instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ThreadHeap::TakeSnapshot(SnapshotType type) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->InAtomicMarkingPause());
ThreadState::GCSnapshotInfo info(GCInfoTable::GcInfoIndex() + 1);
String thread_dump_name =
String::Format("blink_gc/thread_%lu",
static_cast<unsigned long>(thread_state_->ThreadId()));
const String heaps_dump_name = thread_dump_name + "/heaps";
const String classes_dump_name = thread_dump_name + "/classes";
int number_of_heaps_reported = 0;
#define SNAPSHOT_HEAP(ArenaType) \
{ \
number_of_heaps_reported++; \
switch (type) { \
case SnapshotType::kHeapSnapshot: \
arenas_[BlinkGC::k##ArenaType##ArenaIndex]->TakeSnapshot( \
heaps_dump_name + "/" #ArenaType, info); \
break; \
case SnapshotType::kFreelistSnapshot: \
arenas_[BlinkGC::k##ArenaType##ArenaIndex]->TakeFreelistSnapshot( \
heaps_dump_name + "/" #ArenaType); \
break; \
default: \
NOTREACHED(); \
} \
}
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage1);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage2);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage3);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(NormalPage4);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(EagerSweep);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector1);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector2);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector3);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(Vector4);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(InlineVector);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(HashTable);
SNAPSHOT_HEAP(LargeObject);
FOR_EACH_TYPED_ARENA(SNAPSHOT_HEAP);
DCHECK_EQ(number_of_heaps_reported, BlinkGC::kNumberOfArenas);
#undef SNAPSHOT_HEAP
if (type == SnapshotType::kFreelistSnapshot)
return;
size_t total_live_count = 0;
size_t total_dead_count = 0;
size_t total_live_size = 0;
size_t total_dead_size = 0;
for (size_t gc_info_index = 1; gc_info_index <= GCInfoTable::GcInfoIndex();
++gc_info_index) {
total_live_count += info.live_count[gc_info_index];
total_dead_count += info.dead_count[gc_info_index];
total_live_size += info.live_size[gc_info_index];
total_dead_size += info.dead_size[gc_info_index];
}
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* thread_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(thread_dump_name);
thread_dump->AddScalar("live_count", "objects", total_live_count);
thread_dump->AddScalar("dead_count", "objects", total_dead_count);
thread_dump->AddScalar("live_size", "bytes", total_live_size);
thread_dump->AddScalar("dead_size", "bytes", total_dead_size);
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* heaps_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(heaps_dump_name);
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* classes_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(classes_dump_name);
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CurrentProcessMemoryDump()
->AddOwnershipEdge(classes_dump->guid(), heaps_dump->guid());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race condition in Oilpan in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434} | High | 173,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeFloat(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size_, double& result) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size_ != 4) && (size_ != 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
unsigned char buf[8];
const int status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 4) {
union {
float f;
unsigned long ff;
};
ff = 0;
for (int i = 0;;) {
ff |= buf[i];
if (++i >= 4)
break;
ff <<= 8;
}
result = f;
} else {
assert(size == 8);
union {
double d;
unsigned long long dd;
};
dd = 0;
for (int i = 0;;) {
dd |= buf[i];
if (++i >= 8)
break;
dd <<= 8;
}
result = d;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| Medium | 173,865 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int yr_object_copy(
YR_OBJECT* object,
YR_OBJECT** object_copy)
{
YR_OBJECT* copy;
YR_OBJECT* o;
YR_STRUCTURE_MEMBER* structure_member;
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* func;
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* func_copy;
int i;
*object_copy = NULL;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_object_create(
object->type,
object->identifier,
NULL,
©));
switch(object->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) copy)->value = UNDEFINED;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) copy)->value = NULL;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION:
func = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) object;
func_copy = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) copy;
FAIL_ON_ERROR_WITH_CLEANUP(
yr_object_copy(func->return_obj, &func_copy->return_obj),
yr_object_destroy(copy));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_OVERLOADED_FUNCTIONS; i++)
func_copy->prototypes[i] = func->prototypes[i];
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE:
structure_member = ((YR_OBJECT_STRUCTURE*) object)->members;
while (structure_member != NULL)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR_WITH_CLEANUP(
yr_object_copy(structure_member->object, &o),
yr_object_destroy(copy));
FAIL_ON_ERROR_WITH_CLEANUP(
yr_object_structure_set_member(copy, o),
yr_free(o);
yr_object_destroy(copy));
structure_member = structure_member->next;
}
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY:
yr_object_copy(
((YR_OBJECT_ARRAY *) object)->prototype_item,
&o);
((YR_OBJECT_ARRAY *)copy)->prototype_item = o;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY:
yr_object_copy(
((YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY *) object)->prototype_item,
&o);
((YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY *)copy)->prototype_item = o;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
*object_copy = copy;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The sized_string_cmp function in libyara/sizedstr.c in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted rule.
Commit Message: Fix issue #658 | Low | 168,187 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int snd_hrtimer_stop(struct snd_timer *t)
{
struct snd_hrtimer *stime = t->private_data;
atomic_set(&stime->running, 0);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/hrtimer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 does not prevent recursive callback access, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via a crafted ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel()
hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.
However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Low | 167,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PlatformSensorWin::PlatformSensorWin(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> sensor_thread_runner,
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorReaderWin> sensor_reader)
: PlatformSensor(type, std::move(mapping), provider),
sensor_thread_runner_(sensor_thread_runner),
sensor_reader_(sensor_reader.release()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(sensor_reader_);
sensor_reader_->SetClient(this);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: cisco_autorp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len)
{
int type;
int numrps;
int hold;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auto-rp "));
type = bp[0];
switch (type) {
case 0x11:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "candidate-advert"));
break;
case 0x12:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mapping"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "type-0x%02x", type));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
numrps = bp[1];
ND_TCHECK2(bp[2], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Hold "));
hold = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
if (hold)
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FOREVER"));
/* Next 4 bytes are reserved. */
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/*XXX skip unless -v? */
/*
* Rest of packet:
* numrps entries of the form:
* 32 bits: RP
* 6 bits: reserved
* 2 bits: PIM version supported, bit 0 is "supports v1", 1 is "v2".
* 8 bits: # of entries for this RP
* each entry: 7 bits: reserved, 1 bit: negative,
* 8 bits: mask 32 bits: source
* lather, rinse, repeat.
*/
while (numrps--) {
int nentries;
char s;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
ND_TCHECK(bp[4]);
switch (bp[4] & 0x3) {
case 0: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv?"));
break;
case 1: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1"));
break;
case 2: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv2"));
break;
case 3: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1+2"));
break;
}
if (bp[4] & 0xfc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[4] & 0xfc));
ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);
nentries = bp[5];
bp += 6; len -= 6;
s = ' ';
for (; nentries; nentries--) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s%s/%d", s, bp[0] & 1 ? "!" : "",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[2]), bp[1]));
if (bp[0] & 0x02) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " bidir"));
}
if (bp[0] & 0xfc) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[0] & 0xfc));
}
s = ',';
bp += 6; len -= 6;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|autorp]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes. | Low | 167,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ASN.1 implementation in OpenSSL before 1.0.1o and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2c allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer underflow and memory corruption) via an ANY field in crafted serialized data, aka the "negative zero" issue.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred,
gss_ctx_id_t *ctx,
send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
sc = create_spnego_ctx();
if (sc == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
/* determine negotiation mech set */
ret = get_negotiable_mechs(minor_status, spcred, GSS_C_INITIATE,
&sc->mech_set);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
/* Set an initial internal mech to make the first context token. */
sc->internal_mech = &sc->mech_set->elements[0];
if (put_mech_set(sc->mech_set, &sc->DER_mechTypes) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* The actual context is not yet determined, set the output
* context handle to refer to the spnego context itself.
*/
sc->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
*ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
sc = NULL;
*tokflag = INIT_TOKEN_SEND;
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
cleanup:
release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | Medium | 166,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
{
FDrive *cur_drv;
uint32_t retval = 0;
int pos;
cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
fdctrl->dsr &= ~FD_DSR_PWRDOWN;
if (!(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_RQM) || !(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_DIO)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error: controller not ready for reading\n");
return 0;
}
pos = fdctrl->data_pos;
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
if (pos == 0) {
if (fdctrl->data_pos != 0)
if (!fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(fdctrl, cur_drv)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error seeking to next sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
return 0;
}
if (blk_read(cur_drv->blk, fd_sector(cur_drv), fdctrl->fifo, 1)
< 0) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error getting sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
/* Sure, image size is too small... */
memset(fdctrl->fifo, 0, FD_SECTOR_LEN);
}
}
}
retval = fdctrl->fifo[pos];
if (++fdctrl->data_pos == fdctrl->data_len) {
fdctrl->data_pos = 0;
/* Switch from transfer mode to status mode
* then from status mode to command mode
*/
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
fdctrl_stop_transfer(fdctrl, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
} else {
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
fdctrl_reset_irq(fdctrl);
}
}
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("data register: 0x%02x\n", retval);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Floppy Disk Controller (FDC) in QEMU, as used in Xen 4.5.x and earlier and KVM, allows local guest users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and guest crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via the (1) FD_CMD_READ_ID, (2) FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND, or other unspecified commands, aka VENOM.
Commit Message: | Low | 164,707 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: vsock_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb,
struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
int err;
size_t target;
ssize_t copied;
long timeout;
struct vsock_transport_recv_notify_data recv_data;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != SS_CONNECTED) {
/* Recvmsg is supposed to return 0 if a peer performs an
* orderly shutdown. Differentiate between that case and when a
* peer has not connected or a local shutdown occured with the
* SOCK_DONE flag.
*/
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
err = 0;
else
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
if (flags & MSG_OOB) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
/* We don't check peer_shutdown flag here since peer may actually shut
* down, but there can be data in the queue that a local socket can
* receive.
*/
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
err = 0;
goto out;
}
/* It is valid on Linux to pass in a zero-length receive buffer. This
* is not an error. We may as well bail out now.
*/
if (!len) {
err = 0;
goto out;
}
/* We must not copy less than target bytes into the user's buffer
* before returning successfully, so we wait for the consume queue to
* have that much data to consume before dequeueing. Note that this
* makes it impossible to handle cases where target is greater than the
* queue size.
*/
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
if (target >= transport->stream_rcvhiwat(vsk)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
copied = 0;
err = transport->notify_recv_init(vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
while (1) {
s64 ready = vsock_stream_has_data(vsk);
if (ready < 0) {
/* Invalid queue pair content. XXX This should be
* changed to a connection reset in a later change.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_wait;
} else if (ready > 0) {
ssize_t read;
err = transport->notify_recv_pre_dequeue(
vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
break;
read = transport->stream_dequeue(
vsk, msg->msg_iov,
len - copied, flags);
if (read < 0) {
err = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
copied += read;
err = transport->notify_recv_post_dequeue(
vsk, target, read,
!(flags & MSG_PEEK), &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
goto out_wait;
if (read >= target || flags & MSG_PEEK)
break;
target -= read;
} else {
if (sk->sk_err != 0 || (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
|| (vsk->peer_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)) {
break;
}
/* Don't wait for non-blocking sockets. */
if (timeout == 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
err = transport->notify_recv_pre_block(
vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
break;
release_sock(sk);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeout);
break;
} else if (timeout == 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
}
if (sk->sk_err)
err = -sk->sk_err;
else if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
err = 0;
if (copied > 0) {
/* We only do these additional bookkeeping/notification steps
* if we actually copied something out of the queue pair
* instead of just peeking ahead.
*/
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* If the other side has shutdown for sending and there
* is nothing more to read, then modify the socket
* state.
*/
if (vsk->peer_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
if (vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0) {
sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
}
}
err = copied;
}
out_wait:
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The vsock_stream_sendmsg function in net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,028 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex ;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ETB: buffer = %p, buffer->pBuffer[%p]", buffer, buffer->pBuffer);
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL || (buffer->nSize != sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> buffer is null or buffer size is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nVersion.nVersion != OMX_SPEC_VERSION) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: omx_video::etb--> OMX Version Invalid");
return OMX_ErrorVersionMismatch;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Bad port index to call empty_this_buffer");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (!m_sInPortDef.bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Cannot call empty_this_buffer while I/P port is disabled");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
nBufferIndex = buffer - ((!meta_mode_enable)?m_inp_mem_ptr:meta_buffer_hdr);
if (nBufferIndex > m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: ETB: Invalid buffer index[%d]", nBufferIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
m_etb_count++;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG: i/p nTimestamp = %u", (unsigned)buffer->nTimeStamp);
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,m_input_msg_id);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 venc component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27903498.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27903498
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem #3)
CRs-Fixed: 1010088
Change-Id: I898b42034c0add621d4f9d8e02ca0ed4403d4fd3
| Low | 173,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Show(remoting::ChromotingHost* host,
const std::string& username) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to display box rendering.
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
int i, snapshot_index;
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int new_l1_bytes;
int ret;
assert(bs->read_only);
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"Can't find snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = &s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Allocate and read in the snapshot's L1 table */
new_l1_bytes = s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_bytes, 512));
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, sn->l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_bytes);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Failed to read l1 table for snapshot");
g_free(new_l1_table);
return ret;
}
/* Switch the L1 table */
g_free(s->l1_table);
s->l1_size = sn->l1_size;
s->l1_table_offset = sn->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
for(i = 0;i < s->l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&s->l1_table[i]);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in QEMU before 1.7.2 and 2.x before 2.0.0, allow local users to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a large (1) L1 table in the qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp in the QCOW 2 block driver (block/qcow2-snapshot.c) or (2) uncompressed chunk, (3) chunk length, or (4) number of sectors in the DMG block driver (block/dmg.c).
Commit Message: | Low | 165,402 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: de_dotdot( char* file )
{
char* cp;
char* cp2;
int l;
/* Collapse any multiple / sequences. */
while ( ( cp = strstr( file, "//") ) != (char*) 0 )
{
for ( cp2 = cp + 2; *cp2 == '/'; ++cp2 )
continue;
(void) strcpy( cp + 1, cp2 );
}
/* Remove leading ./ and any /./ sequences. */
while ( strncmp( file, "./", 2 ) == 0 )
(void) memmove( file, file + 2, strlen( file ) - 1 );
while ( ( cp = strstr( file, "/./") ) != (char*) 0 )
(void) memmove( cp, cp + 2, strlen( file ) - 1 );
/* Alternate between removing leading ../ and removing xxx/../ */
for (;;)
{
while ( strncmp( file, "../", 3 ) == 0 )
(void) memmove( file, file + 3, strlen( file ) - 2 );
cp = strstr( file, "/../" );
if ( cp == (char*) 0 )
break;
for ( cp2 = cp - 1; cp2 >= file && *cp2 != '/'; --cp2 )
continue;
(void) strcpy( cp2 + 1, cp + 4 );
}
/* Also elide any xxx/.. at the end. */
while ( ( l = strlen( file ) ) > 3 &&
strcmp( ( cp = file + l - 3 ), "/.." ) == 0 )
{
for ( cp2 = cp - 1; cp2 >= file && *cp2 != '/'; --cp2 )
continue;
if ( cp2 < file )
break;
*cp2 = '\0';
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based Buffer Overflow in the de_dotdot function in libhttpd.c in sthttpd before 2.27.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted filename.
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot | Medium | 168,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AcpiNsEvaluate (
ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO *Info)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsEvaluate);
if (!Info)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PARAMETER);
}
if (!Info->Node)
{
/*
* Get the actual namespace node for the target object if we
* need to. Handles these cases:
*
* 1) Null node, valid pathname from root (absolute path)
* 2) Node and valid pathname (path relative to Node)
* 3) Node, Null pathname
*/
Status = AcpiNsGetNode (Info->PrefixNode, Info->RelativePathname,
ACPI_NS_NO_UPSEARCH, &Info->Node);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
/*
* For a method alias, we must grab the actual method node so that
* proper scoping context will be established before execution.
*/
if (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node) == ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_METHOD_ALIAS)
{
Info->Node = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, Info->Node->Object);
}
/* Complete the info block initialization */
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
Info->NodeFlags = Info->Node->Flags;
Info->ObjDesc = AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "%s [%p] Value %p\n",
Info->RelativePathname, Info->Node,
AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node)));
/* Get info if we have a predefined name (_HID, etc.) */
Info->Predefined = AcpiUtMatchPredefinedMethod (Info->Node->Name.Ascii);
/* Get the full pathname to the object, for use in warning messages */
Info->FullPathname = AcpiNsGetNormalizedPathname (Info->Node, TRUE);
if (!Info->FullPathname)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
/* Count the number of arguments being passed in */
Info->ParamCount = 0;
if (Info->Parameters)
{
while (Info->Parameters[Info->ParamCount])
{
Info->ParamCount++;
}
/* Warn on impossible argument count */
if (Info->ParamCount > ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS)
{
ACPI_WARN_PREDEFINED ((AE_INFO, Info->FullPathname, ACPI_WARN_ALWAYS,
"Excess arguments (%u) - using only %u",
Info->ParamCount, ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS));
Info->ParamCount = ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS;
}
}
/*
* For predefined names: Check that the declared argument count
* matches the ACPI spec -- otherwise this is a BIOS error.
*/
AcpiNsCheckAcpiCompliance (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->Predefined);
/*
* For all names: Check that the incoming argument count for
* this method/object matches the actual ASL/AML definition.
*/
AcpiNsCheckArgumentCount (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->ParamCount, Info->Predefined);
/* For predefined names: Typecheck all incoming arguments */
AcpiNsCheckArgumentTypes (Info);
/*
* Three major evaluation cases:
*
* 1) Object types that cannot be evaluated by definition
* 2) The object is a control method -- execute it
* 3) The object is not a method -- just return it's current value
*/
switch (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node))
{
case ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE:
case ACPI_TYPE_EVENT:
case ACPI_TYPE_MUTEX:
case ACPI_TYPE_REGION:
case ACPI_TYPE_THERMAL:
case ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_SCOPE:
/*
* 1) Disallow evaluation of certain object types. For these,
* object evaluation is undefined and not supported.
*/
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO,
"%s: Evaluation of object type [%s] is not supported",
Info->FullPathname,
AcpiUtGetTypeName (Info->Node->Type)));
Status = AE_TYPE;
goto Cleanup;
case ACPI_TYPE_METHOD:
/*
* 2) Object is a control method - execute it
*/
/* Verify that there is a method object associated with this node */
if (!Info->ObjDesc)
{
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO, "%s: Method has no attached sub-object",
Info->FullPathname));
Status = AE_NULL_OBJECT;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC,
"**** Execute method [%s] at AML address %p length %X\n",
Info->FullPathname,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlStart + 1,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlLength - 1));
/*
* Any namespace deletion must acquire both the namespace and
* interpreter locks to ensure that no thread is using the portion of
* the namespace that is being deleted.
*
* Execute the method via the interpreter. The interpreter is locked
* here before calling into the AML parser
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
Status = AcpiPsExecuteMethod (Info);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
break;
default:
/*
* 3) All other non-method objects -- get the current object value
*/
/*
* Some objects require additional resolution steps (e.g., the Node
* may be a field that must be read, etc.) -- we can't just grab
* the object out of the node.
*
* Use ResolveNodeToValue() to get the associated value.
*
* NOTE: we can get away with passing in NULL for a walk state because
* the Node is guaranteed to not be a reference to either a method
* local or a method argument (because this interface is never called
* from a running method.)
*
* Even though we do not directly invoke the interpreter for object
* resolution, we must lock it because we could access an OpRegion.
* The OpRegion access code assumes that the interpreter is locked.
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
/* TBD: ResolveNodeToValue has a strange interface, fix */
Info->ReturnObject = ACPI_CAST_PTR (ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, Info->Node);
Status = AcpiExResolveNodeToValue (ACPI_CAST_INDIRECT_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, &Info->ReturnObject), NULL);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "Returned object %p [%s]\n",
Info->ReturnObject,
AcpiUtGetObjectTypeName (Info->ReturnObject)));
Status = AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE; /* Always has a "return value" */
break;
}
/*
* For predefined names, check the return value against the ACPI
* specification. Some incorrect return value types are repaired.
*/
(void) AcpiNsCheckReturnValue (Info->Node, Info, Info->ParamCount,
Status, &Info->ReturnObject);
/* Check if there is a return value that must be dealt with */
if (Status == AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE)
{
/* If caller does not want the return value, delete it */
if (Info->Flags & ACPI_IGNORE_RETURN_VALUE)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Info->ReturnObject);
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
}
/* Map AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE to AE_OK, we are done with it */
Status = AE_OK;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES,
"*** Completed evaluation of object %s ***\n",
Info->RelativePathname));
Cleanup:
/*
* Namespace was unlocked by the handling AcpiNs* function, so we
* just free the pathname and return
*/
ACPI_FREE (Info->FullPathname);
Info->FullPathname = NULL;
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The acpi_ns_evaluate() function in drivers/acpi/acpica/nseval.c in the Linux kernel through 4.12.9 does not flush the operand cache and causes a kernel stack dump, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism (in the kernel through 4.9) via a crafted ACPI table.
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in nseval.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.464168] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.467022] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.469376] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.471647] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.477997] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.482706] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.487503] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.492136] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB._INI] (Node ffff88021710a618), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.497683] ACPI: Interpreter enabled
>[ 0.499385] ACPI: (supports S0)
>[ 0.501151] ACPI: Using IOAPIC for interrupt routing
>[ 0.503342] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.506522] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.510463] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.514477] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_PIC] (Node ffff88021710ab18), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.518867] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, Evaluating _PIC (20170303/bus-991)
>[ 0.522384] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.524597] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.526795] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.529668] Call Trace:
>[ 0.530811] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.532240] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.533905] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.535497] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.537237] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.538701] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.540008] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.541593] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.543008] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.546202] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.547513] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.548817] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.550587] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.551716] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.553744] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.555038] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found AcpiNsEvaluate() function
only removes Info->ReturnObject in AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE case. But, when errors
occur, the status value is not AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE, and Info->ReturnObject is
also not null. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]> | Low | 167,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void emulate_load_store_insn(struct pt_regs *regs,
void __user *addr, unsigned int __user *pc)
{
union mips_instruction insn;
unsigned long value;
unsigned int res;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
/*
* This load never faults.
*/
__get_user(insn.word, pc);
switch (insn.i_format.opcode) {
/*
* These are instructions that a compiler doesn't generate. We
* can assume therefore that the code is MIPS-aware and
* really buggy. Emulating these instructions would break the
* semantics anyway.
*/
case ll_op:
case lld_op:
case sc_op:
case scd_op:
/*
* For these instructions the only way to create an address
* error is an attempted access to kernel/supervisor address
* space.
*/
case ldl_op:
case ldr_op:
case lwl_op:
case lwr_op:
case sdl_op:
case sdr_op:
case swl_op:
case swr_op:
case lb_op:
case lbu_op:
case sb_op:
goto sigbus;
/*
* The remaining opcodes are the ones that are really of interest.
*/
case lh_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (".set\tnoat\n"
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlb\t%0, 0(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlb\t%0, 1(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
#endif
"sll\t%0, 0x8\n\t"
"or\t%0, $1\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.set\tat\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lw_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lhu_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
".set\tnoat\n"
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlbu\t%0, 0(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlbu\t%0, 1(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
#endif
"sll\t%0, 0x8\n\t"
"or\t%0, $1\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.set\tat\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lwu_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"dsll\t%0, %0, 32\n\t"
"dsrl\t%0, %0, 32\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case ld_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 8))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tldl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tldr\t%0, 7(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tldl\t%0, 7(%2)\n"
"2:\tldr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case sh_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
".set\tnoat\n"
"1:\tsb\t%1, 1(%2)\n\t"
"srl\t$1, %1, 0x8\n"
"2:\tsb\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
".set\tat\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
".set\tnoat\n"
"1:\tsb\t%1, 0(%2)\n\t"
"srl\t$1,%1, 0x8\n"
"2:\tsb\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
".set\tat\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
case sw_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tswl\t%1,(%2)\n"
"2:\tswr\t%1, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tswl\t%1, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tswr\t%1, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
case sd_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 8))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tsdl\t%1,(%2)\n"
"2:\tsdr\t%1, 7(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tsdl\t%1, 7(%2)\n"
"2:\tsdr\t%1, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case lwc1_op:
case ldc1_op:
case swc1_op:
case sdc1_op:
/*
* I herewith declare: this does not happen. So send SIGBUS.
*/
goto sigbus;
/*
* COP2 is available to implementor for application specific use.
* It's up to applications to register a notifier chain and do
* whatever they have to do, including possible sending of signals.
*/
case lwc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_LWC2_OP, regs);
break;
case ldc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_LDC2_OP, regs);
break;
case swc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_SWC2_OP, regs);
break;
case sdc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_SDC2_OP, regs);
break;
default:
/*
* Pheeee... We encountered an yet unknown instruction or
* cache coherence problem. Die sucker, die ...
*/
goto sigill;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
unaligned_instructions++;
#endif
return;
fault:
/* Did we have an exception handler installed? */
if (fixup_exception(regs))
return;
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access", regs);
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
return;
sigbus:
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access", regs);
force_sig(SIGBUS, current);
return;
sigill:
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access or invalid instruction", regs);
force_sig(SIGILL, current);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Low | 165,785 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AcpiNsTerminate (
void)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsTerminate);
#ifdef ACPI_EXEC_APP
{
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *Prev;
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *Next;
/* Delete any module-level code blocks */
Next = AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList;
while (Next)
{
Prev = Next;
Next = Next->Method.Mutex;
Prev->Method.Mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Prev);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Free the entire namespace -- all nodes and all objects
* attached to the nodes
*/
AcpiNsDeleteNamespaceSubtree (AcpiGbl_RootNode);
/* Delete any objects attached to the root node */
Status = AcpiUtAcquireMutex (ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_VOID;
}
AcpiNsDeleteNode (AcpiGbl_RootNode);
(void) AcpiUtReleaseMutex (ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_INFO, "Namespace freed\n"));
return_VOID;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass +Info
CWE ID: CWE-755
Summary: The acpi_ns_terminate() function in drivers/acpi/acpica/nsutils.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12 does not flush the operand cache and causes a kernel stack dump, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory and bypass the KASLR protection mechanism (in the kernel through 4.9) via a crafted ACPI table.
Commit Message: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling AcpiTerminate() function. The function calls
AcpiNsTerminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList).
But the deletion code in AcpiNsTerminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in AcpiNsTerminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <[email protected]> | Low | 170,039 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = ssd->bufsize;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The VGA emulator in QEMU allows local guest users to read host memory by setting the display to a high resolution.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, *slot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = check_memory_region_flags(mem);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if (user_alloc &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr,
mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = id_to_memslot(kvm->memslots, mem->slot);
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/*
* Disallow changing a memory slot's size or changing anything about
* zero sized slots that doesn't involve making them non-zero.
*/
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
if (!npages && !old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, kvm->memslots) {
if (slot->id >= KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS || slot == memslot)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= slot->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= slot->base_gfn + slot->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/*
* Allocate if a slot is being created. If modifying a slot,
* the userspace_addr cannot change.
*/
if (!old.npages) {
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
if (kvm_arch_create_memslot(&new, npages))
goto out_free;
} else if (npages && mem->userspace_addr != old.userspace_addr) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
if (!npages || base_gfn != old.base_gfn) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
slot = id_to_memslot(slots, mem->slot);
slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
update_memslots(slots, NULL);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted,
* or moved, memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(kvm, slot);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map/unmap the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
} else
kvm_iommu_unmap_pages(kvm, &old);
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kmemdup(kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
memset(&new.arch, 0, sizeof(new.arch));
}
update_memslots(slots, &new);
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the __kvm_set_memory_region function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by leveraging certain device access to trigger movement of memory slots.
Commit Message: KVM: Fix iommu map/unmap to handle memory slot moves
The iommu integration into memory slots expects memory slots to be
added or removed and doesn't handle the move case. We can unmap
slots from the iommu after we mark them invalid and map them before
installing the final memslot array. Also re-order the kmemdup vs
map so we don't leave iommu mappings if we get ENOMEM.
Reviewed-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> | High | 169,892 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SocketStream::Connect() {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
if (context_.get()) {
context_->ssl_config_service()->GetSSLConfig(&server_ssl_config_);
proxy_ssl_config_ = server_ssl_config_;
}
CheckPrivacyMode();
DCHECK_EQ(next_state_, STATE_NONE);
AddRef(); // Released in Finish()
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT;
net_log_.BeginEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_CONNECT,
NetLog::StringCallback("url", &url_.possibly_invalid_spec()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoLoop, this, OK));
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote servers to execute arbitrary code via crafted response traffic after a URL request.
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,252 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: store_pool_delete(png_store *ps, store_pool *pool)
{
if (pool->list != NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s %s: memory lost (list follows):\n", ps->test,
pool == &ps->read_memory_pool ? "read" : "write",
pool == &ps->read_memory_pool ? (ps->current != NULL ?
ps->current->name : "unknown file") : ps->wname);
++ps->nerrors;
do
{
store_memory *next = pool->list;
pool->list = next->next;
next->next = NULL;
fprintf(stderr, "\t%lu bytes @ %p\n",
(unsigned long)next->size, (PNG_CONST void*)(next+1));
/* The NULL means this will always return, even if the memory is
* corrupted.
*/
store_memory_free(NULL, pool, next);
}
while (pool->list != NULL);
}
/* And reset the other fields too for the next time. */
if (pool->max > pool->max_max) pool->max_max = pool->max;
pool->max = 0;
if (pool->current != 0) /* unexpected internal error */
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s %s: memory counter mismatch (internal error)\n",
ps->test, pool == &ps->read_memory_pool ? "read" : "write",
pool == &ps->read_memory_pool ? (ps->current != NULL ?
ps->current->name : "unknown file") : ps->wname);
pool->current = 0;
if (pool->limit > pool->max_limit)
pool->max_limit = pool->limit;
pool->limit = 0;
if (pool->total > pool->max_total)
pool->max_total = pool->total;
pool->total = 0;
/* Get a new mark too. */
store_pool_mark(pool->mark);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| Low | 173,707 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::networkError()
{
genericError();
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().errorEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().errorEvent));
internalAbort();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in core/xml/XMLHttpRequest.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger multiple conflicting uses of the same XMLHttpRequest object.
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static ssize_t bat_socket_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct socket_client *socket_client = file->private_data;
struct socket_packet *socket_packet;
size_t packet_len;
int error;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && (socket_client->queue_len == 0))
return -EAGAIN;
if ((!buf) || (count < sizeof(struct icmp_packet)))
return -EINVAL;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
error = wait_event_interruptible(socket_client->queue_wait,
socket_client->queue_len);
if (error)
return error;
spin_lock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
socket_packet = list_first_entry(&socket_client->queue_list,
struct socket_packet, list);
list_del(&socket_packet->list);
socket_client->queue_len--;
spin_unlock_bh(&socket_client->lock);
error = copy_to_user(buf, &socket_packet->icmp_packet,
socket_packet->icmp_len);
packet_len = socket_packet->icmp_len;
kfree(socket_packet);
if (error)
return -EFAULT;
return packet_len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The bat_socket_read function in net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted batman-adv ICMP packet.
Commit Message: batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,207 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetConnection(
void* language_library,
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed,
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties,
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property,
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_change_handler) {
DCHECK(language_library);
DCHECK(current_input_method_changed),
DCHECK(register_ime_properties);
DCHECK(update_ime_property);
InputMethodStatusConnection* object = GetInstance();
if (!object->language_library_) {
object->language_library_ = language_library;
object->current_input_method_changed_ = current_input_method_changed;
object->register_ime_properties_= register_ime_properties;
object->update_ime_property_ = update_ime_property;
object->connection_change_handler_ = connection_change_handler;
object->MaybeRestoreConnections();
} else if (object->language_library_ != language_library) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown language_library is passed";
}
return object;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
if (FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
break ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In libsndfile before 1.0.28, an error in the *flac_buffer_copy()* function (flac.c) can be exploited to cause a segmentation violation (with read memory access) via a specially crafted FLAC file during a resample attempt, a similar issue to CVE-2017-7585.
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files. | Medium | 168,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
{
BN_ULONG t1,t2;
BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
c1=0;
c2=0;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
r[0]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
r[1]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
r[2]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
r[3]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,4,0,c2,c3,c1);
r[4]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,5,0,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,4,1,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
r[5]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,4,2,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,5,1,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,6,0,c1,c2,c3);
r[6]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,7,0,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,6,1,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,5,2,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,4,3,c2,c3,c1);
r[7]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c(a,4,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,5,3,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,6,2,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,7,1,c3,c1,c2);
r[8]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,7,2,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,6,3,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,5,4,c1,c2,c3);
r[9]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c(a,5,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,6,4,c2,c3,c1);
sqr_add_c2(a,7,3,c2,c3,c1);
r[10]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,7,4,c3,c1,c2);
sqr_add_c2(a,6,5,c3,c1,c2);
r[11]=c3;
c3=0;
sqr_add_c(a,6,c1,c2,c3);
sqr_add_c2(a,7,5,c1,c2,c3);
r[12]=c1;
c1=0;
sqr_add_c2(a,7,6,c2,c3,c1);
r[13]=c2;
c2=0;
sqr_add_c(a,7,c3,c1,c2);
r[14]=c3;
r[15]=c1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The BN_sqr implementation in OpenSSL before 0.9.8zd, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k does not properly calculate the square of a BIGNUM value, which might make it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via unspecified vectors, related to crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl, crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c, and crypto/bn/bn_asm.c.
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <[email protected]> | Low | 166,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakOrEnqueue(Utterance* utterance) {
if (IsSpeaking() && utterance->can_enqueue()) {
utterance_queue_.push(utterance);
} else {
Stop();
SpeakNow(utterance);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: INT_PTR CALLBACK NewVersionCallback(HWND hDlg, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
char cmdline[] = APPLICATION_NAME " -w 150";
static char* filepath = NULL;
static int download_status = 0;
LONG i;
HWND hNotes;
STARTUPINFOA si;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
HFONT hyperlink_font = NULL;
EXT_DECL(dl_ext, NULL, __VA_GROUP__("*.exe"), __VA_GROUP__(lmprintf(MSG_037)));
switch (message) {
case WM_INITDIALOG:
apply_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION, hDlg);
download_status = 0;
SetTitleBarIcon(hDlg);
CenterDialog(hDlg);
update_original_proc = (WNDPROC)SetWindowLongPtr(hDlg, GWLP_WNDPROC, (LONG_PTR)update_subclass_callback);
hNotes = GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_RELEASE_NOTES);
SendMessage(hNotes, EM_AUTOURLDETECT, 1, 0);
SendMessageA(hNotes, EM_SETTEXTEX, (WPARAM)&friggin_microsoft_unicode_amateurs, (LPARAM)update.release_notes);
SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETSEL, -1, -1);
SendMessage(hNotes, EM_SETEVENTMASK, 0, ENM_LINK);
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_YOUR_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_018,
rufus_version[0], rufus_version[1], rufus_version[2]));
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_LATEST_VERSION), lmprintf(MSG_019,
update.version[0], update.version[1], update.version[2]));
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD_URL), update.download_url);
SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_PROGRESS), PBM_SETRANGE, 0, (MAX_PROGRESS<<16) & 0xFFFF0000);
if (update.download_url == NULL)
EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), FALSE);
break;
case WM_CTLCOLORSTATIC:
if ((HWND)lParam != GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_WEBSITE))
return FALSE;
SetBkMode((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT);
CreateStaticFont((HDC)wParam, &hyperlink_font);
SelectObject((HDC)wParam, hyperlink_font);
SetTextColor((HDC)wParam, RGB(0,0,125)); // DARK_BLUE
return (INT_PTR)CreateSolidBrush(GetSysColor(COLOR_BTNFACE));
case WM_COMMAND:
switch (LOWORD(wParam)) {
case IDCLOSE:
case IDCANCEL:
if (download_status != 1) {
reset_localization(IDD_NEW_VERSION);
safe_free(filepath);
EndDialog(hDlg, LOWORD(wParam));
}
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
case IDC_WEBSITE:
ShellExecuteA(hDlg, "open", RUFUS_URL, NULL, NULL, SW_SHOWNORMAL);
break;
case IDC_DOWNLOAD: // Also doubles as abort and launch function
switch(download_status) {
case 1: // Abort
FormatStatus = ERROR_SEVERITY_ERROR|FAC(FACILITY_STORAGE)|ERROR_CANCELLED;
download_status = 0;
break;
case 2: // Launch newer version and close this one
Sleep(1000); // Add a delay on account of antivirus scanners
if (ValidateSignature(hDlg, filepath) != NO_ERROR)
break;
memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si));
memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi));
si.cb = sizeof(si);
if (!CreateProcessU(filepath, cmdline, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) {
PrintInfo(0, MSG_214);
uprintf("Failed to launch new application: %s\n", WindowsErrorString());
} else {
PrintInfo(0, MSG_213);
PostMessage(hDlg, WM_COMMAND, (WPARAM)IDCLOSE, 0);
PostMessage(hMainDialog, WM_CLOSE, 0, 0);
}
break;
default: // Download
if (update.download_url == NULL) {
uprintf("Could not get download URL\n");
break;
}
for (i=(int)strlen(update.download_url); (i>0)&&(update.download_url[i]!='/'); i--);
dl_ext.filename = &update.download_url[i+1];
filepath = FileDialog(TRUE, app_dir, &dl_ext, OFN_NOCHANGEDIR);
if (filepath == NULL) {
uprintf("Could not get save path\n");
break;
}
SendMessage(hDlg, WM_NEXTDLGCTL, (WPARAM)GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), TRUE);
DownloadFileThreaded(update.download_url, filepath, hDlg);
break;
}
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
}
break;
case UM_PROGRESS_INIT:
EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), FALSE);
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_038));
FormatStatus = 0;
download_status = 1;
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
case UM_PROGRESS_EXIT:
EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDCANCEL), TRUE);
if (wParam) {
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_039));
download_status = 2;
} else {
SetWindowTextU(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD), lmprintf(MSG_040));
download_status = 0;
}
return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
}
return (INT_PTR)FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-494
Summary: Akeo Consulting Rufus prior to version 2.17.1187 does not adequately validate the integrity of updates downloaded over HTTP, allowing an attacker to easily convince a user to execute arbitrary code
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately. | Medium | 167,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: DeviceRequest(
int requesting_process_id,
int requesting_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
bool user_gesture,
MediaStreamRequestType request_type,
const StreamControls& controls,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin,
DeviceStoppedCallback device_stopped_cb = DeviceStoppedCallback())
: requesting_process_id(requesting_process_id),
requesting_frame_id(requesting_frame_id),
page_request_id(page_request_id),
user_gesture(user_gesture),
controls(controls),
salt_and_origin(std::move(salt_and_origin)),
device_stopped_cb(std::move(device_stopped_cb)),
state_(NUM_MEDIA_TYPES, MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_NOT_REQUESTED),
request_type_(request_type),
audio_type_(MEDIA_NO_SERVICE),
video_type_(MEDIA_NO_SERVICE),
target_process_id_(-1),
target_frame_id_(-1) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 173,102 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool blk_kick_flush(struct request_queue *q, struct blk_flush_queue *fq)
{
struct list_head *pending = &fq->flush_queue[fq->flush_pending_idx];
struct request *first_rq =
list_first_entry(pending, struct request, flush.list);
struct request *flush_rq = fq->flush_rq;
/* C1 described at the top of this file */
if (fq->flush_pending_idx != fq->flush_running_idx || list_empty(pending))
return false;
/* C2 and C3 */
if (!list_empty(&fq->flush_data_in_flight) &&
time_before(jiffies,
fq->flush_pending_since + FLUSH_PENDING_TIMEOUT))
return false;
/*
* Issue flush and toggle pending_idx. This makes pending_idx
* different from running_idx, which means flush is in flight.
*/
fq->flush_pending_idx ^= 1;
blk_rq_init(q, flush_rq);
/*
* Borrow tag from the first request since they can't
* be in flight at the same time.
*/
if (q->mq_ops) {
flush_rq->mq_ctx = first_rq->mq_ctx;
flush_rq->tag = first_rq->tag;
}
flush_rq->cmd_type = REQ_TYPE_FS;
flush_rq->cmd_flags = WRITE_FLUSH | REQ_FLUSH_SEQ;
flush_rq->rq_disk = first_rq->rq_disk;
flush_rq->end_io = flush_end_io;
return blk_flush_queue_rq(flush_rq, false);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In blk_mq_tag_to_rq in blk-mq.c in the upstream kernel, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition when a request has been previously freed by blk_mq_complete_request. This could lead to local escalation of privilege. Product: Android. Versions: Android kernel. Android ID: A-63083046.
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void umount_tree(struct mount *mnt, enum umount_tree_flags how)
{
LIST_HEAD(tmp_list);
struct mount *p;
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_mount_unlock(mnt);
/* Gather the mounts to umount */
for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt)) {
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
list_move(&p->mnt_list, &tmp_list);
}
/* Hide the mounts from mnt_mounts */
list_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_list) {
list_del_init(&p->mnt_child);
}
/* Add propogated mounts to the tmp_list */
if (how & UMOUNT_PROPAGATE)
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
while (!list_empty(&tmp_list)) {
bool disconnect;
p = list_first_entry(&tmp_list, struct mount, mnt_list);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
__touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
disconnect = !IS_MNT_LOCKED_AND_LAZY(p);
pin_insert_group(&p->mnt_umount, &p->mnt_parent->mnt,
disconnect ? &unmounted : NULL);
if (mnt_has_parent(p)) {
mnt_add_count(p->mnt_parent, -1);
if (!disconnect) {
/* Don't forget about p */
list_add_tail(&p->mnt_child, &p->mnt_parent->mnt_mounts);
} else {
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
change_mnt_propagation(p, MS_PRIVATE);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.2 does not properly support mount connectivity, which allows local users to read arbitrary files by leveraging user-namespace root access for deletion of a file or directory.
Commit Message: mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and
leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag
UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use
this flag in detach_mounts.
This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could
trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Low | 167,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: write_header( FT_Error error_code )
{
FT_Face face;
const char* basename;
error = FTC_Manager_LookupFace( handle->cache_manager,
handle->scaler.face_id, &face );
if ( error )
PanicZ( "can't access font file" );
if ( !status.header )
{
basename = ft_basename( handle->current_font->filepathname );
switch ( error_code )
{
case FT_Err_Ok:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "%s %s (file `%s')", face->family_name,
face->style_name, basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_Pixel_Size:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid pixel size (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
case FT_Err_Invalid_PPem:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "Invalid ppem value (file `%s')",
basename );
break;
default:
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "File `%s': error 0x%04x", basename,
(FT_UShort)error_code );
break;
}
status.header = status.header_buffer;
}
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, 0,
status.header, display->fore_color );
sprintf( status.header_buffer, "at %g points, angle = %d",
status.ptsize/64.0, status.angle );
grWriteCellString( display->bitmap, 0, CELLSTRING_HEIGHT,
status.header_buffer, display->fore_color );
grRefreshSurface( display->surface );
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in demo programs in FreeType before 2.4.0 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted font file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector_chain(const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_sat_t *ssat, const cdf_stream_t *sst,
cdf_secid_t sid, size_t len, cdf_stream_t *scn)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h), i, j;
scn->sst_len = cdf_count_chain(ssat, sid, CDF_SEC_SIZE(h));
scn->sst_dirlen = len;
if (sst->sst_tab == NULL || scn->sst_len == (size_t)-1)
return -1;
scn->sst_tab = calloc(scn->sst_len, ss);
if (scn->sst_tab == NULL)
return -1;
for (j = i = 0; sid >= 0; i++, j++) {
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Read short sector chain loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
if (i >= scn->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds reading short sector chain "
"%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
i, scn->sst_len));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
if (cdf_read_short_sector(sst, scn->sst_tab, i * ss, ss, h,
sid) != (ssize_t)ss) {
DPRINTF(("Reading short sector chain %d", sid));
goto out;
}
sid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)ssat->sat_tab[sid]);
}
return 0;
out:
free(scn->sst_tab);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: file before 5.11 and libmagic allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted Composite Document File (CDF) file that triggers (1) an out-of-bounds read or (2) an invalid pointer dereference.
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again. | Medium | 165,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int c;
unsigned long flags = MS_MANDLOCK;
char * orgoptions = NULL;
char * share_name = NULL;
const char * ipaddr = NULL;
char * uuid = NULL;
char * mountpoint = NULL;
char * options = NULL;
char * optionstail;
char * resolved_path = NULL;
char * temp;
char * dev_name;
int rc = 0;
int rsize = 0;
int wsize = 0;
int nomtab = 0;
int uid = 0;
int gid = 0;
int optlen = 0;
int orgoptlen = 0;
size_t options_size = 0;
size_t current_len;
int retry = 0; /* set when we have to retry mount with uppercase */
struct addrinfo *addrhead = NULL, *addr;
struct utsname sysinfo;
struct mntent mountent;
struct sockaddr_in *addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
FILE * pmntfile;
/* setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE); */
if(argc && argv)
thisprogram = argv[0];
else
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
if(thisprogram == NULL)
thisprogram = "mount.cifs";
uname(&sysinfo);
/* BB add workstation name and domain and pass down */
/* #ifdef _GNU_SOURCE
fprintf(stderr, " node: %s machine: %s sysname %s domain %s\n", sysinfo.nodename,sysinfo.machine,sysinfo.sysname,sysinfo.domainname);
#endif */
if(argc > 2) {
dev_name = argv[1];
share_name = strndup(argv[1], MAX_UNC_LEN);
if (share_name == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s", argv[0], strerror(ENOMEM));
exit(EX_SYSERR);
}
mountpoint = argv[2];
} else if (argc == 2) {
if ((strcmp(argv[1], "-V") == 0) ||
(strcmp(argv[1], "--version") == 0))
{
print_cifs_mount_version();
exit(0);
}
if ((strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0) ||
(strcmp(argv[1], "-?") == 0) ||
(strcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0))
mount_cifs_usage(stdout);
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
} else {
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
}
/* add sharename in opts string as unc= parm */
while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "afFhilL:no:O:rsSU:vVwt:",
longopts, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
/* No code to do the following options yet */
/* case 'l':
list_with_volumelabel = 1;
break;
case 'L':
volumelabel = optarg;
break; */
/* case 'a':
++mount_all;
break; */
case '?':
case 'h': /* help */
mount_cifs_usage(stdout);
case 'n':
++nomtab;
break;
case 'b':
#ifdef MS_BIND
flags |= MS_BIND;
#else
fprintf(stderr,
"option 'b' (MS_BIND) not supported\n");
#endif
break;
case 'm':
#ifdef MS_MOVE
flags |= MS_MOVE;
#else
fprintf(stderr,
"option 'm' (MS_MOVE) not supported\n");
#endif
break;
case 'o':
orgoptions = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'r': /* mount readonly */
flags |= MS_RDONLY;
break;
case 'U':
uuid = optarg;
break;
case 'v':
++verboseflag;
break;
case 'V':
print_cifs_mount_version();
exit (0);
case 'w':
flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
break;
case 'R':
rsize = atoi(optarg) ;
break;
case 'W':
wsize = atoi(optarg);
break;
case '1':
if (isdigit(*optarg)) {
char *ep;
uid = strtoul(optarg, &ep, 10);
if (*ep) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad uid value \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
} else {
struct passwd *pw;
if (!(pw = getpwnam(optarg))) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad user name \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
uid = pw->pw_uid;
endpwent();
}
break;
case '2':
if (isdigit(*optarg)) {
char *ep;
gid = strtoul(optarg, &ep, 10);
if (*ep) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad gid value \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
} else {
struct group *gr;
if (!(gr = getgrnam(optarg))) {
fprintf(stderr, "bad user name \"%s\"\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
gid = gr->gr_gid;
endpwent();
}
break;
case 'u':
got_user = 1;
user_name = optarg;
break;
case 'd':
domain_name = optarg; /* BB fix this - currently ignored */
got_domain = 1;
break;
case 'p':
if(mountpassword == NULL)
mountpassword = (char *)calloc(MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1,1);
if(mountpassword) {
got_password = 1;
strlcpy(mountpassword,optarg,MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE+1);
}
break;
case 'S':
get_password_from_file(0 /* stdin */,NULL);
break;
case 't':
break;
case 'f':
++fakemnt;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unknown mount option %c\n",c);
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
}
}
if((argc < 3) || (dev_name == NULL) || (mountpoint == NULL)) {
mount_cifs_usage(stderr);
}
/* make sure mountpoint is legit */
rc = check_mountpoint(thisprogram, mountpoint);
if (rc)
goto mount_exit;
/* enable any default user mount flags */
flags |= CIFS_SETUID_FLAGS;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: client/mount.cifs.c in mount.cifs in smbfs in Samba 3.0.22, 3.0.28a, 3.2.3, 3.3.2, 3.4.0, and 3.4.5 allows local users to mount a CIFS share on an arbitrary mountpoint, and gain privileges, via a symlink attack on the mountpoint directory file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct l2tp_ip6_sock *lsk = l2tp_ip6_sk(sk);
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
if (peer) {
if (!lsk->peer_conn_id)
return -ENOTCONN;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->peer_conn_id;
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->daddr;
if (np->sndflow)
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = np->flow_label;
} else {
if (ipv6_addr_any(&np->rcv_saddr))
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->saddr;
else
lsa->l2tp_addr = np->rcv_saddr;
lsa->l2tp_conn_id = lsk->conn_id;
}
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
*uaddr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The l2tp_ip6_getname function in net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_unused member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via
the getsockname() syscall. Initialize l2tp_unused with 0 to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: James Chapman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline void sem_getref(struct sem_array *sma)
{
spin_lock(&(sma)->sem_perm.lock);
ipc_rcu_getref(sma);
ipc_unlock(&(sma)->sem_perm);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Low | 165,973 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Decode(
const media::BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kNormal || state_ == kStopped),
"Invalid state: " << state_, ILLEGAL_STATE,);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFSample> sample;
sample.Attach(CreateSampleFromInputBuffer(bitstream_buffer,
renderer_process_,
input_stream_info_.cbSize,
input_stream_info_.cbAlignment));
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(sample, "Failed to create input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
if (!inputs_before_decode_) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator.Decoding", this, "");
}
inputs_before_decode_++;
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_START_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to create input sample", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
HRESULT hr = decoder_->ProcessInput(0, sample, 0);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to process input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_END_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to send eos message to MFT", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
state_ = kEosDrain;
last_input_buffer_id_ = bitstream_buffer.id();
DoDecode();
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kStopped || state_ == kNormal),
"Failed to process output. Unexpected decoder state: " << state_,
ILLEGAL_STATE,);
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyInputBufferRead, this,
bitstream_buffer.id()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,941 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool DataReductionProxyConfig::ShouldAddDefaultProxyBypassRules() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Lack of special casing of localhost in WPAD files in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed an attacker on the local network segment to proxy resources on localhost via a crafted WPAD file.
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112} | Medium | 172,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadSVGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
int
status,
unique_file;
ssize_t
n;
SVGInfo
*svg_info;
unsigned char
message[MaxTextExtent];
xmlSAXHandler
sax_modules;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr
sax_handler;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((image->x_resolution < MagickEpsilon) ||
(image->y_resolution < MagickEpsilon))
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
int
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(SVGDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MSVG") != 0)
{
const DelegateInfo
*delegate_info;
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("svg:decode",(char *) NULL,exception);
if (delegate_info != (const DelegateInfo *) NULL)
{
char
background[MaxTextExtent],
command[MaxTextExtent],
density[MaxTextExtent],
input_filename[MaxTextExtent],
opacity[MaxTextExtent],
output_filename[MaxTextExtent],
unique[MaxTextExtent];
int
status;
struct stat
attributes;
/*
Our best hope for compliance to the SVG standard.
*/
status=AcquireUniqueSymbolicLink(image->filename,input_filename);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(output_filename);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(unique);
(void) FormatLocaleString(density,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g,%.20g",
image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution);
(void) FormatLocaleString(background,MaxTextExtent,
"rgb(%.20g%%,%.20g%%,%.20g%%)",
100.0*QuantumScale*image->background_color.red,
100.0*QuantumScale*image->background_color.green,
100.0*QuantumScale*image->background_color.blue);
(void) FormatLocaleString(opacity,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",QuantumScale*
(QuantumRange-image->background_color.opacity));
(void) FormatLocaleString(command,MaxTextExtent,GetDelegateCommands(
delegate_info),input_filename,output_filename,density,background,
opacity,unique);
status=ExternalDelegateCommand(MagickFalse,image_info->verbose,
command,(char *) NULL,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(unique);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(input_filename);
if ((status == 0) && (stat(output_filename,&attributes) == 0) &&
(attributes.st_size != 0))
{
ImageInfo
*read_info;
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(read_info->filename,output_filename,
MaxTextExtent);
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(output_filename);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
return(image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(output_filename);
}
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_RSVG_DELEGATE)
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
cairo_surface_t
*cairo_surface;
cairo_t
*cairo_image;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register unsigned char
*p;
RsvgDimensionData
dimension_info;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#else
GdkPixbuf
*pixel_buffer;
register const guchar
*p;
#endif
GError
*error;
ssize_t
y;
PixelPacket
fill_color;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
RsvgHandle
*svg_handle;
svg_handle=rsvg_handle_new();
if (svg_handle == (RsvgHandle *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
rsvg_handle_set_base_uri(svg_handle,image_info->filename);
if ((image->x_resolution != 90.0) && (image->y_resolution != 90.0))
rsvg_handle_set_dpi_x_y(svg_handle,image->x_resolution,
image->y_resolution);
while ((n=ReadBlob(image,MaxTextExtent,message)) != 0)
{
error=(GError *) NULL;
(void) rsvg_handle_write(svg_handle,message,n,&error);
if (error != (GError *) NULL)
g_error_free(error);
}
error=(GError *) NULL;
rsvg_handle_close(svg_handle,&error);
if (error != (GError *) NULL)
g_error_free(error);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
rsvg_handle_get_dimensions(svg_handle,&dimension_info);
image->columns=image->x_resolution*dimension_info.width/90.0;
image->rows=image->y_resolution*dimension_info.height/90.0;
pixel_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
#else
pixel_buffer=rsvg_handle_get_pixbuf(svg_handle);
rsvg_handle_free(svg_handle);
image->columns=gdk_pixbuf_get_width(pixel_buffer);
image->rows=gdk_pixbuf_get_height(pixel_buffer);
#endif
image->matte=MagickTrue;
SetImageProperty(image,"svg:base-uri",
rsvg_handle_get_base_uri(svg_handle));
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
g_object_unref(G_OBJECT(pixel_buffer));
#endif
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
ThrowReaderException(MissingDelegateError,
"NoDecodeDelegateForThisImageFormat");
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
size_t
stride;
stride=4*image->columns;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PANGOCAIRO_DELEGATE)
stride=(size_t) cairo_format_stride_for_width(CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,
(int) image->columns);
#endif
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(stride,image->rows*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
#endif
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
cairo_surface=cairo_image_surface_create_for_data(pixels,
CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32,(int) image->columns,(int) image->rows, (int)
stride);
if (cairo_surface == (cairo_surface_t *) NULL)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
cairo_image=cairo_create(cairo_surface);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_CLEAR);
cairo_paint(cairo_image);
cairo_set_operator(cairo_image,CAIRO_OPERATOR_OVER);
cairo_scale(cairo_image,image->x_resolution/90.0,
image->y_resolution/90.0);
rsvg_handle_render_cairo(svg_handle,cairo_image);
cairo_destroy(cairo_image);
cairo_surface_destroy(cairo_surface);
g_object_unref(svg_handle);
p=pixels;
#else
p=gdk_pixbuf_get_pixels(pixel_buffer);
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
fill_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
#else
fill_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
fill_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
#endif
fill_color.opacity=QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
{
double
gamma;
gamma=1.0-QuantumScale*fill_color.opacity;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
fill_color.blue*=gamma;
fill_color.green*=gamma;
fill_color.red*=gamma;
}
#endif
MagickCompositeOver(&fill_color,fill_color.opacity,q,
(MagickRealType) q->opacity,q);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CAIRO_DELEGATE)
if (pixel_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
#else
g_object_unref(G_OBJECT(pixel_buffer));
#endif
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
#endif
}
}
/*
Open draw file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"w");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,filename,MaxTextExtent);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Parse SVG file.
*/
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
svg_info=AcquireSVGInfo();
if (svg_info == (SVGInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) fclose(file);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
svg_info->file=file;
svg_info->exception=exception;
svg_info->image=image;
svg_info->image_info=image_info;
svg_info->bounds.width=image->columns;
svg_info->bounds.height=image->rows;
if (image_info->size != (char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&svg_info->size,image_info->size);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"begin SAX");
(void) xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sax_modules,0,sizeof(sax_modules));
sax_modules.internalSubset=SVGInternalSubset;
sax_modules.isStandalone=SVGIsStandalone;
sax_modules.hasInternalSubset=SVGHasInternalSubset;
sax_modules.hasExternalSubset=SVGHasExternalSubset;
sax_modules.resolveEntity=SVGResolveEntity;
sax_modules.getEntity=SVGGetEntity;
sax_modules.entityDecl=SVGEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.notationDecl=SVGNotationDeclaration;
sax_modules.attributeDecl=SVGAttributeDeclaration;
sax_modules.elementDecl=SVGElementDeclaration;
sax_modules.unparsedEntityDecl=SVGUnparsedEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.setDocumentLocator=SVGSetDocumentLocator;
sax_modules.startDocument=SVGStartDocument;
sax_modules.endDocument=SVGEndDocument;
sax_modules.startElement=SVGStartElement;
sax_modules.endElement=SVGEndElement;
sax_modules.reference=SVGReference;
sax_modules.characters=SVGCharacters;
sax_modules.ignorableWhitespace=SVGIgnorableWhitespace;
sax_modules.processingInstruction=SVGProcessingInstructions;
sax_modules.comment=SVGComment;
sax_modules.warning=SVGWarning;
sax_modules.error=SVGError;
sax_modules.fatalError=SVGError;
sax_modules.getParameterEntity=SVGGetParameterEntity;
sax_modules.cdataBlock=SVGCDataBlock;
sax_modules.externalSubset=SVGExternalSubset;
sax_handler=(&sax_modules);
n=ReadBlob(image,MaxTextExtent,message);
if (n > 0)
{
svg_info->parser=xmlCreatePushParserCtxt(sax_handler,svg_info,(char *)
message,n,image->filename);
while ((n=ReadBlob(image,MaxTextExtent,message)) != 0)
{
status=xmlParseChunk(svg_info->parser,(char *) message,(int) n,0);
if (status != 0)
break;
}
}
(void) xmlParseChunk(svg_info->parser,(char *) message,0,1);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(svg_info->parser);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end SAX");
(void) fclose(file);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image->columns=svg_info->width;
image->rows=svg_info->height;
if (exception->severity >= ErrorException)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
ImageInfo
*read_info;
/*
Draw image.
*/
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=(Image *) NULL;
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
if (read_info->density != (char *) NULL)
read_info->density=DestroyString(read_info->density);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"mvg:%s",
filename);
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (svg_info->title != (char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"svg:title",svg_info->title);
if (svg_info->comment != (char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"svg:comment",svg_info->comment);
}
svg_info=DestroySVGInfo(svg_info);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long SimpleBlock::Parse()
{
return m_block.Parse(m_pCluster);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 174,410 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int wasm_dis(WasmOp *op, const unsigned char *buf, int buf_len) {
op->len = 1;
op->op = buf[0];
if (op->op > 0xbf) {
return 1;
}
WasmOpDef *opdef = &opcodes[op->op];
switch (op->op) {
case WASM_OP_TRAP:
case WASM_OP_NOP:
case WASM_OP_ELSE:
case WASM_OP_RETURN:
case WASM_OP_DROP:
case WASM_OP_SELECT:
case WASM_OP_I32EQZ:
case WASM_OP_I32EQ:
case WASM_OP_I32NE:
case WASM_OP_I32LTS:
case WASM_OP_I32LTU:
case WASM_OP_I32GTS:
case WASM_OP_I32GTU:
case WASM_OP_I32LES:
case WASM_OP_I32LEU:
case WASM_OP_I32GES:
case WASM_OP_I32GEU:
case WASM_OP_I64EQZ:
case WASM_OP_I64EQ:
case WASM_OP_I64NE:
case WASM_OP_I64LTS:
case WASM_OP_I64LTU:
case WASM_OP_I64GTS:
case WASM_OP_I64GTU:
case WASM_OP_I64LES:
case WASM_OP_I64LEU:
case WASM_OP_I64GES:
case WASM_OP_I64GEU:
case WASM_OP_F32EQ:
case WASM_OP_F32NE:
case WASM_OP_F32LT:
case WASM_OP_F32GT:
case WASM_OP_F32LE:
case WASM_OP_F32GE:
case WASM_OP_F64EQ:
case WASM_OP_F64NE:
case WASM_OP_F64LT:
case WASM_OP_F64GT:
case WASM_OP_F64LE:
case WASM_OP_F64GE:
case WASM_OP_I32CLZ:
case WASM_OP_I32CTZ:
case WASM_OP_I32POPCNT:
case WASM_OP_I32ADD:
case WASM_OP_I32SUB:
case WASM_OP_I32MUL:
case WASM_OP_I32DIVS:
case WASM_OP_I32DIVU:
case WASM_OP_I32REMS:
case WASM_OP_I32REMU:
case WASM_OP_I32AND:
case WASM_OP_I32OR:
case WASM_OP_I32XOR:
case WASM_OP_I32SHL:
case WASM_OP_I32SHRS:
case WASM_OP_I32SHRU:
case WASM_OP_I32ROTL:
case WASM_OP_I32ROTR:
case WASM_OP_I64CLZ:
case WASM_OP_I64CTZ:
case WASM_OP_I64POPCNT:
case WASM_OP_I64ADD:
case WASM_OP_I64SUB:
case WASM_OP_I64MUL:
case WASM_OP_I64DIVS:
case WASM_OP_I64DIVU:
case WASM_OP_I64REMS:
case WASM_OP_I64REMU:
case WASM_OP_I64AND:
case WASM_OP_I64OR:
case WASM_OP_I64XOR:
case WASM_OP_I64SHL:
case WASM_OP_I64SHRS:
case WASM_OP_I64SHRU:
case WASM_OP_I64ROTL:
case WASM_OP_I64ROTR:
case WASM_OP_F32ABS:
case WASM_OP_F32NEG:
case WASM_OP_F32CEIL:
case WASM_OP_F32FLOOR:
case WASM_OP_F32TRUNC:
case WASM_OP_F32NEAREST:
case WASM_OP_F32SQRT:
case WASM_OP_F32ADD:
case WASM_OP_F32SUB:
case WASM_OP_F32MUL:
case WASM_OP_F32DIV:
case WASM_OP_F32MIN:
case WASM_OP_F32MAX:
case WASM_OP_F32COPYSIGN:
case WASM_OP_F64ABS:
case WASM_OP_F64NEG:
case WASM_OP_F64CEIL:
case WASM_OP_F64FLOOR:
case WASM_OP_F64TRUNC:
case WASM_OP_F64NEAREST:
case WASM_OP_F64SQRT:
case WASM_OP_F64ADD:
case WASM_OP_F64SUB:
case WASM_OP_F64MUL:
case WASM_OP_F64DIV:
case WASM_OP_F64MIN:
case WASM_OP_F64MAX:
case WASM_OP_F64COPYSIGN:
case WASM_OP_I32WRAPI64:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCSF32:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCUF32:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCSF64:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCUF64:
case WASM_OP_I64EXTENDSI32:
case WASM_OP_I64EXTENDUI32:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCSF32:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCUF32:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCSF64:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCUF64:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTSI32:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTUI32:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTSI64:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTUI64:
case WASM_OP_F32DEMOTEF64:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTSI32:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTUI32:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTSI64:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTUI64:
case WASM_OP_F64PROMOTEF32:
case WASM_OP_I32REINTERPRETF32:
case WASM_OP_I64REINTERPRETF64:
case WASM_OP_F32REINTERPRETI32:
case WASM_OP_F64REINTERPRETI64:
case WASM_OP_END:
{
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s", opdef->txt);
}
break;
case WASM_OP_BLOCK:
case WASM_OP_LOOP:
case WASM_OP_IF:
{
st32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_i32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
switch (0x80 - val) {
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_EMPTY:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_i32:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result i32)", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_i64:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result i64)", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_f32:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result f32)", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_f64:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result f64)", opdef->txt);
break;
default:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result ?)", opdef->txt);
break;
}
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_BR:
case WASM_OP_BRIF:
case WASM_OP_CALL:
{
ut32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d", opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_BRTABLE:
{
ut32 count = 0, *table = NULL, def = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &count);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) {
goto err;
}
if (!(table = calloc (count, sizeof (ut32)))) {
goto err;
}
int i = 0;
op->len += n;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &table[i]);
if (!(op->len + n <= buf_len)) {
goto beach;
}
op->len += n;
}
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &def);
if (!(n > 0 && n + op->len < buf_len)) {
goto beach;
}
op->len += n;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d ", opdef->txt, count);
for (i = 0; i < count && strlen (op->txt) + 10 < R_ASM_BUFSIZE; i++) {
int optxtlen = strlen (op->txt);
snprintf (op->txt + optxtlen, R_ASM_BUFSIZE - optxtlen, "%d ", table[i]);
}
snprintf (op->txt + strlen (op->txt), R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%d", def);
free (table);
break;
beach:
free (table);
goto err;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_CALLINDIRECT:
{
ut32 val = 0, reserved = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
op->len += n;
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &reserved);
if (!(n == 1 && op->len + n <= buf_len)) goto err;
reserved &= 0x1;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d %d", opdef->txt, val, reserved);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_GETLOCAL:
case WASM_OP_SETLOCAL:
case WASM_OP_TEELOCAL:
case WASM_OP_GETGLOBAL:
case WASM_OP_SETGLOBAL:
{
ut32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d", opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD:
case WASM_OP_F32LOAD:
case WASM_OP_F64LOAD:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD8S:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD8U:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD16S:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD16U:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD8S:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD8U:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD16S:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD16U:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD32S:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD32U:
case WASM_OP_I32STORE:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE:
case WASM_OP_F32STORE:
case WASM_OP_F64STORE:
case WASM_OP_I32STORE8:
case WASM_OP_I32STORE16:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE8:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE16:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE32:
{
ut32 flag = 0, offset = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &flag);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
op->len += n;
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &offset);
if (!(n > 0 && op->len + n <= buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d %d", opdef->txt, flag, offset);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_CURRENTMEMORY:
case WASM_OP_GROWMEMORY:
{
ut32 reserved = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &reserved);
if (!(n == 1 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
reserved &= 0x1;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d", opdef->txt, reserved);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_I32CONST:
{
st32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_i32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" PFMT32d, opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_I64CONST:
{
st64 val = 0;
size_t n = read_i64_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" PFMT64d, opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_F32CONST:
{
ut32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
long double d = (long double)val;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" LDBLFMT, opdef->txt, d);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_F64CONST:
{
ut64 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u64_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
long double d = (long double)val;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" LDBLFMT, opdef->txt, d);
op->len += n;
}
break;
default:
goto err;
}
return op->len;
err:
op->len = 1;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "invalid");
return op->len;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The wasm_dis() function in libr/asm/arch/wasm/wasm.c in or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted WASM file.
Commit Message: Fix #9969 - Stack overflow in wasm disassembler | Medium | 169,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: vhost_scsi_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct vhost_scsi_tport *tport = container_of(wwn,
struct vhost_scsi_tport, tport_wwn);
struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg;
unsigned long tpgt;
int ret;
if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (kstrtoul(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt > UINT_MAX)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
tpg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vhost_scsi_tpg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tpg) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate struct vhost_scsi_tpg");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
mutex_init(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tpg->tv_tpg_list);
tpg->tport = tport;
tpg->tport_tpgt = tpgt;
ret = core_tpg_register(&vhost_scsi_fabric_configfs->tf_ops, wwn,
&tpg->se_tpg, tpg, TRANSPORT_TPG_TYPE_NORMAL);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(tpg);
return NULL;
}
mutex_lock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
list_add_tail(&tpg->tv_tpg_list, &vhost_scsi_list);
mutex_unlock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
return &tpg->se_tpg;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Array index error in the tcm_vhost_make_tpg function in drivers/vhost/scsi.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0 might allow guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT ioctl call. NOTE: the affected function was renamed to vhost_scsi_make_tpg before the vulnerability was announced.
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]> | Low | 166,615 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool radeon_atom_get_tv_timings(struct radeon_device *rdev, int index,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *tv_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *tv_info_v1_2;
ATOM_DTD_FORMAT *dtd_timings;
int data_index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, AnalogTV_Info);
u8 frev, crev;
u16 data_offset, misc;
if (!atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, data_index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset))
return false;
switch (crev) {
case 1:
tv_info = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING)
return false;
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Total);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Disp);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Total);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Disp);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usPixelClock) * 10;
if (index == 1) {
/* PAL timings appear to have wrong values for totals */
mode->crtc_htotal -= 1;
mode->crtc_vtotal -= 1;
}
break;
case 2:
tv_info_v1_2 = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2)
return false;
dtd_timings = &tv_info_v1_2->aModeTimings[index];
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = mode->crtc_hsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = mode->crtc_vsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usPixClk) * 10;
break;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, a range check issue in drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/atombios.c could cause an off by one (buffer overflow) problem.
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> | Low | 169,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MockRenderThread::AddRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Channel::Listener* listener) {
EXPECT_EQ(routing_id_, routing_id);
widget_ = listener;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not use a dedicated process for the loading of links found on an internal page, which might allow attackers to bypass intended sandbox restrictions via a crafted page.
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int udpv6_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen, copied;
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int is_udp4;
bool slow;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &off, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
copied = len;
if (copied > ulen)
copied = ulen;
else if (copied < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
is_udp4 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP));
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg, copied);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
trace_kfree_skb(skb, udpv6_recvmsg);
if (!peeked) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!peeked) {
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
}
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (is_udp4) {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&sin6->sin6_addr);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0;
} else {
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
inet6_iif(skb));
}
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (is_udp4) {
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
} else {
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
}
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) {
if (is_udp4) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
} else {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
}
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
/* starting over for a new packet, but check if we need to yield */
cond_resched();
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC;
goto try_again;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-358
Summary: udp.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via UDP traffic that triggers an unsafe second checksum calculation during execution of a recv system call with the MSG_PEEK flag.
Commit Message: udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 168,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator(
VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator* vaapi_dec,
VaapiWrapper* vaapi_wrapper)
: vaapi_wrapper_(vaapi_wrapper), vaapi_dec_(vaapi_dec) {
DCHECK(vaapi_wrapper_);
DCHECK(vaapi_dec_);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | High | 172,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: TIFFReadEncodedStrip(TIFF* tif, uint32 strip, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFReadEncodedStrip";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 rowsperstrip;
uint32 stripsperplane;
uint32 stripinplane;
uint16 plane;
uint32 rows;
tmsize_t stripsize;
if (!TIFFCheckRead(tif,0))
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (strip>=td->td_nstrips)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,
"%lu: Strip out of range, max %lu",(unsigned long)strip,
(unsigned long)td->td_nstrips);
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
}
/*
* Calculate the strip size according to the number of
* rows in the strip (check for truncated last strip on any
* of the separations).
*/
rowsperstrip=td->td_rowsperstrip;
if (rowsperstrip>td->td_imagelength)
rowsperstrip=td->td_imagelength;
stripsperplane=((td->td_imagelength+rowsperstrip-1)/rowsperstrip);
stripinplane=(strip%stripsperplane);
plane=(uint16)(strip/stripsperplane);
rows=td->td_imagelength-stripinplane*rowsperstrip;
if (rows>rowsperstrip)
rows=rowsperstrip;
stripsize=TIFFVStripSize(tif,rows);
if (stripsize==0)
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
/* shortcut to avoid an extra memcpy() */
if( td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_NONE &&
size!=(tmsize_t)(-1) && size >= stripsize &&
!isMapped(tif) &&
((tif->tif_flags&TIFF_NOREADRAW)==0) )
{
if (TIFFReadRawStrip1(tif, strip, buf, stripsize, module) != stripsize)
return ((tmsize_t)(-1));
if (!isFillOrder(tif, td->td_fillorder) &&
(tif->tif_flags & TIFF_NOBITREV) == 0)
TIFFReverseBits(buf,stripsize);
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif,buf,stripsize);
return (stripsize);
}
if ((size!=(tmsize_t)(-1))&&(size<stripsize))
stripsize=size;
if (!TIFFFillStrip(tif,strip))
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
if ((*tif->tif_decodestrip)(tif,buf,stripsize,plane)<=0)
return((tmsize_t)(-1));
(*tif->tif_postdecode)(tif,buf,stripsize);
return(stripsize);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: LibTIFF 4.0.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted TIFF image, related to libtiff/tif_read.c:351:22.
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in
TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596 | Medium | 168,470 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(gzopen)
{
char *filename;
char *mode;
int filename_len, mode_len;
int flags = REPORT_ERRORS;
php_stream *stream;
long use_include_path = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &filename, &filename_len, &mode, &mode_len, &use_include_path) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (use_include_path) {
flags |= USE_PATH;
}
stream = php_stream_gzopen(NULL, filename, mode, flags, NULL, NULL STREAMS_CC TSRMLS_CC);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_to_zval(stream, return_value);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: PHP before 5.4.40, 5.5.x before 5.5.24, and 5.6.x before 5.6.8 does not ensure that pathnames lack %00 sequences, which might allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted input to an application that calls the stream_resolve_include_path function in ext/standard/streamsfuncs.c, as demonstrated by a filename\0.extension attack that bypasses an intended configuration in which client users may read files with only one specific extension.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,319 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The netjoin processing in Irssi 1.x before 1.0.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) and possibly execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10 | Low | 168,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, nonOpt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, opt1, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (args.Length() <= 2) {
imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt, opt1);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, opt2, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs(nonOpt, opt1, opt2);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,091 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int idx;
struct kvm_memslots *slots;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, slots)
kvm_iommu_put_pages(kvm, memslot->base_gfn, memslot->npages);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The KVM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.3.4 does not properly manage the relationships between memory slots and the iommu, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory leak and host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS to conduct hotunplug and hotplug operations on devices.
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Low | 165,617 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> getObjectParameter(const v8::Arguments& args, ObjectType objectType)
{
if (args.Length() != 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
unsigned target = toInt32(args[0]);
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[1]);
WebGLGetInfo info;
switch (objectType) {
case kBuffer:
info = context->getBufferParameter(target, pname, ec);
break;
case kRenderbuffer:
info = context->getRenderbufferParameter(target, pname, ec);
break;
case kTexture:
info = context->getTexParameter(target, pname, ec);
break;
case kVertexAttrib:
info = context->getVertexAttrib(target, pname, ec);
break;
default:
notImplemented();
break;
}
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xps_parse_gradient_stops(xps_document *doc, char *base_uri, fz_xml *node,
struct stop *stops, int maxcount)
{
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
float sample[8];
float rgb[3];
int before, after;
int count;
int i;
/* We may have to insert 2 extra stops when postprocessing */
maxcount -= 2;
count = 0;
while (node && count < maxcount)
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "GradientStop"))
{
char *offset = fz_xml_att(node, "Offset");
char *color = fz_xml_att(node, "Color");
if (offset && color)
{
stops[count].offset = fz_atof(offset);
stops[count].index = count;
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, color, &colorspace, sample);
fz_convert_color(doc->ctx, fz_device_rgb(doc->ctx), rgb, colorspace, sample + 1);
stops[count].r = rgb[0];
stops[count].g = rgb[1];
stops[count].b = rgb[2];
stops[count].a = sample[0];
count ++;
}
}
node = fz_xml_next(node);
}
if (count == 0)
{
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "gradient brush has no gradient stops");
stops[0].offset = 0;
stops[0].r = 0;
stops[0].g = 0;
stops[0].b = 0;
stops[0].a = 1;
stops[1].offset = 1;
stops[1].r = 1;
stops[1].g = 1;
stops[1].b = 1;
stops[1].a = 1;
return 2;
}
if (count == maxcount)
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "gradient brush exceeded maximum number of gradient stops");
/* Postprocess to make sure the range of offsets is 0.0 to 1.0 */
qsort(stops, count, sizeof(struct stop), cmp_stop);
before = -1;
after = -1;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
if (stops[i].offset < 0)
before = i;
if (stops[i].offset > 1)
{
after = i;
break;
}
}
/* Remove all stops < 0 except the largest one */
if (before > 0)
{
memmove(stops, stops + before, (count - before) * sizeof(struct stop));
count -= before;
}
/* Remove all stops > 1 except the smallest one */
if (after >= 0)
count = after + 1;
/* Expand single stop to 0 .. 1 */
if (count == 1)
{
stops[1] = stops[0];
stops[0].offset = 0;
stops[1].offset = 1;
return 2;
}
/* First stop < 0 -- interpolate value to 0 */
if (stops[0].offset < 0)
{
float d = -stops[0].offset / (stops[1].offset - stops[0].offset);
stops[0].offset = 0;
stops[0].r = lerp(stops[0].r, stops[1].r, d);
stops[0].g = lerp(stops[0].g, stops[1].g, d);
stops[0].b = lerp(stops[0].b, stops[1].b, d);
stops[0].a = lerp(stops[0].a, stops[1].a, d);
}
/* Last stop > 1 -- interpolate value to 1 */
if (stops[count-1].offset > 1)
{
float d = (1 - stops[count-2].offset) / (stops[count-1].offset - stops[count-2].offset);
stops[count-1].offset = 1;
stops[count-1].r = lerp(stops[count-2].r, stops[count-1].r, d);
stops[count-1].g = lerp(stops[count-2].g, stops[count-1].g, d);
stops[count-1].b = lerp(stops[count-2].b, stops[count-1].b, d);
stops[count-1].a = lerp(stops[count-2].a, stops[count-1].a, d);
}
/* First stop > 0 -- insert a duplicate at 0 */
if (stops[0].offset > 0)
{
memmove(stops + 1, stops, count * sizeof(struct stop));
stops[0] = stops[1];
stops[0].offset = 0;
count++;
}
/* Last stop < 1 -- insert a duplicate at 1 */
if (stops[count-1].offset < 1)
{
stops[count] = stops[count-1];
stops[count].offset = 1;
count++;
}
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the xps_parse_color function in xps/xps-common.c in MuPDF 1.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large number of entries in the ContextColor value of the Fill attribute in a Path element.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void _sx_sasl_client_process(sx_t s, sx_plugin_t p, Gsasl_session *sd, const char *mech, const char *in, int inlen) {
_sx_sasl_t ctx = (_sx_sasl_t) p->private;
_sx_sasl_sess_t sctx = NULL;
char *buf = NULL, *out = NULL, *realm = NULL, **ext_id;
char hostname[256];
int ret;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
int i;
#endif
size_t buflen, outlen;
assert(ctx);
assert(ctx->cb);
if(mech != NULL) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "auth request from client (mechanism=%s)", mech);
if(!gsasl_server_support_p(ctx->gsasl_ctx, mech)) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "client requested mechanism (%s) that we didn't offer", mech);
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INVALID_MECHANISM, NULL), 0);
return;
}
/* startup */
ret = gsasl_server_start(ctx->gsasl_ctx, mech, &sd);
if(ret != GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_server_start failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_TEMPORARY_FAILURE, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
return;
}
/* get the realm */
(ctx->cb)(sx_sasl_cb_GET_REALM, NULL, (void **) &realm, s, ctx->cbarg);
/* cleanup any existing session context */
sctx = gsasl_session_hook_get(sd);
if (sctx != NULL) free(sctx);
/* allocate and initialize our per session context */
sctx = (_sx_sasl_sess_t) calloc(1, sizeof(struct _sx_sasl_sess_st));
sctx->s = s;
sctx->ctx = ctx;
gsasl_session_hook_set(sd, (void *) sctx);
gsasl_property_set(sd, GSASL_SERVICE, ctx->appname);
gsasl_property_set(sd, GSASL_REALM, realm);
/* get hostname */
hostname[0] = '\0';
gethostname(hostname, 256);
hostname[255] = '\0';
gsasl_property_set(sd, GSASL_HOSTNAME, hostname);
/* get EXTERNAL data from the ssl plugin */
ext_id = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
for(i = 0; i < s->env->nplugins; i++)
if(s->env->plugins[i]->magic == SX_SSL_MAGIC && s->plugin_data[s->env->plugins[i]->index] != NULL)
ext_id = ((_sx_ssl_conn_t) s->plugin_data[s->env->plugins[i]->index])->external_id;
if (ext_id != NULL) {
/* if there is, store it for later */
for (i = 0; i < SX_CONN_EXTERNAL_ID_MAX_COUNT; i++)
if (ext_id[i] != NULL) {
ctx->ext_id[i] = strdup(ext_id[i]);
} else {
ctx->ext_id[i] = NULL;
break;
}
}
#endif
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl context initialised for %d", s->tag);
s->plugin_data[p->index] = (void *) sd;
if(strcmp(mech, "ANONYMOUS") == 0) {
/*
* special case for SASL ANONYMOUS: ignore the initial
* response provided by the client and generate a random
* authid to use as the jid node for the user, as
* specified in XEP-0175
*/
(ctx->cb)(sx_sasl_cb_GEN_AUTHZID, NULL, (void **)&out, s, ctx->cbarg);
buf = strdup(out);
buflen = strlen(buf);
} else if (strstr(in, "<") != NULL && strncmp(in, "=", strstr(in, "<") - in ) == 0) {
/* XXX The above check is hackish, but `in` is just weird */
/* This is a special case for SASL External c2s. See XEP-0178 */
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl auth string is empty");
buf = strdup("");
buflen = strlen(buf);
} else {
/* decode and process */
ret = gsasl_base64_from(in, inlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret != GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_from failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
return;
}
}
ret = gsasl_step(sd, buf, buflen, &out, &outlen);
}
else {
/* decode and process */
ret = gsasl_base64_from(in, inlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret != GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_from failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
return;
}
if(!sd) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "response send before auth request enabling mechanism (decoded: %.*s)", buflen, buf);
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_MECH_TOO_WEAK, "response send before auth request enabling mechanism"), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
return;
}
_sx_debug(ZONE, "response from client (decoded: %.*s)", buflen, buf);
ret = gsasl_step(sd, buf, buflen, &out, &outlen);
}
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
/* auth completed */
if(ret == GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl handshake completed");
/* encode the leftover response */
ret = gsasl_base64_to(out, outlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret == GSASL_OK) {
/* send success */
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_success(s, buf, buflen), 0);
free(buf);
/* set a notify on the success nad buffer */
((sx_buf_t) s->wbufq->front->data)->notify = _sx_sasl_notify_success;
((sx_buf_t) s->wbufq->front->data)->notify_arg = (void *) p;
}
else {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_to failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
}
if(out != NULL) free(out);
return;
}
/* in progress */
if(ret == GSASL_NEEDS_MORE) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl handshake in progress (challenge: %.*s)", outlen, out);
/* encode the challenge */
ret = gsasl_base64_to(out, outlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret == GSASL_OK) {
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_challenge(s, buf, buflen), 0);
free(buf);
}
else {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_to failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
}
if(out != NULL) free(out);
return;
}
if(out != NULL) free(out);
/* its over */
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl handshake failed; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
switch (ret) {
case GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR:
case GSASL_NO_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN:
case GSASL_NO_AUTHID:
case GSASL_NO_AUTHZID:
case GSASL_NO_PASSWORD:
case GSASL_NO_PASSCODE:
case GSASL_NO_PIN:
case GSASL_NO_SERVICE:
case GSASL_NO_HOSTNAME:
out = _sasl_err_NOT_AUTHORIZED;
break;
case GSASL_UNKNOWN_MECHANISM:
case GSASL_MECHANISM_PARSE_ERROR:
out = _sasl_err_INVALID_MECHANISM;
break;
case GSASL_BASE64_ERROR:
out = _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING;
break;
default:
out = _sasl_err_MALFORMED_REQUEST;
}
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, out, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: JabberD 2.x (aka jabberd2) before 2.6.1 allows anyone to authenticate using SASL ANONYMOUS, even when the sasl.anonymous c2s.xml option is not enabled.
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check | Low | 168,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int vapic_enter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
struct page *page;
if (!apic || !apic->vapic_addr)
return 0;
page = gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, apic->vapic_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(page))
return -EFAULT;
vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_page = page;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VAPIC synchronization operation involving a page-end address.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | High | 165,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int br_mdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = NULL;
int idx = 0, s_idx;
s_idx = cb->args[0];
rcu_read_lock();
/* In theory this could be wrapped to 0... */
cb->seq = net->dev_base_seq + br_mdb_rehash_seq;
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_EBRIDGE) {
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_GETMDB,
sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (nlh == NULL)
break;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
if (br_mdb_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
if (br_rports_fill_info(skb, cb, dev) < 0)
goto out;
cb->args[1] = 0;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
if (nlh)
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/bridge/br_mdb.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application.
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: null_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int length = h->len;
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int family;
if (caplen < NULL_HDRLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|null]"));
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
memcpy((char *)&family, (const char *)p, sizeof(family));
/*
* This isn't necessarily in our host byte order; if this is
* a DLT_LOOP capture, it's in network byte order, and if
* this is a DLT_NULL capture from a machine with the opposite
* byte-order, it's in the opposite byte order from ours.
*
* If the upper 16 bits aren't all zero, assume it's byte-swapped.
*/
if ((family & 0xFFFF0000) != 0)
family = SWAPLONG(family);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length);
length -= NULL_HDRLEN;
caplen -= NULL_HDRLEN;
p += NULL_HDRLEN;
switch (family) {
case BSD_AFNUM_INET:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_BSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_FREEBSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_DARWIN:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_APPLETALK:
atalk_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
/* unknown AF_ value */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length + NULL_HDRLEN);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
}
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | Low | 167,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Release() {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Release";
pincode_callback_.Reset();
passkey_callback_.Reset();
confirmation_callback_.Reset();
UnregisterAgent();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s | Medium | 170,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int decode_studio_vop_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
if (get_bits_left(gb) <= 32)
return 0;
s->partitioned_frame = 0;
s->decode_mb = mpeg4_decode_studio_mb;
decode_smpte_tc(ctx, gb);
skip_bits(gb, 10); /* temporal_reference */
skip_bits(gb, 2); /* vop_structure */
s->pict_type = get_bits(gb, 2) + AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I; /* vop_coding_type */
if (get_bits1(gb)) { /* vop_coded */
skip_bits1(gb); /* top_field_first */
skip_bits1(gb); /* repeat_first_field */
s->progressive_frame = get_bits1(gb) ^ 1; /* progressive_frame */
}
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
if (get_bits1(gb))
reset_studio_dc_predictors(s);
}
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE) {
s->alternate_scan = get_bits1(gb);
s->frame_pred_frame_dct = get_bits1(gb);
s->dct_precision = get_bits(gb, 2);
s->intra_dc_precision = get_bits(gb, 2);
s->q_scale_type = get_bits1(gb);
}
if (s->alternate_scan) {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
} else {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_horizontal_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
}
mpeg4_load_default_matrices(s);
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 4);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The studio profile decoder in libavcodec/mpeg4videodec.c in FFmpeg 4.0 before 4.0.4 and 4.1 before 4.1.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted MPEG-4 video data.
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Clear interlaced_dct for studio profile
Fixes: Out of array access
Fixes: 13090/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4_fuzzer-5408668986638336
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: Kieran Kunhya <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void install_local_socket(asocket* s) {
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
s->id = local_socket_next_id++;
if (local_socket_next_id == 0) {
local_socket_next_id = 1;
}
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_list);
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) implementation in adb/sockets.cpp in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-09-01 mishandles socket close operations, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28347842.
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
| High | 174,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long Track::GetNumber() const
{
return m_info.number;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 174,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool V8DOMWindow::namedSecurityCheckCustom(v8::Local<v8::Object> host, v8::Local<v8::Value> key, v8::AccessType type, v8::Local<v8::Value>)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> window = host->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(V8DOMWindow::GetTemplate(isolate, worldTypeInMainThread(isolate)));
if (window.IsEmpty())
return false; // the frame is gone.
DOMWindow* targetWindow = V8DOMWindow::toNative(window);
ASSERT(targetWindow);
Frame* target = targetWindow->frame();
if (!target)
return false;
if (target->loader()->stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
target->loader()->didAccessInitialDocument();
if (key->IsString()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, nameOfProtoProperty, ("__proto__", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
String name = toWebCoreString(key);
Frame* childFrame = target->tree()->scopedChild(name);
if (type == v8::ACCESS_HAS && childFrame)
return true;
if (type == v8::ACCESS_GET && childFrame && !host->HasRealNamedProperty(key->ToString()) && name != nameOfProtoProperty)
return true;
}
return BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(target, DoNotReportSecurityError);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and trigger namespace pollution via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Named access checks on DOMWindow miss navigator
The design of the named access check is very fragile. Instead of doing the
access check at the same time as the access, we need to check access in a
separate operation using different parameters. Worse, we need to implement a
part of the access check as a blacklist of dangerous properties.
This CL expands the blacklist slightly by adding in the real named properties
from the DOMWindow instance to the current list (which included the real named
properties of the shadow object).
In the longer term, we should investigate whether we can change the V8 API to
let us do the access check in the same callback as the property access itself.
BUG=237022
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15346002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150616 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 171,335 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_readdirplusargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readdirargs *args)
{
int len;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->cookie);
args->verf = p; p += 2;
args->dircount = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
len = args->count = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
if (!args->buffer)
args->buffer = page_address(p);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Low | 168,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void toggle_os_keylockstates(int fd, int changedlockstates)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: fd = %d, changedlockstates = 0x%x",
__FUNCTION__, fd, changedlockstates);
UINT8 hidreport[9];
int reportIndex;
memset(hidreport,0,9);
hidreport[0]=1;
reportIndex=4;
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_CAPSLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting CAPSLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8)HID_REPORT_CAPSLOCK;
}
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_NUMLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting NUMLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8)HID_REPORT_NUMLOCK;
}
if (changedlockstates & BTIF_HH_KEYSTATE_MASK_SCROLLLOCK) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s Setting SCROLLLOCK", __FUNCTION__);
hidreport[reportIndex++] = (UINT8) HID_REPORT_SCROLLLOCK;
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Writing hidreport #1 to os: "\
"%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[0], hidreport[1], hidreport[2]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[3], hidreport[4], hidreport[5]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[6], hidreport[7], hidreport[8]);
bta_hh_co_write(fd , hidreport, sizeof(hidreport));
usleep(200000);
memset(hidreport,0,9);
hidreport[0]=1;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Writing hidreport #2 to os: "\
"%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[0], hidreport[1], hidreport[2]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[3], hidreport[4], hidreport[5]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: %x %x %x ", __FUNCTION__,
hidreport[6], hidreport[7], hidreport[8]);
bta_hh_co_write(fd , hidreport, sizeof(hidreport));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::RegisterProcessHostForSite(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
RenderProcessHost* process,
const GURL& url) {
SiteProcessMap* map =
GetSiteProcessMapForBrowserContext(browser_context);
std::string site = SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url)
.possibly_invalid_spec();
map->RegisterProcess(site, process);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 does not properly manage bindings of extension processes, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
BIGNUM **rp)
{
BN_CTX *ctx;
BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL;
BIGNUM l, m;
int ret = 0;
int q_bits;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
BN_init(&k);
BN_init(&kq);
BN_init(&l);
BN_init(&m);
if (ctx_in == NULL) {
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else
ctx = ctx_in;
if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
/* Preallocate space */
q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits)
|| !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits)
|| !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits))
goto err;
/* Get random k */
do
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(&k));
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
/*
* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
* compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length.
*
* We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a
* small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
* one bit longer than the modulus.
*
* TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
* conditional copy.
*/
if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q)
|| !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q)
|| !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m))
goto err;
BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
K = &kq;
} else {
K = &k;
}
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (*kinvp != NULL)
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
*kinvp = kinv;
kinv = NULL;
if (*rp != NULL)
BN_clear_free(*rp);
*rp = r;
ret = 1;
err:
if (!ret) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
if (r != NULL)
BN_clear_free(r);
}
if (ctx_in == NULL)
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(&k);
BN_clear_free(&kq);
BN_clear_free(&l);
BN_clear_free(&m);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-320
Summary: The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1a (Affected 1.1.1). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0j (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0i). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2q (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2p).
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void jpc_undo_roi(jas_matrix_t *x, int roishift, int bgshift, int numbps)
{
int i;
int j;
int thresh;
jpc_fix_t val;
jpc_fix_t mag;
bool warn;
uint_fast32_t mask;
if (roishift == 0 && bgshift == 0) {
return;
}
thresh = 1 << roishift;
warn = false;
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(x); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(x); ++j) {
val = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
mag = JAS_ABS(val);
if (mag >= thresh) {
/* We are dealing with ROI data. */
mag >>= roishift;
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
} else {
/* We are dealing with non-ROI (i.e., background) data. */
mag <<= bgshift;
mask = (1 << numbps) - 1;
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the sample value. */
/* Some implementations write garbage in the unused
most-significant bit planes introduced by ROI shifting.
Here we ensure that any such bits are masked off. */
if (mag & (~mask)) {
if (!warn) {
jas_eprintf("warning: possibly corrupt code stream\n");
warn = true;
}
mag &= mask;
}
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jpc_tsfb_synthesize function in jpc_tsfb.c in JasPer before 1.900.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via vectors involving an empty sequence.
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer). | Low | 168,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int jpg_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[JPG_MAGICLEN];
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= JPG_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, JPG_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < JPG_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
/* Does this look like JPEG? */
if (buf[0] != (JPG_MAGIC >> 8) || buf[1] != (JPG_MAGIC & 0xff)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. | Medium | 168,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: media::mojom::VideoFrameDataPtr MakeVideoFrameData(
const scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame>& input) {
if (input->metadata()->IsTrue(media::VideoFrameMetadata::END_OF_STREAM)) {
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewEosData(
media::mojom::EosVideoFrameData::New());
}
if (input->storage_type() == media::VideoFrame::STORAGE_MOJO_SHARED_BUFFER) {
media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame* mojo_frame =
static_cast<media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame*>(input.get());
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle dup = mojo_frame->Handle().Clone(
mojo::SharedBufferHandle::AccessMode::READ_ONLY);
DCHECK(dup.is_valid());
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewSharedBufferData(
media::mojom::SharedBufferVideoFrameData::New(
std::move(dup), mojo_frame->MappedSize(),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane)));
}
if (input->HasTextures()) {
std::vector<gpu::MailboxHolder> mailbox_holder(
media::VideoFrame::kMaxPlanes);
size_t num_planes = media::VideoFrame::NumPlanes(input->format());
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; i++)
mailbox_holder[i] = input->mailbox_holder(i);
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewMailboxData(
media::mojom::MailboxVideoFrameData::New(std::move(mailbox_holder)));
}
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported VideoFrame conversion";
return nullptr;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 172,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProperty(Image *image,
const char *property,const char *value,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->properties == (void *) NULL)
image->properties=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,
RelinquishMagickMemory,RelinquishMagickMemory); /* create splay-tree */
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(DeleteImageProperty(image,property)); /* delete if NULL */
status=MagickTrue;
if (strlen(property) <= 1)
{
/*
Do not 'set' single letter properties - read only shorthand.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* FUTURE: binary chars or quotes in key should produce a error */
/* Set attributes with known names or special prefixes
return result is found, or break to set a free form properity
*/
switch (*property)
{
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case '8':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("8bim:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
#endif
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare("background",property) == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image->background_color,exception);
/* check for FUTURE: value exception?? */
/* also add user input to splay tree */
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channels",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("colorspace",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (colorspace < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
return(SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) colorspace,exception));
}
if (LocaleCompare("compose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compose;
compose=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (compose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compose=(CompositeOperator) compose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("compress",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (compression < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("delay",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & GreaterValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay > (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
else
if ((flags & LessValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay < (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(ssize_t)
floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
else
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("delay_units",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("density",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("depth",property) == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("dispose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (dispose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("exif:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("fx:",property,3) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare("gamma",property) == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("gravity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
gravity;
gravity=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (gravity < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->gravity=(GravityType) gravity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("height",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("intensity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (intensity < 0)
return(MagickFalse);
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
interpolate;
interpolate=ParseCommandOption(MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (interpolate < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->interpolate=(PixelInterpolateMethod) interpolate;
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("iptc:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'K':
case 'k':
if (LocaleCompare("kurtosis",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'L':
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("loop",property) == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
if ((LocaleCompare("magick",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("max",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("mean",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'O':
case 'o':
if (LocaleCompare("opaque",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("page",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("pixel:",property,6) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
if (LocaleCompare("profile",property) == 0)
{
ImageInfo
*image_info;
StringInfo
*profile;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,value,MagickPathExtent);
(void) SetImageInfo(image_info,1,exception);
profile=FileToStringInfo(image_info->filename,~0UL,exception);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
status=SetImageProfile(image,image_info->magick,profile,exception);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("rendering-intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'S':
case 's':
if ((LocaleCompare("size",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("skewness",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("scenes",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("standard-deviation",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare("tile-offset",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare("units",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (units < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'V':
case 'v':
{
if (LocaleCompare("version",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("width",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("xmp:",property,4) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
}
/* Default: not an attribute, add as a property */
status=AddValueToSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->properties,
ConstantString(property),ConstantString(value));
/* FUTURE: error if status is bad? */
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: coders/tiff.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.3.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298 | Medium | 168,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int lz4_uncompress(const char *source, char *dest, int osize)
{
const BYTE *ip = (const BYTE *) source;
const BYTE *ref;
BYTE *op = (BYTE *) dest;
BYTE * const oend = op + osize;
BYTE *cpy;
unsigned token;
size_t length;
size_t dec32table[] = {0, 3, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0};
#if LZ4_ARCH64
size_t dec64table[] = {0, 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3};
#endif
while (1) {
/* get runlength */
token = *ip++;
length = (token >> ML_BITS);
if (length == RUN_MASK) {
size_t len;
len = *ip++;
for (; len == 255; length += 255)
len = *ip++;
length += len;
}
/* copy literals */
cpy = op + length;
if (unlikely(cpy > oend - COPYLENGTH)) {
/*
* Error: not enough place for another match
* (min 4) + 5 literals
*/
if (cpy != oend)
goto _output_error;
memcpy(op, ip, length);
ip += length;
break; /* EOF */
}
LZ4_WILDCOPY(ip, op, cpy);
ip -= (op - cpy);
op = cpy;
/* get offset */
LZ4_READ_LITTLEENDIAN_16(ref, cpy, ip);
ip += 2;
/* Error: offset create reference outside destination buffer */
if (unlikely(ref < (BYTE *const) dest))
goto _output_error;
/* get matchlength */
length = token & ML_MASK;
if (length == ML_MASK) {
for (; *ip == 255; length += 255)
ip++;
length += *ip++;
}
/* copy repeated sequence */
if (unlikely((op - ref) < STEPSIZE)) {
#if LZ4_ARCH64
size_t dec64 = dec64table[op - ref];
#else
const int dec64 = 0;
#endif
op[0] = ref[0];
op[1] = ref[1];
op[2] = ref[2];
op[3] = ref[3];
op += 4;
ref += 4;
ref -= dec32table[op-ref];
PUT4(ref, op);
op += STEPSIZE - 4;
ref -= dec64;
} else {
LZ4_COPYSTEP(ref, op);
}
cpy = op + length - (STEPSIZE - 4);
if (cpy > (oend - COPYLENGTH)) {
/* Error: request to write beyond destination buffer */
if (cpy > oend)
goto _output_error;
LZ4_SECURECOPY(ref, op, (oend - COPYLENGTH));
while (op < cpy)
*op++ = *ref++;
op = cpy;
/*
* Check EOF (should never happen, since last 5 bytes
* are supposed to be literals)
*/
if (op == oend)
goto _output_error;
continue;
}
LZ4_SECURECOPY(ref, op, cpy);
op = cpy; /* correction */
}
/* end of decoding */
return (int) (((char *)ip) - source);
/* write overflow error detected */
_output_error:
return (int) (-(((char *)ip) - source));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Integer overflow in the LZ4 algorithm implementation, as used in Yann Collet LZ4 before r118 and in the lz4_uncompress function in lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2, on 32-bit platforms might allow context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted Literal Run that would be improperly handled by programs not complying with an API limitation, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-4715.
Commit Message: lz4: ensure length does not wrap
Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Low | 166,301 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_random_pseudo_bytes)
{
long buffer_length;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
zval *zstrong_result_returned = NULL;
int strong_result = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &buffer_length, &zstrong_result_returned) == FAILURE) {
return;
return;
}
if (buffer_length <= 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
zval_dtor(zstrong_result_returned);
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
buffer = emalloc(buffer_length + 1);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
strong_result = 1;
/* random/urandom equivalent on Windows */
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (php_win32_get_random_bytes(buffer, (size_t) buffer_length) == FAILURE) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#else
if ((strong_result = RAND_pseudo_bytes(buffer, buffer_length)) < 0) {
efree(buffer);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, 0);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)buffer, buffer_length, 0);
if (zstrong_result_returned) {
ZVAL_BOOL(zstrong_result_returned, strong_result);
}
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The openssl_random_pseudo_bytes function in ext/openssl/openssl.c in PHP before 5.4.44, 5.5.x before 5.5.28, and 5.6.x before 5.6.12 incorrectly relies on the deprecated RAND_pseudo_bytes function, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Low | 165,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateOverflowControlsClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (!NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate())
return;
if (NeedsOverflowControlsClip()) {
properties_->UpdateOverflowControlsClip(
context_.current.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{
context_.current.transform,
ToClipRect(LayoutRect(context_.current.paint_offset,
ToLayoutBox(object_).Size()))});
} else {
properties_->ClearOverflowControlsClip();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | Low | 171,801 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
extent,
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*extent*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*extent*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The generic decoder in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds access) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126 | Medium | 168,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::RunTests(const std::string& filter) {
RUN_TEST(Basics, filter);
RUN_TEST(RunWithoutQuit, filter);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529} | Medium | 172,125 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void rd_release_device_space(struct rd_dev *rd_dev)
{
u32 i, j, page_count = 0, sg_per_table;
struct rd_dev_sg_table *sg_table;
struct page *pg;
struct scatterlist *sg;
if (!rd_dev->sg_table_array || !rd_dev->sg_table_count)
return;
sg_table = rd_dev->sg_table_array;
for (i = 0; i < rd_dev->sg_table_count; i++) {
sg = sg_table[i].sg_table;
sg_per_table = sg_table[i].rd_sg_count;
for (j = 0; j < sg_per_table; j++) {
pg = sg_page(&sg[j]);
if (pg) {
__free_page(pg);
page_count++;
}
}
kfree(sg);
}
pr_debug("CORE_RD[%u] - Released device space for Ramdisk"
" Device ID: %u, pages %u in %u tables total bytes %lu\n",
rd_dev->rd_host->rd_host_id, rd_dev->rd_dev_id, page_count,
rd_dev->sg_table_count, (unsigned long)page_count * PAGE_SIZE);
kfree(sg_table);
rd_dev->sg_table_array = NULL;
rd_dev->sg_table_count = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The rd_build_device_space function in drivers/target/target_core_rd.c in the Linux kernel before 3.14 does not properly initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from ramdisk_mcp memory by leveraging access to a SCSI initiator.
Commit Message: target/rd: Refactor rd_build_device_space + rd_release_device_space
This patch refactors rd_build_device_space() + rd_release_device_space()
into rd_allocate_sgl_table() + rd_release_device_space() so that they
may be used seperatly for setup + release of protection information
scatterlists.
Also add explicit memset of pages within rd_allocate_sgl_table() based
upon passed 'init_payload' value.
v2 changes:
- Drop unused sg_table from rd_release_device_space (Wei)
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
char* name = argv[0];
bool applyColorCorrection = false;
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
if (argc >= 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--color-correct") == 0)
applyColorCorrection = (--argc, ++argv, true);
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [--color-correct] file [iterations] [packetSize]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
#else
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s file [iterations] [packetSize]\n", name);
exit(1);
}
#endif
size_t iterations = 1;
if (argc >= 3) {
char* end = 0;
iterations = strtol(argv[2], &end, 10);
if (*end != '\0' || !iterations) {
fprintf(stderr, "Second argument should be number of iterations. "
"The default is 1. You supplied %s\n", argv[2]);
exit(1);
}
}
size_t packetSize = 0;
if (argc >= 4) {
char* end = 0;
packetSize = strtol(argv[3], &end, 10);
if (*end != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Third argument should be packet size. Default is "
"0, meaning to decode the entire image in one packet. You "
"supplied %s\n", argv[3]);
exit(1);
}
}
class WebPlatform : public blink::Platform {
public:
const unsigned char* getTraceCategoryEnabledFlag(const char*) override
{
return reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("nope-none-nada");
}
void cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char*, size_t) override
{
}
void screenColorProfile(WebVector<char>* profile) override
{
getScreenColorProfile(profile); // Returns a whacked color profile.
}
};
blink::initializeWithoutV8(new WebPlatform());
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
ImageDecoder::qcmsOutputDeviceProfile(); // Initialize screen colorProfile.
#endif
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> data = readFile(argv[1]);
if (!data.get() || !data->size()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error reading image data from [%s]\n", argv[1]);
exit(2);
}
data->data();
double totalTime = 0.0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
double startTime = getCurrentTime();
bool decoded = decodeImageData(data.get(), applyColorCorrection, packetSize);
double elapsedTime = getCurrentTime() - startTime;
totalTime += elapsedTime;
if (!decoded) {
fprintf(stderr, "Image decode failed [%s]\n", argv[1]);
exit(3);
}
}
double averageTime = totalTime / static_cast<double>(iterations);
printf("%f %f\n", totalTime, averageTime);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 48.0.2564.82, does not ensure that a proper cryptographicallyRandomValues random number generator is used, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229} | Medium | 172,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: char* engrave_tombstone(pid_t pid, pid_t tid, int signal, int original_si_code,
uintptr_t abort_msg_address, bool dump_sibling_threads,
bool* detach_failed, int* total_sleep_time_usec) {
log_t log;
log.current_tid = tid;
log.crashed_tid = tid;
if ((mkdir(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0755) == -1) && (errno != EEXIST)) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to create %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
if (chown(TOMBSTONE_DIR, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM) == -1) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to change ownership of %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
int fd = -1;
char* path = NULL;
if (selinux_android_restorecon(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0) == 0) {
path = find_and_open_tombstone(&fd);
} else {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Failed to restore security context, not writing tombstone.\n");
}
if (fd < 0) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Skipping tombstone write, nothing to do.\n");
*detach_failed = false;
return NULL;
}
log.tfd = fd;
int amfd = activity_manager_connect();
log.amfd = amfd;
*detach_failed = dump_crash(&log, pid, tid, signal, original_si_code, abort_msg_address,
dump_sibling_threads, total_sleep_time_usec);
ALOGI("\nTombstone written to: %s\n", path);
close(amfd);
close(fd);
return path;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: rootdir/init.rc in Android 4.x before 4.4.4 does not ensure that the /data/tombstones directory exists for the Debuggerd component, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 26403620.
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
| Medium | 173,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cmd, unsigned long arg,
struct fb_info *info,
int type, int fb_depth, unsigned long fb_size)
{
switch(cmd) {
case FBIOGTYPE: {
struct fbtype __user *f = (struct fbtype __user *) arg;
if (put_user(type, &f->fb_type) ||
__put_user(info->var.yres, &f->fb_height) ||
__put_user(info->var.xres, &f->fb_width) ||
__put_user(fb_depth, &f->fb_depth) ||
__put_user(0, &f->fb_cmsize) ||
__put_user(fb_size, &f->fb_cmsize))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC: {
struct fbcmap __user *c = (struct fbcmap __user *) arg;
struct fb_cmap cmap;
u16 red, green, blue;
u8 red8, green8, blue8;
unsigned char __user *ured;
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
int index, count, i;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
cmap.len = 1;
cmap.red = &red;
cmap.green = &green;
cmap.blue = &blue;
cmap.transp = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int err;
if (get_user(red8, &ured[i]) ||
get_user(green8, &ugreen[i]) ||
get_user(blue8, &ublue[i]))
return -EFAULT;
red = red8 << 8;
green = green8 << 8;
blue = blue8 << 8;
cmap.start = index + i;
err = fb_set_cmap(&cmap, info);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC: {
struct fbcmap __user *c = (struct fbcmap __user *) arg;
unsigned char __user *ured;
unsigned char __user *ugreen;
unsigned char __user *ublue;
struct fb_cmap *cmap = &info->cmap;
int index, count, i;
u8 red, green, blue;
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
if (index + count > cmap->len)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
if (put_user(red, &ured[i]) ||
put_user(green, &ugreen[i]) ||
put_user(blue, &ublue[i]))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In the function sbusfb_ioctl_helper() in drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c in the Linux kernel through 4.15, an integer signedness error allows arbitrary information leakage for the FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC and FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC commands.
Commit Message: fbdev: Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in
sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
'index' is defined as an int in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
We retrieve this from the user:
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
and then we use 'index' in the following way:
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
This is a classic information leak vulnerability. 'index' should be
an unsigned int, given its usage above.
This patch is straight-forward; it changes 'index' to unsigned int
in two switch-cases: FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC && FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC.
This patch fixes CVE-2018-6412.
Signed-off-by: Peter Malone <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathieu Malaterre <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <[email protected]> | Low | 169,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: GURL SanitizeFrontendURL(const GURL& url,
const std::string& scheme,
const std::string& host,
const std::string& path,
bool allow_query_and_fragment) {
std::vector<std::string> query_parts;
std::string fragment;
if (allow_query_and_fragment) {
for (net::QueryIterator it(url); !it.IsAtEnd(); it.Advance()) {
std::string value = SanitizeFrontendQueryParam(it.GetKey(),
it.GetValue());
if (!value.empty()) {
query_parts.push_back(
base::StringPrintf("%s=%s", it.GetKey().c_str(), value.c_str()));
}
}
if (url.has_ref())
fragment = '#' + url.ref();
}
std::string query =
query_parts.empty() ? "" : "?" + base::JoinString(query_parts, "&");
std::string constructed =
base::StringPrintf("%s://%s%s%s%s", scheme.c_str(), host.c_str(),
path.c_str(), query.c_str(), fragment.c_str());
GURL result = GURL(constructed);
if (!result.is_valid())
return GURL();
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient data validation in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak user cross-origin data via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Improve sanitization of remoteFrontendUrl in DevTools
This change ensures that the decoded remoteFrontendUrl parameter cannot
contain any single quote in its value. As of this commit, none of the
permitted query params in SanitizeFrontendQueryParam can contain single
quotes.
Note that the existing SanitizeEndpoint function does not explicitly
check for single quotes. This is fine since single quotes in the query
string are already URL-encoded and the values validated by
SanitizeEndpoint are not url-decoded elsewhere.
BUG=798163
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/798163#c1
TEST=./unit_tests --gtest_filter=DevToolsUIBindingsTest.SanitizeFrontendURL
Change-Id: I5a08e8ce6f1abc2c8d2a0983fef63e1e194cd242
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/846979
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#527250} | Medium | 172,689 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: VideoTrack::VideoTrack(
Segment* pSegment,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
Track(pSegment, element_start, element_size)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 174,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::AddNewContents(
WebContents* source,
WebContents* new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
DCHECK_NE(disposition, SAVE_TO_DISK);
DCHECK_NE(disposition, CURRENT_TAB);
TabHelpers::AttachTabHelpers(new_contents);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = GetJavaDelegate(env);
AddWebContentsResult add_result =
ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_STOP_LOAD_AND_DELETE;
if (!obj.is_null()) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jsource;
if (source)
jsource = source->GetJavaWebContents();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jnew_contents;
if (new_contents)
jnew_contents = new_contents->GetJavaWebContents();
add_result = static_cast<AddWebContentsResult>(
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_addNewContents(
env,
obj.obj(),
jsource.obj(),
jnew_contents.obj(),
static_cast<jint>(disposition),
NULL,
user_gesture));
}
if (was_blocked)
*was_blocked = !(add_result == ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_PROCEED);
if (add_result == ADD_WEB_CONTENTS_RESULT_STOP_LOAD_AND_DELETE)
delete new_contents;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the editing implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.63, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via JavaScript code that triggers removal of a node during processing of the DOM tree, related to CompositeEditCommand.cpp and ReplaceSelectionCommand.cpp.
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469} | Medium | 171,137 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: parse_cosine_hex_dump(FILE_T fh, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, int pkt_len,
Buffer* buf, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
guint8 *pd;
gchar line[COSINE_LINE_LENGTH];
int i, hex_lines, n, caplen = 0;
/* Make sure we have enough room for the packet */
ws_buffer_assure_space(buf, COSINE_MAX_PACKET_LEN);
pd = ws_buffer_start_ptr(buf);
/* Calculate the number of hex dump lines, each
* containing 16 bytes of data */
hex_lines = pkt_len / 16 + ((pkt_len % 16) ? 1 : 0);
for (i = 0; i < hex_lines; i++) {
if (file_gets(line, COSINE_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
if (empty_line(line)) {
break;
}
if ((n = parse_single_hex_dump_line(line, pd, i*16)) == -1) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("cosine: hex dump line doesn't have 16 numbers");
return FALSE;
}
caplen += n;
}
phdr->caplen = caplen;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: wiretap/cosine.c in the CoSine file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12395
Change-Id: Ia70f33b71ff28451190fcf144c333fd1362646b2
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15172
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(iocb);
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
int copied = 0;
int check_creds = 0;
int target;
int err = 0;
long timeo;
int skip;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags&MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
/* Lock the socket to prevent queue disordering
* while sleeps in memcpy_tomsg
*/
if (!siocb->scm) {
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
}
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
if (err) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
do {
int chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb, *last;
unix_state_lock(sk);
last = skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
again:
if (skb == NULL) {
unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level = 0;
if (copied >= target)
goto unlock;
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
goto unlock;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto unlock;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo, last);
if (signal_pending(current)
|| mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
continue;
unlock:
unix_state_unlock(sk);
break;
}
skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags);
while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) {
skip -= unix_skb_len(skb);
last = skb;
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (!skb)
goto again;
}
unix_state_unlock(sk);
if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */
if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != siocb->scm->pid) ||
!uid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).uid, siocb->scm->creds.uid) ||
!gid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).gid, siocb->scm->creds.gid))
break;
} else if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
/* Copy credentials */
scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid);
check_creds = 1;
}
/* Copy address just once */
if (sunaddr) {
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
sunaddr = NULL;
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, unix_skb_len(skb) - skip, size);
if (skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, UNIXCB(skb).consumed + skip,
msg->msg_iov, chunk)) {
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
UNIXCB(skb).consumed += chunk;
sk_peek_offset_bwd(sk, chunk);
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
if (unix_skb_len(skb))
break;
skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
consume_skb(skb);
if (siocb->scm->fp)
break;
} else {
/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
*/
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
siocb->scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
break;
}
} while (size);
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
scm_recv(sock, msg, siocb->scm, flags);
out:
return copied ? : err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 166,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
u16 *buflen,
struct cifs_ses *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc;
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
*buflen = 0;
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
}
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC;
if (ses->server->sign) {
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (!ses->server->session_estab ||
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
}
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
} else {
/*
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
*/
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
}
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
} else {
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
}
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The Linux kernel before version 4.11 is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference in fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c:setup_ntlmv2_rsp() that allows an attacker controlling a CIFS server to kernel panic a client that has this server mounted, because an empty TargetInfo field in an NTLMSSP setup negotiation response is mishandled during session recovery.
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateTransform() {
if (object_.IsSVGChild()) {
UpdateTransformForNonRootSVG();
return;
}
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
if (NeedsTransform(object_)) {
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State state;
if (object_.IsBox()) {
auto& box = ToLayoutBox(object_);
state.origin = TransformOrigin(box);
style.ApplyTransform(
state.matrix, box.Size(), ComputedStyle::kExcludeTransformOrigin,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeMotionPath,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeIndependentTransformProperties);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.rendering_context_id = context_.current.rendering_context_id;
if (style.Preserves3D() && !state.rendering_context_id) {
state.rendering_context_id =
PtrHash<const LayoutObject>::GetHash(&object_);
}
state.direct_compositing_reasons =
CompositingReasonsForTransform(box);
}
}
state.flattens_inherited_transform =
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.backface_visibility =
object_.HasHiddenBackface()
? TransformPaintPropertyNode::BackfaceVisibility::kHidden
: TransformPaintPropertyNode::BackfaceVisibility::kVisible;
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(), CompositorElementIdNamespace::kPrimary);
}
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateTransform(context_.current.transform,
std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearTransform());
}
}
if (properties_->Transform()) {
context_.current.transform = properties_->Transform();
if (object_.StyleRef().Preserves3D()) {
context_.current.rendering_context_id =
properties_->Transform()->RenderingContextId();
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = false;
} else {
context_.current.rendering_context_id = 0;
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = true;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | Low | 171,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int iwgif_read_image(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int retval=0;
struct lzwdeccontext d;
size_t subblocksize;
int has_local_ct;
int local_ct_size;
unsigned int root_codesize;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,9)) goto done;
rctx->image_left = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[0]);
rctx->image_top = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[2]);
rctx->image_width = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[4]);
rctx->image_height = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[6]);
rctx->interlaced = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>6)&0x01);
has_local_ct = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>7)&0x01);
if(has_local_ct) {
local_ct_size = (int)(rctx->rbuf[8]&0x07);
rctx->colortable.num_entries = 1<<(1+local_ct_size);
}
if(has_local_ct) {
if(!iwgif_read_color_table(rctx,&rctx->colortable)) goto done;
}
if(rctx->has_transparency) {
rctx->colortable.entry[rctx->trans_color_index].a = 0;
}
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
root_codesize = (unsigned int)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(root_codesize<2 || root_codesize>11) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Invalid LZW minimum code size");
goto done;
}
if(!iwgif_init_screen(rctx)) goto done;
rctx->total_npixels = (size_t)rctx->image_width * (size_t)rctx->image_height;
if(!iwgif_make_row_pointers(rctx)) goto done;
lzw_init(&d,root_codesize);
lzw_clear(&d);
while(1) {
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
subblocksize = (size_t)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(subblocksize==0) break;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(!lzw_process_bytes(rctx,&d,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(d.eoi_flag) break;
if(rctx->pixels_set >= rctx->total_npixels) break;
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-369
Summary: The iwgif_read_image function in imagew-gif.c in libimageworsener.a in ImageWorsener 1.3.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15 | Medium | 168,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 data;
void *vapic;
if (test_bit(KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest(vcpu, vcpu->arch.apic);
if (!test_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
return;
vapic = kmap_atomic(vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_page);
data = *(u32 *)(vapic + offset_in_page(vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr));
kunmap_atomic(vapic);
apic_set_tpr(vcpu->arch.apic, data & 0xff);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VAPIC synchronization operation involving a page-end address.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | High | 165,945 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static ssize_t driver_override_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
char *driver_override, *old = pdev->driver_override, *cp;
if (count > PATH_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
driver_override = kstrndup(buf, count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!driver_override)
return -ENOMEM;
cp = strchr(driver_override, '\n');
if (cp)
*cp = '\0';
if (strlen(driver_override)) {
pdev->driver_override = driver_override;
} else {
kfree(driver_override);
pdev->driver_override = NULL;
}
kfree(old);
return count;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The driver_override implementation in drivers/base/platform.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.1 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging a race condition between a read operation and a store operation that involve different overrides.
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,992 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::ShowingInterstitialPage() const {
return GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page() != NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117} | Medium | 172,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup(struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = sta->sdata;
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct sk_buff_head pending;
int filtered = 0, buffered = 0, ac;
unsigned long flags;
clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_SP);
BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_TO_LONGS(IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS) > 1);
sta->driver_buffered_tids = 0;
if (!(local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_AP_LINK_PS))
drv_sta_notify(local, sdata, STA_NOTIFY_AWAKE, &sta->sta);
skb_queue_head_init(&pending);
/* Send all buffered frames to the station */
for (ac = 0; ac < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; ac++) {
int count = skb_queue_len(&pending), tmp;
spin_lock_irqsave(&sta->tx_filtered[ac].lock, flags);
skb_queue_splice_tail_init(&sta->tx_filtered[ac], &pending);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sta->tx_filtered[ac].lock, flags);
tmp = skb_queue_len(&pending);
filtered += tmp - count;
count = tmp;
spin_lock_irqsave(&sta->ps_tx_buf[ac].lock, flags);
skb_queue_splice_tail_init(&sta->ps_tx_buf[ac], &pending);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sta->ps_tx_buf[ac].lock, flags);
tmp = skb_queue_len(&pending);
buffered += tmp - count;
}
ieee80211_add_pending_skbs_fn(local, &pending, clear_sta_ps_flags, sta);
/* This station just woke up and isn't aware of our SMPS state */
if (!ieee80211_smps_is_restrictive(sta->known_smps_mode,
sdata->smps_mode) &&
sta->known_smps_mode != sdata->bss->req_smps &&
sta_info_tx_streams(sta) != 1) {
ht_dbg(sdata,
"%pM just woke up and MIMO capable - update SMPS\n",
sta->sta.addr);
ieee80211_send_smps_action(sdata, sdata->bss->req_smps,
sta->sta.addr,
sdata->vif.bss_conf.bssid);
}
local->total_ps_buffered -= buffered;
sta_info_recalc_tim(sta);
ps_dbg(sdata,
"STA %pM aid %d sending %d filtered/%d PS frames since STA not sleeping anymore\n",
sta->sta.addr, sta->sta.aid, filtered, buffered);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the mac80211 subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.13.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via network traffic that improperly interacts with the WLAN_STA_PS_STA state (aka power-save mode), related to sta_info.c and tx.c.
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,391 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline int mount_entry_on_generic(struct mntent *mntent,
const char* path)
{
unsigned long mntflags;
char *mntdata;
int ret;
bool optional = hasmntopt(mntent, "optional") != NULL;
ret = mount_entry_create_dir_file(mntent, path);
if (ret < 0)
return optional ? 0 : -1;
cull_mntent_opt(mntent);
if (parse_mntopts(mntent->mnt_opts, &mntflags, &mntdata) < 0) {
free(mntdata);
return -1;
}
ret = mount_entry(mntent->mnt_fsname, path, mntent->mnt_type,
mntflags, mntdata, optional);
free(mntdata);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: lxc-start in lxc before 1.0.8 and 1.1.x before 1.1.4 allows local container administrators to escape AppArmor confinement via a symlink attack on a (1) mount target or (2) bind mount source.
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | Low | 166,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
std::string input_method_id_to_switch = input_method_id;
if (!InputMethodIsActivated(input_method_id)) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
DCHECK(!input_methods->empty());
if (!input_methods->empty()) {
input_method_id_to_switch = input_methods->at(0).id;
LOG(INFO) << "Can't change the current input method to "
<< input_method_id << " since the engine is not preloaded. "
<< "Switch to " << input_method_id_to_switch << " instead.";
}
}
if (chromeos::ChangeInputMethod(input_method_status_connection_,
input_method_id_to_switch.c_str())) {
return true;
}
LOG(ERROR) << "Can't switch input method to " << input_method_id_to_switch;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 170,481 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void close_uinput (void)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
if (uinput_fd > 0) {
ioctl(uinput_fd, UI_DEV_DESTROY);
close(uinput_fd);
uinput_fd = -1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,450 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q,
const struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int j;
int nr_pages = 0;
struct page **pages;
struct bio *bio;
int cur_page = 0;
int ret, offset;
struct iov_iter i;
struct iovec iov;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* Overflow, abort
*/
if (end < start)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
nr_pages += end - start;
/*
* buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now
*/
if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!nr_pages)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages);
if (!bio)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask);
if (!pages)
goto out;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
const int local_nr_pages = end - start;
const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages;
ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages,
(iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE,
&pages[cur_page]);
if (ret < local_nr_pages) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unmap;
}
offset = offset_in_page(uaddr);
for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) {
unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
if (len <= 0)
break;
if (bytes > len)
bytes = len;
/*
* sorry...
*/
if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) <
bytes)
break;
len -= bytes;
offset = 0;
}
cur_page = j;
/*
* release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any
*/
while (j < page_limit)
put_page(pages[j++]);
}
kfree(pages);
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED);
/*
* subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio,
* it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run.
* however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra
* reference to it
*/
bio_get(bio);
return bio;
out_unmap:
for (j = 0; j < nr_pages; j++) {
if (!pages[j])
break;
put_page(pages[j]);
}
out:
kfree(pages);
bio_put(bio);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: The bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user functions in block/bio.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 do unbalanced refcounting when a SCSI I/O vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page. The bio_add_pc_page function merges them into one, but the page reference is never dropped. This causes a memory leak and possible system lockup (exploitable against the host OS by a guest OS user, if a SCSI disk is passed through to a virtual machine) due to an out-of-memory condition.
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Low | 167,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void _php_mb_regex_set_options(OnigOptionType options, OnigSyntaxType *syntax, OnigOptionType *prev_options, OnigSyntaxType **prev_syntax TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (prev_options != NULL) {
*prev_options = MBREX(regex_default_options);
}
if (prev_syntax != NULL) {
*prev_syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
}
MBREX(regex_default_options) = options;
MBREX(regex_default_syntax) = syntax;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free | Low | 167,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: dump_keywords(vector_t *keydump, int level, FILE *fp)
{
unsigned int i;
keyword_t *keyword_vec;
char file_name[21];
if (!level) {
snprintf(file_name, sizeof(file_name), "/tmp/keywords.%d", getpid());
fp = fopen(file_name, "w");
if (!fp)
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < vector_size(keydump); i++) {
keyword_vec = vector_slot(keydump, i);
fprintf(fp, "%*sKeyword : %s (%s)\n", level * 2, "", keyword_vec->string, keyword_vec->active ? "active": "disabled");
if (keyword_vec->sub)
dump_keywords(keyword_vec->sub, level + 1, fp);
}
if (!level)
fclose(fp);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,997 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
size_t size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer");
base::SharedMemory shared_memory(transfer_buffer, false);
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the IPC layer in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 171,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int orinoco_ioctl_set_auth(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu, char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
hermes_t *hw = &priv->hw;
struct iw_param *param = &wrqu->param;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EINPROGRESS;
if (orinoco_lock(priv, &flags) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
switch (param->flags & IW_AUTH_INDEX) {
case IW_AUTH_WPA_VERSION:
case IW_AUTH_CIPHER_PAIRWISE:
case IW_AUTH_CIPHER_GROUP:
case IW_AUTH_RX_UNENCRYPTED_EAPOL:
case IW_AUTH_PRIVACY_INVOKED:
case IW_AUTH_DROP_UNENCRYPTED:
/*
* orinoco does not use these parameters
*/
break;
case IW_AUTH_KEY_MGMT:
/* wl_lkm implies value 2 == PSK for Hermes I
* which ties in with WEXT
* no other hints tho :(
*/
priv->key_mgmt = param->value;
break;
case IW_AUTH_TKIP_COUNTERMEASURES:
/* When countermeasures are enabled, shut down the
* card; when disabled, re-enable the card. This must
* take effect immediately.
*
* TODO: Make sure that the EAPOL message is getting
* out before card disabled
*/
if (param->value) {
priv->tkip_cm_active = 1;
ret = hermes_enable_port(hw, 0);
} else {
priv->tkip_cm_active = 0;
ret = hermes_disable_port(hw, 0);
}
break;
case IW_AUTH_80211_AUTH_ALG:
if (param->value & IW_AUTH_ALG_SHARED_KEY)
priv->wep_restrict = 1;
else if (param->value & IW_AUTH_ALG_OPEN_SYSTEM)
priv->wep_restrict = 0;
else
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
case IW_AUTH_WPA_ENABLED:
if (priv->has_wpa) {
priv->wpa_enabled = param->value ? 1 : 0;
} else {
if (param->value)
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* else silently accept disable of WPA */
priv->wpa_enabled = 0;
}
break;
default:
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
orinoco_unlock(priv, &flags);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The orinoco_ioctl_set_auth function in drivers/net/wireless/orinoco/wext.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 does not properly implement a TKIP protection mechanism, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access to a Wi-Fi network by reading Wi-Fi frames.
Commit Message: orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <[email protected]>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> | Low | 165,907 |
Subsets and Splits