task
stringclasses 260
values | output
stringlengths 2
5
| instruction
stringlengths 576
15.3k
|
|---|---|---|
songer_weightev | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?" This includes discussions of whether the litigant met the burden of proof. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
McMAN OIL & GAS CO. v. HURLEY et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 19, 1928.
No. 5050.
1. Mines and minerals <§=105 (2) — Authority to execute conveyance was conclusively presumed, where secretary’s certificates showed resolutions of executive committee and directors authorizing sale.
Where certificates of secretary, showing resolutions of executive committee and board of directors of corporation authorizing and approving sale of oil lease, were issued and delivered to purchaser, it was conclusively presumed that the resolutions were adopted and that corporate authority was given to execute conveyance.
2. Corporations <@=>422(1) — Corporation is es-topped to deny authorized representations of its officers and'agents.
Corporation is estopped to deny representations of its officers and agents, made within the scope of their authority.
3. Frauds, statute of <@=63(2)— Purchaser’s oral agreement, after sale of oil lease, to re-convey, held inadmissible under statute.
Alleged oral agreement of purchaser of oil lease, after sale was made, to reconvey upon return of purchase price within 60 days, held inadmissible under statute of frauds.
4. Evidence <@=230 (3) — Title, having passed, cannot be impeached by vendor’s declaration that it passed conditionally.
After title to property has passed to purchaser, it cannot be impeached by the vendor’s declaration that sale was conditional only.
5. Mines and minerals <@=74 — Failure of vendor of oil lease to attempt to comply with alleged condition permitting repurchase within time agreed rendered purchaser’s title absolute.
If purchaser of oil lease entered into agreement with vendor to reconvey on return of purchase price within 69 days, purchaser’s title became absolute, where no attempt was made to comply with the condition within the time limit agreed upon.
6. Evidence <@=244(1 i) — Declaration that ■ Its officer had agreed to give bribe for sale of oil lease held not binding on purchaser corporation and insufficient to show bribery.
Purchaser of oil lease, sued by receivers of vendor corporation to set aside conveyance as fraud on creditors, held not bound by declaration of vendor’s officer concerning agreement of purchaser’s officer to give bribe for sale, since conversation was not part of res gestee but constituted mere narration of past event, and charge of bribery was therefore not sustained.
7. Fraudulent conveyances <@=298(I)— Evidence held insufficient to support finding that sale of oil lease by corporation at time of financial embarrassment and decline in price of oil was made to defraud creditors.
In suit by receivers of oil company to set aside corporation’s sale of oil lease, made at time price of oil had considerably declined and corporation was financially embarrassed, evidence held insufficient to support finding that sale was made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, notwithstanding close family relations between officers and stockholders of two companies and profits realized from property after sale, where insolvency of grantor was not satisfactorily shown.
8. Fraudulent conveyances <@=249 — Year’s delay by receivers held to bar suit to set aside sale of corporation’s oil lease as fraud on creditors.
Suit by receivers of oil company to set aside sale of corporation’s oil lease as fraud on creditors held barred by laches, where receivers delayed bringing suit for one year, after having acquired knowledge of all essential facts upon which suit was based, on account of belief that transaction was profitable to corporation.
9. Fraudulent conveyances <§=248 — Vendor’s receivers on purchaser’s refusal to reconvey oil lease as agreed were required to act promptly to set aside sale as fraud on creditors.
Receivers of oil company, upon receiving notice of refusal of purchaser of oil lease to re-convey in alleged violation of agreement, were required to act promptly to set aside sale on account of fraud, especially in view of fluctuation in prices of oil-producing properties, and receivers could not wait and determine in the light of subsequent events whether it would be to their advantage to recognize the sale as valid.
Appeal from tlie District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas; James Clifton Wilson, Judge.
Suit by P. J. Hurley and another, receivers of the Gilliland Oil Company, against the McMan Oil & Gas Company. From a decree for complainants defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
John Rogers, of Tulsa, Okl., Harry H. Rogers, of San Antonio, Tex., A. B. Flanary, of Dallas, Tex., A. H. Carrigan, of Wichita Falls, Tex., and R. L. Batts, of Austin, Tex. (Carrigan, Britain, Morgan & King, of Wichita Falls, Tex., and Flanary & Aldredge, of Dallas, Tex., on the brief), for appellant.
T. R. Boone, of Wichita Falls, Tex., John M. Atkinson, of St. Louis, Mo., J. M. McCormick, of Dallas, Tex. (McCormick, Bromberg, Leftwich & Carrington, of Dallas, Tex., Atkinson, Rombauer & Hill, of St. Louis, Mo., Boone & Humphrey, of Wichita Falls, Tex., and Robert H. Richards, of Wilmington, Del., on the brief), for appellees.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and FOSTER, Circuit Judges.
BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
On May 11, 1921, the Gilliland Oil Company conveyed to the McMan Oil & Gas Company an interest in oil-producing land, designated in the record as the Hardin lease. The conveyance was absolute in form, and was authorized by the executive committee of the Gilliland company’s board of directors. A resolution of the board of directors, dated May 19, purporting to approve the sale, appears in the minutes; but whether it was adopted by a majority vote depends upon conflicting evidence as.to whether a director named McCullough was present. However, it is shown by undisputed testimony that the secretary certified that both sets of resolutions were regularly adopted by a majority vote, and his certificates to that effect‘Were delivered by the general attorney of the Gilliland company to the general attorney of the McMan company after the latter had insisted upon the sale being approved by resolution of the directors.
On November 20, 1922, this suit was brought by P. J. Hurley and John J. Satterthwait, as receivers of Gilliland company, against the McMan company, to have the conveyance in question- decreed to be a mortgage, or to have been made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors of the grantor. The bill alleged that at the time of such conveyance the Gilliland company was insolvent, in the sense that it was unable to pay its debts as they matured in the course of business. Appellant defended on the grounds that it paid adequate consideration, was the purchaser of an unconditional title in good faith, without notice of the grantor’s insolvency, and that the suit was barred by laches. The purchase price, which was promptly paid, was a million dollars. Before this suit was brought, the net profits exceeded that sum. On final hearing, the District Court held that the sale was made in fraud of creditors, and that appellant had notice, though not actual knowledge, thereof, and ordered that the sale be set aside, and that appellant account to the receivers for the profits it had received over and above the purchase price.
The Gilliland company was engaged in trading in oil properties and in producing and selling oil therefrom. It was incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with its principal office at Tulsa, Okl. In July of 1921 Hurley and Satterthwait were appointed receivers of that company by the Federal Distriet Court of
Question: Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_genresp2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.
CONCRETE ENGINEERING CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 9124.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
April 13, 1932.
George E. H. Goodner, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
Norman D. Keller, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen. (G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen., and G. M. Charest, Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and John D. Foley, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for respondent.
Before STONE and KENYON, Circuit Judges, and CANT, District Judge.
STONE, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition by a taxpayer to review an order of the Board of Tax Appeals redetermining income and excess profits taxes for the year 1920.
Before the Board of Tax Appeals petitioner urged four errors in the assessment-of this tax. One of these had to do with the failure of the Commissioner to allow a depreciation deduction on two patents which formed the foundation of petitioner’s business. The Board found the values of the patents, and allowed a depreciation deduction equivalent to one-seventeenth of the value thereof. The petitioner acquiesces in this finding, and that question is not presented here [however, see Burnet v. National Electrie Ticket Register Co., 55 F.(2d) 587, this court, opinion filed January 23, 1932]. Another error has to do with the contention that this assessment is barred by limitations. A third error is the failure of the Commissioner to include the value of the above patents as invested capital for the taxable year. The final error is that the Commissioner refused to allow petitioner the benefit of a “special assessment” in accordance with sections 327 and 328 of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1093). As to this last error, the Board found that petitioner was entitled to this special assessment, and this finding of the Board is acquiesced in by the petitioner, except that it here contends that the Board erred in failing to hold that petitioner is entitled to have its tax liability computed both by special assessment and by the regular statutory basis with allowance of the patents as invested capital, and that whichever of these two methods results in the least tax is the proper one to apply.
I. Limitations.
The tax return of the petitioner for the year 1920 was filed on March 15,1921. Under section 277 (a) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 9, 58, 26 USCA § 1057 (a) (3), taxes were required to be assessed within five years after the return for taxation was filed. Section 278 (c) of the same act (44 Stat. 9, 59, 26 USCA § 1060 note) provided that “where both the commissioner and the taxpayer have consented in writing to the assessment of the tax after the time prescribed in Section 277 for its assessment the tax may be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon.” Under the above statutes, the limitation for the assessment of this tax would (without such consent) have expired on March 15, 1926. On February 2, 1926, a waiver, in the departmental form, was executed by the taxpayer and the Commissioner, expiring December 31,1926. Upon June 14, 1926, the Commissioner notified petitioner of the deficiency assessment here involved. Petitioner concedes that, if this waiver is valid, the assessment is not barred, but it attacks the validity of this waiver. This attack is upon two grounds, which are: First, that this waiver was signed on the part of the Commissioner, “D. H. Blair, Commissioner, L. G.,” which reveals that it was not signed by the Commissioner in person, and there was no showing as to who signed his name to this document; seeond, that the other signature is “Concrete Engineering Company, by A. P. Jessen, See’y-Treas., Taxpayer,” and that, under the laws of Nebraska, the secretary of a corporation is not authorized to bind the corporation in the absence of specific authority.
In Stem Brothers & Co. v. Burnet, 51 F. (2d) 1042, 1046, a similar contention was made regarding a waiver signed “D. H. Blair, Commissioner, M. B.,” and this court said:
“The contention as to the proper signature is met by the waiver itself, which eontains the signature ‘D. H. Blair, Commissioner/ and the presumption of the verity of the acts of public' officials. United Thacker Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 46 F. (2d) 231, 233 (C. C. A. 1); Trustees for Ohio & Big Sandy Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.(2d) 782, 784 (C. C. A. 4).
“In general, it may be said as to this controversy and those of a related character that a waiver of this kind is ‘essentially a voluntary, unilateral waiver of a defense by the taxpayer/ as stated in Stange v. United States, 282 U. S. 270, 276, 51 S. Ct. 145, 75 L. Ed. 335; also see Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co. v. U. S., 280 U. S. 453, 466, 50 S. Ct. 215, 74
Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appel1_3_2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Your task is to determine which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. 2,974.49 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, IN CLARENDON COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA, and South Carolina Public Service Authority, et al., Appellees.
No. 8618.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 11, 1962.
Decided Sept. 17, 1962.
Edmund B. Clark, Atty., Dept, of Justice (Ramsey Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Terrell L. Glenn, U. S. Atty., Thomas P. Simpson, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Roger P. Marquis, Atty., Dept, of Justice, on the brief), for appellant.
Walton J. McLeod, Jr., Waterboro, S. C. (W. D. Simpson, Moncks Corner, S. C., and Rogers & Riggs, Manning, S. C., on brief), for appellees.
Before SOPER and BRYAN, Circuit Judges, and LARKINS, District Judge.
LARKINS, District Judge.
On March 29, 1956 the South Carolina Public Service Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Authority) granted to the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as United States) a three-month option to purchase for the price of $105,000. approximately 3,000 acres of land in Clarendon County, South Carolina, for and on behalf of the Santee National Wildlife Refuge Project. No time limit for performance of the contract, if the option were accepted, was set forth in the option contract. On October 26, 1956 the option was extended to January 29,1957 and the United States exercised the option in writing on December 21, 1956.
No further correspondence ensued between the parties until January 20, 1958 when the Authority advised the United States that it considered the delay of more than one year in making payment to be unreasonable and declared the option to be terminated. The United States replied on January 28, 1958 that it would complete acquisition. On May 6, 1958 the Authority stated that it definitely would not convey the property pursuant to the option contract.
On November 15, 1958 the United States filed a complaint in condemnation and a Declaration of Taking and deposited with the court, the sum of $105,000. as estimated compensation. An order for immediate possession was entered on February 13, 1959. In the complaint reference was made to the option agreement wherein the parties had agreed upon a purchase price of $105,000.
The Authority’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint and vacate the Declaration of Taldng was denied.
The United States then moved for judgment on the pleadings and the district court denied the motion while deciding that a question of fact to be determined by a jury existed as to whether the United States had complied with its obligations under the. option contract.
In October 1961, trial was held upon the sole issue of whether the United States had complied with the terms of the option contract to perform its obligations within a reasonable time. The jury returned as its verdict, that the delay of the United States in meeting its obligations under the option contract was unreasonable. The district court thereupon entered an order dismissing the complaint, vacating the Declaration of Taking and vacating the order for immediate possession with the comment that the jury verdict rendered the option contract invalid, and inasmuch as the option contract was inseparably involved in the pleadings and issues in this action, the action could not continue without defendant suffering grave prejudice.
The district court was not in error in submitting to the jury the issue of whether the United States’ delay in fulfilling its obligations under the option contract was reasonable. The complaint specifically set forth the option contract as the basis of the price ($105,000.) alleged to be just compensation for the taking of the Authority’s property. This fact coupled with the apparent lethargy on the part of the United States to carry out its obligations under the option contract between December 26, 1956 and May 6, 1958 was sufficient basis for determining that a question of fact existed as to whether the United States had acted within a reasonable time under the option contract and that said question was sufficiently pertinent to this action to be submitted to a jury.
In refusing the Authority’s motion for a summary judgment and in submitting to the jury the question whether the United States had acted within a reasonable time the Judge followed the established procedure. The rule is that the vendor in a contract for the sale of land in which the time for carrying out the contract is not specified, cannot put an end to the contract without notice to the vendee of his intention to do so and affording the vendee a reasonable time to carry out his contract obligations. See United States v. Stott et ux, 140 F.2d 941 (8th Cir., 1944). The Judge was also correct in instructing the jury that, in the determination of what constitutes a reasonable time within which the vendee must act after notice of rescission, the nature of the subject matter, the object of the contract and the situation and conduct of the parties and all other circumstances should be taken into consideration. What is a reasonable time must be computed from the receipt of the notice of rescission, but in considering this question all the circumstances should be taken into consideration, including those which occurred prior to the time when the notice of rescission was received.
The district court determined in its Opinion and Order of July 29, 1960 that this condemnation was duly authorized by federal statutes. Nevertheless, the district court in its order of October 30, 1961 dismissed the condemnation proceeding upon the grounds that the option contract, found to be invalid by the jury, was so intertwined in the condemnation complaint and the exhibits attached thereto that to leave the complaint stand would be prejudicial to the defendant whenever the question of just compensation was considered. The district court went one step further and stated that even an amended complaint would be inadequate to prevent the defendant suffering prejudice.
We think that in this action the court went too far. Once it had determined that the condemnation was authorized by statute and that the statutory requirements had been complied with the court was without power to dismiss the condemnation proceedings and Declaration of Taking. United States v. Hayes et al., 172 F.2d 677 (9th Cir., 1949). The court should have permitted the Government to amend the pleadings so as to eliminate reference to the agreement of option and to permit the proceeding to go on on the basis of the Government’s general power of eminent domain. We think, however, that the option contract may be considered in the trial of the condemnation case which will take place upon the remand and that at this trial the Government may offer the option contract in proof of the value of the property condemned. Since the option here is between the condemnor and the condemnee, the date of the execution of the option and the extension thereof by the Authority was not too remote in time as to preclude the admissibility of the option and the option price as having some probative effect of the value two years later when the formal condemnation proceedings were filed. The jury, however, should be specifically instructed that they should ascertain the value of the property as of November 15, 1958 when the condemnation proceeding and the Declaration of Taking were filed and the money was paid into court; and they should be further instructed that they are not bound by the purchase price agreed upon on March 29, 1956 and extended by the subsequent agreement of October 26, 1956 but that they should consider the agreement as evidence of the value of the property on those dates together with any evidence that may be'offered of a change in valuation between the date on which the agreement was made and the date when the condemnation proceeding was filed.
The Order entered in this action by the district court on October 30, 1961 dismissing the complaint, vacating the Declaration of Taking and vacating the order for
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant?
A. cabinet level department
B. courts or legislative
C. agency whose first word is "federal"
D. other agency, beginning with "A" thru "E"
E. other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"
F. other agency, beginning with "O" thru "R"
G. other agency, beginning with "S" thru "Z"
H. Distric of Columbia
I. other, not listed, not able to classify
Answer: |
sc_adminaction_is | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.
SUGARMAN, ADMINISTRATOR, NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, et al. v. DOUGALL et al.
No. 71-1222.
Argued January 8, 1973 —
Decided June 25, 1973
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, BreNnan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. RehNQUIst, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 649.
Samuel A. Hirshowits, First Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General.
Lester Evens argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees.
J. Shane Creamer, Attorney General, and James R. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Mb. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 53 (1) of the New York Civil Service Law reads:
“Except as herein otherwise provided, no person shall be eligible for appointment for any position in the competitive class unless he is a citizen of the United States.”
The four appellees, Patrick McL. Dougall, Esperanza Jorge, Teresa Vargas, and Sylvia Castro, are federally registered resident aliens. When, because of their alien-age, they were discharged in 1971 from their competitive civil service positions with the city of New York, the appellees instituted this class action challenging the constitutionality of § 53. The named defendants, and appellants here, were the Administrator of the city’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), and the city’s Director of Personnel and Chairman of its Civil Service Commission. The appellees sought (1) a declaration that the statute was invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) injunctive relief against any refusal, on the ground of alienage, to appoint and employ the appellees, and all persons similarly situated, in civil service positions in the competitive class, and (3) damages for lost earnings. A defense motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was denied by Judge Tenney, 330 F. Supp. 265 (SDNY 1971). A three-judge court was convened. That court ruled that the statute was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause, and granted injunctive relief. 339 F. Supp. 906 (SDNY 1971). Judge Lumbard joined the court’s opinion and judgment, but wrote separately in concurrence. Id., at 911. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 407 U. S. 908 (1972).
I
Prior to December 28, 1970, the appellees were employed by nonprofit organizations that received funds through HRA from the United States Office of Economic Opportunity. These supportive funds ceased to be available about that time and the organizations, with approximately 450 employees, including the appellees and 16 other noncitizens, were absorbed by the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of HRA. The appellant Administrator advised the transferees that they would be employed by the city. The appellees in fact were so employed in MCDA. In February, however, they were informed that they were ineligible for employment by the city and that they would be dismissed under the statutory mandate of § 53 (1). Shortly thereafter, they were discharged from MCDA solely because of their alienage.
Appellee Dougall was born in Georgetown, Guyana, in September 1927. He has been a resident of New York City since 1964. He was employed by MCDA as an administrative assistant in the staff Development Unit.
Appellee Jorge was born in November 1948 in the Dominican Republic. She has been a resident of New York City since 1967. She was employed by the Puerto Rican Forum as a clerk-typist and, later, as a human resources technician. She worked in the latter capacity for MCDA.
Appellee Vargas was born in the Dominican Republic in June 1946. She has been a resident of New York City since 1963. She worked as a clerk-typist for the Puerto Rican Forum and in the same capacity for MCDA.
Appellee Castro was born in El Salvador in June 1944. She has resided in New York City since 1967. She was employed by the Puerto Rican Forum as an assistant counselor and then as a human resources technician and worked in the latter capacity for MCDA.
The record does not disclose that any of the four appellees ever took any step to attain United States citizenship.
The District Court, in reaching its conclusion that § 53 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, placed primary reliance on this Court’s decisions in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), and Takahashi v. Fish Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948), and, to an extent, on Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P. 2d 645 (1969). On the basis of these cases, the court also concluded that § 53 was in conflict with Congress’ comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization because, in effect, it denied appellees entrance to, and abode in, New York. Accordingly, the court held, § 53 encroached upon an exclusive federal power and was constitutionally impermissible under Art. VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution.
II
As is so often the case, it is important at the outset to define the precise and narrow issue that is here presented. The Court is faced only with the question whether New York’s flat statutory prohibition against the employment of aliens in the competitive classified civil service is constitutionally valid. The Court is not asked to decide whether a particular alien, any more than a particular citizen, may be refused employment or discharged on an individual basis for whatever legitimate reason the State might possess..
Neither is the Court reviewing a legislative scheme that bars some or all aliens from closely defined and limited classes of public employment on a uniform and consistent basis. The New York scheme, instead, is indiscriminate. The general standard is enunciated in the State’s Constitution, Art. Y, § 6, and is to the effect that appointments and promotions in the civil service “shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive.” In line with this rather flexible constitutional measure, the classified service is divided by statute into four classes. New York Civil Service Law § 40. The first is the exempt class. It includes, generally, the higher offices in the state executive departments, certain municipal officers, certain judicial employees, and positions for which a competitive or noncompetitive examination may be found to be impracticable. The exempt class contains no citizenship restriction whatsoever. § 41. The second is the noncompetitive class. This includes positions, not otherwise classified, for which a noncompetitive examination would be practicable. There is no citizenship requirement. § 42. The third is the labor class. This includes unskilled laborers holding positions for which competitive examinations would be impracticable. No alienage exclusion is imposed. § 43. The fourth is the competitive class with which we are here concerned. This includes all positions for which it is practicable to determine merit and fitness by a competitive examination. § 44. Only citizens of the United States may hold positions in this class. § 53. The limits of these several classes, particularly the competitive class from which the appellees were deemed to be disqualified, are not readily defined. It would appear, however, that, consistent with the broad scope of the cited constitutional provision, the competitive class reaches various positions in nearly the full range of work tasks, that is, all the way from the menial to the policy making.
Apart from the classified civil service, New York has an unclassified service. § 35. This includes, among others, all elective
Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
A. No
B. Yes
Answer: |
songer_direct2 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be for government tax claim; for person claiming patent or copyright infringement; for the plaintiff alleging the injury; for economic underdog if one party is clearly an underdog in comparison to the other, neither party is clearly an economic underdog; in cases pitting an individual against a business, the individual is presumed to be the economic underdog unless there is a clear indication in the opinion to the contrary; for debtor or bankrupt; for government or private party raising claim of violation of antitrust laws, or party opposing merger; for the economic underdog in private conflict over securities; for individual claiming a benefit from government; for government in disputes over government contracts and government seizure of property; for government regulation in government regulation of business; for greater protection of the environment or greater consumer protection (even if anti-government); for the injured party in admiralty - personal injury; for economic underdog in admiralty and miscellaneous economic cases. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.
Aida Guzman De FONT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 71-1124.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard Nov. 16, 1971.
Decided Jan. 6, 1972.
Antonio Montalvo-Nazario, San Juan, P. R., with whom Segurola & Montalvo, San Juan, P. R., was on brief, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Morton Hollander, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Julio Morales-Sanchez, U. S. Atty. and Robert M. Feinson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on brief, for defendants-appellees.
Before COFFIN, Circuit Judge, VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.
Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal from dismissal of their complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674) for damages sustained as a result of malpractice injury to their deceased husband and father. The trial court dismissed on the basis of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950). The complaint alleges that the treatment evaluation and medical care given decedent by various army physicians and hospitals was “deficient, negligent and unwarranted, causing extreme pain, mental disorder and anguish” to deceased and his wife, and that “plaintiffs have suffered the loss of companionship, the loss of father’s ability to produce income and support to both plaintiffs, which are calculated in the amount of $884,000.”
Initially, we observe that the plaintiffs, in opposition to the Government’s motion to dismiss, contend Feres does not control because plaintiffs were not members of the Armed Forces at the time of the negligent act and the injuries received by both plaintiffs did not arise out of', or in the course of, activity incident to service because both plaintiffs were civilians at the time the injuries and damages were suffered. Plaintiffs contend that as wife and child of decedent they have a separate and independent cause of action for mental suffering and anguish under the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141. See Commercial Union Insurance Company v. Gonzalez Rivera, 358 F.2d 480, 482-483. (C.A.5 1966). The mere fact that the cause of action is not derivative under local law, but is an original and distinct cause of action granted to the heirs and personal representatives to recover damages sustained by them by reason of the wrongful death of the decedent, does not remove it from the prohibition of Feres. Van Sickel v. United States, 285 F.2d 87 (C.A.9 1960); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (C.A.9 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1053, 89 S.Ct. 691, 21 L.Ed.2d 695 (1969). In Feres, 340 U.S. at p. 143, 71 S.Ct. 153, the Supreme Court made it clear that an accident of geography would not be determinative of the applicable law. The controlling rule is that the Government is not liable under the Act “for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service,” Feres at p. 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159.
In the case at hand, the damage claim for loss of “companionship,” “father’s ability to produce income and support to both plaintiffs” is, under the allegations of the complaint, incident to decedent’s service. On this basis the trial court was fully justified in dismissing the complaint. However, we further note that in appellant’s brief and argument before this Court it is claimed that appellant wife “was present throughout the treatment and witnessed and suffered the grave consequences of the inadequate care given to her husband.” Although appellants’ prayer for damages refers only to “loss of companionship” and to loss of the decedent’s “ability to produce income,” appellants also apparently raise some claim of a separate and independent tort to the wife based on mental anguish arising from her observations of the inadequate care given her deceased husband. See Prosser, The Law of Torts, 181 (2d ed. 1955). Even if this claim were adequately specified and damages claimed therefor, we are satisfied that this allegation would not remove the incident-to-service limitation of Feres. We would be unwilling to depart therefrom even if we were able to do so. Cf. Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1971).
Affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_circuit | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the circuit of the court that decided the case.
Marcus N. BRESSLER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FORTUNE, A DIVISION OF TIME INC., Defendant Appellant.
No. 91-5601.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 23, 1992.
Decided Aug. 6, 1992.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 16, 1992.
Janet Mayfield Hogan (briefed), Knoxville, Tenn., William H. Ogle, Ormond Beach, Fla., Paul N. Minkoff (argued), Klovsky, Kuby & Harris, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff-appellee.
Floyd Abrams (argued & briefed), Dean Ringel, Cahill, Gordon and Reindel, New York City, R. Louis Crossley, Jr., Long, Ragsdale & Waters, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant-appellant.
Laura Handman (briefed), New York City, for Amici Curiae.
Before: GUY, NORRIS, and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Defendant, Fortune Magazine, appeals a $550,000 jury verdict in a libel suit brought by plaintiff, Marcus Bressler. Bressler’s claim stemmed from a 1986 Fortune article which reported allegations that Bressler, an official of the Tennessee Valley Authority, had attempted to cover up safety violations at TVA’s Watts Bar nuclear plant. Fortune argues that Bressler, a public official, failed to establish that the article’s statements were false and that the reporters acted with actual malice. Fortune also contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury that Bressler need only prove the article’s falsity by a “preponderance of the evidence,” rather than by “clear and convincing” evidence.
Our thorough review of the record— which details the information provided by the various sources on which the Fortune reporters relied — reveals that the evidence falls short of demonstrating that the reporters realized their statements were false or had serious doubts as to the truth of their statements. We thus reach the contest over the article’s “falsity” only tangentially; we reach not at all the debate over the proper standard of proof for falsity in a public official’s libel suit. On the actual malice issue alone, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Fortune.
I.
In October 1986, Fortune published an article focusing mainly on federal officials’ allegations that TVA’s chief of nuclear operations (not the plaintiff here) may have violated conflict-of-interest and salary rules. Seven of the article’s 33 paragraphs, however, reported on investigators’ “allegations about an attempted cover-up of safety questions at the Watts Bar plant.” Brian Dumaine, Nuclear Scandal Shakes the TVA, Fortune, Oct. 27, 1986, at 44.
The article explained that Howard Hasten, an “authorized nuclear inspector” with Hartford Steam Boiler, which had contracted with TVA to inspect the construction of the Watts Bar plant, discovered that welds in pipes carrying water to and from the nuclear reactor containment area had not been tested in accordance with the governing engineering code. At that stage of construction, performing the necessary tests and inspection would have been extremely time-consuming and costly, since many of the pipes had already been insulated and installed.
The article further stated that TVA had issued a safety report which recommended that the pipes be “used as is.” Hasten initially refused to sign this report, since the lack of proper testing violated minimum safety standards. “A burst pipe could set off a serious nuclear accident,” according to the article.
The Fortune story then noted that a “campaign... to force Hasten to sign the report” was mounted, and that an internal investigation at TVA revealed that managers at TVA’s engineering codes and standards office (of which plaintiff Bressler is a member) called Haston’s superiors at Hartford to complain about Haston’s intransigence. Haston’s supervisor, Harold Robi-son, pressured Haston to sign; Haston finally did so, but wrote that his signature was only at Robison’s direction. The article went on to state that TVA investigator Jerry Smith had received anonymous telephone calls about pressure on Hartford inspectors and that TVA had received an anonymous letter threatening to publicize the welding problems unless TVA persuaded Hartford to increase its inspectors’ salaries. “According to TVA investigators,” the article continued, “Marcus Bres-sler... tried to cover up the breach of safety standards” and “warned Hartford Steam Boiler to get its inspectors in line or TVA would not renew its inspection con-tract_”
The TVA Board of Directors assigned another internal investigator, Mansour Guity, to look into the origin of the anonymous extortion letter. Guity was unable to link the letter to Hartford inspectors, but, according to the article, Guity “did find out about the pressure Bressler had exerted to cover up the safety violation.” Investigators Smith and Guity later complained to the U.S. Labor Department that TVA management had harassed and intimidated them for voicing their safety concerns. The Labor Department ruled in their favor.
The Fortune story added that the “Hartford Steam Boiler incident was confirmed in a draft report by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s office of investigation.” The article attributed this information to “congressional sources.”
At Bressler’s ensuing libel trial, Fortune introduced the final report of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which concluded, among other things, that TVA managers might have pressured Hartford to accept the “use as is” proposal in the report about the pipe welds even though the welds violated code requirements. Fortune also introduced the notes the reporters took during interviews with the private and federal investigators, who had identified Bressler as the source of the pressure, and the corroborating deposition testimony of two former TVA officials. The reporters’ testimony included explanations of how they developed the story and subjected it to the magazine’s pre-publication fact-checking process.. A journalism expert for plaintiff testified, over defendant’s objection, that the Fortune reporters’ investigation and writing “fell far below the standard of journalism” and that the reporters “knew [the article] was false.” We address this evidence more fully below.
The jury found that the statements about Bressler were false and. that the reporters had acted with actual malice. Bressler was awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied Fortune’s. JNOV and new trial motions, and Fortune now appeals.
II.
The trial judge determined that Bressler was a public official; as such, Bressler could prevail only by showing that Fortune published the article with actual malice, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and by demonstrating that the “gist” of the article was false, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991).
In a recent public-figure libel case summarizing accepted formulations of the “actual malice” test, the Supreme Court stated that the test
requires at a minimum that the statements were made with a reckless disregard for the truth. And although the concept of “reckless disregard” “cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition,” we have made clear that the. defendant must have made the false publication with a “high degree of awareness of... probable falsityf.]”
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2685,105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) (citations omitted). The Court emphasized that the inquiry is “subjective,” focusing on whether the defendant “ ‘in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’ ” Id. at 688, 109 S.Ct. at 2696 (citation omitted). Actual malice, defined in this way, must be established by “clear and convincing proof.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). The question whether the record may support a finding of actual malice is a question of law. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S, at 685, 109 S.Ct. at 2694.
The Harte-Hanks Court also set forth the duty of an appellate court considering a case such as this one.
In determining whether the constitutional standard has been satisfied, the reviewing court must consider the factual record in full. Although credibility determinations are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous standard... the reviewing court must “ ‘examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see... whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment... protect
Question: What is the circuit of the court that decided the case?
A. First Circuit
B. Second Circuit
C. Third Circuit
D. Fourth Circuit
E. Fifth Circuit
F. Sixth Circuit
G. Seventh Circuit
H. Eighth Circuit
I. Ninth Circuit
J. Tenth Circuit
K. Eleventh Circuit
L. District of Columbia Circuit
Answer: |
sc_adminaction | 117 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.
OWEN v. CITY OF INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI, et al.
No. 78-1779.
Argued January 8, 1980
Decided April 16, 1980
Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 658.
Irving Achtenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was David Achtenberg.
Richard G. Carlisle argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Bruce J. Ennis, Oscar G. Chase, and Nancy Steams for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, David Rubin, William E. Caldwell, John B. Jones, Jr., Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, and Norman Chachkin for the National Education Association et al.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), insofar as Monroe held that local governments were not among the “persons” to whom 42 U. S. C. 11983 applies and were therefore wholly immune from suit under the statute. Monell reserved decision, however, on the question whether local governments, although not entitled to an absolute immunity, should be afforded some form of official immunity in 1 1983 suits. 436 U. S., at 701. In this action brought by petitioner in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that respondent city of Independence, Mo., “is entitled to qualified immunity from liability” based on the good faith of its officials: “We extend the limited immunity the district court applied to the individual defendants to cover the City as well, because its officials acted in good faith and without malice.” 589 F. 2d 335, 337-338 (1978). We granted certiorari. 444 U. S. 822 (1979). We reverse.
I
The events giving rise to this suit are detailed in the District Court’s findings of fact, 421 F. Supp. 1110 (1976). On February 20, 1967, Robert L. Broucek, then City Manager of respondent city of Independence, Mo,, appointed petitioner George D. Owen to an indefinite term as Chief of Police. In 1972, Owen and a new City Manager, Lyle W. Alberg, engaged in a dispute over petitioner’s administration of the Police Department’s property room. In March of that year, a handgun, which the records of
Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?
001. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
002. Atomic Energy Commission
003. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
004. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
005. Alien Property Custodian
006. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
007. Board of Immigration Appeals
008. Bureau of Indian Affairs
009. Bureau of Prisons
010. Bonneville Power Administration
011. Benefits Review Board
012. Civil Aeronautics Board
013. Bureau of the Census
014. Central Intelligence Agency
015. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
016. Department or Secretary of Commerce
017. Comptroller of Currency
018. Consumer Product Safety Commission
019. Civil Rights Commission
020. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
021. Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
022. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
023. Drug Enforcement Agency
024. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
025. Department or Secretary of Energy
026. Department or Secretary of the Interior
027. Department of Justice or Attorney General
028. Department or Secretary of State
029. Department or Secretary of Transportation
030. Department or Secretary of Education
031. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
032. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
033. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
034. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
035. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
036. Federal Bureau of Prisons
037. Farm Credit Administration
038. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
039. Federal Credit Union Administration
040. Food and Drug Administration
041. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
042. Federal Energy Administration
043. Federal Election Commission
044. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
045. Federal Housing Administration
046. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
047. Federal Labor Relations Authority
048. Federal Maritime Board
049. Federal Maritime Commission
050. Farmers Home Administration
051. Federal Parole Board
052. Federal Power Commission
053. Federal Railroad Administration
054. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
055. Federal Reserve System
056. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
057. Federal Trade Commission
058. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
059. General Accounting Office
060. Comptroller General
061. General Services Administration
062. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
063. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
064. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
065. Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
066. Interstate Commerce Commission
067. Indian Claims Commission
068. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
069. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
070. Information Security Oversight Office
071. Department or Secretary of Labor
072. Loyalty Review Board
073. Legal Services Corporation
074. Merit Systems Protection Board
075. Multistate Tax Commission
076. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
077. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
078. National Credit Union Administration
079. National Endowment for the Arts
080. National Enforcement Commission
081. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
082. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
083. National Mediation Board
084. National Railroad Adjustment Board
085. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
086. National Security Agency
087. Office of Economic Opportunity
088. Office of Management and Budget
089. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
090. Office of Personnel Management
091. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
092. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
093. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
094. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
095. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
096. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
097. U.S. Public Health Service
098. Postal Rate Commission
099. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
100. Renegotiation Board
101. Railroad Adjustment Board
102. Railroad Retirement Board
103. Subversive Activities Control Board
104. Small Business Administration
105. Securities and Exchange Commission
106. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
107. Selective Service System
108. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
109. Tennessee Valley Authority
110. United States Forest Service
111. United States Parole Commission
112. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
113. United States Sentencing Commission
114. Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
115. War Production Board
116. Wage Stabilization Board
117. State Agency
118. Unidentifiable
119. Office of Thrift Supervision
120. Department of Homeland Security
121. Board of General Appraisers
122. Board of Tax Appeals
123. General Land Office or Commissioners
124. NO Admin Action
125. Processing Tax Board of Review
Answer: |
songer_r_bus | 99 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
NEW BRITAIN MACHINE CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. Lloyd YEO, Administrator, Estate of Joseph H. Hoern, et al., Defendants-Appellees. W. Lloyd YEO, Administrator, Estate of Joseph H. Hoern, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. NEW BRITAIN MACHINE CO., Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 16211, 16287.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
March 8, 1966.
Roy C. Hopgood, New York City, and Palmer S. McGee, Jr., Hartford, Conn'., for New Britain Machine Co., Milton E. Higgs, Higgs & Higgs, Bay City, Mich., on the brief, John M. Calimafde, Arthur M. Lieberman, Hopgood & Calimafde, New York City, Palmer S. McGee, Jr., Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, Conn., of counsel.
Ferdinand D. Heilman, Saginaw, Mich., for W. Lloyd Yeo and others, Heil-man, Purcell, Tunison & Cline, Saginaw, Mich., on the brief.
Before PHILLIPS and CELE-BREZZE, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
HARRY PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
Case No. 16,287 is an appeal by New Britain Machine Company (referred to herein as “New Britain”) from a final judgment rendered against it in the amount of $202,253.51, plus costs and disbursements yet to be taxed. This judgment is based upon royalties on a certain “BV” machine manufactured and sold by New Britain, which uses mechanisms covered by U. S. Patent No. 2,872,-853 (application No. 400,531). Plaintiff s-appellees (referred to herein as “Yeo et al.”) are a group of twenty-four former stockholders of Hoern & Dilts, Inc., a Michigan corporation which was dissolved in 1955, and are the owners of the aforesaid patent as assignees of this corporation.
Case No. 16,211 is an appeal by New Britain from an order of the district court dismissing its action against Yeo et al. for the recovery of royalties alleged to have been paid by mistake and without consideration in the amount of $207,193.-36.
Jurisdiction in both cases is- based upon diversity of citizenship. This opinion will be devoted to case No. 16,287 except where otherwise indicated.
1) The three contracts at issue
This action is for breach of contract. Three contracts are involved, referred to herein as the 1946 contract, the 1950 contract and the 1955 contract. The patent in question, No. 2,872,853, was issued to J. H. Hoern, inventor, February 10, 1959. The application for this patent was filed by Mr. Hoern December 28, 1953.
New Britain is a manufacturer and seller of industrial machines. The machine here in question is of a type known as a rotary-cam actuated boring machine. This type of machine falls generally into one of three classes, namely: (1) “indexing” machines, or (2) “continuous” machines, or (3) “non-indexing, non-eontinuous” machines. The BV machine here involved is of the third class, i. e., “non-indexing, non-eontinuous.”
In 1946 and prior thereto J. H. Hoern and Carl E. Dilts were engaged in business as a partnership designing and building machine tools. Mr. Hoern is now dead and Yeo is the administrator of his estate.
The 1946 Contract
On March 28, 1946, these two individuals entered into a licensing agreement with New Britain. This contract stated that the licensors, Hoern and Dilts, “have been and now are developing cam and pneumatic actuated' type boring machines;” that certain improvements in cam and pneumatic actuated type boring machines were disclosed in patent application No. 642,352 (later granted as Patent No. 2,641,146) and in application for U. S. Patents then in course of preparation (this reference is to application No. 671,477 which was filed May 22, 1946, and for which the patent was issued November 24, 1953, as No. 2,659,961); and that the exclusive right and license to manufacture and sell the said boring machines was granted to New Britain, except in certain particulars therein provided.
The pertinent licensing language of the 1946 contract is quoted in the margin.
Additionally the agreement provided that Hoern and Dilts would disclose to New Britain any invention or improvements relating to the said machines, without further royalty payments.
In September 1946, the Hoern and Dilts Corporation, hereinafter referred to as “H & D, Inc.”, was formed, with Messrs. Hoern and Dilts holding a majority of the stock. H
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_initiate | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
Errol B. RESNICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 86-1509.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 21, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 23,1988.
Cyd Gilman, Asst. Federal Public Defender, D. Kan. (Charles D. Anderson, Federal Public Defender, Wichita, Kan., with her on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Leon J. Patton, Topeka, Kan. (Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., U.S. Atty., Wichita, Kan., Alleen S. Castellani, Asst. U.S. Atty., D. Kan., Topeka, Kan., with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before MOORE, BALDOCK and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
Errol B. Resnick, an inmate in the United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against the United States Parole Commission, challenging a decision of the Commission which held that Resnick would continue to stay in prison for the time being and that he would not be afforded another parole hearing until April, 1992. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court issued a show cause order, and the Commission filed an answer and return, to which Resnick filed a traverse. Based on the pleadings, and attachments thereto, the district court denied Resnick’s petition and dismissed the action. Resnick appeals.
Resnick is presently incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, pursuant to four sentences imposed by federal district courts in the State of Florida. The sentences thus imposed are to be served consecutively, and they total 34.5 years. Resnick has now served approximately 15 years under those consecutive sentences. Specifically, Resnick was sentenced on federal charges as follows:
1. 17 years by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on November 2, 1971, upon a conviction for a narcotics conspiracy;
2. 10 years, to be served consecutively to the 17-year sentence referred to in paragraph 1, by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on December 6, 1972, upon a conviction for unlawful melting of United States coins;
3. 2 years and six months, to be served consecutively to the sentences mentioned above, by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on January 24, 1973, upon a conviction for illegal sale of firearms; and
4. 5 years, to be served consecutively to the sentences mentioned above, by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on September 12, 1973, upon a conviction for conspiracy to escape and attempted escape.
In addition to the four sentences mentioned above, Resnick is serving two life sentences imposed by state courts in Florida for hiring others to commit two murders. The Florida sentences were to be served concurrently with the federal sentences now being served.
Resnick had his initial hearing before examiners of the United States Parole Commission on August 25, 1981. The examiners assigned an offense severity rating for each offense and aggregated those ratings to result in a greatest II rating, indicating that Resnick’s offenses were very serious. As concerns Resnick’s salient factor rating, the examiners fixed that at 10, indicating that he was a good parole risk. In this regard, the examiners noted that Resnick, while incarcerated, had earned a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree, and was working toward a doctorate degree. Resnick was also highly recommended for parole by a former assistant educational director at the penitentiary.
The examiners referred Resnick’s case to the National Commissioners on September 8, 1981, for original decision because of the unusual sophistication of the crimes involved and because of the possibility of an ongoing criminal conspiracy. On October 16, 1981, the National Commissioners determined that it needed more information concerning the scope of the offenses. A letter was written at that time by the National Commissioners to the U.S. Probation Office requesting more information. The matter was subsequently referred back to the examiners for further hearing, at which time information obtained from the United States Probation Office, as well as other matters, was to be considered. Resnick was informed on February 23, 1982, which was later corrected on March 2, 1982, that the hearing would be held on April 27, 1982.
At the hearing on April 27, 1982, the examiners again gave Resnick a salient factor score of 10, and an offense severity rating in the greatest II category. The case was again referred to the National Commissioners with a recommendation that release of Resnick at that time would depreciate the seriousness of his several offenses, which recommendation noted Res-nick’s state criminal convictions, as well as the four federal convictions, and recommended that Resnick be kept in custody until April 1, 1992, when a new parole hearing would be held. On June 4, 1982, the National Commissioners adopted the recommendations of the hearing examiners. Resnick’s subsequent appeal to the National Appeals Board was denied, whereupon Resnick instituted the present proceeding.
The present appeal raises two issues: (1) The offenses for which Resnick was convicted and sentenced having occurred in 1971, 1972, and 1973, does the application of statutes and regulations in effect at the time of Resnick’s parole board hearings in 1981 and 1982 violate the ex post facto provision of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3? (2) Were Resnick’s due process rights violated by arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Commission?
Ex Post Facto
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, of the Constitution provides that, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.”
18 U.S.C. § 4206(a), in effect at the time of Resnick’s parole hearings, provides as follows:
(a)If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution or institutions to which he has been confined, and if the Commission, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner, determines:
(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law;
(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare;
subject to the provisions of subsections (b)and (c) of this section, and pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 4203(a)(1), such prisoner shall be released.
# # * # * *
(c)The Commission may grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the guidelines referred to in subsection (a) of this section if it determines there is good cause for so doing: Provided, That the prisoner is furnished written notice stating with particularity the reasons for its determination, including a summary of the information relied upon.
In denying Resnick present parole and continuing the matter for a 10-year reconsideration to April, 1992, the National Commissioners spoke as follows:
REASONS:
Your offense behavior has been rated as Greatest II severity because you were involved in melting $9,000 in U.S. coins, sold firearms without filing the appropriate ATF forms, smuggled approximately 900 lbs. of marijuana and you had two individuals murdered (as evidenced by your Florida conviction) in conjunction with the marijuana offense. Your salient factor score (SFS-81) is 10 (see attached sheet). You have been in custody a total of 130 months. Guidelines established by the Commission for adult cases which consider the above factors indicate a minimum of 52 months to be served before release for cases with good institutional program performance and adjustment. In addition, you attempted to escape from a secure facility and guidelines established by the Commission for that offense indicate a customary range of 6-12 months to be added to your minimum range of 52 months. Your combined minimum range is 58 months. After review of all relevant factors and information presented, it is found that your release at this time would depreciate the seriousness of your offense behavior. Commission guidelines for Greatest II severity cases do not specify a maximum limit. Therefore, the decision in your case is based in part upon a comparison of the relative severity of your offense behavior with the offense behaviors and time ranges specified in the Greatest I severity category.
In rendering this decision, the Commission also noted that the victims were murdered in an especially brutal fashion; one victim was mutilated by being covered with lye and the other thrown out of a car and left by the roadside.
Also, during the attempted escape, a hostage was taken.
In essence, then, the National Commissioners denied Resnick present parole and
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_counsel1 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the appellant. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
CREDIT ALLIANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patricia Ann CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 87-1385.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Oct. 26, 1987.
Decided April 29, 1988.
Sol D. Bromberg, New York City, Corneal L. Domeck, III, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant.
James F. Flynn, Newman, Trockman, Lloyd, Flynn, & Rheinlander, P.C., Evansville, Ind., for defendant-appellee.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, WOOD and MANION, Circuit Judges.
HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.
This case is an appeal from the district court’s grant of defendant’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Plaintiff had obtained on October 21, 1980, a default judgment in the Southern District of New York enforcing a guaranty contract against the defendant. The judgment was in the amount of $1,302,954.80. The plaintiff registered the judgment in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on December 4, 1980 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). On January 9, 1984, Patricia Campbell filed her motion for relief in the district court in Indiana. The court granted this motion on November 26, 1984. We reverse the district court’s grant of relief setting aside the judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In late 1977 or early 1978 Ralph Douglas Campbell, the defendant’s husband, was a heavy equipment salesman for Stockberger Machinery, Inc. Steve Stockberger, Campbell, another salesman, Tom Marshall, and a physician, James Spahn, entered into a partnership they called Indicoal. The partners’ intention was to strip-mine coal at a mine in Kentucky, and, to further this purpose, the partners acquired equipment from the Stockberger Company. A Credit Alliance sales representative, Harold Kap-lan, sold floor-plan and end-user financing arrangements for Credit Alliance Corporation in the Evansville, Indiana area. Kap-lan arranged financing for the business venture through Credit Alliance. The partners executed a conditional sales contract with Stockberger on May 18, 1978; Stock-berger assigned the contract to Credit Alliance the same day; and the partners and their wives, including the defendant, signed a guaranty for Indicoal’s debts on May 22, 1978. There was undisputed testimony that the wives did not play an active role in Indicoal’s operations. The defendant signed the guaranty without reading it, and she did not receive a copy of the document.
Indicoal began to experience financial difficulties soon after its formation, and fell behind in its payments to Credit Alliance. Meanwhile, the defendant and her husband developed serious marital difficulties which led to their separation at the end of 1978 and divorce in March of 1979. On September 29, 1978, Indicoal and Credit Alliance entered into an agreement to extend Indicoal’s payment period. Although the original guaranty had provided that the guarantors consented to “any agreement or arrangements whatever with subject or anyone else, including without limitation, agreements and arrangements for payment extension,” Credit Alliance customarily executed new extension agreements with all guarantors. The defendant’s husband signed the agreement for the defendant without her knowledge or consent. Credit Alliance granted Indicoal a second extension on March 29, 1979, again without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, whose marriage to Campbell had been dissolved two weeks earlier.
On January 15, 1980, Credit Alliance compromised and settled the Indicoal debt with Dr. Spahn and on August 14, 1980, compromised and settled with the Mar-shalls. A proposed settlement March 6, 1980, between Credit Alliance, Campbell, and Marshall fell through when Campbell’s check was dishonored. The defendant was unaware of these events.
On May 2, 1980, the plaintiff filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In accordance with the terms of the guaranty, summonses were served on Credit Alliance as agent for the defendants. Credit Alliance sent two certified letters to the defendant notifying her of the lawsuit, but both letters were returned.
The defendant remained unaware of the lawsuit, the entry of default judgment October 21, 1980, and the registry of the judgment in the Southern District of Indiana December 4, 1980, until shortly after the United States Marshal attached all the funds in her bank account. The writ of execution was issued, and the defendant became aware of it, in November of 1983.
The defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Southern District of Indiana stayed enforcement of the New York judgment. The parties stipulated, contrary to the guaranty language, that Indiana was the proper forum and Indiana law should apply. We find this to be a reasonable stipulation as to the applicable law. Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31, 34 n. 2 (7th Cir.1987); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.1982). On November 10, 1986, the court heard evidence on the motion. The court considered defendant’s arguments that the guaranty was unsupported by consideration and that her obligation had been so altered as to discharge her. The court found validity in the latter assertion, and granted defendant’s motion.
II. DISCUSSION
Although the parties did not raise the issue, we first consider the propriety of the Indiana courts as a forum for defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion.
“The decision to grant or deny relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) is committed to the discretion of the trial court.” Fuhrman v. Livaditis, 611 F.2d 203, 204 (7th Cir.1979). We therefore need only determine whether the court abused its discretion.
In the Fuhrman case Fuhrman, a citizen of Iowa, sued Livaditis, a citizen of Illinois, in the Northern District of Iowa, based on diversity of citizenship. Process was served by certified mail. The return receipt indicated that Livaditis had received notice of the suit. He did not file an appearance and the court entered a default judgment against him. Notice of the default judgment was sent through certified mail to the defendant.
Fuhrman registered the judgment in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Almost a year after the judgment was registered in Illinois, Livadi-tis filed a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The Northern District of Illinois denied the motion without prejudice, noting that Livaditis could file his motion in the Northern District of Iowa, the court that rendered the judgment.
As we mentioned on appeal, “[o]rdinarily, a motion for relief from judgment is addressed to the court which rendered judgment.” 611 F.2d at 204. Generally, “it is more convenient for motions for relief from judgment to be addressed to the [rendering] court.” Id. Two policy considerations support the general rule:
(1) comity among the federal district courts is furthered if the registering court refers the question of relief from judgment to the court which ordinarily entered the judgment; (2) efficient judicial administration is furthered if the registering court defers to the original court, which is likely to be more familiar with the issues raised by the motion for relief from judgment.
Id.
In Fuhrman, as here, there was no litigation with which the rendering court could become familiar. There was simply a default. In Fuhrman, however, Livaditis argued that the rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. This challenge required the court to apply the laws of the state of Iowa, laws with which the district court in Iowa was more familiar than was the district court in Illinois. The federal court in Iowa was thus a more convenient forum for the motion.
The defendant here does not argue that the district court in New York lacked personal jurisdiction over her. The terms of the guaranty provided that an attorney for Credit Alliance would accept service of process for the guarantors, and that they would “agree to the venue and jurisdiction of any court in the State and County of New York.” They agreed as well that the guaranty “shall be interpreted according to the laws of the State of New York.” The defendant instead asserted that there was no consideration for her guaranty, that she terminated her consent
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the appellant?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_2-3-3 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "civil rights - other civil rights".
Ronnie STRICKLIN, Richard B. Rosen-feld and James Michael Strickler, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN and the President of the University of Wisconsin, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 17597.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 13, 1970.
Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., Charles A. Bleck, Warren M. Schmidt, Asst. Attys. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Madison, Wis., for defendants-appellants.
Sander N. Karp, Percy L. Julian, Jr., Madison, Wis., W. Haywood Burns, Jack Greenberg, Michael Meltsner, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before KILEY, FAIRCHILD and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.
KILEY, Circuit Judge.
The Regents and President of the University of Wisconsin have appealed from an interlocutory order, in a civil rights class action, ordering them to reinstate as students the three named plaintiffs who had been temporarily suspended from the University.
Plaintiffs, students then in good standing at the University of Wisconsin, were arrested February 27, 1969, during campus disorders. On March 6 the Regents met and, after hearing a report from the University security agency that plaintiffs had participated in the February 27, and earlier, campus disorders, adopted a resolution suspending the plaintiffs “immediately” pending the filing of charges by the University administration, on or before March 8, to be heard on March 19. A “hearing agent” was named to conduct the hearing and report his findings of fact and recommendations to the Regents for review and action by them.
On March 7, the day after the Regents’ meeting, plaintiffs filed a class action civil rights complaint in the district court alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights on the grounds that they were not informed — before the Regents’ March 6 action suspending them — of the charges against them, and that they had no notice of the meeting and no opportunity to be heard. They sought a declaration that their summary suspension was unlawful and an injunction against enforcement of the suspension and against the refusal of the Regents to reinstate them as students. They also moved for a “temporary restraining order” to stay the suspension pending ultimate determination of the charges to be filed against them on March 8 by virtue of the Regents’ resolution.
On March 12 a hearing was held on plaintiffs’ motion, and on March 13 the district court filed an Interim Opinion and Order, which was amended on March 14. The substance of this entry was to lay ground rules with respect to the burden of proof. The only definitive finding was that the plaintiffs had met their burden to establish prima fa-cie that their suspension was for a substantial period of time without previous specification of charges, notice of hearing and opportunity to be heard; and that the Regents had the burden of showing that the summary termination of each of the plaintiffs — pending the ultimate disposition of charges filed against them — was required by reasons relating to the physical or emotional safety and well-being of the plaintiffs and of other students, faculty, other personnel and University property. Additional affidavits were then submitted.
On March 18, the day before the full hearing of charges was scheduled to begin, the district court entered the Opinion and Order before us. The court, having established federal question jurisdiction, found: that the Regents acted under color of state law; that prior to the Regents’ meeting of March 6 plaintiffs were given no notice or specification of charges and had no opportunity to be heard at the meeting; that since that meeting they were given no opportunity to be heard on the question whether their “immediate” suspension should be continued pending ultimate determination of charges against them; and that the Regents had no intention of reinstating plaintiffs as students during that interim period.
The court found that the Regents had not met the burden defined in the court’s March 13 Interim Opinion and Order. It concluded that under the Regents’ by-laws, as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs were denied due process because the Regents had made no showing “whatever” that it was impossible or unreasonably difficult to have provided a preliminary hearing prior to the interim suspension order, or a hearing since March 6 on the question whether the interim suspension should continue until completion of the full hearing and the Regents’ ultimate determination thereafter. The court ordered plaintiffs reinstated at noon March 19, without prejudice to the Regents’ rights to impose interim suspension under the due process procedures outlined in the opinion, and to proceed with the full hearing on the charges filed and take appropriate action thereafter. This appeal followed.
Plaintiffs contend that the March 18, 1969, order is not appealable and that even if it is, the issue presented to us is moot.
We hold the order is appealable. While contending that a temporary restraining order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1), plaintiffsappellees concede that the label used by the parties in the district court is not controlling on the appealability question. The order under consideration was entered after notice, a March 12 hearing, and a subsequent consideration of additional affidavits, findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order granted affirmative substantive relief. See International Products Corp. v. Charles A. Koons & Co., 325 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1963). These elements were not present in an order held not appealable in Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1964), relied on by plaintiffs. The fact that other issues raised by the pleadings in the district court are still pending there does not preclude appealability. American Cyanamid Co. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 403 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1968).
We decide, however, that the issue presented to us is moot. The full hearing upon the charges filed against plaintiffs by the Regents has been completed, and plaintiffs have been expelled from the University. The March 18 order, which allowed the Regents to proceed with the hearing scheduled for March 19, became functus officio when the Regents took final action after completion of the full hearing.
We are not persuaded by the Regents’ arguments that we should decide the issue of whether due process requires the procedural safeguards, imposed by the district court, prior to an immediate suspension pending a final hearing because of its great public importance; that we should furnish a guide for conduct of “school authorities”; and that the result of a mootness finding will leave standing a precedent militating against school authorities properly dealing, in the future, with additional problems of student discipline.
Although we hold the March 18 order is appealable, it does not follow that its provisions were of great public importance. It affected only the three named plaintiffs, and them only for the short period until they were expelled in further disciplinary proceedings. We are not disposed on the record before us to decide a moot issue simply because, as contended by counsel for the Regents, the issue will probably arise in the future. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 90 S.Ct. 206, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1969); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1969).
Appellants rely on the decision in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963), where the Supreme Court declined to find mootness despite the voluntary abandonment by the State of Georgia of its illegal practice of using the county unit system in primary elections. The Court thought that if the complaint was dismissed the laws establishing the county unit system would remain on the books, would govern elections, and “appellants would be ‘free to return to * * * [their] old ways.’ ” Id. at 376, 83 S.Ct. at 806. There the Georgia laws had been held void under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Here, however, the Regents’ by-laws have not been held invalid; rather,
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "civil rights - other civil rights"?
A. alien petitions - (includes disputes over attempts at deportation)
B. indian rights and law
C. juveniles
D. poverty law, rights of indigents (civil)
E. rights of handicapped (includes employment)
F. age discrimination (includes employment)
G. discrimination based on religion or nationality
H. discrimination based on sexual preference federal government (other than categories above)
I. other 14th amendment and civil rights act cases
J. 290 challenge to hiring, firing, promotion decision of federal government (other than categories above)
K. other civil rights
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_2-3-3 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "civil rights - other civil rights".
Angela Morris Amado ROCHA, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
No. 6505.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Heard Sept. 13, 1965.
Decided Oct. 14, 1965.
Martin T. Camacho, Boston, Mass., for petitioner.
John M. Callahan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., was on brief, for respondent.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, J. WARREN MADDEN, Senior Judge and JULIAN, District Judge.
Sitting by designation.
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.
This is a petition to review a judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming a denial of a certificate of citizenship and an order of deportation. The case presents the question whether a statute that was repealed in 1922 was unconstitutional so far as it affected the citizenship of the petitioner. The facts are undisputed. Petitioner’s mother was born in this country in 1901. In 1916 she married a Portuguese citizen and subsequently moved, apparently permanently, to Portugal. Petitioner was born in Portugal in 1931. Her father was a Portuguese citizen, but was not her mother’s husband. Her mother was divorced in 1932. Petitioner first came to this country in 1961.
By Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, petitioner’s mother by marrying a foreign national, lost her United States citizenship and acquired that of her husband. This law was repealed by Act of September 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 7, 42 Stat. 1022, but not retroactively. If born abroad to two foreign nationals petitioner obviously was not a United States citizen merely because her mother had once been one. Indeed, it is conceded that in 1931 petitioner would not have been a United States citizen even if her mother had retained her citizenship. Petitioner’s claim, so far as we could find it to have any merit, is based upon the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 205, 54 Stat. 1139, which stated that persons in petitioner’s status are “held to have acquired at birth * * [the] nationality status” of the mother. This statute was repealed by the Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403, 66 Stat. 280, but not retrospectively. Id., section 405(c).
Necessarily underlying the applicability of the 1940 Act to the petitioner is the contention that section 3 of the 1907 Act, in depriving her mother of citizenship on marriage, was unconstitutional. In Mackenzie v. Hare, 1915, 239 U.S. 299, 36 S.Ct. 106, 60 L.Ed. 297, a unanimous court upheld its constitutionality. It is true that this unanimity has not characterized the decisions of the last decade upholding Perez v. Brownell, 1958, 356 U.S. 44, 78 S.Ct. 568, 2 L.Ed.2d 603 (5-to-4; four opinions); Marks v. Esperdy, 1964, 377 U.S. 214, 84 S.Ct. 1224, 12 L.Ed.2d 292 (4-to-4), or holding unconstitutional, Trop v. Dulles, 1958, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (5-to-4; four opinions); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 1963, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (5-to-4; four opinions); Schneider v. Rusk, 1964, 377 U.S. 163, 84 S.Ct. 1187, 12 L.Ed.2d 218 (5-to-3), congressional expatriation legislation. No majority has questioned the authority of Mackenzie, however, and, indeed, it has been relied upon in several recent decisions. Perez v. Brownell, supra; Savorgnan v. United States, 1950, 338 U.S. 491, 70 S.Ct. 292, 94 L.Ed. 287; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, 372 U.S. at 187, 83 S.Ct. 554; cf. Perez v. Brownell, supra, 356 U.S. at 69-73, 78 S.Ct. 568 (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
Petitioner relies principally on Schneider v. Rusk, supra, for the proposition that Mackenzie is no longer law. The statute considered in Schneider was directed solely to naturalized citizens, and certainly basic to the decision was the court’s condemnation of this discrimination. It is true that the dissenting opinion expressed the view that the reasoning of the court extended a fortiori to the 1907 Act upheld in Mackenzie. The opinion of the court did not mention the earlier case, however.
It is clear that the decision itself in Schneider did not overrule Mackenzie. It is likewise apparent from the cases cited above that the limits of congressional authority to deprive citizens of their nationality have yet to be defined. We do not feel we should attempt to be the catalyst when to do so would involve express departure from a case which has never, in a majority opinion of the court, been questioned.
Petitioner’s other points do not warrant discussion.
Affirmed.
. “Sec. 3. That any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband. At the termination of tile marital relation she may resume her American citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within one year with a consul of the United States, or by returning to reside in the United States, or, if residing in the United States at the termination of the marital relation, by continuing to reside therein.”
. This enactment is unusual in that it does not make residence in the United States before the foreign-born minor reaches a certain age a condition of citizenship. Compare prior act, Act of May 24, 1934, § 5, 48 Stat. 797, and the 1952 Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b).
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "civil rights - other civil rights"?
A. alien petitions - (includes disputes over attempts at deportation)
B. indian rights and law
C. juveniles
D. poverty law, rights of indigents (civil)
E. rights of handicapped (includes employment)
F. age discrimination (includes employment)
G. discrimination based on religion or nationality
H. discrimination based on sexual preference federal government (other than categories above)
I. other 14th amendment and civil rights act cases
J. 290 challenge to hiring, firing, promotion decision of federal government (other than categories above)
K. other civil rights
Answer: |
songer_circuit | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the circuit of the court that decided the case.
Antonio AMBROSINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANSOCEANIC STEAMSHIP CO., LTD., Defendant-Appellee, v. Giacomo CIRCOLONE and Cross Caruso, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees. Louis CIGLIANO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EMPRESSA LINEAS MARITIMAS ARGENTINAS, S. A., Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 3, 811, Dockets 80-7554, 81-7808.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued March 1, 1982.
Decided March 19, 1982.
Martin Lassoff, New York City (Zimmerman & Zimmerman, Thomas J. Doyle, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant, Antonio Ambrosino.
Joseph Arthur Cohen, New York City (Alexander, Ash, Schwartz & Cohen, P. C., Carl Ian Schwartz, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee, Transoceanic Steamship Co., Ltd.
Martin Lassoff, New York City (Zimmerman & Zimmerman, Howard Fishkin, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant, Louis Cigliano.
Michael D. Martocci, New York City, for defendant-appellee, Empressa Lineas Marítimas Argentinas, S. A.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, and KAUFMAN and MANSFIELD, Circuit J udges.
PER CURIAM:
These two appeals are by longshoremen injured aboard ship during the course of their employment; they seek damages from the shipowners under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., for their personal injuries. The sole issue presented to us is whether the September 9, 1977 amendments to the Code of Federal Regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 702.312 and.315, mandate a result on these cases different from the one we reached in Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co. Ltd., 617 F.2d 955 (2nd Cir. 1980), aff’d, 451 U.S. 596, 101 S.Ct. 1945, 68 L.Ed. 2d 472 (1981). We find that our analysis in Rodriguez is dispositive of the two appeals now before us, and we affirm the judgments of the district courts.
The undisputed facts are that each plaintiff accepted from his employer, the stevedore, compensation for his permanent disability following an informal conference convened by a United States Department of Labor claims examiner in the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). In each case, the Department issued a Memorandum of Informal Conference, but no formal compensation order was entered and no party requested such an order. Both plaintiffs brought suit in district court more than six months after they accepted payment from their employer. In the Ambrosino case, the complaint was dismissed after defendant’s answer and oral motion to dismiss; in the Cigliano case, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. In both cases, the district court relied on our decision in Rodriguez, supra, and disposed of the claim on the same ground: The longshoreman’s failure to bring suit within six months after acceptance of a compensation award resulted in an assignment of his cause of action to his employer, who thereafter had the exclusive right to pursue the third-party claim against the shipowner, 33 U.S.C. § 933(b).
Plaintiffs argue that Rodriguez is not dispositive because the regulations at the time Rodriguez was decided were later changed in two respects. First, plaintiff points out that formerly any OWCP employee empowered to convene an informal conference could issue a compensation order and that therefore a settlement agreement signed by an OWCP claims examiner could properly be construed as an “award in a compensation order” within the meaning of § 33(b), as Rodriguez held. Plaintiffs argue that in contrast 20 C.F.R. § 702.312, which is quoted in the margin and is applicable to the two cases before us, now provides that “a compensation order following an agreement shall be issued only by a person so designated by the Director to perform such duty.” Plaintiffs contend that the claims examiners in these two cases were not so designated and that therefore we cannot construe the Memorandum of Informal Conference as having the effect of an “award in a compensation order.” Second, plaintiffs argue that under the amended regulation 20 C.F.R. § 702.-315, also reproduced in the margin, if an employer wishes an assignment of the cause of action it must request that “a formal compensation order” be issued. No such request was made here.
Although the effect of the amendments to the regulations was specifically left open in Rodriguez, 617 F.2d at 959 n.l and 960 n.2, and also was not reached by the Supreme Court in affirming our decision in that case, 451 U.S. 596, 598-99 n.3,101 S.Ct. 1945, 1948 n.3, 68 L.Ed.2d 472, we believe that plaintiffs’ arguments are not persuasive. We find nothing in the 1977 amendments that would change the result we reached in Rodriguez. The intent of the Department of Labor in amending the regulations was clearly stated:
The amendments will enable the Department of Labor to process in a more efficient and timely manner the increasing number of claims filed each year.
42 Fed.Reg. 45300, September 9, 1977. Additional language used by the agency in discussing comments received on the proposed amendments reflected a primary concern to avoid “unnecessary delays in the processing of claims.” Id. Plaintiffs provide no basis, and we can find none, that would lead us to conclude that the agency intended in any way to affect the substantive rights of the parties, or to inject additional technicalities into the settlement process. To the contrary, the Department encourages resolution through “informal procedures” in the “vast majority of cases.” 20 C.F.R. § 702.301. The amendments recognize the importance of an official informal conference in which an agreement approved by the Department of Labor has the same final and binding effect as a formal compensation order issued after a contested proceeding. Thus, 20 C.F.R. § 702.315, see note 5 supra, provides: (Emphasis supplied.) See also Verderame v. Torm Lines, 670 F.2d 5, 7 (2nd Cir. 1982).
[W]hen the employer or carrier has agreed to pay,... such action shall be commenced immediately upon becoming aware of the agreement, and without awaiting receipt of the memorandum or the formal compensation order.
Accordingly, we find that under the revised regulations an agreement approved in a Memorandum of Informal Conference by the claims examiner after an official informal conference constitutes an “award in a compensation order” under § 933(b).
The judgments of the district courts are affirmed.
. Ambrosino was injured on September 14, 1975; a Memorandum of Informal Conference was filed and payment accepted on January 16, 1978. His complaint was filed in the district court on August 16, 1978.
Cigliano was injured on June 21, 1979; a Memorandum of Informal Conference was filed on May 14, 1980 and payment was accepted on JAay 20, 1980. His complaint was filed in the district court on January 10, 1981.
. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) provides:
Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order filed by the deputy commissioner or Board shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third person unless such person shall commence an action against such third person within six months after such award.
. 20 C.F.R. § 702.312 provides in relevant part;
Informal conferences shall be called by the deputy commissioner or his designee assigned or reassigned the case and held before that same person, unless such person is absent or unavailable. When so assigned, the designee shall perform the duties set forth below assigned to the deputy commissioner, except that a compensation order following an agreement shall be issued only by a person so designated by the Director to perform such duty.
. Acceptance of the compensation award in both cases was subsequent to the 1977 amendments, which were effective October 11, 1977, 42 Fed.Reg. 45300, September 9,1977.
. 20 C.F.R. § 702.315(a) provides in relevant part:
Following an informal conference at which agreement is reached on all issues, the deputy commissioner shall (within 10 days after conclusion of the conference), embody the agreement in a memorandum or within 30 days issue a formal compensation order, to be filed and mailed....
If either party requests that a formal compensation order be issued the deputy commissioner shall, within 30 days of such request, prepare, file, and serve such order....
. Neither plaintiff contends that he had no notice of the consequences of accepting a compensation award or that he was unaware
Question: What is the circuit of the court that decided the case?
A. First Circuit
B. Second Circuit
C. Third Circuit
D. Fourth Circuit
E. Fifth Circuit
F. Sixth Circuit
G. Seventh Circuit
H. Eighth Circuit
I. Ninth Circuit
J. Tenth Circuit
K. Eleventh Circuit
L. District of Columbia Circuit
Answer: |
songer_respond1_7_2 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").
STEELE v. HARRISON et al.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted April 3, 1929.
Decided May 6, 1929.
Petition for Rehearing Denied May 25, 1929.
No. 4746.
Walter C. Balderston and Leonard J. Mather, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
R. B. Dickey, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
The appellant as plaintiff in the lower court filed a bill of complaint against the appellees, praying that a certain deed of conveyance theretofore executed by her be set aside upon the ground of fraud and also upon the ground that it was obnoxious to the proviso of section 1155, D. C. Code (then iu force), providing that no married woman shall have power to make any contract as surety or guarantor. The lower court heard the evidence and dismissed appellant’s bill. This appeal is now prosecuted upon a record containing the pleadings and the substance of the evidence heard by the trial court. We have carefully considered both pleadings and evidence, and we are convinced that the controlling facts in the case are in substance as follows:
On May 15, 1926, the appellant, Elsie A. Steele, was, and still is, a married woman, the wife of Lewis P. Steele, and was the owner as tenant in common with Blanche A. Davis of certain real estate situate in the District of Columbia, subject to certain trust incumbrances which are not in question in this case. At that time appellant’s husband Lewis P. Steele, and William E. Davis, husband of appellant’s cotenant Blanche A. Davis, were partners engaged in the real estate business in the District of Columbia, and were in need of funds with which to meet their obligations. They accordingly formulated a plan of having their wives place a trust deed upon the aforesaid property wherewith to secure funds for the use of the partnership. Pursuant to this plan appellant and her cotenant, acting under the direction of their husbands, on May 15, 1926, executed and delivered to Francis L. Davis, brother of said William E. Davis, a deed of conveyance in fee simple for the real estate aforesaid, without any consideration whatever- moving to the grantors. On the same day said Francis L. Davis executed a deed of trust upon the property to> appellees Raymond B. Dickey and Sidney B. Harrison, to secure one H. L. Timbelake in the sum of $7,355. On May 25, 1936, however, this trust was released of record, and on the same day a trust deed was executed to the same trustees to secure the firm of Davis & Steele, in the same sum, to wit, $7,355> and this obligation was indorsed by Davis & Steele to Sue K. Harrison. On the same day, to wit, May 25, 1926, Francis L. Davis reconveyed the property to appellant and her eotenant subject to the aforesaid trust in favor of Steele and Davis in the sum of $7,355.
The appellant’s bill of complaint attacks the deed of conveyance executed by her and. her cotenant to Francis L. Davis and prays that it he set aside on the ground that appellant was induced to sign the same by the fraudulent representations of certain of the appellees. This charge, we think, is not sustained by the evidence. Appellant also attacks the deed of trust placed by Francis L. Davis upon the property to secure Steele and Davis in the sum of $7,355, upon the ground that the trust deed if sustained would subject her property as security for the indebtedness of Steele and Davis, thus obligating her as an accommodation surety for them in violation of the proviso of section 1155, D. C. Code (since repealed [see 44 Stat. 676]) which provided that no married woman shall have power to make any contract as surety or guarantor, or as accommodation drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser.
We think the latter contention of appellant should he sustained. The circumstances surrounding the transaction in question give unmistakable proof of the fact that Francis L. Davis, as grantee in the deed of conveyance, was acting merely as the agent and trustee of appellant and her cotenant in order to place a trust upon their property to serve as security for the debts of their husbands. This was evidently done in order to escape the express provisions of the statute prohibiting such suretyship. Equity, however, looks through the form of the transaction to its substance, and in such case as this the.law follows the equitable rule. It results accordingly that the trust given by Francis L. Davis is subject to the same infirmities as if given directly by appellant, and is therefore void.
In Waters v. Pearson, 39 App. D. C. 10, 16, Chief Justice Shepard spoke for this court as follows: “1. Section 1155 of the Code (31 Stat. at L. 1374, chap. 854) confers general power upon married women to engage in business, to contract, to sue separately, etc., as fully and freely as if unmarried, but concludes with this proviso: ‘That no married woman shall have power to make any contract as surety or guarantor, or as accommodation drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser.’ By this proviso married women were prohibited from binding themselves as surety for others. But the limitation would be of little or no benefit if it could be evaded by the mere form of the contract entered into. If the mere form of the contract, making the married woman appear as a principal* instead of a surety, would serve to prevent judicial investigation of the real nature of her obligation, the provision of the statute would become a dead letter. The statute declares a rule of public policy and its object is to be executed by courts of law as well as equity. Any one may defend an action on a contract by proof that it is in violation of a statute. E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 76-88, 22 S. Ct. 747, 46 L. Ed. 1058-1068. See Fisk Rubber Co. v. Muller, 42 App. D. C. 49; Schwartz v. Sacks, 55 App. D. C. 87, 2 F.(2d) 188; Howard v. Quinn, 55 Wash. Law Rep. 527, affirmed Bradbury v. Howard, 58 App. D. C. 383, 31 F.(2d) 222.
Tbe decree of the lower court is reversed with costs, and this cause is remanded for such further proceedings as are not inconsistent herewith.
Reversed.
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.
A. not ascertained
B. male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
C. male - assumed because of name
D. female - indication in opinion of gender
E. female - assumed because of name
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_7-2 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "economic activity and regulation".
Augustus CHAVIS, Appellant, v. FINNLINES LTD., O/Y, Appellee.
No. 77-1126.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 6, 1978.
Decided May 22, 1978.
C. Arthur Rutter, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (John H. Klein, Breit, Rutter & Montagna, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant.
John B. King, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (Charles F. Tucker, Vandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, RUSSELL, Circuit Judge, and HOFFMAN, Senior District Judge.
Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
WALTER E. HOFFMAN, Senior District Judge.
Appellant, a longshoreman, brought suit against appellee, a shipowner, under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C., section 1332. More specifically, plaintiff sought damages for injuries he received on February 17, 1975, during the course of his employment in loading cargo aboard the vessel FINN-SAILOR at Newport News, Virginia. He alleged negligence on the part of the shipowner under the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended in 1972, 33 U.S.C., section 901, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On December 2, 1976, the case was tried before the Honorable John A. MacKenzie and a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant-appellee Finn-lines Ltd., O/Y (hereinafter referred to as the shipowner), and the plaintiff appealed. The only issues involve the correctness of the jury instructions. We affirm.
On February 17, 1975, the vessel FINN-SAILOR was being loaded at Newport News. Tidewater Stevedoring Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Tidewater) had been engaged by the shipowner to load the cargo aboard the vessel.
The appellant, an employee of Tidewater, was a member of a longshore gang which was sent to the number six hatch, lower hold, of the FINNSAILOR to load certain cargo. The men in the gang were working under the supervision of the hatch boss, Ralph Sessoms. Appellant and his fellow gang members had been assigned by the stevedore foreman, also an employee of Tidewater, to work in the number six hatch, and plaintiff was advised by Sessoms that a cargo of logs was to be loaded into the lower hold.
The evidence was that the logs were covered with a red clay mud, which created a smooth, slippery surface. The longshore-' men commenced loading, and while there was testimony to the effect that the logs were wet, the longshoremen loaded the logs in the usual manner and apparently had no particular difficulty in handling the logs. (Tr. 24) It rained throughout the day, and the logs were exposed to such weather due to the fact that the hatch was left open. (Tr. 10)
The loading of the logs was completed in the latter part of the afternoon of February 17. Thereafter, the longshoremen began to load bales of herbs. The bales were to be stowed on top of the logs. The men working in the hold, including the appellant, were told that the bales were coming in by the gangwayman, also a Tidewater employee. (Tr. 25) The header in the hatch, Isaiah Battle, made the decision to bring the bales of herbs into the hatch, and Battle testified that the gangwayman could not signal the winchman to bring in the drafts containing the bales until Battle told him to do so. (Tr. 26)
The evidence as to what transpired at this point was sharply conflicting. There was testimony from the appellant and his fellow longshoreman, Isaiah Battle, to the effect that one of the vessel’s mates was in the tween deck of the number six hatch. Battle testified that he asked the mate for some plyboard to put on top of the logs. Battle further testified that this mate who, according to Battle, was wearing a uniform and cap, told him there was no plyboard available on the ship, but to load the bales directly on top of the logs. (Tr. 15-16; 29-30) Appellant’s witnesses testified it was the custom and practice for Finnlines’ vessels, being loaded in Newport News, to supply any plyboard that was necessary for the loading operations.
The vessel’s chief officer testified that the vessel’s mates do not wear uniforms and, in addition, that the vessel never stations a mate in the hatch while logs and bales of herbs are being loaded. (Tr. 87-88) Upon reviewing the vessel’s log book, the chief officer noted that heavy lift cargo was being loaded in the number two hatch, and that under normal procedure all of the vessel’s mates would be in that hatch watching over the loading of the heavy lift. (Tr. 87) He also testified that the ship always carries plyboard. However, there was no evidence that he received any request for such.
While the appellant and several of his fellow longshoremen did testify that the vessel’s mate told them there was no available plyboard on the ship, it was uncontradicted that neither the appellant nor any of the other men advised the hatch boss, Sessoms, or the stevedore foreman that they required plyboard before loading the bales of herbs. (Tr. 32, 59) It was also uncontradicted that, under normal procedure, there is plyboard available on the pier. The appellant testified that he and his fellow longshoremen knew that this plyboard was available on shore for their use. Appellant acknowledged that in the past he and his fellow workers had obtained plyboard from shore for use on various vessels. (Tr. 63-64) However, neither appellant nor any of the other longshoremen attempted to obtain the plyboard from shore.
While handling one of the bales, the appellant injured his back. However, the evidence surrounding the nature of the accident was conflicting. Appellant testified that, while he was maneuvering one of the bales, his feet slipped on the slippery logs and he fell, injuring his back. However, on the day of the accident, appellant reported to the timekeeper for Tidewater, James Davis, who prepared an accident report based upon what the appellant told him. Nowhere in the report is there any indication that a fall on wet logs caused the appellant’s injury. (Tr. 100-101; Defendant’s exhibit No. 2)
Furthermore, on February 18, 1975, the day after the accident, the appellant completed and signed a workmen’s compensation form in which he described his accident as follows:
We were loading bales of herbs weighing approximately 200 pounds on top of some logs we had already loaded. One of the bales fell down between some logs and had to be moved because it was in the way of the rest of them to come. I proceeded to move it when I felt something give in my lower back. (Tr. 69-70)
No mention was made of slippery conditions or the alleged fact that he had slipped on the logs and fallen, thus injuring his back.
I
Duty of Shipowner to Provide a Reasonably Safe Place to Work
Assuming arguendo that, under the stated facts, it was proper to submit the case to the jury, appellant contends that the trial court erred in its refusal to grant an instruction that the shipowner had a responsibility to provide a reasonably safe place to work. Such omission, it is argued, resulted in the jury’s failing to receive a proper statement of the law.
Our consideration of this issue, as well as of the balance of the issues raised, must be guided by the principle that in considering errors in instructions, this court must look to the entire charge, and if the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately state the pertinent legal principles involved, then affirmance of the court below is required. Nitto Shosen K.K. v. Johnson, 350 F.2d 399 (9 Cir. 1965); Garrett v. Campbell, 360 F.2d 382 (5 Cir. 1966).
In order to determine whether the given charge was correct, it is necessary to evaluate the complexion of the Act as it exists in light of the 1972 amendments. In particular, section 905(b) of the Act, as amended, must be taken into consideration. The subsection provides:
(b) In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "economic activity and regulation"?
A. taxes, patents, copyright
B. torts
C. commercial disputes
D. bankruptcy, antitrust, securities
E. misc economic regulation and benefits
F. property disputes
G. other
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_7-2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "economic activity and regulation".
In re Wade Dillon BALDWIN and Judith Ann Baldwin, Bankrupts. Lizzie ZARATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wade Dillon BALDWIN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 77-1696.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Submitted March 13, 1978.
Decided June 30, 1978.
R. Thomas Dawe, Albuquerque, N.M., for defendant-appellant.
Jennie Deden Behles, Albuquerque, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HILL, BARRETT and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.
HILL, Circuit Judge.
This action was brought by Lizzie Zarate, a creditor of bankrupt Wade Dillon Baldwin, for a determination of the discharge-ability of her claim against Baldwin. The bankruptcy judge held that Zarate’s claim was excepted from discharge by § 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act [11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2)]. The district court affirmed. Baldwin seeks reversal of that determination.
In June, 1972, judgment was entered in New Mexico district court in an action by Zarate against Baldwin for negligent medical treatment. Zarate v. Baldwin, No. 11— 71-01121 (Bernalillo Co., N.M., Dist. Ct., June 2, 1972). The judgment specifically incorporated the terms of an agreement settling Zarate’s claim. The judgment recited that it was entered upon a claim of “simple negligence.” It provided that Za-rate should recover $60,000 from Baldwin, payable according to a stated schedule, with interest only in case of delinquency. The schedule of payments required Baldwin to pay $175 each month from July, 1972, through December, 1973; $500 each month from January, 1974, through May, 1975; and $800 each month thereafter until the full amount was paid. The judgment further provided that: “[T]he debt herein stated shall not be provable or dischargeable in bankruptcy.” Baldwin made payments according to the schedule through April, 1975, at which time $48,850 remained unpaid.
Baldwin filed a petition for discharge in bankruptcy in June, 1975. Zarate commenced this action pursuant to § 17(c) of the Bankruptcy Act [11 U.S.C. § 35(c)]. She contended the debt should be excepted from discharge on two grounds: (1) Baldwin’s contractual waiver, incorporated into the state court judgment, precluded discharge; (2) Because the settlement agreement upon which judgment was entered was reached through Baldwin’s false representation that he would not seek discharge of the debt, her claim was excepted from discharge by § 17(a)(2).
The testimony adduced at the hearing in bankruptcy court revealed that Baldwin had previously obtained a discharge in bankruptcy and he was not again eligible to seek discharge until May, 1975. Both Za-rate and Richard Ransom, her attorney in the state court proceeding, testified that at the time of the settlement negotiations she was concerned about the possibility Baldwin would seek discharge and that she agreed to the settlement only upon Baldwin’s assurance that he intended to pay in full and that the debt would not be affected by subsequent bankruptcies.
The bankruptcy judge found that Baldwin misrepresented ■ his intent to pay the debt in full and not to seek its discharge in bankruptcy and that Zarate relied upon that misrepresentation in entering into the settlement agreement. He further concluded that Baldwin was bound by his waiver contained in the settlement agreement. He held the debt was not dischargeable.
Baldwin contends the bankruptcy judge’s conclusions regarding his misrepresentation and Zarate’s reliance were erroneous. He further contends that the liability was not within the scope of § 17(a)(2) because Za-rate did not give up property on account of his misrepresentation. Finally, he argues that the contractual waiver of his right to seek discharge of the debt is unenforceable.
The bankruptcy judge’s findings of fact, adopted by the district court, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Bankruptcy R. 810. The evidence amply supports the finding that Baldwin misrepresented his intent. The clause waiving discharge, together with the promise to pay inherent in the agreement, is at the very least a representation that Baldwin intended to pay the debt in full, regardless of future bankruptcies. The circumstances which indicate Baldwin had no intention of fulfilling that promise when he made it include his insistence that the agreement state Zarate’s claim to be for “simple negligence”, thus paving the way for discharge of the debt; the progressive payment schedule ■ that permitted Baldwin to avoid enforceable liability for the greater share of the debt or any interest thereon until he was again eligible to seek discharge; and the fact that he ceased to make payments as soon as he was again eligible to petition for discharge.
Testimony by Zarate and Ransom that she knew of his previous bankruptcy and insisted on the waiver clause to assure payment in full amply supports the finding that Zarate relied upon Baldwin’s, misrepresentation.
Section 17(a)(2) excepts from discharge claims which “are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations.” A liability for negligent medical malpractice is a dis-chargeable debt. In re Byrne, 296 F. 98 (2d Cir. 1924). In its present posture, however, Zarate’s claim is not for Baldwin’s malpractice; it is for the property she forwent by entering into the settlement agreement in reliance on Baldwin’s false representations. Before agreeing to the settlement, Zarate had an unliquidated claim for damages against Baldwin. The significant aspect of the agreement is not that it caused the prior claim to be reduced to judgment, but that it caused Zarate to give up property of a value equal to the present unpaid balance of the judgment. By agreeing to settle, Zarate forwent her right to pursue her claim to judgment after trial. Her evidence could have shown that Baldwin’s conduct was willful, in which case his liability would not have been dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(8). But most importantly, she forwent her right to collect the debt through the process of the court during the time when Baldwin was precluded from seeking discharge by reason of his prior bankruptcy. By keeping current with the relatively low initial payments, Baldwin avoided interest on the unpaid balance of the principal sum, and he avoided enforceable obligation for the remainder of the debt until his statutory six years [11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5)] had run. The bankruptcy judge correctly held that Zarate’s claim was excepted from discharge by § 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.
We need not address the matter of enforceability of the contractual waiver of discharge. The significance of the provision is that it constitutes a representation that Baldwin intended to pay the debt in full, which we have held was false.
AFFIRMED.
. Claims for willful and malicious injuries are excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(8).
. Because Zarate’s claim was for property which she gave up by entering into the settlement agreement rather than for damages resulting from Baldwin’s negligent malpractice, our decision in In re Vickers, No. 76-2175 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1977), stating the rule that when a claim has been reduced to judgment the record and the judgment are ordinarily dispositive as to the nature of the claim, does not apply.
The instant case may be distinguished from our recent opinion in In re Feisen, No. 77-2035 (10th Cir. Apr. 14,-1978). In that case, a guarantor of a debt challenged the discharge of his claim against the debtor for the amount he had been caused to pay on account of the debtor’s default. The original debt, the guarantor’s liability thereon, and the debtor’s liability to the guarantor had been reduced to judgment in state court pursuant to a settlement agreement. In the bankruptcy court the guarantor sought to raise the matter of the debtor’s fraud in the contract of guaranty. We held that he was properly precluded from doing so because there had been no showing of fraud in the state court proceeding. We specifically noted “[tjhere is nothing in this record which indicates that the stipulation reached in settling the litigation in the state court proceedings . was in any manner induced by fraud.” Slip op. at 5-6.
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "economic activity and regulation"?
A. taxes, patents, copyright
B. torts
C. commercial disputes
D. bankruptcy, antitrust, securities
E. misc economic regulation and benefits
F. property disputes
G. other
Answer: |
songer_district | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
Thomas S. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. CENTRAL SOYA COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
No. 83-7468.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 10, 1984.
Champ Lyons, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.
William C. Tidwell, III, Kathryn Anne Eckerlein, Mobile, Ala., for defendant-ap-pellee, cross-appellant.
Before HILL and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge.
Honorable John Minor Wisdom, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
ALBERT J. HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Thomas S. Jones and Central Soya Company, Inc. (“Central”) both challenge the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Jones by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama in a successful action against Central alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (“ADEA”). The jury found Central’s conduct to be willful and awarded Jones double damages in the amount of $41,666.42. The district court later granted Jones an additional interim amount of $18,796.00 as well as reinstatement with full pension benefits.
Pursuant to a provision in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) authorizing reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff in an ADEA action, the district court awarded Jones approximately $24,000.00 allocable to counsel fees. On appeal, Jones alleges that the amount was insufficient because of 1) the exceptional result obtained in the litigation, 2) the purported contingency fee arrangement between Jones and his counsel, and 3) the delay in payment of the attorney’s fees. Central cross appeals, contending that the district court improperly awarded Jones attorney’s fees for the time billed for the work of an unnecessary second trial lawyer.
Awards of attorney’s fees in age discrimination actions are governed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) which provides: “[t]he court... shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant....” See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (rendering section 216(b) applicable to ADEA actions). A number of factors are relevant to the determination whether such an award is reasonable, the most familiar of which were discussed at length in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).
In this case, the district court based its award on a “lodestar” figure consisting of the product of the time invested by Jones’ counsel and an hourly rate. Record, vol. 1, pp. 381-84. In doing so, the district court addressed each of the factors listed in Johnson and concluded that no adjustment of the lodestar amount was necessary. See id. at 381-86. We may overturn this award only for “clear abuse of discretion.” Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1983).
Jones first contends that the lodestar figure should have been increased because of the results obtained in the ADEA action. The district court reasoned that although counsel “achieved substantial relief for the plaintiff in this case, the court does not feel that counsel is entitled to an enhancement bonus on this factor.” Record, vol. 1, p. 385.
The Supreme Court of the United States has instructed that “[bjecause acknowledgment of the ‘results obtained’ generally will be subsumed within other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee it normally should not provide an independent basis for increasing the fee award.” Blum v. Stenson, — U.S. —, —, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d 891, 903 (1984). However, “in some eases of exceptional success an enhanced award may be justified.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 52 (1983); see Blum, — U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 1550, 79 L.Ed.2d at 903 (quoting Hensley). We are confronted here with the question whether the result in this ease constitutes “exceptional success.”
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed in detail the-circumstances under which an award of attorney’s fees should be enhanced because of the result obtained, the Court noted in Blum that “where the experience and special skill of the attorney... require the expenditure of fewer hours than counsel normally would be expected to spend on a particularly novel or complex issue” an increase may be warranted. Blum, — U.S. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d at 902. See also Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557 (10th Cir.1983) (“exceptional success” may be based upon extraordinary economies of time given the complexity of the task).
Other courts have articulated additional factors that may justify an enhanced attorney’s fee award such as the development of new law furthering important congressional policies, see Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1530-31 (11th Cir.1983); Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718; accord Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557, success achieved under unusually difficult circumstances, see White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir.1983) (near complete success achieved in face of highly unfavorable law); Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557 (“unusually difficult circumstances”), and the size of the award. See Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Board, 719 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir.1983); Wolf v. Frank, 555 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.1977); Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
None of these grounds is sufficiently present in this case to compel the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion. There is no indication that the success of Jones’ attorneys was achieved with any special economics of time or under unusually difficult circumstances. Moreover, the case did not establish significant new law furthering an important congressional goal, and the $60,462.42 recovered is not such a substantial amount as to require enhancement.
In Ramos the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit observed that “total victory” may constitute “exceptional success.” Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557. The main thrust of Jones’ argument appears to be based precisely on this point. According to Jones, because he prevailed on all his claims he is entitled to an enhanced award of attorney’s fees.
We decline, however, to equate “total success” with “exceptional success.” Although the Supreme Court in Hensley observed that “the extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943, 76 L.Ed.2d at 54, the Court has never suggested that complete victory alone requires an enhanced award. Indeed, the Court specifically distinguished “excellent” results from “exceptional” results and instructed that only the latter could justify an increased grant of attorney’s fees. Id., 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52. Winning on all claims does not seem to us to be so unusual that it must be deemed “exceptional.”
Furthermore, the Court in Hensley held that, given the vast range of success possible in a civil rights action, a decrease in the lodestar amount is not required simply because the plaintiff failed to win every contention raised in his lawsuit. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943, 76 L.Ed.2d at 55. We believe the converse follows — just as losing on some claims does not necessarily mandate a decrease in the lodestar figure, neither does winning on all claims demand an increased amount. The central inquiry remains whether the expenditure of counsel’s time was reasonable in light of the overall success achieved. See id., 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d at 52.
A contrary boilerplate rule that total victory mandates a larger award of attorney’s fees would mean that lawyers fortunate enough to attract clients with highly meritorious claims would always be entitled to increased attorney’s fees. Stat
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_respond1_1_4 | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "financial institution". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
VAREKA INVESTMENTS, N.V., a Netherlands Antilles Corp., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida Corp., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 82-5722.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Feb. 9, 1984.
Rehearing Denied March 21, 1984.
Lawrence H. Rogovin, North Miami Beach, Fla., for defendant-appellant.
Steel, Hector & Davis, Vance E. Salter, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before RONEY, HATCHETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:
In this diversity case, we review the district court’s award of damages to a lessor resulting from a commercial lease transaction and the termination of the lease. We affirm.
FACTS
Vareka Investments, N.V. (Vareka) was incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands Antilles on October 20, 1978, to serve as a passive investment vehicle. With the exception of a shareholder who is a citizen of Italy residing in Montreal, Canada, all of the shareholders of Vareka are citizens and residents of the Republic of Ecuador. Leonard E. Treister and Jerome J. Cohen were shareholders, officers, and directors of American Investment Properties, Inc. (AIP). In January, 1978, AIP purchased The Quarters Office Park. During 1978, a company half owned by Treister and Cohen, Greater American Management Corporation (GAMC), operated The Quarters Office Park (The Quarters). In January, 1979, Vareka purchased The Quarters from AIP. Simultaneously, AIP leased The Quarters back from Vareka under a fifteen-year net lease under which AIP was obligated to pay Vareka a minimum “net” return of Vare-ka’s cash investment. AIP was also obligated to pay all expenses and assume all duties to the subtenants and to operate The Quarters. Vareka had no liability whatsoever for the operation, maintenance, or expenses of The Quarters. Treister and Cohen, individually, guaranteed AIP’s performance under the lease for the first five years, with an aggregate liability of $100,-000.
On January 15, 1979, Vareka filed an “Application by Foreign Corporation for Authorization to Transact Business in Florida” with the Florida Department of State. The State of Florida granted the application, and Vareka became qualified to transact business in Florida. The qualification listed as the “address of principal office” of Vareka, 1400 Southeast First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida. A Resident Agent Certificate was also filed with the Secretary of State of Florida. On the certificate, Vareka designated an attorney at a Miami, Florida, law firm as its resident agent. The law firm had represented Vareka in the negotiations and consummation of the transaction, and continues to represent Vareka in Florida.
In August, 1979, AIP notified Vareka that AIP intended to terminate the lease. The present actions were commenced in September, 1979, when Vareka filed suit. In October, 1979, the district court authorized Vareka to re-enter the premises for the purposes of operation and management, pursuant to the lease agreement. Vareka hired Coldwell Banker Property Management Company (Coldwell Banker) to operate the property from October, 1979, through the date of the trial.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 4, 1979, soon after AIP advised Vareka of its intent to terminate, Vareka sued AIP under the lease. On September 14, 1979, Vareka sued Treister and Cohen based on the Guaranty. The trial court consolidated the cases.
Vareka moved for partial summary judgment on liability. The district court withheld ruling on Vareka’s motion for summary judgment pending a determination of whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After holding an evidentiary hearing and considering memoranda of law on the issue of jurisdiction, the district court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction existed. Thereafter, the district court granted Vareka’s motion for summary judgment as to the liability of AIP, Treister, and Cohen. The district court conducted a bench trial and found that Vareka suffered $548,000 in damages due to AIP’s breach of the lease, and that Vareka was entitled to collect $100,000 of that amount from Treister and Cohen under the Guaranty. AIP, Treister, and Cohen (appellants) then filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment” and a “Notice of Appeal.” The district court denied the motion to alter or amend judgment. The appellants did not file a new notice of appeal.
ISSUES
On appeal, we must decide whether the district court correctly concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction; whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment; whether Vareka’s cause of action for damages was premature; whether Vareka properly mitigated those damages; whether there was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s award of damages; and whether Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) requires dismissal of this appeal.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Appellant, AIP, contends that the district court’s finding that Vareka’s principal place of business was in Quito, Ecuador, • is clearly erroneous. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c), a foreign corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it has its principal place of business. Jerguson v. Blue Dot Investment, Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 2013, 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982). One looks to the “total activity” of the corporation in order to determine its principal place of business. Village Fair Shopping Center v. Sam Broadhead Trust, 588 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.1979). This analysis incorporates both the “place of activities” test (focus on production or sales activities), and the “nerve center” test (emphasis on the locus of the managerial and policymaking functions of the corporation). Toms v. Country Quality Meats, Inc., 610 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir.1980).
The question of a corporation’s principal place of business is a question of fact. Village Fair at 433. Thus, we review the district court’s determination that Vareka’s principal place of business was Ecuador to determine whether it is clearly erroneous.
The district court found that all of Vareka’s shareholders were citizens and residents of the Republic of Ecuador, with the exception of DiGiorgis, a citizen of Italy, residing in Montreal, Canada. Prior to institution of the present case, all corporate meetings were conducted, and all corporate decisions were made in Ecuador. The appellants were at all times relevant to this case residents and citizens of the state of Florida. The managing director of Vareka was a citizen and resident of Ecuador; the major investor in Vareka is an Ecuadorian corporation. Vareka was formed as a passive investment vehicle in order to invest funds in United States real estate. Jose Perez, the managing director of Vareka, received materials offering The Quarters for sale at his offices in Quito, Ecuador. In connection with the purchase of The Quarters, Vareka obtained loans from several Ecuadorian citizens. These loans were evidenced by promissory notes made, executed, and delivered in Quito, Ecuador. Under the long-term lease, AIP was obligated to pay all the expenses, assume all the duties to the subtenants, and operate The Quarters Office Park. Thus, Vareka was not involved in the day-to-day operation of this commercial property. At no time did any officer, director, employee, shareholder, or other representative of Vareka meet or communicate with any of the tenants at The
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "financial institution". What subcategory of business best describes this litigant?
A. bank
B. insurance
C. savings and loan
D. credit union
E. other pension fund
F. other financial institution or investment company
G. unclear
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Welcome Linden FRALEY, III, Appellant.
No. 26328.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Nov. 26, 1971.
David M. Rothman (argued), Los An-geles, Cal., for appellant.
Larry S. Flax, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before BARNES, KOELSCH and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges.
KOELSCH, Circuit Judge.
Welcome Linden Fraley, III, appeals from the judgment of the district court convicting him of disobeying the order of his Selective Service Board to report for induction into the armed forces of the United States. (50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a)).
He challenges the validity of the judgment on several grounds. However, a discussion of all of them is unnecessary, for one has merit and requires reversal of the judgment.
United States v. Kember, 437 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 1392, 28 L.Ed.2d 662 (1971), holds that “the appeal board as well as the local board [must] state its reasons for denial of a conscientious objector claim where the application therefor is prima facie sufficient, unless the appeal board’s reasons can be determined from the agency record with reasonable certainty.” That rule, applicable here, is dispositive of this appeal.
Although Fraley made out a prima facie showing in support of his claim as a conscientious objector, the local board denied him such classification. Thereafter, the appeal board made a de novo determination [Bishop v. United States, 412 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1969)] and likewise classified him 1-A. It specified no reason or reasons for its determination and none is apparent from the administrative record “with reasonable certainty.” United States v. Kember, supra,, 437 F.2d p. 536. In that respect this case is wholly unlike United States v. Verbeek, 423 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1970), where “fresh and powerful evidence” of the registrant’s insincerity, not before the local board, was initially presented to the appeal board; instead, it falls in the category of cases such as United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1970), in which the “appeals board had no more information to go on than did the local board; * ? * ”
In Atherton, supra, the conviction was reversed, where the appeal board had nothing before it save the record of the local board, and it was impossible to ascertain whether the latter board’s denial of the registrant’s conscientious objector claim was based upon an erroneous standard of religious belief. Here, even if we assume the appeal board adopted the local board’s reasons, the latter’s statement of them is both ambiguous and uncertain.- It is impossible to determine whether the local board concluded (erroneously) that Fraley’s beliefs were not religious, or whether Fraley was not sincere in his profession of them, or both. Thus, because as in United States v. French, 429 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1970) “we cannot tell whether or not the Appeal Board relied upon the erroneous ground” the order to report was invalid and the conviction must be and is
Reversed.
. “Statement: The reason why we feel that the conscientious objector status be denied:
1. Ou the initial filing of the form 150 there is very little to indicate the basis for this individual’s belief. In most instances questions were answered with one short sentence.
2. The report of the appearance before the Government Appeal Agent indicates nothing whatsoever to do with beliefs that would sustain a conscientious objector status, but delves into the physical and mental status of the individual with respect to the Armed Forces.
3. At the inception of this Personal Appearance the registrant submitted a three page hand written document setting forth numerous reasons why he is not acceptable for the armed services, but nothing verifying why he is not acceptable.
4. Upon considerable questioning as to the religious beliefs, as the record of this hearing will show, at no time did he give answers that would show basic or deep seated reasons for non violence.
In fact registrant did indicate on one answer that where he had a choice he would prefer not to destroy. It is the majority opinion of this board that the Selective Service Regulations do not give the registrant the choice in this case.”
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.