required under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be made' — ■
“ (A) in accordance with the method of amortizing bond premium regularly employed by the holder of the bond, if such method is reasonable;
“(B) in all other cases, in accordance with regulations prescribing reasonable methods of amortizing bond premium, prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.
“(c) Election on taxable and partially taxable bonds—
“(1) Eligibility to elect and bonds with respect to which election permitted. This section shall apply with respect to the following classes of taxpayers with respect to the following classes of bonds only if the' taxpayer has elected to have this section apply.
“(d) Definition of bond. As used in this section, the term 'bond’ means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation and bearing interest (including any like obligation issued by a government or political subdivision thereof), with interest coupons or in registered form, but does not include any such obligation which constitutes stock in trade of the taxpayer or any such obligation of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or any such obligation held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.”
See statement of Roy C. Osgood, 2 Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1728-29 (1942).
H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1942). Precisely the same language appears in S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1942). U. S, Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.125-5, is of identical tenor.
Int. Rev. Code §113 (b) (1) provides that “Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases be made . . . (H) in the case of any bond (as defined in section 125) the interest on which is wholly exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter, to the extent of the amortizable bond premium disallowable as a deduction pursuant to section 125 (a) (2), and in the case of any other bond (as defined in such section) to the extent of the deductions allowable pursuant to section 125 (a) (1) with respect thereto.” See note 3, ante, p. 621, for the text of § 125.
Of this amount, 25.5 billion was wholly, and 33.0 billion partially tax-exempt. Statistical Abstract of the United States 372 (1948).
In this case, the record does not disclose how petitioner disposed of the bonds. If for some reason he had sold them after six months at a price above 138, his capital gain would have exceeded the deduction he took on the bond premium. This possibility is not merely theoretical, for the bonds in fact stood above 138 for over a year, starting in August, 1945.
Petitioner cites H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1942), and the statements of John O’Brien, 1 Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1942), and Randolph Paul, 1 Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942). None of these can be taken as a clear statement excluding premium reflecting financial inducements other than the interest rate.
E. g., “When bonds sell at a price greater than par, they are said to sell at a premium . . . .” Financial Handbook 1210 (3d ed. 1948); “. . . bond premium — the amount by which issue price, or cost at later date, exceeds maturity value Paton, Advanced Accounting 197 (1941); Grossman, Investment Principles and Practice 14 (1939); Noble, Accounting Principles 447 (4th ed. 1945). And see Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 555 (1932); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U. S. 109, 116 (1926); 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 831 (1935); 2 Scott on Trusts § 239.2 (1939).
See, e. g., 1 Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 662 (4th ed. 1941); Saliers and Holmes, Basic Accounting Principles 509 (1937); 4 (pt. 1) Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 319 (1935); 2 Scott on Trusts 1337 (1939); Williams, Are Convertibles Now Attractive? 83 Mag. of Wall St. 134 (1948).
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1947); Helvering v. Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U. S. 247, 249 (1941); Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co., 297 U. S. 496, 499 (1936); Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109, 111 (1933); cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U. S. 168, 171 (1947). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
255
] | sc_petitioner |
PARIS ADULT THEATRE I et al. v. SLATON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, et al.
No. 71-1051.
Argued October 19, 1972 —
Decided June 21, 1973
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, BlacicmuN, Powell, and RehNQUist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 70. BrenNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 73.
Robert Eugene Smith argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Mel 8. Friedman and D. Freeman Hutton.
Thomas E. Moran argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joel M. Feldman
Charles H. Keating, Jr., pro se, Richard M. Bertsch, James J. Clancy, and Albert S. Johnston III filed a brief for Charles H. Keating, Jr., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are two Atlanta, Georgia, movie theaters and their owners and managers, operating in the style of “adult” theaters. On December 28, 1970, respondents, the local state district attorney and the solicitor for the local state trial court, filed civil complaints in that court alleging that petitioners were exhibiting to the public for paid admission two allegedly obscene films, contrary to Georgia Code Ann. § 26-2101. The two films in question, “Magic Mirror” and “It All Comes Out in the End,” depict sexual conduct characterized by the Georgia Supreme Court as “hard core pornography” leaving “little to the imagination.”
Respondents' complaints, made on behalf of the State of Georgia, demanded that the two films be declared obscene and that petitioners be enjoined from exhibiting the films. The exhibition of the films was not enjoined, but a temporary injunction was granted ex parte by the local trial court, restraining petitioners from destroying the films or removing them from the jurisdiction. Petitioners were further ordered to have one print each of the films in court on January 13, 1971, together with the proper viewing equipment.
On January 13, 1971, 15 days after the proceedings began, the films were produced by petitioners at a jury-waived trial. Certain photographs, also produced at trial, were stipulated to portray the single entrance to both Paris Adult Theatre I and Paris Adult Theatre II as it appeared at the time of the complaints. These photographs show a conventional, inoffensive theater entrance, without any pictures, but with signs indicating that the theaters exhibit “Atlanta's Finest Mature Feature Films.” On the door itself is a sign saying: “Adult Theatre — You must be 21 and able to prove it. If viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter.”
The two films were exhibited to the trial court. The only other state evidence was testimony by criminal investigators that they had paid admission to see the films and that nothing on the outside of the theater indicated the full nature of what was shown. In particular, nothing indicated that the films depicted — as they did— scenes of simulated fellatio, cunnilingus, and group sex intercourse. There was no evidence presented that minors had ever entered the theaters. Nor was there evidence presented that petitioners had a systematic policy of barring minors, apart from posting signs at the entrance. On April 12, 1971, the trial judge dismissed respondents’ complaints. He assumed “that obscenity is established/’ but stated:
“It appears to the Court that the display of these films in a commercial theatre, when surrounded by requisite notice to the public of their nature and by reasonable protection against the exposure of these films to minors, is constitutionally permissible.”
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed. It assumed that the adult theaters in question barred minors and gave a full warning to the general public of the nature of the films shown, but held that the films were without protection under the First Amendment. Citing the opinion of this Court in United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351 (1971), the Georgia court stated that “the sale and delivery of obscene material to willing adults is not protected under the first amendment.” The Georgia court also held Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), to be inapposite since it did not deal with “the commercial distribution of pornography, but with the right of Stanley to possess, in the privacy of his home, pornographic films.” 228 Ga. 343, 345, 185 S. E. 2d 768, 769 (1971). After viewing the films, the Georgia Supreme Court held that their exhibition should have been enjoined, stating:
“The films in this case leave little to the imagination. It is plain what they purport to depict, that is, conduct of the most salacious character. We hold that these films are also hard core pornography, and the showing of such films should have been enjoined since their exhibition is not protected by the first amendment.” Id., at 347, 185 S. E. 2d, at 770.
I
It should be clear from the outset that we do not undertake to tell the States what they must do, but rather to define the area in which they may chart their own course in dealing with obscene material. This Court has consistently held that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment as a limitation on the state police power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller v. California, ante, at 23-25; Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229, 230 (1972); United States v. Reidel, supra, at 354; Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 485 (1957).
Georgia case law permits a civil injunction of the exhibition of obscene materials. See 1024 Peachtree Corp. v. Slaton, 228 Ga. 102, 184 S. E. 2d 144 (1971); Walter v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 676, 182 S. E. 2d 464 (1971); Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S. E. 2d 712 (1971). While this procedure is civil in nature, and does not directly involve the state criminal statute proscribing exhibition of obscene material, the Georgia case law permitting civil injunction does adopt the definition of “obscene materials” used by the criminal statute. Today, in Miller v. California, supra, we have sought to clarify the constitutional definition of obscene material subject to regulation by the States, and we vacate and remand this case for reconsideration in light of Miller.
This is not to be read as disapproval of the Georgia civil procedure employed in this case, assuming the use of a constitutionally acceptable standard for determining what is unprotected by the First Amendment. On the contrary, such a procedure provides an exhibitor or purveyor of materials the best possible notice, prior to any criminal indictments, as to whether the materials are unprotected by the First Amendment and subject to state regulation. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 441-444 (1957). Here, Georgia imposed no restraint on the exhibition of the films involved in this case until after a full adversary proceeding and a final judicial determination by the Georgia Supreme Court that the materials were constitutionally unprotected. Thus the standards of Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 417 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U. S. 139, 141-142 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 58-59 (1965), and Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, at 443-445, were met. Cf. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 367-369 (1971) (opinion of White, J.).
Nor was it error to fail to require “expert” affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene when the materials themselves were actually placed in evidence. United States v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577, 579-586 (CA5 1973); id., at 586-588 (Ainsworth, J., concurring); id., at 588-589 (Clark, J., concurring); United States v. Wild, 422 F. 2d 34, 35-36 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 986 (1971); Kahm v. United States, 300 F. 2d 78, 84 (CA5), cert. denied, 369 U. S. 859 (1962); State v. Amato, 49 Wis. 2d 638, 645, 183 N. W. 2d 29, 32 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Amato v. Wisconsin, 404 U. S. 1063 (1972). See Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 172 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); United States v. Brown, 328 F. Supp. 196, 199 (ED Va. 1971). The films, obviously, are the best evidence of what they represent. “In the cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since Both, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves for the determination of the question.” Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 465 (1966).
II
We categorically disapprove the theory, apparently adopted by the trial judge, that obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity from state regulation simply because they are exhibited for consenting adults only. This holding was properly rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court. Although we have often pointedly recognized the high importance of the state interest in regulating the exposure of obscene materials to juveniles and unconsenting adults, see Miller v. California, ante, at 18-20; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S., at 567; Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1967), this Court has never declared these to be the only legitimate state interests permitting regulation of obscene material. The States have a long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all places of public accommodation, as long as these regulations do not run afoul of specific constitutional prohibitions. See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 376-377 (opinion of White, J.); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S., at 354-356. Cf. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 378 (Stewart, J., concurring). "In an unbroken series of cases extending over a long stretch of this Court’s history, it has been accepted as a postulate that ‘the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.’ [Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931)].” Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, at 440.
In particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby. Rights and interests “other than those of the advocates are involved.” Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 642 (1951). These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself. The Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography indicates that there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime. Quite apart from sex crimes, however, there remains one problem of large proportions aptly described by Professor Bickel:
“It concerns the tone of the society, the mode, or to use terms that have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life, now and in the future. A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room, or expose himself indecently there .... We should protect his privacy. But if he demands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather in public places — discreet, if you will, but accessible to all — with others who share his tastes, then to grant him his right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies. Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not.” 22 The Public Interest 25-26 (Winter 1971). (Emphasis added.)
As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a “right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society . . . Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 199 (1964) (dissenting opinion). See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 457 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 256-257 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 86-88 (1949).
But, it is argued, there are no scientific data which conclusively demonstrate that exposure to obscene material adversely affects men and women or their society. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that, absent such a demonstration, any kind of state regulation is “impermissible.” We reject this argument. It is not for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected by the Constitution itself. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 642-643 (1968), said: “We do not demand of legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria of legislation.’ Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110.” Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist. In deciding Roth, this Court implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion to protect “the social interest in order and morality.” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S., at 485, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added in Roth).
From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions. Such assumptions underlie much lawful state regulation of commercial and business affairs. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S., at 632-633, 641-645; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525, 536-537 (1949). The same is true of the federal securities and antitrust laws and a host of federal regulations. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186-195 (1963); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 99-103 (1946); North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 686, 705-707 (1946), and cases cited. See also Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 436-437 (1925), and Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 322 (1913). On the basis of these assumptions both Congress and state legislatures have, for example, drastically restricted associational rights by adopting antitrust laws, and have strictly regulated public expression by issuers of and dealers in securities, profit sharing “coupons,” and “trading stamps,” commanding what they must and must not publish and announce. See Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 597-602 (1936); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U. S. 568, 584-589 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559, 567-568 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 548-552 (1917); Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 383-386 (1916); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 363-368 (1916). Understandably those who entertain an absolutist view of the First Amendment find it uncomfortable to explain why rights of association, speech, and press should be severely restrained in the marketplace of goods and money, but not in the marketplace of pornography.
Likewise, when legislatures and administrators act to protect the physical environment from pollution and to preserve our resources of forests, streams, and parks, they must act on such imponderables as the impact of a new highway near or through an existing park or wilderness area. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 417-420 (1971). Thus, § 18 (a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U. S. C. § 138, and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended, 82 Stat. 824, 49 U. S. C. § 1653 (f), have been described by Mr. Justice Black as “a solemn determination of the highest law-making body of this Nation that the beauty and health-giving facilities of our parks are not to be taken away for public roads without hearings, factfindings, and policy determinations under the supervision of a Cabinet officer . . . .” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra, at 421 (separate opinion joined by Brennan, J.). The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people, including imponderable aesthetic assumptions, is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional.
If we accept the improvable assumption that a complete education requires the reading of certain books, see Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 245 (1968), and Johnson v. New York State Education Dept., 449 F. 2d 871, 882-883 (CA2 1971) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 409 U. S. 75 (1972), id., at 76-77 (Marshall, J., concurring), and the well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character, can we then say that a state legislature may not act on the corollary assumption that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior? “Many of these effects may be intangible and indistinct, but they are nonetheless real.” American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, supra, at 103. Mr. Justice Cardozo said that all laws in Western civilization are “guided by a robust common sense . . . .” Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 590 (1937). The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data.
It is argued that individual “free will” must govern, even in activities beyond the protection of the First Amendment and other constitutional guarantees of privacy, and that government cannot legitimately impede an individual’s desire to see or acquire obscene plays, movies, and books. We do indeed base our society on certain assumptions that people have the capacity for free choice. Most exercises of individual free choice— those in politics, religion, and expression of ideas— are explicitly protected by the Constitution. Totally unlimited play for free will, however, is not allowed in our or any other society. We have just noted, for example, that neither the First Amendment nor “free will” precludes States from having “blue sky” laws to regulate what sellers of securities may write or publish about their wares. See supra, at 61-62. Such laws are to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition. Nor do modern societies leave disposal of garbage and sewage up to the individual “free will,” but impose regulation to protect both public health and the appearance of public places. States are told by some that they must await a “laissez-faire” market solution to the obscenity-pornography problem, paradoxically “by people who have never otherwise had a kind word to say for laissez-faire,” particularly in solving urban, commercial, and environmental pollution problems. See I. Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America 37 (1972).
The States, of course, may follow such a “laissez-faire” policy and drop all controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what they prefer, just as they can ignore consumer protection in the marketplace, but nothing in the Constitution compels the States to do so with regard to matters falling within state jurisdiction. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S., at 357; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S., at 462 (White, J., dissenting). “We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965). See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S., at 731; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952).
It is asserted, however, that standards for evaluating state commercial regulations are inapposite in the present context, as state regulation of access by consenting adults to obscene material violates the constitutionally protected right to privacy enjoyed by petitioners’ customers. Even assuming that petitioners have vicarious standing to assert potential customers’ rights, it is unavailing to compare a theater open to the public for a fee, with- the private home of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S., at 568, and the marital bedroom of Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 485-486. This Court, has, on numerous occasions, refused to hold that commercial ventures such as a motion-picture house are “private” for the purpose of civil rights litigation and civil rights statutes. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 236 (1969); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 305-308 (1969); Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U. S. 684, 685-686 (1965); Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306, 307-308 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 247, 260-261 (1964). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically defines motion-picture houses and theaters as places of “public accommodation” covered by the Act as operations affecting commerce. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000a (b)(3), (c).
Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included “only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152 (1973). This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453-454 (1972); id., at 460, 463-465 (White, J., concurring); Stanley v. Georgia, supra, at 568; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 486; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). Nothing, however, in this Court’s decisions intimates that there is any “fundamental” privacy right “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation.
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a “penumbra” of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the “privacy of the home,” which was hardly more than a reaffirmation that “a man’s home is his castle.” Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, supra, at 564. Moreover, we have declined to equate the privacy of the home relied on in Stanley with a “zone” of “privacy” that follows a distributor or a consumer of obscene materials wherever he goes. See United States v. Orito, post, at 141-143; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 126-129; United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S., at 376-377 (opinion of White, J.); United States v. Reidel, supra, at 355. The idea of a “privacy” right and a place of public accommodation are, in this context, mutually exclusive. Conduct or depictions of conduct that the state police power can prohibit on a public street do not become automatically protected by the Constitution merely because the conduct is moved to a bar or a “live” theater stage, any more than a “live” performance of a man and woman locked in a sexual embrace at high noon in Times Square is protected by the Constitution because they simultaneously engage in a valid political dialogue.
It is also argued that the State has no legitimate interest in “control [of] the moral content of a person’s thoughts,” Stanley v. Georgia, supra, at 565, and we need not quarrel with this. But we reject the claim that the State of Georgia is here attempting to control the minds or thoughts of those who patronize theaters. Preventing unlimited display or distribution of obscene material, which by definition lacks any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as communication, Miller v. California, ante, at 24, 34, is distinct from a control of reason and the intellect. Cf. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229 (1972); Roth v. United States, supra, at 485-487; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101—102 (1940); Finnis, “Reason and Passion”: The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 222, 229-230,241-243 (1967). Where communication of ideas, protected by the First Amendment, is not involved, or the particular privacy of the home protected by Stanley, or any of the other “areas or zones” of constitutionally protected privacy, the mere fact that, as a consequence, some human “utterances” or, “thoughts” may be incidentally affected does not bar the State from acting to protect legitimate state interests. Cf. Roth v. United States, supra, at 483, 485-487; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S., at 256-257. The fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of government, but government regulation of drug sales is not prohibited by the Constitution. Cf. United States v. Reidel, supra, at 359-360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Finally, petitioners argue that conduct which directly involves “consenting adults” only has, for that sole reason, a special claim to constitutional protection. Our Constitution establishes, a broad range of conditions on the exercise of power by the States, but for us to say that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond state regulation, is a step we are unable to take. Commercial exploitation of depictions, descriptions, or exhibitions of obscene conduct on commercial premises open to the adult public falls within a State’s broad power to regulate commerce and protect the public environment. The issue in this context goes beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as “wrong” or “sinful.” The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s words, the States’ “right . . . to maintain a decent society.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S., at 199 (dissenting opinion).
To summarize, we have today reaffirmed the basic holding of Roth v. United States, supra, that obscene material has no protection under the First Amendment. See Miller v. California, supra, and Kaplan v. California, post, p. 115. We have directed our holdings, not at thoughts or speech, but at depiction and description of specifically defined sexual conduct that States may regulate within limits designed to prevent infringement of First Amendment rights. We have also reaffirmed the holdings of United States v. Reidel, supra, and United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, that commerce in obscene material is unprotected by any constitutional doctrine of privacy. United States v. Orito, post, at 141-143; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 126-129. In this case we hold that the States have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene material in places of public accommodation, including so-called “adult” theaters from which minors are excluded. In light of these holdings, nothing precludes the State of Georgia from the regulation of the allegedly obscene material exhibited in Paris Adult Theatre I or II, provided that the applicable Georgia law, as written or authoritatively interpreted by the Georgia courts, meets the First Amendment standards set forth in Miller v. California, ante, at 23-25. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion and Miller v. California, supra. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 130 n. 7.
Vacated and remanded.
This is a civil proceeding. Georgia Code Ann. § 26-2101 defines a criminal offense, but the exhibition of materials found to be “obscene” as defined by that statute may be enjoined in a civil proceeding under Georgia case law. 1024 Peachtree Corp. v. Slaton, 228 Ga. 102, 184 S. E. 2d 144 (1971); Walter v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 676, 182 S. E. 2d 464 (1971); Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S. E. 2d 712 (1971). See infra, at 54. Georgia Code Ann. §26-2101 reads in relevant part:
“Distributing obscene materials.
“(a) A person commits the offense of distributing obscene materials when he sells, lends, rents, leases, gives, advertises, publishes, exhibits or otherwise disseminates to any person any obscene material of any description, knowing the obscene nature thereof, or who offers to do so, or who possesses such material with the intent so to do ... .
“(b) Material is obscene if considered as a whole, applying community standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and utterly without redeeming social value and if, in addition, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters. . . .
“(d) A person convicted of distributing obscene material shall for the first offense be punished as for a misdemeanor, and for any subsequent offense shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or both.”
The constitutionality of Georgia Code Ann. § 26-2101 was upheld against First Amendment and due process challenges in Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F. Supp. 998 (ND Ga. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 397 U. S. 592 (1970).
See Georgia Code Ann. §26-2101, set out supra, at 51 n. 1.
In Walter v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 676, 182 S. E. 2d 464 (1971), the Georgia Supreme Court described the cases before it as follows: “Each case was commenced as a civil action by the District Attorney of the Superior Court of Fulton County jointly with the Solicitor of the Criminal Court of Fulton County. In each case the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants named therein were conducting a business of exhibiting motion picture films to members of the public; that they were in control and possession of the described motion picture film which they were exhibiting to the public on a fee basis; that said film 'constitutes a flagrant violation of Ga. Code §26-2101 in that the sole and dominant theme of the motion picture film . . . considered as a whole, and applying contemporary standards, appeals to the prurient interest in sex and nudity, and that said motion picture film is utterly and absolutely without any redeeming social value whatsoever and transgresses beyond the customary limits of candor in describing and discussing sexual matters.’ ” Id., at 676-677, 182 S. E. 2d, at 465.
This procedure would have even more merit if the exhibitor or purveyor could also test the issue of obscenity in a similar civil action, prior to any exposure to criminal penalty. We are not here presented with the problem of whether a holding that materials were not obscene could be circumvented in a later proceeding by evidence of pandering. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 458 n. 3 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 496 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
At the specific request of petitioners’ counsel, the copies of the films produced for the trial court were placed in the “administrative custody” of that court pending the outcome of this litigation.
This is not a subject that lends itself to the traditional use of expert testimony. Such testimony is usually admitted for the purpose of explaining to lay jurors what they otherwise could not understand. Cf. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 556, 559 (3d ed. 1940). No such assistance is needed by jurors in obscenity cases; indeed the “expert witness” practices employed in these cases have often made a mockery out of the otherwise sound concept of expert testimony. See United States v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577, 585-586 (CA5 1973); id., at 587-588 (Ainsworth, J., concurring). “Simply stated, hard core pornography . . . can and does speak for itself.” United States v. Wild, 422 F. 2d 34, 36 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 986 (1971). We reserve judgment, however, on the extreme case, not presented here, where contested materials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that the experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the material appeals to the prurient interest. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 508-510 (1966); United States v. Klaw, 350 F. 2d 155, 167-168 (CA2 1965).
It is conceivable that an “adult” theater can — if it really insists— prevent the exposure of its obscene wares to juveniles. An “adult” bookstore, dealing in obscene books, magazines, and pictures, cannot realistically make this claim. The Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography emphasizes evidence (the Abelson National Survey of Youth and Adults) that, although most pornography may be bought by elders, "the heavy users and most highly exposed people to pornography are adolescent females (among women) and adolescent and young adult males (among men).” The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 401 (1970). The legitimate interest in preventing exposure of juveniles to obscene material cannot be fully served by simply barring juveniles from the immediate physical premises of “adult” bookstores, when there is a flourishing “outside business” in these materials.
The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 390-412 (1970). For a discussion of earlier studies indicating “a division of thought [among behavioral scientists] on the correlation between obscenity and socially deleterious behavior,” Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, at 451, and references to expert opinions that obscene material may induce crime and antisocial conduct, see id., at 451-453 (Clark, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Clark emphasized:
“While erotic stimulation caused by pornography may be legally insignificant in itself, there are medical experts who believe that such stimulation frequently manifests itself in criminal sexual behavior or other antisocial conduct. For example, Dr. George W. Henry of Cornell University has expressed the opinion that obscenity, with its exaggerated and morbid emphasis on sex, particularly abnormal and perverted practices, and its unrealistic presentation of sexual behavior and attitudes, may induce antisocial conduct by the average person. A number of sociologists think that this material may have adverse effects upon individual mental health, with potentially disruptive consequences for the community.
“Congress and the legislatures of every State have enacted measures to restrict the distribution of erotic and pornographic material, justifying these controls by reference to evidence that antisocial behavior may result in part from reading obscenity.” Id., at 452-453 (footnotes omitted).
See also Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy: The Case for Censorship, in 22 The Public Interest 3 (Winter 1971); van den Haag, in Censorship: For & Against 156-157 (H. Hart ed. 1971).
“In this and other cases in this area of the law, which are coming to us in ever-increasing numbers, we are faced with the resolution of rights basic both to individuals and to society as a whole. Specifically, we are called upon to reconcile the right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society and, on the other hand, the right of individuals to express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 199 (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Holmes stated in another context, that:
“[T]he proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain.” Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 446 (1927) (dissenting opinion joined by Brandéis, J.).
“It has been well observed that such [lewd and obscene] utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Roth v. United States, 364 U. S. 476, 485 (1957), quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added in Roth).
The protection afforded by Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), is restricted to a place, the home. In contrast, the constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor’s office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152-154 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 485-486 (1965). Obviously, there is no necessary or legitimate expectation of privacy which would extend to marital intercourse on a street corner or a theater stage.
Cf. J. Mill, On Liberty 13 (1955 ed.)J
The state statute books are replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws against prostitution, suicide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutalizing “bare fist” prize fights, and duels, although these crimes may only directly involve “consenting adults.” Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional provision. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 344-345 (1890). Consider also the language of this Court in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964), as to adultery; Southern Surety Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U. S. 582, 586 (1916), as to fornication; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 320-322 (1913), and Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 484-487, 491-492 (1917), as to “white slavery”; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 629 (1912), as to billiard halls; and the Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 355-356 (1903), as to gambling. See also the summary of state statutes prohibiting bearbaiting, cockfighting, and other brutalizing animal “sports,” in Stevens, Fighting and Baiting, in Animals and Their Legal Rights 112-127 (Leavitt ed. 1970). As Professor Irving Kristol has observed: “Bearbaiting and cockfighting are prohibited only in part out of compassion for the suffering animals; the main reason they were abolished was because it was felt that they debased and brutalized the citizenry who flocked to witness such spectacles.” On the Democratic Idea in America 33 (1972). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
157
] | sc_casesource |
WEBB v. COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DYER COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.
No. 83-1360.
Argued October 29, 1984
Decided April 17, 1985
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burgee, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 244. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the ease.
Charles Stephen Ralston argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, Julius LeVonne Chambers, Deborah Fins, Gail J. Wright, and Richard H. Dinkins.
S. Russell Headrick argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs was Thomas R. Prewitt, Sr.
Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, authorizes a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in “any action or proceeding” to enforce certain statutes, including 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner was represented by counsel in local administrative proceedings and in a subsequent § 1983 action challenging the termination of his employment as a public school teacher. He ultimately prevailed and was awarded attorney’s fees for the time his lawyer spent on the judicial proceedings, but denied fees for the time spent in proceedings before the local School Board. The question presented is whether the District Court correctly excluded the time spent pursuing optional administrative proceedings from the calculation of a “reasonable fee” for the prevailing party.
In the spring of 1974 respondent Dyer County Board of Education, terminated the employment of petitioner, who was a black elementary school teacher with tenure. Petitioner retained counsel to assist him in demonstrating that his discharge was unjustified and to obtain appropriate relief.
A Tennessee statute provides that public school teachers may only be dismissed for specific causes, and guarantees a hearing on charges warranting dismissal. Petitioner sought and eventually obtained a series of hearings before the Board at which his counsel presented testimony supporting his claim that the dismissal was unjustified. Because the Board had not provided him with written charges or a preter-mination hearing, and because there was reason to believe that the Board’s action was racially motivated, petitioner also claimed that his constitutional rights had been violated. Negotiations with the Board continued until the summer of 1978 when the Board finally decided to adhere to its decision to dismiss the petitioner.
On August 13, 1979, the petitioner commenced this action in the United States District for the Western District of Tennessee. He alleged that the Board action was unconstitutional and that various civil rights statutes, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, afforded him a basis for monetary and equitable relief against the respondent Board and various individual defendants associated with his dismissal. The respondents filed an answer to the complaint, a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and certain discovery requests to which the petitioner responded. App. 21-29, 48. In March 1981, the petitioner filed with the District Court a partial record of the administrative proceedings. Id., at 30-31.
On October 14, 1981, the case was settled by the entry of a consent order awarding the petitioner $15,400 in damages and dismissing the action with prejudice. Under the consent decree, the Board also agreed to reinstate the petitioner and treat him as having resigned on the day of dismissal. Adverse comments were to be removed from his employment file. The matter of an award of attorney’s fees was reserved for future resolution by the parties or by the court.
During subsequent negotiations, the Board conceded that the petitioner was a “prevailing party” entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, but the parties could not agree on the amount of the award. After the negotiations proved unsuccessful, petitioner filed a motion for an award of fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. The motion was supported by an affidavit containing an itemized description of the time spent by the petitioner’s counsel on the matter from April 5, 1974, through September 11, 1981. The affidavit also set forth the attorney’s professional qualifications and his regular charges during the period involved. The petitioner requested a total fee of $21,165, based on an hourly rate of $120 and including an upward adjustment of 25% “in light of the peculiar difficulties involved in this particular kind of case and the unusual nature of the hours involved in the Board proceedings.” App. 56.
Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that a reasonable fee would not exceed $5,000. They objected to the hourly rate, to certain miscellaneous, unrecorded hours, and to the request for an upward adjustment of 25%. In addition, the respondents contended that the petitioner was not entitled to receive a fee for services performed by counsel in the administrative proceedings.
The District Court awarded a fee of $9,734.38 plus expenses. In making that award, the District Court accepted respondents’ position that the time spent in the School Board proceedings should be excluded, but otherwise resolved all issues in petitioner’s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 715 F. 2d 254 (CA6 1983). Because of an apparent conflict in federal authority on the availability of attorney’s fees under § 1988 for time spent in state administrative proceedings prior to the filing of a federal civil rights action, we granted certiorari. 466 U. S. 935 (1984).
The petitioner argues that he is entitled to a fee award for the services of his counsel during the School Board hearings on either of two theories: (1) that those hearings were “proceeding[s] to enforce a provision of [§ 1983]” within the meaning of § 1988; or (2) that the time was “reasonably expended” in preparation for the court action and therefore compensable under the rationale of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983). We consider each of these theories.
I
The relevant language m § 1988 is similar to language in § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorizes an award of attorney’s fees in “any action or proceeding” under that Title. In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54 (1980), we held that §706(k) authorizes fees for work performed pursuing a state administrative remedy “to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the provisions of Title VII.” Id., at 71. The petitioner argues that the reasoning in Carey supports a comparable award for the services performed in the School Board proceedings in this case.
Carey, however, arose under a statute that expressly requires the claimant to pursue available state remedies before commencing proceedings in a federal forum. There is no comparable requirement in §1983, and therefore the reasoning in Carey is not applicable to this case. As we noted in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984):
“The difference between Carey and this case is that in Carey the statute that authorized fees, Title VII, also required a plaintiff to pursue available state administrative remedies. In contrast, nothing in § 1983 requires that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 suit. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982).” Id., at 1011, n. 14.
Because § 1983 stands “as an independent avenue of relief” and petitioner “could go straight to court to assert it,” ibid., the School Board proceedings in this case simply do not have the same integral function under § 1983 that state administrative proceedings have under Title VII.
Congress only authorized the district courts to allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee in an “action or proceeding to enforce [§ 1983].” Administrative proceedings established to enforce tenure rights created by state law simply are not any part of the proceedings to enforce § 1983, and even though the petitioner obtained relief from his dismissal in the later civil rights action, he is not automatically entitled to claim attorney’s fees for time spent in the administrative process on this theory.
II
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, at 424, we discussed the method to be employed by the district court in determining the amount of an attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party in a civil rights action covered by § 1988. At the outset, we emphasized that the amount to be awarded necessarily depends “on the facts of each case,” 461 U. S., at 429, and that the exercise of discretion by the district court must be respected, id., at 432. We explained that the “most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id., at 433. We also observed that the party seeking an award of fees has the burden of submitting “evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.” Ibid.
In this case, the petitioner contends that all of the hours spent by his attorney in the School Board proceedings were “reasonably expended” to enforce the rights protected by § 1983. More specifically, since witnesses were examined and opposing arguments considered and refuted in those proceedings, the work was analogous to discovery, investigation, and research that are part of any litigated proceeding, and therefore should be compensable as though the work was performed after the lawsuit was actually filed. “In sum,” petitioner concludes, “Hensley requires that fees for work done from the onset of an attorney-client relationship be awarded if that work was reasonably related to the enforcement of federal civil rights unless the hours spent would not, in the exercise of normal billing judgment, be ‘properly billed to one’s client.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 19 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S., at 434).
The Court’s opinion in Hensley does not sweep so broadly. The time that is compensable under § 1988 is that “reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id., at 433 (emphasis added). When the attorney’s fee is allowed “as part of the costs” — to use the language of the statute — it is difficult to treat time spent years before the complaint was filed as having been “expended on the litigation” or to be fairly comprehended as “part of the costs” of the civil rights action.
Of course, some of the services performed before a lawsuit is formally commenced by the filing of a complaint are performed “on the litigation.” Most obvious examples are the drafting of the initial pleadings and the work associated with the development of the theory of the case. In this case, however, neither the trial judge nor the parties had any difficulty identifying the dividing line between the administrative proceeding and the judicial proceeding. The five years of work before August 1979 were easily separated from the two years of work thereafter. The petitioner made no suggestion below that any discrete portion of the work product from the administrative proceedings was work that was both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached before settlement. The question argued below was whether the time spent on the administrative work during the years before August 1979 should be included in its entirety or excluded in its entirety. On this record, the District Court correctly held that all of the administrative work was not compensable.
“We reemphasize that the district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award.” Id., at 437. When such an award is appealed, the reviewing court must evaluate its reasonableness with appropriate deference. Considering the governing legal principles, the petitioner’s burden of establishing his entitlement to the requested fee, and the evidence and arguments presented below, we conclude that the District Court’s decision to deny any fees for time spent pursuing optional administrative remedies was well within the range of reasonable discretion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
In relevant part, § 1988 provides:
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
Tenn. Code Ann. §49-5-511(a) (1983) (“No teacher shall be dismissed . . . except as provided in this part. . . . The causes for which a teacher may be dismissed are as follows: incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, unprofessional conduct, and insubordination”); §49-5-512 (“A teacher, having received notice of charges against him, may . . . demand a hearing before the board”).
The petitioner contended that he had been discharged, in part, because of the complaints of white parents about his administration of corporal punishment to their children. He claimed that no other teacher in Dyer County engaging in such activities had ever been reprimanded, and that he had been singled out for punishment because of his race. App. 8-9.
Specifically, the petitioner sought reinstatement, backpay, and $1 million in damages. On behalf of a class consisting of all black teachers and black applicants for teaching positions, the petitioner also sought monetary and equitable relief against the Board’s allegedly discriminatory employment practices. Id., at 14-17.
Id., at 32-34.
Id., at 39-55. The time schedule submitted by the petitioner was a reconstruction of the hours his counsel spent on the matter. Tr. of Fee Hearing 10. Contemporaneously recorded time sheets are the preferred practice. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 441 (1983) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). The schedule detailed a “total” of 141.1 hours of which 82.8 hours are specifically attributable to the administrative proceedings which finally terminated in August 1978. The balance of 58.3 hours has been treated by the parties and the courts below as having been spent in connection with the action in federal court.
Counsel’s affidavit stated his regular hourly charges for routine commercial work were $60 in 1974-1976, $90 in 1977-1979, $105 in 1980, and $120 in 1981. App. 55. Two expert witnesses testified for the petitioner that the request of $120 per hour for 141.1 hours was reasonable. Tr. of Fee Hearing 3-23, 30-46.
The respondent’s three experts offered varying opinions on the reasonable hourly fee which was said to be between $50 and $100 for the administrative hearings and between $60 and $100 for the court proceedings. See App. 63-72; Tr. of Fee Hearing 108-114.
In calculating the fee, the District Court applied an hourly rate of $125 to the 58.3 hours that were not recorded as having been spent on the administrative proceedings. The court allowed the 25% upward adjustment sought by the petitioner even though he did not prevail on the class action allegations in his complaint and received only a small portion of the damages'sought. The court also awarded $625 (5 hours) for the time spent litigating the fee application.
The respondents unsuccessfully challenged the District Court’s calculations on appeal. 715 F. 2d, at 259-260. Although the District Court rendered the award without the guidance of this Court’s decisions in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983), and Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886 (1984), the respondents did not file a petition for certiorari from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals, and our review of the District Court’s calculations consequently is limited to its denial of fees for the time spent on the hearings before the School Board.
Compare Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F. 2d 511, 524-525 (CA7 1982), with 715 F. 2d 254 (CA6 1983) (case below), Horacek v. Thone, 710 F. 2d 496, 499-500 (CA81983), Latino Project, Inc. v. City of Camden, 701 F. 2d 262, 264-265 (CA3 1983), Estes v. Tuscaloosa County, 696 F. 2d 898, 900 (CA111983) (per curiam), Redd v. Lambert, 674 F. 2d 1032, 1036-1037 (CA5 1982), and Blow v. Lascaris, 668 F. 2d 670, 671 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 914 (1982). See also Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F. 2d 910, 912-914 (CA9 1982); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F. 2d 634, 638 (CA8 1978).
See n. 1, supra.
78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k) (“In any action or proceeding under [Title VII] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . .
As we explained in Carey:
“It is clear from this scheme of interrelated and complementary state and federal enforcement that Congress viewed proceedings before the EEOC and in federal court as supplements to available state remedies for employment discrimination. Initial resort to state and local remedies is mandated, and recourse to the federal forums is appropriate only when the State does not provide prompt or complete relief.” 447 U. S., at 65.
Of course, competent counsel will be motivated by the interests of the client to pursue state administrative remedies when they are available and counsel believes that they may prove successful. We cannot assume that an attorney would advise the client to forgo an available avenue of relief solely because § 1988 does not provide for attorney’s fees for work performed in the state administrative forum.
This interpretation of § 1988 is consistent with the numerous references in its legislative history to promoting the enforcement of the civil rights statutes “in suits,” “through the courts” and by “judicial process.” See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 94-1011, pp. 2, 6 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). Cf. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U. S. 42, 50 (1984) (“[T]he dominant characteristic of civil rights actions” is that “they belong in court”).
See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 27 (providing a procedure for preserving testimony before the bringing of a federal cause of action).
Indeed, in the 11 months between the late summer of 1978, when the adverse decision in the administrative proceeding became final, and' the summer of 1979, when the petitioner brought this civil rights action, less than one-quarter hour was spent by counsel on the case — to write a letter renewing a previous settlement offer. App. 47.
Justice BRENNAN suggests that the petitioner’s filing of the transcript of the administrative hearings in the record of the civil rights action might justify an award of attorney’s fees, in part, because that transcript substituted for the affidavits the petitioner would have had to file in response to the motion for summary judgment. Post, at 255. That motion, however, was filed only by three of the individual defendants, and addressed a statute of limitations defense. App. 27. On this record, we find no indication that the 82.8 hours spent in the administrative proceeding were in any way equivalent to the time that would have been spent preparing the affidavits necessary to respond to this summary judgment motion, or that any part of the administrative record was necessary for that purpose. Moreover, the District Court judge’s decision on all other fee questions was extremely favorable to the petitioner, and it is quite probable that this decision was influenced by counsel’s extensive experience representing petitioner before the School Board. A remand would only serve to prolong “what must be one of the least socially productive types of litigation imaginable: appeals from awards of attorney’s fees, after the merits of a case have been concluded, when the appeals are not likely to affect the amount of the final fee.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S., at 442 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
We also reemphasize that the district court’s consideration of a fee petition “should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, at 437. The District Court Judge in this case quite properly admonished the parties to limit adversary hostilities and to avoid excessive cross-examination of fee witnesses. E. g., Tr. of Fee Hearing 141. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiondirection |
TOLEDO-FLORES v. UNITED STATES
No. 05-7664.
Argued October 3, 2006
Decided December 5, 2006
Timothy Crooks argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Marjorie A. Meyers, H. Michael Sokolow, and Brent E. Newton.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorneys General Keisler and Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Patricia M. Millett, and Donald E. Keener
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar Association by Michael S. Greco and David W. DeBruin; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Jayashri Srikantiah; for Human Rights First by Linda T. Coberly and Gene C. Schaerr; for the National Association of Federal Defenders et al. by Henry J. Bemporad and Frances H. Pratt; and for the NYSDA Immigrant Defense Project et al. by Christopher J. Meade, Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Marianne C. Yang, and Manuel D. Vargas.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Texas et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General, Kent C. Sullivan, First Assistant Attorney General, Don Clemmer, Deputy Attorney General, and Amy Warr, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Robert F. McDonnell of Virginia
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
65
] | sc_petitioner |
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION v. THE DARLINGTON, INC.
No. 13.
Argued October 13, 1958.
Decided November 24, 1958.
Alan S. Rosenthal argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Assistant Attorney General Doub.
J. C. Long argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were W. Turner Logan and Hernán H. Higgins, Jr.
Me. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a construction of § 608 of the National Housing Act, 56 Stat. 303, 12 U. S. C. § 1743, as amended by § 10 of the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 207, 214, and the Regulations issued thereunder. The aim of the Act as stated in § 608 (b) (2) is to provide housing for veterans of World War II and their immediate families. That end is to be achieved by authorizing the Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages covering those projects. § 608 (a). Mortgagors, eligible for insurance, are to be approved by the agency, which is empowered to require them “to be regulated or restricted as to rents or sales, charges, capital structure, rate of return, and methods of operation.” § 608 (b)(1).
Appellee is a South Carolina corporation formed in 1949 to obtain FHA mortgage insurance for an apartment house to be constructed in Charleston. The insurance issued and the apartment was completed. The Regulations, promulgated under the Act (24 CFR § 280 et seq.), provide that the mortgaged property shall be “designed principally for residential use, conforming to standards satisfactory to the Commissioner, and consisting of not less than eight (8) rentable dwelling units on one site . . . .” § 280.34. The Regulations further provide:
“No charge shall be made by the mortgagor for the accommodations offered by the project in excess of a rental schedule to be filed with the Commissioner and approved by him or his duly constituted representative prior to the opening of the project for rental, which schedule shall be based upon a maximum average rental fixed prior to the insurance of the mortgage, and shall not thereafter be changed except upon application of the mortgagor to, and the written approval of the change by, the Commissioner.” § 280.30 (a).
Veterans and their families are given preference in the rentals; and discrimination against families with children is prohibited. § 280.24.
Appellee submitted to FHA its schedule of monthly rates for its different types of apartments. No schedule of rates for transients was supplied. Indeed there was no representation to FHA that any of the apartménts would be furnished. But an affiliate of appellee without FHA knowledge furnished a number of apartments; and some were leased to transients on a daily basis at rentals never submitted to nor approved by FHA, part of the rental going to the affiliate as “furniture rental.” Though appellee, as required by the Regulations (§ 280.30 (f)), made reports to FHA, it made no disclosure to the agency that it had either furnished some apartments or rented them to transients. But it continued to rent furnished apartments to transients both before and after 1954 when § 513 was added to the Act. 68 Stat. 610, 12 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1731b. The new section contained in subsection (a) the following declaration of congressional purpose:
“The Congress hereby declares that it has been its intent since the enactment of the National Housing Act that housing built with the aid of mortgages insured under that Act is to be used principally for residential use; and that this intent excludes the use of such housing for transient or hotel purposes while such insurance on the mortgage remains outstanding.” And see H. R. Rep. No. 1429, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17; S. Rep. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 31.
Appellee persisted in its rental of space to transients. Appellant FHA persisted in maintaining that the practice was not authorized. In 1955 appellee brought this suit for a declaratory judgment that so long as it operates its property "principally” for residential use, keeps apartments available for extended tenancies, and complies with the terms of the Act in existence at the túne it obtained the insurance, it is entitled to rent to transients. The District Court gave appellee substantially the relief which it demanded. 142 F. Supp. 341. On appeal, we remanded the cause for consideration by a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282. 352 U. S. 977. On the remand a three-judge court adopted the earlier findings and conclusions of the single judge, 154 F. Supp. 411, attaching however certain conditions to the decree unnecessary to discuss here. It held that rental to transients was not barred by § 608 and that § 513 (a) as applied to respondent was unconstitutional. The case is here on direct appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
We take a different view. We do not think the Act gave mortgagors the right to rent to transients. There is no express provision one way or the other; but the limitation seems fairly implied. We deal with legislation passed to aid veterans and their families, not with a law to promote the hotel or motel business. To be sure, the Regulations speak of property “designed principally for residential use” (§ 280.34) — words that by themselves would not preclude transient rentals. But those words, as the Senate Report on the 1954 Amendment indicates, were evidently used so as not to preclude some commercial rentals. Moreover, the Regulation goes on to describe the property that is insured as “dwelling units.” Id. The word “dwelling” in common parlance means a permanent residence. A person can of course take up permanent residence even in a motel or hotel. But those who come for a night or so have not chosen it as a settled abode. Yet the idea of permanency pervades the concept of “dwelling.” That was the construction given to § 608 by FHA in 1947 when it issued its book Planning Rental Housing Projects. “Housing” was there interpreted to mean “dwelling quarters for families — quarters which offer complete facilities for family life.” There again the quality of permanency is implicit. And if the provisions of appellee’s charter are deemed relevant, it is not without interest to note the requirement that “Dwelling accommodations of the corporation shall be rented at a maximum average rental per room per month. . . .” Again the focus is on permanency.
In 1946 FHA made provisions in its application forms for estimates of annual operating expenses of the project. None of the expenses incident to transient accommodations — such as linen supply and cleaning expenses — were listed. Once more we may infer that the insurance program was not designed in aid of transients.
In a letter to field offices in 1951 explaining the criteria to be considered in passing on rent schedules and methods of operation, the FHA instructed them to: “. . . bear in mind that the objective of this Administration is the production of housing designed for occupancy of a relatively permanent nature and that transient occupancy is contrary to policy. No approval will be granted with respect to a proposal anticipating transient occupancy.” That interpretation of the Act is clear and unambiguous, and, taken with the Regulations, indicates that the authority charged with administration of the statute construed it to bar rental to transients.
Moreover, as already mentioned, prior approval by FHA of all rental schedules was always required by § 280.30 of the Regulations and appellee never obtained nor sought approval of a schedule of rents for transients.
It is true that FHA felt it had the authority to approve rental schedules for transients. It gave such approval in a dozen or more instances where it felt the public interest required it. We need not stop to inquire whether FHA had that authority. We have said enough to indicate that no right or privilege to rent to transients is expressly included in the Act nor fairly implied. The contemporaneous construction of the Act by the agency entrusted with its administration is squarely to the contrary. In circumstances no more ambiguous than the present we have allowed contemporaneous administrative construction to carry the day against doubts that might exist from a reading of the bare words of a statute. See United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 549; Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315. When Congress passed the 1954 Amendment, it accepted the construction of the prior Act which bars rentals to transients. Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law is not, of course, conclusive in determining what the previous Congress meant. But the later law is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construction. See United States v. Stafoff, 260 U. S. 477, 480; Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U. S. 317, 329-330. The purpose of the Act, its administrative construction, and the meaning which a later Congress ascribed to it all point to the conclusion that the housing business to be benefited by FHA insurance did not include rental to transients.
If the question be less clear and free from doubt than we think, it is still one that lies in the periphery where vested rights do not attach. If we take as our starting point what the Court said in the Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718— “Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt” — we do not see how it can be said that the 1954 Act is unconstitutional as applied. Appellee is not penalized for anything it did in the past. The new Act applies prospectively only. So there is no possible due process issue on that score. As stated in Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100, 107, “Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by the Cpnstitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not condemn it. Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts.”
Moreover, one has to look long and hard to find even a semblance of a contractual right rising to the dignity of the one involved in Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571. The Constitution is concerned with practical, substantial rights, not with those that are unclear and gain hold by subtle and involved reasoning. Congress by the 1954 Act was doing no more than protecting the regulatory system which it had designed. Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end. Cf. Veix v. Sixth Ward Assn., 310 U. S. 32; Keefe v. Clark, 322 U. S. 393. Invocation of the Due Process Clause to protect the rights asserted here would make the ghost of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, walk again.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Act provides that, except for certain exceptions not relevant here, no new or existing multifamily housing with respect to which a mortgage is insured by the FHA shall be operated for transient purposes. § 513 (b). The Commissioner is authorized to define “rental for transient or hotel purposes” but in any event rental for any period less than 30 days constitutes rental for such purposes. §513 (e).
S. Rep. No. 1130, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1580, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
S. Rep. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 31, states:
“Your committee does not believe the spirit of this intent is violated by the operation of a commercial establishment included to serve the needs of families residing in rental projects operated as permanent residential housing projects (as distinguished from those operated to provide transient accommodations) but it firmly- believes that the operation of such establishments should not be conducted in such a manner as to convert the use of all or any portion of the housing units in the project from permanent, residential use to a project furnishing transient accommodations. . . .”
The same tone is exhibited in the Committee Reports on the various amendments to § 608. For instance, in reporting the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated:
“Since a main purpose of these provisions [authorizations of additional insurance] is to reduce the risks assumed by builders in order to encourage a large volume of housing, the committee calls special attention to the fact that this portion of the bill places' emphasis upon rental housing. It is the specific intent of the committee that those in charge of the program shall make every reasonable effort to obtain a substantial volume of rental housing — or in any event housing held for rental during the emergency — through the operation of title VI, both with respect to multifamily units and individual units. While home ownership is to be encouraged, a large percentage of veterans do not yet possess the certainty of income or of location, or the financial means, to purchase homes at this time. The bill as approved by the House of Representatives included this attention to rental housing.” S. Rep. No. 1130, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 8. (Italics added.)
The 1954 Amendment expressly gave FHA that power in certain limited situations. See § 513 (b).
In Fleming a landlord had obtained a judgment of eviction in a state court prior to the enactment of the Price Control Extension Act, under which the Administrator had promulgated rules prohibiting removal of the tenants from the leased premises on the grounds asserted by the landlord. It was held that the landlord could be enjoined from evicting the tenants under the state judgment, as any “vested” rights by reason of the state judgment were acquired subject to the possibility of their dilution through Congress’ exercise of its paramount regulatory power. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_casedisposition |
NELSON et al. v. TENNESSEE.
No. 56.
Argued December 12, 1957.
Decided December 16, 1957.
Hobart F. Atkins argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
James M. Glasgow, Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George F. McCanless, Attorney General.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiondirection |
DEPARTMENT OF GAME OF WASHINGTON v. PUYALLUP TRIBE et al.
No. 72-481.
Argued October 10, 1973
Decided November 19, 1973
Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BuRGer, C. J., and Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 49.
Joseph L. Coniff, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 72-481 and for respondent in No. 72-746. With him on the brief was Slade Gorton, Attorney General.
Harry B. Sachse argued the cause for respondents in No. 72-481 and for petitioner in No. 72-746. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Johnson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Edmund B. Clark, and Glen B. Goodsell:
Together with No. 72-746, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, also on certiorari to the same court.
Charles A. Hobbs filed a brief for the National Congress of American Indians, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in No. 72-746. Briefs of amici curiae in both cases were filed by James B. Hovis for the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, and by David H. Getches for Ramona C. Bennett et al.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1963 the Department of Game and the Department of Fisheries of the State of Washington brought this action against the Puyallup Tribe and some of its members, claiming they were subject to the State’s laws that prohibited net fishing at their usual and accustomed places and seeking to enjoin them from violating the State’s fishing regulations. The Supreme Court of the State held that the tribe had protected fishing rights under the Treaty of Medicine Creek and that a member who was fishing at a usual and accustomed fishing place of the tribe may not be restrained or enjoined from doing so unless he is violating a state statute or regulation “which has been established to be reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fishery.” 70 Wash. 2d 245, 262, 422 P. 2d 754, 764.
On review of that decision we held that, as provided in the Treaty of Medicine Creek, the “ Tight of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations [which] is . . . secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory’ ” extends to off-reservation fishing but that “the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians.” 391 U. S. 392, 395, 398. We found the state court decision had not clearly resolved the question whether barring the “use of set nets in fresh water streams or at their mouths” by all, including Indians, and allowing fishing only by hook and line in these areas was a reasonable and necessary conservation measure. The case was remanded for determination of that question and also “the issue of equal protection implicit in the phrase fin common with’ ” as used in the Treaty. Id., at 400, 403.
In Washington the Department of Fisheries deals with salmon fishing, while steelhead trout are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Game. On our remand the Department of Fisheries changed its regulation to allow Indian net fishing for salmon in the Puyallup River (but not in the bay or in the spawning areas of the river). The Department of Game, however, continued its total prohibition of net fishing for steelhead trout. The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the regulations imposed by the Department of Fisheries which, as noted, were applicable to salmon; and no party has brought that ruling back here for review. The sole question tendered in the present cases concerns the regulations of the Department of Game concerning steelhead trout. We granted the petitions for certiorari. 410 U. S. 981.
The Supreme Court of Washington, while upholding the regulations of the Department of Game prohibiting fishing by net for steelhead in 1970, 80 Wash. 2d 561, 497 P. 2d 171, held (1) that new fishing regulations for the Tribe must be made each year, supported by “facts and data that show the regulation is necessary for the conservation” of the steelhead, id., at 576, 497 P. 2d, at 180; (2) that the prohibition of net fishing for steelhead was proper because “the catch of the steelhead sports fishery alone in the Puyallup River leaves no more than a sufficient number of steelhead for escapement necessary for the conservation of the steelhead fishery in that river.” Id., at 573, 497 P. 2d, at 178-179.
The ban on all net fishing in the Puyallup River for steelhead grants, in effect, the entire run to the sports fishermen. Whether that amounts to discrimination under the Treaty is the central question in these cases.
We know from the record and oral argument that the present run of steelhead trout is made possible by the planting of young steelhead trout called smolt and that the planting program is financed in large part by the license fees paid by the sports fishermen. The Washington Supreme Court said:
“Mr. Clifford J. Millenbac [h], Chief of the Fisheries Management Division of the Department of Game, testified that the run of steelhead in the Puyallup River drainage is between 16,000 and 18,000 fish annually; that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 are native run which is the maximum the Puyallup system will produce even if undisturbed; that approximately 10,000 are produced by the annual hatchery plant of 100,000 smolt; that smolt, small steelhead from 6 to 9 inches in length, are released in April, and make their way to the sea about the first of August; that during this time all fishing is closed to permit their escapement; that the entire cost of the hatchery smolt plant, exclusive of some federal funds, is financed from license fees paid by sports fishermen. The record further shows that 61 per cent of the entire sports catch on the river is from hatchery-planted steelhead; that the catch of steelhead by the sports fishery, as determined from ‘card count' received from the licensed sports fishermen, is around 12,000 to 14,000 annually; that the escapement required for adequate hatchery needs and spawning is 25 per cent to 50 per cent of the run; that the steelhead fishery cannot therefore withstand a commercial fishery on the Puyallup River.” Id., at 572, 497 P. 2d, at 178.
At oral argument counsel for the Department of Game represented that the catch of steelhead that were developed from the hatchery program was in one year 60% of the total run and in another 80%. And he stated that approximately 80% of the cost of that program was financed by the license fees of sports fishermen. Whether that issue will emerge in this ongoing litigation as a basis for allocating the catch between the two groups, we do not know. We mention it only to reserve decision on it.
At issue presently is the problem of accommodating net fishing by the Puyallups with conservation needs of the river. Our prior decision recognized that net fishing by these Indians for commercial purposes was covered by the Treaty. 391 U. S., at 398-399. We said that “the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation . . . does not discriminate against the Indians.” Id., at 398. There is discrimination here because all Indian net fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely pre-empted by non-Indians, is allowed.
Only an expert could fairly estimate what degree of net fishing plus fishing by hook and line would allow the escapement of fish necessary for perpetuation of the species. If hook-and-line fishermen now catch all the steel-head which can be caught within the limits needed for escapement, then that number must in some manner be fairly apportioned between Indian net fishing and non-Indian sports fishing so far as that particular species is concerned. What formula should be employed is not for us to propose. There are many variables — the number of nets, the number of steelhead that can be caught with nets, the places where nets can be located, the length of the net season, the frequency during the season when nets may be used. On the other side are the number of hook- and-line licenses that are issuable, the limits of the catch of each sports fisherman, the duration of the season for sports fishing, and the like.
The aim is to accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty and the rights of other people.
We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very last steelhead in the river. Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species; and the time may come when the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream that all fishing should be banned until the species regains assurance of survival. The police power of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.
We reverse the judgment below insofar as it treats the steelhead problem and remand the cases for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
“ANNUAL CATCH LIMIT—STEELHEAD ONLY: Thirty steelhead over 20" in length . . . .” 1970 Game Fish Seasons and Catch Limits 3 (Dept. of Game). (Cited at 80 Wash. 2d 561, 572, 497 P. 2d 171, 178.)
The Washington Supreme Court noted “that substantially all the steelhead fishery occurs after their entrance into the respective rivers to which they return.” 80 Wash. 2d, at 575, 497 P. 2d, at 180. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
WOOD v. UNITED STATES.
No. 27,
Misc.
Decided October 16, 1967.
Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner was found guilty by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia of refusing to report for civilian employment, in violation of § 12 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462. Before trial he filed an affidavit with the court requesting assigned counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A. The court considered the affidavit, questioned petitioner and disapproved the request. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis, assigned counsel to assist petitioner in his appeal and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari.
Before this Court the Solicitor General has conceded that the record does not convincingly show that there was adequate inquiry into the question of petitioner’s financial ability to retain counsel, in that “the trial court should have explored the possibility that petitioner could afford only partial payment for the services of trial counsel and that counsel be appointed on that basis, as the Criminal Justice Act permits (see 18 U. S. C. § 3006(A) (c) and (f)).” The Solicitor General urges, however, that there is no basis for believing that petitioner suffered prejudice from the District Court’s error, an argument we find unpersuasive.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Solicitor General’s Memorandum and the relevant criteria of the Criminal Justice Act.
Mr. Justice Black dissents.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
4
] | sc_casedisposition |
HEIDER, ADMINISTRATOR v. MICHIGAN SUGAR CO.
No. 48.
Argued December 8, 1966.
Decided December 12, 1966.
Gregory M. Pillon argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Thomas C. Mayer.
Harry M. Plotkin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Carl H. Smith.
Per Curiam.
The writ is dismissed as improvidently granted. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"comity: civil rights",
"comity: criminal procedure",
"comity: First Amendment",
"comity: habeas corpus",
"comity: military",
"comity: obscenity",
"comity: privacy",
"comity: miscellaneous",
"comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals",
"assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order",
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules",
"judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures",
"mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)",
"venue",
"no merits: writ improvidently granted",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)",
"no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision",
"no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)",
"no merits: miscellaneous",
"standing to sue: adversary parties",
"standing to sue: direct injury",
"standing to sue: legal injury",
"standing to sue: personal injury",
"standing to sue: justiciable question",
"standing to sue: live dispute",
"standing to sue: parens patriae standing",
"standing to sue: statutory standing",
"standing to sue: private or implied cause of action",
"standing to sue: taxpayer's suit",
"standing to sue: miscellaneous",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: review of non-final order",
"judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)",
"judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)",
"judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)",
"judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)",
"judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts",
"judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal",
"judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata",
"judicial administration: interpleader",
"judicial administration: untimely filing",
"judicial administration: Act of State doctrine",
"judicial administration: miscellaneous",
"Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction",
"miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction"
] | [
14
] | sc_issue_9 |
SHIPLEY v. CALIFORNIA.
No. 540,
Misc.
Decided June 23, 1969.
Kate Whyner for petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Marvin A. Bauer, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
The petitioner was convicted in California of robbery in the first degree, and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The California Supreme Court denied review. The petitioner seeks reversal of the judgment below on the ground that evidence introduced at his trial was seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Since we agree with the petitioner that the evidence was taken in the course of an unconstitutional search of his home, the judgment of the California Court of Appeal must be reversed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643.
Informed that the petitioner had been involved in a robbery, police officers went to his residence. The petitioner was not at home, but a 15-year-old girl who identified herself as the petitioner’s wife allowed the officers to enter and search her belongings. When several rings taken by the robbers were found, the officers “staked out” the house and awaited the petitioner’s return. Upon his arrival late that night, he was immediately arrested as he alighted from his car. The officers searched the petitioner and the car, and then again entered and searched the house, where they discovered under a couch a jewelry case stolen in the robbery. The car was parked outside the house and 15 or 20 feet away from it, and the officers did not request permission to conduct the second search of the house. No warrant was ever obtained. The trial court nevertheless upheld the second search on the ground that it was incident to the petitioner’s arrest, and the Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the area searched was “under the [petitioner’s] effective control” at the time of the arrest.
Under our decision today in Chimel v. California, ante, p. 752, the search clearly exceeded Fourth Amendment limitations on searches incident to arrest. But even if Chimel were to have no retroactive application — a question which we reserve for a case which requires its resolution — there is no precedent of this Court that justifies the search in this case. The Court has consistently held that a search “can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.” Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486. (Emphasis supplied.) At the very most, police officers have been permitted to search a four-room apartment in which the arrest took place. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145. See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56. But the Constitution has never been construed by this Court to allow the police, in the absence of an emergency, to arrest a person outside his home and then take him inside for the purpose of conducting a warrantless search. On the contrary, “it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein.” Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 32. (Emphasis supplied.) And in James v. Louisiana, 382 U. S. 36, the Court held that the search of the petitioner’s home after his arrest on the street two blocks away “cannot be regarded as incident to his arrest.” Id., at 37. Since the thorough search of the petitioner’s home extended without reasonable justification beyond the place in which he was arrested, it cannot be upheld under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as incident to his arrest.
Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in granting certiorari but dissents from the reversal and remand of the judgment without a hearing.
Because of our disposition of the case on this ground, we find it unnecessary to consider the contentions of the petitioner that his “wife” did not voluntarily consent to the first search, and that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the petitioner. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state of the court in which the case originated. Consider the District of Columbia as a state. | What is the state of the court in which the case originated? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
5
] | sc_caseoriginstate |
CORY CORPORATION et al. v. SAUBER.
No. 436.
Argued May 16, 1960.
Decided June 20, 1960.
Edwin A. Rothschild argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Stanford Clinton.
Howard A. Heffron argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Grant W. Wiprud.
Per Curiam.
This suit was instituted by petitioners in the District Court for a refund of excise taxes collected on the sales of two air-conditioning units sold in 1954 and 1955. Section 3405 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) §3405 (c), placed a 10% tax on" [s] elf-contained air-conditioning units.” Section 3450 gave the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, power to prescribe needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of the provisions relating to such taxes. Pursuant to this power, the Commissioner published revenue rulings in 1948 and in 1954 holding that the statute taxed air-conditioning units which had certain physical features, were designed for installation in a window or other opening and had “a total motor horsepower of less than 1 horsepower.” These rulings represented the Commissioner’s construction of the Act until a different construction, applied prospectively only, was expressed in regulations issued in 1959.
The parties stipulated that the statute applied only to “self-contained air conditioning units of the household type” and that each of the two units in question had an actual motor horsepower of one horsepower. The taxpayers contended that the words “motor horsepower” in the revenue rulings meant actual horsepower; the Government contended that they meant the nominal horsepower given by the manufacturer or “rated” horsepower assigned on the basis of standards established by trade associations. The District Court construed the revenue rulings as referring to actual, not nominal or rated, horsepower and found, in accordance with the stipulation, that each of the two units had an actual horsepower in excess of one horsepower. It found additionally that even the “rated” horsepower of the two units in question was greater than one horsepower. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed. 266 F. 2d 58, 267 F. 2d 802. It did not reach the question as to the meaning of the revenue rulings, for it held that “household type” was the controlling statutory criterion, that the horsepower of the units is irrelevant to that issue, that the units in question were clearly of the household type because they were “made to meet the needs of a household,” and that the revenue rulings, insofar as they referred to horsepower, were therefore void. The case is here on petition for a writ of certiorari, 361 U. S. 899.
There is much said in the briefs and in oral argument about this case as a test case. It is said that taxes on the sale of about 50,000 units turn on this decision. We intimate no opinion as to the taxes on any sales except the two involved here. The only issues before the Court are the construction and validity of the revenue rulings. Hence we do not reach the question as to what other defenses might have been made. Respondent urges in this Court, contrary to the stipulation below, that the statute taxes all self-contained air-conditioning units, not merely those of the household type. We need not consider which view of the statute is correct for under either view we think the horsepower test is a permissible one. We hold that the revenue rulings which were in force from 1948 to 1959 were not void. The factor of horsepower in our opinion may have had some relation to size in the then stage of engineering development and size might well have been relevant to what was then a “self-contained air-conditioning unit.” There is indeed evidence that the less-than-one-horsepower test was designed to draw the line between household and commercial types of air-conditioning equipment. Moreover, it appears that the rulings in question were issued after consultation with industry representatives, who asserted that horsepower was a factor relevant to the definition of the statutory term as they understood it. The Commissioner consistently adhered to the horsepower test for more than 10 years, and Congress did not change the statute though it was specifically advised in 1956 that that was the test which was being applied. We cannot say that such a construction was not a permissible one, cf. Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580, especially where it continued without deviation for over a decade. Cf. United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U. S. 383. The District Court found that “Among engineers, the horsepower of a motor does not mean its nominal horsepower rating but means the actual horsepower which the motor will deliver continuously under its full normal load.”
The Court of Appeals did not reach that question nor review that finding in view of its conclusion that the horsepower test was not valid. Accordingly we remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of that and any other questions which may remain. And we add that our disposition is without prejudice to such action as the lower courts may deem appropriate to prevent taxpayers, should they ultimately prevail, from obtaining a windfall by reason of taxes collected by them but not paid to the Government.
Reversed.
This was re-enacted in § 4111 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 4111.
S. T. 934, 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 180'.
Rev. Rul. 54-462, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 410.
This test of horsepower was excluded from the Treasury Regulations promulgated in 1959 under the 1954 Code by T. D. 6423, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 282.
See notes 2 and 3, supra.
Hearings, Subcommittee, House Ways and Means Committee on Excise Taxes, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 163-165. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
255
] | sc_respondent |
MOORE et al. v. OGILVIE, GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, et al.
No. 620.
Argued March 27, 1969.
Decided May 5, 1969.
Richard F. Watt argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Richard L. Mandel and Ira A. Kipnis.
John J. O’Toole and Richard E. Friedman, Assistant Attorneys General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief was William J. Scott, Attorney General.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Brennan.
This is a suit for declaratory relief and for an injunction, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202, brought by appellants who are independent candidates for the offices of electors of President and Vice President of the United States from Illinois. The defendants or appellees are members of the Illinois Electoral Board. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, §§ 7-14. In 1968 appellants filed with appellees petitions containing the names of 26,500 qualified voters who desired that appellants be nominated. The appellees ruled that appellants could not be certified to the county clerks for the November 1968 election because of a proviso added in 1935 to an Illinois statute requiring that at least 25,000 electors sign a petition to nominate such candidates. The proviso reads:
“that included in the aggregate total of 25,000 signatures are the signatures of 200 qualified voters from each of at least 50 counties.” Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, § 10-3 (1967).
A three-judge District Court was convened, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, which, feeling bound by MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S. 281, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 293 E. Supp. 411. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
On October 8, 1968, the same day the case was docketed, appellants filed a motion to advance and expedite the hearing and disposition of this cause. Ap-pellees opposed the motion. On October 14, 1968, we entered the following order:
“Because of the representation of the State of Illinois that ‘it would be a physical impossibility’ for the State ‘to effectuate the relief which the appellants seek,’ the ‘Motion to Advance and Expedite the Hearing and Disposition of this Cause' is denied. Mr. Justice Fortas would grant the motion.” 393 U. S. 814.
Appellees urged in a motion to dismiss that since the November 5, 1968, election has been held, there is no possibility of granting any relief to appellants and that the appeal should be dismissed. But while the 1968 election is over, the burden which MacDougall v. Green, supra, allowed to be placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections, as long as Illinois maintains her present system as she has done since 1935. The problem is therefore “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 515. The need for its resolution thus reflects a continuing controversy in the federal-state area where our “one man, one vote” decisions have thrust. We turn then to the merits.
MacDougall v. Green is indistinguishable from the present controversy. The allegations in that case were that 52% of the State’s registered voters were residents of Cook County alone, 87 % were residents of the 49 most populous counties, and only 13% resided in the 53 least populous counties. The argument was that a nominating procedure so weighted violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Today, in contrast, 93.4% of the State’s registered voters reside in the 49 most populous counties, and only 6.6% are resident in the remaining 53 counties. The constitutional argument, however, remains the same.
Five members of the Court held in MacDougall that a State has “the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former.” 335 U. S., at 284. Three members of the Court dissented on the ground that the nominating procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause. One member of the Court voted not to exercise this Court’s jurisdiction in equity to resolve the dispute.
While the majority cited Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, as their authority for denying relief and while a few who took part in Colegrove put this type of question in the “political” as distinguished from the “justiciable” category, 328 U. S., at 552, that matter was authoritatively resolved in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 202. When a State makes classifications of voters which favor residents of some counties over residents of other counties, a justiciable controversy is presented. 369 U. S., at 198-204.
When we struck down the Georgia county-unit system in statewide primary elections, we said:
“How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote — whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 379.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, held that a State in an apportionment of state representatives and senators among districts and counties could not deprive voters in the more populous counties of their proportionate share of representatives and senators.
“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” 377 U. S., at 555.
We have said enough to indicate why MacDougall v. Green is out of line with our recent apportionment cases. The use of nominating petitions by independents to obtain a place on the Illinois ballot is an integral part of her elective system. See People v. Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9, 18, 77 N. E. 321, 323. All procedures used by a State as an integral part of the election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgment of the right to vote. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 314-318; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 664.
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112, is not relevant to the problem of this case. There each councilman was required to be a resident of the borough from which he was elected. Like the residence requirement for state senators from a multi-district county (Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433), the place of residence did not mark the voting unit; for in Dusch all the electors in the city voted for each councilman.
It is no answer to the argument under the Equal Protection Clause that this law was designed to require statewide support for launching a new political party rather than support from a few localities. This law applies a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely settled counties and populous counties alike, contrary to the constitutional theme of equality among citizens in the exercise of their political rights. The idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government.
Under this Illinois law the electorate in 49 of the counties which contain 93.4% of the registered voters may not form a new political party and place its candidates on the ballot. Yet 25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters properly distributed among the 53 remaining counties may form a new party to elect candidates to office. This law thus discriminates against the residents of the populous counties of the State in favor of rural sections. It, therefore, lacks the equality to which the exercise of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.
MacDougall v. Green is overruled.
7 Reversed. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the case was heard by a three-judge federal district court. Beginning in the early 1900s, Congress required three-judge district courts to hear certain kinds of cases. More modern-day legislation has reduced the kinds of lawsuits that must be heard by such a court. As a result, the frequency is less for the Burger Court than for the Warren Court, and all but nonexistent for the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. | Was the case heard by a three-judge federal district court? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_threejudgefdc |
UNITED STATES et al. v. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY CO. et al.
No. 75-420.
Argued April 26-27, 1976
Decided June 17, 1976
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, White, Marshall, Blachmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart, J., joined, ;post, p. 521. Powell, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the ease.
Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for the United States et al. On the briefs were. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Carl D. Lawson, Fritz R. Kahn, Betty Jo Christian, Hanford O’Hara, and Arthur J. Cerra.
Doyle S. Morris argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs were Owen Clarke, Charles C. Rettberg, Jr., George D. Gibson, and E. Milton Farley III.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here on direct appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2325, from an order of the District Court which permanently enjoined the Interstate Commerce Commission from enforcing, against the appellee railway system, an order requiring the application of increased revenues to deferred capital improvements and deferred maintenance as a condition for the nonsuspension of the rate increases. 392 F. Supp. 358 (ED Va. 1975).
In April 1974, the Nation’s railroads, including the appellees, filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a joint petition for a general revenue increase “with respect to the revenue needs of all carriers by railroad operating in the United States.” App. 97. Ex parte No. 805, Nationwide Increase of Ten Percent in Freight Rates and Charges, 1974. The proposed tariffs included a 10% increase in the level of freight rates. In their petition, the railroads alleged in part:
“The railroad industry is capital-intensive and must generate huge amounts of capital annually just to replace stationary facilities and equipment as it becomes worn out or obsolete. When earnings are inadequate to support this level of spending, as now, then a process of asset liquidation occurs accelerating as facilities and equipment are consumed by increased traffic. Even if the liquidation of assets is arrested by earnings sufficient to support maintenance and replacement there is a further need to modernize and expand capacity if the railroads are to be able to meet sharply increasing demands upon them for economic and efficient transportation. There is presently an abundance of data and analysis which reliably establishes that billions of dollars are needed immediately and in the coming decade for maintenance and improvement of the Nation’s rail transportation plant.” App. 107.
On June 3, 1974, the Commission entered an order which noted “that the nation’s railroads are in need of additional freight revenues to offset recently incurred costs of materials, other than fuel, and to provide an improved level of earnings . . . .” Jurisdictional Statement 42a. The Commission found that the Nation’s railroads were “in danger of further deterioration detrimental to the public interest . . . ,” ibid., and recognized that “without the additional revenues to be derived from increased freight rates and charges, the earnings of the nation’s railroads would be insufficient to enable them under honest, economical and efficient management to provide adequate and efficient railroad transportation services . . . .” Ibid. The Commission concluded that “the increases proposed would, if permitted to become effective, generate additional revenues sufficient to enable the carriers to prevent further deterioration and improve service.” At the same time, it noted that “if the schedules were permitted to become effective as filed and without conditions designed to promote service improvements, the increases proposed would be unjust and unreasonable and contrary to the dictates of the national transportation policy . . . .” Id., at 42a-43a. The Commission, therefore, suspended the operation of the new schedules, but authorized the railroads to file new tariffs, subject to conditions providing that revenues generated by the increases “should be expended for capital improvements and deferred maintenance of plant and equipment and the amount needed for increased material and supply cost, other than fuel.” Id., at 46a.
On July 18, 1974, the Commission entered the second pertinent order in this case. This order defined “deferred maintenance” and “delayed capital improvements.” The order also provided that “up to 3 percentage points of the 10-percent authorization may be applied to increased material and supply costs, excluding fuel, provided such costs have been incurred.” Id., at 59a. The order also permitted increased income taxes to be excluded in determining the balance of funds to be applied to deferred maintenance and delayed capital improvements.
On July 30, appellee Chessie System sought reconsideration of the Commission’s order of July 18 “for the reason that' under the Commission’s definitions of deferred maintenance and delayed capital improvements they will be unable to apply any of the increased revenues derived from the Ex parte No. 305 proceeding (other than those earmarked for increased material and supply costs) to any projects now scheduled or which may be scheduled in the foreseeable future.” App. 222. Chessie alleged it had no such “deferred maintenance” or “delayed capital improvements”:
“No worthwhile project on Chessie System designed to improve its transportation service to the shipping public has ever been deferred because financing or funding was not available. None will be as long as Chessie System earnings are at levels adequate enough to attract capital. Chessie System has never stinted in its expenditures to provide adequate and efficient transportation service to its customers.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 223.
Chessie further noted that it had made significant expenditures for capital improvements in the six months prior to the Commission order. It pointed out that these projects did not qualify under the Commission’s definition because the funds had been committed before June 1, 1974, and the projects “had not been deferred because funding or financing was not available.” Id., at 224. Unless it was permitted to apply these additional revenues to these earlier commitments, contended Ches-sie, “[t]hey will simply lie dormant in a sterile, segregated account which will result in several serious consequences both to Chessie System and the shipping public.” Id., at 225. Basically, argued Chessie, the consequence of the order was to place Chessie “at a distinct competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other railroads, which for one reason or another have deferred maintenance or delayed capital improvements within the meaning of the Commission’s order. These lines will be able to use the additional revenues to buy cars and other equipment while Chessie System’s money will lie fallow. In effect, the order penalizes Chessie System and other efficient carriers and rewards only those railroads which are inefficient.” Ibid. Chessie specifically asked the Commission to permit the expenditure of funds generated by the increases for any valid corporate purpose if the railroad had no deferred maintenance or deferred capital improvements as defined by the Commission’s order. Chessie, for the first time, also argued that the Commission, “exceeded its statutory authority by conditioning the use to which the revenues derived from Ex parte No. 305 might be applied.” Id., at 226.
By order dated August 9, 1974, the Commission denied the petition for reconsideration but did significantly clarify its earlier orders. While reiterating its intention that the authorized increases, over and above the increased costs of material and supplies, other than fuel, had to be used exclusively for reducing deferred maintenance of plant and equipment and delayed capital improvements, the Commission left “to the railroad managements' decision how the funds segregated in accordance with the July 18, 1974, order shall be applied to expenditures for the various specific items of equipment and other properties.” Jurisdictional Statement 81a. The Commission pointed out that “the petition and verified statements of railroad officials seeking the increases authorized herein are replete with references to the need for revenues to provide funds for great, but unspecified, amounts of deferred maintenance and delayed capital improvements . . . Id., at 81a-82a. The Commission did note that “certain railroads . . . may have anticipated authorization of the increases by initiating improvement projects, or scheduling or otherwise committing and recognizing them in capital budgets prior to June 1, 1974.” Id., at 82a. Under those circumstances, if the projects otherwise qualified as delayed capital improvements, the Commission stated that it would be “consistent with the Commission’s intention that the authorized increases could be applied” to those projects. Ibid.
The present suit was commenced by Chessie on August 15, 1974. Chessie sought to set aside the June 3, July 18, and August 9 orders of the Commission. No other railroad joined in this action. On August 18, a single District Judge issued a temporary restraining order which prohibited the Commission from “enforcing the limiting conditions on the use of plaintiffs’ revenues and of certain reporting conditions included in [the] Orders . . . .” App. 33.
On August 16, most of the country’s railroads filed with the Commission another petition for clarification and modification of its July 18 and August 9 orders. The Commission reopened the matter and held oral argument on August 27. Appellee Chessie System resisted appearing at this argument on the ground that its filing a complaint in the United States District Court deprived the Commission of further jurisdiction over it. The Commission, however, ordered that counsel representing the Chessie System be present at oral argument and be prepared to orally “show cause why any change should be made in the conditions and requirements contained in the outstanding orders in this proceeding.” Jurisdictional Statement 91a-92a.
On October 3, the Commission concluded that if any railroad was “unable to use the full amount of the funds generated by the increase for deferred maintenance or delayed capital improvements” it might “expend such funds for new and additional capital improvements providing advance approval is obtained from the Commission . . . .” Id., at 104a. Chessie amended its complaint in the District Court to challenge this order as well. It claimed that its maintenance and capital projects will not qualify as “new and additional capital improvement,” App. 37, under the Commission’s order since that order defined such projects as those “over and above those presently undertaken, scheduled or otherwise committed . . . .” Id., at 38.
The District Court enjoined the Interstate Commerce Commission from enforcing against Chessie those portions of the challenged orders that required revenues derived from Ex parte No. 305 to be spent for specified purposes. After rejecting the preliminary defenses raised by the Commission, the court concluded that the conditions imposed by the Commission on the expenditures of the increased revenues were unlawful. The court began with the proposition that the Commission can impose conditions that have been expressly or impliedly authorized by law. It found, of course, no express authorization in the Interstate Commerce Act for the Commission to condition withholding suspension of a rate increase on how the additional revenue is spent. Examining the possibility of implied authority, the court noted that the Commission had not previously conditioned withholding the suspension of rates on control of a railroad’s expenditures, and that, therefore, no court had considered the precise issue presented by this case. However, the District Court noted that it had been held, in other contexts, that the Commission lacks statutory authority to order the railroads how to spend their funds. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, 42 F. 2d 765 (WD Ark. 1930), aff’d, 283 U. S. 249 (1931); ICC v. United States ex rel. Los Angeles, 280 U. S. 52, 70 (1929). These cases, said the District Court, “unmistakenly establish that the Commission has no general power to control a railroad’s expenditures. No provision of [49 U. S. C.] § 15 (7), authorizing suspension of rate increases, implies that the Commission may exercise, as an incident to suspension, the control over expenditures that Congress has otherwise withheld from it.” 392 F. Supp., at 367. The court therefore concluded “that Congress has not authorized the Commission to control a carrier’s expenditure of funds as a condition to withholding the suspension of rates.” Ibid. We noted probable jurisdiction. 423 U. S. 923 (1975).
The precise question presented in this case, while one of first impression in this Court, is also a narrow one. In their application before the Commission, the railroads sought to justify the proposed general revenue increase on several grounds, including the need for additional funds for deferred capital and deferred maintenance expenditures. We are confronted with the question of whether the Commission may, as a condition for not suspending and subsequently investigating the lawfulness of a proposed tariff, require the railroads to devote the additional revenues to a need which, they allege, justifies the increase.
The overall statutory mandate of the Commission in railroad ratemaking proceedings can, for present purposes, be stated quite simply. The Congress has charged the Commission with the task of determining whether the rates proposed by the carriers are “just and reasonable.” 49 U. S. C. § 1 (5). In fulfilling this obligation, the Commission must assess the proposed rates not only against the backdrop of the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C. preceding § 1, but also with specific reference to the statutory criteria set forth by the Congress to guide the ratesetting process. These provisions, in short, require the Commission to ensure that the rate imposed on the traveling or the shipping public will support both an economically sound and efficient rail transportation system.
This Court has recently set out the regulatory scheme for the setting of railroad rates mandated by the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1 et seg. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 672-674 (1973). Rates, in the first instance, are set by the railroads. The proposed rate is filed with the Commission and notice is given to the public. After 30 days’ notice (or a shorter period, if authorized by the ICC), the rate becomes effective. 49 U. S. C. § 6 (3). The Commission has the authority, during that 30-day period, to suspend the proposed tariff for a maximum of seven months in order to investigate the lawfulness of the new rates. 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7). At the end of the seven-month suspension period, the proposed rate becomes effective unless the ICC has, prior to the deadline, completed the investigation and found that the rate is unlawful. See generally Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658 (1963). Ex parte No. 305, the proceeding at issue here, was a “general revenue proceeding.” The railroads, while not seeking specific authority for an increase in the rate applicable to any particular commodity or group of commodities, proposed to increase the average rates charged.
The power to suspend the proposed rates pending investigation — the regulatory tool at issue here — was added to the Interstate Commerce Act by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 552. Its purpose was to protect the public from the irreparable harm resulting in unjustified increases in transportation costs by giving the Commission “full opportunity for . . . investigation” before the tariff became effective. It provided a “means ... for checking at the threshold new adjustments that might subsequently prove to be unreasonable or discriminatory, safeguarding the community against irreparable losses and recognizing more fully that the Commission’s essential task is to establish and maintain reasonable charges and proper rate relationships.” 1 I. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission 59 (1931). The exigencies of competition, seasonal and other demand trends, and the influences of the general economy over a seven-month period can make implementation of this suspension mechanism a particularly potent tool. That potency was well recognized, even at its creation. Senator Elkins referred to it as a “tremendous power.” Senator Cummins characterized it as “an order in the nature of a preliminary injunction,” a characterization later attributed to an almost identical statute. Air Freight Forwarder Assn., 8 C. A. B. 469, 474 (1947).
The Commission’s setting of this particular condition precedent to the immediate implementation of the rate increase was directly related to its mandate to assess the reasonableness of the rates and to suspend them pending investigation if there is a question as to their legality. The ICC could have simply suspended the rates originally proposed by the railroads for the full statutory seven-month period. Instead, it pursued a more measured course and offered an alternative tailored far more precisely to the particular circumstances presented., The railroads had made the representation that the increase was justified, at least in part, by the need to take care of deferred maintenance and deferred capital expenditures. If the railroads did, in fact, use the increased revenues for such purposes, the Commission perceived no reason to impose a suspension of the tariff or to undertake a lengthy investigation and, consequently, no reason to frustrate the clear congressional intent that "just and reasonable” rates be implemented. Delay through suspension would only have aggravated the already poor condition of some of the railroads. On the other hand, the Commission was cognizant of a history of poor financial planning by the railroads in regard to' outlays of this nature. Supra, at 504 n. 4. If the revenues derived from the new tariffs, once received, were used for other purposes, an investigation prior to their implementation might indeed be warranted.
In upholding what we find to be a legitimate, reasonable, and direct adjunct to the Commission’s explicit statutory power to suspend rates pending investigation, we do not imply that the Commission may involve itself in the financial management of the carriers. See ICC v. United States ex rel. Los Angeles, 280 U. S. 52 (1929). The action taken by the Commission here is both conceptually and functionally different from any attempt to require specific management action, whether it be of a financial or operational nature; it specified no particular projects and it set no priorities. In deciding not to suspend the rates and investigate their lawfulness on the condition that the revenues be used in the broadly defined areas of “delayed capital improvements” and “deferred maintenance,” the Commission simply held the railroads to their representation that the increase was justified by needs in these two areas. The railroads were, of course, not required to submit a tariff imposing such a condition on the use of the resulting revenue. They had the option to continue to insist on an unconditional increase, to submit proof of its reasonableness to the Commission, and, if successful, or if the investigation were not completed within the statutory seven-month period, to collect rates based on the new tariffs.
In this Court, Chessie has argued that its particular financial situation makes it unable to use Ex parte No. 305 revenues and, consequently, the application of the Commission’s action to it is arbitrary and capricious. The Commission, on the other hand, submits that there is sufficient evidence in the proceedings before it to demonstrate that Chessie did in fact have deferred maintenance items upon which these revenues could be expended. Moreover, the Commission points out that Chessie was not required to join the other railroads in the cancellation of the original tariff and the refiling of the one conditioned on the use of revenues in these two areas. Since the District Court held that the Commission did not have the power to impose conditions on the refiling of the tariff, it did not address this question. Chessie, if it so chooses, may raise the matter on remand in the District Court.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Me. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Selected Sections of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94r-210, 90 Stat. 31:
Sec. 202. (a) Section 1 (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. 1 (5)) is amended by inserting “(a)” immediately after “(5)” and by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: “The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to common carriers by railroad subject to this part.”
(b) Section 1 (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. 1 (5)), as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subdivisions:
“(b) Each rate for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of persons or property by any common carrier by railroad subject to this part shall be just and reasonable. A rate that is unjust or unreasonable is prohibited and unlawful. No rate which contributes or which would contribute to the going concern value of such a carrier shall be found to be unjust or unreasonable, or not shown to be just and reasonable, on the ground that such rate is below a just or reasonable minimum for the service rendered or to be rendered. A rate which equals or exceeds the variable costs (as determined through formulas prescribed by the Commission) of providing a service shall be presumed, unless such presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, to contribute to the going concern value of the carrier or carriers proposing such rate (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as the ‘proponent carrier'). In determining variable costs, the Commission shall, at the request of the carrier proposing the rate, determine only those costs of the carrier proposing the rate and only those costs of the specific service in question, except where such specific data and cost information is not available. The Commission shall not include in variable cost any expenses which do not vary directly with the level of service provided under the rate in question. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, no rate shall be found to be unjust or unreasonable, or not shown to be just and reasonable, on the ground that such rate exceeds a just or reasonable maximum for the service rendered or to be rendered, unless the Commission has first found that the proponent carrier has market dominance over such service. A finding that a carrier has market dominance over a service shall not create a presumption that the rate or rates for such service exceed a just and reasonable maximum. Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit a rate increase from a level which reduces the going concern value of the proponent carrier to a level which contributes to such going concern value and is otherwise just and reasonable. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, a rate increase which does not raise a rate above the incremental costs (as determined through formulas prescribed by the Commission) of rendering the service to which such rate applies shall be presumed to be just and reasonable.
“(c) As used in this part, the terms—
“(i) ‘market dominance’ refers to an absence of effective competition from other carriers or modes of transportation, for the traffic or movement to which a rate applies; and
“(ii) ‘rate’ means any rate or charge for the transportation of persons or property.
“(d) Within 240 days after the date of enactment of this subdivision, the Commission shall establish, by rule, standards and procedures for determining, in accordance with section 15 (9) of this part, whether and when a carrier possesses market dominance over a service rendered or to be rendered at a particular rate or rates. Such rules shall be designed to provide for a practical determination without administrative delay. The Commission shall solicit and consider the recommendations of the Attorney General and of the Federal Trade Commission in the course of establishing such rules.”
(e) Section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. 15), as amended by this Act, is further amended—
(1) by adding at the end of paragraph (7) thereof the following new sentence: “This paragraph shall not apply to common carriers by railroad subject to this part.”; and
(2) by inserting a new paragraph (8) as follows:
“ (8) (a) Whenever a schedule is filed with the Commission by a common carrier by railroad stating a new individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or a new individual or joint classification, regulation, or practice affecting a rate, fare, or charge, the Commission may, upon the complaint of an interested party or upon its own initiative, order a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice. The hearing may be conducted without answer or other formal pleading, but reasonable notice shall be provided to interested parties. Such hearing shall be completed and a final decision rendered by the Commission not later than 7 months after such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice was scheduled to become effective, unless, prior to the expiration of such 7-month period, the Commission reports in writing to the Congress that it is unable to render a decision within such period, together with a full explanation of the reason for the delay. If such a report is made to the Congress, the final decision shall be made not later than 10 months after the date of the filing of such schedule. If the final decision of the Commission is not made within the applicable time period, the rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice shall go into effect immediately at the expiration of such time period, or shall remain in effect if it has already become effective. Such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice may be set aside thereafter by the Commission if, upon complaint of an interested party, the Commission finds it to be unlawful.
“(b) Pending a hearing pursuant to subdivision (a), the schedule may be suspended, pursuant to subdivision (d), for 7 months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect, or for 10 months if the Commission makes a report to the Congress pursuant to subdivision (a), except under the following conditions:
“(i) in the case of a rate increase, a rate may not be suspended on the ground that it exceeds a just and reasonable level if the rate is within a limit specified in subdivision (c), except that such a rate change may be suspended under any provision of section 2, 3, or 4 of this part or, following promulgation of standards and procedures under section 1 (5) (d) of this part, if the carrier is found to have market dominance, within the meaning of section 1 (5) (c) (i) of this part, over the service to which such rate increase applies; or
“(ii) in the case of a rate decrease, a rate may not be suspended on the ground that it is below a just and reasonable level if the rate is within a limit specified in subdivision (c), except that such a rate change may be suspended under any provision of section 2, 3, or 4 of this part, or for the purposes of investigating such rate change upon a complaint that such rate change constitutes a competitive practice which is unfair, destructive, predatory or otherwise undermines competition which is necessary in the public interest.
“(c) The limitations upon the Commission’s power to suspend rate changes set forth in subdivisions (b) (i) and (ii) apply only to rate changes which are not of general applicability to all or substantially all classes of traffic and only if—
“(i) the rate increase or decrease is filed within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this subdivision;
“(ii) the common carrier by railroad notifies the Commission that it wishes to have the rate considered pursuant to this subdivision:
“(iii) the aggregate of increases or decreases in any rate filed pursuant to clauses (i) and (ii) of this subdivision within the first 365 days following such date of enactment is not more than 7 per centum of the rate in effect on January 1,1976; and
“ (iv) the aggregate of the increases or decreases for any rate filed pursuant to clauses (i) and (ii) of this subdivision within the second 365 day-period following such date of enactment is not more than 7 per centum of the rate in effect on January 1, 1977.
“(d) The Commission may not suspend a rate under this paragraph unless it appears from specific facts shown by the verified complaint of any person that—
“(i) without suspension the proposed rate change will cause substantial injury to the complainant or the party represented by such complainant; and
“(ii) it is likely that such complainant will prevail on the merits. The burden of proof shall be upon the complainant to establish the matters set forth in clauses (i) and (ii) of this subdivision. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as establishing a presumption that any rate increase or decrease in excess of the limits set forth in clauses (iii) or (iv) of subdivision (c) is unlawful or should be suspended.
“(e) If a hearing is initiated under this paragraph with respect to a proposed increased rate, fare, or charge, and if the schedule is not suspended pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission shall require the railroads involved to keep an account of all amounts received because of such increase from the date such rate, fare, or charge became effective until the Commission issues an order or until 7 months after such date, whichever first occurs, or, if the hearings are extended pursuant to subdivision (a), until an order issues or until 10 months elapse, whichever first occurs. The account shall specify by whom and on whose behalf the amounts are paid. In its final order, the Commission shall require the common carrier by railroad to refund to the person on whose behalf the amounts were paid that portion of such increased rate, fare, or charge found to be not justified, plus interest at a rate which is equal to the average yield (on the date such schedule is filed) of marketable securities of the United States which have a duration of 90 days. With respect to any proposed decreased rate, fare, or charge which is suspended, if the decrease or any part thereof is ultimately found to be lawful, the common carrier by railroad may refund any part of the portion of such decreased rate, fare, or charge found justified if such carrier makes such a refund available on an equal basis to all shippers who participated in such rate, fare, or charge according to the relative amounts of traffic shipped at such rate, fare, or charge.
“(f) In any hearing under this section, the burden of proof is on the common carrier by railroad to show that the proposed changed rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice is just and reasonable. The Commission shall specifically consider, in any such hearing, proof that such proposed changed rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice will have a significantly adverse effect (in violation of section 2 or 3 of this part) on the competitive posture of shippers or consignees affected thereby. The Commission shall give such hearing and decision preference over all other matters relating to railroads pending before the Commission and shall make its decision at the earliest practicable time.”
Sec. 205. Section 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. 15a) is amended—
(1) by adding at the end of paragraph (2) and at the end of paragraph (3) the following new sentence: “This paragraph shall not apply to common carriers by railroad subject to this part.”; and
(2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (6), and by inserting immediately after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:
“(4) With respect to common carriers by railroad, the Commission shall, within 24 months after the date of enactment of this paragraph, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, develop and promulgate (and thereafter revise and maintain) reasonable standards and procedures for the establishment of revenue levels adequate under honest, economical, and efficient management to cover total operating expenses, including depreciation and obsolescence, plus a fair, reasonable, and economic profit or return (or both) on capital employed in the business. Such revenue levels should (a) provide a flow of net income plus depreciation adequate to support prudent capital outlays, assure the repayment of a reasonable level of debt, permit the raising of needed equity capital, and cover the effects of inflation and (b) insure retention and attraction of capital in amounts adequate to provide a sound transportation system in the United States. The Commission shall make an adequate and continuing effort to assist such carriers in attaining such revenue levels. No rate of a common carrier by railroad shall be held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other carrier or mode of transportation, unless the Commission finds that such rate reduces or would reduce the going concern value of the carrier charging the rate.”
For cases filed after March 1, 1975, review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders is in the court of appeals with further review possible by petition for writ of certiorari to this Court. Pub. L. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917. The present case was filed prior to March 1, 1975.
Appellees are the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., and the Western Maryland Railway. These railroads are known as the Chessie System and will be referred to as such or as Chessie throughout this opinion.
Except the Long Island Railroad.
The Commission elaborated:
“The Commission has previously expressed its dissatisfaction with the evidence introduced by the respondents in general revenue proceedings. In the subject proceeding, the evidence introduced by the railroads is far from satisfactory, especially, for example, the respondents’ failure to identify and quantify the costs of deferred maintenance.” Jurisdictional Statement 47a.
“. . . Accordingly, as previously indicated, the Commission intends that revenues generated by increases authorized herein, over and above the amount needed for increased material and supply costs, other than fuel, will be used by the respondents exclusively for reducing deferred maintenance of plant and equipment and delayed capital improvements in order that rail service to the shippers will be improved. The Commission expects that the authorized increases will enable the respondents to expend substantially more for maintenance and capital improvements than in recent years and will evaluate respondents’ compliance with this directive. Respondents’ failure to apply the increased revenues as heretofore specified will result in the cancellation of these authorized increases.” Id,., at 48a. (Emphasis in original.)
“[T]he accrued deterioration or deficiency in the physical operating condition of railroad track structures, cars and locomotives, and other property used in the provision of transportation service resulting from the failure and/or inability to properly maintain plant and equipment, which produces an adverse effect on railroad operations to an extent that services to shippers have been rendered partially or wholly inadequate and/or has resulted in diminishing the railroads’ competitive ability . . . .” Id., at 56a.
“[A]ctually planned, specifically identified capital improvements necessary for the provision of adequate or improved transportation service to shippers and which had not been undertaken, scheduled, or otherwise committed because funding . . . was not, or projected to be, available through June 30, 1975. They exclude improvements in progress and those scheduled or otherwise committed and recognized in capital budgets in effect are applicable on June 1, 1974. These capital improvements are further identified as delayed expenditures which would (1) add to or improve the carriers’ plant and/or equipment so as to increase its usefulness, capacity, durability and efficiency, and (2) which are capitalizable in the property accounts in accordance with the Commission’s accounting regulations . . . .” Ibid.
On February 5,1976, while this case was pending, this section was amended by § 202 (a) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,90 Stat. 34. See Appendix to this opinion for text.
Section 15a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as added at 41 Stat. 488, and amended, 49 U. S. C. § 15.a (2), provided:
“In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the Commission shall give due consideration, among other factors, to the effect of rates on the movement of traffic by the carrier or carriers for which the rates are prescribed; to the need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient railway transportation service at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service; and to the need of revenues sufficient to enable the carriers, under honest, economical, and efficient management to provide such service.”
This section has been amended by § 205 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (n. 7, supra). See Appendix to this opinion for text.
Section 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 384, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7), provided:
“Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating a new individual or joint rate, fare, or charge, or any new individual or joint classification, or any new individual or joint regulation or practice affecting any rate, fare, or charge, the Commission shall have, and it is given, authority, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders without answer or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing and the decision thereon the Commission, upon filing with such schedule and delivering to the carrier or carriers affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may from time to time suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice, but not for a longer period than seven months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect; and after full hearing, whether completed before or after the rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice goes into effect, the Commission may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made within the period of suspension, the proposed change of rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice shall go into effect at the end of such period; but in case of a proposed increased rate or charge for or in respect to the transportation of property, the Commission may by order require the interested carrier or carriers to keep accurate account in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts are paid, and upon completion of the hearing and decision may by further order require the interested carrier or carriers to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose behalf such amounts were paid, such portion of such increased rates or charges as by its decision shall be found not justified. At any hearing involving a change in a rate, fare, charge, or classification, or in a rule, regulation, or practice, after September 18, 1940, the burden of proof shall be upon the carrier to show that the proposed changed rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice is just and reasonable, and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over all other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible.”
This section has been amended by § 202 (e) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (n. 7, supra). See Appendix to this opinion for text.
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 94-499, p. 13 (1975), on the recent Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, 90 Stat. 31: “Without suspension, the rate would go into effect and shippers would pass the added cost on to consumers. Upon a finding that a rate was unlawful, shippers could seek a refund, but no such remedy is available to consumers. Thus the power to suspend added an essential element to the Commission’s ability to protect the public interest.”
45 Cong. Rec. 3471 (1910) (statement of Sen. Elkins speaking on behalf of the majority report).
Ibid.
Id., at 6500. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_partywinning |
ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. IQBAL et al.
No. 07-1015.
Argued December 10, 2008
Decided May 18, 2009
Former Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cohn, Curtis E. Gannon, Barbara L. Herwig, and Robert M. Loeb. Michael L. Martinez, David E. Bell, and Matthew F. Scarlato filed briefs for Dennis Hasty as respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.6 urging reversal. Brett M. Schuman, Lauren J. Resnick, and Thomas D Warren filed briefs for Michael Rolince et al. as respondents under this Court’s Rule 12.6 urging reversal.
Alexander A. Reinert argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Javaid Iqbal were Joan M. Magoolaghan, Elizabeth L. Koob, and Rima J. Oken
Daniel J. Popeo, Richard A. Samp, and Paul J. Larkin, Jr., filed a brief for William P. Barr et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association for Justice by Stephen B. Pershing and Les Weisbrod; for the Japanese American Citizens League et al. by John E. Higgins; for National Civil Rights Organizations by Harold Hongju Koh and Cristóbal Joshua Alex; for Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Practice by Allan Ides and David L. Shapiro; for the Sikh Coalition et al. by Brian E. Robinson; and for Ibrahim Turkmen et al. by Michael Winger.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Javaid Iqbal (hereinafter respondent) is a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks he was arrested in the United States on criminal charges and detained by federal officials. Respondent claims he was deprived of various constitutional protections while in federal custody. To redress the alleged deprivations, respondent filed a complaint against numerous federal officials, including John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Ashcroft and Mueller are the petitioners in the case now before us. As to these two petitioners, the complaint alleges that they adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected respondent to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.
In the District Court petitioners raised the defense of qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the suit, contending the complaint was not sufficient to state a claim against them. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding the complaint was sufficient to state a claim despite petitioners’ official status at the times in question. Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court, without discussion, assumed it had jurisdiction over the order denying the motion to dismiss; and it affirmed the District Court’s decision.
Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some governmental actors. But the allegations and pleadings with respect to these actors are not before us here. This case instead turns on a narrower question: Did respondent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that petitioners deprived him of his clearly established constitutional rights. We hold respondent’s pleadings are insufficient.
I
Following the 2001 attacks, the FBI and other entities within the Department of Justice began an investigation of vast reach to identify the assailants and prevent them from attacking anew. The FBI dedicated more than 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel to the endeavor. By September 18 “the FBI had received more than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public.” Dept, of Justice, Office of Inspector General, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks 1,11-12 (Apr. 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ special/0306/full.pdf?bcsi_scan_61073ECQF74759AD=0& bcsi_scan_filename=full.pdf (as visited May 14, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks in particular or to terrorism in general. Id., at 1. Of those individuals, some 762 were held on immigration charges; and a 184-member subset of that group was deemed to be “of ‘high interest’ ” to the investigation. Id., at 111. The high-interest detainees were held under restrictive conditions designed to prevent them from communicating with the general prison population or the outside world. Id., at 112-113.
Respondent was one of the detainees. According to his complaint, in November 2001 agents of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service arrested him on charges of fraud in relation to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F. 3d 143, 147-148 (CA2 2007). Pending trial for those crimes, respondent was housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York. Respondent was designated a person “of high interest” to the September 11 investigation and in January 2002 was placed in a section of the MDC known as the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU). Id., at 148. As the facility’s name indicates, the ADMAX SHU incorporates the maximum security conditions allowable under Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations. Ibid. ADMAX SHU detainees were kept in lock-down 23 hours a day, spending the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer escort. Ibid.
Respondent pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to his native Pakistan. Id., at 149. He then filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against 34 current and former federal officials and 19 “John Doe” federal corrections officers. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). The defendants range from the correctional officers who had day-to-day contact with respondent during the term of his confinement, to the wardens of the MDC facility, all the way to petitioners — officials who were at the highest level of the federal law enforcement hierarchy. First Amended Complaint in No. 04-CV-1809 (JG)(JA), ¶¶ 10-11, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a (hereinafter Complaint).
The 21-cause-of-action complaint does not challenge respondent’s arrest or his confinement in the MDC’s general prison population. Rather, it concentrates on his treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU. The complaint sets forth various claims against defendants who are not before us. For instance, the complaint alleges that respondent’s jailors “kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across” his cell without justification, id., ¶ 113, at 176a; subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or others, id., ¶¶ 143-145, at 182a; and refiised to let him and other Muslims pray because there would be “[n]o prayers for terrorists,” id., ¶ 154, at 184a.
The allegations against petitioners are the only ones relevant here. The complaint contends that petitioners designated respondent a person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.” Id., ¶ 47, at 164a. It further alleges that “[t]he policy of holding post-September-llth detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Id., ¶ 69, at 168a. Lastly, the complaint posits that petitioners “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” respondent to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Id., ¶ 96, at 172a-173a. The pleading names Ashcroft as the “principal architect” of the policy, id., ¶ 10, at 157a, and identifies Mueller as “instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation,” id., ¶ 11, at 157a.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations to show their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. The District Court denied their motion. Accepting all of the allegations in respondent’s complaint as true, the court held that “it cannot be said that there [is] no set of facts on which [respondent] would be entitled to relief as against” petitioners. Id., at 136a-137a (relying on Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 (1957)). Invoking the collateral-order doctrine petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While that appeal was pending, this Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), which discussed the standard for evaluating whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals considered Twombly’s applicability to this case. Acknowledging that Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test relied upon by the District Court, the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussed at length how to apply this Court’s “standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings.” 490 F. 3d, at 155. It concluded that Twombly called for a “flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible” Id., at 157-158. The court found that petitioners’ appeal did not present one of “those contexts” requiring amplification. As a consequence, it held respondent’s pleading adequate to allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discriminatory decisions which, if true, violated clearly established constitutional law. Id., at 174.
Judge Cabranes concurred. He agreed that the majority’s “discussion of the relevant pleading standards reflected] the uneasy compromise . .. between a qualified immunity privilege rooted in the need to preserve the effectiveness of government as contemplated by our constitutional structure and the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 178 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Judge Cabranes nonetheless expressed concern at the prospect of subjecting high-ranking Government officials — entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with responding to “a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic” — to the burdens of discovery on the basis of a complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s. Id., at 179. Reluctant to vindicate that concern as a member of the Court of Appeals, ibid., Judge Cabranes urged this Court to address the appropriate pleading standard “at the earliest opportunity,” id., at 178. We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. 902 (2008), and now reverse.
II
We first address whether the Court of Appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction to affirm the District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Respondent disputed subject-matter jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals, but the court hardly discussed the issue. We are not free to pretermit the question. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt. Arbaugh v.Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002)). According to respondent, the District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss is not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. We disagree.
A
With exceptions inapplicable here, Congress has vested the courts of appeals with “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Though the statute’s finality requirement ensures that “interlocutory appeals — appeals before the end of district court proceedings — are the exception, not the rule,” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 309 (1995), it does not prevent “review of all prejudgment orders,” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 305 (1996). Under the collateral-order doctrine a limited set of district-court orders are reviewable “though short of final judgment.” Ibid. The orders within this narrow category “are immediately appeal-able because they ‘finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’” Ibid, (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949)).
A district-court decision denying a Government officer’s claim of qualified immunity can fall within the narrow class of appealable orders despite “the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530 (1985). This is so because qualified immunity — which shields Government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982) — is both a defense to liability and a limited “entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 526. Provided it “turns on an issue of law,” id., at 530, a district-court order denying qualified immunity “ ‘conclusively determine^]’ ” that the defendant must bear the burdens of discovery; is “conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim”; and would prove “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,” id., at 527-528 (citing Cohen, supra, at 546). As a general matter, the collateral-order doctrine may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic and the strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen. But the applicability of the doctrine in the context of qualified-immunity claims is well established; and this Court has been careful to say that a district court’s order rejecting qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage of a proceeding is a “final decision” within the meaning of § 1291. Behrens, 516 U. S., at 307.
B
Applying these principles, we conclude that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ appeal. The District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss turned on an issue of law and rejected the defense of qualified immunity. It was therefore a final decision “subject to immediate appeal.” Ibid. Respondent says that “a qualified immunity appeal based solely on the complaint's failure to state a claim, and not on the ultimate issues relevant to the qualified immunity defense itself, is not a proper subject of interlocutory jurisdiction.” Brief for Respondent Iqbal 15 (hereinafter Iqbal Brief). In other words, respondent contends the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to determine whether his complaint avers a clearly established constitutional violation but that it lacked jurisdiction to pass on the sufficiency of his pleadings. Our opinions, however, make clear that appellate jurisdiction is not so strictly confined.
In Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250 (2006), the Court reviewed an interlocutory decision denying qualified immunity. The legal issue decided in Hartman concerned the elements a plaintiff “must plead and prove in order to win” a First Amendment retaliation claim. Id., at 257, n. 5. Similarly, two Terms ago in Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U. S. 537 (2007), the Court considered another interlocutory order denying qualified immunity. The legal issue there was whether a Bivens action can be employed to challenge interference with property rights. 551 U. S., at 549, n. 4. These cases cannot be squared with respondent’s argument that the collateral-order doctrine restricts appellate jurisdiction to the “ultimate issu[e]” whether the legal wrong asserted was a violation of clearly established law while excluding the question whether the facts pleaded establish such a violation. Iqbal Brief 15. Indeed, the latter question is even more clearly within the category of appealable decisions than the questions presented in Hartman and Wilkie, since whether a particular complaint sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded. In that sense the sufficiency of respondent’s pleadings is both “inextricably intertwined with,” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 51 (1995), and “directly implicated by,” Hartman, supra, at 257, n. 5, the qualified-immunity defense.
Respondent counters that our holding in Johnson, 515 U. S. 304, confirms the want of subject-matter jurisdiction here. That is incorrect. The allegation in Johnson was that five defendants, all of them police officers, unlawfully beat the plaintiff. Johnson considered “the appealability of a portion of” the District Court’s summary judgment order that, “though entered in a ‘qualified immunity’ case, determine[d] only” that there was a genuine issue of material fact that three of the defendants participated in the beating. Id., at 313.
In finding that order not a “final decision” for purposes of § 1291, the Johnson Court cited Mitchell for the proposition that only decisions turning “ ‘on an issue of law’ ” are subject to immediate appeal. 515 U. S., at 313. Though determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment is a question of law, it is a legal question that sits near the law-fact divide. Or as we said in Johnson, it is a “fact-related” legal inquiry. Id., at 314. To conduct it, a court of appeals may be required to consult a “vast pretrial record, with numerous conflicting affidavits, depositions, and other discovery materials.” Id., at 316. That process generally involves matters more within a district court’s ken and may replicate inefficiently questions that will arise on appeal following final judgment. Ibid. Finding those concerns predominant, Johnson held that the collateral orders that are “final” under Mitchell turn on “abstract,” rather than “fact-based,” issues of law. 515 U. S., at 317.
The concerns that animated the decision in Johnson are absent when an appellate court considers the disposition of a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings. True, the categories of “fact-based” and “abstract” legal questions used to guide the Court’s decision in Johnson are not well defined. Here, however, the order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss falls well within the latter class. Reviewing that order, the Court of Appeals considered only the allegations contained within the four corners of respondent’s complaint; resort to a “vast pretrial record” on petitioners’ motion to dismiss was unnecessary. Id., at 316. And determining whether respondent’s complaint has the “heft” to state a claim is a task well within an appellate court’s core competency. Twombly, 550 U. S., at 557. Evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint is not a “fact-based” question of law, so the problem the Court sought to avoid in Johnson is not implicated here. The District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss is a final decision under the collateral-order doctrine over which the Court of Appeals had, and this Court has, jurisdiction. We proceed to consider the merits of petitioners’ appeal.
Ill
In Twombly, supra, at 553-554, the Court found it necessary first to discuss the antitrust principles implicated by the complaint. Here too we begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.
In Bivens — proceeding on the theory that a right suggests a remedy — this Court “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 66 (2001). Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability “to any new context or new category of defendants.” 534 U. S., at 68. See also Wilkie, 551 U. S., at 549-550. That reluctance might well have disposed of respondent’s First Amendment claim of religious discrimination. For while we have allowed a Bivens action to redress a violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we have not found an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, we have declined to extend Bivens to a claim sounding in the First Amendment. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983). Petitioners do not press this argument, however, so we assume, without deciding, that respondent’s First Amendment claim is actionable under Bivens.
In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the implied cause of action is the “federal analog to suits brought against state officials under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983.” Hartman, 547 U. S., at 254, n. 2. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 609 (1999). Based on the rules our precedents establish, respondent correctly concedes that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal Brief 46 (“[I]t is undisputed that supervisory Bivens liability cannot be established solely on a theory of respondeat superior”). See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 691 (1978) (finding no vicarious liability for a municipal “person” under 42 U. S. C. § 1983); see also Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269 (1812) (a federal official’s liability “will only result from his own neglect in not properly superintending the discharge” of his subordinates’ duties); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 507, 515-516 (1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or positive wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties”). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.
The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue. Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose. Church of Lukumi Bahalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 540-541 (1993) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (First Amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976) (Fifth Amendment). Under extant precedent purposeful discrimination requires more than “intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979). It instead involves a decisionmaker’s undertaking a course of action “ ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Ibid. It follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established right, respondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.
Respondent disagrees. He argues that, under a theory of “supervisory liability,” petitioners can be liable for “knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among detainees.” Iqbal Brief 45-46. That is to say, respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action — where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants — the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a violation of a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities.
IV
A
We turn to respondent’s complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As the Court held in Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id., at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U. S. 265, 286 (1986)). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U. S., at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyperteehnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F. 3d, at 157-158. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Our decision in Twombly illustrates the two-pronged approach. There, we considered the sufficiency of a complaint alleging that incumbent telecommunications providers had entered an agreement not to compete and to forestall competitive entry, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1. Recognizing that § 1 enjoins only anticompetitive conduct “effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy,” Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 775 (1984), the plaintiffs in Twombly flatly pleaded that the defendants “ha[d] entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry . . . and ha[d] agreed not to compete with one another.” 550 U. S., at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint also alleged that the defendants’ “parallel course of conduct... to prevent competition” and inflate prices was indicative of the unlawful agreement alleged. Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court held the plaintiffs’ complaint deficient under Rule 8. In doing so it first noted that the plaintiffs’ assertion of an unlawful agreement was a “ ‘legal conclusion’ ” and, as such, was not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id., at 555. Had the Court simply credited the allegation of a conspiracy, the plaintiffs would have stated a claim for relief and been entitled to proceed perforce. The Court next addressed the “nub” of the plaintiffs’ complaint — the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation of parallel behavior — to determine whether it gave rise to a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy.” Id., at 565-566. Acknowledging that parallel conduct was consistent with an unlawful agreement, the Court nevertheless concluded that it did not plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior. Id., at 567. Because the well-pleaded fact of parallel conduct, accepted as true, did not plausibly suggest an unlawful agreement, the Court held the plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed. Id., at 570.
B
Under Twombly’s, construction of Rule 8, we conclude that respondent’s complaint has not “nudged [his] claims” of invidious discrimination “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Ibid.
We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Respondent pleads that petitioners “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]” to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Complaint ¶ 96, App. to Pet. for Cert. 173a-174a. The complaint alleges that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of this invidious policy, id., ¶ 10, at 157a, and that Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and executing it, id., ¶ 11, at 157a. These bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a constitutional discrimination claim, 550 U. S., at 555, namely, that petitioners adopted a policy “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group,” Feeney, 442 U. S., at 279. As such, the allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true. Twombly, 550 U. S., at 554-555. To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. We do not so characterize them any more than the Court in Twombly rejected the plaintiffs’ express allegation of a “ ‘contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry,’ ” id., at 551, because it thought that claim too chimerical to be maintained. It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.
We next consider the factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men... as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.” Complaint ¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a. It further claims that “[t]he policy of holding post-September-llth detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Id., ¶69, at 168a. Taken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees “of high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin. But given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. A1 Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim' — Osama bin Laden — and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts. As between that “obvious alternative explanation” for the arrests, Twombly, supra, at 567, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.
But even if the complaint’s well-pleaded facts give rise to a plausible inference that respondent’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference alone would not entitle respondent to relief. It is important to recall that respondent’s complaint challenges neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his initial detention in the MDC. Respondent’s constitutional claims against petitioners rest solely on their ostensible “policy of holding post-September-llth detainees” in the ADMAX SHU once they were categorized as “of high interest.” Complaint ¶69, App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. To prevail on that theory, the complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as “of high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin.
This the complaint fails to do. Though respondent alleges that various other defendants, who are not before us, may have labeled him a person “of high interest” for impermissible reasons, his only factual allegation against petitioners accuses them of adopting a policy approving “restrictive conditions of confinement” for post-September-11 detainees until they were “‘cleared’ by the FBI.” Ibid. Accepting the truth of that allegation, the complaint does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race, religion, or national origin. All it plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity. Respondent does not argue, nor can he, that such a motive would violate petitioners’ constitutional obligations. He would need to allege more by way of factual content to “nudg[e]” his claim of purposeful discrimination “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U. S., at 570.
To be sure, respondent can attempt to draw certain contrasts between the pleadings the Court considered in Twombly and the pleadings at issue here. In Twombly, the complaint alleged general wrongdoing that extended over a period of years, id., at 551, whereas here the complaint alleges discrete wrongs — for instance, beatings — by lower level Government actors. The allegations here, if true, and if condoned by petitioners, could be the basis for some inference of wrongful intent on petitioners’ part. Despite these distinctions, respondent’s pleadings do not suffice to state a claim. Unlike in Twombly, where the doctrine of respondeat superior could bind the corporate defendant, here, as we have noted, petitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic. Yet respondent’s complaint does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind. His pleadings thus do not meet the standard necessary to comply with Rule 8.
It is important to note, however, that we express no opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent’s complaint against the defendants who are not before us. Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal alleges serious official misconduct that we need not address here. Our decision is limited to the determination that respondent’s complaint does not entitle him to relief from petitioners.
C
Respondent offers three arguments that bear on our disposition of his case, but none is persuasive.
1
Respondent first says that our decision in Twombly should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute. Iqbal Brief 37-38. This argument is not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. 550 U. S., at 554. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard “in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for “all civil actions,” ibid., and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike, see 550 U. S., at 555-556, and n. 3.
2
Respondent next implies that our construction of Rule 8 should be tempered where, as here, the Court of Appeals has “instructed the district court to cabin discovery in such a way as to preserve” petitioners’ defense of qualified immunity “as much as possible in anticipation of a summary judgment motion.” Iqbal Brief 27. We have held, however, that the question presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery process. Twombly, supra, at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful case management given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Our rejection of the eareful-case-management approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including “avoidance of disruptive discovery.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). There are serious and legitimate reasons for this. If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government. The costs of diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with responding to, as Judge Cabranes aptly put it, “a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.” 490 F. 3d, at 179.
It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery.
We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. That promise provides especially cold comfort in this pleading context, where we are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties. Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.
3
Respondent finally maintains that the Federal Rules expressly allow him to allege petitioners’ discriminatory intent “generally,” which he equates with a conclusory allegation. Iqbal Brief 32 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9). It follows, respondent says, that his complaint is sufficiently well pleaded because it claims that petitioners discriminated against him “on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Complaint ¶96, App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a-173a. Were we required to accept this allegation as true, respondent’s complaint would survive petitioners’ motion to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.
It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when pleading “fraud or mistake,” while allowing “[mjalice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally.” But “generally” is a relative term. In the context of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake. Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigid — though still operative — strictures of Rule 8. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1301, p. 291 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A] rigid rule requiring the detailed pleading of a condition of mind would be undesirable because, absent overriding considerations pressing for a specificity requirement, as in the case of averments of fraud or mistake, the general ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ mandate in Rule 8(a) . . . should control the second sentence of Rule 9(b)”). And Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label “general allegation,” and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.
V
We hold that respondent’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination against petitioners. The Court of Appeals should decide in the first instance whether to remand to the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to amend his deficient complaint.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
This case is here on the uncontested assumption that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), allows personal liability based on a federal officer’s violation of an individual’s rights under the First and Fifth Amendments, and it comes to us with the explicit concession of petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller that an officer may be subject to Bivens liability as a supervisor on grounds other than respondeat superior. The Court apparently rejects this concession and, although it has no bearing on the majority’s resolution of this case, does away with supervisory liability under Bivens. The majority then misapplies the pleading standard under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), to conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim. I respectfully dissent from both the rejection of supervisory liability as a cognizable claim in the face of petitioners’ concession, and from the holding that the complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I
A
Respondent Iqbal was arrested in November 2001 on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud in relation to identification documents, and was placed in pretrial detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F. 3d 143, 147-148 (CA2 2007). He alleges that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials carried out a discriminatory policy by designating him as a person “ 'of high interest’ ” in the investigation of the September 11 attacks solely because of his race, religion, or national origin. Owing to this designation he was placed in the detention center’s Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit for over six months while awaiting the fraud trial. Id., at 148. As I will mention more fully below, Iqbal contends that Ashcroft and Mueller were at the very least aware of the discriminatory detention policy and condoned it (and perhaps even took part in devising it), thereby violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights.
Iqbal claims that on the day he was transferred to the special unit, prison guards, without provocation, “picked him up and threw him against the wall, kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across the room.” First Amended Complaint in No. 04-CV-1809 (JG) (JA), ¶ 113, App. to Pet. for Cert. 176a (hereinafter Complaint). He says that after being attacked a second time he sought medical attention but was denied care for two weeks. Id., ¶¶ 187-188, at 189a. According to Iqbal’s complaint, prison staff in the special unit subjected him to unjustified strip and body cavity searches, id., ¶¶ 136-140, at 181a, verbally berated him as a “ ‘terrorist’ ” and “ ‘Muslim killer,’ ” id., ¶87, at 170a-171a, refused to give him adequate food, id., ¶ 91, at 171a-172a, and intentionally turned on air conditioning during the winter and heating during the summer, id., ¶ 84, at 170a. He claims that prison staff interfered with his attempts to pray and engage in religious study, id., ¶¶ 153-154, at 183a-184a, and with his access to counsel, id., ¶¶ 168, 171, at 186a-187a.
The District Court denied Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion to dismiss Iqbal’s discrimination claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Ashcroft and Mueller then asked this Court to grant certiorari on two questions:
“1. Whether a conclusory allegation that a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by subordinate officials is sufficient to state individual-capacity claims against those officials under Bivens.
“2. Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such subordinate officials.” Pet. for Cert. I.
The Court granted certiorari on both questions. The first is about pleading; the second goes to the liability standard.
In the first question, Ashcroft and Mueller did not ask whether “a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official” who “knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts committed by subordinate officials” was subject to liability under Bivens. In fact, they conceded in their petition for certiorari that they would be liable if they had “actual knowledge” of discrimination by their subordinates and exhibited “‘deliberate indifference’” to that discrimination. Pet. for Cert. 29 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 837 (1994)). Instead, they asked the Court to address whether Iqbal’s allegations against them (which they call conclusory) were sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), and in particular whether the Court of Appeals misapplied our decision in Twombly construing that rule. Pet. for Cert. 11-24.
In the second question, Ashcroft and Mueller asked this Court to say whether they could be held personally liable for the actions of their subordinates based on the theory that they had constructive notice of their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct. Id., at 25-33. This was an odd question to pose, since Iqbal has never claimed that Ashcroft and Mueller are liable on a constructive, notice theory. Be that as it may, the second question challenged only one possible ground for imposing supervisory liability under Bivens. In sum, both questions assumed that a defendant could raise a Bivens claim on theories of supervisory liability other than constructive notice, and neither question asked the parties or the Court to address the elements of such liability.
The briefing at the merits stage was no different. Ashcroft and Mueller argued that the factual allegations in Iqbal’s complaint were insufficient to overcome their claim of qualified immunity; they also contended that they could not be held liable on a theory of constructive notice. Again they conceded, however, that they would be subject to supervisory liability if they “had actual knowledge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of suspects as being ‘of high interest’ and they were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief for Petitioners 50; see also Reply Brief for Petitioners 21-22. Iqbal argued that the allegations in his complaint were sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2) and Twombly, and conceded that as a matter of law he could not recover under a theory of respondeat superior. See Brief for Respondent Iqbal 46. Thus, the parties agreed as to a proper standard of supervisory liability, and the disputed question was whether Iqbal’s complaint satisfied Rule 8(a)(2).
Without acknowledging the parties’ agreement as to the standard of supervisory liability, the Court asserts that it must sua sponte decide the scope of supervisory liability here. Ante, at 675-677. I agree that, absent Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession, that determination would have to be made; without knowing the elements of a supervisory liability claim, there would be no way to determine whether a plaintiff had made factual allegations amounting to grounds for relief on that claim. See Twombly, 550 U. S., at 557-558. But deciding the scope of supervisory Bivens liability in this case is uncalled for. There are several reasons, starting with the position Ashcroft and Mueller have taken and following from it.
First, Ashcroft and Mueller have, as noted, made the critical concession that a supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct are grounds for Bivens liability. Iqbal seeks to recover on a theory that Ashcroft and Mueller at least knowingly acquiesced (and maybe more than acquiesced) in the discriminatory acts of their subordinates; if he can show this, he will satisfy Ashcroft and Mueller’s own test for supervisory liability. See Farmer, supra, at 842 (explaining that a prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” if “the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”). We do not normally override a party’s concession, see, e. g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855 (1996) (holding that “[i]t would be inappropriate for us to [ejxamine in this ease, without the benefit of the parties’ briefing,” an issue the Government had conceded), and doing so is especially inappropriate when, as here, the issue is unnecessary to decide the case, see infra, at 694. I would therefore accept Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession for purposes of this case and proceed to consider whether the complaint alleges at least knowledge and deliberate indifference.
Second, because of the concession, we have received no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory liability, much less the full-dress argument we normally require. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 676-677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). We consequently are in no position to decide the precise contours of supervisory liability here, this issue being a complicated one that has divided the Courts of Appeals. See infra, at 693-694. This Court recently remarked on the danger of “bad decisionmaking” when the briefing on a question is “woefully inadequate,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 239 (2009), yet today the majority answers a question with no briefing at all. The attendant risk of error is palpable.
Finally, the Court’s approach is most unfair to Iqbal. He was entitled to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession, both in their petition for certiorari and in their merits briefs, that they could be held liable on a theory of knowledge and deliberate indifference. By overriding that concession, the Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the question.
B
The majority, however, does ignore the concession. According to the majority, because Iqbal concededly cannot recover on a theory of respondeat superior, it follows that he cannot recover under any theory of supervisory liability. Ante, at 677. The majority says that in a Bivens action, “where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants,” “the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer,” and that “[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ibid. Lest there be any mistake, in these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely. The nature of a supervisory liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very principle that the majority rejects. Ante, at 683 (“[Petitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic”).
The dangers of the majority’s readiness to proceed without briefing and argument are apparent in its cursory analysis, which rests on the assumption that only two outcomes are possible here: respondeat superior liability, in which “[a]n employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment,” Restatement (Third) of Agency §2.04 (2005), or no supervisory liability at all. The dichotomy is false. Even if an employer is not liable for the actions of his employee solely because the employee was acting within the scope of employment, there still might be conditions to render a supervisor liable for the conduct of his subordinate. See, e. g., Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F. 3d 1, 14 (CA1 2005) (distinguishing between respondeat superior liability and supervisory liability); Bennett v. Eastpointe, 410 F. 3d 810, 818 (CA6 2005) (same); Richardson v. Goord, 347 F. 3d 431, 435 (CA2 2003) (same); Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F. 2d 954, 961 (CA8 1993) (same).
In fact, there is quite a spectrum of possible tests for supervisory liability: it could be imposed where a supervisor has actual knowledge of a subordinate’s constitutional violation and acquiesces, see, e. g., Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F. 3d 1186, 1994 (CA3 1995); Woodward v. Worland, 977 F. 2d 1392, 1400 (CA10 1992); or where supervisors “‘know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see,’ ” International Action Center v. United States, 365 F. 3d 20, 28 (CADC 2004) (Roberts, J.) (quoting Jones v. Chicago, 856 F. 2d 985, 992 (CA7 1988) (Posner, J.)); or where the supervisor has no actual knowledge of the violation but was reckless in his supervision of the subordinate, see, e. g., Hall, supra, at 961; or where the supervisor was grossly negligent, see, e. g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F. 2d 881, 902 (CA1 1988). I am unsure what the general test for supervisory liability should be, and in the absence of briefing and argument I am in no position to choose or devise one.
Neither is the majority, but what is most remarkable about its foray into supervisory liability is that its conclusion has no bearing on its resolution of the case. The majority says that all of the allegations in the complaint that Ashcroft and Mueller authorized, condoned, or even were aware of their subordinates’ discriminatory conduct are “conclusory” and therefore are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ante, at 681. As I explain below, this conclusion is unsound, but on the majority’s understanding of Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standards, even if the majority accepted Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession and asked whether the complaint sufficiently alleges knowledge and deliberate indifference, it presumably would still conclude that the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts and must be dismissed.
II
Given petitioners’ concession, the complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft and Mueller admit they are liable for their subordinates’ conduct if they “had actual knowledge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of suspects as being 'of high interest’ and they were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief for Petitioners 50. Iqbal alleges that after the September 11 attacks the FBI “arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men,” Complaint ¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, that many of these men were designated by high-ranking FBI officials as being “'of high interest,’” id., ¶¶48, 50, at 164a, and that in many cases, including Iqbal’s, this designation was made “because of the race, religion, and national origin of the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,” id., ¶49, at 164a. The complaint further alleges that Ashcroft was the “principal architect of the policies and practices challenged,” id., ¶ 10, at 157a, and that Mueller “was instrumental in the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of the policies and practices challenged,” id., ¶ 11, at 157a. According to the complaint, Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Id., ¶ 96, at 172a-173a. The complaint thus alleges, at a bare minimum, that Ashcroft and Mueller knew of and condoned the discriminatory policy their subordinates carried out. Actually, the complaint goes further in alleging that Ashcroft and Mueller affirmatively acted to create the discriminatory detention policy. If these factual allegations are true, Ashcroft and Mueller were, at the very least, aware of the discriminatory policy being implemented and deliberately indifferent to it.
Ashcroft and Mueller argue that these allegations fail to satisfy the “plausibility standard” of Twombly. They contend that Iqbal’s claims are implausible because such high-ranking officials “tend not to be personally involved in the specific actions of lower-level officers down the bureaucratic chain of command.” Brief for Petitioners 28. But this response bespeaks a fundamental misunderstanding of the enquiry that Twombly demands. Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true. We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be. See 550 U. S., at 555 (a court must proceed “on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”); id., at 556 (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations”). The sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. That is not what we have here.
Under Twombly, the relevant question is whether, assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff has stated a ground for relief that is plausible. That is, in Twombly’s words, a plaintiff must “allege facts” that, taken as true, are “suggestive of illegal conduct.” 550 U. S., at 564, n. 8. In Twombly, we were faced with allegations of a conspiracy to violate §1 of the Sherman Act through parallel conduct. The difficulty was that the conduct alleged was “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.” Id., at 554. We held that in that sort of circumstance, “[a]n allegation of parallel conduct is ... much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted). Here, by contrast, the allegations in the complaint are neither confined to naked legal conclusions nor consistent with legal conduct. The complaint alleges that FBI officials discriminated against Iqbal solely on account of his race, religion, and national origin, and it alleges the knowledge and deliberate indifference that, by Ashcroft and Mueller’s own admission, are sufficient to make them liable for the illegal action. Iqbal’s complaint therefore contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570.
I do not understand the majority to disagree with this understanding of “plausibility” under Twombly. Rather, the majority discards the allegations discussed above with regard to Ashcroft and Mueller as conclusory, and is left considering only two statements in the complaint: that “the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of its investigation of the events of September 11,” Complaint ¶ 47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, and that “[t]he policy of holding post-September-llth detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001,” id., ¶ 69, at 168a. See ante, at 681. I think the majority is right in saying that these allegations suggest only that Ashcroft and Mueller “sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity,” ante, at 683, and that this produced “a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims,” ante, at 682. And I agree that the two allegations selected by the majority, standing alone, do not state a plausible entitlement to relief for unconstitutional discrimination.
But these allegations do not stand alone as the only significant, nonconclusory statements in the complaint, for the complaint contains many allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to the discriminatory practices of their subordinates. See Complaint ¶ 10, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a (Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the discriminatory policy); id., ¶ 11, at 157a (Mueller was “instrumentar’ in adopting and executing the discriminatory policy); id., ¶ 96, at 172a-173a (Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh conditions “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest”).
The majority says that these are “bare assertions” that, “much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim” and therefore are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ante, at 681 (quoting Twombly, supra, at 555). The fallacy of the majority’s position, however, lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation. The complaint contains specific allegations that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Chief of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge for the FBI’s New York Field Office implemented a policy that discriminated against Arab Muslim men, including Iqbal, solely on account of their race, religion, or national origin. See Complaint ¶¶ 47-53, supra, at 164a-165a. Viewed in light of these subsidiary allegations, the allegations singled out by the majority as “eonclusory” are no such thing. Iqbal’s claim is not that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” him to a discriminatory practice that is left undefined; his allegation is that “they knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” him to a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy detailed in the complaint. Iqbal does not say merely that Ashcroft was the architect of some amorphous discrimination, or that Mueller was instrumental in an ill-defined constitutional violation; he alleges that they helped to create the discriminatory policy he has described. Taking the complaint as a whole, it gives Ashcroft and Mueller “ ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957) (omission in original)).
That aside, the majority’s holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as noneonclusory. For example, the majority takes as true the statement that “[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Complaint ¶ 69, supra, at 168a; see ante, at 681. This statement makes two points: (1) after September 11, the FBI held certain detainees in highly restrictive conditions, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller discussed and approved these conditions. If, as the majority says, these allegations are not conclusory, then I cannot see why the majority deems it merely conclusory when Iqbal alleges that (1) after September 11, the FBI designated Arab Muslim detainees as being of “ ‘high interest’ ” “because of the race, religion, and national origin of the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,” Complaint ¶¶ 48-50, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed” to that discrimination, id., ¶ 96, at 172a. By my lights, there is no principled basis for the majority’s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates’ discrimination.
I respectfully dissent.
Iqbal makes no claim against Ashcroft and Mueller based simply on his right, as a pretrial detainee, to be free from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt on the fraud charges. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535 (1979).
If I am mistaken, and the majority's rejection of the concession is somehow outcome determinative, then its approach is even more unfair to Iqbal than previously explained, see sv/pra, at 692, for Iqbal had no reason to argue the (apparently dispositive) supervisory liability standard in light of the concession. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
0
] | sc_petitioner |
TANNER et al. v. UNITED STATES
No. 86-177.
Argued March 31, 1987
Decided June 22, 1987
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts III and IV and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Powell, arid Scalia, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 134.
John A. DeVault III argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Timothy J. Corrigan and David R. Best.
Richard J. Lazarus argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Gloria C. Phares.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners William Conover and Anthony Tanner were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U. S. C. §371, and of committing mail fraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. 772 F. 2d 765 (1985). Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in refusing to admit juror testimony at a post-verdict hearing on juror intoxication during the trial; and that the conspiracy count of the indictment failed to charge a crime against the United States. We affirm in part and remand.
I
Conover was the procurement manager at Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Seminole), a Florida corporation owned and operated by 11 rural electric distribution cooperatives. Seminole generates and transmits electrical energy to the cooperatives.
In 1979, Seminole borrowed over $1.1 billion from the Federal Financing Bank in order to construct a coal-fired power plant near Palatka, Florida. The loan was guaranteed by the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), a credit agency of the United States Department of Agriculture that assists rural electric organizations by providing loans, guaranteeing loans from other sources, and approving other security arrangements that allow the borrower to obtain financing. REA, A Brief History of the Rural Electrification and Telephone Programs (1985). The loan agreement between Seminole and the REA provided for federal supervision of the construction project. Under the contract, the REA could supervise the construction and equipment of the electric system, and inspect, examine, and test all work and materials relating to the construction project. App. 61-62. REA Bulletins and REA memoranda required Seminole to obtain REA approval before letting out certain contracts, and required certain bidding procedures to be used depending on the type of contract. Id., at 83, 105-108.
Construction of the Palatka plant began in September 1979. To provide access to an area where a transmission line would be run, the plans called for the construction of a 51-mile patrol road. The road required materials that would support heavy trucks and resist flooding, and in March 1981, Conover was informed that Seminole’s current construction contractor was having difficulty obtaining enough suitable fill material for the road. The contractor indicated that it had not attempted to locate alternative fill materials, and that the contract price would have to be increased substantially in order for them to complete the road. The contract was subsequently terminated.
Following the March meeting at which Conover was informed of the difficulty with the patrol road, Conover called a friend, Anthony R. Tanner. Tanner owned a limerock mine, and the two discussed the possibility of using lime-rock and limerock overburden as an alternative fill material. At Conover’s request, a Seminole engineer examined the material at Tanner’s mine and determined that it would be suitable for the road. Seminole acquired limerock overburden from Tanner on an interim basis so that road construction could continue while bids were solicited for the remainder of the project. Seminole called for bids on a contract for provision of fill materials as well as a contract for building the road. Both contracts were to be paid with loan money guaranteed by the REA, and the contract for building the road required the REA’s approval. The final specifications for the two contracts, which were prepared by Conover’s procurement department, were favorable to Tanner’s company in several respects. Tanner was awarded both contracts on May 14, 1981. The fill material contract paid approximately $1,041,800, and the road construction contract paid approximately $548,000. App. 10.
Several problems developed after Tanner began working on the road. There was a dispute as to whether Seminole or Tanner was required to maintain access roads leading to the patrol road. Conover advised Seminole that the contract was ambiguous and that Seminole should pay for maintenance of the access road; ultimately Seminole did pay for the access road. Later, the REA complained that the bond provided by Tanner was not from a bonding company approved by the Treasury Department. In two letters to another bonding company in July 1981, Conover represented the construction on the patrol road to be considerably more advanced than it was at that time. It was also discovered during the course of construction that limerock, which weakens when wet, could not be used in areas subject to flooding. For those areas Tanner’s company provided and spread sand, at a higher price than the sand provided and spread by the first contractor. The patrol road was completed in October 1981.
At the time Conover called Tanner about using limerock as a fill material for Seminole’s patrol road, Tanner and Conover were friends and had engaged in several business deals together. In January 1981 Conover had obtained a contract from Tanner to perform landscaping work and install a sprinkler system at a condominium complex owned by Tanner. In early March 1981, Tanner paid Conover $10,035, allegedly in partial payment for the landscaping work; eventually Con-over received a total of $15,000 for the work. In May 1981 Conover purchased a condominium from Tanner, and Tanner loaned Conover $6,000 so that Conover could close on the condominium.
In June 1981, before the patrol road was finished, representatives of one of the members of the Seminole cooperative requested that Seminole end all business relations with Tanner. Seminole initiated an internal investigation, after which Seminole suspended and later demoted Conover for violation of the company’s conflict of interest policies.
Federal authorities also investigated the situation, and in June 1983 Conover and Tanner were indicted. A 6-week trial resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial was declared. The two were subsequently reindicted; the first count alleged conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U. S. C. §371, and the second through fifth counts alleged separate instances of mail fraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. Conover was convicted on all counts; Tanner was convicted on all but count three.
The day before petitioners were scheduled to be sentenced, Tanner filed a motion, in which Conover subsequently joined, seeking continuance of the sentencing date, permission to interview jurors, an evidentiary hearing, and a new trial. According to an affidavit accompanying the motion, Tanner’s attorney had received an unsolicited telephone call from one of the trial jurors, Vera Asbul. App. 246. Juror Asbul informed Tanner’s attorney that several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks at various times throughout the trial, causing them to sleep through the afternoons. Id., at 247. The District Court continued the sentencing date, ordered the parties to file memoranda, and heard argument on the motion to interview jurors. The District Court concluded that juror testimony on intoxication was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) to impeach the jury’s verdict. The District Court invited petitioners to call any nonjuror witnesses, such as courtroom personnel, in support of the motion for new trial. Tanner’s counsel took the stand and testified that he had observed one of the jurors “in a sort of giggly mood” at one point during the trial but did not bring this to anyone’s attention at the time. Id., at 170.
Earlier in the hearing the judge referred to a conversation between defense counsel and the judge during the trial on the possibility that jurors were sometimes falling asleep. During that extended exchange the judge twice advised counsel to immediately inform the court if they observed jurors being inattentive, and suggested measures the judge would take if he were so informed:
“MR. MILBRATH [defense counsel]: But, in any event, I’ve noticed over a period of several days that a couple of jurors in particular have been taking long naps during the trial.
“THE COURT: Is that right. Maybe I didn’t notice because I was-
“MR. MILBRATH: I imagine the Prosecutors have noticed that a time or two.
“THE COURT: What’s your solution?
“MR. MILBRATH: Well, I just think a respectful comment from the Court that if any of them are getting drowsy, they just ask for a break or something might be helpful.
“THE COURT: Well, here’s what I have done in the past — and, you have to do it very diplomatically, of course: I once said, I remember, T think we’ll just let everybody stand up and stretch, it’s getting a little sleepy in here,’ I said, but that doesn’t sound good in the record.
“I’m going to — not going to take on that responsibility. If any of you think you see that happening, ask for a bench conference and come up and tell me about it and I’ll figure out what to do about it, and I won’t mention who suggested it.
“MR. MILBRATH: All right.
“THE COURT: But, I’m not going to sit here and watch. I’m — among other things, I’m not going to see— this is off the record.
“(Discussion had off the record.)
“. . . [T]his is a new thing to this jury, and I don’t know how interesting it is to them or not; some of them look like they’re pretty interested.
“And, as I say, if you don’t think they are, come up and let me know and I’ll figure how — either have a recess or — which is more than likely what I would do.” Tr. 12-100-12-101.
As the judge observed during the hearing, despite the above admonitions counsel did not bring the matter to the court again. App. 147.
The judge also observed that in the past courtroom employees had alerted him to problems with the jury. “Nothing was brought to my attention in this case about anyone appearing to be intoxicated,” the judge stated, adding, “I saw nothing that suggested they were.” Id., at 172.
Following the hearing the District Court filed an order stating that “[o]n the basis of the admissible evidence offered I specifically find that the motions for leave to interview jurors or for an evidentiary hearing at which jurors would be witnesses is not required or appropriate.” The District Court also denied the motion for new trial. Id., at 181-182.
While the appeal of this case was pending before the Eleventh Circuit, petitioners filed another new trial motion based on additional evidence of jury misconduct. In another affidavit, Tanner’s attorney stated that he received an unsolicited visit at his residence from a second juror, Daniel Hardy. Id., at 241. Despite the fact that the District Court had denied petitioners’ motion for leave to interview jurors, two days after Hardy’s visit Tanner’s attorney arranged for Hardy to be interviewed by two private investigators. Id., at 242. The interview was transcribed, sworn to by the juror, and attached to the new trial motion. In the interview Hardy stated that he “felt like . . . the jury was on one big party.” Id., at 209. Hardy indicated that seven of the jurors drank alcohol during the noon recess. Four jurors, including Hardy, consumed between them “a pitcher to three pitchers” of beer during various recesses. Id., at 212. Of the three other jurors who were alleged to have consumed alcohol, Hardy stated that on several occasions he observed two jurors having one or two mixed drinks during the lunch recess, and one other juror, who was also the foreperson, having a liter of wine on each of three occasions. Id., at 213-215. Juror Hardy also stated that he and three other jurors smoked marijuana quite regularly during the trial. Id., at 216-223. Moreover, Hardy stated that during the trial he observed one juror ingest cocaine five times and another juror ingest cocaine two or three times. Id., at 227. One juror sold a quarter pound of marijuana to another juror during the trial, and took marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia into the courthouse. Id., at 234-235. Hardy-noted that some of the jurors were falling asleep during the trial, and that one of the jurors described himself to Hardy as “flying.” Id., at 229. Hardy stated that before he visited Tanner’s attorney at his residence, no one had contacted him concerning the jury’s conduct, and Hardy had not been offered anything in return for his statement. Id., at 232. Hardy said that he came forward “to clear my conscience” and “[bjecause I felt . . . that the people on the jury didn’t have no business being on the jury. I felt. . . that Mr. Tanner should have a better opportunity to get somebody that would review the facts right.” Id., at 231-232.
The District Court, stating that the motions “contain supplemental allegations which differ quantitatively but not qualitatively from those in the April motions,” id., at 256, denied petitioners’ motion for a new trial.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 772 F. 2d 765 (1985). We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 929 (1986), to consider whether the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing, including juror testimony, on juror alcohol and drug use during the trial, and to consider whether petitioners’ actions constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United States within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 371.
II
Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in not ordering an additional evidentiary hearing at which jurors would testify concerning drug and alcohol use during the trial. Petitioners assert that, contrary to the holdings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals, juror testimony on ingestion of drugs or alcohol during the trial is not barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Moreover, petitioners argue that whether or not authorized by Rule 606(b), an evidentiary hearing including juror testimony on drug and alcohol use is compelled by their Sixth Amendment right to trial by a competent jury.
By the beginning of this century, if not earlier, the near-universal and firmly established common-law rule in the United States flatly prohibited the admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2352, pp. 696-697 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (common-law rule, originating from 1785 opinion of Lord Mansfield, “came to receive in the United States an adherence almost unquestioned”).
Exceptions to the common-law rule were recognized only in situations in which an “extraneous influence,” Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 149 (1892), was alleged to have affected the jury. In Mattox, this Court held admissible the testimony of jurors describing how they heard and read prejudicial information not admitted into evidence. The Court allowed juror testimony on influence by outsiders in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U. S. 363, 365 (1966) (bailiff’s comments on defendant), and Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227, 228-230 (1954) (bribe offered to juror). See also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209 (1982) (juror in criminal trial had submitted an application for employment at the District Attorney’s office). In situations that did not fall into this exception for external influence, however, the Court adhered to the common-law rule against admitting juror testimony to impeach a verdict. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264 (1915); Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 384 (1912).
Lower courts used this external/internal distinction to identify those instances in which juror testimony impeaching a verdict would be admissible. The distinction was not based on whether the juror was literally inside or outside the jury room when the alleged irregularity took place; rather, the distinction was based on the nature of the allegation. Clearly a rigid distinction based only on whether the event took place inside or outside the jury room would have been quite unhelpful. For example, under a distinction based on location a juror could not testify concerning a newspaper read inside the jury room. Instead, of course, this has been considered an external influence about which juror testimony is admissible. See United States v. Thomas, 463 F. 2d 1061 (CA7 1972). Similarly, under a rigid locational distinction jurors could be regularly required to testify after the verdict as to whether they heard and comprehended the judge’s instructions, since the charge to the jury takes place outside the jury room. Courts wisely have treated allegations of a juror’s inability to hear or comprehend at trial as an internal matter. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F. 2d 1073 (CA3 1985); Davis v. United States, 47 F. 2d 1071 (CA5 1931) (rejecting juror testimony impeaching verdict, including testimony that jurors had not heard a particular instruction of the court).
Most significant for the present case, however, is the fact that lower federal courts treated allegations of the physical or mental incompetence of a juror as “internal” rather than “external” matters. In United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F. 2d 70 (CA2 1974), the defendant Dioguardi received a letter from one of the jurors soon after the trial in which the juror explained that she had “eyes and ears that. . . see things before [they] happen,” but that her eyes “are only partly open” because “a curse was put upon them some years ago.” Id., at 75. Armed with this letter and the opinions of seven psychiatrists that the letter suggested that the juror was suffering from a psychological disorder, Dioguardi sought a new trial or in the alternative an evidentiary hearing on the juror’s competence. The District Court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals noted “[t]he strong policy against any post-verdict inquiry into a juror’s state of mind,” id., at 79, and observed:
“The quickness with which jury findings will be set aside when there is proof of tampering or external influence, . . . parallel the reluctance of courts to inquire into jury deliberations when a verdict is valid on its face. . . . Such exceptions support rather than undermine the rationale of the rule that possible internal abnormalities in a jury will not be inquired into except ‘in the gravest and most important cases.’” Id., at 79, n. 12, quoting McDonald v. Pless, supra, at 269 (emphasis in original).
The Court of Appeals concluded that when faced with allegations that a juror was mentally incompetent, “courts have refused to set aside a verdict, or even to make further inquiry, unless there be proof of an adjudication of insanity or mental incompetence closely in advance ... of jury service,” or proof of “a closely contemporaneous and independent post-trial adjudication of incompetency.” 492 F. 2d, at 80. See also Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F. 2d 465, 467 (CA2 1980) (allegation of juror insanity is internal consideration); United States v. Allen, 588 F. 2d 1100, 1106, n. 12 (CA5 1979) (noting “specific reluctance to probe the minds of jurors once they have deliberated their verdict”); United States v. Pellegrini, 441 F. Supp. 1367 (ED Pa. 1977), aff’d, 586 F. 2d 836 (CA3), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1050 (1978) (whether juror sufficiently understood English language was not a question of “extraneous influence”). This line of federal decisions was reviewed in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, supra, in which the Court of Appeals concluded that a juror’s allegation that a hearing impairment interfered with his understanding of the evidence at trial was not a matter of “external influence.” Id., at 1079.
Substantial policy considerations support the common-law rule against the admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict. As early as 1915 this Court explained the necessity of shielding jury deliberations from public scrutiny:
“[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.” McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S., at 267-268.
See also Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140 (1892).
The Court’s holdings requiring an evidentiary hearing where extrinsic influence or relationships have tainted the deliberations do not detract from, but rather harmonize with, the weighty government interest in insulating the jury’s deliberative process. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209 (1982) (juror in criminal trial had submitted an application for employment at the District Attorney’s office); Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227 (1954) (juror reported attempted bribe during trial and was subjected to investigation). The Court’s statement in Remmer that “[t]he integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions,” id., at 229, could also be applied to the inquiry petitioners seek to make into the internal processes of the jury.
There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it. Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process. See, e. g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, supra, at 1081 (one year and eight months after verdict rendered, juror alleged that hearing difficulties affected his understanding of the evidence). Moreover, full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct. See Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 888-892 (1983).
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is grounded in the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception for juror testimony relating to extraneous influences. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F. 2d 140, 149, n. 22 (CA3 1975); S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (1974) (observing that Rule 606(b) “embodied long-accepted Federal law”).
Rule 606(b) states:
“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.”
Petitioners have presented no argument that Rule 606(b) is inapplicable to the juror affidavits and the further inquiry they sought in this case, and, in fact, there appears to be virtually no support for such a proposition. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 287, pp. 121-125 (1979) (under Rule 606(b), “proof to the following effects is excludable ... : . . . that one or more jurors was inattentive during trial or deliberations, sleeping or thinking about other matters”); cf. Note, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors—Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 417, 430-431, and n. 88 (1978) (observing that under Rule 606(b), “juror testimony as to . . . juror intoxication probably will be inadmissible”; note author suggests that “[o]ne possibility is for the courts to determine that certain acts, such as a juror becoming intoxicated outside the jury room, simply are not within the rule,” but cites no authority in support of the suggestion). Rather, petitioners argue that substance abuse constitutes an improper “outside influence” about which jurors may testify under Rule 606(b). In our view the language of the Rule cannot easily be stretched to cover this circumstance. However severe their effect and improper their use, drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an “outside influence” than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack of sleep.
In any case, whatever ambiguity might linger in the language of Rule 606(b) as applied to juror intoxication is resolved by the legislative history of the Rule. In 1972, following criticism of a proposed rule that would have allowed considerably broader use of juror testimony to impeach verdicts, the Advisory Committee drafted the present version of Rule 606(b). Compare 51 F. R. D. 315, 387 (1971) with 56 F. R. D. 183, 265 (1972); see 117 Cong. Rec. 33642, 33645 (1971) (letter from Sen. McClellan to Advisory Committee criticizing earlier proposal); id., at 33655 (letter from Department of Justice to Advisory Committee criticizing earlier proposal and arguing that “[sjtrong policy considerations continue to support the rule that jurors should not be permitted to testify about what occurred during the course of their deliberations”). This Court adopted the present version of Rule 606(b) and transmitted it to Congress.
The House Judiciary Committee described the effect of the version of Rule 606(b) transmitted by the Court as follows:
“As proposed by the Court, Rule 606(b) limited testimony by a juror in the course of an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment. He could testify as to the influence of extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury’s attention (e. g. a radio newscast or a newspaper account) or an outside influence which improperly had been brought to bear upon a juror (e. g. a threat to the safety of a member of his family), but he could not testify as to other irregularities which occurred in the jury room. Under this formulation a quotient verdict could not be attacked through the testimony of juror, nor could a juror testify to the drunken condition of a fellow juror which so disabled him that he could not participate in the jury’s deliberations.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-650, pp. 9-10 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
The House Judiciary Committee, persuaded that the better practice was to allow juror testimony on any “objective juror misconduct,” amended the Rule so as to comport with the more expansive versions proposed by the Advisory Committee in earlier drafts, and the House passed this amended version.
The Senate Judiciary Committee did not voice any disagreement with the House’s interpretation of the Rule proposed by the Court, or the version passed by the House. Indeed, the Senate Report described the House version as “considerably broader” than the version proposed by the Court, and noted that the House version “would permit the impeachment of verdicts by inquiry into, not the mental processes of the jurors, but what happened in terms of conduct in the jury room.” S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (1974). With this understanding of the differences between the two versions of Rule 606(b) — an understanding identical to that of the House — the Senate decided to reject the broader House version and adopt the narrower version approved by the Court. The Senate Report explained:
“[The House version’s] extension of the ability to impeach a verdict is felt to be unwarranted and ill-advised.
“The rule passed by the House embodies a suggestion by the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference that is considerably broader than the final version adopted by the Supreme Court, which embodied long-accepted Federal law. Although forbidding the impeachment of verdicts by inquiry into the jurors’ mental processes, it deletes from the Supreme Court version the proscription against testimony ‘as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations.’ This deletion would have the effect of opening verdicts up to challenge on the basis of what happened during the jury’s internal deliberations, for example, where a juror alleged that the jury refused to follow the trial judge’s instructions or that some of the jurors did not take part in deliberations.
“Permitting an individual to attack a jury verdict based upon the jury’s internal deliberations has long been recognized as unwise by the Supreme Court.
“As it stands then, the rule would permit the harassment of former jurors by losing parties as well as the possible exploitation of disgruntled or otherwise badly-motivated ex-jurors.
“Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness requires that absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts. Jurors will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in post-trial litigation. In the interest of protecting the jury system and the citizens who make it work, rule 606 should not permit any inquiry into the internal deliberations of the jurors.” Id., at 13-14.
The Conference Committee Report reaffirms Congress’ understanding of the differences between the House and Senate versions of Rule 606(b): “[T]he House bill allows a juror to testify about objective matters occurring during the jury’s deliberation, such as the misconduct of another, juror or the reaching of a quotient verdict. The Senate bill does not permit juror testimony about any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, p. 8 (1974). The Conference Committee adopted, and Congress enacted, the Senate version of Rule 606(b).
Thus, the legislative history demonstrates with uncommon clarity that Congress specifically understood, considered, and rejected a version of Rule 606(b) that would have allowed jurors to testify on juror conduct during deliberations, including juror intoxication. This legislative history provides strong support for the most reasonable reading of the language of Rule 606(b) — that juror intoxication is not an “outside influence” about which jurors may testify to impeach their verdict.
Finally, even if Rule 606(b) is interpreted to retain the common-law exception allowing postverdict inquiry of juror incompetence in cases of “substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency,” Dioguardi, 492 F. 2d, at 80, the showing made by petitioners falls far short of this standard. The affidavits and testimony presented in support of the first new trial motion suggested, at worst, that several of the jurors fell asleep at times during the afternoons. The District Court Judge appropriately considered the fact that he had “an unobstructed view” of the jury, and did not see any juror sleeping. App. 147-149, 167-168; see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F. 2d, at 1077 (“[I]t was appropriate for the trial judge to draw upon his personal knowledge and recollection in considering the factual allegations . . . that related to events that occurred in his presence”). The juror affidavit submitted in support of the second new trial motion was obtained in clear violation of the District Court’s order and the court’s local rule against juror interviews, MD Fla. Rule 2.04(c); on this basis alone the District Court would have been acting within its discretion in disregarding the affidavit. In any case, although the affidavit of juror Hardy describes more dramatic instances of misconduct, Hardy’s allegations of incompetence are meager. Hardy stated that the alcohol consumption he engaged in with three other jurors did not leave any of them intoxicated. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47 (“I told [the prosecutor] that we would just go out and get us a pitcher of beer and drink it, but as far as us being drunk, no we wasn’t”). The only allegations concerning the jurors’ ability to properly consider the evidence were Hardy’s observations that some jurors were “falling asleep all the time during the trial,” and that his own reasoning ability was affected on one day of the trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46, 55. These allegations would not suffice to bring this case under the common-law exception allowing postverdict inquiry when an extremely strong showing of incompetency has been made.
Petitioners also argue that the refusal to hold an additional evidentiary hearing at which jurors would testify as to their conduct “violates the sixth amendment’s guarantee to a fair trial before an impartial and competent jury. ” Brief for Petitioners 34 (emphasis in original).
This Court has recognized that a defendant has a right to “a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing.” Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 176 (1912). In this case the District Court held an evidentiary hearing in response to petitioners’ first new trial motion at which the judge invited petitioners to introduce any admissible evidence in support of their allegations. At issue in this case is whether the Constitution compelled the District Court to hold an additional evidentiary hearing including one particular kind of evidence inadmissible under the Federal Rules.
As described above, long-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry. Petitioners’ Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury, on the other hand, are protected by several aspects of the trial process. The suitability of an individual for the responsibility of jury service, of course, is examined during voir dire. Moreover, during the trial the jury is observable by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel. See United States v. Provenzano, 620 F. 2d 985, 996-997 (CA3 1980) (marshal discovered sequestered juror smoking marijuana during early morning hours). Moreover, jurors are observable by each other, and may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict. See Lee v. United States, 454 A. 2d 770 (DC App. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. McIlwain v. United States, 464 U. S. 972 (1983) (on second day of deliberations, jurors sent judge a note suggesting that foreperson was incapacitated). Finally, after the trial a party may seek to impeach the verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct. See United States v. Taliaferro, 558 F. 2d 724, 725-726 (CA4 1977) (court considered records of club where jurors dined, and testimony of marshal who accompanied jurors, to determine whether jurors were intoxicated during deliberations). Indeed, in this case the District Court held an evidentiary hearing giving petitioners ample opportunity to produce nonjuror evidence supporting their allegations.
In light of these other sources of protection of petitioners’ right to a competent jury, we conclude that the District Court did not err in deciding, based on the inadmissibility of juror testimony and the clear insufficiency of the nonjuror evidence offered by petitioners, that an additional postverdict evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.
H-i l — l I — I
Title 18 U. S. C. § 371 provides, m relevant part:
“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
Section 371 is the descendent of and bears a strong resemblance to conspiracy laws that have been in the federal statute books since 1867. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484 (prohibiting conspiracy to “defraud the United States in any manner whatever”). Neither the original 1867 provision nor its subsequent reincarnations were accompanied by any particularly illuminating legislative history. This case has been preceded, however, by decisions of this Court interpreting the scope of the phrase “to defraud ... in any manner or for any purpose.” In those cases we have stated repeatedly that the fraud covered by the statute “reaches ‘any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.’” Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 861 (1966), quoting Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479 (1910); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 66 (1942); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182, 188 (1924). We do not reconsider that aspect of the scope of § 371 in this case. Therefore, if petitioners’ actions constituted a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the REA, no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under § 371.
The indictment against petitioners charged them with having conspired “to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful functions of the Rural Electrification Administration in its administration and enforcement of its guaranteed loan program.” App. 5. Petitioners argue that if the evidence adduced at trial established a conspiracy to defraud, then the target of that conspiracy was Seminole Electric, and a conspiracy to defraud a private corporation receiving financial assistance from the Federal Government does not constitute a conspiracy to defraud the United States.
The Government sets out two arguments in response to petitioners’ challenge to the § 371 convictions. The first, which we accept, is that a conspiracy to defraud the United States may be effected by the use of third parties. The Government’s second argument asserts that Seminole, as the recipient of federal financial assistance and the subject of federal supervision, may itself be treated as “the United States” for purposes of § 371. This second argument must be rejected.
The Government observes, correctly, that under the common law a fraud may be established when the defendant has made use of a third party to reach the target of the fraud. 2 H. Brill, Cyclopedia of Criminal Law § 1244, p. 1892 (1923). The Government also correctly observes that the broad language of § 371, covering conspiracies to defraud “in any manner for any purpose,” puts no limits based on the method used to defraud the United States. A method that makes uses of innocent individuals or businesses to reach and defraud the United States is not for that reason beyond the scope of § 371. In two cases interpreting the False Claims Act, which reaches “[e]very person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented” a false claim against the United States, Rev. Stat. § 5438, we recognized that the fact that a false claim passes through the hands of a third party on its way from the claimant to the United States does not release the claimant from culpability under the Act. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U. S. 303, 309 (1976); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 541-545 (1943).
The Government’s principal argument for affirmance of petitioners’ § 371 convictions, however, is a great deal broader than the proposition stated above. The Government argues that, because Seminole received financial assistance and some supervision from the United States, a conspiracy to defraud Seminole is itself a conspiracy “to defraud the United States.”
The conspiracies criminalized by § 371 are defined not only by the nature of the injury intended by the conspiracy, and the method used to effectuate the conspiracy, but also — and most importantly — by the target of the conspiracy. Section 371 covers conspiracies to defraud “the United States or any agency thereof,” a phrase that the Government concedes fails to describe Seminole Electric. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26 (“We do not say they are federal agents”). The Government suggests, however, that Seminole served as an intermediary performing official functions on behalf of the Federal Government, and on this basis a conspiracy to defraud Seminole may constitute a conspiracy to defraud the United States under §371.
The Government suggests that this position is supported by the Court’s reasoning in Dixson v. United States, 466 U. S. 482 (1984), a decision involving the scope of the federal bribery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 201(a). Far from supporting the Government’s position in this case, the reasoning of the Court in Dixson illustrates why the argument is untenable. For the purpose of § 201’s provisions pertaining to bribery of public officials and witnesses, § 201(a) defined “public official” to include “an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof ... in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government.” The question presented in Dixson was whether officers of a private, nonprofit corporation administering the expenditure of federal community development block grants were “public officials” under § 201(a). Although the “on behalf of” language in § 201(a) was open to an interpretation that covered the defendants in that case, it was not unambiguously so. Therefore, the Court found § 201(a) applicable to the defendants only after it concluded that such an interpretation was supported by the section’s legislative history. See Dixson, 465 U. S., at 491-496. “If the legislative history fail[ed] to clarify the statutory language,” the Court observed, “our rule of lenity would compel us to construe the statute in favor of petitioners, as criminal defendants in these cases.” Id., at 491; see Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971).
Unlike the interpretation of the federal bribery statute adopted by the Court in Dixson, the interpretation of § 371 proposed by the Government in this case has not even an arguable basis in the plain language of § 371. In Dixson the Court construed § 201(a)’s reference to those acting “on behalf of the United States.” Rather than seeking a particular interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, the Government, in arguing that §371 covers conspiracies to defraud those acting on behalf of the United States, asks this Court to expand the reach of a criminal provision by reading new language into it. This we cannot do.
Moreover, even if the Government’s interpretation of § 371 could be pegged to some language in that section, the Government has presented us with nothing to overcome our rule that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Rewis v. United States, supra, at 812. The Government has wrested no aid from § 371’s stingy legislative history. Neither has the Government suggested much to commend its interpretation in terms of clarity of application. Petitioners assert that the Government’s logic would require any conspiracy to defraud someone who receives federal assistance to fall within §371. The Government replies that “there must be substantial ongoing federal supervision of the defrauded intermediary or delegation of a distinctly federal function to that intermediary to render a fraud upon the intermediary a fraud upon the ‘United States.’” Brief for United States 25-26. Yet the facts of this case demonstrate the difficulty of ascertaining how much federal supervision should be considered “substantial.” The Government emphasizes the supervisory powers granted the REA in the loan agreement; petitioners argue that the restrictions placed by the REA on Seminole were comparable to those “that a bank places on any borrower in connection with a secured transaction.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. Given the immense variety of ways the Federal Government provides financial assistance, and the fact that such assistance is always accompanied by restrictions on its use, the inability of the “substantial supervision” test to provide any real guidance is apparent. “A criminal statute, after if not before it is judicially construed, should have a discernable meaning.” Dixson v. United States, supra, at 512 (dissenting opinion).
Although the Government’s sweeping interpretation of §371 — which would have, in effect, substituted “anyone receiving federal financial assistance and supervision” for the phrase “the United States or any agency thereof” in § 371 — must fail, the Government also charged petitioners with conspiring to manipulate Seminole in order to cause misrepresentations to be made to the REA, an agency of the United States. The indictment against petitioners stated that:
“It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants would and did cause Seminole Electric to falsely state and represent to the Rural Electrification Administration that an REA-approved competitive bidding procedure had been followed in awarding the access road construction contracts.” App. 7.
If the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that petitioners conspired to cause Seminole to make misrepresentations to the REA, then petitioners’ convictions may stand. Because the sufficiency of the evidence on this particular charge in the indictment was not passed on below, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings on this question.
P> I — 1
Each mail fraud count of the indictment charged Tanner and Conover with acting in furtherance of “a scheme and artifice to defraud:
“(a) the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful function of the Rural Electrification Administration in its administration and enforcement of its guaranteed loan program; and
“(b) Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., of its right to have its process and procedures for the procurement of materials, equipment and services run honestly and free from deceit, corruption and fraud, and of its right to the honest and faithful services of its employees.” Id., at 12.
On appeal, petitioners argued that the evidence did not establish either a scheme to defraud the United States or a scheme to defraud Seminole. Petitioners’ arguments on the scheme to defraud the United States were raised in the context of the § 371 convictions. If the § 371 convictions were reversed, petitioners argued, then the mail fraud convictions could stand only if the Government proved a scheme to defraud Seminole. 772 F. 2d, at 771.
The Court of Appeals discussion on this point is as follows:
“Appellants argue that the convictions on counts II through V can be upheld only if the evidence establishes that they used the mails in effectuating a scheme to defraud Seminole. This is so, appellants contend, because the indictment did not charge, and the evidence did not establish, a violation of 18 U. S. C. §371. We have already rejected this proposition. Thus, we need not reach the question of whether the evidence establishes the use of the mails for the purpose of effectuating a scheme to defraud Seminole.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
If, on remand, the premise on which the Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the mail fraud convictions — that petitioners’ actions constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United States under §371 — is rejected, the Court of Appeals must consider petitioners’ argument that the evidence did not establish a scheme to defraud Seminole under the mail fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1341.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The House version, which adopted the earlier Advisory Committee proposal, read as follows:
“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him indicating an effect of this kind be received for these purposes.” H. R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
No. 425.
Decided November 22, 1965.
Paul A. Porter, Dennis G. Lyons, Harold J. Gallagher, Walter H. Brown, Jr., Richard A. Hollander, Edwin H. Burgess, Prime F. Osborn, Albert B. Russ, Jr., and Phil C. Beverly for appellants in No. 425. Robert W. Ginnane and Fritz R. Kahn for appellant in No. 555.
Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner and Lionel Kestenbaum for the United States. A. Alvis Layne and Fred H. Kent for Florida East Coast
Railway Co., W. Graham Claytor, Jr., for Southern Railway Co., and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and William G. Mahoney for Railway Labor Executives’ Association, appellees.
Together with No. 555, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court.
Per Curiam.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission an application for authority to merge. In the administrative proceedings, the applicants contended that the merger would enable them to lower operating costs, improve service, and eliminate duplicate facilities; other carriers opposed the merger on the ground that it would have adverse competitive effects; and the Department of Justice contended that the merger would create a rail monopoly in central and western Florida.
The Commission approved the merger, subject to routing and gateway conditions to protect competing railroads. It recognized that the merger would eliminate competition and create a rail monopoly in parts of Florida. But it found that the merged lines carried only a small part of the total traffic in the area involved; that ample rail competition would remain therein; and that the reduction in competition would “have no appreciably injurious effect upon shippers and communities.” Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 320 I. C. C. 122, 167. In addition, the Commission noted that the need to preserve intramodal rail competition had diminished, due to the fact that railroads were increasingly losing traffic to truck, water, and other modes of competition.
A three-judge District Court set aside the order and remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. It concluded that the Commission’s analysis of the competitive effects of the merger was fatally defective because the Commission had not determined whether the merger violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1964 ed.), by reference to the relevant product and geographic markets. By thus disposing of the case, the District Court did not reach the ultimate question whether the merger would be consistent with the public interest despite the foreseeable injury to competition.
We believe that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the directions this Court set forth in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944), and Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173 (1959). As we said in Minneapolis, at 186:
“Although §5(11) does not authorize the Commission to 'ignore’ the antitrust laws, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 80, there can be ‘little doubt that the Commission is not to measure proposals for [acquisitions] by the standards of the antitrust laws.’ 321 U. S., at 85-86. The problem is one of accommodation of § 5 (2) and the antitrust legislation. The Commission remains obligated to ‘estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from the proposed [acquisition] and consider them along with the advantages of improved service [and other matters in the public interest] to determine whether the [acquisition] will assist in effectuating the overall transportation policy.’ 321 U. S., at 87.”
The same criteria should be applied here to the proposed merger. It matters not that the merger might otherwise violate the antitrust laws; the Commission has been authorized by the Congress to approve the merger of railroads if it makes adequate findings in accordance with the criteria quoted above that such a merger would be “consistent with the public interest.” 54 Stat. 906, 49 U. S. C. §5 (2)(b) (1964 ed.).
Whether the Commission has confined itself within the statutory limits upon its discretion and has based its findings on substantial evidence are questions for the trial court in the first instance, United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U. S. 562, 578 (1952), and we indicate no opinion on the same. We therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to it for a full review of the administrative order and findings pursuant to the standards enunciated by this Court.
Vacated and remanded.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
It expressly declined to consider two further issues, i. e., whether the Commission’s labor-protection conditions were adequate and whether control of the merged company by the Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Company would be consistent with the public interest. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_partywinning |
STUTSON v. UNITED STATES
No. 94-8988.
Decided January 8, 1996
Per Curiam.
Our per curiam opinion issued today in a civil case, Lawrence v. Chafer, ante, p. 163; contains a general discussion of the considerations that properly influence this Court in deciding whether to grant a petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) for further consideration in light of potentially pertinent matters which it appears that the lower court may not have considered. Here, we apply that analysis to a criminal case, again finding that the particularities of the case before us merit a GVR.
Stutson, the petitioner in this case, is currently serving a federal prison sentence of 292 months for cocaine possession. He has had no appellate review of his legal arguments against conviction and sentence. The District Court held that his appeal was untimely and that the untimeliness was not the result of “excusable neglect” within the meaning of Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, because his lawyer’s office mailed his notice of appeal so that it arrived one working day late for the 10-day deadline, and at the Court of Appeals, when it should have been sent to the District Court. The District Court’s opinion did not advert to our decision in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380 (1993), rendered one day before Stutson’s brief was due in the District Court and not cited in the briefs before that court. In Pioneer, we held that a party could in some circumstances rely on his attorney’s inadvertent failure to file a proof of claim in a timely manner in bankruptcy proceedings as “excusable neglect” under the bankruptcy rules.
Stutson appealed the District Court’s ruling. In their briefs to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the parties disputed the applicability of Pioneer’s liberal understanding of “excusable neglect” to the Rule 4(b) criminal appeal context, the Government contending that it applied only in bankruptcy cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court and dismissed Stutson’s appeal without hearing oral argument or writing an opinion. Now, in his response to Stutson’s petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General has reversed the Government’s position. This change of position follows the unanimous view of the six Courts of Appeals that, unlike the Eleventh Circuit in this case, have expressly addressed this new and important issue, and have held that the Pioneer standard applies in Rule 4 cases. See United States v. Clark, 51 F. 3d 42, 44 (CA5 1995) (Rule 4(b)); United States v. Hooper, 9 F. 3d 257, 259 (CA2 1993) (same); Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F. 3d 1041, 1045-1046 (CA10 1994) (Rule 4(a)(5)), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1191 (1995); Fink v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 65 F. 3d 722 (CA8 1995) (same); Reynolds v. Wagner, 55 F. 3d 1426, 1429 (CA9) (same), cert. denied, post, p. 932; Virella-Nieves v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 53 F. 3d 451, 454, n. 3 (CA1 1995) (same).
In sum, this is a case where (1) the prevailing party below, the Government, has now repudiated the legal position that it advanced below; (2) the only opinion below did not consider the import of a recent Supreme Court precedent that both parties now agree applies; (3) the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed that decision; (4) all six Courts of Appeals that have addressed the applicability of the Supreme Court decision that the District Court did not apply in this case have concluded that it applies to Rule 4 cases; and (5) the petitioner is in jail having, through no fault of his own, had no plenary consideration of his appeal. While “we ‘should [not] mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error,’ ” Lawrence, ante, at 171 (quoting Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), this exceptional combination of circumstances presents ample justification for a GVR order. It appears to us that there is at least a reasonable probability that the Court of Appeals will reach a different conclusion on remand, and the equities clearly favor a GVR order.
If the Court of Appeals here, in its summary affirmance, did not rely on the Government’s primary argument and the lower court’s basic premise — that Pioneer did not apply — it does not seem to us that we place an excessive burden on it, relative to Stutson’s liberty and due process interests, by inviting it to clarify its ambiguous ruling. A contrary approach would risk effectively immunizing summary dispositions by courts of appeals from our review, since it is. rare that their basis for decision is entirely unambiguous. See Lawrence, ante, at 170 (discussing Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951 (1995)). If, on the other hand, the Court of Appeals did not fully consider the applicability of Pioneer, or if it concluded that Pioneer does not apply under Rule 4, it might well conclude that while “[t]he law is the law,” ante, at 184 (ScALIA, J., dissenting), the combination of the Government’s change of position and the subsequent contrary decisions of four other Courts of Appeals shed light on the law applicable to this case. If it continues to conclude that Pioneer does not apply, it will be useful for us to have the benefit of its views so that we may resolve the resulting conflict between the Circuits.
Finally, it is not insignificant that this is a criminal case. When a litigant is subject to the continuing coercive power of the Government in the form of imprisonment, our legal traditions reflect a certain solicitude for his rights, to which the important public interests in judicial efficiency and finality must occasionally be accommodated. We have previously refused to allow technicalities that caused no prejudice to the prosecution to preclude a remand under 28 U. S. C. §2106 (1988 ed.) “in the interests of justice.” Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981). And procedural accommodations to prisoners are a familiar aspect of our jurisprudence. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1988 ed.) (habeas review in spite of an adverse final appellate decision); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985) (relief for ineffective assistance of retained counsel on appeal); Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 63-64 (1970) (unlike in civil cases, time limits for petitions for certiorari in criminal cases are not jurisdictional). To the extent that the dissent suggests that it is inconsistent with our “traditional practice,” ante, at 178 (opinion of Scalia, J.), to call upon a Court of Appeals to reconsider its dismissal of a prisoner’s appeal because his lawyer filed it one day late, in circumstances where the Court of Appeals’ decision may have been premised on the assumption, unanimously rejected by other Courts of Appeals, that more stringent rules as to filing deadlines apply to prisoners than to creditors filing claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, we must respectfully disagree.
Judicial efficiency and finality are important values, and our GVR power should not be exercised for “[m]ere convenience,” cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274 (1942). “But dry formalism should not sterilize procedural resources which Congress has made available to the federal courts.” Ibid. In this case, as in Lawrence v. Chater, a GVR order guarantees to the petitioner full and fair consideration of his rights in light of all pertinent considerations, and is also satisfactory to the Government. In this case, as in Lawrence, a GVR order both promotes fairness and respects the dignity of the Court of Appeals by enabling it to consider potentially relevant decisions and arguments that were not previously before it.
Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed informa pau-peris and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380 (1993).
[For concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, see ante, p. 175; for dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice, see ante, p. 176; for dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, see ante, p. 177.]
Clark, Fink, Reynolds, and Virella-Nieves were decided after the Court of Appeals in this case denied Stutson’s petition for rehearing. Chanute and Hooper were decided after the District Court’s decision in this case but before that of the Court of Appeals. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
11
] | sc_certreason |
ARKANSAS v. TENNESSEE
No. 33,
Orig.
Argued January 19, 1970
Decided February 25, 1970
Don Langston, Assistant Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for plaintiff on exceptions to the Report of the Special Master. With him on the brief was Joe E. Purcell, Attorney General.
Heard H. Sutton argued the cause for defendant in support of the Report of the Special Master. With him on the brief were David Pack, Attorney General of Tennessee, C. Hayes Cooney, Assistant Attorney General, Harry W. Laughlin, James L. Oarthright, Jr., and J. Martin Regan.
Per Curiam.
This original action was commenced on October 13, 1967, by the State of Arkansas to settle a boundary dispute with the State of Tennessee. The disputed area extends six miles laterally along the west (Arkansas side) bank of the Mississippi River and encompasses some five thousand acres. This Court's jurisdiction arises under Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States. On January 15, 1968, we appointed, 389 U. S. 1026, Hon. Gunnar H. Nordbye, Senior United States Judge of the District of Minnesota, as Special Master to determine the state line in the disputed area known as Cow Island Bend in the Mississippi River located between Crittenden County, Arkansas, and Shelby County, Tennessee. After conducting an evi-dentiary hearing and viewing the area, the Master filed his Report with this Court recommending that all of the disputed area be declared part of the State of Tennessee. We affirm the Master’s Report.
The parties agree that the state line is the thalweg, that is, the steamboat channel of the Mississippi River as it flows west and southward between these States. The Master heard evidence and was presented exhibits and maps which showed that the migration of the Mississippi River northward and west continued until about 1912. At this time an avulsion occurred leaving Tennessee lands on the west or Arkansas side of the new or avulsive river channel. The Master found that thereafter, because of the avulsion, the water in the thalweg became stagnant and erosion and accretion no longer occurred. At this time the boundary between Arkansas and Tennessee became fixed in the middle of the old abandoned channel.
This is a classic example of the situation referred to in an earlier case between these States, Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 173, where we said,
"It is settled beyond the possibility of dispute that where running streams are the boundaries between States, the same rule applies as between private proprietors, namely, that when the bed and channel are changed by the natural and gradual processes known as erosion and accretion, the boundary follows the varying course of the stream; while if the stream from any cause, natural or artificial, suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one, by the process known as an avulsion, the resulting change of channel works no change of boundary, which remains in the middle of the old channel, although no water may be flowing in it, and irrespective of subsequent changes in the new channel.”
And, again, id., at 175,
“An avulsion has this effect, whether it results in the drying up of the old channel or not. So long as that channel remains a running stream, the boundary marked by it is still subject to be changed by erosion and accretion; but when the water becomes stagnant, the effect of these processes is at an end; the boundary then becomes fixed in the middle of the channel as we have defined it, and the gradual filling up of the bed that ensues is not to be treated as an accretion to the shores but as an ultimate effect of the avulsion.”
The exceptions of the State of Arkansas are overruled and the Report of the Special Master is adopted.
It is ordered that the Hon. Gunnar H. Nordbye be, and he is hereby, appointed as Commissioner in this case with power to engage and supervise a competent surveyor, or surveyors, to survey the boundary line as recommended in the Master’s Report. The boundary line determined by such survey shall be submitted to the Court by the Commissioner and, if approved, shall be the boundary line between the two States.
The costs of this proceeding shall be divided equally between the parties. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
2
] | sc_decisiondirection |
Keanu D.W. ORTIZ, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 16-1423.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Jan. 16, 2018.
Decided June 22, 2018.
Brian L. Mizer, Johnathan D. Legg, Lauren-Ann L. Shure, Appellate Defense Counsel, Air Force Legal Ops. Agency, MD, Eugene R. Fidell, New Haven, CT, Stephen I. Vladeck, Austin, TX, Mary J. Bradley, Christopher D. Carrier, Defense Appellate Division, Army Legal Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, for Petitioners.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Dana J. Boente, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Brian H. Fletcher, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Joseph F. Palmer, Danielle S. Tarin, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is about the legality of a military officer serving as a judge on both an Air Force appeals court and the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR). The petitioner, an airman convicted of crimes in the military justice system, contends that the judge's holding of dual offices violated a statute regulating military service, as well as the Constitution's Appointments Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) rejected those claims, and we granted a petition for certiorari. We hold first that this Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the CAAF, even though it is not an Article III court. We then affirm the CAAF's determination that the judge's simultaneous service was lawful.
I
In the exercise of its authority over the armed forces, Congress has long provided for specialized military courts to adjudicate charges against service members. Today, trial-level courts-martial hear cases involving a wide range of offenses, including crimes unconnected with military service; as a result, the jurisdiction of those tribunals overlaps substantially with that of state and federal courts. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) ; United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 404, 133 S.Ct. 2496, 186 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013) (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). And courts-martial are now subject to several tiers of appellate review, thus forming part of an integrated "court-martial system" that closely resembles civilian structures of justice.
United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 920, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 173 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2009) ; see Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174, 114 S.Ct. 752, 127 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994).
That system begins with the court-martial itself, an officer-led tribunal convened to determine guilt or innocence and levy appropriate punishment, up to lifetime imprisonment or execution. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 818, 856a. The next phase of military justice occurs at one of four appellate courts: the Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) for the Army, Navy-Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard. Those courts, using three-judge panels of either officers or civilians, review all decisions in which the sentence imposed involves a punitive discharge, incarceration for more than one year, or death. See §§ 866(a)-(c). Atop the court-martial system is the CAAF, a "court of record" made up of five civilian judges appointed to serve 15-year terms. § 941 ; see §§ 942(a)-(b). The CAAF must review certain weighty cases (including those in which capital punishment was imposed), and may grant petitions for review in any others. See § 867. Finally, this Court possesses statutory authority to step in afterward: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1259, we have jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions by writ of certiorari.
Petitioner Keanu Ortiz's case has run the gamut of this legal system. Ortiz, an Airman First Class in the Air Force, was charged with knowingly possessing and distributing child pornography, in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A court-martial found Ortiz guilty as charged and imposed a sentence of two years' imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. On appeal, an Air Force CCA panel, including Colonel Martin Mitchell, summarily affirmed the court-martial's decision. The CAAF then granted Ortiz's petition for review to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA, thus entitling Ortiz to an appellate do-over.
That issue arose from Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on the CMCR. Congress created the CMCR as an appellate tribunal to review the decisions of military commissions, particularly those operating in Guantanamo Bay. The Secretary of Defense put Judge Mitchell on that court shortly after he became a member of the CCA, under a statutory provision authorizing the Secretary to "assign [officers] who are appellate military judges" to serve on the CMCR as well. 10 U.S.C. § 950f(b)(2). Around the same time, a military-commission defendant argued to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that the Appointments Clause requires the President and Senate (rather than the Secretary) to place judges on the CMCR. The D.C. Circuit avoided resolving that issue, but suggested that the President and Senate could "put [it] to rest" by appointing the very CMCR judges whom the Secretary had previously assigned. In re al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 86 (2015). The President decided to take that advice, and nominated each of those judges-Mitchell, among them-under an adjacent statutory provision authorizing him to "appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," CMCR judges. § 950f(b)(3). The Senate then confirmed those nominations. About a month later, Judge Mitchell-now wearing his CCA robe-participated in the panel decision rejecting Ortiz's appeal.
In Ortiz's view, Judge Mitchell's appointment to the CMCR barred his continued service on the CCA under both a statute and the Constitution. First, Ortiz invoked 10 U.S.C. § 973(b). That statute, designed to ensure civilian preeminence in government, provides that unless "otherwise authorized by law," an active-duty military officer like Judge Mitchell "may not hold, or exercise the functions of," certain "civil office[s]" in the Federal Government. § 973(b)(2)(A). According to Ortiz, a CMCR judgeship is a covered civil office, and no other law allowed the President to put Mitchell in that position: Thus, his appointment to the CMCR violated § 973(b). See Brief in Support of Petition Granted in No. 16-0671 (CAAF), pp. 17-22. And the proper remedy, Ortiz argued, was to terminate Judge Mitchell's military service effective the date of his CMCR appointment and void all his later actions as a CCA judge-including his decision on Ortiz's appeal. See ibid. Second and independently, Ortiz relied on the Appointments Clause to challenge Judge Mitchell's dual service. See id., at 27-40. The premise of his argument was that CMCR judges are "principal officers" under that Clause, whereas CCA judges (as this Court has held) are "inferior officers." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 666, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997). Ortiz claimed that the Appointments Clause prohibits someone serving as a principal officer on one court (the CMCR) from sitting alongside inferior officers on another court (the CCA). Because Judge Mitchell had done just that, Ortiz concluded, the CCA's ruling on his appeal could not stand.
The CAAF rejected both grounds for ordering another appeal. See 76 M.J. 189 (2017). In considering the statutory question, the court chose not to decide whether § 973(b) precluded Judge Mitchell from serving on the CMCR while an active-duty officer. Even if so, the CAAF held, the remedy for the violation would not involve terminating the judge's military service or voiding actions he took on the CCA. See id., at 192. Turning next to the constitutional issue, the CAAF "s[aw] no Appointments Clause problem." Id., at 193. Even assuming Judge Mitchell was a principal officer when sitting on the CMCR, the court held, that status in no way affected his service on the CCA: "When Colonel Mitchell sits as a CCA judge, he is no different from any other CCA judge." Ibid. The CAAF thus upheld the CCA's affirmance of Ortiz's convictions.
This Court granted Ortiz's petition for certiorari to consider whether either § 973(b) or the Appointments Clause prevents a military officer from serving, as Judge Mitchell did, on both a CCA and the CMCR. 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 54, 198 L.Ed.2d 780 (2017). We now affirm the decision below.
II
We begin with a question of our own jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions. Congress has explicitly authorized us to undertake such review in 28 U.S.C. § 1259. See ibid. ("Decisions of the [CAAF] may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari"). Both the Federal Government and Ortiz view that grant of jurisdiction as constitutionally proper. But an amicus curiae, Professor Aditya Bamzai, argues that it goes beyond what Article III allows. That position is a new one to this Court: We have previously reviewed nine CAAF decisions without anyone objecting that we lacked the power to do so. Still, we think the argument is serious, and deserving of sustained consideration. That analysis leads us to conclude that the judicial character and constitutional pedigree of the court-martial system enable this Court, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, to review the decisions of the court sitting at its apex.
Bamzai starts with a proposition no one can contest-that our review of CAAF decisions cannot rest on our original jurisdiction. Brief for Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 11. Article III of the Constitution grants this Court original jurisdiction in a limited category of cases: those "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party." § 2, cl. 2. That list, of course, does not embrace Ortiz's case, or any other that the CAAF considers. And ever since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), this Court has recognized that our original jurisdiction cannot extend any further than the cases enumerated: If Congress attempts to confer more on us, we must (as Chief Justice Marshall famously did, in the pioneer act of judicial review) strike down the law. Id., at 174-180. As a result, Bamzai is right to insist that § 1259 could not authorize this Court, as part of its original jurisdiction, to hear military cases like Ortiz's.
The real issue is whether our appellate jurisdiction can cover such cases. Article III's sole reference to appellate jurisdiction provides no apparent barrier, but also no substantial guidance: Following its specification of this Court's original jurisdiction, Article III says only that in all "other Cases" that the Constitution comprehends (including cases, like this one, involving federal questions), "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact." § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution's failure to say anything more about appellate jurisdiction leads Bamzai to focus on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury . See Brief for Bamzai 2-4, 12-14. In that case (as you surely recall), William Marbury petitioned this Court-without first asking any other-to issue a writ of mandamus to Secretary of State James Madison directing him to deliver a commission. After holding (as just related) that the Court's original jurisdiction did not extend so far, Chief Justice Marshall also rejected the idea that the Court could provide the writ in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. "[T]he essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction," the Chief Justice explained, is "that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause." 1 Cranch, at 175. Marbury's petition, Chief Justice Marshall held, commenced the cause-or, to use the more modern word, the case; hence, it was not a matter for appellate jurisdiction.
Bamzai contends that the same is true of Ortiz's petition.
On any ordinary understanding of the great Chief Justice's words, that is a surprising claim. Ortiz's petition asks us to "revise and correct" the latest decision in a "cause" that began in and progressed through military justice "proceedings." Ibid. Or, as the Government puts the point, this case fits within Chief Justice Marshall's standard because "it comes to th[is] Court on review of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' decision, which reviewed a criminal proceeding that originated in [a] court[ ]-martial." Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48. So this Court would hardly be the first to render a decision in the case. Unless Chief Justice Marshall's test implicitly exempts cases instituted in a military court-as contrasted, for example, with an ordinary federal court-the case is now appellate.
The military justice system's essential character-in a word, judicial-provides no reason to make that distinction. Accord post, at 2186 - 2188 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Each level of military court decides criminal "cases" as that term is generally understood, and does so in strict accordance with a body of federal law (of course including the Constitution). The procedural protections afforded to a service member are "virtually the same" as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding, whether state or federal. 1 D. Schlueter, Military Criminal Justice: Practice and Procedure § 1-7, p. 50 (9th ed. 2015) (Schlueter). And the judgments a military tribunal renders, as this Court long ago observed, "rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations[, as] give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals." Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23, 25 L.Ed. 538 (1879). Accordingly, we have held that the "valid, final judgments of military courts, like those of any court of competent jurisdiction [,] have res judicata effect and preclude further litigation of the merits." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975). In particular, those judgments have identical effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 345, 27 S.Ct. 749, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907).
The jurisdiction and structure of the court-martial system likewise resemble those of other courts whose decisions we review. Although their jurisdiction has waxed and waned over time, courts-martial today can try service members for a vast swath of offenses, including garden-variety crimes unrelated to military service. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 877 - 934 ; Solorio, 483 U.S., at 438-441, 107 S.Ct. 2924 ; supra, at 2170 - 2171. As a result, the jurisdiction of those tribunals overlaps significantly with the criminal jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See Kebodeaux, 570 U.S., at 404, 133 S.Ct. 2496 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). The sentences meted out are also similar: Courts-martial can impose, on top of peculiarly military discipline, terms of imprisonment and capital punishment. See § 818(a) ; post, at 2186 - 2187 (THOMAS, J., concurring) ("[T]hese courts decide questions of the most momentous description, affecting even life itself" (quotation marks and ellipses omitted)). And the decisions of those tribunals are subject to an appellate process-what we have called an "integrated system of military courts and review procedures"-that replicates the judicial apparatus found in most States. Councilman, 420 U.S., at 758, 95 S.Ct. 1300. By the time a case like Ortiz's arrives on our doorstep under 28 U.S.C. § 1259, it has passed through not one or two but three military courts (including two that can have civilian judges).
And just as important, the constitutional foundation of courts-martial-as judicial bodies responsible for "the trial and punishment" of service members-is not in the least insecure. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1858). The court-martial is in fact "older than the Constitution," 1 Schlueter § 1-6(B), at 39; the Federalist Papers discuss "trials by courts-martial" under the Articles of Confederation, see No. 40, p. 250 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). When it came time to draft a new charter, the Framers "recogni[zed] and sanction[ed] existing military jurisdiction," W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 48 (2d ed. 1920) (emphasis deleted), by exempting from the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause all "cases arising in the land or naval forces." And by granting legislative power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," the Framers also authorized Congress to carry forward courts-martial. Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Congress did not need to be told twice. The very first Congress continued the court-martial system as it then operated. See Winthrop, supra, at 47. And from that day to this one, Congress has maintained courts-martial in all their essentials to resolve criminal charges against service members. See 1 Schlueter § 1 -6, at 35-48.
Throughout that history, and reflecting the attributes described above, courts-martial have operated as instruments of military justice, not (as the dissent would have it) mere "military command," post, at 2199 (opinion of ALITO, J.). As one scholar has noted, courts-martial "have long been understood to exercise 'judicial' power," of the same kind wielded by civilian courts. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 576 (2007) ; see W. De Hart, Observations on Military Law 14 (1859) (Military courts are "imbued or endowed with the like essence of judicial power" as "ordinary courts of civil judicature"); accord post, at 2186 - 2188 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Attorney General Bates, even in the middle of the Civil War, characterized a court-martial "proceeding, from its inception, [a]s judicial," because the "trial, finding, and sentence are the solemn acts of a court organized and conducted under the authority of and according to the prescribed forms of law." Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 558, 22 Ct.Cl. 487, 7 S.Ct. 1141, 30 L.Ed. 1167 (1887) (quoting 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 19, 21 (1864)). Colonel Winthrop-whom we have called the "Blackstone of Military Law," Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19, n. 38, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957) (plurality opinion)-agreed with Bates. He regarded a court-martial as "in the strictest sense" a "court of law and justice"-"bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law" and the duty to adjudicate cases "without partiality, favor, or affection." Winthrop, supra, at 54.
Despite all this, Bamzai claims that "Marbury bars th[is] Court from deciding" any cases coming to us from the court-martial system. Brief for Bamzai 3. He begins, much as we did above, by explaining that under Marbury the Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction only when it is "supervising an earlier decision by a lower court." Brief for Bamzai 13. The next step is where the argument gets interesting. The CAAF, Bamzai contends, simply does not qualify as such a body (nor does any other military tribunal). True enough, "the CAAF is called a 'court' "; and true enough, it decides cases, just as other courts do. Id., at 3 ; see id., at 28. But the CAAF, Bamzai notes, is "not an Article III court," id., at 3 (emphasis added): As all agree, its members lack the tenure and salary protections that are the hallmarks of the Article III judiciary, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 942(b), (c). Congress established the CAAF under its Article I, rather than its Article III, powers, and Congress located the CAAF (as we have previously observed) within the Executive Branch, rather than the judicial one. See § 941 ; Edmond, 520 U.S., at 664, and n. 2, 117 S.Ct. 1573. Those facts, in Bamzai's view, prevent this Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over the CAAF. "For constitutional purposes," Bamzai concludes, the members of the CAAF "stand on equal footing with James Madison in Marbury ." Brief for Bamzai 4. (With variations here and there, the dissent makes the same basic argument.)
But this Court's appellate jurisdiction, as Justice Story made clear ages ago, covers more than the decisions of Article III courts. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816), we considered whether our appellate jurisdiction extends to the proceedings of state courts, in addition to those of the Article III federal judiciary. We said yes, as long as the case involves subject matter suitable for our review. Id., at 338-352. For our "appellate power," Story wrote, "is not limited by the terms of [Article III] to any particular courts." Id., at 338. Or again: "[I]t will be in vain to search in the letter of the [C]onstitution for any qualification as to the tribunal" from which a given case comes. Ibid. The decisions we review might come from Article III courts, but they need not.
The same lesson emerges from two contexts yet more closely resembling this one-each involving a non-Article III judicial system created by Congress. First, in United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 15 S.Ct. 16, 39 L.Ed. 76 (1894), this Court upheld the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over decisions of federal territorial courts, despite their lack of Article III status. We observed there that the Constitution grants Congress broad authority over the territories: to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting" those areas. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ; see Coe, 155 U.S., at 85, 15 S.Ct. 16. And we recognized that Congress, with this Court's permission, had long used that power to create territorial courts that did not comply with Article III. See ibid. Chief Justice Marshall had held such a court constitutional in 1828 even though its authority was "not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article." American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 546, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) ; see Coe, 155 U.S., at 85, 15 S.Ct. 16 (describing that opinion as having "settled" that Article III "does not exhaust the power of Congress to establish courts"). The exception to Article III for territorial courts was thus an established and prominent part of the legal landscape by the time Coe addressed this Court's role in reviewing their decisions. And so the Court found the issue simple. "There has never been any question," we declared, "that the judicial action of [territorial courts] may, in accordance with the Constitution, be subjected to [our] appellate jurisdiction." Id., at 86, 15 S.Ct. 16.
Second, we have routinely, and uncontroversially, exercised appellate jurisdiction over cases adjudicated in the non-Article III District of Columbia courts. Here too, the Constitution grants Congress an unqualified power: to legislate for the District "in all Cases whatsoever." Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Under that provision, we long ago determined, "Congress has the entire control over the [D]istrict for every purpose of government," including that of "organizing a judicial department." Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524, 619, 9 L.Ed. 1181 (1838). So when Congress invoked that authority to create a set of local courts, this Court upheld the legislation-even though the judges on those courts lacked Article III protections. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-410, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). We relied on the Constitution's "plenary grant [ ] of power to Congress to legislate with respect to" the national capital. Id., at 408, 93 S.Ct. 1670. And several years later, we referred as well to the "historical consensus" supporting congressional latitude over the District's judiciary. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (plurality opinion); see id., at 65, n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 2858. To be sure, we have never explicitly held, as we did in the territorial context, that those same considerations support our appellate jurisdiction over cases resolved in the D.C. courts. But some things go unsaid because they are self-evident. And indeed, even Bamzai readily acknowledges that this Court can review decisions of the D.C. Court of Appeals. See Brief for Bamzai 23, 25.
The non-Article III court-martial system stands on much the same footing as territorial and D.C. courts, as we have often noted. The former, just like the latter, rests on an expansive constitutional delegation: As this Court early held, Article I gives Congress the power-"entirely independent" of Article III-"to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations." Dynes, 20 How., at 79 ; see supra, at 2174 - 2175. The former has, if anything, deeper historical roots, stretching from before this nation's beginnings up to the present. See supra, at 2174 - 2175. And the former, no less than the others, performs an inherently judicial role, as to substantially similar cases. See supra, at 2174 - 2176. So it is not surprising that we have lumped the three together. In Palmore, the Court viewed the military, territories, and District as a triad of "specialized areas having particularized needs" in which Article III "give[s] way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress." 411 U.S., at 408, 93 S.Ct. 1670. And in Northern Pipeline, the plurality said of all three that "a constitutional grant of power [as] historically understood" has bestowed "exceptional powers" on Congress to create courts outside Article III. 458 U.S., at 66, 70, 102 S.Ct. 2858. Given those well-understood connections, we would need a powerful reason to divorce military courts from territorial and D.C. courts when it comes to defining our appellate jurisdiction.
And Bamzai fails to deliver one. His initial attempt relies on a simple fact about territorial and D.C. courts: They exercise power over "discrete geographic areas." Brief for Bamzai 23. Military courts do not; they instead exercise power over discrete individuals-i.e., members of the armed forces. So Bamzai gives us a distinction: places vs. people. What he does not offer is a good reason why that distinction should matter in our jurisdictional inquiry-why it is one of substance, rather than convenience. He mentions that the territorial and D.C. courts are "functional equivalents of state courts." Id., at 24; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 35. But for starters, that could be said of courts-martial too. As we have described, they try all the "ordinary criminal offenses" (murder, assault, robbery, drug crimes, etc., etc., etc.) that state courts do.
Kebodeaux, 570 U.S., at 404, 133 S.Ct. 2496 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); see supra, at 2170 - 2171, 2174 - 2175. And more fundamentally, we do not see why geographical state -likeness, rather than historical court -likeness, should dispose of the issue. As we have shown, the petition here asks us to "revise[ ] and correct[ ] the proceedings in a cause already instituted" in a judicial system recognized since the founding as competent to render the most serious decisions. Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 175 ; see supra, at 2174 - 2176. That should make the case an appeal, whether or not the domain that system covers is precisely analogous to, say, Alabama.
So Bamzai tries another route to cleave off military courts, this time focusing on their location in the Executive Branch. See Brief for Bamzai 26-30. Bamzai actually never says in what branch (if any) he thinks territorial and D.C. courts reside. But he knows-because this Court has said-that the CAAF is an "Executive Branch entity." Edmond, 520 U.S., at 664, and n. 2, 117 S.Ct. 1573 ; see supra, at 2176 - 2177. And in Bamzai's view, two of our precedents show that we may never accept appellate jurisdiction from any person or body within that branch. See Brief for Bamzai 2-4. The first case he cites is Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243, 17 L.Ed. 589 (1864), in which the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over decisions of a temporary Civil War-era military commission. See id ., at 251-252. The second is Marbury itself, in which the Court held (as if this needed repeating) that it lacked jurisdiction to review James Madison's refusal to deliver a commission appointing William Marbury a justice of the peace. See 1 Cranch, at 175-176 ; supra, at 2173 - 2174.
As to the first, Vallandigham goes to show only that not every military tribunal is alike. The commission the Court considered there was established by General Ambrose Burnside (he of the notorious facial hair) for a time-limited, specialized purpose-to try persons within the military Department of Ohio (Burnside's then-command) for aiding the Confederacy. See 1 Wall., at 243-244. And the General kept firm control of the commission (made up entirely of his own field officers): After personally ordering Vallandigham's arrest, he (and he alone) also reviewed the commission's findings and sentence. See id., at 247-248 ; J. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 596-597 (1988). This Court therefore found that the commission lacked "judicial character." 1 Wall., at 253. It was more an adjunct to a general than a real court-and so we did not have appellate jurisdiction over its decisions.
But the very thing that Burnside's commission lacked, the court-martial system-and, in particular, the CAAF (whose decision Ortiz asks us to review)-possesses in spades. Once again, the CAAF is a permanent "court of record" created by Congress; it stands at the acme of a firmly entrenched judicial system that exercises broad jurisdiction in accordance with established rules and procedures; and its own decisions are final (except if we review and reverse them). See supra, at 2170 - 2171, 2174 - 2176. That is "judicial character" more than sufficient to separate the CAAF from Burnside's commission, and align it instead with territorial and D.C. (and also state and federal) courts of appeals.
And the differences between the CAAF's decisions and James Madison's delivery refusal should have already leaped off the page. To state the obvious: James Madison was not a court, either in name or in function. He was the Secretary of State-the head of a cabinet department (and, by the way, the right arm of the President). Likewise, Madison's failure to transmit Marbury's commission was not a judicial decision; it was an enforcement action (though in the form of non-action), pertaining only to the execution of law. As Chief Justice Marshall saw, Secretary Madison merely triggered the case of Marbury v. Madison ; he did not hear and resolve it, as a judicial body would have done. See 1 Cranch, at 175. The Chief Justice's opinion thus cleanly divides that case from this one, even if both (as Bamzai notes) formally involve executive officers. Here, three constitutionally rooted courts, ending with the CAAF, rendered inherently judicial decisions-just as such tribunals have done since our nation's founding. In reviewing, "revis[ing,] and correct[ing]" those proceedings, as Ortiz asks, we do nothing more or different than in generally exercising our appellate jurisdiction. Ibid.
But finally, in holding that much, we say nothing about whether we could exercise appellate jurisdiction over cases from other adjudicative bodies in the Executive Branch, including those in administrative agencies. Our resolution of the jurisdictional issue here has rested on the judicial character, as well as the constitutional foundations and history, of the court-martial system. We have relied, too, on the connections that our cases have long drawn between that judicial system and those of the territories and the District. If Congress were to grant us appellate jurisdiction over decisions of newer entities advancing an administrative (rather than judicial) mission, the question would be different-and the answer not found in this opinion.
III
We may now turn to the issues we took this case to decide. Recall that Ortiz seeks a new appeal proceeding before the Air Force CCA, based on Judge Mitchell's participation in his last one. See supra, at 2170 - 2172. Ortiz's challenge turns on Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on another court, the CMCR. Originally, the Secretary of Defense had assigned Judge Mitchell to sit on that court. Then, to moot a possible constitutional problem with Judge Mitchell's CMCR service, the President (with the Senate's advice and consent) appointed Judge Mitchell as well. A short time later, Judge Mitchell ruled on Ortiz's CCA appeal. Ortiz contends that doing so violated both a federal statute and the Appointments Clause. We disagree on both counts.
A
The statutory issue respecting Judge Mitchell's dual service turns on two interlocking provisions. The first is § 973(b)(2)(A) -the statute Ortiz claims was violated here. As noted earlier, that law-in the interest of ensuring civilian preeminence in government-prohibits active-duty military officers like Judge Mitchell from "hold[ing], or exercis[ing] the functions of," certain "civil office[s]" in the Federal Government, "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law." See supra, at 2172. The second is § 950f(b) -a statute the Government claims "otherwise authorize[s]" Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR, even if a seat on that court is a covered "civil office." As also noted above, § 950f(b) provides two ways to become a CMCR judge. See supra, at 2171. Under § 950f(b)(2), the Secretary of Defense "may assign" qualified officers serving on a CCA to "be judges on the [CMCR]" as well. And under § 950f(b)(3), the President (with the Senate's advice and consent) "may appoint" persons-whether officers or civilians is unspecified-to CMCR judgeships.
Against that statutory backdrop, Ortiz claims that Judge Mitchell became disqualified from serving on the CCA the moment his presidential appointment to the CMCR became final. See Brief for Petitioners 39-42. Notably, Ortiz has no statutory objection to Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on those courts before that date-when he sat on the CMCR solely by virtue of the Secretary of Defense's assignment. See id., at 40. Nor could he reasonably lodge such a complaint, for § 950f(b)(2), in no uncertain terms, "otherwise authorize[s]" the Secretary to place a military judge on the CMCR-thus exempting such an officer from § 973(b)(2)(A)'s prohibition. But in Ortiz's view, the provision in § 950f(b)(3) for presidential appointments contains no similar authorization, because it makes no "express[ ] or unambiguous[ ]" reference to military officers. Id ., at 20. And so, Ortiz concludes, § 973(b)(2)(A)'s general rule must govern.
In the circumstances here, however, the authorization in § 950f(b)(2) was the only thing necessary to exempt Judge Mitchell from the civil office-holding ban-not just before but also after his presidential appointment. That provision, as just noted, unambiguously permitted the Secretary of Defense to place Judge Mitchell on the CMCR, even if such a judgeship is a "civil office." See supra, at 2181. And once that happened, the President's later appointment of Judge Mitchell made not a whit of difference. Nothing in § 950f (or any other law) suggests that the President's appointment erased or otherwise negated the Secretary's earlier action. To the contrary, that appointment (made for purposes of protecting against a constitutional challenge, see supra, at 2171) merely ratified what the Secretary had already done. The nomination papers that the President submitted to the Senate reflect that fact. They sought confirmation of Judge Mitchell's appointment as a CMCR judge "[i]n accordance with [his] continued status as [a CMCR] judge pursuant to [his] assignment by the Secretary of Defense[,] under 10 U.S.C. Section 950f(b)(2)." 162 Cong. Rec. S1474 (Mar. 14, 2016). So after the Senate approved the nomination, Judge Mitchell served on the CMCR by virtue of both the Secretary's assignment and the President's appointment. And because § 950f(b)(2) expressly authorized the Secretary's assignment, Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR could not run afoul of § 973(b)(2)(A)'s general rule.
Ortiz argues in response that the President's appointment demanded its own clear authorization because only that appointment put Judge Mitchell into a "new office." Reply Brief 7. According to Ortiz, an officer who receives a secretarial assignment to the CMCR "exercise[s] additional duties"-but he does not hold a second position. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13. A presidential appointment alone, he says, effects that more dramatic change. And Ortiz contends that § 973(b)(2)(A)'s rule cares about that difference. That law, Ortiz says, requires a legislative authorization when, and only when, a service member receives a whole new office-which is to say here when, and only when, the President appoints a judge to the CMCR. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5 (stating that § 973(b)(2)(A)"prohibit[s] military officers from holding [civil offices] absent express congressional authorization, while generally allowing military officers to be assigned to exercise the duties of such positions").
But that argument is contrary to § 973(b)(2)(A)'s text, as well as to the purposes it reflects. The statute draws no distinction between secretarial assignees and presidential appointees, nor between those who exercise the duties of an office and those who formally hold it. True enough, we have sometimes referred to § 973(b)(2)(A) as a rule about dual "office-holding," see supra, at 2181 - 2182, 2182, n. 10-but that is mere shorthand. In fact, § 973(b)(2)(A)'s prohibition applies broadly, and uniformly, to any military officer who "hold[s], or exercise[s] the functions of," a covered civil office. And the "except as otherwise authorized" caveat applies in the same way-to "hold[ing]" and "exercis[ing]" alike. So the very distinction that Ortiz relies on, the statute rejects: Indeed, the law could not be clearer in its indifference. That is because Congress determined that military officers threaten civilian preeminence in government by either "hold [ing]" or "exercis[ing] the functions of" important civil offices. Except ... if Congress decides otherwise and says as much.
And once again, here Congress did exactly that. Judge Mitchell became a CMCR judge, while remaining in the military, because of a secretarial assignment that Congress explicitly authorized. See supra, at 2181 - 2182. After his presidential appointment, he continued on the same court, doing the same work, in keeping with the same congressional approval. Even supposing he obtained a "new office" in the way Ortiz says, that acquisition is of no moment. With or without that formal office, Judge Mitchell "h[e]ld, or exercise[d] the functions of," a CMCR judgeship, and so was subject to § 973(b)(2)(A)'s ban. But likewise, with or without that formal office, Judge Mitchell could receive permission from Congress to do the job-that is, to sit as a judge on the CMCR. And § 950f(b)(2) gave Judge Mitchell that legislative green light, from the date of his assignment through his ruling on Ortiz's case and beyond.
B
Finally, Ortiz raises an Appointments Clause challenge to Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on the CCA and the CMCR. That Clause provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" the "Officers of the United States," but that "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Litigants usually invoke the Appointments Clause when they object to how a government official is placed in his office. A litigant may assert, for example, that because someone is a principal rather than an inferior officer, he must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. (Recall that just such an argument about CMCR judges led to Judge Mitchell's presidential appointment. See supra, at 2171.) But Ortiz's argument is not of that genre. He does not claim that the process used to make Judge Mitchell either a CCA judge or a CMCR judge violated the Appointments Clause. Instead, he claims to find in that Clause a principle relating to dual service. A CCA judge, Ortiz notes, is an inferior officer. See Edmond, 520 U.S., at 666, 117 S.Ct. 1573. But a CMCR judge, he says (though the Government has argued otherwise), is a principal officer. And in Ortiz's view, a single judge cannot, consistent with the Appointments Clause, serve as an inferior officer on one court and a principal officer on another. He calls such dual office-holding "incongru[ous]" and "functionally incompatible." Brief for Petitioners 50. The problem, he suggests, is that the other (inferior officer) judges on the CCA will be "unduly influenced by" Judge Mitchell's principal-officer status on the CMCR. Id., at 51.
But that argument stretches too far. This Court has never read the Appointments Clause to impose rules about dual service, separate and distinct from methods of appointment. Nor has it ever recognized principles of "incongruity" or "incompatibility" to test the permissibility of holding two offices. As Ortiz himself acknowledges, he can "cite no authority holding that the Appointments Clause prohibits this sort of simultaneous service." Id., at 52.
And if we were ever to apply the Clause to dual office-holding, we would not start here. Ortiz tells no plausible story about how Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR would result in "undue influence" on his CCA colleagues. The CMCR does not review the CCA's decisions (or vice versa); indeed, the two courts do not have any overlapping jurisdiction. They are parts of separate judicial systems, adjudicating different kinds of charges against different kinds of defendants. See supra, at 2170 - 2171, and n. 1. We cannot imagine that anyone on the CCA acceded to Judge Mitchell's views because he also sat on the CMCR-any more than we can imagine a judge on an Article III Court of Appeals yielding to a colleague because she did double duty on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (another specialized court). The CAAF put the point well: "When Colonel Mitchell sits as a CCA judge, he is no different from any other CCA judge." 76 M.J., at 193 ; see supra, at 2172. So there is no violation of the Appointments Clause.
IV
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions. In exercising that jurisdiction, we hold that Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on the CCA and the CMCR violated neither § 973(b)(2)(A)'s office-holding ban nor the Constitution's Appointments Clause. We therefore affirm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
In contrast to courts-martial, military commissions have historically been used to substitute for civilian courts in times of martial law or temporary military government, as well as to try members of enemy forces for violations of the laws of war. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595-597, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006) (plurality opinion).
At the same time we issued a writ of certiorari in this case, we granted and consolidated petitions in two related cases-Dalmazzi v. United States, No. 16-961, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2273, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2018 WL 3073953 (2018) and Cox v. United States, No. 16-1017, ---U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2273, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2018 WL 3074030 (2018). Those cases raise issues of statutory jurisdiction that our disposition today makes it unnecessary to resolve. We accordingly dismiss Dalmazzi, ---U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at ----, 2018 WL 3073953, post, p. ----, and Cox, --- U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at ----, 2018 WL 3074030, post, p. ----, as improvidently granted in opinions accompanying this decision.
See United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 173 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2009) ; Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 119 S.Ct. 1538, 143 L.Ed.2d 720 (1999) ; United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) ; Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997) ; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996) ; Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995) ; Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ; Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 114 S.Ct. 752, 127 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) ; Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987).
The dissent asserts that, in setting out that test, we have "basically proceed[ed] as though Marbury were our last word on the subject" and overlooked "two centuries of precedent." Post, at 2193 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But the cases the dissent faults us for failing to cite stand for the same principle that we-and more important, Marbury -already set out. They too say that our appellate jurisdiction permits us to review only prior judicial decisions, rendered by courts. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 97, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1869) (Our "appellate jurisdiction" may "be exercised only in the revision of judicial decisions"); The Alicia, 7 Wall. 571, 573, 19 L.Ed. 84 (1869) ("[A]n appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies some judicial determination ... of an inferior tribunal, from which an appeal has been taken"); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 396, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (In exercising appellate jurisdiction, we act as a "supervising Court, whose peculiar province it is to correct the errors of an inferior Court"); Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 101, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807) (We exercise "appellate jurisdiction" in "revisi[ng] a decision of an inferior court"); post, at 2190 - 2192, 2194, 2195. Marbury, then, remains the key precedent.
The independent adjudicative nature of courts-martial is not inconsistent with their disciplinary function, as the dissent claims, see post, at 2198 - 2203. By adjudicating criminal charges against service members, courts-martial of course help to keep troops in line. But the way they do so-in comparison to, say, a commander in the field-is fundamentally judicial. Accord post, at 2188 - 2189 (THOMAS, J., concurring) ("While the CAAF is in the Executive Branch and its purpose is to help the President maintain troop discipline, those facts do not change the nature of the power that it exercises"). Colonel Winthrop stated as much: Even while courts-martial "enforc[e] discipline" in the armed forces, they remain "as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal." W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 49, 54 (2d ed. 1920). And he was right. When a military judge convicts a service member and imposes punishment-up to execution-he is not meting out extra-judicial discipline. He is acting as a judge, in strict compliance with legal rules and principles-rather than as an "arm of military command." Post, at 2199. It is in fact one of the glories of this country that the military justice system is so deeply rooted in the rule of law. In asserting the opposite-that military courts are not "judicial" in "character"-the dissent cannot help but do what it says it would like to avoid: "denigrat [e the court-martial] system." Post, at 2203; see post, at 2202.
See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 594, 199 L.Ed.2d 473 (2018) ; Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1885, 198 L.Ed.2d 443 (2017) ; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) ; Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) ; Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 1412, 75 L.Ed.2d 359 (1983) ; Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) ; United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) ; Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974) ; Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). In none of these or similar cases has anyone ever challenged our appellate jurisdiction.
In addition, several Justices in separate opinions have made the same linkage. See, e.g., Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1951, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (ROBERTS, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "narrow exceptions permit Congress to establish non-Article III courts to exercise general jurisdiction in the territories and the District of Columbia [and] to serve as military tribunals"); id., at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1964 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (referring to territorial courts and courts-martial as "unique historical exceptions" to Article III); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504-505, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the "firmly established historical practice" of exempting territorial courts and courts-martial from Article III's demands).
The dissent must dismiss all this authority, from Justices both functionalist and formalist, to aver that "it is only when Congress legislates for the Territories and the District that it may lawfully vest judicial power in tribunals that do not conform to Article III." Post, at 2197; see post, at 2196 - 2197. Not so, we have made clear, because (once again) of an exceptional grant of power to Congress, an entrenched historical practice, and (for some more functionalist judges) particularized needs. The result is "that Congress has the power [apart from Article III] to provide for the adjudication of disputes among the Armed Forces," just as in the territories and the District. Wellness, 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1964 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
The dissent offers a different-and doubly misleading-explanation for Vallandigham . First, it says that we found jurisdiction lacking because the commission was "was not one of the 'courts of the United States' established under Article III." Post, at 2194 - 2195 (quoting Vallandigham, 1 Wall., at 251 ). But the dissent is reading from the wrong part of the opinion. Vallandigham contained two holdings-first (and relevant here), that Article III precluded the Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over the commission's decisions, and second (and irrelevant here), that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had not authorized such jurisdiction. The language the dissent quotes relates only to the irrelevant statutory holding: The Judiciary Act, the Court explained, confined our jurisdiction to decisions of Article III courts, and the commission did not fit under that rubric. By contrast, the language we quote in the text formed the basis of the Court's constitutional holding-which is all that matters here. Second, the dissent contends that Vallandigham "recognized that the military tribunal had 'judicial character,' " even as it found jurisdiction lacking. Post, at 2195. Not so. Vallandigham expressly rejected the argument that the commission had "judicial character." 1 Wall., at 253. Though the Court understood that the commission pronounced guilt and imposed sentences, it did not think the commission was acting as a court in rendering its decisions. See ibid. (citing United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 46-47, 14 L.Ed. 40 (1852), in which the Court held that a claims tribunal was without judicial "character" and labeled its decisions the "award[s] of a commissioner," "not the judgment[s] of a court of justice").
The dissent contends that the CAAF's decisions are not always final because the President, relevant branch secretary, or one of his subordinates must approve a sentence of death or dismissal from the armed forces before it goes into effect. See post, at 2203 - 2205. But as the Government has explained, the President's (or other executive official's) authority at that stage extends only to punishment: It is "akin to relief by commutation in the federal or state system." Tr. of Oral Arg. 57; see Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235, 247 (C.A.A.F.2005) (likening the approval authority to "executive clemency powers"). The President, even when "mitigat[ing a] sentence[,]" cannot "upset[ ] the conviction" or "the judgment of the CAAF." Tr. of Oral Arg. 55-56. Rather, as we said above, the CAAF's judgment is final when issued (except if we reverse it). See 10 U.S.C. § 871(c)(1) (stating that even when a sentence is subject to an executive official's approval, the "judgment" is "final" when judicial review is concluded).
We state no opinion on a broader argument the Government makes-that § 950f(b)(2) would exempt Judge Mitchell from § 973(b)(2)(A)'s office-holding ban even if the Secretary had not assigned him to the CMCR before the President's appointment. See Brief for United States 27-29. And because we hold that the Secretary's assignment authorized Judge Mitchell to serve on the CMCR while an active-duty military officer, we need not decide whether a CMCR judgeship is a covered "civil office" subject to § 973(b)(2)(A). Neither need we address the remedial issue on which the CAAF ruled, see supra, at 2172-i.e., whether a violation of § 973(b)(2)(A) would have immediately terminated Judge Mitchell's military service and voided later decisions he made (including in Ortiz's case) as a military judge. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
ARIZONA v. GANT
No. 07-542.
Argued October 7, 2008
Decided April 21, 2009
Joseph T Maziarz, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Terry Goddard, Attorney General, Mary R. O’Grady, Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Randall M. Howe, Former Chief Counsel, and Nicholas D. Acedo, Assistant Attorney General.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement, former Assistant Attorney General Fisher, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Thomas F. Jacobs argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jeffrey T Green
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Florida et al. by Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, and Craig D. Feiser and Courtney Brewer, Deputy Solicitors General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., of California, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Steven N. Six of Kansas, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, J. B. Van Hallen of Wisconsin, and Bruce A Salzburg of Wyoming; for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Richard Weintraub, Michael E. McNeff, Eric B. Edwards, and Bernard J. Farber; for the National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., by William J. Johnson and Devallis Rutledge; and for Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve Cooley et al. by Mr. Cooley, pro se, Lael R. Rubin, Brentford J. Ferreira, and Phyllis C. Asayama.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by James J. Tomkovicz, Steven R. Shapiro, and Graham A Boyd; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Jeffrey L. Fisher, Pamela S. Karlan, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, and Thomas C. Goldstein; and for the National Association of Federal Defenders by Beth S. Brinkmann, Seth M. Galanter, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Lila M. Bateman, Frances H. Pratt, Philip J. Lynch, Judith H. Mizner, and Stephen C. Moss.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
After Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his ear to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), did not justify the search in this case. We agree with that conclusion.
Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee’s “ ‘immediate control,’ ” meaning “the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 395 U. S., at 763. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel's reaching-distance rule determine Belton's scope. Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), and following the suggestion in Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, id., at 632, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
I
On August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked on the front door and asked to speak to the owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant’s driver’s license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.
When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet away, called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10-to-12 feet from Gant’s car. Griffith immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him.
Because the other arrestees were secured in the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.
Gant was charged with two offenses — possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia (1 e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search was conducted, Officer Griffith responded: “Because the law says we can do it.” App. 75.
The trial court rejected the State’s contention that the officers had probable cause to search Gant’s car for contraband when the search began, id., at 18, 30, but it denied the motion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited his ear, the court held that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest. Id., at 37. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment.
After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court’s opinion discussed at length our decision in Belton, which held that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of an arrest of the vehicle’s recent occupant. 216 Ariz. 1, 3-4, 162 R 3d 640, 642-643 (2007) (citing 453 U. S., at 460). The court distinguished Belton as a case concerning the permissible scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest and concluded that it did not answer “the threshold question whether the police may conduct a search incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure.” 216 Ariz., at 4, 162 R 3d, at 643. Relying on our earlier decision in Chimel, the court observed that the search-ineident-toarrest exception to the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and evidence preservation. 216 Ariz., at 4,162 P. 3d, at 643. When “the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol ear, and under the supervision of an officer,” the court concluded, a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence.” Id., at 5,162 P. 3d, at 644. Accordingly, the court held that the search of Gant’s ear was unreasonable.
The dissenting justices would have upheld the search of Gant's car based on their view that “the validity of a Belton search . . . clearly does not depend on the presence of the Chimel rationales in a particular case.” Id., at 8, 162 P. 3d, at 647. Although they disagreed with the majority’s view of Belton, the dissenting justices acknowledged that “[t]he bright-line rule embraced in Belton has long been criticized and probably merits reconsideration.” 216 Ariz., at 10, 162 P. 3d, at 649. They thus “add[ed their] voice[s] to the others that have urged the Supreme Court to revisit Belton.” Id., at 11, 162 P. 3d, at 650.
The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles. We therefore granted the State’s petition for certiorari. 552 U. S. 1230 (2008).
II
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914). The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 230-234 (1973); Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763.
In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Ibid. That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. See ibid, (noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable “in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use” and “in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction” of evidence (emphasis added)). If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. E. g., Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1964).
In Belton, we considered ChimeVs application to the automobile context. A lone police officer in that case stopped a speeding car in which Belton was one of four occupants. While asking for the driver’s license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed an envelope on the car floor marked “Supergold” — a name he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe the occupants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered them out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them down. Without handcuffing the arrestees, the officer “ ‘split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway ... so they would not be in physical touching area of each other’ ” and searched the vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in which he found cocaine. 453 U. S., at 456.
The New York Court of Appeals found the search unconstitutional, concluding that after the occupants were arrested the vehicle and its contents were “safely within the exclusive custody and control of the police.” State v. Belton, 50 N. Y. 2d 447, 452, 407 N. E. 2d 420, 423 (1980). The State asked this Court to consider whether the exception recognized in Chimel permits an officer to search “a jacket found inside an automobile while the automobile’s four occupants, all under arrest, are standing unsecured around the vehicle.” Brief in No. 80-328, p. i. We granted certiorari because “courts ha[d] found no workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile.” 453 U. S., at 460.
In its brief, the State argued that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the jacket was under the officer’s exclusive control. Focusing on the number of arrestees and their proximity to the vehicle, the State asserted that it was reasonable for the officer to believe the arrestees could have accessed the vehicle and its contents, making the search permissible under Chimel. Brief in No. 80-328, at 7-8. The United States, as amicus curiae in support of the State, argued for a more permissive standard, but it maintained that any search incident to arrest must be “ ‘substantially contemporaneous’ ” with the arrest — a requirement it deemed “satisfied if the search occurs during the period in which the arrest is being consummated and before the situation has so stabilized that it could be said that the arrest was completed.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in New York v. Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80-328, p. 14. There was no suggestion by the parties or amici that Chimel authorizes a vehicle search incident to arrest when there is no realistic possibility that an arrestee could access his vehicle.
After considering these arguments, we held that when an officer lawfully arrests “the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile” and any containers therein. Belton, 453 U. S., at 460 (footnote omitted). That holding was based in large part on our assumption “that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach.’ ” Ibid.
The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton as merely delineating “the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile” incident to an arrest, id., at 459. That is, when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein may be reached. On that view of Belton, the state court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable because Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search. It also found that no other exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case.
Gant now urges us to adopt the reading of Belton followed by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Ill
Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court’s reading of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. This reading may be attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in which he characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the “fiction... that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car.” Id., at 466. Under the majority’s approach, he argued, “the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car” before conducting the search. Id., at 468.
Since we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given different answers to the question whether a vehicle must be within an arrestee’s reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest, but Justice Brennan’s reading of the Court’s opinion has predominated. As Justice O’Connor observed, “lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.” Thornton, 541 U. S., at 624 (opinion concurring in part). Justice Scalia has similarly noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in “this precise factual scenario . . . are legion.” Id., at 628 (opinion concurring in judgment) (collecting cases). Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under Belton “even when . . . the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.” 541 U. S., at 628 (same).
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception — a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.” 453 U. S., at 460, n. 3. Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Thornton, 541 U. S., at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. See, e. g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 324 (2001); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118 (1998). But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.
Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched Gant’s car. Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license — an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car. Cf. Knowles, 525 U. S., at 118. Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.
IV
The State does not seriously disagree with the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that Gant could not have accessed his vehicle at the time of the search, but it nevertheless asks us to uphold the search of his vehicle under the broad reading of Belton discussed above. The State argues that Belton searches are reasonable regardless of the possibility of access in a given case because that expansive rule correctly balances law enforcement interests, including the interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his vehicle.
For several reasons, we reject the State’s argument. First, the State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, see New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1986), the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection, see Knowles, 525 U. S., at 117. It is particularly significant that Belton searches authorize police officers to search not just the passenger compartment but every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space. A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. Indeed, the character of that threat implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment — the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.
At the same time as it undervalues these privacy concerns, the State exaggerates the clarity that its reading of Belton provides. Courts that have read Belton expansively are at odds regarding how close in time to the arrest and how proximate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s first contact with the arrestee must be to bring the encounter within Belton’s purview and whether a search is reasonable when it commences or continues after the arrestee has been removed from the scene. The rule has thus generated a great deal of uncertainty, particularly for a rule touted as providing a “bright line.” See 3 LaFave §7.1(c), at 514-524.
Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests. Under our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is “dangerous” and might access the vehicle to “gain immediate control of weapons.” Id., at 1049 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)). If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 820-821 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. Unlike the searches permitted by Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Thornton, which we conclude today are reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ross allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader. Finally, there may be still other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search. Cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that, incident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited protective sweep of those areas of a house in which he reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be hiding).
These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search. Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.
V
Our dissenting colleagues argue that the doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to a broad reading of Belton even though the justifications for searching a vehicle incident to arrest are in most cases absent. The doctrine of stare decisis is of course “essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,” but it does not compel us to follow a past decision when its rationale no longer withstands “careful analysis.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 577 (2003).
We have never relied on stare decisis to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice. And we would be particularly loath to uphold an unconstitutional result in a case that is so easily distinguished from the decisions that arguably compel it. The safety and evidentiary interests that supported the search in Belton simply are not present in this case. Indeed, it is hard to imagine two cases that are factually more distinct, as Belton involved one officer confronted by four unsecured arrestees suspected of committing a drug offense, and this case involves several officers confronted with a securely detained arrestee apprehended for driving with a suspended license. This case is also distinguishable from Thornton, in which the petitioner was arrested for a drug offense. It is thus unsurprising that Members of this Court who concurred in the judgments in Belton and Thornton also concur in the decision in this case.
We do not agree with the contention in Justice Alito’s dissent (hereinafter dissent) that consideration of police reliance interests requires a different result. Although it appears that the State’s reading of Belton has been widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years,* many of these searches were not justified by the reasons underlying the Chimel exception. Countless individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the security of their private effects violated as a result. The fact that the law enforcement community may view the State’s version of the Belton rule as an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest that could outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement “entitlement” to its persistence. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 393 (1978) (“[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment”). The dissent’s reference in this regard to the reliance interests cited in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000), is misplaced. See post, at 358-359. In observing that “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture,” 530 U. S., at 443, the Court was referring not to police reliance on a rule requiring them to provide warnings but to the broader societal reliance on that individual right.
The dissent also ignores the checkered history of the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Police authority to search the place in which a lawful arrest is made was broadly asserted in Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927), and limited a few years later in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). The limiting views expressed in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz were in turn abandoned in Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947), which upheld a search of a four-room apartment incident to the occupant’s arrest. Only a year later the Court in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 708 (1948), retreated from that holding, noting that the search-incident-to-arrest exception is “a strictly limited” one that must be justified by “something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest.” And just two years after that, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), the Court again reversed course and upheld the search of an entire apartment. Finally, our opinion in Chimel overruled Rabinowitz and what remained of Harris and established the present boundaries of the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Notably, none of the dissenters in Chimel or the cases that preceded it argued that law enforcement reliance interests outweighed the interest in protecting individual constitutional rights so as to warrant fidelity to an unjustifiable rule.
The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely “within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach,’ ” 453 U. S., at 460, and blind adherence to Belton’s faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us to approve routine constitutional violations.
VI
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search. Accordingly, the judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The officer was unable to handcuff the occupants because he had only one set of handcuffs. See Brief for Petitioner in New York v. Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80-328, p. 3 (hereinafter Brief in No. 80-328).
Compare United States v. Green, 324 F. 3d 375, 379 (CA5 2003) (holding that Belton did not authorize a search of an arrestee’s vehicle when he was handcuffed and lying facedown on the ground surrounded by four police officers 6-to-10 feet from the vehicle), United States v. Edwards, 242 F. 3d 928, 938 (CA10 2001) (finding unauthorized a vehicle search conducted while the arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car), and United States v. Vasey, 834 F. 2d 782, 787 (CA9 1987) (finding unauthorized a vehicle search conducted 30-to-45 minutes after an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police car), with United States v. Hrasky, 453 F. 3d 1099, 1102 (CA8 2006) (upholding a search conducted an hour after the arrestee was apprehended and after he had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car), United States v. Weaver, 433 F. 3d 1104, 1106 (CA9 2006) (upholding a search conducted 10-to-15 minutes after an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car), and United States v. White, 871 F. 2d 41, 44 (CA6 1989) (upholding a search conducted after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police cruiser).
The practice of searching vehicles incident to arrest after the arrestee has been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car has not abated since we decided Thornton. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 221 Fed. Appx. 715, 717 (CA10 2007); Hrasky, 453 F. 3d, at 1100; Weaver, 433 F. 3d, at 1105; United States v. Williams, 170 Fed. Appx. 399, 401 (CA6 2006); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F. 3d 1038, 1041 (CA9 2005); United States v. Osife, 398 F. 3d 1143, 1144 (CA9 2005); United States v. Sumrall, 115 Fed. Appx. 22, 24 (CA10 2004).
Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains. Cf. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), p. 525 (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter LaFave) (noting that the availability of protective measures “ensur[es] the nonexistence of circumstances in which the arrestee’s ‘control’ of the car is in doubt”). But in such a case a search incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 84 (1987); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 760-761 (1969); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 480-484 (1965); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 389-392 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624-625 (1886); see also 10 C. Adams, The Works of John Adams 247-248 (1856). Many have observed that a broad reading of Belton gives police limitless discretion to conduct exploratory searches. See 3 LaFave § 7.1(c), at 527 (observing that Belton creates the risk “that police will make custodial arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth Amendment otherwise prohibits”); see also United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d 889, 894 (CA9 1999) (Trott, J., concurring) (observing that Belton has been applied to condone “purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around in a ear to see what they might find”); State v. Pallone, 2001 WI 77, ¶¶ 87-90,236 Wis. 2d 162, 203-204, and n. 9, 613 N. W. 2d 568, 588, and n. 9 (2000) (Abrahamson, C. J., dissenting) (same); State v. Pierce, 136 N. J. 184, 211, 642 A. 2d 947, 961 (1994) (same).
Compare United States v. Caseres, 533 F. 3d 1064, 1072 (CA9 2008) (declining to apply Belton when the arrestee was approached by police after he had exited his vehicle and reached his residence), with Rainey v. Commonwealth, 197 S. W. 3d 89, 94-95 (Ky. 2006) (applying Belton when the arrestee was apprehended 50 feet from the vehicle), and Black v. State, 810 N. E. 2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2004) (applying Belton when the arrestee was apprehended inside an auto repair shop and the vehicle was parked outside).
Compare McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d, at 890-891 (upholding a search that commenced five minutes after the arrestee was removed from the scene), United States v. Snook, 88 F. 3d 605, 608 (CA8 1996) (same), and United States v. Doward, 41 F. 3d 789, 793 (CA1 1994) (upholding a search that continued after the arrestee was removed from the scene), with United States v. Lugo, 978 F. 2d 631, 634 (CA10 1992) (holding invalid a search that commenced after the arrestee was removed from the scene), and State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 427-428, 512 A. 2d 160, 169 (1986) (holding invalid a search that continued after the arrestee was removed from the scene).
At least eight States have reached the same conclusion. Vermont, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming have declined to follow a broad reading of Belton under their state constitutions. See State v. Bander, 181 Vt. 392, 401, 924 A. 2d 38, 46-47 (2007); State v. Eckel, 185 N. J. 523, 540, 888 A. 2d 1266, 1277 (2006); Camacho v. State, 119 Nev. 395, 399-400, 75 P. 3d 370, 373-374 (2003); Vasquez v. State, 990 P. 2d 476, 488-489 (Wyo. 1999); State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, 123 N. M. 628, 636 (Ct. App.), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-107, 127 N. M. 752 (Ct. App.); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 57, 669 A. 2d 896, 902 (1995); People v. Blasich, 73 N. Y. 2d 673, 678, 541 N. E. 2d 40, 43 (1989); State v. Fesler, 68 Ore. App. 609, 612, 685 P. 2d 1014, 1016-1017 (1984). And a Massachusetts statute provides that a search incident to arrest may be made only for the purposes of seizing weapons or evidence of the offense of arrest. See Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 161-162, 448 N. E. 2d 1264, 1266-1267 (1983) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 276, § 1 (West 2006)).
Justice Auto’s dissenting opinion also accuses us of “overruling]” Belton and Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), “even though respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.” Post, at 355. Contrary to that claim, the narrow reading of Belton we adopt today is precisely the result Gant has urged. That Justice Auto has chosen to describe this decision as overruling our earlier cases does not change the fact that the resulting rule of law is the one advocated by respondent.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in Belton, 453 U. S., at 463, for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 444 (1981), Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion in Thornton, 541 U. S. 615, and Justice Scaua and Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment in that case, id., at 625.
Because a broad reading of Belton has been widely accepted, the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for searches conducted in reasonable reliance on that understanding. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC., et al. v. FALWELL
No. 86-1278.
Argued December 2, 1987
Decided February 24, 1988
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 57. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Alan L. Isaacman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was David O. Carson.
Norman Roy Grutman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jeffrey H. Daichman and Thomas V. Marino.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by Harriette K. Dorsen, John A '. Powell, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists et al. by Roslyn A. Mazer and George Kaufmann; for the Association of American Publishers, Inc., by R. Bruce Rich; for Home Box Office, Inc., by P. Cameron DeVore and Daniel M. Waggoner; for the Law & Humanities Institute by Edward de Grazia; for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Jane E. Kirtley, Richard M. Schmidt, David Barr, and J. Laurent Scharff; for Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al. by Alexander Wellford, David C. Kohler, Rodney A. Smolla, William A. Niese, Jeffrey S. Klein, W. Terry Maguire, and Slade R. Met-calf; and for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., by Irwin Karp and I. Fred Koenigsberg.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Hustler Magazine, Inc., is a magazine of nationwide circulation. Respondent Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on politics and public affairs, sued petitioner and its publisher, petitioner Larry Flynt, to recover damages for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court directed a verdict against respondent on the privacy claim, and submitted the other two claims to a jury. The jury found for petitioners on the defamation claim, but found for respondent on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded damages. We now consider whether this award is consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments- of the United States Constitution.
The inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a “parody” of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name and picture of respondent and was entitled “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.” This parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that included interviews with various celebrities about their “first times.” Although it was apparent by the end of each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of “first times.” Copying the form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler’s editors chose respondent as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged “interview” with him in which he states that his “first time” was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respondent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, “ad parody — not to be taken seriously.” The magazine’s table of contents also lists the ad as “Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.”
Soon after the November issue of Hustler became available to the public, respondent brought this diversity action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Hustler Magazine, Inc., Larry C. Flynt, and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. Respondent stated in his complaint that publication of the ad parody in Hustler entitled him to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the evidence, the District Court granted a directed verdict for petitioners on the invasion of privacy claim. The jury then found against respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the ad parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. Cl. The jury ruled for respondent on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, however, and stated that he should be awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, as well as $50,000 each in punitive damages from petitioners. Petitioners’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against petitioners. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F. 2d 1270 (1986). The court rejected petitioners’ argument that the “actual malice” standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), must be met before respondent can recover for emotional distress. The court agreed that because respondent is concededly a public figure, petitioners are “entitled to the same level of first amendment protection in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they received in [respondent’s] claim for libel.” 797 F. 2d, at 1274. But this does not mean that a literal application of the actual malice rule is appropriate in the context of an emotional distress claim. In the court’s view, the New York Times decision emphasized the constitutional importance not of the falsity of the statement or the defendant’s disregard for the truth, but of the heightened level of culpability embodied in the requirement of “knowing ... or reckless” conduct. Here, the New York Times standard is satisfied by the state-law requirement, and the jury’s finding, that the defendants have acted intentionally or recklessly. The Court of Appeals then went on to reject the contention that because the jury found that the ad parody did not describe actual facts about respondent, the ad was an opinion that is protected by the First Amendment. As the court put it, this was “irrelevant,” as the issue is “whether [the ad’s] publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id., at 1276. Petitioners then filed a petition for rehearing en banc, but this was denied by a divided court. Given the importance of the constitutional issues involved, we granted certiorari. 480 U. S. 945 (1987).
This case presents us with a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State’s authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We must decide whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most. Respondent would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do.
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. “[T]he freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty — and thus a good unto itself — but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 503-504 (1984). We have therefore been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions. The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a “false” idea. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 339 (1974). As Justice Holmes wrote, “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are “intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.” Associated Press v. Walker, decided with Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring in result). Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 673-674 (1944), when he said that “[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the fight to criticize public men and measures.” Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,” New York Times, supra, at 270. “[T]he candidate who vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry ‘Foul!’ when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 274 (1971).
Of course, this does not mean that any speech about a public figure is immune from sanction in the form of damages. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), we have consistently ruled that a public figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id., at 279-280. False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective. See Gertz, 418 U. S., at 340, 344, n. 9. But even though falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are “nevertheless inevitable in free debate,” id., at 340, and a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted “chilling” effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional value. “Freedoms of expression require “‘breathing space.’” Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767, 772 (1986) (quoting New York Times, supra, at 272). This breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of culpability.
Respondent argues, however, that a different standard should apply in this case because here the State seeks to prevent not reputational damage, but the severe emotional distress suffered by the person who is the subject of an offensive publication. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562 (1977) (ruling that the “actual malice” standard does not apply to the tort of appropriation of a right of publicity). In respondent’s view, and in the view of the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false. It is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State’s interest in preventing emotional harm simply outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in speech of this type.
Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently “outrageous.” But in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964), we held that even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression was protected by the First Amendment:
“Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.” Id., at 73.
Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures.
Were we to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject. Webster’s defines a caricature as “the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person, literary style, etc. by exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect.” Webster’s New Unabridged Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language 275 (2d ed. 1979). The appeal of the political cartoon or caricature is often based on exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or politically embarrassing events — an exploitation often calculated to injure the feelings of the subject of the portrayal. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided. One cartoonist expressed the nature of the art in these words:
“The political cartoon is a weapon of attack, of scorn and ridicule and satire; it is least effective when it tries to pat some politician on the back. It is usually as welcome as a bee sting and is always controversial in some quarters.” Long, The Political Cartoon: Journalism’s Strongest Weapon, The Quill 56, 57 (Nov. 1962).
Several famous examples of this type of intentionally injurious speech were drawn by Thomas Nast, probably the greatest American cartoonist to date, who was associated for many years during the post-Civil War era with Harper’s Weekly. In the pages of that publication Nast conducted a graphic vendetta against William M. “Boss” Tweed and his corrupt associates in New York City’s “Tweed Ring.” It has been described by one historian of the subject as “a sustained attack which in its passion and effectiveness stands alone in the history of American graphic art.” M. Keller, The Art and Politics of Thomas Nast 177 (1968). Another writer explains that the success of the Nast cartoon was achieved “because of the emotional impact of its presentation. It continuously goes beyond the bounds of good taste and conventional manners.” C. Press, The Political Cartoon 251 (1981).
Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate. Nast’s castigation of the Tweed Ring, Walt McDougall’s characterization of Presidential candidate James G. Blaine’s banquet with the millionaires at Delmonico’s as “The Royal Feast of Belshazzar,” and numerous other efforts have undoubtedly had an effect on the course and outcome of contemporaneous debate. Lincoln’s tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt’s glasses and teeth, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memorialized by political cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer or the portrait artist. From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been considerably poorer without them.
Respondent contends, however, that the caricature in question here was so “outrageous” as to distinguish it from more traditional political cartoons. There is no doubt that the caricature of respondent and his mother published in Hustler is at best a distant cousin of the political cartoons described above, and a rather poor relation at that. If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description “outrageous” does not supply one. “Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An “outrageousness” standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 910 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action”). And, as we stated in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978):
“[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.” Id., at 745-746.
See also Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that . . . the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers”).
Admittedly, these oft-repeated First Amendment principles, like other principles, are subject to limitations. We recognized in Pacifica Foundation, that speech that is “ ‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking’” is “not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances. ” 438 U. S., at 747. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), we held that a State could lawfully punish an individual for the use of insulting “‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id., at 571-572. These limitations are but recognition of the observation in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 758 (1985), that this Court has “long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.” But the sort of expression involved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by any exception to the general First Amendment principles stated above.
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with “actual malice,” i. e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. This is not' merely a “blind application” of the New York Times standard, see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 390 (1967), it reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
Here it is clear that respondent Falwell is a “public figure” for purposes of First Amendment law. The jury found against respondent on his libel claim when it decided that the Hustler ad parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. Cl. The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to be that the ad parody “was not reasonably believable,” 797 F. 2d, at 1278, and in accordance with our custom we accept this finding. Respondent is thus relegated to his claim for damages awarded by the jury for the intentional infliction of emotional distress by “outrageous” conduct. But for reasons heretofore stated this claim cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
While the case was pending, the ad parody was published in Hustler Magazine a second time.
The jury found no liability on the part of Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. It is consequently not a party to this appeal.
Under Virginia law, in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct (1) is intentional or reckless; (2) offends generally accepted standards of decency or morality; (3) is causally connected with the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (4) caused emotional distress that was severe. 797 F. 2d, at 1275, n. 4 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S. E. 2d 145 (1974)).
The court below also rejected several other contentions that petitioners do not raise in this appeal.
Neither party disputes this conclusion. Respondent is the host of a nationally syndicated television show and was the founder and president of a political organization formerly known as the Moral Majority. He is also the founder of Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, and is the author of several books and publications. Who’s Who in America 849 (44th ed. 1986-1987). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ. | What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction? | [
"cert",
"appeal",
"bail",
"certification",
"docketing fee",
"rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument",
"injunction",
"mandamus",
"original",
"prohibition",
"stay",
"writ of error",
"writ of habeas corpus",
"unspecified, other"
] | [
0
] | sc_jurisdiction |
RING v. ARIZONA
No. 01-488.
Argued April 22, 2002
Decided June 24, 2002
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 610. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 613. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 613. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 619.
Andrew D. Hurwitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John A. Stookey and Daniel L. Kaplan.
Janet Napolitano, Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Patrick Irvine, Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, and Robert L. Ellman and Kathleen P. Sweeney, Assistant Attorneys General.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, Nathan A. Forrester, Solicitor General, and A. Vernon Barnett IV and Michael B. Billingsley, Deputy Solicitors General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indiana, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Mike McGrath of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia; for Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc., et al. by Steve Twist and Douglas E. Beloof; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions. In Arizona, following a jury adjudication of a defendant’s guilt of first-degree murder, the trial judge, sitting alone, determines the presence or absence of the aggravating factors required by Arizona law for imposition of the death penalty.
In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), this Court held that Arizona’s sentencing scheme was compatible with the Sixth Amendment because the additional facts found by the judge qualified as sentencing considerations, not as “element[s] of the offense of capital murder.” Id., at 649. Ten years later, however, we decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), which held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be “expose[d]... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.” Id., at 483. This prescription governs, Apprendi determined, even if the State characterizes the additional findings made by the judge as “sentencing factor[s].” Id., at 492.
Apprendi's reasoning is irreconcilable with Walton’s holding in this regard, and today we overrule Walton in relevant part. Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.
I
At the trial of petitioner Timothy Ring for murder, armed robbery, and related charges, the prosecutor presented evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find the facts here recounted. On November 28, 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to the Dillard’s department store at Arrowhead Mall in Glendale, Arizona. Tr. 57, 60-61 (Nov. 14, 1996). Courier Dave Moss left the van to pick up money inside the store. Id., at 61, 73-74. When he returned, the van, and its driver, John Magoch, were gone. Id., at 61-62.
Later that day, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Deputies found the van — its doors locked and its engine running — in the parking lot of a church in Sun City, Arizona. Id., at 99-100 (Nov. 13,1996). Inside the vehicle they found Magoch, dead from a single gunshot to the head. Id., at 101. According to Wells Fargo records, more than $562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks were missing from the van. Id., at 10 (Nov. 18, 1996).
Prompted by an informant’s tip, Glendale police sought to determine whether Ring and his friend James Greenham were involved in the robbery. The police investigation revealed that the two had made several expensive cash purchases in December 1994 and early 1995. E. g., id., at 153-156 (Nov. 14, 1996); id., at 90-94 (Nov. 21, 1996). Wiretaps were then placed on the telephones of Ring, Greenham, and a third suspect, William Ferguson. Id., at 19-21 (Nov. 18, 1996).
In one recorded phone conversation, Ring told Ferguson that Ring might “cu[t] off” Greenham because “[h]e’s too much of a risk”: Greenham had indiscreetly flaunted a new truck in front of his ex-wife. State’s Exh. 49A, pp. 11-12. Ring said he could cut off his associate because he held “both [Greenham’s] and mine.” Id., at 11. The police engineered a local news broadcast about the robbery investigation; they included in the account several intentional inaccuracies. Tr. 3-5, 13-14 (Nov. 19, 1996). On hearing the broadcast report, Ring left a message on Greenham’s answering machine to “remind me to talk to you tomorrow and tell you about what was on the news tonight. Very important, and also fairly good.” State’s Exh. 55A, p. 2.
After a detective left a note on Greenham’s door asking him to call, Tr. 115-118 (Nov. 18, 1996), Ring told Ferguson that he was puzzled by the attention the police trained on Greenham. “[H]is house is clean,” Ring said; “[m]ine, on the other hand, contains a very large bag.” State’s Exh. 70A, p. 7.
On February 14, 1995, police furnished a staged reenactment of the robbery to the local news, and again included deliberate inaccuracies. Tr. 5 (Nov. 19, 1996). Ferguson told Ring that he “laughed” when he saw the broadcast, and Ring called it “humorous.” State’s Exh. 80A, p. 3. Ferguson said he was “not real worried at all now”; Ring, however, said he was “slightly concerned]” about the possibility that the police might eventually ask for hair samples. Id., at 3-4.
Two days later, the police executed a search warrant at Ring’s house, discovering a duffel bag in his garage containing more than $271,000 in cash. Tr. 107-108, 111, 125 (Nov. 20, 1996). They also found a note with the number “575, 995” on it, followed by the word “splits” and the letters “F,” “Y,” and “T.” Id., at 127-130. The prosecution asserted that “F” was Ferguson, “Y” was “Yoda” (Greenham’s nickname), and “T” was Timothy Ring. Id., at 42 (Dec. 5,1996).
Testifying in his own defense, Ring said the money seized at his house was startup capital for a construction company he and Greenham were planning to form. Id., at 10-11 (Dec. 3,1996). Ring testified that he made his share of the money as a confidential informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and as a bail bondsman and gunsmith. Id., at 162, 166-167, 180 (Dec. 2,1996). But an FBI agent testified that Ring had been paid only $458, id., at 47 (Nov. 20, 1996), and other evidence showed that Ring had made no more than $8,800 as a bail bondsman, id., at 48-51 (Nov. 21, 1996); id., at 21 (Nov. 25, 1996).
The trial judge instructed the jury on alternative charges of premeditated murder and felony murder. The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, with 6 of 12 jurors voting to acquit, but convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1105(A) and (B) (West 2001) (“A person commits first degree murder if... [ajcting either alone or with one or more other persons the person commits or attempts to commit. . . [one of several enumerated felonies] . . . and in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person causes the death of any person. . . . Homicide, as prescribed in [this provision] requires no specific mental state other than what is required for the commission of any of the enumerated felonies.”).
As later summed up by the Arizona Supreme Court, “the evidence admitted at trial failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Ring] was a major participant in the armed robbery or that he actually murdered Magoeh.” 200 Ariz. 267, 280, 25 P. 3d 1139, 1152 (2001). Although clear evidence connected Ring to the robbery’s proceeds, nothing submitted at trial put him at the scene of the robbery. See ibid. Furthermore, “[f]or all we know from the trial evidence,” the Arizona court stated, “[Ring] did not participate in, plan, or even expect the killing. This lack of evidence no doubt explains why the jury found [Ring] guilty of felony, but not premeditated, murder.” Ibid.
Under Arizona law, Ring could riot be sentenced to death, the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder, unless further findings were made. The State’s first-degree murder statute prescribes that the offense “is punishable by death or life imprisonment as provided by § 13-703.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105(0 (West 2001). The cross-referenced section, § 13-703, directs the judge who presided at trial to “conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of [certain enumerated] circumstances . . . for the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed.” § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2001). The statute further instructs: “The hearing shall be conducted before the court alone. The court alone shall make all factual determinations required by this section or the constitution of the United States or this state.” Ibid.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge is to determine the presence or absence of the enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and any “mitigating circumstances.” The State’s law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there is at least one aggravating circumstance and “there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” § 13-703(F).
Between Ring’s trial and sentencing hearing, Greenham pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and armed robbery. He stipulated to a 27/2-year sentence and agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in the cases against Ring and Ferguson. Tr. 35-37 (Oct. 9, 1997).
Called by the prosecution at Ring’s sentencing hearing, Greenham testified that he, Ring, and Ferguson had been planning the robbery for several weeks before it occurred. According to Greenham, Ring “had I guess taken the role as leader because he laid out all the tactics.” Id., at 39. On the day of the robbery, Greenham said, the three watched the armored van pull up to the mall. Id., at 45. When Magoch opened the door to smoke a cigarette, Ring shot him with a rifle equipped with a homemade silencer. Id., at 42, 44-45. Greenham then pushed Magoch’s body aside and drove the van away. Id., at 45. At Ring’s direction, Greenham drove to the church parking lot, where he and Ring transferred the money to Ring’s truck. Id., at 46,48. Later, Greenham recalled, as the three robbers were dividing up the money, Ring upbraided him and Ferguson for “forgetting to congratulate [Ring] on [his] shot.” Id., at 60.
On cross-examination, Greenham acknowledged having previously told Ring’s counsel that Ring had nothing to do with the planning or execution of the robbery. Id., at 85-87. Greenham explained that he had made that prior statement only because Ring had threatened his life. Id., at 87. Greenham also acknowledged that he was now testifying against Ring as “pay back” for the threats and for Ring’s interference in Greenham’s relationship with Greenham's ex-wife. Id., at 90-92.
On October 29, 1997, the trial judge entered his “Special Verdict” sentencing Ring to death. Because Ring was convicted of felony murder, not premeditated murder, the judge recognized that Ring was eligible for the death penalty only if he was Magoch’s actual killer or if he was “a major participant in the armed robbery that led to the killing and exhibited a reckless disregard or indifference for human life.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a-47a; see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982) (Eighth Amendment requires finding that felony-murder defendant killed or attempted to kill); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137, 158 (1987) (qualifying Enmund, and holding that Eighth Amendment permits execution of felony-murder defendant, who did not kill or attempt to kill, but who was a “major participant] in the felony committed” and who demonstrated “reckless indifference to human life”).
Citing Greenham’s testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge concluded that Ring “is the one who shot and killed Mr. Magoeh.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a. The judge also found that Ring was a major participant in the robbery and that armed robbery “is unquestionably a crime which carries with it a grave risk of death.” Ibid.
The judge then turned to the determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See § 13-703. He found two aggravating factors. First, the judge determined that Ring committed the offense in expectation of receiving something of “pecuniary value,” as described in §13-703; “[t]aking the cash from the armored car was the motive and reason for Mr. Magoch’s murder and not just the result.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. Second, the judge found that the offense was committed “in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.” Ibid. In support of this finding, he cited Ring’s comment, as reported by Greenham at the sentencing hearing, expressing pride in his marksmanship. Id., at 49a-50a. The judge found one nonstatutory mitigating factor: Ring’s “minimal” criminal record. Id., at 52a. In his judgment, that mitigating circumstance did not “call for leniency”; he therefore sentenced Ring to death. Id., at 53a.
On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution because it entrusts to a judge the finding of a fact raising the defendant’s maximum penalty. See Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000). The State, in response, noted that this Court had upheld Arizona’s system in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), and had stated in Apprendi that Walton remained good law.
Reviewing the death sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court made two preliminary observations. Apprendi and Jones, the Arizona high court said, “raise some question about the continued viability of Walton.” 200 Ariz., at 278, 25 P. 3d, at 1150. The court then examined the Apprendi majority’s interpretation of Arizona law and found it wanting. Apprendi, the Arizona court noted, described Arizona’s sentencing system as one that “ ‘requires] judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death,’ and not as a system that ‘permits a judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital offense.’ ” 200 Ariz., at 279,25 P. 3d, at 1151 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 496-497). Justice O’Connor’s Ap-prendi dissent, the Arizona court noted, squarely rejected the Apprendi majority’s characterization of the Arizona sentencing scheme: “A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death penalty.” 200 Ariz., at 279, 25 P. 3d, at 1151 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 538).
After reciting this Court’s divergent constructions of Arizona law in Apprendi, the Arizona Supreme Court described how capital sentencing in fact works in the State. The Arizona high court concluded that “the present case is precisely as described in Justice O’Connor’s dissent [in Apprendi]— Defendant’s death sentence required the judge’s factual findings.” 200 Ariz., at 279, 25 P. 3d, at 1151. Although it agreed with the Apprendi dissent’s reading of Arizona law, the Arizona court understood that it was bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply Walton, which this Court had not overruled. It therefore rejected Ring’s constitutional attack on the State’s capital murder judicial sentencing system. 200 Ariz., at 280, 25 P. 3d, at 1152.
The court agreed with Ring that the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of depravity, id., at 281-282, 25 P. 3d, at 1153-1154, but it upheld the trial court’s finding on the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain. The Arizona Supreme Court then reweighed that remaining factor against the sole mitigating circumstance (Ring’s lack of a serious criminal record), and affirmed the death sentence. Id., at 282-284, 25 P. 3d, at 1154-1156.
We granted Ring’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 534 U. S. 1103 (2002), to allay uncertainty in the lower courts caused by the manifest tension between Walton and the reasoning of Apprendi. See, e. g., United States v. Promise, 255 F. 3d 150, 159-160 (CA4 2001) (en banc) (calling the continued authority of Walton in light of Apprendi “perplexing”); Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F. 3d 523, 542 (CA9 2001) (“Apprendi may raise some doubt about Walton.”); People v. Kaczmarek, 318 Ill. App. 3d 340, 351-352, 741 N. E. 2d 1131, 1142 (2000) (“[Wjhile it appears Apprendi extends greater constitutional protections to noncapital, rather than capital, defendants, the Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we are in no position to secondguess that decision here.”). We now reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.
II
Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of first-degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have received was life imprisonment. See 200 Ariz., at 279, 25 P. 3d, at 1151 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-703). This was so because, in Arizona, a “death sentence may not legally be imposed ... unless at least one aggravating factor is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.” 200 Ariz., at 279, 25 P. 3d, at 1151 (citing §13-703). The question presented is whether that aggravating factor may be found by the judge, as Arizona law specifies, or whether the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the aggravating factor determination be entrusted to the jury.
As earlier indicated, see supra, at 588, 595-596, this is not the first time we have considered the constitutionality of Arizona’s capital sentencing system. In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), we upheld Arizona’s scheme against a charge that it violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court had previously denied a Sixth Amendment challenge to Florida’s capital sentencing system, in which the jury recommends a sentence but makes no explicit findings on aggravating circumstances; we so ruled, Walton noted, on the ground that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.” Id., at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U. S. 638, 640-641 (1989) (per curiam)). Walton found unavailing the attempts by the defendant-petitioner in that case to distinguish Florida’s capital sentencing system from Arizona’s. In neither State, according to Walton, were the aggravating factors “elements of the offense”; in both States, they ranked as “sentencing considerations” guiding the choice between life and death. 497 U. S., at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Walton drew support from Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376 (1986), in which the Court held there was no constitutional bar to an appellate court’s finding that a defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, as Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), required for imposition of the death penalty in felony-murder cases. The Enmund finding could be made by a court, Walton maintained, because it entailed no “‘element of the crime of capital murder’”; it “only place[d] ‘a substantive limitation on sentencing.’ ” 497 U. S., at 649 (quoting Cabana, 474 U. S., at 386-386). “If the Constitution does not require that the Enmund finding be proved as an element of the offense of capital murder, and does not require a jury to make that finding,” Walton stated, “we cannot conclude that a State is required to denominate aggravating circumstances ‘elements’ of the offense or permit only a jury to determine the existence of such circumstances.” 497 U. S., at 649.
In dissent in Walton, Justice Stevens urged that the Sixth Amendment requires “a jury determination of facts that must be established before the death penalty may be imposed.” Id., at 709. Aggravators “operate as statutory ‘elements’ of capital murder under Arizona law,” he reasoned, “because in their absence, [the death] sentence is unavailable.” Id., at 709, n. 1. “If th[e] question had been posed in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment became law,” JUSTICE Stevens Said, “the answer would have been clear,” for “[b]y that time,
“the English jury’s role in determining critical facts in homicide cases was entrenched. As fact-finder, the jury had the power to determine not only whether the defendant was guilty of homicide but also the degree of the offense. Moreover, the jury’s role in finding facts that would determine a homicide defendant’s eligibility for capital punishment was particularly well established. Throughout its history, the jury determined which homicide defendants would be subject to capital punishment by making factual determinations, many of which related to difficult assessments of the defendant’s state of mind. By the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, the jury’s right to make these determinations was unquestioned.” Id., at 710-711 (quoting White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1989)).
Walton was revisited in Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227 (1999). In that case, we construed the federal carjacking statute, 18 U. S. C. §2119 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), which, at the time of the criminal conduct at issue, provided that a person possessing a firearm who “takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation . . . shall — (1) be .. . imprisoned not more than 15 years , (2) if serious bodily injury . . . results, be . . . imprisoned not more than 25 years . . . , and (3) if death results, be .. . imprisoned for any number of years up to life . .. .” The question presented in Jones was whether the statute “defined three distinct offenses or a single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.” 526 U. S., at 229.
The carjacking statute, we recognized, was “susceptible of [both] constructions”; we adopted the one that avoided “grave and doubtful constitutional questions.” Id., at 239 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909)). Section 2119, we held, established three separate offenses. Therefore, the facts — causation of serious bodily injury or death — necessary to trigger the escalating maximum penalties fell within the jury’s province to decide. See Jones, 526 U. S., at 251-252. Responding to the dissenting opinion, the Jones Court restated succinctly the principle animating its view that the carjacking statute, if read to define a single crime, might violate the Constitution: “[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 243, n. 6.
Jones endeavored to distinguish certain capital sentencing decisions, including Walton. Advancing a “careful reading of Walton’s rationale,” the Jones Court said: Walton “characterized the finding of aggravating facts falling within the traditional scope of capital sentencing as a choice between a greater and a lesser penalty, not as a process of raising the ceiling of the sentencing range available.” 526 U. S., at 251.
Dissenting in Jones, Justice Kennedy questioned the Court’s account of Walton. The aggravating factors at issue in Walton, he suggested, were not merely circumstances for consideration by the trial judge in exercising sentencing discretion within a statutory range of penalties. “Under the relevant Arizona statute,” Justice Kennedy observed, “Walton could not have been sentenced to death unless the trial judge found at least one of the enumerated aggravating factors. Absent such a finding, the maximum potential punishment provided by law was a term of imprisonment.” 526 U. S., at 272 (citation omitted). Jones, Justice Kennedy concluded, cast doubt — needlessly in his view — on the vitality of Walton:
“If it is constitutionally impermissible to allow a judge’s finding to increase the maximum punishment for carjacking by 10 years, it is not clear why a judge’s finding may increase the maximum punishment for murder from imprisonment to death. In fact, Walton would appear to have been a better candidate for the Court’s new approach than is the instant case.” 526 U. S., at 272.
One year after Jones, the Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000). The defendant-petitioner in that case was convicted of, inter alia, second-degree possession of a firearm, an offense carrying a maximum penalty of ten years under New Jersey law. See id., at 469-470. On the prosecutor’s motion, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi’s crime had been motivated by racial animus. That finding triggered application of New Jersey’s “hate crime enhancement,” which doubled Apprendi’s maximum authorized sentence. The judge sentenced Apprendi to 12 years in prison, 2 years over the maximum that would have applied but for the enhancement.
We held that Apprendi’s sentence violated his right to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 477 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 510 (1995)). That right attached not only to Ap-prendi’s weapons offense but also to the “hate crime” aggravating circumstance. New Jersey, the Court observed, “threatened Apprendi with certain pains if he unlawfully possessed a weapon and with additional pains if he selected his victims with a purpose to intimidate them because of their race.” Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 476. “Merely using the label ‘sentence enhancement’ to describe the [second act] surely does not provide a principled basis for treating [the two acts] differently.” Ibid.
The dispositive question, we said, “is one not of form, but of effect.” Id., at 494. If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact — no matter how the State labels it — must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at 482-483. A defendant may not be “expose[d] ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.” Id., at 483; see also id., at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]ll the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.’.’).
Walton could be reconciled with Apprendi, the Court finally asserted. The key distinction, according to the Ap-prendi Court, was that a conviction of first-degree murder in Arizona carried a maximum sentence of death. “[0]nce a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.” 530 U. S., at 497 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 257, n. 2. (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
The Apprendi dissenters called the Court’s distinction of Walton “baffling.” 530 U. S., at 538 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). The Court claimed that “the jury makes all of the findings necessary to expose the defendant to a death sentence.” Ibid. That, the dissent said, was “demonstrably untrue,” for a “defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death penalty.” Ibid. Walton, the Apprendi dissenters insisted, if properly followed, would have required the Court to uphold Apprendi’s sentence. “If a State can remove from the jury a factual determination that makes the difference between life and death, as Walton holds that it can, it is inconceivable why a State cannot do the same with respect to a factual determination that results in only a 10-year increase in the maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed.” 530 U. S., at 537 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).
The Arizona Supreme Court, as we earlier recounted, see supra, at 595-596, found the Apprendi majority’s portrayal of Arizona’s capital sentencing law incorrect, and the description in Justice O’Connor’s dissent precisely right: “Defendant’s death sentence required the judge’s factual findings.” 200 Ariz., at 279, 25 P. 3d, at 1151. Recognizing that the Arizona court’s construction of the State’s own law is authoritative, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691 (1975), we are persuaded that Walton, in relevant part, cannot survive the reasoning of Apprendi.
In an effort to reconcile its capital sentencing system with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi, Arizona first restates the Apprendi majority’s portrayal of Arizona’s system: Ring was convicted of first-degree murder, for which Arizona law specifies “death or life imprisonment” as the only sentencing options, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-1105(C) (West 2001); Ring was therefore sentenced within the range of punishment authorized by the jury verdict. See Brief for Respondent 9-19. This argument overlooks Apprendi’s instruction that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.” 530 U. S., at 494. In effect, “the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Ibid.; see 200 Ariz., at 279, 25 P. 3d, at 1151. The Arizona first-degree murder statute “authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense,” Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 541 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty. See §13-1105(C) (“First degree murder is a class 1 felony and is punishable by death or life imprisonment as provided by §13-703.” (emphasis added)). If Arizona prevailed on its opening argument, Apprendi would be reduced to a “meaningless and formalistic” rule of statutory drafting. See 530 U. S., at 541 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Arizona also supports the distinction relied upon in Walton between elements of an offense and sentencing factors. See supra, at 598-599; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. As to elevation of the maximum punishment, however, Apprendi renders the argument untenable; Apprendi repeatedly in-struets in that context that the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an “element” or a “sentencing factor” is not determinative of the question “who decides,” judge or jury. See, e. g., 530 U. S., at 492 (noting New Jersey’s contention that “[t]he required finding of biased purpose is not an 'element’ of a distinct hate crime offense, but rather the traditional 'sentencing factor’ of motive,” and calling this argument “nothing more than a disagreement with the rule we apply today”); id., at 494, n. 19 (“[W]hen the term ‘sentence enhancement’ is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.”); id., at 495 (“[Mjerely because the state legislature placed its hate crime sentence enhancer within the sentencing provisions of the criminal code does not mean that the finding of a biased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element of the offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id., at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]f the legislature defines some core crime and then provides for increasing the punishment of that crime upon a finding of some aggravating fact[,]. .. the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated crime, just as much as grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit larceny. The aggravating fact is an element of the aggravated crime.”).
Even if facts increasing punishment beyond the maximum authorized by a guilty verdict standing alone ordinarily must be found by a jury, Arizona further urges, aggravating circumstances necessary to trigger a death sentence may nonetheless be reserved for judicial determination. As Arizona’s counsel maintained at oral argument, there is no doubt that “[d]eath is different.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. States have constructed elaborate sentencing procedures in death cases, Arizona emphasizes, because of constraints we have said the Eighth Amendment places on capital sentencing. Brief for Respondent 21-25 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 362 (1988) (“Since Furman, our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”); Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 522-523 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n the area of capital punishment, unlike any other area, we have imposed special constraints on a legislature’s ability to determine what facts shall lead to what punishment — we have restricted the legislature’s ability to define crimes.”).
Apart from the Eighth Amendment provenance of aggravating factors, Arizona presents “no specific reason for excepting capital defendants from the constitutional protections . . . extended] to defendants generally, and none is readily apparent.” Id., at 539 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The notion “that the Eighth Amendment’s restriction on a state legislature’s ability to define capital crimes should be compensated for by permitting States more leeway under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in proving an aggravating fact necessary to a capital sentence ... is without precedent in our constitutional jurisprudence.” Ibid.
In various settings, we have interpreted the Constitution to require the addition of an element or elements to the definition of a criminal offense in order to narrow its scope. See, e. g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 561-562 (1995) (suggesting that addition to federal gun possession statute of “express jurisdictional element” requiring connection between weapon and interstate commerce would render statute constitutional under Commerce Clause); Branden burg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (First Amendment prohibits States from “proscribing] advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225, 229 (1957) (Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment requires “actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge” before ex-felon may be convicted of failing to register presence in municipality). If a legislature responded to one of these decisions by adding the element we held constitutionally required, surely the Sixth Amendment guarantee would apply to that element. We see no reason to differentiate capital crimes from all others in this regard.
Arizona suggests that judicial authority over the finding of aggravating factors “may... be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. The Sixth Amendment jury trial right, however, does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts necessary to support a death sentence might be
“an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to the State.... The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has always been free.” Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In any event, the superiority of judicial factfinding in capital cases is far from evident. Unlike Arizona, the great majority of States responded to this Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury.
Although “ ‘the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law[,]’ ... [o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 494 (1987)). “[W]e have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established.” 491 U. S., at 172. We are satisfied that this is such a case.
For the reasons stated, we hold that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be home to both. Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See 497 U. S., at 647-649. Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,” Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.
* * *
“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. ... If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 155-156 (1968).
The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The aggravating circumstances, enumerated in Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G) (West Supp. 2001), are:
“1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.
“2. The defendant was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether preparatory or completed.
“3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the person murdered during the commission of the offense.
“4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
“5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
“6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.
“7. The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a law enforcement agency or a county or city jail.
“8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in § 13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the offense.
“9. The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was tried as an adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or was seventy years of age or older.
“10. The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew, or should have known, that the murdered person was a peace officer.”
The statute enumerates certain mitigating circumstances, but the enumeration is not exclusive. “The court shall consider as mitigating circumstances any factors proffered by the defendant or the state which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death_” §13-703(H).
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury . ...”
Ring's claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him. No aggravating circumstance related to past convictions in his case; Ring therefore does not challenge Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224 (1998), which held that the fact of prior conviction may be found by the judge even if it increases the statutory maximum sentence. He makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to mitigating circumstances. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490-491, n. 16 (2000) (noting “the distinction the Court has often recognized between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation” (citation omitted)). Nor does he argue that the Sixth Amendment required the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death penalty. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 252 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t has never [been] suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.”). He does not question the Arizona Supreme Court’s authority to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances after that court struck one aggravator. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 745 (1990). Finally, Ring does not contend that his indictment was constitutionally defective. See Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 477, n. 3 (Fourteenth Amendment “has not . . . been construed to include the Fifth Amendment right to ‘presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury’ ”).
In Harris v. United States, ante, p. 546, a majority of the Court concludes that the distinction between elements and sentencing factors continues to be meaningful as to facts increasing the minimum sentence. See ante, at 567 (plurality opinion) (“The factual finding in Apprendi extended the power of the judge, allowing him or her to impose a punishment exceeding what was authorized by the jury. [A] finding [that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence] restraints] the judge’s power, limiting his or her choices within the authorized range. It is quite consistent to maintain that the former type of fact must be submitted to the jury while the latter need not be.”); ante, at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[Tjhe Sixth Amendment permits judges to apply sentencing factors — whether those factors lead to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi) or the application of a mandatory minimum (as here).”).
Of the 38 States with capital punishment, 29 generally commit sentencing decisions to juries. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-602 (1993); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (West 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a (2001); Ga. Code Ann. §17-10-31.1 (Supp. 1996); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 720, § 5/9 — 1(d) (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4624(b) (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §532.025(l)(b) (1993); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. §905.1 (West 1997); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(b) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101 (1973-2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.030, 565.032 (1999 and Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §175.552 (Michie 2001); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:5(11) (1996); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:ll-3(c) (Supp. 2001); N. M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-1 (2000); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2001-2002); N. C. Gen. Stat. §15A-2000 (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 (West 1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10(A) (Supp. 2001); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. §163.150 (1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9711 (Supp. 2001); S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(B) (1985); S. D. Codified Laws §23A-27A-2 (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-204 (Supp. 2000); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207 (Supp. 2001); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.050 (1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6-2-102 (2001).
Other than Arizona, only four States commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-11-103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho Code § 19— 2515 (Supp. 2001); Mont. Code Ann. §46-18-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2520 (1995).
Four States have hybrid systems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determinations. See Ala. Code §§13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §4209 (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. §921.141 (West 2001); Ind. Code Ann. §35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2001).
We do not reach the State’s assertion that any error was harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit in the jury’s guilty verdict. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 25 (1999) (this Court ordinarily leaves it to lower courts to pass on the harmlessness of error in the first instance). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_partywinning |
SAENZ, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. v. ROE et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
No. 98-97.
Argued January 13, 1999
Decided May 17, 1999
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, G. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 511. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 521.
Theodore Garelis, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Charlton G. Holland III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Frank S. Furtek, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Janie L. Daigle, Deputy Attorney General.
General Waxman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners in part and respondents in part. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Edward C. DuMont, Mark B. Stem, Kathleen Moriarty Mueller, and Peter J. Smith.
cause respondents. With him on the brief were David S. Schwartz, Daniel P. Tokaji, Evan H. Caminker, Laurence H. Tribe, Martha F. Davis, Karl Manheim, Steven R. Shapiro, Alan L. Schlosser, Richard Rothschild, Clare Pastore, and Jordan C. Budd.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. by D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General, John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, and Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Thurbert E. Bhker of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, and Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington; for the Institute for Justice by Douglas W. Kmiec, William H. Mellor, and Clint Bolick; for the National Governors’ Association et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Sharon L. Browne and Deborah J. La Fetra; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A Samp.
Briefs of amici curiae urging by Paul M. Dodyk and Henry A Freedman; for the American Bar Association by Philip S. Anderson and Paul M. Smith; for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law et al. by Burt Neubome and Deborah Goldberg; for Catholic Charities USA et al. by Louis R. Cohen; for the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty by Ann E. Bushmiller; for Sixty-six Organizations Serving Domestic Violence Survivors by Susan Frietsche; for Social Scientists by Lawrence S. Lust-berg; and for William Cohen et al. by Roderick M. Hills, Jr., and Charles S. Sims.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1992, California enacted a statute limiting the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents. The scheme limits the amount payable to a family that has resided in the State for less than 12 months to the amount payable by the State of the family’s prior residence. The questions presented by this case are whether the 1992 statute was constitutional when it was enacted and, if not, whether an amendment to the Social Security Act enacted by Congress in 1996 affects that determination.
1 — 1
California is not only one of the largest, most populated, and most beautiful States in the Nation; it is also one of the most generous. Like all other States, California has participated in several welfare programs authorized by the Social Security Act and partially funded by the Federal Government. Its programs, however, provide a higher level of benefits and serve more needy citizens than those of most other States. In one year the most expensive of those programs, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which was replaced in 1996 with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), provided benefits for an average of 2,645,814 persons per month at an annual cost to the State of $2.9 billion. In California the cash benefit for a family of two — a mother and one child — is $456 a month, but in the neighboring State of Arizona, for example, it is only $275.
a relatively modest reduction in its vast welfare budget, the California Legislature enacted § 11450.03 of the state Welfare and Institutions Code. That section sought to change the California AFDC program by limiting new residents, for the first year they live in California, to the benefits they would have received in the State of their prior residence. Because in 1992 a state program either had to conform to federal specifications or receive a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services in order to qualify for federal reimbursement, § 11450.03 required approval by the Secretary to take effect. In October 1992, the Secretary issued a waiver purporting to grant such approval.
On December 21, 1992, three California residents who were eligible for AFDC benefits filed an action in the Eastern District of California challenging the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement in § 11450.03. Each plaintiff alleged that she had recently moved to California to live with relatives in order to escape abusive family circumstances. One returned to California after living in Louisiana for seven years, the second had been living in Oklahoma for six weeks and the third came from Colorado. Each alleged that her monthly AFDC grant for the ensuing 12 months would be substantially lower under § 11450.03 than if the statute were not in effect. Thus, the former residents of Louisiana and Oklahoma would receive $190 and $341 respectively for a family of three even though the Ml California grant was $641; the former resident of Colorado, who had just one child, was limited to $280 a month as opposed to the Ml California grant of $504 for a family of two.
The District Court a and, after a hearing, preliminarily enjoined implementation of the statute. District Judge Levi found that the statute “produces substantial disparities in benefit levels and makes no accommodation for the different costs of living that exist in different states.” Relying primarily on our decisions in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982), he concluded that the statute placed “a penalty on the decision of new residents to migrate to the State and be treated on an equal basis with existing residents.” Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 521 (ED Cal. 1993). In his view, if the purpose of the measure was to deter migration by poor people into the State, it would be unconstitutional for that reason. And even if the purpose was only to conserve limited funds, the State had failed to explain why the entire burden of the saving should be imposed on new residents. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed for the reasons stated by the District Judge. Green v. Anderson, 26 F. 3d 95 (CA9 1994).
petition for certiorari. 513 U. S. 922 (1994). We were, however, unable to reach the merits because the Secretary’s approval of § 11450.03 had been invalidated in a separate proceeding, and the State had acknowledged that the Act would not be implemented without further action by the Secretary. We vacated the judgment and directed that the case be dismissed. Anderson v. Green, 513 U. S. 557 (1995) (per curiam). Accordingly, § 11450.03 remained inoperative until after Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 110 Stat. 2105.
replaced the AFDC program with TANF. The new statute expressly authorizes any State that receives a block grant under TANF to “apply to a family the rules (including benefit amounts) of the [TANF] program ... of another State if the family has moved to the State from the other State and has resided in the State for less than 12 months.” 110 Stat. 2124, 42 U. S. C. § 604(c) (1994 ed., Supp. II). With this federal statutory provision in effect, California no longer needed specific approval from the Secretary to implement § 11450.03. The California Department of Social Services therefore issued an “All County Letter” announcing that the enforcement of § 11450.03 would commence on April 1,1997.
The All County Letter clarifies certain aspects of the statute. Even if members of an eligible family had lived in California all of their lives, but left the State “on January 29th, intending to reside in another state, and returned on April 15th,” their benefits are determined by the law of their State of residence from January 29 to April 15, assuming that that level was lower than California’s. Moreover, the lower level of benefits applies regardless of whether the family was on welfare in the State of prior residence and regardless of the family’s motive for moving to California. The instructions also explain that the residency requirement is inapplicable to families that recently arrived from another country.
II
On April 1, 1997, the two respondents filed this action in the Eastern District of California making essentially the same claims asserted by the plaintiffs in Anderson v. Green, but also challenging the constitutionality of PRWORA’s approval of the durational residency requirement. As in Green, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order and certified the case as a class action. The court also advised the Attorney General of the United States that the constitutionality of a federal statute had been drawn into question, but she did not seek to intervene or to file an amicus brief. Reasoning that PRWORA permitted, but did not require, States to impose durational residency requirements, Judge Levi concluded that the existence of the federal statute did not affect the legal analysis in his prior opinion in Green.
He did, however, make certain parties’ factual contentions. He noted that the State did not challenge plaintiffs’ evidence indicating that, although California benefit levels were the sixth highest in the Nation in absolute terms, when housing costs are factored in, they rank 18th; that new residents coming from 43 States would face higher costs of living in California; and that welfare benefit levels actually have little, if any, impact on the residential choices made by poor people. On the other hand, he noted that the availability of other programs such as homeless assistance and an additional food stamp allowance of $1 in stamps for every $3 in reduced welfare benefits partially offset the disparity between the benefits for new and old residents. Notwithstanding those ameliorating facts, the State did not disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that § 11450.03 would create significant disparities between newcomers and welfare recipients who have resided in the State for over one year.
The State relied squarely on the undisputed fact that the statute would save some $10.9 million in annual welfare costs — an amount that is surely significant even though only a relatively small part of its annual expenditures of approximately $2.9 billion for the entire program. It contended that this cost saving was an appropriate exercise of budgetary authority as long as the residency requirement did not penalize the right to travel. The State reasoned that the payment of the same benefits that would have been received in the State of prior residency eliminated any potentially punitive aspects of the measure. Judge Levi concluded, however, that the relevant comparison was not between new residents of California and the residents of their former States, but rather between the new residents and longer term residents of California. He therefore again enjoined the implementation of the statute.
deciding the merits, the Court of Appeals affirmed his issuance of a preliminary injunction. Roe v. Anderson, 134 F. 3d 1400 (CA9 1998). It agreed with the District Court’s view that the passage of PRWORA did not affect the constitutional analysis, that respondents had established a probability of success on the merits, and that class members might suffer irreparable harm if §11450.03 became operative. Although the decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the views of other federal courts that have addressed the issue, we granted certiorari because of the importance of the case. Anderson v. Roe, 524 U. S. 982 (1998). We now affirm.
I — ! HH
The word “travel” is not found in the text of the Constitution. Yet the “constitutional right to travel from one State to another” is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757 (1966). Indeed, as Justice Stewart reminded us in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), the right is so important that it is “assert-able against private interference as well as governmental action ... a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” Id., at 643 (concurring opinion).
In Shapiro, we reviewed the constitutionality of three statutory provisions that denied welfare assistance to residents of Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania, who had resided within those respective jurisdictions less than one year immediately preceding their applications for assistance. Without pausing to identify the specific source of the right, we began by noting that the Court had long “recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” Id., at 629. We squarely held that it was “constitutionally impermissible” for a State to enact dura-tional residency requirements for the purpose of inhibiting the migration by needy persons into the State. We further held that a classification that had the effect of imposing a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel violated the Equal Protection Clause “unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest,” id., at 634, and that no such showing had been made.
case argues that §11450.03 was not enacted for the impermissible purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons and that, unlike the legislation reviewed in Shapiro, it does not penalize the right to travel because new arrivals are not ineligible for benefits during their first year of residence. California submits that, instead of being subjected to the strictest scrutiny, the statute should be upheld if it is supported by a rational basis and that the State’s legitimate interest in saving over $10 million a year satisfies that test. Although the United States did not elect to participate in the proceedings in the District Court or the Court of Appeals, it has participated as amicus curiae in this Court. It has advanced the novel argument that the enactment of PRWORA allows the States to adopt a “specialized choice-of-law-type provision” that “should be subject to an intermediate level of constitutional review,” merely requiring that durational residency requirements be “substantially related to an important governmental objective.” The debate about the appropriate standard of review, together with the potential relevance of the federal statute, persuades us that it will be useful to focus on the source of the constitutional right on which respondents rely.
IV
The “right to travel” discussed in our cases embraces at least three different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.
It was the right to go from one place to another, including the right to cross state borders while en route, that was vindicated in Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941), which invalidated a state law that impeded the free interstate passage of the indigent. We reaffirmed that right in United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966), which afforded protection to the “Tight to travel freely to and from the State of Georgia and to use highway facilities and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce within the State of Georgia.’ ” Id., at 757. Given that § 11450.03 imposed no obstacle to respondents’ entry into California, we think the State is correct when it argues that the statute does not directly impair the exercise of the right to free interstate movement. For the purposes of this case, therefore, we need not identify the source of that particular right in the text of the Constitution. The right of “free ingress and regress to and from” neighboring States, which was expressly mentioned in the text of the Articles of Confederation, may simply have been “conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.” Id., at 758.
The second component of the right to travel is, however, expressly protected by the text of the Constitution. The first sentence of Article IV, §2, provides:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”
Thus, by virtue of a person’s state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to enjoy the “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States” that he visits. This provision removes “from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States.” Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869) (“[Wjithout some provision . . . removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Repub-lie would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists”)* It provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a State whether to obtain employment, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978), to procure medical services, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 200 (1973), or even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948). Those protections are not “absolute,” but the Clause “does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.” Id., at 396. There may be a substantial reason for requiring the nonresident to pay more than the resident for a hunting license, see Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U. S. 371, 390-391 (1978), or to enroll in the state university, see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 445 (1973), but our cases have not identified any acceptable reason for qualifying the protection afforded by the Clause for “the ‘citizen of State A who ventures into State B’ to settle there and establish a home.” Zobel, 457 U. S., at 74 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Permissible justifications for discrimination between residents and nonresidents are simply inapplicable to a nonresident’s exercise of the right to move into another State and become a resident of that State.
What is at issue in this case, then, is this third aspect of the right to travel — the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State. That right is protected not only by the new arrival’s status as a state citizen, but also by her status as a citizen of the United States. That additional source of protection is plainly identified in the opening words of the Fourteenth Amendment:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;...
Despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873), it has always been common ground that this Clause protects the third component of the right to travel. Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller explained that one of the privileges conferred by this Clause “is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bond fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.” Id., at 80. Justice Bradley, in dissent, used even stronger language to make the same point:
“The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right. He is not bound to cringe to any superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Id., at 112-113.
That newly arrived citizens “have two political capacities, one state and one federal,” adds special force to their claim that they have the same rights as others who share their citizenship. Neither mere rationality nor some intermediate standard of review should be used to judge the constitutionality of a state rule that discriminates against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled in the State for less than a year. The appropriate standard may be more categorical than that articulated in Shapiro, see supra, at 499, but it is surely no less strict.
Y
Because this case involves discrimination against citizens who have completed their interstate travel, the State’s argument that its welfare scheme affects the right to travel only “incidentally” is beside the point. Were we concerned solely with actual deterrence to migration, we might be persuaded that a partial withholding of benefits constitutes a lesser incursion on the right to travel than an outright denial of all benefits. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 339 (1972). But since the right to travel embraces the citizen’s right to. be treated equally in her new State of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a penalty.
that respondents and the members of the class that they represent are citizens of California and that their need for welfare benefits is unrelated to the length of time that they have resided in California. We thus have no occasion to consider what weight might be given to a citizen’s length of residence if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned. Moreover, because whatever benefits they receive will be consumed while they remain in California, there is no danger that recognition of their claim will encourage citizens of other States to establish residency for just long enough to acquire some readily portable benefit, such as a divorce or a. college education, that will be enjoyed after they return to their original domicile. See, e. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973).
The classifications challenged in this case — and there are many — are defined entirely by (a) the period of residency in California and (b) the location of the prior residences of the disfavored class members. The favored class of beneficiaries includes all eligible California citizens who have resided there for at least one year, plus those new arrivals who last resided in another country or in a State that provides benefits at least as generous as California’s. Thus, within the broad category of citizens who resided in California for less than a year, there are many who are treated like lifetime residents. And within the broad subeategory of new arrivals who are treated less favorably, there are many smaller classes whose benefit levels are determined by the law of the States from whence they came. To justify § 11450.03, California must therefore explain not only why it is sound fiscal policy to discriminate against those who have been citizens for less than a year, but also why it is permissible to apply such a variety of rules within that class.
These classifications may not be justified by a purpose to deter welfare applicants from migrating to California for three reasons. First, although it is reasonable to assume that some persons may be motivated to move for the purpose of obtaining higher benefits, the empirical evidence reviewed by the District Judge, which takes into account the high cost of living in California, indicates that the number of such persons is quite small — surely not large enough to justify a burden on those who had no such motive. Second, California has represented to the Court that the legislation was not enacted for any such reason. Third, even if it were, as we squarely held in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), such a purpose would be unequivocally impermissible.
Disavowing any desire to nia has instead advanced an entirely fiscal justification for its multitiered scheme. The enforcement of § 11450.03 will save the State approximately $10.9 million a year. The question is not whether such saving is a legitimate purpose but whether the State may accomplish that end by the discriminatory means it has chosen. An evenhanded, across-the-board reduction of about 72 cents per month for every beneficiary would produce the same result. But our negative answer to the question does not rest on the weakness of the State's purported fiscal justification. It rests on the fact that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with residence: “That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based on length of residence.” Zobel, 457 U. S., at 69. It is equally clear that the Clause does not tolerate a hierarchy of 45 subclasses of similarly situated citizens based on the location of their prior residence. Thus § 11450.03 is doubly vulnerable: Neither the duration of respondents’ California residence, nor the identity of their prior States of residence, has any relevance to their need for benefits. Nor do those factors bear any relationship to the State’s interest in making an equitable allocation of the funds to be distributed among its needy citizens. As in Shapiro, we reject any contributory rationale for the denial of benefits to new residents:
“But we need not rest on the particular facts of these cases. Appellants’ reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens.” 394 U. S., at 632-633.
See also Zobel, 457 U. S., at 64. In short, the State’s legitimate interest in saving money provides no justification for its decision to discriminate among equally eligible citizens.
<
The question that remains is whether congressional approval of durational residency requirements in the 1996 amendment to the Social Security Act somehow resuscitates the constitutionality of § 11450.03. That question is readily answered, for we have consistently held that Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the protection afforded to the citizen by the Citizenship Clause of that Amendment is a limitation on the powers of the National Government as well as the States.
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress power to legislate in certain areas. Those legislative powers are, however, limited not only by the scope of the Framers’ affirmative delegation, but also by the principle “that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution. For example, Congress is granted broad power to ‘lay and collect Taxes,’ but the taxing power, broad as it is, may not be invoked in such a way as to violate the privilege against self-incrimination.” Williams v. Rhodes, 893 U. S. 23, 29 (1968) (footnote omitted). Congress has no affirmative power to authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing legislation that purports to validate any such violation.
“Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broad power indeed to enforce the command of the amendment and ‘to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion....’ Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,346 (1880). Congress’ power under § 5, however, ‘is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; §5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.’ Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651, n. 10 (1966). Although we give deference to congressional decisions and classifications, neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210 (1977); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968).” Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 732-733 (1982).
The Solicitor General does not unequivocally defend the constitutionality of § 11450.03. But he has argued that two features of PRWORA may provide a sufficient justification for state durational requirements to warrant further inquiry before finally passing on the section’s validity, or perhaps that it is only invalid insofar as it applies to new arrivals who were not on welfare before they arrived in California.
He first points out that because the TANF program gives the States broader discretion than did AFDC, there will be significant differences among the States which may provide new incentives for welfare recipients to change their residences. He does not, however, persuade us that the disparities under the new program will necessarily be any greater than the differences under AFDC, which included such examples as the disparity between California’s monthly benefit of $673 for a family of four with Mississippi’s benefit of $144 for a comparable family. Moreover, we are not convinced that a policy of eliminating incentives to move to California provides a more permissible justification for classifying California citizens than a policy of imposing special burdens on new arrivals to deter them from moving into the State. Nor is the discriminatory impact of §11450.03 abated by repeatedly characterizing it as “a sort of specialized choice-of-law rule.” California law alone discriminates among its own citizens on the basis of their prior residence.
The Solicitor General also suggests that we should recognize the congressional concern addressed in the legislative history of PRWORA that the “States might engage in a 'race to the bottom’ in setting the benefit levels in their TANF programs.” Again, it is difficult to see why that concern should be any greater under TANF than under AFDC. The evidence reviewed by the District Court indicates that the savings resulting from the discriminatory policy, if spread equitably throughout the entire program, would have only a miniscule impact on benefit levels. Indeed, as one of the legislators apparently interpreted this concern, it would logically prompt the States to reduce benefit levels sufficiently “to encourage emigration of benefit recipients.” But speculation about such an unlikely eventuality provides no basis for upholding § 11450.03.
Finally, the Solicitor General suggests discrimination might be acceptable if California had limited the disfavored subcategories of new citizens to those who had received aid in their prior State of residence at any time within the year before their arrival in California. The suggestion is ironic for at least three reasons: It would impose the most severe burdens on the neediest members of the disfavored classes; it would significantly reduce the savings that the State would obtain, thus making the State’s claimed justification even less tenable; and, it would confine the effect of the statute to what the Solicitor General correctly characterizes as “the invidious purpose of discouraging poor people generally from settling in the State.”
* * *
Citizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose to be citizens “of the State wherein they reside.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, § 1. The States, however, do not have any right to select their citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Constitution itself, was, as Justice Cardozo put it, “framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
California Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §11450.03 (West Supp. 1999) provides:
“(a) Notwithstanding the máximum aid payments specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 11450, families that have resided in this state for less than 12 months shall be paid an amount calculated in accordance with paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 11450, not to exceed the maximum aid payment that would have been received by that family from the state of prior residence.
shall not become operative until the date of approval by the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services necessary to implement the provisions of this section so as to ensure the continued compliance of the state plan for the following:
Security Act (Subchapter 4 (commencing with Section 601) of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United States Code).
Security Act (Subchapter 19 (commencing with Section 1396) of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United States Code).”
The District Court referred to an official table of fair market rents indicating that California’s housing costs are higher than any other State except Massachusetts. See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 521, n. 13 (ED Cal. 1993); see also Declaration of Robert Greenstein, App. 91-94.
Beno v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d 1057 (CA9 1994).
February 1996, the Secretary 4granted waivers for certain changes in California’s welfare program, but she declined to authorize any distinction between old and new residents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46-52.
Record 30 (Plaintiffs’ Exh. 3, Attachment 1).
One of the respondents is a former moved to California from the District of Columbia. In both of those jurisdictions the benefit levels are substantially lower than in California.
On the stipulation of the defined as “‘all present and future AFDC and TANF applicants and recipients who have applied or will apply for AFDC or TANF on or after April 1,1997, and who will be denied full California AFDC or TANF benefits because they have not resided in California for twelve consecutive months immediately preceding their application for aid.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20.
Forty-four States and the District of Columbia have lower benefit levels than California. Id., at 22, n. 10.
See Maldonado v. Houston, 157 F. 3d 179 (CA3 1998) (finding two-tier durational residency requirement an unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel); Anderson v. Green, 26 F. 3d 95 (CA9 1994), vacated as unripe, 513 U. S. 557 (1995) (per curiam); Hicks v. Peters, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (ND III. 1998) (granting injunction against enforcement of dura-tional residency requirement); Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 998 F. Supp. 146 (RI 1998) (holding durational residency requirement a penalty on right to travel incapable of surviving rational-basis review). Two state courts have reached the same conclusion. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N. W. 2d 198 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1081 (1994) (striking down a similar provision in Minnesota law); Sanchez v. Department of Human Services, 314 N. J. Super. 11, 713 A. 2d 1056 (1998) (striking down two-tier welfare system); cf. Jones v. Milwaukee County, 168 Wis. 2d 892, 485 N. W. 2d 21 (1992) (holding that a 60-day waiting period for applicant for general relief is not a penalty and therefore not unconstitutional).
After this case was argued, petitioner Rita L. Saenz replaced Eloise Anderson as Director, California Department of Social Services.
“We do not doubt that the one-year waiting-period device is well suited to discourage the influx of poor families in need of assistance.... But the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible.” 394 U. S., at 629.
“Thus, the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period_ If a law has ‘no other purpose ... than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.’ United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 581 (1968).” Id., at 631.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8,10.
“The 4th article, respecting the [sic] extending the rights of the Gitizens of each State, throughout the United States ... is formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the present Confederation.” 3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 112 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). Article IV of the Articles of Confederation provided that “the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State.”
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (CCED Pa. 1823) (Washington, J., on circuit) (“fundamental” rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause include “the right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state”).
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment modeled this Clause upon •the “Privileges and Immunities” Clause found in Article IV. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033-1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham). In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), this Court had limited the protection of Article IV to rights under state law and concluded that free blacks could not claim citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment overruled this decision. The Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause and Citizenship Clause guaranteed the rights of newly freed black citizens by ensuring that they could claim the state citizenship of any State in which they resided and by precluding that State from abridging their rights of national citizenship.
U. S. Const., Amdt. §1. The remainder of the section provides: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of .their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.” U S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
App. 21-26.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded, however, that the “apparent purpose of § 11450.03 was to deter migration of poor people to California.” Roe v. Anderson, 134 F. 3d 1400, 1404 (CA9 1998).
See Cohen, Discrimination Against New State Citizens: An Update, 11 Const. Comm. 73, 79 (1994) (“[Jjust as it would violate the Constitution to deny these new arrivals state citizenship, it would violate the Constitution to concede their citizenship in name only while treating them as if they were still citizens of other states”).
“‘Congress is without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.’ Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 641 (1969).” Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 291 (1971).
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 10.
Id., at 9; see also id., at 3, 8,14,15,20, 22,23,24, 27, 28,28-29.
Id., at 8. See H. R. Rep. No. 104-651, p. 1387 (1996) (“States that want to pay higher benefits should not be deterred from doing so by the fear that they will attract large numbers of recipients from bordering States”).
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16. See States’ Perspective on Welfare Reform: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance, ' 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1995).
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30, n. 11.
As Justice Jackson observed: “[I]t is a privilege of citizenship of the United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any State of the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof If national citizenship means less than this, it means nothing.” Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 183 (1941) (concurring opinion). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
GRANBERRY v. GREER, WARDEN
No. 85-6790.
Argued February 24, 1987
Decided April 21, 1987
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Howard B. Eisenberg, by appointment of the Court, 479 U. S. 912, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Marcia L. Friedl, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, Roma J. Stewart, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorneys General.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a state prisoner, applied to the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The Magistrate to whom the District Court referred the case ordered the State of Illinois to file an answer; the State instead filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court adopted the Magistrate’s recommendation and dismissed the petition on the merits. When petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, respondent for the first time interposed the defense that petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies. In response, petitioner contended that the State had waived that defense by failing to raise it in the District Court. The Court of Appeals rejected the waiver argument and remanded the cause to the District Court with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. Granberry v. Mizell, 780 F. 2d 14 (1985). Because the Courts of Appeals have given different answers to the question whether the State’s failure to raise nonexhaustion in the district court constitutes a waiver of that defense in the court of appeals, we granted certiorari. 479 U. S. 813 (1986).
How an appellate court ought to handle a nonexhausted ha-beas petition when the State has not raised this objection in the district court is a question that might be answered in three different ways. We might treat the State’s silence on the matter as a procedural default precluding the State from raising the issue on appeal. At the other extreme, we might treat nonexhaustion as an inflexible bar to consideration of the merits of the petition by the federal court, and therefore require that a petition be dismissed when it appears that there has been a failure to exhaust. Or, third, we might adopt an intermediate approach and direct the courts of appeals to exercise discretion in each case to decide whether the administration of justice would be better served by insisting on exhaustion or by reaching the merits of the petition forthwith.
We have already decided that the failure to exhaust state remedies does not deprive an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas corpus application. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 684 (1984) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 456 U. S. 509, 515-520 (1982)); see also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, 521-522 (1952). As the Strickland case demonstrates, there are some cases in which it is appropriate for an appellate court to address the merits of a habeas corpus petition notwithstanding the lack of complete exhaustion. Although there is a strong presumption in favor of requiring the prisoner to pursue his available state remedies, his failure to do so is not an absolute bar to appellate consideration of his claims.
We have also expressed our reluctance to adopt rules that allow a party to withhold raising a defense until after the “main event” — in this case, the proceeding in the District Court — is over. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 89-90 (1977). Although the record indicates that the State’s failure to raise the nonexhaustion defense in this case was the result of inadvertence, rather than a matter of tactics, it seems unwise to adopt a rule that would permit, and might even encourage, the State to seek a favorable ruling on the merits in the district court while holding the exhaustion defense in reserve for use on appeal if necessary. If the habeas petition is meritorious, such a rule would prolong the prisoner’s confinement for no other reason than the State’s postponement of the exhaustion defense to the appellate level. Moreover, if the court of appeals is convinced that the petition has no merit, a belated application of the exhaustion rule might simply require useless litigation in the state courts.
We are not persuaded by either of the extreme positions. The appellate court is not required to dismiss for non-exhaustion notwithstanding the State’s failure to raise it, and the court is not obligated to regard the State’s omission as an absolute waiver of the claim. Instead, we think the history of the exhaustion doctrine, as recently reviewed in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982), points in the direction of a middle course:
“The exhaustion doctrine existed long before its codification by Congress in 1948. In Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 251 (1886), this Court wrote that as a matter of comity, federal courts should not consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts have had an opportunity to act:
“‘The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon “to dispose of the party as law and justice require” does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.’
“Subsequent cases refined the principle that state remedies must be exhausted except in unusual circumstances. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13, 17-19 (1925) (holding that the lower court should have dismissed the petition because none of the questions had been raised in the state courts. ‘In the regular and ordinary course of procedure, the power of the highest state court in respect of such questions should first be exhausted’). In Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 117 (1944), this Court reiterated that comity was the basis for the exhaustion doctrine: ‘it is a principle controlling all habeas corpus petitions to the federal courts, that those courts will interfere with the administration of justice in the state courts only “in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.’”
“In 1948, Congress codified the exhaustion doctrine in 28 U. S. C. §2254, citing Ex parte Hawk as correctly stating the principle of exhaustion.” Id., at 515-516 (footnotes omitted).
When the State answers a habeas corpus petition, it has a duty to advise the district court whether the prisoner has, in fact, exhausted all available state remedies. See n. 5, supra. As this case demonstrates, however, there are exceptional cases in which the State fails, whether inadvertently or otherwise, to raise an arguably meritorious non-exhaustion defense. The State’s omission in such a case makes it appropriate for the court of appeals to take a fresh look at the issue. The court should determine whether the interests of comity and federalism will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring a series of additional state and district court proceedings before reviewing the merits of the petitioner’s claim.
If, for example, the case presents an issue on which an unresolved question of fact or of state law might have an important bearing, both comity and judicial efficiency may make it appropriate for the court to insist on complete exhaustion to make sure that it may ultimately review the issue on a fully informed basis. On the other hand, if it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim, the interests of the petitioner, the warden, the state attorney general, the state courts, and the federal courts will all be well served even if the State fails to raise the exhaustion defense, the district court denies the habeas petition, and the court of appeals affirms the judgment of the district court forthwith. See United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F. 2d 740, 743 (CA7 1973); Note, State Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement in Habeas Corpus Cases, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 419, 433 (1984).
Conversely, if a full trial has been held in the district court and it is evident that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, it may also be appropriate for the court of appeals to hold that the nonexhaustion defense has been waived in order to avoid unnecessary delay in granting relief that is plainly warranted. In Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952), respondent brought a habeas action in District Court, seeking release from a Michigan state prison. The State did not raise the availability of state relief, and the District Court denied the writ. The Court of Appeals reached the merits of the habeas petition and reversed. While we ultimately disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion on the merits, we rejected the State’s nonexhaustion argument and approved the Court of Appeals’ determination that “special circumstances” required “prompt federal intervention.” Id., at 522. We noted that the general rule of exhaustion “is not rigid and inflexible .... Whether such circumstances exist calls for a factual appraisal by the court in each special situation.” Id., at 521. As we recognized in Frisbie, the cases in which the nonexhaustion defense is not asserted in the district court may present a wide variety of circumstances which the courts of appeals, drawing on their familiarity with state criminal practice, are able to evaluate individually.
In this case the Court of Appeals simply held that the nonexhaustion defense could not be waived, and made no attempt to determine whether the interests of justice would be better served by addressing the merits of the habeas petition or by requiring additional state proceedings before doing so. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Before seeking federal relief, petitioner had filed a mandamus action in the Illinois Supreme Court in 1981. That court denied the petition “without prejudice to proceeding in any appropriate circuit court for consideration of the question presented.” App. 10. In 1983, petitioner commenced a second mandamus action in the Illinois Supreme Court, which denied the motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus. Id., at 9.
Compare Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F. 2d 859, 862-864 (CA9 1982); Naranjo v. Ricketts, 696 F. 2d 83, 87 (CA10 1982), with Jenkins v. Fitzberger, 440 F. 2d 1188, 1189 (CA4 1971); McGee v. Estelle, 722 F. 2d 1206, 1214 (CA5 1984) (en banc); Purnell v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 753 F. 2d 703, 710 (CA8 1985).
Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527 (1986).
Cf. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U. S. 9 (1987) (district court may not exercise diversity jurisdiction until remedies in parallel tribal court proceeding have been exhausted); National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845 (1985) (comity requires that tribal remedies be exhausted before district court considers issue of tribal court jurisdiction).
Rule 5 of the Rules governing § 2254 eases in the United States district courts requires that the answer to a habeas petition “shall state whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies including any post-conviction remedies available to him under the statutes or procedural rules of the state. . . .” The State’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and accompanying brief did not contain this required statement. App. 12-17. The State represents that this omission “was a mistake on the part of the assistants, on the part of the assistant attorney general. . . . The assistant was not even aware of the exhaustion requirement.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, 38 (counsel for respondent).
It is also true, of course, that the Magistrate, upon receipt of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, did not then ask the State to make a Rule 5 statement of whether petitioner had exhausted his state remedies. Instead, the Magistrate gave notice to petitioner that the State had filed a motion to dismiss with “an affidavit or other documentary evidence,” and that accordingly, under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner could not “rest upon the mere allegations of your Petition,” but must send affidavits establishing a genuine issue for trial. Record Doc. No. 7. Petitioner filed a response, and the Magistrate then issued his Report and Recommendation that the motion to dismiss be granted. The District Court adopted this recommendation and dismissed the action, without referring to the exhaustion issue. App. 18-21.
The State can successfully defend a habeas action either by obtaining dismissal for failure to exhaust or by winning on the merits, while the prisoner can only obtain the relief he seeks if the court reaches the merits and rules in his favor. A rule requiring dismissal when the defense of nonexhaustion is raised at the appellate level for the first time therefore would never operate to the prisoner’s benefit. If the prisoner obtains relief in district court, the State could assert this rule to obtain a reversal on appeal, while conversely, if the district court denies habeas relief and the prisoner appeals, the rule requiring dismissal would not result in reversal of the denial of habeas relief.
The Rules governing §2254 cases in the United States district courts leave open this possibility. While the Magistrate requested the State to file an answer in this case, Rule 4 authorizes a district judge summarily to dismiss a habeas petition if “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” If the petition is not summarily dismissed, “the judge shall order the respondent to file an answer or other pleading. ...” The answer “shall state whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies.” Rule 5. Thus, the District Court’s dismissal of a nonmeritorious petition under Rule 4 pretermits consideration of the issue of non-exhaustion. Similarly, it is appropriate for the court of appeals to dispose of nonmeritorious petitions without reaching the nonexhaustion issue.
See, e. g., Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561, 564 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (exhaustion should not be required “whenever it may become clear that the alleged state remedy is nothing but a procedural morass offering no substantial hope of relief”).
Petitioner has also contested the Court of Appeals’ determination that he failed to exhaust his state remedies. Granberry v. Mizell, 780 F. 2d 14, 16 (1985). On that issue, however, we defer to the Court of Appeals which is more familiar with Illinois’ practice than we are. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York. | What is the court in which the case originated? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims",
"United States Supreme Court"
] | [
57
] | sc_caseorigin |
LOCAL 761, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al.
No. 321.
Argued April 17-18, 1961.
Decided May 29, 1961.
Benjamin C. Sigal argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were David S. Davidson, Mozart G. Batner and Herbert L. Segal.
Norton J. Come argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board, respondent. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Stuart Rothman and Dominick L. Manoli.
Gerard D. Reilly argued the cause and filed a brief for the General Electric Co., respondent.
David E„ Feller filed a brief for the United Steelworkers of America et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Local 761 of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, was charged with a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 141, upon the following facts.
General Electric Corporation operates a plant outside of Louisville, Kentucky, where it manufactures washers, dryers, and other electrical household appliances. The square-shaped, thousand-acre, unfenced plant is known as Appliance Park. A large drainage ditch makes ingress and egress impossible except over five roadways across culverts, designated as gates.
Since 1954, General Electric sought to confine the employees of independent • contractors, described hereafter, who work on the premises of the Park, to the use of Gate 3-A and confine its use to them. The undisputed reason for doing so was to insulate General Electric employees from the frequent labor disputes in which the contractors were involved. Gate 3-A is 550 feet away from the nearest entrance available for General Electric employees, suppliers, and deliverymen. Although anyone can pass the gate without challenge, the roadway leads to a guardhouse where identification must be presented. Vehicle stickers of various shapes and colors enable a guard to check on sight whether a vehicle is authorized to use Gate 3-A. Since January 1958, a prominent sign has been posted at the gate which states: “GATE 3-A FOR EMPLOYEES OF CONTRACTORS ONLY — G. E. EMPLOYEES USE OTHER GATES.” On rare occasions, it appears, a General Electric employee was allowed to pass the guardhouse, but such occurrence was in violation of company instructions. There was no proof of any unauthorized attempts to pass the gate during the strike in question.
The independent contractors are utilized for a great variety of tasks on the Appliance Park premises. Some do construction work on new buildings; some install and repair ventilating and heating equipment; some engage in retooling and rearranging operations necessary to the manufacture of new models; others do “general maintenance work.” These services are contracted to outside employers either because the company’s employees lack the necessary skill or manpower, or because the work can be done more economically by independent contractors. The latter reason determined the contracting of maintenance work for which the Central Maintenance department of the company bid competitively with the contractors. While some of the work done by these contractors had on occasion been previously performed by Central Maintenance, the findings do not disclose the number of employees of independent contractors who were performing these routine maintenance services, as compared with those who were doing specialized work of a capital-improvement nature.
The Union, petitioner here, is the certified bargaining representative for the production and maintenance workers who constitute approximately 7,600 of the 10,500 employees of General Electric at Appliance Park. On July 27, 1958, the Union called a strike because of 24 unsettled grievances with the company. Picketing occurred at all the gates, including Gate 3-A, and continued until August 9 when an injunction was issued by a Federal District Court. The signs carried by the pickets at all gates read: “LOCAL 761 ON STRIKE G. E. UNFAIR.” Because of the picketing, almost all of the employees of independent contractors refused to enter the company premises.
Neither the legality of the strike or of the picketing at any of the gates except 3-A nor the peaceful nature of the picketing is in dispute. The sole claim is that the picketing before the gate exclusively used by employees of independent contractors was conduct proscribed by §8 (b)(4)(A).
The Trial Examiner recommended that the Board dismiss the eomplaint. He concluded that the limitations on picketing which the Board had prescribed in so-called “common situs” cases were not applicable to the situation before him, in that the picketing at Gate 3-A represented traditional primary action which necessarily had a secondary effect of inconveniencing those who did business with the struck employer. He reasoned that if a primary employer could limit the area of picketing around his own premises by constructing a separate gate for employees of independent contractors, such a device could also be used to isolate employees of his suppliers and customers, and that such action could not relevantly be distinguished from oral appeals made to secondary employees not to cross a picket line where only a single gate existed.
The Board rejected the Trial Examiner’s conclusion, 123 N. L. R. B. 1547. It held that, since only the employees of the independent contractors were allowed to use Gate 3-A, the Union’s object in picketing there was “to enmesh these employees of the neutral employers in its dispute with the Company,” thereby constituting a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A) because the independent employees were encouraged to engage in a concerted refusal to work “with an object of forcing the independent contractors to cease doing business with the Company.”
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted enforcement of the Board's order, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 402, 278 F. 2d 282. Although noting that a fine line was being drawn, it concluded that the Board was correct in finding that the objective of the Gate 3-A picketing was to encourage the independent-contractor employees to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services for their employers in order to bring pressure on General Electric. Since the incidence of the problem involved in this case is extensive and the treatment it has received calls for clarification, we brought the case here, 364 U. S. 869.
I.
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
“. . . to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other person ... to cease doing business with any other person. . . .”
This provision could not be literally construed; otherwise it would ban most strikes historically considered to be lawful, so-called primary activity. “While § 8 (b) (4) does not expressly mention ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ disputes, strikes or boycotts, that section often is referred to in the Act’s legislative history as one of the Act’s ‘secondary boycott sections.’ ” Labor Board v. Denver Building Council, 341 U. S. 675, 686. “Congress did not seek, by § 8 (b)(4), to interfere with the ordinary strike . . . .” Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 672. The impact of the section was directed toward what is known as the secondary boycott whose “sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it.” International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 181 F. 2d 34, 37. Thus the section “left a striking labor organization free to use persuasion, including picketing, not only on the primary employer and his employees but on numerous others. Among these were secondary employers who were customers or suppliers of the primary employer and persons dealing with them . . . and even employees of secondary employers so long as the labor organization did not . . . ‘induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment’. . . .” Labor Board v. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 284 F. 2d 887, 889.
But not all so-called secondary boycotts were outlawed in § 8 (b)(4)(A). “The section does not speak generally of secondary boycotts. It describes and condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objectives. . . . Employees must be induced; they must be induced to engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must be to force or require their employer or another person to cease doing business with a third person. Thus, much that might argumentatively be found to fall within the broad and somewhat vague concept of secondary boycott is not in terms prohibited.” Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board, 357 U. S. 93, 98. See also United Brotherhood of Carpenters (Wadsworth Building Co.), 81 N. L. R. B. 802, 805.
Important as is the distinction between legitimate “primary activity” and banned “secondary activity,” it does not present a glaringly bright line. The objectives of any picketing include a desire to influence others from withholding from the employer their services or trade. See Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N. L. R. B. 547. “[I]ntended or not, sought for or not, aimed for or not, employees of neutral employers do take action sympathetic with strikers and do put pressure on their own employers.” Seafarers International Union v. Labor Board, 265 P. 2d 585, 590. “It is clear that, when a union pickets an employer with whom it has a dispute, it hopes, even if it does not intend, that all persons will honor the picket line, and that hope encompasses the employees of neutral employers who may in the course of their employment (deliverymen and the like) have to enter the premises.” Id., at 591. “Almost all picketing, even at the situs of the primary employer and surely at that of the secondary, hopes to achieve the forbidden objective, whatever other motives there may be and however small the chances of success.” Local 294, supra, at 890. But picketing which induces secondary employees to respect a picket line is not the equivalent of picketing which has an object of inducing those employees to engage in concerted conduct against their employer in order to force him to refuse to deal with the struck employer. Labor Board v. International Rice Milling, supra.
However difficult the drawing of lines more nice than obvious, the statute compels the task. Accordingly, the Board and the courts have attempted to devise reasonable criteria drawing heavily upon the means to which a union resorts in promoting its cause. Although “[n]o rigid rule which would make ... [a] few factors conclusive is contained in or deducible from the statute,” Sales Drivers v. Labor Board, 229 F. 2d 514, 517, “[i]n the absence of admissions by the union of an illegal intent, the nature of acts performed shows the intent.” Seafarers' International Union, supra, at 591.
The nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevitably involves an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula as a comprehensive answer. And so, it is not surprising that the Board has more or less felt its way during the fourteen years in which it has had to apply § 8 (b) (4) (A), and has modified and reformed its standards on the basis of accumulating experience. “One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration.” Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 800.
II.
The early decisions of the Board following the TaftHartley amendments involved activity which took place around the secondary employer’s premises. For example, in Wadsworth Building Co., supra, the union set up a picket line around the situs of a builder who had eontracted to purchase prefabricated houses from the primary employer. The Board found this to be illegal secondary activity. See also Printing Specialties Union (Sealbright Pacific), 82 N. L. R. B. 271. In contrast, when picketing took place around the premises of the primary employer, the Board regarded this as valid primary activity. In Oil Workers International Union (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N. L. R. B. 315, Pure had used Standard’s dock and employees for loading its oil onto ships. The companies had contracted that, in case of a strike against Standard, Pure employees would take over the loading of Pure oil. The union struck against Standard and picketed the dock, and Pure employees refused to cross the picket line. The Board held this to be a primary activity, although the union’s action induced the Pure employees to engage in a concerted refusal to handle Pure products at the dock. The fact that the picketing was confined to the vicinity of the Standard premises influenced the Board not to find that' an object of the activity was to force Pure to cease doing business with Standard, even if such was a secondary effect.
“A strike, by its very nature, inconveniences those who customarily do business with the struck employer. Moreover, any accompanying picketing of the employer’s premises is necessarily designed to induce and encourage third persons to cease doing business with the picketed employer. It does not follow, however, that such picketing is therefore proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.” 84 N. L. R. B., at 318.
See also Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union (Interborough News Co.), 90 N. L. R. B. 2135; International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Di Giorgio Wine Co.), 87 N. L. R. B. 720; International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Rice Milling Co.), 84 N. L. R. B. 360.
In United Electrical Workers (Ryan Construction Corp.), 85 N. L. R. B. 417, Ryan had contracted to perform construction work on a building adjacent to the Bucyrus plant and inside its fence. A separate gate was cut through the fence for Ryan’s employees which no employee of Bucyrus ever used. The Board concluded that the union — on strike against Bucyrus — could picket the Ryan gate, even though an object of the picketing was to enlist the aid of Ryan employees, since Congress did not intend to outlaw primary picketing.
“When picketing is wholly at the premises of the employer with whom the union is engaged in a labor dispute, it cannot be called ‘secondary’ even though, as is virtually always the case, an object of the picketing is to dissuade all persons from entering such premises for business reasons. It makes no difference whether 1 or 100 other employees wish to enter the premises. It follows in this case that the picketing of Bucyrus premises, which was primary because in support of a labor dispute with Bucyrus, did not lose its character and become ‘secondary’ at the so-called Ryan gate because Ryan employees were the only persons regularly entering Bucyrus premises at that gate.” 85 N. L. R. B., at 418. See also General Teamsters (Crump, Inc.), 112 N. L. R. B. 311.
Thus, the Board eliminated picketing which took place around the situs of the primary employer — regardless of the special circumstances involved — from being held invalid secondary activity under §8 (b)(4)(A).
However, the impact of the new situations made the Board conscious of the complexity of the problem by reason of the protean forms in which it appeared. This became clear in the “common situs” cases — situations where two employers were performing separate tasks on common premises. The Moore Dry Dock case, supra, laid out the Board’s new standards in this area. There, the union picketed outside an entrance to a dock where a ship, owned by the struck employer, was being trained and outfitted. Although the premises picketed were those of the secondary employer, they constituted the only place where picketing could take place; furthermore, the objectives of the picketing were no more aimed at the employees of the secondary employer — the dock owner— than they had been in the Pure Oil and Ryan cases. The Board concluded, however, that when the situs of the primary employer was “ambulatory’’ there must be a balance between the union’s right to picket and the interest of the secondary employer in being free from picketing. It set out four standards for picketing in such situations which would be presumptive of valid primary activity: (1) that the picketing be limited to times when the situs of dispute was located on the secondary premises, (2) that the primary employer be engaged in his normal business at the situs, (3) that the picketing take place reasonably close to the situs, and (4) that the picketing clearly disclose that the dispute was only with the primary employer. These tests were widely accepted by reviewing federal courts. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F. 2d 65 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Piezonki v. Labor Board, 219 F. 2d 879 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Labor Board v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 212 F. 2d 216 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Labor Board v. Local 55, 218 F. 2d 226 (C. A. 10th Cir.). As is too often the way of law or, at least, of adjudications, soon the Dry Dock tests were mechanically applied so that a violation of one of the standards was taken to be presumptive of illegal activity. For example, failure of picket signs clearly to designate the' employer against whom the strike was directed was held to be violative of §8 (b)(4) (A). See Superior Derrick Corp. v. Labor Board, 273 F. 2d 891; Truck Drivers v. Labor Board, 249 F. 2d 512; Labor Board v. Local 728, 228 F. 2d 791.
In Local 55 (PBM), 108 N. L. R. B. 363, the Board for the first time applied the Dry Dock test, although the picketing occurred at premises owned by the primary employer. There, an insurance company owned a tract of land that it was developing, and also served as the general contractor. A neutral subcontractor was also doing work at the site. The union, engaged in a strike against the insurance company, picketed the entire premises, characterizing the entire job as unfair, and the employees of the subcontractor walked off. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit enforced the Board’s order which found the picketing to be illegal on the ground that the picket signs did not measure up to the Dry Dock standard that they clearly disclose that the picketing was directed against the struck employer only. 218 F. 2d 226.
The Board’s application of the Dry Dock standards to picketing at the premises of the struck employer was made more explicit in Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks (Crystal Palace Market), 116 N. L. R. B. 856. The owner of a large common market operated some of the shops within, and leased out others to independent sellers. The union, although given permission to picket the owner’s individual stands, chose to picket outside the entire market. The Board held that this action was violative of § 8 (b) (4) (A) in that the union did not attempt to minimize the effect of its picketing, as required in a commonsitus case, on the operations of the neutral employers utilizing the market. “We believe . . . that the foregoing principles should apply to all common situs picketing, including cases where, as here, the picketed premises are owned by the primary employer.” 116 N. L. R. B., at 859. The Ryan case, supra, was overruled to the extent it implied the contrary. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in enforcing the Board’s order, specifically approved its disavowance of an ownership test. 249 F. 2d 591. The Board made clear that its decision did not affect situations where picketing which had effects on neutral third parties who dealt with the employer occurred at premises occupied solely by him. “In such cases, we adhere to the rule established by the Board . . . that more latitude be given to picketing at such separate primary premises than at premises occupied in part (or entirely) by secondary employers.” 116 N. L. R. B., at 860, n. 10.
In rejecting the ownership test in situations where two employers were performing work upon a common site, the Board was naturally guided by this Court’s opinion in Rice Milling, in which we indicated that the location of the picketing at the primary employer’s premises was “not necessarily conclusive” of its legality. 341 U. S., at 671. Where the work done by the secondary employees is unrelated to the normal operations of the primary employer, it is difficult to perceive how the pressure of picketing the entire situs is any less on the neutral employer merely because the picketing takes place at property owned by the struck employer. The application of the Dry Dock tests to limit the picketing effects to the employees of the employer against whom the dispute is directed carries out the “dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.” Labor Board v. Denver Building Council, supra, at 692.
III.
From this necessary survey of the course of the Board’s treatment of our problem, the precise nature of the issue before us emerges. With due regard to the relation between the Board’s function and the scope of judicial review of its rulings, the question is whether the Board may apply the Dry Dock criteria so as to make unlawful picketing at a gate utilized exclusively by employees of independent contractors who work on the struck employer’s premises. The effect of such a holding would not bar the union from picketing at all gates used by the employees, suppliers, and customers of the struck employer. Of course an employer may not, by removing all his employees from the situs of the strike, bar the union from publicizing its cause, see Local 618 v. Labor Board, 249 F. 2d 332. The basis of the Board’s decision in this case would not remotely have that effect, nor any such tendency for the future.
The Union claims that, if the Board’s ruling is upheld, employers will be free to erect separate gates for deliveries, customers, and replacement workers which will be immunized from picketing. This fear is baseless. The key to the problem is found in the type of work that is being performed by those who use the separate gate. It is significant that the Board has since applied its rationale, first stated in the present case, only to situations' where the independent workers were performing tasks unconnected to the normal operations of the struck employer — usually construction work on his buildings. In such situations, the indicated limitations on picketing activity respect the balance of competing interests that Congress has required the Board to enforce. On the other hand, if a separate gate were devised for regular plant deliveries, the barring of picketing at that location would make a clear invasion on traditional primary activity of appealing to neutral employees whose tasks aid the employer’s everyday operations. The 1959 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, which removed the word “concerted” from the boycott provisions, included a proviso that “nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” 29 U. S. C. (Supp. I, 1959) § 158 (b)(4)(B). The proviso was directed against the fear that the removal of “concerted” from the statute might be interpreted so that “the picketing at the factory violates section 8 (b) (4) (A) because the pickets induce the truck drivers employed by the trucker not to perform their usual services where an object is to compel the trucking firm not to do business with the . . . manufacturer during the strike.” Analysis of the bill prepared by Senator Kennedy and Representative Thompson, 105 Cong. Rec. 16589.
In a case similar to the one now before us, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the Board in its application of § 8 (b) (4) (A) to a separate-gate situation. “There must be a separate gate marked and set apart from other gates; the work done by the men who use the gate must be unrelated to the normal operations of the employer and the work must be of a kind that would not, if done when the plant were engaged in its regular operations, necessitate curtailing those operations.” United Steelworkers v. Labor Board, 289 F. 2d 591, 595, decided May 3, 1961. These seem to us controlling considerations.
IV.
The foregoing course of reasoning would require that the judgment below sustaining the Board’s order be affirmed but for one consideration, even though this consideration may turn out not to affect the result. The legal path by which the Board and the Court of Appeals reached their decisions did not take into account that if Gate 3-A was in fact used by employees of independent contractors who performed conventional maintenance work necessary to the normal operations of General Electric, the use of the gate would have been a mingled one outside the bar of § 8 (b) (4) (A). In short, such mixed use of this portion of the struck employer’s premises would not bar picketing rights of the striking employees. While the record shows some such mingled use, it sheds no light on its extent. It may well turn out to be that the instances of these maintenance tasks were so insubstantial as to be treated by the Board as de minimis. We cannot here guess at the quantitative aspect of this problem. It calls for Board determination. Eor determination of the questions thus raised, the case must be remanded by the Court of Appeals to the Board.
Reversed.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black concur in the result.
Mr. Justice Douglas.
I did not vote to grant certiorari in this case because it seemed to me that the problem presented was in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals within the meaning of Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, 490. Since the Court of Appeals followed the guidelines of that case (see 278 F. 2d 282, 286), I would leave the decision with it. I cannot say it made any egregious error, though I might have decided the case differently had I sat on the Labor Board or on the Court of Appeals.
During the strike in question a guard was stationed at the gate.
Member Fanning concurred in the result, reasoning that the common-situs criteria set out by the Board in Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N. L. R. B. 547, could be applied to situations where the primary employer owned the premises, and that the requirement that the picketing take place reasonably close to the situs of the labor dispute had therefore been violated by the picketing around Gate 3-A.
See also Labor Board v. General Drivers, Local 968, 225 F. 2d 205.
The Dry Dock criteria had perhaps their widest application in the trucking industry. There, unions on strike against truckers often staged picketing demonstrations at the places of pickup and delivery. Compare International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 87 N. L. R. B. 502, with International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sterling Beverages, Inc.), 90 N. L. R. B. 401.
United Steelworkers (Phelps Lodge Refining Corp.), 126 N. L. R. B. 1367; International Chemical Workers Union (Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp.), 126 N. L. R. B. 905; see Union de Trabajadores (Gonzales Chemical Industries, Inc.), 128 N. L. R. B. No. 116. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bureau of Prisons",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"State Agency",
"Unidentifiable",
"Office of Thrift Supervision",
"Department of Homeland Security",
"Board of General Appraisers",
"Board of Tax Appeals",
"General Land Office or Commissioners",
"NO Admin Action",
"Processing Tax Board of Review"
] | [
81
] | sc_adminaction |
BOLGER et al. v. YOUNGS DRUG PRODUCTS CORP.
No. 81-1590.
Argued January 12, 1983 —
Decided June 24, 1983
David A. Strauss argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Getter.
Jerold S. Solovy argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Robert L. Graham and Laura A. Raster
Robert D. Joffe, Eve W. Paul, and Dara Klassel filed a brief for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Michael L. Burack, Charles S. Sims, and Janet Benshoof filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court. Title 39 U. S. C. § 3001(e)(2) prohibits the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The District Court held that, as applied to appellee’s mailings, the statute violates the First Amendment. We affirm.
Section 3001(e)(2) states that “[a]ny unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail, and shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs . . . ,” As interpreted by Postal Service regulations, the statutory provision does not apply to unsolicited advertisements in which the mailer has no commercial interest. In addition to the civil consequences of a violation of § 3001(e)(2), 18 U. S. C. §1461 makes it a crime knowingly to use the mails for anything declared by § 3001(e) to be nonmailable.
Appellee Youngs Drug Products Corp. (Youngs) is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of contraceptives. Youngs markets its products primarily through sales to chain warehouses and wholesale distributors, who in turn sell contraceptives to retail pharmacists, who then sell those products to individual customers. Appellee publicizes the availability and desirability of its products by various methods. This litigation resulted from Youngs’ decision to undertake a campaign of unsolicited mass mailings to members of the public. In conjunction with its wholesalers and retailers, Youngs seeks to mail to the public on an unsolicited basis three types of materials:
—multi-page, multi-item flyers promoting a large variety of products available at a drugstore, including prophylactics;
—flyers exclusively or substantially devoted to promoting prophylactics;
—informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and availability of prophylactics in general or Youngs’ products in particular.
In 1979 the Postal Service traced to a wholesaler of Youngs’ products an allegation of an unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements. The Service warned the wholesaler that the mailing violated 39 U. S. C. § 3001(e)(2). Subsequently, Youngs contacted the Service and furnished it with copies of Youngs’ three types of proposed mailings, stating its view that the statute could not constitutionally restrict the mailings. The Service rejected Youngs’ legal argument and notified the company that the proposed mailings would violate § 3001(e)(2). Youngs then brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. It claimed that the statute, as applied to its proposed mailings, violated the First Amendment and that Youngs and its wholesaler were refraining from distributing the advertisements because of the Service’s warning.
The District Court determined that § 3001(e)(2), by its plain language, prohibited all three types of proposed mailings. The court then addressed the constitutionality of the statute as applied to these mailings. Finding all three types of materials to be commercial solicitations, the court considered the constitutionality of the statute within the framework established by this Court for analyzing restrictions imposed on commercial speech. The court concluded that the statutory prohibition was more extensive than necessary to the interests asserted by the Government, and it therefore held that the statute’s absolute ban on the three types of mailings violated the First Amendment. 526 F. Supp. 823 (1981).
Appellants brought this direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252, see United States v. Darusmont, 449 U. S. 292, 293 (1981), and we noted probable jurisdiction, 456 U. S. 970 (1982).
II
Beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), this Court extended the protection of the First Amendment to commercial speech. Nonetheless, our decisions have recognized “the ‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978). Thus, we have held that the Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771-772, n. 24 (1976).
For example, as a general matter, “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972). With respect to noncommercial speech, this Court has sustained content-based restrictions only in the most extraordinary circumstances. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 530, 538-539 (1980); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 82 (1978). By contrast, regulation of commercial speech based on content is less problematic. In light of the greater potential for deception or confusion in the context of certain advertising messages, see In re R. M. 455 U. S. 191, 200 (1982), content-based restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1 (1979) (upholding prohibition on use of trade names by optometrists).
Because the degree of protection afforded by the First Amendment depends on whether the activity sought to be regulated constitutes commercial or noncommercial speech, we must first determine the proper classification of the mailings at issue here. Appellee contends that its proposed mailings constitute “fully protected” speech, so that § 3001(e)(2) amounts to an impermissible content-based restriction on such expression. Appellants argue, and the District Court held, that the proposed mailings are all commercial speech. The application of § 3001(e)(2) to appellee’s proposed mailings must be examined carefully to ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed.
Most of appellee’s mailings fall within the core notion of commercial speech — “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’ ” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., supra, at 762, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S. 376, 385 (1973). Youngs’ informational pamphlets, however, cannot be characterized merely as proposals to engage in commercial transactions. Their proper classification as commercial or noncommercial speech thus presents a closer question. The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 265-266 (1964). Similarly, the reference to a specific product does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech. See Associated Students for Univ. of Cal. at Riverside v. Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11, 24 (CD Cal. 1973). Finally, the fact that Youngs has an economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets would clearly be' insufficient by itself to turn the materials into commercial speech. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S., at 818; Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 474 (1966); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
The combination of all these characteristics, however, provides strong support for the District Court’s conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial speech. The mailings constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and family planning. We have made clear that advertising which “links a product to a current public debate” is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S., at 563, n. 5. A company has the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public issues, so there is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection when such statements are made in the context of commercial transactions. See ibid. Advertisers should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product information from government regulation simply by including references to public issues. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 540 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
We conclude, therefore, that all of the mailings in this case are entitled to the qualified but nonetheless substantial protection accorded to commercial speech.
p-H I — I I — I
The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S., at 563. In Central Hudson we adopted a four-part analysis for assessing the validity of restrictions on commercial speech. First, we determine whether the expression is constitutionally protected. For commercial speech to receive such protection, “it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” Id., at 566. Second, we ask whether the governmental interest is substantial. If so, we must then determine whether the regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Ibid. Applying this analysis, we conclude that § 3001(e)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to appellee’s mailings.
We turn first to the protection afforded by the First Amendment. The State may deal effectively with false, deceptive, or misleading sales techniques. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S., at 771-772. The State may also prohibit commercial speech related to illegal behavior. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S., at 388. In this case, however, appellants have never claimed that Youngs’ proposed mailings fall into any of these categories. To the contrary, advertising for contraceptives not only implicates “‘substantial individual and societal interests’” in the free flow of commercial information, but also relates to activity which is protected from unwarranted state interference. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 700-701 (1977), quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, at 760, 763-766. Youngs’ proposed commercial speech is therefore clearly protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, where — as in this case — a speaker desires to convey truthful information relevant to important social issues such as family planning and the prevention of venereal disease, we have previously found the First Amendment interest served by such speech paramount. See Carey v. Population Services International, supra; Bigelow v. Virginia, supra.
We must next determine whether the Government’s interest in prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements is a substantial one. The prohibition in § 3001(e)(2) originated in 1873 as part of the Comstock Act, a criminal statute designed “for the suppression of Trade in and Circulation of obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use.” Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, §2, 17 Stat. 599. Appellants do not purport to rely on justifications for the statute offered during the 19th century. Instead, they advance interests that concededly were not asserted when the prohibition was enacted into law. This reliance is permissible since the insufficiency of the original motivation does not diminish other interests that the restriction may now serve. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S., at 460. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 190-191 (1973) (a State may readjust its views and emphases in light of modern knowledge).
In particular, appellants assert that the statute (1) shields recipients of mail from materials that they are likely to find offensive and (2) aids parents’ efforts to control the manner in which their children become informed about sensitive and important subjects such as birth control. The first of these interests carries little weight. In striking down a state prohibition of contraceptive advertisements in Carey v. Population Services International, supra, we stated that offensiveness was “classically not [a] justificatio[n] validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment. At least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression.” 431 U. S., at 701. We specifically declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition of commercial speech. Id., at 701, n. 28.
Recognizing that their reliance on this interest is “problematic,” appellants attempt to avoid the clear import of Carey by emphasizing that § 3001(e)(2) is aimed at the mailing of materials to the home. We have, of course, recognized the important interest in allowing addressees to give notice to a mailer that they wish no further mailings which, in their sole discretion, they believe to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative. See Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970) (upholding the constitutionality of 39 U. S. C. §3008). But we have never held that the Government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended. The First Amendment “does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid objectionable speech.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S., at 542. Recipients of objectionable mailings, however, may “‘effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.’” Ibid., quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971). Consequently, the “short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned.” Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (SDNY), summarily aff’d, 386 F. 2d 449 (CA2 1967), cert. denied, 391 U. S. 915 (1968).
The second interest asserted by appellants — aiding parents’ efforts to discuss birth control with their children— is undoubtedly substantial. “[PJarents have an important ‘guiding role’ to play in the upbringing of their children . . . which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions.” H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 410 (1981), quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 637 (1979). As a means of effectuating this interest, however, § 3001(e)(2) fails to withstand scrutiny.
To begin with, § 3001(e)(2) provides only the most limited incremental support for the interest asserted. We can reasonably assume that parents already exercise substantial control over the disposition of mail once it enters their mailboxes. Under 39 U. S. C. § 3008, parents can also exercise control over information that flows into their mailboxes. And parents must already cope with the multitude of external stimuli that color their children’s perception of sensitive subjects. Under these circumstances, a ban on unsolicited advertisements serves only to assist those parents who desire to keep their children from confronting such mailings, who are otherwise unable to do so, and whose children have remained relatively free from such stimuli.
This marginal degree of protection is achieved by purging all mailboxes of unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for adults. We have previously made clear that a restriction of this scope is more extensive than the Constitution permits, for the government may not “reduce the adult population. . . to reading only what is fit for children.” Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957). The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), this Court did recognize that the Government’s interest in protecting the young justified special treatment of an afternoon broadcast heard by adults as well as children. At the same time, the majority “emphasize[d] the narrowness of our holding,” id., at 750, explaining that broadcasting is “uniquely pervasive” and that it is “uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.” Id., at 748-749 (emphasis added). The receipt of mail is far less intrusive and uncontrollable. Our decisions have recognized that the special interest of the Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a justification for regulation of other means of communication. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, supra, at 542-543; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 748 (broadcasting has received the most limited First Amendment protection).
Section 3001(e)(2) is also defective because it denies to parents truthful information bearing on their ability to discuss birth control and to make informed decisions in this area. See Associated Students for Univ. of Cal. at Riverside v. Attorney General, 368 F. Supp., at 21. Cf. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S., at 708 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (provision prohibiting parents from distributing contraceptives to children constitutes “direct interference with . . . parental guidance”). Because the proscribed information “may bear on one of the most important decisions” parents have a right to make, the restriction of “the free flow of truthful information” constitutes a “basic” constitutional defect regardless of the strength of the government’s interest. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 95-96 (1977).
> H-I
We thus conclude that the justifications offered by appellants are insufficient to warrant the sweeping prohibition on the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements. As applied to appellee’s mailings, § 3001(e)(2) is unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court is therefore
Affirmed.
Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of this case.
Section 3001(e)(2) contains express limitations. In particular, an advertisement is not deemed unsolicited “if it is contained in a publication for which the addressee has paid or promised to pay a consideration or which he has otherwise indicated he desires to receive.” In addition, the provision does not apply to advertisements mailed to certain recipients such as a manufacturer of contraceptives, a licensed physician, or a pharmacist. See §§ 3001(e)(2)(A) and (B).
Domestic Mail Manual § 123.434 (July 7, 1981). The Manual, which is issued pursuant to the Postal Service’s power to adopt regulations, 39 U. S. C. § 401, is incorporated by reference into 39 CFR pt. Ill (1982).
The Postal Service’s interpretation of § 3001(e)(2) resulted from the decision in Associated Students for Univ. of Cal. at Riverside v. Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11 (CD Cal. 1973), in which a three-judge court held that the prohibition on the mailing of “advertisements” could not constitutionally be expanded beyond the commercial sense of the term, id., at 24.
The offense is punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, for the first offense; and a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, for each subsequent offense. 18 U. S. C. § 1461.
In the District Court, Youngs offered two examples of informational pamphlets. See Record, Complaint, Group Exhibit C. The first, entitled “Condoms and Human Sexuality,” is a 12-page pamphlet describing the use, manufacture, desirability, and availability of condoms, and providing detailed descriptions of various Trojan-brand condoms manufactured by Youngs. The second, entitled “Plain Talk about Venereal Disease,” is an eight-page pamphlet discussing at length the problem of venereal disease and the use and advantages of condoms in aiding the prevention of venereal disease. The only identification of Youngs or its products is at the bottom of the last page of the pamphlet, which states that the pamphlet has been contributed as a public service by Youngs, the distributor of Trojan-brand prophylactics.
The District Court ordered that the multi-item drugstore flyers containing promotion of contraceptives could be mailed to the same extent such flyers could be mailed if they did not contain such promotion. With respect to flyers and pamphlets devoted to promoting the desirability or availability of contraceptives, the court’s order states that such materials were mailable only under four conditions:
“First, they must be mailed in an envelope that completely obscures from the sight of the addressee the contents. Second, the envelope must contain a prominent notice stating in capital letters that the enclosed material has not been solicited in any way by the recipient. Third, the envelope must contain a prominent warning that the contents are ‘promotional material for contraceptive products.’ Fourth, the envelope must contain a notice, in less prominent lettering than the warning and the other notice, but not in ‘fine print,’ that federal law permits the recipient to have his name removed from the mailing list of the mailer of that envelope, and citing to 39 U. S. C. § 3008(a).” 526 F. Supp. 823, 830 (1981).
Youngs did not file a cross-appeal challenging these restrictions, and their propriety is therefore not before us in this case.
Before that time, purely commercial advertising received no First Amendment protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52, 54 (1942).
Our decisions have displayed a greater willingness to permit content-based restrictions when the expression at issue fell within certain special and limited categories. See, e. g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words).
Brief for Appellee 17; see id., at 12, 13, 15, 20, 25-31, 31-32.
See Brief for Appellants 13-14, n. 6; Reply Brief for Appellants 1 (“We do not suggest that a prohibition comparable to Section 3001(e)(2) can be applied to fully protected, noncommercial speech”).
“526 F. Supp., at 826.
Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978). To the extent any of appellee’s mailings could be considered noncommercial speech, our conclusion that § 3001(e)(2) is unconstitutional as applied would be reinforced.
For example, the drugstore flyer consists primarily of price and quantity information.
One of the informational pamphlets, “Condoms and Human Sexuality,” specifically refers to a number of Trojan-brand condoms manufactured by appellee and describes the advantages of each type.
The other informational pamphlet, “Plain Talk about Venereal Disease,” repeatedly discusses condoms without any specific reference to those manufactured by appellee. The only reference to appellee’s products is contained at the very bottom of the last page, where appellee is identified as the distributor of Trojan-brand prophylactics. That a product is referred to generically does not, however, remove it from the realm of commercial speech. For example, a company with sufficient control of the market for a product may be able to promote the product without reference to its own brand names. Or a trade association may make statements about a product without reference to specific brand names. See, e. g., National Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F. 2d 157 (CA7 1977) (enforcing in part a Federal Trade Commission order prohibiting false and misleading advertising by an egg industry trade association concerning the relationship between cholesterol, eggs, and heart disease). In this case, Youngs describes itself as “the leader in the manufacture and sale” of contraceptives. Brief for Appellee 3.
“See Note, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205, 236 (1976). Of course, a different conclusion may be appropriate in a case where the pamphlet advertises an activity itself protected by the First Amendment. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (advertisement for religious book cannot be regulated as commercial speech); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943). This case raises no such issues. Nor do we mean to suggest that each of the characteristics present in this case must necessarily be present in order for speech to be commercial. For example, we express no opinion as to whether reference to any particular product or service is a necessary element of commercial speech. See Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sourcebook on Corporate Image and Corporate Advocacy Advertising, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1149-1337 (Comm. Print 1978) (FTC Memorandum concerning corporate image advertising).
Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 388 (1967), quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940) (defining public issues as those “about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period”).
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 530 (1980).
See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 406 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965).
Appellants argue that §3001(e)(2) does not interfere “significantly” with free speech because the statute applies only to unsolicited mailings and does not bar other channels of communication. See Brief for Appellants 16-24. However, this Court has previously declared that “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939). See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 757, n. 15 (1976). Nor is the restriction on the use of the mails an insignificant one. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 416 (1971), quoting Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues . . .”). The argument that individuals can still request that they be sent appellee’s mailings, Brief for Appellants 19, does little to bolster appellants’ position. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 307 (1965) (Government’s imposition of affirmative obligations on addressee to receive mail constitutes an abridgment of the addressee’s First Amendment rights).
Of course, the availability of alternative means of communication is relevant to an analysis of “time, place, and manner” restrictions. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, supra, at 541, n. 10; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93 (1977). Appellants do not, however, attempt to justify § 3001(e)(2) as a time, place, or manner restriction. Nor would such a characterization be tenable in light of § 3001(e)(2)’s content-based prohibition. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, supra, at 536; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, supra, at 93-94; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (1975).
The driving force behind § 3001(e)(2) was Anthony Comstock, who in his diary referred to the 1873 Act as “his law.” See Paul, The Post Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 UCLA L. Rev. 44, 57 (1961). Comstock was a prominent antivice crusader who believed that “anything remotely touching upon sex was . . . obscene.” H. Broun & M. Leech, Anthony Comstock 265 (1927). See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 520, n. 10 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The original prohibition was recodified and reenacted on a number of occasions, but its thrust remained the same — “to prevent the mails from being used to corrupt the public morals.” S. Rep. No. 113, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1955). In 1970 Congress amended the law by striking the blanket prohibitions on the mailing of all advertisements for contraceptives, but it retained without any real discussion the ban on unsolicited advertisements. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91-1472, p. 2 (1970).
The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 570 (1980); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, supra, at 95.
See Brief for Appellants 24 (“Congress did not announce these interests in the legislative history when it enacted Section 3001(e)”).
See id., at 24-33.
See, e. g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 915-920 (1982); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971).
Brief for Appellants 30.
Title 39 U. S. C. §3008, a prohibition of “pandering advertisements,” permits any householder to insulate himself from advertisements that offer for sale “matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.” § 3008(a). The addressee’s rights are absolute and “unlimited; he may prohibit the mailing of a dry goods catalog because he objects to the contents — or indeed the text of the language touting the merchandise.” Rowan, 397 U. S., at 737.
For example, many magazines contain advertisements for contraceptives. See M. Redford, G. Duncan, & D. Prager, The Condom: Increasing Utilization in the United States 145 (1974) (ads accepted in Family Health, Psychology Today, and Ladies’ Home Journal in 1970). Section 3001(e)(2) itself permits the mailing of publications containing contraceptive advertisements to subscribers. Similarly, drugstores commonly display contraceptives. And minors taking a course in sex education will undoubtedly be exposed to the subject of contraception.
In Butler this Court declared unconstitutional a Michigan statute that banned reading materials inappropriate for children. The legislation was deemed not “reasonably restricted” to the evil it sought to address; rather, the effect of the statute was “to burn the house to roast the pig.” 352 U. S., at 383.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 756-758 (1982).
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386-390 (1969).
The statute also quite clearly denies information to minors, who are entitled to “a significant measure of First Amendment protection.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S., at 212. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). The right to privacy in matters affecting procreation also applies to minors, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 72-75 (1976), so that the State could not ban the distribution of contraceptives to minors, see Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality opinion). We need not rely on such considerations in this case because of the impact of the statute on the flow of information to parents. Yet it cannot go without notice that adolescent children apparently have a pressing need for information about contraception. Available data indicate that, in 1978, over one-third of all females aged 13-19 (approximately five million people) were sexually active. Dryfoos, Contraceptive Use, Pregnancy Intentions and Pregnancy Outcomes Among U. S. Women, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 81, 83 (1982). Approximately 30% of these sexually active teenage females became pregnant during 1978; over 70% of these pregnancies (roughly 1.2 million) were unintended. Id., at 88. Almost half a million teenagers had abortions during 1978. Ibid. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
SHIPLEY v. CALIFORNIA.
No. 540,
Misc.
Decided June 23, 1969.
Kate Whyner for petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Marvin A. Bauer, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
The petitioner was convicted in California of robbery in the first degree, and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The California Supreme Court denied review. The petitioner seeks reversal of the judgment below on the ground that evidence introduced at his trial was seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Since we agree with the petitioner that the evidence was taken in the course of an unconstitutional search of his home, the judgment of the California Court of Appeal must be reversed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643.
Informed that the petitioner had been involved in a robbery, police officers went to his residence. The petitioner was not at home, but a 15-year-old girl who identified herself as the petitioner’s wife allowed the officers to enter and search her belongings. When several rings taken by the robbers were found, the officers “staked out” the house and awaited the petitioner’s return. Upon his arrival late that night, he was immediately arrested as he alighted from his car. The officers searched the petitioner and the car, and then again entered and searched the house, where they discovered under a couch a jewelry case stolen in the robbery. The car was parked outside the house and 15 or 20 feet away from it, and the officers did not request permission to conduct the second search of the house. No warrant was ever obtained. The trial court nevertheless upheld the second search on the ground that it was incident to the petitioner’s arrest, and the Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the area searched was “under the [petitioner’s] effective control” at the time of the arrest.
Under our decision today in Chimel v. California, ante, p. 752, the search clearly exceeded Fourth Amendment limitations on searches incident to arrest. But even if Chimel were to have no retroactive application — a question which we reserve for a case which requires its resolution — there is no precedent of this Court that justifies the search in this case. The Court has consistently held that a search “can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.” Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486. (Emphasis supplied.) At the very most, police officers have been permitted to search a four-room apartment in which the arrest took place. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145. See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56. But the Constitution has never been construed by this Court to allow the police, in the absence of an emergency, to arrest a person outside his home and then take him inside for the purpose of conducting a warrantless search. On the contrary, “it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein.” Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 32. (Emphasis supplied.) And in James v. Louisiana, 382 U. S. 36, the Court held that the search of the petitioner’s home after his arrest on the street two blocks away “cannot be regarded as incident to his arrest.” Id., at 37. Since the thorough search of the petitioner’s home extended without reasonable justification beyond the place in which he was arrested, it cannot be upheld under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as incident to his arrest.
Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in granting certiorari but dissents from the reversal and remand of the judgment without a hearing.
Because of our disposition of the case on this ground, we find it unnecessary to consider the contentions of the petitioner that his “wife” did not voluntarily consent to the first search, and that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the petitioner. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion. | What type of decision did the court make? | [
"opinion of the court (orally argued)",
"per curiam (no oral argument)",
"decrees",
"equally divided vote",
"per curiam (orally argued)",
"judgment of the Court (orally argued)",
"seriatim"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiontype |
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF THIBODAUX.
No. 398.
Argued April 2, 1959.
Decided June 8, 1959.
J. Raburn Monroe argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were /. Blanc Monroe, Monte M. Lemann, Malcolm L. Monroe and Andrew P. Carter.
Louis Fenner Claiborne argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Remy Chiasson.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The City of Thibodaux, Louisiana, filed a petition for expropriation in one of the Louisiana District Courts, asserting a taking of the land, buildings, and equipment of petitioner Power and Light Company. Petitioner, a Florida corporation, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District.of Louisiana on the basis of diversity of citizenship. After a .pre-trial conference in which various aspects of the case were discussed, the district judge, on his own motion, ordered that “Further proceedings herein, therefore, will be stayed until the Supreme Court of Louisiana has been afforded an opportunity to interpret Act 111 of 1900,” the authority on which the city's expropriation order was based. 153 F. Supp. 515, 517-518. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the procedure adopted by the district judge was not available in an expropriation proceeding, and that in any event no exceptional circumstances were present to justify the procedure even if available. 255 F. 2d 774. We granted certiorari, 358 U. S. 893, because of the importance of the question in the judicial enforcement of the power of eminent domain under diversity jurisdiction.
In connection with the first decision in which a closely divided Court considered and upheld jurisdiction over an eminent domain proceeding removed to the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship, Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 257, Mr. Justice Holmes made the following observation:
“The fundamental fact is that eminent domain is a prerogative of the State, which on the one hand may be exercised in any way that the State thinks fit, and on the other may not be exercised except by an authority which the State confers.”
While this was said in the dissenting opinion, the distinction between expropriation proceedings and ordinary diversity cases, though found insufficient to restrict diversity jurisdiction, remains a relevant and important consideration in the appropriate judicial administration of such actions in the federal courts.
We have increasingly recognized the wisdom of slaying actións in the federal courts pending determination by a state court of decisive issues of state law. Thus in Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 499, it was said:
“Had we or they [the lower court judges] no choice in the matter but to decide what is the law of the state, we should hésitatVlong before rejecting their forecast of Texas law. But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination.”
On the other hand, we have held that the mere difficulty of state law does not justify a federal court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of state court action. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 236. But where the issue touched upon the relationship of City to State, Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168, or involved the scope of a previously uninterpreted state statute which, if applicable, was of questionable constitutionality, Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U. S. 220, 229, we have required District Courts, and not merely sanctioned an exercise of their discretionary power, to stay their proceedings pending the submission of the state law question to state determination.
These prior cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply a technical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy derived from our federalism. We have drawn upon the judicial discretion of the chancellor to decline jurisdiction over a part or all of a case brought before him. See Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., supra. Although an eminent domain proceeding is deemqd for certain purposes of legal classification a “suit at common, law,” Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 375-376, it is of a special and peculiar nature. Mr. Justice Holmes set forth one differentiating characteristic of eminent domain: it is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative. And when, as here, a city’s power to condemn is challenged, a further aspect of sovereignty is introduced. A determination of the nature and extent of delegation of the power of eminent domain concerns the apportionment of governmental powers between City and State. The issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation interpreted in local settings. The considerations that prevailed in conventional equity suits for avoiding the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts of state government or needless friction between state and federal authorities are similarly appropriate in a state eminent domain proceeding brought in, or removed to, a federal court.
The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge, when his familiarity with the problems of local law so counsels him, to ascertain the meaning of a.disputed state statute from the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively — the courts of the State under whose statute eminent domain is sought to be exercised — rather than himself make a .dubious and tentative forecast. This course does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition. Eventually the District Court will award compensation ,if the taking is sustained. If for some reason a declaratory judgment is not promptly sought from the state courts and obtained within a reasonable time, the District Court, having retained complete control of the litigation, will doubtless assert it to decide also the question of the meaning of the state statute. The justification for this power, to be exercised within the indicated limits, lies in regard for the respective competence of the state and federal court systems and for the maintenance of harmonious federal-state relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State.
It would imply an unworthy conception of the federal judiciary to give weight to the suggestion that acknowledgment of this power will tempt some otiose or timid judge to shuffle off responsibility. “Such apprehension implies a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180, 185. Procedures for effective judicial administration presuppose a .federal judiciary composed of judges well-equipped and of sturdy character in whom may safely be vested, as is already, a wide range of. judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal.
In light of these considerations, the immediate situation quickly falls into place. In providing on his own motion for a stay in this case, an experienced district judge was responding in a sensible way to a quandary about the power of the City of Thibodaux into which he was placed by an opinion of the Attorney General of Louisiana in which it was concluded that in a strikingly similar case a Louisiana city did not have the power here claimed by the City. A Louisiana statute apparently seems to grant such a power. But that statute has never been interpreted, in respect to a situation like that before the judge, by the Louisiana courts and it would not be the first time that the authoritative tribunal has found in a statute less than meets the outsider’s eye. Informed local courts may find meaning not discernible to the outsider. The consequence of allowing this to come to pass would be that this case would be the only case in which the Louisiana statute is construed as we would, construe it, whereas the rights of all''other litigants would be thereafter governed -by a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana quite different from ours.
Caught between the language of an old but uninterpreted statute and the pronouncement of the Attorney General of Louisiana, the district judge determined to solve his conscientious perplexity by directing utilization of the legal resources of Louisiana for a prompt ascertainment of meaning through the only tribunal whose interpretation could be controlling — the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The District Court was thus exercising a fair and well-considered judicial discretion in staying proceedings pending the institution of a declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the stay order of the district Court reinstated. We assume that both,parties will cooperate in taking prompt and effective steps to secure a declaratory judgment under the Louisiana Declaratory Judgment Act, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, Tit. 13, §-§ 4231-4246, and a review of that judgment by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. By retaining the case the District Court, of course, reserves power to take such steps as may be necessary for the just disposition of the litigation should anything prevent a prompt state court determination.
Reversed.
In the petition for certiorari there was also raised the question of the appealability of the District Court’s order. In our grant of the writ we eliminated this question by limiting the scope of review. 358 U. S. 893.
The issue in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, is, of course, decisively different from the issue now before 'the Court. Here the issue is whether an experienced district judge, especially conversant with Louisiana law, who, when troubled with the construction which Louisiana courts may give to a Louisiana statute, himself initiates the taking of appropriate measures for securing construction of this doubtful and unsettled statute, (and not at all in response to any alleged attempt by petitioner to delay a decision by that judge), should be jurisdictionally disabled from seeking the controlling light of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The issue in Winter Haven was not that. It was whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court. At the very outset of his opinion Mr. Chief Justice Stone stated this issue:
“The question is whether the Circuit Court of Appeals, on appeal from the judgment of the District Court, rightly declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that decision of the case on the merits turned on questions of Florida constitutional and statutory law which the decisions of the Florida courts had left in a state of uncertainty.” 320 U. S., at 229.
In Winter Haven the Court of Appeals directed the action to be dismissed. In this case the Court of Appeals .denied a conscientious exercise by the federal district judge of his discretionary power merely to stay disposition of a retained case until he could get controlling light from the state court. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state associated with the respondent. If the respondent is a federal court or federal judge, note the "state" as the United States. The same holds for other federal employees or officials. | What state is associated with the respondent? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
21
] | sc_respondentstate |
UNITED STATES v. DEBROW.
NO. 51.
Argued October 20, 1953.
Decided November 16, 1953.
John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and Felicia H. Dubrovsky.
Ben F. Cameron argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were W. S. Henley, R. W. Thompson, Jr., Albert Sidney Johnston, Jr., W. W. Dent and T. J. Wills.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents here, defendants below, were charged by separate indictments with the crime of perjury, as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 1621. Each indictment read in material part as follows:
“[T]he defendant herein, having duly taken an oath before a competent tribunal, to wit: a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments known as the Subcommittee on Investigations, a duly created and authorized subcommittee of the United States Senate conducting official hearings in the Southern District of Mississippi, and inquiring in a matter then and there pending before the said subcommittee in which a law of the United States authorizes that an oath be administered, that he would testify truly, did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully, and contrary to said oath, state a material matter which he did not believe to be true . . .
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were sustained on the ground that the indictments did not allege the name of the person who administered the oath nor his authority to do so. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting, 203 F. 2d 699, and we granted certiorari, 345 U. S. 991, because of the importance of the question in the administration of federal criminal law.
An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged.
“The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, ‘and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offence, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.’ Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U. S. 286, 290; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 34.” Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427, 431.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure. Rule 2, F. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 7 (c) provides in pertinent part as follows:
“The indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. ... It need not contain . . . any other matter not necessary to such statement. . . .”
The essential elements of the crime of perjury as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 1621 are (1) an oath authorized by a law of the United States, (2) taken before a competent tribunal, officer or person, and (3) a false statement wil-fully made as to facts material to the hearing. The indictments allege that the subcommittee of the Senate was a competent tribunal, pursuing matters properly before it, that in such proceeding it was authorized by a law of the United States to administer oaths, and that each defendant duly took an oath before such competent tribunal and wilfully testified falsely as to material facts.
The oath administered must be authorized by a law of the United States. This requirement is met by the allegations in the indictments that the defendants had “duly taken an oath.” “Duly taken” means an oath taken according to a law which authorizes such oath. See Robertson v. Perkins, 129 U. S. 233, 236. The name of the person who administered the oath is not an essential element of the crime of perjury; the identity of such person goes only to the proof of whether the defendants were duly sworn. Therefore, all the essential elements of the offense of perjury were alleged.
The source of the requirement that an indictment for perjury must aver the name and authority of the person who administered the oath is to be found in R. S. § 5396, 18 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 558. It may be worthy of note that this provision was expressly repealed by Congress in 1948, 62 Stat. 862, in the revision and recodification of Title 18. The House Committee on Revision of the Laws had the assistance of two special consultants who were members of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and who “rendered invaluable service in the technical task of singling out for repeal or revision the statutory provisions made obsolete by the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4.. In the tabulation of laws omitted and repealed by the revision, it is stated that R. S. § 5396 was repealed because “Covered by rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id., at A214.
The charges of the indictments followed substantially the wording of the statute, which embodies all the elements of the crime, and such charges clearly informed the defendants of that with which they were accused, so as to enable them to prepare their defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecutions for the same offense. It is inconceivable to us how the defendants could possibly be misled as to the offense with which they stood charged. The sufficiency of the indictment is not a question of whether it could have been more definite and certain. If the defendants wanted more definite information as to the name of the person who administered the oath to them, they could have obtained it by requesting a bill of. particulars. Rule 7 (f), F. R. Crim. Proc.
The indictments were sufficient, and the dismissal thereof was error. The judgments are
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
“Perjury generally.
“Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
United States v. Debrow et al., U. S. D. C. S. D. Miss., Feb. 11, 1952 (unreported). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
9
] | sc_certreason |
GIBSON v. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE.
No. 6.
Argued December 5, 1961.
Restored to the calendar for reargument April 2, 1962.
Reargued October 10-11, 1962.
Decided March 25, 1963.
Robert L. Carter reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Frank D. Reeves.
Mark R. Hawes reargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Erie B. Askew.
Mr. Justice Goldberg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is the culmination of protracted litigation involving legislative investigating committees of the State of Florida and the Miami branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
The origins of the controversy date from 1956, when a committee of the Florida Legislature commenced an investigation of the N. A. A. C. P. Upon expiration of this committee’s authority, a new committee was established to pursue the inquiry. The new committee, created in 1957, held hearings and sought by subpoena to obtain the entire membership list of the Miami branch of the N. A. A. C. P.; production was refused and the committee obtained a court order requiring that the list be submitted. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that the committee could not require production and disclosure of the entire membership list of the organization, but that it could compel the custodian of the records to bring them to the hearings and to refer to them to determine whether specific individuals, otherwise identified as, or “suspected of being,” Communists, were N. A. A. C. P. members. 108 So. 2d 729, cert. denied, 360 U. S. 919.
Because of the impending expiration of the authority of the 1957 committee, the Florida Legislature in 1959 established the respondent Legislative Investigation Committee to resume the investigation of the N. A. A. C. P. The authorizing statute, c. 59-207, Fla. Laws 1959, defining the purpose and operations of the respondent, declared:
“It shall be the duty of the committee to make as complete an investigation as time permits of all organizations whose principles or activities include a course of conduct on the part of any person or group which would constitute violence, or a violation of the laws of the state, or would be inimical to the well-being and orderly pursuit of their personal and business activities by the majority of the citizens of this state. . . .”
The petitioner, then president of the Miami branch of the N. A. A. C. P., was ordered to appear before the respondent Committee on November 4, 1959, and, in accordance with the prior decision of the Florida Supreme Court, to bring with him records of the association which were in his possession or custody and which pertained to the identity of members of, and contributors to, the Miami and state N. A. A. C. P. organizations. Prior to interrogation of any witnesses the Committee chairman read the text of the statute creating the Committee and declared that the hearings would be “concerned with the activities of various organizations which have been or are presently operating in this State in the fields of, first, race relations; second, the coercive reform of social and educational practices and mores by litigation and pressured administrative action; third, of labor; fourth, of education; fifth, and other vital phases of life in this State.” The chairman also stated that the inquiry would be directed to Communists and Communist activities, including infiltration of Communists into organizations operating in the described fields.
Upon being called to the stand, the petitioner admitted that he was custodian of his organization’s membership records and testified that the local group had about 1,000 members, that individual membership was renewed annually, and that the only membership lists maintained were those for the then current year.
The petitioner told the Committee that he had not brought these records with him to the hearing and announced that he would not produce them for the purpose of answering questions concerning membership in the N. A. A. C. P. He did, however, volunteer to answer such questions on the basis of his own personal knowledge; when given the names and shown photographs of 14 persons previously identified as Communists or members of Communist front or affiliated organizations, the petitioner said that he could associate none of them with the N. A. A. C. P.
The petitioner’s refusal to produce his organization’s membership lists was based on the ground that to bring the lists to the hearing and to utilize them as the basis of his testimony would interfere with the free exercise of Fourteenth Amendment associational rights of members and prospective members of the N. A. A. C. P.
In accordance with Florida procedure, the petitioner was brought before a state court and, after a hearing, was adjudged in contempt, and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and fined $1,200, or, in default in payment thereof, sentenced to an additional six months’ imprisonment. The Florida Supreme Court sustained the judgment below, 126 So. 2d 129, and this Court granted certiorari, 366 U. S. 917; the case was argued last Term and restored to the calendar for reargument this Term, 369 U. S. 834.
I.
We are here called upon once again to resolve a conflict between individual rights of free speech and association and governmental interest in conducting legislative investigations. Prior decisions illumine the contending principles.
This Court has repeatedly held that rights of association are within the ambit of the constitutional protections afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415. The respondent Committee does not contend otherwise, nor could it, for, as was said in NAACP v. Alabama, supra, “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” 357 U. S., at 460. And it is equally clear that the guarantee encompasses protection of privacy of association in organizations such as that of which the petitioner is president; indeed, in both the Bates and Alabama cases, supra, this Court held N. A. A. C. P. membership lists of the very type here in question to be beyond the States’ power of discovery in the circumstances there presented.
The First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free speech and free association are fundamental and highly prized, and “need breathing space to survive.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433. “Freedoms such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.” Bates v. Little Rock, supra, 361 U. S., at 523. And, as declared in NAACP v. Alabama, supra, 357 U. S., at 462, “It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] . . . effective . . . restraint on freedom of association .... This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations. . . . Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.” So it is here.
At the same time, however, this Court’s prior holdings demonstrate that there can be no question that the State has power adequately to inform itself — through legislative investigation, if it so desires — in order to act and protect its legitimate and vital interests. As this Court said in considering the propriety of the congressional inquiry challenged in Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178: “The power ... to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.” 354 U. S., at 187. And, more recently, it was declared that “The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 111. It is no less obvious, however, that the legislative power to investigate, broad as it may be, is not without limit. The fact that the general scope of the inquiry is authorized and permissible does not compel the conclusion that the investigatory body is free to inquire into or demand all forms of information. Validation of the broad subject matter under investigation does not necessarily carry with it automatic and wholesale validation of all individual questions, subpoenas, and documentary demands. See, e. g., Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 197-199. See also Barenblatt v. United States, supra, 360 U. S., at 127-130. When, as in this case, the claim is made that particular legislative inquiries and demands infringe substantially upon First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights of individuals, the courts are called upon to, and must, determine the permissibility of the challenged actions, Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 198 — 199 ; “[T]he delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substan-tiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights,” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161. The interests here at stake are of significant magnitude, and neither their resolution nor impact is limited to, or dependent upon, the particular parties here involved. Freedom and viable government are both, for this purpose, indivisible concepts; whatever affects the rights of the parties here, affects all.
II.
Significantly, the parties are in substantial agreement as to the proper test to be applied to reconcile the competing claims of government and individual and to determine the propriety of the Committee’s demands. As declared by the respondent Committee in its brief to this Court, “Basically, this case hinges entirely on the question of whether the evidence before the Committee [was] . . . sufficient to show probable cause or nexus between the N. A. A. C. P. Miami Branch, and Communist activities.” We understand this to mean — regardless of the label applied, be it “nexus,” “foundation,” or whatever- — -that it is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into the area of constitütionally protected rights of speech, press, association and petition that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest. Absent such a relation between the N. A. A. C. P. and conduct in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern, the Committee has not “demonstrated so cogent an interest in obtaining and making public” the membership information sought to be obtained as to “justify the substantial abridgment of associational freedom which such disclosures will effect.” Bates v. Little Rock, supra, 361 U. S., at 524. “Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.” Ibid.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the respondent Committee contends that the prior decisions of this Court in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109; Wilkinson V. United States, 365 U. S. 399; and Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431, compel a result here upholding the legislative right of inquiry. In Barenblatt, Wilkinson, and Braden, however, it was a refusal to answer a question or questions concerning the witness’ own past or present membership in the Communist Party which supported his conviction. It is apparent that the necessary preponderating governmental interest and, in fact, the very result in those cases were founded on the holding that the Communist Party is not an ordinary or legitimate political party, as known in this country, and that, because of its particular nature, membership therein is itself a permissible subject of regulation and legislative scrutiny. Assuming the correctness of the premises on which those cases were decided, no further demonstration of compelling governmental interest was deemed necessary, since the direct object of the challenged questions there was discovery of membership in the Communist Party, a matter held pertinent to a proper subject then under inquiry.
Here, however, it is not alleged Communists who are the witnesses before the Committee and it is not discovery of their membership in that party which is the object of the challenged inquiries. Rather, it is the N. A. A. C. P. itself which is the subject of the investigation, and it is its local president, the petitioner, who was called before the Committee and held in contempt because he refused to divulge the contents of its membership records. There is no suggestion that the Miami branch of the N. A. A. C. P. or the national organization with which it is affiliated was, or is, itself a subversive organization. Nor is there any indication that the activities or policies of the N. A. A. C. P. were either Communist dominated or influenced. In fact, this very record indicates that the association was and is against communism and has voluntarily taken steps to keep Communists from being members. Each year since 1950, the N. A. A. C. P. has adopted resolutions barring Communists from membership in the organization. Moreover, the petitioner testified that all prospective officers of the local organization are thoroughly investigated for Communist or subversive connections and, though subversive activities constitute grounds for termination of association membership, no such expulsions from the branch occurred during the five years preceding the investigation.
Thus, unlike the situation in Barenblatt, Wilkinson and Braden, supra, the Committee was not here seeking from the petitioner or the records of which he was custodian any information as to whether he, himself, or even other persons were members of the Communist Party, Communist front or affiliated organizations, or other allegedly subversive groups; instead, the entire thrust of the demands on the petitioner was that he disclose whether other persons were members of the N. A. A. C. P., itself a concededly legitimate and nonsubversive organization. Compelling such an organization, engaged in the exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, to disclose its membership presents, under our cases, a question wholly different from compelling the Communist Party to disclose its own membership. Moreover, even to say, as in Barenblatt, supra, 360 U. S., at 129, that it is permissible to inquire into the subject of Communist infiltration of educational or other organizations does not mean that it is permissible to demand or require from such other groups disclosure of their membership by inquiry into their records when such disclosure will seriously inhibit or impair the exercise of constitutional rights and has not itself been demonstrated to bear a crucial relation to a proper governmental interest or to be essential to fulfillment of a proper governmental purpose. The prior holdings that governmental interest in controlling subversion and the particular character of the Communist Party and its objectives outweigh the right of individual Communists to conceal party membership or affiliations by no means require the wholly different conclusion that other groups— concededly legitimate — automatically forfeit their rights to privacy of association simply because the general subject matter of the legislative inquiry is Communist subversion or infiltration. The fact that governmental interest was deemed compelling in Barenblatt, Wilkinson, and Braden and held to support the inquiries there made into membership in the Communist Party does not resolve the issues here, where the challenged questions go to membership in an admittedly lawful organization.
Respondent’s reliance on Uphaus v. Wyman, supra, as controlling is similarly misplaced. There, this Court upheld the right of the State of New Hampshire, in connection with an investigation of whether “subversive” persons were within the State, to obtain a list of guests who attended a World Fellowship summer camp located in the State. In Uphaus this Court found that there was demonstrated a sufficient connection between subversive activity — held there to be a proper subject of governmental concern — and the World Fellowship, itself, to justify discovery of the guest list; no semblance of such a nexus between the N. A. A. C. P. and subversive activities has been shown here. See III, infra. Moreover, contrary to the facts in this case, the claim to associational privacy in Uphaus was held to be “tenuous at best,” 360 U. S., at 80, since the disputed list was already a matter of public record by virtue of a generally applicable New Hampshire law requiring that places of accommodation, including the camp in question, maintain a guest register open to public authorities. Thus, this Court noted that the registration statute “made public at the inception the association they [the guests] now wish to keep private.” 360 U. S., at 81. Finally, in Uphaus, the State was investigating whether subversive persons were within its boundaries and whether their presence constituted a threat to the State. No such purpose or need is evident here. The Florida Committee is not seeking to identify subversives by questioning the petitioner; apparently it is satisfied that it already knows who they are.
III.
In the absence of directly determinative authority, we turn, then, to consideration of the facts now before us. Obviously, if the respondent were still seeking discovery of the entire membership list, we could readily dispose of this case on the authority of Bates v. Little Rock, and NAACP v. Alabama, supra; a like result would follow if it were merely attempting to do piecemeal what could not be done in a single step. Though there are indications that the respondent Committee intended to inquire broadly into the N. A. A. C. P. membership records, there is no need to base our decision today upon a prediction as to the course which the Committee might have pursued if initially unopposed by the petitioner. Instead, we rest our result on the fact that the record in this case is insufficient to show a substantial connection between the Miami branch of the N. A. A. C. P. and Communist activities which the respondent Committee itself concedes is an essential prerequisite to demonstrating the immediate, substantial, and subordinating state interest necessary to sustain its right of inquiry into the membership lists of the association.
Basically, the evidence relied upon by the respondent to demonstrate the necessary foundation consists of the testimony of R. J. Strickland, an investigator for the Committee and its predecessors, and Arlington Sands, a former association official.
Strickland identified by name some 14 persons whom he said either were or had been Communists or members of Communist “front” or “affiliated” organizations. His description of their connection with the association was simply that “each of them has been a member of and/or participated in the meetings and other affairs of the N. A. A. C. P. in Dade County, Florida.” In addition, one of the group was identified as having made, at an unspecified time, a contribution of unspecified amount to the local organization.
We do not know from this ambiguous testimony how many of the 14 were supposed to have been N. A. A. C. P. members. For all that appears, and there is no indicated reason to entertain a contrary belief, each or all of the named persons may have attended no more than one or two wholly public meetings of the N. A. A. C. P., and such attendance, like their membership, to the extent it existed, in the association, may have been wholly peripheral and begun and ended many years prior even to commencement of the present investigation in 1956. In addition, it is not clear whether the asserted Communist affiliations and the association with the N. A. A. C. P., however slight, coincided in time. Moreover, except for passing reference to participation in annual elections, there is no indication that membership carried with it any right to control over policy or activities, much less that any was sought. The reasoning which would find support for the challenged inquiries in Communist attendance at meetings from which no member of the public appears to have been barred is even more attenuated, since the only prerogative seemingly attaching to such attendance was the right to listen to the scheduled speaker or program. Mere presence at a public meeting or bare membership— without more — is not infiltration of the sponsoring organization.
It also appears that a number of the 14 persons named by Strickland were no longer even residents of Florida; as to these people, it is difficult to see any basis for supposing that they would be current — much less influential — members of the Miami branch of the N. A. A. C. P., and no other pertinent reason for the inquiry as to them could be found because, as the petitioner testified, the only membership records available related to the then current year.
Strickland did refer to one informant as having been instructed to infiltrate the N. A. A. C. P. and “other organizations.” But any persuasive impact this recitation might otherwise have had is neutralized by the same informant’s disclosure that his response to this command was simply to attend N. A. A. C. P. meetings “on occasions” and by the absence of any other substantial indication of infiltration. This is not a case in which, after a proper foundation has been laid, a Communist is himself interrogated about his own alleged subversive activities or those of the Communist Party, all as part of an inquiry related to what this Court has held to be a legitimate legislative purpose to investigate the activities of the party or its knowing members.
The testimony of Sands, the other assertedly important witness, added not even a semblance of anything more convincing with regard to the existence of a connection between subversion and the N. A. A. C. P. Sands, whose officership in the association predated 1950 and who admitted that he was uncertain even as to his then current membership in the N. A. A. C. P., merely corroborated to some extent certain of Strickland’s references to attendance at N. A. A. C. P. meetings by a few of the persons identified as Communists. However, this too must have related to some time in the unspecified past, since Sands admitted that he had not even been to an N. A. A. C. P. meeting in two years. Sands also noted that one of the asserted Communists, a lawyer, had represented the association in a “murder case,” but there is no explanation as to how this fact might indicate or support a conclusion of Communist influence.
Nor does the fact that the N. A. A. C. P. has demonstrated its antipathy to communism and an awareness of its threat by passage of annual antisubversion resolutions carry with it any permissible inference that it has, in fact, been infiltrated, influenced, or in any way dominated or used by Communists. Indeed, given the gross improbability of a Communist dominated or influenced organization denouncing communism, the more reasonable inference would seem to be to the contrary.
Finally, the Committee can find no support for its inquiry into the membership list from Strickland’s suggestion that Sands had once uncertainly told him (Strickland) that one or possibly two of the group of 14 may have “made a talk” to the local N. A. A. C. P. chapter, again at some unspecified time in the past. There is no indication that the subject of the “talks” was in any way improper and, in any event, such isolated incidents cannot be made to do the work of substantial evidence of subversive influence or infiltration. The same is true of the few additional vague and somewhat unspecific references to other minor and nondirective participation in the affairs of the local group.
This summary of the evidence discloses the utter failure to demonstrate the existence of any substantial relationship between the N. A. A. C. P. and subversive or Communist activities. In essence, there is here merely indirect, less than unequivocal, and mostly hearsay testimony that in years past some 14 people who were asserted to be, or to have been, Communists or members of Communist front or “affiliated organizations” attended occasional meetings of the Miami branch of the N. A. A. C. P. “and/or” were members of that branch, which had a total membership of about 1,000.
On the other hand, there was no claim made at the hearings, or since, that the N. A. A. C. P. or its Miami branch was engaged in any subversive activities or that its legitimate activities have been dominated or influenced by Communists. Without any indication of present subversive infiltration in, or influence on, the Miami branch of the N. A. A. C. P., and without any reasonable, demonstrated factual basis to believe that such infiltration or influence existed in the past, or was actively attempted or sought in the present — in short<without any showing of a meaningful relationship between the N. A. A. C. P., Miami branch, and subversives or subversive or other illegal activitieshywe are asked to find the compelling and subordinating state interest which must exist if essential freedoms are to be curtailed or inhibited. This we cannot do. The respondent Committee has laid no adequate foundation for its direct demands upon the officers and records of a wholly legitimate organization for disclosure of its membership; the Committee has neither demonstrated nor pointed out any threat to the State by virtue of the existence of the N. A. A. C. P. or the pursuit of its activities or the minimal associational ties of the 14 asserted Communists. The strong associational interest in maintaining the privacy of membership lists of groups engaged in the constitutionally protected free trade in ideas and beliefs may not be substantially infringed upon such a slender showing as here made by the respondent. While, of course, all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these protections, they are all the more essential here, where the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and the deterrent and “chilling” effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association is consequently the more immediate and substantial. What we recently said in NAACP v. Button, supra, with respect to the State of Virginia is, as appears from the record, equally applicable here: “We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered the intense resentment and opposition of the politically dominant white community . . . .” 371 U. S., at 435.
Of course, a legislative investigation — as any investigation — must proceed “step by step,” Barenblatt v. United States, supra, 360 U. S., at 130, but step by step or in totality, an adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid before proceeding in such a manner as will substantially intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally protected activities or seriously interfere with similarly protected associational rights. No such foundation has been laid here. The respondent Committee has failed to demonstrate the compelling and subordinating governmental interest essential to support direct inquiry into the membership records of the N. A. A. C. P.
Nothing we say here impairs or denies the existence of the underlying legislative right to investigate or legislate with respect to subversive activities by Communists or anyone else; our decision today deals only with the manner in which such power may be exercised and we hold simply that groups which themselves are neither engaged in subversive or other illegal or improper activities nor demonstrated to have any substantial connections with such activities are to be protected in their rights of free and private association. As declared in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 245 (opinion of The Chief Justice), “It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of communication of ideas . . .
To permit legislative inquiry to proceed on less than an adequate foundation would be to sanction unjustified and unwarranted intrusions into the very heart of the constitutional privilege to be secure in associations in legitimate organizations engaged in the exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; to impose a lesser standard than we here do would be inconsistent with the maintenance of those essential conditions basic to the preservation of our democracy.
The judgment below must be and is
Reversed.
The prefatory portions of the statute noted the existence of the predecessor committees, recited that the 1957 committee had “been prevented” from conducting its investigations by “the deliberate and almost unanimous action of the witnesses before it in resorting to litigation to frustrate said committee’s investigations” and asserted that as a result the committee was “mired down” in numerous lawsuits; the committees’ records and reports were said to disclose “a great abuse of the judicial processes,” as well as violent or illegal conduct, or the threat thereof, and Communist attempts to “agitate and engender ill-will between the races.” The enactment concluded that “there still exists the same grave and pressing need for such a committee to exist ... to continue and complete the above two committees’ work, and to participate in and contest the efforts represented by the above referred to litigation to whittle away further at this State’s rights and sovereignty, and to be ever ready to investigate any agitator who may appear in Florida in the interim [between legislative sessions].”
See, e. g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 127-128. Thus, this Court “has upheld federal legislation aimed at the Communist problem which in a different context would certainly have raised constitutional issues of the gravest character.” Id., at 128. See also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 88-105.
The Florida Supreme Court, in a companion case, Graham v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 126 So. 2d 133, 136, characterized the N. A. A. C. P. as “an organization perfectly legitimate but allegedly unpopular in the community.” Interestingly, in Graham, which arose out of the very same- hearings held on the same days as here involved, the Florida court, apparently on the same record we now have before us, upheld the Fourteenth Amendment claims of a witness, not himself asserted to have subversive connections, who refused to answer questions going to his own membership in the N. A. A. Ó. P. The court there took notice of the “considerable” evidence of possible or probable reprisals and deterrent effect on the N. A. A. C. P. resulting from involuntary disclosure of affiliation with the organization. Id,., at 134-135.
Interrogation was not to be confined simply to ascertaining whether or not the 14 persons, first named by Strickland, the Committee investigator, were members of the N. A. A. C. P. Strickland had named 38 other persons about whom inquiry was to be made, and, even more significantly, the Committee counsel declared that he had “a lot of other people” he wanted to ask about.
It is apparent that no impetus to relevant legislative interest or need can be garnered from Strickland’s additional identification of a group of 33 alleged Communists or five more asserted card-carrying party members since these individuals were in no way evidentially connected with the N. A. A. C. P., locally or nationally. Were it otherwise, the mere demonstration of the existence of local and extant Communists would always support a demand for membership lists of any organization which might be thought to be an object of infiltration, and the constitutional guarantees of privacy of association and assembly would become meaningless.
For example, on retaking the stand, Strickland said that Sands had told him that one of the 14 had been a member of the N. A. A. C. P. prior to 1950 and that another had “delivered” N. A. A. C. P. “leaflets”; there was also separate testimony that another was believed to have been an N. A. A. C. P. member “at one time.” These statements and scattered allusions to a few of the 14 “possibly” having been “seen” at N. A. A. C. P. public meetings obviously cannot support infringement of constitutional rights.
There is here even less of a connection with subversive activities than was shown in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, in which, on grounds not here relevant, The Chief Justice, writing for four members of the Court, deemed the inquiry improper. There the State Attorney General, as part of an investigation of subversive activities, sought to question a witness who, though he denied that he himself was a Communist, had “a record of affiliation with groups cited by the Attorney General of the United States or the House Un-Amer-ican Activities Committee,” 354 U. S., at 255, 261 (concurring opinion). The contested questions related, inter alia, to the activities of third persons in the Progressive Party and “considerable sworn testimony [had] . . . been given in [the] . . . investigation to the effect that the Progressive Party in New Hampshire [had] . . . been heavily infiltrated by members of the Communist Party and that the policies and purposes of the Progressive Party have been directly influenced by members of the Communist Party.” Id., at 265 (quoting from state court opinion). The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in which MR. Justice HarlaN joined, declared with respect to this supporting demonstration that “the inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen’s political loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meagre a countervailing interest of the State as may be argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy threat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in the origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and in petitioner’s relations to these.” Ibid. The concurring opinion concluded that “Whatever, on the basis of massive proof and in the light of history, of which this Court may well take judicial notice, be the justification for not regarding the Communist Party as a conventional political party, no such justification has been afforded in regard to the Progressive Party. A foundation in fact and reason would have to be established far weightier than the intimations that appear in the record to warrant such a view of the Progressive Party. This precludes the questioning that petitioner resisted in regard to that Party.” Id., at 266. Precisely the same reasoning applies herei While in Sweezy it did not clearly appear that the persons about whom inquiry was made were themselves asserted to have Communist associations, the interest in political and associational privacy was no stronger there than here; if anything, the fact that the legitimate organization itself — -rather than a witness suspected of subversive ties — is here put to questioning through its president and that it is its own membership records which are the objects of scrutiny makes the claimed right worthy of more— not less — protection. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
11
] | sc_certreason |
PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE CO., dba AT&T CALIFORNIA, et al. v. LINKLINE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al.
No. 07-512.
Argued December 8, 2008
Decided February 25, 2009
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 457.
Aaron M. Fanner argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Michael K. Kellogg.
Deanne E. Maynard argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With her on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attorney General Barnett, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney General O’Connell, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, and David Seidman.
Maxwell M. Blecher argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Richard M. Brunell argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae for the American Antitrust Institute. With him on the brief was Albert A. Foer
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. by Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, Stephen R. McCullough, State Solicitor General, William C. Mims, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Sarah Oxenham Allen, Assistant Attorney General, and William E. Thro, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Bill McCollum of Florida, Steve Six of Kansas, Jon C. Bruning of Nebraska, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Robert M. McKenna of Washington; for Abbott Laboratories by Gene C. Schaerr, Steffen N. Johnson, Charles B. Klein, James F. Hurst, and Linda T. Coberly; for Verizon Communications Inc. et al. by John Thorne, Richard G. Taranto, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Mark J. Botti, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for COMPTEL by Samuel L. Feder, Elaine J. Goldenberg, and Mary C. Albert; and for Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics by J. Gregory Sidak and Robert H. Bork, both pro se.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs in this case, respondents here, allege that a competitor subjected them to a “price squeeze” in violation of §2 of the Sherman Act. They assert that such a claim can arise when a vertically integrated firm sells inputs at wholesale and also sells finished goods or services at retail. If that firm has power in the wholesale market, it can simultaneously raise the wholesale price of inputs and cut the retail price of the finished good. This will have the effect of “squeezing” the profit margins of any competitors in the retail market. Those firms will have to pay more for the inputs they need; at the same time, they will have to cut their retail prices to match the other firm’s prices. The question before us is whether such a price-squeeze claim may be brought under § 2 of the Sherman Act when the defendant is under no antitrust obligation to sell the inputs to the plaintiff in the first place. We hold that no such claim may be brought.
I
This case involves the market for digital subscriber line (DSL) service, which is a method of connecting to the Internet at high speeds over telephone lines. AT&T owns much of the infrastructure and facilities needed to provide DSL service in California. In particular, AT&T controls most of what is known as the “last mile” — the lines that connect homes and businesses to the telephone network. Competing DSL providers must generally obtain access to AT&T’s facilities in order to serve their customers.
Until recently, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required incumbent phone companies such as AT&T to sell transmission service to independent DSL providers, under the theory that this would spur competition. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Red. 14853, 14868 (2005). In 2005, the FCC largely abandoned this forced-sharing requirement in light of the emergence of a competitive market beyond DSL for high-speed Internet service; DSL now faces robust competition from cable companies and wireless and satellite services. Id., at 14879-14887. As a condition for a recent merger, however, AT&T remains bound by the mandatory interconnection requirements, and is obligated to provide wholesale “DSL transport” service to independent firms at a price no greater than the retail price of AT&T’s DSL service. In re AT&T Inc., 22 FCC Red. 5662, 5814 (2007).
The plaintiffs are four independent Internet service providers (ISPs) that compete with AT&T in the retail DSL market. Plaintiffs do not own all the facilities needed to supply their customers with this service. They instead lease DSL transport service from AT&T pursuant to the merger conditions described above. AT&T thus participates in the DSL market at both the wholesale and retail levels; it provides plaintiffs and other independent ISPs with wholesale DSL transport service, and it also sells DSL service directly to consumers at retail.
In July 2003, the plaintiffs brought suit in District Court, alleging that AT&T violated §2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 2, by monopolizing the DSL market in California. The complaint alleges that AT&T refused to deal with the plaintiffs, denied the plaintiffs access to essential facilities, and engaged in a “price squeeze.” App. 18-19. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that AT&T squeezed their profit margins by setting a high wholesale price for DSL transport and a low retail price for DSL Internet service. This maneuver allegedly “exclude[d] and unreasonably impede[d] competítion,” thus allowing AT&T to “preserve and maintain its monopoly control of DSL access to the Internet.” Ibid.
In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398, 410 (2004), we held that a firm with no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at all is under no obligation to provide those rivals with a “sufficient” level of service. Shortly after we issued that decision, AT&T moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims in this case were foreclosed by Trinko. The District Court held that AT&T had no antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiffs, App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a-85a, but it denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the price-squeeze claims, id., at 86a-90a. The court acknowledged that AT&T’s argument “has a certain logic to it,” but held that Trinko “simply does not involve price-squeeze claims.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. The District Court also noted that price-squeeze claims have been recognized by several Circuits and “are cognizable under existing antitrust standards.” Id., at 89a, and n. 27.
At the District Court’s request, plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint providing greater detail about their price-squeeze claims. AT&T again moved to dismiss, arguing that price-squeeze claims could only proceed if they met the two established requirements for predatory pricing: below-cost retail pricing and a “‘dangerous probability’” that the defendant will recoup any lost profits. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U. S. 209, 222-224 (1993). The District Court did not reach the issue whether all price-squeeze claims must meet the Brooke Group requirements, because it concluded that the amended complaint, “generously construed,” satisfied those criteria. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a-49a, 56a. The court also certified its earlier order for interlocutory appeal on the question whether “Trinko bars price squeeze claims where the parties are compelled to deal under the federal communications laws.” Id., at 56a-57a.
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of AT&T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the price-squeeze claims, linkline Communications, Inc. v. SBC California, Inc., 503 F. 3d 876 (2007). The court emphasized that “Trinko did not involve a price squeezing theory.” Id., at 883. Because “a price squeeze theory formed part of the fabric of traditional antitrust law prior to Trinko,” the Court of Appeals concluded that “those claims should remain viable notwithstanding either the telecommunications statutes or Trinko.” Ibid. Based on the record before it, the court held that plaintiffs’ original complaint stated a potentially valid claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
Judge Gould dissented, noting that “the notion of a ‘price squeeze’ is itself in a squeeze between two recent Supreme Court precedents.” Id., at 886. A price-squeeze claim involves allegations of both a high wholesale price and a low retail price, so Judge Gould analyzed each component separately. He concluded that “Trinko insulates from antitrust review the setting of the upstream price.” Id., at 886-887. With respect to the downstream price, he argued that “the retail side of a price squeeze cannot be considered to create an antitrust violation if the retail pricing does not satisfy the requirements of Brooke Group, which set unmistakable limits on what can be considered to be predatory within the meaning of the antitrust laws.” Id., at 887 (citing Brooke Group, supra, at 222-224). Judge Gould concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not satisfy these requirements because it contained no allegations that the retail price was set below cost and that those losses could later be recouped. 503 F. 3d, at 887. Judge Gould would have allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint if they could, in good faith, raise predatory pricing claims meeting the Brooke Group requirements. 503 F. 3d, at 887.
We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. 916 (2008), to resolve a conflict over whether a plaintiff can bring price-squeeze claims under §2 of the Sherman Act when the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiff. See Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F. 3d 666, 673-674 (CADC 2005) (holding that Trinko bars such claims). We reverse.
II
This case has assumed an unusual posture. The plaintiffs now assert that they agree with Judge Gould’s dissenting position that price-squeeze claims must meet the Brooke Group requirements for predatory pricing. They ask us to vacate the decision below in their favor and remand with instructions that they be given leave to amend their complaint to allege a Brooke Group claim. In other words, plaintiffs are no longer pleased with their initial theory of the case, and ask for a mulligan to try again under a different theory. Some amici argue that the case is moot in light of this confession of error. They contend that “[w]ith both petitioners and respondents now aligned on [the same] side of the question presented, no party with a concrete stake in this case’s outcome is advocating for the contrary position.” Brief for COMPTEL 6.
We do not think this case is moot. First, the parties continue to seek different relief. AT&T asks us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint at issue. The plaintiffs ask that we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions that they be given leave to amend their complaint. The parties thus continue to be adverse not only in the litigation as a whole, but in the specific proceedings before this Court.
Second, it is not clear that the plaintiffs have unequivocally abandoned their price-squeeze claims. In their brief and at oral argument, the plaintiffs continue to refer to their “pricing squeeze claim.” See Brief for Respondents 13. They appear to acknowledge that those claims must meet the Brooke Group requirements, but it is not clear whether they believe the necessary showing can be made in at least partial reliance on the sort of price-squeeze theory accepted by the Court of Appeals. At one point, for example, the plaintiffs suggest that “the DSL transport price” may be pertinent to their claims going forward under the theory of Judge Gould’s dissent; that opinion, however, concluded that Trinko “in essence takes the issu[e] of wholesale pricing out of the case.” 503 F. 3d, at 886. Given this ambiguity, the case before us remains a live dispute appropriate for decision. Cf. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189 (2000) (a party’s voluntary conduct renders a case moot only if it is “ ‘absolutely clear’ ” the party will take that course of action).
Amici also argue that we should dismiss the writ of certiorari because of the “lack of adversarial presentation” by an interested party. Brief for COMPTEL 7. To the contrary, prudential concerns favor our answering the question presented. Plaintiffs defended the Court of Appeals’ decision at the certiorari stage, and the parties have invested a substantial amount of time, effort, and resources in briefing and arguing the merits of this case. In the absence of a decision from this Court on the merits, the Court of Appeals’ decision would presumably remain binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit, and the Circuit conflict we granted certiorari to resolve would persist. Two amici have submitted briefs defending the Court of Appeals’ decision on the merits, and we granted the motion of one of those amici to participate in oral argument. 555 U. S. 1029 (2008). We think it appropriate to proceed to address the question presented.
Ill
A
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209,15 U. S. C. §2. Simply possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2; rather, the statute targets “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 570-571 (1966).
As a general rule, businesses are free to choose the parties with whom they will deal, as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307 (1919). But there are rare instances in which a dominant firm may incur antitrust liability for purely unilateral conduct. For example, we have ruled that firms may not charge “predatory” prices — below-cost prices that drive rivals out of the market and allow the monopolist to raise its prices later and recoup its losses. Brooke Group, 509 U. S., at 222-224. Here, however, the complaint at issue does not contain allegations meeting those requirements. App. 10-24.
There are also limited circumstances in which a firm’s unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U. S. 585, 608-611 (1985). Here, however, the District Court held that AT&T had no such antitrust duty to deal with its competitors, App. to Pet. for Cert. 84a-85a, and this holding was not challenged on appeal.
The challenge here focuses on retail prices — where there is no predatory pricing — and the terms of dealing — where there is no duty to deal. Plaintiffs’ price-squeeze claims challenge a different type of unilateral conduct in which a firm “squeezes” the profit margins of its competitors. This requires the defendant to be operating in two markets, a wholesale (“upstream”) market and a retail (“downstream”) market. A firm with market power in the upstream market can squeeze its downstream competitors by raising the wholesale price of inputs while cutting its own retail prices. This will raise competitors’ costs (because they will have to pay more for their inputs) and lower their revenues (because they will have to match the dominant firm’s low retail price). Price-squeeze plaintiffs assert that defendants must leave them a “fair” or “adequate” margin between the wholesale price and the retail price. In this case, we consider whether a plaintiff can state a price-squeeze claim when the defendant has no obligation under the antitrust laws to deal with the plaintiff at wholesale.
B
A straightforward application of our recent decision in Trinko forecloses any challenge to AT&T’s wholesale prices. In Trinko, Verizon was required by statute to lease its network elements to competing firms at wholesale rates. 540 U. S., at 402-403. The plaintiff — a customer of one of Verizon’s rivals — asserted that Verizon denied its competitors access to interconnection support services, making it difficult for those competitors to fill their customers’ orders. Id., at 404-405. The complaint alleged that this conduct in the upstream market violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by impeding the ability of independent carriers to compete in the downstream market for local telephone service. Ibid.
We held that the plaintiff’s claims were not actionable under § 2. Given that Verizon had no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at all, we concluded that “Verizon’s alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of service to rivals” did not violate the Sherman Act. Id., at 410. Trinko thus makes clear that if a firm has no antitrust duty to deal with its competitors at wholesale, it certainly has no duty to deal under terms and conditions that the rivals find commercially advantageous.
In this case, as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at wholesale; any such duty arises only from FCC regulations, not from the Sherman Act. See supra, at 448. There is no meaningful distinction between the “insufficient assistance” claims we rejected in Trinko and the plaintiffs’ price-squeeze claims in the instant case. The Trinko plaintiff challenged the quality of Verizon’s interconnection service, while this case involves a challenge to AT&T’s pricing structure. But for antitrust purposes, there is no reason to distinguish between price and nonprice components of a transaction. See, e. g., American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 223 (1998) (“Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services and vice versa”). The nub of the complaint in both Trinko and this case is identical— the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants (upstream monopolists) abused their power in the wholesale market to prevent rival firms from competing effectively in the retail market. Trinko holds that such claims are not cognizable under the Sherman Act in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not regard Trinko as controlling because that case did not directly address price-squeeze claims. 503 F. 3d, at 883; App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a; see also Brief for COMPTEL as Amicus Curiae 27-30. This is technically true, but the reasoning of Trinko applies with equal force to price-squeeze claims. AT&T could have squeezed its competitors’ profits just as effectively by providing poor-quality interconnection service to the plaintiffs, as Verizon allegedly did in Trinko. But a firm with no duty to deal in the wholesale market has no obligation to deal under terms and conditions favorable to its competitors. If AT&T had simply stopped providing DSL transport service to the plaintiffs, it would not have run afoul of the Sherman Act. Under these circumstances, AT&T was not required to offer this service at the wholesale prices the plaintiffs would have preferred.
The other component of a price-squeeze claim is the assertion that the defendant’s retail prices are “too low,” Here too plaintiffs’ claims find no support in our existing antitrust doctrine.
“[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 594 (1986). In cases seeking to impose antitrust liability for prices that are too low, mistaken inferences are “especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” Ibid.; see also Brooke Group, 509 U. S., at 226; Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U. S. 104, 121-122, n. 17 (1986). To avoid chilling aggressive price competition, we have carefully limited the circumstances under which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that prices are too low. Specifically, to prevail on a predatory pricing claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) “the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs”; and (2) there is a “dangerous probability” that the defendant will be able to recoup its “investment” in below-cost prices. Brooke Group, supra, at 222-224. “Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U. S. 328, 340 (1990).
In the complaint at issue in this interlocutory appeal, App. 10-24, there is no allegation that AT&T’s conduct met either of the Brooke Group requirements. Recognizing a price-squeeze claim where the defendant’s retail price remains above cost would invite the precise harm we sought to avoid in Brooke Group: Firms might raise their retail prices or refrain from aggressive price competition to avoid potential antitrust liability. See 509 U. S., at 223 (“As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price cutting”).
Plaintiffs’ price-squeeze claim, looking to the relation between retail and wholesale prices, is thus nothing more than an amalgamation of a meritless claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the wholesale level. If there is no duty to deal at the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level, then a Arm is certainly not required to price both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals’ profit margins.
C
Institutional concerns also counsel against recognition of such claims. We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of clear rules in antitrust law. Courts are ill suited “to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing.” Trinko, 540 U. S., at 408. “ 'No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-today controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.”’ Id., at 415 (quoting Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L. J. 841, 853 (1989)); see also Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F. 2d 17, 25 (CA1 1990) (Breyer, C. J.) (“[A]ntitrust courts normally avoid direct price administration, relying on rules and remedies . . . that are easier to administer”).
It is difficult enough for courts to identify and remedy an alleged anticompetitive practice at one level, such as predatory pricing in retail markets or a violation of the duty-to-deal doctrine at the wholesale level. See Brooke Group, supra, at 225 (predation claims “requir[e] an understanding of the extent and duration of the alleged predation, the relative financial strength of the predator and its intended victim, and their respective incentives and will”); Trinko, supra, at 408. Recognizing price-squeeze claims would require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not being squeezed. And courts would be aiming at a moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices that may result in a squeeze.
Perhaps most troubling, firms that seek to avoid price-squeeze liability will have no safe harbor for their pricing practices. See Concord, supra, at 22 (antitrust rules “must be clear enough for lawyers to explain them to clients”). At least in the predatory pricing context, firms know they will not incur liability as long as their retail prices are above cost. Brooke Group, supra, at 223. No such guidance is available for price-squeeze claims. See, e. g., 3B P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 767c, p. 138 (3d ed. 2008) (“[A]ntitrust faces a severe problem not only in recognizing any § 2 [price-squeeze] offense, but also in formulating a suitable remedy”).
The most commonly articulated standard for price squeezes is that the defendant must leave its rivals a “fair” or “adequate” margin between the wholesale price and the retail price. See Concord, supra, at 23-25; Alcoa, 148 F. 2d 416, 437-438 (CA2 1945). One of our colleagues has highlighted the flaws of this test in Socratic fashion:
“[H]ow is a judge or jury to determine a ‘fair price?’ Is it the price charged by other suppliers of the primary product? None exist. Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the primary level not monopolized? How can the court determine this price without examining costs and demands, indeed without acting like a rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting proceedings of which often last for several years? Further, how is the court to decide the proper size of the price ‘gap?’ Must it be large enough for all independent competing firms to make a ‘living profit,’ no matter how inefficient they may be? . . . And how should the court respond when costs or demands change over time, as they inevitably will?” Concord, supra, at 25.
Some amici respond to these concerns by proposing a “transfer price test” for identifying an unlawful price squeeze: A price squeeze should be presumed if the upstream monopolist could not have made a profit by selling at its retail rates if it purchased inputs at its own wholesale rates. Brief for American Antitrust Institute (AAI) 30; Brief for COMPTEL 16-19; see Ray v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 606 F. Supp. 757, 776-777 (ND Ill. 1984). Whether or not that test is administrate, it lacks any grounding in our antitrust jurisprudence. An upstream monopolist with no duty to deal is free to charge whatever wholesale price it would like; antitrust law does not prohibit lawfully obtained monopolies from charging monopoly prices. Trinko, supra, at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system”). Similarly, the Sherman Act does not forbid — indeed, it encourages — aggressive price competition at the retail level, as long as the prices being charged are not predatory. Brooke Group, 509 U. S., at 223-224. If both the wholesale price and the retail price are independently lawful, there is no basis for imposing antitrust liability simply because a vertically integrated firm’s wholesale price happens to be greater than or equal to its retail price.
Amici assert that there are circumstances in which price squeezes may harm competition. For example, they assert that price squeezes may raise entry barriers that fortify the upstream monopolist’s position; they also contend that price squeezes may impair nonprice competition and innovation in the downstream market by driving independent firms out of business. See Brief for AAI 11-15; Concord, supra, at 23-24.
The problem, however, is that amici have not identified any independent competitive harm caused by price squeezes above and beyond the harm that would result from a duty-to-deal violation at the wholesale level or predatory pricing at the retail level. See 3A P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 767c, p. 126 (2d ed. 2002) (“[I]t is difficult to see any competitive significance [of a price squeeze] apart from the consequences of vertical integration itself”). To the extent a monopolist violates one of these doctrines, the plaintiffs have a remedy under existing law. We do not need to endorse a new theory of liability to prevent such harm.
IV
Lastly, as mentioned above, plaintiffs have asked us for leave to amend their complaint to bring a Brooke Group predatory pricing claim. We need not decide whether leave to amend should be granted. Our grant of certiorari was limited to the question whether price-squeeze claims are cognizable in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal. The Court of Appeals addressed only AT&T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the plaintiffs’ original complaint. For the reasons stated, we hold that the price-squeeze claims set forth in that complaint are not cognizable under the Sherman Act.
Plaintiffs have also filed an amended complaint, and the District Court concluded that this complaint, generously construed, could be read as alleging conduct that met the Brooke Group requirements for predatory pricing. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a-52a, 56a. That order, however, applied the “no set of facts” pleading standard that we have since rejected as too lenient. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 561-563 (2007). It is for the District Court on remand to consider whether the amended complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted in light of the new pleading standard we articulated in Twombly, whether plaintiffs should be given leave to amend their complaint to bring a claim under Brooke Group, and such other matters properly before it. Even if the amended complaint is further amended to add a Brooke Group claim, it may not survive a motion to dismiss. For if AT&T can bankrupt the plaintiffs by refusing to deal altogether, the plaintiffs must demonstrate why the law prevents AT&T from putting them out of business by pricing them out of the market. Nevertheless, such questions are for the District Court to decide in the first instance. We do not address these issues here, as they are outside the scope of the question presented and were not addressed by the Court of Appeals in the decision below. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view”).
* * *
Trinko holds that a defendant with no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals has no duty to deal under the terms and conditions preferred by those rivals. 540 U. S., at 409-410. Brooke Group holds that low prices are only actionable under the Sherman Act when the prices are below cost and there is a dangerous probability that the predator will be able to recoup the profits it loses from the low prices. 509 U. S., at 222-224. In this case, plaintiffs have not stated a duty-to-deal claim under Trinko and have not stated a predatory pricing claim under Brooke Group. They have nonetheless tried to join a wholesale claim that cannot succeed with a retail claim that cannot succeed, and alchemize them into a new form of antitrust liability never before recognized by this Court. We decline the invitation to recognize such claims. Two wrong claims do not make one that is right.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Petitioners consist of several corporate entities and subsidiaries, and their names and corporate structures have changed frequently over the course of this litigation. For simplicity, we will refer to all the petitioners as “AT&T.”
The Court of Appeals assumed that any duty to deal arose only from FCC regulations, 503 F. 3d 876,878-879, n. 6 (CA9 2007), and the question on which we granted certiorari made the same assumption. Even aside from the District Court’s reasoning, App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a-85a, it seems quite unlikely that AT&T would have an antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiffs. Such a duty requires a showing of monopoly power, but— as the FCC has recognized, In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Red. 14853, 14879-14887 (2005) — the market for high-speed Internet service is now quite competitive; DSL providers face stiff competition from cable companies and wireless and satellite providers.
Like the Court of Appeals, 503 F. 3d, at 880, amici argue that price-squeeze claims have been recognized by Courts of Appeals for many years, beginning with Judge Hand’s opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (CA2 1945) (Alcoa). In that case, the Government alleged that Alcoa was using its monopoly power in the upstream aluminum ingot market to squeeze the profits of downstream aluminum sheet fabricators. The court concluded: “That it was unlawful to set the price of ‘sheet’ so low and hold the price of ingot so high, seems to us unquestionable, provided, as we have held, that on this record the price of ingot must be regarded as higher than a‘fair price.’” Id., at 438. Given developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since Alcoa, we find our recent decisions in Trinko and Brooke Group more pertinent to the question before us.
We note a procedural irregularity with this case: Normally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1476, pp. 556-557 (2d ed. 1990). Here, the District Court addressed the amended complaint in its 2005 order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-52a, but the court only certified its 2004 order — addressing the original complaint — for interlocutory appeal, id,., at 56a-57a. Both parties, as well as the Solicitor General, have expressed confusion about whether the amended complaint and the 2005 order are properly before this Court. See Brief for Petitioners 9, n. 6 (noting “some ambiguity” about which order was certified); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17 (“[I]t is unclear whether the 2005 Order and the amended complaint are properly at issue in this interlocutory appeal”); Brief for Respondents 8-10. The Court of Appeals majority did not address any of the District Court’s holdings from the 2005 order, so we decline to consider those issues at this time. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent. | Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdisagreement |
UNITED STATES v. TWIN CITY POWER CO. et al.
No. 21.
Argued October 18, 1955.
Decided January 23, 1956.
Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobelojf, Assistant Attorney General Morton and Roger P. Marquis.
David W. Robinson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were James F. Dreher and R. Hoke Robinson.
Mr. JusticeDouglas
delivered the opinion of the
This is a suit for condemnation of land instituted by the United States against respondent power company. A single question of valuation is presented. It is whether the just compensation which the United States must pay by force of the Fifth Amendment includes the value of the land as a site for hydroelectric power operations. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it does. 215 2d 592. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same result in litigation involving other lands the same hydroelectric project. United States v. Twin. City Power Co., 221 F. 2d 299. We granted the petition certiorari in the former case because of the importance the issue presented. 348 U. S. 910.
The condemnation proceedings are part of the procedure for completion of the Clark Hill project on the Savannah River, a navigable stream in southeastern United States. The Clark Hill project is the first in series of steps recommended by the Chief of Army Engineers for the improvement of the basin of that river. R. Doc. No. 657, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. That Report conceives of the Clark Hill project as serving multiple purposes — hydroelectric, flood control, and navigation. It states that the Clark Hill project, “if suitably constructed operated primarily for hydroelectric-power develop-would incidentally reduce downstream flood dam- and improve low-water flows for navigation.” Id., p. 3. Congress approved this project as part of “the comprehensive development of the Savannah River Basin for flood control and other purposes.” Section 10 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 887. And see United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U. S. 153, 170.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the improvement of navigation was not the purpose of the taking but that the Clark Hill project was designed to serve flood control and water-power development. 215 F. 2d, at 597. It is not for courts, however, to substitute their judgments for congressional decisions on what is or is not necessary for the improvement or protection of navigation. See Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455-457. The role of the judiciary in reviewing the legislative judgment is a narrow one in any case. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32; United States ex rel. TV A v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546, 552. The decision of Congress that this project will serve the interests of navigation involves engineering and policy considerations for Congress and Congress alone to evaluate. Courts should respect that decision until and unless it is shown “to involve an impossibility,” as Mr. Justice Holmes expressed it in Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 66. If the interests of navigation are served, it is constitutionally irrelevant that other purposes may also be advanced. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 426; Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 525, 533-534. As we said in the Appalachian Power Co. case, “Flood protection, watershed development, recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of commerce control.” 311 U. S., at 426.
The interest of the United States in the flow of a navigable stream originates in the Commerce Clause. That Clause speaks in terms of power, not of property. But the power is a dominant one which can be asserted to the any competing or conflicting one. The power is a privilege which we have called “a dominant servitude” (see United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U. S. 386, 391; Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U. S. 239, 249) or “a superior navigation easement.” United States v. Oerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 736. The legislative history and construction of particular enactments may lead to the conclusion that Congress exercised less than its constitutional power, fell short of appropriating the flow of the river to the public domain, and provided that private rights existing under state law should be compensable or otherwise recognized. Such were United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, and Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra. We have a different situation here, one where the United States displaces all competing interests and appropriates the entire flow of the river for the declared public purpose.
We can also put aside such cases as United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799, where assertion of the dominant servitude in the navigable river injured property beyond the bed of the stream. Here we are dealing with the. stream itself, for it is in the water power that respondents have been granted a compensable interest.
however, that the special water-rights value should be awarded the owners of this land since it lies not in the bed of the river nor below high water but above and beyond the ordinary high-water mark. An effort is made by this argument to establish that this private land is not burdened with the Government’s servitude. The flaw in that reasoning is that the landowner here seeks a value in the flow of the stream, a value inheres in the Government’s servitude and one that under our decisions the Government can grant or with-as it chooses. It is no answer to say that payment is sought only for the location value of the fast lands. That special location value is due to the flow of the stream; and if the United States were required to pay the judgments below, it would be compensating the landowner for the increment of value added to the fast lands if the flow of the stream were taken into account.
That is illustrated by United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53, the case that controls this one. In that case a private company installed a power project in St. Mary's River under a permit from the Government, revocable at will. The permit was revoked, Congress appropriating the entire flow of the stream for navigation purposes. The Court unanimously held that the riparian owner had no compensable interest in the water power of which it had been deprived. Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the Court, said, “Ownership of a private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.” Id., at 69. The Court accordingly reversed a judgment that awarded the riparian owner what respondents have obtained in this case, viz., “the present money value of the rapids and falls to the Chandler-Dunbar Company as riparian owners of the shore and appurtenant submerged land.” Id., at 74. The Court said, “The Government had dominion over the water power of the rapids and falls and cannot be required to pay any hypothetical additional value to a riparian owner who had no right to appropriate the current to his own commercial use.” Id., at 76. Some of the land owned by the private company was in the bed of the stream, some above ordinary high water. But the location of the land was not determinative. It was the dominion of the Government over the water power that controlled the decision. Both in Chandler-Dunbar and in this case it is the water power that creates the special value, whether the lands are above or below ordinary high water. The holding in Chandler-Dunbar led us to say in United States v. Appalachian Power Co., supra, at 424, that the “exclusion of riparian owners” from the benefits of the power in a navigable stream “without compensation is entirely within the Government’s discretion.” And again, “If the Government were now to build the dam, it would have to pay the fair value, judicially determined, for the fast land; nothing for the water power.” Id., at 427.
The power company in the present case is certainly in no stronger position than the owner of the hydroelectric site in the Chandler-Dunbar case. While the latter was deprived of a going private power project by the Government, the present private owners never had a power project on the Savannah and as a result of the Government’s pre-emption never can have one.
It is no answer to say that these private owners had interests in the water that were recognized by state law. We deal here with the federal domain, an area which Congress can completely pre-empt, leaving no vested private claims that constitute “private property” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Location of the lands might under some circumstances give them special value, as our cases have illustrated. But to attach a value of water power of the Savannah River due to location and to enforce that value against the United States would go contra to the teaching of Chandler-Dunbar — “that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.” 229 U. S., at 69.
The holding of the Chandler-Dunbar case that water power in a navigable stream is not by force of the Fifth Amendment a compensable interest when the United States asserts its easement of navigation is in harmony with another rule of law expressed in United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 375.
“Since the owner is to receive no more than indemnity for his loss, his award cannot be enhanced by any gain to the taker. Thus, although the market value of the property is to be fixed with due consideration of all its available uses, its special value to the condemnor as distinguished from others who may or may not possess the power to condemn, must be excluded as an element of market value.”
The Court in the Chandler-Dunbar case emphasized that it was only loss to the owner, not gain to the taker, that is compensable. 229 U. S., at 76. If the owner of the fast lands can demand water-power value as part of his compensation, he gets the value of a right that the Government in the exercise of its dominant servitude can grant or withhold as it chooses. The right has value or is an empty one dependent solely on the Government. What the Government can grant or withhold and exploit for its own benefit has a value that is peculiar to it and that no other user enjoys. Cf. U. S. ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 273 et seg. To require the United States to pay for this water-power value would be to create private claims in the public domain.
Reversed.
In the Chandler-Dunbar case, an award of compensation was made for the value of the land for a lock and canal, passing “around the falls and rapids.” United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S., at 67, 76-78. It may be that the Court was influenced by the fact that, on the special facts of the case, the use of the land for canals and locks was wholly consistent with the dominant navigation servitude of the United States and indeed aided navigation. Whatever may be said for that phase of the case, it affords no support for respondent, since water-power value, held to be compensable by the Court of Appeals, was ruled to be noncompensable in the Chandler-Dunbar case. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent. | Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisagreement |
MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE v. JONES, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF REVENUE OF NEW MEXICO, et al.
No. 71-738.
Argued December 12, 1972
Decided March 27, 1973
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Stewart, JJ., joined, post, p. 159.
George E. Fettinger argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was F. Randolph Burroughs.
John C. Cook, Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was David L. Norvell, Attorney General.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Frizzell, Harry R. Sachse, Carl Strass, and Eva R. Datz for the United States; by Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Philip P. Ashby, Royal D. Marks, and George P. Vlassis for the Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc., et al.; by David H. Getches for the Native American Rights Fund; by Samuel W. Murphy, Jr., and William C. Pelster for Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board; and by Raymond C. Simpson for Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians.
William, D. Dexter, Assistant Attorney General of Washington, and Eugene F. Corrigan filed a brief for Multistate Tax Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Mescalero Apache Tribe operates a ski resort in the State of New Mexico, on land located outside the boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation. The State has asserted the right to impose a tax on the gross receipts of the ski resort and a use tax on certain personalty purchased out of State and used in connection with the resort. Whether paramount federal law permits these-taxes to be levied is the issue presented by this case.
The home of the Mescalero Apache Tribe is on reservation lands in Lincoln and Otero Counties in New Mexico. The Sierra Blanca Ski Enterprises, owned and operated by the -Tribe, is adjacent to the reservation and was developed under the auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq, After a feasibility study by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, equipment and construction money was provided by a loan from the Federal Government under § 10 of the Act, 25 U. S. C. § 470, and the necessary land was leased from the United States Forest Service for a term of 30 years. The ski area borders on the Tribe’s reservation but, with the exception of some cross-country ski trails, no part of the enterprise, its buildings, or equipment is located within the existing boundaries of the reservation.
The Tribe has paid under protest $26,086.47 in taxes to the State, pursuant to the sales tax law, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 72-16-1 et seq. (1953), based on the gross receipts of the ski resort from the sale of services and tangible property. In addition, in 1968 the State assessed compensating use taxes against the Tribe in the amount of $5,887.19 (plus penalties and interest), based on the purchase price of materials used to construct two ski lifts at the resort. N. M. Stat. Ann. § 72-17-1 et seq. (1953). The Tribe duly protested the use tax assessment and sought a refund of the sales taxes 'paid. The State Commissioner of Revenue denied both the claim for refund and the protest of assessment and the Court of Appeals of the State affirmed. The court held, essentially, that the State had authority to apply its nondiscriminatory taxes to the Tribe’s enterprise and property involved in the dispute, and that the Indian Reorganization Act did not render the Tribe’s enterprise a federal instrumentality, constitutionally immune from state taxation, nor did it, by its own terms, grant immunity from the taxes here involved. 83 N. M. 158, 489 P. 2d 666 (1971). The Supreme Court of New Mexico denied certiorari. 83 N. M. 151, 489 P. 2d 659 (1971). We granted the Tribe’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 406 U. S. 905, to consider its claim that the income and property of the ski resort are not properly subject to state taxation. We affirm in part and in part reverse.
I
At the outset, we reject — as did the state court — the broad assertion that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the Tribe for all purposes and that the State is therefore prohibited from enforcing its revenue laws against any tribal enterprise, “[wjhether the enterprise is located on or off tribal land.” Generalizations on this subject have become particularly treacherous. The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 556-561 (1832), has given way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes, including statehood enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, post, p. 164; Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 71-73 (1962). The upshot has been the repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even on reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law. Organized Village of Kake, supra, at 75; Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240 (1896). Even so, in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, supra, lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.
But tribal activities conducted outside the reservation present different considerations. “State authority over Indians is yet more extensive over activities . . . not on any reservation.” Organized Village of Kake, supra, at 75. Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State. See, e. g., Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U. S. 392, 398 (1968); Organized Village of Kake, supra, at 75-76; Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, 683 (1942); Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575 (1928) ; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504 (1896). That principle is as relevant to a State’s tax laws as it is to state criminal laws, see Ward v. Race Horse, supra, at 516, and applies as much to tribal ski resorts as it does to fishing enterprises. See Organized Village of Kake, supra.
The Enabling Act for New Mexico, 36 Stat. 557, reflects the distinction between on- and off-reservation activities. Section 2 of the Act provides that the people of the State disclaim “all right and title” to lands “owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States . . . and that . . . the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.” But the Act expressly provides, with respect to taxation, that “nothing herein . . . shall preclude the said State from taxing, as other lands and other property are taxed, any lands and other property outside of an Indian reservation owned or held by any Indian, save and except such lands as have been granted ... or as may be granted or confirmed to any Indian or Indians under any Act of Congress, but ... all such lands shall be exempt from taxation by said State [only] so long and to such extent as Congress has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe.” It is thus clear that in terms of general power New Mexico retained the right to tax, unless Congress forbade it, all Indian land and Indian activities located or occurring “outside of an Indian reservation.”
We also reject the broad claim that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 rendered the Tribe’s off-reservation ski resort a federal instrumentality constitutionally immune from state taxes of all sorts. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). The intergovernmental-immunity doctrine was once much in vogue in a variety of contexts and, with respect to Indian affairs, was consistently held to bar a state tax on the lessees of, or the product or income from, restricted lands of tribes or individual Indians. The theory was that a federal instrumentality was involved and that the tax would interfere with the Government’s realizing the maximum return for its wards. This approach did not survive; its rise and decline in Indian affairs is described and reflected in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943); and Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949), where the Court cut to the bone the proposition that restricted Indian lands and the próceeds from them were — as a matter of constitutional law- — automatically exempt from state taxation. Rather, the Court held that Congress has the power “to immunize these lessees from the taxes we think the Constitution permits Oklahoma to impose in the absence of such action” and that “[t]he question whether immunity shall be extended in situations like these is essentially legislative in character.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., supra, at 365-366.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 neither requires nor counsels us to recognize this tribal business venture as a federal instrumentality. Congress itself felt it necessary to address the immunity question and to provide tax immunity to the extent it deemed desirable. There is, therefore, no statutory invitation to consider projects undertaken pursuant to the Act as federal instrumentalities generally and automatically immune from state taxation. Unquestionably, the Act reflected a new policy of the Federal Government and aimed to put a halt to the loss of tribal lands through allotment. It gave the Secretary of the Interior power to create new reservations, and tribes were encouraged to revitalize their self-government through the adoption of constitutions and bylaws and through the creation of chartered corporations, with power to conduct the business and economic affairs of the tribe. As was true in the case before us, a tribe taking advantage of the Act might generate substantial revenues for the education and the social and economic welfare of its people. So viewed, an enterprise such as the ski resort in this case serves a federal function with respect to the Government's role in Indian affairs. But the “mere fact that property is used, among others, by the United States as an instrument for effecting its purpose does not relieve it from state taxation.” Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. Co. v. Mackey, 256 U. S. 531, 536 (1921). See also Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150, 154 (1897).
The intent and purpose of the Reorganization Act was “to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.” H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). See also S. Rep. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934). As Senator Wheeler, on the floor, put it:
“This bill . . . seeks to get away from the bureaucratic control of the Indian Department, and it seeks further to give the Indians the control of their own affairs and of their own property; to put it in the hands either of an Indian council or in the hands of a corporation to be organized by the Indians.” 78 Cong. Rec. 11125.
Representative Howard explained that:
“The program of self-support and of business and civic experience in the management of their own affairs, combined with the program of education, will permit increasing numbers of Indians to enter the white world on a footing of equal competition.” Id., at 11732.
The Reorganization Act did not strip Indian tribes and their reservation lands of their historic immunity from state and local control. But, in the context of the Reorganization Act, we think it unrealistic to conclude that Congress conceived of off-reservation tribal enterprises “virtually as an arm of the Government.” Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 359-360 (1966). Cf. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 (1923). On the contrary, the aim was to disentangle the tribes from the official bureaucracy. The Court's decision in Organized Village of Kake, supra, which involved tribes organized under the Reorganization Act, demonstrates that off-reservation activities are within the reach of state law. See also Puyallup Tribe, 391 U. S., at 398. What was said in Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575 (1928), is relevant here. At issue there was the taxability of off-reservation Indian land purchased with consent of the Secretary of the Interior with the accumulated royalties from the individual Indian’s restricted allotted lands. Alienation of the purchased land was federally restricted. In rejecting a claim that state taxation of the land was barred by the federal-instrumentality doctrine, the then Mr. Justice Stone wrote for a unanimous Court:
“What governmental instrumentalities will be held free from state taxation, though Congress has not expressly so provided, cannot be determined apart from the purpose and character of the legislation creating them. . . .
“The early legislation affecting the Indians had as its immediate object the closest control by the government of their lives and property. The first and principal need then was that they should be shielded alike from their own improvidence and the spoliation of others but the ultimate purpose was to give them the more independent and responsible status of citizens and property owners. . . .
“In a broad sense all lands which the Indians are permitted to purchase out of the taxable lands of the state in this process of their emancipation and assumption of the responsibility of citizenship, whether restricted or not, may be said to be instrumentalities in that process. But . . . [t]o hold them immune would be inconsistent with one of the very purposes of their creation, to educate the Indians in responsibility . . . Id., at 578-581.
We accordingly decline the invitation to resurrect the expansive version of the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine that has been so consistently rejected in modern times.
II
The Tribe’s broad claims of tax immunity must therefore be rejected. But there remains to be considered the scope of the immunity specifically afforded by § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act. 25 U. S. C. § 465.
A
Section 465 provides, in part, that “any lands or rights acquired” pursuant to any provision of the Act “shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” On its face, the statute exempts land and rights in land, not income derived from its use. It is true that a statutory tax exemption for “lands” may, in light of its context and purposes, be construed to support an exemption for taxation on income derived from the land. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1 (1956); cf. Superior Bath House Co. v. McCarroll, 312 U. S. 176 (1941). But, absent clear statutory guidance, courts ordinarily will not imply tax exemptions and will not exempt off-reservation income from tax simply because the land from which it is derived, or its other source, is itself exempt from tax.
“This Court has repeatedly said that tax exemptions are not granted by implication. ... It has applied that rule to taxing acts affecting Indians as to all others. ... If Congress intends to prevent the State of Oklahoma from levying a general non-discriminatory estate tax applying alike to all its citizens, it should say so in plain words. Such a conclusion cannot rest on dubious inferences.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S., at 606-607. See Squire v. Capoeman, supra, at 6. Absent a “definitely expressed” exemption, an Indian’s royalty income from Indian oil lands is subject to the federal income tax although the source of the income may be exempt from tax. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691, 696-697 (1931). The Court has also held that a State, as well as the Federal Government, may tax an Indian’s pro rata share of income from a tribe’s restricted mineral resources. Leahy v. jState Treasurer, 297 U. S. 420 (1936). Lessees of otherwise exempt Indian lands are also subject to state taxation. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949).
On the face of § 465, therefore, there is no reason to hold that it forbids income as well as property taxes. Nor does the legislative history support any other conclusion. As we have noted, several explicit provisions encompassing a broad tax immunity for chartered Indian communities were dropped from the bills that preceded the Wheeler-Howard bill. See n. 9, supra. Similarly, the predecessor to the exemption embodied in § 465 dealt only with lands acquired for new reservations or for additions to existing reservations. 1934 House Hearings 11. Here, the rights and land were acquired by the Tribe beyond its reservation borders for the purpose of carrying on a business enterprise as anticipated by § § 476 and 477 of the Act. These provisions were designed to encourage tribal enterprises “to enter the white world on a footing of equal competition.” 78 Cong. Rec. 11732. In this context, we will not imply an expansive immunity from ordinary income taxes that businesses throughout the State are subject to. We therefore hold that the exemption in § 465 does not encompass or bar the collection of New Mexico’s nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax and that the Tribe’s ski resort is subject to that tax.
B
We reach a different conclusion with respect to the compensating use tax imposed on the personalty installed in the construction of the ski lifts. According to the Stipulation of Facts, that personal property has been “permanently attached to the realty.” In view of § 465, these permanent improvements on the Tribe’s tax-exempt land would certainly be immune from the State’s ad valorem property tax. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, 441-443 (1903). We think the same immunity extends to the compensating use tax on the property. The jurisdictional basis for use taxes is the use of the property in the State. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co,, 300 U. S. 577 (1937); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 330 (1944). It has long been recognized that “use” is among the “bundle of privileges that make up property or ownership” of property and, in this sense at least, a tax upon “use” is a tax upon the property itself. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., supra, at 582. This is not to say that use taxes are for all purposes to be deemed simple ad valorem property taxes. See, e. g., United States v. Detroit, 355 U. S. 466 (1958), and its companion cases; Sullivan v. United States, 395 U. S. 169 (1969). But use of permanent improvements upon land is so intimately connected with use of the land itself that an explicit provision relieving the latter of state tax burdens must be construed to encompass an exemption for the former. “Every reason that can be urged to show that the land was not subject to local taxation applies to the assessment and taxation of the permanent improvements.” United States v. Rickert, supra, at 442.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
In 1936, the Tribe adopted a constitution, pursuant to § 16 of the Act, 25 U. S. C. § 476.
The Tribe asserts that “no sales tax (gross receipts tax) is being . . . charged for any ski rentals, lift tickets, food or beverages.”
Brief for Petitioner 16.
A corresponding provision appears in the Constitution of the State of New Mexico, Art. XXI, § 2.
The Tribe’s treaty with the United States, 10 Stat. 979, which acknowledges that the Tribe is “exclusively under the laws, jurisdiction, and government of the United States . . . does not alter the obvious effect of the State’s admission legislation. See, e. g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 67-68 (1962), and cases cited therein.
See generally U. S. Dept, of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 129-132 (1958), a revision of Handbook of Federal Indian Law, prepared under the editorial direction of Felix S. Cohen, first printed in 1940 (hereinafter Federal Indian Law); Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 955 (1972).
For other examples see Comment, n. 6, supra, at 983-985. See also J. Collier, On the Gleaming Way 149, 129-149 (1962).
See also id., at 11727, 11731-11732 (remarks of Rep. Howard); the statements of Mr. John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in Hearings on H. R. 7902, before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 37, 60, 65-67 (1934) (hereinafter 1934 House Hearings).
The predecessor bills to the Wheeler-Howard Act, H. R. 7902 and S. 2755 (respectively 78 Cong. Rec. 2437 and 2440), expressly provided that the chartered Indian communities may act “as a Federal agency in the administration of Indian Affairs,” and, correspondingly, that the United States would not “be liable for any act done ... by a chartered Indian community.” Title I, §4 (i). 1934 House Hearings 3. The bills further provided that: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as rendering the property of any Indian community . . . subject to taxation by any State or subdivision thereof . . . .” Tit. I, § 11. Id., at 5. The memorandum of John Collier, which accompanied the bills, stated that “[a]s a Federal agency, the property of a chartered community is constitutionally exempt from State taxation . . . .” Id., at 25. These extensive provisions for tax immunity were discarded in the Wheeler-Howard Act, along with the accompanying provisions for more extensive governmental powers on the part of the chartered communities. See H. R. Rep. No. 1804, supra, at 6. We do not read this legislative history, however, as suggesting that Congress intended to remove the traditional tax immunity that Indian tribes enjoyed on their reservations. This reading finds support in Felix S. Cohen’s treatise, see Federal Indian Law 852-853, although we believe that the broader thrust of his statement — that any “attempt by a State to impose income or other types of taxes” upon “tribal corporations organized under the Indian Reorganization Act . . . would still be held a direct burden on a Federal instrumentality” — is not supported by the modern cases and should be read with and in the light of other discussions of the immunity doctrine in particularized contexts. See id., at 872-873, 864-873.
The claim of tax immunity was made by a non-Indian lessee, under the rule of Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922), which was itself overruled in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949), over two decades after Shaw. As a decision with respect to constitutionally mandated intergovernmental immunity, Shaw remains good law, although its result was altered by statute, as Congress was free to do. See generally Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705 (1943).
The ski resort land was not technically “acquired” “in trust for the Indian tribe.” But, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, “it would have been meaningless for the United States, which already had title to the forest, to convey title to itself for the use of the Tribe.” Brief for the United States as amicus curiae 13. We think the lease arrangement here in question was sufficient to bring the Tribe’s interest in the land within the immunity afforded by § 465. It should perhaps be noted that the Tribe has not suggested that it is immune from taxation by virtue of its status as a lessee of land owned by the Federal Government. See, e. g., United States v. Detroit, 355 U. S. 466 (1958); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937); cf. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., supra.
Squire v. Capoeman involved the attempted imposition of federal capital gains taxes on the sale price of timber logged off allotted Indian timberland (located within a reservation). The timber constituted “the major value” — if not the only practical value — of the Indian’s allotted land and it was clear that if the capital gains tax was to apply, the purposes and intent of the General Allotment Act of 1887 would in large measure have been frustrated. 351 U. S., at 10. The Court, relying in part on “relatively contemporaneous official and unofficial writings” on the intended scope of the income tax laws, id., at 9, declined to so interpret those later enacted laws and to find that the Government intended to tax its own ward in this particular manner. In contrast to Squire, we find nothing fundamentally inconsistent with the intent of the Indian Reorganization Act in permitting the gross receipts of the Tribe’s off-reservation enterprise to be subject to nondiscriminatory state taxes.
It is unclear from the record whether the Tribe has actually incorporated itself as an Indian chartered corporation pursuant to § 477. But see Charters, Constitutions and By-Laws of the Indian Tribes of North America, pt. III, pp. 13-15 (G. Fay ed. 1967). The Tribe’s constitution, however, adopted under 25 U. S. C. §476, gives its Tribal Council the powers that would ordinarily be held by such a corporation, Art. XI, and by both practice and regulations, the two entities have apparently merged in important respects. See 25 CFR §91.2; Comment, n. 6, supra, at 973. In any event, the question of tax immunity cannot be made to turn on the particular form in which the Tribe chooses to conduct its business. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bureau of Prisons",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"State Agency",
"Unidentifiable",
"Office of Thrift Supervision",
"Department of Homeland Security",
"Board of General Appraisers",
"Board of Tax Appeals",
"General Land Office or Commissioners",
"NO Admin Action",
"Processing Tax Board of Review"
] | [
116
] | sc_adminaction |
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.
No. 375.
Decided December 13, 1965.
William A. Goichman and Joseph C. Bruno for appellant.
Hugh B. Cox and Windsor F. Cousins for appellee.
Per Curiam.
In the three-judge District Court from which this appeal comes to us, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company sued to enjoin the enforcement of a duly promulgated order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission on the sole ground that the order conflicted with a federal statute. The Commission, among other defenses, contended that the federal statute was unconstitutional, but the District Court decided the case in favor of the railroad and issued an appropriate injunction. 240 F. Supp. 233.
It follows from our recent decision in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, ante, p. 111, that the injunction sought by the railroad, being based on incompatibility between the state order and the federal statute, was not grounded in the “unconstitutionality” of a state measure so as to require a three-judge tribunal under 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1964 ed.). Nor is § 2282, requiring such a tribunal in order to enjoin “any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution,” invoked by the Commission’s defense that the federal statute is unconstitutional; it is settled that this provision “does not provide for a case where the validity of an Act of Congress is merely drawn in question, albeit that question be decided, but only for a case where there is an application for an interlocutory or permanent injunction to restrain the enforcement of an Act of Congress.” Garment Workers v. Donnelly Co., 304 U. S. 243, 250.
Because a three-judge court was not required to adjudicate this suit, this Court has no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 (1964 ed.) to entertain a direct appeal. It does not appear from the record that the Commission lodged a protective appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the time to do so has almost certainly expired. The appeal to this Court occurred before Swift & Co. v. Wick-ham, supra, was decided, and there is no reason why the Commission should be deprived of appellate review. In accordance with precedent, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the District Court so that it may enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 254.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bureau of Prisons",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"State Agency",
"Unidentifiable",
"Office of Thrift Supervision",
"Department of Homeland Security",
"Board of General Appraisers",
"Board of Tax Appeals",
"General Land Office or Commissioners",
"NO Admin Action",
"Processing Tax Board of Review"
] | [
116
] | sc_adminaction |
UNITED STATES v. FORTIER et al.
No. 14.
Argued October 10, 1951.
Decided December 11, 1951.
Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge and Samuel D. Slade.
Stanley M. Brown argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for Fortier, respondent. With Mr. Brown on the brief was Meyer Green for Marino et al., respondents.
Briefs of amici curiae supporting respondents were filed by Alvan J. Goodbar for Doernhoefer; and by John G. Simms.
Per Curiam.
The United States brought this action under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to compel restitution of allegedly excessive prices charged by respondents in the sale of two houses. The District Court entered judgment for respondents, 89 F. Supp.708, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 185 F. 2d 608. We granted certiorari, 341 U. S. 925.
Maximum sales prices for the two houses had been stipulated by respondents in securing the permission to build required under Priorities Regulation 33. Statutory authority for that regulation had been repealed before the sale of respondents’ houses, except for a proviso continuing in full force and effect priorities for building materials issued under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing’ Act of 1946. The Government views the maximum prices stipulated by respondents as a condition of construction authorization and priorities assistance that survived repeal under the proviso. We reject this view.
The 1946 Act contained detailed authorization for price restrictions on houses and for priorities on building materials. When that Act was repealed in 1947, Congress provided for veterans’ preferences in the sale and rental of housing and for rent ceilings on certain accommodations constructed with the assistance of priorities secured under the 1946 Act. Congress addressed itself to the problem of veterans’ housing, but refrained from imposing any price restrictions on the sale of houses. Congress having indicated a contrary purpose, we will not impose such restrictions by implication.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
50 U. S. C. App. § 1821 et seq.
10 Fed. Reg. 15301, as amended, 11 Fed. Reg. 6598. Respondents ' were required to comply with this regulation by Veterans’ Housing Program Order No. 1, 11 Fed. Reg. 3190.
50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1881 (a), in repealing the 1946 Act, provided:
“That any allocations made or committed, or priorities granted for the delivery, of any housing materials or facilities under any regulation or order issued under the authority contained in said Act, and before the date of enactment of this Act [June 30, 1947], with respect to veterans of World War II, their immediate families, and others, shall remain in full force and effect.”
Respondents’ houses were not sold until November and December, 1947, months after repeal of the 1946 Act. As a result, no “penalty, forfeiture, or liability” had been incurred under the 1946 Act which would survive repeal under the general saving clause, 1 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 109. Compare United States v. Carter, 171 F. 2d 530 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1948).
50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1884 (a); id., § 1892 (c) (1) (B) (3) (A). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
26
] | sc_petitioner |
CARAFAS v. LaVALLEE, WARDEN.
No. 71.
Argued March 27, 1968.
Decided May 20, 1968.
James J. Cally argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Michael H. Rauch, Assistant Attorney General.
Mr. Justice Fortas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case has a lengthy procedural history. In 1960, petitioner was convicted of burglary and grand larceny in New York state court proceedings and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three to five years. On direct appeal (following Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961)), petitioner claimed that illegally obtained evidence had been introduced against him at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion, People v. Carafas, 14 App. Div. 2d 886, 218 N. Y. S. 2d 536 (1961), as did the New York Court of Appeals, 11 N. Y. 2d 891, 182 N. E. 2d 413 (1962). This Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. 372 U. S. 948 (1963).
Thereafter, complex proceedings took place in which petitioner sought in both federal and state courts to obtain relief by writ of habeas corpus, based on his claim that illegally seized evidence was used against him. 334 F. 2d 331 (1964); petition for writ of certiorari denied, 381 U. S. 951 (1965). On November 5, 1965, the United States District Court, as directed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (334 F. 2d 331 (1964)), heard petitioner’s claim on the merits. It dismissed his petition on the ground that he had failed to show a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Petitioner appealed in circumstances hereinafter related. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal. On March 20, 1967, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed here. We granted the petition, 389 U. S. 896 (1967), to consider whether, because of facts to which we later refer, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal conformed to our holding in Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U. S. 542 (1967). But first we must consider the State’s contention that this case is now moot because petitioner has been unconditionally released from custody.
Petitioner applied to the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus in June 1963. He was in custody at that time. On March 6, 1967, petitioner’s sentence expired, and he was discharged from the parole status in which he had been since October 4, 1964. We issued our writ of certiorari on October 16, 1967 (389 U. S. 896).
The issue presented, then, is whether the expiration of petitioner’s sentence, before his application was finally adjudicated and while it was awaiting appellate review, terminates federal jurisdiction with respect to the application. Respondent relies upon Parker v. Ellis, 362 U. S. 574 (1960), and unless this case is overruled, it stands as an insuperable barrier to our further consideration of petitioner’s cause or to the grant of relief upon his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Parker v. Ellis held that when a prisoner was released from state prison after having served his full sentence, this Court could not proceed to adjudicate the merits of the claim for relief on his petition for habeas corpus which he had filed with the Federal District Court. This Court held that upon petitioner’s unconditional release the case became "moot.” Parker was announced in a per curiam decision.
It is clear that petitioner’s cause is not moot. In consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these “disabilities or burdens [which] may flow from” petitioner’s conviction, he has “a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him.” Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 222 (1946). On account of these “collateral consequences,” the case is not moot. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 633-634, n. 2 (1968); Fiswick v. United States, supra, at 222, n. 10; United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 512-513 (1954).
The substantial issue, however, which is posed by Parker v. Ellis, is not mootness in the technical or constitutional sense, but whether the statute defining the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in respect of persons in state custody is available here. In Parker v. Ellis, as in the present case, petitioner’s application was filed in the Federal District Court when he was in state custody, and in both the petitioner was unconditionally released from state custody before his case could be heard in this Court. For the reasons which we here summarize and which are stated at length in the dissenting opinions in Parker v. Ellis, we conclude that under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such application.
The federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be “in custody” when the application for habeas corpus is filed. This is required not only by the repeated references in the statute, but also by the history of the great writ. Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamental of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a person. See Peyton v. Rowe, ante, p. 54.
But the statute does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical custody. Its mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted. It provides that “[t]he court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U. S. C. § 2243. The 1966 amendments to the habeas corpus statute seem specifically to contemplate the possibility of relief other than immediate release from physical custody. At one point, the new § 2244 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. II) speaks in terms of “release from custody or other remedy.” See Peyton v. Rowe, supra; Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U. S. 335 (1968). Cf. Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941).
In the present case, petitioner filed his application shortly after June 20, 1963, while he was in custody. He was not released from custody until March 6, 1967, two weeks before he filed his petition for certiorari here. During the intervening period his application was under consideration in various courts. Petitioner is entitled to consideration of his application for relief on its merits. He is suffering, and will continue to suffer, serious disabilities because of the law’s complexities and not because of his fault, if his claim that he has been illegally convicted is meritorious. There is no need in the statute, the Constitution, or sound jurisprudence for denying to petitioner his ultimate day in court.
This case illustrates the validity of The Chief Justice’s criticism that the doctrine of Parker simply aggravates the hardships that may result from the “intolerable delay[s] in affording justice.” Parker v. Ellis, supra, at 585 (dissenting opinion). The petitioner in this case was sentenced in 1960. He has been attempting to litigate his constitutional claim ever since. His path has been long — partly because of the inevitable delays in our court processes and partly because of the requirement that he exhaust state remedies. He should not be thwarted now and required to bear the consequences of assertedly unlawful conviction simply because the path has been so long that he has served his sentence. The federal habeas corpus statute does not require this result, and Parker v. Ellis must be overruled.
We turn now to the substance of the question as to which we granted certiorari. Petitioner’s first hearing on the merits in the Federal District Court was held on November 5, 1965. The District Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus, denying petitioner’s claim that evidence used against him had been obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The District Court issued a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2253 and ordered that the notice of appeal be filed without prepayment of the prescribed fee. A notice of appeal was filed, and the petitioner applied in the Court of Appeals for an order allowing him to appeal in forma pauperis. 28 U. S. C. § 1915. The State opposed petitioner’s application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was without merit. Petitioner filed a reply in July 1966 in which he opposed the State’s motion to dismiss and in which he renewed his plea for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. On February 3, 1967, the Court of Appeals entered the following order: “Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Application denied. Motion to dismiss appeal granted.” Rehearing was thereafter denied. It is this action of the Court of-Appeals that brings into issue our decision in Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U. S. 542 (April 10, 1967).
In Nowakowski, we held that “when a district judge grants ... a certificate [of probable cause], the court of appeals must grant an appeal in forma pauperis (assuming the requisite showing of poverty), and proceed to a disposition of the appeal in accord with its ordinary procedure.” At 543. Although Nowakowski was decided after the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal, its holding applies to a habeas corpus proceeding which, like this one, was not concluded at the time Nowakowski was decided. Cf. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 628, n. 13 and 639, n. 20 (1965); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966).
Respondent argues that the denial of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis by the Court of Appeals in this case and the dismissal of the appeal were permissible because the Court had before it the entire District Court record and because respondent’s motion to dismiss and petitioner’s reply contained some argument on the merits. Nothing in the order entered by the Court of Appeals, however, indicates that the appeal was duly considered on its merits as Nowakowski requires in cases where a certificate of probable cause has been granted. Although Nowakowski does not necessarily require that the Court of Appeals give the parties full opportunity to submit briefs and argument in an appeal which, despite the issuance of the certificate of probable cause, is frivolous, enough must appear to demonstrate the basis for the court’s summary action. Anything less than this, as we held in Nowakowski, would negate the office of the certificate of probable cause. Indeed, it appears that since Nowakowski, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has accorded this effect to that ruling. The State informs us that “it appears to be the policy of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that in cases where habeas corpus appeals have been dismissed, reargument will be granted and the appeal reinstated where the time to apply for certiorari had not expired prior to the decision in NowakowskiBrief for respondent 22-23.
Accordingly, the judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The New York Court of Appeals amended its remittitur to reflect that it had passed on petitioner’s constitutional claim. 11 N. Y. 2d 969, 183 N. E. 2d 697 (1962).
It appears that petitioner was on bail after conviction until this Court denied his earlier petition for a writ of certiorari. 372 U. S. 948 (March 18, 1963).
The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and BreNnan dissented.
E. g., New York Education Law §§ 6502, 6702; New York General Business Law §74, subd. 2; New York Real Property Law § 440-a; New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 126.
73 Stat. 536, 29 U. S. C. § 504.
New York Election Law § 152, subd. 2.
New York Judiciary Law §§ 596, 662.
Undoubtedly there are others. See generally Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1967).
See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2249, 2252, 2254.
See 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 108-125 (1926).
E. g., Article 39 of the Magna Carta (see 9 W. Holdsworth, at 112-125). The federal habeas corpus statute grants jurisdiction to inquire into violations of the United States Constitution.
If there has been, or will be, an unconditional release from custody before inquiry can be made into the legality of detention, it has been held that there is no habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Parker v. Ellis, supra, at 582, n. 8 (WARREN, C. J., dissenting); Ex parte Baez, 177 U. S. 378 (1900); United States ex rel. Rivera v. Reeves, 246 F. Supp. 599 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1965); Burnett v. Gladden, 228 F. Supp. 527 (D. C. D. Ore. 1964).
Petitioner was convicted in 1960. He took his case through the state appellate process, and this Court denied a writ of certiorari in March 1963. 372 U. S. 948. In June 1963 petitioner began his quest for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. The District Court denied the petition without prejudice, suggesting, in view of what the judge thought was the unsettled state of New York law, that petitioner reapply to the state courts. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254. Petitioner did so, and apparently at the same time appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The state courts denied relief a second time. The United States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered a hearing on the merits. 334 F. 2d 331 (1964). This Court denied the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 381 U. S. 951 (1965). The hearing ordered by the Court of Appeals was held by the District Court on November 5, 1965. The petition was dismissed on the merits on May 2, 1966. Petitioner’s appeal to the Second Circuit was dismissed on February 3, 1967, and a petition for rehearing was denied on February 21, 1967, A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed here on March 20, 1967, and granted on October 16, 1967, 389 U. S. 896, about seven years after petitioner’s conviction..
See Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F. 2d 67 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1964).
See n. 13, supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the opinion effectively says that the decision in this case "overruled" one or more of the Court's own precedents. Alteration also extends to language in the majority opinion that states that a precedent of the Supreme Court has been "disapproved," or is "no longer good law". Note, however, that alteration does not apply to cases in which the Court "distinguishes" a precedent. | Did the the decision of the court overrule one or more of the Court's own precedents? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_precedentalteration |
COUNTY BOARD OF ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA, et al. v. RICHARDS et al.
No. 76-1418.
Decided October 11, 1977
Per Curiam.
The motion, of D. C. Federation of Civic Associations et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
To stem the flow of traffic from commercial and industrial districts into adjoining residential neighborhoods, Arlington County, Va., adopted zoning ordinance § 29D. The ordinance directs the County Manager to determine those residential areas especially crowded with parked cars from outside the neighborhood. Free parking permits are then issued to residents of the designated areas for their own vehicles, to persons doing business with residents there, and to some visitors. To park an automobile without a permit in a restricted area between 8 a. m. and 5 p. m. on weekdays is a misdemeanor.
Acting under the ordinance, the'County Manager designated a restricted area in Aurora Highlands, a residential neighborhood near a large commercial and office complex. Commuters who worked in this complex and had regularly parked in the area sued in the Circuit Court of Arlington County to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance on state and federal constitutional grounds. The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately held that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As stated in its preamble, the Arlington ordinance is intended
“to reduce hazardous traffic conditions resulting from the use of streets within areas zoned for residential uses for the parking of vehicles by persons using districts zoned for commercial or industrial uses ... ; to protect those districts from polluted air, excessive noise, and trash and refuse caused by the entry of such vehicles; to protect the residents of those districts from unreasonable burdens in gaining access to their residences; to preserve the character of those districts as residential districts; to promote efficiency in the maintenance of those streets in a clean and safe condition; to preserve the value of the property in those districts; and to preserve the safety of children and other pedestrians and traffic safety, and the peace, good order, comfort, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the County.”
Conceding the legitimacy of these goals, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the ordinance's discrimination between residents and nonresidents “bears no reasonable relation to [the regulation’s] stated objectives,” and, therefore, that “the ordinance on its face offends the equal protection guarantee of the 14th Amendment.” 217 Va. 645, 651, 231 S. E. 2d 231, 235. We disagree.
To reduce air pollution and other environmental effects of automobile commuting, a community reasonably may restrict on-street parking available to commuters, thus encouraging reliance on car pools and mass transit. The same goal is served by assuring convenient parking to residents who leave their cars at home during the day. A community may also decide that restrictions on the flow of outside traffic into particular residential areas would enhance the quality of life there by reducing noise, traffic hazards, and litter. By definition, discrimination against nonresidents would inhere in such restrictions.
The Constitution does not outlaw these social and environmental objectives, nor does it presume distinctions between residents and nonresidents of a local neighborhood to be invidious. The Equal Protection Clause requires only that the distinction drawn by an ordinance like Arlington’s rationally promote the regulation’s objectives. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 8 (1974). On its face, the Arlington ordinance meets this test.
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall would grant the petition for cer-tiorari and set the case for oral argument.
This condition is met when “the average number of vehicles [operated by persons whose destination is a commercial or industrial district] is in excess of 25% of the number of parking spaces on such streets and the total number of spaces actually occupied by any vehicles exceeds 75% of the number of spaces on such streets on the weekdays of any month . . . .”
Although the state trial court found the ordinance invalid under the State and Federal Constitutions, the State Supreme Court rested its decision solely on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Restrictions on nonresident parking have sparked considerable litigation. See, e. g., South Terminial Corp. v. EPA, 504 F. 2d 646, 671-676 (CA1 1974) (restrictions upheld); Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F. 2d 1118, 1125 (CA2 1974) (restrictions upheld); Commonwealth v. Petralia, - Mass. -, 362 N. E. 2d 513 (1977) (restrictions upheld); State v. Whisman, 24 Ohio Misc. 59, 263 N. E. 2d 411 (Ct. Com. Pleas, 1970) (restrictions invalidated); Georgetown Assn. of Businessmen v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 7242-76 (D. C. Super. Ct., Aug. 9, 1976) (restrictions preliminarily enjoined). The United States as amicus curiae notes that parking restrictions to discourage automobile commuting have been, recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency to implement the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30629 (1973). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
157
] | sc_casesource |
MULLOY v. UNITED STATES
No. 655.
Argued April 20, 1970
Decided June 15, 1970
Robert Allen Sedler argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Joseph J. Connolly argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Francis X. Bey-tagh, Jr., and Philip R. Monahan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Marvin M. Karpatkin, Michael N. Pollet, and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union et al., and by Ralph Rudd and Benjamin B. Sheerer for Wayne Spencer Deri et al.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, the petitioner was convicted for refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in violation of § 12 (a) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and fined $10,000, and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 412 F. 2d 421. We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 1036, to consider the petitioner’s contention, raised both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, that the order to report was invalid because his local board had refused to reopen his I-A classification following his application for a 1-0 classification as a conscientious objector. The argument is that it was an abuse of discretion for the board to reject his conscientious objector claim without reopening his classification, and by so doing to deprive him of his right to an administrative appeal.
I
On October 17, 1967, the petitioner, who was then 23 years old and classified I-A (available for military service), wrote to his local Selective Service Board that “[ajfter much, much thinking, seeking, and questioning of my own religious upbringing and political experience I have concluded that I am a conscientious objector. I am therefore opposed to war in any form.” In response to this letter the clerk sent him the Special Form for Conscientious Objectors (SSS Form 150), which he promptly completed and returned.
The petitioner stated in the form that he was conscientiously opposed by reason of his religious training and belief to participation in war in any form. He said that he believed in a Supreme Being and that this belief involved duties superior to those arising from any human relation; that his religious training had taught him that it was against God’s law to kill; and that as a member of the armed services he would be obliged to kill or indirectly assist in killing. In response to the form’s inquiry as to how, when, and from what source he had received the training and acquired the belief upon which his conscientious objection was based, he gave a detailed answer, explaining that he had been born and raised a Catholic; that he had at one point in his life thought he would become a priest; that he had gone through a religious crisis in college and left the church, but had returned to it and been greatly influenced by the writings of Thomas Merton, who had preached nonviolence. He said that he had learned in the work he had been doing with an antipoverty organization in Appalachia of the need for love and understanding among people, and of the futility of violence. He concluded that his early training, coupled with his adult experience, particularly as a worker among the Appalachian poor, had brought him to his present position as a conscientious objector.
The petitioner also gave detailed and specific answers to other questions that the form asked, such as when and where he had given public expression to the views expressed as the basis for his conscientious objector claim, and what actions or behavior he thought most conspicuously demonstrated the consistency and depth of his religious convictions. Five people who were well acquainted with the petitioner wrote to the board, attesting to the sincerity of his beliefs. One letter was from a Catholic priest, who wrote of the petitioner’s honesty and integrity and said that he felt military service would do violence to the petitioner’s conscience. Other letters from people who had worked with the petitioner spoke of his belief in nonviolence and confirmed the accuracy of the incidents that the petitioner had referred to in the form as manifestations of his beliefs. The petitioner’s brother wrote that while he vehemently disagreed with the petitioner’s unwillingness to bear arms for his country, he still felt that the petitioner was sincere in his beliefs.
In response to the petitioner’s request to discuss his application with the board, the clerk wrote that the board had decided to grant him a personal appearance. This interview took place on November 9 and lasted about 10 or 15 minutes. It was attended by three of the four local board members. The résumé of the interview prepared by the clerk stated that the petitioner “advised that he was claiming a C. 0. classification because he had learned through experience and did not until later in life realize the importance of now believing as he did,” and that he “felt that military service would interrupt his work and there would be no one else to take his place.” The minute entry in the petitioner’s file indicated that all members present felt the information in the form, and accompanying letters, together with what was learned at the interview, did not warrant a reopening of the petitioner’s I-A classification. However, no formal vote on the petitioner’s application was taken until January 11, 1968, at which time, the minute entry indicated, all four members were present and again it was noted that all “felt this information did not warrant reopening” of the I-A classification. After receiving notification of the board’s action, the petitioner wrote to the board on January 21 seeking to appeal its failure to reclassify him I-O. He said that he considered the November interview to have been a reopening of his case. On January 23 the board replied that the interview had been extended as a matter of courtesy, and that it had not at any time reopened the petitioner’s classification. On the same day the petitioner was ordered to report for induction on February 23, 1968. The petitioner reported, but refused to submit to induction. This refusal resulted in the criminal charge that led to his conviction under 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
II
Under the Selective Service regulations a “local board may reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant ... [if presented with] facts not considered when the registrant was classified which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant’s classification . . . .” 32 CFR § 1625.2. Even if the local board denies the requested reclassification, there is a crucial difference between such board action and a simple refusal to reopen the classification at all. For once the local board reopens, it is required by the regulations to “consider the new information which it has received [and to] again classify the registrant in the same manner as if he had never before been classified.” 32 CFR § 1625.11. A classification following a reopening is thus in all respects a new and original one and, even if the registrant is placed in the same classification as before, “[e]ach such classification [following the reopening] shall be followed by the same right of appearance before the local board and ... of appeal as in the case of an original classification.” 32 CFR § 1625.13. Where, however, in the opinion of the board, no new facts are presented or “such facts, if true, would not justify a change in such registrant’s classification . . . ,” 32 CFR § 1625.4, the board need not reopen, and following such a refusal to reopen, the registrant has no right to a personal appearance or to an appeal. Thus, whether or not a reopening is granted is a matter of substance, for with a reopening comes the right to be heard personally and to appeal. While the petitioner here was given an interview as a matter of courtesy, the board’s refusal to reopen his classification denied him the opportunity for an administrative appeal from the rejection of his conscientious objector claim. Therefore, if the refusal to reopen was improper, petitioner was wrongly deprived of an essential procedural right, and the order to report for induction was invalid.
Ill
Though the language of 32 CFR § 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily refuse to reopen a registrant’s classification. While differing somewhat in their formulation of precisely just what showing must be made before a board is required to reopen, the courts of appeals in virtually all Federal Circuits have held that where the registrant has set out new facts that establish a prima facie case for a new classification, a board must reopen to determine whether he is entitled to that classification. Not to do so, these courts have held, is an abuse of discretion, and we agree.
Where a registrant makes nonfrivolous allegations of facts that have not been previously considered by his board, and that, if true, would be sufficient under regulation or statute to warrant granting the requested reclassification, the board must reopen the registrant’s classification unless the truth of these new allegations is conclusively refuted by other reliable information in the registrant’s file. See United States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906, 911. For in the absence of such refutation there can be no basis for the board’s refusal to reopen except an evaluative determination adverse to the registrant’s claim on the merits. And it is just this sort of determination that cannot be made without affording the registrant a chance to be heard and an opportunity for an administrative appeal.
Because of the narrowly limited scope of judicial review available to a registrant, the opportunity for full administrative review is indispensable to the fair operation of the Selective Service System. Where a prima facie case for reclassification has been made, a board cannot deprive the registrant of such review by simply refusing to reopen his file. Yet here the board did precisely that. For it is clear that the petitioner’s SSS Form 150 and the accompanying letters constituted a prima facie showing that he met the statutory standard for classification as a conscientious objector (50 U. S. C. App. §456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. IV)), and the Government now virtually concedes as much.
The Government suggests, however, that the board might have concluded that the prima facie claim had been undercut by the petitioner himself — by his statements at the courtesy interview or because his demeanor convinced the board that he was not telling the truth. There is, however, but scant evidence in the record that the board’s action was based on any such grounds. And, in any event, it is on precisely such grounds as these that board action cannot be predicated without a reopening of the registrant’s classification, and a consequent opportunity for administrative appeal.
This is not to say that on all the facts presented to it the board might not have been justified in refusing to grant the petitioner a 1-0 classification; it is to say that such refusal could properly occur only after his classification had first been reopened. The board could not deprive the petitioner of the procedural protections attending reopening by making an evaluative determination of his claim while purportedly declining to reopen his classification.
Since the petitioner presented a nonfrivolous, prima facie claim for a change in classification based on new factual allegations which were not conclusively refuted by other information in his file, it was an abuse of discretion for the board not to reopen his classification, thus depriving him of his right to an administrative appeal. The order to report for induction was accordingly invalid, and his conviction for refusing to submit to induction must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
At this time there was no outstanding order to report for induction, though at least two orders to report had previously been sent and subsequently canceled for various reasons not relevant here. Prior to the petitioner’s classification in I-A he had had a II-S student deferment and subsequently a II-A occupational deferment.
If reclassification is sought after an order to report for induction has been mailed to the registrant, the regulations provide that the classification “shall not be reopened . . . unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant’s status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control.” 32 CFR § 1625.2.
United States v. Gearey, 379 F. 2d 915, 922 n. 11 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1967), adopting the standard enunciated in United States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906, 911 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1966); United States y. Turner, 421 F. 2d 1251 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Grier, 415 F. 2d 1098 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1969); Robertson v. United States, 404 F. 2d 1141 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 417 F. 2d 440 (1969); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F. 2d 376 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1956); United States v. Freeman, 388 F. 2d 246 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967); Davis v. United States, 410 F. 2d 89 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1969); Miller v. United States, 388 F. 2d 973 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1967); Fore v. United States, 395 F. 2d 548, 554 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1968).
See, e. g., Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U. S. 256.
See, e. g., United States v. Freeman, 388 F. 2d 246; United States v. Turner, 421 F. 2d 1251; Olvera v. United States, 223 F. 2d 880 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1955); see also Simmons v. United States, 348 U. S. 397.
The scope of judicial review is, as a practical matter, particularly narrow where the registrant is claiming conscientious objector status.
“A sincere claimant for conscientious objector status cannot turn to the habeas corpus remedy [to challenge the legality of his classification] because his religious belief prevents him from accepting induction under any circumstances. As a result he is limited to seeking review in a criminal trial for refusal to submit. In this criminal proceeding, as in any proceeding reviewing a draft classification, his defense of invalid classification is tested by the ‘basis in fact’ formula. Under these circumstances conviction is almost inevitable, since the Board’s refusal to grant the conscientious objector classification is based on an inference as to the sincerity of the registrant’s belief and there will almost always be something in the record to support an inference of lack of sincerity.” United, States v. Freeman, 388 F. 2d 246, 248-249 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967).
The Government argues that if the local board must reopen whenever a prima facie case for reclassification is stated by the registrant, he will be able to postpone his induction indefinitely and the administration of the Selective Service System will be undermined. But the board need not reopen where the claim is plainly incredible, or where, even if true, it would not warrant reclassification, or where the claim has already been passed on, or where the claim itself is conclusively refuted by other information in the applicant’s file. Moreover, a registrant who makes false statements to his draft board is subject to severe criminal penalties. 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a) - (1964 ed., Supp. IY). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | What is the agency involved in the administrative action? | [
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bureau of Prisons",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"State Agency",
"Unidentifiable",
"Office of Thrift Supervision",
"Department of Homeland Security",
"Board of General Appraisers",
"Board of Tax Appeals",
"General Land Office or Commissioners",
"NO Admin Action",
"Processing Tax Board of Review"
] | [
106
] | sc_adminaction |
LAWSON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, v. SUWANNEE FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO. et al.
No. 56.
Argued December 7, 1948.
Decided February 14, 1949.
Newell A. Clapp argued the cause for petitioner. Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Philip Elman, Paul A. Sweeney and Morton Liftin filed a brief for petitioner.
Harry T. Gray argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Sam R. Marks.
Mr. Justice Murphy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a workmen’s compensation case, under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. A narrow and difficult question of statutory construction confronts us.
John Davis lost the sight of his right eye in an accident unconnected with industry or his employment. He was later hired by respondent. An injury occurred during this employment, and he is now blind in both eyes. The parties agree that he is totally disabled within the meaning of the Act; they also agree that the employer is liable for compensation for the loss of the left eye. The dispute is narrowed to this question: should the employer or the statutory second injury fund, administered by petitioner, be liable for the balance of payments to equal compensation for total disability?
Petitioner concluded that the employer was liable. The employer secured a reversal of this determination in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 68 F. Supp. 616, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 166 F. 2d 13. Because this decision conflicted with that of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in National Homeopathic Hospital Association v. Britton, 79 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 147 F. 2d 561, cert. denied 325 U. S. 857, we granted certiorari.
Section 8 (f) (1) of the Act provides that “if an employee receive an injury which of itself would only cause permanent partial disability but which, combined with a previous disability, does in fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall provide compensation only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury: Provided, however, That in addition to compensation for such permanent partial disability, and after the cessation of the payments for the prescribed period of weeks, the employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for permanent total disability. Such additional compensation shall be paid out of the special fund established in section 44.” The court below held that this section is “clear and unambiguous, and therefore needs no construction. When read in its ordinary sense it can have but one meaning”: liability for the second injury fund.
But the word “disability” is defined in the statute. Section 2 provides that “when used in this Act . . . ,(10) ‘Disability’ means incapacity because of injury . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The word “injury” is, in turn, defined as “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment . . . .” § 2 (2). If these definitions are read into the second injury provision, then, it reads as follows: “If an employee receive an injury which of itself would only cause permanent partial disability but which, combined with a previous incapacity because of accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, does in fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall provide compensation only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury.” Because Davis’ previous injury was nonindustrial, this reading points to liability for the employer.
If Congress intended to use the term “disability” as a term of art, a shorthand way of referring to the statutory definition, the employer must pay total compensation. If Congress intended a broader and more usual concept of the word, the judgment below must be affirmed. Statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words, of course, in the usual case. But this is an unusual case. If we read the definition into § 8 (f) (1) in a mechanical fashion, we create obvious incongruities in the language, and we destroy one of the major purposes of the second injury provision: the prevention of employer discrimination against handicapped workers. We have concluded that Congress would not have intended such a result.
Chief Justice Groner, dissenting in the National Homeopathic case, 79 U. S. App. D. C. at 313, 147 F. 2d at 565, noticed that the “inter-replacements of words” we have set out above “produces a manifest incongruity, for . . . it would literally result in this: ‘. . . previous incapacity because of accidental injury or death’ — And if to avoid this it be argued that only a portion of the definition of injury should be inserted, the result would be to change or at least to limit the statutory definition only to produce a desired result, which no one would urge or defend. It is evident, therefore,” that the definition of disability was “not made with watch-like precision” and should not be so applied in§8(f)(l). If the intent of Congress had been to limit the applicability of this subsection in the fashion for which petitioner contends, “it could easily have accomplished this by the insertion of the word ‘compensable’ between the words ‘previous’ and ‘disability’. . . .” And see Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427.
More important, perhaps, is the disservice we would do to the purpose of the second injury provision. We must look to the explanation of congressional intent behind the subsection. A witness at a hearing on the measure outlined his reasons for favoring the provision in the following manner: “The second injury proposition is as much to the advantage of the employer and his interests as it is for the benefit of the employee. It protects that employer who has hired, say, a one-eyed worker who goes and loses his other eye and becomes a total disability. The employer without this sort of thing would have to pay total permanent disability compensation. Then, on the other hand, this also protects the worker with one eye from being denied employment on account of his being an extra risk. Now, by simply taking this up in this way it is possible to protect both the employer and to protect the one-eyed employee also.”
Petitioner relies on the statement of another witness before the Senate Committee, who favored inclusion of the second injury provisions because “they have become a commonplace ... in State compensation legislation and ought to be included in the act.” And petitioner states that “we may appropriately refer, therefore, to the second injury provisions in other statutes and to the evaluations made by administrative experts in the field for guidance with respect to the manner in which opposing policy considerations have been resolved.” But our search for guidance in the sources suggested by petitioner convinces us that petitioner’s theories are not well-founded.
From the attitude of experts in the field, one would not expect Congress to distinguish between two types of handicapped workers. The annual conventions of the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions provide the most helpful considerations of the problem. At the 1931 convention, Mr. Joseph Parks of the Massachusetts Commission spoke as follows of workmen’s compensation legislation without a second injury provision: “I little knew that this great piece of legislation . . . would become an instrument of persecution, as I may call it, of men who are physically handicapped, but that is what it has become. Men who are physically handicapped are being discriminated against in our Commonwealth.”
This attitude has been echoed by Mr. Charles Sharkey of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics; Miss Frances Perkins, then Industrial Commissioner in New York; and others. Perhaps the most impressive evidence of the force behind these statements is that offered by Mr. I. K. Huber of Oklahoma. Nease v. Hughes Stone Co., 114 Okla. 170, 244 P. 778, held the employer liable for total compensation for loss of the second eye. After the decision, Mr. Huber reports, “thousands of one-eyed, one-legged, one-armed, one-handed men in the State of Oklahoma were let out and can not get employment coming under the workmen’s compensation law of Oklahoma. . . . Those . . . court decisions put us in bad shape. . . . The decision displaced between seven and eight thousand men in less than 30 days in Oklahoma.”
A distinction between a worker previously injured in industry and one handicapped by a cause outside of industry has no logical foundation if we accept the premise that the purpose of the fund is that of aid to the handicapped. This is the conclusion of Mr. Fred Wilcox, then Chairman of the Wisconsin Commission: “Wisconsin takes no account of where the injured man may have gotten his first injury. It makes no difference where he got it. It is just as serious to him, when he has the second injury, as if he had gotten the first one in industry.” We cannot attribute the illogic of petitioner’s position to Congress.
Our conclusion is reinforced by the administrative practice under the New York statute. The federal statute is based upon New York law. In New York “the commission holds that if the man loses his second eye in an industrial accident it is immaterial how he lost the first eye. The loss of eyesight in one eye may have been congenital; it may have occurred when the child was two years old, or it may have occurred after he was grown, but not in an industrial accident. Nevertheless, at the time he loses his second eye, he has suffered total disability.”
Petitioner argues that New York law is to the contrary, citing La Belle v. Britton Stone & Supply Corp., 247 App. Div. 843, 286 N. Y. S. 347, and Bervilacqua v. Clark, 225 App. Div. 190, 232 N. Y. S. 502. The La Belle case is inadequately reported; the Bervilacqua case did not consider the precise point involved in this case, and was distinguished by the New York Attorney-General in 1937 when he advised the Department of Labor to continue its established practice. Annual Report of the Attorney-General, State of New York, for 1937 (Albany, 1938), p. 270.
Petitioner’s most strenuous argument is that the fund will soon be insolvent if we open liability to a nonindustrial previous injury, and that therefore Congress could not have contemplated the result we reach. Petitioner’s worries seem exaggerated in the light of Wisconsin and New York experience. From 1919 to 1933, Wisconsin’s fund had only 50 second injury cases charged against it. Second-Injury Funds as Employment Aids to the Handicapped, U. S. Division of Labor Standards (1944), p. 7. From 1919 to 1943, only 99 cases were charged against the New York fund. Id., p. 5. In 1930 Miss Frances Perkins told her associates that the problem is “not so large ... as it appears.”
On the basis of the incongruity involved in applying the definition mechanically, the unmistakable purpose of the second injury fund, and the interpretation of the State statute on which the federal act is based, we conclude that the term “disability” was not used as a term of art in § 8 (f) (1), and that the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
Under § 21 of the statute.
Emphasis supplied.
Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), p. 208.
Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) p. 43.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 564 (1932), p. 278.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 577 (1933), p. 146.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 536 (1931), p. 254.
“We are dealing with a condition and not a theory. If the man is found with some defect which, if he meets with an accident, is likely to be aggravated and made more severe and thus increase the cost to the employer whose experience rating goes up as a result, then he does not want to accept that risk; and that poor fellow is met with the alternative of being deprived of a means of earning a livelihood or of waiving his rights to compensation.” Ibid,., p. 256. And see Discussion of Industrial Accidents and Diseases, United States Division of Labor Standards, Bull. No. 94 (1948), p. 104; United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 602 (1934), p. 11, ff., especially p. 15; United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 577 (1933), pp. 154, 155.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 536 (1931), pp. 268, 272. Mr. Fred Wilcox, former Chairman of the Wisconsin Commission, said: “Fundamentally, there is no moral reason why the employer of a man, when he gets his second injury, should not pay the full cumulative effect of that injury . . . but that is not the way things work out. The employer escapes the burden and lets the injured man bear it, and he sits at home without a job. . . . The employer is going to be afraid to take them on because of some added responsibility. . . . We allowed the employee who lost his second eye to have twice as much compensation for the loss of the second eye as for the loss of the first eye. But what about it ? Did anyone ever get any compensation for the loss of a second eye? No; he never got a job. He never got a chance to lose his second eye in an industry — to be blunt in stating the facts. Employers would not hire him, because they would take on twice as much liability as they had before.” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 577 (1933), pp. 157, 158.
Id.
H. R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. See Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Monahan, 91 F. 2d 130; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hoage, 66 App. D. C. 154, 85 F. 2d 411.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 577 (1933), p. 154.
Payments are made from the special fund established in § 44 of the Act. Employers pay $1,000 into the fund for noncompensable deaths, half of which is available for second injuries. All penalties and fines collected are also paid into the fund. §44 (c).
In 1933 the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Ruehlow v. Industrial Commission, 213 Wis. 240, 251 N. W. 451, which reversed the administrative practice outlined by Mr. Wilcox, supra. Compare Lehman v. Schmahl, 179 Minn. 388, 229 N. W. 553.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 536 (1931), p. 260. At p. 259, Mr. L. W. Hatch of New York is reported as follows: “Many people have said, ‘Oh, well, if you make a second-injury fund take care of every case in which a prior condition was a material factor in the man’s disability you will bankrupt the State or the taxpayers will be called upon to bear an enormous burden.’ The evidence so far as we have gone does not indicate any such situation.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence. | What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision? | [
"judicial review (national level)",
"judicial review (state level)",
"Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction",
"statutory construction",
"interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order",
"diversity jurisdiction",
"federal common law"
] | [
3
] | sc_authoritydecision |
ABATE et al. v. MUNDT et al.
No. 71.
Argued November 19, 1970
Decided June 7, 1971
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, White, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Harlan, J., filed a statement concurring in the result. Stewart, J., concurred in the judgment. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas, J., joined, post, p. 187.
Frank P. Barone argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner Abate. Doris Friedman Ulman argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners Molof et al. Paul H. Rivet argued the cause and'filed a brief for petitioners O’Sullivan et al.
J. Martin Cornell argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Arthur J. Prindle.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Ruth Kessler Toch, Solicitor General, and Robert W. Imrie, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New York as amicus curiae.
Me. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, petitioners challenge the constitutionality of a reapportionment plan proposed in response to both federal and .state court findings of malapportionment in Rockland County, New York. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York upheld the plan. We affirm.
For more than 100 years, Rockland County was governéd by a board of supervisors consisting of the supervisors of each of the county’s five constituent towns. This county legislature was not separately elected; rather, its members held their county offices by virtue of their election as town supervisors — a pattern that typified New York county government. The result has been a local structure in which overlapping public services are provided by the towns and their county working in. close cooperation. For example, in Rockland County the towns adopt their own budgets and submit them to the county which levies taxes. These taxes are based on real property assessments established by the towns but equalized by the county board. Similarly, public services such as waste disposal and snow removal are provided through cooperative efforts among the municipalities. There is no indication that these joint efforts have declined in importance; in fact, respondents strenuously urge that the county’s rapidly expanding population has amplified the need for town and county coordination in the future.
The county’s increased population also produced severe malapportionment — so severe that, in 1966, a federal district court required that the county board submit a reapportionment plan to the Rockland County voters, Lodico v. Board of Supervisors, 256 F. Supp. 440 (SDNY). Pursuant to that order, three different plans were devised and submitted to the electorate; but each was rejectéd at the polls. The present action was brought in 1968 to compel the board to reapportion. After its initial proposal was rejected by the New York courts, the board submitted the plan that is the subject of this decision.
The challenged plan, based on 1969 population figures, provides for a county legislature composed of 18 members chosen from five legislative districts. These districts éxactly correspond to the county’s five constituent towns. Each district is assigned its legislators according to the district’s population in relation to the population of the smallest town, Stony Point. Stony Point has a population of 12,114 and is assigned one representative in the county legislature. The number of representatives granted the other districts is determined by dividing the population of each by the population of the smallest town. Fractional results of the computation are rounded to the nearest integer, and this need to round off “fractional representatives” produces some variations among districts in terms of population per legislator. Under 1969 population figures, the Orange-town district is the most “underrepresented” (7.1%); while Clarkstown is the most “overrepresented” (4.8%). Thus, the plan presently produces a total deviation from population equality of H.9%. Petitioners attack these , deviations as unconstitutional.
It is well established that electoral apportionment must be based on the general principle of population equality and that this principle applies to state and local elections, Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474, 481 (1968). “Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly .a workable constitutional requirement,” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 577 (1964), but deviations from population equality must be justified by legitimate state considerations, Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440, 444 (1967). Because voting rights require highly sensitive safeguards, this Court has carefully scrutinized state interests offered to justify deviations from population eouality.
In assessing the constitutionality , of various apportionment plans, we have observed that viable local governments may need considerable flexibility in municipal arrangements if they are to meet changing societal needs, Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105, 110-111 (1967), and that a desire to preserve the integrity of political subdivisions may justify an apportionment plan which departs from numerical equality. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 578. These observations, along with the facts that local legislative bodies frequently have fewer representatives than do their state and national counterparts and that some local legislative districts may have a much smaller population than do congressional and state legislative districts, lend support to the argument that slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable for local government apportionment schemes, cf. ibid. Of course, this Court has never suggested that certain geographic areas or political interests are entitled to disproportionate representation. Rather, our statements have reflected the view that the particular circumstances and needs of a local community as .a whole may sometimes justify departures from strict equality.
Accordingly, we have underscored the danger of apportionment, structures that contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular geographic areas or political interests or which necessarily will tend to favor, for example, less populous districts over their more highly populated neighbors, see Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50, 57-58 (1970). In this case, we have no such indigenous bias; there is no suggestion that the Rockland County plan was.designed to favor particular groups. It is true that the existence of any deviations from strict equality means that certain districts are advantaged at that point in time; but, under this plan, changing demographic patterns may shift electoral advantages from one town to another.
The mere absence of a built-in bias is not, of course, justification for a departure-from population equality. In this case, however, Rockland County defends its plan by asserting the long history of, and perceived need for, close cooperation between the county and its constituent towns. The need for intergovernmental coordination is often greatest at the local level, and we have already commented on the extensive functional interrelationships between Rockland County and its towns. But because almost all governmental entities are interrelated in numerous ways, we would be hesitant to accept this justification by itself. To us, therefore, it is significant that Rockland County has long recognized the advantages of having the same individuals occupy the governing positions of both .the county and its towns. For over 100 years, the five town supervisors were the only members of the county board, a system that necessarily fostered extensive interdependence between the towns and their couqty government. When population shifts required that some towns receive a greater portion of seats on the county legislature, Rockland County responded with a plan that substantially remedies the malapportionment and that, by preserving an exact correspondence between each town and one of the county legislative districts, continues to encourage town supervisors to serve on the county board.
We emphasize that our decision is based on the long tradition of overlapping functions and dual personnel in Rockland County government and on the fact that the .plan before us does not contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geographic areas. And nothing we say today should be taken to imply that even these factors could justify substantially greater deviations from-population equality. But we are not prepared to hold that the Rockland County reapportionment plan violates the Constitution, and, therefore, we affirm.
Mb. Justice Harlan concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, ante, p. 165.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment.
All of the population figures and percentage deviations are:
District Population* Number. of Representatives Percentage** Deviations
Stony Point 12,114 1 0.3
Haverstraw 23,676 2 . 2.5
Orangetown 52,080 4 —7.1
Clarkstown 57,883 5 4.8
Ramapo 73,051 6 —0.2
*1969 Population data.
**( — ) refers to “underrepresented.”
Petitioners also attack the plan’s use of .multi-member districts. However, they have not shown that these multi-member districts, by themselves, operate to impair the voting strength of particular racial or political elements of the Rockland County voting population, see Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966).
Naturally, we express no opinion on the* contention that, in future years, the Rockland County plan may produce substantially greater deviations than presently exist. Such questions can be answered if and when they arise. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisposition |
COUNTY COURT OF ULSTER COUNTY, NEW YORK, et al. v. ALLEN et al.
No. 77-1554.
Argued February 22, 1979
Decided June 4, 1979
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 167. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrennaN, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 168.
Eileen F. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Louis J. Lefkowitz, former Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, Patricia C. Armstrong, Assistant Attorney General, and George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Solicitor General.
Michael Young argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A New York statute provides that, with certain exceptions, the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that respondents may challenge the constitutionality of this statute in a federal habeas corpus proceeding and that the statute is “unconstitutional on its face.” 568 F. 2d 998, 1009. We granted certiorari to review these holdings and also to consider whether the statute is constitutional in its application to respondents. 439 U. S. 815.
Four persons, three adult males (respondents) and a 16-year-old girl (Jane Doe, who is not a respondent here), were jointly tried on charges that they possessed two loaded handguns, a loaded machinegun, and over a pound of heroin found in a Chevrolet in which they were riding when it was stopped for speeding on the New York Thruway shortly after noon on March 28, 1973. The two large-caliber handguns, which together with their ammunition weighed approximately six pounds, were seen through the window of the car by the investigating police officer. They were positioned crosswise in an open handbag on either the front floor or the front seat of the car on the passenger side where Jane Doe was sitting. Jane Doe admitted that the handbag was hers.' The machine-gun and the heroin were discovered in the trunk after the police pried it open. The car had been borrowed from the driver’s brother earlier that day; the key to the trunk could not be found in the car or on the person of any of its occupants, although there was testimony that two of the occupants had placed something in the trunk before embarking in the borrowed car. The jury convicted all four of possession of the handguns and acquitted them of possession of the contents of the trunk.
Counsel for all four defendants objected to the introduction into evidence of the two handguns, the machinegun, and the drugs, arguing that the State had not adequately demonstrated a connection between their clients and the contraband. The trial court overruled the objection, relying on the presumption of possession created by the New York statute. Tr. 474-483. Because that presumption does not apply if a weapon is found “upon the person” of one of the occupants of the car, see n. 1, supra, the three male defendants also moved to dismiss the charges relating to the handguns on the ground that the guns were found on the person of Jane Doe. Respondents made this motion both at the close of the prosecution’s case and at the close of all evidence. The trial judge twice denied it, concluding that the applicability of the “upon the person” exception was a question of fact for the jury. Tr. 544-557, 589-590.
At the close of the trial, the judge instructed the jurors that they were entitled to infer possession from the defendants’ presence in the car. He did not make any reference to the “upon the person” exception in his explanation of the statutory presumption, nor did any of the defendants object to this omission or request alternative or additional instructions on the subject.
Defendants filed a post-trial motion in which they challenged the constitutionality of the New York statute as applied in this case. The challenge was made in support of their argument that the evidence, apart from the presumption, was insufficient to sustain the convictions. The motion was denied, id., at 775-776, and the convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. People v. Lemmons, 49 App. Div. 2d 639, 370 N. Y. S. 2d 243 (1975).
The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. People v. Lemmons, 40 N. Y. 2d 505, 354 N. E. 2d 836 (1976). It rejected the argument that as a matter of law the guns were on Jane Doe’s person because they were in her pocketbook. Although the court recognized that in some circumstances the evidence could only lead to the conclusion that the weapons were in one person’s sole possession, it held that this record presented a jury question on that issue. Since the defendants had not asked the trial judge to submit the question to the jury, the Court of Appeals treated the case as though the jury had resolved this fact question in the prosecution's favor. It therefore concluded that the presumption did apply and that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Id., at 509-512, 354 N. E. 2d, at 839-841. It also summarily rejected the argument that the presumption was unconstitutional as applied in this case. See infra, at 153-154.
Respondents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York contending that they were denied due process of law by the application of the statutory presumption of possession. The District Court issued the writ, holding that respondents had not “deliberately bypassed” their federal claim by their actions at trial and that the mere presence of two guns in a woman’s handbag in a car could not reasonably give rise to the inference that they were in the possession of three other persons in the car. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a-36a.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but for different reasons. First, the entire panel concluded that the New York Court of Appeals had decided respondents’ constitutional claim on its merits rather than on any independent state procedural ground that might have barred collateral relief. Then, the majority of the court, without deciding whether the presumption was constitutional as applied in this case, concluded that the statute is unconstitutional on its face because the “presumption obviously sweeps within its compass (1) many occupants who may not know they are riding with a gun (which may be out of their sight), and (2) many who may be aware of the presence of the gun but not permitted access to it.” Concurring separately, Judge Timbers agreed with the District Court that the statute was unconstitutional as applied but considered it improper to reach the issue of the statute’s facial constitutionality. 568 F. 2d, at 1011-1012.
The petition for a writ of certiorari presented three questions: (1) whether the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ claim that the presumption is unconstitutional; (2) whether it was proper for the Court of Appeals to decide the facial constitutionality issue; and (3) whether the application of the presumption in this case is unconstitutional. We answer the first question in the affirmative, the second two in the negative. We accordingly reverse.
I
This is the sixth time that respondents have asked a court to hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to rely on the presumption because the evidence is otherwise insufficient to convict them. No court has refused to hear the claim or suggested that it was improperly presented. Nevertheless, because respondents made it for the first time only after the jury had announced its verdict, and because the state courts were less than explicit in their reasons for rejecting it, the question arises whether the New York courts did so on the basis of an independent and adequate state procedural ground that bars the federal courts from addressing the issue on habeas corpus. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438. We conclude that there is no support in either the law of New York or the history of this litigation for an inference that the New York courts decided respondents' constitutional claim on a procedural ground, and that the question of the presumption’s constitutionality is therefore properly before us. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 161-162; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 704-705, and n. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
New York has no clear contemporaneous-objection policy that applies in this case. No New York court, either in this litigation or in any other case that we have found, has ever expressly refused on contemporaneous-objection grounds to consider a post-trial claim such as the one respondents made. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 74. Indeed, the rule in New York appears to be that “insufficiency of the evidence” claims may be raised at any time until sentence has been imposed. Moreover, even if New York’s contemporaneous-objection rule did generally bar the type of postverdict insufficiency claim that respondents made, there are at least two judicially created exceptions to that rule that might nonetheless apply in this case.
The conclusion that the New York courts did not rely on a state procedural ground in rejecting respondents’ constitutional claim is supported, not only by the probable unavailability in New York law of any such ground, but also by three aspects of this record. First, the prosecution never argued to any state court that a procedural default had occurred. This omission surely suggests that the New York courts were not thinking in procedural terms when they decided the issue. Indeed, the parties did not even apprise the appellate courts of the timing of respondents’ objection to the presumption; a procedural default would not have been discovered, therefore, unless those courts combed the transcript themselves. If they did so without any prompting from the parties and based their decision on what they found, they surely would have said so.
Second, the trial court ruled on the merits when it denied respondents’ motion to set aside the verdict. Tr. 775-776. Because it was not authorized to do so unless the issue was preserved for appeal, the trial court implicitly decided that there was no procedural default. The most logical inference to be drawn from the Appellate Division’s unexplained affirmance is that that court accepted not only the judgment but also the reasoning of the trial court.
Third, it is apparent on careful examination that the New York Court of Appeals did not ignore respondents’ constitutional claim in its opinion. Instead, it summarily rejected the claim on its merits. That court had been faced with the issue in several prior cases and had always held the presumption constitutional. Indeed, the State confined its brief on the subject in the Court of Appeals to a string citation of some of those cases. Respondent’s Brief in the Court of Appeals, p. 9. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court of Appeals confined its discussion of the issue to a reprise of the explanation that its prior cases have traditionally given for the statute in holding it constitutional and a citation of two of those cases. 40 N. Y. 2d, at 509-511, 354 N. E. 2d, at 839-840, citing People v. McCaleb, 25 N. Y. 2d 394, 255 N. E. 2d 136 (1969); People v. Leyva, 38 N. Y. 2d 160, 341 N. E. 2d 546 (1975). Although it omits the word “constitutional,” the most logical interpretation of this discussion is that it was intended as a passing and summary disposition of an issue that had already been decided on numerous occasions. This interpretation is borne out by the fact that the dissenting members of the Court of Appeals unequivocally addressed the merits of the constitutional claim and by the fact that three Second Circuit Judges, whose experience with New York practice is entitled to respect, concluded that the State’s highest court had decided the issue on its merits. 568 F. 2d, at 1000. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-346; Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237.
Our conclusion that it was proper for the federal courts to address respondents’ claim is confirmed by the policies informing the “adequate state ground” exception to habeas corpus jurisdiction. The purpose of that exception is to accord appropriate respect to the sovereignty of the States in our federal system. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 88. But if neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim.
II
Although 28 U. S. C. § 2254 authorizes the federal courts to entertain respondents’ claim that they are being held in custody in violation of the Constitution, it is not a grant of power to decide constitutional questions not necessarily subsumed within that claim. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They have the authority to adjudicate specific controversies between adverse litigants over which and over whom they have jurisdiction. In the exercise of that authority, they have a duty to decide constitutional questions when necessary to dispose of the litigation before them. But they have an equally strong duty to avoid constitutional issues that need not be resolved in order to determine the rights of the parties to the case under consideration. E. g., New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582-583.
A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights. As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 610 (and cases cited). A limited exception has been recognized for statutes that broadly prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 611-616. This exception has been justified by the overriding interest in removing illegal deterrents to the exercise of the right of free speech. E. g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486. That justification, of course, has no application to a statute that enhances the legal risks associated with riding in vehicles containing dangerous weapons.
In this case, the Court of Appeals undertook the task of deciding the constitutionality of the New York statute “on its face.” Its conclusion that the statutory presumption was arbitrary rested entirely on its view of the fairness of applying the presumption in hypothetical situations — situations, indeed, in which it is improbable that a jury would return a conviction, or that a prosecution would ever be instituted. We must accordingly inquire whether these respondents had standing to advance the arguments that the Court of Appeals considered decisive. An analysis of our prior cases indicates that the answer to this inquiry depends on the type of presumption that is involved in the case.
Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime— that is, an “ultimate” or “elemental” fact — from the existence of one or more “evidentiary” or “basic” facts. E. g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837, 843-844; Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42. The value of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under the Due Process Clause, vary from case to case, however, depending on the strength of the connection between the particular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the device curtails the factfinder’s freedom to assess the evidence independently. Nonetheless, in criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device’s constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate‘facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S., at 702-703, n. 31.
The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. See, e. g., Barnes v. United States, supra, at 840 n. 3. In that situation the basic fact may constitute prima facie evidence of the elemental fact. See, e. g., Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 402 n. 2. When reviewing this type of device, the Court has required the party challenging it to demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him. E. g., Barnes v. United States, supra, at 845; Turner v. United States, supra, at 419-424. See also United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 67-68, 69-70. Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational fact-finder to make an erroneous factual determination.
A mandatory presumption is a far more troublesome evi-dentiary device. For it may affect not only the strength of the “no reasonable doubt” burden but also the placement of that burden; it tells the trier that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. E. g., Turner v. United States, supra, at 401-402, and n. 1; Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 30; United States v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136, 137, and n. 4, 138, 143; Tot v. United States, supra, at 469. In this situation, the Court has generally examined the presumption on its face to determine the extent to which the basic and elemental facts coincide. E. g., Turner v. United States, supra, at 408-418; Leary v. United States, supra, at 45-52; United States v. Romano, supra, at 140-141; Tot v. United States, 319 U. S., at 468. To the extent that the trier of fact is forced to abide by the presumption, and may not reject it based on an independent evaluation of the particular facts presented by the State, the analysis of the presumption’s constitutional validity is logically divorced from those facts and based on the presumption’s accuracy in the run of cases. It is for this reason that the Court has held it irrelevant in analyzing a mandatory presumption, but not in analyzing a purely permissive one, that there is ample evidence in the record other than the presumption to support a conviction. E. g., Turner v. United States, 396 U. S., at 407; Leary v. United States, 395 U. S., at 31-32; United States v. Romano, 382 U. S., at 138-139.
Without determining whether the presumption in this case was mandatory, the Court of Appeals analyzed it on its face as if it were. In fact, it was not, as the New York Court of Appeals had earlier pointed out. 40 N. Y. 2d, at 510-511, 354 N. E. 2d, at 840.
The trial judge’s instructions make it clear that the presumption was merely a part of the prosecution’s case, that it gave rise to a permissive inference available only in certain circumstances, rather than a mandatory conclusion of possession, and that it could be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative proof offered by defendants in rebuttal. The judge explained that possession could be actual or constructive, but that constructive possession could not exist without the intent and ability to exercise control or dominion over the weapons. He also carefully instructed the jury that there is a mandatory presumption of innocence in favor of the defendants that controls unless it, as the exclusive trier of fact, is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the handguns in the manner described by the judge. In short, the instructions plainly directed" the jury to consider all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the inference that all four occupants of the car had possession of the two loaded handguns and to decide the matter for itself without regard to how much evidence the defendants introduced.
“In other words, these presumptions or this latter presumption upon proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons, you may infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions is effective only so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the conclusion flowing from the presumption, and the presumption is said to disappear when such contradictory evidence is adduced.” Id., at 743.
“The presumption or presumptions which I discussed with the jury relative to the drugs or weapons in this case need not be rebutted by affirmative proof or affirmative evidence but may be rebutted by any evidence or lack of evidence in the case.” Id., at 760.
Our cases considering the validity of permissive statutory presumptions such as the one involved here have rested on an evaluation of the presumption as applied to the record before the Court. None suggests that a court should pass on the constitutionality of this kind of statute “on its face.” It was error for the Court of Appeals to make such a determination in this case.
Ill
As applied to the facts of this case, the presumption of possession is entirely rational. Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ analysis, respondents were not “hitchhikers or other casual passengers,” and the guns were neither “a few inches in length” nor “out of [respondents’] sight.” See n. 4, supra, and accompanying text. The argument against possession by any of the respondents was predicated solely on the fact that the guns were in Jane Doe’s pocketbook. But several circumstances — which, not surprisingly, her counsel repeatedly emphasized in his questions and his argument, e. g., Tr. 282-283, 294-297, 306 — made it highly improbable that she was the sole custodian of those weapons.
Even if it was reasonable to conclude that she had placed the guns in her purse before the car was stopped by police, the facts strongly suggest that Jane Doe was not the only person able ’to exercise dominion over them. The two guns were too large to be concealed in her handbag. The bag was consequently open, and part of one of the guns was in plain view, within easy access of the driver of the car and even, perhaps, of the other two respondents who were riding in the rear seat.
Moreover, it is highly improbable that the loaded guns belonged to Jane Doe or that she was solely responsible for their being in her purse. As a 16-year-old girl in the company of three adult men she was the least likely of the four to be carrying one, let alone two, heavy handguns. It is far more probable that she relied on the pocketknife found in her brassiere for any necessary self-protection. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for her counsel to argue and for the jury to infer that when the car was halted for speeding, the other passengers in the car anticipated the risk of a search and attempted to conceal their weapons in a pocketbook in the front seat. The inference is surely more likely than the notion that these weapons were the sole property of the 16-year-old girl.
Under these circumstances, the jury would have been entirely reasonable in rejecting the suggestion — which, incidentally, defense counsel did not even advance in their closing arguments to the jury- — that the handguns were in the sole possession of Jane Doe. Assuming that the jury did reject it, the case is tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the floor or the seat of the car in the plain view of the three other occupants of the automobile. In such a case, it is surely rational to infer that each of the respondents was fully aware of the presence of the guns and had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the weapons. The application of the statutory presumption in this case therefore comports with the standard laid down in Tot v. United States, 319 U. S., at 467, and restated in Leary v. United States, 396 U. S., at 36. For there is a “rational connection” between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is “more likely than not to flow from” the former.
Respondents argue, however, that the validity of the New York presumption must be judged by a “reasonable doubt” test rather than the “more likely than not” standard employed in Leary. Under the more stringent test, it is argued that a statutory presumption must be rejected unless the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational jury to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S., at 842-843. Respondents’ argument again overlooks the distinction between a permissive presumption on which the prosecution is entitled to rely as one not necessarily sufficient part of its proof and a mandatory presumption which the jury must accept even if it is the sole evidence of an element of the offense.
In the latter situation, since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But in the former situation, the prosecution may rely on all of the evidence in the record to meet the reasonable-doubt standard. There is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a trial than there is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evidence before it may be admitted. As long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, it need only satisfy the test described in Leary.
The permissive presumption, as used in this case, satisfied the Leary test. And, as already noted, the New York Court of Appeals has concluded that the record as a whole was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment is reversed.
So ordered.
New York Penal Law § 265.15 (3) (McKinney 1967):
“The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus, of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, bomb, bombshell, gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuckles, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except under the following circumstances:
“(a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein; (b) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile which is being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and proper pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply to the driver; or (c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the occupants, not present under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have and carry concealed the same.”
In addition to the three exceptions delineated in §§265.15 (3)(a)-(c) above as well as the stolen-vehicle and public-omnibus exception in §265.15 (3) itself, §265.20 contains various exceptions that apply when weapons are present in an automobile pursuant to certain military, law enforcement, recreational, and commercial endeavors.
The arrest was made by two state troopers. One officer approached the driver, advised him that he was going to issue a ticket for speeding, requested identification, and returned to the patrol car. After a radio check indicated that the driver was wanted in Michigan on a weapons charge, the second officer returned to the vehicle and placed the driver under arrest. Thereafter, he went around to the right side of the car and, in “open view,” saw a portion of a .45-caliber automatic pistol protruding from the open purse on the floor or the seat. People v. Lemmons, 40 N. Y. 2d 505, 508-509, 354 N. E. 2d 836, 838-839 (1976). He opened the car door, removed that gun, and saw a .38-caliber revolver in the same handbag. He testified that the crosswise position of one or both of the guns kept the handbag from closing. After the weapons were secured, the two remaining male passengers, who had been sitting in the rear seat, and Janie Doe were arrested and frisked. A subsequent search at the police station disclosed a pocketknife and marihuana concealed on Jane Doe’s person. Tr. 187-192, 208-214, 277-278, 291-297, 408.
Early that morning, the four defendants had arrived at the Rochester, N. Y., home of the driver’s sister in a Cadillac. Using her telephone, the driver called their brother, advised him that “his car ran hot” on the way there from Detroit and asked to borrow the Chevrolet so that the four could continue on to New York City. The brother brought the Chevrolet to the sister’s home. He testified that he had recently cleaned out the trunk and had seen no weapons or drugs. The sister also testified, stating that she saw two of the defendants transfer some unidentified item or items from the trunk of one vehicle to the trunk of the other while both cars were parked in her driveway. Id., at 17-19, 69-73, 115-116, 130-131, 193-194.
The majority continued:
“Nothing about a gun, which may be only a few inches in length (e. g., a Baretta or Derringer) and concealed under a seat, in a glove. compartment or beyond the reach of all but one of the car’s occupants, assures that its presence is known to occupants who may be hitchhikers or other casual passengers, much less that they have any dominion or control over it.” 568 F. 2d, at 1007.
Respondents first made the argument in a memorandum of law in support of their unsuccessful post-trial motion to set aside the verdict. App. 36a-38a. That memorandum framed the argument in three parts precisely as respondents would later frame it in their briefs in the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals, see id., at 41a-44a, 50a-52a, and in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See id., at 6a-10a: First, “[t]he only evidence” relied upon to convict them was their presence in an automobile in which the two handguns were found. Id., at 35a. Second, but for the presumption of possession, this evidence was “totally insufficient to sustain the conviction.” Id., at 38a. And third, that presumption is “unconstitutional as applied” (or, “ ‘arbitrary/ and hence unconstitutional”) under Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 36, a case in which this Court established standards for determining the validity under the Due Process Clauses of statutory presumptions in criminal eases. App. 36a. This sufficiency-focused argument on the presumption is amply supported in our case law. E. g., Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 424 (“[A] conviction resting on [an unconstitutional] presumption cannot be deemed a conviction based on sufficient evidence”). See also Rossi v. United States, 289 U. S. 89, 90.
Although respondents’ memorandum did not cite the provision of the Constitution on which they relied, their citation of our leading case applying that provision, in conjunction with their use of the word “unconstitutional,” left no doubt that they were making a federal constitutional argument. Indeed, by its responses to that argument at every step of the way, the State made clear that it, at least, understood the federal basis for the claim. E. g., Respondent’s Brief and Appendix in the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, p. 9.
Petitioners contend that, in addition to the timing of respondents’ claim and the alleged silence of the New York courts, there is another basis for concluding that those courts rejected respondents’ claim on procedural grounds. Petitioners point out that respondents — having unsuccessfully argued to the trial court (as they would unsuccessfully argue on appeal) that the “upon the person” exception applied as a matter of law in their case — failed either to ask the trial court to instruct the jury to consider the exceptions or to object when the court omitted the instruction. They further point out that the majority of the New York Court of Appeals, after concluding that the exception’s application was a jury question in this case, refused to review the trial court’s omission of an instruction on the issue because of respondents’ failure to protest that omission. 40 N. Y. 2d, at 512, 354 N. E. 2d, at 841.
Petitioners argue that we should infer from the Court of Appeals’ explicit treatment of this state-law claim — a claim never even pressed on appeal — how that court implicitly treated the federal claim that has been the crux of respondents’ litigation strategy from its post-trial motion to the present. There is no basis for the inference. Arguing on appeal that an instruction that was never requested should have been given is far more disruptive to orderly judicial proceedings than arguing in a post-trial motion that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Moreover, that the Court of Appeals felt compelled expressly to reject, on procedural grounds, an argument never made is hardly proof that they would silently reject on similar grounds an argument that was forcefully made. As we discuss, infra, at 153-154, it is clear that the court did address the constitutional question and did so on the merits, albeit summarily.
Petitioners also contend that respondents, having failed to seek a jury determination based on state law that the presumption does not apply, may not now argue that the presumption is void as a matter of federal constitutional law. The argument is unpersuasive. Respondents’ failure to demand an instruction on the state-law exception is no more and no less than a concession on their part that as a matter of state law the guns were not found “upon the person” of any occupant of the car as that phrase is interpreted by the New York courts, and therefore, again as a matter of state law, that the presumption of possession is applicable. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the ease in that posture, and we do the same.
Petitioners advance a second reason why there is no federal jurisdiction in this case. Respondents were convicted on the basis of a statutory presumption they argue is unconstitutional. Following the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of their conviction, they could have appealed that decision to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) and thereby forced a binding federal disposition of the matter. Because respondents failed to do so, petitioners argue that respondents waived any right to federal review of the decision on habeas corpus.
In Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 435-438, we rejected a similar argument that habeas corpus review was unavailable in advance of a petition for certiorari. See also Stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, in which the Court entertained a challenge to a state statute in a federal habeas corpus proceeding even though the defendant had not pursued that challenge on appeal to this Court prior to filing his petition for habeas corpus. The analysis of the federal habeas statute that led us to our conclusion in Fay is equally applicable in the present situation. That statute gives federal courts jurisdiction to “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” if that custody allegedly violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (a). The only statutory exception to this jurisdiction arises when the petitioner has failed to exhaust “the remedies available in the courts of the State.” §2254 (b). As was said in Fay with regard to petitions for certiorari under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3), direct appeals to this Court under § 1257 (2) are not “ ‘remedies available in the courts of the State.’ ” 372 U. S., at 436. Accordingly, there is no statutory requirement of an appeal to this Court as a predicate to habeas jurisdiction.
New York’s cautious contemporaneous-objection policy is embodied in N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §470.05 (2) (McKinney 1971):
“For purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a ruling or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or proceeding is presented when a protest thereto was registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same’’ (emphasis added).
That policy is carefully limited by several statutory qualifications in addition to the one italicized above. First, the form of the “protest” is not controlling so long as its substance is clear. Ibid. Second, such protests may be made “expressly or impliedly.” Ibid. Third, once a protest is made, it need not be repeated at each subsequent disposition of the matter. Ibid. And finally, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court is authorized in its discretion to “consider and determine any question of law or issue of fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have adversely affected the appellant,” even if not previously objected to. § 470.15 (1). See, e. g., People v. Fragale, 60 App. Div. 2d 972, 401 N. Y. S. 2d 629 (1978); People v. Travison, 59 App. Div. 2d 404, 408, 400 N. Y. S. 2d 188, 191 (1977) .
E. g., People v. Ramos, 33 App. Div. 2d 344, 308 N. Y. S. 2d 195 (1970); People v. Walker, 26 Misc. 2d 940, 206 N. Y. S. 2d 377 (1960). Cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29 (c) (“It shall not be necessary to the making of [a motion for judgment of acquittal] that a similar motion has been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury”); Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 17-18 (under federal law a post-trial motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence is not a waiver of the right to acquittal at that point if the evidence is found to be insufficient).
First, the New York Court of Appeals has developed an exception to the State’s contemporaneous-objection policy that allows review of unob-jected-to errors that affect “a fundamental constitutional right.” People v. McLucas, 15 N. Y. 2d 167, 172, 204 N. E. 2d 846, 848 (1965). Accord, People v. Arthur, 22 N. Y. 2d 325, 239 N. E. 2d 537 (1968); People v. DeRenzzio, 19 N. Y. 2d 45, 224 N. E. 2d 97 (1966). Indeed, this Court recognized that exception in concluding that an ambiguously presented federal claim had been properly raised in New York trial and appellate courts and was therefore cognizable by this Court on appeal. Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 583-584. Although this exception has been narrowed more recently, e. g., People v. Robinson, 36 N. Y. 2d 224, 326 N. E. 2d 784 (1975), it continues to have currency within the State where there has been a denial of a “fair trial.” E. g., La Rocca v. Lane, 37 N. Y. 2d 575, 584, 338 N. E. 2d 606, 613 (1975); People v. Bennett, 29 N. Y. 2d 462, 467, 280 N. E. 2d 637, 639 (1972); People v. White, 86 Misc. 2d 803, 809, 383 N. Y. S. 2d 800, 804 (1976). The relevance of this exception is apparent from the Second Circuit opinion in this case which held that respondents “were denied a fair trial when the jury was charged that they could rely on the presumption . . . .” 568 F. 2d, at 1011.
Second, the New York courts will also entertain a federal constitutional claim on appeal even though it was not expressly raised at trial if a similar claim seeking similar relief was clearly raised. E. g., People v. De Bour, 40 N. Y. 2d 210, 214-215, 352 N. E. 2d 562, 565-566 (1976); People v. Robbins, 38 N. Y. 2d 913, 346 N. E. 2d 815 (1976); People v. Arthur, supra. Cf. United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 364-365 (failure to invoke Interstate Agreement on Detainers time limit in a speedy trial motion is not a waiver of the former argument). In this case, respondents made two arguments based on the unavailability of the presumption and the consequent total absence, in their view, of proof of the crime. The first, that the statutory “upon the person” exception to the presumption should apply in^ this case, was made in the middle of trial at the close of the prosecutor’s case and then repeated at the close of the defendants’ case. Tr. 554-590; App. 12a-17a. Indeed, respondents arguably made this claim even earlier, during the middle of the government’s case, when they unsuccessfully objected to the introduction of the handguns in evidence on the ground that there was “nothing [in the record up to that point] to connect this weapon with the . . . defendants.” Tr. 474-502. Although the constitutional counterpart to this argument was not made until just after the verdict was announced, the earlier objection to the State’s reliance on the presumption might suffice under these cases as an adequate contemporaneous objection. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.05 (2) (McKinney 1971); n. 8, supra. The logical linkage between the two objections is suggested by legislative history and case law in New York indicating that the “upon the person” exception was included in the presumption statute to avoid constitutional problems. See People v. Logan, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 681, 684 (Sup. Ct., 1949); Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Firearms and Ammunition, N. Y. Leg. Doc. No. 29, p. 21 (1962).
Section 330.30 (1) of the N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law (McKinney 1971) authorizes a trial court to grant a motion to set aside the verdict “[a]t any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence” on “[a]ny ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court.”
40 N. Y. 2d, at 514-515, 354 N. E. 2d, at 842-843 (Wachtler, J., concurring and dissenting); id., at 516, 354 N. E. 2d, at 843-844 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring and dissenting).
Moreover, looking beyond its position as an adversary in this litigation, it is arguable that the State of New York will benefit from an authoritative resolution of the conflict between its own courts and the federal courts sitting in New York concerning the constitutionality of one of its statutes.
Indeed, in this very case the permissive presumptions in § 265.15 (3) and its companion drug statute, N. Y. Penal Law § 220.25 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1978), were insufficient to persuade the jury to convict the defendants of possession of the loaded machinegun and heroin in the trunk of the car notwithstanding the supporting testimony that at least two of them had been seen transferring something into the trunk that morning. See n. 3, supra.
The hypothetical, even implausible, nature of the situations relied upon by the Court of Appeals is illustrated by the fact that there are no reported cases in which the presumption led to convictions in circumstances even remotely similar to the posited situations. In those occasional cases in which a jury has reached a guilty verdict on the basis of evidence insufficient to justify ati inference of possession from presence, the New York appellate courts have not hesitated to reverse. E. g., People v. Scott, 53 App. Div. 2d 703, 384 N. Y. S. 2d 878 (1976); People v. Garcia, 41 App. Div. 2d 560, 340 N. Y. S. 2d 35 (1973).
In light of the improbable character of the situations hypothesized by the Court of Appeals, its facial analysis would still be unconvincing even were that type of analysis appropriate. This Court has never required that a presumption be accurate in every imaginable case. See Leary v. United States, 395 U. S., at 53.
See n. 4, supra, and accompanying text. Thus, the assumption that it would be unconstitutional to apply the statutory presumption to a hitchhiker in a car containing a concealed weapon does not necessarily advance the constitutional claim of the driver of a car in which a gun was 'found on the front seat, or of other defendants in entirely different situations.
This class of more or less mandatory presumptions can be subdivided into two parts: presumptions that merely shift the burden of production to the defendant, following the satisfaction of which the ultimate burden of persuasion returns to the prosecution; and presumptions that entirely shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The mandatory presumptions examined by our cases have almost uniformly fit into the former subclass, in that they never totally removed the ultimate burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution. E. g., Tot v. United States, 319 U. S., at 469. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 63, describing the operation of the presumption involved in Turner, Leary, and Romano.
To the extent that a presumption imposes an extremely low burden of production — e. g., being satisfied by “any” evidence — it may well be that its impact is no greater than that of a permissive inference, and it may be proper to analyze it as such. See generally Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 703 n. 31.
In deciding what type of inference or presumption is involved in a case, the jury instructions will generally be controlling, although their interpretation may require recourse to the statute involved and the cases decided under it. Turner v. United States provides a useful illustration of the different types of presumptions. It analyzes the constitutionality of two different presumption statutes (one mandatory and one permissive) as they apply to the basic fact of possession of both heroin and cocaine, and the presumed facts of importation and distribution of narcotic drugs. The jury was charged essentially in the terms of the two statutes.
The importance of focusing attention on the precise presentation of the presumption to the jury and the scope of that presumption is illustrated by a comparison of United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, with United States v. Romano. Both cases involved statutory presumptions based on proof that the defendant was present at the site of an illegal still. In Gainey the Court sustained a conviction “for carrying on” the business of the distillery in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 5601 (a)(4), whereas in Romano, the Court set aside a conviction for being in “possession, or custody, or . . . control” of such a distillery in violation of § 5601 (a) (1). The difference in outcome was attributable to two important differences between the eases. Because the statute involved in Gainey was a sweeping prohibition of almost any activity associated with the still, whereas the Romano statute involved only one narrow aspect of the total undertaking, there was a much higher probability that mere presence could support an inference of guilt in the former case than in the latter.
Of perhaps greater importance, however, was the difference between the trial judge’s instructions to the jury in the two cases. In Gainey, the judge had explained that the presumption was permissive; it did not require the jury to convict the defendant even if it was convinced that he was present at the site. On the contrary, the instructions made it clear that presence was only “ 'a circumstance to be considered along with all the other circumstances in the case.’ ” As we emphasized, the “jury was thus specifically told that the statutory inference was not conclusive.” 380 U. S., at 69-70. In Romano, the trial judge told the jury that the defendant’s presence at the still “ 'shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction.’ ” 382 U. S., at 138. Although there was other evidence of guilt, that instruction authorized conviction even if the jury disbelieved all of the testimony except the proof of presence at the site. This Court’s holding that the statutory presumption could not support the Romano conviction was thus dependent, in part, on the specific instructions given by the trial judge. Under those instructions it was necessary to decide whether, regardless of the specific circumstances of the particular case, the statutory presumption adequately supported the guilty verdict.
In addition to the discussion of Romano in n. 16, supra, this point is illustrated by Leary v. United States. In that case, Dr. Timothy Leary, a professor at Harvard University, was stopped by customs inspectors in Laredo, Tex., as he was returning from the Mexican side of the international border. Marihuana seeds and a silver snuffbox filled with semirefined marihuana and three partially smoked marihuana cigarettes were discovered in his car. He was convicted of having knowingly transported marihuana which he knew had been illegally imported into this country in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 176a (1964 ed.). That statute included a mandatory presumption: “possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction [for importation] unless the defendant explains his possession to the satisfaction of the jury.” Leary admitted possession of the marihuana and claimed that he had carried it from New York to Mexico and then back.
Mr. Justice Harlan for the Court noted that under one theory of the case, the jury could have found direct proof of all of the necessary elements of the offense without recourse to the presumption. But he deemed that insufficient reason to affirm the conviction because under another theory the jury might have found knowledge of importation on the basis of either direct evidence or the presumption, and there was accordingly no certainty that the jury had not relied on the presumption. 395 U. S., at 31-32. The Court therefore found it necessary to test the presumption against the Due Process Clause. Its analysis was facial. Despite the fact that the defendant was well educated and had recently traveled to a country that is a major exporter of marihuana to this country, the Court found the presumption of knowledge of importation from possession irrational. It did so, not because Dr. Leary was unlikely to know the source of the marihuana, but instead because “a majority of possessors” were unlikely to have such knowledge. Id., at 53. Because the jury had been instructed to rely on the presumption even if it did not believe the Government’s direct evidence of knowledge of importation (unless, of course, the defendant met his burden of “satisfying” the jury to the contrary), the Court reversed the conviction.
Indeed, the court never even discussed the jury instructions.
“It is your duty to consider all the testimony in this case, to weigh it carefully and to test the credit to be given to a witness by his apparent intention to speak the truth and by the accuracy of his memory to reconcile, if possible, conflicting statements as to material facts and in such ways to try and get at the truth and to reach a verdict upon the evidence.” Tr. 739-740.
“To establish the unlawful possession of the weapons, again the People relied upon the presumption and, in addition thereto, the testimony of Anderson and Lemmons who testified in their case in chief.” Id., at 744.
“Accordingly, you would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilt against the defendants or defendant if you find the defendants or defendant was in possession of a machine gun and the other weapons and that the fact of possession was proven to you by the People beyond a reasonable doubt, and an element of such proof is the reasonable presumption of illegal possession of a machine gun or the presumption of illegal possession of firearms, as I have just before explained to you.” Id., at 746.
“Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of any machine gun or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive evidence of their unlawful possession.
“As so defined, possession means actual physical possession, just as having the drugs or weapons in one’s hand, in one’s home or other place under one’s exclusive control, or constructive possession which may exist without personal dominion over the drugs or weapons but with the intent and ability to retain such control or dominion.” Id., at 742.
“[Y]ou are the exclusive judges of all the questions of fact in this case. That means that you are the sole judges as to the weight to be given to the evidence and to the weight and probative value to be given to the testimony of each particular witness and to the credibility of any witness.” Id., at 730.
“Under our law, every defendant in a criminal trial starts the trial with the presumption in his favor that he is innocent, and this presumption follows him throughout the entire trial and remains with him until such time as you, by your verdict, find him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or innocent of the charge. If you find him or her not guilty, then, of course, this presumption ripens into an established fact. On the other hand, if you find him or her guilty, then this presumption has been overcome and is destroyed.” Id., at 734.
“Now, in order to find any of the defendants guilty of the unlawful possession of the weapons, the machine gun, the .45 and the .38, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the machine gun and the .45 and the .38, possessed it as I defined it to you before.” Id., at 745.
The verdict announced by the jury clearly indicates that it understood its duty to evaluate the presumption independently and to reject it if it was not supported in the record. Despite receiving almost identical instructions on the applicability of the presumption of possession to the contraband found in the front seat and in the trunk, the jury convicted all four defendants of possession of the former but acquitted all of them of possession of the latter. See n. 14, supra.
Jane Doe’s counsel referred to the .45-caliber automatic pistol as a “cannon.” Tr. 306.
The evidence would have allowed the jury to conclude either that the handbag was on the front floor or front seat.
Indeed, counsel for two of the respondents virtually invited the jury to find to the contrary:
“One more thing. You know, different people live in different cultures and different societies. You may think that the way [respondent] Hard-rick has his hair done up is unusual; it may seem strange to you. People live differently. ... For example, if you were living under their times and conditions and you traveled from a big city, Detroit, to a bigger city, New York City, it is not unusual for 'people to carry guns, small arms to protect themselves, is it? There are places in New York City policemen fear to go. But you have got to understand; you are sitting here as jurors. These are people, live flesh and blood, the same as you, different motives, different objectives.” Id., at 653-654 (emphasis added). See also id., at 634.
It is also important in this regard that respondents passed up the opportunity to have the jury instructed not to apply the presumption if it determined that the handguns were “upon the person” of Jane Doe.
The New York Court of Appeals first upheld the constitutionality of the presumption involved in this case in People v. Russo, 303 N. Y. 673, 102 N. E. 2d 834 (1951). That decision relied upon the earlier case of People v. Terra, 303 N. Y. 332, 102 N. E. 2d 576 (1951), which upheld the constitutionality of another New York statute that allowed a jury to presume that the occupants of a room in which a firearm was located possessed the weapon. The analysis in Terra, the appeal in which this Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 342 U. S. 938, is persuasive:
“[T]here can be no doubt about the ‘sinister significance’ of proof of a machine gun in a room occupied by an accused or about the reasonableness of the connection between its illegal possession and occupancy of the room where it is kept. Persons who occupy a room, who either reside in it or use it in the conduct and operation of a business or other venture— and that is what in its present context the statutory term ‘occupying’ signifies . . . — normally know what is in it; and, certainly, when the object is as large and uncommon as a machine gun, it is neither unreasonable nor unfair to presume that the room’s occupants are aware of its presence. That being so, the legislature may not be considered arbitrary if it acts upon the presumption and erects it into evidence of a possession that is ‘conscious’ and ‘knowing.’ ” 303 N. Y., at 335-336, 102 N. E. 2d, at 578-579.
See also Interim Report of Temporary State Commission to Evaluate the Drug Laws, N. Y. Leg. Doc. No. 10, p. 69 (1972), in which the drafters of the analogous automobile/narcotics presumption in N. Y. Penal Law § 220.25 (McKinney Supp. 1978), explained the basis for that presumption:
“We believe, and find, that it is rational and logical to presume that all occupants of a vehicle are aware of, and culpably involved in, possession of dangerous drugs found abandoned or secreted in a vehicle when the quantity of the drug is such that it would be extremely unlikely for an occupant to be unaware of its presence. . . .
“We do not believe that persons transporting dealership quantities of contraband are likely to go driving about with innocent friends or that they are likely to pick up strangers. We do not doubt that this can and does in fact occasionally happen, but because we find it more reasonable to believe that the bare presence in the'vehicle is culpable, we think it reasonable to presume culpability in the direction which the proven facts already point. Since the presumption is an evidentiary one, it may be offset by any evidence, including the testimony of the defendant, which would negate the defendant’s culpable involvement.”
Legislative judgments such as this one deserve respect in assessing the constitutionality of evidentiary presumptions. E. g., Leary v. United States, 395 U. S., at 39; United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S., at 67.
“The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is, we think, that a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” 395 U. S., at 36.
The dissenting argument rests on the assumption that “the jury [may have] rejected all of the prosecution’s evidence concerning the location and origin of the guns.” Post, at 175-176. Even if that assumption were plausible, the jury was plainly told that it was free to disregard the presumption. But the dissent’s assumption is not plausible; for if the jury rejected the testimony describing where the guns were found, it would necessarily also have rejected the only evidence in the record proving that the guns were found in the car. The conclusion that the jury attached significance to the particular location of the handguns follows inexorably from the acquittal on the charge of possession of the machinegun and heroin in the trunk. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_casedisposition |
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN et al. v. McCARTIN et al.
No. 270.
Argued January 17, 1947.
Decided March 31, 1947.
Mortimer Levitan, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Lawrence E. Hart argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Harold M. Wilkie.
Mr. Justice Murphy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, this Court had occasion to consider the effect of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States where awards are sought under the workmen’s compensation laws of two states. This case presents another facet of that problem.
The facts are undisputed. Leo Thomas Kopp worked as a bricklayer for E. E. McCartin. Both were residents of Illinois. Pursuant to a contract made in Illinois, Kopp worked for McCartin on a building job in Wisconsin. He drove back and forth between his home in Illinois and his work in Wisconsin. While thus employed in Wisconsin, Kopp suffered an injury to his left eye. On June 7, 1943, he filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. McCartin and his insurance carrier entered an objection to the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin Commission to hear the claim. Then on July 20, 1943, Kopp filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Commission of Illinois, in which the general nature of the dispute was given as “Whether Illinois or Wisconsin has jurisdiction in my case.”
Under date of October 11, 1943, the Wisconsin Commission wrote the insurance carrier that Kopp had been informed that, so far as Wisconsin law was concerned, he was entitled to proceed under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, §§ 138-172) and thereafter claim compensation under the Wisconsin Workmen’s Compensation Act (Wis. Stat. 1945, Ch. 102), with credit to be given for the amount paid him pursuant to the Illinois Act. A copy of this letter was sent to Kopp. Counsel for the insurance carrier replied on November 3, 1943. It was there stated that the insurance carrier understood that if payments were made by it to Kopp under the Illinois statute credit would be given for those payments in the event an award was made to Kopp under the Wisconsin Act; and with that understanding, the insurance carrier was proceeding to pay Kopp compensation under the Illinois statute.
On November 3, 1943, a settlement contract was signed by Kopp and McCartin. The parties therein agreed that the sum of $2,112 was to be paid to Kopp in full and final settlement of any and all claims arising out of Kopp’s injury by virtue of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act. The contract also stated: “This settlement does not affect any rights that applicant may have under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Wisconsin.”
The settlement contract and a petition by Kopp that the amount due be paid to him in a lump sum were filed with the Illinois Commission on November 29, 1943. A hearing was held before a Commissioner on December 3, in the course of which attention was called tff the reservation of rights in Wisconsin. The presiding Commissioner informed Kopp that he did not know what effect the reservation had or what Kopp’s rights were under the Wisconsin statute. Kopp replied that he would appreciate receiving the lump sum under the Illinois law and that he would “take chances on Wisconsin.” Following the hearing, the Commissioner approved the settlement contract and the petition for a lump sum payment. Kopp received payment on December 7 in the amount specified in the settlement contract plus a small additional sum for temporary disability. Thereafter, on January 10, 1944, a formal order was entered by the Illinois Commission directing payment of the lump sum of $2,112. The circumstances of the entry of this later order, after payment had been made in fact, are not disclosed. No petition to review the settlement contract or lump sum payment was filed and no action to secure a review of the formal order was taken.
In the meantime, on December 20, 1943, this Court’s decision in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra, was rendered. The Wisconsin Commission then held a hearing on February 20, 1944, on Kopp’s application before it. McCartin and the insurance carrier filed an amended answer, contending that under the full faith and credit clause the Wisconsin proceedings were barred by the award and payment under the Illinois Act; reliance was placed upon the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case. The Commission overruled this objection and ordered the payment to Kopp of certain benefits, after giving credit for the sums paid under the Illinois Act.
The Circuit Court for Dane County, Wisconsin, set aside the Wisconsin Commission’s order on the authority of the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court’s judgment on the same authority. 248 Wis. 570, 22 N. W. 2d 522. We granted certiorari to determine the applicability of the full faith and credit clause, as interpreted in the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case, to the facts of this case.
It is clear, in the absence of a prior award in Wisconsin, that the compensation paid to the employee under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act was constitutionally proper from the full faith and credit standpoint. Illinois was the state where the parties entered into the employment contract and its legitimate concern with that employer-employee relationship permitted it to apply its own statute even though the injury occurred elsewhere. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U. S. 532; Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469. At the same time, in view of the fact that the accident took place in Wisconsin, any full faith and credit questions that might have been raised had compensation first been awarded under the Wisconsin Workmen’s Compensation Act are answered by Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U. S. 493. The troublesome problem that arises here is whether the compensation paid under the Illinois statute raises a full faith and credit bar to a subsequent award in Wisconsin for an additional amount.
If it were apparent that the Illinois award was intended to be final and conclusive of all the employee’s rights against the employer and the insurer growing out of the injury, the decision in the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case would be controlling here. The Court there found that the compensation award under the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Law was made explicitly in lieu of any other recovery for injury to the employee, precluding even a recovery under the laws of another state. See Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 153. And since the Texas award had the degree of finality contemplated by the full faith and credit clause, it was held that Louisiana was constitutionally forbidden from entering a subsequent award under its statute. But we do not believe that the same situation exists in this case, the Illinois award being different in its nature and effect from the Texas award in the Magnolia case.
The Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act was concededly applicable under the circumstances of this case. Section 3 of that Act provides that it shall apply automatically and without election to all employers and employees engaged in businesses or enterprises such as those involving the erection or construction of any structure. At the time when he was injured, Kopp was doing mason work for his employer in connection with the erection of houses. Section 5 then provides that the term “employee” includes those persons “whose employment is outside of the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made within the State of Illinois . . . .” Kopp was such an employee, having been hired in Illinois and injured while employed in Wisconsin.
Section 6 states that “No common law or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death sustained by any employe while engaged in the line of his duty as such employe, other than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employe who is covered by the provisions of this act, . . .” This section has been interpreted to mean that, in situations to which the Act applies, the right of action against the employer under the Illinois common law or under the Illinois Personal Injuries Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 70, §§ 1, 2) has been abolished. Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 289 Ill. 353, 124 N. E. 552; Faber v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 115, 185 N. E. 255. To that extent, the Act provides an exclusive remedy.
• But there is nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to indicate that it is completely exclusive, that it is designed to preclude any recovery by proceedings brought in another state for injuries received there in the course of an Illinois employment. Cf. Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, supra; Cole v. Industrial Commission, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520. And in light of the rule that workmen's compensation laws are to be liberally construed in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted, Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 414, we should not readily interpret such a statute so as to cut off an employee’s right to sue under other legislation passed for his benefit. Only some unmistakable language by a state legislature or judiciary would warrant our accepting such a construction. Especially is this true where the rights affected are those arising under legislation of another state and where the full faith and credit provision of the United States Constitution is brought into play. See Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler Co., 289 U. S. 439.
We need not rest our decision, however, solely upon the absence of any provision or construction of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act forbidding an employee from seeking alternative or additional relief under the laws of another state. There is additional evidence that the employee is free to ask for additional compensation in Wisconsin. That evidence is in the Illinois award itself, an award which is acknowledged to have been made in compliance with the Illinois statute.
Here the employer and the employee entered into a settlement contract fixing the amount of compensation to which the employee was entitled under the Illinois statute, thereby avoiding the expense and delay of litigating the matter. This contract, together with the employee’s petition for a lump sum payment, was approved by one of the Commissioners of the Illinois Industrial Commission. By that approval, the agreement became “in legal effect an award.” Hartford Accident Co. v. Industrial Commission, 320 Ill. 544, 546, 151 N. E. 495, 496; Michelson v. Industrial Commission, 375 Ill. 462, 31 N. E. 2d 940. Under Illinois law, such awards are described as res judicata on the matters thus adjudicated and agreed upon, precluding the Commission from subsequently reviewing the awards or setting them aside. Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 Ill. 451, 130 N. E. 727; Stromberg Motor Device Co. v. Industrial Commission, 305 Ill. 619, 137 N. E. 462; Lewin Metals Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 360 Ill. 371, 196 N. E. 482; Trigg v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 581, 5 N. E. 2d 394.
One of the provisions in the settlement contract which became the award was the statement that “This settlement does not affect any rights that applicant may have under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Wisconsin.” That statement was made a part of the contract at the request of the employee, who had been informed by the Wisconsin Commission that he was entitled to claim an additional amount of compensation in Wisconsin after recovering in Illinois. See Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889; Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, 219 Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349; Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 222 Wis. 194, 268 N. W. 134. The employer’s insurance carrier was likewise informed, and all the parties proceeded on the assumption that the employee was attempting to recover compensation under the statutes of both Illinois and Wisconsin, with credit to be given in Wisconsin for any sum recovered in Illinois. In furtherance of this common understanding, the above statement was inserted in the Illinois settlement contract and was brought to the attention of the Industrial Commissioner before he approved the contract. The Commissioner confessed that he did not know the meaning of this provision, but he did not order it stricken. Rather he approved it for whatever it was worth.
This contract provision saving the rights of the employee in Wisconsin thus became part of the Illinois award, an award which has achieved finality in the absence of a timely appeal. This provision means more than might be implied in the case of an ordinary judgment or decree. Any party, of course, has the right to seek another judgment or decree, however inconsistent or futile such an attempt might be; and it takes no reservation in the original judgment or decree to give him that right. But when the reservation in this award is read against the background of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act, it becomes clear that the reservation spells out what we believe to be implicit in that Act—namely, that an Illinois workmen’s compensation award of the type here involved does not foreclose an additional award under the laws of another state. And in the setting of this case, that fact is of decisive significance.
Since this Illinois award is final and conclusive only as to rights arising in Illinois, Wisconsin is free under the full faith and credit clause to grant an award of compensation in accord with its own laws. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra, thus does not control this case.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Rutledge concurs in the result. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
0
] | sc_partywinning |
PERRY v. COMMERCE LOAN CO.
No. 694.
Argued January 26, 1966.
Decided March 7, 1966.
Robert J. Harris argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
R. Howard Smith argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Perry, a furnace operator employed by Moore Lead Company, filed a petition in the District Court under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1086, requesting confirmation of his plan for an extension of time within which to pay his debts out of his future wages. In his plan he proposed to pay his debts of $1,412 in 28 equal monthly installments of $60 from his wages of $265 a month. On the hearing for confirmation of the plan, however, it appeared that Perry had previously filed a petition in straight bankruptcy and obtained a discharge therein in 1959, within six years of the filing of this proceeding. On motion of the respondent, Commerce Loan Company, the referee dismissed the plan on the ground that the previous bankruptcy was a bar thereto under the provisions of § 14 (c) (5) of the Act. On review the District Court upheld the dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 340 F. 2d 588. We granted certiorari, 382 U. S. 889, in view of a conflict on the point among the courts of appeals. We conclude that confirmations of wage-earner plans by way of extensions are not affected by §14 (c)(5), and, therefore, reverse the judgment below.
I.
Although statutory relief for the financially distressed wage earner had been available to some extent as early as the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517, Congress found in its study prior to the 1938 revision of the bankruptcy laws that there were no effective provisions for the complete repayment of the wage earner’s debts suited to his problems. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1937). For example, compositions under § 12 of the 1898 Act, 30 Stat. 549, were available to the wage earner, but the relief afforded was unsatisfactory. Section 12 proceedings, which were primarily adaptable for use by business entities, were disproportionately expensive in view of the small sums ordinarily involved in wage-earner cases; they lacked flexibility; and they did not provide for jurisdiction of the court subsequent to confirmation. Other provisions of the Act had similar disadvantages. Faced with inadequate relief under the federal bankruptcy laws and often with little protection from creditors under state law, the only course usually open to the wage-earning debtor was straight bankruptcy. In such proceedings, everyone lost — the creditors by receiving a mere fraction of their claims, the debtor by bearing thereafter the stigma of having been adjudged a bankrupt. In designing a remedy for the dilemma facing a debtor seeking to repay, rather than avoid, his obligations, the Congress settled upon the wage-earner extension-of-time procedures of Chapter XIII. The chapter gave — and was intended to give— to the wage earner a reasonable opportunity to arrange installment payments to be made out of his future earnings. Congress clearly intended to encourage wage earners to pay their debts in full, rather than to go into straight bankruptcy or composition, by offering two inducements: (1) avoidance of an adjudication of bankruptcy with its attendant stigma; and, at the same time, (2) temporary freedom during the extension from garnishments, attachments and other harassment by creditors. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 52-55.
History demonstrates that extension plans under Chapter XIII are fulfilling the purposes intended. The records of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show that over the past 20 years more than 20% of all proceedings filed under the Bankruptcy Act by wage earners have been for plans under Chapter XIII, the overwhelming majority of these being for extension plans. Since many wage earners who go into bankruptcy do not proceed under Chapter XIII because they are unemployed (and consequently have no earnings to use for extension arrangements), have an inextricably large indebtedness, or are simply unaware of the existence of an alternative to straight bankruptcy, the 20% figure is even more significant. Moreover, large sums of money are annually returned to creditors under extension plans, the current rate being well over $26,000,000. As wage earners ordinarily have little or no assets available for distribution in straight bankruptcy, these sums represent settlements which the debtors would otherwise be unable to effect and the creditors unable to obtain. See Note, The Wage Earner Plan — A Superior Alternative to Straight Bankruptcy, 9 Utah L. Rev. 730 (1965) ; Allgood, Operation of the Wage Earners’ Plan in the Northern District of Alabama, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 578 (1960).
In light of the proven advantages of extension plans, the Congress has re-expressed its legislative purpose in amendments to Chapter XIII adopted since the original enactment. A report to the House of Representatives expresses it in these words:
“[C] hap ter XIII provides a highly desirable method for dealing with the financial difficulties of individuals. It creates an equitable and feasible way for the honest and conscientious debtor to pay off his debts rather than having them discharged in bankruptcy. The power of the court to change the amount and maturity of installment payments without affecting the aggregate amount of such payments makes chapter XIII particularly applicable to the present-day financial problems generated by heavy installment buying.” H. R. Rep. No. 193, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1969).
And similarly, the Senate report states:
“We think there can be no doubt . . . that a procedure by which a debtor who is financially involved and unable to meet his debts as they mature, over a period of time, works out of his involvement and pays his debts in full is good for his creditors and good for him.” S. Rep. No. 179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959).
It is with this underlying policy in mind that we turn to a consideration of the problem posed here, i. e., whether confirmation of an extension plan is barred by a discharge in bankruptcy obtained within the previous six years.
II.
Chapter XIII requires the confirmation of a wage-earner extension plan if “the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to perform any of the duties which would be a bar to the discharge of the bankrupt . . . .” § 656 (a)(3). And Chapter III commands that a discharge of a bankrupt shall be granted unless the court is satisfied that the bankrupt has “within six years prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy . . . been granted a discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner’s plan by way of composition confirmed under this Act . . . .” §14 (c)(5). The “discharge” of a debtor under a wage-earner plan shall issue after compliance with the provisions of the confirmed plan, § 660, c. XIII, 11 U. S. C. § 1060. If at the expiration of three years from the date of confirmation of the plan the debtor has not completed his payments in accordance with his plan the court may, after notice and hearing, discharge the debts and liabilities dischargeable under the plan, provided the court is satisfied that the debtor’s failure to make all of his payments “was due to circumstances for which he could not be justly held accountable.” § 661, c. XIII, 11 U. S. C. § 1061. And finally, § 602, of Chapter XIII declares that the provisions of Chapters I through VII of the Bankruptcy Act, insofar as they are not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of Chapter XIII, apply in proceedings thereunder.
We should note at the outset that in his present application for relief Perry did not file a straight, voluntary bankruptcy action in the District Court, nor “a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner’s plan by way of composition.” He proposed to pay all his debts, secured and unsecured, and sought only an extension of time — 28 months — in which to pay them in equal installments from his future wages. Ordinarily, a wage earner seeking to obtain the benefits of extension proceedings under Chapter XIII need only file a plan that meets the approval of the majority of his creditors, § 652, 11 U. S. C. § 1052, and is confirmed by the court; whereupon the plan becomes binding, § 657, 11 U. S. C. § 1057, and the appointed trustee commences collecting and disbursing to the creditors the periodic payments provided under the plan. Extension plans, therefore, differ materially from straight bankruptcy, arrangements under Chapters XI and XII, and wage-earner plans by way of composition, all of which contemplate only a partial payment of the wage earner’s debts. Indeed, under an extension plan, the wage earner who makes the required payments will have paid his debts in full and will not need a discharge, even though the Act provides for a formal one. § 660.
In view of these considerations and the purposes of Chapter XIII as outlined above, we do not believe that the Congress intended to apply the six-year bar of § 14 (c) (5) to the confirmation of wage-earner extension plans. The six-year bar was enacted 35 years prior to the adoption of Chapter XIII, 32 Stat. 797 (1903), at a time when no relief corresponding to extension plans existed under the Bankruptcy Act. The unmistakable purpose of the six-year provision was to prevent the creation of a class of habitual bankrupts — debtors who might repeatedly escape their obligations as frequently as they chose by going through repeated bankruptcy. See H. R. Rep. No. 1698, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1902); In re Thompson, 51 F. Supp. 12, 13 (1943). But an extension plan has no escape hatch for debtors, it is “a method by which, without resorting to bankruptcy proceedings in the usual sense, a wage earner may meet the claims of creditors.” S. Rep. No. 179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959). To apply the six-year bar at the time of ruling on the confirmation of an extension plan would be both illogical and in head-on collision with the congressional purpose as announced in the adoption and design of extension plans under Chapter XIII. Even if a literal reading of these provisions suggested the application of § 14 (c)(5) to extension plans, we would have little hesitation in construing the Act to give effect to the clear policy underlying Chapter XIII. As was said in United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940):
"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.”
But such a literal reading is not apparent in this case. Section 656. (a) (3) does not, on its face, state that a court may confirm an extension plan only if the debtor is eligible for a discharge in bankruptcy. Rather, the language of the section speaks, ambiguously, of “guilty” acts and unfulfilled duties. There is, of course, no unfulfilled duty involved in § 14 (c)(5). Moreover, a prior bankruptcy is hardly a “guilty” act within the usual meaning of that word, and its use as a reference to §14 (c)(5) is strained indeed. In fact, the legislative history of § 14 (c) lends some support to a view that a prior discharge is not a “guilty” act. In 1903, when the forerunners of subdivisions (3) through (6) were originally added to § 14. (c), the House report stated:
“This amendment also provides four additional grounds for refusing a discharge in bankruptcy: (1) Obtaining property on credit on materially false statements; (2) making a fraudulent transfer of property; (3) having been granted or denied a discharge in bankruptcy within six years, and (4) having refused to obey the lawful orders of the court or having refused to answer material questions approved by the court. No person who has been guilty of any of these fraudulent acts should be discharged, and a person who has refused to obey the order of the court ought not to be discharged, and it is quite clear that no person should have the benefit of the act as a voluntary bankrupt of tener than once in six years.” H. R. Rep. No. 1698, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1902). (Italics added.)
This language might be construed to set apart acts which are criminal or reprehensible in nature and to consider a prior bankruptcy to be something other than a “guilty” act. But we need not, and do not, go so far as to place this interpretation on the words “guilty acts.” It suffices that we find in them sufficient ambiguity to impel recourse to the legislative purposes, outlined above, underlying §14 (c)(5). And while the identical language of § 656 (a) (3) has been a part of the Bankruptcy Act since 1898, as a restriction to confirmation of compositions under what is now § 366 (3), 52 Stat. 911, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 766 (3) and § 472 (3), 52 Stat. 923, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 872 (3), there is no indication that its enactment in Chapter XIII was intended to bar confirmation of wage-earner extensions. Indeed, it would seem that the absence of any legislative history bearing on the adoption of this provision in Chapter XIII indicates that its inclusion was a legislative oversight, at least insofar as it bears on wage-earners’ extension plans.
This oversight is, of course, cured by the provisions of § 602, which further buttress our conclusion. That section directs that the provisions of Chapters I through VII, which include §14 (c)(5), are incorporated into Chapter XIII only “insofar as they are not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.” The rationale of §14 (c)(5) — the prevention of recurrent avoidance of debts — is so inconsistent with the aims of extension plans as to fall squarely within the exception of § 602.
It is claimed, however, that § 686 (5) of Chapter XIII, 11 U. S. C. § 1086 (5), indicates a contrary result. We think not. This provision, in setting the effective date of the chapter, provides that confirmations thereunder “shall not be refused because of a discharge granted or a composition confirmed prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act.” It must be remembered that extension-plan relief of Chapter XIII was novel to the law of bankruptcy. However, both compositions and straight bankruptcies were old on the books. The Congress, we believe, was only making certain, insofar as extensions were concerned, that the old procedures would not affect the new. This would be consistent with the purpose of the Congress not to make § 14 (c)(5) applicable to confirmations in extension-plan cases. Rather than making an illogical exemption from the six-year bar, given in cases where a discharge had been received before — but not after — the new Act, § 686 (5) merely gave expansive effect to the congressional purpose by making it clear that the remedy afforded be available retroactively as well as prospectively.
We emphasize that our construction of the Act does not preclude application of § 14 (c)(5) to confirmations of general arrangements under Chapter XI or to real property arrangements under Chapter XII. It is true that restrictions identical in phrasing to § 656 (a) (3) appear both in Chapter XI, § 366 (3), and in Chapter XII, §472 (3). The relief afforded in those chapters, however, represents a wholly different statutory scheme from wage-earners’ extensions, and the restrictive provisions are not, therefore, in pari materia. Sections 366 (3) and 472 (3) neither impart to nor receive from § 656 (a)(3) a meaningful effect. Nor does our construction imply an immunity from the six-year bar to those seeking confirmation of wage-earner compositions. A composition under Chapter XIII, unlike an extension, is closely akin to straight bankruptcy and to proceedings under Chapters XI and XII, for under such a plan the debtor is discharged from his debts and claims of the creditors are only partially paid. In re Jensen, 200 F. 2d 58 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 926 (1953), but see In re Goldberg, 53 F. 2d 454 (1931). It is both logical and consistent with the underlying purposes of § 14 (c) (5) that confirmation of wage-earner compositions be barred by prior bankruptcy, since repeated use of such plans would, in effect, provide an opportunity for abuse of the Act.
It has been argued that extension plans do not completely avoid the possibility of adjusting the wage earner’s debts. It is true that § 660 provides for discharge after compliance with the provisions of a Chapter XIII plan. While this section applies to wage-earner compositions as well as to extensions, a “discharge” thereunder has a wholly different impact where an extension is involved. In the latter case a discharge is little more than a mere formality. It is also claimed that § 661 presents a somewhat more troublesome objection. That section as we have noted may allow a wage earner to obtain a release from all dischargeable debts if, after notice and hearing, the court is satisfied that the failure of the debtor to comply with the plan was due to circumstances for which he could not be held justly accountable. However, we see no serious problems in this section. First, experience has shown that almost all plans approved under the Act envision repayment within three years. The problem, therefore, is not likely to arise. Second, there are adequate provisions for notice and hearing prior to a discharge under § 661. Objecting creditors may raise § 14 (c)(5) as a bar to relief if and when the debtor seeks such relief. A request for relief under § 661 would, in effect, constitute an attempt to transpose an extension plan into a composition, and a grant of relief thereunder would, at that time, be tantamount to a confirmation of a composition. The six-year bar would, therefore, be operative in such a situation. In view of this, as well as the power of the court to make certain that the provisions of the chapter are not abused, we see no reason to allow this section alone to destroy the beneficial purposes of enactment.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that petitioner’s plan should have been confirmed.
Reversed and remanded.
All United States Code citations herein refer to the 1964 edition.
52 Stat. 850 (1938), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 32 (e) (5): “(c) The court shall grant the discharge [in bankruptcy] unless satisfied that the bankrupt has ... (5) in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy . . . been granted a discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner’s plan by way of composition confirmed under this title . . . .” 11 U. S. C. §32 (c)(5).
Compare In re Schlageter, 319 F. 2d 821 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1963), and Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 340 F. 2d 588, with Edins v. Helzberg’s Diamond Shops, Inc., 315 F. 2d 223 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1963), and In re Mahaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1960). See also In re Mayorga, 355 F. 2d 89 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1966).
Chapter XIII also provides for wage-earner plans by way of composition. Compositions under that chapter, however, are almost insignificant in the operation of wage-earner plans because most creditors will not give the necessary approval. The latest published statistics show that 95% of the funds paid to creditors under Chapter XIII proceedings derive from extensions rather than compositions. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics, Table F 11 (1964) (by computation).
11 U. S. C. § 1002: “The provisions of chapters 1-7 of this title shall, insofar as they are Pot inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter, apply in proceedings under this chapter . . . .”
Such a collision undoubtedly affects the functioning of the Act. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that a “pronounced drop in Chapter XIII filings” has been noted in the districts in the Sixth Circuit as a result of the holding in Perry. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Memorandum for the Committee on Bankruptcy Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Ueport on the Use of Chapter XIII, p. 2 (June 22, 1965).
This is not the only example of drafting oversights in the Act. Although § 14 (c) (5) was amended in 1938 to include a reference to wage-earner compositions, the provision in that section relating to confirmation of a composition was not deleted even though § 12 of the 1898 Act, 30 Stat. 549, under which such a composition might have been confirmed, was repealed in the same enactment.
We note that the National Bankruptcy Conference has proposed amendments to- the Act which are intended to clarify the interrelationship of §§14 (c)(5), 656 (a)(3), and 661. The proposed clarification is in accord with our construction of the Act. See H. R. 20, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The Judicial Conference, upon request of the Congress, has submitted its views approving the bill. Letter from the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (September 29, 1965). See also Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, at 68 (September 22-23, 1965). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
QUILL CORP. v. NORTH DAKOTA, by and through its TAX COMMISSIONER, HEITKAMP
No. 91-194.
Argued January 22, 1992
Decided May 26, 1992
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and the opinion of the Court with respect; to Part IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O’Connor, and Souter, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 319. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 321.
John E. Gaggini argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Don S. Harnack, Richard A. Hanson, James H. Peters, Nancy T Owens, and William P. Pearce.
Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Laurie J. Loveland, Solicitor General, Robert W. Wirtz, Assistant Attorney General, and Alan H. Friedman, Special Assistant Attorney General.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Hampshire et al. by John P Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire, and Harold T. Judd, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, and John R. McKernan, Jr., Governor of Maine; for the American Bankers Association et al. by John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, and Frank M. Salinger; for the American Council for the Blind et al. by David C. Todd and Timothy J. May; for Arizona Mail Order Co., Inc., et al. by Maryann B. Gall, Timothy B. Dyk, Michael J. Meehan, Frank G. Julian, David J. Bradford, George S. Isaacson, Martin I. Eisenstein, and Stuart A Smith; for Carrot Top Industries, Inc., et al. by Charles A. Trost and James F. Blumstein; for the Clarendon Foundation by Ronald D. Maines; for the Coalition for Small Direct Marketers by Richard J. Leighton and Dan M. Peterson; for the Direct Marketing Association by George S. Isaacson, Martin I. Eisenstein, and Robert J. Levering; for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., David W. Ogden, Jan S. Amundson, and John Kamp; for Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., et al. by Eli D. Minton, James R. Cregan, Ian D. Volner, and Stephen F. Owen, Jr.; and for the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., by Timothy J. McCormally.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Connecticut et al. by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Paul J. Hartman, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Larry Echo Hawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Roland W. Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa, Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, Ken Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, Mario J. Palumbo, Attorney General of West Virginia, and John Payton; for the State of New Jersey by Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General, Sarah T. Darrow, Deputy Attorney General, Joseph L. Wannotti, Assistant Attorney General, Richard G. Taranto, and Joel I. Klein; for the State of New Mexico by Tom Udall, Attorney General, and Frank D. Katz, Special Assistant Attorney General; for the City of New York by O. Peter Sherwood, Edward F. X. Hart, and Stanley Buchsbaum; for the International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc., et al. by Charles Rothfeld; for the Multistate Tax Commission by James F. Flug and Martin Lobel; for the National Governors’ Association et al. by Richard Ruda; and for the Tax Policy Research Project by Rita Marie Cain.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), involves a State’s attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State. In Bellas Hess we held that a similar Illinois statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and created an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In particular, we ruled that a “seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail” lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State. Id., at 758.
In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to follow Bellas Hess because “the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations” of the past quarter-century have rendered its holding “obsolete].” 470 N. W. 2d 203, 208 (1991). Having granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 808, we must either reverse the State Supreme Court or overrule Bellas Hess. While we agree with much of the state court’s reasoning, we take the former course.
I
Quill is a Delaware corporation with offices and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia. None of its employees work or reside in North Dakota, and its ownership of tangible property in that State is either insignificant or nonexistent. Quill sells office equipment and supplies; it solicits business through catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls. Its annual national sales exceed $200 million, of which almost $1 million are made to about 3,000 customers in North Dakota. It is the sixth largest vendor of office supplies in the State. It delivers all of its merchandise to its North Dakota customers by mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations.
As a corollary to its sales tax, North Dakota imposes a use tax upon property purchased for storage, use, or consumption within the State. North Dakota requires every “retailer maintaining a place of business in” the State to collect the tax from the consumer and remit it to the State. N. D. Cent. Code §57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991). In 1987, North Dakota amended the statutory definition of the term “retailer” to include “every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.” §57-40.2-01(6). State regulations in turn define “regular or systematic solicitation” to mean three or more advertisements within a 12-month period. N. D. Admin. Code § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988). Thus, since 1987, mail-order companies that engage in such solicitation have been subject to the tax even if they maintain no property or personnel in North Dakota.
Quill has taken the position that North Dakota does not have the power to compel it to collect a use tax from its North Dakota customers. Consequently, the State, through its Tax Commissioner, filed this action to require Quill to pay taxes (as well as interest and penalties) on all such sales made after July 1, 1987. The trial court ruled in Quill’s favor, finding the case indistinguishable from Bellas Hess; specifically, it found that because the State had not shown that it had spent tax revenues for the benefit of the mail-order business, there was no “nexus to allow the state to define retailer in the manner it chose.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A41.
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “wholesale changes” in both the economy and the law made it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess today. 470 N. W. 2d, at 213. The principal economic change noted by the court was the remarkable growth of the mail-order business “from a relatively inconsequential market niche” in 1967 to a “goliath” with annual sales that reached “the staggering figure of $183.3 billion in 1989.” Id., at 208,209. Moreover, the court observed, advances in computer technology greatly eased the burden of compliance with a “‘welter of complicated obligations’ ” imposed by state and local taxing authorities. Id., at 215 (quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 759-760).
Equally important, in the court’s view, were the changes in the “legal landscape.” With respect to the Commerce Clause, the court emphasized that Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), rejected the line of cases holding that the direct taxation of interstate commerce was impermissible and adopted instead a “consistent and rational method of inquiry [that focused on] the practical effect of [the] challenged tax.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 443 (1980). This and subsequent rulings, the court maintained, indicated that the Commerce Clause no longer mandated the sort of physical-presence nexus suggested in Bellas Hess.
Similarly, with respect to the Due Process Clause, the North Dakota court observed that cases following Bellas Hess had not construed “minimum contacts” to require physical presence within a State as a prerequisite to the legitimate exercise of state power. The state court then concluded that “the Due Process requirement of a ‘minimal connection’ to establish nexus is encompassed within the Complete Auto test” and that the relevant inquiry under the latter test was whether “the state has provided some protection, opportunities, or benefit for which it can expect a return.” 470 N. W. 2d, at 216.
Turning to the case at hand, the state court emphasized that North Dakota had created “an economic climate that fosters demand for” Quill’s products, maintained a legal infrastructure that protected that market, and disposed of 24 tons of catalogs and flyers mailed by Quill into the State every year. Id., at 218-219. Based on these facts, the court concluded that Quill’s “economic presence” in North Dakota depended on services and benefits provided by the State and therefore generated “a constitutionally sufficient nexus to justify imposition of the purely administrative duty of collecting and remitting the use tax.” Id., at 219.
II
As in a number of other cases involving the application of state taxing statutes to out-of-state sellers, our holding in Bellas Hess relied on both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Although the “two claims are closely related,” Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 756, the Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States. Accordingly, while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause. See, e. g., Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232 (1987).
The two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally, in several ways. As discussed at greater length below, see Part IV, infra, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause reflect different constitutional concerns. Moreover, while Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 315 (1945), it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.
Thus, although we have not always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.
“ ‘Due process’ and ‘commerce clause’ conceptions are not always sharply separable in dealing with these problems. ... To some extent they overlap. If there is a want of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone any burden the tax imposes on the commerce among the states becomes ‘undue.’ But, though overlapping, the two conceptions are not identical. There may be more than sufficient factual connections, with economic and legal effects, between the transaction and the taxing state to sustain the tax as against due process objections. Yet it may fall because of its burdening effect upon the commerce. And, although the two notions cannot always be separated, clarity of consideration and of decision would be promoted if the two issues are approached, where they are presented, at least tentatively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled ones.” International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Heeding Justice Rutledge’s counsel, we consider each constitutional limit in turn.
Ill
The Due Process Clause “requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,” Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344-345 (1954), and that the “income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing State,’” Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 273 (1978) (citation omitted). Here, we are concerned primarily with the first of these requirements. Prior to Bellas Hess, we had held that that requirement was satisfied in a variety of circumstances involving use taxes. For example, the presence of sales personnel in the State or the maintenance of local retail stores in the State justified the exercise of that power because the seller’s local activities were “plainly accorded the protection and services of the taxing State.” Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 757. The furthest extension of that power was recognized in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U. S. 207 (1960), in which the Court upheld a use tax despite the fact that all of the seller’s in-state solicitation was performed by independent contractors. These cases all involved some sort of physical presence within the State, and in Bellas Hess the Court suggested that such presence was not only sufficient for jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, but also necessary. We expressly declined to obliterate the “sharp distinction ... between mail-order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as a part of a general interstate business.” 386 U. S., at 758.
Our due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the 25 years since Bellas Hess, particularly in the area of judicial jurisdiction. Building on the seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), we have framed the relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id., at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940)). In that spirit, we have abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s “presence” within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 212 (1977), the Court extended the flexible approach that International Shoe had prescribed for purposes of in personam jurisdiction to in rem jurisdiction, concluding that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”
Applying these principles, we have held that if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in personam jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State. As we explained in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 (1985):
“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physi cally enter the forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Id., at 476 (emphasis in original).
Comparable reasoning justifies the imposition of the collection duty on a mail-order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State. Such a corporation clearly has “fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S., at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). In “modern commercial life” it matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers: The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation’s lack of physical presence in the taxing State. Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.
In this case, there is no question that Quill has purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts is more than sufficient for due process purposes, and that the use tax is related to the benefits Quill receives from access to the State. We therefore agree with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not bar enforcement of that State’s use tax against Quill.
HH <J
Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.” It says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of any action by Congress. Nevertheless, as Justice Johnson suggested in his concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 231-232, 239 (1824), the Commerce Clause is more than an affirmative grant of power; it has a negative sweep as well. The Clause, in Justice Stone’s phrasing, “by its own force” prohibits certain state actions that interfere with interstate commerce. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U. S. 177, 185 (1938).
Our interpretation of the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce Clause has evolved substantially over the years, particularly as that Clause concerns limitations on state taxation powers. See generally P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation §§2:9-2:17 (1981). Our early cases, beginning with Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1827), swept broadly, and in Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 648 (1888), we declared that “no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form.” We later narrowed that rule and distinguished between direct burdens on interstate commerce, which were prohibited, and indirect burdens, which generally were not. See, e. g., Sanford v. Poe, 69 F. 546 (CA6 1895), aff’d sub nom. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 220 (1897). Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 256-258 (1938), and subsequent decisions rejected this formal, categorical analysis and adopted a “multiple-taxation doctrine” that focused not on whether a tax was “direct” or “indirect” but rather on whether a tax subjected interstate commerce to a risk of multiple taxation. However, in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256 (1946), we embraced again the formal distinction between direct and indirect taxation, invalidating Indiana’s imposition of a gross receipts tax on a particular transaction because that application would “im-poste] a direct tax on interstate sales.” Most recently, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S., at 285, we renounced the Freeman approach as “attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference.” We expressly overruled one of Freeman’s progeny, Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951), which held that a tax on “the privilege of doing interstate business” was unconstitutional, while recognizing that a differently denominated tax with the same economic effect would not be unconstitutional. Spector, as we observed in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U. S. 434, 441 (1959), created a situation in which “magic words or labels” could “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.” Complete Auto emphasized the importance of looking past “the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect,” 430 U. S., at 279, and set forth a four-part test that continues to govern the validity of state taxes under the Commerce Clause.
Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, in the middle of this latest rally between formalism and pragmatism. Contrary to the suggestion of the North Dakota Supreme Court, this timing does not mean that Complete Auto rendered Bellas Hess “obsolete.” Complete Auto rejected Freeman and Spector’s formal distinction between “direct” and “indirect” taxes on interstate commerce because that formalism allowed the validity of statutes to hinge on “legal terminology,” “draftsmanship and phraseology.” 430 U. S., at 281. Bellas Hess did not rely on any such labeling of taxes and therefore did not automatically fall with Freeman and its progeny.
While contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent cases. Under Complete Auto’s four-part test, we will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” 430 U. S., at 279. Bellas Hess concerns the first of these tests and stands for the proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks the “substantial nexus” required by the Commerce Clause.
Thus, three weeks after Complete Auto was handed down, we cited Bellas Hess for this proposition and discussed the case at some length. In National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551, 559 (1977), we affirmed the continuing vitality of Bellas Hess’ “sharp distinction . . . between mail-order sellers with [a physical presence in the taxing] State and those ... who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business.” We have continued to cite Bellas Hess with approval ever since. For example, in Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U. S. 252, 263 (1989), we expressed “doubt that termination of an interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to tax a call. See National Bellas Hess . . . (receipt of mail provides insufficient nexus).” See also D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 33 (1988); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 626 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S., at 437; National Geographic Society, 430 U. S., at 559. For these reasons, we disagree with the State Supreme Court’s conclusion that our decision in Complete Auto undercut the Bellas Hess rule.
The State of North Dakota relies less on Complete Auto and more on the evolution of our due process jurisprudence. The State contends that the nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are equivalent and that if, as we concluded above, a mail-order house that lacks a physical presence in the taxing State nonetheless satisfies the due process “minimum contacts” test, then that corporation also meets the Commerce Clause “substantial nexus” test. We disagree. Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical. The two standards are animated by different constitutional concerns and policies.
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity. Thus, at the most general level, the due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual’s connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the State’s exercise of power over him. We have, therefore, often identified “notice” or “fair warning” as the analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis. In contrast, the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy. Under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills. See generally The Federalist Nos. 7, 11 (A. Hamilton). It is in this light that we have interpreted the negative implication of the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we have ruled that that Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, see, e. g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), and bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce, see, e. g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U. S. 662 (1981).
The Complete Auto analysis reflects these concerns about the national economy. The second and third parts of that analysis, which require fair apportionment and nondiscrimination, prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate commerce. The first and fourth prongs, which require a substantial nexus and a relationship between the tax and state-provided services, limit the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce. Thus, the “substantial nexus” requirement is not, like due process’ “minimum contacts” requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather' a means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce. Accordingly, contrary to the State’s suggestion, a corporation may have the “minimum contacts” with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the “substantial nexus” with that State as required by the Commerce Clause.
The State Supreme Court reviewed our recent Commerce Clause decisions and concluded that those rulings signaled a “retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive approach” and thus supported its decision not to apply Bellas Hess. 470 N. W. 2d, at 214 (citing Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue of Wash., 419 U. S. 560 (1975), and Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232 (1987)). Although we agree with the state court’s assessment of the evolution of our cases, we do not share its conclusion that this evolution indicates that the Commerce Clause ruling of Bellas Hess is no longer good law.
First, as the state court itself noted, 470 N. W. 2d, at 214, all of these cases involved taxpayers who had a physical presence in the taxing State and therefore do not directly conflict with the rule of Bellas Hess or compel that it be overruled. Second, and more importantly, although our Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more flexible balancing analyses, we have never intimated a desire to reject all established “bright-line” tests. Although we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule.
Complete Auto, it is true, renounced Freeman and its progeny as “formalistic.” But not all formalism is alike. Spector’s formal distinction between taxes on the “privilege of doing business” and all other taxes served no purpose within our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but stood “only as a trap for the unwary draftsman.” Complete Auto, 430 U. S., at 279. In contrast, the bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce Clause. Undue burdens on interstate commerce may be avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed by particular regulations or taxes, but also, in some situations, by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation. Bellas Hess followed the latter approach and created a safe harbor for vendors “whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or the United States mail.” Under Bellas Hess, such vendors are free from state-imposed duties to collect sales and use taxes.
Like other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial at its edges: Whether or not a State may compel a vendor to collect a sales or use tax may turn on the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office. Cf. National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551 (1977); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U. S. 207 (1960). This artificiality, however, is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule. Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes. This benefit is important, for as we have so frequently noted, our law in this area is something of a “quagmire” and the “application of constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.” Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 457-458 (1959).
Moreover, a bright-line rule in the area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectations and, in doing so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the mail-order industry’s dramatic growth over the last quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from state taxation created in Bellas Hess.
Notwithstanding the benefits of bright-line tests, we have, in some situations, decided to replace such tests with more contextual balancing inquiries. For example, in Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U. S. 375 (1983), we reconsidered a bright-line test set forth in Public Util. Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927). Attleboro distinguished between state regulation of wholesale sales of electricity, which was constitutional as an “indirect” regulation of interstate commerce, and state regulation of retail sales of electricity, which was unconstitutional as a “direct regulation” of commerce. In Arkansas Electric, we considered whether to “follow the mechanical test set out in Attleboro, or the balance-of-interests test applied in our Commerce Clause cases.” 461 U. S., at 390-391. We first observed that “the principle of stare decisis counsels us, here as elsewhere, not lightly to set aside specific guidance of the sort we find in Attleboro.” Id., at 391. In deciding to reject the Attleboro analysis, we were influenced by the fact that the “mechanical test” was “anachronistic,” that the Court had rarely relied on the test, and that we could “see no strong reliance interests” that would be upset by the rejection of that test. 461 U. S., at 391-392. None of those factors obtains in this case. First, the Attleboro rule was “anachronistic” because it relied on formal distinctions between “direct” and “indirect” regulation (and on the regulatory counterparts of our Freeman line of cases); as discussed above, Bellas Hess turned on a different logic and thus remained sound after the Court repudiated an analogous distinction in Complete Auto. Second, unlike the Attleboro rule, we have, in our decisions, frequently relied on the Bellas Hess rule in the last 26 years, see supra, at 311, and we have never intimated in our review of sales or use taxes that Bellas Hess was unsound. Finally, again unlike the Attleboro rule, the Bellas Hess rule has engendered substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry. The “interest in stability and orderly development of the law” that undergirds the doctrine of stare decisis, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 190-191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), therefore counsels adherence to settled precedent.
In sum, although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes. To the contrary, the continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare deci-sis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law. For these reasons, we disagree with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the time has come to renounce the bright-line test of Bellas Hess.
This aspect of our decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve. No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946). Indeed, in recent years Congress has considered legislation that would “overrule” the Bellas Hess rule. Its decision not to take action in this direction may, of course, have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due Process Clause prohibits States from imposing such taxes, but today we have put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.
Indeed, even if we were convinced that Bellas Hess was inconsistent with our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, “this very fact [might] giv[e us] pause and counse[l] withholding our hand, at least for now. Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from intolerable or even undesirable burdens.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 463 U. S., at 637 (White, J., concurring). In this situation, it may be that “the better part of both wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the other branches of the Government.” Id., at 638.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Dakota is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
In the trial court, the State argued that because Quill gave its customers an unconditional 90-day guarantee, it retained title to the merchandise during the 90-day period after delivery. The trial court held, however, that title passed to the purchaser when the merchandise was received. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A40-A41. The State Supreme Court assumed for the purposes of its decision that that ruling was correct. 470 N. W. 2d 203, 217, n. 13 (1991). The State Supreme Court also noted that Quill licensed a computer software program to some of its North Dakota customers that enabled them to check Quill’s current inventories and prices and to place orders directly. Id., at 216-217. As we shall explain, Quill’s interests in the licensed software does not affect our analysis of the due process issue and does not comprise the “substantial nexus” required by the Commerce Clause. See n. 8, infra.
The court also suggested that, in view of the fact that the “touchstone of Due Process is fundamental fairness” and that the “very object” of the Commerce Clause is protection of interstate business against discriminatory local practices, it would be ironic to exempt Quill from this burden and thereby allow it to enjoy a significant competitive advantage over local retailers. 470 N. W. 2d, at 214-215.
Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939).
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 369 (1941).
Under our current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, “with certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.” D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 31 (1988); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 623-624 (1981) (“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
North Dakota’s use tax illustrates well how a state tax might unduly burden interstate commerce. On its face, North Dakota law imposes a collection duty on every vendor who advertises in the State three times in a single year. Thus, absent the Bellas Hess rule, a publisher who included a subscription card in three issues of its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a corporation whose telephone sales force made three calls into the State, all would be subject to the collection duty. What is more significant, similar obligations might be imposed by the Nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753, 769-760 (1967) (noting that the “many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle [a mail-order house] in a virtual welter of complicated obligations”) (footnotes omitted); see also Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 925-926 (1992).
We have sometimes stated that the “Complete Auto test, while responsive to Commerce Clause dictates, encompasses as well . . . due process requirement^].” Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 498 U. S. 358, 373 (1991). Although such comments might suggest that every tax that passes contemporary Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under the Due Process Clause, it does not follow that the converse is as well true: A tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly burden interstate commerce. See, e. g., Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232 (1987).
In addition to its common-carrier contacts with the State, Quill also licensed software to some of its North Dakota clients. See n. 1, supra. The State “concedes that the existence in North Dakota of a few floppy diskettes to which Quill holds title seems a slender thread upon which to base nexus.” Brief for Respondent 46. We agree. Although title to “a few floppy diskettes” present in a State might constitute some minimal nexus, in National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 561, 556 (1977), we expressly rejected a “ ‘slightest presence' standard of constitutional nexus.” We therefore conclude that Quill’s licensing of software in this case does not meet the “substantial nexus” requirement of the Commerce Clause.
It is worth noting that Congress has, at least on one occasion, followed a similar approach in its regulation of state taxation. In response to this Court’s indication in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 368 U. S. 450, 452 (1959), that, so long as the taxpayer has an adequate nexus with the taxing State, “net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation,” Congress enacted Pub. L. 86-272, codified at 15 U. S. C. § 381. That statute provides that a State may not impose a net income tax on any person if that person’s “only business activities within such State [involve] the solicitation of orders [approved] outside the State [and] filled . . . outside the State.” Ibid. As we noted in Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 409 U. S. 275, 280 (1972), in enacting § 381, “Congress attempted to allay the apprehension of businessmen that ‘mere solicitation’ would subject them to state taxation. . . . Section 381 was designed to define clearly a lower limit for the exercise of [the State’s power to tax]. Clarity that would remove uncertainty was Congress’ primary goal.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Many States have enacted use taxes. See App. 3 to Brief for Direct Marketing Association as Amicus Curiae. An overruling of Bellas Hess might raise thorny questions concerning the retroactive application of those taxes and might trigger substantial unanticipated liability for mail-order houses. The precise allocation of such burdens is better resolved by Congress rather than this Court.
See, e. g., H. R. 2230, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 480, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 2368, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H. R. 3621, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1099, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H. R. 3549, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 282, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state associated with the respondent. If the respondent is a federal court or federal judge, note the "state" as the United States. The same holds for other federal employees or officials. | What state is associated with the respondent? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
38
] | sc_respondentstate |
UNITED STATES v. CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND IN THE COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA, et al.
No. 253.
Argued January 9, 1953.
Decided April 6, 1953.
Assistant Attorney General Kirks argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings and Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney.
Frederick A. Ballard argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joseph W. Wyatt.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This nine-year-old proceeding is for the condemnation of certain easements in land and title to sewer mains which together comprise the sewerage system of Belle Haven, a residential subdivision in Fairfax County, Virginia. It was brought under the authority of Title II, § 202 of the Act of June 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 361, and a rider on the Appropriation Act of July 15, 1943, 57 Stat. 565, both amendments to the Lanham Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, 42 U. S. C. § 1521 et seq. Questions important in the administration of the Act moved us to grant certiorari, 344 U. S. 812, to review the dismissal of the government petition. 196 F. 2d 657, aff’g 101 F. Supp. 172.
During World War II, defense housing needs in the Washington area led the government to construct a large sewer project to serve defense housing properties in Fair-fax County. It sought to utilize, as a part of its trunk-line sewer, existing easements containing sewer pipes in the system originally constructed by respondent Belle Haven Realty Corporation. Negotiations produced an agreement under which the corporation, still holder of the fee, was to accept nominal compensation for its sewer properties on the condition that the government take the entire system and that the final order protect the Belle Haven householders against any future charges for its use. The government then filed a condemnation petition together with a declaration of taking and deposited estimated just compensation of $2. Possession was taken under court order, Belle Haven’s outfalls into the Potomac River blocked off, and its sewage diverted into the government’s trunk-line system. In .1948, a group of Belle Haven householders intervened as defendants, alleging that the government had leased the integrated system to the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and that the latter had undertaken to assess a use charge of $2 per month against each householder in Belle Haven subdivision. The intervenors claimed that they were the equitable owners in fee of the Belle Haven system since the developing corporation had included its construction cost in the purchase price of their lots, that they had been granted easements of user in that system and that the use charges assessed exceeded reasonable maintenance and operation costs. The prayer was that the court, in lieu of direct compensation for their interests, protect them against having to contribute to the amortization of the integrated system. The court decided that the householders had acquired implied easements in the Belle Haven system for which they were entitled to claim compensation, and intervention was granted. 89 F. Supp. 571. But the district judge held that he could not make an award in the form of a limitation on future use charges and he denied a temporary injunction against the collection of current bills. 89 F. Supp. 567. The in-tervenors then amended their answer to attack the taking as unauthorized under the Lanham Act. The Belle Haven Realty Corporation, which had not previously answered the government’s petition, did so in 1950, claiming it was the legal owner of the system and entitled to its present reproduction cost, less depreciation, as just compensation.
The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Lanham Act, as amended, required the consent of the intervenors as well as the realty corporation, that the corporation had only conditionally consented to the taking and that the householders had not consented at all. While the Court of Appeals approved the trial court’s reading of the statutory consent requirement, it declined to base its affirmance on that ground because, “It is perfectly clear . . . that the power of condemnation given by the Lanham Act extends only to lands or interests in lands; . . . there is nothing in the act which authorizes the condemnation of a public works system such as this.” 196 F. 2d 657, 662, relying on Puerto Rico R. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 131 F. 2d 491.
The original Lanham Act of October 14,. 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, was designed to provide relief for defense areas found by the President to be suffering from an existing or impending housing shortage. In such cases, the Federal Works Administrator was empowered to acquire “improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands” for construction sites by purchase, donation, exchange, lease or condemnation. The quoted language describing the kind of property which the Administrator could condemn was carried over into Title II of the Act, added in 1941, which extended the statute to public works shortages in defense areas. “Public work,” as defined, included sewers and sewage facilities. § 201. While the general language “improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands” included within § 202 of Title II of the Lanham Act appears to authorize the taking here, United States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230, 242, 243, n. 13 (1946), it is not necessary to depend on that section alone. In 1943, the Act was amended to provide that “none of the funds authorized herein shall be used to acquire public works already operated by public or private agencies, except where funds are allotted for substantial additions or improvements to such public works and with the consent of the owners thereof . . . .” 57 Stat. 565, 42 U. S. C. § 1534, note. The 1943 amendment was in effect when the present petition was filed and its applicability here is common ground among the parties. It explicitly authorized the condemnation of such property subject to the conditions stated.
In this connection, we do not believe that the consent requirement bars acquisitions by condemnation. This interpretation would strip it of significance since the other means of acquiring property described in the statute necessarily rest on consensual transactions. Although condemnation is sometimes regarded as a taking without the owner’s consent, 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 1, it is not anomalous to provide for such consent which can, in effect, represent an election to have value determined by a court rather than by the parties. In addition, “friendly” condemnation proceedings are often used to obtain clear title where price is already settled. Cf. Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271 (1939). Thus construed, all of the statutory terms are given effect.
Here, the consent of Belle Haven Realty Corporation was implicit in its promise to accept-nominal damages. That consent cannot be characterized as conditional. Indeed, the corporation’s answer, filed six years later, recognized this; rather than resisting the taking, it merely asserted a claim for more than nominal compensation.
Whether the intervening householders were “owners” whose consent was required is a different matter. Their interests were regarded by both courts below as implied easements or rights of user in the sewer system. It is true that easement holders have been held to be “owners” as that term is used in condemnation statutes. Swanson v. United States, 156 F. 2d 442, 445; United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333 (1910); cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945). But the relevant question in those cases is whether the holders of such interests are entitled to compensation under the Constitution. The compensability of these interests is not in issue here; it follows that the cases on which inter-venors rely are not controlling. In deciding who are “owners” here, we look to the scheme of the Act itself. We think it unlikely that, in providing for the condemnation of public works, Congress at the same time intended to make preliminary negotiations so cumbersome as to virtually nullify the power granted. Yet the interpretation pressed by respondents would have that effect. It would compel the government, before taking public works, to deal with the holder of every servitude to which the property might be subject. We hold that intervenors were not “owners” under the 1943 amendment and that the government was not required before condemning to engage in a round robin to secure from each of them a self-serving “Barkis is willin’.”
We do not pass on other issues raised by respondents, some of which if decided adversely to the government might be cured by amendment, and others we deem not ripe for adjudication because of factual questions not yet resolved.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“Sec. 202. Whenever the President finds that in any area or locality an acute shortage of public works or equipment for public works necessary to the health, safety, or welfare of persons engaged in national-defense activities exists or impends which would impede national-defense activities, and that such public works or equipment cannot otherwise be provided when needed, or could not be provided without the imposition of an increased excessive tax burden or an unusual or excessive increase in the debt limit of the taxing or borrowing authority in which such shortage exists, the Federal Works Administrator is authorized, with the approval of the President, in order to relieve such shortage—
“(a) To acquire, . . . improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands by purchase, donation, exchange, lease ... or condemnation ... for such public works.”
“. . . none of the funds authorized herein shall be used to acquire public works already operated by public or private agencies, except where funds are allotted for substantial additions or improvements to such public works and with the consent of the owners thereof . . . .”
Since the district judge deemed himself unable to order the government to restore the Belle Haven system to its original condition, the householders were remitted by dismissal of the condemnation petition to a separate action for any compensable damage they suffered because of the taking. Under this ruling, the property taken would remain part of the integrated system whether title is in the government or the realty corporation. In each case, the rights of the householders, if any, to an award remain to be determined. One effect of upholding the condemnation is to have that question tried on remand in this proceeding. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
FOLEY et al. v. BLAIR & CO., INC., et al.
No. 72-1154.
Argued November 12, 1973
Decided December 5, 1973
Leo H. Raines argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Harvey R. Miller argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Charles Seligson, Michael L. Cook, and Donald J. Zoeller.
Per Curiam.
Blair & Co., Inc., was a member of the New York Stock Exchange, engaged in the general brokerage and commission business. In the early summer of 1970, as the result of operating losses and a shrinkage of capital, Blair began a program of self-liquidation, which involved the transfer of customer accounts to other broker-dealers and the delivery of securities to customers so requesting. Blair apparently believed that its resources were sufficient to allow it to discharge its obligations to all customers and general creditors through this program. In September 1970, however, Blair concluded that successful implementation of this program might require the assistance of a Special Trust Fund which the New York Stock Exchange had established in 1964 to avoid bankruptcy of member firms.
Consequently, on September 21, 1970, Blair entered into an agreement with the New York Stock Exchange, whereby the trustees of the special fund would make loans and guarantees to protect Blair’s customers against loss. The agreement provided that the first such loan, guarantee, or advance by the fund would give the New York Stock Exchange the power to appoint a Liquidator of its own choosing to manage Blair’s affairs. The powers of the Liquidator were set forth in the agreement.
On September 25, 1970, the trustees made an initial advance of $1,000, which triggered the appointment of respondent Patrick E. Scorese as Liquidator. Any plans for further advances or loans were terminated four days later, however, when the petitioners, holders of subordinated debentures of Blair, filed an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against Blair in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Inter alia, the petition alleged that the appointment of the Liquidator constituted an act of bankruptcy under § 3a (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 21 (a)(5). That section makes it an act of bankruptcy if any person
“(5) while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property.”
Concluding that Blair's consent to the appointment of the Liquidator in fact constituted this fifth act of bankruptcy, the Referee adjudicated Blair an involuntary bankrupt. The District Court denied a petition to review his order. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Liquidator was not a “receiver or trustee” within the statutory definition. 471 F. 2d 178. We granted the writ of certiorari, 411 U. S. 930, in order to resolve this issue of seeming importance in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act, and oral argument was heard on November 12, 1973.
The respondents have suggested, however, that we should not decide the merits of the controversy, because the present circumstances of Blair & Co. render the case moot. The suggestion is premised on a series of events following the filing of the original involuntary petition. On April 15, 1971, two days after the Referee had granted the petitioners’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Blair had committed the fifth act of bankruptcy, Blair filed a petition for relief under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, pursuant to § 321 of the Act, 11 U. S. C. § 721. On May 18, 1971, the Referee entered an order pursuant to § 325 of the Act, 11 U. S. C. § 725, staying ordinary bankruptcy proceedings under Chapters I-VII pending the determination of the Chapter XI petition.
On May 26, 1971, Blair filed with the District Court its proposed arrangement with its creditors under Chapter XI. On September 27, 1971, the bankruptcy court found that the proposed arrangement had been accepted in writing by the requisite majority in number and amount of Blair’s creditors, in accordance with §§ 336 (4) and 362 of the Act, 11 U. S. C. §§ 736 (4), 762. Shortly thereafter on October 4, 1971, the petitioners moved in the District Court to dismiss the Chapter XI proceedings. This motion was not acted upon until February 16, 1973, after the Court of Appeals had reversed the adjudication of Blair as an involuntary bankrupt; on that date, the motion was denied. On June 12, 1973, the District Court denied a petition for review of that order. On October 2, 1973, while the present case was awaiting argument in this Court, the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming the arrangement proposed by Blair under Chapter XI. Apparently, no appeal was taken from the order of confirmation.
In light of the confirmation of the Chapter XI arrangement, the respondents suggest that this case no longer presents a live controversy. They rely upon § 371 of the Act, 11 U. S. C. § 771, which provides that confirmation of an arrangement “shall discharge a debtor from all his unsecured debts and liabilities provided for by the arrangement,” and argue that the petitioners thus no longer have any monetary stake in resolution of the controversy over whether the fifth act of bankruptcy was committed. See generally 9 W. Collier, Bankruptcy ¶¶ 9.32, 9.33 (14th ed. 1972). The respondents also argue that the original adjudication of bankruptcy is irrelevant to the present situation, since § 322 of the Act, 11 U. S. C. § 722, does not make the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for relief under Chapter XI.
While the issue of mootness was briefed and argued before this Court, it was not treated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, no doubt because the final confirmation order was not entered by the District Court until well after the appellate court had issued its judgment. Under these circumstances, we think it appropriate that the Court of Appeals have the opportunity to consider the mootness issue in the first instance. In reviewing the question of mootness, the Court of Appeals should consider the effect of § 64a (1) of the Act, 11 U. S. C. § 104 (a) (1). Inter alia, that section provides that “one reasonable attorney’s fee” for the services rendered to petitioning-creditors in involuntary cases shall be treated aá4a priority debt in bankruptcy proceedings, payable out of the estate in advance of distribution of any dividends to creditors. Section 64 is made applicable to | 321 Chapter XI proceedings by § 802 of the Act, 11 U. S. C. § 702, and thus might allow the treatment of at least some of the petitioners’ counsel fees as a priority expense. See 8 W. Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 5.33 [3.1] and n. 25 (14th ed. 1972); see also Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U. S. 471, 475.
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to that court to consider whether it has now become moot.
It is so ordered.
The Special Trust Fund is authorized by the Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, Art. XIX, § 1.
Paragraph VIII of the agreement provided:
“Immediately following his appointment by the Exchange, the Liquidator shall take control of the business and property of the Corporation for the purpose of liquidating the business of the Corporation and shall proceed as follows in connection with the liquidation:
“i.) he shall promptly take such steps as he may deem practicable to reduce the Corporation’s operating expenses and to dispose of the Corporation’s salable assets;
“ii.) he shall have power to retain independent public accountants, consultants, counsel and other agents and assistants and shall have power to augment and reduce or eliminate the staff of the Corporation;
“iii.) he shall, as soon as practicable, assert and collect or settle all claims and rights of the Corporation;
“iv.) he shall pay any claim against the Corporation considered by him to be a valid claim of any customer of the Corporation;
“v.) he shall take such other steps as he deems necessary or appropriate to liquidate the business of the Corporation.
“It is agreed that consistent with the duty of the Liquidator to effect a fair and orderly liquidation of the business of the Corporation to enable prompt settlement with its customers, the Liquidator shall act in accordance with what he deems to be good business practice.”
On the same date that this agreement was signed, Blair executed a second instrument that more specifically delineated the powers of the Liquidator, who was described as “the true and lawful attorney and agent of and for the Corporation [Blair].”
The actual order adjudging Blair a bankrupt was not issued until April 27, 1971.
The September 27 finding was an oral one, made in open court. Written findings to the same effect were filed on December 27, 1971.
While the effect of § 64a (1) upon the issue of mootness was discussed at oral argument, it was not the subject of briefing by either of the parties. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states. | What is the issue area of the decision? | [
"Criminal Procedure",
"Civil Rights",
"First Amendment",
"Due Process",
"Privacy",
"Attorneys",
"Unions",
"Economic Activity",
"Judicial Power",
"Federalism",
"Interstate Relations",
"Federal Taxation",
"Miscellaneous",
"Private Action"
] | [
8
] | sc_issuearea |
GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 352.
Argued March 10, 1965.
Decided April 27, 1965.
Donald K. Barnes argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Aloysius F. Power, Thomas J. Hughes, Seymour S. Mintz, William T. Plumb, Jr., and E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.
Henry E. Wixon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Chester H. Cray and Milton D. Korman.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947 imposes a tax of 5% on the taxable income of every corporation, foreign or domestic, for the privilege of engaging in any trade or business within the District. The Act further provides that “[t]he measure of the franchise tax shall be that portion of the net income of the corporation ... as is fairly attributable to any trade or business carried on or engaged in within the District and such other net income as is derived from sources within the District.” The Act does not attempt to define a specific method whereby the portion of income “fairly attributable” to the District is to be determined, but authorizes the District Commissioners to prescribe regulations for such determination. However, the Commissioners’ discretion in devising such regulations is not unfettered, as the Act further commands: “If the trade or business of any corporation ... is carried on or engaged in both within and without the District, the net income derived therefrom shall ... be deemed to be income from sources within and without the District.”
Acting pursuant to the authority delegated to formulate regulations governing the allocation of income, the District Commissioners promulgated regulations which provide: “Where income for any taxable year is derived from the manufacture and sale or purchase and sale of tangible personal property, the portion thereof to be apportioned to the District shall be such percentage of the total of such income as the District sales made during such taxable year bear to the total sales made everywhere during such taxable year.”
The petitioner, General Motors Corporation (G. M.), seeks reyiew of an en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which approved the application of these regulations in determining the proportion of its total net income allocable to the District for the purpose of computing the franchise tax due. General Motors attacks this method of computation on the grounds that it attributes to the District an unreasonably high proportion of its total income and that it is therefore both unauthorized by the relevant sections of the statute, and violative of the Interstate Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. We agree that this method of allocation is not authorized by the D. C. Code and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals without reaching the constitutional questions raised.
General Motors is engaged in the manufacture and sale of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. A Delaware corporation, the petitioner maintains its principal offices in New York and Detroit. It carries on no manufacturing operations within the District of Columbia, but it makes substantial sales to customers located within the District, chiefly retail automobile dealers. During the years in question, 1957 and 1958, its volume of sales to such customers aggregated $37,185,704 and $32,542,519, respectively. Orders for these sales were received and filled outside the District, and the products were shipped to customers from G. M. manufacturing plants in Maryland, Delaware, and Michigan.
It is the claim of G. M. that the use of the “sales-factor formula” in the regulations is beyond the authority of the statute, because that formula taxes more of its net income than is “fairly attributable” to its District of Columbia business, particularly in light of the statutory provision which provides that the net income of a business carried on both within and without the District shall be deemed to be from sources within and without the District. We agree that the Commissioners exceeded their statutory authority by allocating income to the District in disregard of the express restrictions of the law.
We are normally content to leave undisturbed decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concerning the import of legislation governing the affairs of the District. However, at times application of the District Code has an impact not confined to the Potomac’s shores, but reaching far beyond. This is such a case, for approval of the District Commissioners’ regulations lends sanction to an apportionment formula seriously at variance with those prevailing in the vast majority of States and creates substantial dangers of multiple taxation. Where a decision is of such significance to interstate commerce, and where the result reached involves statutorily unsupportable exertions of administrative power, the traditional reasons underlying our customary refusal to review interpretations of District law do not apply.
It is of course clear that the District Code does not expressly prescribe the use of any particular formula for the apportionment of income to sources within and without the District. On the contrary, the Code expressly authorizes the District Commissioners to promulgate regulations for the detailed apportionment of the income of multistate enterprises. But neither does the Code leave the Commissioners wholly unguided in their exercise of this authority. The Commissioners’ authority is clearly limited by the provision (§ 47-1580a) which requires that the net income of a corporation doing business inside and outside the District be deemed to arise from sources situated in like fashion. To understand the meaning of this limitation, we need but take the simple example of a corporation which has its manufacturing facilities located wholly in Maryland and sells all of its products in the District of Columbia. Application of the Commissioners’ formula would result in the allocation of 100% of the corporation’s income to the District. Yet there can be no doubt that the business of the corporation is carried on both within and without the District, viz., manufacture in Maryland and sales in the District. The statute does not say that net income shall be deemed to be derived from sources within and without the District only where the sales of any corporation are made both within and without the District, which is the effect of the Commissioners’ regulation. The statute is phrased more broadly and commands apportionment of income to sources within and without the District whenever “the trade or business of any corporation ... is carried on or engaged in both within and without the District.” As it is clear that some part of the trade or business of this hypothetical corporation is carried on without the District, the conclusion follows that the Commissioners must “deem” some part of the income of this corporation to be derived from sources outside the District.
It is said that the Commissioners’ regulations are within the statutory grant of authority because the language “the net income derived therefrom” in § 47-1580a must be read to mean the total income of the corporation and not the “net income arising from activities in the District.” The section must be so read, it is argued, because this reading least restricts the discretion of the Commissioners in devising apportionment formulae, and the traditional canon of broad construction of revenue measures demands that restrictions on the Commissioners’ discretion be minimized. Applying this approach to the case at hand, it is argued that the Commissioners fulfilled their statutory obligation in apportioning the total income of G. M. to sources inside and outside the District in accordance with the geographical distribution of the company’s sales.
Where, as in this case, some portion of a corporation’s income is derived from manufacture and sale outside the District, there is no question that the statute requires the Commissioners to allocate that portion to sources outside the District. However, it does not follow that the malting of.that kind of allocation alone relieves the Commissioners of their statutory responsibility to apportion that part of a corporation’s income arising from manufacture outside and sale inside the District limits. As to this segment of its income, G. M. is in precisely the same situation as the hypothetical corporation manufacturing wholly in Maryland and selling solely in the District; that is, it is carrying on a business partly within and partly without the District limits. It is not enough under the statute to require apportionment of income derived from District sales only in the case where the taxed corporation has no sales outside the District. The inescapable and determinative fact in both the hypothetical case and the case before us is that the company carries on business both inside and outside the District with respect to the income which it derives from the sales made within the District. Consequently, § 47-1580a requires that some portion of this income be deemed to arise from sources outside the District.'
The conclusion which we reach by analysis of the plain language of the statute also finds support in the consequences which a contrary view would have for the overall pattern of taxation of income derived from interstate commerce. The great majority of States imposing corporate income taxes apportion the total income of a corporation by application of a three-factor formula which gives equal weight to the geographical distribution of plant, payroll, and sales. The use of an apportionment formula based wholly on the sales factor, in the context of general use of the three-factor approach, will ordinarily result in multiple taxation of corporate net income; for the States in which the property and payroll of the corporation are located will allocate to themselves 67% of the corporation’s income, whereas the jurisdictions in which the sales are made will allocate 100% of the income to themselves. Conversely, in some cases enterprises will have their payroll and plant located in the sales-factor jurisdictions and make their sales in the three-factor jurisdictions so that only 33% of their incomes will be subject to state taxation. In any case, the sheer inconsistency of the District formula with that generally prevailing may tend to result in the unhealthy fragmentation of enterprise and an uneconomic pattern of plant location, and so presents an added reason why this Court must give proper meaning to the relevant provisions of the District Code.
Moreover, the result reached in this case is consistent with the concern which the Court has shown that state taxes imposed on income from interstate commerce be fairly apportioned. In upholding taxes imposed on corporate income by Connecticut and New York and apportioned in accordance with the geographical distribution of a corporation’s property, this Court carefully inquired into the reasonableness of the apportionment formulae used.
“The profits of the corporation were largely earned by a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in Connecticut and ending with sale in other States. In this it was typical of a large part of the manufacturing business conducted in the State. The legislature in attempting to put upon this business its fair share of the burden of taxation was faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes conducted within its borders. . . . There is . . . nothing in this record to show that the method of apportionment adopted by the State was inherently arbitrary, or that its application to this corporation produced an unreasonable result.” Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 120-121.
See also Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271. While the Court has refrained from attempting to define any single appropriate method of apportionment, it has sought to ensure that the methods used display a modicum of reasonable relation to corporate activities within the State. The Court has approved formulae based on the geographical distribution of corporate property and those based on the standard three-factor formula. See, e. g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra; Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501. The standard three-factor formula can be justified as a rough, practical approximation of the distribution of either a corporation’s sources of income or the social costs which it generates. By contrast, the geographic distribution of a corporation’s sales is, by itself, of dubious significance in indicating the locus of either factor. We of course do not mean to take any position on the constitutionality of a state income tax based on the sales factor alone. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to note that the factors alluded to by this Court in justifying apportionment measures constitutionally challenged in the past lend little support to the use of an exclusively sales-oriented approach. In construing the District Code to prohibit the use of a sales-factor formula, we sacrifice none of the values which' our scrutiny of state apportionment measures has sought to protect.
In sum, we find that the language of the authorizing statute does not permit the application of an apportionment formula which makes use of the sales factor alone. The conclusion which we draw from examination of the statutory language finds support in the conflict with other taxing jurisdictions which would result from a contrary view. It finds further support in the continuing concern for fair apportionment which this Court has displayed over the years in scrutinizing state taxing statutes. As the District Code confides in the Commissioners the authority to prescribe detailed regulations, it is not for us to make specific prescription, and we limit ourselves to holding that the present regulation is unauthorized by the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the tax here is authorized by the controlling statute, would affirm the judgment.
D. C. Code 1961, §47-1571a.
D. C. Code 1961, §47-1580.
D. C. Code 1961, §47-1580a.
Ibid.
Section 10.2 (c) of the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Regulations, relettered by amendment of July 24, 1956.
118 U. S. App. D. C. 381, 336 F. 2d 885, certiorari granted, 379 U. S. 887. An earlier decision (91 Wash. Law Rep. 650) of a panel of the Circuit Court, reversed by the decision here reviewed, had reached a contrary conclusion in affirming the decision of the'District of Columbia Tax Court (CCH D. C. Tax Rep. ¶ 200-006).
Out of total sales of $9,461,855,874 in 1957 and $7,853,393,381 in 1958.
This is not to say that the Commissioners need engage in detailed segmentation of corporate income to source and specific allocation thereof. All that is required is that the formula adopted for general application take account of the geographical spread of the major dimensions of a business.
Of the 38 States requiring payment of such taxes, 26 employ varieties of a three-factor formula which takes into account the geographical distribution of a corporation’s payroll, property and sales, generally giving equal weight to each factor. Another three use substantially the same formula, replacing the payroll factor with the broader category of manufacturing costs. Yet another three make, use of a formula which incorporates the sales and property factors. Only four taxing jurisdictions use formulae based solely on the geographic distribution of corporate sales. See H. R. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 119. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
11
] | sc_certreason |
Kerri L. KALEY, et vir, Petitioners
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 12-464.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Oct. 16, 2013.
Decided Feb. 25, 2014.
Syllabus*
Title 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) empowers courts to enter pre-trial restraining orders to "preserve the availability of [forfeitable] property" while criminal proceedings are pending. Such pre-trial asset restraints are constitutionally permissible whenever probable cause exists to think that a defendant has committed an offense permitting forfeiture and that the assets in dispute are traceable or otherwise sufficiently related to the crime charged. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512.
After a grand jury indicted petitioners, Kerri and Brian Kaley, for reselling stolen medical devices and laundering the proceeds, the Government obtained a § 853(e)(1) restraining order against their assets. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order, intending to use a portion of the disputed assets for their legal fees. The District Court allowed them to challenge the assets' traceability to the offenses in question but not the facts supporting the underlying indictment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Held : When challenging the legality of a § 853(e)(1) pre-trial asset seizure, a criminal defendant who has been indicted is not constitutionally entitled to contest a grand jury's determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimes charged. Pp. 1096 - 1105.
(a) In Monsanto, this Court held that the Government may seize assets before trial that a defendant intends to use to pay an attorney, so long as probable cause exists "to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable." 491 U.S., at 615, 109 S.Ct. 2657. The question whether indicted defendants like the Kaleys are constitutionally entitled to a judicial re-determination of the grand jury's probable cause conclusion in a hearing to lift an asset restraint has a ready answer in the fundamental and historic commitment of the criminal justice system to entrust probable cause findings to a grand jury. A probable cause finding sufficient to initiate a prosecution for a serious crime is "conclusive[e]," Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, and, as a general matter, "a challenge to the reliability or competence of the evidence" supporting that finding "will not be heard," United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352. A grand jury's probable cause finding may, on its own, effect a pre-trial restraint on a person's liberty. Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854. The same result follows when it works to restrain a defendant's property.
The Kaleys' alternative rule would have strange and destructive consequences. Allowing a judge to decide anew what the grand jury has already determined could result in two inconsistent findings governing different aspects of one criminal proceeding, with the same judge who found probable cause lacking presiding over a trial premised on its existence. That legal dissonance could not but undermine the criminal justice system's integrity, especially the grand jury's constitutional role. Pp. 1096 - 1100.
(b) The balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18-which requires a court to weigh (1) the burdens that a requested procedure would impose on the government against (2) the private interest at stake, as viewed alongside (3) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" of that interest without the procedure and "the probable value, if any, of [the] additional ... procedural safeguar[d]," id., at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893-if applicable here, tips against the Kaleys. Because the Government's interest in freezing potentially forfeitable assets without an adversarial hearing about the probable cause underlying criminal charges and the Kaleys' interest in retaining counsel of their own choosing are both substantial, the test's third prong is critical. It boils down to the "probable value, if any," of a judicial hearing in uncovering mistaken grand jury probable cause findings. But when the legal standard is merely probable cause and the grand jury has already made that finding, a full-dress hearing will provide little benefit. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61. A finding of probable cause to think that a person committed a crime "can be [made] reliably without an adversary hearing," Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854, and the value of requiring additional "formalities and safeguards" would "[i]n most cases ... be too slight," id., at 121-122, 95 S.Ct. 854. The experience of several Circuits corroborates this view. Neither the Kaleys nor their amici point to a single case in two decades where courts, holding hearings of the kind they seek, have found the absence of probable cause to believe that an indicted defendant committed the crime charged. Pp. 1100 - 1105.
677 F.3d 1316, affirmed and remanded.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
Howard Srebnick, Miami, FL, for Petitioners.
Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Howard Srebnick, Counsel of Record, Black, Srebnick, Kornspan & Stumpf, P.A., G. Richard Strafer, G. Richard Strafer, P.A., Miami, FL, for Petitioners.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General (Counsel of Record), Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Elaine J. Goldenberg, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Sonja M. Ralston, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e), authorizes a court to freeze an indicted defendant's assets prior to trial if they would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. In United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989), we approved the constitutionality of such an order so long as it is "based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable." And we held that standard to apply even when a defendant seeks to use the disputed property to pay for a lawyer.
In this case, two indicted defendants wishing to hire an attorney challenged a pre-trial restraint on their property. The trial court convened a hearing to consider the seizure's legality under Monsanto. The question presented is whether criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled at such a hearing to contest a grand jury's prior determination of probable cause to believe they committed the crimes charged. We hold that they have no right to relitigate that finding.
I
A
Criminal forfeitures are imposed upon conviction to confiscate assets used in or gained from certain serious crimes. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). Forfeitures help to ensure that crime does not pay: They at once punish wrongdoing, deter future illegality, and "lessen the economic power" of criminal enterprises. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989); see id., at 634, 109 S.Ct. 2646 ("Forfeiture provisions are powerful weapons in the war on crime"). The Government also uses forfeited property to recompense victims of crime, improve conditions in crime-damaged communities, and support law enforcement activities like police training. See id., at 629-630, 109 S.Ct. 2646.1 Accordingly, "there is a strong governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets." Id., at 631, 109 S.Ct. 2646.
In line with that interest, § 853(e)(1) empowers courts to enter pre-trial restraining orders or injunctions to "preserve the availability of [forfeitable] property" while criminal proceedings are pending. Such an order, issued "[u]pon application of the United States," prevents a defendant from spending or transferring specified property, including to pay an attorney for legal services. Ibid. In Monsanto, our principal case involving this procedure, we held a pre-trial asset restraint constitutionally permissible whenever there is probable cause to believe that the property is forfeitable. See 491 U.S., at 615, 109 S.Ct. 2657. That determination has two parts, reflecting the requirements for forfeiture under federal law: There must be probable cause to think (1) that the defendant has committed an offense permitting forfeiture, and (2) that the property at issue has the requisite connection to that crime. See § 853(a). The Monsanto Court, however, declined to consider "whether the Due Process Clause requires a hearing" to establish either or both of those aspects of forfeitability. Id., at 615, n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2657.2
Since Monsanto, the lower courts have generally provided a hearing to any indicted defendant seeking to lift an asset restraint to pay for a lawyer. In that hearing, they have uniformly allowed the defendant to litigate the second issue stated above: whether probable cause exists to believe that the assets in dispute are traceable or otherwise sufficiently related to the crime charged in the indictment.3 But the courts have divided over extending the hearing to the first issue. Some have considered, while others have barred, a defendant's attempt to challenge the probable cause underlying a criminal charge.4 This case raises the question whether an indicted defendant has a constitutional right to contest the grand jury's prior determination of that matter.
B
The grand jury's indictment in this case charges a scheme to steal prescription medical devices and resell them for profit. The indictment accused petitioner Kerri Kaley, a sales representative for a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, and petitioner Brian Kaley, her husband, with transporting stolen medical devices across state lines and laundering the proceeds of that activity.5 The Kaleys have contested those allegations throughout this litigation, arguing that the medical devices at issue were unwanted, excess hospital inventory, which they could lawfully take and market to others.
Immediately after obtaining the indictment, the Government sought a restraining order under § 853(e)(1) to prevent the Kaleys from transferring any assets traceable to or involved in the alleged offenses.
Included among those assets is a $500,000 certificate of deposit that the Kaleys intended to use for legal fees. The District Court entered the requested order. Later, in response to the Kaleys' motion to vacate the asset restraint, the court denied a request for an evidentiary hearing and confirmed the order, except as to $63,000 that it found (based on the parties' written submissions) was not connected to the alleged offenses.
On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for further consideration of whether some kind of evidentiary hearing was warranted. See 579 F.3d 1246 (2009). The District Court then concluded that it should hold a hearing, but only as to "whether the restrained assets are traceable to or involved in the alleged criminal conduct." App. to Pet. for Cert. 43, n. 5. The Kaleys informed the court that they no longer disputed that issue; they wished to show only that the "case against them is 'baseless.' " Id., at 39; see App. 107 ("We are not contesting that the assets restrained were ... traceable to the conduct. Our quarrel is whether that conduct constitutes a crime"). Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the restraining order, and the Kaleys took another appeal. The Eleventh Circuit this time affirmed, holding that the Kaleys were not entitled at a hearing on the asset freeze "to challenge the factual foundation supporting the grand jury's probable cause determination[ ]"-that is, "the very validity of the underlying indictment." 677 F.3d 1316, 1317 (2012).
We granted certiorari in light of the Circuit split on the question presented, 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1580, 185 L.Ed.2d 575 (2013), and we now affirm the Eleventh Circuit.
II
This Court has twice considered claims, similar to the Kaleys', that the Fifth Amendment's right to due process and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel constrain the way the federal forfeiture statute applies to assets needed to retain an attorney. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528;Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512. We begin with those rulings not as mere background, but as something much more. On the single day the Court decided both those cases, it cast the die on this one too.
In Caplin & Drysdale, we considered whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments exempt from forfeiture money that a convicted defendant has agreed to pay his attorney. See 491 U.S., at 623-635, 109 S.Ct. 2646. We conceded a factual premise of the constitutional claim made in the case: Sometimes "a defendant will be unable to retain the attorney of his choice," if he cannot use forfeitable assets. Id., at 625, 109 S.Ct. 2646. Still, we held, the defendant's claim was "untenable." Id., at 626, 109 S.Ct. 2646. "A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's money" for legal fees-even if that is the only way to hire a preferred lawyer. Ibid. Consider, we submitted, the example of a "robbery suspect" who wishes to "use funds he has stolen from a bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is apprehended." Ibid. That money is "not rightfully his." Ibid. Accordingly, we concluded, the Government does not violate the Constitution if, pursuant to the forfeiture statute, "it seizes the robbery proceeds and refuses to permit the defendant to use them" to pay for his lawyer. Ibid.
And then, we confirmed in Monsanto what our "robbery suspect" hypothetical indicated: Even prior to conviction (or trial)-when the presumption of innocence still applies-the Government could constitutionally use § 853(e) to freeze assets of an indicted defendant "based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable." 491 U.S., at 615, 109 S.Ct. 2657. In Monsanto, too, the defendant wanted to use the property at issue to pay a lawyer, and maintained that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitled him to do so. We disagreed. We first noted that the Government may sometimes "restrain persons where there is a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a serious offense." Id., at 615-616, 109 S.Ct. 2657. Given that power, we could find "no constitutional infirmity in § 853(e)'s authorization of a similar restraint on [the defendant's] property" in order to protect "the community's interest" in recovering "ill-gotten gains." Id., at 616, 109 S.Ct. 2657. Nor did the defendant's interest in retaining a lawyer with the disputed assets change the equation. Relying on Caplin & Drysdale, we reasoned: "[I]f the Government may, post-trial, forbid the use of forfeited assets to pay an attorney, then surely no constitutional violation occurs when, after probable cause is adequately established, the Government obtains an order barring a defendant from frustrating that end by dissipating his assets prior to trial." Ibid. So again: With probable cause, a freeze is valid.
The Kaleys little dispute that proposition; their argument is instead about who should have the last word as to probable cause. A grand jury has already found probable cause to think that the Kaleys committed the offenses charged; that is why an indictment issued. No one doubts that those crimes are serious enough to trigger forfeiture. Similarly, no one contests that the assets in question derive from, or were used in committing, the offenses. See supra, at 1096. The only question is whether the Kaleys are constitutionally entitled to a judicial re-determination of the conclusion the grand jury already reached: that probable cause supports this criminal prosecution (or alternatively put, that the prosecution is not "baseless," as the Kaleys believe, supra, at 1096). And that question, we think, has a ready answer, because a fundamental and historic commitment of our criminal justice system is to entrust those probable cause findings to grand juries.
This Court has often recognized the grand jury's singular role in finding the probable cause necessary to initiate a prosecution for a serious crime. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). "[A]n indictment 'fair upon its face,' and returned by a 'properly constituted grand jury,' " we have explained, "conclusively determines the existence of probable cause" to believe the defendant perpetrated the offense alleged. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (quoting Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250, 53 S.Ct. 129, 77 L.Ed. 283 (1932)). And "conclusively" has meant, case in and case out, just that. We have found no "authority for looking into and revising the judgment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding was founded upon sufficient proof." Costello, 350 U.S., at 362-363, 76 S.Ct. 406 (quoting United States v. Reed, 27 F.Cas. 727, 738 (No. 16,134) (C.C.N.D.N.Y.1852) (Nelson, J.)). To the contrary, "the whole history of the grand jury institution" demonstrates that "a challenge to the reliability or competence of the evidence" supporting a grand jury's finding of probable cause "will not be heard." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) (quoting Costello, 350 U.S., at 364, 76 S.Ct. 406, and Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 261, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988)). The grand jury gets to say-without any review, oversight, or second-guessing-whether probable cause exists to think that a person committed a crime.
And that inviolable grand jury finding, we have decided, may do more than commence a criminal proceeding (with all the economic, reputational, and personal harm that entails); the determination may also serve the purpose of immediately depriving the accused of her freedom. If the person charged is not yet in custody, an indictment triggers "issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry" into the case's strength. Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854; see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997). Alternatively, if the person was arrested without a warrant, an indictment eliminates her Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial assessment of probable cause to support any detention. See Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 114, 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854. In either situation, this Court-relying on the grand jury's "historical role of protecting individuals from unjust persecution"-has "let [that body's] judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached magistrate." Ibid. The grand jury, all on its own, may effect a pre-trial restraint on a person's liberty by finding probable cause to support a criminal charge.6
The same result follows when, as here, an infringement on the defendant's property depends on a showing of probable cause that she committed a crime. If judicial review of the grand jury's probable cause determination is not warranted (as we have so often held) to put a defendant on trial or place her in custody, then neither is it needed to freeze her property. The grand jury that is good enough-reliable enough, protective enough-to inflict those other grave consequences through its probable cause findings must needs be adequate to impose this one too. Indeed, Monsanto already noted the absence of any reason to hold property seizures to different rules: As described earlier, the Court partly based its adoption of the probable cause standard on the incongruity of subjecting an asset freeze to any stricter requirements than apply to an arrest or ensuing detention. See supra, at 1108; 491 U.S., at 615, 109 S.Ct. 2657 ("[I]t would be odd to conclude that the Government may not restrain property" on the showing often sufficient to "restrain persons "). By similar token, the probable cause standard, once selected, should work no differently for the single purpose of freezing assets than for all others.7 So the longstanding, unvarying rule of criminal procedure we have just described applies here as well: The grand jury's determination is conclusive.
And indeed, the alternative rule the Kaleys seek would have strange and destructive consequences. The Kaleys here demand a do-over, except with a different referee. They wish a judge to decide anew the exact question the grand jury has already answered-whether there is probable cause to think the Kaleys committed the crimes charged. But suppose the judge performed that task and came to the opposite conclusion. Two inconsistent findings would then govern different aspects of one criminal proceeding: Probable cause would exist to bring the Kaleys to trial (and, if otherwise appropriate, hold them in prison), but not to restrain their property. And assuming the prosecutor continued to press the charges,8 the same judge who found probable cause lacking would preside over a trial premised on its presence. That legal dissonance, if sustainable at all, could not but undermine the criminal justice system's integrity-and especially the grand jury's integral, constitutionally prescribed role. For in this new world, every prosecution involving a pre-trial asset freeze would potentially pit the judge against the grand jury as to the case's foundational issue.9
The Kaleys counter (as does the dissent, post, at 1108 - 1109) that apparently inconsistent findings are not really so, because the prosecutor could have presented scantier evidence to the judge than he previously offered the grand jury. Suppose, for example, that at the judicial hearing the prosecutor put on only "one witness instead of all five"; then, the Kaleys maintain, the judge's decision of no probable cause would mean only that "the Government did not satisfy its burden[ ] on that one day in time." Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 18; see Reply Brief 11-12. But we do not think that hypothetical solves the problem. As an initial matter, it does not foreclose a different fact pattern: A judge could hear the exact same evidence as the grand jury, yet respond to it differently, thus rendering what even the Kaleys must concede is a contradictory finding. And when the Kaleys' hypothetical is true, just what does it show? Consider that the prosecutor in their example has left home some of the witnesses he took to the grand jury-presumably because, as we later discuss, he does not yet wish to reveal their identities or likely testimony. See infra, at 1101 - 1102. The judge's ruling of no probable cause therefore would not mean that the grand jury was wrong: As the Kaleys concede, the grand jury could have heard more than enough evidence to find probable cause that they committed the crimes charged. The Kaleys would win at the later hearing despite, not because of, the case's true merits. And we would then see still less reason for a judge to topple the grand jury's (better supported) finding of probable cause.10
Our reasoning so far is straightforward. We held in Monsanto that the probable cause standard governs the pre-trial seizure of forfeitable assets, even when they are needed to hire a lawyer. And we have repeatedly affirmed a corollary of that standard: A defendant has no right to judicial review of a grand jury's determination of probable cause to think a defendant committed a crime. In combination, those settled propositions signal defeat for the Kaleys because, in contesting the seizure of their property, they seek only to relitigate such a grand jury finding.
III
The Kaleys would have us undertake a different analysis, which they contend would lead to a different conclusion. They urge us to apply the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to assess whether they have received a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to challenge the seizure of their assets. See Brief for Petitioners 32-64. Under that three-pronged test (reordered here for expositional purposes), a court must weigh (1) the burdens that a requested procedure would impose on the Government against (2) the private interest at stake, as viewed alongside (3) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" of that interest without the procedure and "the probable value, if any, of [the] additional ... procedural safeguard[ ]." Mathews, 424 U.S., at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Stressing the importance of their interest in retaining chosen counsel, the Kaleys argue that the Mathews balance tilts hard in their favor. It thus overrides-or so the Kaleys claim-all we have previously held about the finality of grand jury findings, entitling them to an evidentiary hearing before a judge to contest the probable cause underlying the indictment.
The Government battles with the Kaleys over whether Mathews has any application to this case. This Court devised the test, the Government notes, in an administrative setting-to decide whether a Social Security recipient was entitled to a hearing before her benefits were terminated. And although the Court has since employed the approach in other contexts, the Government reads Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), as foreclosing its use here. In that case, we held that "the Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which ... are part of the criminal process," reasoning that because the "Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure," the Due Process Clause "has limited operation" in the field. Id., at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572. That settles that, asserts the Government. See Brief for United States 18. But the Kaleys argue that Medina addressed a State's procedural rule and relied on federalism principles not implicated here. Further, they claim that Medina concerned a criminal proceeding proper, not a collateral action seizing property. See Reply Brief 1-5. As to that sort of action, the Kaleys contend, Mathews should govern.
We decline to address those arguments, or to define the respective reach of Mathews and Medina, because we need not do so. Even if Mathews applied here-even if, that is, its balancing inquiry were capable of trumping this Court's repeated admonitions that the grand jury's word is conclusive-the Kaleys still would not be entitled to the hearing they seek. That is because the Mathews test tips against them, and so only reinforces what we have already said. As we will explain, the problem for the Kaleys comes from Mathews ' prescribed inquiry into the requested procedure's usefulness in correcting erroneous deprivations of their private interest. In light of Monsanto's holding that a seizure of the Kaleys' property is erroneous only if unsupported by probable cause, the added procedure demanded here is not sufficiently likely to make any difference.
To begin the Mathews analysis, the Government has a substantial interest in freezing potentially forfeitable assets without an evidentiary hearing about the probable cause underlying criminal charges. At the least, such an adversarial proceeding-think of it as a pre-trial mini-trial (or maybe a pre-trial not-so-mini-trial)-could consume significant prosecutorial time and resources. The hearing presumably would rehearse the case's merits, including the Government's theory and supporting evidence. And the Government also might have to litigate a range of ancillary questions relating to the conduct of the hearing itself (for example, could the Kaleys subpoena witnesses or exclude certain evidence?).
Still more seriously, requiring a proceeding of that kind could undermine the Government's ability either to obtain a conviction or to preserve forfeitable property. To ensure a favorable result at the hearing, the Government could choose to disclose all its witnesses and other evidence. But that would give the defendant knowledge of the Government's case and strategy well before the rules of criminal procedure-or principles of due process, see, e.g.,Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)-would otherwise require. See Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 26.2(a), 16(a)(2); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) ("There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case"). And sometimes (particularly in organized crime and drug trafficking prosecutions, in which forfeiture questions often arise), that sneak preview might not just aid the defendant's preparations but also facilitate witness tampering or jeopardize witness safety. Alternatively, to ensure the success of its prosecution, the Government could hold back some of its evidence at the hearing or give up on the pre-trial seizure entirely. But if the Government took that tack, it would diminish the likelihood of ultimately recovering stolen assets to which the public is entitled.11 So any defense counsel worth his salt-whatever the merits of his case-would put the prosecutor to a choice: "Protect your forfeiture by providing discovery" or "protect your conviction by surrendering the assets." 12 It is small wonder that the Government wants to avoid that lose-lose dilemma.
For their part, however, defendants like the Kaleys have a vital interest at stake: the constitutional right to retain counsel of their own choosing. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (describing the scope of, and various limits on, that right). This Court has recently described that right, separate and apart from the guarantee to effective representation, as "the root meaning" of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-148, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006); cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ("It is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice").13 Indeed, we have held that the wrongful deprivation of choice of counsel is "structural error," immune from review for harmlessness, because it "pervades the entire trial." Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557. Different lawyers do all kinds of things differently, sometimes "affect[ing] whether and on what terms the defendant ... plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial"-and if the latter, possibly affecting whether she gets convicted or what sentence she receives. Ibid. So for defendants like the Kaleys, having the ability to retain the "counsel [they] believe[ ] to be best"-and who might in fact be superior to any existing alternatives-matters profoundly. Id., at 146, 126 S.Ct. 2557.
And yet Monsanto held, crucially for the last part of our Mathews analysis, that an asset freeze depriving a defendant of that interest is erroneous only when unsupported by a finding of probable cause. Recall that Monsanto considered a case just like this one, where the defendant wanted to use his property to pay his preferred lawyer. He urged the Court to hold that the Government could seize assets needed for that purpose only after conviction. But we instead decided that the Government could act "after probable cause [that the assets are forfeitable] is adequately established." 491 U.S., at 616, 109 S.Ct. 2657. And that means in a case like this one-where the assets' connection to the allegedly illegal conduct is not in dispute, see supra, at 1096 -that a pre-trial seizure is wrongful only when there is no probable cause to believe the defendants committed the crimes charged. Or to put the same point differently, such a freeze is erroneous-notwithstanding the weighty burden it imposes on the defendants' ability to hire a chosen lawyer-only when the grand jury should never have issued the indictment.
The Mathews test's remaining prong-critical when the governmental and private interests both have weight-thus boils down to the "probable value, if any," of a judicial hearing in uncovering mistaken grand jury findings of probable cause. 424 U.S., at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. The Kaleys (and the dissent) contend that such proceedings will serve an important remedial function because grand juries hear only a "one-sided presentation[ ]" of evidence. Brief for Petitioners 57; see post, at 1113 - 1114. And that argument rests on a generally sound premise: that the adversarial process leads to better, more accurate decision-making. But in this context-when the legal standard is merely probable cause and the grand jury has already made that finding-both our precedents and other courts' experience indicate that a full-dress hearing will provide little benefit.
This Court has repeatedly declined to require the use of adversarial procedures to make probable cause determinations. Probable cause, we have often told litigants, is not a high bar: It requires only the "kind of 'fair probability' on which 'reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.' " Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)); see Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 121, 95 S.Ct. 854 (contrasting probable cause to reasonable-doubt and preponderance standards). That is why a grand jury's finding of probable cause to think that a person committed a crime "can be [made] reliably without an adversary hearing," id., at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854; it is and "has always been thought sufficient to hear only the prosecutor's side," United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). So, for example, we have held the "confrontation and cross-examination" of witnesses unnecessary in a grand jury proceeding. Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 121-122, 95 S.Ct. 854. Similarly, we have declined to require the presentation of exculpatory evidence, see Williams, 504 U.S., at 51, 112 S.Ct. 1735, and we have allowed the introduction of hearsay alone, see Costello, 350 U.S., at 362-364, 76 S.Ct. 406. On each occasion, we relied on the same reasoning, stemming from our recognition that probable cause served only a gateway function: Given the relatively undemanding "nature of the determination," the value of requiring any additional "formalities and safeguards" would "[i]n most cases ... be too slight." Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 121-122, 95 S.Ct. 854.
We can come out no differently here. The probable cause determinations the Kaleys contest are simply those underlying the charges in the indictment. No doubt the Kaleys could seek to poke holes in the evidence the Government offered the grand jury to support those allegations. No doubt, too, the Kaleys could present evidence of their own, which might cast the Government's in a different light. (Presumably, the Kaleys would try in those two ways to show that they did not steal, but instead lawfully obtained the medical devices they later resold. See supra, at 1095 - 1096.) Our criminal justice system of course relies on such contestation at trial when the question becomes whether a defendant is guilty beyond peradventure. But as we have held before, an adversarial process is far less useful to the threshold finding of probable cause, which determines only whether adequate grounds exist to proceed to trial and reach that question. The probable cause decision, by its nature, is hard to undermine, and still harder to reverse. So the likelihood that a judge holding an evidentiary hearing will repudiate the grand jury's decision strikes us, once more, as "too slight" to support a constitutional requirement. Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 122, 95 S.Ct. 854.
The evidence from other courts corroborates that view, over and over and over again. In the past two decades, the courts in several Circuits have routinely held the kind of hearing the Kaleys seek. See supra, at 1095, and n. 4. Yet neither the Kaleys nor their amici (mostly lawyers' associations) have found a single case in which a judge found an absence of probable cause to believe that an indicted defendant committed the crime charged. One amicus cites 25 reported cases involving pre-trial hearings on asset freezes. See Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers 4, n. 2. In 24 of those, the defendant lost outright. The last involved a not-yet-indicted defendant (so no grand jury finding); there, the District Court's ruling for him was reversed on appeal. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15, 36. To be sure, a kind of selection bias might affect those statistics: Perhaps a prosecutor with a very weak case would choose to abandon an asset freeze rather than face a difficult hearing. See id., at 16, 37. But the Kaleys and their amici have also failed to offer any anecdotes of that kind; and we suspect that the far more common reason a prosecutor relinquishes a freeze is just to avoid premature discovery. See supra, at 1101 - 1102. So experience, as far as anyone has discerned it, cuts against the Kaleys: It confirms that even under Mathews, they have no right to revisit the grand jury's finding.14
IV
When we decided Monsanto, we effectively resolved this case too. If the question in a pre-trial forfeiture case is whether there is probable cause to think the defendant committed the crime alleged, then the answer is: whatever the grand jury decides. And even if we test that proposition by applying Mathews, we arrive at the same place: In considering such findings of probable cause, we have never thought the value of enhanced evidentiary procedures worth their costs. Congress of course may strike its own balance and give defendants like the Kaleys the kind of hearing they want. Indeed, Congress could disapprove of Monsanto itself and hold pre-trial seizures of property to a higher standard than probable cause. But the Due Process Clause, even when combined with a defendant's Sixth Amendment interests, does not command those results. Accordingly, the Kaleys cannot challenge the grand jury's conclusion that probable cause supports the charges against them. The grand jury gets the final word.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice BREYER and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.
An individual facing serious criminal charges brought by the United States has little but the Constitution and his attorney standing between him and prison. He might readily give all he owns to defend himself.
We have held, however, that the Government may effectively remove a defendant's primary weapon of defense-the attorney he selects and trusts-by freezing assets he needs to pay his lawyer. That ruling is not at issue. But today the Court goes further, holding that a defendant may be hobbled in this way without an opportunity to challenge the Government's decision to freeze those needed assets. I cannot subscribe to that holding and respectfully dissent.
I
The facts of this case are important. They highlight the significance to a defendant of being able to hire his counsel of choice, and the potential for unfairness inherent in giving the prosecutor the discretion to take that right away. Kerri Kaley worked as a sales representative for a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary, selling prescription medical devices. Kaley and other sales representatives occasionally obtained outmoded or surplus devices from staff members at the medical facilities they served, when, for example, those devices were no longer needed because they had been superseded by newer models. Kaley sold the unwanted devices to a Florida company, dividing the proceeds among the sales representatives.
Kaley learned in January 2005 that a federal grand jury was investigating those activities as a conspiracy to sell stolen prescription medical devices. Kaley and her husband (who allegedly helped ship the products to Florida) retained counsel, who immediately set to work preparing their defense against any impending charges. Counsel regularly discussed the investigation with the Kaleys, helped review documents demanded by the grand jury, and met with prosecutors in an attempt to ward off an indictment. Nonetheless preparing for the worst, the Kaleys applied for a $500,000 equity line of credit on their home to pay estimated legal fees associated with a trial. They used that money to purchase a $500,000 certificate of deposit, which they set aside until it would be needed to pay their attorneys for the trial.
In February 2007, the grand jury returned a seven-count indictment charging the Kaleys and another sales representative, Jennifer Gruenstrass, with violations of federal law. The indictment alleged that a "money judgment" of over $2 million and the $500,000 certificate of deposit were subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) because those assets constituted "proceeds" of the alleged crimes. Armed with this indictment, the prosecution obtained an ex parte order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e), thereby freezing all of the Kaleys' assets listed in the indictment, including the certificate of deposit set aside for legal fees. The Government did not seek to freeze any of Gruenstrass's assets.
The Kaleys moved to vacate the order, requesting a hearing at which they could argue that there was no probable cause to believe their assets were forfeitable, because their alleged conduct was not criminal. They argued they were entitled to such a hearing because the restraining order targeted funds they needed and had set aside to retain for trial the same counsel who had been preparing their defense for two years. And they contended that the prosecution was baseless because the Government could not identify anyone who claimed ownership of the medical devices alleged to have been "stolen." During a telephone conference with a Magistrate Judge on the motion, the prosecution conceded that it had been able to trace only $140,000 in allegedly criminal proceeds to the Kaleys, which led the Magistrate Judge to question the lawfulness of restraining the listed assets.
Just two business days after that conference, the Government obtained a superseding indictment that added a count of conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Adding that charge enabled the Government to proceed under a much broader forfeiture provision than the one in the original indictment. While the civil forfeiture provision in § 981(a)(1)(C) authorized forfeiture of property that "constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to" a qualifying criminal violation, the criminal forfeiture provision now invoked by the Government- § 982(a)(1)-authorizes forfeiture of property "involved in" a qualifying offense, or "any property traceable to such property." The superseding indictment alleged that a sum of more than $2 million, the certificate of deposit reserved to pay legal expenses, and now the Kaleys' home were subject to forfeiture. And again, the Government sought an order freezing substantially all those assets.
The Kaleys objected, repeating the arguments they had previously raised, and also contending that the prosecutors were being vindictive in adding the money laundering charge and seeking broader forfeiture. The District Court nonetheless entered the broader order requested by the Government, and the restraint on the Kaleys' assets remains in place.
While the Kaleys' appeal from that denial was pending, the Government proceeded to trial separately against their codefendant Gruenstrass. As the Government had not sought to freeze Gruenstrass's assets, she was represented by her chosen counsel. Her counsel argued that the Government was pitching a fraud without a victim, because no Government witness took the stand to claim ownership of the allegedly stolen devices. The jury acquitted Gruenstrass on all charges in less than three hours-a good omen for the Kaleys and their counsel as they prepared for their own trial.
II
The issues at stake here implicate fundamental constitutional principles. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." In many ways, this is the most precious right a defendant has, because it is his attorney who will fight for the other rights the defendant enjoys. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-654, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). And more than 80 years ago, we found it "hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).
Indeed, we recently called the "right to select counsel of one's choice.... the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee" of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-148, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). The Amendment requires "that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided-to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best." Id., at 146, 126 S.Ct. 2557. An individual's right to counsel of choice is violated " whenever the defendant's choice is wrongfully denied," and such error "pervades the entire trial." Id., at 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557. A violation of this right is therefore a "structural error," ibid.; that is, one of the very few kinds of errors that "undermine the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole." United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2139, 2149, 186 L.Ed.2d 139 (2013).
It is of course true that the right to counsel of choice is (like most rights) not absolute. A defendant has no right to choose counsel he cannot afford, counsel who is not a member of the bar, or counsel with an impermissible conflict of interest. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). And a district court need not always shuffle its calendar to accommodate a defendant's preferred counsel if it has legitimate reasons not to do so. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). But none of those limitations is imposed at the unreviewable discretion of a prosecutor-the party who wants the defendant to lose at trial.
This Court has held that the prosecution may freeze assets a defendant needs to retain his counsel of choice upon "a finding of probable cause to believe that the assets are forfeitable." United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989). The Kaleys do not challenge that holding here. But the Court in Monsanto acknowledged and reserved the crucial question whether a defendant had the right to be heard before the Government could take such action. Id., at 615, n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2657.1
There was good reason for that caution. The possibility that a prosecutor could elect to hamstring his target by preventing him from paying his counsel of choice raises substantial concerns about the fairness of the entire proceeding. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Issues concerning the denial of counsel of choice implicate the overall fairness of the trial because they "bear[ ] directly on the 'framework within which the trial proceeds.' " Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, at 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)).
III
Notwithstanding the substantial constitutional issues at stake, the majority believes that syllogistic-type reasoning effectively resolves this case. Ante, at 1100. The majority's reasoning goes like this: First, to freeze assets prior to trial, the Government must show probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed an offense giving rise to forfeiture. Second, grand jury determinations of probable cause are nonreviewable. Therefore, the Kaleys cannot "relitigate [the] grand jury finding" of probable cause to avoid a pretrial restraint of assets they need to retain their counsel of choice. Ibid. I do not view the matter as nearly so "straightforward," and neither did the multiple Courts of Appeals since Monsanto that have granted defendants the type of hearing the Kaleys request. See ante, at 1095, n. 4.
To begin with, the majority's conclusion is wrong on its own terms. To freeze assets prior to trial, the Government must show probable cause to believe both that (1) a defendant has committed an offense giving rise to forfeiture and (2) the targeted assets have the requisite connection to the alleged criminal conduct. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A). The Solicitor General concedes-and all Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have held-that "defendants are entitled to show that the assets that are restrained are not actually the proceeds of the charged criminal offense," Tr. of Oral Arg. 45; that is, that the second prong of the required showing is not satisfied. But by listing property in the indictment and alleging that it is subject to forfeiture-as required to restrain assets before trial under § 853(e)(1)(A)-the grand jury found probable cause to believe those assets were linked to the charged offenses, just as it found probable cause to believe the Kaleys committed the underlying crimes. App. 60-61 (separate indictment section alleging criminal forfeiture, including of the certificate of deposit); see United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 645 (C.A.10 1998); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1197 (C.A.2 1991) (en banc); Dept. of Justice, Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual 128 (2013) ("That the indictment alleges that property is subject to forfeiture indicates that the grand jury has made a probable cause determination."). Neither the Government nor the majority gives any reason why the District Court may reconsider the grand jury's probable cause finding as to traceability-and in fact constitutionally must, if asked-but may not do so as to the underlying charged offenses.2
In any event, the hearing the Kaleys seek would not be mere relitigation of the grand jury proceedings. At that hearing, the District Court would consider the merits of the prosecution to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the Kaleys' assets are forfeitable, not to determine whether the Kaleys may be tried at all. If the judge agrees with the Kaleys, he will merely hold that the Government has not met its burden at that hearing to justify freezing the assets the Kaleys need to pay their attorneys. The Government may proceed with the prosecution, but the Kaleys will have their chosen counsel at their side.
Even though the probable cause standard applies at both the indictment stage and the pretrial asset restraint hearing, the judge's determination will be based on different evidence than that previously presented to the grand jury. For its part, the Government may choose to put on more or less evidence at the hearing than it did before the grand jury. And of course the Kaleys would have the opportunity to tell their side of the story-something the grand jury never hears. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-52, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). Here, much of what the Kaleys want to present comes from Gruenstrass's trial-evidence that the grand jury obviously could not have considered. So even if the judge determined that probable cause to justify the pretrial asset restraint had not been adequately established, that determination would not in any way amount to "looking into and revising the judgment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding was founded upon sufficient proof." Ante, at 1097 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362-363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The judge's decision based on the evidence presented at the hearing would have no necessary legal or logical consequence for the underlying prosecution because it would be based on different evidence and used for a different purpose.
The majority warns that allowing a judge to consider the underlying merits of the prosecution for purposes of determining whether a defendant's assets may be restrained pretrial could create "legal dissonance" with the grand jury's indictment, which "could not but undermine the criminal justice system's integrity." Ante, at 1099. But as explained, such a judicial finding based on different evidence with both sides present would not contradict the grand jury's probable cause finding based on what was before it. That finding would still suffice to accomplish its purpose-to call for a trial on the merits of the charges. Rather than creating "dissonance," the traditional roles of the principal actors in our justice system would remain respected: The grand jury decides whether a defendant should be required to stand trial, the judge decides pretrial matters and how the trial should proceed, and the jury decides whether the defendant is guilty of the crime.
Indeed, in the bail context-the pretrial determination that is perhaps the closest analogue to the pretrial restraint of assets at issue here-we allow judicial inquiries into the underlying merits of the indicted charges, without concern about intruding into the province of the grand jury. An indictment charging sufficiently serious crimes gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not eligible for pretrial release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)(3) and (f). Such a defendant is nonetheless entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he may contest (among other things) "the weight of the evidence against" him, § 3142(g)(2). Yet no one would say that the district court encroached on the grand jury's role if the court determined that it would not authorize pretrial detention because of the weakness of the prosecution's case. See, e.g., United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479-1480 (C.A.11 1985) (recognizing that in considering the "weight of the evidence" to decide whether the presumption is rebutted, "it may well be necessary to open up the issue of probable cause since that too is a question of evidentiary weight"). That makes sense, because the district court has considered the underlying merits of the charges based on different information and for a different purpose than the grand jury did. Such a defendant would be granted pretrial release, but would still have to show up for trial.3
In any event, few things could do more to "undermine the criminal justice system's integrity," ante, at 1099, than to allow the Government to initiate a prosecution and then, at its option, disarm its presumptively innocent opponent by depriving him of his counsel of choice-without even an opportunity to be heard. That is the result of the Court's decision in this case, and it is fundamentally at odds with our constitutional tradition and basic notions of fair play.
IV
The majority is no more persuasive in applying the due process balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).4 As an initial matter, the majority gives short shrift to the Kaleys' interests at stake. "The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). Whatever serious crimes the grand jury alleges the Kaleys committed, they are presumptively innocent of those charges until final judgment. Their right to vindicate that presumption by choosing the advocate they believe will best defend them is, as explained, at the very core of the Sixth Amendment.
I suspect that, for the Kaleys, that right could hardly be more precious than it is now. In addition to potentially losing the property the Government has already frozen-including their home-the Kaleys face maximum prison terms of five years (18 U.S.C. § 371), ten years (§ 2314), and 20 years (§ 1956(h)) for the charges in the superseding indictment. The indictment means they must stand trial on those charges. But the Kaleys plainly have an urgent interest in having their chosen counsel-who has worked with them since the grand jury's investigation began, two years before the indictment-mount their best possible defense at trial.
The majority alludes to our cases recognizing that indictments may result in the temporary deprivation of a defendant's liberty without judicial review, and suggests that indictments therefore must also be "good enough" to deprive a defendant of property without judicial review. Ante, at 1098 - 1099. Even if this greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning might be valid in other contexts, it is not when the property at issue is needed to hire chosen counsel. In the context of a prosecution for serious crimes, it is far from clear which interest is greater-the interest in temporary liberty pending trial, or the interest in using one's available means to avoid imprisonment for many years after trial. Retaining one's counsel of choice ensures the fundamental fairness of the actual trial, and thus may be far more valuable to a criminal defendant than pretrial release.
As for the Government's side, the Court echoes the Government's concerns that a hearing would place demands on its resources and interfere with its desire to keep its trial strategy close to the vest. These concerns are somewhat curious in light of the majority's emphasis on how easy it is to make a probable cause showing. And they are even more surprising in light of the extensive discovery obligations already imposed on the Government by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The emphasis the Government places on pretrial secrecy evokes an outdated conception of the criminal trial as "a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970).
Moreover, recall that the Government concedes that due process guarantees defendants a hearing to contest the traceability of the restrained assets to the charged conduct. If a defendant requests such a hearing, the Government will likely be required to reveal something about its case to demonstrate that the assets have the requisite connection to the charged offenses.
In any event, these concerns are exaggerated. What the Government would be required to show in a pretrial restraint hearing is similar to pretrial showings prosecutors make in other contexts on a daily basis. As mentioned above, when the Government seeks an order detaining a defendant pending trial, it routinely makes an extensive evidentiary showing-voluntarily disclosing much of its evidence and trial strategy-in support of that relief. See Brief for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae 11-18. The Government makes similar showings in the context of other pretrial motions, such as motions to admit hearsay evidence under the co-conspirator exception, or to discover attorney-client communications made in furtherance of a future crime. Id., at 19-28.
In those contexts, as in this one, the decision how much to "show its hand" rests fully within the Government's discretion. If it has a strong case and believes that pretrial restraint is necessary to preserve the assets for forfeiture, the Government may choose to make a strong evidentiary showing and have little concern about doing so. In a closer case, where the Government is more concerned about tipping its hand, it may elect to forgo a pretrial restraint of those assets the defendant needs to pay his counsel. I see no great burden on the Government in allowing it to strike this balance as it sees fit when considering a pretrial asset restraint that would deprive a defendant of his right to counsel of choice. In the end, it is a bit much to argue that the Government has discretion to deprive a defendant-without a hearing-of the counsel he has chosen to present his defense, simply to avoid the mere possibility of a premature peek at some aspect of what the Government intends to do at trial.
The majority also significantly underestimates the amount of control judges can exercise in these types of hearings. The Circuits that allow such hearings have afforded judges a great deal of flexibility in structuring them. Judges need not apply the Federal Rules of Evidence during the hearings, and they can take many steps, including in camera proceedings, to ensure that witness safety and grand jury secrecy are fully preserved. See Monsanto, 924 F.2d, at 1198;United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 418-419 (C.A.D.C.2008).
Moreover, experience in the Second Circuit, where defendants have for more than 20 years been afforded the type of hearing the Kaleys seek, indicates that such hearings do not occur so often as to raise substantial concerns about taxing the resources of the Government and lower courts. See Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 4-9. As the majority notes, only 25 reported cases appear to have addressed such hearings. Id., at 4. This relative rarity is unsurprising. To even be entitled to the hearing, defendants must first show a genuine need to use the assets to retain counsel of choice. See United States v. Bonventre, 720 F.3d 126, 131 (C.A.2 2013). And defendants too have an incentive not to tip their hands as to trial strategy-perhaps to an even greater extent than the Government, given that defendants bear comparatively few discovery obligations at a criminal trial. In light of the low bar of the probable cause standard, many defendants likely conclude that the possible benefits of the hearing are not worth the candle.
For those hearings that do occur, they are by all appearances ably controlled by district judges to keep them manageable and to limit the potential for excess or abuse. See Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 6-8. In addition, where such hearings are allowed, prosecutors and defense counsel often reach agreements concerning the scope and conditions of any protective order that accommodate the interests of both sides. See id., at 8-9. When the right at stake is as fundamental as hiring one's counsel of choice-the "root meaning" of the Sixth Amendment, Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 147-148, 126 S.Ct. 2557-the Government's interest in saving the time and expense of a limited number of such proceedings is not particularly compelling.
The Government does have legitimate interests that are served by forfeiture of allegedly tainted assets.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989). And imposing a pretrial restraint on such assets does increase the likelihood that they will be available if the defendant is convicted.5 But that interest is protected in other ways that mitigate the concern that defendants will successfully divert forfeitable assets from the Government's reach if afforded a hearing. The relation-back provision in 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) provides that title to forfeitable assets, once adjudged forfeitable, vests in the Government as of the time the offense was committed. Section 853(c) then provides that the Government may seek a "special verdict of forfeiture" as to any forfeited property that was subsequently transferred to a third party. The Government protests that recovery of such assets will often be complicated and subject to the vagaries of state law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 49-50. But such complaints of administrative inconvenience carry little weight in this particular context, when the Government knows exactly where the money has gone: to an attorney who is, after all, an officer of the court, and on notice that the Government claims title to the assets.
And we are not talking about all of a defendant's assets that are subject to forfeiture-only those that the defendant can show are necessary to secure his counsel of choice. Here, for example, the Kaleys have identified as needed to pay counsel only a discrete portion of the assets the Government seeks. The statistics cited by the Court on the total amount of assets recovered by the Government and provided as restitution for victims, ante, at 1094, n. 1, are completely beside the point.
The majority ultimately concludes that a pretrial hearing of the sort the Kaleys seek would be a waste of time. Ante, at 1103 - 1105. No. It takes little imagination to see that seizures based entirely on ex parte proceedings create a heightened risk of error. Common sense tells us that secret decisions based on only one side of the story will prove inaccurate more often than those made after hearing from both sides. We have thus consistently recognized that the "fundamental instrument for judicial judgment" is "an adversary proceeding in which both parties may participate." Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). In the present context, some defendants (like the Kaleys) may be able to show that the theory of prosecution is legally defective through an argument that almost certainly was not presented to the grand jury. And as discussed above, supra, at 1100 - 1102, prosecutors in some cases elect not to freeze needed assets, or they negotiate tailored protective orders to serve the interests of both sides-something they would be unlikely to do if the hearings were rote exercises.
Given the risk of an erroneous restraint of assets needed to retain chosen counsel, the "probable value" of the "additional safeguard" a pretrial hearing would provide is significant. That is because the right to counsel of choice is inherently transient, and the deprivation of that right effectively permanent. In our cases suggesting that little would be gained by requiring an adversary hearing on probable cause or imposing stricter evidentiary requirements in grand jury proceedings, we have noted that the grand jury is not where the ultimate question of "the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); see United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) (explaining that the grand jury hears only from the prosecutor because " 'the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined' " (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 300 (1769))). If the grand jury considers incomplete or incompetent evidence in deciding to return an indictment, the defendant still has the full trial on the merits, with all its "formalities and safeguards," Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), to prove his innocence.
Here, by contrast, the Government seeks to use the grand jury's probable cause determination to strip the Kaleys of their counsel of choice. The Kaleys can take no comfort that they will be able to vindicate that right in a future adversarial proceeding. Once trial begins with someone other than chosen counsel, the right is lost, and it cannot be restored based on what happens at trial. "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Mathews, 424 U.S., at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). If the Kaleys are to have any opportunity to meaningfully challenge that deprivation, they must have it before the trial begins.
* * *
The issues presented here implicate some of the most fundamental precepts underlying the American criminal justice system. A person accused by the United States of committing a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But he faces a foe of powerful might and vast resources, intent on seeing him behind bars. That individual has the right to choose the advocate he believes will most ably defend his liberty at trial.
The trial is governed by rules designed to ensure that, whatever the ultimate verdict, we can be confident to the extent possible that justice was done, within the bounds of the Constitution. That confidence is grounded in our belief in the adversary system. "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975). Today's decision erodes that confidence by permitting the Government to deprive a criminal defendant of his right to counsel of choice, without so much as a chance to be heard on why such a significant pretrial deprivation is unwarranted.
The majority wraps up its analysis by blandly noting that Congress is of course free to extend broader protection to criminal defendants. Ante, at 1104 - 1105. Not very likely. In this area it is to the courts that those charged with crime must turn.
Federal prosecutors, when they rise in court, represent the people of the United States. But so do defense lawyers-one at a time. In my view, the Court's opinion pays insufficient respect to the importance of an independent bar as a check on prosecutorial abuse and government overreaching. Granting the Government the power to take away a defendant's chosen advocate strikes at the heart of that significant role. I would not do it, and so respectfully dissent.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.
Between January 2012 and April 2013, for example, the Department of Justice returned over $1.5 billion in forfeited assets to more than 400,000 crime victims. See Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Returned $1.5 Billion to Victims of Crime Since January 2012 (Apr. 26, 2013), online at http:// www. justice. gov/ opa/ pr/ 2013/ April/ 13- crm- 480. html (as visited Feb. 21, 2014 and available in the Clerk of the Court's case file).
The forfeiture statute itself requires a hearing when the Government seeks to restrain the assets of someone who has not yet been indicted. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B). That statutory provision is not at issue in this case, which involves a pair of indicted defendants.
At oral argument, the Government agreed that a defendant has a constitutional right to a hearing on that question. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. We do not opine on the matter here.
Compare United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411 (C.A.D.C.2008) (holding that a defendant is entitled to raise such a challenge); United States v. Dejanu, 37 Fed.Appx. 870, 873 (C.A.9 2002) (same); United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 700 (C.A.7 1994) (same); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (C.A.2 1991) (en banc) (same), with United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 406-407 (C.A.6 2005) (prohibiting a defendant from raising such a challenge); United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 803-806 (C.A.4 2001) (same); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 648-649 (C.A.10 1998) (same).
An earlier version of the indictment did not include the money laundering charge. In its superseding indictment, the Government also accused Jennifer Gruenstrass, another sales representative, of transporting stolen property and money laundering. Her case went to trial, and she was acquitted. Several other sales representatives participating in the Kaleys' activity entered guilty pleas (each to a charge of shipping stolen goods) during the Government's investigation.
The grand jury's unreviewed finding similarly may play a significant role in determining a defendant's eligibility for release before trial under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. That statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is ineligible for bail if "there is probable cause to believe" she committed certain serious crimes. §§ 3142(e)(2)-(3), (f). The Courts of Appeal have uniformly held that presumption to operate whenever an indictment charges those offenses. Relying on our instruction that an indictment returned by a proper grand jury "conclusively determines the existence of probable cause," the courts have denied defendants' calls for any judicial reconsideration of that issue. United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 54 (C.A.2 1985) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); see, e.g.,United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 117-119 (C.A.3 1986); United States v. Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 162-163 (C.A.1 1986) ( per curiam); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1477-1479 (C.A.11 1985).
The dissent, while conceding this point, notes that courts may consider the "weight of the evidence" in deciding whether a defendant has rebutted the presumption. See post, at 1109 - 1110, and n. 3 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). And so they may, along with a host of other factors relating to the defendant's dangerousness or risk of flight. See § 3142(g). But that is because the Bail Reform Act so allows-not because (as argued here) the Constitution compels the inquiry. And even that provision of the statute cuts against the dissent's position, because it enables courts to consider only an evidentiary issue different from the probable cause determination. When it comes to whether probable cause supports a charge- i.e., the issue here-courts making bail determinations are stuck, as all agree, with the grand jury's finding.
Contrary to the dissent's characterization, see post, at 1110 - 1111, nothing in our reasoning depends on viewing one consequence of a probable cause determination (say, detention) as "greater" than another (say, the asset freeze here). (We suspect that would vary from case to case, with some defendants seeing the loss of liberty as the more significant deprivation and others the loss of a chosen lawyer.) We simply see no reason to treat a grand jury's probable cause determination as conclusive for all other purposes (including, in some circumstances, locking up the defendant), but not for the one at issue here.
A prosecutor, of course, might drop the case because of the court's ruling, especially if he thought that decision would bring into play an ethical standard barring any charge "that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(a) (2013). But then the court would have effectively done what we have long held it cannot: overrule the grand jury on whether to bring a defendant to trial. See supra, at 1097 - 1098.
The dissent argues that the same is true when a judge hears evidence on whether frozen assets are traceable to a crime, because that allegation also appears in the indictment. See post, at 1108 - 1109; supra, at 1095, and n. 3. But the tracing of assets is a technical matter far removed from the grand jury's core competence and traditional function-to determine whether there is probable cause to think the defendant committed a crime. And a judge's finding that assets are not traceable to the crime charged in no way casts doubt on the prosecution itself. So that determination does not similarly undermine the grand jury or create internal contradictions within the criminal justice system.
The dissent claims as well that the hearing the Kaleys seek "would not be mere relitigation" of the grand jury's decision because they could now "tell their side of the story." Post, at 1109. But the same could be said of an adversarial hearing on an indictment's validity, which everyone agrees is impermissible because it "look[s] into and revise[s]" the grand jury's judgment. See ibid. (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956)). The lesson of our precedents, as described above, is that a grand jury's finding is "conclusive"-and thus precludes subsequent proceedings on the same matter-even though not arising from adversarial testing. See supra, at 1097 - 1098; see also infra, at 1114 - 1115.
The dissent says not to worry-the Government can obtain the assets after conviction by using 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)'s "relation-back" provision. See post, at 1112 - 1113. That provision is intended to aid the Government in recovering funds transferred to a third party-here, the Kaleys' lawyer-subsequent to the crime. But forfeiture applies only to specific assets, so in the likely event that the third party has spent the money, the Government must resort to a State's equitable remedies-which may or may not even be available-to force him to disgorge an equivalent amount. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 48-49. And indeed, if the Government could easily recover such monies, then few lawyers would agree to represent defendants like the Kaleys, and the dissent's proposed holding would be for naught.
Compare Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure, 32 Am. J. Crim. L. 55, 63 (2004) (explaining that "defendants tend to demand the hearing ... to afford defense counsel an early opportunity to discover the nature of the Government's criminal case and to cross-examine some of the Government's witnesses") with May, Attorney Fees and Government Forfeiture, 34 Champion 20, 23 (Apr. 2010) (advising that "[e]ven if defense counsel cannot prevail on the facts or the law, he may be able to prevail anyway" because "[s]ometimes the government will decide to give up its restraint on a piece of property rather than engage in litigation that will result in early discovery").
Still, a restraint on assets could not deprive the Kaleys of representation sufficient to ensure fair proceedings. The Sixth Amendment would require the appointment of effective counsel if the Kaleys were unable to hire a lawyer. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The vast majority of criminal defendants proceed with appointed counsel. And the Court has never thought, as the dissent suggests today, that doing so risks the "fundamental fairness of the actual trial." Post, at 1111; see post, at 1114 - 1115. If it does, the right way to start correcting the problem is not by adopting the dissent's position, but by ensuring that the right to effective counsel is fully vindicated.
As against all this-all we have formerly held and all other courts have actually found-the dissent cites nothing: not a single decision of ours suggesting, nor a single decision of a lower court demonstrating, that formal, adversarial procedures are at all likely to correct any grand jury errors. The dissent argues only that a hearing will have "probable value" for the Kaleys because "the deprivation of [their] right" to chosen counsel, once accomplished, is "effectively permanent." Post, at 1113 - 1114. But that argument confuses two different parts of the Mathews inquiry. The dissent's point well underscores the importance of the Kaleys' interest: As we have readily acknowledged, if the grand jury made a mistake, the Kaleys have suffered a serious injury, which cannot later be corrected. See supra, at 1102 - 1103. (We note, though, that the dissent, in asserting that injury's uniqueness, understates the losses that always attend a mistaken indictment, which no ultimate verdict can erase.) But the dissent's argument about what is at stake for the Kaleys says nothing about the crucial, last prong of Mathews, which asks whether and to what extent the adversarial procedures they request will in fact correct any grand jury errors. That part of the analysis is what requires our decision, and the dissent's view that the Government overreached in this particular case cannot overcome it.
Because the District Court in Monsanto had imposed the restraining order after an "extensive, 4-day hearing on the question of probable cause," it was "pointless" for this Court to decide whether a hearing was required to "adequately establish[ ]" probable cause. 491 U.S., at 615, n. 10, 616, 109 S.Ct. 2657.
The majority's only response is to characterize the grand jury's finding of traceability as merely a "technical matter." Ante, at 1099, n. 9. But the indictment draws no distinction between the grand jury's finding of probable cause to believe that the Kaleys committed a crime and its finding of probable cause to believe that certain assets are traceable to that crime. Both showings must be made to justify a pretrial asset restraint under Monsanto, and there is nothing in that case or the indictment that justifies treating one grand jury finding differently than the other.
The majority cites cases in which courts have correctly rejected requests for a judicial redetermination of the grand jury's probable cause finding for purposes of determining whether the rebuttable presumption of pretrial detention is triggered. See ante, at 1098, n. 6. But those cases do not question the judge's authority to consider the underlying merits of the Government's case (including what the grand jury has alleged in the indictment) for purposes of determining whether that presumption has been rebutted. E.g., United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 (C.A.7 1986) ("evidence probative of guilt is admitted at a detention hearing only to support or challenge the weight of the government's case against the defendant"); see also United States v. Jones, 583 F.Supp.2d 513, 517 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (releasing a defendant pretrial after determining that "the weight of the evidence now overcomes the presumption of detention"). The majority notes that this inquiry in the bail context is authorized by statute, but that does not alter the crucial point: Where the prosecutor seeks to use the indictment to impose another significant pretrial consequence on a defendant, judges are allowed to inquire into the underlying merits of the prosecution (including the very same matters the grand jury has considered) as part of the inquiry into whether that consequence is justified, and that has not resulted in "dissonance" or the undermining of the grand jury's role.
Under our due process precedents, it is clear that the Mathews test applies in this case, rather than the inquiry set forth in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992). We held in Medina that Mathews is inapplicable when "assessing the validity of state procedural rules" that "are part of the criminal process." Id., at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572. We have therefore applied Medina rather than Mathews only when considering such due process challenges, including, for example, the allocation of burdens of proof or what type of evidence may be admitted. See, e.g., id., at 443-446, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (burden of proving incompetence to stand trial); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (burden of proving affirmative defense); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (admissibility of testimony about a prior crime of which the defendant was acquitted). This case is not about such questions, but about the collateral issue of the pretrial deprivation of property a defendant needs to exercise his right to counsel of choice. Mathews therefore provides the relevant inquiry.
The Government and the majority place particular emphasis on the use of forfeited assets to provide restitution to victims of crime. See Brief for United States 41-42, and n. 14; ante, at 1094, n. 1. It is worth noting in this respect that in prosecuting the other sales representatives that participated with the Kaleys in the allegedly fraudulent conduct, the Government's position as to who exactly is the "victim" has shifted frequently. See Brief for Petitioners 9-11 (hospitals); id., at 18, 21-23 (their employers); Tr. of Oral Arg. 43-44 (hospitals). As one prosecutor forthrightly acknowledged at the sentencing hearing of an alleged co-conspirator, "we can't make restitution." Brief for Petitioners 11. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
29
] | sc_casesource |
FIORE v. WHITE, WARDEN, et al.
No. 98-942.
Argued October 12, 1999
Decided November 30, 1999
Breyer, J., delivered the opmion for a unammous Court.
James Brandon Lieber argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were M. Jean Clickner and Harold Gondelman.
Robert A. Grad, Assistant Executive Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General, pro se, and Andrea F. McKenna, Senior Deputy Attorney General.
Saul M. Pilchen, Peter Goldberger, and Lisa Bondareff Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers urging reversal.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, Michael B. Billingsley, Assistant Attorney General, Dan Schweitzer, and Thomas R. Keller, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, and Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania convicted codefend-ants William Fiore and David Searpone of violating a provision of Pennsylvania law forbidding any person to “operate a hazardous waste” facility without a “permit.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993) (reprinted at Appendix A, infra). Each codefendant appealed to a different intermediate state court, one of which affirmed Fiore’s conviction, the other of which reversed Searpone’s. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review of Fiore’s case, and his conviction became final. However, that court agreed to review Searpone’s case, and it subsequently held that the statutory provision did not apply to those who, like Searpone and Fiore, possessed a permit but deviated radically from the permit’s terms. Consequently, it set aside Searpone’s conviction.
In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 634 A. 2d 1109 (1993), Fiore asked the Pennsylvania courts to reconsider his identical conviction. They denied his request. He then brought a federal habeas corpus petition in which he argued, among other things, that Pennsylvania’s courts, either as a matter of Pennsylvania law or as a matter of federal constitutional law, must apply the Scarpone interpretation of the statute to his identical ease. If this proposition of law is correct, he asserted, it would follow that the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence at all with respect to one essential element of the crime (namely, the lack of a permit). On this reasoning, Fiore concluded that the Federal Constitution requires his release. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970).
The Federal District Court granted the habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision. We agreed to review the appellate court’s rejection of Fiore’s claim. Before deciding whether the Federal Constitution requires that Fiore’s conviction be set aside in light of Scarpone, we first must know whether Pennsylvania itself considers Scarpone to have explained what Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), always meant, or whether Pennsylvania considers Scarpone to have changed the law. We invoke the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s certification procedure in order to obtain that court’s view of the matter. See Appendix B, infra.
I
The relevant background circumstances include the following.
1. Fiore owned and operated a hazardous waste disposal facility in Pennsylvania. Scarpone was the facility’s general manager. Pennsylvania authorities, while conceding that Fiore and Searpone possessed a permit to operate the facility, claimed that their deliberate alteration of a monitoring pipe to hide a leakage problem went so far beyond the terms of the permit that the operation took place without a permit at all. A jury convicted them both of having “operate[d] a hazardous waste storage, treatment or disposal facility” without a “permit.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993); see Commonwealth v. Fiore, CC No. 8508740 (Ct. Common Pleas, Allegheny Cty., Pa., Jan. 19, 1988), p. 2, App. 6 (marking date of conviction as Feb. 18, 1986). The trial court upheld the conviction, despite the existence of a permit, for, in its view, the “alterations of the . . . pipe represented such a significant departure from the terms of the existing permit that the operation of the hazardous waste facility was im-permitted’ after the alterations were undertaken ....” Id., at 48, App. 44.
2. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 742 (1998) (granting the Superior Court jurisdiction over all appeals from a final order of a court of common pleas). That court affirmed the conviction “on the basis of the opinion of the court below.” Commonwealth v. Fiore, No. 00485 PGH 1988 (May 12, 1989), pp. 2-3, App. 99-100. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Fiore leave to appeal on March 13, 1990; shortly thereafter, Fiore’s conviction became final.
3. Fiore’s codefendant, Searpone, appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §762(a)(2)(ii) (1998) (granting the Commonwealth Court jurisdiction over appeals in regulatory criminal cases). That court noted the existence of a “valid permit,” found the Commonwealth’s interpretation of the statute “strained at best,” and set Scarpone’s conviction aside. Scarpone v. Commonwealth, 141 Pa. Commw. 560, 567, 596 A. 2d 892, 895 (1991). The court wrote:
“The alteration of the monitoring pipe was clearly a violation of the conditions of the permit. But to say that the alteration resulted in the operation of a new facility which had not been permitted is to engage in a semantic exercise which we cannot accept. . . . [W]e will not let [the provision’s] language be stretched to include activities which clearly fall in some other subsection.” Ibid.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion. It wrote:
“[T]he Commonwealth did not make out the crime of operating a waste disposal facility without a permit.... Simply put, Mr. Searpone did have a permit. . . . [T]o conclude that the alteration constituted the operation of a new facility without a permit is a bald fiction we cannot endorse.... The Commonwealth Court was right in reversing Mr. Searpone’s conviction of operating without a permit when the facility clearly had one.” Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa., at 279, 634 A. 2d, at 1112.
4. Fiore again asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case, once after that court agreed to review Scarporie’s ease and twice more after it decided Searpone. See Appellee’s Supplemental App. in No. 97-3288 (CA3), pp. 59, 61 (including docket sheets reflecting Fiore’s filings on Jan. 30, 1992, Jan. 24, 1994, and Oct. 18, 1994). The court denied those requests.
5. Fiore then sought collateral relief in the state courts. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pa., refused to grant Fiore’s petition for collateral relief — despite Searpone — because “at the time of... conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law was otherwise,” and “[t]he petitioner is not entitled to a retroactive application of the interpretation of the law set forth in Scarpone.” Commonwealth v. Fiore, CC No. 8508740 (Aug. 18, 1994), p. 6. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, both because Fiore had previously litigated the claim and because Fiore’s “direct appeal was no longer pending when the Supreme Court made the ruling which [Fiore] now seeks to have applied to his case.” Commonwealth v. Fiore, 445 Pa. Super. 401, 416, 665 A. 2d 1185, 1193 (1995).
6. Fiore sought federal habeas corpus relief. As we previously pointed out, supra, at 25, he argued that Pennsylvania had imprisoned him ‘Tor conduct which was not criminal under the statutory section charged.” App. 194. The Federal District Court, acting on a Magistrate’s recommendation, granted the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, however, primarily because it believed that “state courts are under no constitutional obligation to apply their decisions retroactively.” 149 F. 3d 221, 222 (1998).
7. We subsequently granted Fiore’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that his conviction be set aside.
HH h — I
Fiore essentially claims that Pennsylvania produced no evidence whatsoever of one element of the crime, namely, that he lacked “a permit.” The validity of his federal claim may depend upon whether the interpretation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scarpone was always the statute’s meaning, even at the time of Fiore’s trial. Scarpone marked the first time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted the statute; previously, Pennsylvania’s lower courts had been divided in their interpretation. Fiore’s and Searpone’s trial court concluded that § 6Q18.401(a)’s “permit” requirement prohibited the operation of a hazardous waste facility in a manner that deviates from the permit’s terms, and the Superior Court, in adjudicating Fiore’s direct appeal, accepted the trial court’s interpretation in a summary unpublished memorandum. Then, the Commonwealth Court, in Scarpone’s direct appeal, specifically rejected the interpretation adopted by the Superior Court in Fiore’s case. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scarpone set forth its authoritative interpretation of the statute, affirming the Commonwealth Court only after Fiore’s conviction became final. For that reason, we must know whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s construction of the statute in Scarpone stated the correct understanding of the statute at the time Fiore’s conviction became final, or whether it changed the interpretation then applicable. Compare, e. g., Buradus v. General Cement Prods. Co., 52 A. 2d 205, 208 (Pa. 1947) (stating that “[i]n general, the construction placed upon a statute by the courts becomes a part of the act,/rom the very beginning”), with Commonwealth v. Fiore, supra, at 416-417, 665 A. 2d, at 1193; Commonwealth v. Fiore, CC No. 8508740 (Aug. 18, 1994), at 6 (refusing to apply the Scarpone interpretation because “at the time of [Fiore’s] conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law was otherwise”).
Ill
We certify the following question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to that court’s Rules Regarding Certification of Questions of Pennsylvania law:
Does the interpretation of Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), set forth in Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 279, 634 A. 2d 1109, 1112 (1993), state the correct interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore’s conviction became final?
We respectfully request that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accept our certification petition because, in our view, the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case.
We recommend that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court designate William Fiore (the petitioner here) as appellant and both Gregory White, Warden, and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the respondents here) as appellees.
The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania a copy of this opinion and the briefs and records filed with this Court in this ease. Judgment and further proceedings in this ease are reserved pending our receipt of a response from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX A TO OPINION OP THE COURT
Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993) provides:
“No person or municipality shall store, transport, treat, or dispose of hazardous waste within this Commonwealth unless such storage, transportation, treatment, or disposal is authorized by the rules and regulations of the department; no person or municipality shall own or operate a hazardous waste storage, treatment or disposal facility unless such person or municipality has first obtained a permit for the storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste from the department; and, no person or municipality shall transport hazardous waste within the Commonwealth unless such person or municipality has first obtained a license for the transportation of hazardous waste from the department.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 6018.606(f) establishes criminal penalties for a violation of § 6018.401 and provides:
“Any person who stores, transports, treats, or disposes of hazardous waste within the Commonwealth in violation of [§ 6018.401]... shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $2,500 but not more than $100,000 per day for each violation or to imprisonment for not less than two years but not more than ten years, or both.” (Footnote omitted.)
APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT
“RULES REGARDING CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
“1. This Court will accept Certification Petitions, on a trial basis, from January 1,1999 to January 1, 2000.
“2. Any of the following courts may file a Certification Petition with this Court:
“a. The United States Supreme Court; or
“b. Any United States Court of Appeals.
“3. A court may file a Certification Petition either on the motion of a party or sua sponte.
“A. A Certification Petition shall contain the following:
“a. A brief statement of the nature and stage of the proceedings in the petitioning court;
“b. A brief statement of the material facts of the ease; “c. A statement of the question or questions of Pennsylvania law to be determined;
“d. A statement of the particular reasons why this Court should accept certification; and “e. A recommendation about which party should be designated Appellant and which Appellee in subsequent pleadings filed with this Court.
“f. The petitioning court shall attach to the Certification Petition copies of any papers filed by the parties regarding certification, e. g., a Motion for Certification, a Response thereto, a Stipulation of Facts, etc.” Pa. Rules of Court, p. 745 (1999). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"comity: civil rights",
"comity: criminal procedure",
"comity: First Amendment",
"comity: habeas corpus",
"comity: military",
"comity: obscenity",
"comity: privacy",
"comity: miscellaneous",
"comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals",
"assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order",
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules",
"judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures",
"mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)",
"venue",
"no merits: writ improvidently granted",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)",
"no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision",
"no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)",
"no merits: miscellaneous",
"standing to sue: adversary parties",
"standing to sue: direct injury",
"standing to sue: legal injury",
"standing to sue: personal injury",
"standing to sue: justiciable question",
"standing to sue: live dispute",
"standing to sue: parens patriae standing",
"standing to sue: statutory standing",
"standing to sue: private or implied cause of action",
"standing to sue: taxpayer's suit",
"standing to sue: miscellaneous",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: review of non-final order",
"judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)",
"judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)",
"judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)",
"judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)",
"judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts",
"judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal",
"judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata",
"judicial administration: interpleader",
"judicial administration: untimely filing",
"judicial administration: Act of State doctrine",
"judicial administration: miscellaneous",
"Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction",
"miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction"
] | [
18
] | sc_issue_9 |
SEILA LAW LLC, Petitioner
v.
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
No. 19-7
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued March 3, 2020
Decided June 29, 2020
Mr. Kannon K. Shanmugam, for Petitioner.
Mr. Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco for the respondent supporting vacatur, by Mr. Paul D. Clement, appointed by this Court, as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, and by Mr. Douglas N. Letter for the United States House of Representatives as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court
Thomas H. Bienert, Jr., Anthony Bisconti, Bienert Katzman PC, 903 Calle Amanecer, Suite 350, San Clemente, CA, Melina M. Meneguin Layerenza, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,, Wharton & Garrison LLP, 1285 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY, Kannon K. Shanmugam, Masha G. Hansford, William T. Marks, Joel S. Johnson, Laura E. Cox, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, 2001 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent regulatory agency tasked with ensuring that consumer debt products are safe and transparent. In organizing the CFPB, Congress deviated from the structure of nearly every other independent administrative agency in our history. Instead of placing the agency under the leadership of a board with multiple members, Congress provided that the CFPB would be led by a single Director, who serves for a longer term than the President and cannot be removed by the President except for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance. The CFPB Director has no boss, peers, or voters to report to. Yet the Director wields vast rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority over a significant portion of the U. S. economy. The question before us is whether this arrangement violates the Constitution's separation of powers.
Under our Constitution, the "executive Power"-all of it-is "vested in a President," who must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ; id. , § 3. Because no single person could fulfill that responsibility alone, the Framers expected that the President would rely on subordinate officers for assistance. Ten years ago, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U.S. 477, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010), we reiterated that, "as a general matter," the Constitution gives the President "the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties," id. , at 513-514, 130 S.Ct. 3138. "Without such power, the President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else." Id. , at 514, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
The President's power to remove-and thus supervise-those who wield executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article II, was settled by the First Congress, and was confirmed in the landmark decision Myers v. United States , 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926). Our precedents have recognized only two exceptions to the President's unrestricted removal power. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States , 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935), we held that Congress could create expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the President only for good cause. And in United States v. Perkins , 116 U.S. 483, 6 S.Ct. 449, 29 L.Ed. 700 (1886), and Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that Congress could provide tenure protections to certain inferior officers with narrowly defined duties.
We are now asked to extend these precedents to a new configuration: an independent agency that wields significant executive power and is run by a single individual who cannot be removed by the President unless certain statutory criteria are met. We decline to take that step. While we need not and do not revisit our prior decisions allowing certain limitations on the President's removal power, there are compelling reasons not to extend those precedents to the novel context of an independent agency led by a single Director. Such an agency lacks a foundation in historical practice and clashes with constitutional structure by concentrating power in a unilateral actor insulated from Presidential control.
We therefore hold that the structure of the CFPB violates the separation of powers. We go on to hold that the CFPB Director's removal protection is severable from the other statutory provisions bearing on the CFPB's authority. The agency may therefore continue to operate, but its Director, in light of our decision, must be removable by the President at will.
I
A
In the summer of 2007, then-Professor Elizabeth Warren called for the creation of a new, independent federal agency focused on regulating consumer financial products. Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy (Summer 2007). Professor Warren believed the financial products marketed to ordinary American households-credit cards, student loans, mortgages, and the like-had grown increasingly unsafe due to a "regulatory jumble" that paid too much attention to banks and too little to consumers. Ibid. To remedy the lack of "coherent, consumer-oriented" financial regulation, she proposed "concentrat[ing] the review of financial products in a single location"-an independent agency modeled after the multimember Consumer Product Safety Commission. Ibid.
That proposal soon met its moment. Within months of Professor Warren's writing, the subprime mortgage market collapsed, precipitating a financial crisis that wiped out over $10 trillion in American household wealth and cost millions of Americans their jobs, their retirements, and their homes. In the aftermath, the Obama administration embraced Professor Warren's recommendation. Through the Treasury Department, the administration encouraged Congress to establish an agency with a mandate to ensure that "consumer protection regulations" in the financial sector "are written fairly and enforced vigorously." Dept. of Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation 55 (2009). Like Professor Warren, the administration envisioned a traditional independent agency, run by a multimember board with a "diverse set of viewpoints and experiences." Id. , at 58.
In 2010, Congress acted on these proposals and created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent financial regulator within the Federal Reserve System. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. Congress tasked the CFPB with "implement[ing]" and "enforc[ing]" a large body of financial consumer protection laws to "ensur[e] that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive." 12 U. S. C. § 5511(a). Congress transferred the administration of 18 existing federal statutes to the CFPB, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Truth in Lending Act. See §§ 5512(a), 5481(12), (14). In addition, Congress enacted a new prohibition on "any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice" by certain participants in the consumer-finance sector. § 5536(a)(1)(B). Congress authorized the CFPB to implement that broad standard (and the 18 pre-existing statutes placed under the agency's purview) through binding regulations. §§ 5531(a)-(b), 5581(a)(1)(A), (b).
Congress also vested the CFPB with potent enforcement powers. The agency has the authority to conduct investigations, issue subpoenas and civil investigative demands, initiate administrative adjudications, and prosecute civil actions in federal court. §§ 5562, 5564(a), (f). To remedy violations of federal consumer financial law, the CFPB may seek restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive relief, as well as civil penalties of up to $1,000,000 (inflation adjusted) for each day that a violation occurs. §§ 5565(a), (c)(2); 12 CFR § 1083.1(a), Table (2019). Since its inception, the CFPB has obtained over $11 billion in relief for over 25 million consumers, including a $1 billion penalty against a single bank in 2018. See CFPB, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2015, p. 3; CFPB, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Announces Settlement With Wells Fargo for Auto-Loan Administration and Mortgage Practices (Apr. 20, 2018).
The CFPB's rulemaking and enforcement powers are coupled with extensive adjudicatory authority. The agency may conduct administrative proceedings to "ensure or enforce compliance with" the statutes and regulations it administers. 12 U. S. C. § 5563(a). When the CFPB acts as an adjudicator, it has "jurisdiction to grant any appropriate legal or equitable relief." § 5565(a)(1). The "hearing officer" who presides over the proceedings may issue subpoenas, order depositions, and resolve any motions filed by the parties. 12 CFR § 1081.104(b). At the close of the proceedings, the hearing officer issues a "recommended decision," and the CFPB Director considers that recommendation and "issue[s] a final decision and order." §§ 1081.400(d), 1081.402(b); see also § 1081.405.
Congress's design for the CFPB differed from the proposals of Professor Warren and the Obama administration in one critical respect. Rather than create a traditional independent agency headed by a multimember board or commission, Congress elected to place the CFPB under the leadership of a single Director. 12 U. S. C. § 5491(b)(1). The CFPB Director is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. § 5491(b)(2). The Director serves for a term of five years, during which the President may remove the Director from office only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." §§ 5491(c)(1), (3).
Unlike most other agencies, the CFPB does not rely on the annual appropriations process for funding. Instead, the CFPB receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. Each year, the CFPB requests an amount that the Director deems "reasonably necessary to carry out" the agency's duties, and the Federal Reserve grants that request so long as it does not exceed 12% of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve (inflation adjusted). §§ 5497(a)(1), (2)(A)(iii), 2(B). In recent years, the CFPB's annual budget has exceeded half a billion dollars. See CFPB, Fiscal Year 2019: Ann. Performance Plan and Rep., p. 7.
B
Seila Law LLC is a California-based law firm that provides debt-related legal services to clients. In 2017, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law to determine whether the firm had "engag[ed] in unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt relief services." 2017 WL 6536586, *1 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 2017). See also 12 U. S. C. § 5562(c)(1) (authorizing the agency to issue such demands to persons who "may have any information[ ] relevant to a violation" of one of the laws enforced by the CFPB). The demand (essentially a subpoena) directed Seila Law to produce information and documents related to its business practices.
Seila Law asked the CFPB to set aside the demand, objecting that the agency's leadership by a single Director removable only for cause violated the separation of powers. The CFPB declined to address that claim and directed Seila Law to comply with the demand.
When Seila Law refused, the CFPB filed a petition to enforce the demand in the District Court. See § 5562(e)(1) (creating cause of action for that purpose). In response, Seila Law renewed its defense that the demand was invalid and must be set aside because the CFPB's structure violated the Constitution. The District Court disagreed and ordered Seila Law to comply with the demand (with one modification not relevant here).
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 923 F.3d 680 (C.A.9 2019). The Court observed that the "arguments for and against" the constitutionality of the CFPB's structure had already been "thoroughly canvassed" in majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions by the en banc Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in PHH Corp. v. CFPB , 881 F.3d 75 (2018), which had rejected a challenge similar to the one presented here. 923 F.3d at 682. The Court saw "no need to re-plow the same ground." Ibid. Instead, it provided a brief explanation for why it agreed with the PHH Court's core holding. The Court took as its starting point Humphrey's Executor , which had approved for-cause removal protection for the Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In applying that precedent, the Court recognized that the CFPB wields "substantially more executive power than the FTC did back in 1935" and that the CFPB's leadership by a single Director (as opposed to a multimember commission) presented a "structural difference" that some jurists had found "dispositive." 923 F.3d at 683-684. But the Court felt bound to disregard those differences in light of our decision in Morrison , which permitted a single individual (an independent counsel) to exercise a core executive power (prosecuting criminal offenses) despite being insulated from removal except for cause. Because the Court found Humphrey's Executor and Morrison "controlling," it affirmed the District Court's order requiring compliance with the demand. 923 F.3d at 684.
We granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the CFPB's structure. 589 U. S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 427, 205 L.Ed.2d 244 (2019). We also requested argument on an additional question: whether, if the CFPB's structure violates the separation of powers, the CFPB Director's removal protection can be severed from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Because the Government agrees with petitioner on the merits of the constitutional question, we appointed Paul Clement to defend the judgment below as amicus curiae . He has ably discharged his responsibilities.
II
We first consider three threshold arguments raised by the appointed amicus for why we may not or should not reach the merits. Each is unavailing.
First, amicus argues that the demand issued to petitioner is not "traceable" to the alleged constitutional defect because two of the three Directors who have in turn played a role in enforcing the demand were (or now consider themselves to be) removable by the President at will. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 21-24. Amicus highlights the Government's argument below that the demand, originally issued by former Director Richard Cordray, had been ratified by an acting CFPB Director who, according to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), was removable by the President at will. See Brief for Appellee in No. 17-56324 (CA9), pp. 1, 10, 13-19 (citing Designating an Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 41 Op. OLC ----, ---- (Nov. 25, 2017)). Amicus further observes that current CFPB Director Kathleen Kraninger, now responsible for enforcing the demand, agrees with the Solicitor General's position in this case that her for-cause removal protection is unconstitutional. See Brief for Respondent on Pet. for Cert. 20; Letter from K. Kraninger, CFPB Director, to M. McConnell, Majority Leader, U. S. Senate, p. 2 (Sept. 17, 2019); Letter from K. Kraninger, CFPB Director, to N. Pelosi, Speaker, U. S. House of Representatives, p. 2 (Sept. 17, 2019). In amicus ' view, these developments reveal that the demand would have been issued-and would continue to be enforced-even in the absence of the CFPB Director's removal protection, making the asserted separation of powers dispute "artificial." Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 22.
Even if that were true, it would not deprive us of jurisdiction. Amicus ' traceability argument appears to challenge petitioner's Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (explaining that the plaintiff 's injury must be "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant" (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). But amicus ' argument does not cast any doubt on the jurisdiction of the District Court because petitioner is the defendant and did not invoke the Court's jurisdiction. See Bond v. United States , 564 U.S. 211, 217, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011) (When the plaintiff has standing, " Article III does not restrict the opposing party's ability to object to relief being sought at its expense.").
It is true that "standing must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance."
Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693, 705, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). But petitioner's appellate standing is beyond dispute. Petitioner is compelled to comply with the civil investigative demand and to provide documents it would prefer to withhold, a concrete injury. That injury is traceable to the decision below and would be fully redressed if we were to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to deny the Government's petition to enforce the demand.
Without engaging with these principles, amicus contends that a litigant wishing to challenge an executive act on the basis of the President's removal power must show that the challenged act would not have been taken if the responsible official had been subject to the President's control. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 21-24. Our precedents say otherwise. We have held that a litigant challenging governmental action as void on the basis of the separation of powers is not required to prove that the Government's course of conduct would have been different in a "counterfactual world" in which the Government had acted with constitutional authority. Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 512, n. 12, 130 S.Ct. 3138. In the specific context of the President's removal power, we have found it sufficient that the challenger "sustain[s] injury" from an executive act that allegedly exceeds the official's authority. Bowsher v. Synar , 478 U.S. 714, 721, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986).
Second, amicus contends that the proper context for assessing the constitutionality of an officer's removal restriction is a contested removal. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 24-27. While that is certainly one way to review a removal restriction, it is not the only way. Our precedents have long permitted private parties aggrieved by an official's exercise of executive power to challenge the official's authority to wield that power while insulated from removal by the President. See Bowsher , 478 U.S., at 721, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (lawsuit filed by aggrieved third party in the absence of contested removal); Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 487, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (same); Morrison , 487 U.S., at 668-669, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (defense to subpoena asserted by third party in the absence of contested removal). Indeed, we have expressly "reject[ed]" the "argument that consideration of the effect of a removal provision is not 'ripe' until that provision is actually used," because when such a provision violates the separation of powers it inflicts a "here-and-now" injury on affected third parties that can be remedied by a court. Bowsher , 478 U.S., at 727, n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals therefore correctly entertained petitioner's constitutional defense on the merits.
Lastly, amicus contends that we should dismiss the case because the parties agree on the merits of the constitutional question and the case therefore lacks "adverseness." Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43, 45-46. That contention, however, is foreclosed by United States v. Windsor , 570 U.S. 744, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013). There, we explained that a lower court order that presents real-world consequences for the Government and its adversary suffices to support Article III jurisdiction-even if "the Executive may welcome" an adverse order that "is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it wants." Id. , at 758, 133 S.Ct. 2675. Here, petitioner and the Government disagree about whether petitioner must comply with the civil investigative demand. The lower courts sided with the Government, and the Government has not volunteered to relinquish that victory and withdraw the demand. To the contrary, while the Government agrees that the agency is unconstitutionally structured, it believes it may nevertheless enforce the demand on remand. See infra , at 2207 - 2208. Accordingly, our "decision will have real meaning" for the parties. INS v. Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 939, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). And, as in Windsor , any prudential concerns with deciding an important legal question in this posture can be addressed by "the practice of entertaining arguments made by an amicus when the Solicitor General confesses error with respect to a judgment below," which we have done. 570 U.S., at 760, 133 S.Ct. 2675.
We therefore turn to the merits of petitioner's constitutional challenge.
III
We hold that the CFPB's leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers.
A
Article II provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President," who must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ; id. , § 3. The entire "executive Power" belongs to the President alone. But because it would be "impossib[le]" for "one man" to "perform all the great business of the State," the Constitution assumes that lesser executive officers will "assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust." 30 Writings of George Washington 334 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939).
These lesser officers must remain accountable to the President, whose authority they wield. As Madison explained, "[I]f any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws." 1 Annals of Cong. 463 (1789). That power, in turn, generally includes the ability to remove executive officials, for it is "only the authority that can remove" such officials that they "must fear and, in the performance of [their] functions, obey." Bowsher , 478 U.S., at 726, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The President's removal power has long been confirmed by history and precedent. It "was discussed extensively in Congress when the first executive departments were created" in 1789. Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 492, 130 S.Ct. 3138. "The view that 'prevailed, as most consonant to the text of the Constitution' and 'to the requisite responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department,' was that the executive power included a power to oversee executive officers through removal." Ibid. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), 16 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 893 (2004)). The First Congress's recognition of the President's removal power in 1789 "provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning," Bowsher , 478 U.S., at 723, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (internal quotation marks omitted), and has long been the "settled and well understood construction of the Constitution," Ex parte Hennen , 13 Pet. 230, 259, 10 L.Ed. 138 (1839).
The Court recognized the President's prerogative to remove executive officials in Myers v. United States , 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, conducted an exhaustive examination of the First Congress's determination in 1789, the views of the Framers and their contemporaries, historical practice, and our precedents up until that point. He concluded that Article II "grants to the President" the "general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers." Id. , at 163-164, 47 S.Ct. 21 (emphasis added). Just as the President's "selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be his power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible." Id. , at 117, 47 S.Ct. 21. "[T]o hold otherwise," the Court reasoned, "would make it impossible for the President ... to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Id. , at 164, 47 S.Ct. 21.
We recently reiterated the President's general removal power in Free Enterprise Fund . "Since 1789," we recapped, "the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep these officers accountable-by removing them from office, if necessary." 561 U.S., at 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138. Although we had previously sustained congressional limits on that power in certain circumstances, we declined to extend those limits to "a new situation not yet encountered by the Court"-an official insulated by two layers of for-cause removal protection. Id., at 483, 514, 130 S.Ct. 3138. In the face of that novel impediment to the President's oversight of the Executive Branch, we adhered to the general rule that the President possesses "the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties." Id., at 513-514, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
Free Enterprise Fund left in place two exceptions to the President's unrestricted removal power. First, in Humphrey's Executor , decided less than a decade after Myers , the Court upheld a statute that protected the Commissioners of the FTC from removal except for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 295 U.S. at 620, 55 S.Ct. 869 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 41 ). In reaching that conclusion, the Court stressed that Congress's ability to impose such removal restrictions "will depend upon the character of the office." 295 U.S. at 631, 55 S.Ct. 869.
Because the Court limited its holding "to officers of the kind here under consideration," id., at 632, 55 S.Ct. 869, the contours of the Humphrey's Executor exception depend upon the characteristics of the agency before the Court. Rightly or wrongly, the Court viewed the FTC (as it existed in 1935) as exercising "no part of the executive power." Id., at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869. Instead, it was "an administrative body" that performed "specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid." Ibid. It acted "as a legislative agency" in "making investigations and reports" to Congress and "as an agency of the judiciary" in making recommendations to courts as a master in chancery. Ibid. "To the extent that [the FTC] exercise[d] any executive function [,] as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional sense," it did so only in the discharge of its "quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers." Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Court identified several organizational features that helped explain its characterization of the FTC as non-executive. Composed of five members-no more than three from the same political party-the Board was designed to be "non-partisan" and to "act with entire impartiality." Id. , at 624, 55 S.Ct. 869 ; see id. , at 619-620, 55 S.Ct. 869. The FTC's duties were "neither political nor executive," but instead called for "the trained judgment of a body of experts" "informed by experience." Id. , at 624, 55 S.Ct. 869 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Commissioners' staggered, seven-year terms enabled the agency to accumulate technical expertise and avoid a "complete change" in leadership "at any one time." Ibid .
In short, Humphrey's Executor permitted Congress to give for-cause removal protections to a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power. Consistent with that understanding, the Court later applied "[t]he philosophy of Humphrey's Executor " to uphold for-cause removal protections for the members of the War Claims Commission-a three-member "adjudicatory body" tasked with resolving claims for compensation arising from World War II. Wiener v. United States , 357 U.S. 349, 356, 78 S.Ct. 1275, 2 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1958).
While recognizing an exception for multimember bodies with "quasi-judicial" or "quasi-legislative" functions, Humphrey's Executor reaffirmed the core holding of Myers that the President has "unrestrictable power ... to remove purely executive officers." 295 U.S. at 632, 55 S.Ct. 869. The Court acknowledged that between purely executive officers on the one hand, and officers that closely resembled the FTC Commissioners on the other, there existed "a field of doubt" that the Court left "for future consideration." Ibid.
We have recognized a second exception for inferior officers in two cases, United States v. Perkins and Morrison v. Olson . In Perkins , we upheld tenure protections for a naval cadet-engineer. 116 U.S. at 485, 6 S.Ct. 449. And, in Morrison , we upheld a provision granting good-cause tenure protection to an independent counsel appointed to investigate and prosecute particular alleged crimes by high-ranking Government officials. 487 U.S. at 662-663, 696-697, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Backing away from the reliance in Humphrey's Executor on the concepts of "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" power, we viewed the ultimate question as whether a removal restriction is of "such a nature that [it] impede[s] the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty." 487 U.S. at 691, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Although the independent counsel was a single person and performed "law enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch," we concluded that the removal protections did not unduly interfere with the functioning of the Executive Branch because "the independent counsel [was] an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause, with limited jurisdiction and tenure and lacking policymaking or significant administrative authority." Ibid.
These two exceptions-one for multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority-"represent what up to now have been the outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the President's removal power." PHH , 881 F.3d at 196 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Director Kraninger did not indicate whether she would disregard her statutory removal protection if the President attempted to remove her without cause.
The Court's conclusion that the FTC did not exercise executive power has not withstood the test of time. As we observed in Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), "[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey's Executor would at the present time be considered 'executive,' at least to some degree." Id., at 690, n. 28, 108 S.Ct. 2597. See also Arlington v. FCC , 569 U.S. 290, 305, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013) (even though the activities of administrative agencies "take 'legislative' and 'judicial' forms," "they are exercises of-indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of-the 'executive Power' " (quoting Art. II, § 1, cl. 1 )).
Article II distinguishes between two kinds of officers-principal officers (who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate) and inferior officers (whose appointment Congress may vest in the President, courts, or heads of Departments). § 2, cl. 2. While "[o]ur cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers," we have in the past examined factors such as the nature, scope, and duration of an officer's duties. Edmond v. United States , 520 U.S. 651, 661, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997). More recently, we have focused on whether the officer's work is "directed and supervised" by a principal officer. Id., at 663, 117 S.Ct. 1573.
B
Neither Humphrey's Executor nor Morrison resolves whether the CFPB Director's insulation from removal is constitutional. Start with Humphrey's Executor. Unlike the New Deal-era FTC upheld there, the CFPB is led by a single Director who cannot be described as a "body of experts" and cannot be considered "non-partisan" in the same sense as a group of officials drawn from both sides of the aisle. 295 U.S. at 624, 55 S.Ct. 869. Moreover, while the staggered terms of the FTC Commissioners prevented complete turnovers in agency leadership and guaranteed that there would always be some Commissioners who had accrued significant expertise, the CFPB's single-Director structure and five-year term guarantee abrupt shifts in agency leadership and with it the loss of accumulated expertise.
In addition, the CFPB Director is hardly a mere legislative or judicial aid. Instead of making reports and recommendations to Congress, as the 1935 FTC did, the Director possesses the authority to promulgate binding rules fleshing out 19 federal statutes, including a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices in a major segment of the U. S. economy. And instead of submitting recommended dispositions to an Article III court, the Director may unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in administrative adjudications. Finally, the Director's enforcement authority includes the power to seek daunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf of the United States in federal court-a quintessentially executive power not considered in Humphrey's Executor .
The logic of Morrison also does not apply. Everyone agrees the CFPB Director is not an inferior officer, and her duties are far from limited. Unlike the independent counsel, who lacked policymaking or administrative authority, the Director has the sole responsibility to administer 19 separate consumer-protection statutes that cover everything from credit cards and car payments to mortgages and student loans. It is true that the independent counsel in Morrison was empowered to initiate criminal investigations and prosecutions, and in that respect wielded core executive power. But that power, while significant, was trained inward to high-ranking Governmental actors identified by others, and was confined to a specified matter in which the Department of Justice had a potential conflict of interest. By contrast, the CFPB Director has the authority to bring the coercive power of the state to bear on millions of private citizens and businesses, imposing even billion-dollar penalties through administrative adjudications and civil actions.
In light of these differences, the constitutionality of the CFPB Director's insulation from removal cannot be settled by Humphrey's Executor or Morrison alone.
C
The question instead is whether to extend those precedents to the "new situation" before us, namely an independent agency led by a single Director and vested with significant executive power. Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138. We decline to do so. Such an agency has no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure.
1
"Perhaps the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem" with an executive entity "is [a] lack of historical precedent" to support it. Id., at 505, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (internal quotation marks omitted). An agency with a structure like that of the CFPB is almost wholly unprecedented.
After years of litigating the agency's constitutionality, the Courts of Appeals, parties, and amici have identified "only a handful of isolated" incidents in which Congress has provided good-cause tenure to principal officers who wield power alone rather than as members of a board or commission. Ibid. "[T]hese few scattered examples"-four to be exact-shed little light. NLRB v. Noel Canning , 573 U.S. 513, 538, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014).
First, the CFPB's defenders point to the Comptroller of the Currency, who enjoyed removal protection for one year during the Civil War. That example has rightly been dismissed as an aberration. It was "adopted without discussion" during the heat of the Civil War and abandoned before it could be "tested by executive or judicial inquiry." Myers , 272 U.S., at 165, 47 S.Ct. 21. (At the time, the Comptroller may also have been an inferior officer, given that he labored "under the general direction of the Secretary of the Treasury." Ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.)
Second, the supporters of the CFPB point to the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC), which has been headed by a single officer since 1978. But this first enduring single-leader office, created nearly 200 years after the Constitution was ratified, drew a contemporaneous constitutional objection from the Office of Legal Counsel under President Carter and a subsequent veto on constitutional grounds by President Reagan. See Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel, Civil Service Commission, 2 Op. OLC 120, 122 (1978); Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, Vol. II, Oct. 26, 1988, pp. 1391-1392 (1991). In any event, the OSC exercises only limited jurisdiction to enforce certain rules governing Federal Government employers and employees. See 5 U. S. C. § 1212. It does not bind private parties at all or wield regulatory authority comparable to the CFPB.
Third, the CFPB's defenders note that the Social Security Administration (SSA) has been run by a single Administrator since 1994. That example, too, is comparatively recent and controversial. President Clinton questioned the constitutionality of the SSA's new single-Director structure upon signing it into law. See Public Papers of the Presidents, William J. Clinton, Vol. II, Aug. 15, 1994, pp. 1471-1472 (1995) (inviting a "corrective amendment" from Congress). In addition, unlike the CFPB, the SSA lacks the authority to bring enforcement actions against private parties. Its role is largely limited to adjudicating claims for Social Security benefits.
The only remaining example is the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created in 2008 to assume responsibility for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That agency is essentially a companion of the CFPB, established in response to the same financial crisis. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 2654. It regulates primarily Government-sponsored enterprises, not purely private actors. And its single-Director structure is a source of ongoing controversy. Indeed, it was recently held unconstitutional by the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc. See Collins v. Mnuchin , 938 F.3d 553, 587-588 (2019).
With the exception of the one-year blip for the Comptroller of the Currency, these isolated examples are modern and contested. And they do not involve regulatory or enforcement authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB. The CFPB's single-Director structure is an innovation with no foothold in history or tradition.
2
In addition to being a historical anomaly, the CFPB's single-Director configuration is incompatible with our constitutional structure. Aside from the sole exception of the Presidency, that structure scrupulously avoids concentrating power in the hands of any single individual.
"The Framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty." Bowsher , 478 U.S., at 730, 106 S.Ct. 3181. Their solution to governmental power and its perils was simple: divide it. To prevent the "gradual concentration" of power in the same hands, they enabled "[a]mbition ... to counteract ambition" at every turn. The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). At the highest level, they "split the atom of sovereignty" itself into one Federal Government and the States. Gamble v. United States , 587 U. S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1968, 204 L.Ed.2d 322 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). They then divided the "powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial." Chadha , 462 U.S., at 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764.
They did not stop there. Most prominently, the Framers bifurcated the federal legislative power into two Chambers: the House of Representatives and the Senate, each composed of multiple Members and Senators. Art. I, §§ 2, 3.
The Executive Branch is a stark departure from all this division. The Framers viewed the legislative power as a special threat to individual liberty, so they divided that power to ensure that "differences of opinion" and the "jarrings of parties" would "promote deliberation and circumspection" and "check excesses in the majority." See The Federalist No. 70, at 475 (A. Hamilton); see also id ., No. 51, at 350. By contrast, the Framers thought it necessary to secure the authority of the Executive so that he could carry out his unique responsibilities. See id ., No. 70, at 475-478. As Madison put it, while "the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be ... divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified." Id ., No. 51, at 350.
The Framers deemed an energetic executive essential to "the protection of the community against foreign attacks," "the steady administration of the laws," "the protection of property," and "the security of liberty." Id ., No. 70, at 471. Accordingly, they chose not to bog the Executive down with the "habitual feebleness and dilatoriness" that comes with a "diversity of views and opinions." Id. , at 476. Instead, they gave the Executive the "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" that "characterise the proceedings of one man." Id. , at 472.
To justify and check that authority-unique in our constitutional structure-the Framers made the President the most democratic and politically accountable official in Government. Only the President (along with the Vice President) is elected by the entire Nation. And the President's political accountability is enhanced by the solitary nature of the Executive Branch, which provides "a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people." Id., at 479. The President "cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with it," because Article II "makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch." Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 496-497, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (quoting Clinton v. Jones , 520 U.S. 681, 712-713, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment)).
The resulting constitutional strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and render the President directly accountable to the people through regular elections. In that scheme, individual executive officials will still wield significant authority, but that authority remains subject to the ongoing supervision and control of the elected President. Through the President's oversight, "the chain of dependence [is] preserved," so that "the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest" all "depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community." 1 Annals of Cong. 499 (J. Madison).
The CFPB's single-Director structure contravenes this carefully calibrated system by vesting significant governmental power in the hands of a single individual accountable to no one. The Director is neither elected by the people nor meaningfully controlled (through the threat of removal) by someone who is. The Director does not even depend on Congress for annual appropriations. See The Federalist No. 58, at 394 (J. Madison) (describing the "power over the purse" as the "most compleat and effectual weapon" in representing the interests of the people). Yet the Director may unilaterally , without meaningful supervision, issue final regulations, oversee adjudications, set enforcement priorities, initiate prosecutions, and determine what penalties to impose on private parties. With no colleagues to persuade, and no boss or electorate looking over her shoulder, the Director may dictate and enforce policy for a vital segment of the economy affecting millions of Americans.
The CFPB Director's insulation from removal by an accountable President is enough to render the agency's structure unconstitutional. But several other features of the CFPB combine to make the Director's removal protection even more problematic. In addition to lacking the most direct method of presidential control-removal at will-the agency's unique structure also forecloses certain indirect methods of Presidential control.
Because the CFPB is headed by a single Director with a five-year term, some Presidents may not have any opportunity to shape its leadership and thereby influence its activities. A President elected in 2020 would likely not appoint a CFPB Director until 2023, and a President elected in 2028 may never appoint one. That means an unlucky President might get elected on a consumer-protection platform and enter office only to find herself saddled with a holdover Director from a competing political party who is dead set against that agenda. To make matters worse, the agency's single-Director structure means the President will not have the opportunity to appoint any other leaders-such as a chair or fellow members of a Commission or Board-who can serve as a check on the Director's authority and help bring the agency in line with the President's preferred policies.
The CFPB's receipt of funds outside the appropriations process further aggravates the agency's threat to Presidential control. The President normally has the opportunity to recommend or veto spending bills that affect the operation of administrative agencies. See Art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Art. II, § 3. And, for the past century, the President has annually submitted a proposed budget to Congress for approval. See Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, ch. 18, § 201, 42 Stat. 20. Presidents frequently use these budgetary tools "to influence the policies of independent agencies." PHH , 881 F.3d at 147 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing Pasachoff, The President's Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 Yale L. J. 2182, 2191, 2203-2204 (2016) ). But no similar opportunity exists for the President to influence the CFPB Director. Instead, the Director receives over $500 million per year to fund the agency's chosen priorities. And the Director receives that money from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside of the annual appropriations process. This financial freedom makes it even more likely that the agency will "slip from the Executive's control, and thus from that of the people." Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 499, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
3
Amicus raises three principal arguments in the agency's defense. At the outset, amicus questions the textual basis for the removal power and highlights statements from Madison, Hamilton, and Chief Justice Marshall expressing "heterodox" views on the subject. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 4-5, 28-29. But those concerns are misplaced. It is true that "there is no 'removal clause' in the Constitution," id. , at 1, but neither is there a "separation of powers clause" or a "federalism clause." These foundational doctrines are instead evident from the Constitution's vesting of certain powers in certain bodies. As we have explained many times before, the President's removal power stems from Article II's vesting of the "executive Power" in the President. Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (quoting Art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ). As for the opinions of Madison, Hamilton, and Chief Justice Marshall, we have already considered the statements cited by amicus and discounted them in light of their context (Madison), the fact they reflect initial impressions later abandoned by the speaker (Hamilton), or their subsequent rejection as ill-considered dicta (Chief Justice Marshall). See Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 500, n. 6, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (Madison) ; Myers , 272 U.S., at 136-139, 142-144, 47 S.Ct. 21 (Hamilton and Chief Justice Marshall).
Next, amicus offers a grand theory of our removal precedents that, if accepted, could leave room for an agency like the CFPB-and many other innovative intrusions on Article II. According to amicus , Humphrey's Executor and Morrison establish a general rule that Congress may impose "modest" restrictions on the President's removal power, with only two limited exceptions. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 33-37. Congress may not reserve a role for itself in individual removal decisions (as it attempted to do in Myers and Bowsher ). And it may not eliminate the President's removal power altogether (as it effectively did in Free Enterprise Fund ). Outside those two situations, amicus argues, Congress is generally free to constrain the President's removal power. See also post , at 2232 - 2236 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (hereinafter dissent) (expressing similar view).
But text, first principles, the First Congress's decision in 1789, Myers , and Free Enterprise Fund all establish that the President's removal power is the rule, not the exception. While we do not revisit Humphrey's Executor or any other precedent today, we decline to elevate it into a freestanding invitation for Congress to impose additional restrictions on the President's removal authority.
Finally, amicus contends that if we identify a constitutional problem with the CFPB's structure, we should avoid it by broadly construing the statutory grounds for removing the CFPB Director from office. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 50-53; Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-62. The Dodd-Frank Act provides that the Director may be removed for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 12 U. S. C. § 5491(c)(3). In amicus ' view, that language could be interpreted to reserve substantial discretion to the President. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 51.
We are not persuaded. For one, Humphrey's Executor implicitly rejected an interpretation that would leave the President free to remove an officer based on disagreements about agency policy. See 295 U.S., at 619, 625-626, 55 S.Ct. 869. In addition, while both amicus and the House of Representatives invite us to adopt whatever construction would cure the constitutional problem, they have not advanced any workable standard derived from the statutory language. Amicus suggests that the proper standard might permit removals based on general policy disagreements, but not specific ones; the House suggests that the permissible bases for removal might vary depending on the context and the Presidential power involved. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 58-60, 76-77. They do not attempt to root either of those standards in the statutory text. Further, although nearly identical language governs the removal of some two-dozen multimember independent agencies, amicus suggests that the standard should vary from agency to agency, morphing as necessary to avoid constitutional doubt. Tr. of Oral Arg. 55-56. We decline to embrace such an uncertain and elastic approach to the text.
Amicus and the House also fail to engage with the Dodd-Frank Act as a whole, which makes plain that the CFPB is an "independent bureau." 12 U. S. C. § 5491(a) ; see also 44 U. S. C. § 3502(5)
(listing the CFPB as an "independent regulatory agency"). Neither amicus nor the House explains how the CFPB would be "independent" if its head were required to implement the President's policies upon pain of removal. See Black's Law Dictionary 838 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "independent" as "[n]ot subject to the control or influence of another"). The Constitution might of course compel the agency to be dependent on the President notwithstanding Congress's contrary intent, but that result cannot fairly be inferred from the statute Congress enacted.
Constitutional avoidance is not a license to rewrite Congress's work to say whatever the Constitution needs it to say in a given situation. Without a proffered interpretation that is rooted in the statutory text and structure, and would avoid the constitutional violation we have identified, we take Congress at its word that it meant to impose a meaningful restriction on the President's removal authority.
The dissent, for its part, largely reprises points that the Court has already considered and rejected: It notes the lack of an express removal provision, invokes Congress's general power to create and define executive offices, highlights isolated statements from individual Framers, downplays the decision of 1789, minimizes Myers , brainstorms methods of Presidential control short of removal, touts the need for creative congressional responses to technological and economic change, and celebrates a pragmatic, flexible approach to American governance. See post , at 2224 - 2238, 2241 - 2243, 2245.
If these arguments sound familiar, it's because they are. They were raised by the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund . Compare post , at 2224 - 2238, 2241 - 2243, 2245, with Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 515-524, 530, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (BREYER, J., dissenting). The answers to these repeated concerns (beyond those we have already covered) are the same today as they were ten years ago. Today, as then, Congress's "plenary control over the salary, duties, and even existence of executive offices" makes "Presidential oversight" more critical-not less-as the "[o]nly" tool to "counter [Congress's] influence." Id. , at 500, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (opinion of the Court). Today, as then, the various "bureaucratic minutiae" a President might use to corral agency personnel is no substitute for at will removal. Ibid. And today, as always, the urge to meet new technological and societal problems with novel governmental structures must be tempered by constitutional restraints that are not known-and were not chosen-for their efficiency or flexibility. Id., at 499, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
As we explained in Free Enterprise Fund , "One can have a government that functions without being ruled by functionaries, and a government that benefits from expertise without being ruled by experts." Ibid. While "[n]o one doubts Congress's power to create a vast and varied federal bureaucracy," the expansion of that bureaucracy into new territories the Framers could scarcely have imagined only sharpens our duty to ensure that the Executive Branch is overseen by a President accountable to the people. Ibid.
IV
Having concluded that the CFPB's leadership by a single independent Director violates the separation of powers, we now turn to the appropriate remedy. We directed the parties to brief and argue whether the Director's removal protection was severable from the other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that establish the CFPB. If so, then the CFPB may continue to exist and operate notwithstanding Congress's unconstitutional attempt to insulate the agency's Director from removal by the President. There is a live controversy between the parties on that question, and resolving it is a necessary step in determining petitioner's entitlement to its requested relief.
As the defendant in this action, petitioner seeks a straightforward remedy. It asks us to deny the Government's petition to enforce the civil investigative demand and dismiss the case. The Government counters that the demand, though initially issued by a Director unconstitutionally insulated from removal, can still be enforced on remand because it has since been ratified by an Acting Director accountable to the President. The parties dispute whether this alleged ratification in fact occurred and whether, if so, it is legally sufficient to cure the constitutional defect in the original demand. That debate turns on case-specific factual and legal questions not addressed below and not briefed here. A remand for the lower Courts to consider those questions in the first instance is therefore the appropriate course-unless such a remand would be futile.
In petitioner's view, it would be. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that, regardless of any ratification, the demand is unenforceable because the statutory provision insulating the CFPB Director from removal cannot be severed from the other statutory provisions that define the CFPB's authority. See Brief for Appellant in No. 17-56324 (CA9), pp. 27-28, 30-32. If petitioner is correct, and the offending removal provision means the entire agency is unconstitutional and powerless to act, then a remand would be pointless. With no agency left with statutory authority to maintain this suit or otherwise enforce the demand, the appropriate disposition would be to reverse with instructions to deny the Government's petition to enforce the agency's demand for documents and dismiss the case, as petitioner requests.
Accordingly, there is a live controversy over the question of severability. And that controversy is essential to our ability to provide petitioner the relief it seeks: If the removal restriction is not severable, then we must grant the relief requested, promptly rejecting the demand outright. If, on the other hand, the removal restriction is severable, we must instead remand for the Government to press its ratification arguments in further proceedings. Unlike the lingering ratification issue, severability presents a pure question of law that has been fully briefed and argued by the parties. We therefore proceed to address it.
It has long been settled that "one section of a statute may be repugnant to the Constitution without rendering the whole act void." Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees , 179 U.S. 472, 490, 21 S.Ct. 174, 45 L.Ed. 280 (1900) (quoting Treasurer of Fayette Cty. v. People's & Drovers' Bank , 47 OhioSt. 503, 523, 25 N.E. 697, 702 (1890) ). Because a "statute bad in part is not necessarily void in its entirety," "[p]rovisions within the legislative power may stand if separable from the bad."
Dorchy v. Kansas , 264 U.S. 286, 289-290, 44 S.Ct. 323, 68 L.Ed. 686 (1924).
"Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem, severing any problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact." Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 508, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even in the absence of a severability clause, the "traditional" rule is that "the unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock , 480 U.S. 678, 685, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987). When Congress has expressly provided a severability clause, our task is simplified. We will presume "that Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision ... unless there is strong evidence that Congress intended otherwise." Id., at 686, 107 S.Ct. 1476.
The only constitutional defect we have identified in the CFPB's structure is the Director's insulation from removal. If the Director were removable at will by the President, the constitutional violation would disappear. We must therefore decide whether the removal provision can be severed from the other statutory provisions relating to the CFPB's powers and responsibilities.
In Free Enterprise Fund , we found a set of unconstitutional removal provisions severable even in the absence of an express severability clause because the surviving provisions were capable of "functioning independently" and "nothing in the statute's text or historical context [made] it evident that Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the Constitution, would have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose members are removable at will." 561 U.S., at 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (internal quotation marks omitted).
So too here. The provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act bearing on the CFPB's structure and duties remain fully operative without the offending tenure restriction. Those provisions are capable of functioning independently, and there is nothing in the text or history of the Dodd-Frank Act that demonstrates Congress would have preferred no CFPB to a CFPB supervised by the President. Quite the opposite. Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act at issue in Free Enterprise Fund , the Dodd-Frank Act contains an express severability clause. There is no need to wonder what Congress would have wanted if "any provision of this Act" is "held to be unconstitutional" because it has told us: "the remainder of this Act" should "not be affected." 12 U. S. C. § 5302.
Petitioner urges us to disregard this plain language for three reasons. None is persuasive. First, petitioner dismisses the clause as non-probative "boilerplate" because it applies "to the entire, 848-page Dodd-Frank Act" and "appears almost 600 pages before the removal provision at issue." Brief for Petitioner 45. In petitioner's view, that means we cannot be certain that Congress really meant to apply the clause to each of the Act's provisions. But boilerplate is boilerplate for a reason-because it offers tried-and-true language to ensure a precise and predictable result. That is the case here. The language unmistakably references "any provision of this Act." 12 U. S. C. § 5302 (emphasis added). And it appears in a logical and prominent place, immediately following the Act's title and definitions sections, reinforcing the conclusion that it applies to the entirety of the Act. Congress was not required to laboriously insert duplicative severability clauses, provision by provision, to accomplish its stated objective.
Second, petitioner points to an additional severability clause in the Act that applies only to one of the Act's subtitles. See 15 U. S. C. § 8232. In petitioner's view, that clause would be superfluous if Congress meant the general severability clause to apply across the Act. But "our preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute." Lamie v. United States Trustee , 540 U.S. 526, 536, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). In this instance, the redundant language appears to reflect the fact that the subtitle to which it refers originated as a standalone bill that was later incorporated into Dodd-Frank. Compare 15 U. S. C. § 8232 with H. R. 2571, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., § 302 (2009). And petitioner does not offer any construction that would give effect to both provisions, making the redundancy both inescapable and unilluminating. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L. P. , 564 U.S. 91, 106, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011) ("The canon against superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, petitioner argues more broadly that Congress would not have wanted to give the President unbridled control over the CFPB's vast authority. Petitioner highlights the references to the CFPB's independence in the statutory text and legislative history, as well as in Professor Warren's and the Obama administration's original proposals. See Brief for Petitioner 43-44 (collecting examples). And petitioner submits that Congress might not have exempted the CFPB from congressional oversight via the appropriations process if it had known that the CFPB would come under executive control.
These observations certainly confirm that Congress preferred an independent CFPB to a dependent one; but they shed little light on the critical question whether Congress would have preferred a dependent CFPB to no agency at all. That is the only question we have the authority to decide, and the answer seems clear. Petitioner assumes that, if we eliminate the CFPB, regulatory and enforcement authority over the statutes it administers would simply revert back to the handful of independent agencies previously responsible for them. See id. , at 46. But, as the Solicitor General and House of Representatives explain, that shift would trigger a major regulatory disruption and would leave appreciable damage to Congress's work in the consumer-finance arena. See Reply Brief for Respondent 21-22; Tr. of Oral Arg. 67-68. One of the agencies whose regulatory authority was transferred to the CFPB no longer exists. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 5412 - 5413 (Office of Thrift Supervision). The others do not have the staff or appropriations to absorb the CFPB's 1,500-employee, 500-million-dollar operations. And none has the authority to administer the Dodd-Frank Act's new prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices in the consumer-finance sector. Given these consequences, it is far from evident that Congress would have preferred no CFPB to a CFPB led by a Director removable at will by the President.
Justice THOMAS would have us junk our settled severability doctrine and start afresh, even though no party has asked us to do so. See post , at 2219 - 2220 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Among other things, he objects that it is sheer "speculation" that Congress would prefer that its consumer protection laws be enforced by a Director accountable to the President rather than not at all. Post , at 2223 - 2224. We think it clear that Congress would prefer that we use a scalpel rather than a bulldozer in curing the constitutional defect we identify today. And such an approach by this Court can come as no surprise to Congress, which was on notice of constitutional objections to single-Director agencies by multiple past Presidents from both political parties, supra , at 2201 - 2202, and enacted Dodd-Frank against the background of our established severability doctrine.
As in every severability case, there may be means of remedying the defect in the CFPB's structure that the Court lacks the authority to provide. Our severability analysis does not foreclose Congress from pursuing alternative responses to the problem-for example, converting the CFPB into a multimember agency. The Court's only instrument, however, is a blunt one. We have "the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment," Massachusetts v. Mellon , 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) ; see Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 178, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), but we cannot re-write Congress's work by creating offices, terms, and the like. "[S]uch editorial freedom ... belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary." Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 510, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
Because we find the Director's removal protection severable from the other provisions of Dodd-Frank that establish the CFPB, we remand for the Court of Appeals to consider whether the civil investigative demand was validly ratified.
* * *
A decade ago, we declined to extend Congress's authority to limit the President's removal power to a new situation, never before confronted by the Court. We do the same today. In our constitutional system, the executive power belongs to the President, and that power generally includes the ability to supervise and remove the agents who wield executive power in his stead. While we have previously upheld limits on the President's removal authority in certain contexts, we decline to do so when it comes to principal officers who, acting alone, wield significant executive power. The Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice GORSUCH joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court's decision today takes a restrained approach on the merits by limiting Humphrey's Executor v. United States , 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935), rather than overruling it. At the same time, the Court takes an aggressive approach on severability by severing a provision when it is not necessary to do so. I would do the opposite.
Because the Court takes a step in the right direction by limiting Humphrey's Executor to "multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power ," ante , at 2219 (emphasis added), I join Parts I, II, and III of its opinion. I respectfully dissent from the Court's severability analysis, however, because I do not believe that we should address severability in this case.
I
The decision in Humphrey's Executor poses a direct threat to our constitutional structure and, as a result, the liberty of the American people. The Court concludes that it is not strictly necessary for us to overrule that decision. See ante , at 2119 - 2192, 2197 - 2200. But with today's decision, the Court has repudiated almost every aspect of Humphrey's Executor . In a future case, I would repudiate what is left of this erroneous precedent.
A
"The Constitution does not vest the Federal Government with an undifferentiated 'governmental power.' " Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads , 575 U.S. 43, 67, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 191 L.Ed.2d 153 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). It sets out three branches and vests a different form of power in each-legislative, executive, and judicial. See Art. I, § 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ; Art. III, § 1.
Article II of the Constitution vests "[t]he executive Power" in the "President of the United States of America," § 1, cl. 1, and directs that he shall "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," § 3. Of course, the President cannot fulfill his role of executing the laws without assistance. See Myers v. United States , 272 U.S. 52, 117, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926). He therefore must "select those who [are] to act for him under his direction in the execution of the laws." Ibid. While these officers assist the President in carrying out his constitutionally assigned duties, "[t]he buck stops with the President." Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U.S. 477, 493, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010). "Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep [his] officers accountable-by removing them from office, if necessary." Id. , at 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138. The Framers "insist[ed]" upon "unity in the Federal Executive" to "ensure both vigor and accountability" to the people. Printz v. United States , 521 U.S. 898, 922, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997) ; see also ante , at 2203.
Despite the defined structural limitations of the Constitution and the clear vesting of executive power in the President, Congress has increasingly shifted executive power to a de facto fourth branch of Government-independent agencies. These agencies wield considerable executive power without Presidential oversight. They are led by officers who are insulated from the President by removal restrictions, "reduc[ing] the Chief Magistrate to [the role of] cajoler-in-chief." Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 502, 130 S.Ct. 3138. But "[t]he people do not vote for the Officers of the United States. They instead look to the President to guide the assistants or deputies subject to his superintendence." Id. , at 497-498, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (alterations, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because independent agencies wield substantial power with no accountability to either the President or the people, they "pose a significant threat to individual liberty and to the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances." PHH Corp. v. CFPB , 881 F.3d 75, 165 (C.A.D.C. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Unfortunately, this Court "ha[s] not always been vigilant about protecting the structure of our Constitution," at times endorsing a "more pragmatic, flexible approach" to our Government's design. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn. , 575 U.S. 92, 115-116, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 191 L.Ed.2d 186 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our tolerance of independent agencies in Humphrey's Executor is an unfortunate example of the Court's failure to apply the Constitution as written. That decision has paved the way for an ever-expanding encroachment on the power of the Executive, contrary to our constitutional design.
B
1
The lead up to Humphrey's Executor begins with this Court's decision in Myers , 272 U.S., 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160. Myers involved a federal statute that prohibited the President from removing certain postmasters except "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. , at 107, 47 S.Ct. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). The question presented was "whether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. , at 106, 47 S.Ct. 21. In a 70-page opinion by Chief Justice Taft, the Court held that the Constitution did vest such power in the President.
The Court anchored its analysis in evidence from the founding era. It acknowledged that the "subject [of removal] was not discussed in the Constitutional Convention," id. , at 109-110, 47 S.Ct. 21, but it reviewed in detail the First Congress' vigorous debate about the removal of executive officers in what is known as the Decision of 1789, id. , at 111-135, 47 S.Ct. 21. In the course of analyzing the Decision of 1789, the Court explained that Article II vests "the executive power of the Government ... in one person"-the President-and that the executive power includes the authority to "select those who [are] to act for him under his direction in the execution of the laws." Id. , at 116-117, 47 S.Ct. 21. Reiterating the position of James Madison and other Members of the First Congress, the Court noted that allowing limits on the President's removal authority would grant Congress "the means of thwarting the Executive in the exercise of his great powers and in the bearing of his great responsibility, by fastening upon him, as subordinate executive officers, men who by their inefficient service under him, by their lack of loyalty to the service, or by their different views of policy might make his taking care that the laws be faithfully executed most difficult or impossible." Id. , at 131, 47 S.Ct. 21. After "devot[ing] much space to [the] discussion and decision of the question of the Presidential power of removal in the First Congress" as well as its understanding of the executive power, id. , at 136, 47 S.Ct. 21, the Court concluded that "the power to remove officers appointed by the President and the Senate vested in the President alone," id. , at 114, 47 S.Ct. 21. It repeatedly described this removal power as "unrestricted." Id. , at 115, 134, 150, 172, 176, 47 S.Ct. 21.
The Court noted that the First Congress' understanding of the removal question was quickly "accepted as a final decision of the question by all branches of the Government." Id. , at 136, 47 S.Ct. 21. The decision was "affirmed by this Court in unmistakable terms." Id. , at 148, 152-153, 47 S.Ct. 21 (discussing Ex parte Hennen , 13 Pet. 230, 259, 10 L.Ed. 138 (1839) ; Parsons v. United States , 167 U.S. 324, 330, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) ). Presidents had "uniform[ly]" adopted the First Congress' view "whenever an issue ha[d] clearly been raised." Myers , 272 U.S., at 169, 47 S.Ct. 21. And "Congress, in a number of acts, followed and enforced the legislative decision of 1789 for seventy-four years." Id. , at 145, 47 S.Ct. 21. While disputes with President Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction led Congress to "enact legislation to curtail the then acknowledged powers of the President,"
id. , at 165, 47 S.Ct. 21, the Myers Court declined to give these politically charged acts any weight, id., at 175-176, 47 S.Ct. 21.
After exhaustively analyzing the historical evidence, the Court had "no hesitation in holding that [the First Congress'] conclusion [was] correct." Id. , at 176, 47 S.Ct. 21. Accordingly, the Court held that "the provision of the law [at issue], by which the unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to the President, [was] in violation of the Constitution, and invalid." Ibid.
2
Nine years after Myers , the Court decided Humphrey's Executor . That case arose from the attempted removal of Commissioner William Humphrey from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In 1931, President Herbert Hoover appointed Humphrey to serve a 7-year term as one of the FTC's five Commissioners. By all accounts, Humphrey proved to be a controversial figure. See Crane, Debunking Humphrey's Executor , 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1836, 1841 (2015); Winerman, The FTC at Ninety: History Through Headlines, 72 Antitrust L. J. 871, 878-879 (2005) ; Yoo, Calabresi, & Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 64 (2004). He reportedly "vowed not to approve any Commission action that did not have as its goal to help business help itself," "threaten[ed] criminal prosecution against other commissioners who publicly dissented," and "called his fellow commissioners men drunk with their own greatness" when they voted to initiate an investigation. Crane, supra , at 1841 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Less than two years into Humphrey's term, newly inaugurated President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote Humphrey a letter, asking for his resignation. The President explained that, in his view, "the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect to the work of the Commission [could] be carried out most effectively with personnel of [his] own selection." Humphrey's Executor , 295 U.S., at 618, 55 S.Ct. 869 (internal quotation marks omitted). A little over a month after his first letter, President Roosevelt wrote Humphrey again to ask for his resignation. The letter stated: "You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the [FTC], and, frankly, I think it is best for the people of this country that I should have a full confidence." Id. , at 619, 55 S.Ct. 869 (internal quotation marks omitted). Humphrey declined to resign. In October 1933, President Roosevelt informed Humphrey that he was removed from his position. Humphrey did not comply, continuing "to insist that he was still a member of the commission, entitled to perform its duties and receive the compensation provided by law." Ibid.
Four months later, Humphrey died. The executor of his estate brought suit in the Court of Claims, seeking to recover Humphrey's salary from the date of his removal until the date of his death. The Court of Claims certified two questions to this Court: (1) whether § 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, prohibited the President from removing FTC Commissioners except for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office," and (2) if so, whether that restriction was constitutional. 295 U.S., at 619, 55 S.Ct. 869 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court answered both of these questions in favor of Humphrey's estate. It first held that the FTC Act "limit[ed] the executive power of removal to the causes enumerated" therein-inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Id. , at 626, 55 S.Ct. 869. In the Court's view, this construction of the Act was clear from "the face of the statute" and "the character of the commission," id. , at 624, 55 S.Ct. 869, which the Court described as a "body of experts" that operates "independent of executive authority ... and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official," id. , at 625-626, 55 S.Ct. 869.
Then, notwithstanding the text of Article II of the Constitution and the decision in Myers , the Court held that the Act's restriction on the President's authority to remove Commissioners was constitutional. The Court acknowledged that the "recently decided" Myers decision had "fully review[ed] the general subject of the power of executive removal" and "examine[d] at length the historical, legislative and judicial data bearing upon the question." Humphrey's Executor , 295 U.S., at 626, 55 S.Ct. 869. And it conceded that executive officers are "subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive." Id. , at 627, 55 S.Ct. 869 ; see also id. , at 631, 55 S.Ct. 869 (recognizing "the President's illimitable power of removal" over executive officers). The Court, however, claimed that "[t]he office of a postmaster is so essentially unlike the office [of an FTC Commissioner] that the decision in the Myers case [could not] be accepted as controlling." Id. , at 627, 55 S.Ct. 869. In the Court's view, unlike the postmaster in Myers , FTC commissioners did not qualify as "purely executive officers." 295 U.S., at 632, 55 S.Ct. 869.
The Court grounded its analysis in its assertion that the FTC "occupies no place in the executive department and ... exercises no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President." Id. , at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869. Rather, in the Court's view, by "filling in and administering the details embodied by [the FTC Act's] general standard[,] the commission act[ed] in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially." Ibid. The Court stated that the FTC acted "as a legislative agency" by "making investigations and reports thereon for the information of Congress" and acted "as an agency of the judiciary" when performing its role "as a master in chancery under rules prescribed by the court." Ibid. "Such a body," the Court explained, "cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive." Ibid.
After distinguishing "purely executive officers" from officers exercising "quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers," ibid. , the Court held that "[w]hether the power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by ... precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the character of the office," id. , at 631, 55 S.Ct. 869. "[P]urely executive officers" are subject to the President's "unrestrictable power ... to remove." Id. , at 632, 55 S.Ct. 869. But with regard to "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" officers, the Court concluded that "no removal [could] be made ... except for one or more of the causes named." Ibid.
3
Humphrey's Executor laid the foundation for a fundamental departure from our constitutional structure with nothing more than handwaving and obfuscating phrases such as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial." Unlike the thorough analysis in Myers , the Court's thinly reasoned decision is completely "devoid of textual or historical precedent for the novel principle it set forth." Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 726, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The exceptional weakness of the reasoning could be a product of the circumstances under which the case was decided-in the midst of a bitter standoff between the Court and President Roosevelt -or it could be just another example of this Court departing from the strictures of the Constitution for a "more pragmatic, flexible approach" to our government's design. Perez , 575 U.S., at 116, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). But whatever the motivation, Humphrey's Executor does not comport with the Constitution.
Humphrey's Executor relies on one key premise: the notion that there is a category of "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" power that is not exercised by Congress or the Judiciary, but that is also not part of "the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President." Humphrey's Executor , supra , at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869. Working from that premise, the Court distinguished the "illimitable" power of removal recognized in Myers , Humphrey's Executor , 295 U.S., at 627-628, 55 S.Ct. 869, and upheld the FTC Act's removal restriction, while simultaneously acknowledging that the Constitution vests the President with the entirety of the executive power, id. , at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869.
The problem is that the Court's premise was entirely wrong. The Constitution does not permit the creation of officers exercising "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial powers" in "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial agencies." Id., at 628-629, 55 S.Ct. 869. No such powers or agencies exist. Congress lacks the authority to delegate its legislative power, Whitman v. American Trucking Assns. , Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001), and it cannot authorize the use of judicial power by officers acting outside of the bounds of Article III, Stern v. Marshall , 564 U.S. 462, 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). Nor can Congress create agencies that straddle multiple branches of Government. The Constitution sets out three branches of Government and provides each with a different form of power-legislative, executive, and judicial. See Art. I, § 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ; Art. III, § 1. Free-floating agencies simply do not comport with this constitutional structure.
"[A]gencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution." FTC v. Ruberoid Co. , 343 U.S. 470, 487, 72 S.Ct. 800, 96 L.Ed. 1081 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). But "[t]he mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed." Id. , at 487-488, 72 S.Ct. 800.
That is exactly what happened in Humphrey's Executor . The Court upheld the FTC Act's removal restriction by using the "quasi" label to support its claim that the FTC "exercise[d] no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President." Humphrey's Executor , supra , at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869. But "it is hard to dispute that the powers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey's Executor would at the present time be considered 'executive,' at least to some degree." Morrison , supra , at 690, n. 28, 108 S.Ct. 2597 ; see ante , at 2198 n.2; see post , at 2201 n.7 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part).
C
Today's decision constitutes the latest in a series of cases that have significantly undermined Humphrey's Executor . First, in Morrison , the Court repudiated the reasoning of the decision. 487 U.S. at 689, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Then, in Free Enterprise Fund , we returned to the principles set out in the "landmark case of Myers ." 561 U.S., at 492, 130 S.Ct. 3138. And today, the Court rightfully limits Humphrey's Executor to "multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power." Ante , at ----. After these decisions, the foundation for Humphrey's Executor is not just shaky. It is nonexistent.
This Court's repudiation of Humphrey's Executor began with its decision in Morrison . There, the Court upheld a statute insulating an independent counsel from removal by the Attorney General absent a showing of "good cause." Morrison , supra , at 659-660, 108 S.Ct. 2597. In doing so, the Court set aside the reasoning of Humphrey's Executor . It recognized that Humphrey's Executor "rel[ied] on the terms 'quasilegislative' and 'quasi-judicial' to distinguish the officials involved in Humphrey's Executor ... from those in Myers ." 487 U.S., at 689, 108 S.Ct. 2597. But it then immediately stated that its "present considered view is that the determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a 'good cause'-type restriction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as 'purely executive.' " Ibid. The Court also rejected Humphrey's Executor 's conclusion that the FTC did not exercise executive power, stating that "the powers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey's Executor would at the present time be considered 'executive.' " Morrison , supra , at 690, n. 28, 108 S.Ct. 2597. The lone dissenter, Justice Scalia, disagreed with much of the Court's analysis but noted that the Court had rightfully "swept" Humphrey's Executor "into the dustbin of repudiated constitutional principles." 487 U.S., at 725, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Thus, all Members of the Court who heard Morrison rejected the core rationale of Humphrey's Executor .
The reasoning of the Court's decision in Free Enterprise Fund created further tension (if not outright conflict) with Humphrey's Executor . In Free Enterprise Fund , the Court concluded that a dual layer of for-cause removal restrictions for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violated the Constitution. In its analysis, the Court recognized that allowing officers to "execute the laws" beyond the President's control "is contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President ." 561 U.S., at 496, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (emphasis added). The Court acknowledged that "the executive power include[s] a power to oversee executive officers through removal." Id. , at 492, 130 S.Ct. 3138. And it explained that, without the power of removal, the President cannot "be held fully accountable" for the exercise of the executive power, " 'greatly diminish[ing] the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate himself.' " Id. , at 514, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (quoting The Federalist No. 70, p. 478 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). Accountability, the Court repeatedly emphasized, plays a central role in our constitutional structure. See, e.g. , Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 498, 130 S.Ct. 3138 ("[E]xecutive power without the Executive's oversight ... subverts the President's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed-as well as the public's ability to pass judgment on his efforts"); id. , at 513, 130 S.Ct. 3138 ("The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him the power to do so"). Humphrey's Executor is at odds with every single one of these principles: It ignores Article II's Vesting Clause, sidesteps the President's removal power, and encourages the exercise of executive power by unaccountable officers. The reasoning of the two decisions simply cannot be reconciled.
Finally, today's decision builds upon Morrison and Free Enterprise Fund , further eroding the foundation of Humphrey's Executor . The Court correctly notes that "[t]he entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone." Ante , at 2197. The President therefore must have "power to remove-and thus supervise-those who wield executive power on his behalf." Ante , at 2191 - 2192. As a result, the Court concludes that Humphrey's Executor must be limited to "multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power ." Ante, at 2219 - 2220 (emphasis added). And, at the same time, it recognizes (as the Court did in Morrison ) that "[t]he Court's conclusion that the FTC did not exercise executive power has not withstood the test of time." Ante , at 2198 n.2. In other words, Humphrey's Executor does not even satisfy its own exception.
In light of these decisions, it is not clear what is left of Humphrey's Executor 's rationale. But if any remnant of that decision is still standing, it certainly is not enough to justify the numerous, unaccountable independent agencies that currently exercise vast executive power outside the bounds of our constitutional structure.
* * *
Continued reliance on Humphrey's Executor to justify the existence of independent agencies creates a serious, ongoing threat to our Government's design. Leaving these unconstitutional agencies in place does not enhance this Court's legitimacy; it subverts political accountability and threatens individual liberty. We have a "responsibility to 'examin[e] without fear, and revis[e] without reluctance,' any 'hasty and crude decisions' rather than leaving 'the character of [the] law impaired, and the beauty and harmony of the [American constitutional] system destroyed by the perpetuity of error.' " Gamble v. United States , 587 U. S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1984, 204 L.Ed.2d 322 (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (quoting 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 444 (1826); some alterations in original). We simply cannot compromise when it comes to our Government's structure. Today, the Court does enough to resolve this case, but in the future, we should reconsider Humphrey's Executor in toto . And I hope that we will have the will to do so.
II
While I think that the Court correctly resolves the merits of the constitutional question, I do not agree with its decision to sever the removal restriction in 12 U. S. C. § 5491(c)(3). See ante , at 2207 - 2211; post , at 2244 - 2245. To resolve this case, I would simply deny the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) petition to enforce the civil investigative demand.
A
Article III of the Constitution vests "[t]he judicial Power of the United States" in the "supreme Court" and the lower federal courts established by Congress. § 1. "[T]he judicial power is, fundamentally, the power to render judgments in individual cases" or controversies that are properly before the court. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. , 584 U. S. ----, --- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1485-1486, 200 L.Ed.2d 854 (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. , 514 U.S. 211, 219, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (" '[A] "judicial Power" is one to render dispositive judgments' "); Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L. J. 1807, 1815-1816 (2008). "[T]he power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy." Massachusetts v. Mellon , 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). In the context of a constitutional challenge, "[i]t amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment." Ibid. ; see also Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 933, 936 (2018). Thus, if a party argues that a statute and the Constitution conflict, "then courts must resolve that dispute and, ... follow the higher law of the Constitution." Murphy , 584 U. S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1486 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
Consistent with this understanding, "[e]arly American courts did not have a severability doctrine." Id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1485 (citing Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 738, 769 (2010) ). If a statute was unconstitutional, the court would just decline to enforce the statute in the case before it. 584 U. S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1486 (THOMAS, J., concurring). That was the end of the matter. "[T]here was no 'next step' in which [a] cour[t]" severed portions of a statute. Walsh, supra , at 777.
Our modern severability precedents create tension with this historic practice. Instead of declining to enforce an unconstitutional statute in an individual case, this Court has stated that courts must "seve[r] and excis[e]" portions of a statute to "remedy" the constitutional problem. United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 245, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ;
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock , 480 U.S. 678, 686, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987). The Court's rhetoric when discussing severance implies that a court's decision to sever a provision "formally suspend[s] or erase[s it], when [the provision] actually remains on the books as a law." Mitchell, supra , at 1017. The Federal Judiciary does not have the power to excise, erase, alter, or otherwise strike down a statute. Murphy , supra , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1486 (THOMAS, J., concurring) Mitchell, supra , at 936. And the Court's reference to severability as a "remedy" is inaccurate. Traditional remedies-like injunctions, declarations, or damages-" 'operate with respect to specific parties,' not 'on legal rules in the abstract.' " Murphy , supra , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1486 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (quoting Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and Constitutional Adjudication, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 56, 85 (2014) ).
Because the power of judicial review does not allow courts to revise statutes, Mitchell, supra , at 983, the Court's severability doctrine must be rooted in statutory interpretation. But, even viewing severability as an interpretive question, I remain skeptical of our doctrine. As I have previously explained, "the severability doctrine often requires courts to weigh in on statutory provisions that no party has standing to challenge, bringing courts dangerously close to issuing advisory opinions." Murphy , 584 U. S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1487 (concurring opinion). And the application of the doctrine "does not follow basic principles of statutory interpretation." Id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1486. Instead of determining the meaning of a statute's text, severability involves "nebulous inquir[ies] into hypothetical congressional intent." Booker , supra, at 320, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 738 (THOMAS, J., dissenting in part).
B
Consistent with the traditional understanding of the judicial power, I would deny CFPB's petition to enforce the civil investigative demand that it issued to Seila. See § 5562(e)(1). Seila "challenge[d] the validity of both the civil investigative demand and the ensuing enforcement action." Reply Brief for Petitioner 5. Seila has not countersued or sought affirmative relief preventing the CFPB from acting in the future; it simply asks us to "reverse the court of appeals' judgment." Brief for Petitioner 35. I would do just that. As the Court recognizes, the enforcement of a civil investigative demand by an official with unconstitutional removal protection injures Seila. See ante , at 2195 - 2196. Presented with an enforcement request from an unconstitutionally insulated Director, I would simply deny the CFPB's petition for an order of enforcement. This approach would resolve the dispute before us without addressing the issue of severability.
The Court, however, does more. In the plurality's view, because the CFPB raised a ratification argument before the Court of Appeals, we can (and should) reach the question of severability. See ante , at 2207 - 2208. But as explained more fully below, resolving this question is wholly unnecessary. Regardless of whether the CFPB's ratification theory is valid, the Court of Appeals on remand must reach the same outcome: The CFPB's civil investigative demand cannot be enforced against Seila.
The ratification argument presented by the CFPB is quite simple. Since its creation in 2010, the CFPB has had three Directors-first Director Richard Cordray, then Acting Director Mick Mulvaney, and now Director Kathleen Kraninger. The CFPB's first Director, Director Cordray, issued a civil investigative demand to Seila and initiated the enforcement action. The CFPB has conceded that these actions were unconstitutional. But, in the Ninth Circuit, the CFPB argued that the investigative demand was ratified by Acting Director Mulvaney, who it claimed was not insulated by the removal provision. Brief for Appellee in No. 17-56324, pp. 13-19. In the CFPB's view, the President could remove Acting Director Mulvaney at will because the "removal provision by its terms applies only to 'the Director,' not to an Acting Director," and the Federal Vacancy Reform Act "does not limit the President's ability to designate a different person as Acting Director." Id. , at 14. Based on this ratification theory, the CFPB asked the Ninth Circuit to affirm the District Court's order granting the CFPB's petition to enforce its investigative demand.
The CFPB does not ask this Court to address ratification on the merits, but it does rely on its unresolved ratification theory to assert that the Court should reach severability. In doing so, the CFPB relies on the same theory that it presented to the Ninth Circuit. Thus, the only live ratification claim is the theory that Acting Director Mulvaney ratified the civil investigative demand. See ante , at 2207 - 2208.
The resolution of the CFPB's Acting-Director ratification theory, however, has no bearing on the outcome of the dispute before us and therefore provides no basis for addressing severability. If the Acting Director did not ratify the investigative demand, then there is obviously no need to address severability. And even if he did, the Court still does not need to address severability because the alleged ratification does not cure the constitutional injury-enforcement of an investigative demand by an unconstitutionally insulated Director. Seila "challenge[d] the validity of both the civil investigative demand and the ensuing enforcement action ." Reply Brief for Petitioner 5 (emphasis added). Acting Director Mulvaney may (or may not) have properly ratified the issuance of the investigative demand and the initiation of the enforcement proceedings. But he certainly could not ratify the continuance of the enforcement action by his successor, Director Kraninger. Id. , at 7. Thus, even if the CFPB's ratification theory is valid, Seila still has an injury: It has been (and continues to be) subjected to enforcement of an investigative demand by Director Kraninger, who "remains statutorily insulated from removal." Reply Brief for Respondent 7; see also Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 513, 130 S.Ct. 3138 ; ante , at 2196. Thus, we should decline to enforce the civil investigative demand against Seila. See supra, at 2198 - 2199.
Ultimately, I cannot see how the resolution of the severability question affects the dispute before us. And even if severability could affect this case in some hypothetical scenario, I would not reach out to resolve the issue given my growing discomfort with our current severability precedents.
C
Confident that it can address the question of severability, the plurality moves on to conduct its analysis. It starts by pointing to the severability clause in the Dodd-Frank Act. See ante , at 2209. That clause states: "If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby." § 5302. The plurality states that "[i]f the Director were removable at will by the President, the constitutional violation would disappear." Ante , at 2208 - 2209. Then, relying on language in the severability clause, it concludes that the removal provision, § 5491(c)(3), should be severed.
The plurality suggests that its analysis is a matter of simply enforcing the "plain language" of the severability clause. See ante , at 2209. But I am not sure it is that simple. For one, the plurality does not actually analyze the statutory language. Second, the analysis the plurality does provide looks nothing like traditional statutory interpretation. Generally, when we interpret a statute, we do not hold that the text sets out a "presum[ption]" that can be rebutted by looking to atextual evidence of legislative intent. Ante , at 2208 - 2209. A text-based interpretation does not allow a free-ranging inquiry into what " 'Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the Constitution, would have preferred' " had it known of a constitutional issue. Ante , at 2209 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund , supra , at 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138 ). Nor does it consider whether Congress would have wanted to avoid "a major regulatory disruption." Ante , at 2210 - 2211. Statutory interpretation focuses on the text.
Even treating the question as a matter of pure statutory interpretation and assuming that the plurality points to the correct language, the text of the severability clause cannot, in isolation, justify severance of the removal provision. In some instances, a constitutional injury arises as a result of two or more statutory provisions operating together. See, e.g. , Free Enterprise Fund , supra , at 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (stating that the convergence of "a number of statutory provisions" produce a constitutional violation); Booker , 543 U.S., at 316-317, 125 S.Ct. 738 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (explaining that "the concerted action of [ 18 U. S. C.] § 3553(b)(1) and the operative Guidelines and the relevant Rule of Criminal Procedure resulted in unconstitutional judicial factfinding"); Lea, Situation Severability, 103 Va. L. Rev. 735, 778-780 (2017) (discussing statutory convergences). That is precisely the situation we have in this case.
As in Free Enterprise Fund , the provision requiring "good-cause removal is only one of [the] statutory provisions that, working together, produce a constitutional violation." 561 U.S., at 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138. The constitutional violation results from, at a minimum, the combination of the removal provision, 12 U. S. C. § 5491(c)(3), and the provision allowing the CFPB to seek enforcement of a civil investigative demand, § 5562(e)(1). When confronted with two provisions that operate together to violate the Constitution, the text of the severability clause provides no guidance as to which provision should be severed. Thus, we must choose, based on something other than the severability clause, which provision to sever.
Without text to guide us, the severability inquiry moves away from statutory interpretation and falls back on this Court's questionable precedents. See Murphy , 584 U. S., at --- - ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1486-1488 (THOMAS, J., concurring). An analysis of the Court's decisions in Booker and Free Enterprise Fund illustrates the Court's approach to determining which provision to sever when confronting an injury caused by an unconstitutional convergence of multiple statutory provisions.
In Booker , a Rule of Criminal Procedure, a subset of provisions in the Sentencing Guidelines, and a statutory provision operated together to require unconstitutional judicial factfinding. To determine which aspect of the sentencing scheme to sever, the Court sought to divine "what Congress would have intended in light of the Court's constitutional holding." Booker , 543 U.S., at 246, 125 S.Ct. 738 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court "recognize[d] that sometimes severability questions ... can arise [in the context of] a legislatively unforeseen constitutional problem." Id. , at 247, 125 S.Ct. 738. But it nonetheless felt qualified to craft a remedy that would "move sentencing in Congress' preferred direction." Id. , at 264, 125 S.Ct. 738. Surprisingly, that "move" did not involve enforcing the constitutional aspects of Congress' sentencing scheme. The Court stated that "we cannot assume that Congress, if faced with the statute's invalidity in key applications, would have preferred to apply the statute in as many other instances as possible." Id. , at 248, 125 S.Ct. 738. Despite the fact that there were a plethora of cases in which mandatory Sentencing Guidelines would have posed no constitutional problem, the Court decided to "sever and excise ... the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range," along with another provision which was not even at issue in the case. Id. , at 259, 125 S.Ct. 738. In essence, the Court crafted a new sentencing scheme, transforming the Sentencing Guidelines into an entirely discretionary system based on its estimation that Congress would have wanted that result.
The Court in Free Enterprise Fund declined to explicitly engage in Booker 's free-wheeling inquiry into Congress' hypothetical preferences, but it did not replace that inquiry with a clear standard. In that case, the Court held that a "number of statutory provisions ..., working together, produce[d] a constitutional violation" similar to the violation at issue here. Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 509, 130 S.Ct. 3138. The Court decided to sever the Board's removal restriction. It explicitly recognized that there were multiple ways to address the constitutional injury, stating that the Court could, for example, "blue-pencil a sufficient number of the Board's responsibilities," or "restrict the Board's enforcement powers." Ibid. But it described these alternative options as involving "editorial freedom-far more extensive than [the] holding today-[that] belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary." Id. , at 510, 130 S.Ct. 3138. The Court did not explain, however, why the option that it chose was not also "editorial freedom" that belongs to the Legislature or why the alternatives involved "more extensive" "editorial freedom" than its preferred option. Ibid. The most that the Court provided was a suggestion that fewer provisions would have to be severed under its approach. Id. , at 509-510, 130 S.Ct. 3138.
Today's plurality opinion provides no further guidance. In fact, the plurality does not even recognize that it has made a choice between the provisions that cause the constitutional injury. It merely states that "[i]f the Director were removable at will by the President, the constitutional violation would disappear." Ante , at 2209. Fair enough. But if the Director lacked executive authority under the statute to seek enforcement of a civil investigative demand, § 5562(e)(1), the constitutional violation in this case would also disappear. The plurality thus chooses which of the provisions to sever.
In short, when multiple provisions of law combine to cause a constitutional injury, the Court's current approach allows the Court to decide which provision to sever. The text of a severability clause does not guide that choice. Nor does the practice of early American courts. See supra , at 2218 - 2219. The Court is thus left to choose based on nothing more than speculation as to what the Legislature would have preferred. And the result of its choice can have a dramatic effect on the governing statutory scheme. See Booker , supra , at 259, 125 S.Ct. 738 (converting the entirety of the Sentencing Guidelines from a mandatory to a discretionary system). This is not a simple matter of following the "plain language" of a statute. Ante , at 2209. It is incumbent on us to take a close look at our precedents to make sure that we are not exceeding the scope of the judicial power.
* * *
Given my concerns about our modern severability doctrine and the fact that severability makes no difference to the dispute before us, I would resolve this case by simply denying the CFPB's petition to enforce the civil investigative demand.
Justice KAGAN, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part.
Throughout the Nation's history, this Court has left most decisions about how to structure the Executive Branch to Congress and the President, acting through legislation they both agree to. In particular, the Court has commonly allowed those two branches to create zones of administrative independence by limiting the President's power to remove agency heads. The Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The National Labor Relations Board. Statute after statute establishing such entities instructs the President that he may not discharge their directors except for cause-most often phrased as inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Those statutes, whose language the Court has repeatedly approved, provide the model for the removal restriction before us today. If precedent were any guide, that provision would have survived its encounter with this Court-and so would the intended independence of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
Our Constitution and history demand that result. The text of the Constitution allows these common for-cause removal limits. Nothing in it speaks of removal. And it grants Congress authority to organize all the institutions of American governance, provided only that those arrangements allow the President to perform his own constitutionally assigned duties. Still more, the Framers' choice to give the political branches wide discretion over administrative offices has played out through American history in ways that have settled the constitutional meaning. From the first, Congress debated and enacted measures to create spheres of administration-especially of financial affairs-detached from direct presidential control. As the years passed, and governance became ever more complicated, Congress continued to adopt and adapt such measures-confident it had latitude to do so under a Constitution meant to "endure for ages to come." McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 415, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) (approving the Second Bank of the United States). Not every innovation in governance-not every experiment in administrative independence-has proved successful. And debates about the prudence of limiting the President's control over regulatory agencies, including through his removal power, have never abated. But the Constitution-both as originally drafted and as practiced-mostly leaves disagreements about administrative structure to Congress and the President, who have the knowledge and experience needed to address them. Within broad bounds, it keeps the courts-who do not-out of the picture.
The Court today fails to respect its proper role. It recognizes that this Court has approved limits on the President's removal power over heads of agencies much like the CFPB. Agencies possessing similar powers, agencies charged with similar missions, agencies created for similar reasons. The majority's explanation is that the heads of those agencies fall within an "exception"-one for multimember bodies and another for inferior officers-to a "general rule" of unrestricted presidential removal power. Ante, at 2197 - 2198. And the majority says the CFPB Director does not. That account, though, is wrong in every respect. The majority's general rule does not exist. Its exceptions, likewise, are made up for the occasion-gerrymandered so the CFPB falls outside them. And the distinction doing most of the majority's work-between multimember bodies and single directors-does not respond to the constitutional values at stake. If a removal provision violates the separation of powers, it is because the measure so deprives the President of control over an official as to impede his own constitutional functions. But with or without a for-cause removal provision, the President has at least as much control over an individual as over a commission-and possibly more. That means the constitutional concern is, if anything, ameliorated when the agency has a single head. Unwittingly, the majority shows why courts should stay their hand in these matters. "Compared to Congress and the President, the Judiciary possesses an inferior understanding of the realities of administration" and the way "political power[ ] operates." Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U.S. 477, 523, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) (BREYER, J., dissenting).
In second-guessing the political branches, the majority second-guesses as well the wisdom of the Framers and the judgment of history. It writes in rules to the Constitution that the drafters knew well enough not to put there. It repudiates the lessons of American experience, from the 18th century to the present day. And it commits the Nation to a static version of governance, incapable of responding to new conditions and challenges. Congress and the President established the CFPB to address financial practices that had brought on a devastating recession, and could do so again. Today's decision wipes out a feature of that agency its creators thought fundamental to its mission-a measure of independence from political pressure. I respectfully dissent.
I
The text of the Constitution, the history of the country, the precedents of this Court, and the need for sound and adaptable governance-all stand against the majority's opinion. They point not to the majority's "general rule" of "unrestricted removal power" with two grudgingly applied "exceptions." Ante, at 2197 - 2198, 2199 - 2200. Rather, they bestow discretion on the legislature to structure administrative institutions as the times demand, so long as the President retains the ability to carry out his constitutional duties. And most relevant here, they give Congress wide leeway to limit the President's removal power in the interest of enhancing independence from politics in regulatory bodies like the CFPB.
A
What does the Constitution say about the separation of powers-and particularly about the President's removal authority? (Spoiler alert: about the latter, nothing at all.)
The majority offers the civics class version of separation of powers-call it the Schoolhouse Rock definition of the phrase. See Schoolhouse Rock! Three Ring Government (Mar. 13, 1979), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKSGyiT-o3o ("Ring one, Executive. Two is Legislative, that's Congress. Ring three, Judiciary"). The Constitution's first three articles, the majority recounts, "split the atom of sovereignty" among Congress, the President, and the courts. Ante, at 2202 - 2203 (internal quotation marks omitted). And by that mechanism, the Framers provided a "simple" fix "to governmental power and its perils." Ibid.
There is nothing wrong with that as a beginning (except the adjective "simple"). It is of course true that the Framers lodged three different kinds of power in three different entities. And that they did so for a crucial purpose-because, as James Madison wrote, "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person[ ] or body" or where "the power of judging [is] not separated from the legislative and executive powers." The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (quoting Baron de Montesquieu).
The problem lies in treating the beginning as an ending too-in failing to recognize that the separation of powers is, by design, neither rigid nor complete. Blackstone, whose work influenced the Framers on this subject as on others, observed that "every branch" of government "supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated, by the rest." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 151 (1765). So as James Madison stated, the creation of distinct branches "did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other." The Federalist No. 47, at 325 (emphasis deleted). To the contrary, Madison explained, the drafters of the Constitution-like those of then-existing state constitutions-opted against keeping the branches of government "absolutely separate and distinct." Id., at 327. Or as Justice Story reiterated a half-century later: "[W]hen we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government," it is "not meant to affirm, that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 524, p. 8 (1833). Instead, the branches have-as they must for the whole arrangement to work-"common link[s] of connexion [and] dependence." Ibid.
One way the Constitution reflects that vision is by giving Congress broad authority to establish and organize the Executive Branch. Article II presumes the existence of "Officer[s]" in "executive Departments." § 2, cl. 1. But it does not, as you might think from reading the majority opinion, give the President authority to decide what kinds of officers-in what departments, with what responsibilities-the Executive Branch requires. See ante, at 2197 ("The entire 'executive Power' belongs to the President alone"). Instead, Article I's Necessary and Proper Clause puts those decisions in the legislature's hands. Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" not just its own enumerated powers but also "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." § 8, cl. 18. Similarly, the Appointments Clause reflects Congress's central role in structuring the Executive Branch. Yes, the President can appoint principal officers, but only as the legislature "shall ... establish[ ] by Law" (and of course subject to the Senate's advice and consent). Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. And Congress has plenary power to decide not only what inferior officers will exist but also who (the President or a head of department) will appoint them. So as Madison told the first Congress, the legislature gets to "create[ ] the office, define[ ] the powers, [and] limit[ ] its duration." 1 Annals of Cong. 582 (1789). The President, as to the construction of his own branch of government, can only try to work his will through the legislative process.
The majority relies for its contrary vision on Article II's Vesting Clause, see ante, at 2197, 2204 - 2205, but the provision can't carry all that weight. Or as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote of a similar claim in Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), "extrapolat[ing]" an unrestricted removal power from such "general constitutional language"-which says only that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President"-is "more than the text will bear." Id., at 690, n. 29, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Dean John Manning has well explained why, even were it not obvious from the Clause's "open-ended language." Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1971 (2011). The Necessary and Proper Clause, he writes, makes it impossible to "establish a constitutional violation simply by showing that Congress has constrained the way '[t]he executive Power' is implemented"; that is exactly what the Clause gives Congress the power to do. Id., at 1967. Only "a specific historical understanding" can bar Congress from enacting a given constraint. Id., at 2024. And nothing of that sort broadly prevents Congress from limiting the President's removal power. I'll turn soon to the Decision of 1789 and other evidence of Post-Convention thought. See infra , at 2228 - 2231. For now, note two points about practice before the Constitution's drafting. First, in that era, Parliament often restricted the King's power to remove royal officers-and the President, needless to say, wasn't supposed to be a king. See Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive, 73 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021). Second, many States at the time allowed limits on gubernatorial removal power even though their constitutions had similar vesting clauses. See Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 323, 334-344 (2016). Historical understandings thus belie the majority's "general rule."
Nor can the Take Care Clause come to the majority's rescue. That Clause cannot properly serve as a "placeholder for broad judicial judgments" about presidential control. Goldsmith & Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1835, 1867 (2016) ; but see ante, at 2197, 2206 n.11 (using it that way). To begin with, the provision-"he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"-speaks of duty, not power. Art. II, § 3. New scholarship suggests the language came from English and colonial oaths taken by, and placing fiduciary obligations on, all manner and rank of executive officers. See Kent, Leib, & Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111, 2121-2178 (2019). To be sure, the imposition of a duty may imply a grant of power sufficient to carry it out. But again, the majority's view of that power ill comports with founding-era practice, in which removal limits were common. See, e.g., Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 353, 385 (1927) (noting that New York's Constitution of 1777 had nearly the same clause, though the State's executive had "very little voice" in removals). And yet more important, the text of the Take Care Clause requires only enough authority to make sure "the laws [are] faithfully executed"-meaning with fidelity to the law itself, not to every presidential policy preference. As this Court has held, a President can ensure " 'faithful execution' of the laws"-thereby satisfying his "take care" obligation-with a removal provision like the one here. Morrison , 487 U.S., at 692, 108 S.Ct. 2597. A for-cause standard gives him "ample authority to assure that [an official] is competently performing [his] statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the [relevant legislation's] provisions." Ibid.
Finally, recall the Constitution's telltale silence: Nowhere does the text say anything about the President's power to remove subordinate officials at will. The majority professes unconcern. After all, it says, "neither is there a 'separation of powers clause' or a 'federalism clause.' " Ante, at 2204 - 2205. But those concepts are carved into the Constitution's text-the former in its first three articles separating powers, the latter in its enumeration of federal powers and its reservation of all else to the States. And anyway, at-will removal is hardly such a "foundational doctrine[ ]," ibid. : You won't find it on a civics class syllabus. That's because removal is a tool -one means among many, even if sometimes an important one, for a President to control executive officials. See generally Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S., at 524, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (BREYER, J., dissenting). To find that authority hidden in the Constitution as a "general rule" is to discover what is nowhere there.
B
History no better serves the majority's cause. As Madison wrote, "a regular course of practice" can "liquidate & settle the meaning of " disputed or indeterminate constitutional provisions. Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908); see NLRB v. Noel Canning , 573 U.S. 513, 525, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014). The majority lays claim to that kind of record, asserting that its muscular view of "[t]he President's removal power has long been confirmed by history." Ante , at 2197. But that is not so. The early history-including the fabled Decision of 1789-shows mostly debate and division about removal authority. And when a "settle[ment of] meaning" at last occurred, it was not on the majority's terms. Instead, it supports wide latitude for Congress to create spheres of administrative independence.
1
Begin with evidence from the Constitution's ratification. And note that this moment is indeed the beginning: Delegates to the Constitutional Convention never discussed whether or to what extent the President would have power to remove executive officials. As a result, the Framers advocating ratification had no single view of the matter. In Federalist No. 77, Hamilton presumed that under the new Constitution "[t]he consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint" officers of the United States. Id., at 515. He thought that scheme would promote "steady administration": "Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new president would be restrained" from substituting "a person more agreeable to him." Ibid. By contrast, Madison thought the Constitution allowed Congress to decide how any executive official could be removed. He explained in Federalist No. 39: "The tenure of the ministerial offices generally will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case, and the example of the State Constitutions." Id., at 253. Neither view, of course, at all supports the majority's story.
The second chapter is the Decision of 1789, when Congress addressed the removal power while considering the bill creating the Department of Foreign Affairs. Speaking through Chief Justice Taft-a judicial presidentialist if ever there was one-this Court in Myers v. United States , 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926), read that debate as expressing Congress's judgment that the Constitution gave the President illimitable power to remove executive officials. The majority rests its own historical claim on that analysis (though somehow also finding room for its two exceptions). See ante, at 2197 - 2198. But Taft's historical research has held up even worse than Myers ' holding (which was mostly reversed, see infra , at 2200 - 2201). As Dean Manning has concluded after reviewing decades' worth of scholarship on the issue, "the implications of the debate, properly understood, [are] highly ambiguous and prone to overreading." Manning, 124 Harv. L. Rev., at 1965, n. 135; see id., at 2030-2031.
The best view is that the First Congress was "deeply divided" on the President's removal power, and "never squarely addressed" the central issue here. Id., at 1965, n. 135; Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1021, 1072 (2006). The congressional debates revealed three main positions. See Corwin, 27 Colum. L. Rev., at 361. Some shared Hamilton's Federalist No. 77 view: The Constitution required Senate consent for removal. At the opposite extreme, others claimed that the Constitution gave absolute removal power to the President. And a third faction maintained that the Constitution placed Congress in the driver's seat: The legislature could regulate, if it so chose, the President's authority to remove. In the end, Congress passed a bill saying nothing about removal, leaving the President free to fire the Secretary of Foreign Affairs at will. But the only one of the three views definitively rejected was Hamilton's theory of necessary Senate consent. As even strong proponents of executive power have shown, Congress never "endorse[d] the view that [it] lacked authority to modify" the President's removal authority when it wished to. Prakash, supra, at 1073 ; see Manning, supra, at 1965, n. 135, 2030-2031. The summer of 1789 thus ended without resolution of the critical question: Was the removal power "beyond the reach of congressional regulation?" Prakash, supra, at 1072.
At the same time, the First Congress gave officials handling financial affairs-as compared to diplomatic and military ones-some independence from the President. The title and first section of the statutes creating the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War designated them "executive departments." Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28; Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49. The law creating the Treasury Department conspicuously avoided doing so. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65. That difference in nomenclature signaled others of substance. Congress left the organization of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War skeletal, enabling the President to decide how he wanted to staff them. See Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 239-241 (1989). By contrast, Congress listed each of the offices within the Treasury Department, along with their functions. See ibid. Of the three initial Secretaries, only the Treasury's had an obligation to report to Congress when requested. See § 2, 1 Stat. 65-66. And perhaps most notable, Congress soon deemed the Comptroller of the Treasury's settlements of public accounts "final and conclusive." Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 48, § 4, 1 Stat. 441-442. That decision, preventing presidential overrides, marked the Comptroller as exercising independent judgment. True enough, no statute shielded the Comptroller from discharge. But even James Madison, who at this point opposed most removal limits, told Congress that "there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not hold his office at the pleasure" of the Secretary or President. 1 Annals of Cong. 612. At the least, as Professor Prakash writes, "Madison maintained that Congress had the [constitutional] authority to modify [the Comptroller's] tenure." Prakash, supra , at 1071.
Contrary to the majority's view, then, the founding era closed without any agreement that Congress lacked the power to curb the President's removal authority. And as it kept that question open, Congress took the first steps-which would launch a tradition-of distinguishing financial regulators from diplomatic and military officers. The latter mainly helped the President carry out his own constitutional duties in foreign relations and war. The former chiefly carried out statutory duties, fulfilling functions Congress had assigned to their offices. In addressing the new Nation's finances, Congress had begun to use its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause to design effective administrative institutions. And that included taking steps to insulate certain officers from political influence.
2
As the decades and centuries passed, those efforts picked up steam. Confronting new economic, technological, and social conditions, Congress-and often the President-saw new needs for pockets of independence within the federal bureaucracy. And that was especially so, again, when it came to financial regulation. I mention just a few highlights here-times when Congress decided that effective governance depended on shielding technical or expertise-based functions relating to the financial system from political pressure (or the moneyed interests that might lie behind it). Enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause, those measures-creating some of the Nation's most enduring institutions-themselves helped settle the extent of Congress's power. "[A] regular course of practice," to use Madison's phrase, has "liquidate[d]" constitutional meaning about the permissibility of independent agencies. See supra, at 2228 - 2229.
Take first Congress's decision in 1816 to create the Second Bank of the United States-"the first truly independent agency in the republic's history." Lessig & Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1994). Of the twenty-five directors who led the Bank, the President could appoint and remove only five. See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, § 8, 3 Stat. 269. Yet the Bank had a greater impact on the Nation than any but a few institutions, regulating the Nation's money supply in ways anticipating what the Federal Reserve does today. Of course, the Bank was controversial-in large part because of its freedom from presidential control. Andrew Jackson chafed at the Bank's independence and eventually fired his Treasury Secretary for keeping public moneys there (a dismissal that itself provoked a political storm). No matter. Innovations in governance always have opponents; administrative independence predictably (though by no means invariably) provokes presidential ire. The point is that by the early 19th century, Congress established a body wielding enormous financial power mostly outside the President's dominion.
The Civil War brought yet further encroachments on presidential control over financial regulators. In response to wartime economic pressures, President Lincoln (not known for his modest view of executive power) asked Congress to establish an office called the Comptroller of the Currency. The statute he signed made the Comptroller removable only with the Senate's consent-a version of the old Hamiltonian idea, though this time required not by the Constitution itself but by Congress. See Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. A year later, Congress amended the statute to permit removal by the President alone, but only upon "reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate." Act of June 3, 1864, § 1, 13 Stat. 100. The majority dismisses the original version of the statute as an "aberration." Ante, at 2201. But in the wake of the independence given first to the Comptroller of the Treasury and then to the national Bank, it's hard to conceive of this newest Comptroller position as so great a departure. And even the second iteration of the statute preserved a constraint on the removal power, requiring a President in a firing mood to explain himself to Congress-a demand likely to make him sleep on the subject. In both versions of the law, Congress responded to new financial challenges with new regulatory institutions, alert to the perils in this area of political interference.
And then, nearly a century and a half ago, the floodgates opened. In 1887, the growing power of the railroads over the American economy led Congress to create the Interstate Commerce Commission. Under that legislation, the President could remove the five Commissioners only "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office"-the same standard Congress applied to the CFPB Director. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, § 11, 24 Stat. 383. More-many more-for-cause removal provisions followed. In 1913, Congress gave the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board for-cause protection to ensure the agency would resist political pressure and promote economic stability. See Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251. The next year, Congress provided similar protection to the FTC in the interest of ensuring "a continuous policy" "free from the effect" of "changing [White House] incumbency." 51 Cong. Rec. 10376 (1914). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In the financial realm, "independent agencies have remained the bedrock of the institutional framework governing U. S. markets." Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 327, 331 (2013). By one count, across all subject matter areas, 48 agencies have heads (and below them hundreds more inferior officials) removable only for cause. See Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 541, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (BREYER, J., dissenting). So year by year by year, the broad sweep of history has spoken to the constitutional question before us: Independent agencies are everywhere.
C
What is more, the Court's precedents before today have accepted the role of independent agencies in our governmental system. To be sure, the line of our decisions has not run altogether straight. But we have repeatedly upheld provisions that prevent the President from firing regulatory officials except for such matters as neglect or malfeasance. In those decisions, we sounded a caution, insisting that Congress could not impede through removal restrictions the President's performance of his own constitutional duties. (So, to take the clearest example, Congress could not curb the President's power to remove his close military or diplomatic advisers.) But within that broad limit, this Court held, Congress could protect from at-will removal the officials it deemed to need some independence from political pressures. Nowhere do those precedents suggest what the majority announces today: that the President has an "unrestricted removal power" subject to two bounded exceptions. Ante , at 2188 - 2189.
The majority grounds its new approach in Myers , ignoring the way this Court has cabined that decision. Myers , the majority tells us, found an unrestrained removal power "essential to the [President's] execution of the laws." Ante, at 2197 - 2198 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S., at 117, 47 S.Ct. 21 ). What the majority does not say is that within a decade the Court abandoned that view (much as later scholars rejected Taft's one-sided history, see supra, at 2229 - 2230). In Humphrey's Executor v. United States , 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935), the Court unceremoniously-and unanimously-confined Myers to its facts. "[T]he narrow point actually decided" there, Humphrey's stated, was that the President could "remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of the Senate." 295 U.S., at 626, 55 S.Ct. 869. Nothing else in Chief Justice Taft's prolix opinion "c[a]me within the rule of stare decisis ." Ibid. (Indeed, the Court went on, everything in Myers "out of harmony" with Humphrey's was expressly "disapproved." 295 U.S., at 626, 55 S.Ct. 869.) Half a century later, the Court was more generous. Two decisions read Myers as standing for the principle that Congress's own "participation in the removal of executive officers is unconstitutional." Bowsher v. Synar , 478 U.S. 714, 725, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) ; see Morrison , 487 U.S., at 686, 108 S.Ct. 2597 ("As we observed in Bowsher , the essence" of " Myers was the judgment that the Constitution prevents Congress from draw[ing] to itself " the power to remove (internal quotation marks omitted)). Bowsher made clear that Myers had nothing to say about Congress's power to enact a provision merely "limit[ing] the President's powers of removal" through a for-cause provision. 478 U.S., at 724, 106 S.Ct. 3181. That issue, the Court stated, was "not presented" in "the Myers case." Ibid. Instead, the relevant cite was Humphrey's .
And Humphrey's found constitutional a statute identical to the one here, providing that the President could remove FTC Commissioners for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 295 U.S., at 619, 55 S.Ct. 869. The Humphrey's Court, as the majority notes, relied in substantial part on what kind of work the Commissioners performed. See id., at 628, 631, 55 S.Ct. 869 ; ante, at 2231 - 2232. (By contrast, nothing in the decision turned-as the majority suggests, see ante, at 2231 - 2232-on any of the agency's organizational features. See infra , at 2240 - 2241.) According to Humphrey's , the Commissioners' primary work was to "carry into effect legislative policies"-"filling in and administering the details embodied by [a statute's] general standard." 295 U.S., at 627-628, 55 S.Ct. 869. In addition, the Court noted, the Commissioners recommended dispositions in court cases, much as a special master does. Given those "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial"-as opposed to "purely executive"-functions, Congress could limit the President's removal authority. Id., at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869. Or said another way, Congress could give the FTC some "independen[ce from] executive control." Id., at 629, 55 S.Ct. 869.
About two decades later, an again-unanimous Court in Wiener v. United States , 357 U.S. 349, 78 S.Ct. 1275, 2 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1958), reaffirmed Humphrey's . The question in Wiener was whether the President could dismiss without cause members of the War Claims Commission, an entity charged with compensating injuries arising from World War II. Disdaining Myers and relying on Humphrey's , the Court said he could not. The Court described as "short-lived" Myers ' view that the President had "inherent constitutional power to remove officials, no matter what the relation of the executive to the discharge of their duties." 357 U.S., at 352, 78 S.Ct. 1275. Here, the Commissioners were not close agents of the President, who needed to be responsive to his preferences. Rather, they exercised adjudicatory responsibilities over legal claims. Congress, the Court found, had wanted the Commissioners to do so "free from [political] control or coercive influence." Id., at 355, 78 S.Ct. 1275 (quoting Humphrey's , 295 U.S., at 629, 55 S.Ct. 869 ). And that choice, as Humphrey's had held, was within Congress's power. The Constitution enabled Congress to take down "the Damocles' sword of removal" hanging over the Commissioners' heads. 357 U.S., at 356, 78 S.Ct. 1275.
Another three decades on, Morrison both extended Humphrey's domain and clarified the standard for addressing removal issues. The Morrison Court, over a one-Justice dissent, upheld for-cause protections afforded to an independent counsel with power to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by high-ranking officials. The Court well understood that those law enforcement functions differed from the rulemaking and adjudicatory duties highlighted in Humphrey's and Wiener . But that difference did not resolve the issue. An official's functions, Morrison held, were relevant to but not dispositive of a removal limit's constitutionality. The key question in all the cases, Morrison saw, was whether such a restriction would "impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty." 487 U.S., at 691, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Only if it did so would it fall outside Congress's power. And the protection for the independent counsel, the Court found, did not. Even though the counsel's functions were "purely executive," the President's "need to control the exercise of [her] discretion" was not "so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require" unrestricted removal authority. Id., at 690-691, 108 S.Ct. 2597. True enough, the Court acknowledged, that the for-cause standard prevented the President from firing the counsel for discretionary decisions or judgment calls. But it preserved "ample authority" in the President "to assure that the counsel is competently performing" her "responsibilities in a manner that comports with" all legal requirements. Id., at 692, 108 S.Ct. 2597. That meant the President could meet his own constitutional obligation "to ensure 'the faithful execution' of the laws." Ibid. ; see supra, at 2228.
The majority's description of Morrison , see ante, at 2198 - 2199, is not true to the decision. (Mostly, it seems, the majority just wishes the case would go away. See ante, at 2200, n. 4.) First, Morrison is no "exception" to a broader rule from Myers . Morrison echoed all of Humphrey's criticism of the by-then infamous Myers "dicta." 487 U.S., at 687, 108 S.Ct. 2597. It again rejected the notion of an "all-inclusive" removal power. Ibid. It yet further confined Myers ' reach, making clear that Congress could restrict the President's removal of officials carrying out even the most traditional executive functions. And the decision, with care, set out the governing rule-again, that removal restrictions are permissible so long as they do not impede the President's performance of his own constitutionally assigned duties. Second, as all that suggests, Morrison is not limited to inferior officers. In the eight pages addressing the removal issue, the Court constantly spoke of "officers" and "officials" in general. 487 U.S., at 685-693, 108 S.Ct. 2597. By contrast, the Court there used the word "inferior" in just one sentence (which of course the majority quotes), when applying its general standard to the case's facts. Id., at 691, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissent emphasized that the counsel's inferior-office status played no role in the Court's decision. See id., at 724, 108 S.Ct. 2597 ("The Court could have resolved the removal power issue in this case by simply relying" on that status, but did not). As Justice Scalia noted, the Court in United States v. Perkins , 116 U.S. 483, 484-485, 6 S.Ct. 449, 29 L.Ed. 700 (1886), had a century earlier allowed Congress to restrict the President's removal power over inferior officers. See Morrison , 487 U.S., at 723-724, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Were that Morrison 's basis, a simple citation would have sufficed.
Even Free Enterprise Fund , in which the Court recently held a removal provision invalid, operated within the framework of this precedent-and in so doing, left in place a removal provision just like the one here. In that case, the Court considered a "highly unusual" scheme of double for-cause protection. 561 U.S., at 505, 130 S.Ct. 3138. Members of an accounting board were protected from removal by SEC Commissioners, who in turn were protected from removal by the President. The Court found that the two-layer structure deprived the President of "adequate control" over the Board members. Id., at 508, 130 S.Ct. 3138. The scheme "impaired" the President's "ability to execute the laws," the Court explained, because neither he nor any fully dependent agent could decide "whether[ ] good cause exists" for a discharge. Id., at 495-496, 130 S.Ct. 3138. That holding cast no doubt on ordinary for-cause protections, of the kind in the Court's prior cases (and here as well). Quite the opposite. The Court observed that it did not "take issue with for-cause limitations in general"-which do enable the President to determine whether good cause for discharge exists (because, say, an official has violated the law). Id., at 501, 130 S.Ct. 3138. And the Court's solution to the constitutional problem it saw was merely to strike one level of insulation, making the Board removable by the SEC at will. That remedy left the SEC's own for-cause protection in place. The President could thus remove Commissioners for malfeasance or neglect, but not for policy disagreements. See ante, at 2206 - 2207.
So caselaw joins text and history in establishing the general permissibility of for-cause provisions giving some independence to agencies. Contrary to the majority's view, those laws do not represent a suspicious departure from illimitable presidential control over administration. For almost a century, this Court has made clear that Congress has broad discretion to enact for-cause protections in pursuit of good governance.
D
The deferential approach this Court has taken gives Congress the flexibility it needs to craft administrative agencies. Diverse problems of government demand diverse solutions. They call for varied measures and mixtures of democratic accountability and technical expertise, energy and efficiency. Sometimes, the arguments push toward tight presidential control of agencies. The President's engagement, some people say, can disrupt bureaucratic stagnation, counter industry capture, and make agencies more responsive to public interests. See, well, Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2331-2346 (2001). At other times, the arguments favor greater independence from presidential involvement. Insulation from political pressure helps ensure impartial adjudications. It places technical issues in the hands of those most capable of addressing them. It promotes continuity, and prevents short-term electoral interests from distorting policy. (Consider, for example, how the Federal Reserve's independence stops a President trying to win a second term from manipulating interest rates.) Of course, the right balance between presidential control and independence is often uncertain, contested, and value-laden. No mathematical formula governs institutional design; trade-offs are endemic to the enterprise. But that is precisely why the issue is one for the political branches to debate-and then debate again as times change. And it's why courts should stay (mostly) out of the way. Rather than impose rigid rules like the majority's, they should let Congress and the President figure out what blend of independence and political control will best enable an agency to perform its intended functions.
Judicial intrusion into this field usually reveals only how little courts know about governance. Even everything I just said is an over-simplification. It suggests that agencies can easily be arranged on a spectrum, from the most to the least presidentially controlled. But that is not so. A given agency's independence (or lack of it) depends on a wealth of features, relating not just to removal standards, but also to appointments practices, procedural rules, internal organization, oversight regimes, historical traditions, cultural norms, and (inevitably) personal relationships. It is hard to pinpoint how those factors work individually, much less in concert, to influence the distance between an agency and a President. In that light, even the judicial opinions' perennial focus on removal standards is a bit of a puzzle. Removal is only the most obvious, not necessarily the most potent, means of control. See generally Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 524, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (BREYER, J., dissenting). That is because informal restraints can prevent Presidents from firing at-will officers-and because other devices can keep officers with for-cause protection under control. Of course no court, as Free Enterprise Fund noted, can accurately assess the "bureaucratic minutiae" affecting a President's influence over an agency. Id. , at 500, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (majority opinion); ante, at 2208 (reprising the point). But that is yet more reason for courts to defer to the branches charged with fashioning administrative structures, and to hesitate before ruling out agency design specs like for-cause removal standards.
Our Constitution, as shown earlier, entrusts such decisions to more accountable and knowledgeable actors. See supra, at 2226 - 2229. The document-with great good sense-sets out almost no rules about the administrative sphere. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote when he upheld the first independent financial agency: "To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument." McCulloch , 4 Wheat. at 415. That would have been, he continued, "an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly." Ibid. And if the Constitution, for those reasons, does not lay out immutable rules, then neither should judges. This Court has usually respected that injunction. It has declined to second-guess the work of the political branches in creating independent agencies like the CFPB. In reversing course today-in spurning a "pragmatic, flexible approach to American governance" in favor of a dogmatic, inflexible one, ante, at 2207-the majority makes a serious error.
II
As the majority explains, the CFPB emerged out of disaster. The collapse of the subprime mortgage market "precipitat[ed] a financial crisis that wiped out over $10 trillion in American household wealth and cost millions of Americans their jobs, their retirements, and their homes." Ante, at 2192. In that moment of economic ruin, the President proposed and Congress enacted legislation to address the causes of the collapse and prevent a recurrence. An important part of that statute created an agency to protect consumers from exploitative financial practices. The agency would take over enforcement of almost 20 existing federal laws. See 12 U. S. C. § 5581. And it would administer a new prohibition on "unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]" in the consumer-finance sector. § 5536(a)(1)(B).
No one had a doubt that the new agency should be independent. As explained already, Congress has historically given-with this Court's permission-a measure of independence to financial regulators like the Federal Reserve Board and the FTC. See supra, at 2197 - 2200. And agencies of that kind had administered most of the legislation whose enforcement the new statute transferred to the CFPB. The law thus included an ordinary for-cause provision-once again, that the President could fire the CFPB's Director only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." § 5491(c)(3). That standard would allow the President to discharge the Director for a failure to "faithfully execute[ ]" the law, as well as for basic incompetence. U. S. Const., Art. II, § 3 ; see supra, at 2195, 2202. But it would not permit removal for policy differences.
The question here, which by now you're well equipped to answer, is whether including that for-cause standard in the statute creating the CFPB violates the Constitution.
A
Applying our longstanding precedent, the answer is clear: It does not. This Court, as the majority acknowledges, has sustained the constitutionality of the FTC and similar independent agencies. See ante, at 2191 - 2192, 2231 - 2233. The for-cause protections for the heads of those agencies, the Court has found, do not impede the President's ability to perform his own constitutional duties, and so do not breach the separation of powers. See supra, at 2200 - 2203. There is nothing different here. The CFPB wields the same kind of power as the FTC and similar agencies. And all of their heads receive the same kind of removal protection. No less than those other entities-by now part of the fabric of government-the CFPB is thus a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to structure administration.
First, the CFPB's powers are nothing unusual in the universe of independent agencies. The CFPB, as the majority notes, can issue regulations, conduct its own adjudications, and bring civil enforcement actions in court-all backed by the threat of penalties. See ante, at 2191; 12 U. S. C. §§ 5512, 5562 - 5565. But then again, so too can (among others) the FTC and SEC, two agencies whose regulatory missions parallel the CFPB's. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 45, 53, 57a, 57b-3, 78u, 78v, 78w. Just for a comparison, the CFPB now has 19 enforcement actions pending, while the SEC brought 862 such actions last year alone. See Brief for Petitioner 7; SEC, Div. of Enforcement 2019 Ann. Rep. 14. And although the majority bemoans that the CFPB can "bring the coercive power of the state to bear on millions of private citizens," ante, at 2200 - 2201, that scary-sounding description applies to most independent agencies. Forget that the more relevant factoid for those many citizens might be that the CFPB has recovered over $11 billion for banking consumers. See ante, at 2193. The key point here is that the CFPB got the mass of its regulatory authority from other independent agencies that had brought the same "coercive power to bear." See 12 U. S. C. § 5581 (transferring power from, among others, the Federal Reserve, FTC, and FDIC). Congress, to be sure, gave the CFPB new authority over "unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]" in transactions involving a "consumer financial product or service." §§ 5517(a)(1), 5536(a)(1). But again, the FTC has power to go after "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce"-a portfolio spanning a far wider swath of the economy. 15 U. S. C. § 45(a)(1). And if influence on economic life is the measure, consider the Federal Reserve, whose every act has global consequence. The CFPB, gauged by that comparison, is a piker.
Second, the removal protection given the CFPB's Director is standard fare. The removal power rests with the President alone; Congress has no role to play, as it did in the laws struck down in Myers and Bowsher . See supra, at 2233 - 2234. The statute provides only one layer of protection, unlike the law in Free Enterprise Fund . See supra, at 2236. And the clincher, which you have heard before: The for-cause standard used for the CFPB is identical to the one the Court upheld in Humphrey's . Both enable the President to fire an agency head for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." See 12 U. S. C. § 5491(c)(3) ; 15 U. S. C. § 41 ; supra, at 2234. A removal provision of that kind applied to a financial agency head, this Court has held, does not "unduly trammel[ ] on executive authority," even though it prevents the President from dismissing the official for a discretionary policy judgment. Morrison , 487 U.S., at 691, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Once again: The removal power has not been "completely stripped from the President," providing him with no means to "ensure the 'faithful execution' of the laws." Id., at 692, 108 S.Ct. 2597 ; see supra, at 2202. Rather, this Court has explained, the for-cause standard gives the President "ample authority to assure that [the official] is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with" all legal obligations. 487 U.S., at 692, 108 S.Ct. 2597 ; see supra, at 2235. In other words-and contra today's majority-the President's removal power, though not absolute, gives him the "meaningful[ ] control[ ]" of the Director that the Constitution requires. Ante, at 2203 - 2204.
The analysis is as simple as simple can be. The CFPB Director exercises the same powers, and receives the same removal protections, as the heads of other, constitutionally permissible independent agencies. How could it be that this opinion is a dissent?
B
The majority focuses on one (it says sufficient) reason: The CFPB Director is singular, not plural. "Instead of placing the agency under the leadership of a board with multiple members," the majority protests, "Congress provided that the CFPB would be led by a single Director." Ante, at 2191. And a solo CFPB Director does not fit within either of the majority's supposed exceptions. He is not an inferior officer, so (the majority says) Morrison does not apply; and he is not a multimember board, so (the majority says) neither does Humphrey's . Further, the majority argues, "[a]n agency with a [unitary] structure like that of the CFPB" is "novel"-or, if not quite that, "almost wholly unprecedented." Ante, at 2188 - 2189, 2200 - 2201. Finally, the CFPB's organizational form violates the "constitutional structure" because it vests power in a "single individual" who is "insulated from Presidential control." Ante, at 2188 - 2189, 2203 - 2204.
I'm tempted at this point just to say: No. All I've explained about constitutional text, history, and precedent invalidates the majority's thesis. But I'll set out here some more targeted points, taking step by step the majority's reasoning.
First, as I'm afraid you've heard before, the majority's "exceptions" (like its general rule) are made up. See supra, at 2232 - 2236. To begin with, our precedents reject the very idea of such exceptions. "The analysis contained in our removal cases," Morrison stated, shuns any attempt "to define rigid categories" of officials who may (or may not) have job protection. 487 U.S., at 689, 108 S.Ct. 2597. Still more, the contours of the majority's exceptions don't connect to our decisions' reasoning. The analysis in Morrison , as I've shown, extended far beyond inferior officers. See supra, at 2235 - 2236. And of course that analysis had to apply to individual officers: The independent counsel was very much a person, not a committee. So the idea that Morrison is in a separate box from this case doesn't hold up. Similarly, Humphrey's and later precedents give no support to the majority's view that the number of people at the apex of an agency matters to the constitutional issue. Those opinions mention the "groupness" of the agency head only in their background sections. The majority picks out that until-now-irrelevant fact to distinguish the CFPB, and constructs around it an until-now-unheard-of exception. So if the majority really wants to see something "novel," ante, at 2191 - 2192, it need only look to its opinion.
By contrast, the CFPB's single-director structure has a fair bit of precedent behind it. The Comptroller of the Currency. The Office of the Special Counsel (OSC). The Social Security Administration (SSA). The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Maybe four prior agencies is in the eye of the beholder, but it's hardly nothing. I've already explained why the earliest of those agencies-the Civil-War-era Comptroller-is not the blip the majority describes. See supra, at 2231 - 2232. The office is one in a long line, starting with the founding-era Comptroller of the Treasury (also one person), of financial regulators designed to do their jobs with some independence. As for the other three, the majority objects: too powerless and too contested. See ante, at 2200 - 2203. I think not. On power, the SSA runs the Nation's largest government program-among other things, deciding all claims brought by its 64 million beneficiaries; the FHFA plays a crucial role in overseeing the mortgage market, on which millions of Americans annually rely; and the OSC prosecutes misconduct in the two-million-person federal workforce. All different from the CFPB, no doubt; but the majority can't think those matters beneath a President's notice. (Consider: Would the President lose more votes from a malfunctioning SSA or CFPB?) And controversial? Well, yes, they are. Almost all independent agencies are controversial, no matter how many directors they have. Or at least controversial among Presidents and their lawyers. That's because whatever might be said in their favor, those agencies divest the President of some removal power. If signing statements and veto threats made independent agencies unconstitutional, quite a few wouldn't pass muster. Maybe that's what the majority really wants (I wouldn't know)-but it can't pretend the disputes surrounding these agencies had anything to do with whether their heads are singular or plural.
Still more important, novelty is not the test of constitutionality when it comes to structuring agencies. See Mistretta v. United States , 488 U.S. 361, 385, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) ("[M]ere anomaly or innovation" does not violate the separation of powers). Congress regulates in that sphere under the Necessary and Proper Clause, not (as the majority seems to think) a Rinse and Repeat Clause. See supra, at 2227. The Framers understood that new times would often require new measures, and exigencies often demand innovation. See McCulloch , 4 Wheat. at 415 ; supra, at 2237. In line with that belief, the history of the administrative sphere-its rules, its practices, its institutions-is replete with experiment and change. See supra, at 2228 - 2233. Indeed, each of the agencies the majority says now fits within its "exceptions" was once new; there is, as the saying goes, "a first time for everything." National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , 567 U.S. 519, 549, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012). So even if the CFPB differs from its forebears in having a single director, that departure is not itself "telling" of a "constitutional problem." Ante, at 2200 - 2201. In deciding what this moment demanded, Congress had no obligation to make a carbon copy of a design from a bygone era.
And Congress's choice to put a single director, rather than a multimember commission, at the CFPB's head violates no principle of separation of powers. The purported constitutional problem here is that an official has "slip[ped] from the Executive's control" and "supervision"-that he has become unaccountable to the President. Ante, at 2203, 2205 (internal quotation marks omitted). So to make sense on the majority's own terms, the distinction between singular and plural agency heads must rest on a theory about why the former more easily "slip" from the President's grasp. But the majority has nothing to offer. In fact, the opposite is more likely to be true: To the extent that such matters are measurable, individuals are easier than groups to supervise.
To begin with, trying to generalize about these matters is something of a fool's errand. Presidential control, as noted earlier, can operate through many means-removal to be sure, but also appointments, oversight devices (e.g., centralized review of rulemaking or litigating positions), budgetary processes, personal outreach, and more. See Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 524, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (BREYER, J., dissenting); supra, at 2236 - 2237. The effectiveness of each of those control mechanisms, when present, can then depend on a multitude of agency-specific practices, norms, rules, and organizational features. In that complex stew, the difference between a singular and plural agency head will often make not a whit of difference. Or to make the point more concrete, a multimember commission may be harder to control than an individual director for a host of reasons unrelated to its plural character. That may be so when the two are subject to the same removal standard, or even when the individual director has greater formal job protection. Indeed, the very category of multimember commissions breaks apart under inspection, spoiling the majority's essential dichotomy. See generally Brief for Rachel E. Barkow et al. as Amici Curiae . Some of those commissions have chairs appointed by the President; others do not. Some of those chairs are quite powerful; others are not. Partisan balance requirements, term length, voting rules, and more-all vary widely, in ways that make a significant difference to the ease of presidential control. Why, then, would anyone distinguish along a simple commission/single-director axis when deciding whether the Constitution requires at-will removal?
But if the demand is for generalization, then the majority's distinction cuts the opposite way: More powerful control mechanisms are needed (if anything) for commissions. Holding everything else equal, those are the agencies more likely to "slip from the Executive's control." Ante, at 2204. Just consider your everyday experience: It's easier to get one person to do what you want than a gaggle. So too, you know exactly whom to blame when an individual-but not when a group-does a job badly. The same is true in bureaucracies. A multimember structure reduces accountability to the President because it's harder for him to oversee, to influence-or to remove, if necessary-a group of five or more commissioners than a single director. Indeed, that is why Congress so often resorts to hydra-headed agencies. "[M]ultiple membership," an influential Senate Report concluded, is "a buffer against Presidential control" (especially when combined, as it often is, with partisan-balance requirements). Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Study on Federal Regulation, S. Doc. No. 95-91, vol. 5, p. 75 (1977). So, for example, Congress constructed the Federal Reserve as it did because it is "easier to protect a board from political control than to protect a single appointed official." R. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 153 (1941). It is hard to know why Congress did not take the same tack when creating the CFPB. But its choice brought the agency only closer to the President-more exposed to his view, more subject to his sway. In short, the majority gets the matter backward: Where presidential control is the object, better to have one than many.
Because it has no answer on that score, the majority slides to a different question: Assuming presidential control of any independent agency is vanishingly slim, is a single-head or a multi-head agency more capable of exercising power, and so of endangering liberty? See ante, at 2202 - 2204. The majority says a single head is the greater threat because he may wield power "unilaterally " and "[w]ith no colleagues to persuade." Ante, at 2203 - 2204 (emphasis in original). So the CFPB falls victim to what the majority sees as a constitutional anti-power-concentration principle (with an exception for the President).
If you've never heard of a statute being struck down on that ground, you're not alone. It is bad enough to "extrapolat[e]" from the "general constitutional language" of Article II's Vesting Clause an unrestricted removal power constraining Congress's ability to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Morrison , 487 U.S., at 690, n. 29, 108 S.Ct. 2597 ; see supra, at 2227 - 2228. It is still worse to extrapolate from the Constitution's general structure (division of powers) and implicit values (liberty) a limit on Congress's express power to create administrative bodies. And more: to extrapolate from such sources a distinction as prosaic as that between the SEC and the CFPB-i.e., between a multi-headed and single-headed agency. That is, to adapt a phrase (or two) from our precedent, "more than" the emanations of "the text will bear." Morrison , 487 U.S., at 690, n. 29, 108 S.Ct. 2597. By using abstract separation-of-powers arguments for such purposes, the Court "appropriate[s]" the "power delegated to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause" to compose the government. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 78 (2014). In deciding for itself what is "proper," the Court goes beyond its own proper bounds.
And in doing so, the majority again reveals its lack of interest in how agencies work. First, the premise of the majority's argument-that the CFPB head is a mini-dictator, not subject to meaningful presidential control, see ante , at 2203 - 2204-is wrong. As this Court has seen in the past, independent agencies are not fully independent. A for-cause removal provision, as noted earlier, leaves "ample" control over agency heads in the hands of the President. Morrison , 487 U.S., at 692, 108 S.Ct. 2597 ; see supra , at 2235. He can discharge them for failing to perform their duties competently or in accordance with law, and so ensure that the laws are "faithfully executed." U. S. Const., Art. II, § 3 ; see supra, at 2229, 2235. And he can use the many other tools attached to the Office of the Presidency-including in the CFPB's case, rulemaking review-to exert influence over discretionary policy calls. See supra , at 2242, and n.13. Second, the majority has nothing but intuition to back up its essentially functionalist claim that the CFPB would be less capable of exercising power if it had more than one Director (even supposing that were a suitable issue for a court to address). Ante , at 2202 - 2204. Maybe the CFPB would be. Or maybe not. Although a multimember format tends to frustrate the President's control over an agency, see supra , at 2209 - 2211, it may not lessen the agency's own ability to act with decision and dispatch. (Consider, for a recent example, the Federal Reserve Board.) That effect presumably would depend on the agency's internal organization, voting rules, and similar matters. At the least: If the Court is going to invalidate statutes based on empirical assertions like this one, it should offer some empirical support. It should not pretend that its assessment that the CFPB wields more power more dangerously than the SEC comes from someplace in the Constitution. But today the majority fails to accord even that minimal respect to Congress.
III
Recall again how this dispute got started. In the midst of the Great Recession, Congress and the President came together to create an agency with an important mission. It would protect consumers from the reckless financial practices that had caused the then-ongoing economic collapse. Not only Congress but also the President thought that the new agency, to fulfill its mandate, needed a measure of independence. So the two political branches, acting together, gave the CFPB Director the same job protection that innumerable other agency heads possess. All in all, those branches must have thought, they had done a good day's work. Relying on their experience and knowledge of administration, they had built an agency in the way best suited to carry out its functions. They had protected the public from financial chicanery and crisis. They had governed.
And now consider how the dispute ends-with five unelected judges rejecting the result of that democratic process. The outcome today will not shut down the CFPB: A different majority of this Court, including all those who join this opinion, believes that if the agency's removal provision is unconstitutional, it should be severed. But the majority on constitutionality jettisons a measure Congress and the President viewed as integral to the way the agency should operate. The majority does so even though the Constitution grants to Congress, acting with the President's approval, the authority to create and shape administrative bodies. And even though those branches, as compared to courts, have far greater understanding of political control mechanisms and agency design.
Nothing in the Constitution requires that outcome; to the contrary. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Framers took pains to craft a document that would allow the structures of governance to change, as times and needs change. The Constitution says only a few words about administration. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote: Rather than prescribing "immutable rules," it enables Congress to choose "the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers." McCulloch , 4 Wheat. at 415. It authorizes Congress to meet new exigencies with new devices. So Article II does not generally prohibit independent agencies. Nor do any supposed structural principles. Nor do any odors wafting from the document. Save for when those agencies impede the President's performance of his own constitutional duties, the matter is left up to Congress.
Our history has stayed true to the Framers' vision. Congress has accepted their invitation to experiment with administrative forms-nowhere more so than in the field of financial regulation. And this Court has mostly allowed it to do so. The result is a broad array of independent agencies, no two exactly alike but all with a measure of insulation from the President's removal power. The Federal Reserve Board; the FTC; the SEC; maybe some you've never heard of. As to each, Congress thought that formal job protection for policymaking would produce regulatory outcomes in greater accord with the long-term public interest. Congress may have been right; or it may have been wrong; or maybe it was some of both. No matter-the branches accountable to the people have decided how the people should be governed.
The CFPB should have joined the ranks. Maybe it will still do so, even under today's opinion: The majority tells Congress that it may "pursu[e] alternative responses" to the identified constitutional defect-"for example, converting the CFPB into a multimember agency." Ante , at 2211. But there was no need to send Congress back to the drawing board. The Constitution does not distinguish between single-director and multimember independent agencies. It instructs Congress, not this Court, to decide on agency design. Because this Court ignores that sensible-indeed, that obvious-division of tasks, I respectfully dissent.
The dissent would have us ignore the reasoning of Humphrey's Executor and instead apply the decision only as part of a reimagined Humphrey's -through-Morrison framework. See post , at 2234 n.7, 2234 - 2236 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (hereinafter dissent). But we take the decision on its own terms, not through gloss added by a later Court in dicta. The dissent also criticizes us for suggesting that the 1935 FTC may have had lesser responsibilities than the present FTC. See post , at 2239 n.10. Perhaps the FTC possessed broader rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers than the Humphrey's Court appreciated. Perhaps not. Either way, what matters is the set of powers the Court considered as the basis for its decision, not any latent powers that the agency may have had not alluded to by the Court.
The dissent suggests that the Comptroller still enjoyed some degree of insulation after his removal protection was repealed because the President faced a new requirement to "communicate[ ]" his "reasons" for terminating the Comptroller to the Senate. Post, at 2232 (quoting Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 1, 13 Stat. 100). But the President could still remove the Comptroller for any reason so long as the President was, in the dissent's phrase, "in a firing mood." Post , at 2232.
The OSC should not be confused with the independent counsel in Morrison or the special counsel recently appointed to investigate allegations related to the 2016 Presidential election. Despite sharing similar titles, those individuals have no relationship to the OSC.
An Act similar to the one vetoed by President Reagan was eventually signed by President George H. W. Bush after extensive negotiations and compromises with Congress. See Public Papers of the Presidents, George H. W. Bush, Vol. I, Apr. 10, 1989, p. 391 (1990).
The dissent categorizes the CFPB as one of many "financial regulators" that have historically enjoyed some insulation from the President. See post , at 2230 - 2233. But even assuming financial institutions like the Second Bank and the Federal Reserve can claim a special historical status, the CFPB is in an entirely different league. It acts as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens. See supra, at 2192 - 2193. And, of course, it is the only agency of its kind run by a single Director.
Amicus and the dissent try to diminish the CFPB's insulation from Presidential control by observing that the CFPB's final rules can be set aside by a super majority of the Financial Stability and Oversight Council (FSOC). See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 40; post , at 2242 n.13, 2244. But the FSOC's veto power is statutorily reserved for extreme situations, when two-thirds of the Council concludes that a CFPB regulation would "put the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk." 12 U. S. C. §§ 5513(a), (c)(3). That narrow escape hatch has no impact on the CFPB's enforcement or adjudicatory authority and has never been used in the ten years since the agency's creation. It certainly does not render the CFPB's independent, single-Director structure constitutional.
The dissent likewise points to Madison's statement in The Federalist No. 39 that the "tenure" of "ministerial offices generally will be a subject of legal regulation." Post , at 2229 - 22230 (quoting The Federalist No. 39, p. 253 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)). But whatever Madison may have meant by that statement, he later led the charge in contending, on the floor of the First Congress, that "inasmuch as the power of removal is of an Executive nature ... it is beyond the reach of the Legislative body." 1 Annals of Cong. 464 (1789); see also id. , at 462-464, 495-496. Like the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund , the dissent goes on to "attribute[ ] to Madison a belief that ... the Comptroller[ ] could be made independent of the President. But Madison's actual proposal, consistent with his view of the Constitution, was that the Comptroller hold office for a term of 'years, unless sooner removed by the President'; he would thus be 'dependent upon the President, because he can be removed by him,' and also 'dependent upon the Senate, because they must consent to his [reappointment] for every term of years.' " Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U.S. 477, 499, 500 n. 6, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) (citation omitted) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 612). See post , at 2229 n.4. The dissent further notes that, at the time of the founding, some States placed limitations on their Governors' removal power. See post , at 2227 - 2228. But the Framers hardly viewed State Governors as a reliable guide in fashioning the Federal Executive. Indeed, they expressly rejected the "executive council" structure favored by most States, fearing that subjecting the President to oversight, as the States had, would "distract and ... enervate the whole system of administration" and inject it with "habitual feebleness and dilatoriness." The Federalist No. 70, at 473, 476 (A. Hamilton).
Building on amicus ' proposal, the dissent would endorse whatever "the times demand, so long as the President retains the ability to carry out his constitutional functions." Post , at 2226. But that amorphous test provides no real limiting principle. The "clearest" (and only) "example" the dissent can muster for what may be prohibited is a for-cause removal restriction placed on the President's "close military or diplomatic advisers." Post , at 2233. But that carveout makes no logical or constitutional sense. In the dissent's view, for-cause removal restrictions are permissible because they guarantee the President "meaningful control" over his subordinates. Post , at 2239 - 2240 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also post , at 2228, 2235, 2238 - 2239, 2244. If that is the theory, then what is the harm in giving the President the same "meaningful control" over his close advisers? The dissent claims to see a constitutional distinction between the President's "own constitutional duties in foreign relations and war" and his duty to execute laws passed by Congress. Post , at 2231. But the same Article that establishes the President's foreign relations and war duties expressly entrusts him to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. And, from the perspective of the governed, it is far from clear that the President's core and traditional powers present greater cause for concern than peripheral and modern ones. If anything, "[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive's control, and thus from that of the people." Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 499, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (emphasis added).
Justice THOMAS believes that any ratification is irrelevant. In his view, even if the issuance of the demand and initiation of this suit have been validly ratified, Director Kraninger's activities in litigating the case-after inheriting it from an Acting Director, but before becoming removable at will herself in light of our decision-present a distinct constitutional injury requiring immediate dismissal. See post , at 2233 - 2235 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). But whether and when the temporary involvement of an unconstitutionally insulated officer in an otherwise valid prosecution requires dismissal falls outside the questions presented, has not been fully briefed, and is best resolved by the lower courts in the first instance.
For a comprehensive review of the Decision of 1789, see Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1021 (2006).
The explicit and repeated recognition of the President's "illimitable power" in Humphrey's Executor highlights the dissent's error in claiming that Humphrey's Executor "abandoned [the] view" set out in Myers v. United States , 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926). Post , at 2233 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (hereinafter dissent). Humphrey's Executor did not abandon Myers ; it distinguished Myers based on the flawed premise that the FTC exercised "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" power that is not part of "the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President." Humphrey's Executor , 295 U.S., at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869 ; see also infra , at 2216 - 2217.
A number of historical sources indicate that President Roosevelt saw Humphrey's Executor v. United States , 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935), as an attack on his administration. Given the Court's recent decision in Myers , the Roosevelt administration was reportedly "stunned" by the Court's decision in Humphrey's Executor , and the President was particularly annoyed that the decision "ma[de] it appear that he had been willfully violating the Constitution." See W. Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn 78 (1995). Justice Jackson, who was serving in the Roosevelt administration at the time, stated in an interview that " 'the decision that made Roosevelt madder at the Court than any other decision was that ... little case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States . The President thought they went out of their way to spite him personally.' " E. Gerhart, America's Advocate: Robert H. Jackson 99 (1958) (quoting 1949 interview with Justice Jackson).
The dissent, while vigorously defending the holding of Humphrey's Executor , can muster no defense for the reasoning of the decision. The dissent does not defend the notion of "quasi" powers or "quasi" agencies, recognizing that the power exercised by the FTC was executive power. See post , at 2234 n.7. And, in 39 pages, it cannot explain how any aspect of Humphrey's Executor (other than its holding) survived Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U.S. 477, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010). Instead, the dissent simply claims that Humphrey's Executor was "extended" and "clarified" in Morrison , post , at 2234 - 2235, attempting to breathe validity into Humphrey's Executor through the Court's Morrison decision. But the dissent's reading of Morrison as "extend[ing] Humphrey's domain" is baffling. Post , at 2234 - 2235. Morrison expressly repudiated the substantive reasoning of Humphrey's Executor . See supra , at 2217 - 2218.
The dissent provides no analysis of severability, simply stating "if the agency's removal provision is unconstitutional, it should be severed." Post, at 2245.
The Court-appointed amicus suggests that the CFPB's current Director, Director Kraninger, ratified the enforcement proceeding by maintaining the suit after she stated her belief that the removal provision is unconstitutional. But the CFPB expressly disclaimed the notion that Director Kraninger had the power to ratify the civil investigative demand, stating that she "remains statutorily insulated from removal, regardless whether she believes the law is invalid." Reply Brief for Respondent 7.
The severability clause refers to three alternative scenarios: (1) a "provision of [the] Act ... is held to be unconstitutional"; (2) "an amendment made by [the] Act ... is held unconstitutional"; and (3) "the application of [a] provision or amendment [of the Act] to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional." 12 U. S. C. § 5302. The plurality assumes, with no analysis, that this case falls in the first scenario, calling for a provision to be severed from the Dodd-Frank Act. See ante , at 2209. But, as discussed below, there is no single "provision" of the Act that has led to the constitutional injury in this case. See infra , at 2235 - 2236. It is the attempted enforcement of a civil investigative demand under § 5562(e)(1) by an unconstitutionally insulated Director that causes the constitutional injury in this case. There is at least a nonfrivolous argument that this case implicates the third scenario contemplated by the severability clause-i.e., "the application of [a] provision" in a certain "circumstance." § 5302. If that were so, the text of the severability clause would not require any "provision" to be severed; the unconstitutional application of § 5562(e)(1) simply would not affect other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. Such a reading would be consistent with the traditional limits on the judicial power. See supra , at 2218 - 2219.
This statement in Booker is irreconcilable with the plurality's assertion here that "Congress would prefer that we use a scalpel rather than a bulldozer in curing the constitutional defect." Ante, at 2210 - 2211. Thus, it appears that the plurality either sub silentio "junk[s] our settled severability doctrine," ibid. , or invokes, without explanation, different assumptions for different cases.
In the academic literature, compare, e.g., Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2331-2346 (2001) (generally favoring presidential control over agencies), with, e.g., Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704, 713-715 (2007) (generally favoring administrative independence).
The principle of separation of powers, Madison continued, maintained only that "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution[ ] are subverted." The Federalist No. 47, at 325-326.
Article II's Opinions Clause also demonstrates the possibility of limits on the President's control over the Executive Branch. Under that Clause, the President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." § 2, cl. 1. For those in the majority's camp, that Clause presents a puzzle: If the President must always have the direct supervisory control they posit, including by threat of removal, why would he ever need a constitutional warrant to demand agency heads' opinions? The Clause becomes at least redundant-though really, inexplicable-under the majority's idea of executive power.
The majority dismisses Federalist Nos. 77 and 39 as "reflect[ing] initial impressions later abandoned." Ante, at 2205, and n.10. But even Hamilton's and Madison's later impressions are less helpful to the majority than it suggests. Assuming Hamilton gave up on the Senate's direct participation in removal (the evidence is sketchy but plausible), there is no evidence to show he accepted the majority's view. And while Madison opposed the first Congress's enactment of removal limits (as the majority highlights), he also maintained that the legislature had constitutional power to protect the Comptroller of the Treasury from at-will firing. See infra , at 2230 - 2231, 2231. In any event, such changing minds and inconstant opinions don't usually prove the existence of constitutional rules.
As President Jefferson explained: "[W]ith the settlement of the accounts at the Treasury I have no right to interfere in the least," because the Comptroller of the Treasury "is the sole & supreme judge for all claims of money against the US. and would no more receive a direction from me" than would "one of the judges of the supreme court." Letter from T. Jefferson to B. Latrobe (June 2, 1808), in Thomas Jefferson and the National Capital 429, 431 (S. Padover ed. 1946). A couple of decades later, Attorney General William Wirt reached the same conclusion, stating that "the President has no right to interpose in the settling of accounts" because Congress had "separated" the Comptroller from the President's authority. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 636, 637 (1824); 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 678, 680 (1824). And indeed, Wirt believed that Congress could restrict the President's authority to remove such officials, at least so long as it "express[ed] that intention clearly." 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 212, 213 (1818).
The Comptroller legislation of the Civil War provided a key precedent for what does appear a historical "aberration"-the Tenure of Office Act of 1867. See ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430. Anxious to prevent President Andrew Johnson from interfering with reconstruction policies-including through his command of the military-Congress barred presidential removal of any Senate-confirmed officials without the Senate's consent. The law thus severed the President's removal authority over even officials like the Secretaries of War and State. The statute became the basis for the Nation's first presidential impeachment, but was repealed in 1887. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. In one sense, the two-decade-long existence of the Tenure of Office Act reveals the 19th-century political system's comfort with expansive restrictions on presidential removal. But the ultimate repudiation of the law, and the broad historical consensus that it went too far, just as strongly shows the limits that system later accepted on legislative power-that Congress may not impose removal restrictions preventing the President from carrying out his own constitutionally assigned functions in areas like war or foreign affairs. See Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 689-691, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (recognizing that limit as the constitutional standard).
The majority is quite right that today we view all the activities of administrative agencies as exercises of "the 'executive Power.' " Arlington v. FCC , 569 U.S. 290, 305, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013) (quoting Art. II, § 1, cl.1); see ante, at 2198 n.2, n. 2. But we well understand, just as the Humphrey's Court did, that those activities may "take 'legislative' and 'judicial' forms." Arlington , 569 U.S., at 305, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 1863. The classic examples are agency rulemakings and adjudications, endemic in agencies like the FTC and CFPB. In any event, the Court would soon make clear that Congress can also constrain the President's removal authority over officials performing even the most "executive" of functions. See infra , at 2234 - 2235.
Expressing veiled contempt as only he could, Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court that Chief Justice Taft's opinion had "laboriously traversed" American history and that it had failed to "restrict itself to the immediate issue before it." 357 U.S., at 351, 78 S.Ct. 1275. No wonder Humphrey's had "narrowly confined the scope of the Myers decision." 357 U.S., at 352, 78 S.Ct. 1275. Justice Frankfurter implied that the "Chief Justice who himself had been President" was lucky his handiwork had not been altogether reversed. Id., at 351, 78 S.Ct. 1275.
Pretending this analysis is mine rather than Morrison 's, the majority registers its disagreement. See ante, at 2240, n. 11. In its view, a test asking whether a for-cause provision impedes the President's ability to carry out his constitutional functions has "no real limiting principle." Ibid. If the provision leaves the President with constitutionally sufficient control over some subordinates (like the independent counsel), the majority asks, why not over even his close military or diplomatic advisers? See ibid. But the Constitution itself supplies the answer. If the only presidential duty at issue is the one to ensure faithful execution of the laws, a for-cause provision does not stand in the way: As Morrison recognized, it preserves authority in the President to ensure (just as the Take Care Clause requires) that an official is abiding by law. See 487 U.S., at 692, 108 S.Ct. 2597. But now suppose an additional constitutional duty is implicated-relating, say, to the conduct of foreign affairs or war. To carry out those duties, the President needs advisers who will (beyond complying with law) help him devise and implement policy. And that means he needs the capacity to fire such advisers for disagreeing with his policy calls.
The majority suggests that the FTC was a different animal when this Court upheld its independent status in Humphrey's . See ante, at 2200. But then, as now, the FTC's organic statute broadly "empowered and directed" the agency "to prevent persons" or businesses "from using unfair methods of competition in commerce." Act of Sept. 26, 1914, § 5, 38 Stat. 719. To fulfill that mandate, the agency could and did run investigations, bring administrative charges, and conduct adjudications. See ibid. ; § 6(a), id. , at 721; FTC Ann. Rep. (1935) (describing the FTC's extensive enforcement activities in the year before Humphrey's ). And if any person refused to comply with an order, the agency could seek its enforcement in federal court under a highly deferential standard. See § 5, 38 Stat. 720; FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assn. , 273 U.S. 52, 63, 47 S.Ct. 255, 71 L.Ed. 534 (1927). Still more, the FTC has always had statutory rulemaking authority, even though (like several other agencies) it relied on adjudications until the 1960s. See § 6(g), 38 Stat. 722; National Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FTC , 482 F.2d 672, 686 (C.A.D.C. 1973). (The majority's reply that a court including Charles Evans Hughes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Harlan Stone somehow misunderstood these powers, see ante, at 2200 n.4, lacks all plausibility.) And in any case, the relevant point of comparison is the present-day FTC, which remains independent even if it now has some expanded powers-and which remains constitutional under not only Humphrey's but also Morrison . See supra, at 2234 - 2235.
The majority briefly mentions, but understandably does not rely on, two other features of Congress's scheme. First, the majority notes that the CFPB receives its funding outside the normal appropriations process. See ante , at 2204 - 2205. But so too do other financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 243, 1815(d), 1820(e). And budgetary independence comes mostly at the expense of Congress's control over the agency, not the President's. (Because that is so, it actually works to the President's advantage.) Second, the majority complains that the Director's five-year term may prevent a President from "shap[ing the agency's] leadership" through appointments. Ante , at 2204. But again that is true, to one degree or another, of quite a few longstanding independent agencies, including the Federal Reserve, the FTC, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Postal Service Board of Governors. See, e.g. , §§ 241, 242; 15 U. S. C. § 41 ; 5 U. S. C. §§ 1201, 1202 ; 39 U. S. C. § 202. (If you think the last is unimportant, just ask the current President whether he agrees.)
The majority, seeking some other way to distinguish Morrison , asserts that the independent counsel's "duties" were more "limited" than the CFPB Director's. Ante , at 2200 - 2201. That's true in a sense: All (all?) the special counsel had to do was decide whether the President and his top advisers had broken the law. But I doubt (and I suspect Presidents would too) whether the need to control those duties was any less "central to the functioning of the Executive Branch" than the need to control the CFPB's. Morrison , 487 U.S., at 691-692, 108 S.Ct. 2597. And in any event, as I've shown, Morrison did much more than approve a specific removal provision; it created a standard to govern all removal cases that is at complete odds with the majority's reasoning. See supra, at 2234 - 2236.
To use one important example, Congress provided for executive oversight of all the CFPB's rulemaking. The Financial Stability Oversight Council can veto by a two-thirds vote any CFPB regulation it deems a threat to the "safety and soundness" of the financial system. 12 U. S. C. § 5513(a). The FSOC is chaired by the Treasury Secretary, and most of its members are under the direct supervision of the President. See § 5321. So the majority is wrong in saying that the CFPB's Director can "unilaterally " issue final regulations. Ante , at 2203 - 2204 (emphasis in original). Indeed, the President has more control over rulemaking at the CFPB than at any similar independent agency. And the majority is similarly wrong to think that because the FSOC has not yet issued a formal veto, its review authority makes no practical difference. See ante, at 2204 n.9. Regulatory review, whether by the Office of Management and Budget or the FSOC, usually relies more on the threat of vetoes than on their execution. OMB casts a long shadow over rulemaking in the Executive Branch, but rarely uses its veto pen. See Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1846-1847, n. 37 (2013).
I could go on. A recent study prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States noted that "[g]overnance by multiple members limits the President's influence." J. Selin & D. Lewis, Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies 89 (2d ed. 2018). And the General Accounting Office has recognized that the desire for "greater independence" is what "most likely explains why the Congress in the past has opted to head independent regulatory bodies with multimember commissions rather than single administrators." Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 135 (1987) (Statement of F. Frazier). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
27
] | sc_casesource |
UNITED STATES v. LEE
No. 80-767.
Argued November 2, 1981
Decided February 23, 1982
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Con-nor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 261.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, former Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Murray, Stuart A. Smith, and Gary R. Allen.
Francis X. Caiazza argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.
William Bentley Ball and Phillip J. Murren filed a brief for the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to determine whether imposition of social security taxes is unconstitutional as applied to persons who object on religious grounds to receipt of public insurance benefits and to payment of taxes to support public insurance funds. 450 U. S. 993 (1981). The District Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits forced payment of social security taxes when payment of taxes and receipt of benefits violate the taxpayer’s religion. We reverse.
I
Appellee, a member of the Old Order Amish, is a farmer and carpenter. From 1970 to 1977, appellee employed several other Amish to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He failed to file the quarterly social security tax returns required of employers, withhold social security tax from his employees, or pay the employer’s share of social security taxes.
In 1978, the Internal Revenue Service assessed appellee in excess of $27,000 for unpaid employment taxes; he paid $91— the amount owed for the first quarter of 1973 — and then sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for a refund, claiming that imposition of the social security taxes violated his First Amendment free exercise rights and those of his Amish employees.
The District Court held the statutes requiring appellee to pay social security and unemployment insurance taxes unconstitutional as applied. 497 F. Supp. 180 (1980). The court noted that the Amish believe it sinfiil not to provide for their own elderly and needy and therefore are religiously opposed to the national social security system. The court also accepted appellee’s contention that the Amish religion not only prohibits the acceptance of social security benefits, but also bars all contributions by Amish to the social security system. The District Court observed that in light of their beliefs, Congress has accommodated self-employed Amish and self-employed members of other religious groups with similar beliefs by providing exemptions from social security taxes. 26 U. S. C. § 1402(g). The court’s holding was based on both the exemption statute for the self-employed and the First Amendment; appellee and others “who fall within the carefully circumscribed definition provided in 1402(g) are relieved from paying the employer’s share of [social security taxes] as it is an unconstitutional infringement upon the free exercise of their religion.” 497 F. Supp., at 184.
Direct appeal from the judgment of the District Court was taken pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 81252.
II
The exemption provided by § 1402(g) is available only to self-employed individuals and does not apply to employers or employees. Consequently, appellee and his employees are not within the express provisions of § 1402(g). Thus any exemption from payment of the employer’s share of social security taxes must come from a constitutionally required exemption.
A
The preliminary inquiry in determining the existence of a constitutionally required exemption is whether the payment of social security taxes and the receipt of benefits interferes with the free exercise rights of the Amish. The Amish believe that there is a religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security system. Although the Government does not challenge the sincerity of this belief, the Government does contend that payment of social security taxes will not threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance. It is not within “the judicial function and judicial competence,” however, to determine whether appellee or the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 716 (1981). We therefore accept appel-lee’s contention that both payment and receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith. Because the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security system interferes with their free exercise rights.
The conclusion that there is a conflict between the Amish faith and the obligations imposed by the social security system is only the beginning, however, and not the end of the inquiry. Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. See, e. g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879). The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest. Thomas, supra; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963).
B
Because the social security system is nationwide, the governmental interest is apparent. The social security system in the United States serves the public interest by providing a comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits available to all participants, with costs shared by employers and employees. The social security system is by far the largest domestic governmental program in the United States today, distributing approximately $11 billion monthly to 36 million Americans. The design of the system requires support by mandatory contributions from covered employers and employees. This mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system. “[W]ide-spread individual voluntary coverage under social security . . . would undermine the soundness of the social security program.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 116 (1965). Moreover, a comprehensive national social security system providing for voluntary participation would be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not impossible, to administer. Thus, the Government’s interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social security system is very high.
C
The remaining inquiry is whether accommodating the Amish belief will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 605 (1961), this Court noted that “to make accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task . . . because resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing. . . prosecution.” The difficulty in attempting to accommodate religious beliefs in the area of taxation is that “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference.” Braunfeld, supra, at 606. The Court has long recognized that balance must be struck between the values of the comprehensive social security system, which rests on a complex of actuarial factors, and the consequences of allowing religiously based exemptions. To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, see, e. g., Thomas, supra; Sherbert, supra, but there is a point at which accommodation would “radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.” Braunfeld, supra, at 606.
Unlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, it would be difficult to accommodate the eomprehen-sive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs. The obligation to pay the social security tax initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay income taxes; the difference — in theory at least — is that the social security tax revenues are segregated for use only in furtherance of the statutory program. There is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act. If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief. See, e. g., Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F. 2d 1166 (CA4 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1014 (1980); Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F. 2d 586 (CA9 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1036 (1970). Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
HH I h — I
Congress has accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive national program, the practices of those who believe it a violation of their faith to participate in the social security system. In § 1402(g) Congress granted an exemption, on religious grounds, to self-employed Amish and others. Confining the § 1402(g) exemption to the self- • employed provided for a narrow category which was readily identifiable. Self-employed persons in a religious community having its own “welfare” system are distinguishable from the generality of wage earners employed by others.
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees. Congress drew a line in § 1402(g), exempting the self-employed Amish but not all persons working for an Amish employer. The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
The Social Security Act and its subsequent amendments provide a system of old-age and unemployment benefits. 26 U. S. C. §3101 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). These benefits are supported by various taxes, including, relevant to this appeal, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxes. The FICA tax is a tax paid in part by employees through withholding, 26 U. S. C. § 3101 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), and in part by employers through an excise tax. 26 U. S. C. § 3111 (1976 ed., Supp. III). The FUTA tax is an excise tax imposed only on employers. 26 U. S. C. § 3301. Both taxes are based on the wages paid to employees, and the recordkeeping and transmittal of funds are obligations of the employer. Only the FICA tax is collected from self-employed individuals.
In this case appellee failed to pay the employer’s portion of FICA and FUTA taxes and failed to withhold his employee’s contributions to the FICA taxes. An employer is liable for payment of the employee’s share of FICA taxes whether or not he withholds the required amount of the employee’s contribution. 26 U. S. C. § 3102(b).
Appellee also requested injunctive relief to prevent the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from attempting to collect the unpaid balance of the assessments. Under the Internal Revenue Code, injunctive relief is to be granted sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The District Court therefore denied in-junctive relief, but noted that should the Government attempt to collect the remaining payments “further Court relief could be requested.” 497 F. Supp. 180, 184 (1980).
Appellee indicates that his scriptural basis for this belief was: “But if any provide not... for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” (I Timothy 5: 8.)
Title 26 U. S. C. § 1402(g) provides, in part:
“(1) Exemption
Any individual may file an application... for an exemption from the tax imposed by this chapter if he is a member of a recognized religious sect or division thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance which makes payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, or retirement or makes payments toward the cost of, or provides services for, medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system established by the Social Security Act).”
In order to qualify for the exemption, the applicant must waive his right to all social security benefits and the Secretary of Health and Human Services must find that the particular religious group makes sufficient provision for its dependent members.
The precise basis of the District Court opinion is not clear. The court recognized that on its face § 1402(g) does not apply to appellee because he is not a self-employed individual. The District Court nonetheless used the language of § 1402(g) to provide an exemption for appellee. The court’s decision to grant appellee an exemption, however, appears to be based on its view that the statute was unconstitutional as applied. Consequently, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 to hear the appeal. See also United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7, 9, n. 4 (1974).
This is not an instance in which the asserted claim is “so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S., at 715. At least one other religious organization has sought an exemption under § 1402(g). See also Henson v. Commissioner, 66 T. C. 835 (1976) (member of Sai Baba denied exemption because although opposed to insurance on religious grounds, the faith did not provide for its dependent members).
The Social Security Act was enacted in 1935 to provide supplementary retirement benefits. Over the following 45 years coverage has broadened, and the cost of the system has increased dramatically. See A. Abraham & D. Kopelman, Federal Social Security (1979). In 1939 the Act was amended to provide insurance benefits for retired workers, auxiliaries of retired workers, and survivors of deceased workers. In 1950 coverage was extended to self-employed workers and to select other employees previously excluded. In 1954 and 1956 disability benefits were added and in 1965 Medicare benefits were made available to participants in the system.
National Commission on Social Security, Social Security in America’s Future 5 (1981).
The fiscal soundness of the social security system has been the subject of several studies and of congressional concern. See, e. g., Congressional Budget Office, Paying for Social Security: Funding Options for the Near Term (1981).
See, e. g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (preacher not entitled to be free from taxes); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 112 (1943) (same).
The District Court read this as extending to the present claims. We need not decide whether the Free Exercise Clause compelled an exemption as provided by § 1402(g); Congress’ grant of the exemption was an effort toward accommodation. Nor do we need to decide whether, if Congress-had, as the District Court believed, intended § 1402(g) to reach this case, conflicts with the Establishment Clause would arise.
We note that here the statute compels contributions to the system by way of taxes; it does not compel anyone to accept benefits. Indeed, it would be possible for an Amish member, upon qualifying for social security benefits, to receive and pass them along to an Amish fund having parallel objectives. It is not for us to speculate whether this would ease or mitigate the perceived sin of participation. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ. | What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction? | [
"cert",
"appeal",
"bail",
"certification",
"docketing fee",
"rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument",
"injunction",
"mandamus",
"original",
"prohibition",
"stay",
"writ of error",
"writ of habeas corpus",
"unspecified, other"
] | [
1
] | sc_jurisdiction |
UNITED STATES v. PATRICK et al.
No. 22.
Argued March 28, 1962.
Restored to the calendar for reargument April 2, 1962.
Reargued December 6, 1962.
Decided February 18, 1963.
Wayne G. Barnett reargued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Richard J. Medalie, Melva M. Graney, Harold C. Wilkenfeld'and Arthur I. Gould.
Robert M. Ward reargued the cause and filed briefs for respondents.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question, similar to that decided today in No. 21, United States v. Gilmore, ante, p. 39, as to the deductibility of certain legal fees paid by the respondent to his attorneys and attorneys representing his wife in connection with divorce proceedings instituted by the wife. In a suit for refund contesting the Commissioner’s disallowance of such a deduction claimed in the taxpayer’s 1956 federal income tax return, the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina held these expenses to be deductible under § 212 (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 186 F. Supp. 48, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 288 F. 2d 292, and we granted certiorari on the Government’s petition, 368 U. S. 817.
In 1955 respondent’s wife sued for divorce, alleging adultery on the part of her husband. Extended negotiations by the attorneys for both parties resulted in a property settlement agreement, and thereafter respondent filed his answer to the complaint neither admitting nor denying the allegations of adultery. Respondent did not testify at the trial. The South Carolina divorce court granted the wife an absolute divorce, approved the property settlement agreement, and in accordance therewith ordered respondent to pay the attorneys’ fee.s for both parties.
At the time of these proceedings, respondent was president of the Herald Publishing Company in Rock Hill, South Carolina, and editor of the newspaper published by it. He owned 28% of the corporation’s outstanding stock, his wife owned 28%, their oldest son, Hugh Patrick, owned 9%, and the remaining 35% was held in trusts for Hugh and the parties’ two minor children. The real property on which the Herald Company was situated was owned by respondent and his wife, the former having an 80% undivided interest and the latter a 20% undivided interest. The couple also owned two houses. In addition, each independently owned diversified securities and other assets of substantial value.
The property settlement agreement recited that “by virtue of this agreement a final and lump settlement has been made of any and all rights whatsoever . . . concerning the matter of support, separate maintenance, alimony or any financial obligation of whatsoever sort due to [the wife] ... on account of and growing out of the marital relationship of the parties ....” Besides provisions for the custody and support of the minor children and a provision giving one of the two houses to each of the parties, certain arrangements were made concerning the respective interests in the newspaper properties. Respondent delivered to his wife high-quality securities worth $112,000, the agreed value of her 28% of the publishing company stock, which she transferred to him subject to the condition that such stock should go to their three children in the event of his death or a sale of the entire business. A new long-term lease of the real property housing the newspaper was entered into with the corporation, and both parties then transferred their interests in this property to a trust, the income therefrom being payable to the wife for life and the remainder to pass in equal shares to the children. Finally, respondent agreed to pay all of his wife’s attorneys’ fees for services rendered in connection with the divorce and property settlement arrangements.
These fees, paid by respondent in 1956, amounted to $24,000 — $12,000 to his attorneys and $12,000 to his wife’s attorneys. The $24,000 total was allocated by agreement of counsel and the parties as follows: $4,000 for handling the divorce itself; $16,000 for rearranging the stock interests in the publishing company; and $4,000 for leasing the real property and transferring it to a trust. Respondent claimed a deduction for the $16,000 item and for 80% of the $4,000 ($3,200) item relating to the business real estate.
Both courts below held that the entire $19,200 was deductible under § 212 (2) of the 1954 Code as an “ordinary and necessary [expense] paid or incurred ... for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income.” The Government’s contention that this was a personal expense, nondeductible under § 262 of the Code, was rejected. Relying on Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 646, and cases following it (see No. 21, ante, pp. 49-51), the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the fees were incurred not to resist a liability, but to arrange how it could be met without depriving the taxpayer of income-producing property, the loss of which would have destroyed his capacity to earn income. The property settlement provisions, so the lower courts held, were designed to satisfy respondent’s marital obligations to his wife and protect the interests of the children, yet at the same time preserve respondent’s control over the publishing company, to which he had devoted many years of effort.
The situation, in short, is comparable to that in United States v. Gilmore, supra. The principles held governing in that case are equally applicable here. It is evident that the claims asserted by the wife in the divorce action arose from respondent’s marital relationship with her and were thus the product of respondent’s personal or family life, not profit-seeking activity. As we have held in Gilmore, payments made for the purpose of discharging such claims are not deductible as “business” expenses.
We find no significant distinction in the fact that the legal fees for which deduction is claimed were paid for arranging a transfer of stock interests, leasing real property, and creating a trust rather than for conducting litigation. These matters were incidental to litigation brought by respondent’s wife, whose claims arising from respondent’s personal and family life were the origin of the property arrangements. The property settlement agreement itself recited that it settled rights “growing out of the marital relationship,” supra, p. 55, and both courts below found that, although nominally an agreement for the purchase of the wife’s property, it served ultimately to protect respondent’s income-producing property from an assertion of his wife’s latent marital rights. It would be unsound to make deductibility turn on the nature of the measures taken to forestall a claim rather than the source of the claim itself.
As in the Gilmore case, we need not pass on the Government’s alternative contention that part of the legal fees sought to be deducted here are not expenses at all, but rather are capital outlays. Since we hold that the payments were not deductible as “business” expenses, it makes no difference for present purposes whether they are personal expenses or capital expenditures; in either case they would not be deductible.
We conclude that none of the legal fees paid by respondent is deductible, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent.
Section 212 provides, in pertinent part: “In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year— . . . (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income . . . .”
This case was argued at the 1961 Term, and was restored to the calendar for reargument at this Term. 369 U. S. 835.
Mr. Patrick will be referred to as the sole respondent. The administrator of the estate of his second wife is a party only because a joint return was filed. Respondent’s former wife will be referred to as the “wife” notwithstanding the divorce.
Section 262 provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.”
In view of our conclusion that the legal fees were not “business” expenses, we do not reach the Government’s second alternative contention that at least the fees paid by respondent to his wife’s attorneys were not deductible under prior decisions of this Court. See, e. g., Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U. S. 394; Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 590. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisposition |
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF SOUTHERN OHIO, INC., et al. v. PINE CREEK CONSERVANCY DISTRICT et al.
No. 76-667.
Decided February 22, 1977
Per Curiam.
Chapter 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code establishes procedures for the organization and governance of conservancy districts, political subdivisions of the State invested with the power to carry out flood prevention and control measures. The statute provides for the creation of a conservancy court each time that a petition is duly filed to propose the creation of a new district. It is the conservancy court’s responsibility first to evaluate the desirability of establishing the proposed district and then, if it decides to create the district, to assume the ultimate responsibility for administering the district. A conservancy district may include territory from one or more counties, and the conservancy court is composed of one judge from the court of common pleas in each county having territory within the conservancy district.
In 1966 the Pine Creek Conservancy District was established in accordance with the procedures set forth in chapter 6101. Appellants, who collectively are residents, property owners, and taxpayers in the Pine-Creek District, brought the present action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging, inter alia, that chapter 6101 is unconstitutional.
Appellants leveled three constitutional challenges against the statute in the District Court, and those claims have been renewed in the 'instant appeal. First, they argue that it violates due process for the conservancy courts to make the decision as to whether the conservancy districts that they will administer should be formed. Since the judges of the conservancy courts are entitled to special compensation for their work on those courts, appellants contend that they have a financial incentive to declare the proposed districts organized and that, therefore, persons objecting to the formation of a district are deprived of a hearing before an impartial judicial officer. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). Second, appellants contend that the composition of the conservancy courts violates the one-man, one-vote principle of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), because the judges on those courts are selected without regard to the size of the population that they represent. Third, appellants argue that chapter 6101 permits the disenfranchisement of freeholders affected by the decision to create a conservancy district because the statute creates a presumption that a local political body, such as a township, represents the views of alb persons within its jurisdiction whenever it supports a petition proposing the creation of a conservancy district.
A three-judge court rejected all of these claims on the single ground that they were foreclosed by Orr v. Allen, 248 U. S. 35 (1918), aff’g 245 F. 486 (WD Ohio 1917), a case in which we rejected a due process and equal protection attack on the statute challenged here. No. C-1-75-5 (WD Ohio, July 6, 1976).
None of the issues presented in this case was raised or passed upon in On. The appellant in On presented four issues to this Court, none of which had anything to do with the issues presented here. The appellant argued that the challenged statute denied him judicial review, that it authorized an impairment of existing contracts, that it improperly conferred legislative powers on the judiciary, and that it authorized a taking without compensation. Our three-page memorandum opinion in On did not purport to go beyond the issues raised by the appellant in that ease. By no stretch of the imagination- can our decision in On be thought to have silently dealt with issues which arose and were decided in later cases such as Ward, Tumey, and Reynolds v. Sims.
Because the court below gave no independent consideration to the issues raised by appellants and relied exclusively on On, although that case considered none of the issues now presented, it is apparent that the merits of appellants’ claims have never been fully considered by any federal court. Without offering any view as to the relative merit of appellants’ contentions, it is fair to say that they are not insubstantial. We therefore reverse the decision below and remand for a full consideration of the issues presented by appellants.
So ordered.
The Chief Justice would note probable jurisdiction and give plenary consideration to this appeal. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"comity: civil rights",
"comity: criminal procedure",
"comity: First Amendment",
"comity: habeas corpus",
"comity: military",
"comity: obscenity",
"comity: privacy",
"comity: miscellaneous",
"comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals",
"assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order",
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules",
"judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures",
"mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)",
"venue",
"no merits: writ improvidently granted",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)",
"no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision",
"no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)",
"no merits: miscellaneous",
"standing to sue: adversary parties",
"standing to sue: direct injury",
"standing to sue: legal injury",
"standing to sue: personal injury",
"standing to sue: justiciable question",
"standing to sue: live dispute",
"standing to sue: parens patriae standing",
"standing to sue: statutory standing",
"standing to sue: private or implied cause of action",
"standing to sue: taxpayer's suit",
"standing to sue: miscellaneous",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: review of non-final order",
"judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)",
"judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)",
"judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)",
"judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)",
"judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts",
"judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal",
"judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata",
"judicial administration: interpleader",
"judicial administration: untimely filing",
"judicial administration: Act of State doctrine",
"judicial administration: miscellaneous",
"Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction",
"miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction"
] | [
19
] | sc_issue_9 |
LYNAUGH, INTERIM DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. PETTY
No. 85-1656.
Argued March 3, 1987
Decided March 25, 1987
Charles A. Palmer, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jim Mattox, Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and F. Scott McCown and William C. Zapalac, Assistant Attorneys General.
John R. Breihan by appointment of the Court, 479 U. S. 808, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Larry W. Yackle and George Kannar filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion. | What type of decision did the court make? | [
"opinion of the court (orally argued)",
"per curiam (no oral argument)",
"decrees",
"equally divided vote",
"per curiam (orally argued)",
"judgment of the Court (orally argued)",
"seriatim"
] | [
4
] | sc_decisiontype |
LEIMAN et al. v. GUTTMAN et al.
No. 88.
Argued December 13, 1948.
Decided January 17, 1949.
Samuel Marion argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Leo Praeger and Barney Rosenstein argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Solicitor General Perlman, Roger S. Foster and George Zolotar filed a brief for the Securities & Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.
Mr.' Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 221 of Ch. X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 897, 11 U. S. C. § 621, provides:
“The judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that ....
“(4) all payments made or promised by the debtor or by a corporation issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan or by any other person, for services and for costs and expenses in, or in connection with, the proceeding or in connection with the plan and incident to the reorganization, have been fully disclosed to the judge and are reasonable or, if to be fixed after confirmation of the plan, will be subject to the approval of the judge . . . .”
The question presented by this case is whether that provision gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim for services as attorneys in the reorganization of Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., the debtor.
Petitioners were attorneys for a protective committee representing public holders of the preferred stock of the debtor. The committee had on deposit 584 shares of the preferred stock from four stockholders. The committee agreed to hold those shares in escrow for the purpose of affording petitioners “additional compensation” for their services in the reorganization proceedings of the debtor.
Petitioners rendered valuable service in connection with the reorganization. When the plan was confirmed, they applied to the bankruptcy court for an allowance. That court allowed them $37,500 out of the estate. It concluded that, while that amount was all the estate should bear, their services were worth more than the allowance. But it held that it had no jurisdiction to pass on the amount of the allowance which should be paid under the escrow agreement. In re Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 69 F. Supp. 656.
Since in their view that court did not have jurisdiction of the claim, petitioners did not appeal from that order but brought instead the present suit in the New York courts for specific performance of the escrow agreement and for delivery of the deposited stock in accordance with the terms of that agreement. The Court of Appeals answered in the negative the following certified question :
“Has the Supreme Court of the State of New York jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action to recover for legal services rendered to the stockholders committee which are not compensable out of the assets of the Debtor’s estate, in a Chapter X reorganization proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Act?” 297 N. Y. at 204.
The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question in administration of the Act.
We reviewed in Woods v. City Bank Co., 312 U. S. 262, and Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U. S. 178, the design of Ch. X insofar as fees and allowances are concerned. There we were dealing with fees and allowances payable out of the estate. Here we are dealing with fees which are incident to the reorganization but not payable out of the estate. Under the less comprehensive language of § 77B the leading authority was that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the latter claims as well. In re McCrory Stores Corp., 91 F. 2d 947. We would be unmindful of history and heedless of statutory language if we held that the power of the bankruptcy court in this respect had been contracted as a result of Ch. X.
The control of the judge is not limited to fees and allowances payable out of the estate. Section 221 (4) places under his control “all payments made or promised” (1) by “the debtor” or (2) “by a corporation issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan” or (3) “by any other person” for services rendered “in connection with” the proceeding or “in connection with” the plan and “incident to” the reorganization. The services of petitioners concededly met those requirements; and the committee against whose stock a lien is sought to be asserted would plainly be included within the words “any other person.” Moreover, these petitioners are included in the classes of claimants to whom the judge is empowered to allow reasonable compensation. To lift petitioners’ claim from § 221 (4) would therefore be to rewrite it or to hold that when extended so far it was unconstitutional. The latter has not even been intimated. The former is not permissible.
The aim of the expanded controls over reorganization fees and expenses is clear. The practice had been to fix them by private arrangement outside of court. The deposit agreement under which committees commonly functioned was viewed as a private contract, which granted the committee a lien on the deposited securities for its fees and expenses. By terms of the agreement the committee was normally the sole judge of their amount. This gave rise to serious abuses. There was the spectacle of fiduciaries fixing the worth of their own services and exacting fees which often had no relation to the value of services rendered. The result was that the effective amount received by creditors and stockholders under the plan was determined not by the court but by reorganization managers and committees.
Hence Congress instituted controls, controls which became more pervasive as § 77B was evolved into Ch. X. Section 211 requires that a committee file with the court a statement disclosing specified information, including the agreement under which it operates. The scrutiny clause of § 212 gives the court power to set aside any of the provisions of such an agreement which it finds to be “unfair or not consistent with public policy.” And § 221 (4) is written in pervasive terms — it applies to “all payments” for services “in connection with” the proceeding or “in connection with” the plan and “incident to” the reorganization, whoever pays them. A statute establishing such broad supervision over committees cannot be presumed to be niggardly in its grant of authority when it deals with the matter which of all the others has the most direct impact on those whom it aims to protect.
We can find in this language no exemption for the kind of committee that petitioners represented. The fact that the committee may have represented a smaller or more intimate group than a conventional committee is irrelevant. The statute was designed to police the return which all security holders obtain from reorganization plans. The net return cannot be kept under supervision if private arrangements expressed in escrow agreements are to control. For the impact of excessive fee claims is the same whether they are charged directly against the estate or against the claim which represents a proportionate interest in the estate.
Nor is it an answer to say that state courts can supervise allowances of this nature if the bankruptcy court is, disallowed authority to do so. The happenstance of litigation in the state courts is not the equivalent of the administrative rule adopted by Congress when it asked that committee claimants submit their requests to the bankruptcy court. The incidence of fees on reorganization plans is so great that control over them is deemed indispensable to the court’s determination whether the plan should be confirmed. Section 221 (4) provides, indeed, one of the standards by which the court makes that determination. Since the determination of allowances has been made an integral part of the process of confirmation which is exclusively entrusted to the bankruptcy court, we cannot infer that it may be delegated to a state court. Moreover, it is the bankruptcy court that is in the best position to know what work was done by the fee claimant, how important and involved it was, how much it benefited the whole group of security holders and how much it benefited the one class alone, how much of it was necessary, how much of it was effective. That court has already determined what the estate should pay. The question that remains is how much of a charge should be made against the escrowed stock and whether the state court or the bankruptcy court should determine what that charge should be. Certainly where, as in this case, the services benefited in part the estate and in part one class of security holders, it is the bankruptcy court that is in the position to weigh the interrelated issues of fact and make a fair allocation between the two.
These practical considerations support the literal reading of § 221 (4) that it is the bankruptcy court that has jurisdiction to pass on these fees. Its jurisdiction is therefore exclusive. See Brown v. Gerdes, supra.
Petitioners did not appeal from the order of the District Court holding that it had no jurisdiction over these claims. But no reason is apparent why the petitioners may not apply to the District Court for an allowance even at this date. We were advised during the course of argument that the final decree under § 228 has not been .entered. Yet though it has been, there is no reason in view of the special circumstances of this case why application cannot be made at the foot of the decree.
Affirmed.
The relevant part of the escrow agreement provided:
“These shares are held in escrow by this Committee pending the termination of all proceedings in the matter of the Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation.
“This Committee has secured these shares from the stockholders listed above for the purpose of affording to you additional compensation for your services in the above matter. They have been obtained and are held in escrow on the condition that they be delivered to you only at such time as the reorganization proceedings in the matter of Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation are finally terminated and a final settlement of all suits and claims made by this Committee in behalf of the preferred stockholders have been settled. It is further conditioned upon faithful and satisfactory performance of your duties as counsel to this Committee until the termination of all proceedings.”
The indicated purpose was to strengthen, not to impair, the existing controls which § 77B established in regard to allowances. See Sen. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1938); H. R. Rep. No. 1409,75th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1937).
Section 242 provides:
“The judge may allow reasonable compensation for services rendered and reimbursement for proper costs and expenses incurred in connection with the administration of an estate in a proceeding under this chapter or in connection with a plan approved by the judge, whether or not accepted by creditors and stockholders or finally confirmed by the judge—
“(1) by indenture trustees, depositaries, reorganization managers, and committees or representatives of creditors or stockholders;
“(2) by any other parties in interest except the Securities and Exchange Commission; and
“(3) by the attorneys or agents for any of the foregoing except the Securities and Exchange Commission.”
See Part VIII, Protective Committee Report, Securities and Exchange Commission (1940), pp. 232 et seq.
See Habirshaw Elec. Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co., Inc., 296 F. 875, 879.
See Part I, Protective Committee Report, Securities and Exchange Commission (1937), pp. 642, 644,645, 646-647:
“An examination of the 846 deposit agreements received with replies to the Commission’s questionnaire reveals that 841 agreements, or 99.4 percent, provided that the committee should be entitled to fees or expenses or both. Of those 841 deposit agreements, 672 agreements, or 79.9 percent, gave the committee an express lien upon the deposited securities, for expenses or compensation, or both. 742, or 88.2 percent, clothed the committee with power to pledge deposited securities to secure loans to finance its activities. These powers commonly may be exercised by the committee in its sole discretion free from supervision by any independent agency or by the depositors.”
“The deposit agreements provide little check upon the amounts the committees may charge for fees and expenses. As we have stated above, 841 of the 846 deposit agreements that we examined provided that the committee should be entitled to payment of its fees or expenses or both. In 469 the amount of compensation and expenses which the committee might charge against the deposited securities was unlimited. That is to say, in 55.4 percent of the cases neither the aggregate amount nor the amount per unit of securities which committees could claim for their expenses and services was limited.
“in the 705 cases not associated with Section 77 or Section 77B proceedings machinery was provided for having some independent person or agency review the amount of the fees and expenses of these committees in only 2.13 percent of the cases. In the balance of the cases, numbering 690, the committee had reserved to itself the right to determine, within the limits prescribed by the agreement, the amount which it could charge for fees and expenses. And in 403 of these 690 cases, the agreements prescribed no limitations. These fiduciaries, therefore, had in the vast majority of the cases provided machinery whereby they became the sole arbiters of the worth of their own services and of the propriety of their expenses. As we have pointed out, it was usually provided that the compensation to be fixed by the committee must be ‘reasonable.’ But this restriction in and of itself would mean little, since the committee and the committee alone was to determine what was ‘reasonable.’ And it is no answer to say that a court of equity would review these fees on complaint of a depositor and disallow sums beyond a ‘reasonable’ amount or disallow improper items of expense. Such relief would necessitate litigation by the depositors. Considering the time, expense, and difficulty of legal questions involved, such a remedy would for all practical purposes furnish no check whatsoever on the extravagance of committee members.”
See Part II, Protective Committee Report, Securities and Exchange Commission (1937), pp. 351 et seq.
It is to be noted that while this provision only applies to committees representing more than twelve creditors or stockholders, the scrutiny clause contained in § 212 and the power to control allowances contained in § 221 (4) is not so restricted.
Sen. Rep. No. 1916, supra, note 2, at 36, explains §221 (4) as follows:
"Subsection (4) of section 221, derived from section 77B (f) (5), requires full disclosure and the approval by the judge of all payments for services, and for costs and expenses, in connection with the plan or the proceedings, whether such payments are made or promised by the debtor, or by any corporation succeeding to it, or by any other person.”
Section 77B (f) (5) provided that “the judge shall confirm the plan if satisfied that ... (5) all amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any corporation or corporations acquiring the debtor’s assets, and all amounts to be paid to committees or reorganization managers, whether or not by the debtor or any such corporation for services or expenses incident to the reorganization, have been fully disclosed and are reasonable, or are to be subject to the approval of the judge ...” 48 Stat. 919.
Section 228 provides:
“Upon the consummation of the plan, the judge shall enter a final decree—
“(1) discharging the debtor from all its debts and liabilities and terminating all rights and interests of stockholders of the debtor, except as provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan or in the order directing or authorizing the transfer or retention of property;
“ (2) discharging the trustee, if any;
“(3) making such provisions by way of injunction or otherwise as may be equitable; and
“ (4) closing the estate.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)",
"mergers",
"bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)",
"sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death",
"election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things",
"liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.",
"liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages",
"liability, punitive damages",
"Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)",
"state or local government tax",
"state and territorial land claims",
"state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)",
"federal or state regulation of securities",
"natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)",
"corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending",
"zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property",
"arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)",
"federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts",
"patents and copyrights: patent",
"patents and copyrights: copyright",
"patents and copyrights: trademark",
"patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes",
"federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad",
"federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)",
"federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company",
"miscellaneous economic regulation"
] | [
2
] | sc_issue_8 |
Ricky Lee SMITH, Petitioner
v.
Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
No. 17-1606
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued March 18, 2019
Decided May 28, 2019
Eugene R. Fidell, Yale Law School, Supreme Court Clinic, New Haven, CT, Wolodymyr Cybriwsky, Cybriwsky Wolodymyr, Law Office, Prestonsburg, KY, Andrew J. Pincus, Paul W. Hughes, Charles A. Rothfeld, Michael B. Kimberly, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor, General, Charles W. Scarborough, Sarah Carroll, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Social Security Act allows for judicial review of "any final decision ... made after a hearing" by the Social Security Administration (SSA). 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith was denied Social Security benefits after a hearing by an administrative law judge (ALJ) and later had his appeal from that denial dismissed as untimely by the SSA's Appeals Council-the agency's final decisionmaker. This case asks whether the Appeals Council's dismissal of Smith's claim is a "final decision ... made after a hearing" so as to allow judicial review under § 405(g). We hold that it is.
I
A
Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 1935, responding to the crisis of the Great Depression. 49 Stat. 620; F. Bloch, Social Security Law and Practice 13 (2012). In its early days, the program was administered by a body called the Social Security Board; that role has since passed on to the Board's successor, the SSA.
In 1939, Congress amended the Act, adding various provisions that-subject to changes not at issue here-continue to govern cases like this one. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. First, Congress gave the agency "full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures ... necessary or appropriate to carry out" the Act. § 405(a). Second, Congress directed the agency "to make findings of fac[t] and decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for a payment" and to provide all eligible claimants-that is, people seeking benefits-with an "opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision[s]." § 405(b)(1). Third, and most centrally, Congress provided for judicial review of "any final decision of the [agency] made after a hearing." § 405(g). At the same time, Congress made clear that review would be available only "as herein provided"-that is, only under the terms of § 405(g). § 405(h) ; see Heckler v. Ringer , 466 U.S. 602, 614-615, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984).
In 1940, the Social Security Board created the Appeals Council, giving it responsibility for overseeing and reviewing the decisions of the agency's hearing officers (who, today, are ALJs). Though the Appeals Council originally had just three members, its ranks have since swelled to include over 100 individuals serving as either judges or officers. The Appeals Council remains a creature of regulatory rather than statutory creation.
Today, the Social Security Act provides disability benefits under two programs, known by their statutory headings as Title II and Title XVI. See § 401 et seq. (Title II); § 1381 et seq. (Title XVI). Title II "provides old-age, survivor, and disability benefits to insured individuals irrespective of financial need." Bowen v. Galbreath , 485 U.S. 74, 75, 108 S.Ct. 892, 99 L.Ed.2d 68 (1988). Title XVI provides supplemental security income benefits "to financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled regardless of their insured status." Ibid. The regulations that govern the two programs are, for today's purposes, equivalent. See Sims v. Apfel , 530 U.S. 103, 107, n. 2, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). Likewise, § 405(g) sets the terms of judicial review for each. See § 1383(c)(3).
Modern-day claimants must generally proceed through a four-step process before they can obtain review from a federal court. First, the claimant must seek an initial determination as to his eligibility. Second, the claimant must seek reconsideration of the initial determination. Third, the claimant must request a hearing, which is conducted by an ALJ. Fourth, the claimant must seek review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. See 20 CFR § 416.1400. If a claimant has proceeded through all four steps on the merits, all agree, § 405(g) entitles him to judicial review in federal district court.
The tension in this case stems from the deadlines that SSA regulations impose for seeking each successive stage of review. A party who seeks Appeals Council review, as relevant here, must file his request within 60 days of receiving the ALJ's ruling, unless he can show "good cause for missing the deadline." § 416.1468.
The Appeals Council's review is discretionary: It may deny even a timely request without issuing a decision. See § 416.1481. If a claimant misses the deadline and cannot show good cause, however, the Appeals Council does not deny the request but rather dismisses it. § 416.1471. Dismissals are "binding and not subject to further review" by the SSA. § 416.1472. The question here is whether a dismissal for untimeliness, after the claimant has had an ALJ hearing, is a "final decision ... made after a hearing" for purposes of allowing judicial review under § 405(g).
B
Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith applied for disability benefits under Title XVI in 2012. Smith's claim was denied at the initial-determination stage and upon reconsideration. Smith then requested an ALJ hearing, which the ALJ held in February 2014 before issuing a decision denying Smith's claim on the merits in March 2014.
The parties dispute what happened next. Smith's attorney says that he sent a letter requesting Appeals Council review in April 2014, well within the 60-day deadline. The SSA says that it has no record of receiving any such letter. In late September 2014, Smith's attorney sent a copy of the letter that he assertedly had mailed in April. The SSA, noting that it had no record of prior receipt, counted the date of the request as the day that it received the copy. The Appeals Council accordingly determined that Smith's submission was untimely, concluded that Smith lacked good cause for missing the deadline, and dismissed Smith's request for review.
Smith sought judicial review of that dismissal in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, maintaining that "an Appeals Council decision to refrain from considering an untimely petition for review is not a 'final decision' subject to judicial review in federal court." Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security , 880 F. 3d 813, 814 (2018).
Smith petitioned this Court for certiorari. Responding to Smith's petition, the Government stated that while the Sixth Circuit's decision accorded with the SSA's longstanding position, the Government had "reexamined the question and concluded that its prior position was incorrect." Brief for Respondent on Pet. for Cert. 15.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. 586 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 451, 202 L.Ed.2d 345 (2018). Because the Government agrees with Smith that the Appeals Council's dismissal meets § 405(g)'s terms, we appointed Deepak Gupta as amicus curiae to defend the judgment below. 586 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 451, 202 L.Ed.2d 345 (2018). He has ably discharged his duties.
II
Section 405(g), as noted above, provides for judicial review of "any final decision ... made after a hearing." This provision, the Court has explained, contains two separate elements: first, a "jurisdictional" requirement that claims be presented to the agency, and second, a "waivable ... requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted." Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). This case involves the latter, nonjurisdictional element of administrative exhaustion. While § 405(g) delegates to the SSA the authority to dictate which steps are generally required, see Sims , 530 U.S. at 106, 120 S.Ct. 2080, exhaustion of those steps may not only be waived by the agency, see Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749, 767, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975), but also excused by the courts, see Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 484, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986) ; Eldridge , 424 U.S. at 330, 96 S.Ct. 893.
The question here is whether a dismissal by the Appeals Council on timeliness grounds after a claimant has received an ALJ hearing on the merits qualifies as a "final decision ... made after a hearing" for purposes of allowing judicial review under § 405(g). In light of the text, the context, and the presumption in favor of the reviewability of agency action, we conclude that it does.
A
We begin with the text. Taking the first clause ("any final decision") first, we note that the phrase "final decision" clearly denotes some kind of terminal event, and Congress' use of the word "any" suggests an intent to use that term "expansive[ly]," see Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons , 552 U.S. 214, 218-219, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008). The Appeals Council's dismissal of Smith's claim fits that language: Under the SSA's own regulations, it was the final stage of review. See 20 CFR § 416.1472.
Turning to the second clause ("made after a hearing"), we note that this phrase has been the subject of some confusion over the years. On the one hand, the statute elsewhere repeatedly uses the word "hearing" to signify an ALJ hearing, which suggests that, in the ordinary case, the phrase here too denotes an ALJ hearing. See, e.g. , IBP , Inc.v.Alvarez , 546 U.S. 21, 34, 126 S.Ct. 514, 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005) (noting "the normal rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same meaning"). On the other hand, the Court's precedents make clear that an ALJ hearing is not an ironclad prerequisite for judicial review. See, e.g. , City of New York , 476 U.S. at 484, 106 S.Ct. 2022 (emphasizing the Court's " 'intensely practical' " approach to the applicability of the exhaustion requirement and disapproving "mechanical application" of a set of factors).
There is no need today to give § 405(g) a definition for all seasons, because, in any event, this is a mine-run case and Smith obtained the kind of hearing that § 405(g) most naturally suggests: an ALJ hearing on the merits. In other words, even giving § 405(g) a relatively strict reading, Smith appears to satisfy its terms.
Smith cannot, however, satisfy § 405(g)'s "after a hearing" requirement as a matter of mere chronology. In Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), the Court considered whether the SSA's denial of a claimant's petition to reopen a prior denial of his claim for benefits qualified as a final decision under § 405(g). Id ., at 102-103, 107-109, 97 S.Ct. 980. The Court concluded that it did not, reasoning that a petition to reopen was a matter of agency grace that could be denied without a hearing altogether and that allowing judicial review would thwart Congress' own deadline for seeking such review. See id. , at 108-109, 97 S.Ct. 980. That the SSA's denial of the petition to reopen (1) was conclusive and (2) postdated an ALJ hearing did not, alone, bring it within the meaning of § 405(g).
Here, by contrast, the SSA's "final decision" is much more closely tethered to the relevant "hearing." Unlike a petition to reopen, a primary application for benefits may not be denied without an ALJ hearing (assuming the claimant timely requests one, as Smith did). § 405(b)(1). Moreover, the claimant's access to this first bite at the apple is indeed a matter of legislative right rather than agency grace. See id ., at 108, 97 S.Ct. 980. And, again unlike the situation in Sanders , there is no danger here of thwarting Congress' own deadline, given that the only potential untimeliness here concerns Smith's request for Appeals Council review-not his request for judicial review following the agency's ultimate determination.
B
The statutory context weighs in Smith's favor as well. Appeals from SSA determinations are, by their nature, appeals from the action of a federal agency, and in the separate administrative-law context of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an action is "final" if it both (1) "mark[s] the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process" and (2) is "one by which 'rights or obligations have been determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow.' " Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 177-178, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). Both conditions are satisfied when a Social Security claimant has reached the fourth and final step of the SSA's four-step process and has had his request for review dismissed as untimely. It is consistent to treat the Appeals Council's dismissal of Smith's claim as a final decision as well.
To be clear, "the doctrine of administrative exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular administrative scheme at issue," Salfi , 422 U.S. at 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, and we leave this axiom undisturbed today. The Social Security Act and the APA are different statutes, and courts must remain sensitive to their differences. See, e.g. , Sullivan v. Hudson , 490 U.S. 877, 885, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 104 L.Ed.2d 941 (1989) (observing that "[a]s provisions for judicial review of agency action go, § 405(g) is somewhat unusual" in that its "detailed provisions ... suggest a degree of direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to" APA review). But at least some of these differences suggest that Congress wanted more oversight by the courts in this context rather than less, see ibid. , and the statute as a whole is one that "Congress designed to be 'unusually protective' of claimants," City of New York , 476 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 2022.
We note further that the SSA is a massive enterprise, and mistakes will occur. See Brief for National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives as Amicus Curiae 13 (collecting examples). The four steps preceding judicial review, meanwhile, can drag on for years. While mistakes by the agency may be admirably rare, we do not presume that Congress intended for this claimant-protective statute, see City of New York , 476 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 2022, to leave a claimant without recourse to the courts when such a mistake does occur-least of all when the claimant may have already expended a significant amount of likely limited resources in a lengthy proceeding.
C
Smith's entitlement to judicial review is confirmed by "the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action." Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians , 476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). "That presumption," of course, "is rebuttable: It fails when a statute's language or structure demonstrates that Congress wanted an agency to police its own conduct." Mach Mining , LLCv.EEOC , 575 U.S. 480, ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct. 1645, 1651, 191 L.Ed.2d 607 (2015). But the burden for rebutting it is " 'heavy,' " id. , at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 1651, and that burden is not met here. While Congress left it to the SSA to define the procedures that claimants like Smith must first pass through, see Sims , 530 U.S. at 106, 120 S.Ct. 2080, Congress has not suggested that it intended for the SSA to be the unreviewable arbiter of whether claimants have complied with those procedures. Where, as here, a claimant has received a claim-ending timeliness determination from the agency's last-in-line decisionmaker after bringing his claim past the key procedural post (a hearing) mentioned in § 405(g), there has been a "final decision ... made after a hearing" under § 405(g).
III
Amicus ' arguments to the contrary have aided our consideration of this case, but they have not dissuaded us from concluding that the Appeals Council's dismissal of Smith's claim satisfied § 405(g).
Amicus first argues that the phrase "final decision ... made after a hearing" refers to a conclusive disposition, after exhaustion, of a benefits claim on the merits-that is, on a basis for which the Social Security Act entitles a claimant to a hearing. This reading follows, amicus argues, from the Court's observations that § 405(g) generally requires exhaustion, and moreover from Sanders ' suggestion, see 430 U.S. at 108, 97 S.Ct. 980, that review is not called for where a claimant loses on an agency-determined procedural ground that is divorced from the substantive matters for which a hearing is required. Even if Smith did receive a hearing on the merits, amicus argues, the conclusive determination was not on that basis, and "[i]t would be unnatural to read the statute as throwing open the gates to judicial review of any final decision, no matter how collateral," just because such a hearing occurred. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 34.
We disagree. First, as noted above, the Court's precedents do not make exhaustion a pure necessity, indicating instead that while the SSA is empowered to define the steps claimants must generally take, the SSA is not also the unreviewable arbiter of whether a claimant has sufficiently complied with those steps. See supra , at 1773 - 1774, and n. 7. Second, the Appeals Council's dismissal is not merely collateral; such a dismissal calls an end to a proceeding in which a substantial factual record has already been developed and on which considerable resources have already been expended. See supra , at 1776, and n. 16. Accepting amicus ' argument would mean that a claimant could make it to the end of the SSA's process and then have judicial review precluded simply because the Appeals Council stamped "untimely" on the request, even if that designation were patently inaccurate. While there may be contexts in which the law is so unforgiving, this is not one. See supra , at 1775 - 1777.
Smith's case, as noted above, is also distinct from Sanders . See supra , at 1775. Sanders , after all, involved the SSA's denial of a petition for reopening-a second look that the agency had made available to claimants as a matter of grace. See 430 U.S. at 101-102, 107-108, 97 S.Ct. 980. But Smith is not seeking a second look at an already-final denial; he argues that he was wrongly prevented from continuing to pursue his primary claim for benefits. That primary claim, meanwhile, is indeed a matter of statutory entitlement. See § 405(b).
Amicus also emphasizes that the SSA handles a large volume of claims, such that a decision providing for greater judicial review could risk a flood of litigation. That result seems unlikely for a few reasons. First, the number of Appeals Council untimeliness dismissals is comparatively small-something on the order of 2,500 dismissals out of 160,000 dispositions per year. Second, the interpretation that Smith and the Government urge has been the law since 1983 in the Eleventh Circuit, and the data there do not bear out amicus ' warning. See Reply Brief for Respondent 14-15 (collecting statistics). Third, while amicus flags related contexts that could be informed by today's ruling, see Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 36-40, those issues are not before us. We therefore do not address them other than to reinforce that such questions must be considered in the light of "the particular administrative scheme at issue." See Salfi , 422 U.S. at 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457. Today's decision, therefore, hardly knocks loose a line of dominoes.
Finally, amicus argues that the meaning of § 405(g) is ambiguous and that the SSA's longstanding interpretation of § 405(g) -prior to its changed position during the pendency of this case-is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The Government and Smith maintain that the statute unambiguously supports the Government's new position, and Smith further asserts that deference is inappropriate where the Government itself has rejected the interpretation in question in its filings.
We need not decide whether the statute is unambiguous or what to do with the curious situation of an amicus curiae seeking deference for an interpretation that the Government's briefing rejects. Chevron deference " 'is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.' " Kingv.Burwell , 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). The scope of judicial review, meanwhile, is hardly the kind of question that the Court presumes that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency.
Indeed, roughly six years after Chevron was decided, the Court declined to give Chevron deference to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of a federal statute that would have foreclosed private rights of action under certain circumstances. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett , 494 U.S. 638, 649-650, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 108 L.Ed.2d 585 (1990). As the Court explained, Congress' having created "a role for the Department of Labor in administering the statute" did "not empower the Secretary to regulate the scope of the judicial power vested by the statute." Id. , at 650, 110 S.Ct. 1384. Rather, "[a]lthough agency determinations within the scope of delegated authority are entitled to deference, it is fundamental 'that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction.' " Ibid . Here, too, while Congress has empowered the SSA to create a scheme of administrative exhaustion, see Sims , 530 U.S. at 106, 120 S.Ct. 2080, Congress did not delegate to the SSA the power to determine "the scope of the judicial power vested by" § 405(g) or to determine conclusively when its dictates are satisfied. Adams Fruit Co. , 494 U.S. at 650, 110 S.Ct. 1384. Consequently, having concluded that Smith and the Government have the better reading of § 405(g), we need go no further.
IV
Although they agree that § 405(g) permits judicial review of the Appeals Council's dismissal in this case, Smith and the Government disagree somewhat about the scope of review on remand. Smith argues that if a reviewing court disagrees with the procedural ground for dismissal, it can then proceed directly to the merits, while the Government argues that the proper step in such a case would be to remand. We largely agree with the Government.
To be sure, there would be jurisdiction for a federal court to proceed to the merits in the way that Smith avers. For one, as noted above, exhaustion itself is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. See supra , at 1773 - 1774. Moreover, § 405(g) states that a reviewing "court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing"-a broad grant of authority that reflects the high "degree of direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency" envisioned by § 405(g). Hudson , 490 U.S. at 885, 109 S.Ct. 2248. In short, there is no jurisdictional bar to a court's reaching the merits.
Fundamental principles of administrative law, however, teach that a federal court generally goes astray if it decides a question that has been delegated to an agency if that agency has not first had a chance to address the question. See, e.g. , INS v. Orlando Ventura , 537 U.S. 12, 16, 18, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam ); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers , 482 U.S. 270, 283, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) ; cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp. , 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) ("For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency"). The Court's cases discussing exhaustion in the Social Security context confirm the prudence of applying this general principle here, where the agency's final decisionmaker has not had a chance to address the merits at all. See City of New York , 476 U.S. at 485, 106 S.Ct. 2022 ("Because of the agency's expertise in administering its own regulations, the agency ordinarily should be given the opportunity to review application of those regulations to a particular factual context"); Salfi , 422 U.S. at 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457 (explaining that exhaustion serves to "preven[t] premature interference with agency processes" and to give the agency "an opportunity to correct its own errors," "to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise," and to produce "a record which is adequate for judicial review"). Accordingly, in an ordinary case, a court should restrict its review to the procedural ground that was the basis for the Appeals Council dismissal and (if necessary) allow the agency to address any residual substantive questions in the first instance.
V
We hold that where the SSA's Appeals Council has dismissed a request for review as untimely after a claimant has obtained a hearing from an ALJ on the merits, that dismissal qualifies as a "final decision ... made after a hearing" within the meaning of § 405(g). The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 199, 234-235 (1990) (Koch & Koplow).
See id ., at 235.
SSA, Brief History and Current Information About the Appeals Council, https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_ac.html (all Internet materials as last visited May 22, 2019).
Because Smith seeks benefits under Title XVI, we cite to the regulations that govern Title XVI, which are located at 20 CFR pt. 416 (2018). The regulations that govern Title II are located at 20 CFR pt. 404.
Of course, if the result at any of the four preceding stages is fully favorable, there is generally no need to proceed further.
Seven Courts of Appeals have held that there is no judicial review under these circumstances, while two have held that there is. Compare Brandtner v. Department of Health & Human Servs. , 150 F. 3d 1306, 1307 (CA10 1998) ; Bacon v. Sullivan , 969 F. 2d 1517, 1520 (CA3 1992) ; Matlock v. Sullivan , 908 F. 2d 492, 494 (CA9 1990) ; Harper v. Bowen , 813 F. 2d 737, 743 (CA5 1987) ; Adams v. Heckler , 799 F. 2d 131, 133 (CA4 1986) ; Smith v. Heckler , 761 F. 2d 516, 518 (CA8 1985) ; Dietsch v. Schweiker , 700 F. 2d 865, 867 (CA2 1983), with Casey v. Berryhill , 853 F. 3d 322, 326 (CA7 2017) ; Bloodsworth v. Heckler , 703 F. 2d 1233, 1239 (CA11 1983).
While Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), can be read to cabin Eldridge and Salfi to only constitutional claims, the Court's subsequent decision in City of New York demonstrates that this understanding of § 405(g) can extend to cases lacking Eldridge 's and Salfi 's constitutional character. See City of New York , 476 U.S. at 474-475, and n. 5, 482-484, 106 S.Ct. 2022 ; see also City of New York v. Heckler , 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1124-1125 (EDNY 1984) (ruling that the agency's actions violated the Social Security Act and its own regulations and thus declining to reach the plaintiffs' constitutional argument).
See 5 Oxford English Dictionary 920 (2d ed. 1989) (Final: "Marking the last stage of a process; leaving nothing to be looked for or expected; ultimate"); 4 Oxford English Dictionary 222 (1933) (same); see also Webster's New World College Dictionary 542 (5th ed. 2016) (Final: "leaving no further chance for action, discussion, or change; deciding; conclusive"); Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 469 (11th ed. 2011) (Final: "coming at the end: being the last in a series, process, or progress").
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (entitling claimants to a hearing on the merits); § 405(b)(2) (discussing "reconsideration" of certain findings "before any hearing under paragraph (1) on the issue of such entitlement"); § 405(g) (discussing factual findings and evidence resulting from such a "hearing"); § 405(h) (discussing binding effect of decision "after a hearing"); see also §§ 1383(c)(1)(A), (3) (similar).
We note as well that the "hearing" referred to in § 405(g) cannot be a hearing before the Appeals Council. Congress provided for a hearing in § 405(b) and for judicial review "after a hearing" in § 405(g) before the Appeals Council even existed. See supra, at 1771 - 1772. Moreover, the Appeals Council makes many decisions without a hearing-e.g., denying a petition for review without giving reasons-that are nevertheless plainly reviewable. See 20 CFR §§ 416.1400(a)(5), 416.1467, 416.1481. Accordingly, the fact that there was no Appeals Council hearing-much like the fact that there was no reasoned Appeals Council decision on the merits-does not bar review.
We return below to the possibility, suggested by amicus , that "final decision ... made after a hearing" could signify a final decision "on a matter on which the Act requires a hearing." Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 13; see infra , at 1777- - 1778. Here, we note only that while Congress certainly could have written something like "final decision on the merits ... made after a hearing," it did not.
The alternative risks untenable breadth. The Battle of Yorktown predates our ruling today, but no one would describe today's opinion as a "decision made after the Battle of Yorktown." As we explain, however, the dismissal of Smith's claim is tethered to Smith's hearing in a way that more distant events are not.
The noteworthy counterpoint is § 405(h), which withdraws federal-court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1346. While that provision clearly serves "to route review through" § 405(g), see Sanders , 430 U.S. at 103, n. 3, 97 S.Ct. 980 ; see also Heckler v. Ringer , 466 U.S. 602, 614-615, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984), that routing choice does not simultaneously constrict the route that Congress did provide.
For example, the agency receives roughly 2.5 million new disability claims per year. See SSA, Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2017-2019, p. 32 (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY19Files/2019APR.pdf.
See also Koch & Koplow 257 (noting that each Appeals Council member "typically spends only ten to fifteen minutes reviewing an average case" given "the pressures of the caseload").
See SSA, FY 2020 Congressional Justification 9 (Mar. 2019) (estimating 2019 average processing time for the first three steps at 113 days, 105 days, and 515 days, respectively), https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY20Files/FY20-JEAC.pdf; Brief for National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives as Amicus Curiae 11.
A different question would be presented by a claimant who assertedly faltered at an earlier step-e.g., whose request for an ALJ hearing was dismissed as untimely and who then appealed that determination to the Appeals Council before seeking judicial review. While such a claimant would not have received a "hearing" at all, the Court's precedents also make clear that a hearing is not always required. See supra, at 1773 - 1774. Because such a situation is not before us, we do not address it.
See Brief for Respondent 43, n. 17 (number of timeliness dismissals); SSA, Annual Statistical Supplement 2018 (Table 2.F11) (number of dispositions), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/ 2018/2f8-2f11.pdf.
The parties agree, as do we, on the standard of review: abuse of discretion as to the overall conclusion, and "substantial evidence" "as to any fact." See § 405(g) ; see also Brief for Respondent 43-44; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5; cf. Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 483, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986) ("Ordinarily, the Secretary has discretion to decide when to waive the exhaustion requirement").
We make no statement, by contrast, regarding the applicability of this line of cases to situations in which the Appeals Council has had a chance to address the merits. Cf. Sims v. Apfel , 530 U.S. 103, 110-112, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000) (plurality opinion) (discussing why the inquisitorial nature of SSA proceedings counsels against imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement).
By the same token, remand may be forgone in rarer cases, such as where the Government joins the claimant in asking the court to reach the merits or where remand would serve no meaningful purpose. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"comity: civil rights",
"comity: criminal procedure",
"comity: First Amendment",
"comity: habeas corpus",
"comity: military",
"comity: obscenity",
"comity: privacy",
"comity: miscellaneous",
"comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals",
"assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order",
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules",
"judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures",
"mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)",
"venue",
"no merits: writ improvidently granted",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)",
"no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision",
"no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)",
"no merits: miscellaneous",
"standing to sue: adversary parties",
"standing to sue: direct injury",
"standing to sue: legal injury",
"standing to sue: personal injury",
"standing to sue: justiciable question",
"standing to sue: live dispute",
"standing to sue: parens patriae standing",
"standing to sue: statutory standing",
"standing to sue: private or implied cause of action",
"standing to sue: taxpayer's suit",
"standing to sue: miscellaneous",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: review of non-final order",
"judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)",
"judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)",
"judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)",
"judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)",
"judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts",
"judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal",
"judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata",
"judicial administration: interpleader",
"judicial administration: untimely filing",
"judicial administration: Act of State doctrine",
"judicial administration: miscellaneous",
"Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction",
"miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction"
] | [
31
] | sc_issue_9 |
SUMNER, WARDEN v. MATA
No. 81-844.
Decided March 22, 1982
Per Curiam.
This is the second time that this matter has come before us. In Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981), decided last Term, we held that 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) requires federal courts in habeas proceedings to accord a presumption of correctness to state-court findings of fact. This requirement could not be plainer. The statute explicitly provides that “a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction. . . , shall be presumed to be correct.” Only when one of seven specified factors is present or the federal court determines that the state-court finding of fact “is not fairly supported by the record” may the presumption properly be viewed as inapplicable or rebutted.
We held further that the presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact, and we held that if a federal court concludes that the presumption of correctness does not control, it must provide a written explanation of the reasoning that led it to conclude that one or more of the first seven factors listed in § 2254(d) were present, or the “reasoning which led it to conclude that the state finding was ‘not fairly supported by the record.’” 449 U. S., at 551.
Applying these general principles to the case at hand, we found in our decision last Term that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had neither applied the presumption of correctness nor explained why it had not. See Mata v. Sumner, 611 F. 2d 754 (CA9 1979). Instead, the court had made findings of fact that were “considerably at odds” with the findings made by the California Court of Appeal without any mention whatsoever of § 2254(d). 449 U. S., at 543.
In reaching the conclusion that the Court of Appeals had not followed § 2254(d), we rejected the argument, advanced by respondent Mata, that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals and the California court were not in conflict. Mata was convicted in 1973 in state trial court of the first-degree murder of a fellow inmate. There were three witnesses to the murder, each of whom identified Mata as a participant in the killing. On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Mata argued for the first time that the photographic lineup procedure used by the state police was so im-permissibly suggestive as to deprive him of due process. After examining the evidence, the California Court of Appeal rejected this assertion. It concluded that the pretrial procedures had not been unfair under the test stated by this Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377 (1968):
“Reviewing the facts of the present case to determine if the particular photographic identification procedure used contained the proscribed suggestive characteristics, we first find that the photographs were available for cross-examination purposes at the trial. We further find that there is no showing of influence by the investigating officers: that the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to view the crime; and that their descriptions are accurate. The circumstances thus indicate the inherent fairness of the procedure, and we find no error in the admission of the identification evidence.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C-8.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion, and did so on the basis of factfindings that were clearly in conflict with those made by the state court. We noted that the Court of Appeals had relied, inter alia, on its own conflicting findings that “(1) the circumstances surrounding the witnesses’ observation of the crime were such that there was a grave likelihood of misidentification; (2) the witnesses had failed to give sufficiently detailed descriptions of the assailant; and (3) considerable pressure from both prison officials and prison factions had been brought to bear on the witnesses.” Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S., at 543. We concluded that the “findings made by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit are considerably at odds with the findings made by the California Court of Appeal.” Ibid. We remanded so that the Court of Appeals could review its determination of the issue and either apply the statutory presumption or explain why the presumption did not apply in light of the factors listed in § 2254(d). We expressed no view as to whether the procedures had been impermissibly suggestive. That was a question for the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance after complying with § 2254(d).
On remand, the Court of Appeals found that it was not necessary for it to apply the presumption of correctness or explain why the presumption should not be applied. 649 F. 2d 713 (CA9 1981). Rather, agreeing with the argument advanced by Mata and the dissenting opinion in Sumner v. Mata, supra, the court concluded that § 2254(d) was simply irrelevant in this case because its factfindings in no way differed from those of the state court. It argued that its disagreement with the state court was “over the legal and constitutional significance of certain facts” and not over the facts themselves. 649 F. 2d, at 716. It found that whether or not the pretrial photographic identification procedure used in this case was impermissibly suggestive was a mixed question of law and fact as to which the presumption of correctness did not apply. And it reinstated its conclusion that the pretrial procedures had been impermissibly suggestive and that Mata therefore was entitled to release or a new trial.
We have again reviewed this case and conclude that the Court of Appeals apparently misunderstood the terms of our remand. Nor did it comply with the requirements of § 2254(d). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the ultimate question as to the constitutionality of the pretrial identification procedures used in this case is a mixed question of law and fact that is not governed by § 2254(d). In deciding this question, the federal court may give different weight to the facts as found by the state court and may reach a different conclusion in light of the legal standard. But the questions of fact that underlie this ultimate conclusion are governed by the statutory presumption as our earlier opinion made clear. Thus, whether the witnesses in this case had an opportunity to observe the crime or were too distracted; whether the witnesses gave a detailed, accurate description; and whether the witnesses were under pressure from prison officials or others are all questions of fact as to which the statutory presumption applies.
Of course, the federal courts are not necessarily bound by the state court’s findings. Section 2254(d) permits a federal court to conclude, for example, that a state finding was “not fairly supported by the record.” But the statute does require the federal courts to face up to any disagreement as to the facts and to defer to the state court unless one of the factors listed in § 2254(d) is found. Although the distinction between law and fact is not always easily drawn, we deal here with a statute that requires the federal courts to show a high measure of deference to the factfindings made by the state courts. To adopt the Court of Appeals’ view would be to deprive this statutory command of its important significance.
Our remand directed the Court of Appeals to re-examine its findings in light of the statutory presumption. We pointed the way by identifying certain of its findings that we considered to be at odds with the findings of the California Court of Appeal. We asked the Court of Appeals to apply the statutory presumption or explain why the presumption was not applicable in view of the factors listed in the statute. The Court of Appeals did neither. Accordingly, we again must remand. Again we note that “we are not to be understood as agreeing or disagreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeals on the merits of the issue of impermissibly suggestive identification procedures.” 449 U. S., at 552.
The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Section 2254(d) provides:
“(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit—
“(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
“(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
“(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
“(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
“(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
“(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or
“(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding;
“(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances repectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.”
Respondent argued: “All of the facts set forth in the opinion [of the Court of Appeals] are drawn from the record and do not contradict any finding of primary fact made by the California Court of Appeal.” Brief for Respondent, O. T. 1980, No. 79-1601, pp. 19-20.
Two other inmates — Salvadore Vargas and David Gallegos — were also convicted of taking part in the murder.
The California Court of Appeal summarized the pretrial procedures as follows:
“Three inmate witnesses testified that they saw the stabbing take place. All three — Childress, Almengor, and Allen — identified all three defendants .... The witnesses were shown a number of photographs of Te-hachapi inmates in an attempt to identify the slayers. Almengor was interviewed and shown photos on October 19, 1972, the day of the incident. He made a possible identification of appellant Vargas, but made possible misidentifications of the other two participants. On October 30, 1972, more recent photos were presented to Almengor and he identified all the appellants. On October 27,1972, Allen was shown photographs but stated he could not make an identification because the photographs were old. On October 30,1972, more photos were presented to Allen and he identified all three appellants. On that date Childress also selected all three appellants from photographs shown to him.
“Appellants argue that the witnesses Almengor and Allen were housed in the same segregation unit with appellants, that they were aware that appellants were removed from the segregation unit to have their pictures taken and that this makes their identification inadmissible. But they make no showing, and the record supports none, that the witnesses were in fact influenced in their identification by this action of the investigating officers.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C-4 to C-6.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit differed not only with that of the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal but also with the decision of three levels of state courts in state habeas proceedings and with the decision of the Federal District Court in federal habeas proceedings.
In dissent Justice Brennan argued that there was no conflict between the facts as found by the state court and as found by the Court of Appeals. He argued that the California court’s finding that the witnesses had an opportunity to view the killing was not in conflict with a finding by the Court of Appeals that the witnesses were “quite likely” distracted at the time of the killing. He argued further that the California court’s finding that the descriptions given by the witnesses were “accurate” was not in conflict with a finding that these descriptions were not detailed. Finally, the dissent appears to have considered that the existence of influence by prison officials was a not a question of fact but of law. 449 U. S., at 556. It is obvious that a majority of the Court did not find this reasoning persuasive. On our remand, the Court of Appeals apparently adopted Justice Brennan’s dissenting views. See 649 F. 2d 713, 716 (CA9 1981).
“Lest the reviewing court ‘be left to guess’ as to our reasons for granting habeas relief notwithstanding the provisions of § 2254(d), we reiterate: As our original analysis indicates ... we substantially agree with the ‘historical’ or ‘basic’ facts adduced by the California Court of Appeal Fifth Appellate District.... We disagree, however, with the application of the Simmons standard ... to the totality of the circumstances of this case.” Id., at 717.
Judge Sneed dissented from the Court of Appeals’ original decision, and he dissented again “respectfully, and to some degree sorrowfully.” Ibid.
Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 193, n. 3 (1972).
In Neil v. Biggers, supra, at 199-200, we noted that “the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” Each of these “factors” requires a finding of historical fact as to which § 2254(d) applies. The ultimate conclusion as to whether the facts as found state a constitutional violation is a mixed question of law and fact as to which the statutory presumption does not apply.
Because we remand for failure to comply with §2254(d), we do not reach the second question presented in the petition for certiorari as to whether the Court of Appeals applied the proper legal standard in determining that the pretrial identification procedures used in this case were constitutionally defective. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | Did administrative action occur in the context of the case? | [
"No",
"Yes"
] | [
0
] | sc_adminaction_is |
BRUNNER, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE v. OHIO REPUBLICAN PARTY et al.
No. 08A332.
Decided October 17, 2008
Per Curiam.
On October 9, 2008, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing Jennifer Brunner, the Ohio Secretary of State (Secretary), to update Ohio’s Statewide Voter Registration Database to comply with §303 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 116 Stat. 1708,42 U. S. C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i) (2000 ed., Supp. V). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the Secretary’s motion to vacate the TRO. The Secretary has filed an application to stay the TRO with Justice Stevens as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, and he has referred the matter to the Court. The Secretary argues both that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter the TRO and that its ruling on the merits was erroneous. We express no opinion on the question whether HAVA is being properly implemented. Respondents, however, are not sufficiently likely to prevail on the question whether Congress has authorized the District Court to enforce § 303 in an action brought by a private litigant to justify the issuance of a TRO. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 283 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286 (2001). We therefore grant the application for a stay and vacate the TRO.
It is so ordered.
Section 15483(a)(5)(B)(i) states, in relevant part:
“The chief State election official and the official responsible for the State motor vehicle authority of a State shall enter into an agreement to match information in the database of the statewide voter registration system with information in the database of the motor vehicle authority to the extent required to enable each such official to verify the accuracy of the information provided on applications for voter registration.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York. | What is the court in which the case originated? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims",
"United States Supreme Court"
] | [
94
] | sc_caseorigin |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.